G.R. No.

77116 January 31, 1989

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. FERDINAND CAMALOG and NOVELITO SOTTO

When is a confession legally sufficient in accordance with the system of criminal justice in this
country? The present case brought before this Court on appeal from a decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Cavite in Criminal Case No. TM-140 entitled People vs. Armando de los Reyes, et al., projects
this issue.

In an Information that was filed by the Provincial Fiscal of Cavite, Armando de los Reyes, Ferdinand
Camalog and Novelito Sotto were charged with the crime of Robbery with Homicide before the
Regional Trial Court of Cavite. It reads as follows:

That on or about June 12, 1985, In the municipality of Tanza, Cavite, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named accused, conspiring together, acting jointly
and assisting one another, with violence against persons and with intent of gain and without the
consent of the owner did, then and there wilfully and feloniously rob, take and carry away cash
money amounting to P600.00 and assorted jewelry valued at P30,600.00 Philippine Currency and
owned by Jose M. Malabanan, and by reason and on the occasion of the robbery, the said accused
with intent to kill, did, then and there wilfully and feloniously strike and stab Jose M. Malabanan, with
a pickax and a three-bladed and pointed weapon commonly known as tres cantos on the different
parts of his body causing the death of Jose M. Malabanan, to the damage and prejudice of his heirs.

The aggravating circumstances of dwelling, nighttime, treachery and abuse of superior strength,
were present at the time of the commission of the aforesaid offense.

CONTRARY TO LAW. 1

The accused pleaded not guilty when arraigned. The three accused were earlier arrested and
detained without bail.

The facts of the case as presented by the prosecution are as follows:

In the morning of June 12, 1985, the Integrated National Police (INP) stationed at Tanza, Cavite
received a report that a killing was perpetrated inside a house at Barrio Amaya, Tanza, Cavite. Two
INP police officers, Patrolmen Ruben Bolante and Augusta de la Cruz responded to the report and
conducted an investigation at the scene of the crime. They came upon the lifeless body of Jose M.
Malabanan. The deceased was found lying on the floor of the room. They noted that the furniture
was in disarray and that the cabinet in the room was forcibly opened with its contents scattered
around the victim. The investigators took note of the presence of several bloodstains in many parts of
the room. They then found a pick hammer lying near the victim's body. They also came upon a triple
bladed knife, popularly called as tres cantos. Upon going outside the house, they discovered human
blood spilled near an artesian well. A third police officer, Sgt. Esmeraldo Romero, interrogated some
of the residents of the Barrio. He eventually came upon a barrio resident, Bayani Bocalan, who told
them that he saw Armando de los Reyes, a resident of Tanza, strolling near the house of the victim in
the early morning of June 12, 1985 and was in the company of two other men, all of them acting
suspiciously in the vicinity of the house of the victim
Acting on the information given by Bayani Bocalan, the police authorities invited Armando de los
Reyes to their office for questioning. Sgt. Romero informed de los Reyes about his constitutional rights
and then began interrogating him. De los Reyes admitted his participation in the commission of the
crime and identified his two companions as a certain Mario from Ilocos and one Ben from Manila,
both of whom, according to him, could be found in the Luneta Park of Manila. The extra-judicial
confession was reduced in writing and was signed by him before Judge Aurelio Icasiano, Municipal
Trial Court Judge of Tanza, Cavite.

A team of Tanza policemen accompanied De los Reyes to the Luneta on the evening of June 13,
1985 to look for the said Mario and Ben. At the Luneta, De los Reyes pointed out to the policemen the
accused Ferdinand Camalog and Novelito Sotto whom he identified as his fellow conspirators.

Ferdinand Camalog and Novelito Sotto were interrogated and made to sign extra-judicial
confessions wherein they admitted their alleged participation in the commission of the crime
charged. These statements were subscribed and sworn to also before Judge Icasiano.

On the basis of these extra-judicial confessions, the three were charged with the crime of Robbery
with Homicide.

The appellants pleaded not guilty to the charge.

Both oral and documentary evidence were presented in court by the prosecution. They established
the death of Jose Malabanan, the damage caused to his heirs, and the loss of P30,600.00 worth of
cash and jewelries. The extra-judicial statements of the accused were presented, identified and
admitted in court as part of the testimony of the police investigators.

The defense presented witnesses who testified on the good moral character of Camalog and Sotto
and their whereabouts in the early morning of June 12, 1985.

On the witness stand, De los Reyes admitted his participation in the commission of the crime charged
but retracted his statement made in the extra-judicial confession regarding the participation of his
co-accused Camalog and Sotto. He testified that he had been mauled by the police investigators
during the interrogation. He also testified that he was threatened with bodily harm if he refused to
admit having committed the crime charged. He likewise testified that be was forced to pinpoint the
two other accused as his co-conspirators on account of a threat against his life made by the police
authorities. He asserted that Camalog and Sotto were not involved in the commission of the robberry
and homicide, that two men named Ben and Mario were his companions then, and that both Ben
and Mario are still at large.

The other two accused, Camalog and Sotto, testified that they were never near the scene of the
crime on the date and time it was committed, and that they were in their residences in Manila and
Quezon City, respectively. Two witnesses, Concepcion Villasis and Robert Cabanban, employer and
brother-in-law, respectively, of Sotto and Camalog, were presented to corroborate the alibi they
gave.

The accused further stressed the fact that they were forced to sign the extra-judicial confessions
presented in court. They also testified that the police investigators heat, maltreated and threatened
them with death if they refused to sign the confessions. They likewise stated that they were never
informed about their constitutional rights and that the police investigators never conducted an
investigation as regards their alleged participation in the crime. The two accused further testified that
during the period covering their custodial interrogation, they never had the chance to confer with a
lawyer.

On September 30, 1986, the trial court rendered a decision finding all the three accused guilty of the
crime charged, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused ARMANDO DE LOS REYES, FERDINAND CAMALOG, and NOVELITO
SOTTO guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with Homicide punishable under
Article 294 par. (1) of the Revised Penal Code and there being no mitigating or aggravating
circumstances present in the commission of the crime hereby sentences said accused to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua, to indemnify the heirs of the victim jointly and severally (1) in the
amount of P30,000.00 for the death of Jose Malabanan; (2) P30,600.00 for the items taken from the
victim's house; and (3) actual damages of P70,000.00; (4) moral damages of P5,000.00 and to pay the
proportionate costs.

SO ORDERED.

Taking exception to the finding that their guilt has been proved beyond reasonable doubt, the
accused Ferdinand Camalog and Novelito Sotto appealed their case to this Court on the ground
that the trial court erred as follows:

I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING THE EXTRA-JUDICIAL CONFESSIONS OF THE APPELLATE
BECAUSE THEY WERE OBTAINED THROUGH FORCE, THREAT AND INTIMIDATION AND THAT THEY WERE
OBTAINED IN VIOLATION OF SECTION 20, ARTICLE IV OF THE (1973) PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION.

II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF JOHN LEO ALABADO.

III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE DEFENSE OF ALIBI.

IV. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE TESTIMONY OF ACCUSED ARMANDO DE LOS REYES.

V. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE APPELLATE APPELLANT'S GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT.

In considering these interrelated errors assigned by appellants, We find merit in their contention that
there is no moral certainty to find them guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged.

The records show that their confessions were not regularly obtained. There were enough indications
that the statements were not given voluntarily.

The trial court gave credence to the claim of the prosecution that the subject confessions were
signed voluntarily on the basis of the failure of appellants to complain to the Municipal Trial Judge
that they were forced to sign the same. The trial court failed to take note of the fact that when said
confessions were presented to Judge Icasiano, their tormentors were present to hear and know what
the appellants would say and do. They remained in the custody of their tormentors and not with
Judge Icasiano. Appellants must have been reasonably apprehensive of further maltreatment if they
manifested to Judge Icasiano that they were forced to sign the said confessions.

An observation was also made by the court a quo that it was not shown that the police investigators
had ill motive in order to implicate the accused to such a heinous crime. The police investigators
were from Tanza, Cavite, just like the victim and his heirs. Appellant Ferdinand Camalog is from Ilocos
Sur while appellant Novelito Sotto hails from Oriental Mindoro and both resided in Metro Manila. De
los Reyes pointed them out to the police investigators to be the "Ben" and "Mario" who were his
confederates. None of said nicknames jibed with the true names of appellants. The police
investigators did not care. They brought the two to their headquarters in Tanza. They investigated
them under circumstances that place into serious doubt their impartiality and motive.

The presence of details in the confessions of appellants were considered by the trial court as
evidence that the confessions were voluntarily made. An examination of the confession earlier
executed by De los Reyes shows that the details in the questioned confessions of appellants were
culled from the said confession of De los Reyes.

The high point in deciding this case is the respect which must be accorded the constitutional rights of
custodial prisoners at the time they are subjected to interrogation and their subsequent execution of
an extra-judicial confession, was there really a confession or admission during the
custodial investigation? Were they informed of their rights? We find no affirmative answers to
these questions. It appears that the appellants were not informed of their constitutional rights and,
even assuming that they were so informed, there is no indication that they understood those rights.

We gave emphasis to these points in recent cases, to wit:

When the Constitution requires a person under investigation to be informed of his rights to remain
silent and to counsel, it must be presumed to contemplate the transmission of meaningful information
rather than just the ceremonial and perfunctory recitation of an abstract constitutional principle. As a
rule, therefore, it would not be sufficient for a police officer just to repeat to the person under
investigation the provisions of Section 20, Article IV of the Constitution. He is not only duty-bound to
tell the person the rights to which the latter is entitled: he must also explain their effects in practical
terms, e.g., what the person under interrogation may or may not do, and in a language the subject
fairly understands.

In Reyes vs. Quizo 5 We took time to elucidate on this viz.

In other words, the right of a person under interrogation "to be informed' implies a correlative
obligation on the part of the police investigator to explain, and contemplates an effective
communication that results in understanding what is conveyed. Short of this, there is a denial of the
right, as it cannot truly be said that the person has been 'informed' of his rights. Now, since the right to
be informed' implies comprehension, the degree of explanation required will necessarily vary,
depending upon the education, intelligence and other relevant personal circumstances of the
person under investigation. Suffice it to say that a simpler and more lucid explanation is needed
where the subject is unlettered.

The trial court relied on the testimony of the police investigators that the appellants have been
informed of their fundamental rights but failed to take note of the conspicuous absence of any
lawyer to assist the accused during the custodial investigation. Even assuming that the accused
waived their constitutional right to counsel, there is no indication that they did so with the assistance
of counsel. The testimony of the accused during the trial of this case supports Our observation, to wit:

Atty. Abaya:

Q. Do you know who conducted the investigation?

A. The police.

Q. When you were investigated by the police were you assisted by counsel of your choice?

A. No, sir.

Q. Did they inform you that you have the right to counsel?

A. No, sir.

Q. And did they manifest to you that they will give you a lawyer to assist you in your investigation?

A. No, sir.

Q. Despite the absence of a lawyer, did you give a statement to the police investigator?

A. No, sir. I did not give (a) statement. 6

Atty. Abaya:

Q. You did not give a statement to the police investigator?

A. I was just asked to sign the document.

Q. Why did you sign the document?

A. I signed it because I was being threatened by the police.

Q. What kind of threat did the police exert on your person?

A. They told me that if I will not sign the document, they are going to salvage me.7

The prosecution witness, Sgt. Esmeraldo G. Romero, testified:

Atty. Bince:

Q. In short, when you told him of his right to counsel, there was no lawyer present, is that correct?
A. Yes, sir.

Q. When you told him that the statement that he will give might be used against him, you told that
without the presence of the lawyer, is that correct?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. When he refused allegedly the assistance of counsel there was no counsel around, is that also
correct?

A. Yes, sir.8

Atty. Bince:

Q. You said you investigated also Novelito Sotto. During your investigation of him there was no lawyer
present. Is that correct?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. When you told him he can avail (of) the services of a lawyer, there was no lawyer present. Is that
correct?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. In short in both the custodial investigation of Armando de los Reyes and Novelito Sotto there was
no lawyer present to assist them?

A. Yes, sir. 9

Very relevant to this case is the pronouncement of this Court in Morales vs. Ponce Enrile, 10 reiterated
in People vs. Galit 11 and People vs. Lumayok, 12 where this Court categorically stated that the
waiver by the accused of his right to counsel must be made in the presence and with the assistance
of counsel.

We stressed the inadmissibility of extra-judicial confessions obtained in violation of this principle:

At the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting officer to inform him of the reason
for the arrest and he must be shown the warrant of arrest, if any, He shall be informed of his
constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel, and that any statement he might make could be
used against him. The person arrested shall have the right to communicate with his lawyer, a relative,
or anyone he chooses by the most expedient means by telephone if possible or by letter or
messenger. It shall be the responsibilityof the arresting officer to see to it that this is accomplished. No
custodial investigation shall be conducted unless it be in the presence of counsel engaged by the
person arrested, by any person on his behalf, or appointed by the court upon petition either of the
detainee himself of by anyone on his behalf. The right to counsel may be waived but the waiver shall
not be valid unless made with the assistance of counsel. Any statement obtained in violation of the
procedure herein laid, whether exculpatory or inculpatory in whole or in part, shall be inadmissible in
evidence. (Emphasis supplied.) 13

In People vs. Lumayok, 14 this Court made the following observation —

No custodial investigation shall be conducted unless it be in the presence of counsel engaged by

the person arrested by any person on his behalf or appointed by the court upon petition either of the
detainee himself or by anyone on his behalf. The right to counsel may be waived but the waiver shall
not be valid unless made with the assistance ofcounsel. Any statement obtained in violation of the
procedure herein laid down whether exculpatory or inculpatory in whole or in part shall be
inadmissible in evidence. (Emphasis supplied).

The second error submitted by the appellants is that the extra-judicial confessions offered in
evidence were obtained in violation of Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, the
fundamental law in force and effect at the time of their arrest. Even assuming that the accused were
informed of their right to remain silent, there is no showing that the appellants fully understood the
same.
The assertion made by the police investigators to the effect that the appellants were informed of
their fundamental rights will not overthrow the fact that appellants were not assisted by counsel
during the custodial investigation even if they had waived the right. The fact that the appellants were
never assisted by counsel during the custodial investigation is confirmed in the testimony of
prosecution witness Sgt. Esmeraldo Romero.

From the foregoing, it clearly appears that the Tanza, Cavite police investigators informed the
accused-appellants Ferdinand Camalog and Novelito Sotto about their constitutional rights in a
rather sloopy manner. The type of questions and answers recited in their extra-judicial confessions is
Identical to that of their co-accused Armando de los Reyes. There was not even a semblance of
conformity with the fundamental law.

Of course, the trial court put emphasis on the testimony of prosecution rebuttal witness John Leo
Alabado that at about 5:00 o'clock in the morning of June 17, 1985 on his way to the residence of
Bayani Bocalan, he saw the three (3) persons coming out of the victim's house. He identified the
appellants to be among the three. 15

This witness was presented by the prosecution when its witness Bayani Bocalan failed to appear and
accused De los Reyes denied the participation of the appellants in the commission of the offense. It
took this witness over a year to report what he saw. And instead of reporting the same to the police
authorities he conveniently allegedly reported what he supposedly saw to the victim's father who
was then looking for witnesses. He appeared in court without a subpoena. The sudden emergence of
this witness at the closing stages of the case is, to say the least, suspicious. A reading of the transcript
of his testimony, shows how incredible it can be. He remembers the exact day he saw appellants. He
did not notice any startling occurrence to remember said date and the identities of appellants so
vividly. He met Francisco Malabanan, the father of the victim, for the first time in April 1986 when he
revealed what he knew allegedly because his conscience bothered him. It was Malabanan who
brought him to court to testify.

Bayani Bocalan, who was the witness who identified De lo Reyes and saw his two companions, was
never presented by the prosecution. Such wilful suppression of evidence gives rise to the presumption
that if presented the same would prove to be adverse to the prosecution. 16

Moreover as argued by appellants, the testimony of Alabado was improper for rebuttal. It should
have been presented at the time the prosecution was presenting its evidence on direct examination.

The Solicitor General does not share the enthusiasm of the trial court in accepting the testimony of
this witness. He argues, however that the extra-judicial confessions of appellants are sufficient to
establish their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The Court finds otherwise. With the inadmissibility of the
extra-judicial confessions of appellants, their conviction becomes baseless. They are entitled to an
acquittal.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cavite in Criminal Case No. TM-140 dated
September 30, 1986 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE as to the defendants-appellants and another
judgment is hereby rendered ACQUITTING defendants-appellants FERDINAND CAMALOG and
NOVELITO SOTTO with costs de oficio. This Decision is immediately executory.

SO ORDERED
G.R. No. L-65674 April 15, 1988
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.DANILO B. CAPULONG

This is an appeal interposed by accused Danilo B. Capulong from the decision of the Regional Trial
Court, 4th Judicial Region, Santa Cruz, Laguna, Branch XXVI finding him guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of violating Section 4, Article II of Republic Act 6425, the Dangerous Drugs Act of the 1972 as
amended and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P
20,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, with all the accessory penalties
provided by law, and to pay the costs.
The information filed against Capulong alleged:
That on or about October 14, 1982 in the afternoon at Brgy. Santissima, Municipality of Santa Cruz,
Republic of the Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above- named
accused, without lawful authority and not being authorized by law, did then and there, wilfully and
feloniously, sell six (6) small transparent plastic bags of dried marijuana, leaves in the amount of FIFTY
(P 50.00) PESOS, to a poseur buyer without any authority or license to sell Id marijuana, which is a
prohibited drug in Violation of Sec. 4, Art. II, of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended. (p. 8,
Rollo)
When arraigned, the appellant pleaded not guilty. Thereafter, trial ensued.

The prosecution's evidence which formed the basis for the appellant's conviction can be summarized
as follows:
On October 14, 1982, a special mission of the Constabulary Anti-Narcotics Unit composed of Sgt. Lino
Jarilla as head, Sgt. Adjare Jasani and Patrolman Reynaldo Resurreccion as members proceeded to
Santissima Cruz, Santa Cruz, Laguna to conduct a "buy bust" operation for the purpose of
apprehending pushers who are engaged in the selling of marijuana. Their specific assignment was to
locate Danilo Capulong, the accused-appellant who was the alleged number one pusher in the sale
of marijuana in Santa Cruz, Laguna. The team arrived at Santissima Cruz at about 1:00 o'clock in the
afternoon of the same day. With them was an informant, Larry Estacio. The informant was given
instructions to contact the accused after which the team positioned themselves at strategic places.
Estacio then approached Capulong pretending to buy marijuana leaves for himself. Capulong
agreed to sell six (6) plastic bags of dried marijuana for the price of P 50.00 winch was paid by
Estacio. The transaction was witnessed by the team so that immediately after Capulong received the
marked money (P 50.00) from Estacio, the former arrested Capulong. With Capulong at the time was
Bernardo Paynaganan who was also charged for violation of section 8, Art. II of the Dangerous Drugs
Act (Criminal Case No. SC-2816 of the Regional Trial Court, Santa Cruz, Laguna).
Found in the possession of Capulong was the marked money, a fifty peso bill with serial No. JF
247521, while one stick of marijuana was found in the possession of Paynaganan.
Capulong was brought to the headquarters at Calamba, Laguna where he was investigated.
Thereafter, he executed an extra-judicial confession admitting his guilt. After a laboratory
examination at the PC Laboratory, the bags containing dried leaves were found positive for
marijuana.
On his part, Capulong's defense is summarized as follows:

On October 14, 1982 at about 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon, he was with Bernardo Paynaganan in
Aling Nelia's store watching a basketball game in a vacant lot when Larry Estacio, who was drunk,
arrived. Estacio was holding a fifty peso (P 50.00) bill, and asked Capulong and Paynaganan if they
had marijuana to which they replied in the negative. Estacio then left but returned a few minutes
later carrying with him six (6) plastic bags of marijuana and one (1) stick of marijuana. After giving the
stick of marijuana to Paynaganan, Estacio left.

A little later, Estacio returned with CANU officials riding in a jeep and Paynaganan and Capulong
were immediately handcuffed.

The defense also tried to prove that Capulong was maltreated several times by the investigators
forcing him to sign an extra-judicial confession admitting his guilt. In addition, he asserted that his
pieces of jewelry amounting to P 3,000.00, his new Adidas pair of shoes worth P 500.00 and his Zeppo
lighter worth P 80.00 were taken by investigator, Lino Jarilla.

The trial court gave credence to the prosecution's evidence and rejected that of the appellant.
Accordingly, Capulong was found guilty as charged.

The issues raised in this appeal can be categorized into the following: (1) whether or
not the extrajudicial confession of Capulong is admissible in the light of the force,
duress and intimidation which allegedly attended the execution thereof and 2)
credibility of the witnesses.

The records are clear to the effect that the extrajudicial confession of Capulong was made without
the assistance of counsel. Therefore, applying our pronouncements in the case of People v. Benigno
Pineda y Dimatulac, (G.R. No. 72400, January 15, 1988), this issue has become academic. We said:

A discussion of the alleged coercion and intimidation in the first assigned error has become
academic with the change in the Bill of Rights of the 1987 Constitution regarding the rights of the
accused. Article 3, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution specifically provides that the rights of the
accused, among them the right to counsel, cannot be waived except in writ and in the presence of
counsel. Thus, even if the confession of the accused is gospel truth, since it was made without
assistance of counsel, it becomes inadmissible in evidence regardless of the absence of coercion or
even if it had been voluntarily given.
After a careful examination of the records, however, we find no reason to depart from the trial court's
appreciation of the evidence of the prosecution and that of the defense.

On the credibility of the witnesses, the well-settled rule is that the trial court's findings are accorded
the highest degree of respect, it being in the position to observe the demeanor and manner of
testifying of the witnesses (People v. de Jesus, 145 SCRA 521).

In the instant case, the guilt of the accused was proven beyond reasonable doubt. He was caught in
flagrante delicto by the CANU officers who were then on a mission to conduct a "buy bust" operation
for the purpose of apprehending marijuana pushers in Santissima, Santa Cruz, Laguna. What the
team did was to employ ways and means of entrapping and catching him in flagrante. The three
CANU officers were eyewitnesses to the crime committed by the appellant. We give credence to the
narration of the incident by the three officers of the team because they are law enforcers and are,
therefore, presumed to have regularly performed their duty in the absence of proof to the contrary
(People v. Gamayon, 121 SCRA 642; People v. Patog, 144 SCRA 429; People v. Natipravat, 145 SCRA
483; People v. de Jesus, 145 SCRA 521). The testimonies of the prosecution witnesses were accepted
by the trial court as credible. Going over the details of said testimonies, we see no reason not to
follow the conclusions of the trial court.

Moreover, the record does not show that the CANU officers who were responsible for the appellant's
entrapment were motivated by any improper motives other than to accomplish their mission (See
People vs. De Jesus, supra.)

The appellant alleges that he was a victim of a pre-planned extortion. To prove his allegation. The
appellant cites the following circumstances: The complaint against him was filed only on October 20,
1982, six days after his arrest; that the complaint was filed without any supporting documents;
affidavits of the accused were attached only on October 21, 1982; the alleged marijuana leaves
were submitted for laboratory examination only on October 27, 1982 or after a period of 13 days from
the arrest of the accused and 7 days or the complaint was filed. These delays according to the
appellant were for the purpose of extorting money from him and his relatives especially his
half-sister who was the common-law wife of a rich Chinese businessman. Thus, the appellant alleges
that the filing of the complaint was completed only on October 27, 1982, after his sister failed to see
Patrolman Resurreccion for the delivery of the money being demanded from the appellant in
exchange for his freedom.

We are not inclined to believe his extortion angle of the case. As the lower court said:

In his attempt to weaken the evidence of the prosecution, the accused tried to prove that, in the
course of the investigation, investigating officials, particularly a certain Pat. Reynaldo Resurreccion of
the INP was extorting P 30,000.00 from him in order to fix the case and that for their failure to raise the
necessary amount, this case was fabricated against him. Be that as it may, that the investigator was
extorting from the accused does not disprove the commission of the crime. In fact, it is even an
admission of a crime. Why would anybody extort from another unless there is a case to be fixed?
Bernardo Paynaganan, one of the witnesses for the accused, testified and was corroborated by
Violets Osano that the CANU officials were asking the sum of P 30,000.00, but according to Violeta,
she was not able to raise said amount and the case had already been filed. If it were true that the
accused was not actually engaged in any illegal activity selling prohibited drugs, the demand could
have been rejected outright and they could have reported the matter to the higher authorities.
While Violeta Osano alleged to have gone to Colonel Antonio to denounce the actuation of
Resurreccion, she testified that she did not want to be responsible for the suspension of said officer
from his work, because she had observed Resurreccion's poor economic condition. Between
Resurreccion and her own brother, the accused in this case, it is against human nature that she
would think of the effect of Resurreccion's suspension on his future life and disregard the would be
effect on that of her brother. Contrary to her allegation that the case was filed because they had
failed to produce the required amount, she testified on cross that on October 20, she already knew
about the case filed before the municipal court. Despite that fact, she mentioned having gone to
Resurreccion's place on the 24th of said month but Resurreccion was not in his place at that time (tsn
May 16, 1983, pp. 19-20). Another witness for the defense Bernardo Paynaganan, the companion of
the accused at the time of the apprehension by the CANU officers, claimed that he was not able to
produce the amount because he is only a fisherman. (p. 25-27, Rollo)

Finally, the appellant questions the non-presentation of Larry Estaclo, the informant used by the
CANU officers in entrapping him in flagrante. The number of witnesses to be presented and the
nature of the facts to be established during the examination of those witnesses is a discretionary
function of the prosecution.

The non-presentation of Estacio as witness is not fatal to the prosecution's case. His testimony would
be merely corroborative and cumulative (See People v. Cerelegia 147 SCRA 538).

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DISMISSED. The questioned decision of the Regional Trial Court, 4th
Judicial District, Santa Cruz, Laguna, Branch XXVI is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan (Chairman), Feliciano, Bidin and Cortes, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 78692 December 8, 1988

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.ANTONIO LAGAHAN Y RUBASTO

The killing of an 84-year old Chinese woman, Lim Sy, and the robbery of P7,000.00 from her residence
in the early morning of 2 May 1985 led to the filing of an Information for Robbery with Homicide
against the accused Antonio Lagahan y Rubasto Having been convicted and sentenced to reclusion
perpetua by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 85, Quezon City, * the accused has interposed the
present appeal.

The evidence for the prosecution discloses that at the time of the incident, Appellant, a native of
Leyte, along with other employees, was employed in the Pag-asa Bakery managed and operated
by one Ramon Jacinto Tan, a grandson of the victim.

On 1 May 1985, Appellant asked his employer for permission to take a vacation from 1 May to 16
May 1985 and for a cash advance of P 400.00 after which he left the bakery at around 7:30 P.M. of
said date, the lst of May.

The bakery is located at 122 Road I, Bagong Pag-asa, Quezon City. It was also in the same place
where the victim lived with her grandson Ramon. In the evening of 1 May, the victim slept inside her
room near the kitchen at the ground floor of the bakery while Ramon and his employees occupied
their respective rooms, except for Appellant who had, as previously stated, left for a vacation.

At around 1:00-2:00 o'clock in the early morning of 2 May 1985, Councilman Crisanto Tongol, who was
sleeping in his house located in front of the bakery, was awakened by the call of a Barangay Tanod
who told them that a person was sprawled near the gate of the bakery. Tongol rushed to the place
where he saw the gate slightly opened and the victim lying prostrate by the gate. He shouted for
Ramon and woke him up. The latter saw his grandmother with several stab wounds on different parts
of her body and profusely bleeding from the back of her head. He also noticed that her room had
been ransacked and the drawer where he used to keep his daily earnings from the bakery was
forcibly opened and P7,000.00 was missing. Ramon and the Barangay Tanod rushed the victim to the
hospital but she died upon arrival thereat.

The autopsy report disclosed that the victim had suffered contusions on her head and several stab
wounds on different parts of her body.

Investigation by the police authorities confirmed the forcible opening of the drawer and the
scattering of its contents. Further investigation disclosed that at about 1:00-2:00 o'clock in the early
morning of 2 May 1985, Appellant was at the Mirales Restaurant not too far away from the bakery. He
ordered a cup of coffee, which was served by the waitress. prosecution witness Rose Nipal. Rose
noticed that Appellant was uneasy and was constantly changing places inside the restaurant. Rose
knew him by face even before them because he used to pass by the restaurant. After a while, at
about 2:00 A.M., Appellant left.

His whereabouts traced to Naval, Leyte, where Appellant and his live-in-partner, Julita Mahilum had
gone on 5 May 1985, Appellant was subsequently apprehended at Julita's residence and taken to
Tacloban City for investigation together with Julita. The latter, assisted by a CLAO lawyer, voluntarily
gave a written statement (Exhibits "F" to "F-8") wherein she declared that Appellant had admitted to
her that lie had killed the victim. Confronted with the statement, Appellant readily admitted that he
had really killed and robbed the victim of P7,000.00. Appellant was thereafter taken to Quezon City
for further investigation.

In his written statement in the Visayan dialect executed on 12 June 1985 (Exhibits "C" to "C-8")
Appellant admitted that he had hit the victim with a piece of hard wood known as "bakawan" and
stabbed her several times with a 6-inch long kitchen knife given to him by Mario Cuesta, his former
co-employee at the bakery but who had since transferred to another bakery. Picked up by
investigators for questioning, Cuesta admitted that he had, indeed, given a knife to Appellant.

A re-enactment of the crime was conducted at the scene thereof on 12 June 1985 during which
Appellant demonstrated how he entered the gate of the bakery, struck the victim with a piece of
wood, stabbed her with a knife, ransacked the drawer, and thereafter left the place (Exhibits "H", "I"
"J", "K", & "L").

On 15 July 1986, when Julita was scheduled to testify as a prosecution witness, Appellant, when
placed on the witness stand, and with the assistance of counsel, changed his plea to one of Guilty
and admitted before the Court that he had really killed and robbed the victim. He declared that on
the night of the incident he went to the victim's house to get his belongings but that the victim got
mad at him; that he was forced to kill the victim with the use of a knife about six (6) inches long; that
he also hit her with a piece of hard wood several times on the nape. He also admitted that Julita
Mahilum was his live-in partner. lie only begged for a reduction of his sentence (t.s.n., July 15, 1986,
pp. 2-8). Notwithstanding Appellant's admissions, the Court refrained from imposing sentence on the
date and instead reset the trial to the next day to give him time to reflect on the consequences of his
change of plea. On the date reset, Appellant again admitted killing the victim but this time claimed
that he did not take any money from the drawer (t.s.n., July 16, 1986, p. 2). As a result, the Court
rejected the Guilty plea and continued with the trial.

In his defense, appellant maintained that on I May 1985, at around 7:00 P.M., he left the bakery where
he was working. In the evening of 1 May, he was in Marikina, watched TV, and did not leave that
place. He left for Leyte on 5 May 1985 and stayed at Villa Consuelo, Naval, Leyte, for two weeks until
he was arrested in the house of his live-in partner, Julita, on 11 June 1985. When he was investigated
in Tacloban City he told the authorities that he knew nothing about the killing. He did not sign any
statement in Leyte. From Leyte he was taken to Quezon City where he was detained, investigated
and forced to sign a written statement (Exhibits "B", "B-1", "C" to "C-8") without knowing its contents. He
denied having taken coffee in the early morning of 2 May at the Mirales Restaurant alleging that he
was then already sleeping in Marikina. As to the admissions he made in open Court, he explained
that he did so because he had long been suffering in jail. He admitted having re-enacted the
commission of the offense before the authorities but repeated that he did so because of said
suffering. Finally, he denied having robbed the victim of P7,000.00 claiming that he was able to save
P2,000.00 while under the employ of the bakery.

Sifting the evidence thus adduced, the Trial Court concluded, with moral certainty, that Appellant
was guilty of' Robbery with Homicide and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua;
to pay the heirs of the victim the sum of P7,000.00 as actual damages; and P30,000.00 as moral
damages, plus costs.

Now ascribed by Appellant to the Trial Court are the following errors:

I. The Trial Court erred in admitting the extra-judicial confession of the accused appellant
(Exhibits C to C-8) as evidence against him.

II. The Trial Court erred in convicting the accused-appellant of the special complex crime of
robbery with homicide when only the crime of homicide. was established by evidence.

The first assigned error is persuasive. The requirements of the law on custodial investigation, as
amplified by Jurisprudence in a string of cases, were not met when Appellant's extra-judicial
confession was taken on 12 June 1985 (Exhibit "B"). The appraisal of Appellant's constitutional rights
was, at best, perfunctory. At no point in time does it even appear that Appellant was assisted by
counsel. And even if he had waived his right to counsel, the waiver is invalid absent any showing
that-it was made with counsel's assistance. Accordingly, the said extrajudicial confession must be
held inadmissible in evidence.

Be that as it may, even without said extrajudicial confession, there is sufficient evidence establishing
Appellant's guilt beyond peradventure of doubt. Not only has circumstantial evidence been furnished
by credible and unbiased prosecution witnesses but also, Appellant himself, during the 15 July 1986
hearing, admitted his guilt, Although he retracted the same subsequently on 12 August 1986, his
retraction cannot prevail over other evidence on record. That he was in the vicinity of the crime was
testified to by Rose Nipal the waitress in the Mirales Restaurant. That he had, in fact, hit the victim with
a piece of wood is confirmed by tile contusions oil the parietal and frontal region of the victim's head
as shown by the medico-legal report (Exhibit "G"). That he had used a knife to stab the victim is
likewise borne out by the three stab wounds that the victim had suffered on the neck, the left
umbilical region, and the left lumbar region; by a lacerated wound in the right ear; and an incised
wound on the left arm (ibid.). That he had used such weapon in assaulting the victim is further
established by Mario Cuesta who admitted having given him that knife. That he was in Marikina in the
early morning of 2 May 1985 when the killing occurred is an uncorroborated alibi. Besides, even if it
were so, it does not prove that he could not have been at the scene of the crime at the time of its
commission, transportation between Marikina and Quezon City being readily accessible. That he
had killed the victim was further corroborated by his live-in partner, Julita, who testified that Appellant
had so confided to her That also accounted for their sudden trip to Leyte on 5 May, and his not having
reported back to work on 17 May after his vacation. Appellant's sudden departure a few days after
the incident is clear evidence of flight. "The guilty flees even if no one pursuit, but the innocent stands
as brave as a lion" (People vs. Aragona, L-43752, September 19, 1985, 138 SCRA 571).

The crime committed is Robbery with Homicide. The homicide was committed by reason, or on the
occasion, of the robbery. Appellant's claim that he killed the victim because she had maltreated him
(t.s.n., July 16, 1986, p. 7) is farfetched. It is inconceivable that a defenseless 84-year old woman
could have inflicted harm on him. Neither was there any more reason for him to go back to the
bakery that fateful night except to rob and kill, considering that he had already asked for permission
to go on vacation and had received a cash advance. Ramon Tan, the victim's grandson also
testified that on his return from the hospital he immediately went to his grandmother's room and
found the drawer opened, the keys scattered and cash amounting to P7,000.00 representing the
day's earnings missing from the drawer where it was kept (t.s.n., August 7, 1985, p. 9).

Appellant's claim that he had saved P2,000.00 while in the employ of the victim (t.s.n., August 12,
1986, pp. 9-10) and, therefore, need not have committed robbery, cannot be given credence
because if he really did have that sum there would have been no need for him to have asked for a
cash advance of P400.00 before leaving for a vacation.

Julita Mahilum's testimony further confirmed the fact that Appellant took the money. She testified that
he showed to him the P7,000.00 while they were in Manila and while on board the boat (t.s.n., July 23,
1986, p. 9). Part of the money was placed in his wallet and the rest in a traveling bag (t.s.n., Ibid.).
Appellant's bare denial cannot prevail over Julita's positive declarations specially since no ill motive
could be imputed to her for testifying against Appellant. On the contrary, considering their personal
relationship, it would have been more in the natural order of things for her to have shielded Appellant
by, at the very least, keeping silent.

We thus conclude that Appellant's guilt of the crime of Robbery with Homicide has been proven
beyond reasonable doubt.

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED, with costs against accused-
appellant, Antonio Lagahan y Rubasto.

SO ORDERED.

Paras, Padilla, Sarmiento and Regalado, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-22345 October 10, 1924

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS vs FELIPE DIÑO, ET AL.,
The Court of First Instance of Samar sentenced the appellants to be imprisoned for ten years and one
day of presidio mayor, with the accessories prescribed by law, to indemnify Casimiro Abria jointly and
severally in the sum of P10, and to pay the costs.
The defendants are charged with the crime of arson committed, according to the complaint, as
follows:

That on or about midnight of the 4th of May, 1923, in the sitio of Capipian, barrio of Lope de Vega,
municipality of Catarman, Province of Samar, Philippine Islands, and within the jurisdiction of this
court, the above named defendants with premeditation and confederating together, provided
themselves with dynamite and criminally place it and cause the same to explode on the door of the
house inhabited by Casimiro Abria and his family, which dynamite or explosive substance exploded
and burnt the ceiling of said house; as a result of which a part of said house was destroyed; the
damage caused not exceeding 6,250 pesetas.

Contrary to law.

The appellants pray for the reversal of the judgment appealed from, while the Attorney-General
prays for the modification thereof in the sense that the penalty of from four months and twenty-one
days to six months of arresto mayor be imposed upon the defendants, under the provision of article
557, paragraph 1, of the Penal Code.

After a careful study of the record, we are of the opinion, and so hold, that the guilt of the
defendants does not appear duly proven beyond a reasonable doubt, as is required for the
imposition of the penalty fixed by the law.

There is in the record no direct evidence of the commission of the crime by the defendants. None of
the witnesses has seen the dynamite which, it is said, they caused to explode in the house of the
offended Casimiro Abria. Indeed the Attorney-General says in his brief: "It is true that none of the
witnesses for the prosecution has seen the defendants Felipe Diño and Fortunato Lauristo on the night
of May 4, 1923, at the act of firing the dynamite that set fire to the ceiling of the house of Casimiro
Abria and unnailed several boards from its wall, but the circumstances of record in this case are so
clear and conclusive that no other conclusion is possible than that the herein appellants Felipe Diño
and Fortunato Lauristo were the authors of the explosion that caused a part of the ceiling of the
house of Casimiro Abria to burn."

What are these circumstances? They are made to consists in the facts testified to by Andres Borca
and Enrique Horogon.

The witness Andres Borca says that about the month of February, 1923, the accused Felipe Diño
proposed to him to cause a dynamite to explode in the house of Casimiro Abria, telling him, "Andres
there is a dynamite here; fire it in the house of Casimiro Abria," which the witness refused to do,
because he did not known how to fire a dynamite. This seems to indicate the guilt of the accused
Felipe Diño; but if it is considered that the testimony of the witness Borca is not corroborated in any
manner and is denied by the accused Felipe Diño, and that Borca has not seen any dynamite or
other explosive substance in Felipe's possession, it cannot be said in reason that his testimony
constitutes a strong and conclusive evidence of guilt of the accused Felipe Diño.

The witness Enrique Horogon says that he was invited by Gabriel Diño on the night of the 4th of May,
1923, to go out fishing on a boat. This witness says, further, that upon their arrival at the place known
as Iraya of the barrio of Lope de Vega his companions left them on the boat; that then he heard an
explosion and a little later the accused came back in a hurry to the boat and in their return Felipe
Diño warned him not to reveal to anybody that he (Felipe Diño) had ordered the accused Lauristo to
fire a dynamite in the house of Casimiro Abria.

But is it true that Horogon was invited by Gabriel Diño on the night in question to go out on a boat
with the defendants up to the place known as Iraya? The record does not disclose any confirmation
of the testimony of Horogon; on the contrary it is denied by the Diño defendants and the
circumstances of the voyage on the boat and of the warning that Horogon puts in the mouth of Felipe
make it completely incredible. If after all, Horogon had no part to perform in connection with the
supposed igniting of the dynamite, what necessity did the accused have to take him on the boat? If
Horogon, at any rate, did not know where the defendants went after they had left him on the boat,
nor did he see Lauristo fire the dynamite in the house of Abria, what necessity did Felipe have to
caution him not to tell anything about what they (the defendants) had done? By instinct the criminal
avoids the presence of witnesses who may denounce the commission of the crime; and the case
now related by the witness Horogon is so rare that without a strong corroboration, as is the case here,
we cannot believe it. And upon this ground, the case must be dismissed as to the defendant Gabriel
Diño.

The fact itself of the explosion of the dynamite related by the offended Abria is not free from doubt.
According to this witness, at about midnight of May 4, 1923, while he was sleeping in company with
eight persons in his house situated in the sitio of Capipian, barrio of Lope de Vega, municipality of
Catarman, Province of Samar, he was awakened by a strong explosion, which he supposed had
burst out in his house; he immediately stood up, and went to the place where he believed the
explosion had taken place, and found a part of the wall that was contiguous to the door destroyed,
and the ceiling of the house burning; he called his servant and both of them succeeded in putting
out the fire. As a result of said explosion, the hemp fiber baled and deposited behind the main door
of the house was scattered and a part of the ceiling, which was of anahaw, burnt, thus presenting a
hole which was one foot in diameter, four boards having been unnailed and a hole made on the
wooden floor. On the next day he reported the matter to the municipal president of Catarman who
repaired to the place of the event and saw that the damage caused by the explosion would
amount to P10. According to the testimony of the witness Abria the explosion seems to have taken
place on the exterior part of his house near the main door, destroying the wall contiguous to the door
through which it entered, scattering the hemp fiber which was baled and deposited behind said
door, and unnailing four boards of the wall; but such a hypothesis cannot be reconciled with the fact
of an opening one foot in diameter having been made on the wooden floor of the house, and
another of equal size on the ceiling of anahaw, unless it is granted that the explosion was so strong
that a part of the explosive was thrown against the unnailed boards, another part against the floor,
making an opening thereon, and still another against the ceiling. But then it cannot be explained
how the eight persons who were sleeping in the same room, which contained an area of only about
12 square brazas and formed one single compartment, did not suffer the slightest injury.

Without the necessity of expounding other hypotheses which may be drawn from the testimony of
Abria, and taking into account that the same witnesses, Borca and Horogon, have not seen any
dynamite in possession of the defendants, or in those of Felipe, Diño, or in the boat on the night in
question, we conclude that if the circumstances stated by said witnesses indicate anything, they are
not so convincing or conclusive as to establish the guilt of the defendants beyond a reasonable
doubt.

According to Rule 52 of the Provincial Law for the Application of the Provisions of the Penal Code, in
order that a conviction may be sustained upon circumstantial evidence alone, it is necessary , first,
that the circumstances be more than one; second, that the facts upon which they are based be
proven; and third, that, taken together, they convince the mind in such a manner as not to leave
any room for reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused in the natural and ordinary course of
things. And this is substantially the same rule established by the jurisprudence of this court. (U. S. vs.
Perez, 2 Phil., 171; U. S. vs. Douglass, 2 Phil., 461; U. S. vs. Reyes, 3 Phil., 3; U. S. vs. Villos, 6 Phil., 510.)

For all of the foregoing, the judgment appealed from must be reversed, and the appellants Felipe
Diño and Fortunato Lauristo be, as they are hereby, acquitted with the costs de oficio. So ordered.

G.R. No. L-31866 November 7, 1979

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. Carlos Caramonte
G.R. No. L-31866 November 7, 1979
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
CARLOS CARAMONTE, defendant-appellant.
Victorino U. Montecillo for appellant,
Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza Assistant Solicitor General Jaime M. Lantin and Solicitor Reynato
S. Puno for appellee.

ABAD SANTOS, J:
On December 31, 1967, armed men sacked two places in Negros Occidental: Toboso town in the
early morning; and Cadiz City in the evening. For the raid on Toboso, the Circuit Criminal Court at
Bacolod City, in Criminal Case No. CCC-XII-27, found the accused Carlos Caramonte guilty of
robbery in band with multiple homicide and less serious physical injuries, and sentenced him to
death. But for the raid on Cadiz City the Court of First Instance, Branch I, at Silay City, in Criminal Case
No. 690, acquitted the same accused Caramonte. 'This is an appeal from the judgment of
conviction.
At the time the trial of this case started, of the several accused mentioned in the Third Amended
Information, all were at large except Ricardo Cañete and Caramonte. Trial proceeded against these
two; but before the prosecution rested its case, it move that the case be dismissed against Cañete,
on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. There was no objection on the part of the accused, and
the court dismissed the case against Cañete. Hence, the case proceeded only as against the
accused Caramonte.
One witness — Luciano Salinas — testified for the prosecution in both cases. In Criminal Case No. 690,
which resulted in the judgment of acquittal, Salinas was discharged to become a state witness. In the
instant case, he testified that he resides at Sitio Amamansa, barrio Pasil, Bantayan, Cebu. This place is
found on the island of Botiguez, which is a part of Bantayan.
On December 30, 1967, at about 4:00 p. m., Salinas left his house for sitio Tunga to buy matches from
the store of one Agustin Cañete. When he arrived, he saw about ten meters away from the store, a
group compose of: Carlos Caramonte, Isabelo Montemayor, Florencio Tagsawa alias Turing, Tambok,
Boy, Kiampao, Cesar Cañete, Roberto Rivera, and Tatong Mansueto.
When Salinas approached the group squatting on the ground, he heard that they were planning to
stage robberies at Toboso and Cadiz City. Specifically, at arm's length, he heard Montemayor tell the
others: "We'll Rob Toboso and Cadiz City . " When he left the place, the group remained but later
they also went away. They divided into two groups and went to the seashore.
At about 5:00 p.m., Salinas reached home and went to the seashore. He watched while a group of
seven — Caramonte, Turing, Tambok, Mario, Boy, Ponyot, and Kiampao — boarded a yellow
pumpboat. He was about 40 to 50 meters away from the point of departure. He followed with his
eyes the progress of the boat until it was about four to five kilometers away.
The scenario shifts from Botiguez island to Toboso town which, on December 31, 1967, between 1:00
to 1:30 a.m., was the venue of a victory celebration for the newly-elected mayor and other town
officials held at the town plaza. One of those who abstained from participating in the celebration
was Lim Eng Yu, a merchant who preferred to go to sleep in his house located about 10 meters from
the plaza. At about 1:20 a.m., he was awakened by several, shots fired near the municipal building,
about 30 meters away. He peeped through the window and saw several men with carbines passing
through Del Pilar street. He hid himself, and then heard the front door being broken down with an
axe. After gaining entry, the malefactors broke the second door leading upstairs. They fired several
shots and destroyed the clothes closets. Lim did not recognize any one of the three or four persons
who broke into his house.
Together with Lim in his house at this time, were his daughter Elizabeth Lim, and two maids: Dioleta
Disol and Lolita Pahayahay. Lolita testified that when the three girls heard the sound of the axe upon
the door, they hid under the bed in the living room. The armed men espied Dioleta's feet sticking out
from under the bed. They pulled Dioleta out and dragged her downstairs. The band ordered them to
look for money, but the girls did not know where it could be found. Later, the band brought them to
the seashore, which is about half a kilometer's distance from the house. There they were released,
and they ran back home. After the marauders left, Lim found that they had broken his wooden safe
open and taken the amount of P2,600.00, as well as some pieces of jewelry.
At the time of the, robbery, at about 1:30 a.m., a group of policemen were taking a coffee break at
a store on Del Pilar ,street. this group was composed of: the Chief of Police Sgt. Charles Valencia, Pat.
Salustiano, Taganele, and Pat. Sotero Baynosa . As they left the store to go home, a burst of gunfire
exploded in the vicinity. The policemen, seeing that the band of malefactors were armed, sought
refuge in different places. The band gave chase to Pat. Baynosa. He testified that he ran towards the
market place and emerged only after one hour, after the band has disappeared. Baynosa found
Valencia's dead body at the municipal kiosk. He had been hit on the head by a bullet. The Chief of
Police directed Pat. Baynosa to investigate the robbery. The policeman went to Lim's house and
recovered: an axe; 29 pieces of .30 cal. shells; and one piece of live .45 cal. bullet.
At about the same time, between 1:30 to 2:00 a.m., Vivencio Rosales and his son. Nelson where inside
a bus Identified as Simwin No. 50. They were poised to go home after attending the victory ball. His
son took a seat near the bus driver. 'Then a person unknown to Vivencio approached the bus and
ordered the driver not to start the vehicle and not to put on the lights. When the driver, disregarding
the stranger's directive, started the bus, immediately afterwards an explosion occurred. After the first
explosion, Nelson was hit on the left side of the head and died five hours after arrival at the hospital.
The passenger beside Nelson, George Baynosa. was also hit and he died from the gunshot wound.
Dr. Enrique Guazon, Acting Municipal Health Officer of Toboso testified that at about 1:45 a.m., he
examined the cadaver of Sgt. Charles Valencia, and later issued a post mortem report. Dr. Gauzon
was of the opinion that death was caused by severe hemorrhage from the cerebral gunshot wound.
He testified that the wound was probably caused by a carbine, a Garand, or a Thompson. Dr.
Gauzon also examined the body of Nelson Rosales and arrived at the similar conclusion that the
cause of death was severe hemorrhage from a gunshot wound. Further, the doctor also examined
the cadaver of George Baynosa and found one bullet wound. He issued the opinion that the wounds
on the three cadavers he examined could have been caused by .38 or .45 cal. bullets.
Dr. Eusebio Respicio, Jr., a physician engaged in private practice, testified that he examined Lim
Katian at the Magdalene Hospital on December 31, 1967. Lim informed the doctor that he was shot
in Toboso; his wounds actually healed on the actually healed on the 11th day. The doctor turned
over the bullet to the PC.
After this telescopic view of the events Toboso we return to Botiguez island and find Salinas on the
day of the robbery, December 31, 1967, At about 6:00 a.m., he had climbed to the top of a coconut
tree in order to gather tuba. From this vantage point, at a distance of about 50 meters, he saw the
yellow pumpboat coming back to the seashore. He saw the pumpboat disgorge seven persons who
were Caramonte and his six other companions. The band proceeded towards barrio Pasil.
On the same day, at about 5:00 p.m., Salinas went to the cockpit. lie then went to buy tuba at the
house of Rosendo Cañete — his wife's relative — at barrio Silanga. In the yard he saw: Caramonte,
Isabelo Montemayor, Teofilo Mejia, Ronnie Boy, Boy, Mario, Turing, Tambok, Ponyot, Kiampao,
Liadring, and Panday. He heard Montemayor say: "Let's raid Cadiz" He then received an invitation
from Montemayor to join the raiding party. Although initially hesistant, Salinas accepted the invitation
and boarded a blue pumpboat with the others at the seashore of Tabunok. The left at 7:00 p.m., and
arrived at 9:00 p.m. at Cadez City.
Salinas stayed in the pumpboat while his 13 companions — including Caramonte — disembarked
with firearms. Salinas heard shots; after about 30 minutes, the group came back. While they were at
sea, he heard Boy groaning and complaining that he was wounded on his left thigh. Ronnie Boy was
also wounded on the left arm. They reached Amamansa at about 4:00 a.m. and brought the two
wounded men to Salinas's house. Montemayor gave him P30.00 as his share for the Cadiz adventure.
On January 3 and 5, 1968, the III PC Zone at Cebu City received a spot report from the PC at Negros
Occidental on the robbery with multiple homicide in Toboso. On January 9, 1968, Master Sgt. Sandy
Castañeda was assigned to lead the team for the investigation of the robberies at Toboso and Cadiz
City. The team interviewed Salinas and took down his affidavits. On January 20, 1968, past 5:00 a.m.,
Sgt. Castañeda went to the house of Rafael Escario at barrio Pasil, where he found Caramonte. He
was accompanied by Capt. Luis Panes and other soldiers of the PC at Negros Occidental. Capt.
Panes on the witness stand later confirmed the sergeant's story. The sergeant showed to Caramonte
the warrant of arrest issued by the judge of the Cadiz City Court. Caramonte argued as an alibi that
on the day of the robbery. on December 31, 1967, he took his oath as municipal councilor. -However.
the sergeant verified that Caramonte actually took his oath on a later day, and therefore effected
the arrest.
Judge Francisco Ledesma of the Cadiz City Court testified that before him, on January 23, 1968,
Caramonte subscribed his affidavit, marked as Exhibit "G"; and on January 24, 1968, another affidavit,
marked as Exhibit "H". In Exhibit "G", consisting of 12 pages, Caramonte raised the alibi that he stayed
at his residence, the house of Rafael Escario at barrio Pasil, Botiguez the whole day of December 30,
1967, until the afternoon of December 31, 1967, when he went to Silanga. Caramonte and a certain
Pat. Ramos brought Exhibit "G" to Judge Ledesma. The judge explained to Caramonte the contents
of affidavit, and advised him that he could make the necessary corrections. Accordingly,
Caramonte made about ten corrections on Exhibit "G".
In the affidavit marked as Exhibit "H", consisting of four pages, Carlos Caramonte admitted his
participation in the robberies at Toboso and Cadiz City. The accused also corrected Exhibit "H". judge
Fernando Uy Bontua of the municipal court of Toboso testified that before him, Caramonte
subscribed his affidavit, marked as Exhibit "F", on February 2, 1968. In this affidavit consisting of two
pages, Caramonte confessed his participation and acknowledged his receipt of P130.00 as his share
in the robbery at Toboso. Judge Bontua testified that Caramonte was alone when he brought the
affidavit to the judge's office. There were no policemen in the judge's chamber. The judge advised
Caramonte, in English, of his constitutional rights, and told him that he could correct the affidavit.
Accordingly, Caramonte made about seven corrections on both the original and the carbon copies
of the affidavit.
On February 2, 1968, Sgt. Castañeda went to Toboso for the re- enactment of the robbers,. He
testified that Caramonte agreed to the re-enactment, and that Caramonte played his role
voluntarily, without instruction from others. Sgt. Castañeda asserted that while he was present and
directed the photographer on the shots to be made, yet Caramonte voluntarily assumed different
positions during the re-enactment, and did not do so upon Castañeda's instructions.
The photographer. Samuel Villaflor, testified that while he was taking pictures of there enactment,
Caramonte voluntarily assumed different positions without force from any source.
The accused Caramonte, testifying in his own behalf, raised the defense of alibi. He testified that he is
a native of Botiguez island. He was informally adopted by Rafael Escario, who financed him through
the Cebu Institute of Technology until he earned the degree of Bachelor of Science in Commerce.
He then engaged in business, and in 1967 was elected No. 2 councilor of Bantayan.
Caramonte testified that on December 28, 1967, at about 10:00 a.m. he left Botiguez island by
pumpboat and arrived at Bantayan at 11:00 a.m. At 4:00 p.m. he went to the house of Mayor-elect
Jesus Escario — Rafael's nephew — to verify when their briefing session would be held, Caramonte
next went to the house of Dr. Surmillion, and then to the municipal building, and finally returned to
the house of Mayor Escario.
On December 30, 1967, at 10:00 a.m., he left for Botiguez island. He had lunch with Rafael Escario
and his wife. At 3:00 p.m., the barrio captain of Botiguez invited him and the Escario couple to the
celebration scheduled for December 31, 1967, at sitio Silanga. The celebration was partly in
Caramonte's honor as newly- elected councilor, and he accepted.
From the afternoon of December 30, 1967 up to noon of December 31, 1967, he stayed in Escario's
house, where he lived. At 3:00 p.m., he went to barrio Silanga to attend a cockfight. In the afternoon,
he learned that the oath-taking was to be held that night (December 31, 1967). But since he could
not take the pumpboat as low tide had set in and since he had to attend the celebration that
evening, he sent word that he would take his oath before the Mayor on January 2, 1968.
On December 31, 1967, at 9:00 p.m., he and the Escario couple went to barrio Silanga to attend the
affair sponsored by the barrio captain. He stayed at the dance hall from 9:00 p.m. to 5:00 a.m. the
next day, January 1, 1968, All during the night, he was at the dance hall, except only for one hour
when he had some snacks at the house of Mrs. Adela Cañete. Afterwards. he returned home to
barrio Pasil and stayed there the whole day. Caramonte took his oath as councilor on January 3,
1968.
Caramonte testified that on January 20, 1968, in the early morning, law enforcers led by Capt. Panes,
and including Sgt. Castañeda, showed him a warrant and effected his arrest. He was first brought to
Bantayan and then to Cadiz City, initially, he shared a cell with Agustin and Rosendo, both surnamed
Cañete, but later, the two men were transferred and Caramonte was left alone in the cell.
On January 21, 1968, at about 4:00 p.m., Sgt. Castañeda and others brought him to the radio room.
They asked him why he joined the robbery in Cadiz City, but he protested that he was at sitio Silanga
at the time of the robbery. They brought Salinas into the room, and he affirmed Caramonte's
participation. Caramonte testified that after Salinas left the room, Sgt. Castañeda ordered him to
take off his clothes and stand against the wall with both of his hands extended. Castañeda then
started punching him in the stomach. The other CIS agent also thrust his fingers into Caramonte's
stomach. Caramonte fell, but Castañeda ordered him to stand up and hit him with a flying kick on
the right shin Caramonte was wounded and fell down. He was told to stand up, only to be kicked
again on the left shin.
The Chief of Police pointed a gun to the right side of Caramonte's head and said: "If you will not tell
the truth, We'll kill you." Consequently, Caramonte said: "I will accept all what you are doing. ." He
was allowed to sit down but he was already dizzy. Castañeda told him: "If you keep on lying that you
were not in the Cadiz robbery we will maltreat you until you die." Castañeda's stout companion
made Caramonte stand and hit him with his open palm on the solar plexus Then Castañeda hit him
on the abdomen until he lost consciousness.
Caramonte claimed that when he regained consciousness on January 22, 1968, in the morning, he
was back in the cell. A policeman came and Caramonte requested for a doctor, but this request
was not granted until the end of January. At about 10:00 p.m. of that day, he was taken by jeep to
the beach and ordered to wade into the water about six inches deep. Castañeda told him: "If you
will not point out the place where you landed right here, we will hit you with our bullet." Caramonte
protested that he had never been to that place, at which five policemen hit him with their carbines
and he fell to the water. When he stood up, Castañeda cocked his pistol and said: "You point,
otherwise, we will kill you." But Caramonte refused to admit his guilt, and he was brought back to his
cell.
Caramonte then claimed that on January 23, 1968, at about 10:00 a.m., Castañeda and his stout
companion told him that if he did not sign the affidavit they brought, they would maltreat him until
death. They brought him to City Hall and on the ground floor, Castañeda told him that if he did not
sign, he would die of maltreatment. He was brought to the city judge who read the affidavit, Exh. "G".
He did not want to sign it, but he did so because he could no longer endure the pain they inflicted
on him, and because he was told that if he failed to sign they would continue the maltreatment until
he died.
Caramonte claimed that it was Judge Ledesma and not he who made the corrections marked as
Exh. "G-1 ", to "G-8". He wrote the corrections marked as Exh. "G-9" and "G-10", but he did so only on
the instructions of the judge. At the time he affixed his signature to the affidavit, he was positioned
between Castañeda and his companion, facing the judge.
On January 23, 1968, in the evening, Castañeda, his stout companion, and the chief of police
brought him again to the radio room. When he refused to admit his guilt, they made him stand up
and kicked him at the back of his right thigh. They asked him to name the mastermind of the robbery,
and promised that if he did so they would free him. 'They suggested that he Identify Rafael Escario as
the brains behind the robbery, but he refused. Castañeda made the same threats on his life, and
then showed Caramonte the affidavit marked as Exh. "H".
On January 24, 1968 Castañeda, his stout companion, and the policemen brought him to the city
judge to sign Exh. "H". He was again threatened with death and guarded on each side by
Castañeda and his companion. Caramonte claimed that he did not request for permission to read
the affidavit and he signed it without reading, He claimed that all signatures appearing on the left
side of the four pages are his, but the signature on page 4 is not his. He made the cancellation on
paragraph 2, but it was Judge, Ledesma who made the other cancellation.
On the same day, January 24, 1968, at about 3:00 p.m., Castañeda, his stout companion, and the
chief of police — all armed — took him by jeep to the beach. Castañeda produced a boat and
then supervised the re-enactment of the robbery. Castañeda ordered Salinas to sit on the boat with
a carbine, and ordered the photographer to take a picture. Castañeda also ordered Caramonte to
sit on the banca.
Later, the law officers brought Caramonte to the Toboso beach. Policemen of Toboso and Cadiz city
surrounded Caramonte. There were many civilians at the beach. The Toboso policemen
approached him, held his left ear, and threatened: "You pirate, you better watch out, later, I'll cut
your ear." When he refused to point to the place where he allegedly landed, five policemen
simultaneously hit him with the butt of their carbines. Castañeda threatened him with death, and
more pictures were taken.
Caramonte said that on February 2, 1968, substantially the same group of law-enforcers brought him
to the Toboso municipal building. Castañeda again made the same threats of death, and the group
brought him to the municipal judge. In the presence of the judge, Castañeda repeated his threats. In
the company of the law- enforcers, Caramonte signed the affidavit marked as Exh. "F" because of
fear and the maltreatment he had received.
The defense presented ten witnesses to prove the defense of alibi, i.e., that on December 31, 1967: in
the morning, Caramonte was at Barrio Pasil, Botiguez island, in Rafael Escario's house; in the
afternoon, he went to the cockpit at Silanga; and in the evening, he attended the celebration
hosted by the barrio captain in his honor. But the trial judge discounted the defense of alibi, as well
as the defense that Caramonte made his extra-judicial confession only because of force and
intimidation. The trial judge conceded that not one of those who saw the shooting at Lim's house was
able to Identify the robbers. He also conceded that Salinas as a witness is unreliable, and that his
testimony alone can not sustain a judgment of conviction. But the trial court was convinced that
Caramonte's extra-judicial confession, Exh. "F", is valid, having been the result of reflection after
several days in jail.
The trial court disregarded Caramonte's claim that he signed Exhibit "F" only because of force and
intimidation. It stressed that Caramonte not only signed his confession, but also introduced
corrections on the affidavit. Moreover, he did not report the alleged acts of force and intimidation to
Judge Bontua. Hence, the trial court applied the presumption of regularity in the performance of
public function. The trial court applied the same presumption with respect to the reenactment of the
crime.
The trial court then rendered judgment as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused CARLOS CARAMONTE guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of robbery in band with multiple homicide and less serious physical injuries as charged in
the information, and considering the aggravating circumstances that the act was committed by a
band, that the crime was committed during nighttime to facilitate the commission and its
accomplishment, that the crime was committed with evident premeditation, that the crime was
committed with the use of superior strength, and that it was committed with the use of fast motor
vehicle without any mitigating circumstance to offset the same, hereby sentences said accused
Carlos Caramonte to suffer the penalty of DEATH, to indemnify each of the heirs of the deceased
Charles 13. Valencia, George Baynosa and Nelson Rosales each in the sum of P12,000.00; and
another sum of P10,000.00 each to the heirs of said deceased as moral damages, to indemnify Lim
Katian the sum of P3,000.00 for the injuries he received and Another sum of P3,000.00 as moral
damages, to indemnify Lim Eng Yu the sum of P2,600.00, the amount stolen, and to pay the costs.
In its Brief, the defense assigned two errors: that the lower court erred in convicting the accused and
imposing on him the extreme penalty of death on the basis of his coerced confession and his
voluntary re-enactment of the crime charged; and that the lower court erred in ignoring the defense
of alibi, notwithstanding its finding that there was no Identification whatsoever that the accused
committed the crime charged.
The defense pointed out that the Court of First Instance, Branch I, of Negros Occidental acquitted
Caramonte in Criminal Case No. 690 for the robbery at Cadiz City. The defense claimed that the
prosecution, in spite of the judgment of acquittal in that case, is bent on securing Caramonte's
conviction. It stressed that while the accused made a confession in Exhibit "F", he initially denied
participation in the robberies in Exhibit "G". It argued that it should be Exhibit "G" and not Exhibit "F"
which should be accepted because Exhibit "G" was subscribed earlier — some three days after
Caramonte's arrest — on January 23. 1968; while Exhibit "F" was subscribed later, on February 2, 1968.
Why did Caramonte deny his guilt in the first affidavit and then some days later repadiate that
document and admit his participation in the Toboso robbery? The defense claims that the answer lies
in the "intensive investigation" conducted by Sgt. Castañeda for the intervening days that
Caramonte was detained.
The issue on appeal hinges on the validity of the extrajudicial confession made by the accused. The
Rules of Court, Rule 130, Section 29 provides: "The declaration of an accused expressly
acknowledging his guilt of the offense charged, may be given as evidence against him." But
following the time-honored caveat, it has been constantly held that when the accused successfully
proves that a confession was given as a result of violence, intimidation, threat, or promise of a reward
or lieniency the confession becomes inadmissible. The Court is ever cognizant of the time-honored
admonition that confessions, especially those made extra-judicially, should be carefully scrutinized.
The court does not accept confessions readily, because experience has shown that some law
officers are not above extorting confessions through violence and intimidation. Hence, the true test
of admissibility is that the confession is made freely and voluntarily.
But the rule is that a confession is presumed to be voluntary until the contrary is proved. The defense
has the burden to show that the confession is involuntary. Generally, the question of admissibility of
extra-judicial confessions is necessarily addressed to the sound discretion of the judge, and since
such discretion must be controlled by all the attendant circumstances, the courts have wisely
forborne to mark with absolute precision any rules limiting the admission or exclusion of such
testimony, Their admissibility must depend largely in each case upon the facts and circumstances
surrounding the same. (US vs. De Leon and De Leon, No. 9656, August 20 1914, 27 Phil. 506).
In determining whether a confession is voluntary or not, the age. character and situation of the
accused at the time it was made are important elements in the consideration of the court. Much
depends upon the intelligence of the accused or want of it. The defendant must realize the
importance of his act. The accused was 37 years old and a college degree-holder at that time he
gave his confession. Not only that: he was a responsible public official, having been newly elected
municipal councilor. Even counsel for the accused stresses his strong character by emphasizing that
although born to poverty, he rose above the handicap of his economic position to claim moderate
success in his professional life.
The accused made numerous corrections on Exhibit "F", "G", and "H" in front of the municipal judges
before whom they were subscribed and sworn to. The corrections embody information best known
only to the accused, and it is improbable that coercion wrung them out of him. Moreover, testimony
of the accused that his confession was not voluntary can not prevail as against that of a justice of
the peace to the effect that the confession was voluntarily signed in his presence (People vs.
Cabrera, No. L-1311, February 25, 1949, 82 Phil. 839; People vs. Baluran, No. L-28582, March 25, 1970,
32 SCRA 71.) The accused contends that we should disbelieve Exhibit "F" because in an earlier
affidavit, Exhibit "G"; he denied his participation in the Toboso robbery. But a variation in the
declaration of a witness is not always sufficient to discredit his testimony (US vs. Briones. No. 9589,
November 12, 1914, 28 Phil. 367).
Parenthetically, Exhibit "G' — the validity of which the defense presses on this Court — indicates
certain aspects of the character and personality of the accused Caramonte. For one, it appears that
he knew his acquaintance Isabelo Montemayor was wanted by the authorities for past robberies
committed in 1962 and 1966; yet, although they both resided at Botiguez island, Caramonte did not
report Montemayor's presence to the authorities at Bantayan. For another, it appears that on
December 30, 1967 at about 5:00 p.m., Caramonte was present while Montemayor's group planned
the robbery at Cadiz city. Instead of dissuading them, Caramonte said: " It's up to you. For me I have
a different life already. " The clause "I have a different life already" — which appear several times in
the affidavit — implies an unsavory aspect of Caramonte's personal history antecedent to the instant
case. Moreover, it appears that although Caramonte was privy to the plans for the raid at Cadiz City,
he did not attempt to stave off the crime by reporting it to the authorities in that city. in the
handwritten correction marked as Exhibit "G-9", Caramonte added the explanation that his failure to
make a report was due to fear of fatal reprisal at the hands of the conspirators.
It has been held that conflicting confessions can not be a ground for acquitting the defendant, for if
a confession could be rejected on such ground, all that would be necessary in any case to dispense
with a damaging confession would be for an accused to tell another story out of harmony with the
preceding one (US vs. Acacia, No. 12875, October 26, 1917, 37 Phil. 71). And when an extra-judicial
confession is followed by a re-enactment of the crime by the accused himself in accordance with his
confession, such confession may be deemed voluntary. (PP. vs. Conde, L-2921, June 27, 1951, 89 Phil.
298). Whether or not a confession is voluntary depends upon the credibility of the witnesses. This
matter lies within the special competence of the trial court whose conclusion concerning the
credibility of witnesses will not be disturbed by the appellate court. (PP. vs, Pereto L-20894, December
29, 1967, 21 SCRA 1469; PP. vs. Secapuri, L-17518-19, February 28, 1966, 16 SCRA 199; PP vs. Pasiona, L-
18295, February 28, 1966, 16 SCRA 212; PP. vs. Quintab, L-21417, January 31, 1966, 16 SCRA 146)
The trial court was convinced that the extra-judicial confession of the accused was a truthful
emanation from a man resigned to his fate because of the seeming lack of help from his friends and
associates. The court noted that when Caramonte was arrested at Botiguez island, he requested that
the arresting party pass Bantayan, in order to seek aid from his family and some town officials. But no
help issued, and on that day Caramonte was brought to Cadiz city, where he was detained for
several days. During this period of waiting, Caramonte gradually lost faith that help would ever be
forthcoming. In this state of mind he executed his extrajudicial confession. He was so resigned to
retribution that on January 28, 1968, he sent a collect telegram (Exh. 24) to a certain Mrs. Myrna
Surmillion stating: "No need of counsel, I'm happy to die, only God's justice for me." The upshot of this
telegram was that on the next day, counsel did arrive at Cadiz City. But this form of succor came too
late, for Caramonte had already signed his extra-judicial confession.
The defense of alibi is traditionally received by the courts with less than cordiality, for its easily
concocted. In this case, the alibi of the accused can not prevail over his voluntary confession
contained in Exhibits "F" and "H". It is evident that his alibi is a last-ditch effort to salvage what, in a
moment of truth, he has voluntarily admitted as to his criminal participation.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the appellant guilty as charged. The penalty for the crime is death.
However, for lack of the necessary number of required votes, the decision appealed from is modified
in respect of the principal penalty to reclusion perpetua, but affirmed in all other respects.
SO ORDERED.
Makasiar, Antonio, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Santos, Fernandez, Guerrero, De Castro and Melencio-
Herrera, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

FERNANDO, C.J., concurring:

While concurring in the result, I feel that I should make of record my lack of conformity to the view
expressedly the ponente on the subject of confessions.
TEEHANKEE, J., concurring and dissenting:
I vote for affirmance of the death penalty.
BARREDO, J., concurring:
In view of the long detention of appellant since his conviction by the trial court, I vote for life
imprisonment.
# Separate Opinions
FERNANDO, C.J., concurring:
While concurring in the result, I feel that I should make of record my lack of conformity to the view
expressedly the ponente on the subject of confessions.
TEEHANKEE, J., concurring and dissenting:
I vote for affirmance of the death penalty.
BARREDO, J., concurring:
In view of the long detention of appellant since his conviction by the trial court, I vote for life
imprisonment.

G.R. No. 77685 April 15, 1988

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. NESTOR ENCISO alias "DAGUL" JESSIE ABE SUYONG, ARMANDO
BALASBAS
PARAS, J.:

The hapless victim of this crime Norberto Lonzaga y Coronas, a mere 13-year old boy, was a balut
vendor. At about 2:30 a.m. of November 18,1980 his body was found dead, sprawled at the comer of
Sikap and Kayumanggi Streets in Mandaluyong, Metro Manila. His chest bore nine (9) stab wounds
(Exh. E, E-1, E-2). Pfc. Romeo Santiago of the Anti-Organized Crime Task Force received the
corresponding report and he informed his team leader, Pfc. Alejandro Aliwalas, about it. Together
with Pat. Fructuoso Capacino who resides in the vicinity of the crime, they formed a three-man
investigation team. The whole day of November 18,1980, they interviewed a number of people who
might be able to shed light on the killing of the victim. Among the persons interviewed were the
victim's father, Elpidio Lonzaga, and balut vendors Rodolfo Escano, Pelagia Cruz, and Roberto
Ballante.

Rodolfo Escano informed the investigators that before midnight of November 17, 1980, he saw the
victim and the three appellants sleeping together in a parked passenger jeep at the corner of P.Cruz
and Boni Avenue in Mandaluyong. Pelagia Cruz confirmed the observation of Escano and further
stated that she even borrowed an icepick from accused Nestor Enciso to punch a hole in a can of
milk. She returned the icepick to Enciso. Escano referred the investigators to Ballante who allegedly
knew the appellants' residence.

At around 1:00 a.m. of November 19, 1980, Escano pointed to the police a shanty on Calbayog St. in
Mandaluyong where appellants reside. The policemen immediately secured the place and then
proceeded to enter the shanty Pat. Capacillo peeped through the door that was ajar and saw
Enciso and Balasbas who were then sleeping. The policemen entered the shanty and woke them up.
Enciso admitted stabbing the victim with an icepick. He implicated Suyong and Balasbas. That same
morning, the police detained Enciso and Balasbas for further investigation. Before noon of November
20, 1980, Suyong was arrested and was also detained.

On November 20, 1980, Pfc. Damaso Miranda, Jr. conducted an investigation of the three after
which they executed sworn statements admitting participation in the killing of the victim. At about
4:00 p.m. of the same day, a re-enactment of the crime was made. The sworn statements and the re-
enactment show that

On the night stated in the information Nestor Enciso, met Jessie Abe y Suyong and Armando
Balasbas. Being long-time friends, Enciso proposed that they look for work. Jessie suggested that
Enciso first attend to his balut-selling so that they may earn some amount for their fare. Mando
Balasbas and Jessie were left behind at the front of the Cuadra Disco house at Boni Avenue while
Nestor went to the Balut distribution center of Tony Fabillar. When Nestor returned with balut for sale
on consignment, he was joined in by Jessie and Mando until they reached a gasoline station.The
three accused became hungry so they ate the balut of Nestor intended for sale. Nestor reminded
Armando Balasbas and Jessie Abe-Suyong that he will get short in his balut sales. They walked on
further and they saw Norberto Lonzaga at a distance and this is where Jessie suggested to his co-
accused to waylay Berto so that they could have money to defray the balut shortage which Enciso
had. They went ahead of Berto in going home and waited for him near the railway.

Upon reaching the railway and while Berto was on his way home, the three (3) accused walked with
him until the corner of Sikay and Kayumanggi Streets of Mandaluyong. Jessie took hold of Berto
Lonzaga's hands and with a handkerchief, gagged his mouth to prevent Berto from shouting and
placed his red reversible jacket upon the head and Enciso stabbed Berto several times with an ice
pick (Exhibit D).

As Norberto Lonzaga fell lifeless, Armando Balasbas (Mando) took the money from the pocket of
Berto's short pants (Exhibits B and B-3) which amounted to P21.00, P15.00 of which was spent to
purchase rice and the P5.00 was given to Jessie. The act of killing Berto by the accused was planned
before hand (Exhibit H p. 2 Records) and this was done at about 11:00 P.M. evening of November
17,1980. (pp. 16-17, Rollo)

On November 22, 1980, the police submitted its written report. Thereafter, an information for robbery
with homicide was filed before the Regional Trial Court, Pasig, Metro Manila, against the three
accused. The said information reads —

That on or about the 18th day of November, 1980, in the municipality of Mandaluyong, Metro Manila,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring
and confederating together and mutually helping and aiding one another, accused Armando
Balasbas, being 14 years old but acting with discernment by means of violence, threats, and
intimidation and with intent of gain, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take from,
divest and rob one Norberto Lonzaga y Coronas of the amount of P21.00, against his will and
consent, thereby causing damage and prejudice to said Norberto Lonzaga y Coronas in the
aforementioned amount of P21.00; that on the occasion of said robbery and for the purpose of
enabling them to take and steal the money, said accused, in the furtherance of their conspiracy and
armed with an ice pick, with intent to kill, by means of treachery and evident premeditation and
taking advantage of their superior strength, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
attack assault and stab with said icepick said Norberto Lonzaga y Coronas on the vital parts of his
body, thereby inflicting upon the latter mortal stab wounds which directly caused his death.

Contrary to law. (pp. 15-16, Rollo)

Upon arraignment on February 4, 1981, all the accused entered a plea of not guilty. However, when
the case was called for hearing on March 3,1981, the accused Nestor Enciso and Jessie Suyong,
through counsel manifested their desire to withdraw their former plea of not guilty and to enter
instead a plea of guilty. The trial fiscal, Rodolfo S. Mateo, gave his conformity thereto.Thereafter on
proper motion to withdraw former plea of not guilty made by Atty. Jose Leagogo, the same was
granted by the Court, after which both accused were re-arraigned accordingly and they voluntarily
and spontaneously pleaded guilty to the crime charged in the information. (Order dated March 3,
1981 p. 65 Original Record) The trial court also ruled in the same Order that —
However, considering the gravity of the crime imputed against both accused which is a capital
offense and the nature of the penalty which the Court may have to impose, let the mandatory
presentation of evidence by the prosecuting fiscal commence simultaneously with the trial of the
remaining accused, Armando Balasbas (Order dated March 3, 1981, supra)

After trial, the lower court rendered judgment, the dispositive portion of which reads —

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing considerations, it is the opinion of this Court and so holds that
all the accused are GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of the crime of Robbery with Homicide
described and made punishable by paragraph No.1, Article 294 of the Penal Code and each is
therefore sentenced as follows:

NESTOR ENCISO alias Dagul, being the mastermind and acknowledged leader of the group is
sentenced to DEATH by electrocution;

JESSIE ABE SUYONG is likewise sentenced to DEATH by electrocution as co-principal of the crime
committed;

The execution of the above-named accused shall be carried out at a place, time and date to be
designated by the Director of Prisons, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila;

ARMANDO BALASBAS being a minor or a youthful offender as understood in Art. 189 of the Youth and
Welfare Code (PD 603), but who acted with discernment is hereby sentenced to imprisonment for the
REST OF HIS NATURAL LIFE (Cadena Perpetua).

The accused Armando Balasbas is, however, recommended to the Chief Executive for clemency by
remitting his sentence upon service of a minimum of twenty (20) years to enable him to avail of
reformation and a tranquil return to society should he not avail of the provisions of Art. 192 of the
aforesaid Code (PD 603).

All the accused, aside from the above sentence are likewise directed to indemnify the heirs of the
deceased in the sum of P12,000.00 to be paid share and share alike and the costs of the
proceedings.

Let the entire record of this case be transmitted to the Supreme Court without delay for the
mandatory review required by law.

SO ORDERED. (pp, 67-68, Rollo)

The aforesaid decision is now before Us on automatic review. Appellants claim that the lower court
erred (a) in admitting hearsay evidence to prove the commission of the crime (b) in basing its
findings and conclusions on said hearsay evidence and (c) in admitting the written statements of the
accused.

The Solicitor General recommends that the assailed decision be reversed and all the accused
acquitted for the following reasons —

A.. Extrajudicial confessions of appellants are inadmissible.

Pfc. Damaso Miranda, Jr., conducted the investigation of the appellants separately. During the
investigation, the only other person present apart from him and an appellant was Cpl. Gil Marquez,
the officer-in-charge of the Anti-Organized Crime Task Force. Moreover, Miranda admitted that
appellants were not assisted by counsel when they allegedly waived their right to counsel. He failed
to rebut appellants' testimony that they were mishandled to force them to sign sworn statements.
Under the foregoing circumstances, it is clear that appellants' sworn statements confessing
conspiracy to robbery with homicide are inadmissible in evidence (People v. Galit, 135 SCRA 465;
People v.Lumayok 139 SCRA 1; People v. Jara, 144 SCRA 516).

B. Appellants were convicted on basis of hearsay evidence

No eyewitness was presented to testify to the killing and robbery of the victim. The balut vendors who
allegedly saw the victim with as appellants a few hours before the crime was committed were not
subpoenaed to testify for unknown reasons. Thus, the testimonies of the police which merely narrated
the alleged statements of the balut vendors have no probative value for being hearsay. The defense
was not afforded any opportunity to cross-examine these balut vendors interviewed by the police.

C. Appellants were victim of police brutality.

The prosecution failed to rebut the testimony of appellants that they were coerced to sign
Extrajudicial confessions by force and that they were not informed of their constitutional rights during
custodial investigation. Indeed, such failure to rebut is tantamount to an admission of appellants'
allegations. Thus, their sworn statements are inadmissible in evidence.

Appellants were confined in the provincial jail from November 17, 1980 up to October 30, 1986 when
they were convicted. On the latter date, they were transferred to the National Penitentiary where
they remain confined to the present. All in all, appellants have been imprisoned for over seven years
for a crime which was not proven to have been committed by them (Rec. pp. 24, 381, 390-391).
Hence, they deserve their freedom. (pp. 73-75, Rollo)

It should be noted that the two accused Nestor Enciso and Jessie Suyong pleaded guilty to the
offense charged in the information. And they have not questioned the validity of this plea. It should
likewise be noted that conspiracy is alleged in the information. A plea of guilty constitutes an
admission of the crime and the attendant circumstances alleged in the information. Nonetheless,
despite Enciso's and Suyong's pleas of guilty, We believe the pleas must not be taken against them,
for as clearly borne out by the evidence presented, said guilt has not actually been proved beyond
reasonable doubt. The fact that they did not appeal is of no concur. influence, for after all, this case
is before Us on automatic review (that is whether appeal was made or not). Accordingly both Enciso
and Suyong are ACQUITTED on reasonable doubt.

In the same vein and on reasonable doubt, the third accused Balasbas is ACQUITTED on reasonable
doubt.

WHEREFORE, all three judgments of conviction are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and all the
accused are ordered SET FREE immediately.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-57184-85 November 14, 1986

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. EUGENIA ABANO, ELISEO CABAÑA alias LUCIO CABAÑA and PABLO
CABAÑA alias TEOFILO CABAÑA

FERNAN, J.:

Before Us on automatic review is the decision of the Cebu-Bohol Circuit Criminal Court in Criminal
Cases Nos. CCC-XIV-2147 and CCC-XIV-2148, which found Eugenia Abano guilty of the crimes of
parricide and murder, and Eliseo and Teofilo, both surnamed Cabana, of two murders. Two death
penalties were imposed on each of the accused.

The information dated May 7, 1980 in Criminal Case No. CCC-XIV-2147 for parricide and murder
alleges:

That on or about the 7th day of February, 1980 at 11:30 o'clock in the evening, more or less, in Sitio
Tunga, Barangay Cantuod, Municipality of Balamban, Province of Cebu, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused Eugenia Abano, then united in lawful
wedlock with Agripino Abano, and conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another with
Eliseo Cabana alias Lucio Cabana and Pablo Cabana alias Teofilo Cabana, armed with sharp
bladed weapons, with evident premeditation and treachery and in consideration of a prize or
reward for the accomplishment of their criminal purposes, with deliberate intent to kill, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously attack, assault and stab the said Agripino Abano with the
weapons aforecited thereby inflicting upon the latter multiple wounds on the vital parts of the body
which injuries caused, as a consequence, the instantaneous death of the victim.

In addition to the above qualifying circumstances, the offense was committed with the aid of armed
men; superior strength and arms; nighttime; in consideration of the prize or reward and perpetrated
in the dwelling of the victim.
Except for the difference in the name of the accused, the absence of the allegation on the
accused's relationship to the victim and the fact that Bienvenida Cumad is Identified as the victim,
the information for murder in Criminal Case No. CCC-XIV-2148 is also dated May 7, 1980 and
couched in basically the same language.

The prosecution's version of the crimes is as follows:

Eugenia Tolero Abano and Agripino Abano were married in 1948. 1 At the time of the commission of
the crimes in February, 1980, they had been separated for three years. Eugenia, who was then 57
years old, stayed in the conjugal home in Cumbado, Balamban, Cebu with two of their children, one
of whom was mentally incapacitated. To support her dependents, Eugenia worked as copra-maker
earning eight pesos a day.

Agripino, 55 years old, lived with another woman, 50-year old widow Bienvenida Cumad, at the
Abanos' hut some 400 meters away from the conjugal home. Only a bridge separated the Abanos'
conjugal home from the hut which was actually located in Tunga, Cantuod, Balamban, Cebu.

Behind Eugenia's house was another hut which used to be a pig pen. Elevated from the ground by
about two feet, only a sack served as its door. It was occupied by Rodolfo Abano, a son of Eugenia
and Agripino, and his family.

At around 7:00 o'clock in the evening of February 7, 1980, Rodolfo's wife, Concordia, saw Eugenia
partaking of supper with Eliseo Cabana and Teofilo Cabana at the former's house. Concordia knew
Eliseo and Teofilo because they were medicine men or quack doctors who frequented Cumbado to
treat sick persons.

