Aristotle Bos Soul

Aristotle on Soul and Soul-'Parts' in Semen ("GA" 2.
1, 735a4-22)
Author(s): Abraham P. Bos
Source: Mnemosyne, Fourth Series, Vol. 62, Fasc. 3 (2009), pp. 378-400
Published by: Brill
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MNEMOSYNE
A Journal
' /6.*-" Of
Classical St
BRILL Mnemos
Aristotle on
(GL4 2.1,7
Abraham P.
Vrije Universiteit,
DeBoelelaan 1105, 1
apbos@xs4all. n
Received: January
Abstract
Aristotle, Generation of Animals 2.1, 735a4-22 speaks about semen and soul. The
passage speaks about 'the soul' and 'the parts'. Against all current interpretations it
is argued that Aristotle means 'the soul in its entirety' and 'the parts of the soul\ It
is proposed that the Greek text edited by Drossaart Lulofs in 735a22 be corrected
by accepting the reading of ms Z.
Keywords
Aristotle, Generation of Animals, soul-theory, biology, procreation
1. Introduction
Generation of Animals 2.1, 735a4-22 raises the question whether semen

possesses soul. We could call it a study in 'semen-tics. The passage talks
about 'the soul' and 'the parts'.^ Modern critics are clear on the meaning
]) Arist. GA 2.1, 735a4-22: ??xepov ?' ?%ei xypyriv xo Grcepua r\ oi5; ? auxo? taSyo? Kai
TCEpi xcov uop?cov oiSie y?p yx>%r\ ?v akXcp ov?euia eGxai nXr\v ?v eice?vco o\) y' ?ax?v, oike
in?piov ?Gxai |xr| uex?xov aM,' r\ ?ux?v?ugoc coG7cep xeOvecoxo?, ?(p0a?uo?. ?fjôv ovv oxi
Kai E%ei Kai eoxi ouvauei. ?yyux?pG) ?? Kai rcoppc?x?pG) a?x? a-oxou ?v?eêxai eivai
?uvauei, coG7tep ? mOeu?cov yecou?xpri?, xox> ?ypnyopoxo?. Ttoppcoxepco Kai ouxoc xo?
Gecopowcoc. xauxnc, u?v o?v o?G?v uopiov a?xiov xfj? yeveGeco?, ?Xk? xo rcpcoxov KivfJGav
Eô?Gev. o\)6?v y?p a?xo ?auxo yevva- ?xav ?? y?vnxai aiS?ei fj?n a?xo ?awo. ?iorcep
np xov xi yiyvexai Kai ov% aua rc?vxa, xotJxo ?? yiyveGOai ?vayicn rcpcoxov o au^riGeco?.
? Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2009 DOI: 10.1163/156852509X339879
A.P Bos /Mnemosyne 62 (2009) 378-400 379
of the passage, which they translate and explain along the same lines.
According to this interpretation, the passage talks about 'the soul' and 'the
parts of the body . But the same text admits of an entirely different explana
tion. In this alternative interpretation Aristotle talks about 'the soul in its
entirety' and 'the parts of the soul \ Below I reproduce the translation by
Peck (1942, 155-7). A number of arguments are then offered which seem
to support this explanation. But next I want to see which elements in
Aristotle's oeuvre could point in a different direction. Finally, I propose an
alternative translation.
Translation by Peck:
As for the question whether the semen possesses Soul or not, the same argument
holds as for the parts of the body viz., (a) no Soul will be present elsewhere
than in that of which it is the Soul; (b) no part of the body will be such in
more than name unless it has some Soul in it {e.g., the eye of a dead person).
Hence it is clear both that semen possesses Soul, and that it is Soul, potentially.
And there are varying degrees in which it may be potentially that which it is
capable of being?it may be nearer to it or further removed from it (just as a
sleeping geometer is at a further remove than one who is awake, and a waking
one than one who is busy at his studies). So then, the cause of this process of
formation is not any part of the body but the external agent which first set
the movement going?for of course nothing generates itself, though as soon
as it has been formed a thing makes itself grow. That is why one part is formed
first, not all the parts simultaneously. And the part which must of necessity be
formed first is the one which possesses the principle of growth: be they plants
or animals, this, the nutritive, faculty is present in all of them alike (this also
is the faculty of generating another creature like itself, since this is a function
which belongs to every animal and plant that is perfect in its nature). The
reason why this must of necessity be so is that once a thing has been formed,
it must of necessity grow. And though it was generated by another thing bear
ing the same name {e.g., a man is generated by a man), it grows by means of
itself. So then, since it makes itself grow, it is something, (underlinings added)
?p%f|v e%ei- eue y?p (pDx?v 8?X8 ?coov ouoico? xo?xo k?cgiv \)7t?p%ei X? Gp87tXlK?v. X0\)X0 ?'
eaxi xo yevvnxiK?v ?x?poi) oiov a\)xo* xooxo y?p 7tavxo? (p\)Gei xeX,eioi) epyov Kai ?coo\>
Kai (p'?xo'u- ?v?yicn ?? ?i? xo?e oxi ?xav xi y?vnxai a?^?veoOai ?vayicn. ?y?vvr|G8 u?v
xo?v?v xo guvc?vuuov oiov ?vGpcoTio? ?vOpamov, aiêxai ?? ?i' eauxo?). a\)x? ?pa xi ?v
aiSêi. Text Drossaart Lulofs 1965. Underlinings added. In the following I will propose to
read in 735a7: oike uop?cov ?oxai uf| uex?%ov and in 735a22: eaxvv ?pa xi o aiSêi.
380 AP Bos /Mnemosyne 62 (2009) 378-400
2005 saw the publication of an excellent Dutch translation by R. Ferwerda.