Just before midnight or at around 11:30 o'clock that night, Concordia was sleeping near the door of
their hut, with her four children lying between her and her husband, when she was awakened by
someone pulling her hair. As the hut was lighted by a kerosene lamp, she recognized the man pulling
her hair to be Eliseo. With Eliseo was his son, Teofilo. Eliseo was standing on the ground but he was
able to reach for her hair use of her position near the door.

Eliseo tried to cover her mouth and cautioned her not to make any noise. Afraid of what he might do
to her with the bolo [pinuti] she noticed he was carrying, Concordia jumped out of the hut. Eliseo
then ordered her to accompany him to her father-in-law, Agripino. Along the way, Eliseo and Teofilo
instructed her to tell Agripino that his son Rodolfo [Concordia's husband] was suffering from a
stomach ache and that he should be brought to a doctor.

Upon reaching Agripino's hut, Concordia called him saying, "Tay, Tay, wake up, bring Rudy to the
doctor because he is suffering stomach ache." 2 Agripino answered by asking her why Rudy had
stomach ache. Concordia told him that Rudy had eaten something raw.

Eliseo then dragged Concordia towards the road, pointed the bolo at her and said, "You run now,
but do not tell your husband about this because if you will tell him I win kill your husband and all the
members of your family." 3 Concordia ran and hid for some time under the big stove between
Eugenia's house and her hut before proceeding home.

Delia Cumad, the 15-year-old daughter of Bienvenida, who was then sleeping in one of the two
rooms of Agripino's hut was likewise awakened by Concordia's voice. She heard Concordia telling
Agripino that Rudy was sick because he ate something raw. Then she noticed Agripino pass by her
on his way to the hut's door. When Agripino was already downstairs, Delia heard an impact the
sound of which resembled that of the hacking of a banana trunk. 4 Then she heard Agripino calling
out, "Day, help Day, I am hacked." Delia tried to prevent her mother Bienvenida from going down the
hut but the latter persisted. Bienvenida brought along a kerosene lamp. Because she was afraid,
Delia did not even try to peep through the window to see what was happening. Neither did she hear
Bienvenida and Agripino mention any names while they were outside the hut. 5

Almost an hour later, Delia came down the hut. She looked for Agripino and Bienvenida but failed to
find them. Scared, she ran to the house of Rosario Montero. On the way, Delia met Rudy and
Concordia Abano. Rudy asked her where she was going. Delia replied that she was going to the
house of Rosario Montero. She did not tell them what happened to Agripino and Bienvenida.
As it was too quiet in Rosario's house, Delia proceeded to the house of Pesing Baynas to whom she
related what had transpired at their hut. Pesing accompanied her back to their hut. Four meters from
that hut, they found the lifeless body of Bienvenida.

Rodolfo Abano was awakened by his mother Eugenia at around midnight. She asked him to
transport Eliseo and Teofilo Cabana to Matab-ang, Toledo City in his motorized tricycle. When
Rodolfo said that he would rather transport them in the morning, Eugenia told him that Eliseo and
Teofilo were in a hurry.

At that time, Concordia was feeding her baby but she accompanied Rodolfo to the garage to get
the motorized tricycle. It was on the way to the garage that they met Delia Cumad.

From the garage, Rodolfo went back to his hut where, after Concordia had alighted from the
tricycle, Eugenia boarded it. Near her house, Eugenia got off and Eliseo and Teofilo boarded the
tricycle. As he was ferrying them to Matab-ang, Rodolfo noticed that they were carrying a piece of
sack that was rolled over a two-feet-long object. From Matab-ang, Rodolfo went back to Cantuod.
There he met Bernie Verdeflor who told him that his father and his common-law wife were dead.

Bienvenida D. Cumad died of cardio-respiratory arrest secondary to shock and hemorrhage due to
multiple wounds on the neck [head], trunk and extremities." 6 In the medico-legal necropsy report,
she is Identified as Bienvenida Delfin Abano. 7 Actually, her maiden name was Bienvenida Mancia
Delfin but she was mistaken for the legal wife of Agripino by Doctor Ladislao V. Diola, Jr. who
conducted the autopsy on the two victims. 8

Bienvenida sustained an avulsion which penetrated her skull and four lacerated wounds in the
anterior portion of the neck, the right lumbar region, the right iliac region and the right wrist. The
inferior vena cava on both sides of her neck and the left carotid arteries were lacerated. 9

Agripino Albano also died of "cardio-respiratory arrest secondary to shock and hemorrhage due to
multiple wounds on the head, trunk and extremeties." 10 He sustained twelve lacerated wounds and
an abrasion on the head and neck, and twenty-one lacerated wounds, five stab wounds and an
avulsion in his trunk and extremities. He had a half-moon fracture in his cranium extending from the
left to the right temporal bone and other fractures in his orbital and ethmoidal bones, third cervical
vertebra, seventh rib and left elbow joint. He also suffered a subarachnoidal hemorrhage of the
brain, and laceration in his upper lobe left lung, middle lobe right lung, septum, right ventricle and
right kidney. 11

In the course of the investigation conducted by the police, Delia Cumad, Rodolfo Abano, Concordia
Abano, Eugenia Abano, Eliseo Cabana and Pablo [Teofilo] Cabana were interrogated. Significantly,
only the interrogations of Rodolfo and Delia were reduced to writing. 12

In his sworn statement, 13 Rodolfo narrated that at about twelve noon of February 9, 1980, his mother,
Eugenia, revealed to him that she hired Eliseo and Pablo [Teofilo] Cabana to kill Agripino and his
common-law wife.

Because of that statement, Vicente S. Cabahug, the substation commander of the Balamban Police
Force, interrogated Eugenia. At the trial court, Cabahug related how he investigated Eugenia. He
testified thus:

Q. After the revelation of Rodolfo Abano that it was her mother who hired the other two accused
to kill the deceased Agripino Abano and Bienvenida Cumad, what else did you do?

A. After the revelation of the said Rodolfo Abano of the killing of the father and the common-law
wife, I investigated Eugenia Abano as she was made to stay around, then at about 11:00 o'clock on
February 11 in the morning, 1980, she admitted and confirmed the revelation of her son, Rodolfo
Abano.

COURT [To the witness]:

Q. But what did she admit?

A. She admitted and she narrated to me that she even burst into tears telling me of the agony
that she suffered for the last three years her husband was living in the house with a girl aside from her
and they were living 200 meters away where she lives and she confided and confessed that she was
forced to hire the two accused, these Eliseo and Teofilo Cabana to kill her husband and common-
law wife. 14

xxx xxx xxx

ATTY. VELOSO:

Q. According to you, Eugenia Abano admitted hiring the present two accused who appeared to
be father and son.

A. Yes.

Q. Now. You asked her what was the prize or reward?

A. Yes, I asked her.

Q. What did she say?

A. According to Eugenia Abano she told the two accused, Teofilo and Eliseo Cabana that the
consideration was the proceeds of the passenger tricycle that she was going to sell after the killing of
her husband and the paramour.

Q. In other words, she promised to pay the consideration after the act of killing has already taken
place?

A. Yes.

Q. Did she tell you what guarantee she issued in order that the father and son Cabanas would
really execute the act?

A. She did not give any guarantee.

Q. So that was only the promise?

A. According to her only the promise. 15

According to Cabahug, he reduced Eugenia's statement in writing but he did not bring his notes in
court because they were "just more or less [a] scratch." 16

On the strength of those confessions, Cabahug filed on February 11, 1980, a complaint for parricide
with murder and double murder against Eugenia and "Eliseo Doe and Pablo Doe" before the
municipal circuit court of Balamban-Asturias. Said complaint was amended three times: first, to fill in
the full names of Eliseo and Teofilo; second, to include "Cording Abano" as one of the accused; and
third, to reflect Concordia's full name.

On February 14, 1980, the municipal circuit judge issued a warrant for the arrest of Eugenia,
Concordia, Eliseo and "Pablo." 17 Eugenia and Concordia voluntarily surrendered to the police. 18
Eliseo was arrested in Toledo City while he and his wife were selling mangoes. 19 He led the arresting
officers to Pinamungahan, Cebu, where his son Teofilo [Pablo] was also arrested.20 After their arrest
Eliseo and Teofilo were interrogated by Cabahug thus:

Q. Having arrested both Eliseo and Teofilo Cabana, did you investigate them?

A. No. Because we brought along with us Eliseo Cabana to Pinamungahan and put him in jail
when we went up the mountain to arrest Eliseo [sic] Cabana. When Teofilo Cabana arrived after his
arrest we confronted [sic] them to the Pinamungahan Police Station. When they were confronted by
us they admitted that they were the ones who killed Agripino Abano and Bienvenida Cumad. Eliseo
Cabana admitted that he was the one who killed Agripino Abano while the other one, Teofilo
Cabana admitted that he was the one who killed Bienvenida Cumad.

Q. Who was present when you interrogated Eliseo and Teofilo Cabana?

A. We were plenty. We have T/Sgt. Paddy. Baron, Pat. Kiyamko, Pat. Cabanero, then we have
Pat. Leonor Dagohoy of the Pinamungahan Police Station and Antonio Mahinay also of the
Pinamungahan Police Station were present when we confronted Eliseo and Teofilo Cabana at the
Pinamungahan Police Station

Q. In your investigation of the accused Eliseo Cabana and Teofilo Cabana did you come to
know what weapons were used by them in the commission of the crime?

A. We asked them the weapon that they used.

Q. What was their answer?

A. Eliseo Cabana said he used a bolo, locally known as pinuti and Teofilo Cabana admitted also
that he used a bolo, locally known as pinuti. 21

The municipal circuit judge set the preliminary investigation of the case on February 9, 1980. On that
date, all the accused appeared in court but they were not assisted by counsel. Eugenia and
Concordia manifested that they wanted the investigation postponed to February 28.
Notwithstanding, the investigating judge assigned one Atty. Sarmiento as counsel for Concordia who
was thereafter investigated. 22

Eliseo and Teofilo Cabana waived their right to present evidence in the preliminary investigation.
Eugenia also waived her right to further preliminary investigation. 23 Those waivers were the subject of
two orders both dated February 28, 1980.24

At the continuation of the investigation on March 4, 1980, Atty. Cosme Montesclaros, who "appeared
for the accused" but who was actually appearing only for Concordia, presented Eugenia as a
witness. She testified that on February 3, 1980, she forged an agreement with Eliseo and Teofilo to kin
Agripino and Bienvenida as she herself could not "do it" because she is a woman and that on the
night of February 7, she was with Eliseo and Teofilo when they threatened and pulled the hair of
Concordia although she did not proceed to the latter's hut. 25

In view of Eugenia's admissions, Atty. Montesclaros moved to dismiss the charge against Concordia
on the ground that she was threatened at that time. 26 Said counsel then filed a memorandum in
support of said motion to dismiss. 27 The prosecution opposed it alleging that Concordia's defense of
duress was incredible and fabricated because she was a "principal by direct participation and
indispensable cooperation." 28

Nevertheless, on March 13, 1980, the investigating judge issued an order discharging Concordia as
an accused and forwarding the records of the case to the Court of First Instance for trial on the
merits. In ordering Concordia's discharge the investigating judge noted that she was a mother of four
children the youngest of whom was still being breastfed for which reason she should not be made "to
undergo the travails of confinement in jail pending termination" of the case for humanitarian
considerations. 29

Thereafter, the assistant provincial fiscal filed the two informations quoted and mentioned earlier. At
their arraignment, the three accused pleaded not guilty. 30

They interposed alibi as their defense. Eugenia testified that on February 7, 1980, she was making
copra in Singing, Balamban until 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon when she returned home. She did not
entertain any visitors and was in bed at 8:00 o'clock. She was awakened at 4:00 o'clock the following
morning by Rodolfo who informed her that his Papa had been killed. 31

Eugenia narrated that when she asked Rodolfo who killed his father, Rodolfo answered that he did
not know. She told him to report the killing to the municipal authorities but she herself was detained
and investigated by the police on suspicion that she "caused the death" of her husband. 32 On her
detention and investigation, Eugenia testified thus:

COURT [To witness]:

Q. You were detained ahead of Concordia Abano?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. COURT. Proceed.
A. ATTY. DE LA VICTORIA —

Q. How about your co-accused , did you see them in that detention cell where you and
Concordia Abano were detained?

A. Yes, after they were arrested.

Q. By the way, where did the police actually place you?

A. In the office of the Chief of Police.

Q. Do you mean to say you were not actually placed inside the cell?

A. That is right.

Q. Concordia Abano testified before this Court that sometime on February 14, 1980 you confided
to her that you were the one who instigated the two accused to kill your husband in consideration of
a reward in concept of the proceeds of the motorcycle which was in the possession of your husband,
what can you say to that?

A. That is not true.

Q. What is the truth then?

A. I never told Concordia that I was the one who instigated the two accused to kill my husband
and give them rewards out of the proceeds of the motorcycle in the possession of my husband
because I do not have possession of the motorcycle. After my husband lived with another woman he
brought the motorcycle and it was my son who drove that motorcycle in conducting passengers.

Q. Who is that son?

Q. Rodolfo Abano.

A. Rodolfo Abano testified that on February 9, 1980 he went to your house and there you
confessed to him that you were the one who induced the two accused in consideration of a reward
to kill your husband and his paramour, what can you say to this testimony?

Q. That is not true.

A. What is the truth?

Q. I did not tell him that I instigated the killing of my husband. I never had any ire against my
husband.

A. Do you know Lt. Vicente Cabahug

Q. Yes, sir.

A. Lt. Cabahug testified that you told him that you were the one who induced the two other
accused to kin your husband and his paramour in consideration of a reward, what can you say
about this?

Q. It was Vicente Cabahug who told me to admit everything so that my daughter-in-law will not
be implicated and that I will not be included in the case, instead I will be made a witness for the
prosecution

A. Can you give any reason why Concordia Abano and Rudy Abano would testify against you in
these cases?

Q. Yes, sir, it is because the police had requested Rudy to ask me to admit so that Concordia will
be dropped from the case because she has many children and I will not be included and instead I
will be made a witness.

COURT [To witness]:

Q. Do you mean to say that you admit the crime only for this reason?

A. I was compelled to tell statements against myself because the Chief of Police told me that I
will not be included in this case. 33

Eugenia acknowledged that she had a lawyer during the preliminary investigation but her lawyer,
Atty. Rafael de la Victoria, was absent during its continuation on March 4, 1981. She testified further:

Q. Do you know the reason why the Court proceeded with the preliminary investigation in the
absence of your lawyer?

FISCAL —

The witness is incompetent.

COURT —

May answer.

WITNESS-

A. Yes, I know.

ATTY. DE LA VICTORIA —

Q. What was the purpose?

A. So that Concordia Abano will be released.

Q. Were you able to testify in that preliminary investigation which was conducted on March 4,
1980 by the Municipal Court of Balamban?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Who presented you there since you were not represented by a lawyer?

A. They forced me to testify so that Concordia will be released.

Q. Who forced you?

A. The Chief of Police.

Q. Can you tell the court what have you testified in that proceeding.?

A. I testified there against myself because I cannot bear looking at my grandchildren, the
children of Concordia Abano who were small and who were in jail with Concordia and who were
crying all the time and Concordia requested me to own everything in this case so she will be
released.

Q. What was the result of that hearing on preliminary investigation on March 4, 1980?

A. Concordia was released,

COURT [To witness]:

Q. You said that you were unable to bear the sight of your grandchildren in jail and so you
managed to have Concordia Abano released, what did you testify to in the preliminary investigation
that caused Concordia Abano to be released?

A. I testified there that I was the one who ordered because I was confused that time.

Q. Order to what?
A. I was the one who ordered the killing.

Q. Whom?

A. My husband.

Q. What was your reason for being confused. That is not a reason for ordering the killing?

A. I was confused of the sorrows I felt that I was suspected of ordering the killing of my husband. I
did not do it.

Q. Did you not state for the reason of the killing the fact that your husband was living with another
woman?

A. That is not true, because, although my husband was living with that woman for three years I
never did anything against him because I have no ill-reefing against my husband.

ATTY. DE LA VICTORIA —

I want to make of record that the witness is crying in the course of her testimony on that point.

COURT —

Make it of record. 34

On cross-examination, Eugenia disclosed that she allowed Agripino and Bienvenida to live in their
conjugal hut on the land of

Mendoza which she and Agripino used to till as tenants therein, because Agripino was "brave" and
he used to box and maltreat her whenever she expressed her objection to Agripino's cohabitation
with Bienvenida. Eugenia surmised that it was his paramour who induced her husband to maltreat
her so that she would die and Agripino and Bienvenida would Eugenia also admitted that she knew
be free to live together. 35 Eliseo and "Pablo" Cabana because as quack doctors, they treated the
children of Rodolfo. 36

According to Eugenia, she voluntarily went to the municipal building on February 11, 1980 to seek
protection after she heard rumors that Agripino's brothers and sisters were threatening to kill her. 37 In
the municipal building, Rodolfo requested her to admit the crimes so that his wife could be released
and then, he apologized to her for the statements against her that he had given the police.38
Eugenia insisted that she admitted participation in the crimes because of the request of her son. 39

To establish the whereabouts of Eliseo Cabana when the crimes were committed, the defense
presented in court his wife, Patricia. She testified that on the night of February 7, her husband was at
home in Bairan, Toledo City and that when she woke up at 4:00 o'clock in the morning, Eliseo was still
asleep. 40 She stated that her husband did not use Lucio as an alias because he was known as
either Li or Eli among his friends and neighbors. 41

Eliseo himself admitted that he was familiarly known as Eli. 42 He was a farmer who was also engaged
in mending pots and pans and in making handles or scabbards of bolos. He denied being a quack
doctor. 43

After he and his son Teofilo were arrested on February 14, 1980 in Toledo City and Pinamungahan,
respectively, they were detained at the Balamban jail, where they were handcuffed the whole night.
When their handcuffs were removed in the morning, a policeman told them that two deaths had
occurred in Cantuod and, with a gun pointed at them, that policeman told them to admit the killings
otherwise he would break their heads. Eliseo was not able to say a thing but he took cover behind a
cemented wall. Later, a policeman named Boy Rosario told them to affix their thumbmarks to a
document the contents of which were not read to them.44

It was Rodolfo Abano or Rudy who categorically told them to admit having perpetrated the killings
and to produce two bolos so they could be exonerated. 45 One of the bolos thus presented was
owned by Ambrosio Pilapil.46 Eliseo told the police about it and the latter took it from Pilapil
sometime in February, 1980. Pilapil had delivered it to Eliseo in order that a scabbard could be made
for it and Eliseo returned it to Pilapil on February 25, 1980.47
The other bolo, Exhibit B, was recovered in Eliseo's house by the police. According to Eliseo, Rudy
Abano left it with him early in the morning of February 8, 1980 with the intention of bartering it with
one chicken which Rudy needed for his daughter's birthday. 48

Eliseo expressed his belief that Rodolfo and Concordia Abano were involved in the killings but that
they pointed to other persons indiscriminately so that they could extricate themselves from the
charges. 49 Although he admitted having been convicted of homicide in another case, Eliseo
denied involvement in the murders of Agripino and Bienvenida.50

For his part, Teofilo Cabana, a farmer and coconut-gatherer, testified that on February 7 and 8, 1980,
he was in his house in Binabag, Pinamungahan, Cebu. 51 He denied having participated in the
murders of Agripino and Bienvenida.52 He stated that he did not use Pablo as an alias and labelled
as lies the prosecution's allegation that he and his father were quack doctors.

Special counsel Gabriel Trocio, Jr. testified that on February 27, 1980, he administered the oath of
Rodolfo Abano who retracted his statement implicating his own mother. In his sworn retraction,
Rodolfo stated that he was forced to make said statement because he wanted his wife to be
released as he and his wife were in a "difficult and bitter situation" inasmuch as his pregnant wife had
to breastfeed their youngest child in jail. 53

Defense counsel Rafael de la Victoria testified that on February 18, 1980, Rodolfo Abano sought the
help of the Citizens Legal Assistance Office in behalf of his wife and mother. 54 He asserted that
contrary to Rodolfo's allegation, the latter voluntarily executed his affidavit of retraction.55 According
to Atty. De la Victoria, he filed before the investigating judge a motion to postpone the preliminary
investigation on February 28, 1980 to March 6, 1980 56 but it was not acted upon. When he learned
that Eugenia confessed during the continuation of the preliminary investigation on March 4, 1980
while he, as her counsel could not appear in court, Atty. De la Victoria confronted Eugenia who told
him that she was "constrained" to make self-incriminating statements during that hearing. 57
Consequently, on March 8, 1980, Eugenio executed a sworn statement professing innocence of the
crimes charged against her and stating that she made self-incriminating statements because of her
confused mind and her pity for Concordia whom she wanted released from jail because she was
breastfeeding a child and her other children were all crying inside the jail. 58

The prosecution did not present any rebuttal witnesses.

On January 27, 1981, the lower court rendered the decision under consideration. The lower court
stated that the "web of circumstantial evidence" produced "beyond all doubt, complete proof of the
guilt" of Eugenia Abano as principal by inducement and Eliseo and Teofilo Cabana as principals by
direct and actual participation. 59 It considered as "evidence of high caliber and of great persuasive
value" Eugenia's confession which, it believed, "was not extracted from her under custodial
interrogation by police
authorities." 60

In the instant mandatory review, Eugenia Abano, through her counsel de oficio, contends that the
lower court erred in: [a] appreciating against her, her alleged verbal extrajudicial confession and her
inculpatory statements during the preliminary investigation on March 4, 1980 after she had waived
her right to such investigation, in the absence of her counsel and without her being informed of her
rights under Section 20, Article IV of the Constitution, and [b] failing to acquit her in both cases on the
ground that the prosecution failed to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

For Eliseo and Teofilo Cabana, the same counsel de oficio avers that the lower court erred in: [a]
appreciating against them their alleged extrajudicial confession and that of their co-accused,
Eugenia Abano, as well as the latter's confession during the preliminary investigation; [b] giving fun
faith and credit to the testimony of Concordia Abano and [c] failing to acquit the accused on
grounds of reasonable doubt.

In view of the absence of eyewitnesses to the killings, the confessions of the accused are of great
importance in the disposition of these cases. Understandably, the appellant's assignments of errors
are focused on the issue of whether the rights of the accused had been properly protected when
they made self-incriminating statements. The Constitutional provision involved states thus:

SEC. 20. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. Any person under investigation
for the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be
informed of such right. No force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the
free will shall be used against him. Any confession obtained in violation of this section shall be
inadmissible in evidence. [Art. IV]

As the confessions in question were taken during the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution" the
aforequoted constitutional provision is applicable in this case. 61

In People vs. Duero, G.R. No. 52016, May 13, 1981, 104 SCRA 379, this Court discussed extensively the
procedural safeguards for in-custody interrogation of accused persons. In that case, wherein no
eyewitnesses testified to the brutal killing of an octogenarian, the chief of police, corroborated by
the sworn statements of two other policemen, testified that the accused voluntarily confessed to the
killing. In ruling against the admissibility of the alleged oral confession, this Court stressed the fact that
the prosecution failed to prove that before the accused made his alleged oral confession, he was
informed of his rights to remain silent and to have counsel as there was no proof that he knowingly
and intelligently waived those rights. The Duero ruling is applicable in this case.

While Eugenia Abano was free to go home from February 8, 1980 when she was first "invited" for
questioning by Chief of Police Cabahug until the time she confessed on February 11, 1980, she was in
fact in the custody of the police notwithstanding Cabahug's assertion that she was "not exactly
placed in jail." 62

Concededly, Cabahug informed Eugenia that she needed a lawyer. But there is no proof that
Cabahug offered to secure one of her at the instance of the State especially after she had
manifested that she could not afford to hire her own counsel. 63 Cabahug's omission to make such
offer is a grave one. It rendered her alleged confession inadmissible.64

Similarly, there is no evidence that Eugenia was informed of her right to remain silent. Neither is there
proof that she had voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently waived that right. 65

Moreover, as the unchallenged testimony of Eugenia reveals, she made the confession because the
chief of police promised that she would "not be included in the case" as she would be discharged as
a prosecution witness. Considering her emotional and mental state at that time, that promise must
have overcome Eugenia's better judgment. It became a factor which contributed to the
inadmissibility of her confession. 66

Chief of police Cabahug's uncorroborated testimony on the confessions of Eliseo and Teofilo
Cabana is likewise bereft of indications that he had observed the procedural safeguards mandated
by the Constitution to which the Cabanas are entitled as a matter of right. In fact, from Eliseo's
unrebutted testimony, use of threats to extract their alleged confessions is evident. 67

We agree with the Solicitor General that the municipal judge who conducted the preliminary
investigation need not apprise Eugenia of the nature and gravity of the charges against her and the
consequences of her admission thereof when she appeared as witness for Concordia Abano. During
that investigation, all that was needed was for the investigating judge to remind her that she was
under oath and that she should "ten the truth and nothing but the truth."

But the Solicitor General overlooked an aspect in the presentation of Eugenia as her daughter-in-
law's witness which cannot pass the test of fundamental fairness. She was presented as such witness
after she had waived her right to preliminary investigation and at a time when she was unassisted by
counsel. As it were, Eugenia, an unschooled copra-maker, was left to fend for herself in a proceeding
wherein she herself was the accused.

What added gall to her bitter predicament was the fact that she was presented as a witness to
forestall the further detention of her daughter-in-law and insure the latter's discharge as her co-
accused only to find herself in the precarious situation of answering questions the implications of
which may have been beyond her comprehension. Ironically, the investigating judge cited "human
considerations" as a reason for discharging Concordia as an accused, unmindful of the fact that in
allowing Eugenia to incriminate herself, he was trampling on her rights as an accused.

As this Court enunciated in Chavez vs. Court of Appeals, L-29169, August 19, 1968, 24 SCRA 663, 680
and in Bermudez vs. Castillo, 64 Phil. 483, 488, the rule against self-incrimination positively intends to
avoid and prohibit the certainly inhuman procedure of compelling a person "to furnish the missing
evidence necessary for his conviction." In the Chavez case, we express the view that the rule may
apply even to a co-defendant in a joint trial
The situation would have been different had Eugenia been assisted by counsel during the preliminary
investigation For the- she could have availed herself of legal advice on when to refrain from
answering incriminating questions.

We consider the absence of Eugenia's counsel when she appeared as witness during the preliminary
investigation as an irreparable damage which rendered inadmissible her alleged confession.

The inadmissibility in evidence of the accused's extrajudicial confession, notwithstanding, We find the
"web of circumstantial evidence" which the trial court found sufficient for conviction, to have
remained unimpaired. Under Section 5 of Rule 133, circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction
if: [a] there is more than one circumstance; [b] the facts from which the inferences are derived are
proven; and [c] the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
a reasonable doubt. These requirements have been satisfied in the case at bar.

Concordia testified that she saw Eugenia Abano with her co-accused, Eliseo and Teofilo Cabana,
taking supper together at the former's house hours before the commission of the crimes; that Eliseo
and Teofilo forced her [Concordia] to accompany them to Agripino's hut and in order to draw
Agripino out of said hut, instructed her to say that her husband Rodolfo needed to be brought to a
doctor because of a stomach ache; and that after she returned to her hut, Eugenia woke Rodolfo to
ask him to bring Eliseo and Teofilo in his motorized tricycle to Matab-ang, Toledo City. This testimony
was not rebutted, but in fact corroborated in part by Delia Cumad, who testified to hearing
Concordia calling to Agripino to bring Rodolfo to a doctor as he was suffering from a stomach ache;
and by Rodolfo himself, who testified to his being roused from sleep by his mother Eugenia with the
request to bring the Cabanas to Matab-ang, Toledo City. Noteworthy is the fact that her request
came shortly after the victims were hacked to death as it was while Rodolfo and Concordia were on
their way to get the tricycle from the garage that they met Delia, who was then on her way to a
neighbor's house to seek help.

Rodolfo testified that from the garage, he went back to his hut, where after Concordia had alighted
from the tricycle, Eugenia, boarded it up to a place near the latter's hut where she got off and the
Cabanas in turn boarded it. Rodolfo likewise stated that he noticed the Cabanas carrying a piece of
sack rolled over a two-foot object.

The events narrated by Concordia, Delia and Rodolfo constitute an unbroken chain of natural and
rational circumstances, which corroborate each other and point beyond reasonable doubt to the
complicity of the accused in the crimes.

The defense attempted to discredit Concordia by turning the tables on her. No reason nor motive
was however proferred why Concordia would commit the crimes or why she would falsely accuse
her own mother-in-law and the Cabanas, who were virtual strangers and against whom she held no
grudge, of crimes so grave. On the other hand, among the persons implicated, it was Eugenia
Abano who had the motive to order the killing of her husband and his paramour. Her initial
protestation that she harbored no ill-feelings toward her husband and his common-law wife was
totally negated by her very own testimony that Agripino used to box and maltreat her every time she
objected to his cohabitation with Bienvenida and the suspicion she expressed that it was Bienvenida
who induced her husband to maltreat her so that she would die and they would be free to live
together. Because her husband was "brave" she could not do anything openly about the situation
and she merely kept her resentment concealed within her. Human nature as it is, the tendency is for
pent-up emotions to grow and magnify, rather than diminish and disappear, particularly where the
cause thereof is constantly present, as in the case at bar, and it is not uncommon in the realm of
human experience for such emotions to burst and translate themselves into violence-thus, the so-
called crimes of passion.

The Court sympathizes with the most pitiful plight of Eugenia Abano. How she must have suffered
during the three years that her husband lived with his paramour. The wound in her heart, occasioned
by the separation, never had a chance to heal, but was kept raw and bleeding by the brazen and
cruel behavior of her husband maintaining a love nest so near the abandoned wife. Four hundred
meters in an urban area may seem a long distance, but not so in a rural community where the next-
door neighbor may be housed at an even greater distance. It is indeed in cases like this, that the
bounden duty of the court to apply the law becomes a painful task and the maxim "dura lex, sed lex"
makes its full impact felt. In view of the exceptional circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, the
Court recommends executive clemency for accused-appellant Eugenia Abano.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Cebu-Bohol Circuit Criminal Court in Criminal Cases Nos. CCC-XIV-
2147 and CCC-XIV-2148, is hereby affirmed with the modification that the civil indemnities for the
heirs of the deceased Agripino Abano and the heirs of the deceased Bienvenida Cumad are hereby
increased to P30,000.00 each. For lack of necessary votes, the two death penalties imposed on each
of the accused are hereby commuted to reclusion perpetua. Let copies of this decision be furnished
the Minister of Justice.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-68603 June 25, 1986

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. NENITA QUIZON y KATIPUNAN

In Criminal Case No. 83-20146 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, National Capital Region, Branch
55, the appellant Nenita Quizon y Katipunan was charged with violation of Section 4, Article 11, in
relation to Section 21, Article IV of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended, allegedly
committed as follows:

That on or about August 25, 1983, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, not being
authorized by law to sell, deliver, give away to another or distribute any prohibited drug, did then
and there wilfully and unlawfully sell, deliver or give away to another fifteen (15) sticks of cigarette
containing marijuana, which is a prohibited drug.

Upon arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty, and thereafter, trial proceeded and the
prosecution as well as the defense presented their respective evidence.

The prosecution presented in evidence, in addition to the testimonies of Pat. Jesus Gesolfon III,
Patrolwoman Susan Mendez, P/Lt. Reynaldo Jaylo and P/Sgt. Herminio Siochi, all of the Special Anti-
Narcotics Group, Auxiliary Services Bureau, Western Police District, Metropolitan Police Force and
Edwin C. Purificando, NBI Forensic Chemist, the extrajudicial confessions of appellant, wherein she
admitted the commission of the offense imputed to her.

Testifying in her own behalf, appellant repudiated her extrajudicial confessions, claiming that she was
forced to sign them.

The trial court convicted her of the crime charged primarily on the basis of her extrajudicial
confessions, and sentenced her "to suffer the penalty of LIFE IMPRISONMENT with the accessory
penalties provided by the law and to pay a fine of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00), plus the
costs."

Appellant interposed the present appeal, contending that —

THE LOWER COURT ERRED WHEN DURING THE TRIAL OF THIS CASE IT EXPOSED ITSELF WITH MANIFEST
AND CLEAR BIAS AND PREJUDICE AGAINST THE ACCUSED.

II

THE LOWER COURT ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO CONSIDER THE TESTIMONIAL INCONSISTENCIES AND
CONTRADICTIONS OF PROSECUTION WITNESSES TO BE MATERIAL.

III

THE LOWER COURT ERRED WHEN IT ADMITTED IN EVIDENCE THE MONEY BILLS MARKED EXHIBITS 'H' AND
'H-1'.

IV

THE LOWER COURT ERRED WHEN IT ADMITTED IN EVIDENCE THE ALLEGED EXTRAJUDICIAL CONFESSIONS
OF THE ACCUSED.

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO APPRECIATE THE CLAIM OF THE DEFENSE THAT THE
MARIJUANA AND THE TWO MONEY BILLS ARE PLANTED EVIDENCE.
VI

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING NENITA QUIZON GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE
CRIME OF VIOLATION OF SECTION 4, ARTICLE II IN RELATION TO SECTION 21, ARTICLE IV OF THE
DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT OF 1972, AS AMENDED.

In his MANIFESTATION IN LIEU OF APPELLEE'S BRIEF, the Solicitor General agrees with appellant and
recommends that she be acquitted on the ground that the evidence extant in the record of this
case has not established her guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In the said manifestation he
summarized the evidence of the prosecution and that of the defense, as follows:

A. Version of the Prosecution

On August 25, 1983 at about 7:30 o'clock in the evening, Lt. Alfredo Lazarte, Officer-in-Charge of the
Auxiliary Services Bureau, Special Anti-Narcotics Group of the Western Police District, received
information that a certain woman and her cohorts were selling marijuana in Almario St., Tondo,
Manila. (p. 16, tsn, December 14, 1983)

Acting on the aforesaid information, Lt. Lazarte dispatched a team of policemen headed by Sgt.
Herminio Siochi with the express instruction to entrap a certain Melda, the woman allegedly
engaged in the sale of marijuana. (p. 17, tsn, December 14, 1984)

Thus bidden, the said team of policemen proceeded to Almario St., Tondo, Manila. Patrolman
Gesolfon and Patrolwoman Mendez were specifically assigned the task of entrapping the supposed
marijuana seller. (p. 17, tsn, December 14, 1983)

The testimonies, however, of Gesolfon and Mendez as to here the entrapment was made, who did
the buying from the appellant, who effected the arrest and when such arrest was effected was
made do not jibe with each other. Hence, their narrations on these material points will be separately
discussed.

a. Gesolfon's declaration

Upon reaching Almario St., Gesolfon, Mendez and informant saw the appellant Nenita Quizon in front
of her house and they approached her. Mendez told appellant that she wanted to buy 15 sticks of
marijuana cigarettes from her. After receiving the cigarettes from appellant, Mendez handed her
two marked bills, one P10-bill and one P5-bill. At this point, Gesolfon said, 'I am a police officer. you
are under arrest.' Appellant was then brought to police headquarters for investigation, (pp. 18-26, tsn,
December 14, 1983)

b. Mendez' narrative

When they reached Almario St., Gesolfon, Mendez and the informant proceeded to the appellant's
house. The informant preceded the two in going up the second floor of the appellant's house. The
informant told the appellant they wanted to buy marijuana. Appellant brought out 15 sticks of
marijuana which she gave to Gesolfon. Gesolfon handed money to her after receiving the fifteen
(15) sticks of marijuana. At this point, Mendez gave a signal to their companions along Almario Street.
The latter responded by moving into the house of the appellant. Then, Lt. Jaylo arrested her. (pp. 9-
11, 14, 15 & 18, tsn, February 15, 1984).

The appellant was brought to the Police headquarters where she was made to execute a statement
(Exh. E and E-1) in which it would appear that she admitted her complicity in the crime imputed her.
The following day, she executed another statement (Exh. E-2).

B. Version of the Defense

On the night of August 25, 1983, the appellant was inside their house located at 766 R. Almario St.,
Dagupan, Tondo, Manila, putting a baby to sleep when suddenly three (3) policemen barged into
their house. They demanded of her to bring out the marijuana allegedly in her possession but which
she denied having any. The policemen then forced her to go with them. One of them whom she
recognized as Pat. Gesolfon poked a gun at her. (p. 34, tsn, April 4, 1984)
At the police precinct, the appellant was brought to a room by Patrolwoman Mendez who stripped
off appellant's pants and searched her body for marijuana. Patrolwoman Mendez found nothing
from her, Barely one (1) hour thereafter, she (appellant) was forced to execute a statement before
Mendez admitting the charge levelled against her. The policemen did this by shouting at her and
threatening her that she will rot in jail if she does not-give her statement. The policemen did not allow
her to read the statement, but instead forced her to sign it without knowing its content. She was
afraid and nervous during that time. (pp. 4-6, tsn, April 4, 1984)

The following day, while still under detention, the appellant was again investigated, this time by Pat.
Jaylo. The latter forced her to sign a statement, shouting bad words at her like 'Putang Ina mo, pag
hindi mo pinirmahan ito' and at the same time pulling his sidearm.

Corroborating the appellant's testimony, Maricel Uranyeza testified that she was at the appellant's
house using the latter's telephone while Nenita (appellant) was putting her nephew to sleep. She saw
three (3) persons wearing civilian clothes enter the house.

They asked Nenita Quizon where Imelda Quizon's house was. Nenita informed them that Imelda lives
in the house. Whereupon, the men insisted that Nenita was Imelda and they forced Nenita to go with
them. Seeing this happen, Uranyeza got afraid and ran downstairs where she was confronted by one
of the policemen. However, she told him that she did nothing wrong and went to the appellant's
house only to use their phone. Hearing this, the police let her go. (pp. 4-5, tsn, March 19, 1984)

Uranyeza also executed a 'Sinumpaang Salaysay' on September 1983 categorically contradicting

the events as narrated by the police officers that led to the arrest of the appellant (Exh. 'I').

As previously stated, appellant was convicted primarily on the basis of her alleged extra-judicial
confessions. Appellant and the Solicitor General contend that the said extra-judicial confessions are
inadmissible in evidence because appellant was not fully apprised of her constitutional right to
counsel. (Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution)

We agree. As aptly observed by the Solicitor General —

The appellant's extra-judicial confession executed on the night of her arrest (Exhibits 'E' and 'E-1' is
prefaced as follows:

TANONG:

Nais mo bang magbigay ng kusang loob na salaysay at sagutin ng buong katotohanan lahat ng
itatanong namin sa iyo na hindi ka namin tinatakot, sinasaktan, o pinangakuan ng anumang
pabuya at dapat mong malaman ang lahat ay sasabihin mo dito ay maaring gamitin laban o
pabor sa iyo at kanino mang tao sa alin mang hukuman sa ating bayan at dapat mo ring malaman
na sa pagsisiyasat na ito karapatan mong magkaroon ng manananggol at ang karapatan mo sa
ilalim ng Saligang Batas ay maaari kang huwag sumagot sa itatanong namin sa iyo kung gusto mo.

SAGOT: Opo.

TANONG:

Samakatuwid, magbigay ka nang malayang salaysay kahit na wala kang manananggol?

SAGOT: Opo.

(SGD) NENITA K. QUIZON

The foregoing indubitably shows that while the appellant was informed of her right to remain silent
and to hire a lawyer to assist her, she was not, however, informed that if she could not secure a
lawyer, the State will provide her with one, to assist her in the custodial investigation.

The omission is a fatal defect rendering the extra-judicial confession inadmissible in evidence as ruled
by this Honorable Tribunal in People vs. Pascual, Jr. (109 SCRA 197, 205).

Even the subsequent extra-judicial statement executed by the appellant does not unequivocably
show a clear and intelligent waiver by the appellant of her constitutional right to counsel, thus:
02. — T. Ngayon, nauunawaan mo ang iyong mga karapatan, gusto mo bang magbigay ng
isang malaya at kusang loob na salaysay at sagutin ng pawang katotohanan lamang ang lahat ng
aking mga itatanong sa iyo?

S. Opo, magbigay ako ng salaysay.

03. — T. Gusto mo bang kumuha ng isang abogadong makakatulong sa iyo?

S. Huwag na ho, alam ko naman ang isasagot ko.

As may be gleaned from the foregoing, the appellant was simply asked whether she wanted the
services of a lawyer. However, she was not told that if she could not afford to hire one, the State
would provide her one to assist her in the investigation.

This subsequent extra-judicial confession was also rejected by the appellant under oath. The
appellant testified that Pat. Jaylo intimidated her into signing the questioned statement by shouting
bad words at her and pulling his gun from his waist. This was not rebutted by Pat. Jaylo.

Considering, therefore, the circumstances under which the appellant's subsequent extra-judicial
confession was executed, it stands discredited in the eyes of the law and is a thing that never existed.
(People vs. Urro, 44 SCRA 473 [1972]).?

Only recently, this Court had the occasion to rule that —

When the Constitution requires a person under investigation 'to be informed' of his rights to remain
silent and to counsel, it must be presumed to contemplate the transmission of meaningful information
rather than just the ceremonial and perfunctory recitation of an abstract constitutional principle. As a
rule, therefore, it would not be sufficient for a police officer just to repeat to the person under
investigation the provisions of Section 20, Article IV of the Constitution. He is not only duty-bound to
tell the person the rights to which the latter is entitled; he must also explain their effects in practical
terms, e.g., what the person under interrogation may or may not do, and in a language the subject
fairly understands. (See People vs. Ramos, 122 SCRA 312; People vs. Caguioa, 95 SCRA 2.) In other
words, the right of a person under interrogation 'to be informed' implies a correlative obligation on
the part of the police investigator to explain, and contemplates an effective communication that
results in understanding what is conveyed. Short of this, there is a denial of the right, as it cannot truly
be said that the person has been 'informed' of his rights. Now, since the right 'to be informed' implies
comprehension, the degree of explanation required will necessarily vary, depending upon the
education, intelligence and other relevant personal circumstances of the person under investigation.
Suffice it to say that a simpler and more lucid explanation is needed where the subject is unlettered.
(People vs. Nicandro, G.R. No. 59378, February 11, 1986; People vs. Duhan, et al., G.R. No. 65189, May
28, 1986)

Moreover, the ruling in People vs. Galit (135 SCRA 465, 472), to the effect that the right to counsel
may be waived but the waiver shall not be valid unless made with the assistance of counsel, clearly
applies to the case at bar.

The Solicitor General also joins with appellant in assailing the trial court for giving weight and
credence to the testimonies of the witnesses for the prosecution which are contradictory and
inconsistent on material points, thus casting serious doubts as to the truth of the alleged entrapment.

Again, We agree. As observed by the Solicitor General —

... There are several material inconsistencies in the testimonies of the police officers raising serious
doubts as to the truth of the supposed entrapment. Significant portions of Pat. Gesolfon's testimony
are quoted, as follows:

COURT

Q Who entered the house of Nenita Quizon?

A Nobody entered the house sir,

Q What did P/w Mendez do?

A She requested the 15 sticks of marijuana cigarettes in front of the house of Nenita Quizon, sir.

Q How did you know that P/w Susan Mendez bought 15 sticks of marijuana cigarettes from the
accused on that occasion?

A I was with her, sir.

xxx xxx xxx

Q When P/w Susan Mendez gave the P15.00 to Nenita Quizon immediately after Nenita Quizon
gave the 15 sticks of marijuana cigarettes what else transpired?

A After Nenita Quizon gave the 15 sticks of marijuana to P/w Mendez I say that I am a Police
Officer, and I said to her that you are under arrest and we bring Nenita Quizon to the Police
Headquarters. ... (pp. 18-19, tsn, December 14, 1983; Emphasis supplied.)

while relevant portions of P/w Susan Mendez' testimony are reproduced hereinbelow, to wit:

xxx xxx xxx

q. Were you the one who handed the money to the accused?

a. Pat. Gesolfon, sir.

q. And who received the fifteen (15) sticks of marijuana?

a. Pat. Gesolfon handed the marijuana from the suspect but I was there.

q. Where is not the money?

q. It was on the possession of Lt. Jaylo, I gave it to him.

xxx xxx xxx

q. Where were you?

a. I was beside him, sir.

q. What were you doing when the accused handed the marijuana cigarette to Pat. Gesolfon?

a. I was standing beside Pat. Gesolfon because we have no instruction to arrest her on that
actual selling and buying of marijuana.

court

q. So you did not arrest the accused at that moment?

a. No, Your Honor.

fiscal de jesus

q. After that, what did you do?

a. We went to the place of their house, then we gave a signal, I lighted cigarette and our
companions were a little far away from us when I lighted a cigarette, they saw it as our signal, then
they went with us.

court

q. What particular place did the accused sell marijuana?

a. Inside their house, Your Honor.

fiscal de jesus
q. Was it on the second floor or 1st floor?

a. It was at the second floor, there was stairs.

q. You mean you went upstairs together with Pat. Gesolfon to push (sic) as the buyer of the
accused?

a. Yes, sir.

xxx xxx xxx

q. Who arrested the accused?

a. Lt. Jaylo, Sgt. Sayo, Pat. Gesolfon and Pat. Pedriz.

q. Where was accused arrested?

a. Inside their house, sir. (pp. 8-13, tsn, February 15, 1984; Emphasis Supplied.)

Several inconsistencies are readily noticeable from the aforequoted portions of the testimonies of
Patrolwoman Mendez. Thus:

(1) Gesolfon averred that it was P/w Mendez who handed the marked money to the appellant.
On the other hand, Mendez stated that it was Gesolfon who gave the said money to the appellant.

(2) While Pat. Gesolfon declared that the entrapment took place in front of the appellant's house,
P/w Mendez testified that it took place on the second floor of the appellant's house.

(3) Gesolfon testified that he personally arrested the appellant immediately after the feigned
buying took place. For her part, Mendez declared that the arrest was made by Pat. Jaylo after
receiving a signal coming from her.

(4) Gesolfon narrated that the 15 sticks of marijuana cigarettes were already with the appellant
when they saw her in front of the latter's house. Mendez, on the other hand, stated that the appellant
had yet to get the cigarettes from a room on the second floor of the said appellant's house.

Further inconsistencies are correctly pointed out by the appellant in her brief, to wit:

1. During his direct examination, Pat. Gesolfon, declared that the appellant gave the marked
money only after her investigation at the police headquarters (p. 21, tsn, December 14, 1983, lines 10-
11). On the other hand, Patrolwoman Mendez claimed that she immediately retrieved the money
from the appellant after handing it to her (p. 18, tsn, February 15, 1984, lines 12-16).

2. Gesolfon narrated that it was Patrolwoman Mendez who asked the accused: 'Oh, mayroon
ba tayo' (p. 25, tsn, December 14, 1984). For her part, Mendez testified that the informant did the
asking of marijuana from the appellant (p. 15, tsn, February 15, 1984).

3. Pat. Gesolfon admitted during his cross-examination that he was armed with a.38 Cal. gun
when the alleged entrapment took place (p. 27, tsn, December 14, 1983). When presented as a
rebuttal witness, Lt. Jaylo, however, maintained that Gesolfon was unarmed, Rather, it was
Patrolwoman Mendez who was armed (p. 12, tsn, April 26, 1984).

4. The police crime report (Exhibit "C") does not specifically mention the name of the appellant,
Nenita, as one of those furnished by the informant allegedly engaged in selling marijuana, but 'Melda
and cohorts'. In her testimony, however, Patrolwoman Mendez declared that 'our informant told us
that the marijuana was bought from Melda and Nenita Quizon. (p. 17, tsn, February 14, 1984).

Indeed, if there was an entrapment actually conducted by Gesolfon and Mendez against the
appellant, why would these police officers' testimonies relative thereto differ on material points? This
fact sufficiently raises doubt as to the truth of the alleged entrapment which engenders a reasonable
degree of doubt as to the appellant's guilt. This is one vital fact of substance which the lower court
overlooked, and provides basis for reversal. Thus, as reiterated in People vs. Pagkaliwagan, 36 SCRA
113 (1970):
And while the Court on Appeal would normally not disturb the findings of the trial court on the
credibility of witnesses in view of the latter's advantage of observing at first hand their demeanor in
giving their testimony, the Court has consistently held that this rule of appreciation of evidence must
bow to the superior and immutable rule that the guilt of the accused must be proved beyond
reasonable doubt, because the law, presumes that a defendant is innocent and this presumption
must prevail unless overturned by competent and credible proof '(Emphasis supplied.)

The testimony of defense witness Leticia Limano is, however, revealing, significant portions of which
are quoted, to wit:

atty. dionido

q. Mrs. Leticia Limano, where were you on the night of August 25, 1983?

a. I was in our house by our window.

court

q. that window where you were, where was it lacing?

a. that is facing at the house of nenita quizon, your Honor.

atty. dionido

q. did you notice any unusual incident that happened during that night?

a. yes, sir.

q. will you please tell the honorable court what is that?

a. I was at the window baby sitting when I saw an owner jeep parked in front of the house of
nenita quizon, after that three persons went to the house of nenita quizon and one of those
policemen hold my husband in the neck.

q. and what did you do when you saw your husband was being held by the neck?

a. I went downstairs to stop the policeman in bringing my husband because I informed them that
my husband has not committed anything wrong and he is a good husband and Ideal one and i also
informed them that i am an employee of the NAPOLCOM and i explained to them that i just sent my
husband for an errand to get a pale of water as a matter of fact he was just wearing shorts.

court

q. by the way, do you know who is that arresting officer?

a. i only knew one of the three.

q. who among them?

a. capt. siochi. i don't know his full name,

q. after talking with this capt., what did you do?

a. after talking with him he release my husband and quest my husband to get water for me.

atty. dionido

a. then what happened next in your surrounding, if any

q. after that i noticed that the three policemen were going downstairs of the house of nenita
quizon together with aling juling.
a. and you also know apparently how long the duration when the policemen went upstairs and
downstairs?

q. no, sir.

court

q. do you know why the policemen tried to arrest your husband?

a. i do not know, your honor.

q. did you not asked capt. siochi why he was arresting your husband?

a. yes, your honor.

q. what did he tell you?

a. i was told by capt. siochi he was only asking my husband to point to him who is selling
marijuana in our place. (pp. 13-16, tsn, March 19, 1984; Emphasis Supplied.)

The foregoing was corroborated by prosecution rebuttal witness, Sgt. Siochi, as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

q. There is another witness for the defense in the person of Leticia Limano who testified that when
you arrested Nenita Quizon and before that incident her husband by the name of Willie Limano was
arrested because he refused to cooperate with you and said Leticia Limano talked to you that her
husband should not be arrested because he has nothing to do in the case you are imputing to
Nenita Quizon and that she introduced herself to you as a lady employee of the National Police
Commission, what can you say about that?

a. I remember that incident when I accosted a man before the arrest of Nenita Quizon. And the
arrest of Nenita Quizon was not made by me but it was made by Policewoman Susan Mendez and
Pat. Gesolfon. I was in the street just around seven to ten meters away when Nenita Quizon was
being lead to the jeep.

q. Did that said woman introduced herself to you when she approached you?

a. She refuse to give her name first sir.

q. And after that what happened?

a. The man struggled to free himself when I told him to hopin-to the jeep

q. So after that?

a. The woman introduced herself as an lady employee of the NAPOLCOM inasmuch as the
Identity of the woman being arrested was already established and I gave weigh (way) to free the
man. And we have already Nenita Quizon in the jeep sir.

xxx xxx xxx

q. When you accosted Willie Limano, what was he doing?

witness

a. He was walking in the street?

q. Why as police officer you are accosting a man even though he is not making any trouble?

a. no sir.

q. What else did you do after accosting Willie Limano around that place?
a. nothing sir.

q. So usually you are accosting any persons who are making any trouble in the road as you
testified you accosted Willie Limano?

a. I accosted him but I did not arrested him. (pp. 7-8, tsn, April 25, 1984, Emphasis Supplied.)

Thus, it may be asked, if the team of policemen assigned to entrap the marijuana seller had fore-
knowledge of the identity of the said seller in the person of appellant, why would they still ask a
stranger, Willie Limano in this case, if the latter know anybody who was selling marijuana within the
vicinity of Almario St.?

Clearly, the evidence on record does not justify a verdict of guilt.

By and large, the prosecution failed in its task of proving the guilt of the appellant beyond
reasonable doubt. She is, therefore, entitled to an acquittal.

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from should be, as it is hereby REVERSED, and another one
entered ACQUITTING the herein appellant of the charge against her.

GR No. 71092, Sep 30, 1987

PEOPLE v. ANACLETO Q. OLVIS

SARMIENTO, J.:

This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga Del Norte sitting in
Dipolog City.[1] The case was certified to this Court on January 19, 1985 following the death
sentences imposed on each of the three accused-appellants, Romulo Villarojo, Leonardo Cademas,
and Dominador Sorela (the accused first-named, Anacleto Olvis, was acquitted), over which, under
the Constitution then in force,[2] we exercised exclusive appellate jurisdiction.[3] With the
promulgation of the 1987 Charter, abolishing the death penalty and commuting death penalties
already imposed to reclusion perpetua[4], we, on May 14, 1987, issued a death penalty abolition
resolution requiring the three accused-appellants to file a statement, personally signed by them with
the assistance of counsel, stating whether or not they wished to continue with the case as an
appealed case.[5] We have since observed this procedure with respect to all pending capital cases.

In compliance with our resolution, the three accused-appellants, on May 28, 1987, filed a statement
informing us that they desire to continue with this case as an appealed case.[6]

This appeal stemmed from an information dated November 11, 1976 charging all four accused with
the murder of Deosdedit Bagon. The same reads as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

The undersigned First Assistant Provincial Fiscal accuses ANACLETO Q. OLVIS, as principal by
inducement, ROMULO VILLAROJO, LEONARDO CADEMAS and DOMINADOR SORELA, as principals by
direct participation, of the crime of murder, committed as follows:

That in the evening on or about the 7th day of September 1975, in the Municipality of Polanco,
Zamboanga del Norte, within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
conspiring and confederating with one another and acting upon the direction and instruction of
ANACLETO Q. OLVIS who masterminded the bizarre plot and directly induced ROMULO VILLAROJO,
LEONARDO CADEMAS and DOMINADOR SORELA to execute the conspiracy and who, armed with
boloes and a hunting knife, with intent to kill by means of treachery and evident premeditation, and
for a consideration of a price or reward, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
attack, assault, hack and stab one DEOSDEDIT BAGON, thereby inflicting upon him multiple incised
(hack) and stab wounds which caused his instantaneous death.

CONTRARY TO LAW, with the qualify-ing circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation and
the generic aggravating circumstances of superior strength, nighttime and in consideration of a price
or reward.[7]

xxx xxx xxx

The four accused entered identical "not guilty" pleas.

After trial, the court a quo rendered the decision under appeal, the dispositive portion whereof reads
as follows:

FOREGOING CONSIDERED, and on the part of accused ANACLETO Q. OLVIS, SR., there being no
evidence, direct or indirect, whether testimonial, documentary or physical evidence, that tend to
establish his complicity in this case, said accused has to be, as he hereby is, ACQUITTED.

On the part of the three (3) remaining accused ROMULO VILLAROJO, LEONARDO CADEMAS, and
DOMINADOR SORELA, the degree of moral certainty establishing their authorship of the crime is
irreversibly positive. The three (3) accused conspired and confederated with one another to
successfully achieve their ghastly, evil ends. Their guilt has been proved beyond reasonable doubt.

Treachery and evident premeditation are qualifying circumstances in this case of MURDER. But said
offense was attended by the aggravating circumstances of superior strength and nighttime. No
mitigating circumstance has been shown to offset the two (2) aggravating circumstances, as a
consequence of which, the Court hereby renders judgment sentencing the accused ROMULO
VILLAROJO, LEONARDO CADEMAS, and DOMINADOR SORELA, to suffer the maximum penalty of
DEATH.

The said accused are further sentenced to pay, jointly and severally, to the heirs of the Murder victim,
DEOSDEDIT BAGON, the sum of P12,000.00 as death indemnity, P60,000.00 as moral damages,
P20,000.00 for exemplary damages, and costs.

SO ORDERED.[8]

We come to the facts.

On September 9, 1975, Alfredo and Estrella Bagon, brother and sister, arrived at the local Integrated
National Police station of Barrio Polanco, in Zamboanga del Norte, to report their brother, Deosdedit
Bagon, missing. The station commander, Captain Ruperto Encabo, received their report.

Bagon had been in fact missing since two days before. He was last seen by his wife in the afternoon
of September 7, 1975, on his way home to Sitio Sebaca where they resided. She did not, however,
find him there when she arrived in the evening. She then set out to locate him in three probable
places, but her efforts were in vain.

It was Captain Encabo himself who led a search party to mount an inquiry. As a matter of police
procedure, the team headed off to Sitio Sebaca to question possible witnesses. There, Captain
Encabo's men chanced upon an unnamed volunteer, who informed them that Deosdedit Bagon
was last seen together with Dominador Sorela, one of the accused herein. Encabo then instructed
one of his patrolmen to pick up Sorela.

Sorela bore several scratches on his face, neck, and arms when the police found him. According to
him, he sustained those wounds while clearing his ricefield. Apparently unconvinced, Captain
Encabo had Sorela take them to the ricefield where he sustained his injuries. But half way there,
Sorela allegedly broke down, and, in what would apparently crack the case for the police, admitted
having participated in the killing of the missing Bagon. By then, the police of Polanco knew that they
had a murder case in their hands.

Sorela allegedly confessed having been with Deosdedit Bagon, a friend of his, in the evening of
September 7, 1975 in Sitio Sebaca after some marketing. They were met by Romulo Villarojo and
Leonardo Cademas, Sorela's co-accused herein and likewise friends of the deceased, who led them
to a secluded place in the ricefields. It does not appear from the records how the three were able to
have the deceased join them.

It was then that Villarojo allegedly attacked Bagon with a bolo, hacking him at several parts of the
body until he, Bagon, was dead. Moments later, Sorela fled, running into thick cogon grasses where
he suffered facial and bodily scratches.

The police soon picked up Villarojo and Cademas. Together with Sorela, they were turned over to
the custody of Captain Encabo.
The police thereafter made the three re-enact the crime. Patrolman Dionisio Capito directed Sorela
to lead them to the grounds where Deosdedit Bagon was supposed to have been buried. But it was
Villarojo who escorted them to a watery spot somewhere in the ricefields, where the sack-covered,
decomposing cadaver of Bagon lay in a shallow grave.

The actual exhumation of the body of the victim was witnessed by Polanco policemen and Civilian
Home Defense Forces volunteers, numbering about thirty. The body was transported to the Polanco
municipal hall the following day, September 10, 1975. It was displayed, morbidly, in front of the
building where Mrs. Catalina Bagon, widow of the deceased, and her four children viewed it. The
exhumation, as well as the transfer of Bagon's cadaver, were captured by the lens of a
photographer. (Exhibits "I", "J", "K", "L", "M", and "N").

The "ceremonies" continued in the parish church of the Polanco, where the body of the victim was
transferred. It was laid on the altar, in full public view. Again, the proceedings were recorded by the
camera of a photographer. (Exhibits "Q", "R", "S".)

But it was only later on that the body itself was uncovered from the sack that had concealed it.
(Exhibits "T", "U", "V".) Thereupon, it was readied for autopsy.

The necropsy report prepared by the provincial health officer disclosed that the deceased suffered
twelve stab and hack wounds, six of which were determined to be fatal.

In the re-enactment, the suspects, the three accused herein, demonstrated how the victim was
boloed to death. Exhibit "Y", a photograph, shows the appellant Villarojo in the posture of raising a
bolo as if to strike another, while Solera and Cademas look on. Exhibit "X", another photograph,
portrays Villarojo in the act of concealing the murder weapon behind a banana tree, apparently
after having done the victim in.

The investigation yielded several effects of the offense: a twenty-inch long bolo, the shovel used to
inter the victim's remains, a nylon rope with which the dead body was tied, and the sack itself.

Initial findings of investigators disclosed that the threesome of Solera, Villarojo, and Cademas
executed Deosdedit Bagon on orders of Anacleto Olvis, then Polanco municipal mayor, for a reward
of P3,000.00 each.

While in custody, the three executed five separate written confessions each. The first confessions
were taken on September 9, 1975 in the local Philippine Constabulary headquarters. The second
were made before the Polanco police. On September 18, 1975, the three accused reiterated the
same confessions before the National Bureau of Investigation Dipolog City sub-office. On September
21, 1975 and September 25, 1975, they executed two confessions more, again before the Philippine
Constabulary and the police of Polanco.

In their confessions of September 9, 1975, September 14, 1975, September 21, 1975, and September
25, 1975, the said accused again pointed to the then accused Anacleto Olvis as principal by
inducement, who allegedly promised them a reward of P3,000.00 each.

In their confessions of September 18, 1975, sworn before agents of the National Bureau of
Investigation, however, they categorically denied Olvis' involvement in the killing. We note that the
three were transported to the Dipolog City NBI sub-office following a request on September 10, 1975
by Mrs. Diolinda O. Adaro, daughter of Olvis, and upon complaint by her of harassment against her
father by his supposed political enemies.

Based on these subsequent statements, the court a quo rendered separate verdicts on the three
accused on the one hand, and Anacleto Olvis on the other. As earlier stated, Olvis was acquitted,
while the three were all sentenced to die for the crime of murder.

In acquitting Olvis, the trial court rejected the three accused's earlier confessions pointing to him as
the mastermind, and denied the admissibility thereof insofar as far as he was concerned. It rejected
claims of witnesses that the three accused-appellants would carry out Olvis' alleged order to kill
Bagon upon an offer of a reward when in fact no money changed hands. It likewise noted that Olvis
had, two days after the murder, been in Cebu City, and who, upon arriving in Dipolog City, was in
fact informed by the Philippine Constabulary that he was a "wanted" man, "to which said accused
(Olvis) meekly complied"[9] (that is, he assented, ambiguously, to the remark). According to the
court, this was inconsistent with a guilty mind.

The court repudiated claims that Olvis had motives to do away with the deceased arising from
alleged attempts on his (Olvis') part to eject the deceased from his landholding (the deceased
having been a tenant of his), the case in fact having reached the then Ministry of Agrarian Reform. It
dismissed insinuations that his children had a score to settle with the victim, who had earlier brought a
physical injuries suit against the former, that case having been dismissed. It observed, furthermore,
that he was not questioned by the police after the killing, notwithstanding efforts by the three herein
accused-appellants to implicate him. It relied, finally, on the retraction of the accused themselves,
absolving Olvis of any liability. It was satisfied, overall, that he had a "clean bill of health"[10] in
connection with the murder case.

With the acquittal of Olvis, we are left with the murder cases against the three accused-appellants.
The accused-appellants subsequenty repudiated their alleged confessions in open court alleging
threats by the Polanco investigators of physical harm if they refused to "cooperate" in the solution of
the case. They likewise alleged that they were instructed by the Polanco police investi-gators to
implicate Anacleto Olvis in the case. They insisted on their innocence. The accused Romulo Villarojo
averred, specifically, that it was the deceased who had sought to kill him, for which he acted in self-
defense.

The murder of Deosdedit Bagon was witnessed by no other person. The police of Polanco had but
the three accused-appellants' statements to support its claims. The fundamental issue then is
whether or not these statements, as any extrajudicial confession confronting us, can stand up in
court.

We hold that, based on the recorded evidence, the three accused-appellants' extrajudicial
confessions are inadmissible in evidence.

It was on May 7, 1987 that we promulgated People v. Decierdo.[11] In that decision, we laid down
the rule with respect to extrajudicial confessions:

xxx xxx xxx

"x x x Prior to any questioning, the person must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that
any state-ment he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the
presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed. The defendant, may waive effectuation of
those rights, provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. If, however, he
indicates in any manner and at any stage of the process that he wishes to consult with an attorney
before speaking, there can be no questioning. Likewise, if the individual is alone and indicates in any
manner that he does not wish to be interro-gated, the police may not ques-tion him. The mere fact
that he may have answered some questions or volunteered some statements on his own does not
deprive him of the right to refrain from answering any further inquiries until he has consulted with an
attorney and thereafter consent to be questioned."

xxx xxx xxx

In People v. Duero, we added:

xxx xxx xxx

"At the outset, if a person in custody is to be subjected to interrogation, he must first be informed in
clear and unequivocal terms that he has the right to remain silent.

"For those unaware of the privilege, the warning is needed simply to make them aware of it - the
threshold requirement for an intelligent decision as to its exercise.

"More important, such a warning is an absolute pre-requisite in overcoming the inherent pressures of
the interrogation atmosphere ...

"Further, the warning will show the individual that his interrogators are prepared to recognize his
privilege should he choose to exercise it ...
"The warning of the right to remain silent must be accompanied by the explanation that anything
said can and will be used against the individual in court. This warning is needed in order to make him
aware not only of the privilege, but also of the consequences of foregoing it …

"An individual need not make a pre-interrogation request for a lawyer. While such request
affirmatively secures his right to have one, his failure to ask for a lawyer does not constitute a waiver.
No effective waiver of the right to counsel during interrogation can be recognized unless specifically
made after the warnings we here delineate have been given. The accused who does not know his
rights and therefore does not make a request may be the person who most needs counsel ...

"If an individual indicates that he wishes the assistance of counsel before any interrogation occurs,
the authorities cannot rationally ignore or deny his request on the basis that the individual does not
have or cannot afford a retained attorney ...

"In order fully to apprise a person interrogated of the extent of his rights under this system then, it is
necessary to warn him not only that he has the right to consult with an attorney, but also that if he is
indigent a lawyer will be appointed to represent him ...

"Once warnings have been given, the subsequent procedure is clear. If the individual indicates in
any manner, at any time prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the
interrogation must cease ... If the individual cannot obtain an attorney and he indicates that he
wants one before speaking to police, they must respect his decision to remain silent ...

"If the interrogation continues without the presence of an attorney and a statement is taken, a heavy
burden rests on the government to demonstrate that the defendant knowingly and intelligently
waived his privilege against self-incrimination and his right to retained or appointed counsel ..."[12]

xxx xxx xxx

Like the Decierdo confessions, the confessions in the case at bar suffer from a Constitutional infirmity.
In their supposed statements dated September 9, 14, and 21, 1975, the accused-appellants were not
assisted by counsel when they "waived" their rights to counsel. As we said in Decierdo, the lack of
counsel "makes [those] statement[s], in contemplation of law, 'involuntary,' even if it were otherwise
voluntary, technically."[13]

With respect to the confessions of September 18, 1975, while it is stated therein that "[t]his Office had
just requested the services of Atty. NARVARO VELAR NAVARRO of the Citizens Legal Assistance
Office, Department of Justice, Dipolog District Office, are you willing to accept the legal assistance
of Atty. NAVARRO to handle your case,"[14] the same nonetheless call for a similar rejection. There is
nothing there that would show that Atty. Navarro was the accused-appellants' counsel of choice
(specifically, the appellant Romulo Villarojo who admitted therein having been the bolo-wielder). On
the contrary, it is clear therefrom that Atty. Navarro was summoned by the NBI. He cannot therefore
be said to have been acting on behalf of the accused-appellants when he lent his presence at the
confession proceedings. What we said in People v. Galit,[15] applies with like force here:

No custodial investigation shall be conducted unless it be in the presence of counsel engaged by

the person arrested, by any person on his behalf, or appointed by the court upon petition either of
the detainee himself or by anyone on his behalf.[16]

We cast aside, for the same reason, the confessions of September 25, 1975.

But the accused-appellants were denied their right to counsel not once, but twice. We refer to the
forced re-enactment of the crime the three accused were made to perform shortly after their
apprehension.

Forced re-enactments, like uncounselled and coerced confessions come within the ban against self-
incrimination. The 1973 Constitution, the Charter prevailing at the time of the proceedings below,
says:

No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.[17]

This constitutional privilege has been defined as a protection against testimonial compulsion,[18] but
this has since been extended to any evidence "communicative in nature"[19] acquired under
circumstances of duress. Essentially, the right is meant to "avoid and prohibit positively the repetition
and recurrence of the certainly inhuman procedure of compelling a person, in a criminal or any
other case, to furnish the missing evidence necessary for his conviction."[20] This was the lesson
learned from the ancient days of the inquisition in which accusation was equivalent to guilt.[21] Thus,
an act, whether testimonial or passive, that would amount to disclosure of incriminatory facts is
covered by the inhibition of the Constitution.

This should be distinguished, parenthetically, from mechanical acts the accused is made to execute
not meant to unearth undisclosed facts but to ascertain physical attributes determinable by simple
observation. This includes requiring the accused to submit to a test to extract virus from his body,[22]
or compelling him to expectorate morphine from his mouth,[23] or making her submit to a pregnancy
test[24] or a footprinting test,[25] or requiring him to take part in a police lineup in certain cases.[26] In
each case, the accused does not speak his guilt. It is not a prerequisite therefore that he be
provided with the guiding hand of counsel.

But a forced re-enactment is quite another thing. Here, the accused is not merely required to exhibit
some physical characteristics; by and large, he is made to admit criminal responsibility against his will.
It is a police procedure just as condemnable as an uncounselled confession.

Accordingly, we hold that all evidence based on such a re-enactment to be in violation of the
Constitution and hence, incompetent evidence.

It should be furthermore observed that the three accused-appellants were in police custody when
they took part in the re-enactment in question. It is under such circumstances that the Constitution
holds a strict application. As for the accused Dominador Sorela, we cannot accept the trial judge's
finding that he acted "with unexpected spontaneity"[27] when he allegedly "spilled the beans"[28]
before the law enforcers on September 9, 1975. What is to be borne in mind is that Sorela was himself
under custody. Any statement he might have made thereafter is therefore subject to the
Constitutional guaranty.

By custodial interrogation, we mean questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person
has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant
way.[29]

We indeed doubt whether Sorela's admissions, under the circumstances, were truly his voluntary
statements. Chavez v. Court of Appeals[30] tells us:

Compulsion as it is understood here does not necessarily connote the use of violence; it may be the
product of unintentional statements. Pressure which operates to overbear his will, disable him from
making a free and rational choice, or impair his capacity for rational judgment would in our opinion
be sufficient. So is moral coercion "tending to force testimony from the unwilling lips of the
defendant."[31]

In such a case, he should have been provided with counsel.

Indeed, the three accused-appellants had languished in jail for one year and two months before the
information was filed, and only after they had gone to court on an application for habeas corpus.
For if the authorities truly had a case in their hands, we are puzzled why they, the accused, had to be
made to suffer preventive imprisonment for quite an enormous length of time.

What is more, there are striking aspects in the case that we find distressing. For one, there was no
trace of grief upon the faces of the deceased's bereaved relatives, more so his widow and children,
upon witnessing his cadaver -- wrapped in a sack and all -- although it was supposedly the first time
that they saw his remains after two days of frantic search.[32] Exhibits "K", "L", "M", "N", and "R", for
another, depict the deceased's relatives in fixed poses, while the deceased's corpse lay in the
foreground.[33]

Moreover, the victim was transferred to the municipal hall building and then subsequently, to the
parish church, again, for a photographing session -- an unusual procedure -- when the perfunctory
police procedure should have been to bring the corpse to the health officer for autopsy.

It was in fact only on September 10, 1975 that Deosdedit Bagon's remains were unwrapped, at the
parish church at that, as if pursuant to a script or as part of some eerie ceremony.
To the mind of this Court, the disposition of the case was characterized by unusual grandstanding, for
reasons as yet unclear to us. It leaves us with an uncomfortable impression that each scene was an
act in some contrived tragedy.

We likewise find the authorities' haste in securing the accused Anacleto Olvis' acquittal, at the
expense of the present three accused, quite disconcerting. It should be noted that the three
appellants had initially implicated Olvis as the mastermind. Yet, Olvis was never invited for the usual
questioning.

To us, there is more to Exhibit "20", the request to transfer Olvis' case to the jurisdiction of the National
Bureau of Investigation for reinvestigation, than meets the eye. As it happened, happily for Olvis, the
three accused-appellants, while under NBI custody, retracted their earlier statements indicting him as
a co-conspirator. Why the NBI should intervene in the case when the Polanco police had apparenty
"solved" it, is, in the first place, suspicious enough, but why the three appellants should, in an instant,
make a turn-about there leaves us even more disturbed.

While we do not challenge the verdict of acquittal rendered in favor of Olvis, for it is not within our
power to overturn acquittals,[34] what is our concern is the apparent design to use three ill-lettered
peasants,[35] the three herein accused, as fall guys in an evident network of political intrigue.

Still, we are not prepared to hand down a judgment of acquittal upon all the three accused-
appellants.

In his counter-affidavit,[36] marked as Exhibit "44-A" for the defense, the accused Romulo Villarojo
admitted hacking the victim to death with a bolo. He stressed, however, that he did so in self-
defense. ("[H]e pulled out a hunting knife in order to stab me and in order also to defend my body, I
hack[ed] him.")[37] He completely absolved his co-accused Dominador Sorela and Leonardo
Cademas from any liability.

Villarojo's admission inflicting the fatal wounds upon the deceased is binding on him.[38] But it is still
our business to see whether his defense can stand scrutiny.

The records will disclose that the deceased suffered twelve assorted wounds caused by a sharp
instrument. The assault severed his right hand and left his head almost separated from his body. This
indicates a serious intent to kill, rather than self-defense.[39]

In finding that Villarojo did take the life of the victim, we cannot, however, appreciate superior
strength or nocturnity. These qualifying circumstances were considered by the court a quo on the
basis of the extrajudicial statements executed by the accused, statements we reject for the reasons
earlier discussed. In the absence of any other proof, the severity and number of wounds sustained by
the deceased are not, by themselves, sufficient proof to warrant the appreciation of the generic
aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength. Hence, Villarojo should be liable for plain
homicide.

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered modifying the Decision dated November 30, 1984. The
accused-appellants Leonardo Cademas and Dominador Sorela are ACQUITTED on the ground of
reasonable doubt. The accused-appellant Romulo Villarojo is found guilty of homicide, and is
sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of eight years and one day of prision mayor as
minimum, to fourteen years, eight months, and one day of reclusion temporal, as maximum. He is
furthermore ordered to indemnify the heirs of Deosdedit Bagon in the sum of P30,000.00.

No special pronouncement as to costs.

[G.R. No. 124300. March 25, 1999]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RENANTE ROBLES y BURGOS, JR., alias TITING.

Renante Robles Jr. alias Titing was charged with rape with homicide under the following information:
That at or about 10:00 oclock in the morning of August 29, 1995 at 4th Street, Guingona Subdivision,
Butuan City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused by force and intimidation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal
knowledge with one Gerafil Cabatingan who is a minor, against her will and by reason or on the
occasion of the rape still not satisfied kill Gerafil Cabatingan

CONTRARY TO LAW:

Upon arraignment, the accused pleaded guilty to the crime charged, but the plea was disregarded
as he was not assisted by a lawyer. The court appointed PAO Head Attorney Rogelio P. Dagani, as
counsel de oficio and the accused pleaded not guilty upon re-arraignment. At the initial hearing, the
lawyer of the accused manifested that the latter will withdraw his previous plea and change it to a
plea of guilty. The court was informed by his lawyer that the accused was properly apprised of the
legal consequences of his change of plea from not guilty to guilty, that his plea of guilty will not
change the imposable penalty of death. The case was set for re-arraignment and after reading to
him the information in the Cebuano dialect which the accused knows and understands, the court
propounded questions to satisfy itself that the plea of guilty is voluntary and that he fully understood
the consequences of his plea of guilty. He thereupon entered his plea of guilty to the offense
charged.

The prosecution presented five witnesses: Randy Cabatingan, twelve years old, half-brother of the
victim; Sheila Vernie L. Yaez, a neighbor of the victim; Dr. Julie D. Lagare, Medical Officer III, City
General Hospital; Luzviminda E. Villaro, an eight-year old, playmate and neighbor of the victim; and
Edgar Cabatingan, father of the victim together with the following documentary evidence.:

1. Exh. A Sworn statement of Luzviminda E. Villaro;

2. Exh. B Sworn statement of Randy L. Cabatingan;
3. Exh. C Sworn statement o Edgar Cabatingan;
4. Exh. D Medical Certificate dated August 29, 1995 issued by Dr. Julie D. Lagare;
5. Exh. E Medical Certificate subsequently issued by Dr. Julie D. Lagare indicating substantially the
injuries sustained by the victim and the physicians findings for medico-legal purposes;
6. Exh. F Sworn statement of Sheila L. Yaez; and
7. Exh. G Certificate of Live Birth of the victim (Gigi).
The prosecutions evidence consisted of the following:

Randy Cabatingan, twelve years old, half-brother of the victim, testified that at about 7:00 oclock in
the morning of August 29, 1995, he and his two sisters, Gerafil or Gigi and Jeline, were in their house at
4th Street, Guingona Subdivision, Butuan City. Their parents had already gone to work.[1] The
accused Renante B. Robles, a.k.a. Titing, was then lying outside the house of the Cabatingan family.
Gigi, five years old[2]was crying. Titing approached her and gave her P2.00, and brought her to the
store where he bought some foodstuff for her. They went back to the house. Titing put Gigi on his lap
and caressed her thighs. Titing gave Randy P5.00 to buy ice candy and cigarettes; when he
returned, Titing asked him to buy Kulafu at Montilla Boulevard which was quite a distance away. On
his way home Randy saw his father Edgar, who had returned from work and was looking for Gigi.
Randy told his father that he left Gigi and Jeline in the house but his father countered that only Jeline
is in the house. In their search for Gigi, Randy met Gigis playmate, Badoy" (Luzviminda Villaro), and
asked her if she had seen Gigi. Badoy pointed to the direction of the Barangay Health Center where
she last saw Gigi with Titing Robles. Randy saw Titing coming out from the back door of the Health
Center wiping something on the walls and appeared to be sweating and bloodied. He hid behind
the fence so that Titing would not see him, and when the latter had already gone, he went to the
Center and tried to open the door. He heard what seemed to him the voice of his sister moaning in
pain. With the help of his cousin Irwin, Randy opened the door of the Center, and together with his
father Edgar and Titing, now wearing a pair of white shorts, went inside. There they saw Gigi with
blood in the mouth, lying on the sink and she was soiled all over apparently unconscious, without her
panty and with her legs full of blood.[3]

Sheila Vernie Yaez who lives ten meters away from the health center and who saw the accused and
Gigi walking towards the back portion of the said building, heard a terrible cry, as if a small child was
being beaten or mauled.[4]

Badoy (Luzviminda Villaro) was playing with Gigi at about 9:00 oclock in the morning of August 29,
1995 at the house of Gigi. She testified that Titing asked Gigi to buy posetos and ordered Randy to
buy Kulafu and cigarettes and when Randy was out to buy Kulafu, Badoy saw Titing and Gigi towards
the Barangay Center.[5]
Edgar Cabatingan, Gigis father, returned home at 9:00 oclock a.m. and looked for Gigi and Randy
who were not home. He saw the accused in Yellow T-shirt and maong pants come out of the side of
the Barangay Hall. Titing was surprised to see him. Edgar asked the accused whether he had seen his
two children and Titing replied that he brought Gigi to the store to buy something. Edgar finally found
his daughter in the barangay center lying on the sink, with blood on her mouth, on both ears and
chest, and dying. He picked her up, embraced her and shook her to see if she is still alive. He brought
Gigi to the City Hospital, where she expired at 3:00 oclock in the afternoon of the same day.[6]

Dr. Julie Lagare, who treated Gigi, and issued the medico-legal certificate, affirmed in court the
findings therein:

Patient examined semi conscious, restless, less responsive to verbal command and in respiratory
distress with the following vital signs;

BP80/40 mm hg; - HR 150 beats/min. PR 38 cycle/min.

Skin Multiple contusions at the face, body and arm.

HEENT = (+) contusion at the right temporo-zygomatic area of the face, 4 x 3 cm. In size.

(+) two contusions at the chin, 1 x 1 cm. In size each.

(+) contusion at the right parietal area, 4 x 3 cm. In size with 0.7 cm. Length lacerated wound on top
of it.

(+) small lacerated wound at the right pinna of the ear.

(+) blood at the mouth with laceration and contusion at the right upper inner lip and contusion at
right lower inner lip.

Cardio-vascular; - Regular Rhythm, tachycardia.

Chest & Lungs; -- (+) contusion at the right anterior chest below the nipple; 4 x 3 cm. in size.

(+) contusion at the left anterior chest below the subcostal area, 4 x 4 cm. in size.

Extremities; -(+) contusion at the right arm 2 x 3 cm-in size.

Condition of the Patients; Cuddled by father, restless, semi-conscious and in respiratory distress

Back (+) contusion at mid lumbar area, 4 x 4 cm. In size.

GIT Anal orifice with 1 cm. Diameter and with mucosa slightly protruding

Internal Examination of the female genital organ.

(+) for blood at the perinium.

(+) laceration at the hymen at 3, 6, 9, oclock position.

(+) laceration at the vaginal floor mucosa, 1st degree. Cervix essentially normal.

Vaginal Smear taken for presence of spermatozoa; Positive for sperm.

(Admitted) August 29, 1995 at 11:40 A.M.

Remarks : Patient died at 3:00 P.M. August 29, 1995 with diagnosis of Cardio Pulmonary Arrest.
Consumated rape with multiple head and body injuries.[7]

She testified that the victim suffered from multiple head and body injuries, and the genital organ was
positive for spermatozoa. Cardio pulmonary arrest was the cause of death which occurred about
four hours after Gigis admission to the hospital. She stated that there was force applied that caused
multiple head and body injuries.[8]
The accused opted not to present evidence in his behalf.

The court a quo found the accused guilty of the crime of rape with homicide. The dispositive portion
of the judgment reads:

"WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing findings of facts and law, and also on account of the plea
of guilty knowingly and voluntarily made by the accused, the court finds accused Renante B. Robles
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape with homicide under Art. 335, Revised Penal
Code as amended by Sec. 11, R.A. No. 7659, thereby sentencing him to suffer the indivisible penalty
of death. Further, accused Renante B. Robles is ordered to pay the heirs of Gerafil L. Cabatingan:

1. Actual damages in the amount of P60,000.00

2. Moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00 and

3. Death indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00.

Also to pay the cost.

Furthermore, the records of this case should be forwarded to the Supreme Court for review.

SO ORDERED.

The case is now under automatic review by this Court.

The accused appellant submits the lone error that:

THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FINDING THROUGH CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE THAT THE ACCUSED HAD
CARNAL KNOWLEDGE OF THE VICTIM BY USING FORCE OR INTIMIDATION AND BY REASON OR ON THE
OCCASION OF THE RAPE, THE VICTIM WAS KILLED.

The accused-appellant challenges the decision of the trial court and claims that the identity of the
perpetrator of the crime was not conclusively established, as no one witnessed the events that
transpired from the time the accused and the victim were seen going to the health center up to the
time when the accused was seen coming out of it. Thus, it is contended that a reasonable doubt
exists as to the identity of the perpetrator of this heinous crime and this doubt must be resolved in
favor of the accused.

We resolve to affirm the judgment of conviction.

The accused was found guilty of rape with homicide on the basis of his plea of guilty and of the
circumstantial evidence which is correctly summed up by the appellee on pages 12 to 14 of its brief
as follows:

1. While the victim Gigi was crying in the morning of August 29, 1995, appellant, who was then lying
outside the Cabatingan residence, went inside the said house and approached Gigi and gave her
P2.00. Then, Gigi went along with him to the store where he bought some foodstuffs for her;

2. After they went back to the house, appellant put Gigi on his lap and caressed her thighs;

3. Appellant and Gigi were seen walking towards the back of the barangay health center;

4. Appellant and Gigi were seen at the barangay health center;

5. Gigis brother saw appellant come out of the back door of the health center, wiping something on
the walls, and appearing to be sweating and bloodied on his right thigh;

6. Sheila Yaez, who saw appellant and Gigi walking towards the barangay health Center, heard a
voice of a minor as if being beaten, coming from the direction of the barangay health center;

7. A voice moaning in pain which sounded to be that of his younger sister Gigi was heard by Randy
Cabatingan coming from the health center.
8. When the health center was opened, Gigi was found inside with a bloodied mouth, lying on the
sink, soiled all over, appearing to be unconscious, without her panty and with her legs full of blood;

9. Gigi was diagnosed to have suffered multiple head and body injuries resulting from a
consummated rape, and the cause of her death was cardio-pulmonary arrest. Her genital organ was
positive for spermatozoa;

10. Gigi died at 3:00 oclock in the afternoon of the same date August 29, 1995.

The evidence is more than sufficient to convincingly establish appellants culpability beyond
reasonable doubt. Circumstantial evidence may justify a conviction if the following requisites concur:
(a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are
proven; and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce the conviction
beyond reasonable doubt.[9]

For circumstantial evidence to be sufficient to support a conviction, all the circumstances must be
consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty and at the same time inconsistent with the
hypothesis that he is innocent, and with every other rational hypothesis except that of guilt.[10] Here,
the proven circumstance constitute an unbroken chain which leads to a fair and reasonable
conclusion which points to the accused to the exclusion of all others as the guilty party.[11]

More important, the plea of guilty which the accused knowingly and voluntarily made under the
careful inquiry of the court constituted very strong evidence of his guilt. There is no higher evidence of
guilt than the accuseds own confession and unless it is vitiated by evidence of duress, a voluntary
plea of guilty is admissible as evidence of guilt of a high quality.[12]

Rape is a crime which as a rule is not committed in the presence of witnesses.[13] And the
prosecution for the complex crime of rape with homicide is particularly difficult since the victim can
no longer testify against the perpetrator of the crime. In such cases, the evidence against the
accused is usually circumstantial.[14] We have examined the testimonies of Randy Cabatingan,
Sheila Yaez and Luzviminda Villaro and we find that they sufficiently establish that the accused and
the victim were together immediately preceding the incident and that the accused was at the
scene of the crime when it happened. No reason or motive has been alleged nor proven to provide
doubt as to the credibility of the said witnesses as would induce them to falsely implicate the
accused in the commission of such a heinous crime.

The offense is punishable under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by Section 11 of
RA NO. 7659,[15] which reads, insofar as pertinent, as follows:

Art. 335 When and how rape is committed. Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a
woman under any of the following circumstances:

1. By using force or intimidation;

2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and

3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.

The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.

Whenever the crime of rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more
persons, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.

When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has become insane, the penalty shall be
death.

When the rape is attempted or frustrated and a homicide is committed by reason or on the occasion
thereof, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.

When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, a homicide is committed, the penalty shall be
death.

After all the evidence is considered and taken together with the plea of guilt, the Court is
constrained to affirm the death penalty imposed by the trial court. Four justices of the Court,
however, have continued to maintain the unconstitutionality of Republic Act 7659 insofar as it
prescribes the death penalty; nevertheless they submit to the ruling of the majority to the effect that
this law is constitutional and that the death penalty can be lawfully imposed in the case at bar.

With regard to the civil indemnity, the court hereby rules that the victim of rape with homicide should
be awarded the amount of P100,000.00. Prevailing judicial policy has authorized the mandatory
award of P50,000.00 in case of death, and P50,000.00 upon the finding of the fact of rape. Also,
under recent case law the indemnity for the victim shall be in the increased amount of P75,000.00 if
the crime of rape committed is effectively qualified by any of the circumstances under which the
death penalty is authorized by the applicable amendatory laws:[16] Thus, if homicide is committed
by reason or on the occasion of the rape, indemnity in the amount of P100,000.00 is fully justified and
properly commensurate with the seriousness of the said special complex crime.

The award of P50,000.00 as moral damages is maintained. Moral damages may be additionally
awarded to the heirs of the victim in a criminal proceeding without the need or proof of the basis
thereof; the fact that they suffered the trauma of mental, physical and psychological sufferings
which constitutes the bases for moral damage under the Civil Code[17] are too obvious to still require
the recital thereof at the trial.[18] Moreover, the father of the victim testified as to the mental anguish
suffered from the lost of his child.[19]

Anent the award of actual damages, the Court must disallow the amount of P60,000.00 awarded by
the trial court. Aside from the assertion of the father Edgar Cabatingan, no evidence to prove the
same was presented. The Court can only give credit for expenses supported by receipts. Here, the
claim of transportation, hospital and burial expenses was not substantiated, hence, no award for the
same can be granted.[20]

WHEREFORE, the conviction of Renante Robles y Burgos Jr., is hereby AFFIRMED. Accused-Appellant is
directed to indemnify the heirs of the victim of P100,000.00 as civil indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral
damages. The award of actual damages of P60,000.00 is deleted.

In accordance with Section 25 of Republic Act No. 7659 amending Article 83 of the Revised Penal
Code, upon finality of this decision. Let the record of this case be forthwith forwarded to the Office of
the President for possible exercise of the pardoning power.

SO ORDERED

[G.R. No. 101335. June 8, 2000]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. OSCAR ROBLES Y MOANA, ANTONIO MANAS Y FLAVA, VICENTE
ANTONIO Y HAYA, OSCAR ROBLES Y MOANA

DECISION

QUISUMBING, J.:

On appeal is the decision dated March 30, 1989 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 148, in
Criminal Case No. 28829, convicting appellant Oscar Robles y Moana, together with his co-accused
Antonio Manas y Flava,[1] of the crime of Robbery with Homicide, sentencing them to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua, and ordering them to pay the heirs of the victims jointly and severally
the amount of P30,000.00 as indemnity.[2] Vicente Antonio y Haya, the third accused, remains at
large. Since Manas did not appeal, we are here concerned only with Robles.

The facts, based on the records, are as follows:

On January 30, 1987, at around 1:00 P.M., Patrolmen Rey Cocson, Edgar Amurao, and C.
Tabanera[3] were on board a police vehicle patrolling the vicinity of Del Pan Street, Tondo, Manila.
The police car came alongside a taxicab with two male passengers. When the policemen noticed
that the passengers were acting suspiciously and could not look directly at them, they signalled the
taxicab driver to stop for routine inspection. The policemen asked the names of the passengers. The
one seated beside the driver was identified as Manas, while the one at the back seat was appellant
Robles. The policemen saw two bags on the floor of the back of the taxicab. When asked whether
the bags belonged to them, the two men initially refused to answer. However, Robles broke down
and admitted that they had robbed the house of one Jose Macalino in Makati. Manas remained
silent. Patrolman Cocson frisked Robles and found a .38 cal. revolver. Patrolman Tabanera frisked
Manas, and recovered a fan knife (balisong) from him.[4]

In the bags were shoes, cameras, watches, and assorted items. Robles admitted taking them from
the residence of Jose Macalino. After apprising them of their constitutional rights, the policemen
brought Robles and Manas to the police headquarters. Since Patrolman Cocson noticed a bag with
the nametag Beth M. Puzon and a telephone number,[5] he called up the number and spoke with
Beth M. Puzon, a daughter of Jose Macalino.[6] Subsequently, Robles and Manas were turned over
to the Makati Police Department.[7]

Detective Ernesto Gatpayat of the Makati Police Station proceeded to the house of Jose Macalino
and found the house ransacked. He discovered two dead persons inside the house, later identified
as Marilou Dalugdugan and Diego Limato, household helpers of Macalino. Gatpayat recovered a
screwdriver beside the body of Dalugdugan.[8]

After apprising Robles and Manas of their constitutional rights and in the presence of counsel,
Patrolman Celso Noriega, Makati Police station investigator, took down their statements.[9]

In his statement Robles, then 29 years old and employed as a tinsmith, admitted that he participated
in the robbery, but not in the killing. He stated that on the night of January 29, 1987, Manas, Antonio,
and one Jun planned the robbery. The following day, however, Jun stood them up at the meeting
place. Undaunted, Manas and Antonio pushed through with their plan. Manas knocked at the gate
of Macalinos house, which was opened by Dalugdugan. Manas entered the house followed by
Antonio. Robles stayed at the nearby Shakeys as lookout. After about 10 minutes, Manas came out
and motioned Robles to enter. Robles went inside and saw Dalugdugan and Limato sprawled dead
in the kitchen. Manas admitted that he killed Dalugdugan, while Antonio killed Limato. Thereafter,
the three men opened the rooms using tools which they found inside the house. They quickly stashed
valuables inside two black bags. Thereafter, Antonio went his separate way. Robles and Manas
carried the loot and boarded a taxi to Sta. Ana, where Robles had a relative (who was not home).
They were proceeding to Tondo when apprehended by the police officers.

Manas, then 39 years old, employed as a housepainter in the shop of Macalino, admitted in his
statement that he stabbed Dalugdugan with a screwdriver to stop her from screaming when she saw
Antonio stabbing Limato. Manas claimed that Robles was with them inside the house, not waiting at
the nearby Shakeys.

On February 5, 1987, the following Information for Robbery with Double Homicide[10] was filed
against Robles and Manas:

"The undersigned Assistant Fiscal accuses Antonio Maas y Lava and Oscar Robles y Moaa of the
crime of Robbery with Double Homicide committed as follows:

That on or about the 30th day of January, 1987 in the Municipality of Makati, Metro Manila,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named accused, conspiring
and confederating with Vicente Antonio Y Haya @ Ric, who is at large and mutually helping and
aiding with one another with intent of gain and by means of force upon things and intimidation of
persons entered the house of one Jose Macalino y Manalac and once inside, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry away, the following items to wit:

One (1) Yashita Camera P1,500.00

One (1) Minolta Camera 2,800.00

One (1) Minolta Electronic Flash 800.00

Sanyo Walkman 1,500.00

Radio Transistor 250.00

Micro Cassette 800.00

Handcrafted domino 300.00

Two playing cards 80.00

One Colgate 20.00

Leica Handbook 40.00

Adidas Rubber Shoes 250.00

Seven (7) pcs. Handkerchief 100.00

Walkman Accessories 550.00

Walkman Aiwa 500.00

One (1) Ladies Watch Seiko 800.00

One (1) Casio Watch 350.00

Seiko La Salle 8,500.00

One (1) Citizens Watch 1,500.00

One (1) mens ring white gold with diamond 15,000.00

One (1) Smith & Wesson Rev. 3,500.00

Two (2) Leather Bag 300.00

all in total amount of P29,440.00, belonging to said Jose Macalino, to the damage and prejudice of
the owner thereof in the aforementioned amount of P29,440.00.

That on said occasion, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together and all
of them mutually helping and aiding with one another, while armed with a knife and a screw-driver
and with intent to kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab
Diego Limato and Marilou Dalugdugan hitting them on the vital parts of their bodies and as a result
of which, they sustained fatal injuries which directly caused their death."

During trial, the Information was amended to include another accused named Vicente Antonio y
Haya @ "Ric," who remains at large to date.

On August 19, 1987, assisted by Atty. Eugenio Macababayao Jr., Robles and Manas were arraigned.
Both pleaded not guilty to the charge of Robbery with Double Homicide.[11] The prosecution and
defense during a pre-trial agreed on the following facts:[12]

1. The fact and cause of death of Marilou Dalugdugan and Diego Limato;

2. The existence and genuineness of the Certificate of Post Mortem Examination issued by Dr.
Mariano Cueva, Jr., as a result of the examination conducted by him of the late Marilou
Dalugdugan, which certificate was marked in evidence by the prosecution as Exhibit "A";

3. The existence and genuineness of the Certificate of Post Mortem Examination issued by Dr.
Mariano Cueva, Jr., as a result of the examination conducted by him on the late Diego Limato,
which certificate was marked in evidence by the prosecution as Exhibit "B";

4. The existence, identity and value of the articles alleged to have been stolen and which are
specifically enumerated in the information filed in the above-entitled case; the fact of ownership
thereof by Jose Macalino; and the recovery thereof and their subsequent return to the said Jose
Macalino;

5. The existence of the Malayang Salaysay signed by Oscar Robles y Moana, which salaysay was
marked in evidence by the prosecution as Exhibit "C", but the truth of the contents of which were
denied by the accused on the ground that intimidation was allegedly exerted on him prior to the
execution thereof;
6. The existence of the Malayang Salaysay signed by Antonio Manas y Lava, which salaysay was
marked in evidence by the prosecution as Exhibit "D", but the truth of the contents of which were
denied by the accused on the ground that intimidation was allegedly exerted on him prior to the
execution thereof;

7. The fact that Atty. Eugenio Macababayao assisted the accused in the course of their investigation
by the police, particularly in the giving by the accused of their statements marked as Exhibit "C" and
"D";

In consequence of the foregoing, the defense agreed that the prosecution need not present Dr.
Mariano Cueva, Jr. to testify on the post mortem examinations conducted by him on the cadavers of
the late Marilou Dalugdugan and Diego Limato, and that Jose Macalino need not testify on the fact
of ownership, existence, and identity of the articles stolen, but only with respect to the receipt by him
of an alleged letter dated May 30, 1987 sent by the accused Antonio Manas y Lava.

With the above stipulations of facts during pre-trial, only the following witnesses were presented by
the prosecution: (1) Det. Ernesto C. Gatpayat, the policeman who proceeded to the house of Jose
Macalino and discovered the two dead bodies. He also took down the statement of Jose Macalino.
(2) Aida Pascual, Forensic Chemist of the National Bureau of Investigation, who testified that the
blood recovered from the screwdriver and balisong were type A. The blood type of Dalugdugan was
type A, and Limato, type O.[13] (3) Patrolman Rey Cocson, who was one of the policemen who
flagged down the taxi for routine inspection. He also identified in court the items recovered from
appellant and accused;[14] (4) Patrolman Celso Noriega, Jr., police investigator at the Makati Police
Station, who took down the statements of appellant and accused, while they were assisted by
counsel, Atty. Eugenio Macababayao, Jr..[15]

For the defense, Robles and Manas testified. Robles denied participating in either the robbery or the
killings. He testified that in the morning of January 30, 1987, Manas fetched him from his house to
repair a car in Del Pan, Tondo, Manila. However, before they reached their destination, they were
apprehended by policemen who told them that they were the suspects in a robbery. The policemen
brought them to the precinct where they were interrogated and threatened into making a
confession. Robles denied any knowledge of the two bags found inside the taxi. While he admitted
that he was assisted by Atty. Macababayao during custodial investigation, he denied executing any
statement and claimed he could not remember signing any document.[16]

After trial, on March 30, 1989, the trial court rendered a decision[17] finding conspiracy, and
correspondingly sentenced accused as follows:

"WHEREFORE, premises considered, and finding accused OSCAR ROBLES and ANTONIO MANAS guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the complex crime of Robbery with Homicide, both are hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua, with all the accessories of the law.

Further, both accused are hereby ordered to jointly and severally pay unto the heirs of Diego Limato
the amount of P30,000.00 as indemnity for causing his death, and likewise to pay jointly and severally
the heirs of Marilou Dalugdugan the sum of P30,000.00 as indemnity for causing her death.

Equal Costs against the two (2) accused.

SO ORDERED."

Pending appeal, the records of the stenographic notes containing the testimonies of Aida Pascual,
Manas and Robles were burned. Manas manifested that he was not appealing the judgment of the
trial court. Hence, only the testimonies of Pascual and Robles were retaken at the National Bilibid
Prison.[18]

In his brief, appellant contends that the trial court erred in convicting accused-appellants,[19]

I. ... OF THE CRIME AS CHARGED IN THE INFORMATION BASE[D] ON THE ALLEGED CONFESSIONS MADE
BY THE[M] DESPITE ITS INADMISSIBILITY.

II. ... BASED ON CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE PROSECUTION THOUGH THE SAME IS
NOT SUFFICIENT TO CONVICT BOTH ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE CRIME AS CHARGED.
Appellant argues that his extrajudicial confession is inadmissible against him because it was obtained
through threats and without the effective assistance of counsel. He says the only evidence linking him
to the commission of the crime is his presence in the same taxicab as his co-accused and Antonio.
Circumstantial evidence alone, he argues, is insufficient to sustain his conviction for the complex
crime of Robbery with Homicide.

The Office of the Solicitor General, for the State, prays for the affirmance of the judgment, except
with respect to the indemnity which should be increased to P50,000.00 per victim. The Solicitor points
out that appellant, together with his co-accused, was duly assisted by counsel de oficio during
custodial investigation, and in fact, the same counsel de oficio assisted him during trial.

In sum, we find that the issues center on (1) the ADMISSIBILITY of the extrajudicial confession of the
appellant, and (2) the SUFFICIENCY of the EVIDENCE to convict him beyond reasonable doubt.

Considering appellants contentions as well as those of the OSG, in the light of the testimonies and
other pieces of evidence submitted and on record, we now hold that first, the extrajudicial
confessions of appellant and his co-accused are admissible against them. The allegation that they
were not assisted by counsel during custodial investigation is belied by the records, which clearly
show that Atty. Eugenio C. Macababayao Jr. was present during the entire investigation. Further, the
same lawyer acted as counsel for appellant Robles during trial.[20] Atty. Macababayao did not
dispute that he was present and he assisted the appellant and his co-accused at the time they
executed their confessions. Neither did he deny his signatures attesting that he was present in the
preparation of the extrajudicial confessions and assisted appellant and his co-accused. As pointed
out by the trial court, appellant Robles never brought to the attention of his counsel that he was
threatened by the policemen into making his extrajudicial confession. Accused Manas even
corrected the middle initial of his name from "L" to "F" in the preparation of his extrajudicial
confession.[21] Further, the prosecution and defense entered into a stipulation during pre-trial that -

"... Atty. Eugenio Macababayao assisted the accused in the course of their investigation by the
police, particularly in the giving by the accused of their statements marked as Exhibit "C" (Sworn
Statement of Oscar Robles) and "D" (Sworn Statement of Antonio Manas)."[22]

Appellant avers that it was just his misfortune that he rode in the same taxicab with Manas and
Antonio. This claim is inconsistent with the records which show that Antonio was not with them when
they were apprehended at the Del Pan Bridge. According to appellant himself, Antonio already
went his separate way right after the robbery.

Appellant makes a belated attempt to question the validity of his arrest because of the polices
failure to inform him of his Miranda rights at the time of arrest. Note, however, that any objection
involving the acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of an accused must be made before he
enters his plea, otherwise, said objection is deemed waived.[23] The defects in the arrest, if any, were
cured by appellants voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the trial court, when he entered his
plea during arraignment and when he actively participated in the trial, without raising those
defects.[24]

Second, we also hold that there is sufficient evidence to convict appellant beyond reasonable
doubt of the offense charged.

Section 4 of Rule 133 of the Rules of Court[25] provides that circumstantial evidence is sufficient to
convict (1) when there is more than one circumstance, (2) the facts from which the inferences are
derived are proven; and (3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a
conviction beyond reasonable doubt.

In this case, the following circumstances prove the culpability of appellant for the crime charged: (1)
He planned the robbery of the house of Mr. Macalino with accused Manas and Ric. (2) He acted as
look-out while accused Manas and Ric entered the house. (3) He participated in the looting of the
house after the two victims were killed. (4) He left the house with accused Manas carrying the
proceeds of the robbery with them.

The unexplained possession of stolen articles gives rise to a presumption of theft, unless it is proved
that the owner of the articles was deprived of possession by violence or intimidation, in which case,
the presumption becomes one of robbery.[26] In robbery with homicide cases, the prosecution need
only prove these elements: (a) the taking of personal property is perpetrated by means of violence or
intimidation against a person; (b) the property taken belongs to another; (c) the taking is
characterized by intent to gain or animus lucrandi, and (d) on the occasion of the robbery or by
reason thereof, the crime of homicide, here used in its generic sense, is committed.[27] The homicide
may precede the robbery or may occur after the robbery. What is essential is that there is an intimate
connection between robbery and the killing whether the latter be prior or subsequent to the former
or whether both crimes be committed at the same time.[28]

The rule is well-established that whenever homicide has been committed as a consequence of or on
the occasion of the robbery, all those who took part as principals in the robbery will also be held
guilty as principals of the special complex crime of robbery with homicide although they did not
actually take part in the homicide, unless it clearly appears that they endeavored to prevent the
homicide.[29] In this case, appellant tries to exculpate himself from the homicides by insisting that he
did not participate nor could he have prevented them. However, considering his established
participation in looting the Macalino residence where the killing of the victims took place during said
robbery, his culpability for the complex crime of robbery with homicide is well grounded and
sufficiently proved.

We note that Section 3 of Rule 133 of the Rules[30] requires that an extrajudicial confession made by
an accused shall not be sufficient ground for conviction, unless corroborated by evidence of corpus
delicti. Corpus delicti is the body of the crime and, in its primary sense, means a crime has actually
been committed.[31] Applied to a particular offense, it is the actual commission by someone of the
particular crime charged.[32] In this case, aside from the extrajudicial confessions, the police found
the stolen goods, the murder weapons, and the dead bodies, thereby conclusively establishing the
needed corroborating evidence of corpus delicti.

As to the penalty. When more than one person is killed on the occasion of the robbery, the additional
killing should be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance to avoid the anomalous situation
where, from the standpoint of the gravity of the offense, robbery with one killing would be on the
same level as robbery with multiple killings.[33] At the time of the commission of the offense on
January 30, 1987, the penalty for robbery with homicide under Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code
was reclusion perpetua to death. In view, however, of the subsequent suspension of the death
penalty by the 1987 Constitution, favorable to appellant,[34] the proper penalty is reclusion
perpetua, a single indivisible penalty regardless of the attending aggravating or mitigating
circumstances.[35] The trial court, therefore, properly imposed the sentence of reclusion perpetua on
appellant.

But, pursuant to existing jurisprudence, the amount of indemnity should be increased to P50,000.00 for
the death of each of the victims.[36] In addition, the presence of one aggravating circumstance,
which is the second killing, justifies the award of exemplary damages pursuant to Article 2230 of the
New Civil Code, which we now award in the amount of P10,000.00 to the heirs of each of the victims.
All the recovered items from the robbers should be and have been duly restituted to the lawful
owners Jose Macalino and his daughter Beth M. Puzon.[37]

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 148, in Criminal Case No.
28829, convicting appellant OSCAR ROBLES y MOANA of the crime of ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE
beyond reasonable doubt and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATIONS as to the imposition of the amount of death indemnity and also the award of
exemplary damages. The amount of said indemnity to be paid to the heirs of each of the victims is
increased to P50,000.00, together with a further award in the amount of P10,000.00, as exemplary
damages to be paid to the heirs of each of the victims also. Costs against appellant.

SO ORDERED.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. EMMANUEL ELIGINO

DECISION

MELO, J.:

This is an appeal interposed by Emmanuel Eligino from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of the
Third Judicial Region (Angeles City, Branch LIX) in its Criminal Case No. 6374 (Illegal Possession of
Prohibited Drugs) and Criminal Case No. 6375 (Illegal Sale of Prohibited Drugs), finding him guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of both charges and sentencing him as follows:

“1. In Criminal Case No. 6374, to Six (6) Years and One (1) Day of impri-sonment and to pay a fine of
P6,000.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency;
“2. In Criminal Case No. 6375, to life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P20,000.00 with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency.” (p. 8, Rollo.)

Two separate informations, both dated December 6, 1983, were filed by 2nd Assistant City Fiscal
Alberto M. Suller charging Emmanuel Eligino with Illegal Possession of Prohibited Drugs and Illegal Sale
of Prohibited Drugs as defined and penalized under Sections 8 and 4, respectively, of Art. II, Republic
Act No. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972) committed as follows:

“Criminal Case No. 6374

That on or about the 10th day of October, 1983 in the City of Angeles, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession and under his custody and control marijuana
cigarettes and dried marijuana flowering tops without any authority whatsoever.” (p. 1, Rollo.)

“Criminal Case No. 6375

That on or about the 10th day of October, 1983 in the City of Angeles, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously sell and/or deliver marijuana cigarettes to a poseur-buyer without any
authority whatsoever.” (p. 2, Rollo.)

Fairly established by the evidence presented by the People are the following facts:

On the early evening of October 10, 1983, a team of NARCOM operatives composed of Lt.
Calunsod, as leader, and Sgt. Raquidan and Pats. Angeles and de la Cruz, as members, all of the 3rd
Regional Narcotics Unit, Camp Pepito, Angeles City, nabbed along Oak Street, Sta. Maria
Subdivision, Angeles City, a certain Ramon Rejano for selling sticks of marijuana to a NARCOM civilian
agent who acted as poseur-buyer. The operatives then persuaded Rejano to reveal to them his
source of the marijuana. Rejano named a certain “Maning” as his supplier. The team then planned
for the entrapment of said “Maning” and with Rejano as the guide, they proceeded to the residence
of “Maning” at No. 1124 Oak St., Sta. Maria Subdivision, Angeles City.

Upon reaching “Maning’s” place, the team members immediately positioned themselves for the
operation. Sgt. Raquidan and Pat. Angeles posted themselves at the carport leading to the door of
“Maning’s” house while the rest of the group scattered themselves at vantage points. At that time,
the door of “Maning’s” house which led to the carport was closed. As originally planned, and armed
with the marked US$1 bill (Exh. “J”) previously handed to him by the team, Rejano proceeded to and
knocked at the door. When it was slightly slid open, Rejano said, “Kukuha pa ako”. Thereafter,
through a light emanating from inside the house, a hand extended through the door and handed to
Rejano five (5) sticks of marijuana (Exh. “C”). In return, Rejano gave the marked bill. Thereupon Sgt.
Raquidan and Pat. Angeles followed by the other members of the team barged through the door
into the house. There they saw a shocked “Maning” who turned out to be Emmanuel Eligino, herein
accused-appellant. The team introduced themselves as NARCOM agents and placed Emmanuel
Eligino under arrest. Found in his possession was the marked US$1.00 bill which he surrendered to
them. Rejano, upon the other hand, handed to the team the five (5) sticks of handrolled marijuana
cigarettes, contained in a small plastic bag container, which he bought from Eligino (Exh. “C”).
Convinced by Sgt. Raquidan that it would lessen his offense if he would yield other marijuana which
he may still have in possession, Eligino allowed the members of the team inside the house and led
them to a room whereat he opened an “aparador” and brought out and handed to the team a
round candy can (Exh. “H”) containing twenty-one (21) sticks of handrolled marijuana cigarettes and
two (2) small and two (2) medium-size plastic bags of dried marijuana fruiting tops (Exhd. “D” and “E”;
“F” and “G”, respectively). Sgt. Raquidan placed identifying marks, consisting of his initials, on the
seized articles. The team turned over the material evidence, as well as the persons of Eligino and
Rejano, to an investigator.

The following day, Eligino was investigated by Cpl. Romeo Consengco of the NARCOM. He was
informed of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel but he waived said rights. He then
admitted having possessed and having sold marijuana. His statement was reduced into writing,
signed by him and subsequently sworn to before Fiscal Mercado of the Fiscal’s Office, Angeles City
(Exh. “K” and “K-1”).
Meanwhile, the seized marijuana items were forwarded to the PC Crime Laboratory, Camp Olivas,
San Fernando, Pampanga for examination (Exh. “A”). Daisy Panganiban, forensic chemist, examined
the seized items and found the same to be positive of marijuana (Exh. “I”).

Accused-appellant presented a completely different version of the facts. He testified that at about
7:00 P.M. of October 10, 1983, while he, his wife and their two children were viewing television inside
their house, some-one knocked at the door. He went thereto and upon opening it, men in civilian
attire, numbering more than three who identified themselves as NARCOM agents, suddenly barged
in, handcuffed him and started searching his house without showing any search warrant to him.
Unable to find anything, the men took him outside, mauled him, boarded him into a car and brought
him to the NARCOM office. Along the way, one of the two men who was seated with him at the
back seat of the car, whom he later identified as Pat. Celestino de la Cruz, continued beating him by
hitting his chest with the butt of a .45 caliber pistol.

At the NARCOM office, de la Cruz and his companions allegedly continued mauling accused-
appellant, prodding him to admit possession and sale of marijuana items which he saw for the first
time atop a table at the NARCOM office. He admitted his signatures appearing in the statement
(Exhs. “K” and “K-1”) but said that he was merely made to sign the document which he did because
the NARCOM people told him that he will be set free the moment he signs it; that he was not assisted
by a lawyer when he was investigated; that he does not know the contents of the document he was
made to sign and the same was not explained to him; and that he does not remember having been
asked the questions and having given the answers appearing in the document except those
pertaining to his personal circumstances.

The trial judge, the Honorable Cancio C. Garcia, now serving with distinction in the Court of Appeals,
found the version of the prosecution to be more credible, thus:

“After a thorough and meticulous review of the evidence on record, we are unable to resist the
commanding weight and credence of the People’s case. In contrast, we find the accused’s version
of the incident as saddled with incon-sistencies and improbabilities that make it unworthy of belief.

To begin with, none of the Narcotic agents who apprehended the accused on the night of October
10, 1983, has any ax to grind against him. In fact, prior to that date, they do not know the accused
nor does the latter knew them. For sure, the agents went to Oak Street in the early evening of that
date in connection with another buy-bust operation involving Ramon Rejano against whom a
separate case has also been filed with this Court (Crim. Case No. 6371). As it were, it was a pure
coincidence that they chanced upon the accused after Rejano pointed to them the source of the
marijuana cigarettes he had earlier sold to the agents’ civilian informer. The agents did not even
know the residence of the accused until Rejano led them to it. Given these backdrop, we simply
cannot believe that the members of the Narcom team who took part in the appre-hension of the
accused and who testified before this Court, could have concocted such a tale of serious
implications and far-reaching consequences against an innocent being.

Upon the other hand, we find too unusual the testimony of the accused that despite the alleged
barging of strangers into his house, handcuffing him and searching his home for at least thirty
minutes, he was not able to utter any remark, not even to ask them why he was handcuffed or why
his house was being searched (tsn, pp. 13, 16, June 26, 1984). Were we to believe him, he just meekly
stood by and allowed the intruders the unbriddled violation of the privacy of his home right in his very
presence and in the presence of his family. Surely, what the accused would want us to believe run
against the grain of common experience and human behavior. This becomes all the more so when
taken in the light of the accused’s testimony that his mouth was not muzzled by the man into silence
and that had he wanted to, he could have asked them why they were searching his house (tsn, p.
28, June 26, 1984). The more we ponder on these, the greater our certainty becomes that after the
accused was caught red-handed in possession of the marked one US dollar bill (Exh. ‘J’) paid to him
by Rejano in exchange for the five sticks of marijuana cigarettes contained in a small plastic bag
(Exh. ‘C’), and after the Narcom agents had introduced them as such to the accused, he allowed
them entry into his house, and, relying on Raquidan’s words that his offense will be lessened if he
would surrender other marijuana which he may still have in his possession, he brought out from the
‘aparador’ the remaining marijuana items he had concealed thereat and handed them to the
agents.

Nor are we impressed by the alleged mauling supposedly administered to him by the Narcom
operatives. In fact, accused’s testimony in this respect is confusing, if not conflicting….” (pp. 5-6,
Rollo.)
From the trial court’s judgment of conviction, accused-appellant has instituted the present appeal,
contending that the trial court erred in not holding that the prosecu-tion failed to prove his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt because:

“1. The arresting officers were not armed with any search warrant nor any warrant of arrest; it follows
that the testimonies of the arresting officers, arrest of the accused-appellant and the consequent
seizures of Exhs. ‘D’ and ‘J’ are doubly illegal and as such these exhibits are therefore absolutely not
admissible in evidence.

2. The constitutional rights of the accused, specifically, the right to counsel, the right to remain
silent, and the statement the accused makes may be used as evidence against him were not
afforded the accused. The prosecution had the burden of proving that the accused waived
constitutional rights against self-incrimination and they failed miserably to prove waiver.

3. Contrary to the testimonies of all defense witnesses, testimonies of the prosecution witnesses,
Sgt. Raquidan, Pat. Angeles, Pat. de la Cruz are not clear, convincing and straightforward but
fraught with contradictions and inconsistencies which cannot and can never pass the test of ‘proof
of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.’

4. Alleged poseur-buyer Ramon Rejano who was supposed to have purchased the five sticks of
marijuana cigarettes from the accused was never presented in court despite insistence of counsel for
accused; his non-identifica-tion and non-presentation are therefore subject to presumption that if
ever so identified and presented, his testimony would only be adverse to the prosecu-tion’s cause.

5. Considering the inadmissibility of the testimonies of the NARCOM agents as fully explained
above, and the non-identification and non-presentation of alleged poseur-buyer Ramon Rejano,
absolutely no proof of evidence has been adduced that the alleged five marijuana cigarettes were
sold by the accused to Rejano.

6. Assuming arguendo, that the testimonies of the NARCOM agents were true the same would
only exempt the accused-appellant from any criminal liability for they together with their alleged
poseur-buyer, had instigated accused-appellant to commit the crime charged.” (pp. 3-5, Brief for
Accused-Appellant; pp. 306-308, Rollo.)

Accused-appellant first contends that his warrantless arrest was illegal because when the NARCOM
operatives effected the arrest, they did not have personal knowledge of facts that accused-
appellant had committed an offense.

This contention is without merit.

Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure clearly provides:

“Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant, when lawful. — A peace officer or private person may, without
warrant, arrest a person:

(a) when in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually commit-ting or is
attempting to commit an offense;

(b) when an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; x x x.”

Having caught accused-appellant in flagrante delicto as a result of the buy-bust operation, the
peace officers were not only authorized but were also under obligation to apprehend the drug
pusher even without a warrant of arrest (People vs. Paco, 170 SCRA 681 [1989]; People vs. Rodriguez,
172 SCRA 742 [1989]; People vs. Bali, 189 SCRA 97 [1990]). And since accused-appellant’s arrest was
lawful, it follows that the search made incidental to the arrest was valid (People vs. Tangliben, 184
SCRA 220 [1990]).

The argument of accused-appellant that the NARCOM agents had no personal knowledge of the
facts indicating that he had committed a crime because the evidence of the prosecution failed to
prove that the alleged sale was seen by the NARCOM agents deserves no consideration at all. The
evidence for the prosecution clearly shows that Rejano, after his arrest, revealed to the agents that
his source of marijuana was a certain “Maning”. Rejano then led them to the residence of accused-
appellant. Arriving thereat, the agents inconspicuously positioned themselves for the operation, with
Sgt. Raquidan and Pat. Angeles posting themselves at the carport. They leaned by the wall of the
house parallel to the main door, which was some 5 to 6 meters away. Then, Rejano knocked at the
door. When it was slightly opened, Rejano said, “kukuha pa ako”. Thereafter, a hand extended out
through the door and handed something to Rejano, after which Rejano handed the marked dollar
bill in return. Both Sgt. Raquidan and Pat. Angeles were certainly near enough to observe the
movements of the accused-appellant and the buyer. With the information from Rejano that
“Maning”, herein accused-appellant, was his source of the marijuana he was peddling, the team
had every reason to conclude that an offense — the sale of marijuana — had been committed.

The Court zealously guards against the curtailment of a person’s basic constitutional and natural right
to liberty. But the Court also upholds the law which specifically allows a warrantless arrest under Rule
113, Section 5, par. (a) of the Rules of Court, if the accused is caught in flagrante delicto, as in the
case at bar. The passing from accused-appellant’s hand of the five (5) sticks of marijuana to Rejano
compelled the NARCOM team to arrest accused-appellant without a warrant. Under those
circumstances, accused-appellant cannot claim that his right to liberty was violated. Nor can he
invoke his constitutional right to the protection of the innocent against any manner of
highhandedness from the authorities, however praiseworthy their intentions (People vs. Aminnudin,
163 SCRA 402 [1988]). For, “to require a search and arrest warrant during on-the-spot apprehensions
of drug pushers, illegal possession of firearms, jueteng collectors, smugglers of contraband goods,
robbers, etc., would make it extremely difficult, if not impossible, to contain the crimes with which
these persons are associated” (People vs. Tangliben, supra).

With regard, however, to the second contention of accused-appellant that the trial court erred in
admitting in evidence his written confession (Exhs. “K” and “K-1”), We find the same to be meritorious.

The record shows that accused-appellant’s alleged waiver of his constitutional rights, more
particularly of his right to counsel, was made without the assistance of counsel. In Morales vs. Ponce
Enrile (121 SCRA 538 [1983]), reiterated in People vs. Galit (135 SCRA 465 [1985]), this Court
categorically stated that “the right to counsel may be waived but the waiver shall not be valid unless
made with the assistance of counsel.”

Be that as it may, the inadmissibility of accused-appellant’s confession does not render the
prosecution’s case for naught. No useful purpose can be served by accused-appellant’s invocation
of such constitutional guarantee since it has been rendered unnecessary and inconsequential by the
overwhelming evidence establishing his guilt. Where there is independent evidence, apart from the
accused’s uncounselled confession, that the accused is truly guilty, he accordingly faces a
conviction (People vs. Como, 202 SCRA 200 [1991]).

Accused-appellant next contends that the trial court erred in lending credence to the testimony of
the prosecution’s witnesses despite their apparent inconsistencies.

This issue hinges on the credibility of witnesses. On this point, we have consistently deferred to the
findings of the trial judge who observes first hand the demeanor and deportment of the witnesses so
as to determine the credibility of their testimony (People vs. Anciano, 189 SCRA 519 [1990]; People
vs.Bernardo, 186 SCRA 876 [1990]). As an appellate court, this Court has none of the judge’s
advantageous position, relying, as it does, only on the cold records of the case and on the judge’s
discretion (People vs. Sanchez, 192 SCRA 649 [1990]).

Accused-appellant points to two alleged inconsistencies in the testimony of Sgt. Raquidan and Pat.
Angeles which, to accused-appellant’s mind, are fatal to and discredit their reliability, to wit:

First, Sgt. Raquidan testified that he placed the marking on the dollar bill at their office, while Pat.
Angeles testified that Sgt. Raquidan placed the marking while they were on their way to the
residence of accused-appellant; and

Second, Sgt. Raquidan testified that accused-appellant’s residence was a one-storey affair while
Pat. testified that the residence was a two-storey bungalow.

These inconsistencies, in our view, are not sufficiently substantial to impair the veracity of the
prosecution’s evidence. While witnesses may differ in their recollections of an incident, it does not
necessarily follow from their disagreement that all of them should be disbelieved as liars and their
testimony completely discarded as worthless (People vs. Manalansan, 189 SCRA 619 [1990]). As long
as the mass of testimony jibes on material points, the slight clashing statements neither dilute the
witnesses’ credibility nor the veracity of their testimony (People vs. de los Santos, 200 SCRA 431
[1991]). Thus, inconsistencies and contradictions referring to minor details do not, in any way, destroy
the credibility of witnesses (People vs. de las Pinas, 141 SCRA 379 [1986]), for indeed, such
inconsistencies are but natural and even enhance credibility as these discrepancies indicate that the
responses are honest and unrehearsed. (People vs. Barba, 203 SCRA 436 [1991]; People vs. de
losReyes, 203 SCRA 707 [1991]).

Accused-appellant also contends that his guilt has not been established beyond reasonable doubt.
He underscores the fact that Rejano was not made to take the witness stand which non-
presentation, he maintains, is a fatal blow to the case of the prosecution as it is clear suppression of
evidence which, if produced, would be adverse. We do not agree. Admittedly, Rejano would be a
highly competent witness, being himself the poseur-buyer. However, his testimony is not indispensable
in view of the testimony of Sgt. Raquidan and Pats. Angeles and de la Cruz categorically declaring
that they saw accused-appellant sell five sticks of marijuana (Exh. “C”) to Rejano while the latter
handed the marked bill to the former. Immediately after the exchange, Sgt. Raquidan and Pat.
Angeles barged through the door into the house. Rejano handed to the team the sticks of marijuana
and the marked bill was found in the possession of accused-appellant.

In People vs. Alerta, Jr. (198 SCRA 656 [1991]), this Court held that the non-presentation of the civilian
informant who was himself the poseur-buyer is not indispensable because the sale of marijuana had
been sufficiently proven by the testimony of the NARCOM agents.

As long as the marijuana actually sold by accused-appellant had been submitted as an exhibit, the
failure to present informant and poseur-buyer would not be fatal to the case because his testimony
would be merely corroborative and cumulative. The positive and categorical testimony of the
prosecution witnesses who had personal knowledge of the happening, together with the physical
evidence submitted, clearly proves the guilt of accused-appellant beyond reasonable doubt
(People vs.Como, 202 SCRA 200 [1991]).

At any rate, the matter of presenting evidence for the People is the prerogative of the prosecutor
(People vs. Adiza, 164 SCRA 643 [1988]; People vs. Solomon, 166 SCRA 767 [1988]). Apparently, the
prosecution found it unnecessary to present Rejano because there was already sufficient evidence
to establish the case of the prosecution (People vs. Alerta, Jr., supra). Accused-appellant’s pretense
that he was not engaged in the drug deal cannot overcome the over-whelming evidence of the
prosecution. So well-entrenched is the rule that greater weight is given to the positive testi-mony of
prosecution witnesses than to the denials of the accused (People vs. de Jesus, 145 SCRA 521 [1986]).
Moreover, no ill-motives were imputed to the prosecution witnesses who happened to be NARCOM
agents and there is nothing in the record to suggest that these agents were compelled by any
motive other than to accomplish their mission to capture a drug pusher in the execution of a crime.
Their testimony, therefore, must be given full faith and credence (People vs. Labriaga, 199 SCRA 530
[1991]).

Finally, accused-appellant contends that if the prosecution’s version were to be believed, then he is
entitled to an acquittal as he was instigated to commit the crimes levelled against him.

This is correct if accused-appellant were induced into committing the crimes imputed against him.
But there was no instigation or inducement in the case at bar. What was resorted to by the NARCOM
agents was a buy-bust operation or entrapment. This is a procedure or operation sanctioned by the
Revised Penal Code (People vs. Valmores, 122 SCRA 922 [1983]). In the case of People vs. Y. Gatong-
o, et al. (168 SCRA 716 [1988]). We defined entrapment as the employment of such ways and means
for the purpose of trapping or capturing a lawbreaker. In entrapment, the idea to commit the crime
originates from the accused. Nobody induces or prods him into committing the offense. This act is
distinguished from inducement or instigation wherein the criminal intent originates in the mind of the
instigator and the accused is lured into the commission of the offense charged in order to prosecute
him. The instigator practic-ally induces the would-be accused into the commission of the offense and
himself becomes a co-principal (People vs. Ramos, Jr., 203 SCRA 237 [1991]).

The Court is convinced that the guilt of accused-appellant has been proven beyond reasonable
doubt. The buy-bust operation conducted by the NARCOM agents to catch him was an entrapment
allowed by law (People vs. Rumeral, 200 SCRA 194 [1991]).

The Prosecutor filed two separate informations because when accused-appellant was caught in
flagrante delicto selling five sticks of marijuana, he was prevailed upon by the agents to turn over the
other “stuffs” of marijuana which were still in his possession. The trial court erroneously convicted
accused-appellant of both illegal possession and sale of marijuana. In People vs. de Jesus (145 SCRA
521 [1986]) and People vs. Andiza (164 SCRA 642 [1988]), We held that the possession of marijuana is
inherent in the crime of selling the same:

“The trial court’s severe stand against traffic in drugs is understandable. But the assumption is that
the legislature will not indulge in absurdities. Since possession of prohibited drugs is inherent in the
crime of selling them, it is to be assumed that, in punishing selling, the legislature took into account
the need to possess them first.

The penalty for selling — life imprisonment to death — is already quite harsh. The legislature should
not have intended to attach a further penalty of 12 years for possession. It would be superfluous
especially if the accused have been imposed a death sentence for selling.” (People vs. de Jesus,
supra.)

Likewise, the judgment in Criminal Case No. 6375 for illegal sale of marijuana, sentencing accused-
appellant to life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P20,000.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency, is not quite correct. The rule is when the principal penalty imposed is higher than prision
correccional no subsidiary imprisonment shall be imposed upon the culprit (Art. 39. Revised Penal
Code).

WHEREFORE, the judgment in Criminal Case No. 6375 is AFFIRMED, except that there shall be no
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. The judgment in Criminal Case No. 6374 for possession
of prohibited drugs is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

With no costs against accused-appellant.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. NO. L-36039 MAY 17, 1980

PEOPLE v. ABEJERO

G.R. No. L-36039 May 17, 1980

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
LEOPOLDO ABEJERO y VILLON accused-appellant.

PER CURIAM:
This is a case of robbery with homicide. At about five o'clock in the afternoon of December 26, 1971,
Clinton C. Tan, 47, and Chua Sy, 49, boarded a calesa at the corner of Teodora Alonzo Street and
Claro M. Recto Avenue, Manila. They were going home. The calesa proceeded to Jose Abad Santos
Street.

After passing the M. Hizon Elementary School, Tan and Chua Sy espied four male persons in the
middle of the street. They stopped the calesa and two of them, later Identified as Leopoldo Abejero,
24, and Jesus Reyes, 18, entered the calesa. Reyes announced that they were staging a holdup.
Abejero and Reyes and their third companion, Identified as Benjamin Mallari, were armed with
knives. They demanded money.

Tan and Sy gave sixty pesos to Abejero who passed the money to Reyes. Sy also gave his wallet
containing a Hongkong dollar. Not satisfied with their loot, Abejero and Reyes demanded some more
money. As the demand was not heeded, Abejero stabbed Sy. Tan jumped to the ground and ran
away, pursued by Reyes, who desisted when a jeep arrived at the place.
Sy was brought to the hospital where he died two days later. He suffered two stab wounds in the
chest which lacerated his heart, liver and diaphragm.

From Tan's description of the knife-wielder, Patrolman Jose de la Cruz, Jr. of the Crimes Against
Persons Division, Detective Bureau of the Manila Metropolitan Police concluded that the assailant
might be Abejero, alias Boy Sakay. His hangout was placed under surveillance. Abejero was
apprehended on January 10, 1972. After verbally admitting his participation in the hold-up, he
executed an extrajudicial confession which was sworn to before Fiscal Mariano Chavez.
In that confession, Abejero, single, jobless, a native of Tondo and a resident of Sta. Cruz, Manila, who
reached first year at the Arellano High School, disclosed that his companions in the holdup were
Susing, Benny Bulok and Ebot; that he had committed several hold-ups; that he stabbed Sy because
the latter fought back ("lumalaban ho") and that with the money taken from Tan and Sy, the four
malefactors bought food and a case of beer and proceeded to the Old Avenue Cabaret at
Caloocan City where they entertained two hostesses up to three o'clock in the morning.
Annexed to Abejero's confession is a sketch (drawn by him) of the knife which he used in the
stabbing. Under that sketch, he wrote the following legend: "Ito ang itsura ng patalim na gamit ko sa
pagsaksak doon sa taong hinold-up namin nila Susing, Ebut at Benny Bulok noong hapon ng
Deciembre 26, 1971 (sa) Kalye Abad Santos." That annex was also sworn to before the inquest fiscal,
Fiscal Chavez.

On the basis of that confession, Abejero was charged on January 11, 1972 with robbery with
homicide in the Circuit Criminal Court (Criminal Case No. 862).
Because of the description of Abejero's companions in that confession, the police apprehended on
January 12, 1972 Susing and Benny Bulok whose real names are Jesus Reyes and Benjamin Mallari.
Their confessions were likewise taken and sworn to before Fiscal Avelino Concepcion. They pointed
to Abejero as the killer of Sy (No. 15, Exh. G and No. 10, Exh. H).
Reyes and Mallari were separately charged with robbery with homicide in the Circuit Criminal Court
(Criminal Cases Nos. 865 and 899). The three cases were tried jointly by Judge Manuel R. Pamaran
who in a decision dated March 3, 1972 convicted them of robbery with homicide, aggravated by
abuse of superiority, and sentenced Abejero to death. Reyes, who pleaded guilty, was sentenced
to reclusion perpetua.

Mallari, who was sixteen years old at the time of the commission of the crime, was sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty of ten years and one day of prision mayor as minimum to seventeen years,
four months and one day of reclusion temporal as maximum.

The three were ordered to pay solidarity an indemnity of thirty-two thousand pesos to the heirs of
Chua Sy, to return the articles taken and, if unable to do so, to pay solidarily sixty pesos to Clinton C.
Tan and Sy's heirs. The return of the Hongkong dollar to Sy's heirs was ordered.
On Abejero's motion, Judge Pamaran set aside that decision and granted a new trial because Reyes
on March 10, 1972, or after the first judgment of conviction was promulgated, signed a statement
wherein he declared that it was not true that Abejero was his companion in stabbing Sy. Reyes said
that he was the only one who stabbed Sy. He stabbed Sy because they bumped each other and
Reyes fell on the ground (Exh. 1, p. 92, Record).

Reyes and Jose Abejero, the father of Leopoldo, testified again at the new trial. When Reyes was
shown his statement, Exhibit 1, he said that he does not know how to read. When it was read to him,
he said that he had forgotten it already. He said that Exhibit 1 was prepared by Abejero's lawyer.
Reyes said that he was forced to sign the statement. The new trial was a fiasco for Abejero.
Judge Pamaran in his amended decision of July 17, 1972 reaffirmed his prior judgment. Abejero
appealed.

Abejero's defense during the trial was an alibi: he was taking a bath in the yard of his house at 1559 F.
Tubera Street, Tindalo Sta. Cruz at the time the alleged robbery with homicide was perpetrated. The
trial court rejected that defense. Abejero's residence is near the scene of the crime.
Appellant's contention that Clinton C. Tan's testimony needs corroboration does not deserve any
serious consideration because the principal evidence against Abejero is his own confession which is
corroborated by the indubitable evidence of the corpus delicti and reinforced by the eyewitness
testimony of Clinton C. Tan.
Abejero's claim that he was maltreated before he signed his confession is not sufficient to overthrow
the testimony of Patrolman De la Cruz that he signed it voluntarily. Abejero did not complain of the
alleged maltreatment to Fiscal Chavez when he was brought to the latter's residence to swear to his
confession.

Fiscal Chavez required him to read his confession and to sign it again if he was in conformity with the
contents thereof. Thus, his confession contains two signatures: one above and the other below his
typed name. He also signed twice the sketch of the knife which sketch was a part of his confession.
It is not sound practice for the court to disregard the confession just because the accused repudiates
it at the trial. Before setting aside a confession, the reasons and motives for its repudiation should be
carefully scrutinized (People vs. Dorado, L-23464, October 31, 1969, 30 SCRA 53, 57-58).
If it were true that Abejero was maltreated and that his confession was involuntary, he could have
complained about the maltreatment to Fiscal Chavez and refused to swear to it and he could have
also asked his counsel de oficio to complain to the proper authorities about the alleged
maltreatment. His failure to do so militates against the veracity of his claim that his confession was
involuntary (People vs. Ijad and Muslim, 113 Phil. 348, 356; People vs. Racca 113 Phil. 802, 812).
The contention that robbery with homicide was not committed because the killing was not
perpetrated in order to conceal the robbery is not well-taken. The provision in article 294 of the
Revised Penal Code that the homicide be committed "by reason or on occasion of the robbery"
("cuando con motivo o con occasion del robo resultare homicidio") means that it is sufficient that
between the robbery and homicide "exista una relacion meramente occasional". têñ.£îhqwâ£
No se require que el homicidio se cometa como medico de ejecucion del robo, ni que el culpable
tenga intencion de matar, el delito existe begun constante jurisprudencia, aun cuando no concurra
animo homicida, incluso si la muerte sobreviniere por mero accidente siempre que el homicidio se
produzca con motivo o con occasion del robo, siendo indiferente que la muerte sea anterior,
coetanea o posterior a este. (2 Cuello Calon, Derecho Penal, Volumen Segundo, 14th Ed., 1975, p.
872).

Abuse of superiority was correctly appreciated by the trial court because the four malefactors took
advantage of their strength to overwhelm the two unarmed victims. One of the robbery victims had
to scamper from the calesa to avoid physical injury (People vs. Mabassa, 65 Phil. 568; U.S. vs.
Tampacan, 19 Phil. 185; People vs. Cruz, 103 Phil. 693, 706; People vs. Abrina, 102 Phil. 695, 706).
Since Abejero and Reyes had already extorted some money from Tan and Sy, the killing of Sy was
utterly senseless and uncalled for, a case of pure lawlessness.

WHEREFORE, the trial court's judgment as to Leopoldo Abejero is affirmed. Costs against the
appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Barredo, A.C.J., Makasiar, Antonio, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Fernandez, Guerrero, Abad Santos, De
Castro and Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concur.1äwphï1.ñët
Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando and Justice Claudio Teehankee is on leave.

[GR No. 77777, Feb 05, 1990

PEOPLE v. DOMINGO BAGANO Y SALI-EN

DECISION

260 Phil. 797

BIDIN, J.:

Before us on appeal is a decision[*] of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio, Br. IV, in Criminal Case No.
2472-R, convicting the accused/appellant of violation of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended,
otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act, the decretal portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, the court finds the accused, Domingo Bagano y Sali-en, guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime charged, and hereby imposes on him the penalty of life imprisonment, as well as
a fine of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00). The ten (10) kilos of marijuana are ordered forfeited in
favor of the government which shall be transmitted to the Dangerous Drugs Board, through NBI Sub-
office Baguio, as custodian, for proper disposition.

"SO ORDERED."
The facts, as presented by the Solicitor General, are as follows:

"On August 1, 1985, Atty. Lolito Utitco of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) in Baguio City and
Steven F. Bostick, a special agent of the U.S. Air Force at Clark Air Base, arranged a "buy-bust"
operation against appellant who was a suspected narcotics dealer. The plan was for Bostick to pose
as buyer. A civilian informer named Clayton Emateo was to aid Bostick by introducing him to
appellant.

"At around 2:45 in the afternoon of the same day, Bostick and Emateo proceeded to the residence
of the latter in Baguio City to meet appellant who was there waiting. They were followed by an NBI
surveillance team. Upon reaching their destination, Emateo introduced appellant and an unnamed
friend to Bostick. Shortly thereafter, negotiations for the purchase of ten (10) kilos of marijuana began
between Bostick and appellant, with Emateo acting as interpreter. Bostick and appellant finally
agreed on P800.00 as the price per kilo of the marijuana. The group then proceeded to appellant's
house at Irisan, Benguet, where he kept the marijuana. They were all the time being trailed by the NBI
team. At Irisan, appellant left Bostick and Emateo in the car. He went back to them after about
fifteen minutes, carrying a large white nylon sack (Exhibit "B"). Bostick opened the trunk of the car
and appellant placed the sack inside. Bostick opened the sack and saw several packages
containing marijuana. Bostick told appellant that he will pay for the marijuana after it has been
weighed in his hotel. Appellant agreed. On the way back to his hotel in Baguio City, Bostick
activated the beeper which signalled the NBI team following them that the transaction had taken
place. The NBI team then blocked Bostick's car and arrested appellant and Emateo."

Based on the foregoing, an information for violation of RA 6425, as amended, otherwise known as the
Dangerous Drugs Act, was filed against appellant alleging:

xxx xxx xxx

"That on or about the 1st day of August, 1985, in the City of Baguio, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without any authority of law, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attempt to sell to another ten (10) kilos, more or
less, of dried marijuana leaves, a dangerous drug, for P800.00 per kilo, in violation of the afore-cited
provision of law."
Upon arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty. His earlier motion to admit bail was deferred and
later denied. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued. On August 9, 1986, the trial judge rendered the
assailed decision (Rollo, pp. 19-36) sentencing appellant, among others, to reclusion perpetua.
Hence, this appeal.

Appellant denies any knowledge anent the ownership and sale of marijuana to Bostick and in
support thereof, he declared that:

"(H)e farms at Irisan, Baguio City; on August 1, 1985, at around 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon, he went
to the house of Clayton Emateo, located along Bonifacio St., to collect the amount of P4,000.00
which the latter borrowed from him on July 1, 1985; on this latter date Clayton went to him and
pleaded for the loan, saying that he needed it to replace the money he took from his wife which he
lost in gambling; Clayton was at his residence when he saw him on August 1, 1985; Clayton told him
to wait for his visitor from whom he would get the money to pay his debt; the American visitor arrived,
and he was introduced to him in English, as Steven; after the introduction, they rode in the car of the
American and he was told by Clayton that they were proceeding to Irisan to get the bag which
Clayton would give to the American as a gift; Clayton sent him to get the bag because he did not
want to get wet; he went to get the bag and placed it in the car of the American; Clayton asked him
to ride with them again; while they were maneuvering the car towards Baguio, two cars stopped and
one of the passengers (NBI agent) came out, brought out his gun and pointed it at him;" (Decision, p.
11; Rollo, p. 29; Underscoring supplied).

In this appeal appellant contends that the lower court erred:

"1. IN FINDING THAT THE APPELLANT AGREED TO SELL TEN (10) KILOS OF MARIJUANA TO STEVEN
BOSTICK WHEN IN FACT, THE APPELLANT HAS NO KNOWLEDGE OR DOES NOT KNOW ANYTHING ABOUT
THE ALLEGED MARIJUANA SALE;

"2. IN NOT HOLDING AS HEARSAY THE ALLEGED CONVERSATION BETWEEN BOSTICK AND APPELLANT
WHEN IN FACT, CLAYTON EMATEO, THE CIVILIAN INFORMANT WHO INTERPRETED THEIR CONVERSATION
WAS NEVER PRESENTED TO TESTIFY;

"3. IN APPRECIATING THE 'BAG' AND NOT SACK AGAINST APPELLANT THAT WHICH CLAYTON OWNED
AND DEPOSITED IN THE QUARTER OF THE APPELLANT AT IRISAN THAT 10:00 A.M. OF AUGUST 1, 1985
WHEN IN FACT, EVEN BOSTICK LIKEWISE REFERRED TO THE SACK AS 'BAG' MANY TIMES IN HIS
TESTIMONY;

"4. IN NOT APPRECIATING THE DEFENSE OF THE APPELLANT THAT IT WAS CLAYTON, THE CIVILIAN
INFORMER, WHO OWNS THE MARIJUANA IN QUESTION." (Appellant's Brief, pp. 1-2; Rollo, pp. 49-50)

It is the contention of the prosecution that appellant was apprehended as a result of a "buy-bust"
operation which was conducted on the strength of an information supplied by a certain Clayton
Emateo. It is alleged that according to the informer, appellant would only sell to a foreigner,
preferably an American. Immediately, Atty. Utitco, the NBI Chief of Baguio City, sought assistance
from the Clark Air Base which in turn sent Steven Bostick for the purpose.

The "buy-bust" operation involved Bostick and Emateo to proceed to the latter's residence and
therein meet with the suspect for the purchase of marijuana. Acting as the "poseur" buyer, Bostick
testified that he was provided counterfeit money by the NBI which was combined with his own
US$200.00 converted to pesos because appellant only accepts payment in local currency (TSN,
November 7, 1985, p. 16).

Upon arrival at Emateo's residence, Bostick was introduced by Emateo to appellant and a certain
Arman Perez. As to how the "buy-bust" transaction was initiated may be gleaned from the following
testimony of Bostick:

FISCAL CARBONELL:

"Q:
What was the plan then?

"A:
The plan that I was to go with the informer to the informant's residence and meet with the suepct
(suspect) who is supposedly waiting there for us and I was to try and arrange for the purchase of
marijuana.

xxx xxx xxx

"Q:
Who started the conversation?

"A:
I started through the informant translating what I was saying to Domingo.

"Q:
What did you say to your informant which was translated to Domingo?

"A:
Due to the prior arrangement or agreement that we had, I told him that I wanted to purchase ten
(10) kilos of marijuana.
"Q:
And this statement of yours to the effect that you wanted to buy ten (10) kilos of marijuana, to whom
was it directed?

"A:
It was directed to Mr. Domingo.

"Q:
But you said Clayton participated. What was the participation of Clayton?

"A:
He was speaking for me because I wasn't sure Domingo understood what I was saying because of
the language.

"Q:
Is it your testimony that your statement was translated into the dialect by Clayton to Domingo?

"A:
Yes, sir.

COURT:

"Q:
What dialect was that? Do you know?

"A:
No, I have no knowledge.

xxx xxx xxx

FISCAL CARBONELL:

"Q:
Now, when your statement was translated by Clayton to Mr. Domingo to the effect that you wanted
to purchase marijuana, do you know if Domingo made any answer?

"A:
I was told by the informant that there will be no problem. The ten kilos was ready.

ATTY. WAGANG:

I object to that. That would be hearsay.

xxx xxx xxx

FISCAL CARBONELL:
"Q:
What again was that answer which Domingo said or uttered?

"A:
I was told by Clayton that ten (10) kilos would be no problem.

"Q:
And who said that?

"A:
It was told to me by Clayton because I don't understand the language on which they talked.

xxx xxx xxx

"Q:
Now, who quoted the price?

"A:
I was told it will cost one thousand (P1,000.00) pesos per kilo, which I didn't agree.

COURT:

"Q:
Did they speak in English or in another dialect?

"A:
They spoke in the dialect.

"Q:
So, it was again interpreted to you by Clayton?

"A:
Yes, sir.

(TSN, November 7, 1985, pp. 17-20; Italics suplied)

Evident from the foregoing is the fact that Bostick's testimonies as principal witness for the
prosecution, are mere translations and/or interpretations of what the appellant supposedly said in
the dialect to and interpreted by informant Emateo. As such, they are pure hearsay.

With the exception of that portion of Bostick's testimony that he saw the accused-appellant carry the
sackful of marijuana, Bostick testified not on his personal knowledge regarding the alleged ownership
thereof and the appellant's purported offer to sell the same. Bostick never understood the Kankanai
dialect spoken by appellant and Emateo and is therefore not qualified to testify against appellant in
the imputation of the crime charged. Thus, "where a witness is offered to testify to the statements of
another person, spoken in a language not understood by him, but translated for him by an
interpreter, such witness is not qualified, because he does not speak from personal knowledge. All
that he can know as to the testimony which is in fact given in such a case is from the interpretation
thereof which is given by another person." (F. Wharton, Evidence in Criminal Cases 697-698 [11th ed.,
1935])
Indeed, a confession cannot be received in evidence by the testimony of a witness who, although
present when it was made, learned its purport through an interpreter (US v. Chu Chio, 8 Phil. 269
[1907]).

The impropriety of introducing the testimony of Bostick is plainly evident. What the prosecution should
have done was to present Emateo himself to testify on what actually transpired between appellant
and Bostick and thereafter be cross-examined. Yet, the court a quo chose to ignore appellant's
constitutional right to meet the witnesses face to face (Constitution, Art. III, Sec. 14, [2]). In an attempt
to circumvent said right, prosecution witness Atty. Utitco reasoned:

FISCAL CARBONELL:

"Q:
Now, Atty. Utitco, is there any possibility for you to bring before this court this Clayton who was your
informer?

"A:
I do not think that is possible for the following reasons; First, we do not usually expose our informants in
public, second, we do not know where he is staying and third, we do not keep in constant contact
with this informer. He only comes to the office when there is work to do. As a matter of fact since this
operation was accomplished, I have never seen him again. (TSN, December 4, 1985, p. 10)

Atty. Utitco's revelation that he knew nothing of his supposed informant's background is rather
disturbing. Appellant's limb and liberty at stake, Utitco discarded all what a prudent and thinking man
would have taken in order to establish the veracity of a story of one virtually unknown to him.
Appellant should have been, at the least, placed under surveillance (See People v. Periodica, Jr., et
al., G.R. No. 73006, September 29, 1989).

The Court is not unaware of the policy behind non-disclosure of an informant's identity and would
generally uphold the exercise of such privilege as the circumstances may warrant. In the instant
case, however, said privilege cannot be invoked given the factual setting that led to the
incarceration of accused-appellant. For one thing, the identity and even the address of the supposed
informant are already known to appellant. More, he was an active participant of the crime charged
and is in fact the person whom appellant insists is the owner of the prohibited merchandise. In point of
fact, the informer (Emateo) was arrested together with appellant by the NBI team after the latter had
blocked Bostick's car. If indeed Emateo is an informer and not the owner of the prohibited drug, why
was he arrested? Nonetheless, whatever reason the prosecution may have had in shielding the
informant vanished and ceased to exist by the time his identity was made public in the course of the
trial by the prosecution witnesses themselves.

As pointed out by the appellant, the informant's failure to take the witness stand to confirm the
correctness of his interpretations not only rendered the testimonies of Bostick as hearsay and
therefore, inadmissible in evidence, but also deprived appellant of his right to cross-examine him
(Appellant's Brief, pp. 11-12; Rollo, pp. 59-60).

"The right of cross-examination 'is a substantial right, the preservation of which is essential to a proper
administration of justice, and extends to all matters within the knowledge of the witness, the
disclosure of which is material to the controversy.'" (Crosby v. State, 82 S.E. 2d 38 [1954]; citing News
Publishing Co. v. Butler, 22 S.E. 282 [1895]; Richards v. Harpe, 155 S.E. 85 [1930])
Emateo's testimony is not merely corroborative and cumulative and hence, maybe dispensed with
(People v. Extra, 72 SCRA 199 [1976]; People v. Cerelegia, 147 SCRA 538 [1987]; People v. Capulong,
160 SCRA 533 [1988]; People v. Asio, G.R. No. 84960, September 1,1989), but is direct and material to
the defense of appellant who claims innocence of the offense imputed against him and is entitled to
have the former take the witness stand (Appellant's Brief, pp. 11-12; Rollo, p. 60; TSN, November 8,
1985, p. 22), considering appellant's disclaimer of ownership of the prohibited drug.

In People v. Rojo (G. R. No. 82737, July 5, 1989), the Court, in acquitting the accused-appellant,
stamped a note of disapproval on the prosecution's refusal to present the supposed informant whose
identity has already been known, to wit:

"Thus, the identity of the informant was known to the appellant all the time and when immediately
thereafter the appellant was apprehended and arrested by the police officers and the informant was
not similarly taken into custody, the only logical conclusion is that the appellant right then and there
found out that he was the victim of an entrapment and that the informant was in collusion with the
police authorities.

"There is, therefore, no reason why the prosecution could not and did not present the informant as a
prosecution witness. He is the best witness to establish the charge against the appellant who denies
the charge" (citing Pp. v. Ale, 145 SCRA 50, [1986] where the accused was likewise acquitted). (Italics
supplied)

In an earlier case of People v. Caboverde (160 SCRA 550 [1988]) where the prosecution refused to
identify the informer, the Court stated:

"The witnesses for the prosecution refused to divulge the identity of said informer, who could have
been a very vital corroborating witness to their testimonies and thus strengthen the position of the
prosecution. Prosecution maintained that to expose the identity and to bring this informer to court as
witness would pose grave danger to the life of such informer. What danger did the prosecution fear,
when the identity of said informer and his involvement in the entrapment of appellant was already
made known to the appellant during the alleged exchange of the marijuana stuff and money."

Non-presentation of an informer is a privilege that has its own inherent limitation that of fairness in the
administration of criminal justice. Thus, where the disclosure of an informer's identity is relevant and
helpful to the defense of the accused, or is essential to a proper disposition of the case, the privilege
must give way (Wilson v. United States, 59 F. 2d 390 [1932].

Trial courts must always bear in mind that the right to meet the accuser and to have him examined is
a fundamental right. The constitution (Section 14 [2], Art. III) so mandates and they cannot do
otherwise, especially so in instances where the party sought to be presented and examined
possesses vital information essential to the defense in vindicating the accused's plea of innocence.
Such violation of appellant's fundamental right calls for the reversal of his conviction. Thus:

"Where the disclosure of an informer's identity, or of the contents of his communication, is relevant
and helpful to the defense of an accused, or is essential to a fair determination of a cause, the
privilege must give way. In these situations, the trial court may require disclosure and, if the
Government withholds the information, dismiss the action (Roviaro v. United States, 353 US 53, 1 L ed
2d 639 [1957]).

In the case at bar, while the identity of the informer is disclosed, nevertheless, the prosecution failed
to present him as a witness on the dubious assertion that his whereabouts are unknown. As no
subpoena appears to have been issued by the prosecution to the said informer, the presumption that
evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced (Section 5 [e], Rule 131) arises.

Emateo's non-production as a witness could have been excused had he merely played the part of a
true informer. An informer is one who communicates knowledge of someone having committed or
about to commit a crime to the proper authorities who by themselves, acting independently, may
obtain the evidence necessary for the prosecution of the offender. On the contrary, he did more
than that. He played a substantial part in the act complained of and is in fact claimed by the
appellant as the real owner of the subject marijuana.

The case of Sorrentino v. U.S. (163 F.2d 627 [1947]), provides the distinction between one who played
the part of a mere informer and a decoy. There, the defendant was charged for an illegal sale of
opium in favor of a person, the identity of whom the US Government claims to be confidential.
Objections as regards questions seeking to ascertain his identity were sustained by the trial court on
the ground that it will violate the privilege of withholding the identity of informers. In reversing the trial
court, it was held that:

"If the person whom Grady called an informer had been an informer and nothing more, appellant
would not have been entitled to have his identity disclosed; but the person whom Grady called an
informer was something more. He was the person to whom appellant was said to have sold and
dispensed the opium described in the indictment. Information as to this person's identity was
therefore material to appellant's defense x x x."
The Solicitor General, however, contends that appellant's disclaimer of having no knowledge about
the sale of marijuana is not worthy of credence. According to him, the best proof is the fact that
appellant delivered a sackful of marijuana to Bostick and that the sale by appellant of marijuana to
Bostick is shown by evidence independent of Clayton Emateo's testimony. (Appellee's Brief, p. 7;
Rollo, p. 125).
We disagree. Appellant's denial of the ownership of marijuana and his testimony that he took the
sack the contents of which turned out to be marijuana from the place where Emateo previously
deposited it because he was only requested by Emateo to do so (TSN, March 20, 1986, pp. 7-8; March
31, 1986, pp. 8 & 14), was never contradicted by the prosecution. Thus:

"ATTY. WAGANG:

"Q: You made mention of a gift of bag which Clayton will give as a gift to that American; where
did this bag come from?

"A: He, Clayton Emateo brought that bag earlier that morning of the same day.

xxx xxx xxx

"Q: And what happened when you reached Irisan?

"A: When we reached Irisan it was raining.

"Q: And were you able to get that bag left?

"A: Clayton sent me to get the bag because that time it was raining and they did not want to be
wet.

"Q: Where did you bring that bag?

"A: I went to get the bag and loaded the bag on the car of that American."

(TSN, pp. 7-8, March 20, 1986)

On cross-examination:

"FISCAL CARBONELL:

"Q:
Is it your testimony that in the morning of August 1, 1985 Clayton Imateo came to your residence
driving his taxicab and brought the bag to your residence?

"A: Yes, sir.

xxx xxx xxx

"Q:
Is it your testimony that when Clayton Imateo came (to) your residence at Irisan in the morning of
August 1, 1985 he just deposited the bag at your residence without conversing to you?

"A:
He told me that he has no money at that time by(u)t he had to wait for his visitor whom he will give
that bag and from whom he will get money to pay me.

(TSN, pp. 8-9, March 31, 1986)

xxx xxx xxx

"Q: Now, immediately after the American parked his vehicle, you alighted from the vehicle, is that
correct?

"A: Yes, I was sent by Clayton to go to our quarters to get the bag because it was raining.

"Q:
Now, is it your testimony Mr. Witness that Clayton just sent you to fetch the bag from a place which is
about ten minutes walk from the place where the vehicle was parked when in fact he was the one
who has a debt of gratitude to you because of the P4,000.00 you lent him?
"A: Yes, sir.

"Q: You, readily acceeded to that order for you to go and get the bag from your quarters?

"A:
Yes, because when I saw him (h)e was well-dressed and he was wearing leather shoes." (TSN, pp. 14-
15, March 31, 1986; Italics supplied)

The prosecution witnesses' bare assertions, including that of Bostick's, anent appellant's delivery of the
sack/bag of marijuana cannot, by itself, indicate ownership nor even illegal possession as
contemplated by law under the circumstances in the absence of any other evidence.

Neither is there any reason for us to believe, as advanced by the Solicitor General, that appellant
even acknowledged ownership of the seized marijuana by identifying them and affixing his signature
on the back and on each and every parcel inside it (sic) (Appelle's Brief, p. 8; Rollo, p. 126). Appellant
testified that he affixed his signature because he was asked and forced to do so (TSN, March 20,
1986, p. 11; March 31, 1986, pp. 18 & 22). Nowhere in the cited testimony of Atty. Aurellado relied
upon by the prosecution (Appelle's Brief, p. 8; Rollo, p. 126; TSN, November 8, 1985, pp. 9-15) was
there any indication that appellant did acknowledge ownership of the prohibited merchandise.

Appellant's signature appearing on the sack and individual bundles containing marijuana do not
signify, much less evidence, guilt for they are mere procedural steps normally undertaken after
effecting arrest (People v. Sariol, G.R. No. 83809, June 22, 1989).

Furthermore, it appearing that appellant was not informed of his right to counsel at the time he affixed
his signature, the same has been obtained in violation of his right as a person under custodial
investigation for the commission of an offense and is therefore inadmissible (Constitution, Art. III, Sec.
12 [1], [3]).

And there is the question of money involved. While the prosecution took time to prepare counterfeit
money to the extent that Bostick even shelled out his own, the same turned out to be not really
necessary it appearing that appellant never even got hold of it, much less saw the same. It defies
credulity that in a carefully orchestrated "buy-bust" operation such as in the case at bar, no money
changed hands between the alleged buyer and seller. It may then be asked, was there really an
attempt to sell on the part of appellant of a merchandise he does not even own?

It is a cardinal rule in this jurisdiction that in order to merit conviction, the prosecution must rely on the
strength of its own evidence and not on the weakness of evidence presented by the defense. An
accused must always be deemed innocent until the contrary is proved beyond reasonable doubt. In
the instant case, the prosecution failed to so establish the guilt of herein appellant.

WHEREFORE, the challenged judgment is REVERSED and appellant is hereby ACQUITTED on the
ground of reasonable doubt.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-69676 June 4, 1990

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. GARDO ESTEVAN y EUGENIO

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Meliton V. Chicote for accused-appellant.

REGALADO, J.:

Accused-appellant Edgardo Estevan y Eugenio was charged in the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
Branch VIII at Pasig, Metro Manila in Criminal Case No. 42051 with a violation of Section 4, Article II of
Republic Act No. 6425, otherwise known as "The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972," as amended by
Presidential Decree No. 1675, in an information of the following tenor:
That on or about the 2nd day of July, 1981, in the Municipality of Mandaluyong, Metro Manila,
Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above- named accused,
without having been duly authorized by law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
sell, deliver and give away to another two (2) plastic bags of dried Marijuana stalks (flowering tops), a
prohibited drug, in violation of the above-cited law, as amended.

Contrary to law. 1

At the arraignment, appellant, assisted by his counsel de oficio, pleaded not guilty. 2 Forthwith, trial
on the merits ensued.

The People's version of this case, which is sustained by the evidence and is not seriously disputed, is
presented as follows:

At about 10:00 o'clock in the morning of July 2, 1981, the Philippine Constabulary Anti-Narcotics Unit
(CANU) at Camp Crame, Quezon City, received confidential information that traffic in prohibited
drugs was rampant in the Daang Bakal area in Mandaluyong, Metro Manila, and two persons,
namely, accused Edgardo Estevan y Eugenio alias "Tikboy' and one alias 'Boy Japon' were the
traffickers. Acting thereon, a team of CANU agents was immediately sent to the place, arriving
thereat at about 11:15 o'clock in the morning of the same day. One of the agents, Sgt. Cesar V.
Garcia, posed as a buyer. After a while the poseur came upon the accused Edgardo Estevan alias
'Tikboy along Daang Bakal Street., The poseur immediately ordered P250.00 worth of marijuana from
the accused, at the same time handing to the latter the amount of P250.00. After receiving the
P250.00, the accused left the poseur and walked toward a waiting shed along Daang Bakal St.
about 30 meters away and there talked to a person known only as Boy Japon who was alone at the
waiting shed. The accused then gave the P250.00 to Boy Japon and the latter in turn handed to the
accused two (2) plastic bags of dried marijuana. The accused returned to the poseur and delivered
to him the two plastic bags. After getting the two plastic bags and upon ascertaining them to
contain marijuana (Exh. 'C' & 'C-l'), the poseur arrested the accused. And, to assure the
apprehension of Boy Japon, the poseur fired a shot to alert his companions. Boy Japon, however,
scampered and eluded arrest. Thereupon, the CANU agents brought the accused and the two
plastic bags of marijuana to Camp Crame (tsn, October 6, 1981, pp. 3-4, 7-11, 12-13; October 21,
1981, pp. 3-4).

The two plastic bags and contents were referred to the PC Crime Laboratory for examination. The
laboratory tests confirmed the contents of the two plastic bags as marijuana (tsn, October 6, 1981,
pp. 2-3, 4-5; Exhs. 'A', 'B', 'C', 'C-1', C-2', 'C-3' and 'D'). 3

After appellant was apprehended, he was brought to Camp Crame where he allegedly executed a
sworn written statement, presented in evidence as Exhibit "E," to the effect that he was caught by
members of the CANU while selling two (2) plastic bags of marijuana for P250.00 on July 2, 1981 at
Daang Bakal Street, Mandaluyong, Metro Manila.

In its decision dated July 20, 1982, 4 the trial court, after finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime imputed to him, sentenced him to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of
imprisonment and to pay a fine of P12,000.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and
to pay the costs. It also ordered that, subject to rules and regulations, the period of preventive
imprisonment which started July 2, 1981 shall be credited to appellant. The marijuana was ordered
burned.

Not satisfied therewith, herein appellant took his case to the former Intermediate Appellate Court,
faulting the court below with the following errors, to wit:

1. That the trial court erred in not finding the accused to have been instigated to commit a crime
or otherwise asked to purchase marijuana so as to entrap the drug pusher who succeeded in eluding
the law agents.

2. That the trial court erred in not finding the investigating officer to have violated the
constitutional rights of the accused.

3. That the trial court erred in not having acquitted the accused based on reasonable doubt.5

The Intermediate Appellate Court, after discussing the evidence and the law involved, affirmed the
decision of the trial court but modified the penalty by imposing the penalty of life imprisonment and
ordering herein appellant to pay a fine of P20,000.00.6 By reason of the penalty thus imposed, the
Intermediate Appellate Court did not enter judgment but certified the case to us pursuant to Section
12 (now Section 13), Rule 124 of the Rules of Court.

It was held by said appellate court that what transpired in this case is entrapment and not instigation.
It adopted the trial court's findings that the extrajudicial confession signed by appellant adheres in all
material aspects to his testimony in court. It also observed that appellant did not find any difficulty in
getting the marijuana, which goes to show that the appellant himself was engaged in illegal
trafficking of prohibited drugs.

The Intermediate Appellate Court further ruled that appellant signed the sworn statement, Exhibit "E,"
after he was informed of his constitutional rights and that he validly waived his right to be assisted by
a lawyer. The Solicitor General avers that the ruling in Morales vs. Enrile, et al. 7 to the effect that the
waiver of the right to counsel shag not be valid unless made with the assistance of counsel, has no
retroactive effect and is thus not applicable to the case at bar inasmuch as the extra judicial
confession of appellant was taken way back on July 2, 1981 when the prevailing rule did not require
the assistance of counsel for the validity of the waiver. It was submitted, nonetheless, that even if the
extrajudicial confession is expunged, there is more than enough evidence to convict appellant.

On the other hand, appellant contends that his extrajudicial confession taken by the police
operatives should rejected because he was not informed of his constitutional rights; that his
extrajudicial confession was not read to him nor was he given the opportunity to read it before he
was asked to affix his signature; that he was threatened and forced to sign it; and that his mother
who does not know how to read and write, signed as witness thereto without his presence. 8 He insists
that he was instigated to commit a crime when he was utilized by the CANU operatives to entrap a
certain Boy Japon who is a suspected drug dealer and that when the latter eluded arrest, he was
instead arrested and charged as a drug pusher.

We first deal with the admissibility of the sworn written statement allegedly containing the
extrajudicial confession of appellant.

3The rule is firmly settled that a confession is presumed to be voluntary until the contrary is proved
and the burden of proof is upon the person who gave the confession.9 Appellant made the bare
assertion that he was threatened and forced to execute an extrajudicial confession. He admitted,
however, having signed it.10 His mother apparently appears to be a witness to such confession.

We cannot reject the extrajudicial confession on this ground. Appellant failed to substantiate his
claim that he was threatened and forced into executing the confession. His nonchalant and
indifferent attitude in not proving his assertion erodes the reliability of his claim.

However, a careful examination of the extrajudicial confession indicates that while appellant waived
his right to counsel, such waiver is not valid. Nothing appears from the records that appellant was
assisted by counsel when he allegedly made the waiver.

This Court has clearly set the rule that the right to counsel may be waived but the waiver shall not be
valid unless made with the assistance of counsel. Any statement obtained in violation of this
requirement, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, in whole or in part, shall be inadmissible in
evidence.11 Thus, even if the confession of the accused speaks the truth, if it was made without the
assistance of counsel, it becomes inadmissible in evidence regardless of the absence of coercion or
even if it had been voluntarily given. 12

As earlier noted, the Solicitor General stresses the fact that since the extrajudicial confession in this
case was executed prior to the promulgation of Morales vs. Enrile, et al. in 1983, ante., it should be
declared admissible even if the waiver was not made with the assistance of counsel.

In People vs. Eglipa, 13 the trial court convicted the accused therein on the basis of two separate
extrajudicial confessions made on April 17, 1982 and on September 10, 1982. While the trial court
noted that the extrajudicial confessions were taken without the presence of counsel, nevertheless it
admitted these confessions in view of the fact that they were made before April 26, 1983, the date
Morales vs. Enrile, et al. was promulgated. We rejected the confessions and declared them
inadmissible.
In the fairly recent cases of Aballe vs. People, et al.14 and People vs. Manlapaz, et al., 15 we
discarded the extrajudicial confessions therein it appearing that the waiver of counsel was not made
with the assistance of counsel as mandated by Section 20, Article TV of the 1973 Constitution.

There is still another reason why we reject the extrajudicial confession of appellant. A cursory reading
of said extrajudicial confession readily discloses that the statements therein purporting to show
compliance with the constitutional requisites for confessions made during a custodial investigation fall
short of the acceptable norms. The supposed cautionary explanations read:

PASUBALI: Ginoong Edgardo Estevan y Eugenio ay nasa ilalim ng isang pagsisiyasat sa kasalanang
paglabag sa batas gaya ng pagbebenta ng bawal na gamot, Marijuana (Violation of Section 4,
Article II of RA 6425 otherwise known as 'The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972', as amended), ngunit
bago kita tanungin ay nais kung ipaliwanag sa iyo ang iyong mga karapatan alinsunod sa ating
Bagong Saligang Batas gaya ng mga sumusunod:

Na ikaw ay may karapatan na manahimik o huwag sumagot sa ano mang itatanong sa iyo?.

Na ikaw ay may karapatan na kumuha ng iyong sariling pili na manananggol upang sumubaybay sa
iyo sa pagsisiyasat na ito at kung hindi mo naman kaya ang humirang ng isa, ang tanggapang ito
ang bahalang humirang ng isa para sa iyo.

Na ano man ang sasabihin mo rito sa pagsisiyasat na ito ay maaaring gamiting ebidensiya laban or
pabor sa iyo sa alin mang hukuman dito sa ating bansa. TAGASIYASAT: Naunawaan at naintindihan
mo bang lahat ang iyong mga karapatan na ipinaliwanag at ipinabatid ko sa iyo?

SINISIYASAT: OPO.

TANONG: Matapos mong maunawaan at maintindihan lahat ang iyong karapatan alinsunod sa
ating Bagong Saligang Batas na ipinaliwanag at ipinabatid ko sa iyo, ikaw ba ay nakahanda pang
magbigay ng isang malaya at kusang loob na salaysay kahit na walang abogado sa ngayon?

SAGOT: OPO. 16

Time and again, we have emphasized that such long questions followed by monosyllabic answers do
not satisfy the requirements of the law that the accused be informed of his. constitutional rights under
the Constitution and our laws. Instead, there should be several short and clear questions and every
right explained in simple words in a dialect or language known to the person under interrogation.17
When such an investigation conducted upon the accused does not conform to the requirements set
forth in the aforecited case of People vs. Galit, the extrajudicial confession taken therein is
inadmissible.

We now come to the defense of appellant that he was instigated to commit a crime. In entrapment,
ways and means are resorted to for the purpose of trapping and capturing the lawbreakers in the
execution of their criminal plan; in instigation, the instigator practically induces the would-be
accused into the commission of the offense and the former himself becomes a co-principal.18

The usual defense of being "framed-up" invoked by drug pushers, as in this case, does not impress us.
In order that the defense of having been set up or framed by the authorities may prosper, the
evidence adduced must be clear and convincing. Like alibi, it is a weak defense that is easy to
concoct and is difficult to prove.19 Law enforcers are presumed to have performed their duties
regularly in the absence of proof negating the same. Contrariwise, herein appellant failed to show
any ill motive on the part of the prosecution witnesses to falsely impute such a serious charge against
him, a consideration debilitative of his defense as we have ruled in previous cases.20

An analysis of the testimony of appellant reveals his admission of the following facts: that he knew
Boy Japon and the place where the latter can be found;21 that Boy Japon is his acquaintance
whom he used to see;22 and that he handed the money to Boy Japon in exchange for the
marijuana after which he delivered the same to the CANU operative .23

In People vs. Asio, 24 which likewise involved the same offense with which appellant is charged in the
present case, we made the following observation which can as aptly be stated in the case at bar:

The existence beforehand of such unlawful trade is evident from the fact that the accused-appellant
had a ready supply of marijuana to meet the buyer's demand. He might not have it right at the time
the initial transaction took place but he was readily able to produce the desired quantity. In fact, it
took him only a few minutes to produce the marijuana. If it were really true that he was induced into
looking for marijuana, it would have taken him a considerable length of time to look for a source. The
fact that he returned shortly after the transaction shows that he already had contacts from whom he
could readily get the marijuana. This is clearly not a case where an innocent person is induced to
commit a crime. This is simply a trap to catch the criminal.