The translations of Peck and Ferwerda are in complete agreement. Both
translate the crucial elements as 'parts of the body and no part of the
body. The same goes for the translation by P. Louis (1961, 56), who notes:
'les parties du corps'. D. Lanza (1971, 888-9), Balme,2) and A. Platt3) read
'the parts' but in fact make the same choice. Likewise the interpretation by
C. Lefevre (1972, 58).
2. Arguments in Favour of the Traditional Interpretation
(a) GA 2.1 uses 'the partsFifteen Times to Denote 'the parts of the body
Generation of Animals 2.1 talks constantly about 'parts'. The chapter deals
with the question how a plant or an animal is formed from seed and what
entity is responsible for forming 'the parts'. The heart, lungs, liver, eye are
mentioned as examples of these parts (2.1, 734al7). The word 'part'/'parts'
is used fifteen times in this sense in chapter 1, not including the passage
quoted above.4) So it seems natural, when the passage mentions 'parts' thrice,
to assume that this again refers to 'parts of the body, though the Greek text
does not explicitly indicate what 'parts' are meant.
(b) An 'eye is a Part of the Body, like a face' or 'flesh'
The interpretation of Peck and Ferwerda can also base itself on the fact
that 2.1, 735a7-8 seems to repeat the more extensive passage in 734b24-7,
where Aristotle also applies the principle of homonymy. In 734b25 he says
that after fertilization each one of the parts gets formed and acquires Soul.
It acquires Soul, because 'there is no such thing as face, or flesh either,
2) Balme 1972, 61: And has the seed soul or not? The same reasoning applies to it as to the
parts. For there can be no soul in anything except in that of which it is in fact the soul, nor
can there be a part unless it has some soul', with commentary on p. 157.
3) In Barnes 1984,1 1140-1: 'Has the semen soul, or not? The same argument applies here
as in the question concerning the parts. As no part, if it participate not in soul, will be a part
except homonymously (...) so no soul will exist in anything except that of which it is soul;
it is plain therefore that semen both has soul, and is soul, potentially (with only minor
changes compared with the 1912 Oxford edition).
4) Both u?piov and u?po? occur. Peck (1942, xlvii-xlix) devotes an entry to the word, pay
ing attention only to the meaning 'parts of the body . For 'parts' of soul, cf. lviii.
A.P. Bos ?Mnemosyne 62 (2009) 378-400 381
without Soul in it; and though they are still said to be 'face' and 'flesh' after
they are dead, these terms will be names merely ('homonyms'), just as if
the things were to turn into stone or wooden ones' (transi. Peck).5)
It is clear there that the parts' are ensouled and therefore parts of the
body. This is also the case in Generation of Animals 1.19, 726b22-4, where
Aristotle states: 'For a hand or any part is not a hand or a part if it does not
contain a soul or some other power: they only bear the same name.'6) So it
does not seem far-fetched to see 'the parts' of 735a6 as harking back to
what was just said, in almost the same way, about the parts of the body.
Moreover, 735a8 talks about 'an eye'. This can also be taken as a random
example of a bodily part.
3. What is Aristotle's Point in the Traditional Interpretation?
So did Aristotle try to clarify the question 'Is there soul in semen?' by pos
ing the comparable question: 'Is there soul in a bodily part?'? And did he
solve this problem by saying that a soul is always the soul of a specific living
creature, and that no part of it does not participate in the soul of the entire
creature? And is he pointing out once again that a part of an animal or
human being that does not participate in the soul of this animal or human
being as a whole is not a 'part' of such a living creature, that is to say, not a
real hand or foot or eye? In that case it is only homonymously a foot or an
eye. What argumentative force did Aristotle therefore attribute to the com
parison? After all, semen is semen of the begetter and as such not a part of
the new specimen. Does he mean that, just as all parts of the begetter's
body are ensouled, his semen is ensouled too? But then how are we to
interpret the conclusion in 735a8? Is it a double conclusion on 'the soul'
or is it a two-part conclusion that talks about 'the soul' and 'the parts of the
5) GA 2.1, 734b24-7: ox> yap eaxi rcpooamov \ir\ e%ov \ja)%tV o??? oap?, ??A? (pBap?vxa
?uxov?u?oc Xe%9riGeTai to u?v e?vai rcp?aamov to ?? aap?, orcep kcxv ei ?yvYveTo ?iGiva
il cj?tava. Cf. 2.5, 741al0-3: ??uvaxov ?? Ttp?oamov r\ xe?pa fl o?pica eivai r\ aMo ti
u?piov \ir\ ?vouan? a?G9r|TiKfi? \|n)%f?? r\ ?vEpye?a r\ ?wafiei Kal t^ tct| -q arcAxoc ?oiai y?p
oiov veKpo? ti veicpc?) ji?piov.
6) Louis (1961, 215) refers to this text. Lefevre (1972, 57) notes that Nuyens saw these
texts as evidence of the hylomorphistic character of the conception in GA, inasmuch as they
argue the presence of soul in all parts of the body. Lefevre is sceptical (59) and points to 2.1,
734a 14-6, which says explicitly that soul must always be in a part o? the body.
382 AP Bos /Mnemosyne 62 (2009) 378-400
body'? And how does the addition 'potentially' function? Aristotle's con
ciseness again demands a choice here. Does he mean: 'so it is clear that
(semen) possesses (soul) and potentially is (soul)'?7) Or: 'so it is clear that
(semen) possesses (soul) and is (a bodily part) potentially (participating
in soul)'? The first option is highly problematical. 'To have soul' is quite
different from 'being soul'. According to De anima 2.1, 4l2al9; a27-8,
'the natural body' of the soul can 'potentially' possess life. But it cannot
be 'life'.
So we should in any case consider the second option. But it is unclear
why Aristotle would say of bodily parts that they 'potentially' participate in
soul.8) Had he not said in 734b24-5 that there is 'no face' or 'flesh' of an
embryo that 'does not possess soul'? We should bear in mind, though, that
Aristotle also says in De motu animalium 10 that the soul of a living crea
ture is not present in all parts of the living creature, but only in its central
part, i.e. in the heart (or its analogue). The other parts possess life because
they are connected with it.9)
An interesting text in this connection is Metaphysics Z 16, which asks
what an ousia is. This status is denied to Earth or Water. More eligible
candidates are said to be the 'parts of ensouled entities and the (parts) of
the soul' (1040b 10-1). Because Aristotle clarifies this with a reference to
the phenomenon that both parts of some animals, when bisected, live on,
he seems to be thinking here of millipedes and the like.10) Could it be that
7) Thus Peck and Ferwerda. Lanza 1971, 888: '? perci? chiaro che il seme possiede
un anima e che ? potenzialmente anima and Vinci & Robert 2005, 216. Louis (1961, 56)
goes off on a different tack: 'Il est ?vident que la semence a une ?me et que cette ?me est en
puissance.' Balme (1972, 61) reads here: 'Clearly therefore it does have soul and exists?
potentially'.
8) It is striking that Aristotle here does not use 'to have', 'to possess' (eêiv), but 'to share
in', 'to participate' (uex?%ew). For this, see GA 1.23, 731a32; 2.1, 732all; al2; 732b29;
de An. 2.1, 4l2al5 in contrast to al7; a20; a28.
9) MA 10, 703al4 and a36: coGxe urj??v ?e?v ?v eic?GXcp e?vai \\fvx*\v> ??kX9 ev xivi ?pxT\
x?v Gcbuaxo? oiSon? x?XXa ?fjv u?v xcp 7tpOG7i89\)K?vai, Ttoie?v ?? xo epyov xo a?xcbv ?i?
xriv cp?Giv. Aristotle had already stated in 9, 702b 15 that the principle of motion is to be
situated in the centre of the living creature. This is one of the reasons which led Nuyens and
his followers to talk about 'development' in Aristotle's philosophy, and to assign MA to his
transitional phase but GA and de An. to his late, hylomorphistic phase.
10) Metaph. 6.16, 1040bl4. On the skolopendrai, cf. HA 4.2, 531b28 ff.; PA 4.6, 682b4;
IA 7, 707b2-4 and Bos 2007.
A.P Bos /Mnemosyne 62 (2009) 378-400 383
in our text, too, Aristotle is thinking of the phenomenon that, when some
plants and insects (e.g. some worms) are cut into pieces, their parts live on
and produce a new plant or insect? Aristotle explains this phenomenon by
stating that these plants possess one soul actually, but many souls poten
tially.n) Is perhaps the point of comparison that both semen and the parts
of visible bodies possess the soul 'dorm?ntly', without the soul itself being
activated? We should note, however, that such an explanation assumes
extensive knowledge of Aristotle's discussions in other writings. The con
text of this passage in itself does not suggest this avenue of approach. And
it seems to be virtually ruled out by the examples of'face' and 'flesh'.
4. Objections to Peck's Explanation
But there are also arguments against the explanation proposed by Peck and
other modern exegetes. To start with, it is hard to understand why Aristotle
believes that a reference to the ensouled parts of a living body could clarify
why semen possesses soul. Next, a first reading of the sentence in 735a5 on
'the parts' may suggest that it is talking about 'the parts' of'the soul' or about
'the parts' of'the semen referred to in the preceding interrogative clause.
(a) The Semen and the Parts of the Semen
It is not entirely unthinkable that Aristotle would talk about 'parts' of the
semen. He is familiar with the possibility of multiple births as the result of
one fertilization {GA 1.18, 723b9-l 1). And he has proved in 2.1, 733b32
734a 16 that 'the parts' of the new living creature are produced by 'a part'
of the embryo which must have been present in the semen. In 734a33-b3
he declares that the semen contains no part' of the new specimen of a liv
ing creature.
(b) The Entire Soul and the Parts of the Soul
But it is also conceivable that Aristotle is referring to 'the parts of the soul'.
He makes it very clear that he is addressing a major problem in the theory
n) See Long. 6, 467al8-30, esp. a29: oc?xiov 5' oxi ?vi)7t?p%ei 7i?vxn r\ ?pxn ?-ovauei
?vo?oa. Cf. de An. 2.2, 413b 18-9: <b? ovari?, xfl? ?v xo-uxoi? \|A)%ti? ?vxeXe%eia u?v uia? ?v
?KOCGXCp qyuxco, ?uvocuei ?? rcXei?vcov (text quoted from Jannone 1966).
384 A.P. Bos ?Mnemosyne 62 (2009) 378-400
of reproduction, viz. the question by what entity specific plants and spe
cific animals are formed,12) that is to say, 'the parts' of these animals and
plants (733b32). His thesis is that it must be something external, or some
thing in the male semen and seed, either a 'part of a souV or a soul' or
'something that possesses soul'.13) Of these four options he goes on to
exclude the option that 'something external' is the productive principle,
and then that it is something in the semen itself which does not form part
of the semen (734a2-13). Only two options remain, that the productive
entity is present in the semen and is either soul or a soul-part.14) This means
that Aristotle speaks at least once in chapter 1 about 'a part' in the sense of
'a soul-party and does so, importantly, in the formulation of the problem
that he proposes to solve and that amounts to the question whether the
productive principle should be identified with 'soul' or with 'a part of the
soul'. And this makes sense, because the question being asked is what entity
is responsible for producing all parts of the body. Clearly this entity cannot
itself be a bodily part.
When he now asks in 735a4: 'Does semen possess soul or not?', he is
determining whether the first of the two remaining options from 733b33
734a 1 is valid. And when he continues: 'The same dilemma applies to the
parts', it could be, and it is in fact natural to assume, that he is thinking of
the second remaining option from 733b33-734al, and is therefore asking
whether semen possesses 'the parts' of a soul. This turns out to be relevant,
for it will become clear further on that the bodily part which is produced
12) GA 2.1, 733b23-4: Ilepl ?v ?cmv acopia nXemv, rcco? itoxe yiyvexai ek too cm?puaTo?
to qyuT?v il Tcov ?ocov otio?v. In 2.3, 736b5 Aristotle seems to indicate a problem of even
greater weight: 7iepi vov... e%ei t' arcop?av TtXe?axrjv_
13) GA 2.1, 733b32-734al: t^toi yocp twv e^coBev ti 7ioie? r\ evurc?pxov ti ?v Tfl yovfl Kai
orc?piiocTi, Kai tow' ?'GTiv f\ jiepo? ti \|n)%fj? fl \|/a>x"n, r\ ?'%ov av e?t| \|ruxr|v. For parts'
of the soul, see also: de An. 1.1, 402b9; blO: tt^v oh\v \|TOXTlv r\ Ta fi?pia, bl2; 5, 4llb2;
14; 16; 25; 2.2, 4l3b7; bl4; b27; 3.9, 432al9; a23; 432b2-3; 10, 433bl; Sens. 1, 436al;
Mem. 1, 449b5;>w 1, 467bl7; b21; b26; 2, 468a28; PA 1.1, 64lbl0; GA 2.1, 735al2
(see below); 3, 736a30; 737a22 (see below); 4, 74la2; Metaph. 6.16, 1040M1; EN 1.13,
1102b4; 6.2, 1139a9; bl2; 5, Il40b25; Pol. 1.5, 1254b8-9; 13, 1260all; Ph. 73, 2472,6;
247b 1; 248a8. See also Bonitz, Index 864b8-865a53 and Feola 2006; Bastit 1996; Whiting
2002.
14) This removes the basis of the entire argument put forward by Hinton (2006). This author
states incorrectly on p. 370: "the seed is not the type ofthing that could bear any soul for
it is just a residue of a living being and not itself a living being".
A.P. Bos ?Mnemosyne 62 (2009) 378-400 385
first, the heart or the analogue of the heart,15) is produced in all living crea
tures by the vegetative or procreative soul-paxt. If the semen of a cat
possessed 'soul' but not the vegetative/nutritive soul-part, the process of
producing the bodily parts of young kittens would not get under way.
And, conversely, Aristotle holds that chickens do pass on the nutritive/
vegetative soul-part to an egg they lay, but that the sensitive soul-part is
contributed by the cock alone. That is why a 'wind egg' (an unfertilized
egg) does not yield a chicken (2.5, 74la6-32).
In comparable fashion Aristotle in De anima 2.1, 4l2b6-17 first postu
lates the unity of the soul and its instrumental soma-, and in 4l2bl7-3a5
explains the unity of the parts of the soul with the instrumental body of
the soul.16) He contrasts there 'the eye' as the visual faculty's 'instrumental
body with 'the entire sensitive body as the bearer of the faculty of sense in
general17) and observes that it must be connected with the soul-body, even
if this faculty is dormant in every respect. In this context Aristotle also
notes that an axe which cannot be used for chopping is an axe only in a
homonymous sense and a stone eye or a painted eye an eye only homony
mously, because it cannot perform the function of seeing (of the soul-part
which is called the anima sensitiva). Studying the consequences attendant
on the bisection of insects, he also concludes that the various functions or
'parts' of the soul do not occur separately from each other,18) as Plato had
claimed.
15) We have already seen Aristotle's repeated assertion that no part of the body is present in
semen. He rejects the preformation theory and opts for the epig?nesis theory. Cf. GA 1.17,
721b6 and 18, 725a21, and Bos 2003, 149-50.
16) There we also have a clear contrast between KaG?tan) ji?v o?v E?pr|Tai ti eotiv x\ \|/i)xri
(412b 10) and 0?copE?v ?? Kai ?nl tcov jxep v ?e? to X,?%6?v (412b 13). Cf. Bos 2003, 103-9.
Ail modem translators opt for parts of the body here too. Likewise Whiting 2002, 145
n. 4; Shields 2007, 290. But de An. 2.1, 4l3a4-5 shows clearly that Aristotle talked about
'the parts' of the soul.
17) Aristotle there sets the single sense of sight with its bearer (the eye) against 'the entire
faculty of sense' (4l2b24) with 'the entire body which is the bearer of the faculty of sense'.
This a?G0nai? must be connected with semen, he says there in 4l2b24-8, even though it is
mere potentiality.
18) de An. 1.5, 4llb24-6: ?v EKaT?pcp tcov uop?cov obtavT' ?vu7t?p%ei Ta u?pia t?jc \in)%fj?,
Kai ouoei?E?? eiaiv ?A?fitaxi? Kai xx\ ?atj, ?^riXcov jx?v d>? o\) xcopiGTa ?vTa_Cf. 2.2,
4l3bl9-24; 3, 4l5al-3 and Whiting 2002, 142-50.
386 A.P. Bos ?Mnemosyne 62 (2009) 378-400
(c) The Eye is the Instrument of the Sensitive Soul-Part
We can note in this connection that the example of 'the eye of a dead per
son in 735a8 differs significantly from the example in 734b24-5 of 'the
face' or 'flesh'. The eye is the instrument of one of the five sensory faculties
which together form the anima sensitiva^ or the soul-part that is typical of
an animal as opposed to a plant.20) So if Aristotle had used the example of
'the face' or 'flesh' here in 735a8, it would be natural to assume that 'the
parts' in 735a6 refers to the parts of the body.2l) But now that he uses the
example of'the eye', it may be, and is in fact likely, that his focus here, as
in De anima 2.1, 412b 17 ff., is on 'the parts' of the soul. In that case his
argument is that semen which does not take part in the sensitive soul-part
is no more semen than a stone eye is a bearer of sensitive soul-activity.
(d) Philosophical Relevance
We should note, too, that it is philosophically relevant if Aristotle in