The extrajudicial confession signed by appellant on July 2, 1981 substantially interlocks with his
testimony in court.. Thus, even if said confession were completely disregarded, as we have done,
there would still be more than enough evidence to sustain appellant's conviction. The judgment of
conviction we are asked to review is not solely based on the disputed extrajudicial confession. 25

WHEREFORE, the judgment of the former Intermediate Appellate Court is hereby AFFIRMED.

G.R. No. L-59318 May 16, 1983

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ROGELIO RAMOS y GAERLAN

GUERRERO, J.:

This is an automatic review of the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila finding the accused
Rogelio Ramos y Gaerlan in Criminal Case No. 61029 guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of
Section 4, Article II, in relation to Section 2(i), Article I of the Republic Act No. 6425, as amended by
P.D. No. 44 and further amended by P.D. No. 1675, and imposing upon him the penalty of reclusion
perpetua.

There is no dispute about the facts of this case. At about 10:00 o'clock in the evening of May 3. 1981,
while P/Lt. E. Mediavillo and P/Sgt. A. Linga were on routine patrol along Taft Avenue, they had seen
and observed one MALCON OLEVERE y NAPA, acting suspiciously near the corner of Estrada Street. 1
The police officers, after Identifying themselves, stopped and frisked the suspect and found in his
possession dried marijuana leaves. 2 The police officers thereafter placed Malcon Olevere under
arrest. Upon investigation, suspect Olevere declared that he bought the recovered marijuana leaves
from one ROGELIO RAMOS y GAERLAN, alias "Balanchoy". 3

The following day, May 4, 1981, at about 12:00 o'clock noon, a police team with suspect Malcon
Olevere y Napa proceeded to the residence of appellant Rogelio Ramos y Gaerlan in 2366
Singalong, Malate, Manila and arrested him. The police operatives immediately brought appellant to
the Drugs Enforcement Section Western Police Department Headquarters for investigation.

During the custodial investigation, suspect Malcon Olevere executed a written sworn statement
implicating the accused-appellant Rogelio Ramos as the source of the marijuana leaves. 4 The
accused, after having been duly apprised of his constitutional rights, verbally admitted before Lt. E.
Mediavillo and Sgt. A. Linga the commission of the offense charged. He likewise admitted that he
sold to Malcon Olevere the marijuana leaves for P10.00. 5

On May 22, 1981, upon arraignment, the accused-appellant Ramos entered a plea of not guilty to
the information filed by assistant fiscal Antonio J. Ballena which states:

That on or about May 4, 1981, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, not being
authorized by law to sell, deliver, give away to another or distribute any prohibited drug, did then
and there willfully and unlawfully sell or offer for sale and deliver dried marijuana leaves, which is a
prohibited drug.

Contrary to law. 6

At the trial, the prosecution presented three witnesses to wit: Patrolman Jaime Cruz, a police
investigator, Patrolman Agapito Linga, a police agent, and Felisa Vequilla, an NBI forensic chemist.

Patrolman Cruz testified that on May 5, 1981, he investigated and took down the sworn statement of
one Malcon Olevere who disclosed that the accused-appellant Ramos was the source of the
marijuana leaves. Patrolman Cruz also testified that he prepared the Booking Sheet and Arrest Report
of the appellant Ramos and the corresponding Crime Report. 7 Patrolman Agapito Linga declared
on the witness stand that Lt. Mediavilla arrested appellant Ramos because Malcon Olevere declared
that the appellant sold to him the confiscated marijuana leaves. 8 The third witness, Felisa Vequilla, a
forensic chemist, affirmed that after conducting a dangerous drug test, the leaves confiscated from
Malcon Olevere are positive for marijuana. 9

The prosecution offered the following as documentary evidence: 10

Exhibit "A" The Booking Sheet and Arrest Report of accused Rogelio Ramos prepared by witness
Patrolman Cruz which was offered as part of his testimony;

Exhibit "B" Crime Report dated May 6, 1981 also prepared by the witness Patrolman Cruz;

Exhibit "B-1" second page of Exhibit "B'

Exhibit "C" Sworn Statement of Malcon Olevere y Napa;

Exhibit "C-1" The bracketed portions of Exhibit "C" stating among others that it was Rogelio Ramos
herein accused who furnished Malcon Olevere the marijuana leaves;

Exhibit "D-1" marijuana leaves examined;

Exhibit "E" the envelope containing the marijuana leaves which was confiscated from Malcon
Olevere.

After the trial, the Court of First Instance of Manila (now the Regional Trial Court) found the accused-
appellant Ramos guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged in view of the verbal
admission given by the appellant himself and the evidence offered and admitted in court. The
dispositive portion of its judgment reads:

WHEREFORE, accused ROGELIO RAMOS y GAERLAN is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of a violation of Section 4, Article II in relation to Section 2(i), Article I Republic Act No. 6425, as
amended by PD 44 and further amended by PD 1675 as charged in the present information, for
selling subject prohibited drugs (marijuana leaves) without any lawful authority and is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua (life imprisonment); to pay a fine of Twenty
Thousand (P20,000.00) pesos, without any subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency; and to pay
the costs. Let the accused be given full credit of the entire period of his preventive imprisonment.

Subject marijuana leaves (Exhibit E) are confiscated, to be destroyed by the Dangerous Drugs Board
pursuant to law.

SO ORDERED. 11

The case is now before Us for automatic review. Accused-appellant submits before this Honorable
Court the following errors: 12

That the court erred in finding the accused guilty of violation of Section 4 Article II of Republic Act No.
6425 otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended (Selling-Pushing).

II

That the court erred in its findings both in question of law and fact in convicting the accused
notwithstanding the failure of the prosecution to adduce the quantum of evidence necessary to
establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt by failing to present Malcon Olevere y
Napa, the person who claimed that it was the therein accused who allegedly sold the marijuana
leaves.

III

That the constitutional rights of the accused, more particularly the right to meet the witness against
him face to face and to cross-examination e him has been violated.

IV

That the court has acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to a denial of due process of law.

The principal issue in this case is whether there is competent and/or admissible evidence in the
record to justify the conviction of the accused-appellant Ramos.
We find petitioner's case meritorious. The lower court erred in admitting as evidence the written sworn
affidavit of Malcon Olevere. It can be gleaned from the records that Malcon Olevere executed the
written sworn statement declaring that appellant Ramos sold to him the marijuana leaves for P10.00.
This piece of evidence is a mere scrap of paper because Malcon Olevere was not produced in court
for cross-examination. An affidavit being taken ex-parte is often incomplete and inaccurate. 13 Such
kind of evidence is considered hearsay. 14 The constitutional right to meet witnesses face to face 15
in order not to deprive persons of their lives and properties without due process of law is well-
protected in our jurisprudence. Thus, in People vs. Toledo, 16 We elucidated:

Testimony in open court in actual trial cannot be equated with any out-of-court declaration, even
when the witness has in fact been confronted already by the defendant. The direct relevance of the
trial to the ultimate judgment as to the guilt or innocence of the accused is not present in any other
proceeding and is thus a factor that can influence materially the conduct and demeanor of the
witness as well as the respective efforts of the counsels of the parties.

For the court to admit the sworn statement of Malcon Olevere without giving the adverse party the
right to cross-examine him would easily facilitate the fabrication of evidence and the perpetration of
fraud. The inadmissibility of this sort of evidence is based, not only on the lack of opportunity on the
part of the adverse party to cross-examine the affiant, 17 but also on the commonly known fact that,
generally, an affidavit is not prepared by the affiant himself but by another who uses his own
language in writing the affiant's statements which may either be omitted or misunderstood by the
one writing them.18

The Booking Sheet and the Dangerous Drug Report of chemist Felisa Vequilla which were presented
as evidence by the prosecution, established nothing to support the conviction of the appellant
herein. For the same reason, that Malcon Olevere was not presented as a witness and insofar as they
impute to appellant the commission of the crime charged, the adduced evidence are nothing but
hearsay evidence. They cannot be regarded as competent evidence as to the veracity of the
contents therein.

It is not disputed that the marijuana leaves recovered and tested by witness Vequilla came from
Malcon Olevere and not from appellant. It would be absurd and manifestly unjust to conclude that
appellant had been selling marijuana stuff just because what were recovered from Olevere were
real marijuana. Proof of one does not necessarily prove another. Nowhere can it be found on the
record that appellant was caught in possession or in the act of selling the prohibited marijuana
leaves.

The oral testimonies given by the witnesses for the prosecution prove nothing material and culpable
against the accused. As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General not anyone of the three
witnesses presented testified on the basis of their personal knowledge that the appellant sold the
marijuana leaves to Malcon Olevere. Under Rule 130, Sec. 30 of the Revised Rules of Court, "a witness
can testify only to those facts which he knows of his own knowledge, that is, which are derived from
his own perception. ...

A witness, therefore, may not testify as to what he merely learned from others, either because he was
told or having read or heard the same. Such testimony is considered hearsay and may not be
received as proof of the truth of what he has learned. Since Malcon Olevere was not presented as a
witness, the testimonies offered by the witnesses for the prosecution are regarded as hearsay, insofar
as they impute to the appellant the commission of the offense charged.

The lower court in convicting appellant of the crime charged, Partly relief on the verbal admission
made by appellant himself before Lt. Mediavillo and Sgt. Linga during the custodial investigation.
Although the records prove that the appellant has been duly apprised of his constitutional rights to
silence and to counsel, 19 We are not fully convinced that this apprisal was sufficiently manifested
and intelligently understood and accepted by the appellant. This is fatal to the admissibility of
appellant's verbal admission. We have repeatedly emphasized that care should be taken in
accepting extrajudicial admissions, especially when taken during custodial investigation. In People
vs. Caquioa, 20 We ruled:

As for the procedural safeguards to be employed, unless other fully effective means are devised to
inform accused persons of their right to silence and assure a continuous opportunity to exercise it, the
following measures are required. Prior to questioning, the person must be warned that he has a right
to remain silent, that any statement he does make be used as evidence against him, and that he has
a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed. The defendant may waive
effectuation of those rights provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. If
however, he indicates in any manner and at any stage of the prosecution that he wishes to consult
with an attorney before speaking, there can be no questioning. Likewise, if the individual is alone and
indicates in any manner that he does not wish to be interrogated, the police may not question him.
The mere fact that he may have answered some questions or volunteered some statements on his
own does not deprive him of the right to refrain from answering any further inquiries until he has
consulted with an attorney and thereafter consents to be questioned.

Again, the constitutional rights of the accused to silence and to counsel is fortified in the very recent
case of Morales and Moncupa vs. Enrile 21 where this Court said:

At the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting officer to inform him of the reason
for the arrest and he must be shown the warrant of arrest, if any. He shall be informed of his
constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel and that any statement he might make could be
used against him. The person arrested shall have the right to communicate with his lawyer, a relative,
or anyone he chooses by the most expedient means - by telephone if possible - or by letter or
messenger. It shall be the responsibility of the arresting officer to see to it that this is accomplished. No
custodial investigation shall be conducted unless it be in the presence of counsel engaged by the
person arrested, by any person on his behalf, or appointed by the court upon petition either of the
detainee himself or by anyone on his behalf. The right to counsel may be waived but the waiver shag
not be valid unless made with the assistance of counsel. Any statement obtained in violation of the
procedure herein laid down, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, in whole or in part, shall be
inadmissible in evidence.

In the case at bar, appellant has only finished Grade VI, 22 which means that he is not adequately
educated to understand fairly and fully the significance of his constitutional rights to silence and to
counsel. As mandated, it is not enough that the police investigator merely informs him of his
constitutional rights to silence and to counsel, and then taking his statements down, the interrogating
officer must have patience in explaining these rights to him. The records do not reveal that these
requirements have been fully complied with, nor was there any showing that appellant has been
represented by counsel during custodial investigation. In consonance with Section 20 of the Bill of
Rights which states that "any confession obtained in violation of this section shall be inadmissible in
evidence," We hold that the verbal admissions of appellant during custodial investigation may not be
taken in evidence against him.

We hold and rule that the guilt of the accused has not been established beyond reasonable doubt
and he is, therefore, entitled to acquittal.

WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila is
REVERSED, and appellant is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime charged in the information. No costs.

People v flores G.R NO. 148145-46, 2004

G.R. Nos. 148145-46 July 5, 2004

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,
vs.
FELIX VENTURA y QUINDOY and ARANTE FLORES y VENTURA, appellants.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:
On automatic appeal1 before this Court is the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Negros
Occidental, Branch 50, finding appellants Felix Ventura (Ventura) and Arante Flores (Flores) guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of Murder in Criminal Case No. 00-20692 and Attempted Murder in
Criminal Case No. 00-20693.
The accusatory portion of the Information for Murder in Criminal Case No. 00-20692 reads as follows:
That on or about the 23rd day of February, 2000 in the City of Bacolod, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the herein accused, conspiring, confederating and acting in
concert, without any justifiable cause or motive, with intent to kill and by means of treachery and
evident premeditation, accused Felix Q. Ventura armed with a .38 Caliber Home-made Revolver and
Arante V. Flores armed with a bladed weapon, and by taking advantage of their superior strength,
did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack and stab with bladed weapon
one Aileen Bocateja y Peruelo, thereby inflicting upon the person of the latter the following wounds,
to wit:
- Cardio respiratory arrest
- Hemothorax
- stab wounds
which wounds were the direct and immediate cause of the death of said victim, to the damage and
prejudice of the heirs of the latter.
That the crime was committed with the aggravating circumstances of dwelling, night time and with
the use of an unlicensed firearm.
Act contrary to law.2 (Emphasis supplied)
The accusatory portion of the Information for Frustrated Murder in Criminal Case No. 00-20693 reads
as follows:
That on or about the 23rd day of February, 2000 in the City of Bacolod, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the herein accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually
helping each other, without any justifiable cause or motive, accused Felix Q. Ventura armed with a
.38 Caliber Homemade Revolver and Arante Flores y Ventura armed with a bladed weapon, with
intent to kill and by means of treachery and evident premeditation, and abuse of superior strength,
did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack and stab with said bladed
weapon one Jaime Bocateja, thereby causing upon of the latter the following wounds, to wit:
- multiple stab wounds
- #1 Posterior axillary area right
- #2 Posterior axillary area left with minimal hemothorax
- lacerated wound right parietal area
OPERATION PERFORMED:
- Exploration of wound right parietal for removal of foreign body
thus performing all the acts of execution which would have produced the crime of murder as a
consequence, but which nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of some cause or accident
independent of the will of the perpetrator, that is, due to the timely and able medical assistance,
which saved the life of the victim and the victim was able to escape.
That the crime was committed with the aggravating circumstances of dwelling, night time, and with
the use of an unlicensed firearm.
Act contrary to law.3 (Emphasis supplied)
When arraigned, appellants pleaded not guilty to both charges.4 The two criminal cases were
consolidated following which they were jointly tried.5
The spouses Jaime and Aileen Bocateja were, in the early hours of February 23, 2000, fast asleep in
their room on the ground floor of their two-storey house at Alunan-Yulo in Bacolod City, Negros
Occidental. The room had a glass wall with a glass sliding door which was closed but not locked. The
kitchen light was open, as was the light in the adjoining room where the couple's young children,
Jummylin and Janine, were sleeping. Their niece, Aireen Bocateja, and Jaime's elder daughter, Rizza
Mae, were asleep in their rooms on the second floor.6
At around 2:00 a.m.,7 Jaime was roused from his sleep by appellant Ventura who, together with his
nephew appellant Flores, had stealthily entered the couple's room after they gained entry into the
house by cutting a hole in the kitchen door.
As established by the testimonial and object evidence for the prosecution, the following transpired
thereafter:
Appellant Ventura pointed a revolver at Jaime's face, announced a hold-up, hit Jaime on the head
with the gun and asked him for his keys. 8
When appellant Ventura struck him again, Jaime called out for help and tried to grab the revolver.
The two men then struggled for possession of the gun. As Jaime almost succeeded in wresting
possession of the gun from him, appellant Flores shouted to appellant Ventura to stab Jaime. Using
the knife he
was carrying, appellant Flores stabbed Jaime three times. Jaime thereupon released the gun, threw
a nearby plastic stool at the jalousy glass window causing it to break and cried out for help.9
In the meantime, Aileen who had been awakened, began shouting for help as she saw her husband
in mortal danger. Appellant Flores stabbed her, however, with his knife, and although Aileen tried to
defend herself with an electric cord, appellant Flores continued stabbing her.10
Awakened by the commotion, Aireen descended the stairs and saw the knife wielding appellant
Flores whom she recognized as a former employee of the butcher shop of the Bocataje spouses.
Pleading with appellant Flores not to harm her, Aireen ran back upstairs into Rizza Mae's room, and
the two called to their neighbors for help.11
Appellants Ventura and Flores thereupon fled the Bocateja house,12 bringing nothing with them.13
Soon members of the Central Investigation Unit (CIU) of the Philippine National Police (PNP) arrived in
response to a flash report.14 Some of the police officers took the spouses to the Western Visayas
Regional Hospital,15 while other elements of the CIU team intercepted appellants Ventura and Flores
who were being pursued by neighbors of the spouses at the corner of Araneta-Yulo. Recovered from
appellant Ventura was a .38 caliber revolver with five (5) live bullets, and from appellant Flores a
blood stained knife16 measuring 14½ inches from tip to handle with a 10-inch blade.17
Shortly after their arrest, appellants were interviewed by reporters from Bombo Radio to whom they
admitted responsibility for stabbing Jaime and Aileen. In response to questions from the reporters,
appellant Ventura explained that he suspected his wife was carrying on an affair with Jaime.18
In the ocular inspection of the Bocateja residence, the CIU team found the spouses' room in disarray,
with some cabinets opened and blood splattered all over the floor, the bed and the ceiling. 19
Aileen eventually died in the hospital on the same day of the commission of the crime.20 Dr. Luis
Gamboa, City Health Officer of Bacolod City who conducted the autopsy of her body, found that
she suffered a hack wound on her face and four stab wounds on her body, three at the chest and
one at the back of the right shoulder, all caused by a sharp bladed instrument, such as the knife
recovered from appellant Flores. One of the stab wounds penetrated Aileen's chest near the left
nipple, the intercoastal space and the middle of her right lung causing internal hemorrhage and
ultimately resulting in her death.21
Jaime who was hospitalized for a total of six days, was treated by Dr. Jose Jocson,22 who certified that
he sustained the following non-lethal injuries: 23
Multiple Stab Wounds
#1 Posterior Axillary Area Right
#2 Posterior Axillary Area Left with Minimal Hemothorax
Lacerated Wound Right Parietal Area24
From the evidence for the defense consisting of the testimonies of appellants Ventura and Flores and
Primitiva Empirado, the following version is culled:
Four days after February 13, 2000 when appellant Ventura arrived in Negros Occidental from Manila
where he had been working as a security guard,25 he noticed that his wife, Johanna, who had
previously been employed as a house helper of the Bocateja spouses, was wearing a new ring.
When he confronted her, she said that it came from Jaime who was courting her, and that it was
because Jaime's wife, Aileen, had discovered their illicit relationship that she had been dismissed
from the Bocateja household. Incensed at the revelation, he slapped his wife whereupon she left the
conjugal home.26
On February 22, 2000, Johanna returned to the conjugal home in Barangay Alegria, Municipality of
Murcia, Negros Occidental to get her things. After a verbal confrontation with her husband, she left
to find work in Kabankalan, Negros Occidental. This was the last time that Johanna and appellant
Ventura saw each other.27
That same day, appellant Flores visited his uncle-appellant Ventura. The two spoke at length and
appellant Flores, who had previously worked for a day at the meat shop of the Bocateja spouses,
confirmed that Johanna and Jaime were having an affair.28
Since appellant Flores knew where the Bocateja spouses lived, appellant Ventura asked him to go
with him to their residence so he could confront Jaime about his affair with Johanna.29
Appellants, armed with an unlicensed revolver and a knife, thus repaired to the Bocateja residence
still on the same day, February 22, 2000, arriving there at around 11:00 p.m. They were not able to
immediately enter the premises, however. After boring a hole through the kitchen door with the knife,
appellants entered the Bocateja residence at 2:00 a.m. of the next day, February 23, 2000.30
Once inside, appellants entered the room of the Bocateja spouses through the unlocked sliding door.
Appellant Ventura woke Jaime up, confronted him and told him to stop his relationship with
Johanna. Jaime fought back, and he and appellant Ventura grappled for possession of the latter's
gun.31
Soon after, Aileen woke up, screamed for help, and began throwing things at appellant Flores whom
she attempted to strangle with an electrical extension cord. Unable to breathe, appellant Ventura
stabbed Aileen twice with his knife. And seeing that Jaime had wrested control of the gun from
appellant Ventura, appellant Flores also stabbed Jaime.32
Since appellants had not intended to kill Aileen or stab Jaime, they fled in the course of which Jaime
began shooting at them with a 9 mm pistol. Appellants were eventually intercepted by policemen
who placed them under arrest.33
Interviewed by the media after his arrest, appellant Ventura stressed that he just wanted to confront
Jaime about the latter's relationship with appellant's wife, Johanna.34
By the appealed Decision of December 15, 2000, the trial court disposed as follows:
FOR ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court finds the accused FELIX VENTURA y QUINDOY and ARANTE
FLORES y VENTURA GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as Principals by Direct Participation of the crime
of ATTEMPTED MURDER as alleged in Criminal Information No. 00-20693 with the aggravating
circumstances of evident premeditation, dwelling, nighttime and the breaking of door to gain
entrance to the house and with no mitigating circumstance. Accordingly, they are sentenced to
suffer the penalty of Reclusion Temporal in its maximum period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, they shall serve a prison term of from Eight (8) years of Prision Mayor as Minimum to Eighteen (18)
years of Reclusion Temporal as Maximum.
The Court also finds the two (2) above-named accused GUILTY as Principal[s] by Direct participation
for the crime of Murder as alleged in Criminal Information No. 00-20692 qualified by abuse of superior
strength. The aggravating circumstances of dwelling, nighttime and by the breaking of a door are
present in the commission of the crime. There is no mitigating circumstance. The accused, therefore,
are meted the Supreme penalty of DEATH.
By way of civil liability, the accused are solidarily ordered to pay the heirs of Aileen Bocoteja the sum
of P50,000.00 as death indemnity. The accused are likewise held solidarily liable to pay Jaime
Bocateja the sum of P100,000.00 as moral damages and the sum of P20,000.00 as exemplary
damages.35 (Emphasis supplied)
In their Brief,36 appellants contend that the trial court erred (1) in convicting them despite the failure
of the prosecution to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt; (2) in considering abuse of superior
strength as a qualifying circumstance in Criminal Case No. 00-20892; (3) in considering
evident premeditation as a qualifying circumstance in Criminal Case No. 00-20893; and (4) in
considering the aggravating circumstances of breaking of door and nocturnity in both cases.37
Appellants argue that, at most, they can only be convicted of attempted homicide for the stabbing
of Jaime and homicide for the fatal stabbing of Aileen.38
From a considered review of the records and applicable jurisprudence, the instant appeal fails.
The essence of evident premeditation is that the execution of the criminal act must be preceded by
cool thought and reflection upon the resolution to carry out the criminal intent during a space of
time sufficient to arrive at a calm judgment.39 For it to be appreciated, the following must be proven
beyond reasonable doubt: (1) the time when the accused determined to commit the crime; (2) an
act manifestly indicating that the accused clung to his determination; and (3) sufficient lapse of time
between such determination and execution to allow him to reflect upon the circumstances of his
act.40
By appellants' argument, even if appellant Ventura became jealous when he learned of the illicit
affair between his wife and Jaime, it is not, by itself, sufficient proof that he determined to kill the
latter; that with Jaime's testimony that appellant had announced a "hold-up," they, at most, intended
to rob, but not kill the spouses; that their only purpose was to confront Jaime regarding his supposed
affair with appellant Ventura's wife, Johanna; and that if they had truly intended to kill Jaime, then
appellant Ventura would not have bothered to awaken him, but would just have shot him in his
sleep.
These assertions run counter to the established facts and are debunked by appellants' own
admissions.
Appellants admittedly arrived at the Bocateja residence at 11:00 p.m. and surreptitiously entered
therein at 2:00 a.m. At that time, the surrounding premises were decidedly dark, and all the members
of the household were fast asleep. Armed with a gun and a knife, they proceeded directly to the
bedroom of the spouses, where appellant Ventura woke up Jaime. These actuations are not of those
seeking parley, but instead betray an unmistakable intention to kill, not merely confront, Jaime.
Indeed, when pressed during cross-examination to explain why he chose to "confront" Jaime under
the foregoing circumstances, appellant Ventura became evasive and did not give a clear answer:
Q Mr. Witness, you said that your purpose in going to the house of Jaime was only to confront him.
My question is, why is it that you went there at 11:00 o'clock in the evening and not in the morning so
that you will have all the opportunity to confront him?
A Because at that time, I was not on my proper frame of mind.
Q Why, is it not a fact that as early as February 17, 2000, you were already told by your wife that
there was that relationship with Jaime Bocateja and your wife?
A Yes, sir.
Q Why did you not immediately confront Mr, Bocateja after that day or February 17?
WITNESS:
A On that day, I don't know Jaime Bocateja.
xxx
ATTY. ORTIZ:
Q On February 22. So that you did not ask your wife where the place of Jaime Bocateja was at
that time you were by him on February 22, 2000?
A Johanna did not tell me the place of Jaime Bocateja.
Q Why did you not ask her where the house is, at that time?
A What she told me was that, she is working in Bacolod City.
Q Mr. Witness, you had from February 17 to 22, a number of days to confront Mr. Jaime Bocateja.
Did you not confront your wife or perhaps ask her about the place or where this Jaime Bocateja was
at that time and have the intention to confront him, if that was really your intention to confront him?
WITNESS:
A No, I did not ask her because we had a confrontation and the next day, February 17, she left.
Q Of course, when you arrived at the house of the Bocateja [spouses] at 11:00 o'clock in the
evening, you were armed at that time, is that right, you and your companion, Arante Flores?
A Yes, sir.
Q What was that weapon at that time?
A .38 caliber revolver.
xxx
ATTY. ORTIZ:
Q Mr. Witness, if your intention was only to confront Mr. Jaime Bocateja, why is it that you did not
wait or you did not come to that place earlier so that at that time, Jaime Bocateja was still awake or
perhaps waited until the next day?
COURT:
Already answered. He said that he was not at the proper frame of his mind.41 (Emphasis supplied)
Cross-examined on the same point, appellant Flores was equally evasive, but eventually revealed
that the timing and method of entry were purposely chosen to avoid detection by either the
Bocateja family or their neighbors:
Q You arrived in the house of Bocateja at about 11:00 o'clock is that right?
A Yes, sir.
Q And your purpose in going to the house of Bocateja was only to confront Jaime Bocateja
about his relationship with Johanna is that right?
A Yes, sir.
ATTY. ORTIZ:
Q Why did you wait Mr. Witness why did you and the other accused Felix Ventura wait for three (3)
hours for you to confront him in his house?
WITNESS:
A Because we were not able to enter the door right away because the door could not be
opened.
Q My question Mr. Witness, is this you ate your supper at Libertad market at about 8:00 o'clock
why did you not go to the house of Jaime Bocateja at 9:00 o'clock immediately after supper? At that
time when the members of the family were yet awake?A We stayed at Burgos market and then from
Burgos to Libertad we only walk and from Libertad to the house of Bocateja.
ATTY. ORTIZ:
Q You will admit Mr. Witness at the time you left your place at Brgy. Alegria you were already
armed, is that right?
WITNESS:
A Yes, sir.
Q Your uncle Felix Ventura was armed with [a] .38 caliber revolver, is that right?
A Yes, sir.
Q And you were also armed with a bladed weapon is that correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q Why do you have to bring this weapon Mr. Witness?
A We brought this weapon just to frighten Jaime Bocateja during [the] confrontation.
ATTY. ORTIZ:
Q Are you saying Mr. Witness if your purpose was only to confront him you have to bring this [sic]
weapons?
WITNESS:
A Yes, sir.
Q When you arrived at the house of Jaime Bocateja about 11:00 o'clock. . . by the way when did
you arrive at the house of Jaime Bocateja?
A 11:00 in the evening.
Q Of course you did not anymore knock at the door Mr. Witness?
A No, sir.
Q Or you did not also call any member of the family to open [the door for] you, is that right?
WITNESS:
A No, sir.
ATTY. ORTIZ:
Q As a matter of fact you only broke the gate Mr. Witness in order to enter the compound of the
Bocateja family?
A We scaled over the gate.
Q And why do you have Mr. Witness to go over the fence and open a hole at the kitchen for you
to confront Mr. Jaime Bocateja if that was your purpose?
A The purpose of my uncle was just to confront Jaime.
Q And when you confront, are you saying that you cannot any more knock at the door, perhaps
call any member of the family inside the house?
WITNESS:
A No, sir.
ATTY. ORTIZ:
Q Why Mr. Witness, Why?
A We did not call or knock at the person inside the house because it will make noise or calls and
alarm to the neighbors.42 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
To be sure, all the elements of evident premeditation were clearly established from the lips of
appellants themselves. Thus, on clarificatory questioning by the trial court, appellant Ventura testified:
COURT:
Q I recall that you left Murcia [at] 4:00 o'clock. Is that morning or afternoon?
A I left Murcia at 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon.
Q 4:00 o'clock from Alegria then to Alangilan, then to Bacolod, is that correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q From Alangilan to Bacolod, what mode of transportation did you make?
A From Alegria to Alangilan, we only hiked and then from Alangilan to Bacolod we took the
passenger jeepney.
Q From Alegria to Alangilan, how long did it take you to walk? How many kilometers?
A Four (4) kilometers.
Q And, I assume that while you were walking, you were talking with Arante Flores, your nephew,
about the plans to go to the house of Jaime Bocateja?
A Yes, sir.
COURT:
Q By the way, what did you do at Alangilan?
A I went there because my clothes were at my sister's house.
Q So, what time did you arrive in [Bacolod]?
A We arrived here in [Bacolod] late in the evening.
Q I assume that you disembarked at Burgos Market?
A Yes, sir.
Q And you just walked from Burgos Market to Libertad Baybay to the house of Jaime Bocateja?
A Yes, sir.
Q It took you about thirty (30) [minutes] to one (1) hour, more or less?
A More than one (1) hour.
Q And during this time, you were talking again with Arante Flores [about] the course of action that
you will take once a confrontation takes place with Jaime Bocateja?
WITNESS:
A Yes, I asked him the location of 3rd Road since I do not know the house of Jaime Bocateja.
COURT:
Q I assume that the front main door of the house was close[d] at that time, correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q You scaled that door, the front main door of the gate?
A Yes, sir, we scaled the gate.
Q You were not able to open it but you simply scaled, you went over?
A Yes, sir.
Q And you said yet, you destroyed the main door of the house. Can you tell the Court, how did
you destroy the main door of the house?
A No, the kitchen door, sir.
COURT:
Q How were you able to destroy it?
WITNESS:
A We used the knife in unlocking the door. We made a hole.
Q You made a hole and with the use of your hand, you were able to unlock the inside lock
because of the hole?
A Yes, sir.
Q And I assume that it took you twenty (20) – thirty (30) minutes to make that hole?
A Yes, sir.43 (Emphasis supplied)
The immediately foregoing narration was echoed by appellant Flores who gave the following
testimony on direct examination:
ATTY. JACILDO:
Q So from Brgy. Alegria where did you proceed?
WITNESS:
A We proceeded to Brgy. Alangilan.
Q This Brgy. Alegria how far is it from Brgy. Alangilan?
A The distance between Brgy. Alegria to Brgy. Alangilan is about three (3) kilometers.
Q So, what means of transportation did you used in going to Alangilan?
A We walked in going to Alangilan.
Q When you arrived at Brgy. Alangilan what did you do?
WITNESS:
A We went to our aunt's house.
ATTY. JACILDO:
Q From Alangilan where did you proceed?
A In Alangilan, we stayed at the house of my aunt and then we proceeded to Bacolod.
Q So what time did you arrived [sic] in Bacolod?
A 8:00 o'clock in the evening.
Q When you arrived in Bacolod, what did you do?
A We ate our supper at Libertad Market.
Q After eating your dinner at Libertad, what did you do?
A After eating our supper, we proceeded to the house of Jaime Bocateja.
ATTY. JACILDO:
Q What time did you arrived [sic] at the house of Jaime?
WITNESS:
A 11:00 o'clock in the evening.
Q When you arrived at the house of Jaime, what did you do?
A We enter[ed] the gate of their house.
Q Please continue?
A Then, we opened the door.
Q And then?
A We reach[ed] [the Bocateja residence] at around 11:00 o'clock and we tried to open the door
but we could not open the door immediately. We made a hole so that we can get in the house. We
entered the house at about 2:00 o'clock in the morning the following day.44 (Emphasis supplied)
Undoubtedly, the accounts of appellants evince not only their resolve to kill Jaime, but the calm and
methodical manner by which they sought to carry out his murder. As pointed out by the Solicitor
General, unless shown to be customary,45 appellants' act of arming themselves with a gun and a
knife constitutes direct evidence of a careful and deliberate plan to carry out a killing. Consider the
following ruling of this Court in People v. Samolde:46
As stated earlier, accused-appellant and Armando Andres tried to borrow Cabalin's tear gas
gun. This attempt by the accused-appellant and his co-accused to arm themselves prior to the
commission of the crime constitutes direct evidence that the killing of Feliciano Nepomuceno had
been planned with care and executed with utmost deliberation. From the time the two agreed to
commit the crime to the time of the killing itself, sufficient time had lapsed for them to desist from their
criminal plan had they wanted to. Instead, they clung to their determination and went ahead with
their nefarious plan. x x 47 (Emphasis supplied)
From the time appellants left Murcia, Negros Occidental, after they had resolved to go to confront
Jaime, to the time they entered the Bocateja residence in Bacolod City, ten hours had elapsed –
sufficient for appellants to dispassionately reflect on the consequences of their actions and allow for
their conscience and better judgment to overcome the resolution of their will and desist from
carrying out their evil scheme, if only they had desired to hearken to such warnings. In spite of this,
appellants evidently clung to their determination to kill Jaime.
That evident premeditation was established through the testimonies of appellants and not by those
of the prosecution witnesses is of no moment. While appellants could not have been compelled to
be witnesses against themselves,48 they waived this right by voluntarily taking the witness stand.
Consequently, they were subject to cross-examination on matters covered by their direct
examination.49 Their admissions before the trial court constitute relevant and competent evidence
which the trial court correctly appreciated against them. 50
Although he admitted stabbing Jaime, appellant Flores sought to justify his actions by claiming that
he was impelled by the need to prevent Jaime from shooting his uncle, appellant Ventura. This
pretense does not impress.
To successfully claim that he acted in defense of a relative, the accused must prove the
concurrence of the following requisites: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the person killed or
injured; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel the unlawful aggression;
and (3) the person defending the relative had no part in provoking the assailant, should any
provocation have been given by the relative attacked.51 Of these, the requisite of "unlawful
aggression" is primary and indispensable without which defense of relative, whether complete or
otherwise, cannot be validly invoked.52
Not one of the foregoing requisites of defense of a relative is present. From all accounts, it was
appellants who initiated the unlawful aggression, and it was the victim Jaime who acted in self
defense. Hence, neither the justifying circumstance of defense of a relative53 nor the special
mitigating circumstance of incomplete defense of a relative54 may be appreciated in appellant
Flores' favor.
While appellant Ventura did not directly participate in the stabbing of Jaime, the trial court correctly
held both appellants collectively liable for the attempt on the latter's life since they were shown to
have acted in conspiracy with each other.
There is a conspiracy when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission
of a felony and decide to commit it.55 Where conspiracy has been adequately proven, as in these
cases, all the conspirators are liable as co-principals regardless of the extent and character of their
participation because, in contemplation of law, the act of one is the act of all.56
By stabbing Jaime Bocateja pursuant to their pre-conceived plot, appellants commenced the
commission of murder directly by overt acts. Despite their efforts, however, they failed to inflict a
mortal wound on Jaime, hence, their liability only for attempted murder.57
With respect to the death of Aileen, the trial court found both appellants guilty of murder qualified
not by evident premeditation but by taking advantage of superior strength, 58 to wit:
The killing of Aileen Bocateja is qualified by the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior
strength. The accused Arante Flores who delivered the stabbing blow is big and strong, standing
about five feet and six (5'6") inches tall. His weapon was a 14 inch dagger. Aileen Bocateja [stood]
only about five (5'0") feet tall. The disparity of their strength is enormous.59 (Emphasis supplied)
To take advantage of superior strength means to purposely use excessive force out of proportion to
the means of defense available to the person attacked.60 The appreciation of this aggravating
circumstance depends on the age, size and strength of the parties, and is considered whenever
there is a notorious inequality of forces between the victim and the aggressor, assuming a superiority
of strength notoriously advantageous to the aggressor, which is selected or taken advantage of by
him in the commission of the crime.61
Appellants "agree with the trial court that accused-appellant Arante Flores is taller, and probably
stronger than the victim Aileen Bocateja because of their difference in sex as well as the fact that the
accused appellant Flores was armed at that time x x x."62 Nevertheless, they argue that Aileen's death
was not attended by abuse of superior strength since: (1) though ultimately unsuccessful, she was
able to put up a defense against appellant Flores; and (2) the prosecution failed to show that
appellant Flores deliberately took advantage of the disparity in their size and sex in order to facilitate
the commission of the crime.
Unlike in treachery, where the victim is not given the opportunity to defend himself or repel the
aggression,63 taking advantage of superior strength does not mean that the victim was completely
defenseless. Abuse of superiority is determined by the excess of the aggressor's natural strength over
that of the victim, considering the momentary position of both and the employment of means
weakening the defense, although not annulling it.64 Hence, the fact that Aileen attempted to fend
off the attack on her and her husband by throwing nearby objects, such as an electric cord, at
appellant Flores does not automatically negate the possibility that the latter was able to take
advantage of his superior strength.
On the contrary, this Court in a very long line of cases has consistently held that an attack made by a
man with a deadly weapon upon an unarmed and defenseless woman constitutes the circumstance
of abuse of that superiority which his sex and the weapon used in the act afforded him, and from
which the woman was unable to defend herself.65 Thus, in People v. Molas,66 where the accused was
convicted of murder for stabbing to death two women and an eight year old boy, this Court
discoursed:
While treachery was not appreciated as a qualifying circumstance against Molas, the killing of the
three victims was raised to murder by the presence of the qualifying circumstance of abuse of
superior strength. There was abuse of superior strength when Molas inflicted several mortal wounds
upon Soledad. Molas, besides being younger and stronger, was armed with a weapon which he used
in seriously wounding her. That circumstance was also present when he hacked eight-year old
Abelaro and also Dulcesima who, besides being a woman of lesser strength was
unarmed.67 (Emphasis supplied)
And in the more recent case of People v.Loreto,68 this Court opined:
The contention of accused-appellant is barren of merit. Article 14, paragraph 15 of the Revised Penal
Code provides that a crime against persons is aggravated by the accused taking advantage of
superior strength. There are no fixed and invariable rules regarding abuse of superior strength or
employing means to weaken the defense of the victim. Superiority does not always mean numerical
superiority. Abuse of superiority depends upon the relative strength of the aggressor vis-à-vis the
victim. There is abuse of superior strength even if there is only one malefactor and one victim. Abuse
of superiority is determined by the excess of the aggressor's natural strength over that of the victim,
considering the position of both and the employment of means to weaken the defense, although not
annulling it. The aggressor must have advantage of his natural strength to insure the commission of
the crime. In this case, accused-appellant was armed with a knife and used the same in repeatedly
stabbing Leah, a young wisp of a girl, no less than eighteen times after overtaking her in the sala of
Dan's house. Irrefragably, then, accused-appellant abused his superior strength in stabbing Leah. In a
case of early vintage [People v. Guzman, supra. at 1127], the Court held that:
There is nothing to the argument that the accused was erroneously convicted of murder. An attack
made by a man with a deadly weapon upon an unarmed and defenseless woman constitutes the
circumstance of abuse of that superiority which his sex and the weapon used in the act afforded him,
and from which the woman was unable to defend herself (U.S. vs. Camiloy, 36 Phil. 757; U.S. vs.
Consuelo, 13 Phil. 612; People vs. Quesada, 62 Phil. 446). The circumstance of abuse of superior
strength was, therefore, correctly appreciated by the trial court, as qualifying the offense as
murder.69 (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted)
By deliberately employing a deadly weapon against Aileen, appellant Flores clearly took advantage
of the superiority which his strength, sex and weapon gave him over his unarmed victim.
As for appellant Flores' claim of self-defense, it cannot be sustained. As in defense of a relative, one
claiming self defense must prove by clear and convincing evidence70 both unlawful aggression on
the part of the person killed or injured and reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent
or repel the unlawful aggression. As a third requisite, he must also prove lack of sufficient provocation
on his part.71 None of these requisites was shown to be present. As expounded by the trial court:
Arante declared that Aileen panicked and screamed and was hitting him with an extension cord so
he stabbed her. Arante was suggesting that had Ai[l]een remained cool, composed and friendly, she
would not have died.
This perverted reasoning need not detain the Court. There was an on-going aggression being
committed inside her house and within the confines of her room, hence, Aileen's actuations were
perfectly just and legitimate.72
As adverted to earlier, the trial court, citing People v. Dueno,73 did not consider evident
premeditation as having aggravated the killing of Aileen since she was not the intended victim of
appellants' conspiracy. Upon further scrutiny, however, this Court finds that this aggravating
circumstance should have been appreciated in connection with Aileen's murder. Jurisprudence is to
the effect that evident premeditation may be considered as present, even if a person other than the
intended victim was killed, if it is shown that the conspirators were determined to kill not only the
intended victim but also anyone who may help him put a violent resistance.74
Here, it was established that upon seeing her husband being attacked by appellants, Aileen
immediately called for help and hurled objects at appellant Flores. And it was because of this
passionate defense of her husband that appellant Flores hacked at her face and stabbed her four
times. These factual circumstances are analogous to those in People v. Belga,75 where this Court had
occasion to state that:
While it would seem that the main target of the malefactors were Alberto and Arlene Rose, this does
not negative the presence of evident premeditation on the physical assault on the person of
Raymundo Roque. We have established jurisprudence to the effect that evident premeditation may
be considered as present, even if a person other than the intended victim was killed (or wounded, as
in this case), if it is shown that the conspirators were determined to kill not only the intended victim
but also anyone who may help him put a violent resistance. Here, Raymundo Roque provided such
violent resistance against the conspirators, giving the latter no choice but to eliminate him from their
path.76 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied, citations omitted)
Thus, while appellants' original objective may have only been the killing of Jaime, the trial court
correctly held both of them responsible for the murder of Aileen. Co-conspirators are liable for such
other crimes which could be foreseen and are the natural and logical consequences of the
conspiracy.77 In Pring, et al. v. Court of Appeals,78 this Court held:
While the acts done by the petitioners herein vary from those of their co-accused, there is no question
that they were all prompted and linked by a common desire to assault and retaliate against the
group of Loreto Navarro. Thus, they must share equal liability for all the acts done by the participants
in such a felonious undertaking. While petitioners herein, Rogelio Pring and Alberto (Roberto) Roxas,
on their part, had ganged up Jesus Yumol who belonged to the group of their adversaries by hitting
the latter with a bench and a piece of wood, and that it was a certain David Ravago who stabbed
the deceased Loreto Navarro, nevertheless, it is a rule that conspirators would necessarily be liable
also for the acts of the other conspirators unless such acts differ radically or substantially from that
which they intended to commit (People vs. Enriquez, 58 Phil. 536; People vs. Rosario, 68 Phil. 720).
The pronouncements made by this Court in the aforecited case of People vs. Enriquez, still serve as
the governing rule that should be applied to the case at bar. In the said case, this Court stated:
"x x x x x x x x x
'We are of the opinion that this contention is not tenable. The accused had undoubtedly conspired
to do grave personal injury to the deceased, and now that the injuries actually inflicted have resulted
in death, they cannot escape from the legal effect of their acts on the ground that one of the
wounds was inflicted in a different way from that which had been intended. x x x x x x x x x.
'As has been said by the Supreme Court of the United States, 'If a number of persons agree to
commit, and enter upon the commission of the crime which will probably endanger human life such
as robbery, all of them are responsible for the death of a person that ensues as a consequence.'
(Boyd vs. U.S., 142 U.S. 450; 35 Law. ed. 1077). In United States vs. Patten, the court said: 'Conspirators
who join in a criminal attack on a defenseless man with dangerous weapons, knock him down, and
when he tries to escape, pursue him with increased numbers, and continue the assault, are liable for
manslaughter when the victim is killed by a knife wound inflicted by one of the them during the
beating, although in the beginning they did not contemplate the use of a knife.' (42 Appeals, D.C.,
239)"
Although during the incident in question the aggression committed by the petitioners herein was
directed against the other members of the group of Loreto Navarro and not on the deceased, this
would not relieve them from the consequence of the acts jointly done by another member of the
petitioners' group who stabbed the deceased Loreto Navarro.79 (Emphasis supplied, citations
omitted)
And in the more recent case of People v. Bisda, et al.,80 this Court held:
Each conspirator is responsible for everything done by his confederates which follows incidentally in
the execution of a common design as one of its probable and natural consequences even though it
was not intended as part of the original design. Responsibility of a conspirator is not confined to the
accomplishment of a particular purpose of conspiracy but extends to collateral acts and offenses
incident to and growing out of the purpose intended. Conspirators are held to have intended the
consequences of their acts and by purposely engaging in conspiracy which necessarily and directly
produces a prohibited result, they are, in contemplation of law, chargeable with intending that
result. Conspirators are necessarily liable for the acts of another conspirator unless such act differs
radically and substantively from that which they intended to commit. As Judge Learned Hand put it
in United States v. Andolscheck, "when a conspirator embarks upon a criminal venture of indefinite
outline, he takes his chances as to its content and membership, so be it that they fall within the
common purposes as he understands them." (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted)
Indeed, since they deliberately planned to attack Jaime in the sanctity of his bedroom where his wife
Aileen was also sleeping, appellants cannot now claim that the latter's violent resistance was an
unforeseen circumstance. Hence, neither of them can escape accountability for the tragic
consequences of their actions.
In determining appellants' criminal liability, the trial court appreciated the generic aggravating
circumstances of dwelling,81 nighttime82 and breaking of door83 in connection with both crimes.
Dwelling is considered aggravating because of the sanctity of privacy that the law accords to
human abode.84
Thus, it has been said that the commission of the crime in another's dwelling shows greater perversity
in the accused and produces greater alarm.85 Here, dwelling was correctly appreciated since the
crimes were committed in the place of abode of the victims who had not given immediate
provocation.86
Upon the other hand, as pointed out by both appellants and the Solicitor General, the breaking of a
door was not alleged in either of the two informations. Thus, the same cannot be appreciated
against appellants. On this point, this Court's discussion in People v. Legaspi,87 quoted in the Solicitor
General's Brief, is instructive:
Nonetheless, it is to be noted that the appreciation by the trial court of the aggravating
circumstances of dwelling and nighttime, despite the non-allegation thereof in the Information,
resulted in the imposition of the supreme penalty of death upon accused-appellant. In People v.
Gallego (G.R. No. 130603, 338 SCRA 21, August 15, 2000), We had occasion to rule thus:
"In People v. Albert (251 SCRA 136, 1995), we admonished courts to proceed with more care where
the possible punishment is in its severest form – death – because the execution of such a sentence is
irrevocable. Any decision authorizing the State to take life must be as error-free as possible, hence it is
the bounden duty of the Court to exercise extreme caution in reviewing the parties' evidence.
Safeguards designed to reduce to a minimum, if not eliminate the grain of human fault ought not to
be ignored in a case involving the imposition of capital punishment for an erroneous conviction 'will
leave a lasting stain in our escutcheon of justice.' The accused must thence be afforded every
opportunity to present his defense on an aggravating circumstance that would spell the difference
between life and death in order for the Court to properly 'exercise extreme caution in reviewing the
parties' evidence.' This, the accused can do only if he is appraised of the aggravating circumstance
raising the penalty imposable upon him to death. Such aggravating circumstance must be alleged in
the information, otherwise the Court cannot appreciate it. The death sentence being irrevocable, we
cannot allow the decision to take away life to hinge on the inadvertence or keenness of the
accused in predicting what aggravating circumstance will be appreciated against him.
xxx
The principle above-enunciated is applicable to the case at bar. Consequently, we hold that due to
their non-allegation in the Information for rape filed against accused-appellant, the aggravating
circumstances of nighttime and dwelling cannot be considered in raising the penalty imposable
upon accused-appellant from reclusion perpetua to death.
xxx
It is to be noted carefully that the rule on generic aggravating circumstances has now been
formalized in the Revised Rules of Criminal procedure, which took effect on December 1, 2000.
Section 8 of Rule 110 now provides that:
Sec. 8. Designation of the offense. – The complaint or information shall state the designation of the
offense given by the statute, aver the acts or omissions constituting the offense, and specify its
qualifying and aggravating circumstances. If there is no designation of the offense, reference shall
be made to the section or subsection of the statute punishing it.
Likewise, Section 9 of the same Rule provides:
Sec. 9. Cause of the accusation. – The acts or omission complained of as constituting the offense
and the qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be stated in ordinary and concise language
and not necessarily in the language used in the statute but in terms sufficient to enable a person of
common understanding to know what offense is being charged as well as its qualifying
and aggravating circumstances and for the court to pronounce judgment.88 (Emphasis supplied)
Appellants and the Solicitor General also argue that nocturnity should not have been considered
since Jaime himself testified that their bedroom was well-lit and there was light coming from the
kitchen and the adjoining bedroom of their children.89
In determining nocturnity, two tests are employed in the alternative: (1) the objective test, under
which nighttime is aggravating because the darkness facilitated the commission of the offense; and
(2) the subjective test, under which nighttime is aggravating because the darkness was purposely
sought by the offender.90 Applying these tests to the established factual circumstances, this Court
concludes that nocturnity was correctly appreciated in connection with both crimes.
While the bedroom where the crimes occurred was well-lit, the evidence shows that, in furtherance
of their murderous intent, appellants deliberately took advantage of nighttime, as well as the fact
that the household members were asleep, in order to gain entry into the Bocateja residence. Indeed,
their own testimony indicates that while they were already outside the Bocateja house at around
11:00 p.m., they purposely waited until 2:00 a.m. before breaking into the residence so as not to call
the attention of the Bocatejas and/or their neighbors. It is thus clear that appellants deliberately took
advantage of the darkness of the night, not to mention the fact that the Bocatejas were fast asleep,
to conceal their actions and to facilitate and insure that their entry into the victims' home would be
undetected.
No mitigating circumstances are present to offset the foregoing aggravating circumstances. While
the trial Court noted that appellants were apparently motivated by their belief that Johanna and
Jaime were carrying on an illicit relationship, to wit:
The accused presented evidence to prove that Jaime Bocateja and Johanna Ventura, wife of the
accused Felix Ventura, were maintaining an illicit relationship. The evidence on this point is principally
hearsay – the alleged admissions made by Johanna of the relationship. There is no doubt, however,
that the accused Ventura believes that [his] wife and Jaime Bocateja are clandestine lovers. It is
fairly reasonable, in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, that it is Ventura's belief of this illicit
relationship which prompted him to confront Jaime Bocateja,91
it nevertheless ruled out passion or obfuscation92 or immediate vindication of a grave offense93 as
mitigating circumstances.
While jealousy may give rise to passion or obfuscation,94 for the appreciation of this mitigating
circumstance it is necessary that the act which produced the obfuscation was not far removed from
the commission of the crime by a considerable length of time, during which the perpetrator might
recover his normal equanimity.95 In the same vein, while "immediate" vindication should be construed
as "proximate" vindication in accordance with the controlling Spanish text96 of the Revised Penal
Code, still this mitigating circumstance cannot be considered where sufficient time elapsed for the
accused to regain his composure.97
In these cases, appellant Ventura's suspicions were aroused as early as February 17, almost a week
before the stabbing incidents on February 23, when he first confronted his wife about her ring.
Moreover, as previously noted, ten hours had elapsed from the time appellants left Murcia, Negros
Occidental, weapons in hand, to the time they entered the Bocateja residence in Bacolod City.
Within that period appellant Ventura had opportunity to change his clothes at a relatives' house in a
neighboring barangay and both appellants were able to take their dinner at the Burgos Market in
Bacolod City. They even waited three hours outside the Bocateja residence before carrying out their
plan. Without question, sufficient time had passed for appellants' emotions to cool and for them to
recover their equanimity.
In fine, for stabbing Jaime, appellants are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of attempted murder
qualified by evident premeditation with the aggravating circumstances of dwelling and nighttime.
However, as pointed out by the Solicitor General, the trial court erred in imposing the sentence of
Eight (8) Years of prision mayor as minimum to Eighteen (18) Years of reclusion temporal as
maximum.
Article 51 of the Revised Penal Code provides that a penalty two degrees lower than that prescribed
for the consummated penalty shall be imposed upon the principals in an attempted felony. Under
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, the penalty for murder
is reclusion perpetua to death. The penalty two degrees lower is prision mayor.98 Applying Section 1 of
Act No. 4103,99 as amended, otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law, and considering
the presence of two aggravating circumstances, the proper imposable penalty falls within the range
of prision mayor in its maximum period (from Ten (10) Years and One (1) Day to Twelve (12) Years) as
maximum and prision correccional (from Six (6) Months and One (1) Day to Six (6) Years) as minimum.
Accordingly, this Court hereby sentences appellants to an indeterminate penalty of Six (6) Years
of prision correccional as minimum to Twelve (12) Years of prision mayor as maximum.
For fatally stabbing Aileen, appellants are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder qualified by
abuse of superior strength with the aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation, dwelling
and nighttime. As already noted, the penalty for murder is reclusion perpetua to death. Article 63 of
the Revised Penal Code provides that when the law prescribes two indivisible penalties, the greater
penalty shall be imposed when, in the commission of the deed, one aggravating circumstance is
present. Consequently, the trial court's imposition of the supreme penalty of death must be sustained.
Three members of the Court maintain their adherence to the separate opinions expressed in People
vs. Echegaray100 that Republic Act No. 7659, insofar as it prescribes the penalty of death, is
unconstitutional; nevertheless they submit to the ruling of the majority that the law is constitutional
and that the death penalty should accordingly be imposed.
As regards the civil liability of the appellants, the award of the trial court is hereby modified as follows:
In Criminal Case No. 00-20692, the award of P50,000.00 to the heirs of Aileen as civil indemnity for her
death is sustained, the commission of the crime by appellants having been duly proven.101 The award
of moral damages to her heirs is likewise proper considering that the prosecution presented
adequate proof that they suffered mental anguish and wounded feelings.102 However, the amount of
moral damages awarded by the trial court is hereby reduced from P100,000.00 to P50,000.00 in line
with current jurisprudence.103 It should be borne in mind that the purpose for such award is to
compensate the heirs of the victim for the injuries to their feelings and not to enrich them.104
The award of exemplary damages should be increased from P20,000.00 to P25,000.00. Such award is
proper in view of the presence of aggravating circumstances.105 Furthermore, considering that
counsel for appellants admitted that the heirs of Aileen incurred funeral expenses of
P100,000.00106 and such admission has not been shown to have been made through palpable
mistake, the same should be awarded as actual damages.107
In Criminal Case No. 00-20692, the trial court did not grant Jaime's claim for P20,000.00 in actual
damages for hospitalization expenses since he failed to present any receipts to substantiate the
same. Nonetheless, in light of the fact that Jaime was actually hospitalized and operated upon, this
Court deems it prudent to award P20,000.00 as temperate damages.108 Moreover, Jaime is also
entitled to moral damages in accordance with Article 2219, paragraph 2 of the Civil Code, which this
Court hereby awards in the amount of P25,000.00.109 Finally, exemplary damages of P25,000.00 are
also in order considering that the crime was attended by two aggravating circumstances.110
WHEREFORE, the judgment in Criminal Case No. 00-20693 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.
Appellants Felix Ventura and Arante Flores are found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of attempted murder qualified by evident premeditation with the aggravating circumstances of
dwelling and nighttime and are hereby sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of Six (6) Years
of Prision Correccional as minimum to Twelve (12) Years of Prision Mayor as maximum.
Appellants are solidarily ORDERED to pay the victim, Jaime Bocateja, the amounts of: (a) Twenty
Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) as temperate damages; (b) Twenty Five Thousand Pesos (P25,000.00) as
moral damages; and (c) Twenty Five Thousand Pesos (P25,000.00) as exemplary damages.
The judgment in Criminal Case No. 00-20692 is likewise AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Appellants Felix
Ventura and Arante Flores are found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of murder qualified by abuse
of superior strength with the aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation, dwelling and
nighttime and are SENTENCED to the supreme penalty of DEATH.
Appellants are solidarily ORDERED to pay the heirs of Aileen Bocateja the amounts of: (a) Fifty
Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as civil indemnity; (b) One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) as
actual damages; (c) Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as moral damages; and (d) Twenty Five
Thousand Pesos (P25,000.00) as exemplary damages.
Upon the finality of this Decision, and pursuant to Art. 83 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
Sec. 25 of R.A. No. 7659, let the records of the cases be immediately forwarded to the President of
the Philippines for the exercise, at her discretion, of her power to pardon appellants Felix Ventura and
Arante Flores.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-78531 JUNE 22, 1990

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JUNGCO

G.R. No. 78531 June 22, 1990

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
HENRY JUNGCO y SANTIAGO, EDUARDO PALENCIA y GALLO, ORLANDO ORTEGA y MALINIA, RAFAEL
ZARAGOZA y DE IA CRUZ, and ROLANDO AGUILAR y SOMBRA, defendants, RAFAEL ZARAGOSA y DE
LA CRUZ and EDUARDO PALENCIA y GALLO, defendants-appellants.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Public Assistance Office for defendants-appellants.

PADILLA, J.:
This is an appeal interposed by the accused Rafael Zaragosa y De la Cruz and Eduardo Palencia y
Gallo from the judgment * rendered in Criminal Case No. 17280 of the Regional Trial Court of
Caloocan City, finding them and their co-accused Henry Jungco y Santiago, Orlando Ortega y
Malinia, and Rolando Aguilar y Sombra, 1 guilty of the crime of Robbery with Homicide and
sentencing each of them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua,with the accessory penalties
provided for by law, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Dr. Lutgarda Rivera, jointly and severally,
in the amounts of P30,000.00, as death indemnity, P30,000.00 as actual damages, and P50,000.00, by
way of lost earnings, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.
The incriminatory facts of the case, according to the Solicitor General, are as follows:
On December 20, 1981, at about 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon, Patrolman Eddie Regalado of the
Northern Police District was in Women's Club Street, Malabon, Metro Manila conducting a
surveillance on the group of accused Rafael Zaragoza, Henry Jungco, Orlando Ortega, Rolando
Aguilar and Eduardo Palencia, as part of his assignment to monitor the drug pushing activities of the
bystanders in the said area (pp. 6-9, 7-9, tsn, Aug. 23, 1983). At that time all the accused were at the
store drinking beer near the drugstore owned by Dr. Lutgarda Rivera (pp. 8-9, tsn, Ibid). One of them
was holding a wrapped newspaper more or less twelve (12) inches long and one (1) inch in diameter
(p. 9, Ibid). All the while that Regalado was watching the accused, he was standing in front of the
drugstore of Dr. Rivera (p. 7, Ibid). Later, at around 4:35 o'clock in the afternoon, the accused finished
their beer and then proceeded to the drugstore of Dr. Rivera which is located at the Women's Club
Street, Malabon. When they reached the drugstore, Rolando Aguilar was left in front of the drugstore
standing, while the four accused were inside the drugstore (p. 12, Ibid). Regalado then left the place
and went to the nearby police outpost to take a rest (p. 11, Ibid). In a short while a person came to
him (Regalado) and told him that there was a killing committed in the drugstore of Dr. Rivera (p.
11, Ibid). He hurriedly went to the scene and found the dead body of Dr. Rivera prostrate on the floor
(ibid). Immediately, he asked the sidewalk vendors that gathered around the drugstore if they have
seen persons that came out from the store of Dr. Rivera (p. 11, Ibid). One of the sidewalk vendors said
that he saw five male persons hurriedly left the drugstore of the deceased (p. 35, Ibid).
Patrolman Eddie Regalado then relayed the information he gathered from the sidewalk vendor to Sgt.
Dante Buenaventura who arrived at the scene together with Patrolman Leopoldo Simangan (p.
13, Ibid; p. 6, tsn, Sept. 6, 1983). Thereupon, they (Pat. Regalado, Sgt. Dante Buenaventura and
members of the Anti-Organized Task Force) proceeded to arrest Henry Jungco and Orlando Ortega
in their residence at Tambak, Navotas, Malabon (pp. 6-7, 11, tsn, Sept. 6, 1983; p. 14, tsn, Aug. 23,
1983). On the other hand, accused Rafael Zaragosa and Eduardo Palencia were apprehended inside
Hulo Market, while Rolando Aguilar was arrested the following day by members of the other elements
of the Malabon Police Force (pp- 11-12, tsn, Sept. 6, 1983). At the Malabon Police Station, Patrolman
Leopoldo Simangan conducted the investigation of the five accused. In said investigation, after the
accused were duly apprised of their constitutional rights by Pat. Simangan, they executed and
signed their respective sworn statements (Exhibits I, J, K and L, pp. 8-17, records; pp. 12-19, tsn, Sept.
6, 1983), except Henry Jungco who invoked his right to remain silent (p. 13, tsn, Ibid). Ortega and
Palencia admitted having stabbed the victim several times on the body with the use of an icepick
and having ransacked the cash register of the drugstore and that they thereafter fled away (Exhibits I,
L, pp. 8-10, 15, 17, record). After their statements were taken down they (Rafael Zaragosa, Henry
Jungco, Eduardo Palencia, Rolando Aguilar and Orlando Ortega) were brought to Assistant Fiscal
Eduardo Manalaysay where they swore to the truthfulness of their confessions (Exhibits 1, J, K and
L, Ibid; pp. 12-19, tsn, Ibid).
On December 23, 1981, the police investigators conducted a reenactment of the crime at the place
of the incident (pp-20-21, tsn, Ibid). Present at time were the Mayor of Malabon Maynardo Espiritu,
Station Commander Alfredo Cruz, Deputy Station Commander Julio Duenas, Lt. Daniel B. Cruz and a
People's Journal Reporter Bernie Razon and hundreds of other people surrounding the vicinity (p. 21,
tsn, Ibid). Before Regalado started the re-enactment, he informed again the accused of their
constitutional rights, but nonetheless all the accused willingly participated in the re-enactment (p. 24,
tsn, Ibid). Pictures of the re-enactment then were taken (Exhibits N to N24, pp. 22-30, tsn, Ibid). As
depicted in the pictures of the re-enactment, accused Henry Jungco, Eduardo Palencia and Orlando
Ortega Went to the drugstore of the victim Dr. Lutgarda Rivera to buy cough syrup (Exhibit N, p. 26,
tsn, Ibid). The victim, however, refused to sell them Ornacol cough syrup (p. 26, tsn, Ibid). A heated
argument then ensued between Ortega and the victim (pp. 26-27, Ibid). In the course of the
argument, Ortega pulled out an improvised dagger and stabbed the victim hitting her on the body
(Exh. N-1 2, p. 27, tsn, Ibid). Palencia then entered the store and likewise stabbed the victim with an
icepick (Exh. N-13, Ibid). Seeing what happened, Jungco grabbed the icepick and dagger from the
hands of Palencia and Ortega and without any hesitation stabbed the victim three times with the use
of an icepick (Exhs. N-14 to N-17, p. 28, Ibid). Then Jungco and Ortega pulled down the body of the
victim (Exh. N-19, p. 29, Ibid), while Palencia proceeded to ransack the cash register of the victim
and take the money found therein (Exh. N-23, p. 30, Ibid).
On December 21, 1981, Dr. Alberto M. Reyes, NBI Supervising Medico-Legal Officer, performed the
post mortem examination on the cadaver of Dr. Lutgarda Rivera (Exhibit E, pp. 6-7, 13- 20, tsn, July 12,
1983). According to his findings, the victim sustained eleven (11) stabbed wounds caused by a sharp
pointed instrument such as an icepick; that the wounds on the aorta and upper and lower lobes of
the left lung were fatal; that the wounds sustained at the anterior chest wall of the victim indicate that
the assailant was in front of the victim when the said wounds were inflicted on her body (pp. 13-16,
tsn, Ibid).
Atty. Roberto Rivera, the son of the victim, testified that before 6:00 o'clock in the afternoon of
December 20, 1981, the son of the owner of the adjoining establishment adjacent to the drugstore of
her mother came to their house and informed him that something bad happened to his mother; that
immediately he went hurriedly to their drugstore together with his father; that upon reaching the
place, he saw hundreds of people around the door of the drugstore; that he saw the dead body of his
mother covered with a white blanket being carried by persons working with the International Funeral
Homes; that inside the drugstore, he noticed that the shelves were forced opened, many bottles of
medicines and boxes were scattered on the floor; that the store lost cash money in the sum of
P2,000.00; that they spent P5,000-00 for the wake and P10,000.00 for the funeral expenses; that his
mother was earning Pl,000.00 per month as a professor in the College of Medicine of the University of
Santo Tomas; that their drugstore had an average net income of P300.00 a day (pp. 5-13, tsn, Sept.
13, 1983). 2
The appellants denied having committed the crime charged. According to the appellant Rafael
Zaragoza, he was in the Hulo Market in Malabon on 20 December 1981. He arrived at the said market
at about 6:00 o'clock in the morning of the said day after selling fish, and stayed thereat with his co-
accused, drinking until about 10:00 o'clock of the same morning, when he went home to Tangos,
Navotas. Then, on the following day, 21 December 1981, while he was inside the said market eating
"mami", policemen came and arrested him in connection with the death of Dr. Rivera.
According to appellant Zaragosa, he was brought to a salt bed ("asinan") at Tonsuya where he was
maltreated by the policemen and made to affix his thumbprint on a document the contents of
which he did not know. He was also laid on a wooden bed with his head hanging and his feet tied to
the bed an distilled water (for dry batteries) was poured over his mouth. He latter complained to the
National Police Commission,3 but he does not know what happened to his complaint. He admitted
that he had also executed a statement 4 wherein he stated that he was not maltreated by the
policemen. He explained that he made such statement because he was given money by Atty.
Rivera, the son of the deceased, through Pat. Gungon. 5
The appellant, Eduardo Palencia, for his part, declared that he arrived at the Hulo Market at about
1:00 o'clock in the afternoon of 20 December 1981, and spent his time playing the jukebox, until 2:30
o'clock of the same afternoon when he went to the Chinese restaurant at the back of the factory of
Rufina Patis and drank beer with his co-accused. After about thirty (30) minutes, they went back to
the market place where they read "komiks" at a store in the corner of said market until 3:30 o'clock
when they parted. We went home to Tanza, Malabon, while the others went to Cubao, Quezon
City.6 Then, in the morning of the following day, he and Zaragoza were picked up by the police. He
was brought inside a bodega in Niugan, Malabon, where he was maltreated and made to sign a
document the contents of which he did not know. He also complained but he does not know what
happened to his complaint.7
In finding the appellants guilty of the crime with which they were charged, the trial court relied
principally upon the extrajudicial confessions executed by them on 21 December 1981, 8 and the
pictures taken during the re-enactment of the crime.9
Counsel for the appellants, in this appeal, contends that the said extra-judicial confessions are
inadmissible in evidence because they were extracted from the appellants during custodial
investigation without the assistance of counsel and after the appellants had been subjected to
different forms of maltreatment, threats, and intimidation. Counsel further asserts that the pictures of
the re-enactment were taken in a manner contrary to law and are, therefore, inadmissible.
After going over the record of the case, we are convinced that the extra-judicial confessions in
question are inadmissible in evidence, the same having been executed by the appellants during
custodial investigation without the assistance of counsel, particularly, when the confessants
manifested the waiver of their right to counsel. The prevailing rule is still that laid down in People vs.
Galit10 as follows:
10. This Court, in the case of Morales vs. Ponce Enrile, laid down the correct procedure for peace
officers to follow when making an arrest and in conducting a custodial investigation, and which We
reiterate:
7. At the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting officer to inform him of the
reason for the arrest and he must be shown the warrant of arrest, if any. He shall be informed of his
constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel, and that any statement he might make could be
used against him. The person arrested shall have the right to communicate with his lawyer, a relative,
or anyone he chooses by the most expedient means--by telephone if possibleor by letter or
messenger. It shall be the responsibility of the arresting officer to see to it that this is accomplished. No
custodial investigation shall be conducted unless it be in the presence of counsel engaged by the
person arrested, or by any person on his behalf, or appointed by the court upon petition either of the
detainee himself or by anyone on his behalf. The right to counsel may be waived but the waiver shall
not be valid unless made with the assistance of counsel. Any statement obtained in violation of the
procedure herein laid down, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, in whole or in part, shall be
inadmissible in evidence.
We also find that the pictures taken during the re-enactment of the crime, are inadmissible in
evidence since the re-enactment was based upon the defendants' inadmissible extra-judicial
confessions. Pictures re-enacting a crime which are based on an inadmissible confession are
themselves inadmissible.11
However, in a sworn statement executed on 14 July 1982, 12 the appellant Rafael Zaragoza admitted
that he and his co-accused were responsible for the robbery and the death of Dr. Lutgarda Rivera.
His sworn statement reads, in part, as follows:
23. T: Ano ang inamin mo?
S: Inamin ko na kasama ako sa pagnanakaw at pagpatay kay Dra. Rivera.
24. T: Sabihin mo sa akin ngayon kung tutoo ngang kasama ka sa pagnanakaw at pagpatay.
S: Iyon nga po ang pagkakamali ko dahil nasa labas lang po ako ng botika. Hindi pumasok sa loob.
25. T: Isalaysay mo nga sa akin ang tunay na pangyayari?
S: Ganito po iyon, magka kasama po kami nina Butch (referring to HENRY JUNGCO), si Lando
(Referring to Orlando Ortega), si Labo (referring to Rolando Aguilar), at Eding Hula (referring to
Eduardo Palencia), sa may harapan ng botika ni Dra. Rivera. Bumibili po kami ng Corex D pero ayaw
kaming pagbilhan. Ang ginawa namin ay nagpunta kami sa palengke, tapos nagbigay ako ng
katorse pesos kay LANDO pambili ng Corex D, si Lando na po ang bahala doon sa kulang.
Naghanap siya ng mabilhan. Tapos, dumating na si Lando at may dala siyang dalawang boteng
siento bente bawat isa nang Corex. Naghati-hati na kami. tapos, nagkuwentuhan kami sa palengke,
tapos naisipan naming balikan si doktora. May dalang kutsilyo si Lando, si Butch naman po ay ice
pick ang dala. Ang dating may dala ng ice pick noong nasa may botika na kami ay Eding Hula,
pero nakita kong kinuha iyon ni Butch bago sila pumasok sa loob ng botika. Ako ppo ay nagbantay
nalang sa labas, dalawa kami, akot at si Labo. Nang lumabas na iyong tatlo na tumatakbo, umalis
na rin ako. Hindi na ako sumunod sa kanila sa palengke. Tapos nga noon, nahuli na kaming lahat.
Rafael Zaragosa, during the trial, confirmed his execution of the said sworn statement. He claims,
however, that he was paid for it by Atty. Rivera, the son of the victim, who gave him the money
through Pat. Gungon,13 but this was denied by Atty. Rivera and Pat. Gungon.14
The trial court, therefore, did not commit an error in finding the appellants guilty of the crime with
which they were charged. Zaragosa's admission is supported by the physical facts of the case and
the testimonies of Pat. Eddie Regalado that he saw the appellants and their co-accused enter the
drug store of Dr. Lutgarda Rivera and later leave the place hurriedly, at about the time the crime was
committed, and of Atty. Roberto Rivera that upon his arrival at the drug store, he saw the dead body
of his mother and that the shelves of the drug store were forcibly opened and bottles and boxes
containing medicine scattered on the floor. Zaragosa's admission is further supported by the
testimonies of the appellant Eduardo Palencia and co-accused Orlando Ortega, and Rolando
Aguilar that they were together in the afternoon of 20 December 1981. 15 While admittedly no
prosecution witness testified to have actually seen the appellants and their co-accused in the act or
robbing the drug store and killing the owner thereof, the circumstantial evidence is consistent with
each other, such that the appellants and their co-accused, and no other, were the culprits and are
guilty therefor.
Besides, the acceptance by co-accused Henry Jungco, Orlando Ortega and Rolando Aguilar of
their sentence proves, not only their guilt but also that of their companions, the herein appellants
Rafael Zaragosa and Eduardo Palencia.16
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED, with proportionate costs.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera (Chairperson), Paras and Regalado, JJ., concur.

WALEY NAMAN
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ARSENIO

G.R. No. 210798, September 14, 2016

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. BEVERLY VILLANUEVA Y MANALILI @ BEBANG,
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
On appeal is the Decision1 dated 10 May 2013 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No.
05027. The CA affirmed the 28 January 2011 Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Las Pinas
City, Branch 254 in Criminal Case No. 07-0417, finding accused-appellant, Beverly Villanueva y
Manalili, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 6 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9208.

On 18 May 2007, an Information for the violation of Sec. 6 of R.A. 9208 was filed against accused-
appellant. The accusatory portion of the Information reads:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
That sometime during the period from April 25, 2007 up to May 17, 2007, in the city of Las Pinas,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being the
owner/manager of ON TAP VIDEOKE, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously recruit
and hire [AAA],3 a 13- year old minor, to work as a Guest Relations Officer (GRO) of said
establishment, thereby exploiting and taking advantage of her vulnerability as a
child.4chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
On arraignment, accused-appellant entered a plea of NOT GUILTY.5 A Petition for Bail was granted
and accused-appellant was allowed to post bail. The public prosecutor manifested that they will
adopt the evidence presented during the hearing of the Petition for Bail as the same evidence in the
main case, with the further manifestation that other witnesses will be presented by the prosecution.6
Trial on the merits ensued thereafter.

The Facts

The antecedent facts as culled from the CA decision and records of the case are summarized as
follows:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibraryOn 25 April 2007, AAA ran away from home after finding out that she was
adopted and after being scolded by her mother, who became the private complainant in this case.
The friends of AAA informed private complainant that AAA was staying at the On Tap Videoke Bar,
working as a Guest Relations Officer. Private complainant sought assistance from the Channel 2 TV
program "XXX" to regain custody over AAA. Private complainant, accompanied by the TV crew,
lodged a preliminary complaint with the Southern Police District (SPD) Headquarters of Taguig City
against On Tap Videoke Bar and a task force was created for the rescue of AAA. Police Officer 1
Ariel Sullano (PO1 Sullano), accompanied by private complainant was tasked to go inside the
videoke bar to talk to AAA. PO2 Thaddeus Abas (PO2 Abas) and the other police officers were
stationed outside the bar, awaiting the predetermined signal. After the operation, AAA was taken to
the SPD headquarters, together with accused-appellant and five (5) other videoke bar employees
who were without the necessary Mayor's and Health Permits. Private complainant executed a
complaint-affidavit against On Tap Videoke Bar and AAA was endorsed to the Social Development
Center of the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD)-Las Pinas. Accused-appellant
and the five (5) apprehended employees were booked, investigated and underwent medical
examinations.

On 17 May 2007, accused-appellant and the five (5) employees were referred to the inquest
prosecutor with charges for violation of R.A. No. 76107 and working without Mayor's/ Health Permit,
respectively. The Office of the City Prosecutor charged accused-appellant with human trafficking
under R.A. 9208, instead of violation of R.A. 7610 for the reason that accused-appellant "recruited
and exploited AAA, a 13-year old minor, to work as a GRO in her bar by taking advantage of her
vulnerability as a child."8chanrobleslaw

On 24 May 2007, a Petition for Bail was filed by accused-appellant, alleging that the evidence of guilt
was not strong. The prosecution presented the testimonies of PO2 Abas and the private complainant
to prove otherwise.

Meanwhile, on 31 May 2007, an Affidavit of Desistance9 was executed by private complainant,

which formed part of the exhibits. The Affidavit of Desistance was executed after the private
complainant had the opportunity to talk to AAA after the rescue operation and after AAA revealed
that she was merely allowed to stay at the videoke bar after she ran away from
home.10chanrobleslaw

PO2 Abas testified as to the filing of the complaint and the entrapment and rescue operation
conducted. He narrated that during the operation, he was stationed a couple of blocks from the
videoke bar;11 and that upon the execution of the pre-arranged signal, he and his companion
officers rushed to the bar to take custody of AAA and other girls working without permits.12 On cross-
examination, PO2 Abas admitted that he was only acting based on the preliminary complaint filed
by private complainant;13 and that he was not aware of why AAA was in the viedoke bar or who
had custody over AAA.14 When asked about the other details of the investigation and the operation,
he failed to give coherent answers and insisted that his only designation was to secure the GROs and
the other persons in the videoke bar.15chanrobleslaw

The prosecution then presented private complainant as the second witness. She recounted the
details of the rescue operation and the subsequent filing of the complaint against accused-
appellant. On cross-examination, she clarified that she had never been to the videoke bar before
the rescue operation;16 and that when she saw her daughter in the videoke bar, she was neither
drinking, singing, nor smoking.17 When asked about the conversation she had with her daughter after
the rescue, private complainant revealed that AAA claimed that she was neither hired nor recruited
as a GRO at the videoke bar.18 Private complainant further narrated that she signified her lack of
intention to pursue her complaint against accused-appellant after hearing the side of her
daughter.19 Unfortunately, while the trial was ongoing, AAA absconded from DSWD custody,
resulting in the prosecution's failure to obtain her testimony.

The Petition for Bail was granted by the court and accused-appellant was allowed to post bail. To
supplement the testimonies of the witnesses presented during the bail hearing, the prosecution
offered the testimony of P/Chief Insp. Jerome Balbontin (PCI Balbontin). He narrated that on May 16,
2007, the private complainant, accompanied by the TV crew, reported that her missing 13-year old
daughter was seen working as a GRO at the On Tap Videoke Bar.20 According to the witness, he was
not present during the operation21 but he sent SPO1 Camaliga, PO2 Andador, PO1 Sullano, PO2
Abas, PO2 Espinosa, among others, to conduct the surveillance and rescue.22 He further narrated
that after the rescue operation, the TV crew interviewed the child at the police station;23 and that
unfortunately, the footage of said interview and the rescue operation could not be
obtained.24chanrobleslaw

The defense presented Wilfred Aquino (Aquino), the videoke bar waiter, as first witness. He testified as
to the events which transpired during the rescue operation. He narrated that two male individuals
asked him to call AAA; that AAA approached their table to speak with them; and that after five
minutes, the policemen announced the rescue operation.25cralawred The witness insisted that
accused-appellant was not aware of AAA's stay in the videoke bar because it was her father, Rosito
Villanueva, Sr., who allowed AAA to stay in the videoke bar.26 Wilfred also insisted that AAA has
been staying in the videoke bar for two weeks before the rescue operation; and that during such
stay; she was always in the kitchen helping therh wash glasses.27 On cross-examination, he testified
that his immediate superior was Rosito Villanueva, Jr., (Villanueva, Jr.) accused-appellant's brother,
who was the one managing the videoke bar.28chanrobleslaw

Villanueva, Jr. was the second witness for the defense. He testified as to the circumstances
surrounding AAA's stay in the videoke bar. He claimed that while he was on vacation, his father took
over the management of the videoke bar and allowed the temporary stay of AAA, upon the request
of their employee.29 Like Aquino, Villanueva, Jr. claimed that accused-appellant was unaware of
AAA's stay in the videoke' bar because accused-appellant had no hand in the daily operations and
management. On cross-examination, he testified that the videoke bar was merely registered under
his sister's name; and that all earnings belonged to him because the videoke bar was put up by his
sister for him.30chanrobleslaw

Accused-appellant maintained that at the time the raid was conducted, she was at her sister's
house. Her brother called her to apprise her of the situation, prompting her to rush to the bar to
handle the situation. She went with the authorities to the SPD Headquarters and presented herself as
the registered owner of the videoke bar. Accused-appellant vehemently denied hiring and/or
recruiting AAA as a GRO, insisting that she was not involved in the day-to-day operations. Asserting
that she was unaware that AAA was staying at the bar, accused-appellant explained that she
merely provided capital for the business and that her brother, Villanueva, Jr., was the one managing
the same. Both accused-appellant and her brother aver that it was their father who allowed AAA to
stay at the videoke bar upon the request of one of the waiters.

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

The RTC found accused-appellant's denial unavailing and incredible, considering that the
corroborating testimonies came from witnesses who were not disinterested. The court found it
impossible for accused-appellant unaware of AAA's stay in the videoke bar, given that she was the
registered owner thereof. The RTC gave weight on the successful rescue operation conducted by the
police and the TV crew. In sum, the court ruled that despite the failure of
the prosecution to present AAA in court, the circumstantial pieces of evidence were sufficient
to establish accused-appellant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt, for the reason that a direct link
between accused-appellant's commission of the crime and the minor victim was established.31 The
dispositive portion of the decision reads:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
WHEREFORE, finding accused BEVERLY VILLANUEVA y MANALILI @ "BEBANG" GUILTY of Qualified
Trafficking in Persons under Section 6 of Republic Act 9208, the Court hereby sentences her to suffer
the penalty of Life Imprisonment and to pay a fine of 3 Million pesos. Her license/permit to operate
the ON TAP VIDEOKE BAR is ordered cancelled.32chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Accused-appellant challenged the RTC decision on appeal, alleging that the lower court relied on
the weakness of the defense rather than on the strength of the evidence for the prosecution.
Accused-appellant argued that the same set of evidence, which was the basis for granting the
petition for bail, was merely adopted in the main case. Thus, accused-appellant contends that there
can be no conclusion other than that the prosecution failed to substantiate the allegations in the
Information. Moreover, accused-appellant insisted that the lower court erred in not giving the private
complainant's Affidavit of Desistance due weight and consideration.

The appellate court found the appeal bereft of merit. Enumerating the different circumstantial
evidence presented, the CA ruled that the conviction was warranted. The appellate court held that
the "[affidavit of desistance is] not the sole consideration that can result to an acquittal"33 hence, in
view of the lack of circumstances to support the Affidavit of Desistance, acquittal was not warranted.
The pertinent and dispositive portions of the decision read:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Thus, the trial court did not err in imposing upon accused-appellant the penalty of life imprisonment
and fine of P3,000,000.00. The order for the cancellation of her permit to operate the ON TAP
VIDEOKE BAR is also correct, x x x
xxxx

WHEREFORE, the trial court's Decision dated January 28, 2011 is

AFFIRMED.34chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In a Resolution35 dated 3 October 2013, the Court of Appeals gave due course to accused-
appellant's Notice of Appeal.

On 19 February 2014,36 we required the parties to submit their

respective supplemental briefs. Accused-appellant filed a supplemental brief;37 whereas the
Office of the Solicitor General adopted all the arguments raised in its brief, in lieu of filing a
supplemental brief.

Our Ruling

The crux of the controversy is whether the circumstantial pieces of evidence presented by the
prosecution inexorably lead to the conclusion that accused-appellant is guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Qualified Trafficking. After a thorough review of the facts and evidence on
record, we rule for accused-appellant's acquittal.

Qualified Trafficking

The elements of trafficking in persons, derived from the expanded definition found in Section 3(a) of
R.A. No. 9208 as amended by R.A. No. 10364, are as follows:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
(1) The act of "recruitment, obtaining, hiring, providing, offering, transportation, transfer,
maintaining, harboring, or receipt of persons with or without the victim's consent or knowledge, within
or across national borders;"

(2) The means used include "by means of threat, or use of force, or other forms of coercion,
abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power or of position, taking advantage of the vulnerability of
the person, or, the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person
having control over another person;" and

(3) The purpose of trafficking includes "the exploitation or the prostitution of others or other
forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor or services, slavery, servitude or the removal or sale of
organs."
The recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring or receipt of a child for the purpose of exploitation
shall still be considered "trafficking in persons" even if it does not involve any of the means set forth in
the first paragraph of Sec. 3(a) of R.A. No. 9208.38 Given that the person allegedly trafficked in the
case at bar is a child, we may do away with discussions on whether or not the second element was
actually proven.