735a4-6 poses the (new) question whether semen also possesses 'the parts
of the soul', but not relevant if he mentions (again) the ensouled nature of
the bodily parts. Living creatures of a higher order than plants possess
more than one soul-part: horses at least two and human beings at least
three (cf. 2.3, 736a35-b8). Because these soul-parts do not become opera
tive at the same time, it makes sense to consider whether only one soul
part is initially present in semen and the others later, or whether they are
all present in semen from the outset, but start to function successively and
not at the same time.
If this is right, we will have to take 'semen as the subject of u?te%ov in
735a7 and will then have to correct ju?piov to jnopicov. The erroneous read
ing of the manuscripts may be due to the fact that a scribe was still think
ing of the passage 734b24-5, which talks about 'face' and 'flesh'.
19) 4l2b28-9 mentions 'sense' (?ypfiyopGi?) and 'sight' (oxyi?) as the two conditions of
actuality and potentiality for the anima sensitiva.
20) GA 2.3, 736a30: ?cpov ?' egt? Kara to u?piov tti? yvxr\?, t? a?G0r|TiK?v. 5, 74la9-13.
Cf. de An. 2.3, 4l4a32-b3.
21) But even then we would have to take into account GA 2.5, 74la9-13.
AP Bos /Mnemosyne 62 (2009) 378-400 387
(e) In what Way does Semen Possess Soul?
It is worthwhile to look more closely at the question broached in ?2 above.