In an attempt to prove the first element, the prosecution stresses the fact that accused-appellant is
the registered owner of the On Tap Videoke Bar. The prosecution insists that by merely being the
registered owner, accused-appellant necessarily committed the act of recruiting, maintaining or
harboring AAA. Such contention is misplaced. Recruiting, harboring, or maintaining a person for the
purpose of exploitation are acts performed by persons who may or may not be registered owners of
establishments. Thus, being the registered owner per se does not make one criminally liable for the
acts of trafficking committed in the establishment. What the prosecution should have done was to
prove the act of trafficking by other means, and not by mere showing that accused-appellant was
the registered owner. The defense, on the other hand, countered the allegation by presenting
testimonies of Aquino, an employee of the videoke bar; Villanueva, Jr., manager of the videoke bar
and brother of accused-appellant; and accused-appellant herself. The RTC found accused-
appellant's denial and the corroborating testimonies as unavailing and incredible, for the reason that
such testimonies did not come from disinterested witnesses. This Court is not unaware of the
longstanding doctrine that findings of facts and assessment of credibility of witnesses are matters best
left to the trial court, which is in the best position to observe the witnesses' demeanor while being
examined.39 However, we take exception from such rule, considering that there are facts and
circumstances which if properly appreciated, could alter the outcome of the case. That the defense
witnesses are closely related to accused-appellant —one being the brother and manager of the
videoke bar and the other being an employee—is not a sufficient reason to disregard their
testimonies. The declaration of interested witnesses is not necessarily biased and incredible.40 More
importantly, there was no evidence suggesting that the testimonies of the witnesses were untruthful
to begin with.

The prosecution likewise failed to prove the third element—that the recruiting, maintaining or
harboring of persons is for the purpose of exploitation. Curiously, AAA was seen by the prosecution
witnesses at the videoke bar only on the day the rescue operation was conducted. That AAA was
exploited could not be proven by her mere presence at the videoke bar during the rescue
operation. The prosecution should have presented evidence as to the nature of work done by AAA, if
any. Testimonies as to how often AAA was seen in the bar while entertaining customers could have
also lent credence to the prosecution's contention that she was in the videoke bar because she was
being exploited.
Lack of Direct Evidence

Since AAA was not presented in court, the prosecution was not able to offer direct evidence showing
that accused-appellant actually recruited, harbored or maintained AAA in the videoke bar for the
purpose of exploiting her. Neither can private complainant's testimony which merely revolved around
the filing of the complaint be considered direct evidence. Private complainant's testimony, if
considered in light of all the other evidence, is weak. Private complainant testified roughly a month
after the Affidavit of Desistance was executed and filed; thus, she had every opportunity to deny the
execution of the Affidavit during the cross-examination. Instead of denying the veracity of such
Affidavit, private complainant confirmed its truthfulness and accuracy.41 Though it can be said that
private complainant's affirmative answers were only prompted by the leading questions asked by the
defense lawyer during cross-examination, it cannot be denied that the prosecution did not even
bother to rebuild its case during re-direct examination. On re-direct examination, private
complainant merely testified as to matters regarding AAA's adoption.42 She also claimed that she
came to know of accused-appellant's trafficking activities through AAA's friends whose identities she
cannot remember.43 However, on re-cross examination, private complainant admitted that she did
not validate such information before she reached out to the TV program and the
authorities.44chanrobleslaw

A review of the scarce jurisprudence on human trafficking would readily show that a successful
prosecution for human trafficking, to a certain extent, relies greatly on the entrapment operation.45
In entrapment, ways and means are resorted to by the authorities for the purpose of capturing the
perpetrator in flagrante delicto.46 Thus, it can be said that testimonies of the apprehending officers
regarding the entrapment operation are crucial for a conviction, most especially in cases where the
victim is unable to testify. In People v. Casio,47 the conviction for Qualified Trafficking was brought
about by the categorical testimonies of the authorities who conducted the entrapment, on top of
the victim's testimony. In the said case, the police operatives testified as to the actual unfolding of
circumstances which led. them to believe that a crime was being committed in flagrante delicto, to
wit:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
During trial, PO1 Luardo and PO1 Velosa testified that their conversation with accused went as
follows:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Accused:
Chicks mo dongl (Do you like girls, guys?)

PO1 Luardo:
Unya mga bag-o? Kanang batan-on kay naa mi guests naghulal sa motel. (Are they new? They must
be young because we have guests waiting at the motel)

Accused:
Naa, hulal kay magkuha ko. (Yes, just wait and I'll get them)

At that point, PO1 Luardo sent a text message to PSI Ylanan that they found prospective subject.

After a few minutes, accused returned with AAA and BBB, private complainants in this case.

Accused:
Kining duha kauyon mo anil? (Are you satisfied with these two?)
PO1 Veloso:
Maayo man na kaha na sila modala ug kayaf?(Well, are they good in sex?)

Similarly, the prosecution in the case at bar built their case around the entrapment operation and the
successful rescue of AAA; but unfortunately for the prosecution, both PO2 Abas and PCI Balbontin
are incompetent to testify as to matters which occurred during the actual execution of the rescue
and entrapment because both witnesses were not present during the operation. The testimonies of
PO2 Abas and the Chief Inspector pale in comparison with the testimonies of the police operatives in
Casio.48 Oddly, the prosecution failed to present witnesses who could testify as to the actual
conversation that transpired between the undercover authorities and AAA. The testimony of defense
witness Aquino, the waiter, is the only evidence on record which narrated certain details surrounding
the unfolding of the rescue operation. Aquino merely observed that upon being called by the two
men, who turned out to be undercover policemen, AAA approached their table and after five
minutes, policemen announced the operation.49 AAA's act of approaching the table of the
customers after being called is not unequivocal enough as to dispel any other possible scenarios that
could have occurred during their 5-minute conversation. In the absence of any evidence
categorically showing that a crime was being committed in flagrante delicto or that AAA was
performing the tasks of a GRO when she approached the table, this Court cannot uphold accused-
appellant's conviction based on the rescue operation alone.

Circumstantial evidence did not

establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt

While it is recognized that the lack of direct evidence does not ipso facto bar the finding of guilt,50
we still hold that acquittal is in order for the reason that the circumstantial evidence presented does
not lead to the inescapable conclusion that accused-appellant committed the crime. Circumstantial
evidence is deemed sufficient for conviction only if: (1) there is more than one circumstance; (2) the
facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (3) the combination of all the
circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.51 It is essential that the
circumstantial evidence presented constitutes an unbroken chain which leads to only one fair and
reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of others, as the guilty person.52 The
appellate court anchored accused-appellant's conviction on the following circumstantial evidence:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibraryFirstly, AAA was at the On Tap Videoke when the police, accompanied
by private complainant and the crew of the TV program XXX, conducted its rescue operation on
May 16, 2007.

Secondly, while accused-appellant denied recruiting AAA, she was wearing a sexy attire at the time
of the rescue. Even defense witnesses Rosito Villanueva, Jr. and Wilfred Aquino admitted that AAA
wore sexy attires at the videoke bar.
Notably, AAA's attire was similar to the uniform of the videoke bar's GROs. x x x

xxxx

Thirdly, accused-appellant showed propensity of hiring workers without permits. Although the purpose
of the rescue operation was to recover AAA, five other (5) workers of the videoke bar were also
arrested and booked because they were working thereat without the requisite Mayor's /Health
permits.

Fourthly, it appeared that AAA was doing some kind of work at the videoke bar. As testified by
defense witness Willfred Aquino and Rosito Villanueva, Jr.:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Q:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
What was she doing there aside from staying there, Mr. Witness?
A:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
She was helping in the washing of the glasses in the kitchen, Sir.
xxxx

Q:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
When the police arrived, AAA was there inside the Videoke Bar?

Witness:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

A:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
She was at the back of the kitchen.

COURT:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

What was she doing at the kitchen wearing that seductive dress, washing the dishes?

A:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
No, your honor. During that times she was just standing at the back and whenever we needed
something like glass, she would hand us the glass.53
We rule that the circumstantial evidence cited by the appellate court does not lead to the
inescapable conclusion that accused-appellant committed the crime, let alone that a crime was
actually committed. As previously mentioned, the mere presence of AAA at the videoke bar does
not prove that accused-appellant was maintaining or harboring her for the purpose of exploitation.
In fact, such was the holding of the RTC when it granted accused-appellant's petition for bail.
Nowhere in the text of R.A. No. 9208 can it be inferred that a presumption arises by the mere fact of
presence of a child in a videoke bar or similar establishment. Our survey of jurisprudence likewise
does not reveal such established presumption. More to the point, the constitutive crime of trafficking
through harboring or receipt of a person must be specifically for purposes of exploitation. In other
words, establishing mere presence without establishing the purpose therefor cannot be considered
as an element of trafficking. In this case, the private complainant's affidavit of desistance
categorically explained the child's presence in the videoke bar—for humanitarian reasons of
providing shelter to a runaway minor.

That AAA was wearing skimpy clothing similar to those worn by the GROs at the videoke bar during
the rescue operation is not inconsistent with the defense's position that AAA merely sought refuge
and shelter at the bar after she ran away from home. It is highly possible that AAA borrowed clothes
from the videoke bar employees, considering that she ran away from home and was unable to take
all her belongings with her. That accused-appellant showed propensity for hiring workers without
permits is irrelevant in the case at bar. One may be equipped with the proper permits and yet still be
guilty of trafficking. Accused-appellant's propensity for not following ordinances does not necessarily
prove commission of the crime of human trafficking. Lastly, even if it be conceded that AAA was
washing dishes at the back of the kitchen, such circumstance is still not inconsistent with the defense's
position. As a token of gratitude for allowing her to temporarily stay at the bar, AAA could have
voluntarily done the chores. From the foregoing, it is obvious that the totality of circumstantial
evidence will not lead to an inescapable conclusion that accused-appellant committed the crime
charged. It bears stressing that "where the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two
or more explanations, one of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other
consistent with his guilt, then the evidence does not meet or hurdle the test of moral certainty
required for conviction."54chanrobleslaw

Reproduction at trial of evidence

presented in the bail hearing

The prosecution manifested that they will adopt the evidence presented during the hearing of the
Petition for Bail as the same evidence in the main case, with a further manifestation that other
witnesses will be presented during the trial. In fact, a side by side comparison of the RTC Order
granting accused-appellant's petition for bail and the RTC Decision convicting accused-appellant
would reveal that summaries of witnesses' testimonies contained in the former were merely lifted and
copied verbatim in the latter.

After an evaluation of the evidence and after hearing the testimonies of PO2 Abas and private
complainant, the Petition for Bail was granted by the RTC, to wit:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
At this moment the prosecution failed to substantiate the allegations in the information that accused
recruited and hired minor [AAA] to work as Guest Relations Officer (GRO) of her establishment,
thereby exploiting and taking advantage of her vulnerability as a child. The mere presence of the
minor at the establishment, cannot by itself, prove the fact of hiring and recruitment. It is unfortunate
at this juncture, none of the prosecution witnesses was able to testify on this regard, and was only
able to confirm the minor's presence at the videoke bar. Even the alleged mother of the minor
testified that she never saw [AAA] drinking, smoking or singing at the establishment. She further
testified that the minor admitted to her that she was never hired to work at the establishment and the
she was only there in order for her to have a place to stay and reside.

xxx This court is bound by the principle that in all criminal cases, all doubts should be resolved in favor
of the accused, xxx From the evidence presented so far, without touching on the actual merits and
proceedings of the instant case, this court cannot at this point say that the evidence against the
accused is strong."55
It should be noted that when the prosecution witnesses were presented during the bail hearing, they
were subjected to cross, re-direct and re-cross-examinations, as well as inquiries by the court; thus, as
expected, the court no longer recalled the witnesses for additional examination during the trial.
Unfortunately for the prosecution, they were only able to present one more witness, PCI Balbontin,
before they finally rested their case.

While the Court is aware that a bail hearing is merely for the purpose if determining whether the
evidence of guilt is strong and that the same is not an adjudication upon the merits, we note that in
the case at bar, the RTC Order granting the petition for bail casts doubt upon accused-appellant's
conviction. In its Order granting the petition for bail, the RTC noted that none of the prosecution
witnesses testified as to the fact of hiring and recruitment. Considering that the only additional
witness the prosecution presented during trial was PCI Balbontin, it baffles this Court why the RTC
found accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt when the Chief Inspector's testimony was
limited to procedural details regarding the filing of the complaint, forming of the task force and the
interview conducted by the TV crew. If the Chief Inspector's additional testimony was only limited to
those matters, it follows that when the prosecution rested its case, not one of their witnesses testified
as to the fact of hiring and recruitment and neither did the documentary evidence submitted
establish the same. Before this Court is essentially the same set of evidence that was evaluated by
the RTC when it ruled that the evidence of guilt was not strong; we thus see no reason why the same
set of evidence, only supplemented by a testimony regarding irrelevant procedural matters, would
warrant a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

Ei incumbit probatio qui elicit,

non qui negat -- he who asserts,
not he who denies, must prove

Nothing is more settled in criminal law jurisprudence than that the Constitution presumes a person is
innocent until he is proven guilty by proof beyond reasonable doubt.56 Countless times, this Court
has elucidated that the evidence of the prosecution must stand on its own weight and not rely on
the weakness of the defense. The prosecution cannot be allowed to draw strength from the
weakness of the defense's evidence for it has the onus probandi in establishing the guilt of the
accused. In this case, the circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution failed to pass the
test of moral certainty necessary to warrant accused-appellant's conviction. From the foregoing, we
rule that the prosecution failed to discharge its burden of proving accused-appellant's guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 10 May 2013 in CA-
G.R. CR-H.C. No. 05027 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. For failure of the prosecution to prove her
guilt beyond reasonable doubt, BEVERLY VILLANUEVA y MANALILI @ BEBANG is hereby ACQUITTED of
the charge of violation of Section 6 of Republic Act No. 9208 or Qualified Trafficking. Her immediate
RELEASE from detention is hereby ORDERED, unless she is being held for another lawful cause.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Director of the Correctional Institution for Women,
Mandaluyong City, by personal service, for immediate implementation. The Director shall submit to
this Court, within five (5) days from receipt of the copy of the Decision, the jaction taken thereon.

Carpio,*J., Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), Del Castillo, ** and Reyes, JJ., concur.

ORDER OF RELEASE

TO:
The Director

Bureau of Corrections
1770 Muntinlupa City

Thru:
Superintendent

CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION FOR WOMEN

1550 Mandaluyong City

GREETINGS:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibraryWHEREAS, the Supreme Court on September 14, 2016

promulgated a Decision in the above-entitled case, the dispositive portion of which
reads:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
"WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 10 May
2013 in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 05027 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. For failure of the prosecution to
prove her guilt beyond breasonable doubt, BEVERLY VILLANUEVA y MANALILI @ BEBANG is hereby
ACQUITTED of the charge of violation of Section 6 of Republic Act No. 9208 or Qualified Trafficking.
Her immediate RELEASE from detention is hereby ORDERED, unless she is being held for
another lawful cause.

G.R. No. L-32701 June 19, 1984

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RUFINEO DEJARESCO Y LEVIT, RUDY BULAHAN Y BUNDALIAN and
EDUARDO BULAHAN Y BUNDALIAN

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Castro, Makalintal, Mendoza & Associates for defendants-appellants.

RELOVA, J.:

Automatic review of the decision rendered by the there Court of First Instance of Laguna and San
Pablo City, Branch III, in Criminal Case No. SP-1500, "finding all three accused Rufineo Dejaresco y
Levit, Rudy Bulahan y Bundalian and Eduardo Bulahan y Bundalian guilty beyond reasonable doubt
as principals of the crime of robbery with homicide, with its commission having been attended by the
aggravating circumstances of treachery and dwelling without any mitigating circumstance to offset
them, the court accordingly sentences each one of them to suffer the penalty of death, each to
indemnify the heirs of Modesto, jointly and severally in the sum of P20,000.00, each to pay also the
same heirs the sum of P90.00 taken by them from the victim and to pay the costs pro rata."

The records of the case were received by Our Clerk of Court on August 14, 1970. Defendant-
appellant Eduardo Bulahan died on March 19, 1976. Defendants-appellants Rufineo Dejaresco y
Levit and Rudy Bulahan y Bundalian escaped from prison on June 5, 1971. Thus, the case against
Eduardo Bulahan was dismissed, his criminal liability having been extinguished (Article 89, Revised
Penal Code).lwphl@itç The appeal subsists with respect to Rufineo Dejaresco and Rudy Bulahan. Their
escape does not relieve the court of the burden of automatically reviewing the case, in the same
manner that a withdrawal of appeal by a death convict would not remove the case from the
jurisdiction of the Court (People vs. Comelio, 39 SCRA 435).

The information for robbery with homicide charged the accused as follows:

That on or about January 22, 1969, in the City of San Pablo, Republic of the Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused abovenamed, conspiring, confederating,
confabulating and mutually helping one another, armed with deadly weapons, to wit: long and short
firearms, with intent of gam and against the consent of the owners, by means of violence and
intimidation against person, did then and there wilfully unlawfully and feloniously and forcibly enter
the house of the spouses Modesto Icaro and Cesaria Cacao and take from the said spouses, cash
amounting to P90.00; that on the occasion of said robbery and in pursuance of their conspiracy, the
accused with intent to kill and without any justifiable motive, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
attack, assault and shoot Modesto Icaro with the firearms with which they were conveniently
provided with, inflicting upon the said Modesto Icaro mortal wounds which caused his immediate
death. (pp. 19-20, appellants' brief.).

After trial, the lower court rendered its decision, finding the following facts to have been proven from
the evidence of record:

Modesto Icaro was a poor hardworking farmer who lived with his family on the mountain of Sitio Lapi,
Bo. San Cristobal, San Pablo City. Their nearest neighbor was half kilometer away and their house was
seven (7) kilometers from the barrio road. It was isolated and desolate the place where they had
come to live. The man had six (6) children, the eldest was nine (9) years old and the youngest was
seven (7) months, He tilled small patches of earth on the mountainside and planted them with
bananas and camotes to feed his wife and children. From his toils the good wife was able to save for
five (5) months the measly sum of P90.00 which she kept in their aparador. Then tragedy struck the
family. On January 22, 1969 at about 9:00 o'clock in the night, while Icaro and his family were asleep,
three (3) men all armed, one with a carbine, the second with a shotgun, and the third with a .45
caliber pistol came to rob them. Two of the men went up the house while the third stayed on the
ground. The two who entered the house trained their flashlights on the sleeping family and woke
them up with their guns. The intruders were wearing masks on their faces and Icaro asked them who
they were. The men said they were agents of the law and demanded of Icaro to produce the
money he was keeping in the house. Icaro Id if they were agents of the law why were they hiding
their faces. In answer, the man at the balcony fired shots in the air, Icaro's wife told her husband to
get the money so the men would not harm them. Icaro stood up to get the money in their aparador.
While Icaro was opening the aparador the man at the balcony fired at him. Icaro was not able to
get the money, and as he was going out of the door, the man at the balcony pushed him
downstairs. Icaro tumbled down and while he was lying on the ground the three men went over him
and fired their guns on his already wounded body. Icaro died on the spot. After the shooting, the
man who was posted at the balcony went back to the house, poked his gun at Icaro's wife and
asked for the money. She got from the wardrobe the P90.00 which she had saved for five (5) months
and gave it to the man. The man then went down the house and looked for empty shells on the
ground with a flashlight. His companions joined him in the search. After picking the empty shells, the
three left the place. After they were gone Icaro's widow sent one of her children away to fetch her
mother.

Icaro's widow, Cesaria Cacao, stated that she saw only two persons and accused Rufineo Dejaresco
and Eduardo Bulahan strongly resembled the two men who went up their house in physical
appearance and hearing. Dejaresco looking very much like the one who was at the balcony and
Eduardo like the other one who was in the room adjoining their 'batalan'. She had known Dejaresco
for three (3) years and Eduardo Bulahan for nine (9) years before the incident. Dejaresco's wife was a
sister by confirmation of her mother. She Identified the long sleeved khaki shirt (Exh. "A") as the
garment worn by Dejaresco and the Banlon T-shirt (Exh. "B") and denim trouser (Exh. "C") the clothings
worn by Eduardo Bulahan on the night of the robbery-killing. (pp. 21-23, appellants' brief).

The body of Modesto Icaro was taken to the NBI morgue at Funeraria Popular in Manila where an
autopsy was conducted by Dr. Jesus D. Crisostomo, Supervising Medico-Legal Officer of the NBI. From
his necropsy report, Exhibit "I", Dr. Crisostomo gave a detailed description of multiple gunshot wounds
which were the cause of the death.

Meanwhile, Rudy Bulahan, Rufineo Dejaresco and Eduardo Bulahan were brought to San Pablo
Police headquarters for questioning and to the NBI office in Manila for paraffin tests the following
day. The chemistry report submitted by NBI chemist Andres Santiago shows that Rudy Bulahan's right
hand was positive for nitrates; Rufineo Dejaresco was positive for nitrates on both hands; and
Eduardo Bulahan's left hand was positive for nitrates.

On January 23, 1969, Rufineo Dejaresco gave a written statement (Exhibit "N") admitting his
participation in the crime charged. He acknowledged that he, Rudy Bulahan and Eduardo Bulahan
robbed and shot Modesto Icaro on that fateful evening of January 22, 1969 at the latter's house at
Sitio Lapi, Barrio San Cristobal, San Pablo City; that they planned to rob Icaro earlier in the evening
with Dejaresco posting himself in the balcony, Eduardo at the "batalan", and Rudy on the ground
beneath the window; that Rudy and Eduardo Bulahan were carrying flashlights and were armed with
a shotgun and a carbine, respectively; that he had with him a.45 cal. automatic pistol and it was he
who got the P90.00 from Icaro's wife. In an additional statement (Exhibit "X") he admitted that on the
night in question he wore a khaki long-sleeved shirt and faded pants colored lead (tingga); that
Eduardo Bulahan wore denim pants and banlon shirt colored blue, while Rudy Bulahan wore a black
colored jacket and black pants.

Likewise, Rudy Bulahan gave a statement (Exhibit "O") acknowledging his participation in the
shooting incident as well as the ownership of the shotgun used. Accompanied by a peace officer,
they proceeded to his house and recovered the shotgun (Exhibit "P") and one live bullet.

During the trial, Icaro's widow, Cesaria Cacao, Identified Rufineo as the man at the balcony wearing
a long-sleeved khaki shirt on the night of the incident, and Eduardo Bulahan as the one wearing
denim trousers and a Banlon T-shirt.

The trial court rejected the defense of denial and alibi on the strength of the Identification by Cesaria
Cacao, the victim's wife, of Rufineo Dejaresco and Eduardo Bulahan. It is true that the two were
wearing masks to hide their Identities. The doubt, if any, is dissipated when she Identified the long-
sleeved khaki shirt (Exhibit "A") worn by Dejaresco. The police recovered the khaki shirt from the house
of Dejaresco and the T-shirt and denim pants from that of Rudy Bulahan. Besides, in their extra-judicial
confessions Dejaresco and Rudy Bulahan categorically admitted participation in the shooting of
Modesto Icaro on the night in question.

Furthermore, Carmen Alcanse, wife of Rufineo Dejaresco, candidly admitted that the Bulahan
brothers, Eduardo and Rudy, fetched her husband from their house in the afternoon of January 22,
1969 to accompany them to the house of Modesto Icaro regarding the coffee which the Bulahans
wanted allegedly to buy from the victim. When Dejaresco took the witness stand, he reiterated what
he stated in his extra-judicial confession that the two Bulahan brothers were his companions that
night.

There can be no question on the admissibility of the extrajudicial confessions of Dejaresco and Rudy
Bulahan who did not complain that the police investigators extracted said statements from them by
physical force, violence or intimidation. The rituals observed in the signing of said defendants and the
treatment accorded them by the police investigators strongly attest to the voluntariness and
regularity of their execution. They do not bar, as Justice Tuason pointed out in People vs. Carillo, 77
Phil. 572, 576, the conviction of an accused on a voluntary extrajudicial statement ...". At the time,
the 1973 Constitution was not yet in effect, particularly the provisions of Article IV, Section 20, on the
right to remain silent and to counsel.

The defense only assails the findings of the lower court in considering dwelling as an aggravating
circumstance because the same is not alleged in the information, and the disregarding of illiteracy or
lack of sufficient instruction as a mitigating circumstance in the imposition of the penalty. There is no
merit in the contention. As correctly pointed out by the trial court, "the rule is already forged in our
jurisprudence that dwelling is aggravating in robbery with violence or intimidation of persons. U.S. v.
Leyva, 8 Phil. 671; People vs. Sebastian, 85 Phil. 602; People vs. Napili, 85 Phil. 521. The rationale
behind this pronouncement is that this class of robbery could be committed without the necessity of
transgressing the sanctity of the home. People vs. Apduhan, Jr. 24 SCRA 815. Although the
information in this case does not allege dwelling as an aggravating circumstance the same was
nonetheless duly proven, and such omission is no impediment to considering it as a generic
aggravating circumstance for the purpose of determining the proper penalty to impose on herein
accused. Martinez vs. Godinez, L-12268, November 28, 1959." Besides, it does not violate defendants'
constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against them because
dwelling is not an element of the crime charged. "Although a complaint or information contains no
allegation that generic aggravating circumstances of any kind were present in the commission of a
crime, said circumstance may be proven at the trial and, if proven, must be taken into consideration
in the imposition of the corresponding penalty." (People vs. Collado, 60 Phil. 610).

Equally unmeritorious is the contention that the trial court erred in not considering illiteracy as an
alternative mitigating circumstance. Suffice it to say that "no one, however, unschooled he may be,
is so ignorant as not to know that theft or robbery, or assault upon the person of another, is inherently
wrong and a violation of the law." (People vs. Enot, 6 SCRA 325). The mitigating circumstance of lack
of instruction is not applicable to crimes of theft or robbery, much less to the crime of homicide. (U.S.
vs. Pascual, 9 Phil. 49; People vs. Melendres, 59 Phil. 154; People vs. De la Cruz, 77 Phil. 444; People vs.
Mendova, L-7030, January 31, 1957).lwphl@itç Thus, in the absence of any mitigating circumstance,
the court is called upon to affirm the supreme penalty of death. However, for lack of necessary
votes, We impose the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED with the modification that appellants Rufineo
Dejaresco y Levit and Rudy Bulahan y Bundalian are each to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua,
each to indemnify the heirs of Modesto Icaro, jointly and severally, in the sum of P30,000.00, each to
pay said heirs, jointly and severall, the sum of P90.00 taken by them from the victim, and to pay the
costs pro rata.

SO ORDERED.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. LORENZO TUVERA y BAUTISTA alias "ENSO", CORNELIO DE LA CRUZ alias
"NELY", and MATIAS GULENG, accused, CORNELIO DE LA CRUZ y DUMALAY alias "NELY", defendant-
appellant., G.R. Nos. L-38468-69, 1984 June 29,
ESCOLIN, J.:

Appeal from the decision of the Circuit Criminal Court of San Fernando, La Union, in Criminal Cases
Nos. 72 and 73, the dispositive portion of which reads:

"WHEREFORE, the court finds the accused Cornelio dela Cruz guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of:

(1) Murder, as charged in Criminal Case No. 72 and hereby sentences him to suffer imprisonment for
the rest of his natural life and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the amount of P18,000.00 and
to pay the costs;

(2) Robbery, as charged in Criminal Case No. 73, and hereby sentences him to suffer imprisonment
of from 2 years and 4 months of prision correccional to 6 years and 1 day of prision mayor, plus the
accessory penalties provided for by law and to pay the costs.

For reasonable doubt the co-accused Matias Goleng is acquitted."

On September 14, 1972, a search party composed of policemen of Bacnotan, La Union, proceeded
to the mountains of Bo. Ubbog to look for Amadeo Orejudos, barrio captain of said barrio, who has
been reported missing. In the course of their search, they found the lifeless body of Orejudos lying
near a shallow creek. The body was covered with branches, leaves and some earth. Dr. Julita
Draculan, who conducted the autopsy, described the victim's injuries as follows:

"Anterior:
1. Wound, incised, 5 inches long, horizontally across the neck, depth causing injury to the trachea
and severing big blood vessels of the neck, left side.
2. Wound, lacerated, 1/2 inch long, below lateral end, eye, left.
3. Wound, lacerated, 1-1/2 inches long, diagonally above right eyebrow, depth causing fracture of
the skull.
4. Wound lacerated, 2-3/4 inches long, diagonally and slightly above the median to wound No. 3,
depth causing fracture of the skull.
5. Wound, lacerated, 2 1/2 inches long, diagonally above lateral end, eyebrow left.
Posterior:
6. Wound, incised, 4-3/4 inches long, 1/2 inch deep, horizontally, inferior portion, occipital region.
7. Wound, lacerated, 4 inches long, 1/2 inch deep, horizontally, just above wound No. 6.
8. Wound, lacerated, 3 inches long, parietal region, left, depth causing fracture of the skull."

Upon receiving information that the persons last seen in the company of the victim were Lorenzo
Tuvera and Cornelio dela Cruz, Pat. Espejo summoned them to the police station. In the ensuing
investigation, Tuvera pointed to dela Cruz as the killer of Orejudos. At first, dela Cruz denied the
accusation and, instead, countered by charging that Tuvera was the author of the crime. However,
after Tuvera narrated the details of how dela Cruz perpetrated the crime, the latter readily admitted
responsibility for the killing of Orejudos. He also informed the police that he took the gun of the victim.
Asked as to the place where he had kept the gun, dela Cruz directed the police to a small hut in the
mountains of Bo. Ubbog, where they recovered a 'Hi-standard' Cal. 22 revolver with ammunitions,
licensed in the name of the deceased Amadeo Orejudos. Dela Cruz executed two written
statements which he signed in the presence of the Chief of Police, the Fiscal, and Judge Nemesio
Molina of the Municipal Court of Bacnotan.

During the investigation, Tuvera also informed the police investigators that one Matias Guleng had
offered dela Cruz the amount of P4,000.00 to kill Orejudos.

Cornelio dela Cruz, Lorenzo Tuvera and Matias Guleng were subsequently indicted for murder
qualified by treachery, and in a separate information, dela Cruz and Tuvera were accused of the
crime of robbery for having taken and carried away a `Hi-standard' revolver, Cal. 22 with
ammunitions, belonging to the deceased Orejudos, valued at P300.00.

At the trial, accused Tuvera, on motion of the prosecution, was discharged from the information and
utilized as state witness. His testimony in open court, as summarized by the Solicitor General, is as
follows:

"He testified that in the morning of September 14, 1972 he went to the mountains of barrio Ubbog,
Bacnotan, La Union to pasture his carabao (pp. 125-126, tsn, May 23, 1973). After transferring his
carabao, he proceeded to his hut in the mountains and found Cornelio dela Cruz there drying
peanuts (p. 127, id). While Tuvera was making bamboo strands for tying firewood, De la Cruz told him,
"Here comes Amadeo Orejudos. I have some business with him. Do not interfere or else you will be
the first one to be killed or it will be you whom I will report as the killer." (p. 128, id). Upon hearing these
words, Tuvera got scared. (p. 129, id).

When Orejudos arrived, De la Cruz asked Tuvera to place the potful of peanuts on the stove and
requested Orejudos to shape a piece of wood into an arrow (pp. 130-133, id). Both Tuvera and
Orejudos complied with the request of De la Cruz. While Tuvera was putting the pot of peanuts on
the stove, De la Cruz was standing beside Orejudos who was then fashioning the piece of wood into
an arrow (p. 136, id). Tuvera started to kindle fire in the stove, and as he raised his head to pause
after near exhaustion from blowing at the fire, he saw De la Cruz clubbing Orejudos three times with
a piece of wood about three feet long and about the size of a man's wrist in circumference (pp. 136-
137, id). The deceased Orejudos was seated facing West, shaping the piece of wood into an arrow
when De la Cruz, who was then on the side but a little bit at the rear, delivered the first blow which
landed on the left temple of the deceased (pp. 137-138, id). The first blow felled Orejudos to the
ground on his back, snoring (p. 138, id). De la Cruz stooped down and with all force struck the right
temple of the deceased (id). The third blow hit the forehead (pp. 138-139, id). The deceased was
unable to parry any of the blows because he was unaware of the attack (p. 139, id).

After inflicting the third blow, De la Cruz took the gun from the pocket of the deceased, pointed it to
Tuvera and ordered him to drag the body of the victim (p. 140, id). Tuvera could not drag the body
because of fear so he asked De la Cruz to help him do the job (id). Finally, both of them helped
together drag the body to the creek where De la Cruz hacked the deceased twice - the first landed
on the neck; the second, on the nape (p. 141, 144-146, id). The bolo used by De la Cruz in hacking
the deceased belonged to the latter (p. 141, id). After the hacking, De la Cruz ordered Tuvera to cut
branches of an "aludig" tree which were used, in addition to earth, in covering the body."

Appellant imputes as error the action of the trial court "in accepting and giving weight to the
testimony of co-accused Lorenzo Tuvera who turned state witness." It is noted that in assigning such
error, appellant does not question either the correctness or the propriety of Tuvera's discharge under
Section 9 of Rule 119 of the Rules of Court. It is merely contended that the testimony of said state
witness is subject to the gravest suspicion and, therefore, not entitled to any weight or credence
whatsoever.

The contention is devoid of merit. An accused is always a competent witness for or against his co-
accused, and the fact that he had been discharged from the information does not affect the quality
of his testimony, for the admissibility, the relevancy, as well as the weight that should be accorded his
declarations are to be determined by the Rules on Evidence. And in this connection, it has been held
that the uncorroborated testimony of an accused, when satisfactory and convincing, may be the
basis for a judgment of conviction of his co-accused. 1

The trial court had the opportunity to observe the demeanor and manner of testifying of the
witnesses of both the prosecution and the defense, and it assessed the testimony of Tuvera to be
convincing and credible. What is more, the declarations of this witness find solid corroboration in the
statements contained in the appellant's affidavits. The latter not only admitted having killed the
deceased Orejudos, he also informed the police authorities of the place where he hid the gun which
he took from the victim. In fact, the police officers did recover the said gun at the same hut pointed
to by him.

Equally untenable is appellant's attempt to repudiate his confession on ground of force and
intimidation. He claimed that he was mauled and tortured by his investigators, but he failed to
identify his alleged torturers. Neither did he file charges against them. He admittedly affixed his
signature in the two affidavits and voluntarily swore to the truth of the recitals therein before Judge
Nemesio Molina of the Bacnotan Municipal Court, but never for a moment did he complain of any
alleged maltreatment. At the preliminary investigation, Judge Molina propounded questions to
appellant, and it appears that his answers thereto were confirmatory of the facts set forth in his
affidavits. All these circumstances strongly belie appellant's allegation of coercion and duress.

As to the claim that appellant had not been informed of his right to silence and to counsel at the
time of the custodial investigation, it suffices to state that such constitutional objection is unavailing
for the reason that the confession in question was obtained before the effectivity of the 1973
Constitution. 2

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed, with the modification in Criminal Case
No. 72, that the amount of indemnity awarded to the heirs of the deceased Amadeo Orejudos is
increased to P30,000.00.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-37482 July 25, 1984

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
CARLOS R. MATERNAL, EMILIO G. AMAR, JR., ZOSIMO IGAO and NORBERTO RELOJAS, accused,
CARLOS R. MATERNAL, accused-appellant.
RELOVA, J.:
Mandatory review of the decision rendered in Criminal Case No. 4337 of the then Court of First
Instance of Palawan, entitled "People vs. Carlos R. Maternal Emilio G. Amar, Jr., Zosimo Igao, alias
'Sosing' and Norberto Relojas, alias 'Ovit' ", the dispositive portion of which reads:
The information filed is "robbery in band with murder." However, the facts as established in Maternal's
extra-judicial confession is only simple robbery with homicide, there being no more than three armed
men who appeared to have participated in the Commission of the offense. The penalty for this crime
is reclusion perpetua to death. Considering the accused Carlos Maternal's voluntary admission of
guilt and the provision of Art. 160 of the Revised Penal Code relative to quasi-recidivism, the penalty
imposable against Maternal who was serving sentence at the time of the commission of the offense,
is the maximum which is death. However, the Court realizes that Carlos Maternal had no intention to
commit so grave a wrong as borne out by the fact that he was not shown to have joined in the
stabbing and the fact that he was the one who admonished his companions to desist from the
stabbing.
In view of all the foregoing considerations, the Court hereby imposes upon Carlos Maternal, for the
offense as found by this Court, the extreme penalty of death with the recommendation to His
Excellency, the President of the Philippines, that he be extended executive clemency for the
commutation of this penalty to reclusion perpetua.
There being no evidence on hand to establish the guilt of Zosimo Igao and Emilio Amar Jr., beyond
reasonable doubt, the Court holds them not guilty of the offense charged and orders their
immediate release from confinement. (pp. 29- 30, Rollo)
It appears that about 7:00 in the evening of August 27, 1969, Juan Cabasal left his house to go to
Panamonton Beach in Barrio Tagpirara, Municipality of Brooke's Point, Palawan, to keep watch over
his boat and sleep there. He brought with him his radio-phono marked "Fujiya", his bolo, a flashlight
and a blanket. When he did not return home the following morning, his sister Adelaida Cabasal went
looking for him. Failing to find him, she went to the municipal building to ask help from the police.
Likewise, Restituto Cabasal, went in search for his brother, Juan, who he knew had slept in a banca
the previous night. He went to the Philippine Constabulary authorities at Brooke's Point and reported
the matter. The Acting Chief of Police sent out two men to Panamonton Beach to help look for the
missing Juan Cabasal. About two o'clock in the afternoon of August 28, 1969, the search party found
Juan Cabasal under the sea, already dead, about twenty meters from his banca.
The Municipal Health Officer of Brooke's Point, Dr. Domingo Sy Siong, conducted an autopsy of the
deceased Juan Cabasal and found that the latter sustained eleven (11) lacerated wounds in the
different parts of his body, five (5) of which were fatal and could have been caused by sharp edged
and blunt edged instruments.
In search for the persons responsible for Cabasal's death, the police had two persons in mind,
namely: Zosimo Igao and Norberto Relojas. On September 11, 1969, Acting Chief of Police Francisco
Marquez and some policemen went to Barrio Tagpirara to apprehend these two suspects. In the
course of their search, the peace officers found a hideout where they came upon the "Fujiya" radio-
phono of the deceased Juan Cabasal in the possession of an occupant who turned out to be
appellant Carlos Maternal, an escape-convict from the Iwahig Penal Colony. The police placed
Maternal under arrest and, upon investigation, he admitted that he and three others were the ones
responsible for the death of Juan Cabasal. He was brought to the Office of the Chief of Police for
investigation. He gave a statement which was reduced to writing (Exhibit "C") by Pat. Eliseo Crespo at
about 11:35 in the evening of September 13, 1969. The following morning, the statement was given
for him to read and change whatever was wrong with it. The only correction that Maternal made
was his prison number which he claimed was wrong. Thereafter, Pat. Sunico accompanied Maternal
to the Office of Municipal Judge Nicolas Feliciano who propounded questions to appellant
regarding his name and whether the statement, Exhibit "C", was his. The judge then read the
questions and answers appearing therein to Maternal, afterwhich he asked the latter whether he was
willing to sign the same. Maternal replied in the affirmative and signed the statement, Exhibit "C".
Judge Feliciano then made him swear to the truth of said statement, after which the judge signed it
himself.
On the witness stand, appellant Maternal testified that about 10:00 in the evening of August 27, 1969,
he was at Tanyang Bubog, a place some three (3) kilometers from Panamonton. He was with Virgilio
Camus, Rodolfo Madera, and Munton Muslim. They all went out looking for a banca to ride. Virgilio
Camus pointed to them a banca, part of which was resting on the sand while the rear was on the
water. Camus woke up the man who was sleeping in the banca and told him to start the engine.
When the man refused, Camus hacked him with a bolo. Appellant Maternal shouted at Camus to
stop hacking the victim who fell into the water. When Camus and Madera failed to start the engine,
they ran away. He (appellant) followed and returned to the house where they were all staying.
Further, appellant testified that when he was investigated by the Acting Chief of Police of Brooke's
Point he was made to sign a document, the contents of which were not disclosed to him, muchless,
was he able to read the same. He had to sign the statement because he would be maltreated
considering that his hands were tied at his back with a rope. When at first he would not sign, the
police kicked him and the chair he was sitting on fell on its side with him. On the witness stand,
appellant declared that the contents of his statement, Exhibit "C", are not true.
The accused-appellant seeks a reversal of the decision, claiming that the trial court erred (1) in
admitting the extrajudicial confession; (2) in holding him guilty of the crime of robbery with homicide
on the basis alone of the extra-judicial confession, and (3) in imposing the maximum penalty of
death.
The allegation that he was coerced and maltreated in giving his confession, Exhibit "C", was not
corroborated considering that Maternal had not filed any case whether administrative, criminal or
civil against the persons who allegedly maltreated and forced him to sign the "Salaysay" (Exhibit "C").
And, the claim is belied by his failure to present a medical certificate on the injuries allegedly
sustained as a consequence of the supposed maltreatment made by the police when he made the
confession. Municipal Judge Nicolas Feliciano testified that when the said confession was presented
to him, he read it to appellant and asked if he was willing to sign the same voluntarily Maternal
replied in the affirmative and then signed the document, Exhibit "C", which discloses incidents in
details the police investigators were not in a position to know. For instance, the following appears in
said Exhibit "C":
3. T Kailan ka tumakas sa bilangguan ng Santa Lucia kung natatandaan mo?
S Noon pong ika-13 ng Septiembre 1968.
4. T Saan ka nagtungo noong ikaw ay tumakas sa bilangguan ng Santa Lucia?
S Dito po sa Brooke's Point.
5. T Saan ka dito sa Brooke's Point nagtira?
S Sa Tagpirara po.
6. T Papaano ka nabuhay sa Tagpirara at sino ang nag-alaga sa iyo kung mayroon?
S Ako po ay inuupahan na magtrabaho sa lupa at bahay ni Bert Abiog sa kanilang lupa —
7. T Sa tagal ng iyong pagtratrabaho kay Bert Abiog, alam ba niya na ikaw ay takas na bilanggo sa
Santa Lucia, Iwahig Penal Colony?
S Opo.
8. T Papano nalaman ni Bert Abiog na ikaw ay takas na bilanggo?
S Noong ako po ay naligo sa rancho ni Bert Abiog ay nakita ni Bert Abiog na ako ay maraming tato,
at dito ay tinanong ako ni Bert Abiog kung ako ay bilanggo at ipinagtapat ko naman sa kanya na
ako ay isang takas na bilanggo na galing sa Santa Lucia, Iwahig Penal Colony. ...
xxx xxx xxx
17. T Kanino ang radio ponograph na nahuli sa iyo kung nalalaman mo?
S Yon pong Tao na pinatay namin sa tabi ng aplaya sa may bangka.
18. T Alam mo ba kung saan ang lugar na iyon at ano ang pangalan ng lugar na inyong
pinagpatayan ng tao?
S Hindi ko po alam kung anong Barrio iyon.
19. T Sinabi mong yon pong tao na pinatay namin, bakit sino ang mga kasama mo na pumatay sa
taong iyon na may-ari ng radio?
S Apat po kami, ako, si Sosing, si Junior Amar at si Jovit.
20. T Maaari mo bang maisalaysay ang buong pangyayari at kung paano ninyo pinatay ang tao na
sinasabi mong may-ari ng radio?
S Opo. Humigit kumulang po sa alas dies ng gabi (10:00 p.m.) buwan po ng Agosto 1969 ngunit hindi
ko po natatandaan kung anong petsa ako, si Sosing, si Jovit at si Junior Amar ay nagpunta kami sa
aplaya. Noong kami ay dumating sa aplaya ay may nakita kaming nakapundong bangka at itong si
Sosing at si Junior Amar ay tuloy-tuloy sa bangka. Ang ginawa po ni Sosing ay tinaga niya ang atip
ng bangka at may taong lumundag na galing sa bangka at ito naman ay sinalubong ni Junior Amar
ng saksak sa harap ng tao hindi ko lang alam kung saan siya tinamaan At noong masaksak ang tao
ni Junior Amar ang tao po ay nagsigaw ng "Tabang" ng dalawang beses at dito ay pinagtataga siya
ni Sosing hanggang sa lumubog ang tao sa dagat at dito sinabihan ni Jovit si Sosing na tama na yan
Sing at kami ay nagtakbuhan na pauwi sa Tagpirara na dala ko ang radio ponograph,. (pp. 20-21,
Records)
The disclosures were made by him soon after his apprehension, leaving no opportunity for the police
investigators or anyone else to concoct a story.
The fact that appellant was not assisted by counsel of his choice during the custodial investigation as
required by Section 20, Article IV of the Constitution does not render the extra-judicial confession
executed by him previous to the effectivity of the new Constitution inadmissible In Magtoto vs.
Manguera, 63 SCRA 4, the Court said:
A confession obtained from a person under investigation for the commission of an offense, who has
not been informed of his right (to silence and) to counsel, is inadmissible in evidence if the same had
been obtained after the effectivity of the New Constitution on January 17, 1973. Conversely, such
confession is admissible in evidence against the accused, if the same had been obtained before the
effectivity of the New Constitution, even if presented after January 17, 1973, and even if he had not
been informed of his right to counsel since no law gave the accused the right to be so informed
before that date.
It is also significant to note that both in his confession, Exhibit "C", as well as in his testimony in court,
Maternal did not even deny but instead admitted his presence during the killing of Juan Cabasal,
although he tried to exculpate himself from liability by saying that it was his three companions who
killed Juan Cabasal.
The rule on confession is that "the declaration of an accused expressly acknowledging his guilt of the
crime charged, maybe given in evidence against him" (Sec. 29, Rule 130, Revised Rules of Court). If
the same is made freely and voluntarily, the confession constitutes an evidence of a high order since
it is supported by the strong presumption "that no person of normal mind will deliberately and
knowingly confess himself to be the perpetrator of a crime unless prompted by truth and conscience
(US vs. de los Santos. 24 Phil. 329)." In a later case, the Court ruled that "a confession is admissible as
evidence, and it is presumed assumed to be voluntary until the contrary is shown. Before a confession
can be set aside, both the confession and the reasons or motives given for its repudiation should be
carefully scrutinized. It would be unsound practice for the court to disregard the confession of an
accused simply because the accused repudiates it during the trial (People vs. Dorado, 30 SCRA 53.).
"
We find no reason to disregard and set aside the confession, Exhibit "C", given by appellant Carlos
Maternal. The fact that the two other accused, Emilio Amar, Jr. and Zosimo Igao (Norberto Relojas
has remained at large), were acquitted because they had no confession, writing or otherwise, only
shows that the police in this case did not coerce and/or force appellant Maternal to sign one. For, if
he were coerced, and/or intimidated into giving and signing his statement, Exhibit "C", then said
defendants Amar and Igao would also have been forced to execute their confessions. Otherwise
stated, this fact gives Us additional reason to believe that Maternal gave and signed his statement
freely and voluntarily.
The trial court correctly found the accused-appellant guilty of the crime charged and in imposing the
maximum penalty because he committed this crime during service of penalty imposed for another
previous offense (Article 160 of the Revised Penal Code). However, for lack of necessary votes the
penalty is reduced to reclusion perpetua.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of conviction is AFFIRMED and appellant Carlos R. Maternal is hereby
sentenced to reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Juan Cabasal in the
sum of P30,000.00. With costs.
SO ORDERED.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. NILLOS

G.R. No. L-66161 January 30, 1984
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ELMER NILLOS y PALSARIO, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Hector Velez for accused-appellant.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

Accused-appellant Elmer Nillos was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 4,
Article Two of Republic Act No. 6425 as amended and was sentenced by the Court of First Instance
of Negros Occidental to imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as
minimum to reclusion perpetua as maximum, to pay a fine of P20,000.00 and to shoulder the costs.
Nillos appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals. In a decision dated November 18, 1983, the
Intermediate Appellate Court affirmed the findings of the trial court but corrected the penalty
imposed on the appellant. Noting that the penalty under Section 4 of the Dangerous Drugs Act of
1972 as amended by P.D. No. 1675 is life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from P20,000.00 to
P30,000.00, the Intermediate Appellate Court modified the penalty and raised it to life imprisonment.
Pursuant to the rule enunciated in People v. Daniel (86 SCRA 511), the Intermediate Appellate Court
transmitted the case to us for review as a matter within our exclusive appellate jurisdiction.
We have carefully reviewed the entire records of this appeal. We find correct the factual findings
and conclusions of law embodied in the decision penned by Justice Emilio A. Gancayco and
concurred in by Justices Isidro C. Borromeo and Lorna S. Lombos-Dela Fuente. We, therefore, adopt
the said decision in toto and append it as an integral part of this decision.
The appellate decision found without basis the contention of the appellant that his sworn statement
before the Constabulary Anti-Narcotics Unit or CANU was secured through force. We note that even
if this extra-judicial confession is completely disregarded, there is more than enough evidence to
sustain a judgment of conviction. The testimonies of prosecution witnesses Camilo L. Gonzales,
Domingo S. Bolivar, Vicente Palacios, Enrique Garcia, Generoso Dangca, and Luena Layador proved
beyond reasonable doubt the accused-appellant's guilt of the offense charged.
The accused-appellant himself admits that he was carrying 37 match boxes of dried marijuana
leaves although he claims that he was bringing them to the CANU informer for analysis and not
selling them to him. This uncorroborated story was correctly found incredible.
WHEREFORE, we affirm the judgment of conviction imposed upon Elmer Nillos and sentence him to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of P20,000.00 and costs. The 37 match
boxes of marijuana leaves shall be disposed of in accordance with law.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee (Chairman), Melencio-Herrera, Plana and Relova, JJ., concur.
ANNEX "A"
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
MANILA
AC-G.R. CR No. 25554 November 18, 1983 *
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ELMER NILLOS Y PALSARIO, accused-appellant.
GANCAYCO, J.:
In an information that was filed in the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, Elmer Nillos y
Palsario and Leon Peña y Cartel were charged for violation of Sec. 4, Art. II, Republic Act 6425, as
amended by PD 1675 otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, allegedly committed in
this manner:
That during the period from May 21, to May 22, 1980, in the City of Bacolod, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused conspiring, confederating and
mutually aiding one another, with the accused Leon Peña on May 21, 1980 willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously delivering to and supplying the accused, Elmer Nillos with 37 match boxes of dried
marijuana leaves known as "Indian Hemp" for Elmer Nillos to sell and Elmer Nillos on May 22, 1980, did,
then and there, give away to one "Iking" a poseur-buyer of the Constabulary Anti-Narcotics Unit
(CANU) the aforesaid 37 match boxes of dried marijuana leaves, which is a prohibited drug and
which all the above-named accused are not lawfully authorized to possess, sell, deliver or give away,
in violation of the aforementioned law.
After arraignment and trial on the merits, a decision was rendered on May 4, 1982 convicting the
accused Elmer Nillos of the offense charged and acquitting the co-accused Leon Peña, to wit:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the court finds Elmer Nillos guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense as
charged. The law provides that "The penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from
twenty to thirty thousand pesos shall be imposed upon any person, who, unless authorized by law
shall sell administer, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any
prohibited drug or shall act as procurer of any such transactions. ..." There being no aggravating or
mitigating circumstances and applying the provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the Court
sentences Elmer Nillos to an imprisonment of Twelve (12) years and One (1) day of reclusion
temporal as minimum to reclusion perpetua as maximum, to pay a fine of P20,000.00 and to pay the
costs. The 37 match boxes of marijuana leaves are ordered confiscated in favor of the government
to be disposed of in accordance with law.
On grounds of reasonable doubt, Leon Peña is hereby acquitted.
Not satisfied therewith, the accused Elmer Nillos now interposed this appeal alleging that the trial
court committed the following lone assignment of error:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING APPELLANT AND IMPOSING A PENALTY OF 12 YEARS AND 1
DAY OF RECLUSION TEMPORAL AS MINIMUM TO RECLUSION PERPETUA AS MAXIMUM AND TO PAY A
FINE OF P20,000.00 AND COSTS.
The facts of this case as related in the appealed decision is (sic) substantially borne by the records:
It appears that sometime on May 22, 1980 at around 11:30 A.M., at the Plaza Mart Building, Bacolod
City, Elmer Nillos was apprehended by Sgt. Camilo Gonzales of the Philippine Constabulary Anti-
Narcotics Unit (CANU) while in the act of selling 37 match boxes containing Marijuana leaves to
Enrique Garcia, an informer of the CANU. This was made possible because of the information given
by Enrique Garcia himself, to Sgt. Camilo Gonzales on May 22, 1980, at 8:00 A.M. When Enrique
Garcia went to the office of the CANU at Room 201, Golden Heritage Building, San Juan St., Bacolod
City and (sic) told Sgt. Gonzales that marijuana will be delivered by Nillos to Garcia on that same
morning between 10:00 and 11:00 A.M. at the Plaza Mart Building. Because of that information,
Enrique Garcia was briefed by and told what to do by Sgt. Gonzales. The latter organized a team
composed of Sgt. Bolivar, Sgt. Palacios, and two civilian agents with Sgt. Gonzales as the team
leader. They posted themselves at strategic positions at the escalator. A person who was later
Identified as Elmer Nillos arrived and asked the security guard for a certain Iking (Enrique Garcia) and
he was told to proceed to the second floor. They saw Nillos handing a small paper bag to Enrique
Garcia and immediately they apprehended Nillos and got the paper bag from him. When it was
opened, it was found to contain 37 match boxes of dried marijuana leaves (Exh. 1 to 1-38). They
brought Nillos to their office for investigation and Nillos told them that he got the marijuana from his
co-accused Leon Peña. And after being informed of his constitutional rights, he gave a written
statement (Exh. A) implicating Leon Peña as the person from whom he got the marijuana leaves
which statement was sworn on the same day May 22, before Assistant City Fiscal Ricardo Tornilla.
Because of the information given by Nillos that the price of marijuana will be paid to Leon Peña on
May 23, 1980 at around 11:00 A.M. at the Plaza Mart Building, Sgt. Gonzales, together with Sgt. Bolivar
and Nillos went to the Plaza where payment will be made. Leon Peña arrived and he approached
Nillos. Sgt. Gonzales allowed them to talk for about three minutes and they apprehended Leon Peña
and brought him to their office for investigation. After having been appraised of his constitutional
rights, he made a statement in writing (Exh. B also marked Exhibit 3; Exh. B-3 is the English translation)
on May 26, 1980 which was sworn before Assistant City Fiscal Ricardo Tornilla, who asked him whether
he gave his statement voluntarily, to which he answered in the affirmative. In that statement, he
admitted to the investigators ownership of these 37 match boxes of marijuana leaves at the same
time telling the investigators that the seedlings of these marijuana leaves were given to him by Elmer
Nillos last December for planting.
As it is the standard operating pr for evidence in these kind of cases to be forwarded first to the
Regional Command in Iloilo and then for that Command to send the evidence to the Crime
Laboratory at Camp Crame for chemical examination, Sgt. Gonzales first conducted a local field test
of the same and he found out that there is a quantitative part of TCH (Tetrachylenol) which is a
positive sign of marijuana. After a chemical examination of 11 random samples of the 37 match
boxes were conducted by Lt. Luena Lavador, Forensic Chemist of the Integrated National Police
assigned to Camp Crame, Quezon City, who is a chemist by profession, the findings of Sgt. Gonzales
was confirmed as shown by the Chemistry report dated July 1, 1980 (Exh. J). The evidence for the
prosecution further shows that all safeguards were adopted in order to ensure that the 37 match
boxes (Exh. 1) as well as its contents will not be tampered with by having the same hand-carried by
Patrolman Vicente Palacios to Iloilo and who personally delivered it to Maj. Generoso Dangca, Chief
of the PC Crime Laboratory Regional Command VI, Camp Delgado, Iloilo, who in turn forwarded it to
the PC Crime Laboratory in Camp Crame, Quezon City on June 19, 1980 (Exh. H). It was there that
the random samples of these 37 match boxes were chemically examined by Lieut. Luena Lavador
and was found positive for marijuana (Exh. J).
We find no merit in this appeal.
The theory of the appellant is that the marijuana leaves that was (sic) found in his possession was (sic)
intended to be submitted by him for analysis and not for sale as he was allegedly commissioned by
the Anti-communist League of the Philippines to survey the source of marijuana in the province of
Negros Occidental. He alleged that it was one Espiridion Pajes who asked him to conduct this
surveillance in a plantation in Murcia.
This uncorroborated story of the appellant is obviously incredible. Although all opportunity was given
him to produce his witness Espiridion Pajes to corroborate his version, the appellant failed to produce.
said witness. His complaint that he was not given the opportunity to present his defense has been
aptly refuted in the People's brief as follows:
In his testimony, appellant claimed that he was a government informer, commissioned by the Anti-
Communist League of the Philippines to survey the sources of marijuana in Negros Occidental and
report to the person in charge of the organization, Espiridion Pajes (p. 3, Appellant's Brief). So that his
testimony would be believed, it was therefore necessary for appellant to present Pajes. Thus,
appellant asked that Pajes be subpoenad. Appellant's request was granted, but Pajes could not be
located. Appellant asked for more time to look for Pajes and he was given time. But after giving
appellant several opportunities, the trial court became exasperated with the continuous
postponements, with Pajes as ploy. The trial court finally told appellant that if he could not produce
Pajes on the next hearing scheduled on February 15, 1982, he would have to rest his case. Appellant
agreed. On February 15, 1982, appellant did not present Pajes but rested his case instead. Then on
March 12, 1982, he filed a motion seeking leave of court to present corroborative evidence, asking at
the same time for the issuance of a subpoena to Pajes. The court easily saw through the scheme to
further delay the case and denied the motion. It is this denial which appellant advances as
deprivation of his right to present his witness.
By the same token the court a quo in refusing to believe the version of the appellant made the
following observations:
The evidence for the accused consists solely of their testimonies as well as documentary evidence.
For Nillos, his documentary evidence consist of Exhibit 1 to Exhibit 3, purportedly showing that he was
given an assignment by a certain Mr. Espiridion Pajes to conduct surveillance of marijuana
plantations somewhere in Murcia, Negros Occidental, while that of Peña were marked as Exhibit "1"-
Peña (also marked as Exhibit D) Exhibit 2-Peña (also marked as Exhibit E) together with its
submarkings. And Exhibit 3-Peña (also marked as Exhibit B).
Nillos claims that on May 22, 1980, he was carrying the envelopes containing marijuana leaves for
analysis, to be given to a person whom he does not know yet. So he sought the help of Iking or
Enrique Garcia because he knows Iking to be an informer of the Constabulary Anti-Narcotics Unit.
That is why on the day he was apprehended, he was handing the envelope to Iking Garcia but
before that, he reported to Espiridion Pajes whom he knows to be a government in agent, sometime
in the first week of 1980, about the presence of a marijuana plantation in Murcia, Negros Occidental.
He was told by Pajes to continue the surveillance of the plantation and that if he could secure
marijuana leaves he should have it analyzed. When he arrived at the second floor of the Plaza Mart,
he met Pat. Vicente Palacios and together they went to the CANU office at San Juan-Luzuriaga.
Palacios conferred with Sgt. Gonzales and after twenty minutes they called for him. When he entered
the room, he saw the package he was carrying already opened and the contents placed on the
desk. Sgt. Gonzales informed him that those are marijuana leaves and Sgt. Bolivar inquired about his
name, age, and other personal circumstances and asked him where he got these. Then Sgt. Bolivar
typed something and he was made to sign it (Exh. A). He did so because according to him, he was
told that it was merely routinary, when he read the contents, he was surprised because there are
things therein which he did not tell them. But he was told to just cooperate with them as they will
make him a witness. He admitted during his testimony that Exhibit 1 is the same package containing
the 37 match boxes containing marijuana leaves. Explaining why he signed Exhibit D, another
statement (also marked as Exh. 1-Peña) which Nillos also signed on May 27, 1980, after Leon Peña
was arrested, wherein Nillos admitted that he was the one who gave the marijuana seeds to Leon
Peña for planting, he stated that he did so because he was slapped in the face and that if he
refused to do so, he would be made to "dive on the floor." He also signed a "RECEIPT FOR PROPERTY
SEIZED" dated May 22, 1980 (Exh. F) showing that the 37 match boxes of marijuana were taken from
him. He presented in court a xerox copy of a letter allegedly written by a certain Mr. Espiridion dated
May 25, 1980 (Exh. 1-Nillos) addressed to "Hon. Col. Arturo Licup", (sic) purportedly showing that on
May 20, 1980, the accused Elmer Nillos informed him that a certain Mr. Peña is "the one planting and
owner of the plantation somewhere in Murcia, Negros Occidental ..." (sic) and another xerox copy of
a supposedly confidential information dated May 24, 1980 (Exh. 2-Nillos) addressed to "The Chief, D1,
AACLUP, Manila" made by the same Pajes, pointing to Leon Peña containing the summary of the
alleged offense which is not legible and upon very close scrunity shows that the type written imprints
are in the reverse order and another letter of Pajes dated September 17, 1980 (Exh. 3-Nillos)
addressed to Brig. Gen. Hamilton Dimaya purportedly exculpating Elmer Nillos from the offense
charge.
From the foregoing claim of Nillos, it is very apparent that his purportedly exhibits, 1, 2 and 3, Nillos,
which are not even carbon copies but merely xerox copy where he made obviously as an
afterthought. The evidence will show that Elmer Nillos was apprehended on May 22, 1980. The very
first of the letter (Exh. 1-Nillos) is dated May 21, 1980, the second (Exh. 2-Nillos) is dated May 24, 1980,
and the third (Exh. 3-Nillos, is dated September 17, 1980), clearly showing that these letters were
made after his apprehension. These alleged letters were not even presented to the CANU agents
when he was investigated. His claim that he was the carrying the sealed envelope supposedly
containing marijuana leaves "for analysis by a legally authorized person whom I do not know yet"
using his own words, is by itself highly unnatural and incredible. No reason whatsoever was given by
him when the CANU agents instead of commending him apprehended him. Nor was there any
reason why Iking or Enrique Garcia who is supposed to be a friend of his would testify for the
prosecution. There is no showing whatsoever that the CANU agents or Iking Garcia harbor a grudge
against him. His claim that he reported the matter of marijuana plantation to Espiridion Pajes
sometime in the first week of May, 1980 is also incredible, considering that he could have gone
directly to Pajes for help in analyzing the leaves instead of the help of Garcia so that the leaves could
be analyzed "by a legally authorized person whom I do not know yet." It is altogether surprising why
inspite of the letters of this Espiridion Pajes to Col. Licup and Gen. Dimaya, no action whatsoever has
taken by the two regarding the report of said government intelligence agent. The record will show
that his Espiridion Pajes was promised to be presented by Nillos time and again, thus prompting the
court to issue an order dated March 24, 1982 making known its observations to the effect that the
"Urgent Motion For Leave to Present Corroborative Evidence" dated March 12, 1980 of Atty. Hector
Velez, counsel for the accused is obviously dilatory in nature as the records will show that it was really
the failure of Atty. Velez to present Espiridion Pajes to the hearing of January 8, 1982 and February 15,
1982 that make him waive further presentation of that witness and accordingly rested his case. At
any rate, as already stated by this Court, even if said Espiridion Pajes is presented to testify on Exhs. 1,
2, and 3-Nillos, the Court will hardly afford his testimony any weight as the same is patently incredible
and unbelievable.
Of course, the appellant reiterates his claim that his extra-judicial confession (Exh. A) was thru force or
intimidation. It is interesting to note that while in one breath, he said that his captors maltreated him,
yet in another breath, he alleged that only one of the informers did so without Identifying him (p. 5,
Appellant's brief). Nor did he complain of the alleged force or intimidation inflicted on him when he
was brought before Fiscal Tornilla before whom he swore to the truth of the same. Indeed, it does not
appear that he even filed a complaint thereafter for such force or intimidation against the person
allegedly responsible.
Moreover, his confession is replete with details that could have been furnished only by the appellant
himself. During his examination in Court, he admitted that the many details contained therein were
true (Tsn, Jan. 8, 1982, pp. 22-24).
A sign of voluntariness of confession is where an extra-judicial statement contains details which only
he was in a position to know and matters which the investigator included because it (sic) is
exculpatory (People v. Paras, 56 SCRA 248).
Under Section 4 of Republic Act 6425 as amended by PD 1675 which became effective on February
17, 1980, the penalty for the sale, delivery or giving away to another of a prohibited drug is life
imprisonment to death and fine ranging from P20,000.00 to P30,000.00. The correct penalty therefore
that should be imposed on the appellant is life imprisonment. Obviously, this case is not within the
appellate jurisdiction of this Court.
WHEREFORE, except as to modification of the penalty abovestated, the decision appealed from is
hereby AFFIRMED in all other respects with costs against accused- appellant. Let the records of this
case be transmitted to the Honorable Supreme Court for review as a matter within its exclusive
appellate jurisdiction.
SO ORDERED.

PEOPLE VS. SANCHEZ

G.R. No. L-56769 September 21, 1984
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ARMOGENES SANCHEZ Y YAMSON, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Geronimo A. Gueta for accused-appellant.

AQUINO, J.:
This is a conviction for murder based on an extrajudicial confession which was corroborated by
evidence of the corpus delicti. Ferdinand Mauri, 62, was killed in the evening of June 30, 1979 in his
hardware store located at 1814 Rizal Avenue, corner Malabon Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila, opposite the
Dr. Jose R. Reyes Memorial Hospital. His body was discovered forty-eight hours later, or on July 2, in a
state of decomposition.
The autopsy disclosed that the victim had two stab wounds in the neck, one of which penetrated the
chest and which caused his death (Exh. I, J and K). A kitchen knife (Exh. A) was found in the toilet
bowl of the store.
Mauri lived in the hardware store with his houseboy, Armogenes Sanchez who was 16 years and five
months old at the time of the killing (born on December 10, 1962, Exh. C). Mauri was separated from
his wife and children who lived just a block away.
Sanchez was arrested on September 3, 1979. He admitted the crime and reenacted it before two
police officers and the members of the victim's family, as shown in the 16 photographs, Exhibits M to
M-16 (23-28 tsn, Feb. 9, 1981).
He executed an extrajudicial confession on that date. He recounted the details of the killing and his
taking of Mauri's wallet and P150 cash which was on the table (Exh. B). In his confession, he said that
he admitted the crime to his parents who advised him to surrender (Exh. E). His admission in his
confession, that he stabbed the victim twice, jibed with the medical findings.
Charged with robbery with homicide, he was convicted of murder, sentenced to reclusion
perpetua and ordered to indemnify the heirs of Mauri in the sum of P12,000. The trial court held that
robbery was not proven.
The appellant contends in this appeal that his confession was not voluntary, that the trial court erred
in not sustaining his alibi and basing its judgment on matters not supported by the evidence and that
he is entitled to a suspended sentence being 18 years of age.
Sanchez finished the elementary grade. He repudiated his confession. He said that he was
maltreated. The trial court found that his claim of maltreatment is "farthest from the truth." He did not
complain of the maltreatment to his sister, Eliza. He did not file any complaint against his alleged
tormentors. His confessions is filled with details, such as his having a common-law wife, which only an
unintimidated person could have given.
He was duly informed of his rights to remain silent and to have counsel. If he could not afford a
lawyer, the police offered, to hire one for him free of charge. The case is not covered by section 20,
Article IV of the Constitution. Sanchez voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently waived in writing his
constitutional rights to remain silent and to have counsel. Such waiver is allowed (Miranda vs. Arizona,
16 L. Ed. 2nd 684, 384 US 436).
Immediately after his arrest, he orally admitted the crime (Exh. E). He reenacted its commission of his
own volition and without pressure on the part of the police officers because he wanted to reveal the
truth.
The trial court found loopholes and contradictions in his alibi. As in other decided cases, it was a
brazen fabrication.
But the trial court erred in holding that there was no robbery. The accused admitted taking the
victim's wallet and P l50 cash. It constituted the motive for the killing together with the alleged affront
made by the victim when he chided Sanchez for his clumsiness in handling the stock of paints.
In robbery with homicide, an intent to commit robbery must precede the taking of human life but the
fact that the intent of the criminal is tempered with a desire also to revenge grievances against the
murdered person does not prevent his punishment for the complex crime (Syllabus, U.S. vs. Villorente
and Bislig, 30 Phil. 59).
Appellant claims that the trial court erred in not giving him a suspended sentence although he was
over 16 but below 18 when he committed the crime. The provisions on suspended sentence do not
apply to cases, like the instant case, punishable by death or life imprisonment (Art. 192, Child and
Welfare Code as amended by Presidential Decrees No. 1179 and 1210).
Moreover, on March 31, 1981, when the sentence was promulgated, he was already over 18 years.
He was not entitled to a suspended sentence (People vs. Casiguran, L-45387, November 7, 1979, 94
SCRA 244, 250).
The trial court erred in convicting Sanchez of murder only. He is guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of robo con homicidio as charged in the information. As he was over 15 and under 18 when he
committed the crime, he is entitled to a one-degree reduction of the penalty. He should be
penalized by reclusion temporal, there being no modifying circumstances.
WHEREFORE, the lower court's judgment is modified. Sanchez is sentenced to an indeterminate
penalty of seven years of prision mayor as minimum to fifteen years of reclusion temporal as
maximum and to pay an indemnity of P30,150 to Mauri's heirs. Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.

PEOPLE VS. PIZARRO

G.R. No. L-36445 August 28, 1984
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
NARCISO PIZARRO, defendant-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Julie David Feliciano for defendant-appellant.

RELOVA, J.:
Automatic review of the decision of the then Court of First Instance of Cagayan, in Criminal Case No.
124-S (71), sentencing herein appellant to double death, to pay the heirs of the victims the sum of
P24,000.00 as indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages and to pay the costs.
In the evening of June 6, 1971, spouses Teodoro Taban and Maria Pescador were killed inside their
home at Kinalian, Allacapan, Cagayan. They sustained gunshot and stab wounds. The gunshot
wounds were caused by a gun with bullets containing many pellets; on the other hand, the stab
wounds were caused by a sharp pointed instrument. This was the post-mortem finding of Dr. Alfredo
Berbano, the Municipal Health Officer of Allacapan, who testified that the cause of death of spouses
Teodoro Taban and Maria Pescador was:
Shock, Irreversible, Secondary to hemorrhage, Acute, Internal and External, Secondary to Gunshot
wound and stab wound, hypogastric and flank. (Exhibits "A" & "B", pp. 10 & 12, Record)
The finger of suspicion pointed to accused-appellant Narciso Pizarro, son-in-law of the victims,
because among the relatives of the deceased, he was the only one who objected to the wish of the
victims' family that they be buried face downward. This desire was due to the folks' belief that the
ghost of the victims would not make the killer sleep if they were to be interred face downward.
Later, Leonila Taban, a sister-in-law of appellant, told PC Sgt. Francisco Vinagrera that the firearm of
her deceased husband had been taken by the appellant. This firearm was a bulldog, gauge 16,
which fires multiple pellet bullet, and this was exactly the type of gun used by the murderer. Likewise,
Filomeno de los Santos testified that in the evening of June 6, 1971 he was in the house of one
Librada Contapay situated near the road at Kinalian, Allacapan, Cagayan, when he heard the
barking of dogs. He peeped through the window and saw the accused with a companion going to
the direction of the house of the Tabans. He even asked his nephew, Felipe Jose, who was also
awakened by the barking of the dogs and was then urinating at their batalan, whether it was really
the accused who was proceeding to the Taban's residence. Felipe Jose confirmed the Identity of
appellant and even informed him that accused Pizarro had a property dispute with Teodoro Taban
and even threatened to kill the latter. The two, Filomeno de los Santos and Felipe Jose, went down
and followed appellant and his companion. They observed their movements, hiding behind banana
plants from a distance of about fifty (50) meters. Suddenly, they heard gunshot followed by another,
coming from the house of the victims. They went nearer the Tabans' residence and saw two persons
going out of the batalan, one carrying a gun and the other a knife. Pizarro was one of the two.
After Sgt. Vinagrera learned from Filomeno de los Santos what had happened, he confronted the
accused who denied his presence at the place at that time, giving several excuses and alibis. Later,
however, he broke down and confessed in detail the double murder he had committed. His
statement was reduced in writing (Exhibits "C", "C-1" and "C-2") after which he was brought to
Municipal Judge Alejandro Pagayatan of Allacapan, Cagayan. The judge read to appellant the
contents of said Exhibits "C", "C-1" and "C-2" and then asked if he understood everything stated
therein. Answering in the affirmative, appellant then signed the statement and the oath was
administered to him Judge Pagayatan then signed the statement as the administering officer. A little
later, Pizarro also admitted having taken the gun of the deceased husband of Leonila Taban and
said it was the same gun he used in shooting the victims. He even pointed to the place where he
buried it after the incident.
The gun (Exhibit "G") was recovered by the police at the place pointed to by appellant. Thereafter,
appellant was brought again before Judge Pagayatan regarding another statement (Exhibits "E" and
"E-1") relative to the recovery of the death gun. The contents of this statement (Exhibit "E" and "E-1")
were again read to the accused who swore to its truthfulness. He then signed it.
Narciso Pizarro was charged with the crime of double murder.
In his defense, appellant Pizarro claims that he was in town in the morning of June 6, 1971. He
returned home about seven o'clock in the evening. After supper, he went to bed between 8:00 and
9:00. He never left the house that evening. The following day, Santiago Bartolome informed him
about the death of his parents-in-law, Teodoro Taban and Maria Pescador. Immediately thereafter,
he and his wife, Josefina, repaired to Kinalian and made inquiries regarding the killers of the victims.
Zosimo Taban, a 9-year old nephew, told him that he did not recognize the killer and could only
describe him as a "bearded man, taller than himself (accused).
After several days, he was picked up by the police, informing him that he was being suspected as
the killer of his parents in-law. He professed innocence and completely denied the accusation.
However, due to the maltreatment received from the police, he finally gave way and decided to
execute the statements, Exhibits "C", "C-l " and "C-2" and Exhibits "E" and "E-1".
Josefina Taban, daughter of the deceased Teodoro Taban and step-daughter of the late Maria
Pescador, testified that she and her husband, Narciso Pizarro, on June 6, 1971 were residing at
Maluyo, Allacapan, Cagayan; whereas, her parents were living at Sitio Kinalian which is about 15
kilometers away. Narciso left the house at about 10:00 in the morning of June 6, 1971 and returned at
about 2:00 in the afternoon. From then on, Narciso stayed at home and went to bed at about eight
o'clock. The following day, somebody informed them at their residence at Maluyo that her father
and step mother were killed. They rushed to the place and made injuries as to who could be the
assailant and a nephew, Zosimo Taban, described the killer as a "bearded man, taller than her
husband."
The Court is inclined to give full faith and credit to the testimonies of Filomeno de los Santos and
Felipe Jose. De los Santos, a relative of the appellant, clearly testified regarding the Identity of
appellant, as follows:
Q While you were by the window of the house of Librada Contapay and you saw Narciso Pizarro,
what did you do next if any?
A I observed his movements, sir, I even followed him because I know that he should be in Maluyo. I
supposed that he would be in Maluyo, because he was getting a carabao for which to pull
something else, but I was surprised why he was there.
Q You said that we went to follow Narciso Pizarro was he alone when you followed him?
A He had a companion, sir.
Q To what direction did they proceed when you followed Narciso Pizarro and his companion ?
A They proceeded to the direction of the house of Teodoro Taban, sir.
Q What did you do next after following Narciso Pizarro and his companion ?
A I saw Felipe Jose and I asked him if that is Narsing (Narciso Pizarro) and he told me that it was
Narciso Pizarro.
Q Where was Felipe Jose when you inquired from him if that was Narciso Pizarro?
A He was in their batalan urinating, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q Why did you ask Felipe Jose as to the Identity of the person who passed by you?
A I only said, "Is that Narsing?"
Q What was your purpose in asking that question from Felipe Jose ?
A I had a suspicion because I know that Narciso Pizarro is not supposed to be around and he should
be in Maluyo, so I asked Felipe Jose if that is Narsing, and he answered, "Yes, Uncle."
Q When Felipe Jose told you already that it was Narciso Pizarro who pass by also by their house, what
did you and Felipe do next if any?
A Felipe Jose informed me because of the statement of Felipe Jose which he heard from Narciso
Pizarro that because of the misunderstanding with his father-in-law, and if things go wrong he will be
going to kill we tried to follow them for the purpose of observing what is going to happen.
Q You said a while ago that Narciso Pizarro and his companion proceeded to the house of Teodoro
Taban, what did you and Felipe Jose do when you went to observe their movements?
A We hide at the banana plants.
Q How far is that place to the house of Teodoro Taban?
A About 50 meters, sir.
Q What happened next while you were hiding yourself and Felipe Jose among the banana grooves
when you saw Narciso Pizarro and his companion proceeded to the house of Teodoro Taban?
A We heard a gun report, sir, and not long after, we heard again another gun report, so we went
nearer the house of Teodoro Taban?
Q Where did the two gun reports emanated?
A Inside the house, sir.
Q In whose house•
A The house of Teodoro Taban, sir.
Q After hearing the two gun reports, what else happened if any?
A The light went out and we saw two persons going out of the batalan, one carrying a gun and the
other one, immuko sir.
Q Were you able to recognize those persons who went down from the batalan?
A I saw two persons but I only recognized Narciso Pizarro, sir, but when they went down, another
person emerged from under the batalan making the group, three. (pp. 95, 96, 97 & 99, tsn., Nov. 15,
1972 hearing)
Likewise, Felipe Jose, pointed to appellant as one of those who passed by their house going to the
direction of the residence of the victims. Thus:
Q In the night of June 6, 1971, in what particular place in Sitio Kinalian were you?
A I was in our house, sir.
Q Do you remember anything unusual that happened during that night
A Yes, sir I remember.
Q What was that incident about, will you please tell to this Honorable Court?
A That night, I heard the barking of dogs, As I went out to urinate, I saw Narciso Pizarro and a
companion.
Q You said one of the persons you saw was Narciso Pizarro, is that one Narciso Pizarro the person you
have just pointed a while ago, the accused in this case?
A Yes, sir.
Q How far were you from them, when you saw Narciso Pizarro and his companion passing by
A About five meters, sir.
Q What was the condition of the night when this Narciso Pizarro and his companion passed by your
house?
A That time it was showering but there was the moon.
Q It was bright ?
A Yes, sir.
Q After the accused and his companion passed by your house, what happened next?
A Filomeno de los Santos came to me and inquired if these persons who passed by Narciso Pizarro is
one of them, and I answered him, yes.
Q After telling Filomeno de los Santos that the person who passed by your house and one of them is
the accused in this case, what else happened?
A I know that this Narciso Pizarro should be in barrio Maluyo and I am surprises why he is here now, so I
told him (Filomeno) that we follow them.
Q After that, what did you do next?
A He said, let us go and follow him because according to this Narciso Pizarro, it was only a week
before, they told me that his in-laws are liars and that he was going to kill them.
Q Where did you talk with Narciso Pizarro a week before when he told you that his father-in-law is a
liar and he is going to kill him?
A In our house, sir.
Q When you and this Filomeno de los Santos followed Narciso Pizarro and his companion to what
direction did the accused and his companion go?
A They proceeded towards the east, sir.
Q Do you know in what place did they go when they proceeded east?
A I know, sir.
Q Where?
A They went to the house of Teodoro Taban because we followed them, sir.
Q Up to what place did you follow the accused and his companion when they proceeded to the
house of Teodoro Taban?
A When we were nearing the house of Teodoro Taban, about 50 meters away, we heard two gun
reports.
Q Where were these Narciso Pizarro and his companion when you heard the two gun reports?
A They were already inside the house of Teodoro Taban, sir." (pp. 119-121, tsn., Nov. 19,1972)
The defense of alibi cannot prevail over the positive Identification of appellant. No jurisprudence in
criminal cases is more settled than the rule that alibi is the weakest of all defenses and that the same
should be rejected when the Identity of the accused has been sufficiently and positively established
by eye-witnesses to the crime. Alibi is easy to concoct, and difficult to disprove. For alibi to prosper, it
is not enough to prove that defendant was somewhere else when the crime was committed. He
must demonstrate that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime at
the time. (People vs. Estrada, 22 SCRA 111). Otherwise stated, alibi is a defense with a bad
reputation.
Regarding the statements, Exhibits "C", "C-1 ", and "C- 2" pp and Exhibits "E" and "E-1", wherein
appellant confessed to have committed the crime charged against him, the rule is clear that when
such declaration expressly admits guilt the same may be given in evidence against him (Section 29,
Rule 130, Revised Rules of Court). Early decisions of the Court state that if such statements are made
freely and voluntarily, the confession constitutes an evidence of a high order, since it is supported by
the strong presumption that no person of normal mind will deliberately and knowingly confess himself
to be the perpetrator of a crane unless prompted by truth and conscience. (U.S.A. vs. de los Santos,
24 Phil. 329). Hereunder are the pertinent facts narrated by appellant in his statements, Exhibits "C ",
and "C-1 "-
7. Q Will you please narrate to me in brief how the incident happened?
A In the morning of June 6, 1971, Orencio Ramos and I met in the public market at Centro,
Allacapan, Cagayan wherein said Orencio told me that he wants to kill Teodoro Taban. I also agreed
and made the plan to kill Teodoro Taban on the night of June 6, 1971. After that, we went to sitio
Kinalian, Burot, Allacapan, Cagayan and again both of us made the final plan to liquidate the old
man. In the afternoon of that day, I left for Maluyo in order to deceive the people and on the
evening I left barrio Maluyo to execute our plan. Orencio met me in a certain place and proceeded
to the house of Teodoro Taban passing the house of BRIGIDA CONTAPAY and DONATO DE LOS
SANTOS at sitio Kinalian, Burot, Allacapan, Cagayan Upon nearing the house of Teodoro Taban,
Alfredo Ramos appeared and joined us. Upon reaching the house of Teodoro Taban, we peeped
inside the house and found the occupants sleeping. I then shouted d "TATA TATA" and after that
Teodoro raised up his body and at that juncture, Orencio fired his gun at the old man. After that the
old man laid down and then Orencio and I went up inside the house. When we were up, the old
man was still hovering between life and death, so I stabbed him once below the left armpit. At that
time, the wife of Teodoro Taban Identified Orencio and remarked, "WHY DO YOU KILL US BROTHER-IN-
LAW" and at that instant Orencio fired his gun at the old woman. After that, Orencio said, "Let's go"
and because the old woman was still alive and having recognized me, I again stabbed her twice
below the left armpit and at the body. After that, Orencio told me to get the titles of the land owned
by the old man so we forcibly opened the locker with their bolo. Because we could not locate the
documents, we closed the locker and we went down from the house. After that Orencio, Alfredo
and I left proceeding westward and upon crossing a creek, we separated and I went home to
Maluyo.
8. Q What participation did Alfredo do in the commission of the crime?
A He was assigned to guard around the house when Orencio and I went up inside the house, sir.
9. Q Was Alfredo present when the plan to liquidate Teodoro Taban was made?
A None, but they might have made the arrangement with his brother Orencio, sir.
10. Q What were your individual arms or weapons?
A Orencio was armed with a homemade gun (Bulldog), Alfredo was armed with a bolo and I was
also armed with a pointed knife (Imuco).
11. Q You stated in your narration that when you shouted "Tata, Tata", the old man raised his body
and that was the time when Orencio fired at him. Where was Orencio then at the time he fired gun
at the old man?
A Orencio was still on the ground as the house is very low and some portion of the walling of the
house is open.
12. Q What prompted you to kill the old man when in fact, Teodoro is your father-in-law ?
A Because of the hardship of life I and my family are sacrificing and my father-in-law seems to ignore
the will of his daughter by giving what is due to them in connection with the land since all his
daughters are already married. Because of that attitude, that prompted me to commit the crime.
(pp. 4-5, Record)
The above statements contained informations that could not have been known to the police. His
claim therefore that he was maltreated into executing the same cannot be believed. Further, the
finding by the police officers of the gun used in the commission of the crime in the place pointed to
by said appellant is a strong proof of his participation in the commission of the crime. Hereunder is his
statement, Exhibit "E " and "E-1", pertinent to the death gun:
6. Q Presenting to you these homemade gun (Bulldog), gauge .16, serviceable. What relation has this
to that of the firearm which you buried and recovered at barrio Maluyo if there is any?
A That is the very gun which I buried and recovered by us at Maluyo, sir.
7. Q Is this the firearm used in killing the late Teodoro Taban and his wife, Maria Pescador at sitio
Kinalian, Burot, Allacapan on the night of June 6, 1971?
A Yes, sir. (p. 2 1, Record)
Thus, assuming that his extra-judicial confessions were involuntary, they are admissible.
... even assuming the involuntary character of said confessions, the finding of the bones and hair
above referred to confirms the admissions of guilt and renders the confessions admissible in
evidence. In the case of Bery vs. U.S., 2 Col. 186, it was held that 'if the involuntary confessions are
confirmed on material points by facts subsequently discovered in its consequence, the whole
confession should be received and admitted as evidence. * * * The finding of the goods at the place
indicated not only tends to corroborate the declaration of the prisoner that the will be found there
but also his declaration that he stole them and concealed them at that place, if he made this
statement. (People vs. Garcia, et all 99 PhiL 381, 386).
The above statements, Exhibits "C", "C-1 ", "C-2", "E " and "E-1", were given in July 1971, or before the
1973 Constitution took effect. While it is true that they were given without the aid of counsel, this
Court has ruled in Magtoto vs. Manguera, 63 SCRA 4,12 and in People vs. Juliano, 95 SCRA 511 that
"[t]his specific portion of this constitutional mandate has and should be given a prospective and not
a retrospective effect. Consequently, a confession obtained from a person under investigation for
the commission of an offense, who has not been informed of his right (to silence and) to counsel, is
inadmissible in evidence if the same had been obtained after the effectivity of the New Constitution
on January 17, 1973. Conversely, such confession is admissible in evidence against the accused, if
the same had been obtained before the effectivity of the New Constitution, even if presented after
January 17, 1973, and even if he had not been informed of his right to counsel, since no law gave the
accused the right to be so informed before that date. "
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED. However, for lack of the necessary votes, the
penalty is reduced to double reclusion perpetua and the indemnification to the heirs of Teodoro
Taban and Maria Pescador is increased to P30,000.00 for each.
SO ORDERED.
Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero, Abad Santos, Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Escolin Gutierrez, Jr., De la Fuente
and Cuevas, JJ., concur.
Fernando, C.J., and Makasiar, J., are on leave.
Teehankee, J., took no part.
G.R. Nos. L-32866-7 September 21, 1984

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ALFONSO SABILANO Y FIRMANES, defendant-appellant.