What does Aristotle exactly mean by the question: 'Does semen possess
soul or not?'22) He has given an explicit answer to this question in Genera
tion of Animals 2.3, 736b29-737a5. Semen is not the 'instrumental body
{soma organikon) of the soul. In De anima 2.1 Aristotle explains that the
soul itself is not a soma, but something that is inextricably linked to a
natural body. Semen, however, possesses soul inasmuch as it contains this
soul plus its instrumental body. For this instrumental body is the vital
heat or pneuma. Aristotle says this in as many words in Generation of Ani
mals 2.3: 'The semen of all living creatures contains within itself its cause
of being fertile, viz. the so-called vital heat. This vital heat is not fire or any
such power but the pneuma which is enclosed within the semen and in the
foam-like stuff; it is the active substance which is in pneuma, which is an
analogue of the astral element.'23)
It is pneuma (or the vital heat) which is properly the bearer of the soul
and possesses the soul actually or potentially. And it is semen as the con
tainer of pneuma that is compared by Aristotle in 734b9-17 to a winding
mechanism of which the parts are successively set in motion. Semen is
not properly the bearer of the (immaterial) soul, but is the container of
pneuma.,24) The heat and the quality of pneuma can differ in the semen of
one animal species compared with that of another {GA 2.3, 737al flf.). As
22) On this important subject, see Longrigg 1985; Coles 1995. The above-mentioned arti
cle by Hinton (2006) fails to shed light on this subject.
23) GA 2.3, 736b33-737al. Pneuma is an equivalent {analogon) of the astral element,
because it is equally an 'instrumental body' of the soul and a bearer of life-giving power.
24) Cf. Mu. 4, 394b9-l 1, where pneuma is described as: r\ xe ?v qyuxo?? Kai ?cpoi? <o?oa>
Kai ?i? rc?vxcov ?ir)KOi)aa ?'u\|fu%o?, xe Kai yoviuo? o?o?a. Cf. Reale & Bos 1995, 285-8.
The authorship of On the cosmos has always been hotly contested. The discussion has been
radically affected by the conclusion of Barnes in his review of Reale, G. 1974. Aristotele.
Trauato Sul cosmo per Alessandro (Napoli) in Classical Review 27 (1977), 440-3 that there
are no intrinsic arguments left for denying Aristotle's authorship. But he believes that
vocabulary and style do invalidate it. Barnes considers the work's likely date to be before
250 BC. Schenkeveld (1991, 221-55) argued for a date between 350-200 BC. But his dat
ing of the work on the basis of language and style raises a new problem: which anonymous
and highly skilled author in this period would want to present his own ideas as Aristotelian
in this way and why? Today we are able to recognize that the rejection of On the cosmos and
o?De spiritu was the result of the same erroneous understanding of Aristotle's psychology.
388 AP Bos /Mnemosyne 62 (2009) 378-400
a consequence, one 'instrumental body of a soul differs from that of another

and one soul may display vital activity on a higher level than another. That
is the gist of De anima 1.3, 407a 13-26, where Aristotle explains that the
level of functioning of the soul depends on the quality of the receiver (to
8e%?|i?Vov, b21) of the soul.25)
(f ) The Vegetative Soul-Part First
It is essential to Aristotle's argument in this passage that, in the process in

which the new specimen is formed, not all bodily parts are formed at the
same time, but one first and then others. And the starting-point is that no
part of the body is present in semen. The part of the body that is formed
first must therefore be produced, but it cannot be produced by a part of
the body. This first part of the body, like all subsequent parts of the body, is
produced by 'the soul and its instrumental body. Aristotle's point is that
the production of the parts of a new specimen of the species 'man always
involves the heart, the lungs, the eyes of a human being, and so this specific
form of a human being must guide the production process as a rational
(structural) principle {GA 2.1, 734a29-33).26) And it is a consequence of
the difference in quality of souls that the first bodily part to be produced
in the case of higher animals and man is the heart, and in the case of insects
and plants an analogue. So the heart or 'very first' part, according to Aris
totle, is 'that which possesses 'the principle of growth', or, in other words:
which possesses 'the nutritive (part of the soul)'. This is the principle that
begets a new specimen which is exactly like itself.27)
25) Cf. Bos 2003, 31-46.

26) This is entirely disregarded by Hinton (2006).
27) GA 2.1, 735al5-22: xomo ?? y?yveoOai ?vayicn 7tp(oxov o a?^naecoc, ?pxnv exei- e?xe
y?p (pm?v e?xe ?coov ouoico? xo?xo rcaovv bn?pxei x? GpercxiKOv. xo?xo ?' ?axi x?
yewnxiK?v exepov o?ov am?. What Aristotle calls x? GpercxiK?v here is referred to in 2.3,
736a35 as xijv 9pe7txiKf|V \jfuxr|v. See also de An. 2.2, 4l3b7: ?percxiK?v ?? ?iyouev xo
xoio?xov u?piov xfj? \|n)%fj? ov Kai x? (pD?ueva uex?êi and 4, 4l5a23: fj y?p OpercxiKfi
\\f\>Xr\ Kal xot? aA?oi? '?)7i?px?i, Kai rcpcoxri Kai Koivoxaxrj ?uvaui? ?axi \|n)xrj?, KaG' r\v
\)7t?pxei x? ?fjv (XTcaaiv. f|? ?oxiv epya yevvfJGai Kai xpocp?) xp?icOai, and 4l6al9: ?rcei ?'
t? a-uxTi ?uvaui? xfi? \\rvxt\q 6pe7txiKf| Kai yevvnxiKri, and 4l6al9 and bl5-8. So the heart
is the first part of the body that is produced by the vegetative-procreative soul-pan, but is not
itself'the nutritive principle'.
AP Bos /Mnemosyne 62 (2009) 378-400 389
In 735a23 Aristotle goes on by establishing that in some animals the