ESCOLIN, J.:

Automatic review of the decision of the Circuit Criminal Court of Manila in Cases Nos. 234 and 235,
imposing two death penalties on accused Alfonso Sabilano y Firmanes, the dispositive portion of
which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

(1) In CCC-VI-234 (70), accused is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal of
the crime of murder qualified by abuse of superior strength and there being proved the aggravating
circumstances of evident premeditation and craft without any mitigating circumstance to offset the
same, the court sentences him to DEATH, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Benilda Macalde y
Tiongco the sum of P12,000 by way of moral damages; and the sum of P10, 000 by way of exemplary
damages;

(2) In CCC-VI-235 (70), accused is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal of
the crime of murder qualified by abuse of superior strength and there being proved the aggravating
circumstances of evident premeditation and craft, without any mitigating circumstance to offset the
same, the court sentences him to DEATH, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Eduardo
Dasmarinas the sum of P12,000.00 for the death of the latter; the sum of P12,000.00 by way of moral
damages; the sum of P10,000.00 by way of exemplary damages;

And accused to pay the costs. (Decision, pp. 45-46).

The judgment of conviction is founded solely on the accused's extrajudicial confession, Exhibit P, the
admissibility of which is here challenged by the accused on the theory that the same was extracted
through intimidation and violence.

The evidence for the prosecution discloses that at about 11:30 in the evening of June 19, 1970,
Eduardo Dasmariñas and Benilda Macalde were shot while waiting for a ride at the corner of
Rodriguez St. and Younger St., in Tondo, Manila. The victims, both officers of an activist organization
known as the Kabataang Tagapag-ugnay, had just attended a "teach-in" meeting of the
Kabataang Tagapag-ugnay, Tondo Chapter, where Dasmarinas was a lecturer.

Dasmariñas and Macalde were immediately rushed to the Sta. Rita Hospital in Tondo and were
pronounced dead on arrival. Dr. Luis Larion of the MPD medico-legal division, who conducted the
autopsy, certified that the cause of death of Benilda Macalde was "shock and hemorrhage due to
two (2) gunshot wounds, one fracturing the skull and lacerating the brain, and the other fracturing
the second proximal metacarpal right trapezoid and distal right radius and ulna." 1 The doctor
ascribed the death of Eduardo Dasmarinas to "shock and hemorrhage due to gunshot wound on the
head fracturing the skull and lacerating the brain." 2

Immediately after the incident, Cpl. Nicolas Aspeli and Pat. E. Diego of the Manila Police Department
repaired to the scene of the crime and interviewed several persons in the neighborhood. Their
findings are set forth in the Advance Information Sheet, 3 pertinent portions of which read as follows:

... People interviewed at the scene of the crime stated that they heard five (5) shots fired in
succession and when they looked out the window they saw a civilian jeep, gray colored, Plate No.
unknown with undetermined number of occupants fleeing from the scene towards H. Lopez Ave.,
turned right towards Navotas, Rizal.

Further investigation conducted by the police pointed to Ruben Guevarra as the triggerman, and
Tanggol Abreu, Teddy Beltran, Danny Mina and accused Sabilano as co-conspirators in the
liquidation of the victims. The police pursued their search of said suspects, but only accused Sabilano
was apprehended on August 2, 1970 in Bo. Oring Oring, Brookes joint, Palawan. The other suspects
were never arrested until the present time.

The accused was brought to Manila after his arrest, and upon arrival in Manila, he was immediately
subjected to intensive interrogation by the police officers of the MPD headed by Cpl. Aspeli. At the
investigation, accused was not assisted by counsel; and said custodial proceeding terminated after
accused signed an extrajudicial statement, Exhibit P, wherein he admitted complicity in the shooting
incident.

Pertinent portions of said extrajudicial statement are quoted as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

T: Alam mo ba kung bakit ka ini-imbestigahan ngayon dito sa himpilan No. 5 ng MPD?

S: Opo, tungkol po doon sa pagkamatay nuong isang lalaki at isang babae nuong gabi
matapos ang teach-in doon sa Younger st., Balut, Tondo, Manila.

T: Kilala mo ba kung sino yaong dalawang napatay na yaon?

S: Kilala ko lang po sa kanyang palayaw "DASMA" at nalaman ko sa diaryo kinabukasan na sila

ay sina Eddie Dasmariñas at isang babae ay Benilda Macalde.

T: Alam mo ba kung papaano sila napatay, at kung saang lugar?

S: Binaril po ng Cal. .45 automatic doon po sa kanto ng Rodriguez at Younger st., sa Balut,
Tondo, Maynila.

T: Anong oras at petsa nuong mangyari ang pagpatay na ito kay Eddie Dasmariñas at kay
Benilda Macalde ?

S: Mag-iika alas 11:30 ng gabi, nuong Hunyo 19, 1970. Birthday po ni Rizal nuon at kami ay
nanggaling sa teach-in sa headquarters ng MTT sa no. 165 Younger st., Balut, Tundo, Maynila.

T: Ano ba ang ibig sabihin ng MTT?

S: Makabayan Tagapag-ugnay sa Tundo.

T: Sino-sino ang nagsalita doon sa sinasabi mong teach-in?

S: Si Eddie Dasmariñas lang po. Yaong babaeng kasama niya ay hindi nagsalita.

T: Anong oras nag-umpisa at anong oras natapos ang nasabing teach-in?

S: Nuong dumating ako ay may teach-in na. Alas 9:00 ng gabi ako dumating doon nuong
matapos na ay alas 11:25 na ng gabing yaon, ika 19 ng Hunyo, 1970.

T: Nuong matapos na ang sinasabi mong teach-in, ano ang inyong ginawa?

S: Hinatid ko muna si "Abet", si "Ben Parco" at si "Jose" doon sa Calle Nava, at ako ay bumili ng
pan desal doon sa Salvacion Bakery sa kanto ng Nava at Rodriguez at naglakad ako patungo sa
Younger st., at doon ko nasaubong sina Eddie Dasmarinas at yaong kasama niyang babae.

T: Sino naman ang kasama nina Eddie Dasmariñas at nuong niyo patungo sa kanto ng
Rodriguez at Younger st., Balut, Tondo Maynila?

S: Si (1) Ruben Guevara at si (2) Tanggol Abreu, taga U.P. ay nakisama na sa kanila. Nag-
aabang sila sa kantong yaon matapos ang teach-in.

T: Samakatuwid ay apat sila na patungo sa nasabing kanto nuong makasalubong mo sila?

S: Opo si (1) Eddie Dasmariñas, (2) Benilda Macalde, (3) Ruben Guevara, at Tanggol Abreu.
Apat sila at ako ang ika-lima.

T: Nuong kayong lima nina (1) Eddie Dasmariñas, (2) Benilda Macalde, (3) Ruben Guevara, (4)
tanggol Abreu, at (5) ikaw ay nasa kanto na ng Rodriguez at Younger may nangyari ba roon na
hindi pangkaraniwan?

S: Nakita ko na bumunot ng baril cal .45 si Ruben Guevara at kanyang binaril sa ulo si Eddie
Dasmarinas. Tumumba si Eddie Dasmariñas. Nuong makita ng babae ang nangyari ay tatakbo sana
ngunit hinawakan siya ni Ruben Guevarra at nakapiglas ang babae. Binaril ni Ruben Guevara ang
babae at tinamaan dahil sa nakita ko na natumba ang babae doon sa may damuhan. Lumapit si
Ruben Guevara sa babae na natumba sa may damuhan at binaril niyang muli.

T: Ilang putok ang iyong narinig sa pamamaril na iyan?

S: Tatlo po. Isa putok kay Eddie Dasmariñas at dalawang putok doon sa babae na kasama ni
Eddie Dasmariñas, na nalaman ko sa diaryo na Benilda Macalde ang ngalan.
T: Ano naman ang ikinilos nitong si Tanggol Abreu sa pagkakataong iyan?

S: Nanood lamang siya at pagkabaril ni Ruben doon kay Eddie at Benilda ay tumakbo na kami
ni Tanggol patungo doon sa headquarters ng MTT sa no. 165 Younger st. Si Ruben Guevara ay hindi
ko alam kung saan tumakbo ngunit hindi naman siya kasama sa pagtakbo patungo sa MTT
headquarters sa Younger.

T: Kailan pinag-usapan ang pagpatay kay Eddie Dasmariñas at doon sa kasama niya?

S: Nuong gabi na ako ay dumating doon sa teach-in, mag-iika alas 9:00 ng gabi, ika 19 ng
Hunyo, 1970, doon sa MTT headquarters sa no. 165 Younger st., samantalang si Eddie Dasmarinas ay
nagsasalita sa teach-in.

T: Sino-sino ang may plano sa pagpatay na iyan kay Eddie Dasmariñas?

S: Sina (1) Ruben Guevara, 12) Tanggol Abreu, (3) Teddy Beltran, (4) Danny Mina at ako po.

T: Samakatuwid ay lima kayong lahat sa plano ng pagpatay kayDasmariñas at sa babae na

kasama niya doon sa nasabing teach-in sa MTT headquarters?

S: Opo, ngunit si Ruben Guevara lamang ang may baril at siya ang naatasan na babaril doon
sa dalawa, si Eddie Dasmariñas at yaong kasama niya na si Benilda Macalde.4

xxx xxx xxx

At the trial, the accused narrated the maltreatment he suffered in the hands of the police
investigators, thus:

xxx xxx xxx

Q: You executed, I mean you stated that you were maltreated by the police whose names you
mentioned and others, what sort of maltreatment did they commit upon your person?

A: May I be allowed to demonstrate

Court:

Go ahead.

A: They had a bench 4 feet long and the width is about 6 inches. They made me lie down on the
bench, tied me with. my head dangling on one end of the bench and they put on me the towel
which I took along with me. When I was already lying down, they put a blind-fold on me. They placed
the towel above my nose and mouth. They pulled my head while dangling at the end of the bench
and poured water with pepper.

Q: What else did the police do to you?

A: And they poured water with pepper on my nose and all over my body and they tore my pants
and while they were pouring the water with pepper on my nose and body, Sgt. Aspeli told me to talk
and to admit because after all, Aspeli said, that even if you have no fault I will certainly admit, and
then gave me pure water and I passed out. When I came to, he said maybe you will talk now.

Q: Is that all that the police officers who were present at the time your statement was taken did
to you?

A: Many things more.

Q: You relate to this court that what the other thing was, that what the police did to you while
your statement was being taken did to you?

A: My wound was soaked on the water with pepper and they tied me on a post with my two
hands and then hit me at my back.

Q: Is that all?
A: There were many more.

Q: What else did they do to you?

A: And also upon alighting from the plane they let me board a taxi and blindfolded me and they
brought me to Precinct 5 where they untied me or removed the blindfold. 5

We have carefully scrutinized the record and we find the evidence for the prosecution woefully
inadequate to overturn the foregoing allegations of force and coercion. Pat. E. Dino who was
presented as rebuttal witness, declared that "we transferred him (accused) to Capt. Escarcha after
more than an hour, I made myself excused because we were very very tired." 6 He further stated that
he knew of no member of the police force who maltreated the accused because he excused
himself one hour after the accused was brought to Capt. Escarcha. 7

It is not disputed that accused, without aid of counsel, was grilled non-stop for thirteen (13) hours, i.e.,
from 11:00 in the morning to 12:00 midnight. At the trial, Pat. Dino, the only witness presented to
contradict the accused's testimony, was candid enough to admit that he did not know what
happened during the remaining twelve (12) hours, because he went home one (1) hour after the
investigation started. The prosecution rebuttal evidence is therefore too deficient and meager to
overturn the defense that physical violence had been inflicted to extort the confession.

It is proverbial in law that a confession made freely and voluntarily constitutes one of the most
effectual proofs against the person making it. But stripped of its free and voluntary character, which
otherwise gives it its value, a confession is wholly inadmissible. This principle stems from the
constitutional right of the accused against self- incrimination; and this precludes the use of a
confession obtained through force, threat or other means which vitiates the free will. Upon this
premise, the confession, Exhibit "P", must be excluded from consideration by the court.

With the exclusion of Exhibit "P", we find the record bereft of any substantial evidence to sustain the
judgment of conviction. It is true that Carlito Gatpandan and Alfredo Santos, who were present at
the scene of the crime, were presented by the prosecution; but their testimonies did not implicate
the accused in the commission of the crime.

Carlito Gatpandan, then 23 years of age and a resident of No. 210 Younger St., Balut, Tondo, Manila
testified that at about 11:30 in the evening of June 19, 1970 he, his brother Maximo and his friends
Julian Abarquez, and Leandro Leonardo boarded his jeep which he intended to park in front of his
house; that when he started the engine of the vehicle, he saw a woman and three men coming from
the squatters' area at Younger St. that one of the men was clothed in khaki pants and naked from
the waist up, the other man was in white T-shirt holding an umbrella and the third in white polo shirt
that when his jeep passed the corner of Younger and Rodriguez Sts., he again noticed the four
persons standing at that place; that upon reaching his house and was about to park his jeep he
heard a gun explosion, followed by two more gunshots; that whereupon, he recognized two men,
one of whom he Identified as the accused, walking at a fast pace towards their direction; that they
passed by the jeep and proceeded to the squatters' area at the end of Younger St. and that
thereafter, he and his companions went to the street corner and there they found a man and
woman lying on the ground. 8

The other witness, Alfredo Santos, then 14 and a resident of 739 Solis St., Tondo, testified that while he
was standing in front of the Gatpandan's residence at about 11:30 that night, he heard a gunshot;
that looking towards the corner of Younger and Rodriguez Sts., he saw a man in white polo shirt fire
his gun twice; and that immediately thereafter, the gun wielder in white polo shirt and the accused,
who was naked from the waist up, ran towards the squatters' area in Younger St. 9

Thus, as attested to by said witnesses, the assailant was the man clad in white polo shirt. The fact that
the accused was present at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission is not, by itself,
sufficient to establish his criminal liability. To hold the accused guilty as co-principal in the crime
charged, the existence of conspiracy between the accused and the actual killer, must be shown;
and the same degree of proof required for establishing the crime is required to support a finding of
the presence of the conspiracy, i.e., it must be shown to exist as clearly and convincingly as the
commission of the crime itself. 10
In the case at bar, there is not a shred of competent evidence, direct or indirect, to show the
accused's participation in a common criminal design. It is needless to add that in the absence of
conspiracy, the accused cannot be held Hable for the acts of the assassin.

WHEREFORE, the accused Alfonso Sabilano y Firmanes is hereby acquitted of the crime charged,
with costs de oficio. His immediate release from custody is ordered, unless otherwise detained for
some other lawful cause.

SO ORDERED.

PEOPLE VS. VELOSO

G.R. Nos. L-38551-53 February 27, 1987

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
CLAUDIO VELOSO, JULIO DALUMPIENES, RENATO TORRES, ISRAEL RAPOTE, REY TORRES, JOHN DOE
alias "ROLLY" and "PETER DOE," accused, CLAUDIO VELOSO, accused-appellant.

CRUZ, J.:
Three young and innocent girls went to the park on a Sunday evening to relax and enjoy each
other's company. Before the night was over, they would be brutally attacked and flowered and
seared with ugly memories that will probably outrage them for the rest of their lives.
These unfortunate girls were Rosita Rubio, fifteen years old, Constancia de los Reyes, fourteen, and
Rosanna Rodriguez, who was only twelve at the time. 1
At about seven o'clock in the evening of June 22, 1972, while they were seated near the fountain at
a public park in Lucena City, they were approached by a group of men composed of Claudio
Veloso, Julio Dalumpienes, Renato Torres, Israel Rapote, Rey Torres, one Gerry, and a seventh who
remains unidentified to date. Gerry introduced himself to Rosanna and then the men left. 2 At 10
o'clock of the same evening, the same group was to return to the three girls in the park, but this time
with a more malevolent purpose.
This time there were no amenities. The men surrounded the girls. Veloso held the hand of Constancia,
who pushed him to the ground. His 8-1/2 inch bolo fell. Constancia ran but Dalumpienes caught and
detained her. The three girls were then pulled by the group to the Capitol Building, their mouths
covered to prevent them from shouting for help. As it happened, the lights in the park temporally
went out at that precise time, and nobody saw or succored them. 3
Upon reaching the second floor of the building, Veloso and Renato Torres dragged Rosita to a dark
corner, where they raped her in succession. Veloso threatened her with his bolo. 4 Meanwhile, about
seven meters away, Constancia was struggling with Dalumpienes, who subdued and violated her
while she was being held by his two companions, who thereafter also satisfied their lust on her while
also held by the others in turn.5 Nearby, Rosanna met a similar fate from the seventh man in the
group. 6
After ravishing them, the men called a jeep to take the girls home but instead they proceeded
directly to the police station, where they reported their harrowing experiences. 7 Constancia was
then taken by a policeman to the railroad station, where she saw and pointed to Veloso as one of
her assailants. 8 Veloso was arrested. After investigation, he signed an extrajudicial confession. 9 In the
among of the following day, the three were physically examined by Dr. Imelda de Imus, who was to
testify later that she found hymenal lacerations in the complainants that were caused within the past
twenty-four hours from her examination. 10
The above narration is on the testimony of the three girls, 11 as well as the examining physician, 12 the
Several policemen who received the reports of the three victims and investigated Veloso 13 and his
extrajudicial confession. 14
In his defense at the joint trial of the three complaints for rape filed against him and his companions,
Veloso denied the accusations, saying he and Rosita were sweethearts and that they did have
sexual intercourse on the night and in the place in question but by mutual consent. 15 This is not
believable. In the first place, he offers no evidence other than his self-serving statement. Rosita flatly
rejects it. 16 Moreover, it is not likely that, if they were really sweethearts, they would have had sexual
intercourse only a few meters from where the other two girls were being violated. The act of love is
not that perverse and vulgar. It is a private communion. This blatant lie, which would convert a brutal
rape into an amorous fulfillment, does not even have the charm of fantasy.
The extrajudicial confession 17 is admissible against him, having been made before January 17, 1973,
when the right to counsel was not yet in effect under the Magtoto doctrine. 18 Significantly, he
presented no medical or other evidence of his alleged manhandling by the police and did not
complain about it to the fiscal or any other officer. 19By contrast, the policemen he claimed had
mauled him were, presented at the trial and testified to deny his allegations. 20
Indeed, even if the confession were to be disregard the rest of the prosecution evidence would still
be overwhelming against Veloso. The trial judge, * who had the firsthand opportunity to observe the
witnesses and assess their credibility, considered those for the prosecution more reliable, especially
the complaints themselves. While it may be conceded that there were certain inconsistencies in their
testimony, the tale they narrated of that terrible night is on the whole credible. The imperfections
were on mere insignificant details that do not detract from the veracity of the basic
accusation. 21 One could hardly expect that these three naive girls would concoct it out of pure
imagination, implicating without reason people they did not even know, and, worse, exposing their
own ravishment and testing publicly on are the embarrassing details.
Veloso also faults the trial court for convicting him of the other rapes, considering that he was alleged
to have raped only Rosita. The defense forgets that he is responsible also for the other rapes because
he was a co-conspirator along with his six other companions, whose guilt he must also share. The
conspiracy among them has been amply established by the facts that they together approached
the three girls earlier that night as one of them introduced himself; that they returned about three
hours later and without much ado dragged the three girls into the Capitol Building; that they
successively raped their hapless victims, helping each other as each forced himself upon a victim;
and that they later released the girls after they had satisfied their lust and sent them home in. a jeep
they had flagged.
A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement to commit a crime and
decide to commit it. 22While it is desirable that the conspiracy be proved by direct evidence, the an
express understanding among the plotters affirming their commitment and defining their respective
roles, it may nevertheless be established at times by circumstantial evidence only. 23 Thus, to repeat
established doctrine, where the accused move in concert toward a common purpose, conspiracy
may be inferred from their joint acts and design, without need of direct evidence of the criminal
agreement. 24 We have held in many cases that the conduct of the accused before, during and
after the commission of the crime, are circumstances that can show whether or not there was a
conspiracy among them. 25
In a conspiracy, the guilt of one is the guilt of halt Therefore, Veloso is responsible not only for the rape
he committed against Rosita but for all the other rapes committed by his companions, with whom he
had conspired. In other words, he is liable also for the rape of Rosita by Renato Torres, of Constancia
by Dalumpienes and two others, and of Rosanna by another of the conspirators, or a total of six
rapes, including the one he actually committed.
Rape is punished with reclusion perpetua to death where it is committed with the use of a deadly
weapon or by two or more persons, as in case. 26 The trial court, appreciating the aggravating
circumstance of superiority mitigated by voluntary surrender, imposed the penalty of life
imprisonment on Veloso in each of the three cases filed against him, or three life sentences. 27 This
was erroneous.
The accused-appellant did not voluntarily surrender but was in fact arrested at the railroad station in
the morning after the rapes he and his companions had committed. 28 Voluntary surrender should
therefore not have been appreciated. On the other hand, the crime was aggravated not only by
superiority but also by evident premeditation, which the court did not consider. The record shows that
after approaching the three girls in the park at 7 o'clock of that fateful night, the same group
returned about three hours later, obviously according to plan, and without much ado surrounded
their victims and dragged them into the Capitol Building and raped them. 29
With the above aggravating circumstances and no mitigating circumstance, the applicable penalty
is death, to be imposed not for each of the three victims but for each of the six rapes committed on
them by Veloso personally and his companions. Fortunately for him, however, these six death
penalties will now each have to be reduced to life imprisonment in accordance with Article III,
Section 19(l) of the 1987 Constitution.
This decision affects only Claudio Veloso because Julio Dalumpienes, who was convicted with him,
did not appeal. As for the others, we note that they have not been arrested and tried, allegedly
because of the protection and immunity they are enjoying from the police of Lucena City. 30 Let a
copy of this decision be sent to the Chief, PC-Integrated National Police, for investigation of this
charge.
WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment as above modified is AFFIRMED, with costs against the
accused-appellant. It is so ordered.

G.R. Nos. L-37201-02 March 3, 1975

CLEMENTE MAGTOTO, petitioner,

vs.
HON. MIGUEL M. MANGUERA, Judge of the Court of First Instance (Branch II) of Occidental Mindoro,
The PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, IGNACIO CALARA, JR., and LOURDES CALARA, respondents.

G.R. No. L-37424 March 3, 1975

MAXIMO SIMEON, LOUIS MEDNATT, INOCENTES DE LUNA, RUBEN MIRANDA, ALFONSO BALLESTEROS,
RUDOLFO SUAREZ, MANUEL MANALO, ALBERTO GABION, and RAFAEL BRILL, petitioners,
vs.
HON. ONOFRE A. VILLALUZ, in his capacity as Judge of the Criminal Circuit Court of Pasig, Rizal, and
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

G.R. No. L-38929 March 3, 1975

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
HONORABLE ASAALI S. ISNANI, District Judge of the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga del Sur,
Branch II, VICENTE LONGAKIT, and JAIME DALION, respondents.

Felipe S. Abeleda for petitioner Clemente Magtoto.

Joaquin L. Misa for petitioners Maximo Simeon, et al.

Alan L. Roxas for respondents Ignacio Calara, Jr., et al.

Organo Law Office for respondent Vicente Longakit, et al.

Office of the Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza and Assistant Solicitor General Vicente V. Mendoza
for respondent and petitioner People of the Philippines.

FERNANDEZ, J.:

The present cases involve an interpretation of Section 20, Article IV of the New Constitution, which
reads:têñ.£îhqwâ£

No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. Any person under investigation for the
commission of an offense shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of
such right. No force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free will shall
be used against him. Any confession obtained in violation of this section shall be inadmissible in
evidence,

and specifically, the portion thereof which declares inadmissible a confession obtained from a
person under investigation for the commission of an offense who has not been informed of his right
(to remain silent and) to counsel.1

We hold that this specific portion of this constitutional mandate has and should be given a
prospective and not a retrospective effect. Consequently, a confession obtained from a person
under investigation for the commission of an offense, who has not been informed of his right (to
silence and) to counsel, is inadmissible in evidence if the same had been obtained after the
effectivity of the New Constitution on January 17, 1973. Conversely, such confession is admissible in
evidence against the accused, if the same had been obtained before the effectivity of the New
Constitution, even if presented after January 17, 1973, and even if he had not been informed of his
right to counsel, since no law gave the accused the right to be so informed before that date.

Accordingly, We hereby sustain the orders of the respondent Judges in G.R. No.
L-37201-022 and G.R. No. L-374243 declaring admissible the confessions of the accused in said cases,
and We hereby set aside the order of the respondent Judge challenged in G.R. No. L-389294 which
declared inadmissible the confessions of the accused in said case, although they have not been
informed of their right to remain silent and to counsel before they gave the confessions, because
they were given before the effectivity of the New Constitution.

The reasons for these rulings are as follows:

Section 20, Article IV of the New Constitution granted, for the first time, to a person under
investigation for the commission of an offense, the right to counsel and to be informed of such right.
And the last sentence thereof which, in effect, means that any confession obtained in violation of this
right shall be inadmissible in evidence, can and should be given effect only when the right already
existed and had been violated. Consequently, because the confessions of the accused in G.R. Nos.
L-37201-02, 37424 and 38929 were taken before the effectivity of the New Constitution in accordance
with the rules then in force, no right had been violated as to render them inadmissible in evidence
although they were not informed of "their right to remain silent and to counsel," "and to be informed
of such right," because, We repeat, no such right existed at the time.

The argument that the second paragraph of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, which was
added by Republic Act No. 1083 enacted in l954, which reads as follows:têñ.£îhqwâ£

In every case, the person detained shall be informed of the cause of his detention and shall be
allowed, upon his request, to communicate and confer at any time with his attorney or counsel.

impliedly granted to a detained person the right to counsel and to be informed of such right, is
untenable. The only right granted by said paragraph to a detained person was to be informed of the
cause of his detention. But he must make a request for him to be able to claim the right to
communicate and confer with counsel at any time.

The remark of Senator Cuenco, when Republic Act No. 1083 was being discussed in the Senate, that
the bill which became Republic Act No. 1083 provides that the detained person should be informed
of his right to counsel, was only the personal opinion of Senator Cuenco. We grant that he was, as
We personally knew him to be, a learned lawyer and senator. But his statement could reflect only his
personal opinion because if Congress had wanted Republic Act No. 1083 to grant a detained person
a right to counsel and to be informed of such right, it should have been so worded. Congress did not
do so.

As originally worded, Senate Bill No. 50, which became Republic Act No. 1083, provided: "In every
case the person detained shall be allowed, upon his request, to have the services of an attorney or
counsel. In the period of amendment, the phrase "have the services of" was changed to the present
wording "communicate and confer anytime with his." As the Solicitor General points out in his able
memorandum, apparently the purpose was to bring the provision in harmony with the provision of a
complementary measure, Republic Act No. 857 (effective July 16, 1953), which provides:têñ.£îhqwâ£

SECTION 1. Any public officer who shall obstruct, prohibit, or otherwise prevent an attorney entitled
to practice in the courts of the Philippines from visiting and conferring privately with a person
arrested, at any hour of the day or, in urgent cases, of the night, said visit and conference being
requested by the person arrested or by another acting in his behalf, shall be punished by arresto
mayor.

None of these statutes requires that police investigators inform the detained person of his "right" to
counsel. They only allow him to request to be given counsel. It is not for this Court to add a
requirement and carry on where both Congress and the President stopped.

The history behind the new right granted to a detained person by Section 20, Article IV of the New
constitution to counsel and to be informed of said right under pain of a confession taken in violation
thereof being rendered inadmissible in evidence, clearly shows the intention to give this constitutional
guaranty not a retroactive, but a prospective, effect so as to cover only confessions taken after the
effectivity of the New Constitution.

To begin with, Section 29, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, provides:têñ.£îhqwâ£

Confession.—The declaration of an accused expressly acknowledging his guilt of the offense

charged, may be given in evidence against him.

And according to Section 3, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court:

Extrajudicial confession, not sufficient ground for conviction.—An extrajudicial confession made by an
accused, shall not be sufficient ground for conviction, unless corroborated by evidence of corpus
delicti.

Extrajudicial confessions of the accused in a criminal case are universally recognized as admissible in
evidence against him, based on the presumption that no one would declare anything against
himself unless such declarations were true. Accordingly, it has been held that a confession constitutes
an evidence of a high order since it is supported by the strong presumption that no person of normal
mind would deliberately and knowingly confess to a crime unless prompted by truth and conscience.
(U.S. vs. Delos Santos, 24 Phil. 329, 358).

The fundamental rule is that a confession, to be admissible, must be voluntary. And the first rule in this
connection was that before the confession could be admitted in evidence, the prosecution must first
show to the satisfaction of the Court that the same was freely and voluntarily made, as provided for
in Section 4 of Act 619 of the Philippine Commission (U.S. vs. Pascual, August 29, 1903, 2 Phil. 458). But
with the repeal of said provision of law by the Administrative Code in 1916, the burden of proof was
changed. Now, a confession is admissible in evidence without previous proof of its voluntariness on
the theory that it is presumed to be voluntary until the contrary is proved (5 Moran, Comments on the
Rules of Court, p. 264; People vs. Dorado, 30 SCRA 53, 57, citing U.S. vs. Zara, 42 Phil. 308; People vs.
Cabrera, 43 Phil. 64; People v. Singh, 45 Phil. 676; People v. Pereto, 21 SCRA 1469).

And once the accused succeeds in proving that his extrajudicial confession was made involuntarily, it
stands discredited in the eyes of the law and is as a thing which never existed. It is incompetent as
evidence and must be rejected. The defense need not prove that its contents are false (U.S. vs. Delos
Santos, 24 Phil. 329, 358; U.S. vs. Zara, 42 Phil. 325, November, 1921). The same rule was followed in
People vs. Nishishima. "Involuntary confessions are uniformly held inadmissible as evidence — by
some courts on the ground that a confession so obtained is unreliable, and by some on the ground
of humanitarian principles which abhor all forms of torture or unfairness towards the accused in
criminal proceedings. ... ." (57 Phil. 26, 48, 51; 1932).4 * In the concurring opinion of Justice Butte, he
said: "Apart, from the fact that involuntary confessions will be declared incompetent and are
therefore utterly futile, it is high time to put a stop to these (third degree) practices which are a blot
on our Philippine civilization."

This rule was, however, changed by this court in 1953 in the case of People vs. Delos Santos, et al.,
G.R. No. L-4880, citing the rule in Moncado vs. People's Court, et al., 80 Phil 1, and followed in the
case of People vs. Villanueva, et al. (G.R. No. L-7472, January 31, 1956), to the effect that "a
confession to be repudiated, must not only be proved to have been obtained by force or violence
or intimidation, but also that it is false or untrue, for the law rejects the confession when by force or
violence, the accused is compelled against this will to tell a falsehood, not when by such force and
violence is compelled to tell the truth." This ruling was followed in a number of cases.5

But the ruling in Moncado vs. People's Court et al., 80 Phil 1, which was the basis of the leading case
of People vs. Delos Santos, supra, was overruled in the case of Stonehill vs. Diokno (20 SCRA 383, June
19, 1963), holding that evidence illegally obtained is not admissible in evidence. So, We reverted to
the original rule. As stated by this Court, speaking thru Justice Teehankee in People vs. Urro (44 SCRA
473, April 27, 1972), "involuntary or coerced confessions obtained by force or intimidation are null and
void and are abhorred by law which proscribes the use of such cruel and inhuman methods to
secure a confession." "A coerced confession stands discredited in the eyes of the law and is as a
thing that never existed." The defense need not prove that its contents are false. Thus, We turned full
circle and returned to the rule originally established in the case of U.S. vs. Delos Santos, 24 Phil. 323
and People vs. Nishishima, 42 Phil. 26. (See also People vs. Imperio, 44 SCRA 75).

It must be noted that all these Philippine cases refer to coerced confessions, whether the coercion
was physical, mental and/or emotional.
In the meantime, the United States Supreme Court decided the following cases: Massiah vs. United
States (377 U.S. 201, 1964), Escobedo vs. Illinois (378 U.S. 478, 1964); and Miranda vs. Arizona (384 U.S.
436, 1966). In Miranda vs. Arizona, it was held:têñ.£îhqwâ£

To summarize, we hold that when an individual is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his
freedom by the authorities in any significant way and is subjected to questioning, the privilege
against self-incrimination is jeopardized. Procedural safeguards must be employed to protect the
privilege *[384 U.S. 479]* and unless other fully effective means are adopted to notify the person of his
right of silence and to assure that the exercise of the right will be scrupulously honored, the following
measures are required. He must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain
silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the
presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior
to any questioning if he so desires. Opportunity to exercise these rights must be afforded to him
throughout the interrogation. After such warning have been given, and such opportunity afforded
him, the individual may knowingly and intelligently waive these rights and agree to answer questions
or make statement. But unless and until such warning and waiver are demonstrated by the
prosecution at trial, no evidence obtained as a result of interrogation can be used against him.
(Miranda vs. Arizona, supra, p. 478)[Emphasis Ours]

When invoked in this jurisdiction, however, the Miranda rule was rejected by this Court. In the cases of
People vs. Jose (37 SCRA 450, February 6, 1971) and People vs. Paras 56 SCRA 248, March 29, 1974),
We rejected the rule that an extrajudicial confession given without the assistance of counsel is
inadmissible in evidence. This Court in the Jose case(as in the Paras case), held:têñ.£îhqwâ£

The inadmissibility of his extrajudicial statements is likewise being questioned by Jose on the other
ground that he was not assisted by counsel during the custodial interrogations. He cites the decisions
of the Supreme Court of the United States in Massiah vs. U.S. (377 U.S. 201), Escobedo vs. Illinois (37
U.S. 478) and Miranda vs .Arizona (384 U.S. 436).

The provision of the Constitution of the Philippines in point is Article III (Bill of Rights), Section 1, par. 17
of which provides: "In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall ... enjoy the right to be heard by
himself and counsel ... ." While the said provision is identical to that in the Constitution of the United
States, in this jurisdiction the term criminal prosecutions was interpreted by this Court in U.S. vs.
Beechman, 23 Phil 258 (1912), in connection with a similar provision in the Philippine Bill of Rights
(Section 5 of Act of Congress of July 1, 1902), to mean proceedings before the trial court from
arraignment to rendition of the judgment. Implementing the said Constitutional provision, We have
provided in Section 1, Rule 115 of the Rules of Court that "In all criminal prosecutions the defendant
shall be entitled ... (b) to be present and defend in person and by attorney at every state of the
proceedings, that is, from the arraignment to the promulgation of the judgment." The only instances
where an accused is entitled to counsel before arraignment, if he so requests, are during the second
stage of preliminary investigation (Rule 112, Section 11) and after the arrest(Rule 113, Section 18). The
rule in the United States need not be unquestioningly adhered to in this jurisdiction, not only because
it has no binding effect here, but also because in interpreting a provision of the Constitution the
meaning attached hereto at the time of the adoption thereof should be considered. And even there
the said rule is not yet quite settled, as can be deduced from the absence of unanimity in the voting
by the members of the United States Supreme Court in all the three above-cited cases. (People vs.
Jose, supra, at page 472).

The Constitutional Convention at the time it deliberated on Section 20, Article IV of the New
Constitution was aware of the Escobedo and Miranda rule which had been rejected in the case of
Jose. That is the reason why the Miranda-Escobedo rule was expressly included as a new right
granted to a detained person in the present provision of Section 20, Article IV of the New
Constitution.

When Delegate de Guzman (A) submitted the draft of this Section 20, Article IV to the October 26,
1972 meeting of the 17-man committee of the Steering Council, Delegate Leviste (O) expressly made
of record that "we are adopting here the rulings of US Supreme Court in the Miranda-Escobedo
cases." And We cannot agree with the insinuation in the dissenting opinion of Justice Castro that the
Delegates did not know of the existence of the second paragraph of Art. 125 of the Revised Penal
Code.

Hence, We repeat, this historical background of Section 20, Article IV of the New Constitution, in Our
considered opinion, clearly shows that the new right granted therein to a detained person to counsel
and to be informed of such right under pain of his confession being declared inadmissible in
evidence, has and should be given a prospective and not a retroactive effect. It did not exist before
its incorporation in our New Constitution, as We held in the Jose and Paras cases, supra.

The authors of the dissenting opinions ignore the historical fact that the constitutional and legal
guarantees as well as the legal precedents that insure that the confession be voluntary, underwent a
slow and tedious development. The constitutional guarantee in question might indeed have come
late in the progress of the law on the matter. But it is only now that it had come under Section 20 of
Article IV of the 1973 Constitution. That is all that our duty and power ordain Us to proclaim; We
cannot properly do more.

Furthermore, to give a retroactive effect to this constitutional guarantee to counsel would have a
great unsettling effect on the administration of justice in this country. It may lead to the acquittal of
guilty individuals and thus cause injustice to the People and the offended parties in many criminal
cases where confessions were obtained before the effectivity of the New Constitution and in
accordance with the rules then in force although without assistance of counsel. The Constitutional
Convention could not have intended such a a disastrous consequence in the administration of
justice. For if the cause of justice suffers when an innocent person is convicted, it equally suffers when
a guilty one is acquitted.

Even in the United States, the trend is now towards prospectivity. As noted in the memorandum of the
Solicitor General:têñ.£îhqwâ£

... That survey indicates that in the early decisions rejecting retroactivity, the United States Supreme
Court did not require "pure prospectivity;" the new constitutional requirements there were applied to
all cases still pending on direct review at the time they were announced. (See Linkletter vs. Walker,
381 U.S. 618 (1965) (on admissibility of illegally-seized evidence); Tehan vs. Shott, 382 U.S. 406 (1966)
(on the self-incrimination rule of Griffin vs. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965). But the Court began a new
course with Johnson vs. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (1966). It departed from Linkletter and Tehan and
came closer to "pure prospectivity" by refusing to permit cases still pending on direct review to
benefit from the new in-custody interrogation requirements of Miranda vs. Arizona. As Chief Justice
Warren observed in Jenkins vs. Delaware, 395 U.S. 213 (1969), "With Johnson we began increasing
emphasis upon the point at which law enforcement officials relied upon practices not yet
prescribed." "More recently," he continued, "we have selected the point of initial reliance." That
development began with Stovall vs. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967) (on the line-up requirements of United
States vs. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967) and Gilbert vs. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967). These new rulings
were held applicable only in the immediate cases "and all future cases which involve confrontation
for identification purposes conducted in the absence of counsel after the dates of Wade and
Gilbert." The fact that Wade and Gilbert were thus the only beneficiaries of the new rules was
described as an "unavoidable consequence of the necessity that constitutional adjudications not
stand as mere dictum." In Jenkins vs. Delaware itself, the Court held that the Miranda requirement did
not apply to a re-trial after June 13, 1966 — the cut-off point set for the Miranda requirement by
Johnson vs. New Jersey — because Jenkins original trial had begun before the cut-off point.

Thus, the remarkable thing about this development in judge-made law is not that it is given limited
retroactive effort. That is to be expected in the case of judicial decision as distinguished from
legislation. The notable thing is that the limited retroactivity given to judge-made law in the
beginning by Linkletter vs. Walker has been abandoned as the Supreme Court in Johnson vs. New
Jersey and in Jenkins vs. Delaware moved toward "pure prospectivity" (pp. 26-28) (Respondents'
memorandum, Feb. 16, 1974).

The provision of Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code that:têñ.£îhqwâ£

Retroactive effect of penal laws.—Penal laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar as they favor the
person guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual criminal, as this term is defined in Rule 5 of Article 62 of
this Code, although at the time of the publication of such laws a final sentence has been
pronounced and the convict is serving the same,

is not applicable to the present cases: First, because of the inclusion We have arrived at that the
constitutional provision in question has a prospective and not a retrospective effect, based on the
reasons We have given; second, because the "penal laws" mentioned in Article 22 of the Revised
Penal Code refer to substantive penal laws, while the constitutional provision in question is basically a
procedural rule of evidence involving the incompetency and inadmissibility of confessions and
therefore cannot be included in the term "penal laws;"6 and third, because constitutional provisions
as a rule should be given a prospective effect.7

Even as We rule that the new constitutional right of a detained person to counsel and to be informed
of such right under pain of any confession given by him in violation thereof declared inadmissible in
evidence, to be prospective, and that confessions obtained before the effectivity of the New
Constitution are admissible in evidence against the accused, his fundamental right to prove that his
confession was involuntary still stands. Our present ruling does not in any way diminish any of his rights
before the effectivity of the New Constitution.

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petitions for writs of certiorari in G.R. Nos. L-37201-02 and G.R.
No. L-37424 are denied and that in G.R. No. L-38929 is granted. As a consequence, all the confessions
involved in said cases are hereby declared admissible in evidence. No costs.

Makalintal, C.J., Barredo, Makasiar, Esguerra, Muñoz Palma and Aquino, JJ., concur.1äwphï1.ñët

Separate Opinions

CASTRO, J., dissenting:

The burden of this dissent is my considered view that the particular provision of Section 20 of Article IV
of the 1973 Constitution which invalidates a confession obtained during custodial interrogation from
a detained person who at such interrogation was not afforded the assistance of counsel, should
operate retrospectively as of June 15, 1954 when Republic Act 1083 introduced the second
paragraph of article 125 of the Revised Penal Code recognizing the right of a detained person to
counsel in any custodial inquest. I am thus distressed by, and consequently am in sharp disagreement
with, the following doctrines expostulated in the majority opinion of Justice Estanislao A. Fernandez
and in the concurring opinion of Justice Felix Q. Antonio:

(a) "Section 20, Article IV of the new Constitution granted, for the first time, to a person under
investigation for a commission of an offense, the right to counsel and to be informed of such right."

(b) "In most areas, police investigators are without modern and sophisticated instruments for
criminal investigation. Many grave felonies have been unsolved because of the absence or
unavailability of witnesses. In such cases it is obvious that the custodial interrogation of suspects
would furnish the only means of solving the crime."

(c) "The law existing at the time of the adoption of the new Constitution, as construed by this Court in
People vs. Jose, considered admissible an extra-judicial statement of the accused obtained during
custodial interrogation, without assistance of counsel. This decision forms part of the legal system in
this jurisdiction."

1. The second paragraph of article 125 of the Revised Penal Code provides:têñ.£îhqwâ£

In every case the person detained shall be informed of the cause of his detention and shall be
allowed upon his request to communicate and confer at any time with his attorney or counsel.

Misreading the intendment of this provision, the majority of my brethren are of the literal view that the
"only right granted by the said paragraph to a detained person was to be informed of the cause of
his detention," and that a detained person "must make a request for him to be able to claim the right
to communicate and confer with counsel at any time." I regard this interpretation as abhorrent
because it gravely offends against the provisions of the 1935 Constitution as well as of the 1973
Constitution that guarantee equal protection of the laws to every person in the realm. I am
persuaded that only a handful of the more than forty million inhabitants of this country actually know
the provisions of the second paragraph of article 125, notwithstanding the mischievous legal fiction
that everyone is conclusively presumed to know the law. I would even venture the opinion that at
least 95% of the Filipino people are not even aware of the existence of this paragraph. As a matter of
fact, the hearing of Magtoto vs. Manguera and Simeon vs. Villaluz, it was my distinct impression that
many of those in attendance thereat, lawyers and laymen alike, became aware of the existence of
the paragraph then and only then for the first time in their lives. If many full-fledged lawyers with years
upon years of practice behind them are not aware of the said paragraph, can we expect the great
bulk of the population of the Philippines, whose experience has been limited to occasional brushes
with the uniformed "strong arm" of the law (and not with the law itself), to know of its existence? So
that in effect the majority interpretation would give the right to counsel at a custodial inquest to only
the choice few who happen to know the provisions of the law and have the courage or the temerity
to invoke it in the menacing presence of peace officers, and in the same breath deny the
beneficence of those provisions to all others. The poor, the ignorant and the illiterate who do not
know the rudiments of law would be at an overriding disadvantage as against the informed few.

An accurate paraphrase of the majority view may be stated in the following words: "If this detained
wretch asserts his right to counsel, I will allow him to communicate and confer with a lawyer of his
choice. But if he says none because he is unlettered or uninformed, I am under no moral or legal
obligation to help him because, standing mute, he has no right to counsel." The absurdity so implicit
in these words strikes terror in me at the same time that it saddens me, for it not only denies the poor
and the unschooled the equal protection of the laws but also inflicts a horrendous indignity on them
solely because of their poverty, ignorance or illiteracy. The cogent remark of the late Senator
Mariano Jesus Cuenco, truly a man of wisdom and experience, when Republic Act 1083 as a bill was
under discussion in the Senate, that a detained person in every custodial interrogation should, under
the proposed amendment, be informed beforehand of his right to counsel, was therefore not a mere
wisp of wind, but was indeed a warning most pregnant with meaning. The statement by the majority
that Cuenco's remark reflects only his personal opinion is too simplistic.

Twenty centuries ago, our Lord Jesus Christ articulated the first recorded concept of social justice
when he admonished his disciples that "the poor will always be with you." Two decades ago President
Ramon Magsaysay expressed the concept of social justice in his own phrase: "He who has less in life
should have more in law." And President Ferdinand E. Marcos, expounding his own concept of a
"compassionate society," has only one emphasis: the balancing of the scales between the affluent
and the poor. The meaning given by the majority to the second paragraph of article 125 not only
completely denignates all concepts of social justice I have imbibed, for it accords the right to
counsel in custodial interrogation only to an informed few and denies it to the great masses of the
nation, but also would result in a grossly uneven and largely fortuitous application of the law.

I regard as intolerable in a civilized nation, which proclaims equal justice under law as one of its
ideals, that any man should be handicapped when he confronts police agencies because of the
happenstance that he is poor, underprivileged, unschooled or uninformed. The majority
interpretation does violence to the democratic tradition of affording the amplest protection to the
individual — any and every individual — against the tyranny of any governmental agency. It should
be unthinkable that an innocent man may be condemned to penal servitude or even sent to his
death because he is not blessed with familiarity with the intricacies of the law.

I am thus of the firm view that the second paragraph of article 125 makes it an obligation on the part
of any detaining officer to inform the person detained of his right to counsel before the very
inception of custodial inquest, and that this obligation was made a statutory one as early as in the
year 1954. So I consider it an error to say that Section 20 of Article IV of the 1973 Constitution granted,
for the first time, the right to counsel to a person under custodial interrogation.

Without making any reference to the minutes of any proceedings of the 1971 Constitutional
Convention, Justice Fernandez, who himself was a Delegate to the said convention, attests that the
Convention articulated the Miranda- Escobedo doctrine of the United States Supreme Court, as a
"new right" granted to detained person, in Section 20 of Article IV of the 1973 Constitution. He cites
the submission by Delegate de Guzman of the draft of the said Section 20 to the October 26, 1972
meeting of the 17-man committee of the Steering Council of the Convention at which time
"Delegate Leviste expressly made of record that 'we are adopting here the ruling of the US Supreme
Court in the Miranda-Escobedo cases.' " This sketchy statement is all the advertence made by Justice
Fernandez to the proceedings of the 1971 Constitutional Convention upon the issue at bar.
Considering the curiously remarkable paucity of the discussion made by Justice Fernandez, I am at a
loss to determine whether the delegates who had anything to do with the draft of Section 20 of
Article IV knew at all of the existence of the second paragraph of article 125, or, if they were aware
of its existence, whether they really knew what the paragraph meant and signified vis-a-vis the
Miranda-Escobedo doctrine. I am more inclined to believe that the delegates, if indeed they were
aware of the existence of the said second paragraph, completely overlooked it, or chose to consider
it as at par with the Miranda-Escobedo doctrine and decided to elevate it to the primacy of a
constitutional mandate, the better to insulate it from the passing frenzies of temporary majorities.

2. The concurring opinion notes that "in most areas, police investigators are without modern and
sophisticated instruments for criminal investigation. Many grave felonies have been unsolved
because of the absence or unavailability of witnesses. In such cases it is obvious that the custodial
interrogation of suspects would furnish the only means of solving the crime." That most of our police
agencies are superannuated, is undeniable. But I am amused, and also at the same time outraged,
by the implication therefrom that "custodial interrogation of suspects," in such an environment,
"would furnish the only means of solving the crime." If I understand the size and shape of this
implication, Justice Antonio is of the opinion that until our police agencies are freed from the
confining limits of their antiquated methods and ancient equipment, custodial interrogation of
detained persons, without the benefit of counsel, would "furnish the only means of solving" crimes in
this jurisdiction. The validity of this view is of course to be seriously doubted. Conversely, does this
mean that if a detained person has the assistance of counsel, custodial interrogation would cease to
be an effective means of solving the crime?

I hold no brief against custodial interrogation per se. But I do entertain mortal fear that when a
detained person is subjected, without the assistance of counsel, to custodial interrogation by peace
officers, official lawlessness could be the rule and not the exception. Witness the innumerable cases
in the annals of adjudication where this Court has set at naught and declared inadmissible
confessions obtained from detained persons thru official lawlessness. It is a verity in the life of our
nation that people without influence and without stature in society have, more often than not, been
subjected to brutal and brutalizing third-degree methods, if not actually framed, by many police
agencies in this country. Instead of blinking our eyes shut to this reality, we must recognize it for what
it is.

I am completely conscious of the need for a balancing of the interests of society with the rights and
freedoms of the individual. I have advocated the balancing-of-interests rule in all situations which call
for an appraisal of the interplay of connecting interests of consequential dimensions. But I reject any
proposition that would blindly uphold the interests of society at the sacrifice of the dignity of any
human being.

3. I do not ascribe any significance to the statement made by this Court in People vs. Jose that an
extra-judicial confession given without the assistance of counsel is not necessarily inadmissible in
evidence. This ruling, if it can be construed as a ruling, is, to my mind, unmitigated obiter, since it was
absolutely unnecessary to the Court's affirmance of the conviction of the accused in People vs. Jose.
If one were to read critically and with discernment the entire decision in People vs. Jose, one would
inescapably see it crystal-clear that the conviction of the accused was based entirely on the
inculpating declarations in court of the offended party Maggie de la Riva. Their conviction was a
necessary consequence not because of their confessions but in spite of them.

4. If I understand my jurisprudence in criminal adjective law, it would appear to me that an extra-

judicial confession, of and by itself alone, has never been regarded as a proper basis for conviction. I
am not aware of any decision of this Court which affirmed the conviction of an accused solely and
exclusively on the basis of his written confession obtained during custodial interrogation. To the
contrary, my abiding impression is that extra-judicial confessions have been adduced in criminal trials
as mere corroboration of other evidence independently establishing the guilt of the accused. Courts
have generally been reluctant to convict on the strength of extra-judicial confessions alone. This is
quite understandable. Judges generally recognize human frailties and know the realities of life, and
one of these realities is that many police agencies have been prone, as a most facile way out of their
inadequacies, to extract confessions by force from detained persons during custodial interrogation.
This is why in the process of adjudication in criminal cases, courts have invariably required
presentation of evidence of guilt other than and independent of the extra-judicial confession of the
accused.

I cannot comprehend the apprehension of some of my brethren that a retrospective application of

the particular provision of Section 20 of Article IV of the 1973 Constitution relating to the inadmissibility
of a confession obtained from a detained person during custodial interrogation without the
assistance of counsel, would, in the language of the majority opinion, "have a great unsettling effect
in the administration of justice in this country," and, in the phrase of the concurring opinion, "have an
impact upon the administration of criminal law so devastating as to need no elaboration." Giving
due allowance for the hyperbolic and rather extravagant expressions used, I say that the Court need
not entertain such fears, which indeed are more fancied than real. If and when called upon to
review any criminal conviction since June 15, 1954, the Court need merely examine the record for
independent credible evidence, other than the extra-judicial confession of the accused, proving
guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Indeed, the Court has always regarded extra-judicial confessions as
merely and essentially corroborative in nature, never as primary or exclusive inculpating proof.

Perhaps, my brethren may not begrudge this paraphrase of Justice William Douglas as a conclusion
to this dissent: the rights of none are safe unless the rights of all are protected; even if we should sense
no danger to our own rights because we belong to a group that is informed, important and
respected, we must always recognize that any code of fair play is also a code for the less fortunate.

TEEHANKEE, J., dissenting:

I am constrained to dissent from the valedictory main opinion of Mr. Justice Estanislao A. Fernandez
ruling that confessions obtained during custodial interrogation from a detained person without the
assistance of counsel before the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution on January 17, 1973 1 are
admissible in evidence against the accused at his trial although he had not been duly informed of his
right to remain silent and to counsel. Such ruling, to my mind, is in violation of the plain and
unqualified mandate of the Constitution that such confessions are invalid and inadmissible in
evidence.

Section 20 of the Bill of Rights (Article IV) of the 1973 Constitution explicitly provides (as against its one-
sentence counterpart provision in the 1935 Constitution2 ) that têñ.£îhqwâ£

SEC. 20. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. Any person under investigation
for the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be
informed of such right. No force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the
free will shall be used against him. Any confession obtained in violation of this section shall be
inadmissible in evidence.

The main opinion concedes that "a confession obtained from a person under investigation for the
commission of an offense who has not been informed of his right (to silence) and to counsel, is
inadmissible in evidence if the same had been obtained after the effectivity of the New Constitution
on January 17, 1973."3

I fail to see, however, any valid basis for distinguishing such invalid confessions obtained before the
effectivity of the New Constitution from those obtained afterwards and the main opinion's ruling that
conversely such confessions obtained before are to be held admissible in evidence against the
accused.

1. The Constitution now expressly protects "a person under investigation for the commission of an
offense" from the overwhelming power of the State and from official abuse and lawlessness and
guarantees that he "shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel and to be informed of such
right." In order to give force and meaning to the constitutional guarantee, it flatly outlaws the
admission of any confession obtained from a person under investigation who has not been afforded
his right to silence and counsel and to be informed of such right. There is no room for interpretation
and the plain mandate of the Constitution expressly adopting the exclusionary rule as the only
practical means of enforcing the constitutional injunction against such confessions obtained in
violation of one's constitutional rights by outlawing their admission and thereby removing the
incentive on the part of state and police officers to disregard such rights (in the same manner that
the exclusionary rule bars admission of illegally seized evidence4 ) should be strictly enforced. What
the plain language of the Constitution says is beyond the power of the courts to change or modify.

2. The outlawing of all such confessions is plain, unqualified and without distinction whether the
invalid confession be obtained before or after the effectivity of the Constitution. The Court is called
upon to enforce the plain mandate of the Constitution outlawing the admission of such invalid
confessions. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemus.

3. Stated otherwise, the Constitution has now given full substance and meaning to the
fundamental right recognized by all civilized states that no person shall be compelled to be a witness
against himself by placing confessions obtained without counsel in the same category as coerced
confessions (whether the coercion be physical, mental or emotional5 ) and they are therefore
deemed null and void and expressly declared to be inadmissible in evidence. Such confessions
obtained without counsel stand discredited and outlawed by mandate of the Constitution.
ACCORDINGLY, and in line with the views herein expressed, I join Justices Castro and Fernando (who
have extensively expounded on the history and rationale of the rule) in voting for the unqualified
application of the exclusionary rule to confessions obtained without counsel before the effectivity of
the 1973 Constitution but only thereafter sought to be admitted in evidence against the accused
and for the rejection of the confessions in the cases at bar.

FERNANDO, J., dissenting:

It is the difficulty, rather marked in my case, of reconciling the policy of the Constitution regarding the
admissibility of confessions obtained during custodial interrogation, as set forth in language forthright
and categorical, that precludes my yielding conformity to the conclusion reached by my brethren.
Regretfully, with recognition and awareness of the plausibility from its basic approach that
characterizes the lucid and exhaustive opinion of Justice Fernandez, I must dissent. My starting point
is the recognition of the power of the Constitutional Convention to impose conditions that must be
fulfilled before a duty is cast on a court to allow a confession to form part of the records of the case
and that such power was in fact exercised. So I read the last sentence of the provision in question:
"Any confession obtained in violation of this section shall he inadmissible in evidence."1 The words
cannot be any clearer. A judge is bereft of the competence, even if he were so minded, to impress
with admissibility any confession unless the person under investigation was informed of his right to
remain silent and his right to counsel.2 Absent such a showing, whatever statement or admission was
obtained during such stage of custodial interrogation is a worthless piece of paper. So the
Constitution commands. It speaks in no uncertain terms from and after January 17, 1973 when it
became effective. The crucial date is not when the confession was obtained, but when it was sought
to be offered in evidence. Parenthetically, such a mode of viewing the issue would indicate the
irrelevancy of the question of prospectivity. To repeat, there is no imprecision in the terminology of
the fundamental law. It is quite emphatic in its choice of the phrase, "inadmissible in evidence." This
then is, for me at least, one of those cases where, to paraphrase Justice Moreland, the judicial task is
definitely indicated, its first and fundamental duty being to apply the law with the Constitution at the
top rung in the hierarchy of legal norms. Interpretation therefore comes in only after it has been
demonstrated that application is impossible or inadequate without its aid.3

Assume, however, that the need for construction is unavoidable, it is my submission that the
compulsion exerted by the specific wording of the above provision, its historical background with
particular reference to the explicit adoption of the Philippines of the Miranda decision4 of the United
States Supreme Court and the policy to be pursued in line with the avowed objective to vitalize
further the rights of an accused, the present Constitution reflecting, to borrow from Frankfurter, a
more progressive standard of criminal justice, calls for a decision other than that reached by the
Court. Hence this dissent.

1. The authoritative force inherent in the specific language employed by the Constitution is a
fundamental rule of construction. As was expressed in J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure
Administration:5 "We do not of course stop there, but that is where we begin. It is to be assumed that
the words in which constitutional provisions are couched express the objective sought to be attained.
They are to be given ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed in which case
the significance thus attached to them prevails. ... What it says according to the text of the provision
to be construed compels acceptance and negates the power of the courts to alter it, based on the
postulate that the framers and the people mean what they say. Thus there are cases where the need
for construction is reduced to a minimum."6 I am of the belief that this is one of them. The provision, to
my mind, leaves no doubt as to what is intended. Its meaning is crystal-clear. I fail to discern any
ambiguity. What it prohibits then cannot be countenanced its categorical wording should control.
No confession contrary to its tenor is admissible after January 17, 1973. That conclusion I find
inescapable.

2. Even if there were less certitude in its wording, the conclusion, to my mind, would not be any
different. So it must be, if we pay heed to history, one of the extrinsic aids to constitutional
construction. This is to acknowledge, in the terminology of Cardozo, the force of tradition.7 It is to
defer to what has been aptly termed by Holmes "the felt necessities of the time."8 To recall Justice
Tuason, the state of affairs existing when the Constitution was framed as reflected in the operative
principles of law is not to be
ignored. 9 It supplies the needed illumination when things are shrouded in mist. Such is not the case
at all, as was made clear in the preceding paragraph. Even if it were so, the trend of authoritative
decisions of recent date is unmistakable. Confessions are carefully scrutinized and if, in the language
of People v. Bagasala, 1O suffering in any wise from "coercion whether physical, mental, or
emotional" are impressed "with inadmissibility."11 The opinion continues: "What is essential for its
validity is that it proceeds from the free will of the person confessing."12 It is not just a happy
coincidence that Bagasala was promulgated on May 31, 1971, one day before the Constitutional
Convention met. In March of 1972, while it was in session, this Court in a unanimous opinion by Justice
Makasiar in People v. Imperio l3 rejected confessions on a showing of circumstances neutralizing their
"voluntary character."14 The next month, in People v. Urro,15 cited in the opinion of the Court, Justice
Teehankee as ponente stressed: "A coerced confession 'stands discredited in the eyes of the law and
is as a thing that never existed.'"16 Further: "In any case, the most painstaking scrutiny must be
resorted to by the trial courts in weighing evidence relating to alleged voluntary confessions of the
accused and the courts should be slow to accept such confessions unless they are corroborated by
other testimony."17 Nothing is clearer therefore than that during the period this provision was under
consideration by the Convention, the juridical atmosphere was permeated by healthy skepticism, at
times downright distrust, whenever confessions were relied upon by the prosecution, there being an
insistence, as was but proper, that they should be unmarred by any taint of impairment of will. So it
has been from the later sixties.18

To complete the picture, just shortly before the parties in Magtoto and Simeon, were heard in oral
argument, in the closing days of November, 1973, in People v.
Saligan,19 Justice Castro could speak thus for a unanimous Court: "It is worthy of note that the trial
fiscal was in the correct frame of mind when he recognized the importance of demonstrating the
culpability of the defendant by evidence, apart from the latter's plea of guilty. Unfortunately,
however, the fiscal did not follow through. His offer of the extrajudicial confession of the defendant as
evidence of the latter's guilt and the trial court's admission thereof do not afford us comfort in the
discharge of our task. For, having rejected judicial confession of guilt of the defendant (his plea of
guilty) on the ground that the manner of his arraignment does not exclude the possibility of
improvidence in its entry, we can do no less with regard to his extrajudicial confession, the same not
having been properly identified nor shown to have been freely and voluntarily executed."20

Thus is the indispensability of proof of the voluntariness of a confession underscored in a decision

rendered after the effectivity of the Constitution. To repeat, even if the applicable provision were not
free from doubt as to its literal command, history, I would think, supplies the answer. It sustains the
plea for inadmissibility. .

3. Reference to the epochal American Supreme Court decision in Miranda v. Arizona21 is not amiss.
The issue therein raised concerned the admissibility of statements from an individual under police
custody, considering that under such a time and under the stress of such conditions, he would be
hard put not to admit incriminatory matters. The American Supreme Court, through Chief Justice
Warren, held that such statements made during the period of custodial interrogation to be admissible
require a clear, intelligent waiver of constitutional rights, the suspect being warned prior to
questioning that he has a right to remain silent, that any utterance may be used against him, and
that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed. The Miranda
doctrine as set forth in Chief Justice Warren's opinion, is to this effect: "Our holding will be spelled out
with some specificity in the pages which follow but briefly stated it is this: the prosecution may use
statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the
defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege
against self-incrimination. By custodial interrogation, we mean questioning initiated by law
enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his
freedom of action in any significant way. As for the procedural safeguards to be employed, unless
other fully effective means are devised to inform accused persons of their right of silence and to
assure a continuous opportunity to exercise it, the following measures are required. Prior to any
questioning, the person must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he
does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an
attorney, either retained or appointed. The defendant may waive effectuation of those rights,
provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. If, however, he indicates in any
manner and at any stage of the process that he wishes to consult with an attorney before speaking
there can be no questioning. Likewise, if the individual is alone and indicates in any manner that he
does not wish to be interrogated, the police may not question him. The mere fact that he may have
answered some questions or volunteered some statements on his own does not deprive him of the
right to refrain from answering any further inquiries until he has consulted with an attorney and
thereafter consents to be questioned."22 The delegates to the Constitutional Convention, many of
them lawyers, were familiar with this ruling announced in 1966. Concerned as they were with vitalizing
the right against self-incrimination, they advisedly used words that render unmistakable the adoption
of the Miranda doctrine. It would be then, in my opinion, to betray lack of fidelity to the objective
thus revealed if any other interpretation were accorded this provision than that of conformity to its
express terms. No juridical difficulty is posed by this Court's holding in People v. Jose, 23 decided in
1971, that rejected the applicability of the Miranda doctrine. Precisely it must have been partly the
dissatisfaction by the Constitutional Convention with the doctrine announced that led to its inclusion
with its express prohibition against the admission of confessions so tainted, without any qualification
as to when it was obtained. All that it means then is that henceforth People v. Jose and the latter
case of People v. Paras24 are bereft of any persuasive force. This is so not because of a change of
judicial attitude but because of the express language of the present Constitution.25

4. Now as to the question of policy. It is submitted, with respect, that the interpretation adopted by
the Court affords less than hospitable scope to a categorical command of the present Constitution
without, to my way of thinking, deriving support from any overriding consideration from the
standpoint of an efficient administration of justice. Would it not amount then to frustrating the evident
end and aim of such constitutional safeguard? For it does appear that the Convention, in
manifesting its will, had negated any assumption that criminal prosecution would thereby be
needlessly hampered. The memorandum of Solicitor General Estelito Mendoza and Assistant Solicitor
General Vicente Mendoza, commendable for its thoroughness, cites an American leading decision,
McNabb v. United States.26 It does not lend support to their plea, which merited the approval of my
brethren. It is a blade that cuts both ways. Witness these words in the opinion of Justice Frankfurter:
"Legislation such as this, requiring that the police must with reasonable promptness show legal cause
for detaining arrested persons, constitutes an important safeguard - not only in assuring protection for
the innocent but also in securing conviction of the guilty by methods that commend themselves to a
progressive and self-confident society. For this procedural requirement checks resort to those
reprehensible practices known as the 'third degree' which, though universally rejected as
indefensible, still find their way into use. It aims to avoid all the evil implications of secret interrogation
of persons accused of crime. It reflects not a sentimental but a sturdy view of law enforcement. It
outlaws easy but self-defeating ways in which brutality is substituted for brains as an instrument of
crime detection."27

So I would view the matter and thus reach a conclusion different from that of the Court. This is not to
discount the possibility that it may be a little more difficult to obtain convictions. Such a misgiving
informs the prevailing opinion. It seems to me, again with due respect, that a reaction of that sort,
while not groundless, may have an element that goes beyond the bounds of permissible
exaggeration. Even if, as I would have it, the confessions in question are deemed inadmissible in
accordance with the specific wording of the provision under scrutiny, it does not follow that the
efforts of the prosecution are effectively stymied. It would be, to my way of thinking, an undeserved
reflection on that arm of the government if the only way it could prove guilt is to rely on confessions,
especially so when, as is quite apparent from the early sixties, the trend in judicial decisions has been
as is quite proper to scrutinize them with care to erase any lurking doubt or suspicion as to their
having been obtained by coercion, either physical or psychological. Only thus may be truthfully said
that there is full respect for the constitutional mandate that no person shall be compelled to be a
witness against himself.28

5. It is by virtue of the above considerations that I am compelled to differ. Certainly this is not to
imply lack of awareness of the merits of the opinion of the Court. It is only that for me the
countervailing considerations are much more persuasive. There is the apprehension that to postpone
the effectivity of the provision in question by a construction that looks for meaning outside its borders
may at least during such time devitalize its essence. Under the circumstances then, I could not be as
one with my brethren. It is not unusual that the vote of a Justice reflects his deeply-held convictions.
Much more so in constitutional law where it can truly be said that it may not be a matter of right or
wrong but of means and ends. As was so succinctly and aptly put by Justice Malcolm: "Most
constitutional issues are determined by the court's approach to them."29 I am the first to admit then
that viewed from the inarticulate major premise, which, as pointed out by Justice Holmes, is often
decisive, of what in Packer's terminology is the Crime Control Model in the administration of criminal
statutes that I discern in the opinion of the Court, the conclusion reached is both logical and
inevitable. I am unable however to overcome what undoubtedly for some may be a predilection for
what in his value system lies at the other end of the spectrum, the Due Process Model, that for me
conduces most to an effective maintenance of the cluster of the constitutional rights of an accused
person. In the eloquent language of Justice Black: "No higher duty, no more solemn responsibility,
rests upon this Court, than that of translating into living law and maintaining this constitutional shield
deliberately planned and inscribed for the benefit of every human being subject to our Constitution -
of whatever race, creed or persuasion."30 So it will be in due time, even with this decision. Soon,
hopefully, the lower courts will no longer be confronted with confessions obtained before the
effectivity of the Constitution but offered in evidence thereafter. So with more reason, I am led to
conclude, if eventually it has to be thus, why not now?
ANTONIO, J., concurring:

The constant doctrine of this Court has always been in favor of the admissibility of statements
obtained from a defendant under police custodial interrogation where the same has been obtained
freely and voluntarily. 1 We have always held that it will suffice for the admission of an extrajudicial
confession of an accused that it appears to have been given under conditions which accredit prima
facie its admissibility, leaving the accused at liberty to show it was not voluntarily given or was
obtained by undue pressure, thus destroying its weight, 2 and that a presumption of law favors the
spontaneity and voluntariness of a statement given by the defendant in a criminal case and the
burden is upon him to destroy that presumption. 3 We have also declared that an extrajudicial
confession is not rendered inadmissible by reason of failure to caution the accused that he need not
talk and that if he does, what he says will be used against him, even though such extrajudicial
confession was under oath. 4

The concept in voluntariness seems to be used by the courts as a shorthand to refer to practices
which are repugnant to civilized standards of decency or which, under the circumstances, are
thought to apply a degree of pressure to an individual which unfairly impairs his capacity to make a
rational choice. We explained in People v. Carillo5 that "the conviction of an accused on a voluntary
extrajudicial statement in no way violates the constitutional guarantee against self-incrimination.
What the above inhibition seeks to protect is compulsory disclosure of incriminating facts. While there
could be some possible objections to the admissibility of a confession on grounds of its
untrustworthiness, such confession is never excluded as evidence on account of any supposed
violation of the constitutional immunity of the party from self-incrimination. ... The use of voluntary
confession is a universal, time-honored practice grounded on common law and expressly sanctioned
by statutes." In People v. Jose,6 a unanimous Court rejected the contention that a confession
obtained during custodial interrogation without the assistance of counsel is inadmissible,
notwithstanding the argument based on Messiah v. U.S. (377 U.S. 201), Escobedo v. Illinois (378 U.S.
478), and Miranda v. Arizona (384 U.S. 436) that the presence of counsel in an in-custody police
interrogation is an adequate protective device to make the process of interrogation conform to the
dictates of the privilege against self-incrimination. This Court declared that the right of the accused
to counsel under Article III, Section 7, paragraph (17) of the Constitution refers to proceedings before
the trial court from arraignment to rendition of the judgment, and that the only instances where an
accused is entitled to counsel before arraignment, if he so requests, are during the second stage of
the preliminary investigation. Thus, We rejected the applicability of the principles enunciated in
Messiah, Escobedo and Miranda on the ground that "the rule in the United States need not be
unquestionably adhered to in this jurisdiction, not only because it has no binding effect here, but also
because in interpreting a provision of the Constitution, the meaning attached thereto at the time of
the adoption thereof should be considered.

The law enforcement officers of the government and the courts have relied upon these doctrines
and followed their commands. Hundreds, if not thousands, of cases, were finally decided on the basis
of such doctrines. To assert, therefore, that Article IV, Section 20, of the New Constitution - which
renders any confession in violation of said section inadmissible in evidence - is a confirmation,
ratification and promulgation of a pre-existing rule, is to indulge in a historical fallacy.

II.

The purpose of requiring the presence of counsel in police custodial investigations in Section 20, of
Article IV, of the New Constitution, is to serve as an effective deterrent to lawless police action. We
cannot say that this purpose would be advanced by making the requirement retrospective. If any
misconduct had been committed by the police in connection with the taking of statements of
suspects during custodial interrogation prior to the effectivity of the New Constitution, it will not be
corrected by making this proscription retroactive.

III.

There are interests in the administration of justice and the integrity of the judicial process to consider.
To make the proscription in Article IV, Section 20, of the New Constitution retrospective would
certainly impair the effective prosecution of cases and tax to the utmost the administration of justice.
Custodial interrogation has long been recognized as an essential tool in effective law enforcement.
The detection and solution of crime is a difficult and arduous task requiring determination and
persistence on the part of all responsible officers charged with the duty of law enforcement. The line
between proper and permissible police conduct and methods that are offensive to due process is, at
best, a difficult one to draw. It must be noted that in most areas, police investigators are without
modern and sophisticated instruments for criminal investigation. Many grave felonies have been
unsolved because of the absence or unavailability of witnesses. In such cases, it is obvious that the
custodial interrogation of suspects would furnish the only means of solving the crime. It must be noted
also that the law enforcement officials of the national and local governments have heretofore
proceeded on the premise that the Constitution did not require the presence of counsel to render
admissible statements obtained during police custodial interrogations. All of the courts of the land, in
reliance on Our settled doctrines, have heretofore considered as admissible confessions obtained
freely and given voluntarily by the declarant even in the absence of counsel. To insert such
constitutional specific on cases already pending in court before the ratification of the New
Constitution may well undermine the administration of justice and the integrity of the judicial process.
Recognition of this fact should put us on guard in promulgating rules that are doctrinaire. To apply
this new rule retroactively would have an impact upon the administration of criminal law so
devastating as to need no elaboration. Exclusion of this kind of evidence in a retrospective manner
would increase the burden on the administration of justice, would overturn convictions based on fair
reliance upon existing doctrines, and would undercut efforts to restore civil order. The trial of cases
already terminated, where the main evidence consists of extrajudicial statements of accused
obtained during police custodial interrogation, would have to be re-opened. It would be idle to
expect under such circumstances that the police could still produce evidence other than those
submitted, in order that the prosecution of the case could be maintained.

IV

It is a fundamental rule in the construction of constitutions that constitutional provisions should not be
given a retrospective operation, unless that is the unmistakable intention of the words used or the
obvious design of the authors.7 In short, the rule is prospectivity; the exception, retrospectivity.

There is no indication in the language used that Section 20 of Article IV (Bill of Rights), of the New
Constitution, is intended to operate retrospectively. Note the plain language of the of the provision,
which reads:têñ.£îhqwâ£

No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. Any person under investigation for the
commission of an offense shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of
such right. No force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free will shall
be used against him. Any confession obtained in violation of this section shall be inadmissible in
evidence.

Section 8 of Article XVII (Transitory Provisions), of the New Constitution, however, provides as follows:
têñ.£îhqwâ£

All courts existing at the time of the ratification of this Constitution shall continue and exercise their
jurisdiction, until otherwise provided by law in accordance with this Constitution, and all cases
pending in said courts shall be heard, tried, and determined under the laws then in force. The
provisions of the existing Rules of Court not inconsistent with this Constitution shall remain operative
unless amended, modified, or repealed by the Supreme Court or the National Assembly. (emphasis
supplied.) .

The law existing at the time of the adoption of the New Constitution, as construed by this Court in
People v. Jose,8 considered admissible extrajudicial statements of accused obtained during
custodial interrogation, without assistance of counsel. This decision formed part of the legal system in
this jurisdiction. 9

Considered as an expression of public policy, Section 8 of Article XVII, to my mind, lays down the
guidelines to be observed by the courts in the trial and determination of cases pending at the time of
the ratification of the New Constitution. Indeed, this was necessary in view of the considerations
heretofore adverted to and to avoid confusion in the resolution of such cases, considering that there
are new rules enunciated in the New Constitution, one of which is the evidentiary exclusionary rule in
Section 20 of Article IV. To my view, with respect to those cases still pending as of January 17, 1973
(the date the New Constitution was ratified), the admissibility of the extrajudicial statements of the
accused notwithstanding its adjective character, should be decided in accordance with the
provisions of the 1935 Constitution as construed in the existing jurisprudence.

The foregoing construction of Section 20 of Article IV in relation to Section 8 of Article XVII, is not only
in accord with the settled rules of statutory construction, but is an interpretation which is in
accordance with the clear provisions, spirit and intent of the Constitution.

It is, however, asserted that under Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, any incriminatory
statements given by a person detained, in the course of a police custodial interrogation, is
inadmissible in evidence, if the same is done without the assistance of the declarant's counsel. This
novel theory cannot be squared either with the clear wordings of the statutory provision or with the
existing jurisprudence on the matter. While it may be conceded that Article 125 of the Revised Penal
Code requires the detaining officer to inform the person detained the cause of his detention and of
his right, if he so desires, to communicate and confer with his counsel, it does not necessarily follow
that an additional obligation is imposed upon said officer to allow the suspect to be assisted by his
counsel during the custodial interrogation. Neither does it provide that any incriminatory statement
given by him, even if voluntary, would be inadmissible in evidence, if the same was done without the
assistance of counsel. Such a construction finds no basis in the clear and plain wordings of the
statute. Where the language of the statute is plain and unambiguous, the Court should not indulge in
speculation as to the probable or possible qualifications which might have been in the mind of the
legislature.

VI

The final authority of this Court rests upon public respect for its decisions. That public respect is based
upon an image which represents this Court as declaring legal principles with an authority and
certainty that the people may place upon it their bona fide reliance and reasonable expectations.
To hold now that public officers, who have acted in justifiable reliance on Our aforecited doctrines,
have transgressed the Constitution, would certainly not strengthen public respect on the authority of
Our judgments.

Where there has been justifiable reliance on Our decisions, and those who have so relied may be
substantially harmed if retroactive effect is given, where the purpose of the new rule can be
adequately effectuated without giving it retroactive operation, or where retroactive operation might
greatly burden the administration of justice, then it is Our duty to apply the new rule prospectively.

The factual and textual bases for a contrary rule, are at best, less than compelling. Relevant is the
Court's duty to assess the consequences of Its action. More than the human dignity of the accused in
these cases is involved. There is the compelling realization that substantial interests of society may be
prejudiced by a retrospective application of the new exclusionary rule. Thus, the values reflected
transcend the individual interests of the herein accused, and involve the general security of society.
The unusual force of the countervailing considerations strengthens my conclusion in favor of
prospective application. To the extent consistent with this opinion, I, therefore, concur in the opinion
of Justice Fernandez.

Barredo and Muñoz Palma, JJ., concur.1äwphï1.ñët

Separate Opinions

CASTRO, J., dissenting:

The burden of this dissent is my considered view that the particular provision of Section 20 of Article IV
of the 1973 Constitution which invalidates a confession obtained during custodial interrogation from
a detained person who at such interrogation was not afforded the assistance of counsel, should
operate retrospectively as of June 15, 1954 when Republic Act 1083 introduced the second
paragraph of article 125 of the Revised Penal Code recognizing the right of a detained person to
counsel in any custodial inquest. I am thus distressed by, and consequently am in sharp disagreement
with, the following doctrines expostulated in the majority opinion of Justice Estanislao A. Fernandez
and in the concurring opinion of Justice Felix Q. Antonio:

(a) "Section 20, Article IV of the new Constitution granted, for the first time, to a person under
investigation for a commission of an offense, the right to counsel and to be informed of such right."

(b) "In most areas, police investigators are without modern and sophisticated instruments for
criminal investigation. Many grave felonies have been unsolved because of the absence or
unavailability of witnesses. In such cases it is obvious that the custodial interrogation of suspects
would furnish the only means of solving the crime."

(c) "The law existing at the time of the adoption of the new Constitution, as construed by this Court in
People vs. Jose, considered admissible an extra-judicial statement of the accused obtained during
custodial interrogation, without assistance of counsel. This decision forms part of the legal system in
this jurisdiction."

1. The second paragraph of article 125 of the Revised Penal Code provides:têñ.£îhqwâ£

In every case the person detained shall be informed of the cause of his detention and shall be
allowed upon his request to communicate and confer at any time with his attorney or counsel.

Misreading the intendment of this provision, the majority of my brethren are of the literal view that the
"only right granted by the said paragraph to a detained person was to be informed of the cause of
his detention," and that a detained person "must make a request for him to be able to claim the right
to communicate and confer with counsel at any time." I regard this interpretation as abhorrent
because it gravely offends against the provisions of the 1935 Constitution as well as of the 1973
Constitution that guarantee equal protection of the laws to every person in the realm. I am
persuaded that only a handful of the more than forty million inhabitants of this country actually know
the provisions of the second paragraph of article 125, notwithstanding the mischievous legal fiction
that everyone is conclusively presumed to know the law. I would even venture the opinion that at
least 95% of the Filipino people are not even aware of the existence of this paragraph. As a matter of
fact, the hearing of Magtoto vs. Manguera and Simeon vs. Villaluz, it was my distinct impression that
many of those in attendance thereat, lawyers and laymen alike, became aware of the existence of
the paragraph then and only then for the first time in their lives. If many full-fledged lawyers with years
upon years of practice behind them are not aware of the said paragraph, can we expect the great
bulk of the population of the Philippines, whose experience has been limited to occasional brushes
with the uniformed "strong arm" of the law (and not with the law itself), to know of its existence? So
that in effect the majority interpretation would give the right to counsel at a custodial inquest to only
the choice few who happen to know the provisions of the law and have the courage or the temerity
to invoke it in the menacing presence of peace officers, and in the same breath deny the
beneficence of those provisions to all others. The poor, the ignorant and the illiterate who do not
know the rudiments of law would be at an overriding disadvantage as against the informed few.

An accurate paraphrase of the majority view may be stated in the following words: "If this detained
wretch asserts his right to counsel, I will allow him to communicate and confer with a lawyer of his
choice. But if he says none because he is unlettered or uninformed, I am under no moral or legal
obligation to help him because, standing mute, he has no right to counsel." The absurdity so implicit
in these words strikes terror in me at the same time that it saddens me, for it not only denies the poor
and the unschooled the equal protection of the laws but also inflicts a horrendous indignity on them
solely because of their poverty, ignorance or illiteracy. The cogent remark of the late Senator
Mariano Jesus Cuenco, truly a man of wisdom and experience, when Republic Act 1083 as a bill was
under discussion in the Senate, that a detained person in every custodial interrogation should, under
the proposed amendment, be informed beforehand of his right to counsel, was therefore not a mere
wisp of wind, but was indeed a warning most pregnant with meaning. The statement by the majority
that Cuenco's remark reflects only his personal opinion is too simplistic.

Twenty centuries ago, our Lord Jesus Christ articulated the first recorded concept of social justice
when he admonished his disciples that "the poor will always be with you." Two decades ago President
Ramon Magsaysay expressed the concept of social justice in his own phrase: "He who has less in life
should have more in law." And President Ferdinand E. Marcos, expounding his own concept of a
"compassionate society," has only one emphasis: the balancing of the scales between the affluent
and the poor. The meaning given by the majority to the second paragraph of article 125 not only
completely denignates all concepts of social justice I have imbibed, for it accords the right to
counsel in custodial interrogation only to an informed few and denies it to the great masses of the
nation, but also would result in a grossly uneven and largely fortuitous application of the law.

I regard as intolerable in a civilized nation, which proclaims equal justice under law as one of its
ideals, that any man should be handicapped when he confronts police agencies because of the
happenstance that he is poor, underprivileged, unschooled or uninformed. The majority
interpretation does violence to the democratic tradition of affording the amplest protection to the
individual — any and every individual — against the tyranny of any governmental agency. It should
be unthinkable that an innocent man may be condemned to penal servitude or even sent to his
death because he is not blessed with familiarity with the intricacies of the law.

I am thus of the firm view that the second paragraph of article 125 makes it an obligation on the part
of any detaining officer to inform the person detained of his right to counsel before the very
inception of custodial inquest, and that this obligation was made a statutory one as early as in the
year 1954. So I consider it an error to say that Section 20 of Article IV of the 1973 Constitution granted,
for the first time, the right to counsel to a person under custodial interrogation.

Without making any reference to the minutes of any proceedings of the 1971 Constitutional
Convention, Justice Fernandez, who himself was a Delegate to the said convention, attests that the
Convention articulated the Miranda- Escobedo doctrine of the United States Supreme Court, as a
"new right" granted to detained person, in Section 20 of Article IV of the 1973 Constitution. He cites
the submission by Delegate de Guzman of the draft of the said Section 20 to the October 26, 1972
meeting of the 17-man committee of the Steering Council of the Convention at which time
"Delegate Leviste expressly made of record that 'we are adopting here the ruling of the US Supreme
Court in the Miranda-Escobedo cases.' " This sketchy statement is all the advertence made by Justice
Fernandez to the proceedings of the 1971 Constitutional Convention upon the issue at bar.
Considering the curiously remarkable paucity of the discussion made by Justice Fernandez, I am at a
loss to determine whether the delegates who had anything to do with the draft of Section 20 of
Article IV knew at all of the existence of the second paragraph of article 125, or, if they were aware
of its existence, whether they really knew what the paragraph meant and signified vis-a-vis the
Miranda-Escobedo doctrine. I am more inclined to believe that the delegates, if indeed they were
aware of the existence of the said second paragraph, completely overlooked it, or chose to consider
it as at par with the Miranda-Escobedo doctrine and decided to elevate it to the primacy of a
constitutional mandate, the better to insulate it from the passing frenzies of temporary majorities.