heart is the first differentiated part of the body. But this heart is not 'the
principle of growth' or 'the nutritive' or 'that which begets a new specimen
which is exactly like itself. 'The nutritive' is the first part of the soul. If the
heart is the first differentiated part of the body, the nutritive soul-part must
be present in it (just as the soul in its entirety resides in the heart according
to Aristotle).28) But this means that the sentence: 'That is why one part is
formed first, not all their parts simultaneously' (735al4-5), though refer
ring to the heart that is formed as the first part of the body, does so in an
argument designed to show that the vegetative soul-pan must be the first
to function and produces a bodily part specifically geared to it, and that
later the eyes and the ears are produced, because the sensitive soul-part is
activated later than the vegetative.29)
Summarizing: the heart, as the first part of the body of the new living
creature, while not yet being present in the semen of the begetter, is pro
duced by the vegetative part of the soul, which therefore must have been
present in the semen.
(g) Not either... or but and... and
The question with which Aristotle begins this intriguing text is a clear dis
junction: 'Does semen possess soul or not?' His answer is that the problem
has not yet been correctly formulated: semen does and does not possess
soul.30) For semen possesses soul, but not actually, only potentially. Semen
passes on the soul-principle, but the soul is not yet activated in any way in
this process. This cannot be said in the same sense of a bodily part, for
28) Cf. Peck 1942, 157 note d. In GA 2.1, 734al4 Aristotle had said: el ?? ?f| ur| ?oxi xfj?
\j/D%fj? unG?v o uf| xo? a uaxo? ?axw ?v xivi uopico. See also MA 10, 703al4-6.
29) Cf. GA 2.3, 736a35-b5. By 736b2: o? y?p ?ua yiyvexai ?coov Kai ?vGpomo? Aristotle
does not mean that the parts of the body are not formed simultaneously, but that the parts
of the soul are not actualized at the same time. See also 2.5, 740b29-74la3.
30) Cf. Vinci & Robert 2005, 207. Aristotle applies the same procedure in 734b2-7, after
stating that the entity responsible for producing the parts of the visible body must reside
either in the semen or outside of it, and that it must needs be one or other of the two. His
solution in 734b6 is: ?cxi u?v y?p (b? ?v??%exai ?oxi ?' (b? oiS. Aristotle had solved the
Eleatic problem of 'being' and non-being' in the same way in Ph. 1.3, 186a24: ?nXSiq
taxu?avei x? ?v AiyeaGai (sc. Parmenides), Xeyou?voi) noXXax??, and 9, 192a4: x? u?v
o\)K ?v e?vai Kax? Gi)u?e?r|KOc, xf|v vXr\v.
390 AP Bos /Mnemosyne 62 (2009) 378-400
instance 'an eye' of a human being or animal; or of'a face' or of'flesh'. An

eye and a face or flesh are always something of an animal or human being
that is actually alive and that, even when asleep, carries out all kinds of vital
processes (of digestion, respiration, etc.).31) But this might equally be said
of'the parts of the soul\ Semen also does and does not possess the parts of
the soul. For semen possesses the parts of the soul, but not actually, only
potentially.
This insight also sheds light on a passage in the important chapter 2.1 of
De anima. Aristotle repeatedly talks there about the natural body of the
soul as 'potentially possessing life'.32) Aristotle is thinking here of a body
which does not possess life actually on the one hand and potentially on the
other (like the body of a dog that is asleep),33) but a body of which the
entire soul and all the soul-parts are 'dormantly' present.34) That is the situa
tion in which the soul is the 'first entelechy. Aristotle emphasizes this
crucial point further on in the same chapter: though semen and karpos do
not have soul in actuality, they differ essentially from a corpse because they
do possess soul in potentiality.35) This text, in relation to the discussion in
Generation of Animals, makes it crystal clear that Aristotle regards semen or
a fruit (e.g. a grain of corn or a beech-nut) as a body that seems stone-dead,
because no vital activity can be detected in it, but as differing essentially
31) Cf. Ph. 8.6, 259b8: ?veiGiv ?Xtau KivrjGei? (pDGiKai xo?? ? oi?, ?? o? Kivowcai ?i'
ai)xcov, oiov aiS^riGi? cpO?Gi? ?vajwori. Cf. Whiting 2002, 152-3, who refers to Somn. Vig.
1, 454b30-455a3 and 2, 456a25-7.
32) de An. 2.1, 4l2al9-20: ?vayKa?ov ?pa xrjv \|fuxnv o?G?av eivai ob? ei?o? Gcbuaxo?
qyuGiKou ?uv?uei Ccofjv exovxo?. Cf. 4l2a27: ?io r\ \|A)XT1 ?oxiv ?vxeAxxeia f] Tipcircn
Gcbuaxo? (p^GiKov ?i)v?uei ?cofiv exovxo?.
33) A similar situation is referred to in GA 2.5, 741 al0-3. For this problem, see H?bner
1999. Polansky (2007, 154 n. 13) also takes Aristotle to speak about 'having life 'in poten
tiality' when the living being is actually alive'.
34) de An. 2.1, 4l2a23-4: ?v y?p x(p ?rc?pxew xrjv \|/dxt1v Kai vrcvo? Kai ?yprjyopG?c ?Gxiv.
Barbotin's translation is correct here: 'Car le fait d'?tre anim? comporte les deux ?tats de
veille et de sommeil'. That of Ross (1961, 211) is wide of the mark: 'For both sleep and
waking involve the presence of the soul'. Just as misleading is Peck (1942, lvii): 'an animal
can 'have Soul in it' and yet be asleep'.
35) de An. 2.1, 4l2b25-7: eGxi ?? ox> x? a7to?e?Ar|K?c xtvv yDxnv x? ?iw?uei ?v coGxe ?fjv,
?XX? x? ?xov x? ?? Grc?pua Kai ? Kaprc?c x? ?vv?uei xoiov?i G ua. Cf. GA 2.3, 736a32:
oiSxe y?p a>? ?xjruxov ?v Gern xi? x? KUnua Kax? rc?vxa xp?rcov ?Gxepnu?vov ?cofj?- o???v
y?p Hxxov x? xe Grc?puaxa Kai x? Kurjuaxa xcov ?cocov C?r\ x?v (p-uxcov.
AP Bos /Mnemosyne 62 (2009) 378-400 391
from the corpse of a deceased animal or human being, because it has all the
vital potentialities of its kind in it. And Aristotle says this in an exposition
'on the parts' (412b 18), which in 4l3a5 are said to be 'the parts of the
soul\ We shall therefore have to translate 735a8-9 as: 'Hence it is clear that
(semen) has (soul) and that (semen) is (participatory in the parts of the
soul), potentially.36)
But the statement that semen has 'soul' must of course tally with the
definition of'soul' which Aristotle gives in De anima 2.1. This is another
compelling argument against the translation of opyocviK?v in De anima 2.1,
4l2a28 and 4l2b6 as 'equipped with organs', for there are no organs in
semen. We shall have to interpret the pneuma in semen as the 'instrumen
tal' body of the soul.37)
(h) Degrees of Potentiality
Against the background of the fundamental distinctions in De anima 2.1

it is also easier to understand why Aristotle in Generation of Animals 2.1,
735a9-ll elaborates the distinction between potentiality and actuality in
three steps, while in De anima 2.1 he confines this to two steps. In De
anima 2.1, 4l2a9 Aristotle notes that the entelechy is the eidos of some
thing that serves as matter. But he adds: 'Now there are two kinds of ent
elechy, corresponding to knowledge and to reflecting'. This is repeated in
36) GA 2.1, 735a8: ?fjXov o?v ?xi Kai ?xei Kai cgxi (uex?xov) ?wv?uei. In my view, this
interpretation is more in line with Aristotle's argument than Kai eGXi ?Dvauei <\jn)xri>, as
the modern translations assume. Cf. Lefevre 1972, 71: 'le sperme a une ?me; il est ?me, en
puissance'. Semen is always a sorna. It therefore cannot 'be soul' in the sense of the eidos or
the entelechy. Cf. de An. 2.1, 4l2al7; 2, 4l4a20. This could at most be said of pneuma.
Semen is, however, the bearer of pneuma, and as such the bearer of the soul plus its instru
mental body and of the parts of the soul, which can be present potentially or actually. This
is also suggested by GA 2.3, 736b8-10: xfjv u?v ovv Operativ \|/i)X^lv Ta Grcepuaxa Kai x?
K\)T|uaxa x? ?xcopiGxa ?fjôv ?xi ?iw?uei u?v ?xovxa Oex?ov, ?vepye?a ?' o?k exovxa...,
bl5: Tt?ca? y?p ?vaymiov ?uvauei rcp?xepov exeiv r\ ?vepye?a and 737al6-8: Ilepi u?v
ovv \|n)xi?? ?t ? ?xei x? io)r|uaxa Kai f| yov?i Kai tcco? o\)k ?'xei ?i piGxai ?Dv?uei u?v y?p
?xei, ?vepye?a ?' otl)k ?xei. Louis (1961, 56) seems to adopt the same view: 'Il est donc
?vident que la semence a une ?me et que cette ?me est en puissance', following Nuyens.
Peck (1942, xiii) leaves the question open: 'the female's residue... is, or contains, Soul
potentially'. How Balme (1972, 61) can translate: 'Clearly therefore it does have soul and
exists?potentially, I do not understand.
37) Cf. Bos 2003, 85-94. See also Bos & Ferwerda 2007 and 2008.
392 AP Bos /Mnemosyne 62 (2009) 378-400
4l2a22-3 with the clarification that soul is first present as potentiality. In

De anima 2.1 Aristotle thus clarifies the distinction between the possession
of a potentiality and the actualization of a potentiality of an existing soul.
In Generation of Animals 2.1 he goes back a further step. Male semen which
has not yet led to a complete embryo has a prior degree of potentiality'. In
735al0-l he distinguishes a 'sleeping' from a 'waking' and from a 'scien
tifically active' mathematician.38) In this way he tries to make it clear that a
fully grown rabbit can use its eyes; that a newly born rabbit has the poten
tial to see; but that the semen of a rabbit also possesses the potentiality of
an anima sensitiva, though there is no question of an eye-to-be nor of a
working eye. This addition, too, makes sense only if Aristotle is talking
about the soul in its entirety and the parts of the soul in their varying degrees
of potentiality and actualization.
(i) The Argument ofHomonymy
The argument on the basis of homonymy39) that Aristotle uses in 735a7-8

seemed a decisive point in favour of the standard interpretation, as we
argued in ?2 under (b). For this argument is supported with reference to a
part of the body, the eye. Yet such an interpretation of these lines is prob
lematical. According to this interpretation, Aristotle starts by saying: 'The
same argument applies here as in the case of the parts.'40) And he continues
with a two-part sentence, both parts of which start in Greek with 'not'. The
first part reads: 'On the one hand a soul will not be present in something
other than that of which it is the soul'. But the second part reads: 'On the
other hand a part will not not participate in it'. If we follow the standard
interpretation, however, this is not 'the same argument', but the opposite!
38) In view of de An. 2.1, 4l2a22: fi u?v (b? ?7CiGxr|ur|, r\ ?' cb? x? Gecope?v it seems more
natural to identify the yecou?xpT|? of GA 2.1, 735al0 with a practitioner of the theoretical
science of mathematics than with a traditional 'land surveyor', as Ferwerda proposes. Cf.
Metaph. 5.1, 1026a7-29.
39) Anton (1968, 326) argues that Aristotle designated Plato's Ideas and the concreta of the
same name as 'homonyms'. See now also Shields 1999.
40) For the expression ? awo? taSyo?, cf. Bonitz, Index 436&6 ff. MA 10, 703al6-8: n?xepov
u?v o\)v xa?xov ?GXi x? Ttvevua ?ei r\ yivexai ?ei ?xepov, cgxco ?XXoq X?yoq- 6 a?xo? y?p
?Gxi Kai rcepi x?v ?XXayv uopi v, and Gael. 1.3, 270al 1-2: ? y?p a\)xo? A,oyo? 7tepi OXot>
Kai u?pOD?. GA 1.17, 721 b7 and 18, 722a 11: Kai ?m x v (p-ox v ?? ? a\)xo? Xoyo?. de An.
2.11,422bl7.
AP Bos /Mnemosyne 62 (2009) 378-400 393
For it is said of the soul that it must always be present in something corpo
real. But 'the part' (of the body) is then said to participate in the soul. In my
view, it is not easy to explain how this sentence can be interpreted as 'fol
lowing a similar argument' to the first part of the sentence. Moreover, it is
unclear why Aristotle uses the verb 'to participate' here, whereas he had
said 'possesses' in 734b25.41) But the question remains whether the exam
ple of homonymy is in keeping with the previous statements. In my expla
nation this can be defended. In this alternative explanation Aristotle says:
'a soul can only be present in that of which it is the soul (so it must be
present in semen), and (semen) is (participatory in the parts of the soul),
potentially. This two-part statement, which follows 'the same argument'
for both halves of the sentence, is then stipulated by the remark about
speaking homonymously. Semen that does not possess soul is 'semen in
the way that a eunuch can be called a 'man'.42) And semen of a human
being that does not possess a sensitive soul-part would be like the eye of a
dead person. This is still called 'an eye', but cannot perform the function
of an eye.
(j) The Genesis of the Soul and the Genesis of the Soul-Parts
There is another passage which remains unclear in the text that formed
our starting-point. It is 735al2-3. There, too, the standard interpretation
is unanimous but disputable. In Peck's translation we read: 'So then, the
cause of this process of formation is not any part of the body, but the
external agent which first set the movement going'.43) Three things are
remarkable here. First, the question why Aristotle would suggest here that
a part of the body brings about the process in which a new living creature
is formed. Second, why in Greek the word 'this' is five words removed
from 'process of formation. Third, the introduction of 'this process of
formation', though the preceding passage does not talk about a specific
process of formation. Note, too, that Aristotle continues by indicating
that, straight after the production of semen by the father figure, the soul
of the living creature itself sets to work, and specifically the primary, most
41) GA 2.1, 735a7: uexexov. 734b24-5: o?) y?p ?Gxi Tcp?Gomov ufj exov \|ruxTlv ou?? Gap?.
42) On the eunuch, cf. Arist. GA4A, 766a24-30.
43) Likewise Lanza 1971, 889 and Ferwerda 2005. Balme (1972, 62) translates: 'Now this
generative process is not caused by any of its parts'.
394 A.P. Bos I Mnemosyne 62 (2009) 378-400
basic soul-pan, present in all living entities, the nutritive or vegetative