2. The concurring opinion notes that "in most areas, police investigators are without modern and
sophisticated instruments for criminal investigation. Many grave felonies have been unsolved
because of the absence or unavailability of witnesses. In such cases it is obvious that the custodial
interrogation of suspects would furnish the only means of solving the crime." That most of our police
agencies are superannuated, is undeniable. But I am amused, and also at the same time outraged,
by the implication therefrom that "custodial interrogation of suspects," in such an environment,
"would furnish the only means of solving the crime." If I understand the size and shape of this
implication, Justice Antonio is of the opinion that until our police agencies are freed from the
confining limits of their antiquated methods and ancient equipment, custodial interrogation of
detained persons, without the benefit of counsel, would "furnish the only means of solving" crimes in
this jurisdiction. The validity of this view is of course to be seriously doubted. Conversely, does this
mean that if a detained person has the assistance of counsel, custodial interrogation would cease to
be an effective means of solving the crime?

I hold no brief against custodial interrogation per se. But I do entertain mortal fear that when a
detained person is subjected, without the assistance of counsel, to custodial interrogation by peace
officers, official lawlessness could be the rule and not the exception. Witness the innumerable cases
in the annals of adjudication where this Court has set at naught and declared inadmissible
confessions obtained from detained persons thru official lawlessness. It is a verity in the life of our
nation that people without influence and without stature in society have, more often than not, been
subjected to brutal and brutalizing third-degree methods, if not actually framed, by many police
agencies in this country. Instead of blinking our eyes shut to this reality, we must recognize it for what
it is.

I am completely conscious of the need for a balancing of the interests of society with the rights and
freedoms of the individual. I have advocated the balancing-of-interests rule in all situations which call
for an appraisal of the interplay of connecting interests of consequential dimensions. But I reject any
proposition that would blindly uphold the interests of society at the sacrifice of the dignity of any
human being.
3. I do not ascribe any significance to the statement made by this Court in People vs. Jose that an
extra-judicial confession given without the assistance of counsel is not necessarily inadmissible in
evidence. This ruling, if it can be construed as a ruling, is, to my mind, unmitigated obiter, since it was
absolutely unnecessary to the Court's affirmance of the conviction of the accused in People vs. Jose.
If one were to read critically and with discernment the entire decision in People vs. Jose, one would
inescapably see it crystal-clear that the conviction of the accused was based entirely on the
inculpating declarations in court of the offended party Maggie de la Riva. Their conviction was a
necessary consequence not because of their confessions but in spite of them.

4. If I understand my jurisprudence in criminal adjective law, it would appear to me that an extra-

judicial confession, of and by itself alone, has never been regarded as a proper basis for conviction. I
am not aware of any decision of this Court which affirmed the conviction of an accused solely and
exclusively on the basis of his written confession obtained during custodial interrogation. To the
contrary, my abiding impression is that extra-judicial confessions have been adduced in criminal trials
as mere corroboration of other evidence independently establishing the guilt of the accused. Courts
have generally been reluctant to convict on the strength of extra-judicial confessions alone. This is
quite understandable. Judges generally recognize human frailties and know the realities of life, and
one of these realities is that many police agencies have been prone, as a most facile way out of their
inadequacies, to extract confessions by force from detained persons during custodial interrogation.
This is why in the process of adjudication in criminal cases, courts have invariably required
presentation of evidence of guilt other than and independent of the extra-judicial confession of the
accused.

I cannot comprehend the apprehension of some of my brethren that a retrospective application of

the particular provision of Section 20 of Article IV of the 1973 Constitution relating to the inadmissibility
of a confession obtained from a detained person during custodial interrogation without the
assistance of counsel, would, in the language of the majority opinion, "have a great unsettling effect
in the administration of justice in this country," and, in the phrase of the concurring opinion, "have an
impact upon the administration of criminal law so devastating as to need no elaboration." Giving
due allowance for the hyperbolic and rather extravagant expressions used, I say that the Court need
not entertain such fears, which indeed are more fancied than real. If and when called upon to
review any criminal conviction since June 15, 1954, the Court need merely examine the record for
independent credible evidence, other than the extra-judicial confession of the accused, proving
guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Indeed, the Court has always regarded extra-judicial confessions as
merely and essentially corroborative in nature, never as primary or exclusive inculpating proof.

Perhaps, my brethren may not begrudge this paraphrase of Justice William Douglas as a conclusion
to this dissent: the rights of none are safe unless the rights of all are protected; even if we should sense
no danger to our own rights because we belong to a group that is informed, important and
respected, we must always recognize that any code of fair play is also a code for the less fortunate.

TEEHANKEE, J., dissenting:

I am constrained to dissent from the valedictory main opinion of Mr. Justice Estanislao A. Fernandez
ruling that confessions obtained during custodial interrogation from a detained person without the
assistance of counsel before the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution on January 17, 1973 1 are
admissible in evidence against the accused at his trial although he had not been duly informed of his
right to remain silent and to counsel. Such ruling, to my mind, is in violation of the plain and
unqualified mandate of the Constitution that such confessions are invalid and inadmissible in
evidence.

Section 20 of the Bill of Rights (Article IV) of the 1973 Constitution explicitly provides (as against its one-
sentence counterpart provision in the 1935 Constitution2 ) that têñ.£îhqwâ£

SEC. 20. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. Any person under investigation
for the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be
informed of such right. No force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the
free will shall be used against him. Any confession obtained in violation of this section shall be
inadmissible in evidence.

The main opinion concedes that "a confession obtained from a person under investigation for the
commission of an offense who has not been informed of his right (to silence) and to counsel, is
inadmissible in evidence if the same had been obtained after the effectivity of the New Constitution
on January 17, 1973."3

I fail to see, however, any valid basis for distinguishing such invalid confessions obtained before the
effectivity of the New Constitution from those obtained afterwards and the main opinion's ruling that
conversely such confessions obtained before are to be held admissible in evidence against the
accused.

1. The Constitution now expressly protects "a person under investigation for the commission of an
offense" from the overwhelming power of the State and from official abuse and lawlessness and
guarantees that he "shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel and to be informed of such
right." In order to give force and meaning to the constitutional guarantee, it flatly outlaws the
admission of any confession obtained from a person under investigation who has not been afforded
his right to silence and counsel and to be informed of such right. There is no room for interpretation
and the plain mandate of the Constitution expressly adopting the exclusionary rule as the only
practical means of enforcing the constitutional injunction against such confessions obtained in
violation of one's constitutional rights by outlawing their admission and thereby removing the
incentive on the part of state and police officers to disregard such rights (in the same manner that
the exclusionary rule bars admission of illegally seized evidence4 ) should be strictly enforced. What
the plain language of the Constitution says is beyond the power of the courts to change or modify.

2. The outlawing of all such confessions is plain, unqualified and without distinction whether the
invalid confession be obtained before or after the effectivity of the Constitution. The Court is called
upon to enforce the plain mandate of the Constitution outlawing the admission of such invalid
confessions. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemus.

3. Stated otherwise, the Constitution has now given full substance and meaning to the
fundamental right recognized by all civilized states that no person shall be compelled to be a witness
against himself by placing confessions obtained without counsel in the same category as coerced
confessions (whether the coercion be physical, mental or emotional5 ) and they are therefore
deemed null and void and expressly declared to be inadmissible in evidence. Such confessions
obtained without counsel stand discredited and outlawed by mandate of the Constitution.

ACCORDINGLY, and in line with the views herein expressed, I join Justices Castro and Fernando (who
have extensively expounded on the history and rationale of the rule) in voting for the unqualified
application of the exclusionary rule to confessions obtained without counsel before the effectivity of
the 1973 Constitution but only thereafter sought to be admitted in evidence against the accused
and for the rejection of the confessions in the cases at bar.

FERNANDO, J., dissenting:

It is the difficulty, rather marked in my case, of reconciling the policy of the Constitution regarding the
admissibility of confessions obtained during custodial interrogation, as set forth in language forthright
and categorical, that precludes my yielding conformity to the conclusion reached by my brethren.
Regretfully, with recognition and awareness of the plausibility from its basic approach that
characterizes the lucid and exhaustive opinion of Justice Fernandez, I must dissent. My starting point
is the recognition of the power of the Constitutional Convention to impose conditions that must be
fulfilled before a duty is cast on a court to allow a confession to form part of the records of the case
and that such power was in fact exercised. So I read the last sentence of the provision in question:
"Any confession obtained in violation of this section shall he inadmissible in evidence."1 The words
cannot be any clearer. A judge is bereft of the competence, even if he were so minded, to impress
with admissibility any confession unless the person under investigation was informed of his right to
remain silent and his right to counsel.2 Absent such a showing, whatever statement or admission was
obtained during such stage of custodial interrogation is a worthless piece of paper. So the
Constitution commands. It speaks in no uncertain terms from and after January 17, 1973 when it
became effective. The crucial date is not when the confession was obtained, but when it was sought
to be offered in evidence. Parenthetically, such a mode of viewing the issue would indicate the
irrelevancy of the question of prospectivity. To repeat, there is no imprecision in the terminology of
the fundamental law. It is quite emphatic in its choice of the phrase, "inadmissible in evidence." This
then is, for me at least, one of those cases where, to paraphrase Justice Moreland, the judicial task is
definitely indicated, its first and fundamental duty being to apply the law with the Constitution at the
top rung in the hierarchy of legal norms. Interpretation therefore comes in only after it has been
demonstrated that application is impossible or inadequate without its aid.3
Assume, however, that the need for construction is unavoidable, it is my submission that the
compulsion exerted by the specific wording of the above provision, its historical background with
particular reference to the explicit adoption of the Philippines of the Miranda decision4 of the United
States Supreme Court and the policy to be pursued in line with the avowed objective to vitalize
further the rights of an accused, the present Constitution reflecting, to borrow from Frankfurter, a
more progressive standard of criminal justice, calls for a decision other than that reached by the
Court. Hence this dissent.

1. The authoritative force inherent in the specific language employed by the Constitution is a
fundamental rule of construction. As was expressed in J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure
Administration:5 "We do not of course stop there, but that is where we begin. It is to be assumed that
the words in which constitutional provisions are couched express the objective sought to be attained.
They are to be given ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed in which case
the significance thus attached to them prevails. ... What it says according to the text of the provision
to be construed compels acceptance and negates the power of the courts to alter it, based on the
postulate that the framers and the people mean what they say. Thus there are cases where the need
for construction is reduced to a minimum."6 I am of the belief that this is one of them. The provision, to
my mind, leaves no doubt as to what is intended. Its meaning is crystal-clear. I fail to discern any
ambiguity. What it prohibits then cannot be countenanced its categorical wording should control.
No confession contrary to its tenor is admissible after January 17, 1973. That conclusion I find
inescapable.

2. Even if there were less certitude in its wording, the conclusion, to my mind, would not be any
different. So it must be, if we pay heed to history, one of the extrinsic aids to constitutional
construction. This is to acknowledge, in the terminology of Cardozo, the force of tradition.7 It is to
defer to what has been aptly termed by Holmes "the felt necessities of the time."8 To recall Justice
Tuason, the state of affairs existing when the Constitution was framed as reflected in the operative
principles of law is not to be
ignored. 9 It supplies the needed illumination when things are shrouded in mist. Such is not the case
at all, as was made clear in the preceding paragraph. Even if it were so, the trend of authoritative
decisions of recent date is unmistakable. Confessions are carefully scrutinized and if, in the language
of People v. Bagasala, 1O suffering in any wise from "coercion whether physical, mental, or
emotional" are impressed "with inadmissibility."11 The opinion continues: "What is essential for its
validity is that it proceeds from the free will of the person confessing."12 It is not just a happy
coincidence that Bagasala was promulgated on May 31, 1971, one day before the Constitutional
Convention met. In March of 1972, while it was in session, this Court in a unanimous opinion by Justice
Makasiar in People v. Imperio l3 rejected confessions on a showing of circumstances neutralizing their
"voluntary character."14 The next month, in People v. Urro,15 cited in the opinion of the Court, Justice
Teehankee as ponente stressed: "A coerced confession 'stands discredited in the eyes of the law and
is as a thing that never existed.'"16 Further: "In any case, the most painstaking scrutiny must be
resorted to by the trial courts in weighing evidence relating to alleged voluntary confessions of the
accused and the courts should be slow to accept such confessions unless they are corroborated by
other testimony."17 Nothing is clearer therefore than that during the period this provision was under
consideration by the Convention, the juridical atmosphere was permeated by healthy skepticism, at
times downright distrust, whenever confessions were relied upon by the prosecution, there being an
insistence, as was but proper, that they should be unmarred by any taint of impairment of will. So it
has been from the later sixties.18

To complete the picture, just shortly before the parties in Magtoto and Simeon, were heard in oral
argument, in the closing days of November, 1973, in People v.
Saligan,19 Justice Castro could speak thus for a unanimous Court: "It is worthy of note that the trial
fiscal was in the correct frame of mind when he recognized the importance of demonstrating the
culpability of the defendant by evidence, apart from the latter's plea of guilty. Unfortunately,
however, the fiscal did not follow through. His offer of the extrajudicial confession of the defendant as
evidence of the latter's guilt and the trial court's admission thereof do not afford us comfort in the
discharge of our task. For, having rejected judicial confession of guilt of the defendant (his plea of
guilty) on the ground that the manner of his arraignment does not exclude the possibility of
improvidence in its entry, we can do no less with regard to his extrajudicial confession, the same not
having been properly identified nor shown to have been freely and voluntarily executed."20

Thus is the indispensability of proof of the voluntariness of a confession underscored in a decision

rendered after the effectivity of the Constitution. To repeat, even if the applicable provision were not
free from doubt as to its literal command, history, I would think, supplies the answer. It sustains the
plea for inadmissibility. .
3. Reference to the epochal American Supreme Court decision in Miranda v. Arizona21 is not amiss.
The issue therein raised concerned the admissibility of statements from an individual under police
custody, considering that under such a time and under the stress of such conditions, he would be
hard put not to admit incriminatory matters. The American Supreme Court, through Chief Justice
Warren, held that such statements made during the period of custodial interrogation to be admissible
require a clear, intelligent waiver of constitutional rights, the suspect being warned prior to
questioning that he has a right to remain silent, that any utterance may be used against him, and
that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed. The Miranda
doctrine as set forth in Chief Justice Warren's opinion, is to this effect: "Our holding will be spelled out
with some specificity in the pages which follow but briefly stated it is this: the prosecution may use
statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the
defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege
against self-incrimination. By custodial interrogation, we mean questioning initiated by law
enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his
freedom of action in any significant way. As for the procedural safeguards to be employed, unless
other fully effective means are devised to inform accused persons of their right of silence and to
assure a continuous opportunity to exercise it, the following measures are required. Prior to any
questioning, the person must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he
does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an
attorney, either retained or appointed. The defendant may waive effectuation of those rights,
provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. If, however, he indicates in any
manner and at any stage of the process that he wishes to consult with an attorney before speaking
there can be no questioning. Likewise, if the individual is alone and indicates in any manner that he
does not wish to be interrogated, the police may not question him. The mere fact that he may have
answered some questions or volunteered some statements on his own does not deprive him of the
right to refrain from answering any further inquiries until he has consulted with an attorney and
thereafter consents to be questioned."22 The delegates to the Constitutional Convention, many of
them lawyers, were familiar with this ruling announced in 1966. Concerned as they were with vitalizing
the right against self-incrimination, they advisedly used words that render unmistakable the adoption
of the Miranda doctrine. It would be then, in my opinion, to betray lack of fidelity to the objective
thus revealed if any other interpretation were accorded this provision than that of conformity to its
express terms. No juridical difficulty is posed by this Court's holding in People v. Jose, 23 decided in
1971, that rejected the applicability of the Miranda doctrine. Precisely it must have been partly the
dissatisfaction by the Constitutional Convention with the doctrine announced that led to its inclusion
with its express prohibition against the admission of confessions so tainted, without any qualification
as to when it was obtained. All that it means then is that henceforth People v. Jose and the latter
case of People v. Paras24 are bereft of any persuasive force. This is so not because of a change of
judicial attitude but because of the express language of the present Constitution.25

4. Now as to the question of policy. It is submitted, with respect, that the interpretation adopted by
the Court affords less than hospitable scope to a categorical command of the present Constitution
without, to my way of thinking, deriving support from any overriding consideration from the
standpoint of an efficient administration of justice. Would it not amount then to frustrating the evident
end and aim of such constitutional safeguard? For it does appear that the Convention, in
manifesting its will, had negated any assumption that criminal prosecution would thereby be
needlessly hampered. The memorandum of Solicitor General Estelito Mendoza and Assistant Solicitor
General Vicente Mendoza, commendable for its thoroughness, cites an American leading decision,
McNabb v. United States.26 It does not lend support to their plea, which merited the approval of my
brethren. It is a blade that cuts both ways. Witness these words in the opinion of Justice Frankfurter:
"Legislation such as this, requiring that the police must with reasonable promptness show legal cause
for detaining arrested persons, constitutes an important safeguard - not only in assuring protection for
the innocent but also in securing conviction of the guilty by methods that commend themselves to a
progressive and self-confident society. For this procedural requirement checks resort to those
reprehensible practices known as the 'third degree' which, though universally rejected as
indefensible, still find their way into use. It aims to avoid all the evil implications of secret interrogation
of persons accused of crime. It reflects not a sentimental but a sturdy view of law enforcement. It
outlaws easy but self-defeating ways in which brutality is substituted for brains as an instrument of
crime detection."27

So I would view the matter and thus reach a conclusion different from that of the Court. This is not to
discount the possibility that it may be a little more difficult to obtain convictions. Such a misgiving
informs the prevailing opinion. It seems to me, again with due respect, that a reaction of that sort,
while not groundless, may have an element that goes beyond the bounds of permissible
exaggeration. Even if, as I would have it, the confessions in question are deemed inadmissible in
accordance with the specific wording of the provision under scrutiny, it does not follow that the
efforts of the prosecution are effectively stymied. It would be, to my way of thinking, an undeserved
reflection on that arm of the government if the only way it could prove guilt is to rely on confessions,
especially so when, as is quite apparent from the early sixties, the trend in judicial decisions has been
as is quite proper to scrutinize them with care to erase any lurking doubt or suspicion as to their
having been obtained by coercion, either physical or psychological. Only thus may be truthfully said
that there is full respect for the constitutional mandate that no person shall be compelled to be a
witness against himself.28

5. It is by virtue of the above considerations that I am compelled to differ. Certainly this is not to
imply lack of awareness of the merits of the opinion of the Court. It is only that for me the
countervailing considerations are much more persuasive. There is the apprehension that to postpone
the effectivity of the provision in question by a construction that looks for meaning outside its borders
may at least during such time devitalize its essence. Under the circumstances then, I could not be as
one with my brethren. It is not unusual that the vote of a Justice reflects his deeply-held convictions.
Much more so in constitutional law where it can truly be said that it may not be a matter of right or
wrong but of means and ends. As was so succinctly and aptly put by Justice Malcolm: "Most
constitutional issues are determined by the court's approach to them."29 I am the first to admit then
that viewed from the inarticulate major premise, which, as pointed out by Justice Holmes, is often
decisive, of what in Packer's terminology is the Crime Control Model in the administration of criminal
statutes that I discern in the opinion of the Court, the conclusion reached is both logical and
inevitable. I am unable however to overcome what undoubtedly for some may be a predilection for
what in his value system lies at the other end of the spectrum, the Due Process Model, that for me
conduces most to an effective maintenance of the cluster of the constitutional rights of an accused
person. In the eloquent language of Justice Black: "No higher duty, no more solemn responsibility,
rests upon this Court, than that of translating into living law and maintaining this constitutional shield
deliberately planned and inscribed for the benefit of every human being subject to our Constitution -
of whatever race, creed or persuasion."30 So it will be in due time, even with this decision. Soon,
hopefully, the lower courts will no longer be confronted with confessions obtained before the
effectivity of the Constitution but offered in evidence thereafter. So with more reason, I am led to
conclude, if eventually it has to be thus, why not now?

ANTONIO, J., concurring:

The constant doctrine of this Court has always been in favor of the admissibility of statements
obtained from a defendant under police custodial interrogation where the same has been obtained
freely and voluntarily.1 We have always held that it will suffice for the admission of an extrajudicial
confession of an accused that it appears to have been given under conditions which accredit prima
facie its admissibility, leaving the accused at liberty to show it was not voluntarily given or was
obtained by undue pressure, thus destroying its weight2 and that a presumption of law favors the
spontaneity and voluntariness of a statement given by the defendant in a criminal case and the
burden is upon him to destroy that presumption3 We have also declared that an extrajudicial
confession is not rendered inadmissible by reason of failure to caution the accused that he need not
talk and that if he does, what he says will be used against him, even though such extrajudicial
confession was under oath.4

The concept in voluntariness seems to be used by the courts as a shorthand to refer to practices
which are repugnant to civilized standards of decency or which, under the circumstances, are
thought to apply a degree of pressure to an individual which unfairly impairs his capacity to make a
rational choice. We explained in People v. Carillo5 that "the conviction of an accused on a voluntary
extrajudicial statement in no way violates the constitutional guarantee against self-incrimination.
What the above inhibition seeks to protect is compulsory disclosure of incriminating facts. While there
could be some possible objections to the admissibility of a confession on grounds of its
untrustworthiness, such confession is never excluded as evidence on account of any supposed
violation of the constitutional immunity of the party from self-incrimination. ... The use of voluntary
confession is a universal, time-honored practice grounded on common law and expressly sanctioned
by statutes." In People v. Jose,6 a unanimous Court rejected the contention that a confession
obtained during custodial interrogation without the assistance of counsel is inadmissible,
notwithstanding the argument based on Messiah v. U.S. (377 U.S. 201), Escobedo v. Illinois (378 U.S.
478), and Miranda v. Arizona (384 U.S. 436) that the presence of counsel in an in-custody police
interrogation is an adequate protective device to make the process of interrogation conform to the
dictates of the privilege against self-incrimination. This Court declared that the right of the accused
to counsel under Article III, Section 7, paragraph (17) of the Constitution refers to proceedings before
the trial court from arraignment to rendition of the judgment, and that the only instances where an
accused is entitled to counsel before arraignment, if he so requests, are during the second stage of
the preliminary investigation. Thus, We rejected the applicability of the principles enunciated in
Messiah, Escobedo and Miranda on the ground that "the rule in the United States need not be
unquestionably adhered to in this jurisdiction, not only because it has no binding effect here, but also
because in interpreting a provision of the Constitution, the meaning attached thereto at the time of
the adoption thereof should be considered.

The law enforcement officers of the government and the courts have relied upon these doctrines
and followed their commands. Hundreds, if not thousands, of cases, were finally decided on the basis
of such doctrines. To assert, therefore, that Article IV, Section 20, of the New Constitution - which
renders any confession in violation of said section inadmissible in evidence - is a confirmation,
ratification and promulgation of a pre-existing rule, is to indulge in a historical fallacy.

II.

The purpose of requiring the presence of counsel in police custodial investigations in Section 20, of
Article IV, of the New Constitution, is to serve as an effective deterrent to lawless police action. We
cannot say that this purpose would be advanced by making the requirement retrospective. If any
misconduct had been committed by the police in connection with the taking of statements of
suspects during custodial interrogation prior to the effectivity of the New Constitution, it will not be
corrected by making this proscription retroactive.

III.

There are interests in the administration of justice and the integrity of the judicial process to consider.
To make the proscription in Article IV, Section 20, of the New Constitution retrospective would
certainly impair the effective prosecution of cases and tax to the utmost the administration of justice.
.

Custodial interrogation has long been recognized as an essential tool in effective law enforcement.
The detection and solution of crime is a difficult and arduous task requiring determination and
persistence on the part of all responsible officers charged with the duty of law enforcement. The line
between proper and permissible police conduct and methods that are offensive to due process is, at
best, a difficult one to draw. It must be noted that in most areas, police investigators are without
modern and sophisticated instruments for criminal investigation. Many grave felonies have been
unsolved because of the absence or unavailability of witnesses. In such cases, it is obvious that the
custodial interrogation of suspects would furnish the only means of solving the crime. It must be noted
also that the law enforcement officials of the national and local governments have heretofore
proceeded on the premise that the Constitution did not require the presence of counsel to render
admissible statements obtained during police custodial interrogations. All of the courts of the land, in
reliance on Our settled doctrines, have heretofore considered as admissible confessions obtained
freely and given voluntarily by the declarant even in the absence of counsel. To insert such
constitutional specific on cases already pending in court before the ratification of the New
Constitution may well undermine the administration of justice and the integrity of the judicial process.
Recognition of this fact should put us on guard in promulgating rules that are doctrinaire. To apply
this new rule retroactively would have an impact upon the administration of criminal law so
devastating as to need no elaboration. Exclusion of this kind of evidence in a retrospective manner
would increase the burden on the administration of justice, would overturn convictions based on fair
reliance upon existing doctrines, and would undercut efforts to restore civil order. The trial of cases
already terminated, where the main evidence consists of extrajudicial statements of accused
obtained during police custodial interrogation, would have to be re-opened. It would be idle to
expect under such circumstances that the police could still produce evidence other than those
submitted, in order that the prosecution of the case could be maintained.

IV

It is a fundamental rule in the construction of constitutions that constitutional provisions should not be
given a retrospective operation, unless that is the unmistakable intention of the words used or the
obvious design of the authors.7 In short, the rule is prospectivity; the exception, retrospectivity.
There is no indication in the language used that Section 20 of Article IV (Bill of Rights), of the New
Constitution, is intended to operate retrospectively. Note the plain language of the of the provision,
which reads:têñ.£îhqwâ£

No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. Any person under investigation for the
commission of an offense shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of
such right. No force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free will shall
be used against him. Any confession obtained in violation of this section shall be inadmissible in
evidence.

Section 8 of Article XVII (Transitory Provisions), of the New Constitution, however, provides as follows:
têñ.£îhqwâ£

All courts existing at the time of the ratification of this Constitution shall continue and exercise their
jurisdiction, until otherwise provided by law in accordance with this Constitution, and all cases
pending in said courts shall be heard, tried, and determined under the laws then in force. The
provisions of the existing Rules of Court not inconsistent with this Constitution shall remain operative
unless amended, modified, or repealed by the Supreme Court or the National Assembly. (emphasis
supplied.) .

The law existing at the time of the adoption of the New Constitution, as construed by this Court in
People v. Jose,8 considered admissible extrajudicial statements of accused obtained during
custodial interrogation, without assistance of counsel. This decision formed part of the legal system in
this jurisdiction.9

Considered as an expression of public policy, Section 8 of Article XVII, to my mind, lays down the
guidelines to be observed by the courts in the trial and determination of cases pending at the time of
the ratification of the New Constitution. Indeed, this was necessary in view of the considerations
heretofore adverted to and to avoid confusion in the resolution of such cases, considering that there
are new rules enunciated in the New Constitution, one of which is the evidentiary exclusionary rule in
Section 20 of Article IV. To my view, with respect to those cases still pending as of January 17, 1973
(the date the New Constitution was ratified), the admissibility of the extrajudicial statements of the
accused notwithstanding its adjective character, should be decided in accordance with the
provisions of the 1935 Constitution as construed in the existing jurisprudence.

The foregoing construction of Section 20 of Article IV in relation to Section 8 of Article XVII, is not only
in accord with the settled rules of statutory construction, but is an interpretation which is in
accordance with the clear provisions, spirit and intent of the Constitution.

It is, however, asserted that under Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, any incriminatory
statements given by a person detained, in the course of a police custodial interrogation, is
inadmissible in evidence, if the same is done without the assistance of the declarant's counsel. This
novel theory cannot be squared either with the clear wordings of the statutory provision or with the
existing jurisprudence on the matter. While it may be conceded that Article 125 of the Revised Penal
Code requires the detaining officer to inform the person detained the cause of his detention and of
his right, if he so desires, to communicate and confer with his counsel, it does not necessarily follow
that an additional obligation is imposed upon said officer to allow the suspect to be assisted by his
counsel during the custodial interrogation. Neither does it provide that any incriminatory statement
given by him, even if voluntary, would be inadmissible in evidence, if the same was done without the
assistance of counsel. Such a construction finds no basis in the clear and plain wordings of the
statute. Where the language of the statute is plain and unambiguous, the Court should not indulge in
speculation as to the probable or possible qualifications which might have been in the mind of the
legislature.

VI

The final authority of this Court rests upon public respect for its decisions. That public respect is based
upon an image which represents this Court as declaring legal principles with an authority and
certainty that the people may place upon it their bona fide reliance and reasonable expectations.
To hold now that public officers, who have acted in justifiable reliance on Our aforecited doctrines,
have transgressed the Constitution, would certainly not strengthen public respect on the authority of
Our judgments.
Where there has been justifiable reliance on Our decisions, and those who have so relied may be
substantially harmed if retroactive effect is given, where the purpose of the new rule can be
adequately effectuated without giving it retroactive operation, or where retroactive operation might
greatly burden the administration of justice, then it is Our duty to apply the new rule prospectively.

The factual and textual bases for a contrary rule, are at best, less than compelling. Relevant is the
Court's duty to assess the consequences of Its action. More than the human dignity of the accused in
these cases is involved. There is the compelling realization that substantial interests of society may be
prejudiced by a retrospective application of the new exclusionary rule. Thus, the values reflected
transcend the individual interests of the herein accused, and involve the general security of society.
The unusual force of the countervailing considerations strengthens my conclusion in favor of
prospective application. To the extent consistent with this opinion, I, therefore, concur in the opinion
of Justice Fernandez.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. GAPASIN

G.R. No. L-52017 October 27, 1986

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
PEPITO GAPASIN and CALIXTO MATIAS, accused- appellants.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Gonzalo Gonzales counsel de oficio for accused-appellants.

PER CURIAM:
This is an automatic review of the decision of the Court of First Instance of Isabela, Roxas branch,
finding Pepito Gapasin and Calixto Matias guilty of robbery with homicide and rape and sentencing
them "to suffer the extreme penalty of death, to indemnify Loreta Bernardo de Leon of P6,000.00, and
the amount of P12,000.00 for the death of Eusebio de Leon, and to pay the amount of P1,733.00,
without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency . . . 1
The prosecution evidence shows that at about 8 o'clock in the evening of July 23, 1972, in Barrio
Sinamar, Roxas, Isabela, the spouses Eusebio de Leon, 35, and Loreta Bernardo de Leon, 30, were in
bed with their two children, Marilou, aged 2 years, and Perlina, aged 5 months. 2 Hearing a knock at
the door, Eusebio peeped through the door of their elevated one storey hut. He saw six [6] armed
men in civilian clothes, who after Identifying themselves as members of Task Force Lawin in pursuit of
gamblers, asked for drinking water ["Makiinom kame man pare?"]. Out of fear, Eusebio invited them
into the house. Four persons came up while the others remained downstairs. Loreta could hear them
murmuring.3
The house was illuminated by two [2] kerosene lamps. The four men who entered were armed with
pistols. One had a moustache or a beard. After drinking water, they asked for food. Eusebio told his
wife, Loreta, to cook rice. 4
While the men were eating, the fifth member of the group came up and joined them. He was
wearing a hat and his mouth was covered with a handkerchief. He removed his hat. As he started to
eat, his mask slipped off. In the light, Loreta quickly recognized him as Pepito Gapasin, a former
barriomate. 5
After they had eaten, the men invited Eusebio to accompany them because they were after
gamblers. 6
Loreta remained behind. While waiting for her husband's return, she heard someone under the house
say: "You just sleep, Ading." 7 After a while she heard footsteps around the house and someone
entering through the back door. As she tried to get out through another door, she was grabbed from
behind and a hand was clamped hard on her mouth. She bit the hand and was hit on the head with
a gun. Someone cursed her and threatened to slice her neck. Another man brandished his knife at
her and in the process nicked the bridge of her nose which bled a little. While holding a knife at her,
the intruders demanded the proceeds of the tobacco sale. 8
It appears that ten [10] days earlier, or on July 13th, Eusebio and Loreta had sold some tobacco from
their farm for P2,000. P700 of that amount was used to buy a female carabao while the rest of the
money was kept inside their house. 9
The intruders, numbering three, were the same ones who had earlier brought Loreta's husband down
from the house, but this time Eusebio was not with them. 10 They tied Loreta's hands at her back and
threatened to kill her If she did not disclose to them where the money was.
Intimidated by the threat, Loreta motioned towards the aparador which the men then opened with
a key taken from the wall. They took P1,500 and P30 in old coins, several pieces of clothing belonging
to her husband and two wrist-watches. 11 After taking said articles from the aparador, the men turned
to Loreta and removed her pants. They could not remove her house because her hands were tied.
They then dragged her downstairs. 12 It was at this point that Loreta saw Pepito Gapasin
again and recognized Calixto Matias, also a former barriomate. 13 Gapasin and Matias joined the
three men and together they took Loreta to a working hut on a hill, about two kilometers east of her
house. 14 Inside the hut, three men raped her, one after another. One of the rapists was Gapasin.
Matias, who was present, stood watch but did not touch her. 15
After ravishing Loreta, the three men untied her hands and left. She then returned to her house,
washed her private parts, dressed up and sought help. She went to Tony Salagubang, her nearest
neighbor, but there was no response. So she repaired to her house, gathered her two children and
brought them over to her mother's house. 16 From there she proceeded to the house of Victoriano
[Hermogenes] Villegas, the barrio-councilman who lived about 100 meters away. It was then about
two in the morning of July 24th. She recounted to Villegas that they were robbed and that her
husband was gone. 17 She also told him that Gapasin was one of the culprits. 18 With some barrio
officials and rural policemen, Villegas went to the mayor, who in turn, called on the Philippine
Constabulary for assistance. They an then proceeded to the house of Loreta. 19
Under a tree about 700 meters from the De Leon house, they found the lifeless body of Eusebio. He-
was lying flat on his belly and his hands were tied. 20 An autopsy performed by the municipal health
officer at 10:30 of that same morning showed the cause of death as "intra-cranial hemorrhage and
shock resulting from fracture of the left temporal bone." In addition, there were extensive contusions
and bruises on the left side of the neck and face., Both wrists and ankles bore rope imprints. The fatal
wound, "slightly curved, about 2 inches long, 3/4 inch wide and 3/8 inch deep, situated on the upper
portion of the left temporal region and fracturing the left temporal bone," was caused by a blunt
instrument which could be a piece of wood or the butt of a gun. 21
Meanwhile, Loreta went to the Roxas Emergency Hospital for medical examination. The medical
report showed that her vagina was torn at the 12:27 position but was negative for seminal fluid. 22
Loreta, a high school graduate, was investigated by PC Sergeant Lamorena in the morning of July 24,
1972. 23Accoring to Sergeant Lamorena, Loreta identified Calixto Matias alias Calis and Pepito
Gapasin, both residents of Barrio Rangayan. She said that they were her former barriomates in
Sinamar. 24 Sergeant Lamorena immediately conducted a search for the two suspects but only
Gapasin was apprehended. He was confined in the PC stockade.
Sergeant Lamorena indorsed the case to Chief of Police Saludares and during their joint
investigation, Gapasin was brought before Loreta who then positively Identified him as one of those
who killed her husband and robbed and abused her. She said she could recognize the others who
were with Gapasin if they were presented to her.
In the course of the investigation, the questions propounded by Saludares to Loreta in Ilocano which
she answered also in Ilocano were translated into English and reduced into writing which Loreta then
signed and swore to before Municipal Judge Alfredo Mabbayad, after the latter had read the
contents to her. 25
Gapasin, 37, a farmer and an illiterate, also executed a sworn statement before Sergeant Lamorena
on July 24, 1972 wherein he implicated Calixto Matias. 26 He stated that at about 6:00 in the
afternoon of July 23, 1972, Matias came over to his house in Barrio Rangayan with Modesto Viado
and one called Miling and another whose name he did not know. They invited him to rob and kill one
alias Marcos of Sinamar because Marcos was the enemy of Matias. Eusebio de Leon was known in
the locality as Marcos. Gapasin declined to go with Matias that he was warned that he and his
family would be killed if he reported the matter to the authorities.
Matias, 35, also a farmer, was not investigated by Sergeant Lamorena at that time because he was
at large. He was apprehended only on December 14, 1972. 27
A criminal complaint dated August 25, 1972 was filed by the chief of police in the municipal court of
Roxas against Rodolfo Javillonar [Miling], Pepito Gapasin, Calixto Matias, Juanito Lactao, Pedro
Tamayo, Romeo Menor, Jaime Rosete and several John Does for the crime of robbery with homicide
and rape. 28
On September 15, 1972, Judge Mabbayad issued an order discharging Lactao, Tamayo, Menor and
Rosete from the complaint due to lack of evidence. He likewise ordered the arrest and confinement
of Gapasin, Modesto Viado, Matias and Javillonar. 29 However, 'Viado and Javillonar remained at
large. On December 22, 1972, Judge Mabbayad indorsed the criminal case to the Court of First
Instance of Isabela for the proper proceedings., 30 On 'March 6, 1973, the provincial fiscal filed an
information accusing Pepito Gapasin and Calixto Matias of the crime of robbery with homicide and
rape committed as follows:
That on or about the 23rd day of July, 1972, in the municipality of Roxas, province of Isabela,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the herein accused, together with
Modesto Viado and Rodolfo Javillonar, who are still at large, and John Doe, whose real Identity is still
unknown, conspiring and confederating together and all helping one another, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent of gain and by means of intimidation and violence
against persons, ransack a cabinet, take, steal and carry away from the dwelling of the spouses
Eusebio de Leon and Loreta de Leon cash in the amount of P1,500.00; transistorized radio, valued at
P150.00; one [ill sweater, valued at P30.00; and assorted clothings, [sic] valued at P53.00, all
belonging to the spouses Eusebio de Leon and Loreta de Leon, against their will and consent, to the
damage and prejudice of said spouses in the total amount of P1,733.00, Philippine Currency; that on
the occasion of said robbery and for the purpose of enabling them to take, steal and carry away the
above mentioned cash money and articles, the herein accused, in pursuance of their conspiracy,
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with evident premeditation and taking
advantage of their number and strength and with intent to kill, treacherously assault, attack and use
personal violence upon Eusebio de Leon, by then and there giving him several blows with blunt
instruments on the different parts of his body, which directly caused his death due to intracranial
hemorrhage and shock resulting from the fracture of the left temporal bone, and that further on the
occasion of the said robbery with homicide, three [3] of the herein accused, in pursuance of their
conspiracy did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, by means of force, have sexual
intercourse with Loreta de Leon one after the other, against the latter's will and consent. 31
Gapasin and Matias pleaded not guilty when separately arraigned. At the trial they interposed the
defense of alibi. Their version is as follows:
On the night of July 23, 1972 up to the early morning of July 24, 1972, Gapasin was in his house in
Barrio Rangayan, Mallig, Isabela, with his wife, Florentina Acosta, and their eight [8] children. 32 He
never left the place during the period as testified by his wife and his daughter, Leticia
Gapasin. 33 Barrio Rang-ayan is about three kilometers from Sinamar, the scene of the crime. There is
a river in between which is passable in the month of July. Pathways occasionally used by bullcarts
connect the two barrios.
Testifying in his own behalf, Gapasin stated that he was forced to give a statement 34 on July 24, 1972
because he had been tortured and maltreated by soldiers inside the PC barracks where he was
detained for four [4] hours. 35 He informed Judge Mabbayad that he had to affix his thumbmark to
that statement "just so that it will be finished. 36 Judge Mabbayad had noticed that Gapasin had a
contusion on his face and appeared "a little bit nervous" but he did not ask why. 37
Gapasin was acquainted with Loreta de Leon and her de- ceased husband because they were his
former neighbors in Sinamar. 38 They had no quarrel and even up to the time he left to live in Rang-
ayan, they were on speaking terms. He admitted that although his nickname in Sinamar was Peping,
he was jokingly referred to as Caut. 39
On the night of the crime, July 23, 1972, Calixto Matias was playing "pepito" in the house of Alfredo
Gumaru in Rang-ayan. It was supposedly a benefit game to raise funds for the school in the area.
Gumaru was a rural policeman, who, with Domingo Bagaoisan, the tong collector, testified that they,
continuously watched the game from 4:00 p.m. of July 23 up to 7:00 a.m. the following day. They
stated that during that entire period, Matias never left U the place. 40
On October 1, 1979, the trial court found the two accused guilty as charged and sentenced them to
death. Hence, this mandatory review.
In their brief, accused-appellants averred that the lower court erred in not setting aside the
"confession" of Gapasin on constitutional grounds, in giving full credence to the testimony of Loreta
de Leon and in not acquitting them on reasonable doubt.
Counsel for the accused-appellants contends that Gapasin's extrajudicial statement on July 24,
1972 41 should not have been received in evidence against him because it was given under duress
and without the benefit of counsel.
The argument is untenable. It has been held in several cases that statements obtained before the
1973 Constitution from a person under interrogation for commission of an offense although in the
absence of counsel are admissible in evidence against him, the reason being that the provisions of
section 20, Article IV of the Constitution cannot be given retroactive effect. 42 Moreover, any
repudiation on account of force will not necessarily negate the confession unless accompanied by
evidence of injury or medical examination to bolster the claim that force was indeed employed to
obtain the confession.
Gapasin stated that during his four-hour detention in the PC stockade, he was given blows on the
different parts of his body with the butt of a gun. 43 He did not ask to be hospitalized even though the
hospital was just a few meters away. At any rate, even if his so-called confession were disregarded
by the trial court, the testimonial evidence on hand amply proved Gapasin's complicity in the
offense charged.
A perusal of the lower court's decision shows that its verdict rested principally on the lengthy
testimony of Loreta, the widow of the deceased and the sole eyewitness to the alleged crime.
Appellants, however, claim that her testimony is not worthy of credence, it being shot through with
incredibilities and inconsistencies. They contend that in her statement 44 taken within a few hours after
the crime had been committed, Loreta never gave the names of accused Pepito Gapasin and
Calixto Matias.
While it may be true that Loreta failed to mention the names of Gapasin and Matias in her affidavit,
there is no doubt that while she was being investigated, she told Sergeant Lamorena that the two
accused were among those persons who went to their house and committed the crime, 45 It was
precisely because of that information that Sergeant Lamorena, with two soldiers, arrested Gapasin in
the morning of July 24, 1972 at his residence in Rang-ayan and brought him before Loreta for
identification. 46
On the basis of what he perceives as material variances between Loreta's extrajudicial statement
and her testimony in court, accused-appellants' counsel prays for their exoneration on the ground of
reasonable doubt. We cannot oblige.
In People vs. Advincula, L-44643, March 31, 1980, 96 SCRA 875, the Court took into account the state
of shock, excitement and agitation that the rape victim was laboring under when she executed her
statement, hence the differences in her perception and recollection. Similarly, in People vs.
Mendoza, L-33127, July 15, 1981, 105 SCRA 459, the Court observed that the infirmity of affidavit
evidence is a matter of judicial experience. Since generally, an affidavit is not prepared by the
affiant himself but by another who uses his own language in writing the affiant's statements, omissions
and misunderstandings by the writer are not infrequent. But what is important is that the witness was
able to Identify the alleged culprits on the witness stand. 47
Despite the alleged incredibilities and inconsistencies meticulously pointed out by appellants'
counsel, we are convinced to a moral certainty that Loreta de Leon has unerringly Identified
Gapasin and Matias as among the malefactors who had killed, robbed and raped on the night of
July 23, 1972. Let us scrutinize the records:
1. Pepito Gapasin — As earlier mentioned, Gapasin was acquainted with Loreta because she and
her husband were his barriomates in Sinamar. As a matter of fact, they were together once in the
same group which went to Muñoz to harvest
palay. 48
Although Loreta's testimony on the identity of Gapasin is uncorroborated, we believe that the same is
sufficient. She had ample opportunity to unmistakably recognize him on the night of the incident.
There was light in the house when he came up to eat supper. In spite of his hat and mask, Loreta
knew him because of his movements, and more so when he removed his hat and the mask fell off his
face.
The trial court correctly rejected Gapasin's alibi, which in his case has become more dubious
because it was sought to be established by the accused himself, his wife and his twelve year-old
daughter, and not by uninterested, unbiased persons, who would, in the natural order of things, be
best situated to support the tendered alibi. It has been repeatedly observed that alibi is a defense
easily fabricated especially among parents, children and relatives, or even among those not so
related, so that great caution must be exercised in accepting it. 49 The testimony of a wife
corroborating her husband's alibi is of little probative value. It is undeniably tainted with bias for it
springs from the natural desire of a wife to free her husband from criminal liability. 50 Not only that.
Well-entrenched is the rule that for alibi to prosper, it is not enough to prove that the accused was
somewhere else when the crime was committed but it must likewise be demonstrated that he was so
far away that he could not have been physically present at the place of the crime or its immediate
vicinity at the time of its commission. 51 Rang-ayan is only three kilometers from Sinamar, a distance
that can easily be traversed in thirty minutes at a leisurely pace. Such distance does not preclude the
possibility — that the accused could have committed the felony.
2. Calixto Matias-He testified that he was in Rang-ayan playing "pepito" on the evening of July 23rd.
That testimony was corroborated by Gumaru and Bagaoisan, his two close friends. His alibi, however,
cannot prevail over the positive Identification made by Loreta who knew him well because they both
resided in Sinamar for a long time. Matias' house was about 100 meters from Loreta's house. As he
had no quarrel with Loreta, he knew of no reason why she would frame him up. Indeed, the
evidence on record is bereft of any known motive as to why Loreta would prevaricate against him
and Gapasin. It has been held that alibi is unavailing once the accused is indubitably Identified by
one without motive to falsely charge the accused especially with a grave offense that could bring
about his death by execution.52
It results from the foregoing that the participation of Gapasin and Matias in the criminal offense
under consideration has been established beyond question.
The trial court had adjudged Gapasin and Matias guilty of the special complex crime of robbery with
homicide penalized under paragraph 1 of Article 294 of the Penal Code. It should be noted that in
order to sustain a conviction for the aforesaid offense, it is necessary to establish that the homicide
was a mere incident of the robbery, the latter being the main purpose and objective of the
criminals. 53 It contemplates a situation where the homicide resulted by reason or on the occasion of
the robbery.
In a small barrio like Sinamar, the sale of tobacco produce amounting to P2,200 would not escape
notice. Perhaps a pittance by city standards, P2,200 would be considered substantial among rural
folks. And to the less-principled, the lure of all that cash just waiting to be taken, would be too
tempting a chance to pass up, exactly as it happened in the case at bar.
The six armed men, after having partaken of the supper prepared for them, sought to repay Eusebio
by inviting him to join them in their pursuit of gamblers. They brought him down from his house,
waylaid him in an elevated area near a mango tree, bound his hands and feet and beat him to
death. After thus eliminating any possible obstacle to their heinous plan, they returned to the man's
house and ransacked his bedroom with hardly any resistance from his hapless wife. It is thus clear that
the killing and the felonious taking were not isolated acts. It is of no moment that the homicide
preceded the robbery by any appreciable length of time. What is essential is that there was a direct
link, an intimate connection between the two felonies. That connection was the prospect of
monetary gain which impelled the malefactors to place filthy lucre above the value of human
life. 54 And once again, we are witness to the stark reality of man's inhumanity to man. For after
having been given water to drink and food to eat, the six armed men, with the two accused among
them, returned Eusebio's selfless gesture by despoiling his abode and killing him in cold blood.
Was there conspiracy? The settled rule is that where the conspiracy to commit the crime of robbery
was conclusively shown by the concerted acts of the accused, and homicide was committed as a
consequence thereof, all those who participated as principals in the robbery will also be held as
principals in the complex crime of robbery with homicide although they did not actually take part in
the homicide, unless it ap- pears that they attempted to prevent the killing. 55 The question of who
actually robbed or who actually killed has no importance since all of them will be held accountable
for the robbery with homicide.
In the instant case, while the records indicate that Gapasin and Matias were not physically inside the
house when the robbery took place, and there was no eyewitness account of the actual slaying of
Eusebio, they were nonetheless implicated by the prosecution's principal witness, Loreta, as being
part of the group which paid an unexpected nocturnal visit at the house of the De Leon spouses,
culminating in the brutal killing of the husband, the rape of the wife and the asportation of the
couple's personal belongings. Therefore, they stand equally culpable as the rest for the felony of
robbery with homicide.
That Loreta was sexually assaulted following the robbery is unquestionable. She had herself medically
examined a few hours after the rape. The medical report stated that her vagina was torn. At the risk
of being banal, a woman from the barrio, married with two children, would not admit that she was
criminally abused and subject herself to embarrassment and humiliation, and have her private parts
scrutinized-if that were not the truth. 56
It is the uniform jurisprudence of the Supreme Court that where the crime charged is robbery with
homicide and rape, the legal definition of the crime is robbery with homicide punishable under
paragraph I of Article 294 of the Penal Code, and the rape committed on the occasion thereof is
considered an aggravating circumstance. 57
The violent death of Eusebio de Leon was accompanied by treachery, Although there were no
eyewitnesses to the actual assault. Eusebio was apparently beaten to death while his hands and feet
were tied with a rope. The accused, in thus immobilizing the victim, obviously employed means which
tended directly to insure its execution without risk to themselves arising from the defense which the
offended party might make. 58 Abuse of superior strength is deemed absorbed by treachery. 59 Band,
although present, cannot be appreciated because it is absorbed by treachery. 60
The trial court should have taken into account the aggravating circumstances of dwelling. Dwelling is
aggravating in robbery with homicide because this type of robbery could be committed without the
necessity of tranggressing the sanctity of the home. 61
Evident premeditation, although alleged in the information, cannot be considered as an
aggravating circumstance where no clear proof, as in the case at bar, had been adduced as to the
time the accused had resolved to kill and rob their victim. 62
The information has placed the value of the stolen articles from the De Leon household at P1,733.00.
Even if there was a statement by barrio councilman Villegas to the effect that he saw the stolen
goods near the dead body of Eusebio on the early morning of July 24th, the records do not show that
they were in fact recovered by the authorities since they were not presented in evidence during the
trial. Hence, restitution would be in
order. 63
WHEREFORE, accused-appellants Pepito Gapasin and Calixto Matias are hereby declared guilty of
the special complex crime of robbery with homicide and rape. In line with previous decisions, the
rape is deemed to have aggravated the robbery. This, together with the aggravation of treachery
and dwelling, and absent any mitigating circumstances, calls for the imposition of the death penalty.
In addition, the accused-appellants shall jointly and severally indemnify the heirs of Eusebio de Leon
in the increased amount of P30,000 for the homicide, Loreta de Leon in the amount of P20,000 for the
rape plus the amount of P1,733 for the value of the stolen articles. As modified, the appealed
decision is affirmed with costs against the accused-appellants.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. PALO

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ILDEFONSO PALO alias PONCIANO-PONCHING,
and PEDRO PALO, Defendants-Appellants.

Severiano B. Orlina for Appellants.

Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla and Assistant Solicitor General Esmeraldo Umali for Appellee.

SYLLABUS
1. EVIDENCE; OFFER OF COMPROMISE IN CRIMINAL CASES. — The offer of compromise in criminal
cases is properly considered by the court as material evidence against the defendants.

2. ID.; PROOF OF GUILT OF ACCUSED WHEN ESTABLISHED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT. — Where in
the case at bar there are disinterested eye- witnesses, there is an extrajudicial confession, and there is
the corpus delicti; and the motive for the killing appeared to be the defendant’s indignation at the
decease’s zeal in upholding his brother’s interest in the latter’s property dispute with the Palos, the
proof of guilt of the accused is deemed established beyond reasonable doubt.

DECISION

BENGZON, J.:

These are two criminal cases coming up from Batangas (Nos. 1061 and 1062). In the first, Ildefonso
Palo and his brother Pedro were accused of murdering Candido Catapang, their own brother-in-law.
In the second, Ildefonso was charged with illegal possession of the gun with which the victim had
been shot. After a joint trial, the defendants were found guilty as charged. Wherefore the Court
sentenced each of them, in the first case, to life imprisonment with accessories, and to indemnify the
heirs in the sum of P6,000, with costs; and in the second, Ildefonso was given one year and one day
to two years and one day of imprisonment, plus costs. The firearm and the ammunition were
confiscated.

In the afternoon of June 20, 1954 Candido Catapang went to the river of barrio Apakay, Taal,
Batangas, to get some water. There he met and talked with his brother-in-law Juanito Palo.
Apparently they had some sharp disagreement, because Candido was heard to demand angrily
"Why don’t you heed my request? As it happened that Candido’s daughter, Angeles, was in the river
washing some clothes, and overheard the altercation, she became alarmed and hurriedly called
Santiago de Roxas, who was then drilling an artesian well nearby together with Marcelino Araga and
Jose Navarro. Resenting his daughter’s act, Candido reprimanded her and chased her home with a
piece of wood. At that moment Santiago de Roxas and Navarro arrived in time to hear the
detonation of a firearm, the bullet whizzing by. They looked around but saw nobody. Then another
shot rang out. This time Candido Catapang was hit in the abdomen. Forthwith Ildefonso Palo
emerged from behind some big boulders, holding the pistol Exhibit A, even as Pedro Palo, armed with
a bolo sallied forth to slash Candido Catapang across the face. The victim fell down helpless; he was
immediately brought to the Provincial Hospital, but he died on the way.

The foregoing is the firsthand account given in the Batangas court by Angeles Catapang, Santiago
de Roxas and Jose Navarro. Angeles admittedly witnessed the whole affair. The defense implies her
presence, and that of Santiago de Roxas to whom Ildefonso Palo surrendered the gun right after the
killing, inasmuch as he was the barrio lieutenant.

The defense however insists that "the incident arose when one of the defendants demonstrated with
the deceased while the latter (then under the influence of liquor) was beating his daughter, niece of
said defendants with deadly weapons, and in the struggle that ensued the deceased was killed with
his own weapon that was wrested from him by the defendant (Ildefonso)." Pedro, it is claimed, "was
in no way concerned with that struggle."
According to its witnesses Juanito Palo, Ireneo Maristela, Ramon Banaag and the two defendants,
when Candido was chasing his daughter with bolo in hand, Ildefonso arrived and told Candido to
stop; but the latter, taking offense at the interference, returned his bolo to the scabbard, drew his
pistol and saying "I will kill you all" lunged at Ildefonso, who grabbed Candido’s hand, managed to
wrest the firearm and ran away pursued by Candido who meantime unsheated his bolo. However as
his escape was blocked by a fence and some animals, Ildefonso turned around and fire a warning
shot. As Candido kept advancing, Ildefonso fired again, and the bullet hit its mark. But Candido
continued advancing, so Ildefonso — incredible as it seems — "transferred the gun to his left hand",
drew his own bolo and hacked Candido on the face, when the latter came within striking distance. 1

The trial judge who saw the witnesses testify refused to believe the defendants’ version, for seven
reasons, fully explained in his decision under review. Upon examination of the expediente we find
them to be well-founded. Most important is the improbability of such version.

"The Court does not believe" says the decision, "that the deceased would have attempted to kill
Ildefonso and his brother Juanito just because they tried to prevent Candido from chastizing his own
daughter. Nor, does the Court believe that, assuming it to be true that Candido wanted to attack
Ildefonso he would have returned his bolo in its scabbard, and draw a pistol instead, considering that
Ildefonso was not armed; nor, after Ildefonso had wrested the pistol from Candido, would Candido
still pursue Ildefonso who was already in the possession of the pistol. To top it all, the Court considers it
beyond comprehension that while Ildefonso was being allegedly pursued by Candido who refused
to desist from his attack notwithstanding the fact that he was already fired at by a .45 caliber pistol,
Ildefonso would seek to strengthen his position by ceasing to use the pistol, transferring the same to
his left hand, and drawing a bolo instead, in order to defend himself."cralaw virtua1aw library

It should be noted that the day after the shooting, Ildefonso Palo voluntarily swore before the Justice
of the Peace of Taal, Batangas, the affidavit Exhibit C corroborating the evidence of the prosecution
above set out. And, what is most significant, therein he admitted ownership of the unlicensed pistol
which killed Candido Catapang. Obviously in line with this admission, defendants tried to settle the
case amicably by offering to pay P3,500.00 as indemnity to the heirs; but the deal failed to
materialize. The defense presented no evidence that these efforts at settlement were made, not in
acknowledgment of guilt, but to avoid the inconveniences of imprisonment or for other reasons
consistent with defendants innocence. 1 Consequently the offer of compromise was properly
considered as material evidence against the defendants.

The court also considered — quite correctly — that whereas the story of the prosecution was
supported by Santiago de Roxas and Jose Navarro who were not related to the deceased, the
defendants’ account rested upon the corroborative testimony of their brother Juanito Palo, his
father-in-law Irineo Maristela and the uncle of Ildefonso’s wife Ramon Banaag.

These remarks of course do not merely show preponderance of the prosecution’s evidence; they
mean that such evidence should be believed, because defendants’ exculpation appears to be
incredible.

Now then, does the State’s proof establish beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of the accused? We
are convinced that it does: there are disinterested eye-witnesses, there is an extrajudicial confession,
and there is the corpus delicti; and the motive for the killing appeared to be the defendants’
indignation at the deceased’s zeal in upholding his brother’s interest in the latter’s property dispute
with the Palos.

Murder was undoubtedly committed, qualified by treachery. It is said that voluntary surrender may
mitigate defendants’ offense. Although Ildefonso Palo handed the gun to the barrio lieutenant upon
the latter’s demand, there is no evidence that he willingly delivered himself to the authorities. On the
contrary, Pedro Palo denied having voluntarily surrendered, alleging he had been taken from his
house the following morning by some policemen. Anyway this mitigation is compensated by the
aggravating circumstance of relationship, the deceased being brother-in-law of the offenders (Art.
15 Revised Penal Code). 1

Therefore in the absence of other modifying circumstances, life imprisonment was properly imposed
upon these appellants.

In Criminal Case No. 1062 there is no question that Ildefonso Palo had no government permit to
possess the firearm with which he downed Candido Catapang. Hence he violated sec. 2692 of the
Administrative Code as amended by Republic Act No. 4; and the prison term specified in the
appealed decision lies within the limits fixed by said statute.

Wherefore the judgment under review is affirmed in toto, with costs against appellants. So ordered.

[G.R. Nos. 144080-81. January 26, 2004]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. ARSENIO DE JESUS (acquitted) and RUBEN AGO LUMIBAO,
accused,
RUBEN AGO LUMIBAO, appellant.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:

In its joint decision[1] promulgated on May 26, 2000, the Regional Trial Court of Camiling, Tarlac,
Branch 68, found appellant Ruben Lumibao guilty of rape beyond reasonable doubt in Criminal Case
No. 97-37. After carefully considering the records and the evidence, however, we find merit in his
appeal.
The Information filed against Lumibao reads:
That in between the period September 1996 until March 1997 in Cacamilingan Sur, Camiling, Tarlac
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being the uncle of
the offended party, Agnes C. Lumibao, with lewd designs, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously lie and had carnal knowledge with private complainant Agnes C. Lumibao, a mental
retardate.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[2]

The Information against de Jesus reads:

That in between the period September 1996 until March 1997 in Cacamilingan Sur, Camiling, Tarlac
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd designs, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously lie and had carnal knowledge with private
complainant Agnes C. Lumibao, a mental retardate.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[3]

Upon arraignment, the accused Arsenio de Jesus and herein appellant Ruben Lumibao pleaded not
guilty. Thereafter, joint trial on the merits ensued. De Jesus was acquitted. Only herein appellant was
found guilty as charged. He was sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Hence, he
seasonably appealed to this Court.
The facts of the cases as culled from the records are as follows:
Appellant Ruben Ago Lumibao is the paternal uncle of the alleged victim, Agnes Lumibao.
At the time of the alleged offenses, which occurred sometime between September 1996 and March
1997, Agnes Lumibao was 27 years old, but with a mental age of 3 years and 3 months and an
intelligence quotient (IQ) of 29.[4] Her mother, Nenita Lumibao, left Agnes in the care of her
grandparents from the time she was 7 years old.[5] When Nenitas husband died, she left Agnes with
her sister-in-law, Evelyn Lumibao Tagaro, while Nenita worked in Manila.[6]
Appellants house as well as that of Agnes was located in the same compound owned by appellants
parents.[7] The accused Arsenio de Jesus was their neighbor.[8]
Sometime in March 1997, Melba Lumibao Vicente, a paternal aunt of Agnes, observed that Agnes
was pregnant.[9] Melba informed Evelyn about her observation. They asked Agnes who was the
author of her pregnancy by enumerating the names of the men they knew, including Ago, the
nickname of appellant Ruben Lumibao. Agnes only smiled in response to all the names given to
her.[10]
When Nenita was notified of her daughters pregnancy, she directed her son to bring Agnes to Manila
where she was examined by a doctor.[11] Agnes pregnancy was confirmed. Subsequently her
mother filed her complaint before the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) against herein appellant.
In the line-up conducted by the NBI, Agnes pointed to him when asked who raped her from among
a line-up of seven (7) men, six (6) of whom she had never seen before.[12]
The case was then referred to the Department of Justice (DOJ) for preliminary investigation. It was
then and there that Arsenio de Jesus became also an accused because he was mentioned by
Agnes as one of those who allegedly raped her.[13]
On September 12, 1997, Agnes gave birth to a baby girl.[14]
At the trial, the first witness for the prosecution was LORENDA GOZAR, an NBI psychologist. She
testified that Agnes could hardly relate to her environment, was very dependent on the people
around her, and could hardly do a thing without supervision.[15] She also testified that when she
asked Agnes who was the father of her child, the latter answered Papa. Because Agnes could not
state names properly, Gozar enumerated the names of persons Agnes could presumably be calling
Papa with the help of Agnes mother who was with her during the interview. When the name of
appellant Ruben Lumibao was mentioned, Agnes nodded her head and raised her two hands.[16]
Another witness, ANNABELLE SOLIMAN, a psychiatrist at the NBI, testified that in interviewing Agnes,
she had to ask the assistance of the mother because Agnes was answering in Ilocano. Agnes had a
very limited vocabulary and even her mother had difficulty in understanding her.[17] She asked
Agnes who caused her pregnancy by enumerating random names because she did not know the
names of the men in Agnes neighborhood,[18] except for Ruben and Arsenio, which were supplied
by the mother.[19] Agnes nodded her head when she heard the names Ruben and Arsenio.[20]
The next witness, SIXTO COMIA, an NBI agent, testified that the police line-up he conducted at the
NBI consisted of four (4) construction workers from the construction work going on in the NBI building
and two (2) visitors who were in the NBI at the time. The other person completing the police line-up
was appellant Ruben Lumibao.[21] He testified that when he asked Agnes who had sexual
intercourse with her, she pointed to appellant.[22]
RIZALINO LEANO, an NBI special investigator who could speak Ilocano, testified that he took the
sworn statement of Agnes.[23] She had great difficulty trying to narrate how the alleged rape
happened. According to him, Agnes had to be assisted by her mother because he could not
understand her even in Ilocano.[24]
NENITA LUMIBAO, the complainant and mother of Agnes, testified that on March 18, 1997, the son of
Evelyn Tagaro, Gilbert, called her and told her that they suspected Agnes of being pregnant. The
following day, she called Evelyn to ask if it was true. According to Nenita, Evelyn (who died after the
trial started) told her that when asked who caused her pregnancy, Agnes answered, Ago.[25]
AGNES LUMIBAO, the victim, testified on direct examination that the father of her child was Papa and
pointed to appellant Ruben Lumibao.[26] On cross-examination, she testified that her other
neighbors, namely Abet, Ronnie[27] and Gaudencio, also removed her blouse and pants and had
sexual intercourse with her.[28]
In his defense, appellant Ruben Lumibao denied having sexual intercourse with Agnes.[29] He also
testified that the mother of Agnes, Nenita, asked him to sign a document[30] to the effect that she
would acquire the property of his parents. When he refused to do so, she told him that, You will have
your day.[31] On cross-examination, he testified that his brother, who was Nenitas late husband,
predeceased his parents.[32] He said that in March 1997, shortly after his parents death, Nenita
wanted to get the house and lot of his parents.[33]
MELBA LUMIBAO VICENTE, aunt of Agnes and sister of appellant, testified that when she and her sister
Evelyn first confronted Agnes about her pregnancy, the latter could not tell who the father was. They
enumerated the names of men they knew from their neighborhood, including the names Ago[34]
and Papa of Ronald,[35] referring to appellant Ruben Lumibao. But Agnes only smiled in response to
all the names given to her, including that of appellant. She also testified that it took them one week
after this confrontation to inform Nenita because they kept asking her who caused her pregnancy
and she could not tell them.[36]
The trial court rendered a decision on May 26, 2000, convicting Ruben Lumibao of rape and
sentencing him to suffer reclusion perpetua, while acquitting Arsenio de Jesus. The dispositive part of
the decision read:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused Arsenio de Jesus is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime of
Rape under former Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659,
and the Information filed against him is correspondingly QUASHED, whereas accused Ruben Ago
Lumibao is hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the same crime of Rape and is
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, to pay the victim the sum of Seventy Five
Thousand Pesos (P75,000.00) as moral damages, the sum of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as
exemplary damages and the sum of Twenty Five Thousand Pesos (P25,000.00) as compensatory
damages, and further, to acknowledge and support the offspring begotten from said rape.
SO ORDERED.[37]

Appellant now questions said conviction and anchors his appeal on the following assignment of
errors:
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING FULL FAITH AND CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF AGNES LUMIBAO
DESPITE ITS MATERIAL INCONSISTENCIES AND CONTRADICTIONS.

II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT RUBEN LUMIBAO GUILTY BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF RAPE.

The main issue before us is whether or not appellants guilt has been proven beyond reasonable
doubt.
Appellant insists that the testimony of Agnes was replete with material inconsistencies and
contradictions. Appellant submits that the trial court misapprehended or overlooked the following
facts which, if considered, would result in his acquittal:
First, when Agnes was asked by NBI Senior Agent Sixto Comia[38] who raped her, she answered Papa
Onald.[39] The real name of the appellant is Ruben, which is quite different from Onald. Second, the
NBI special investigator could hardly get any answer from the victim without the intervention of her
mother who would interpret Agnes sign language. It took the NBI special investigator more than one
day to prepare Agnes sworn statement because of the difficulty in getting answers from her. Third,
during the line-up conducted at the NBI, Agnes had a hard time identifying appellant Lumibao.
Fourth, even the prosecution lawyer manifested during her cross-examination that Agnes had the
habit of nodding her head to every question and name propounded to her. She was easily swayed
by anything she heard or told to her. Finally, her silence for a long period of time rendered her
credibility doubtful.
For the appellee, the Office of the Solicitor General stresses that though mentally retarded, Agnes
could perceive things and convey her perceptions, using limited verbal communication and sign
language. The OSG argues that assuming there were some inconsistencies or contradictory
declarations in her testimony, or delay in getting her sworn statement, such were to be expected
from a mental retardate. According to the OSG, the records showed that Papa Onald meant Papa
of Ronald, referring to appellant Ruben Lumibao whose son was named Ronald.
Further, the OSG contends that a mentally retarded person is not necessarily prone to suggestions
made by adults but can only relay whatever she perceives by her senses. According to the OSG, it
was the victim who supplied the answers using words, sign language, and re-enactment of the
incidents while her mother merely interpreted for her. Moreover, the OSG submits that Agnes
testimony that she was raped by appellant was materially and substantially corroborated by other
witnesses. Agnes waited some months before she told anyone about what happened to her
because appellant threatened to kill her mother, the OSG added.
In reviewing rape cases, this Court observes the following guiding principles: (1) an accusation for
rape can be made with facility; it is difficult to prove but more difficult for the person accused,
though innocent, to disprove; (2) in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime where only two persons
are usually involved, the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with extreme caution; (3)
the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits, and cannot be allowed to draw
strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense.[40] These guidelines understandably
assume that the victim of the rape is herself the complaining witness and that she could testify
intelligently such that her testimony could normally be understood by the trial court.
The guilt of an accused must be proved beyond reasonable doubt. Before he is convicted, there
should be moral certainty - a certainty that convinces and satisfies the reason and conscience of
those who are to act upon it.[41] Absolute guarantee of guilt is not demanded by the law to convict
a person of a criminal charge but there must, at least, be moral certainty on each element essential
to constitute the offense and on the responsibility of the offender. Proof beyond reasonable doubt is
meant to be that, all things given, the mind of the judge can rest at ease concerning its verdict.[42]
Again, these basic postulates assume, in our view, that the court and others at the trial are able to
comprehend the testimony of witnesses, particularly of the victim herself if she is presented and
testified under oath.
In this case, the records show that when Agnes was asked by her paternal aunts Melba and Evelyn
(with whom she then was living) on the matter of who the father of her child was, she could not give
any answer and merely smiled by way of response to all the names given to her, including that of
appellant. This confrontation happened just after the aunts first noticed that Agnes was pregnant
and before she was sent to her mother in Manila.
Witness Melba Lumibao Vicente testified on direct examination for the defense which we excerpt for
its candor and pertinence:
A: I and my sister (sic) asked her who caused her pregnancy but because she could not understand
the word yot, my sister demonstrated by pointing to her vagina and asked her who did it and she
could not tell, Sir.

Q: And when you said she could not tell who caused her pregnancy, what did you do with Evelyn?

A: Because she could not say who caused her pregnancy, we were the ones who supplied the
names and she answered yi-yi-yi, Sir.

Q: How many names of person you mentioned to Agnes?

A: Several names, Sir

Q: Could you recall some of those names which you mentioned to Agnes?

A: Yes, Sir.

Q: Enumerate some of those names?

A: We said Ronnie because he was her crush, Abbet, Berto, Lakay Kulas, Isko, no more names, Sir.

Q: And what did Agnes tell you or answer you when you mentioned those names?

A: She was smiling, Sir.

Q: Did she make any answer?

A: She did not answer she was just smiling, Sir.

Q: How about the names of Ago and Arsing, did you mention that?

A: Yes, Sir.

Q: And what did Agnes tell you, what was her reaction?

A: She did the same reaction when asked the first names, she was just smiling, Sir.[43]

It was only after she met her mother in Manila that the author of her pregnancy became identified.
When the NBI psychologist asked her who caused her to be pregnant, she answered Papa with the
assistance of her mother. When asked the same question by the NBI psychiatrist who enumerated
random names of men, Agnes nodded upon the mention of the names Arsenio and Ruben because
these were the only names she knew from those given to her. When asked by the NBI special
investigator the identity of her rapist, she answered Papa Onald, again with the assistance of her
mother.
It appears clear to us that Agnes could hardly communicate without her mother assisting her and
interpreting what she said. However, the trial court had to order her mother to step out of the
courtroom because she kept coaching her on what to say during the direct examination.[44]
Given the circumstances of Agnes testimony in court, in the light of the entire evidence on record,
the identity of the author of Agnes pregnancy does not appear to us clearly established. Note that
the alleged offenses in Cases Nos. 97-36 and 97-37 took place over an extended period of time and
long before the actual investigation conducted by the NBI. During the investigation, the active
influence played by her mother during the interviews conducted by the NBI psychologist, psychiatrist,
and special investigator is undenied. The trial judge observed her mothers constant presence and
assistance given to Agnes during her direct examination in court. All these leave us unconvinced that
Agnes testimony on this point could be relied upon to pin down who was her ravisher and the
purported father of her child, with moral certainty.
The rule that this Court should refrain from disturbing the conclusions of the trial court on the credibility
of witnesses and their testimony does not apply where the trial court might have overlooked certain
facts of substance or value which, if considered, would affect the outcome of the case.[45] Further,
this Court will not hesitate to reverse a judgment of conviction and acquit the accused where there
are strong indications pointing to the possibility that the rape charge was motivated by some factors
other than the truth as to its commission.[46] While the allegation of ill motive on the part of the
mother stemming from a dispute over the house and lot owned by the Lumibaos has not been
sufficiently proven by the documentary evidence, we cannot discount the fact that a family
squabble existed among the parties, which could have prompted the mother to file a rape charge
against appellant.
With seeds of doubt planted in our minds by the conduct of proceedings on record, we are unable
to accept the lower courts conclusion to convict appellant. His conviction is founded on the sole
testimony of Agnes, but though a credible witness despite her mental retardation, she showed
unnecessary dependence on her mother when identifying the father of her child. Maternal coaching
taints her testimony. That her mother had to be ordered by the judge to go outside the courtroom
impresses us as significant. We are unable to accept as sufficient the quantum of proof required to
convict appellant of rape based on the alleged victims sole testimony. Hence, here we must fall
back on a truism of the law, in dubilis reus est absolvendus. All doubts must be resolved in favor of the
accused.
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision dated May 26, 2000, of the Regional Trial Court of Camiling, Tarlac,
Branch 68, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Appellant RUBEN LUMIBAO is ACQUITTED of the charge of rape
on reasonable doubt.
The Director of Prisons is hereby DIRECTED to release the appellant immediately, unless he is being
lawfully held for another cause, and to inform the Court accordingly within ten (10) days from notice
of this decision.
SO ORDERED.

[ GR No. 59604, Nov 14, 1986 ]

PEOPLE v. VICTORIO PIA Y BAYHON +

DECISION

229 Phil. 577

PARAS, J.:

This case is before Us on automatic review from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Cavite
finding Gaudencio Lamangan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Kidnapping and
Serious Illegal Detention and accordingly sentencing him to death, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
"WHEREFORE, the Court finds that the guilt of the accused GAUDENCIO LAMANGAN, as principal,
and DIOSDADO ANCIADO and MARIO GARCIA, as accessories, in the Commission of the offense
charged in the information, has been established with proof beyond reasonable doubt, and hereby
imposes upon the accused GAUDENCIO LAMANGAN the mandatory penalty of death, and
sentences the accused Diosdado Anciado and Mario Garcia to suffer imprisonment from eight (8)
years of prision mayor, as minimum to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of
reclusion temporal, as maximum; and each to pay one-fifth of the costs. Said accused are hereby
ordered, jointly and severally, to pay the spouses Juanito Chua and Elma Diato Chua the sum of
P100,000.00 as moral damages.

The accused Diosdado Anciado and Mario Garcia shall be credited with four-fifths (4/5) of the
period during which they have been under preventive imprisonment, unless at the time of their initial
confinement they had executed an agreement binding themselves to the same rules and
regulations applicable to regular prisoners, in which event they shall be credited with the entire
period of their preventive imprisonment.

In the event the accused Diosdado Anciado and Mario Garcia should opt to appeal from the
judgment, the Court hereby fixes their appeal bond in the amount of P25,000.00.

In view of the imposition of the death penalty upon the accused Gaudencio Lamangan, let the
original folio of this case, together with all the evidence, oral and documentary, be forthwith
elevated to the Honorable Supreme Court for automatic review.

SO ORDERED."
It appears undisputed that the antecedent facts upon which this case is based hinged primarily on
the kidnapping and serious illegal detention of Juanito Chua and his wife in the evening of
December 28, 1977 at Dimasalang, Imus, Cavite committed in the following manner: Immediately
after complainant Juanito Chua parked his car near their residence and while he was opening its
door, two (2) persons accosted him, one of them poked a gun at his head and the other poked a
knife at his neck, warning Juanito Chua to keep quiet. They tied Juanito Chua's hands and those of
his wife Elma Deato Chua and brought them in a car to a hut. The kidnappers demanded a ramson
of P100,000.00, warning that a refusal would compel them to kill Juanito Chua and his wife. Juanito
Chua told them that he did not have that amount. He bargained to reduce it. The kidnappers finally
agreed to accept the amount of P18,000.00. Juanito Chua's wife was then released so that she
could secure the money which was to be delivered to the kidnappers at Zapote, Las Piñas, Metro
Manila in the afternoon of December 29, 1977. In the meantime, Juanito Chua continued to be
detained in the hut by his kidnappers. He was rescued by the Philippine Cons-tabulary on January 3,
1978. (pp. 3-4, Appellant's Brief)

Under an information filed by the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Cavite on March 28, 1978, herein
appellant Gaudencio Lamangan, together with his co-accused Victorio Pia, Venancio Pia, Diosdado
Anciado, Mario Garcia and Eduardo Vinas, were charged with the crime of Kidnap-ping and Serious
Illegal Detention.

Two other alleged participants in the commission of the offense, Emiliano del Rosario and Federico
Camia alias Iding were, at the time of the filing of the information, at large. Of the six (6) accused in
the custody of the authorities, five (5) namely, Diosdado Anciado, Venancio Pia, Mario Garcia,
Victorio Pia and Eduardo Vina, bolted the Provincial Jail of Cavite during the trial. (pp. 3-9, Appendix
of Appellant's Brief)

Accused Diosdado Anciado surrendered on March 21, 1979 to the Provincial Governor and was re-
confined in the Provincial Jail of Cavite.

On June 11, 1979, accused Mario Garcia also surrendered and was likewise detained anew at the
Provincial Jail of Cavite.

The court suspended the trial of the case against the remaining fugitives, Venancio Pia, Victorio Pia
and Eduardo Vina, and the two other participants, Emiliano del Rosario and Federico Camia, who
were at large, until they shall have been apprehended. The trial of the case proceeded with
res-pect to accused Gaudencio Lamangan, Diosdado Anciado and Mario Garcia. As herein earlier
stated, they were found guilty and sentenced accordingly for their participation in the commission of
the crime. Only Gaudencio Lamangan's case was elevated to Us on automatic review in view of the
imposition by the trial court of the death penalty on him.

In his Brief, appellant made the following assignments of error:

The lower court erred in considering the extra-judicial admission of accused-appellant Gaudencio
Lamangan as evidence of guilt.

The lower court erred in concluding that sccused-appellant Lamangan directly participated in the
kidnapping of Juanito Chua.

The lower court erred in convicting the accused-appellant Lamangan as principal in the crime of
kidnapping and in imposing upon him the mandatory penalty of death.

The lower court erred in not acquitting accused-appellant Lamangan of the crime charged on the
ground of reasonable doubt.
all of which, boil down to the more important issue of whether or not the guilt of accused-appellant
has been established beyond reasonable doubt.

The contention of appellant that his extrajudicial confession is not admissible, is untenable. Records
show that accused Venancio Pia, Mario Garcia, Victorio Pia and appellant executed their
confessions (Exhs. "A", "B", "C" and "H", respectively) before investigators in the presence of counsel de
oficio (Order dated February 7, 1978 of Muni-cipal Judge of Silang, Cavite). Appellant's repudiation
of his sworn statement (Exh. "C") during the trial because the Philippine Constabulary (PC) allegedly
extracted his admissions through the use of force, threats and intimidation consisting of physical
violence is baseless. For if they had indeed been maltreated, particularly appellant, they should
have complained to the counsel de oficio or to Municipal Judge to whom the case was referred by
the PC for preliminary investigation. In fact, since appellant's arrest on January 3, 1978, he only
complained for the first time, that is, at the hearing held on May 23, 1980, that he was subjected to
maltreatment by the PC, claiming that dried banana leaves were placed on his chest and set on fire.
It has been held that where the defendants did not present evidence of compulsion or duress or
violence on their persons; where they failed to complain to the officers who administered the oaths;
where they did not institute any criminal or administrative action against their alleged intimidators for
maltreatment; where there appeared to be no marks of violence on their bodies and where they did
not have themselves examined by a reputable physician to buttress their claim, all these should be
considered as factors indicating voluntariness of confessions. (People vs. Villanueva, 128 SCRA 488;
People vs. Urgel, 134 SCRA 483; People vs. Toledo 140 SCRA 259).

At any rate, appellant's confession (Exh. "C") narrates that:

"5.
T.
Maaari bang sabihin mo sa tagasiyasat kung paano ninyo binalak o plinano ang pagkidnap sa
inyong ginawa?
S.
Opo, ganito po iyon noong pong ika-24 ng Desyembre 1977 pinag-usapan po namin and
pagkidnap na iyan sa mag-asawa nina Juanito Chua at Ginang Elma Chua sa pamumuno ni Nani
del Rosario x x x at noong ika-28 ng Desyembre 1977 ang oras po ay humigit ika 9:00 ng gabi ay
inutusan ako ni Boy Helen na magpunta sa bayan at magtagpotagpo kami sa gasolinahan sa tapat
ng bahay ni Juanito Chua at noon nga pong ang oras ay humigit kumulang sa ika-10:00 mg gabi ay
sapilitang isinakay namin sa kotse ang mag?asawa at dinala namin sa isang bahay kubo doon sa
Bo. Balite Ist, Silang, Cavite x x x.

"6.
T.
At noong makarating kayo sa kubo ano naman ang inyong ginawa sa mag-asawa?
S.
x x x Inutusan namin ang kanyang asawa na si Mrs. Elma Chua na kumuha ng pera na
nagkakahalaga ng Labinwalong Libong Piso (18,000.00) bilang kapalit ng kanyang asawa.

xxx xxx xxx

"9.
T.
Saan naman ninyo napag-usapan ang lugar at oras na dadalhin ang pera?
S.
Doon po namin iniutos na dalhin ang salapi sa MVS Theater, Zapote, Metro Manila." (Underscoring
supplied)

The rule is that an extrajudicial confession replete with details could not have been extracted by
force. (People vs. Nillos, 127 SCRA 207) In the case at bar, the confession of appellant contains
details which the investigators could not have known beforehand.

Be this as it may, independent of the aforesaid con-fession, the inculpatory facts were established by
prosecution witness Juanito Chua who testified as follows:

"ATTY. BINAY:
"All right. Now, what portion of your head, will you please tell this Honor-able Court the exact portion
of your head when you stated a gun was poked at you?

"WITNESS:

"Here, sir. (Witness pointing to the left temple, 2 inches left eyebrow).

"ATTY. BINAY:

"Now, please tell us what happened after that?

"A
When a gun was poked on me, I was not able to alight from my car, sir.
"Q
Then, what happened?
"A
I was told to move to the other side of my car, sir.
"Q
Who instructed you to move on the other side of your car?
"A
That person who pointed that gun on me, sir.
"Q
Will you kindly look around this courtroom, Mr. Witness, and tell this Honorable Court if that person
who poked a gun on your head and who instructed you to move on the other side of your car is
present in this courtroom?
"A
Yes, sir. There he is.

xxx xxx xxx

"COURT:
Make of record that the witness approached a certain person and tapped his shoulder who
identified himself as Victorio Pia.

xxx xxx xxx

"ATTY. BINAY:
Now, after you had unlocked and opened the door, please tell us what happened.
"A
After unlocking and opening the door on the other side of my car, there was a person that I do not
know who suddenly entered the said door and poked a knife.

xxx xxx xxx

"Q
Will you kindly step down and tap the right shoulder of the person if he is inside the courtroom, as you
said?
"A
Yes, sir. (Witness stepped down from the witness stand and approached a person who identified
himself as Gaudencio Lamangan).

"ATTY. BINAY:
After Gaudencio Lamangan entered your car and he poked a knife on your neck, what happened
after that?
"A
They tied my hands, sir.
"Q
Who in particular tied your hands?
"A
That person who pointed that knife on me (the witness pointed to the accused Gaudencio
Lamangan).
"Q
Now, tell us what happened after your hands were tied by Gaudencio Lamangan?
"A
My wife went down our apartment, sir.
"Q
And what did she do, if she did anything?
"A
She approached the driver and said, 'ano bang nangyayari sa inyo' What is happening?

xxx xxx xxx

"ATTY. BINAY:
With that particular statement, what did this Gaudencio Lamangan and Victorio Pia do?
"A
What he did, he dragged my wife at the rear of our car, sir.
"Q
All right, Now, after your wife was placed at the back of your car, what happened next?
"A
We left, sir, and upon reaching the corner of Dimasalang Subdivision, they blind-folded me, sir.

"ATTY. BINAY:

xxx xxx xxx

"Q
All right. Now, you said you stopped cruising after thirty minutes. Will you please tell us what
happened?
"A
He removed my blindfold after we have stopped, sir."
(pp. 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13, t.s.n., September 15, 1978)
"Q
Now, you said a while ago that when you rested for ten (10) minutes, you were blindfolded. Now,
when you were walking for about one (1) hour, were you still blindfolded, Mr. Chua?
"A
Yes, sir.
"Q
After you were told to stoop down, what happened?
"A
I was asked to enter a place, as if, it was a hut, and which I could not see because I was then
blindfolded.

xxx xxx xxx

"ATTY. BINAY:
Alright, what transpired after that?
"A
I told them, how much are you demanding from me?

xxx xxx xxx

"Q
What was the reply?
"A
P100,000.00, sir.

xxx xxx xxx

"Q
Alright, now, when you said the amount was too big for you to raise what was their answer, if any?
"A
They told me that in case they could not get that amount demanded from me, they ought to follow
their Commander, I will be killed otherwise they are going to kill us."
(pp. 7, 8, 19, 11 and 12, t.s.n., September 27, 1978, underscoring supplied).

xxx xxx xxx

"Q
And then, what happened?
"A
Suddenly, I heard shouts that there were PC soldiers.
"Q
When you heard shouts that there were PC soldiers, what did you do, if you did anything.