soul-part.
We should therefore consider an alternative explanation here too, in the
sense that 'part' here should again be taken as soul-part.4? In that case the
demonstrative pronoun should not be connected with 'process of forma
tion' but with 'soul' (of the semen). Aristotle is therefore saying: no part of
this (soul in the semen) is the cause of formation, but the begetter is the
cause. As soon as fertilization has taken place, however, the new specimen
feeds itself independently thanks to its nutritive soul-part (which must
therefore already be present in the semen) .45) For Aristotle the 'generative'
and the 'nutritive' functions are the same function. But this function starts
as the function of the father (the external agent'); it then continues to

operate as the nutritive function of the embryo.46) The conclusion of this
passage and this chapter also makes it clear that Aristotle has been talking
about 'the first moving and efficient' principle of the soul.47) And his argu
ment links up closely with what he had emphasized in 734b 17-9: the
begetter is always a living creature in actuality, of which all soul-parts are
also operative in actuality; but he passes on a movement via his semen in
such a way that the movement, though belonging to the entire soul of the
mature specimen of the kind in question, is activated only on the vegeta
tive level, and not yet on the higher levels.48)
(k) The Greek Text of735a22
In passing we arrive at a passage in which a striking textual variant has been

passed down by, significantly, manuscript Z, which is three centuries older
44) Louis (1961, 215 n. 6) suggested this possibility, but rejected it because he thought it
more logical to interpret 'part' here as 'partie du corps'.
45) That is to say, Aristotle is taking for granted here what, according to my alternative
interpretation, he posited in 735a4-9.
46) GA 2.4, 740b34: i\ y?p amr\ egtiv x>Xr\ r\ a?c/xvETai Kai ?? fi? GDv?GTarai t? rcpcoTov,
coGTE Kai f| rcoio?Ga ?uvajii? Ta\)T? tco ?cj ?pxf|?- jie??cov ?? awri egtiv. ?? o\)v awri EGT?V
rj 0pE7tTiKf| \\fX)%r\, aurn EGTi Kai f| yevvcoGa.
47) GA 2.1, 735a27-9: T? (i?v o\)v egtiv a?Tiov ? ?p%r| Trj? 7t?pi EKaGTOV y?V?G?co?, kivovv
7tp(?Tov Kai ?r||iio\)pyo'5v, ?ipr|Tai 7tpo? Ta ?ia7topr|0?vra rcpOTEpov. Aristotle is thus refer
ring both to the begetter and to the form-producing movement of the begetter's semen.
48) GA 2.1,734b 17-9: "Oti u?v o?v egti ti o rcoiE?, ox>% owco? ?? ob? to?e ti o\)?' ?VD7t?pxov
?D? T?T?^?G|l?VOV TO 7ipC?T0V.
A.P Bos ?Mnemosyne 62 (2009) 378-400 395
than all the others. The edition by Drossaart Lulofs reads there: 'So, as
soon as it exists, it causes itself to grow'. But Z has an entirely different
reading: ecmv apa xi o aui;ei.49) This alternative reading can be seen as
decisive evidence for my alternative explanation. Aristotle says in 735a20:
'Something with the same name has begotten it, for instance a man a man.
But it grows by itself.' The Z reading now has: 'So there must be something
which brings about growth'.50) That is to say: as soon as the begetter has
secreted his semen, a process of growth must be instigated which the beget
ter no longer carries out. But this means that, before a heart has been
formed, a potential for growth must already have become operative. This
can only be the potential for growth which, as the vegetative soul-part, is
present in the semen. We must conclude that Drossaart Lulofs, very excep
tionally, has chosen the wrong side. The text should be corrected in the
way indicated by manuscript Z (as the obvious lectio difficilior).
(1) The Menstrual Fluid also Potentially Contains all the 'parts'
A text from Generation of Animals 23 is also relevant to the text which

formed our starting-point. The menstrual fluid which the female contrib
utes to the reproductive process, it is said there, 'contains all the parts
potentially, though none in actuality, and 'all' includes those parts which
distinguish the both sexes (Peck 1942, 173-5).51) What is the purport of
this text? The reading of all modern exegetes here is that all the parts of the
body, including the male and female genitals, are potentially present in the
menstrual fluid.52) But this would be a totally irrelevant statement. And it
would be just as bizarre as a statement along the lines: this one wooden
beam potentially contains an entire house.
49) Drossaart Lulofs 1965, 56: amo apa ti ?v auêi. Likewise Louis 1961, 56. But Z,
which hardly notes any accents or aspiration marks, has: egtiv apa ti o aucJEi. In the edi
tion of the text this would be: egtiv apa ti o aiScJEi.
50) Louis (1961, 56) translates strikingly: TI existe par cons?quent quelque chose qui le fait
cro?tre', though he prints a Greek text which does not allow this! Lanza 1971, 889 has: 'Vi
? dunque qualche cosa che fa crescere'.
51) GA 2.3, 737a22-5: Kai y?p eke?vo TtEpiTTGouxx Kai 7t?vTa Ta u?pia exei ?\)v?|i?i,
?vEpyE?a ?' o\)6?v. Kai y?p Ta touxut' exei u?pia ?vvauEi f\ ?iacp?pEi t? Gfjta) to?)
?ppEVO?. On this, see Bos 2006.
52) Peck 1942, 175: 'all the parts of the body'; Balme 1972, 165: 'the female material con
tains potentially both sets of parts by which the sexes are distinguished'; Cooper 1990, 58:
'all the bodily parts'; Ferwerda 2005, 87: alle lichaamsdelen'.
396 A.P. Bos ?Mnemosyne 62 (2009) 378-400
We should ask ourselves whether this traditional interpretation does not

depend on the equally traditional (and erroneous) hylomorphistic inter
pretation of Generation of Animals. This view always sets the female contri
bution as providing the corporeal side of the new specimen. Only when we
have abandoned this view, which goes back to Alexander of Aphrodisias, is
it possible to understand that the menstrual fluid provides the corporeal
side of the soul (as a composite of entelechy and instrumental body). This
puts a different complexion on all kinds of details. Inasmuch as part of the
menstrual fluid is used as 'food' or 'matter' for a part of the new specimen,
its purpose is to form the very first bodily part of the new specimen, the
heart or its analogue.53) All other parts of the new specimen are produced
from food that has been drawn from outside. But the proposition that the
menstrual fluid possesses all parts of the soul, including those to which it
bears a different relationship from the (semen of the) male, is necessary to
the course of the argument and is emphatically supported by the context.
For though Aristotle has demonstrated that male semen must possess the
entire soul and all parts of the soul, a problem arises because he also states
that no physical substance of the male semen remains in the embryo. This
leads once again to the question: can we be sure that the embryo possesses
the entire soul and all parts of the soul, given that the female menstrual
fluid needs to be 'worked on by the male partner? For the male semen may
possess 'soul' and 'the parts' of the soul, but crucial of course is that the
embryo, thanks to the activity of the male, comes to possess these. And a
condition for this is that the menstrual fluid of the female shares in the
soul-principle provided by the male via his semen.54)
As in the case of semen, Aristotle must be talking here about 'parts of the
soul\55) The female menstrual fluid has the potential to become what the
living creature is by nature.56) But not by itself. A female can produce life,
but only up to a certain level. And she also has a potential for soul. But
53) Cf. GA 2.4, 740b2-8 and 1.23, 731a8: to ?? Xoxnbv Tpoqni yiyvETai tco ?A,aGTa> Kai tti
pi??l TTJ 7tpC0TTJ.
54) GA 2.3, 737a33: ?rav ?? uet?gxti Toiat>TT|? ?pxfi? t? 7t?p?TTcouxx to too Oritao? K\>T|}ia
yiyvETai.
55) The difference between the male and the female with regard to the soul-parts is lucidly
explained by Peck (1942, lxvii): 'semen possesses the principle of sentient Soul, menstrual
fluid possesses only nutritive Soul (potentially)'.
56) GA 2.4,740b 18: to TCEpirccoua to to?) BtjXeo? ?uv?uEi toio?tov egtiv otov cp\>G?i t? ?cpov.
A.P Bos /Mnemosyne 62 (2009) 378-400 397
only for the most basic kind, the vegetative soul.57) The difference between
male semen and female menstrual fluid is that the male semen potentially
possesses the soul of the specific living creature, including all parts of the
soul. But by itself the menstrual fluid potentially possesses only the vegeta
tive soul. It does have, besides, the potential for all the higher soul-parts of
the animal of the specific kind. But for this it needs fertilization by the
male.58) Here in Generation of Animals 2.5 we find that the female Tiepmooua
differs from the male Ttepmcouoc in lacking the animal and human soul
functions as entelechy, and this is what Aristotle is referring to in his state
ment in 2.4, 737a24 about 'the parts regarding which the female differs
from the male'.59) And after fertilization the menstrual fluid must differen
tiate itself into a male or female embryo before it can produce male or
female genitals. For only a female soul-principle plus instrumental body
produces a female body. On this view the passage underlines the correct
ness of our explanation of the earlier passage in Generation of Animals 2.1.
But we have yet to deal with a possible objection: the traditional expla
nation seems to be strongly supported by the passage in Generation of
Animals 4.1, 766b3-5.60) Peck (1942, 393) reads there: 'As far, then, as the
principle and the cause of male and female is concerned, this is what it is
and where it is situated; a creature, however, really is male or female only
from the time when it has got the parts by which female differs from
male'. Aristotle is in fact talking here about the parts of the visible body
which differ in male and female specimens. And here, too, he uses the
57) GA 2.5, 74lal7: ?vvaxai u?xpi ye xwo? x? Qr(Xx> yewav, with 74la23: ?fj?,ov ovv oxi
?xei xivct ?uv?uei \|ruxT|v. ?otav o\)v xamnv ?v?yicn ?f| xfjv eGx?xr|v. a?xrj ?' cgxiv r\
9pejtxncf|.
58) GA 2.5, 4l7a28: ?io ?e?xai xfj? xo? ?ppevo? Kowcovia?.
59) This could lead to the conclusion that Aristotle talks in two different ways about 'poten
tially possessing soul'. The male semen possesses soul as 'first entelechy but 'dormantly'.
The female menstrual fluid possesses only the vegetative soul (dormantly) and not the
entire soul, but has the potential, through the effect of the male's movement, to become a
bearer of the soul in actuality, including all parts of the soul, also the sensitive and dianoetic
soul-parts which it does not possess of itself.
^ GA 4A, 766b3-5: tj u?v ovv ?pxn xo\) 9r|Xeo? Kai xo? appevo? Kai i\ aix?a amr\ Kai
?v xo?xcp eGX?v. Qr\Xx> ?' f|?Ti Kal appev eGxlv ?xav exil Kal x? u?pia oi? ?iacp?pei x? 6f|A,i)
xo\) ?ppevo?. Cf. Ferwerda 2005, 156. Note the striking difference between fj ?iacp?pei and
o?? ?iacp?pei in the texts of 2.1 and 4.1. See also 4.1, 766b26: xo?xco ?? x? Qr\Xx) ?iacp?pei
xco uop?cp xo\) ?ppevo?.
398 AP Bos /Mnemosyne 62 (2009) 378-400
unspecified term 'the parts'. From the perspective of this passage in book
4.1, it seems wholly reasonable to follow the same line in book 2.1. Yet this
train of thought is not compelling. The passage occurs in a much later part
of the argumentation. In 2.1 Aristotle is still dealing with a prior issue.
Establishing in 2.1, 766a34-6 that 'male' and 'female' are assigned as pred
icates on the basis of different sexual characteristics, he says that this dis
tinction is determined much earlier by the real principle of differentiation
between a male and a female specimen, the vital heat of the soul's instru
mental body. In book 4.1 the reference to the difference in genitals is
wholly appropriate. If the same theme had already been addressed in book
2.1, the argument would have been much less structured than it is now.
5. Alternative Translation
Does semen possess soul or not? The same dilemma (holds) for the parts (of
the soul). No soul will be present elsewhere than in that of which it is the soul;
nor will (semen) not participate in parts (of the soul) unless homonymously,
just as the eye of a dead person (is called an eye but does not participate in the
sensitive soul-part).
Hence it is clear both that (semen) possesses Soul, and that it is (participa
tory in the parts of the soul), potentially.
There are varying degrees in which something may be potentially that
which it is capable of being?it may be nearer to and further removed from it
(just as a sleeping geometer is at a further remove than one who is awake, and
a waking one than one who is busy at his studies).
Of this (soul) no part is the cause of its coming-to-be, but the external agent
which first set the movement going. For nothing generates itself, but as soon
as it has been formed a thing makes itself grow. That is why one part is formed
first, not all the parts simultaneously. And the part which must of necessity be
formed first is the one which possesses the principle of growth: be they plants
or animals, this, the nutritive faculty (of soul), is present in all of them alike.
This also is the faculty of generating another creature like itself, since this is a
function which belongs to every animal and plant that is perfect in its nature.
The reason why this must of necessity be so is that once a thing has been
formed, it must of necessity grow. And though another thing bearing the
same name does generate it (e.g. a man is generated by a man), it grows by
means of itself. So there must be something which brings about growth.
AP Bos ?Mnemosyne 62 (2009) 378-400 399
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Aristotle Bos Soul

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Aristotle Bos Soul

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Aristotle on Soul and Soul-'Parts' in Semen ("GA" 2.

Generation of Animals 2.1, 735a4-22 raises the question whether semen

? Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2009 DOI: 10.1163/156852509X339879

2005 saw the publication of an excellent Dutch translation by R. Ferwerda.

2. Arguments in Favour of the Traditional Interpretation

(b) An 'eye is a Part of the Body, like a face' or 'flesh'

3. What is Aristotle's Point in the Traditional Interpretation?

4. Objections to Peck's Explanation

(a) The Semen and the Parts of the Semen

(b) The Entire Soul and the Parts of the Soul

(c) The Eye is the Instrument of the Sensitive Soul-Part

(d) Philosophical Relevance

We should note, too, that it is philosophically relevant if Aristotle in

(e) In what Way does Semen Possess Soul?

It is worthwhile to look more closely at the question broached in ?2 above.

a consequence, one 'instrumental body of a soul differs from that of another

(f ) The Vegetative Soul-Part First

It is essential to Aristotle's argument in this passage that, in the process in

25) Cf. Bos 2003, 31-46.

In 735a23 Aristotle goes on by establishing that in some animals the

(g) Not either... or but and... and

instance 'an eye' of a human being or animal; or of'a face' or of'flesh'. An

(h) Degrees of Potentiality

Against the background of the fundamental distinctions in De anima 2.1

4l2a22-3 with the clarification that soul is first present as potentiality. In

(i) The Argument ofHomonymy

The argument on the basis of homonymy39) that Aristotle uses in 735a7-8

basic soul-pan, present in all living entities, the nutritive or vegetative

as the function of the father (the external agent'); it then continues to

(k) The Greek Text of735a22

In passing we arrive at a passage in which a striking textual variant has been

A text from Generation of Animals 23 is also relevant to the text which

We should ask ourselves whether this traditional interpretation does not

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