"WITNESS:
I immediately jumped outside that hut, sir.

"ATTY. BINAY:
Will you kindly tell us why you have to jump outside the hut after you heard those shouts that they
were PC soldiers?
"A
Because I was worried that there might be a shooting or they might fire on the hut.
"Q
What transpired after you jumped out of the hut, Mr. Chua?
"A
I was taken by Sgt. Cortez.
"Q
Now, would you be able to tell us what happened to that person whom you said you were talking
earlier before you heard shouts that they were PC soldiers?
"A
Lamangan was also taken by Sgt. Cortez, including the gun.
"Q
Were you able to know finally, who was this person?
"A
Yes, sir.

"ATTY. BINAY:
Who is this?
"A
Gaudencio Lamangan. (and witness pointing to Gaudencio Lamangan).
(pp. 34, 35 and 36, t.s.n., id., underscoring supplied)

The foregoing declarations were corroborated in their essential details by prosecution witnesses Elma
Chua and PC Sergeant Rodolfo Habana. Clearly then, even if the confession were to be
disregarded, the testimony of the witnesses proved the guilt of the accused-appellant beyond
reasonable doubt. (People vs. Crisanto Jr. 134 SCRA 413).

The crime committed by appellant and his group is kid-napping and serious illegal detention
punishable under Article 267 of the Penal Code, as amended. Since the kidnapping was committed
for the purpose of extorting ransom from the victim and since complainant Juanito Chua was kept
under detention the imposable penalty for the offense committed is death. Appellant's direct
participation (the evidence shows that he was the person who stuck a knife at the victim's neck at
the time Juanito Chua and his wife were kidnapped) makes him guilty as principal.

Considering that as aforestated, Juanito Chua was rescued and the culprits failed to receive the
ransom money which they had purposely sought, and that no bodily harm or injury was inflicted upon
the victim, the penalty that We have decided to impose is that of reclusion perpetua.

WHEREFORE, the decision under review, being in accord-ance with law and the evidence, is hereby
AFFIRMED with the modification of the penalty from one of death to reclusion perpetua.

SO ORDERED.

WALEY DIN
People v encipiado

G.R. No. L-29181 July 9, 1984

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ANDRES CANUMAY, ET AL., defendants, VICTOR BATERNA, NELSON POTESTAS, JAVIER FERNANDEZ,
AGAPITO BAUTISTA, ANTONIO ABATAYO, RICARDO PATIHAN, EGLECERIO DURANO, and
BUENAVENTURA TAGBACAOLA, defendants-appellants.

ESCOLIN, J.:

Invoking the constitutional presumption of innocence which the prosecution allegedly failed to
overturn, appellants Nelson Potestas, Agapito Bautista, Buenaventura Tagbacaola and Javier
Fernandez seek reversal of the judgment of the then Court of First Instance of Misamis Occidental,
sentencing them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for the crime of robbery with homicide
and serious physical injuries.

In the evening of October 31, 1966, Gliceria Tolero Rudines, 63, and her granddaughter Gerarda
Rudines, 18, were in their house at Bo. Mangga, Tangub, Misamis Occidental, preparing "bibingka" for
the next day, the All Saints Day. At about 7:00 that night, bursts of gunshots rang outside the house.
This was followed by shouts ordering them to open the door. When the frightened women refused,
the door was forcibly opened with an axe. Four men rushed into the house, even while the firing
outside continued. Gliceria ran to the room of her husband, Guillermo Rudines, but before reaching
it, she suddenly slumped on the floor, as she cried out, "Mong, Mong, I am hit."

At this juncture, Guillermo Rudines, 75, went out of his room and was met by four armed men, one of
them holding an axe. When the intruders demanded money from him, he took out the cash he had
in his pocket and offered it to them; but they refused to accept it. Instead, they ordered the old man
to lie on the floor face down and tied his hands behind his back. Then, using the axe, they broke
open the trunks in the house and ransacked the same.

Soon after, one of the intruders dropped the axe on Guillermo's back, and demanded more money
from him. Guillermo told them to look in the "aparador" inside his room. While he was lying on the
floor, other members of the group, some armed with pistols and others with long guns, entered the
house and joined their companions in ransacking the house.

The marauders left at about 11:00 that night, after taking away money and jewelry valued at about
P5,000.00.

After the robbery, relatives and neighbors of the Rudineses arrived. Gliceria was brought to the
poblacion for medical assistance; but on the way thereto, she expired.

The following day, Dr. Jesus Abad conducted an autopsy of the deceased. The doctor described the
victim's injuries as follows:

1. Gunshot wound

a) Point of entrance at the back of distal third of the right leg.

b) Point of exit at the front of the distal third of the right leg forming a cauliflower wound.

c) The bones of the distal third of the leg were completely fractured.

Cause of death:

1) Gun shot wound producing shock

2) Hemorrhage. 1

Dr. Abad also examined Guillermo Rudines and found the following wounds sustained by him:

1. Superficial lineal wound about 1 inch long located at the left scapular area.

2. Pain on pressure at the vertebral column at the level of the 10th thorasic vertebral.

3. This certifies further that if without complication, it will heal in two (2) weeks. 2

Upon receiving report of the crime that same night, elements of the Tangub Police Force repaired to
the house of the victims. When asked by Police Chief Andres Enguito as to the Identity of the
intruders, neither Guillermo nor Gerarda could name any of the malefactors. They stated however
that they could recognize them if they saw them again.

The following day, November 1, the Chief of Police went to the house of one Victoriano Rosario,
about 50 meters distant from the victim's residence. Chief Enguito surmised that Rosario, who was a
known police character in the locality, might be able to furnish some information as to the Identity of
the malefactors.

When Rosario's wife told the police that her husband had left for Mananao, Tubod, Lanao del Norte
on October 28 and would not return home until November 3, the Police Chief became suspicious —
he deemed it most unusual for a head of the family to be absent from home on All Saints Day. He
immediately ordered that Rosario be fetched from Mananao. When the latter was brought to the
Tangub Police Station on the following day, November 2, for investigation, Rosario admitted not only
his complicity in the commission of the crime, but also divulged the names of all his sixteen [16] co-
conspirators, viz.: Andres Canumay, Proculo Lemon, Victor Baterna, Buenaventura Tagbacaola,
Nelson Potestas, Benito Saquin, Eduardo Cabahug, Vicente Mondares, Antonio Abatayo, Agapito
Bautista, Ricardo Patihan, Faustino Handugan, Eglecerio Durano, Tente Dimasakay, Javier Fernandez
and Jose Duliente.

All of them, except Dimasakay, who had allegedly gone into hiding in the forest of Lanao del Norte,
were taken into custody. In the ensuing investigation, Andres Canumay readily admitted his
participation in the conspiracy and voluntarily executed an affidavit. 3 At first, Bautista, Lemon,
Durano, Mondares, Patihan, Potestas, and Handugan denied any participation in the crime; but
upon being confronted with the statements of Rosario and Canumay, they too admitted their
culpability. They gave statements which were sworn to before Judge Vicente Baz, Jr. of the
Municipal Court of Tangub. However, the five other accused, namely: Victor Baterna, Benito Saquin,
Antonio Abatayo, Buenaventura Tagbacaola and Javier Fernandez refused to give any statement.
On November 8, all the accused were brought to the scene of the incident where they conducted a
reenactment of the crime.

Thereafter, an information for the crime of robbery with homicide and serious physical injuries was
filed against the sixteen [16] accused namely: Victoriano Rosario, Jose Duliente, Andres Canumay,
Proculo Lemon, Victor Baterna, Buenaventura Tagbacaola, Nelson Potestas, Benito Saquin, Javier
Fernandez, Eduardo Cabahug, Vicente Mondares, Antonio Abatayo, Agapito Bautista, Ricardo
Patihan, Faustino Handugan, and Eglecerio Durano.

At the trial, the court, on motion of the prosecution, ordered the discharge of the accused Victoriano
Rosario and Jose Duliente to be utilized as state witnesses.

The testimony of Victoriano Rosario is summarized by the Solicitor General as follows:

On October 17, 1966, he (Victoriano Rosario) was asked by the accused Andres Canumay whether
Guillermo Rudines was a "moneyed man", which question he answered in the affirmative; that
Canumay then requested him to be their guide when they would rob Guillermo Rudines (p. 41, t.s.n.,
January 20, 1967); that subsequently, on October 30, 1966, he was brought by Andres Canumay to
the cockpit of Tubod, Lanao del Norte, where, together with other companions, they hatched a plan
to commit the robbery the following day, October 31, 1966; that present in that cockpit conference
were the accused Antonio Abatayo, Vicente Mondares, Eduardo Cabahug, Eglecerio Durano, Tinte
Dimasakay, Ricardo Patihan, and Andres Canumay; that he was told to inform Victor Baterna and
Benito Saquin about the robbery plan and to tell them also to converge in Bo. Silanga at 5:00 o'clock
in the afternoon of October 31, 1966; that accordingly, he notified both Benito Saquin and Victor
Baterna (pp. 42-45, Id.); that the following day, October 31, 1966, at about 4:00 o'clock in the
afternoon, he left for Silanga, Misamis Occidental, together with Dado Handugan, Ventura
Tagbacaola and Nelson Potestas, arriving thereat at around 5:00 o'clock that same evening; that the
group of Benito Saquin later arrived, with the accused Agapito Bautista, Proculo Lemon, and Javier
Fernandez; that the last group, which came from Tubod, Lanao del Norte, and composed of Antonio
Abatayo, Andres Canumay, Vicente Mondares, Eduardo Cabahug, Eglecerio Durano, Ricardo
Patihan and Tinte Dimasakay, arrived at 7:00 o'clock that night; that the men were armed with two
Thompsons, an axe, carbines, pistols and knives (pp. 46-52, Id.); that from Silanga, the band
proceeded to the residence of Guillermo Rudines in Barrio Manga, Tangub, Misamis Occidental; that
as they neared the place, he and Javier Fernandez were left near the school house building
because of the fear of the others that as he was known to the Rudines, the latter might recognize him
(pp. 54-55, Id.); that soon thereafter, Victoriano heard gunshots coming from the direction of the
house of Guillermo as well as the breaking of the door of the house; that as the firing continued, he
and Fernandez went near the house of Rudines and saw Victor Baterna and Tinte Dimasakay enter
said house; that Benito Saquin, Victor Baterna, Andres Canumay, Antonio Abatayo, Vicente
Mondares, Eglecerio Durano, Ricardo Patihan, Tinte Dimasakay and Eduardo Cabahug went up the
house, while the others remained with him (Victoriano) on the ground (pp. 55-57, Id.); that at about
11:00 o'clock, those who went up the house came down and all of them proceeded to the school
building and partitioned the loot under a mango tree; that he (Victoriano) did not, however, receive
his share, and instead, he was told to go to Tubod the following day in order to get his share, but
when he did, his companions were no longer in Tubod for which reason he never got his share of the
loot (pp. 58-60, Id.); that the next day, November 1, 1966, he was arrested in Barrio Mananaw, Tubod,
Lanao del Norte, by a member of the police force of Tangub, Misamis Occidental, and two PC
soldiers; and that he was interrogated twice and he confessed to his participation in the crime (pp.
56-58, t.s.n., Feb. 14, 1967).

On the bases of the testimonies of said government witnesses, and of Guillermo Rudines, Gerarda
Rudines, Dr. Jesus Abad, Chief of Police Andres Enguito, and Judge Vicente Baz, Jr. of the municipal
court of Tangub, as well as the extrajudicial confessions of the accused, the trial court rendered a
decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the accused, Andres Canumay, Proculo Lemon, Victor Baterna, Buenaventura
Tagbacaota, Nelson Potestas, Benito Saquin. Javier Fernandez, Eduardo Cabahug, Vicente
Mondares, Antonio Abatayo, Agapito Bautista, Ricardo Patihan, Faustino Handugan Eglecerio
Durano, are hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged in the information.
They are hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA, with the accessory
penalties of the law; to jointly and severally indemnify Guillermo Rudines in the sum of P5,000,00 and
the heirs of Gliceri Tolero in the sum of P6,000,00, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency, and to pay the costs.

All the accused, except Eduardo Cabahug, interposed an appeal. It appears, however, that Saquin,
Mondares, Lemon, Canumay, Handugan, Baterna, Abatayo, Durano and Patihan subsequently
withdrew their appeal; and since the judgment as to them had already become final, only the
appeals of Nelson Potestas, Agapito Bautista, Buenaventura Tagbacaola and Javier Fernardez
remain to be resolved.

We perceive no compelling reason to disturb the judgment of conviction. Appellants were positively
Identified by state witness Victoriano Rosario as co-conspirators in the perpetration of the offense. In
accordance with the plot to rob the Rudines hatched the previous day at the cockpit of Tubod, said
appellants went to Silanga where, previously agreed upon, they and their co-accused met. From
there, they all proceeded to the house of the victims at Bo. Mangga. Appellants Nelson Potestas and
Javier Fernandez were armed with pistols, while Buenaventura Tagbacaola and Agapito Bautista
carried hunting knives. At the time of the robbery, the four appellants stood guard outside the house,
while their co-accused entered the victim's dwelling. After the robbery, each of said appellants
received his corresponding share in the loot.

The fact that appellants did not enter the victims' house did not mitigate, much less abate, their
criminal responsibility. By standing guard outside the house, each of them performed an
indispensable role in the attainment of their common objective. This action on their part, performed
to ensure the success of their nefarious design, clearly indicated the existence of conspiracy which
justified the lower court in holding each and all of them liable for the felony committed as well as the
consequences thereof.

Appellants lay considerable emphasis on the inconsistencies between Rosario's testimony in open
court and the statements in his affidavits. It is thus poited out that while Rosario stated in his affidavit
that he departed for Tubod at 8:00 p.m. of October 30, 1966, in open court he declared that he left
his house for Tubod at 1:00 p.m. on October 30. Such discrepancy is too trivial and immaterial to
discredit his testimony. It should be pointed out that time robbery itself was perpetrated on October
31, not on October 30. Thus the time of the witness' departure for Tubod on October 30, referring as it
does to an immaterial matter, does not impair, much less destroy, his testimony.

It is a settled rule that a witness may be impeached only on matters which are material, competent,
specific and relevant; but not on matters which are immaterial and collateral to the real issue. 4
What is important is that this witness positively affirmed at the trial those portion of affidavit wherein
he described the individual participation of all the accused in the crime in question. 5

Appellants Potestas and Bautista would repudiate their affidavits of confession for having been
allegedly extracted through force and coercion. They claimed that they signed their statements
because they were maltreated and tortured by the chief of police. The records, however, reveal a
number of significant circumstances strongly negating such pretension.

[1] Their confessions were admittedly signed and sworn to before Judge Vicente Baz, Jr. The latter
testified that when he read the contents of the affidavit of Potestas and Bautista, they unhesitatingly
affirmed the truth and correctness thereof; that he further asked them if there was any mistake
therein and both responded in the negative; and that not one of the confessants complained to him
of any maltreatment or torture.

[2] On November 11, all of the accused were brought to Dr. Jesus Abad, municipal health officer
of Tangub, for physical examination. At the trial, the doctor attested to his findings that accused "are
all in good physical condition" and that "there are no signs of physical injuries inflicted on any of
them." 6

[3] As noted by the Solicitor General, "the fact that five of the accused, namely, Antonio
Abatayo, Buenaventura Tagbacaola, Victor Baterna, Javier Fernandez, and Benito Saquin did not
execute similar confessions disproves the alleged use of force and coercion by the chief of police in
securing the confessions of the other nine accused. Why indeed should these nine accused
(including Potestas and Bautista) be tortured and maltreated, while five of their co-accused were
spared from said maltreatment?"
It has been held that a confessant bears the burden of proving that the admissions in his affidavit are
involuntary and untrue. 7 Appellants Potestas and Bautista have not successfully discharged such
burden.

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed, with the modification that the amount
awarded to the heirs of the deceased Gliceria Tolero Rudines is hereby increased to P30,000.00.
Costs against appellants.

SO ORDERED

People V marino

G.R. No. 132550 February 19, 2001

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
RAMON MARIÑO Y MINA, accused-appellant.
KAPUNAN, J.:
It has been consistently held that when a woman, especially one who is the daughter of the
accused, cries rape, she has, in effect, said all that is necessary to establish that rape was committed
against her.1 However, does this principle still hold true if the victim cannot recall how the alleged
rape was committed as she was asleep and never woke up throughout the incident? We answer in
the negative.
On April 28, 1997, accused-appellant Ramon Mariño y Mina was charged with the crime of rape
before the Regional Trial Court of Romblon, Branch 81. The information reads:
That on or about the 6th day of March, 1997, at around 12:00 midnight, in [B[arangay Agtongo,
[M]unicipality of Romblon, [P]rovince of Romblon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously had carnal
knowledge of his daughter EMILY MARIÑO, a fourteen year old girl, against her will.1âwphi1.nêt
Contrary to law.2
Upon his arraignment, on July 8, 1997, accused-appellant, assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty to
the offense charged.
The version of the prosecution is primarily anchored on the testimonies of Emily Mariño, the victim,
and Ramil Mariño, the victim's brother.
Emily is the eldest child among the six children of accused-appellant and Edita Mariño.3 She was
fourteen (14) years old and a Grade V or Grade VI student when she was allegedly sexually ravished.
At around 10:00 p.m. of May 6, 1997, she was in their house and was about to go to sleep beside her
younger siblings when accused-appellant approached her and asked if he could sleep beside
her.4 She refused. Angered by her refusal, accused-appellant kicked her.5 Accused-appellant then
returned to his bed while Emily to sleep beside her siblings6 on the floor of their house.7 Accused-
appellant's wife was not then around because she was staying in the Municipality of Romblon during
weekdays as a helper in the house of a certain Rene Fajilagutan.8
When Emily awoke at around 3:00 a.m., she was surprised to see that she was no longer on the floor
but already lying on her parents' bed.9 She felt her whole body ache and her vagina was painful, wet
and sticky.10Dumbfounded, she looked around and saw accused-appellant wrapped in a blanket
and lying on the floor.11Thereupon, accused-appellant told her: "Madasok lang da gapaindi pa." (It
already entered but still you refused or It is just being inserted but still you refuse).12 Realizing that she
was violated during her sleep, Emily cried.13 She recalled that it was already the third time that her
father raped her; once when she was in grade III and again when she was in Grade V.14
Emily went back to sleep and got out of bed at around 5 a.m. to prepare breakfast.15 Accused-
appellant was no longer around at that time since he went to work.16 After finishing breakfast, she
and three of her siblings, including Ramil, then eleven years old, proceeded to school.17 On their way
to school, Ramil told Emily of what he witnesses the previous night.18 He recounted that at around
midnight, he woke up to urinate.19 After relieving himself, he tried to sleep again but could not.20 It
was at this point when he saw accused-appellant lift Emily from the floor and lay her on the
bed.21 Accused-appellant next opened the skirt of Emily and took off her dress and her
panty.22Thereafter, accused-appellant took off his brief, held his penis and inserted it into the vagina
of Emily, making pumping motions.23 Accused-appellant then stood up, put back the clothes of Emily
as well as his own clothes.24
After lunch break, Emily decided to skip her afternoon classes to report the incident to her
mother.25 At around 3 p.m., she left for the town of Romblon to see her mother.26 Emily told her of the
reprehensible act committed by her father.27 Her mother got angry and commented that accused-
appellant is stupid and mindless.28 Her mother instructed her to stay in Romblon while she proceeded
to their house to confront accused-appellant.29 Emily spent the night at her grandaunt's house in
Bagtasan.30 The following day, she was brought by her mother to the police station where she filed a
complaint for rape against accused-appellant.31 Thereafter, they proceeded to the hospital where
Dr. Victorio Benedicto, the Rural Health Physician, examined her.32
Dr. Benedicto testified that after examining Emily, he issued a medico-legal certificate where he
noted that the victim's vagina easily admitted a thumb; that it had scars at 2, 5 and 7 o'clock
positions; and that the victim suffered no external physical injuries.33 She opined that a hard object
could have previously penetrated Emily's vagina and that she was no longer a virgin.34
The prosecution also presented Teodino Martinez, the Provincial Warden of Romblon, who declared
that accused-appellant was incarcerated in the provincial jail during the pendency of this case.35 He
was, however, able to escape on April 26, 1997. On that day, a group of Seventh Day Adventists
conducted a bible study at the provincial jail.36 As the group was leaving the premises of the
provincial jail, accused-appellant surreptitiously mingled with them pretending to be one of them
and, thus, was able to evade the prison guards.37 For three days, the jail authorities searched for
accused-appellant. On April 29, 1997, he was surrendered to the authorities by his two (2) brothers,
Editho and Raymundo Mariño.38 Martinez conducted an investigation surrounding accused-
appellant's escape. Accused-appellant told him that the reason why he left the jail was to look for his
wife to ask for forgiveness.39
On the other hand, the defense had a totally different account of what transpired.
On March 6, 1997, accused-appellant went home from work.40 He found his children at home except
his eldest, Emily, who had already gone out of their house.41 Emily was used to going out to watch
betamax movies in other people's houses or attend overnight dances and parties,42 sometimes
sleeping in her friend's house and would return the following day.43 Knowing that Emily would not
come home that evening, accused-appellant, after checking on his other children who were
already sleeping, retired to bed at around 8:30 p.m.44 He woke up at 6:00 a.m. the following day,
prepared breakfast for his children and proceeded to work.45 Later on, he was informed by his
neighbor, Ben Mindoro, that Emily returned to their house at around 8:00 a.m. that day and did not
go to school.46
To refute the testimony of Ramil Mariño, the defense put to the witness stand Raymundo Mariño
(accused-appellant's brother), Noemi Selosa (the wife of Raymundo Mariño), and Valentina Mindoro
(accused-appellant's aunt).
Noemi Selosa testified that on March 10, 1997, she accompanied Edita Mariño and Ramil Mariño to
the police station.47 Ramil Mariño gave his statement before the police investigator with regard to
what he witnessed on the night of March 6, 1997.48 When Ramil finished giving his statement, the
investigator noted that his story did not tally with the account previously given by Emily to the police
that she was raped by accused-appellant.49 Instead, Ramil told the police that he did not see his
father rape Emily. Because of this, Edita Mariño instructed Ramil Mariño to tell the police that he saw
accused-appellant take off the shorts of Emily and rape her. She was able to convince her son that if
he would do what he was told, "his father could be released from jail."50 She also warned him that if
he did not follow what she told him, she would not let him eat.51 Ramil Mariño complied with her
mother's instructions.52
Raymundo Mariño testified that in the afternoon of March 10, 1997, Ramil Mariño, his nephew, went
to his house after giving his statement at the police station.53 When Ramil saw his uncle, he cried and
hugged him.54 Raymundo Mariño asked what was wrong55 and Ramil Mariño said that his mother
forced him to tell the police that his father raped Emily. She also assured him that if he made that
story to the police, his father would be released from jail.56
Valentina Mindoro told the court that she lives in the house of Raymundo Mariño and Noemi
Selosa.57 In the afternoon of March 10, 1997, Ramil Mariño arrived in their house crying.58 He
approached his uncle, Raymundo Mariño, and asked him why his father had not yet been released
from jail as he (the father) was not at fault.59 It was then that Ramil Mariño admitted that he was
coached by his mother to testify against his father.60
In its Decision, dated December 12, 1997, the trial court found accused-appellant guilty of raping his
daughter and sentenced him to suffer the supreme penalty of death. The dispositive portion of the
decision reads:
WHEREFORE, this Court finds the accused RAMON MARIÑO Y MINA GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
of the heinous crime of Rape under the aforequoted Information, dated April 14, 1997, and hereby
sentences him to suffer the supreme penalty of DEATH. He is ordered to pay the victim, his daughter
Emily Mariño, the sum of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency, and to pay the costs.61
Hence, this appeal where accused-appellant raises the following as his lone assignment of error:
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE CRIME CHARGED IN THE
INFORMATION DESPITE INSUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT.62
In finding accused-appellant guilty, the trial court considered the alleged statement made by
accused-appellant: "Madasok lang da gapaindi ka pa" (It already entered but still you refused or It is
just being inserted but still you refuse), as an admission that he raped his daughter. We do not agree.
An admission under Section 26, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court63 applies to statements made by an
accused which directly or impliedly point towards an acknowledgement of guilt for the crime
charged.64
In order that an admission may be appreciated against the accused, the statement must have been
clear and unequivocal such that a reasonable construction of the same would lead to an
acknowledgement of the fact sought to be proven.65 Being merely an inference, an admission,
standing alone, is insufficient to authorize a conviction unless backed up by some other proof which
would show the culpability of the accused.66
We agree with the finding of the trial court that accused-appellant's statement: "Madasok lang da
gapaindi a pa" (It already entered but still you refused or It is just being inserted, but still you
refused,)67 is an admission under Section 26 of Rule 130. However, would this admission, standing
alone, create an inference that accused-appellant raped his daughter68 in that he was able to
actually penetrate her vagina with his sex organ? For one thing, there was no mention at all that
what was inserted was accused-appellant's sex organ. Neither was there an indication that the
insertion was made into her sex organ.
While the victim claims that she was raped, she admittedly did not awake during the entire length of
the episode when she was being undressed and her panty removed, when her legs were spread,
when his body was pressed against hers, when his penis entered into her private parts and when
accused-appellant was doing pumping motions into her vagina. In recalling the events that
transpired on March 6, 1997, Emily testified:
Q Now, at about 10:00 o'clock in the evening, do you recall what happened to you?
A Yes, sir.
Q What happened?
A My father said, can I sleep beside you?
Q When he said those words, where were you?
A At the side, beside my younger siblings.
Q Now, what happened after that?
A I said, I don't want to sleep with you.
Q Because you did not want to sleep with your father, what happened?
A My father got angry.
Q When he became angry with you, when he got angry, what happened?
A He counted one (1) up to three (3)
Q Up to three (3)?
A Yes, sir.
Q When he counted, what did you do?
A I remained in the place where I was sleeping and I kept quiet.
Q When you remained in the place where you were lying and you kept quiet, what happened?
A He approached me and kicked me on my feet.
Q Will you please demonstrate before this Honorable Court what part of your body was hit?
A Here, sir (Witness is pointing to her right lower leg).
Q When you were hit by this kick of your father, what did you do?
A I still kept quiet and he returned to his bed and when he returned again I ran towards the center
where my siblings were lying.
Q When he returned again, what did he do, what happened?
A He said, why would you not let me sleep beside you, there's nothing wrong with it, you are my
child.
Q When he told you that, what happened?
A I kept quiet on my place and I did not answer him.
Q What did you do after that?
A There I felt asleep beside my siblings.
Q And what time did you wake that evening?
A When I woke up it was already 3:00 o'clock in the morning.
Q Where were you lying when you woke up at about 3:00 o'clock that early morning?
A I was already on bed.
Q When you woke up on bed, what did you feel if you felt any?
A My whole body was aching and my vagina was also aching and wet and sticky.
Q At 3:00 o'clock, did you see where your father was?
A Yes, sir.
Q Where?
A On his bed.
PROS. ROCERO:
Your Honor, the witness did not say bed, she said sa kanyang higa-an.
COURT:
Answer.
A I saw father where he was sleeping.
xxx
Q Miss Mariño, aside from asking you for him to sleep with you the night of March 6, 1997 you do
not know any other things that your father did to you?
A No more.
Q That your father raped you that evening of March 6 or in the night of March 6, 1997, you only
got that information from your brother?
A And I also came to know about it because at 3:00 early in the morning, he said, "madasok lang
da gapaindi pa" meaning, it already entered but still you refused".
Q This was stated by your father at 3:00 o'clock in the morning?
A Yes, sir.
Q And so, if not for the statement of your father, you do not know about it?
A Yes, sir.
Q And so, the actual incident that happened you do not know because you were asleep?
A Yes, sir.
Q And what do you understand by rape? Do you understand what is rape?
A Yes, sir.
Q What is rape?
A Raping the girls.
Q What do you mean by ginagahasa?
A Used.
Q What is ginagamit?
A Had sexual intercourse.
Q And you only came to know that you were raped by your father, from whom?
A From Ramil, and I also came to know about it because he was the only one there and he had
raped me before.
Q You are talking of the time when you were Grade III?
A Yes, sir.
Q When did Ramil tell you that you were raped by your father?
A The following morning.
Q What time?
A In my estimate it was already 6:30 o'clock.
Q 6:30 o'clock in the morning of March 7?
A Yes, sir, it was March 7 because the incident happened March 6 and if it is already 12:00 o'clock
past it was already March 7.
Q And that was the only time that you came to know about it?
A What?
Q That you were raped by your father?
A Because before when I was studying in Grade III he raped me and when I was studying in Grade
V he raped me again.
Q But we were talking of raped on March 6, 1997, without the information given to you by Ramil
Mariño at 6:30 o'clock in the morning of March 7, 1997 you really do not know what happened to
you?
A No, sir.
Q What do you mean by saying "no, yes sir"?
A Yes, sir.
Q And you are sure about that?
A Yes, sir.69
It is clear from her testimony that she was not aware of what happened between the time she fell
asleep until she woke up in the bed of her parents. Her conclusion that she was raped by accused-
appellant was only deduced from the latter's statement "Madasok lang da gapaindi ka pa."
Be that as it may, her testimony adequately establishes the fact that on that fateful night, her father
did something to her which made her whole body ache and her most private part feel wet and
sticky. Possibly, it was rape, if his penis penetrated her vagina. Possibly it could only be acts of
lasciviousness if the penetration or insertion was caused by another object like accused-appellant's
fingers. The probing fingers could have involuntarily produced a wet and sticky feeling on the part of
the victim by the stimulation of her private parts. Whether victim's body ached, it cannot be
reasonably ascertained if she was telling the truth or simply exaggerating. The facts at hand would
more persuasively support the theory that the offense committed by accused-appellant was acts of
lasciviousness.70Foremost is that Emily was not awakened by the molestation of his father. Unlike in
rape where the perpetrator would normally place his weight atop his victim, penetrate his organ into
her vagina and make thrusting motions which would readily awaken the victim if sleeping, where
only the finger of the assailant or some other object is inserted into the victim's private parts, which is
less obtrusive, there is the possibility of the victim not awaking throughout the act.
Indeed, it is perplexing that the victim would remain asleep as she was being undressed, intruded into
and subjected to a push and pull movement made on her private parts. There is no pretense that she
was drugged or otherwise rendered unconscious to facilitate the alleged rape. The case of People
vs. Corcina71 cited by the Solicitor General to support his claim that carnal knowledge is possible with
a woman without her knowledge due to deep slumber, is not on all fours with the factual
circumstances of the present case. In Corcina, the victim was a married woman who already had a
daughter and, as such, accustomed to sexual intercourse.72 The victim in the said case awoke in the
middle of the rape since she felt the weight of a man on top of her.73 In the present case, Emily was
totally unaware of her being raped.
The testimony of prosecution witness, Ramil Mariño, on what transpired between the time that the
victim slept on the floor until she woke up on the bed of her parents, leaves much to be desired. The
trial court did not give much credence to it, being incoherent. This was shown when Ramil Mariño
was recalled to the witness stand as the prosecution's rebuttal witness in view of his uncle Raymundo
Mariño's earlier testimony that Ramil was coached by his mother to testify against his father. Judge
Placido Marquez had to conduct a very lengthy clarificatory examination of this witness in order to
determine if he really understood the statements he was making. Towards the end of the Judge's
examination, he made the following observations:
COURT:
The truth to this Court I will be frank with you there is a ring of truth to your statement that your mother
told you to say to the police station that you saw your father doing this things like pumping motion on
Emily telling you so that your father will be released from jail it is the Court's perception. You may not
understand this because you are too young but we have to tell you this but maybe after your college
graduation you can read the transcript and this Court told you this that you see Ramil the mother your
mother might be using your love for your father see so that you would be manipulated to tell the
police what he did so that your father will be released because you love your father. That is all Ramil,
I am not sure if you understand. Most likely you must understand. For the record at least. 74
Furthermore, the defense counsel's cross-examination of Ramil Mariño during rebuttal reveals why the
testimony of this eyewitness was discounted by the trial court. Although already 11 years old, he did
not know what the word "year" means. He did not know that his birthday, or Christmas day comes
once in a year. When asked what are the months and the year, he could only give eight (8),
mentioning December ahead of October. Thus:
ATTY. MADRONA ON ADDITIONAL CROSS EXAMINATION:
x x x
ATTY. MADRONA continuing:
Q You are now 11 years old Mr. Mariño?
PROS. SY:
10.
COURT:
11.
A Yes, sir.
ATTY. MADRONA continuing:
Q And what is your birthday?
A January 6, 1986.
Q So that you were 1 year old on January 6, 1987, correct?
PROS. SY:
No. Is not as simple as it seem. We don't know whether he knows how to compute.
ATTY. MADRONA:
That is the question.
PROS. SY:
Why don't we asked him on January 6, 1987, what is your age?
COURT:
Clarify. Your satisfy.
ATTY. MADRONA:
Yes, we will satisfy.
ATTY. MADRONA continuing:
Q On January 6, 1987, how old were you?
A I was 10.
PROS. SY:
That is what I said before and I am saying it now that this little boy from Alas does not know what is a
year.
ATTY. MADRONA:
No. The question was only a span of one (1) year. And yet the … he must have heard 1987, Your
Honor.
COURT:
Let us asked him, clarify.
ATTY. MADRONA continuing:
Q Do you know the difference between 86 and 87?
A No, sir.
PROS. SY:
Your Honor please, why don't we asked the witness directly how many months a year and what are
the month in the year. What does he understand by a year.
ATTY. MADRONA continuing:
Q You have gone to school. Have you finished Grade 3?
A No, sir.
COURT:
Q You are still going to school?
A Still going to school.
Q What school?
A In Alad.
Q Alad Elementary school?
A Lamao Elementary school.
Q Grade 3?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q So, you are now absent?
A Yes, Your Honor.
ATTY. MADRONA continuing:
Q Now, do you know what is a month from January to December?
A Yes, sir.
Q Please tell us?
A Enero, February, March, May, July, August, December, October, no more.
PROS. SY:
It is now very obvious, Your Honor, as we have said earlier he does not know.
ATTY. MADRONA:
Now, Your Honor, we will asked one question and we will leave the matter to the Court.
Q Do you know your birthday only comes once a year?
PROS. SY:
He only blew his candle once a year. It does not prove, Your Honor that this witness does not know
what year and month by asking him whether his birthday happens once a year he might relate that
his birthday happens blowing candle over a cake once a year.
COURT:
Answer.
A I don't know.
ATTY. MADRONA continuing:
Q How about Christmas, do you know that christmas comes once a year also.
PROS. SY.
What is the point? Does he understand what is a year and how many months a year when he cannot
mention a month and a year he could only count 8 months and it is not in the order …
COURT:
Answer.
A No, sir.
ATTY. MADRONA continuing:
Q How about the birthdays of your brothers and sisters, you also know that it comes once a year
also?
PROS. SY:
If he cannot understand his own birthday much more the birthdays of his brother and sister.
COURT:
Answer.
A No, sir.
ATTY. MADRONA:
We are though with the witness, Your Honor.75
Based on the foregoing, it is evident why the trial court doubted the testimony of the prosecution's
sole eyewitness. Due to his inability to comprehend simple questions, Judge Marquez correctly
entertained the thought that Ramil Mariño might not have witnessed the alleged rape committed on
March 6, 1997 but was only coaxed by his mother into testifying against his father. Thus, the trial
court's appreciation of this witness' testimony is reflected in its decision:
xxx. The testimony of Ramil Mariño is no longer needed because "(t)ruth is established not by the
number of witnesses but by the quality of their testimonies" and "the lone testimony of the victim in
the crime of rape if credible is sufficient to sustain a conviction." It is axiomatic that "witnesses are to
be weighed, not numbered." For "after all, there is no law which requires that the testimony of a single
witness needs corroboration except when the law so expressly requires."76
On the other hand, Dr. Victorio Benedicto testified that Emily was no longer a virgin at the time he
conducted the medico-legal examination since her vagina easily admitted the introduction of a
thumb. There were no fresh lacerations on the victim's vagina but only scars at 2, 5 and 7 o'clock
positions. The absence of fresh lacerations renders doubtful the prosecution's assertion that Emily was
raped on March 6, 1997. The medico-legal findings indicating old scars in her vagina tend to buttress
the claim of Emily that she was raped by her father when she was 8 years old. Unfortunately, this
incident is not included in the information.
What has been established is that an object was inserted into her vagina which resulted in her having
felt pain and that she noticed to be wet and sticky after she found herself on his parents' bed
alongside accused-appellant who blurted out "(M)adasok lang da gapaindi a pa."77 What was
inserted into her vagina could be accused-appellant's finger or another object not necessarily his
penis; hence, what was committed was the crime of acts of lasciviousness.
This crime was not alleged in the information against accused-appellant. Nevertheless, an accused
may be convicted of a lesser crime than that with which he is charged if such lesser offense is
necessarily included in the one charged.78
Considering that the crime of acts of lasciviousness or abusos dishonestos is necessarily included in
rape, the accused who is charged with latter crime may be convicted with the former.79
The alternative circumstance of relationship under Article 1580 of the Revised Penal Code should be
appreciated against accused-appellant. In crimes of chastity such as rape and acts of
lasciviousness, relationship is considered as aggravating.81 It was expressly alleged in the information
and duly proven during trial that the offended party is the daughter of accused-appellant; hence,
relationship aggravates the offense committed by accused-appellant.
The felony of acts of lasciviousness is punishable by prision correccional.82 There being one
aggravating circumstance (relationship), the penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period
shall be imposed upon appellant.83
Under Section 1 of Art. No. 1403, the Court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence,
the minimum of which shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the
Revised Penal Code for the offense, arresto mayor in this case. The maximum term of the
indeterminate sentence shall be that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be
properly imposed under the rules of the Code, which we have previously determined to be prision
correccional in its maximum period.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the appealed decision is MODIFIED in that accused-
appellant RAMON MARIÑO Y MINA is found GUILTY of the crime of ACTS OF LASCIVIOUSNESS and
sentenced to suffer the indeterminate sentence of 6 months of arresto mayor as minimum to 6 years
of prision correccional as maximum and the amount of P10,000.00 as moral damages.1âwphi1.nêt
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Pardo, Buena,
Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-Santiago, De Leon, Jr., and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-69876 November 13, 1986

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
PUTTHI NATIPRAVAT and SE-MA SUEBTRAKUL, accused-appellants.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

This is an appeal interposed by accused Putthi Natipravat and Se-ma Suebtrakul from the decision of
the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 53, finding both of them guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
violating Section 4, Article II of Republic Act No. 6425, the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended,
and sentencing each of them to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of
P20,000.00.
The information filed against them alleged:

That on or about March 1, 1983, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, not being
authorized by law to sell, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit, or transport, or
act as brokers of any prohibited drugs, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, jointly and mutually
helping and conspiring with each other, sell, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in
transit or transport the following drugs, to wit:

Fourteen (14) heroin bricks weighing approx. 325 grams.

Two (2) ballons of heroin powder approx. 270 grams.

Two (2) heroin bricks approx. weighing 48.6 grams.

which are prohibited drugs.

The appellants pleaded not guilty when arraigned on March 23, 1983. Thereafter, the trial ensued.
After the prosecution had rested its case, the appellants, on the ground that the prosecution failed to
prove its case against them, abstained from presenting evidence and submitted the case for
decision.

The lower court established their guilt beyond reasonable doubt on the basis of the uncontroverted
prosecution evidence, as follows:

The prosecution evidence establishes that sometime in February 27, 1983, the Office of the Narcotics
Command (NARCOM for short), Camp Crame, Quezon City, received confidential report or
information that two (2) Thai Nationals would be arriving in the Philippines, bringing with them an
undetermined amount of heroin. On February 28, 1983, at about 7:00 a.m., Major Persie M. Aldaba,
Operation Chief and Commanding Officer of the Special Operation Unit of the NARCOM, assigned
and dispatched an intelligence and operation team composed of Aldaba himself, Lt. Emmanuel
Manzano, Sgt. Stanley Millares, Sgt. Rolando Ibañez and CTC Glen Logan, to conduct close
surveillance on the two (2) Thai Nationals who were reported to be traffickers of heroin, a prohibited
drug. As part of the penetrating operation, a NARCOM-poseur-buyer in the person of CTC Glen
Logan was able to set a "buy bust operation" at around 7:00 p.m. on March 1, 1983, in front of the
Savory Restaurant located along T. M. Kalaw St., Ermita, Manila. (t.s.n., May 23, 1983, pp. 13-22; Exh. F)

Glen Logan testified during the trial held on August 19, 1983, that he was assigned by Major Persie
Aldaba on February 28, 1983 to pose as a buyer of heroin with the end in view of entrapping the said
two (2) Thai Nationals who were trafficking in heroin; that he was introduced to the two (2) Thai
nationals by the coordinating individual, a woman, who contacted them and brought them to him
late in the afternoon of February 28, 1983 inside the Savory Restaurant; that he was introduced as an
interested buyer of heroin to the two (2) Thai nationals whom he pointed out and Identified in open
Court to be the two (2) accused herein, Putthi Natipravat and Se-Ma Suebtrakul; that, thereafter, he
was left alone with the two (2) accused by the coordinating individual; that he hold the two (2)
accused that he was interested in buying heroin and asked them if they have some for sale; that the
two (2) accused agreed to sell heroin to him if he could meet their price of P2,500 per gram; that
they were willing to sell five hundred ninety five (595) grams; that he agreed to buy at the price
quoted by the two (2) accused; that they agreed to meet in the evening of the following day; that
he should be prepared with the money and to meet them in front of the Savory Restaurant at around
7:00 p.m. on March 1, 1983; that on March 1, 1983, at around 7:45 p.m., while he was standing beside
a parked Gemini car in front of the Savory Restaurant, the two (2) accused arrived and approached
him; that he inquired from them if they had the heroin; that the accused Putthi Natipravat told or
indicated to him that the bag he was carrying contained the heroin, and asked Logan if he had the
money; that he (Logan) put out and merely showed to Putthi the money inside the attache case
where he had stashed poodle money, which means that the money on top were in P100.00.00 bills,
while inside were newspapers cut like money merely to give the impression that they had enough
money, even as they did not actually have the necessary amount; that he also requested Putthi
Natipravat if he could look into the bag to verify if the heroin was there and Putthi consented; that
after verifying the existence of heroin inside the bag, Logan gave the pre-arranged signal to the
other members of their team who were strategically deployed or posted in front of Savory Restaurant
at a distance of about five (5) meters away from Logan where they may be able to witness the
transaction, particularly the delivery of heroin to Logan; that the pre-arranged signal consisted in his
scratching his head to show that he was already holding the heroin, while the attache case with
money was still with him; that with his (Logan's) prearranged signal, Major Aldaba approached them
and grabbed the accused Putthi Natipravat, while Sgt. Stanley Millares grabbed the other accused
Se-Ma Suebtrakul, that he delivered the bag containing the heroin (Exhs. B, B-1 to B-14; C, C-1, C-2
and G) to Major Aldaba: that the two (2) accused were brought to Camp Crame, Quezon City, for
further investigation (See also t.s.n., May 23, 1983, pp. 26-35; Exh. F; Testimony of Lt. Emmanuel
Manzano, August 29, 1983)

Sgt. Stanley Millares testified on May 23, 1983 and Identified on the witness stand the heroin
confiscated from the two (2) accused on March 1, 1983, in front of the Savory Restaurant, as well as
his signature in Exhibit C. The articles contained in the bag delivered by the accused Putthi
Natipravat were fourteen (14) bricks of heroin weighing approximately 325 grams, and two (2)
balloons of heroin powder, approximately weighing 270 grams (t.s.n., May 23, 1983, pp. 31-34).

The evidence further shows that on that same night at about 11:00 p.m., Lt. Emmanuel 0. Manzano
and T/Sgt. Rolando M. Ybañez were instructed by their team leader Major Persie M. Aldaba, to
proceed with the two (2) accused to Euro-Haus Inn, Boulevard Executive Suites, Roxas Blvd., Ermita,
Manila, and to enter the room of the said accused at said hotel where they were temporary billeted;
that upon arrival thereat, together with the two (2) accused, Lt. Manzano and Sgt. Ybanez
coordinated with the Hotel Security Officer, Mr. Danilo Arellano and the Hotel security guard Efren
Fetalino who accompanied them to Room 4041 occupied by said accused; that before entering
said room, they were able to secure a written consent to search, dated March 3, 1983, signed by the
accused Natipravat who gave his consent, and by the other accused Suebtrakul who signed as a
witness, together with Arellano and Fetalino (Exh. L); that said written consent to search authorized
the members of the Anti-Narcotics Unit led by Lt. Emmanuel Manzano to conduct a search of said
Room 4041, Euro-Haus Inn, Blvd. Executive Suites, Roxas Blvd., Manila; that Lt. Manzano and Sgt.
Ybanez conducted a search inside said Room 4041 in the presence of the two (2) accused and the
two (2) security guards, and found two (2) heroin bricks weighing 48.6 grams, concealed inside a
blue-gray travelling bag allegedly owned by the accused Se-Ma Suebtrakul; (Exhs. D, D-1, D-1-a, D-1-
b, D-2, and D-3); that Lt. Manzano seized the two (2) bricks of heroin (Exhs. D-1 and D-2) and issued
the corresponding receipt (Exh. H); that, on the same occasion and date, the accused Natipravat
also signed a "CERTIFICATION RE CONDUCT OF SEARCH" certifying that from 12:30 a.m. to 1:00 a.m.
on March 2, 1983, the NARCOM team led by Lt. Manzano conducted a search in their room with his
consent and permission; that he (Natipravat) was present at all times and the search was conducted
in an orderly manner, and no unnecessary force was employed; that nobody was hurt, and nothing
was taken without proper receipt; and that he (Natipravat) has no complaint whatsoever against
any member of the NARCOM team which conducted the search (Exhs. J and K); that, thereafter, the
two (2) accused were taken back, together with the confiscated heroin, to the NARCOM Head-
quarters, Camp Crame, Quezon City, for further investigation and proper disposition of the case; that
all the seized heroin articles were brought to the PC Laboratory, Camp Crame, for examination.
(Testimony of Lt. Emmanuel Manzano, August 29, 1983)

On March 3, 1983, the aforementioned fourteen (14) bricks of heroin weighing approximately 325
grams (Exhs. B-1 to B-14), the two (2) balloons of heroin powder, approximately weighing 270 grams
(Exhs. C-1 and C-2), and the two (2) other heroin bricks weighing approximately 48.6 grams (Exhs. D-1
and D-2) were brought to the PC Crime Laboratory, Camp Crame, Quezon City, and were examined
by Captain Lolita B. Chambers, Chief Chemist, PC Crime Laboratory, Camp Crame, Quezon City,
thru chemical and instrumental methods of analysis, and who found them to be positive for heroin, a
prohibited drug. Captain Chambers herself testified that a letter-request, dated March 2, 1983 (Exh.
A), was hand-carried personally to their office by Major Persie Aldaba on March 3, 1983, at 2:30 p.m.
(t.s.n., Idem., pp. 19-21), together with the fourteen (14) bricks of suspected heroin (Exhs. B-1 to B-14),
two (2) plastic bags of suspected heroin powder (Exhs. C-1 and C-2) and two (2) other suspected
heroin bricks (Exhs. D-1 and D-2), all of which she examined and found to be positive for heroin
(idem., pp. 6-19; EXH. E).

xxx xxx xxx

The appellants raised the following assignments of errors in this appeal:

THE RECORD SHOWS THAT DEFENDANT SE-MA SUEBTRAKUL WAS A MERE PASSIVE ONLOOKER IN THE
ALLEGED SALE OF HEROIN UNDER THE REPEATED RULINGS OF THIS SUPREME COURT, IT FOLLOWS THAT
SE-MA SUEBTRAKUL SHOULD BE ACQUITTED.
II

THE RECORD SHOWS THAT MAJOR PERSIE ALDABA CONFISCATED A BAG/BAGS ALLEGEDLY
CONTAINING HEROIN ALLEGEDLY AGAIN IN THE POSSESSION OF PUTTHI NATIPRAVAT. THE RECORD
LIKEWISE SHOWS THAT CAPT. CHAMBERS OF THE CIS LABORATORY RECEIVED CERTAIN PACKAGES
FROM MAJOR ALDABA WHICH SHE FOUND UPON ANALYSIS TO BE HEROIN. THERE IS HOWEVER, NO
EVIDENCE IN RECORD TO SHOW THAT THE PACKAGES THAT CAPT. CHAMBERS RECEIVED FROM MAJOR
ALDABA WERE THE ONES THAT MAJOR ALDABA TOOK FROM PUTTHI NATIPRAVAT. THE LOWER COURT
MERELY ASSUMED THAT THE PACKAGES TAKEN BY MAJOR ALDABA FROM PUTTHI NATIPRAVAT WERE THE
SAME PACKAGES THAT HE DELIVERED TO CAPT. CHAMBERS AND ON THE BASIS OF THIS UNWARRANTED
ASSUMPTION PROCEEDED TO CONVICT PUTTHI NATIPRAVAT. WE SUBMIT THAT THERE IS NOTHING IN THE
LAW THAT AUTHORIZED THE TRIAL COURT TO MAKE AN ASSUMPTION OF THIS NATURE. THE CHAIN OF
EVIDENCE BEING INCOMPLETE PUTTHI NATIPRAVAT SHOULD LIKEWISE BE ACQUITTED.

III

EVEN ASSUMING FOR THE SAKE OF ARGUMENT ONLY THAT THERE IS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO CONVICT
SE-MA SUEBTRAKUL AND PUTTHI NATIPRAVAT OF THE CRIME OF SELLING PROHIBITED DRUGS
NEVERTHELESS THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN SO CONVICTING THEM SINCE THE RECORD SHOWS THAT THE
CONSTABULARY AGENTS WHO APPREHENDED THE ACCUSED ON THE ALLEGED GROUND THAT THE
ACCUSED ATTEMPTED TO SELL PROHIBITED DRUGS TO THEM FIRST EXERTED EVERY EFFORT TO CAUSE THE
ACCUSED TO SELL THEM THESE PROHIBITED DRUGS AND THIS IS A FACT WHICH THE TRIAL COURT TOOK
NOTE OF IN ITS DECISION. UNDER THE REPEATED DOCTRINES OF THIS SUPREME COURT, IT FOLLOWS THAT
THE ACCUSED HAVING BEEN INDUCED TO COMMIT THE ALLEGED CRIME BY THE AGENTS OF THE LAW
THE CASE AGAINST THEM SHOULD BE DISMISSED.

IV

THE RECORD SHOWS THAT THE CONSTABULARY AGENTS WHO APPREHENDED THE ACCUSED ADMITTED
THAT THEY HAD DISREGARDED THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED. IT FOLLOWS THAT THE
CASE AGAINST THE ACCUSED SHOULD BE DISMISSED.

We have carefully reviewed the records of the case and we are convinced that the unlawful
distribution of heroin by the appellants was committed as narrated by the prosecution witnesses. It is
a well-settled rule that the trial court findings relative to the credibility of the testimony of the
witnesses as well as of the witnesses themselves are entitled to high respect, and, therefore, are
generally sustained by the appellate court (People v. Rosario, 134 SCRA 496). The appellants have
failed to give any convincing reasons why we should depart from the steadfast rule.

The lower court, after observing the demeanor and conduct of the prosecution witnesses, was
convinced that "they were testifying truthfully on the substantial matters testified to by them."

The unrebutted testimonies of the prosecution witnesses who were subjected to cross-examination
prove the validity of the charges against the appellants. The evidence is sufficient to establish guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. (See People v. Luces, 125 SCRA 813)

Moreover, credence should be given to the narration of the incident by the prosecution witnesses
especially as they are police officers who are presumed to have performed their duties in a regular
manner in the absence of any evidence to the contrary. (People v. Gamayon, 121 SCRA 642; and
People v. Patog, G.R. No. 69620, September 24,1986)

Appellant Suebtrakul contends that he was a mere passive onlooker in the drug sale considering that
Officer Logan as poseur-buyer talked to Natipravat only during the negotiations and it was
Natipravat alone who was holding the red bag containing the heroin during the actual delivery.

This contention is without merit. We agree with the lower court's findings that conspiracy has been
clearly established.

The presence of Suebtrakul during the negotiations and actual delivery indicates a common purpose
with Natipravat to sell 595 grams of heroin. He could not have been an innocent bystander in the
heroin deal transacted by his fellow Thai, a deal that involved a sizeable amount of money
amounting to P1,487,500.00.
For conspiracy to exist, the evidence need not establish the actual agreement which shows the pre-
conceived plan, motive, interest or purpose in the commission of the crime. It is enough that it is
shown that their concerted efforts were performed with closeness and coordination indicating their
common purpose to sell prohibited drugs. (See People v. Tala, 141 SCRA 240)

It is understandable that CTC Logan talked only to Natipravat because Suebtrakul did not speak
English, only Thai. This fact, however, does not exculpate him as his coming to the Philippines with his
friend and his presence all throughout the transaction until the actual delivery showed his
coordination with Natipravat.

Appellants allege that there is no showing that the package delivered to CTC Logan was the same
package analyzed at Camp Crame.

They contend that there were three different versions as to who brought the confiscated heroin for
analysis.

The first version appears in the testimony of Sgt. Millares (t.s.n., June 1, 1983, pp. 55-59) to the effect
that Lt. Ybañez was ordered to bring the confiscated packages to the laboratory for examination
and that Lt. Ybañez obeyed this order. The second version is from CTC Logan who testified that he
and Major Aldaba brought the said packages to Camp Crame. Later on, Logan testified that he did
not accompany the packages to the laboratory for he was assigned another job, which accounted
for the third version.

The Solicitor General has reconciled these alleged discrepancies. He stated that:

xxx xxx xxx

The above testimonies may be reconciled viewed as follows: Aldaba was with Logan in bringing the
heroin to Camp Crame. However, after reaching the laboratory, Logan left Aldaba for another
assignment Meanwhile, Aldaba instructed Ybañez who was already in Camp Crame to bring the
substance for examination. Ybañez complied although Aldaba could have been with him to the
laboratory.

This Court has repeatedly held that inconsistencies and contradictions referring to collateral matters
do not destroy the credibility of witnesses. On the contrary, they indicate that the witnesses were not
previously rehearsed. (People v. Abigan, G.R. No. 69674, September l , 1986)

On the specific issue of whether the case involved entrapment or instigation, the appellants contend
that the latter method was employed citing the portion in the decision stating that he (Logan) told
the two (2) accused that he was interested in buying heroin and asked them if they have some for
sale...

As aptly stated by the Solicitor General:

xxx xxx xxx

[T]he mere fact that the authorities deceived appellants into believing that they were buyers of
heroin does not exculpate the latter from liability for selling the probihited drugs. The police can
legitimately feign solicitation to catch criminals who habitually engage in the commission of the
offense...

In an entrapment, ways and means are resorted to for the purpose of trapping and capturing the
law breakers in the execution of their criminal plan. On the other hand, in instigation, the instigator
practically induces the would-be defendant into the commission of the offense, and himself
becomes a co-principal. Entrapment is no bar to prosecution and conviction, while in instigation, the
defendant would have to be acquitted (People v. Patog, supra; People v. Abella, 46 Phil. 857;
People v. Luces, supra; and People v. Nillos, 127 SCRA 207)

In the case at bar, CTC Logan did not perform any act which in any way induced or influenced the
herein appellants to sell heroin. The heroin was obviously for sale. When Logan first and set the actual
delivery the very next day. If there was inducement on the part of CTC Logan, the appellants could
not have readily produced such a big amount of heroin the followng day.
Lastly, the appellants question the alleged disregard of the constitutional rights of the accused
particularly the failure to explain the meaning of their rights and of a search warrant and the failure
to furnish an interpreter.

In the case of People v. Nicandro (141 SCRA 289), we stated that:

When the Constitution requires a person under investigation "to be informed" of his right to remain
silent and to counsel, it must be presumed to contemplate the transmission of meaningful information
rather than just the ceremonial and perfunctory recitation of an abstract constitutional principle. As a
rule, therefor, it would not be sufficient for a police officer just to repeat to the person under
investigation the provision of Section 20, Article IV of the Constitution. He is not only duty-bound to tell
person the rights to which the latter is entitled; he must also explain their effects in practical terms,
e.g., what the person under interrogation may or may not do, and in a language the subject fairly
understands. (See People v. Ramos, 122 SCRA 312; People v. Caguioa, 95 SCRA 2). In other words,
the right of a person under interrogation "to be informed" implies a correlative obligation on the part
of the police investigator to explain, and contemplates an effective communication that results in
understanding what is conveyed. Short of this, there is a denial of the right, as it cannot truly be said
that the person has been "informed" of his rights. Now, since the right "to be informed" implies
comprehension, the degree of explanation required will necessarily vary, depending upon the
education, intelligence and other relevant personal circumstances of the person under investigation.
Suffice it to say that a simpler and more lucid explanation is needed where the subject is unlettered.

Admittedly, as Putthi Natipravat was not fluent in English and Suebrakul only understood Thai, they
could not have fully comprehended the recitation of their constitutional rights. However, a lack of full
comprehension is not sufficient to dismiss the charges or acquit the accused. There was no
questioning by law enforcers designed to elicit statements, whether inculpatory or exculpatory. The
judgment of conviction was not based on any extrajudicial statement given by the accused.

In the same light that the appellants failure to fully comprehend the implication of their consent to
have their room searched is not a ground for dismissal, the alleged lack of full comprehension results
only in the exclusion of the evidence taken from the hotel room.

Guilt is still established by proof beyond reasonable doubt independent of the questioned search
and disregarding the additional heroin of 48.6 grams confiscated from the appellants' hotel room.

The appellants allege that their constitutional rights were violated as shown by the testimony of Lt.
Emmanuel Manzano that he could not explain fully the consitutitional rights of the accused because
Thailand has no Constitution. The answer of Manzano was not only irrelevant and beside the point
but also indicates an unfortunate lack of respect by law enforcers of the meaning and extent of the
protection guaranteed by Sections 3 and 20 of the Bill of Rights. However, the alleged violation refers
to the subsequent search conducted at the Euro-Haus Inn in Roxas Boulevard, Manila which yielded
additional bricks of heroin found in Suebtrakul's travelling bag. As earlier stated, the appellants were
convicted on the basis of the earlier sale of heroin in front of the Savory Restaurant, not the presence
of more heroin in their hotel room.

The accused-appellants expressly waived their right to present evidence. First, they states that their
defense would be based on their being subjected to lie detector tests by the National Bureau of
Investigation to prove the truth of their defense. The motion for lie detector tests was granted. The
appellants abandoned this defense. They formally submitted their case on the ground that "there is
no need for the defense to present evidence since the prosecution has failed to prove its case." The
appellants cannot now complain in the face of prosecution evidence clearly and sufficiently
warranting their conviction.

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is AFFIRMED.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, VS. CRUZ

[G.R. No. 152176. October 1, 2003]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. ROGER DELA CRUZ y DOE, appellant.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This is an appeal from the decision[1] of the Regional Trial Court of Calabanga, Camarines Sur, Branch
63, in Criminal Case No. RTC 99-323, finding appellant Roger Dela Cruz y Doe guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua, and to indemnify the heirs of the victim the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and
P50,000.00 as moral damages, and to pay the costs.
On December 28, 1998, an Information for Murder was filed against Roger Dela Cruz y Doe. The
Information reads:
That on or about 10:00 oclock in the evening of August 29, 1998 at Bgy. Cabanbanan, Calabanga,
Camarines Sur, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, with intent to kill, and with treachery, while armed with a deadly weapon - an icepick, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab with the said weapon one,
Mark Lester Resterio Suarez, inflicting upon the latter one (1) fatal wound on his chest, which injury he
sustained caused his death, to the prejudice of his heirs.
ACTS CONTRARY TO LAW.[2]
Appellant was arraigned on June 30, 2000 and pleaded not guilty.[3] Trial on the merits thereafter
ensued.
Prosecution witness Joseph Sanchez testified that at 10:00 p.m. of August 29, 1998, he was walking
along Barangay Cabanbanan, Calabanga, Camarines Sur together with his friends, Mark Lester
Suarez and Edgar delos Santos, on their way towards Barangay Cagsao, Calabanga, Camarines
Sur. He stopped at a store to buy a cigarette. Suddenly, he heard Mark shout that he was stabbed.
When he looked over his shoulder, he saw appellant, running away. Mark told him that it was
appellant who stabbed him. Sanchez ran to the house of Marks mother, Milagros Suarez, to tell her
that Mark had been stabbed by Roger dela Cruz. Together, he and Milagros rushed Mark to the Bicol
Medical Center but he died on the way.
Milagros testified that she incurred P8,500.00 for the funeral expenses, P2,000.00 for the wake and
P750.00 for church rites.
Chief Tanod Felix delos Santos of Barangay Cabanbanan, who responded to the stabbing incident,
narrated that he was awakened by the shouts of Sanchez that somebody had been stabbed. He
and the other tanods went with Sanchez to the place where Mark was lying about fifteen meters
from his residence. He saw Marks wound on the right side of his chest and ordered somebody to call
the police from the Cabanbanan Kababayan Center. He asked Mark who stabbed him, and the
latter answered, Roger. After several days, he learned that Mark died.
Dr. Daniel Y. Tan, who performed the necropsy on the cadaver, found that the cause of the victims
death was hypovolemic shock secondary to mortal stab wound. He testified that the victim sustained
a stab wound which pierced into the right lobe of the liver, diaphragm, right lung lobe and right
ventricle of the heart. The wound was fatal.[4]
In his defense, appellant testified that on August 23, 1998, he went to Manila with his friend, Victorio
Delfin, to look for a job. Prior to that, he worked as operator of JBL Mobile Disco for one week before
he left for Manila. When he failed to obtain employment in Manila, he went to his sister and brother-
in-laws house at Barangay Buck Estate, Alfonso, Cavite on August 27, 1998. His mother also stayed in
his sisters house. On August 29, 1998, he started working as a construction worker in Sta. Lucia,
Tagaytay. The project lasted for three weeks. He looked for another job but he was not able to find
one.
When appellant learned that a case was filed against him, he returned to Cabanbanan,
Calabanga, Camarines Sur. On June 9, 2000, he was arrested. He testified that he knew the victim
Mark, who was his friend.
Zenaida dela Cruz, appellants mother, and Victorio Delfin corroborated appellants testimony.
On October 13, 2001, the trial court rendered its decision, the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the prosecution having proven the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt, accused Roger dela Cruz y Doe is hereby convicted of the crime of
Murder as charged. He is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay the heirs
of Mark Lester Suarez the following damages:
1. P50,000.00 as civil liability for his death;
2. P50,000.00 as moral damages; and
3. to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.[5]
Hence this appeal, based on the following assignment of errors:
I
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING FULL FAITH AND CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONIES OF
PROSECUTION WITNESSES JOSEPH SANCHEZ AND FELIX DELOS SANTOS.
II
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN APPRECIATING THE QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF
TREACHERY ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT INDEED ACCUSED-APPELLANT WAS THE ONE WHO STABBED THE
VICTIM.
III
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF MURDER.[6]
We agree with the trial court that the anti mortem statement of the victim cannot be considered a
dying declaration as the same was not made with awareness of his impending death. In People v.
Bautista, et al.,[7] we held that it is not indispensable that a declarant expires immediately
thereafter. It is the belief of an impending death and not the rapid succession of death, in point of
fact, that renders the dying declaration admissible.
Nonetheless, his declaration is admissible as part of the res gestae. A declaration is deemed part of
the res gestae and admissible in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule when the following
requisites concur: (1) the principal act, the res gestae, is a startling occurrence; (2) the statements
were made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise; and (3) the statements must
concern the occurrence in question and its immediately attending circumstances.[8] All these
requisites are present in this case. The principal act, i.e., the stabbing, was a startling occurrence. The
declaration was made right after the stabbing while the victim was still under the exciting influence
of the startling occurrence, without any prior opportunity to contrive a story implicating the
appellant. The declaration concerns the one who stabbed the victim. Thus, the trial court correctly
appreciated the testimonies of prosecution witnesses Sanchez and Delos Santos on what the victim
told them as part of the res gestae.
Basic is the rule that the findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies
are entitled to the highest respect and will not be disturbed on appeal, in the absence of any clear
showing that it overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and
substance which would have affected the result of the case.[9] None of the aforesaid exceptions
obtains in the case at bar.
We cannot sustain appellants defenses of denial and alibi. Denial is intrinsically a weak defense. It
must be supported by strong evidence of non-culpability in order to be credible. Correspondingly,
courts view the defense of alibi with suspicion and caution, not only because it is inherently weak
and unreliable, but also because it can be fabricated easily.[10]
In the case at bar, appellant claimed that on August 23, 1998, he went to Manila with Victorio Delfin
to look for a job. When he was not able to find any job, he went to his sisters house in Cavite on
August 27, 1998. He started working as a construction worker in Sta. Lucia, Tagaytay on August 29,
1998. Appellant, however admitted that it was his first time to look for a job outside Cabanbanan,
Camarines Sur. On the other hand, prosecution witness Sanchez testified that he saw appellant
leaving the scene of the crime on that fateful night. Time-tested is the rule that between the positive
assertions of prosecution witness and the negative averments of appellant, the former indisputably
deserve more credence and evidentiary weight.[11]
Moreover, appellant fled from the scene of the crime after the stabbing incident. The trial judge had
issued a warrant for his arrest on February 17, 1999 but the authorities arrested him only on June 9,
2000. The flight of an accused is an indication of his guilt or of a guilty mind.[12] Indeed, the wicked
man flees though no man pursueth, but the righteous are as bold as a lion.[13]
We agree with appellant that the crime committed was not murder. The qualifying circumstance of
treachery was not sufficiently established by the prosecution. The essence of treachery is the sudden
and unexpected attack by an aggressor on an unsuspecting victim, depriving the latter of any real
chance to defend himself, thereby ensuring its commission without risk to the aggressor, without the
slightest provocation on the part of the victim.[14]
The prosecution witness did not see the actual stabbing of the victim. Therefore, there is no way of
determining on how the attack was initiated. In the same way that no testimony would prove that
the appellant contemplated upon the mode to insure the killing.
Therefore, the crime committed by appellant is homicide. Under Article 249 of the Revised Penal
Code, homicide is punished by reclusion temporal. There being no mitigating or aggravating
circumstance, the penalty shall be imposed in its medium period. Appellant is entitled to the benefits
under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, and may thus be sentenced to an indeterminate penalty
the minimum term of which shall be taken from the penalty next lower in degree, namely, prision
mayor. Thus, appellant may be sentenced to an indeterminate penalty ranging from eight (8) years
and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1)
day of reclusion temporal, as maximum.
In keeping with prevailing jurisprudence, the heirs of the deceased are entitled to the amount of
P50,000.00 by way of civil indemnity ex delicto. The moral damages awarded in the amount of
P50,000.00 is affirmed, there being proof that because of Mark Lesters death, his mother Milagros
Suarez suffered wounded feelings, mental anguish, anxiety and similar injury.
However, the trial court failed to award actual damages. To be entitled to such damages, it is
necessary to prove the actual amount of loss with a reasonable degree of certainty, premised upon
competent proof and on the best evidence obtainable to the injured party.[15] In the case at bar, the
prosecution was able to substantiate the claim for funeral expenses in the amount of P8,500.00 with
receipts.[16]
In the case of People v. Villanueva,[17] it was held that when actual damages proven by receipts
during the trial amount to less than P25,000.00, as in the present case, the award of temperate
damages for P25,000.00 is justified in lieu of actual damages for a lesser amount. This Court
ratiocinated that it was anomalous and unfair that the heirs of the victim who tried but succeeded in
proving actual damages amounting to less than P25,000.00 would be in a worse situation than those
who might have presented no receipts at all but would be entitled to P25,000.00 temperate
damages.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the appealed decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Calabanga, Camarines Sur, Branch 63 in Criminal Case No. RTC 99-323, is MODIFIED. As modified,
appellant Roger dela Cruz y Doe is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as principal of the crime
of Homicide and is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty ranging from eight (8) years and
one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day
of reclusion temporal, as maximum. He is further ordered to pay the heirs of the deceased the
amounts of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages and P25,000.00 as temperate
damages.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.

[G.R. Nos. 118866-68. September 17, 1997]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. RODOLFO DE LA CRUZ, alias RODOLFO DOMINGO or
OMPONG, accused-appellant.
DECISION
REGALADO, J.:

In this appeal from three sentences of reclusion perpetua, accused-appellant Rodolfo de la Cruz,
alias Rodolfo Domingo or Ompong, consistent with his negative pleas when arraigned on November
5, 1992 and January 11, 1993,[1] impugns his conviction for multiple murder in Criminal Cases Nos. 92-
8029, 92-8030 and 92-8031 by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 74,[2] of Antipolo, Rizal. He anchors his
entreaty for the reversal thereof mainly on the ground that he was not fully and appropriately
apprised of or allowed to exercise his constitutional rights prior to and while undergoing custodial
investigation.
In the early evening of June 23, 1992, the lifeless bodies of Teodorico M. Laroya, Jr. and his children,
12-year old Karen Verona D. Laroya and 10-year old John Lester D. Laroya, were discovered in their
residence at 13 Emerald Street, Greenpark Village, Cainta, Rizal by their horrified neighbors. The star-
crossed trio were all bloodied consequent to numerous stab wounds, and each of them had a knife
still embedded in and protruding from their bodies when found. Karen Verona also bore external
signs of sexual assault.[3]
None of their neighbors, however, witnessed the gruesome murders. Two of them later testified in
court, namely, Harold Jim F. Balocating and Anita F. Pangan. The former merely recounted how,
while playing table tennis in front of the Laroya residence, he and his friends stumbled upon the dead
bodies of the victims. Anita Pangan, on the other hand, recalled that at around 9:00 P.M. of June 23,
1992, appellant, who was a brother-in-law of Teodorico Laroya, Jr., purchased some candies at her
store which is located inside the village.[4]
Both Balocating and Pangan had previously executed sworn statements just three days after the
incident, the assertions in which were of the same import as their respective testimonies in court.[5]
On June 27, 1992, the police authorities apprehended appellant at the house of his brother in Fort
Bonifacio. SPO1 Carlos R. Atanacio, Jr., a member of the Cainta Police Station in Cainta, Rizal
interrogated appellant regarding the crimes on the same day that he was arrested.
This police officer declared in the trial court that before he questioned appellant as to his
participation in said crimes, all steps were undertaken to completely inform the latter of his rights and
this he did in the presence of appellants supposed counsel, one Atty. Lorenza Bernardino-Villanueva.
Appellant then signed, likewise in the presence of said counsel, an extrajudicial confession wherein
he narrated in detail how he allegedly snuffed out the lives of the victims.[6]
When presented as the lone witness for himself, appellant was observed by the trial court to be
afflicted with a problem in expressing himself and an impediment in his speech (ngo-ngo). By
appellants own account, he only reached the fourth grade of elementary schooling and, although
conversant with Tagalog, he is unable to read and write, although he can sign his name. He bluntly
repudiated the version of SPO1 Atanacio, Jr. and insisted that he was never assisted by any counsel
of his choice, much less met said Atty. Lorenza Bernardino-Villanueva, when he was interrogated at
the police headquarters in Cainta, Rizal and signed his supposed extrajudicial confession.
Parenthetically, his answers to the questions appearing therein are in surprisingly fluent, flawless and
expressive Tagalog,[7] which could not have been done by him because of his defect in speech and
articulation.
He further claims that he was instead tortured by the police authorities into signing the same, and not
that he did so voluntarily. While he admits having been at the residence of the victims on the night
that they were murdered, he flatly denied having killed them as he left the trio well and alive that
same night when he proceeded to his brothers place in Fort Bonifacio.[8]
1. In unambiguous and explicit terms, Section 12, paragraph 1, of Article III of the Constitution requires
that [a]ny person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be
informed of his right to remain silent and to have independent counsel preferably of his own choice.
If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights
cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel. Corollary thereto, paragraph 3
thereof declares that any confession or admission obtained in violation of the same shall be
inadmissible in evidence against the confessant.
An accused person must be informed of the rights set out in said paragraph of Section 12 upon being
held as a suspect and made to undergo custodial investigation by the police authorities.[9] As
explained by this Court in People vs. Marra,[10] custodial investigation involves any questioning
initiated by law enforcement authorities after a person is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of
his freedom of action in any significant manner. And, the rule begins to operate at once as soon as
the investigation ceases to be a general inquiry into an unsolved crime and direction is then aimed
upon a particular suspect who has been taken into custody and to whom the police would then
direct interrogatory question which tend to elicit incriminating statements.
Furthermore, not only does the fundamental law impose, as a requisite function of the investigating
officer, the duty to explain those rights to the accused but also that there must correspondingly be a
meaningful communication to and understanding thereof by the accused. A mere perfunctory
reading by the constable of such rights to the accused would thus not suffice.
The defendant in the dock must be made to understand comprehensively, in the language or
dialect that he knows, the full extent of the same. A confession made in an atmosphere
characterized by deficiencies in informing the accused of all the rights to which he is entitled would
be rendered valueless and inadmissible, perforated, as it is by non-compliance with the procedural
and substantive safeguards to which an accused is entitled under the Bill of Rights and as now further
implemented and ramified by statutory law.[11]
2. In the present case, SPO1 Atanacio, Jr., admitted in his testimony before the lower court that the
investigation of appellant in connection with the murders actually commenced at around 9:00 A.M.
on June 27, 1992 at the police headquarters in Cainta, Rizal, at the time when appellant was still
without counsel.[12] The sworn statement containing appellants extrajudicial confession itself shows
that it was taken at around 11:00 A.M.[13] Further, while SPO1 Atanacio, Jr. informed appellant in
Tagalog of his right to remain silent, that any statement he made could be used for or against him in
any court, and that he could have counsel preferably of his own choice, he nonetheless failed to tell
appellant that if the latter could not afford the services of counsel, he could be provided with
one.[14]
The foregoing lapses on the part of the police authorities are all fatal to the admissibility of the
extrajudicial confession supposedly executed by appellant before SPO1 Atanacio, Jr. Jurisprudence
along these lines have all been too consistent - an accused under custodial interrogation must
continuously have a counsel assisting him from the very start thereof. Indeed, Section 12, Article III of
the Constitution, could not be any clearer.
To reiterate, prior to the commencement of the investigation, the accused must perforce be
informed, on top of all his other rights enumerated therein, that where he lacks a counsel of his
choice because of indigence or other incapacitating cause, he shall be provided with one. Without
this further safeguard, the cautionary right to counsel would merely impress upon the accused, more
so upon an impecunious person like appellant who is hardly educated, that his right thereto would
mean simply that he can consult a lawyer if he has one or has the financial capacity to obtain legal
services, and nothing more.
Curiously, the record is completely bereft of any indication as to how appellant was able to engage
the services of Atty. Lorenza Bernardino-Villanueva, the counsel who was allegedly present when
appellant executed his confession and who was not even subpoenaed to testify thereon. This
significant circumstance lends credence to the latters denial that he ever met in person, much less
executed the confession in the presence of, said counsel. What emerges from a perusal of the
record is that this counsel was merely picked out and provided by the law enforcers themselves, thus
putting into serious doubt her independence and competence in assisting appellant during the
investigation[15] as to affect its admissibility.
Moreover, had she been equal to her responsibility in the face of such serious charge involved in the
cases, the failure of SPO1 Atanacio, Jr. to fully apprise appellant of all his rights, particularly the
requirement that if he could not afford the services of a lawyer he shall be provided with one would
have been rectified by said counsel at that very stage of the investigation. Indeed, from our earliest
jurisprudence, the law vouchsafes to the accused the right to an effective counsel, one who can be
made to act in protection of his rights,[16] and not by merely going through the motions of providing
him with anyone who possesses a law degree.
Again, about the only matter that bears out the presence of such counsel at that stage of custodial
interrogation are the signatures which she affixed on the affidavit. Withal, a cursory reading of the
confession itself and SPO1 Atanacios version of the manner in which he conducted the interrogation,
yields no evidence or indication pointing to her having explained to the appellant his rights under the
Constitution.
In People vs. Ayson, etc., et al.,[17] this Court aptly emphasized these constitutional safeguards in this
wise:
In Miranda, Chief Justice Warren summarized the procedural safeguards laid down for a person in
police custody, in-custody interrogation being regarded as the commencement of an adversary
proceeding against the suspect.

He must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he
says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney,
and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he
so desires. Opportunity to exercise those rights must be afforded to him throughout the interrogation.
After such warnings have been given, such opportunity afforded him, the individual may knowingly
and intelligently waive these rights and agree to answer or make a statement. But unless and until
such warnings and waivers are demonstrated by the prosecution at the trial, no evidence obtained
as a result of interrogation can be used against him.

The objective is to prohibit incommunicado interrogation of individuals in a police-dominated

atmosphere, resulting in self-incriminating statements without full warnings of constitutional rights.

The rights above specified, to repeat, exist only in custodial interrogations, or in-custody interrogation
of accused persons. And, as this Court has already stated, by custodial interrogation is meant
questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or
otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. The situation contemplated has
also been more precisely described by this Court.

x x x After a person is arrested and his custodial investigation begins, a confrontation arises which at
best may be termed unequal. The detainee is brought to an army camp or police headquarters and
there questioned and cross-examined not only by one but as many investigators as may be
necessary to break down his morale. He finds himself in strange and unfamiliar surroundings, and
every person he meets, he considers hostile to him. The investigators are well-trained and seasoned in
their work. They employ all the methods and means that experience and study have taught them to
extract the truth, or what may pass for it, out of the detainee. Most detainees are unlettered and are
not aware of their constitutional rights. And even if they were, the intimidating and coercive
presence of the officers of the law in such an atmosphere overwhelms them into silence. Section 20
of the Bill of Rights seeks to remedy this imbalance.

3. Necessarily, even while there is evidence of the corpus delicti in this case, appellants conviction
must be set aside for his extrajudicial confession is obviously inadmissible in evidence against him. The
rule is that an extrajudicial confession, where admissible, must be corroborated by evidence of the
corpus delicti in order to sustain a finding of guilt.[18] Both must co-exist. The insistence of the Office
of the Solicitor General that appellants confession could nonetheless be treated as an admission
which could therefore be admitted in evidence is misplaced, for the Bill of Rights treats of both
confessions and admissions in the same light.[19] In addition, it should be stressed that in appellants
case, no eyewitnesses to the actual killings were ever presented to testify in court, and the
prosecution relied primarily on circumstantial evidence to inculpate appellant in crimes wherein he
was meted three penalties of reclusion perpetua.
It is significant that, with the exception of appellants putative extrajudicial confession, no other
evidence of his alleged guilt has been presented by the People. The proposition that the medical
findings jibe with the narration of appellant as to how he allegedly committed the crimes falls into the
fatal error of figuratively putting the horse before the cart. Precisely, the validity and admissibility of
the supposed extrajudicial confession are in question and the contents thereof are denied and of
serious dubiety, hence the same cannot be used as the basis for such a finding. Otherwise, it would
assume that which has still to be proved, a situation of petitio principii or circulo en probando.
Evidently, herein appellant cannot be made to suffer the extreme penal consequences of the crimes
on account of the shaky and decrepit circumstantial evidence proffered by the prosecution. While
the defense of alibi advanced by appellant is by nature a weak one by itself, it assumes
commensurate significance and strength where the evidence for the prosecution itself is frail and
effete. For, needless to state, the prosecution must not rely on the weakness of the evidence of the
defense but upon the vigor of its own.[20] In sum, the presumption of innocence enjoyed by
appellant has remained intact and impervious to the prosecutions assault thereon.
ACCORDINGLY, on the foregoing premises, the judgments of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 74, of
Antipolo, Rizal in Criminal Cases Nos. 92-8029, 92-8030 and 92-8031 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE and
accused-appellant Rodolfo de la Cruz, alias Rodolfo Domingo or Ompong, is hereby ACQUITTED. His
immediate release is accordingly ordered unless there be any other lawful cause for his continued
incarceration.

HUHUHU CHECK NIYO NA DIN TO

G.R. Nos. 141162-63. July 11, 2002]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ERLINDA DELA CRUZ, LARRY PERIDAS and GERRY
VENTURINA (at large), accused.
ERLINDA DELA CRUZ and LARRY PERIDAS, accused-appellants.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

Before us is an appeal of the joint decision of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 78,
finding accused-appellant Larry Peridas guilty beyond reasonable doubt of homicide in Criminal
Case No. 828-M-98, and finding both accused-appellants Erlinda Dela Cruz and Larry Peridas guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Republic Act. No. 6539, otherwise known as the Anti-
Carnapping Act of 1972, in Criminal Case No. 829-M-98.

Accused-appellants Erlinda Dela Cruz and Larry Peridas, together with Gerry Venturina, were
charged in the following informations:

Criminal Case No. 828-M-98

That on or about the 15th day of January, 1998, in the municipality of Pulilan, province of Bulacan,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named accused armed with
bladed instrument and with intent to kill one Ysmael Mananquil, conspiring, confederating together
and helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with evident
premeditation, abuse of superior strength and treachery, attack, assault and stab with the bladed
instrument the said Ysmael Mananquil y Aguilar, hitting the latter on the different parts of his body,
thereby causing him serious physical injuries which directly caused his death.

Contrary to Law.[1]

Criminal Case No. 829-M-98

That on or about the 15th day of January, 1998, in the municipality of Pulilan, province of Bulacan,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named accused, conspiring,
confederating together and helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, with intent of gain and without the knowledge and consent of the owner thereof, take
steal, and carry away with them one (1) taxi car KIA bearing Plate No. PVS 468, belonging to one
Alvin G. Sanchez, to the damage and prejudice of the said owner.

Contrary to Law.[2]

The two cases were consolidated. Upon arraignment, both accused-appellants entered a plea of
not guilty. Accused Gerry Venturina, on the other hand, remained at large. After joint trial, judgment
was rendered against accused-appellants, the dispositive portion[3] of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered,

1. In Crim. Case No. 828-M-98

accused Erlinda dela Cruz y Sanchez is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime charged, while accused Larry
Peridas is hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide and sentenced
to suffer the indeterminate penalty of 12 years of prision mayor as minimum to 17 years 4 months and
1 day to 20 years of reclusion temporal as maximum and to pay the bereaved family of victim
Ysmael Mananquil the amount of P60,000.00 as compensatory damages and P75,000.00 as indemnity
for the victims death.

2. In Crim. Case No. 829-M-98

accused Erlinda dela Cruz y Sanchez and Larry Peridas are hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of Violation of Republic Act 6539 otherwise known as the Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972, as
amended, and sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua will all its accessory penalties.

The instant cases as against accused Gerry Venturina are hereby ordered sent to the files of
ARCHIVED cases pending the arrest of said accused. Accordingly, let a warrant of arrest be issued for
his immediate apprehension to stand trial before this Court.

With costs.

SO ORDERED.

The facts of the case are as follows:

On January 15, 1998, at about 2:30 in the morning, accused-appellants Erlinda Dela Cruz and Larry
Peridas went to the house of Meliton Estrella in Poblacion, Plaridel, Bulacan on board a KIA Pride
taxicab, which Dela Cruz drove. When they arrived at Estrellas house, Dela Cruz went inside to invite
him to go with them, while Peridas stayed in the taxicab. When Estrella went out, he saw a man lying
on the floor of the taxicab whose head was being pinned down by Peridas foot. Afraid of being
implicated, Estrella refused to go saying, Ilayo ninyo yan at baka pati ako ay madamay.[4]
Accused-appellants left and proceeded to the house of accused Gerry Venturina in Baliuag,
Bulacan. There they stripped the taxicab of all its accessories.[5]

Later that day, at about 7:00 a.m., Peridas returned to Estrellas house. Peridas told Estrella that he had
killed the man and Venturina threw away the body in Pulilan.[6] Since his clothes were covered with
bloodstains, he borrowed clothes from Estrella and asked him to burn his sando and t-shirt. Estrella did
not burn the bloodied clothes. Instead, he turned them over later to the National Bureau of
Investigation Office in Pulilan.
Peridas left to fetch the son of Dela Cruz. He returned to Estrellas house at about 10:30 to 11:00 a.m.
There, he waited for Dela Cruz, who arrived at past twelve noon driving the same taxicab Estrella
earlier saw. The license plate of the vehicle had been replaced from one bearing the number: PVS
468 to one with the number: TAU 667.

Accused-appellants, together with Estrella and Dela Cruzs son, boarded the taxicab and drove to
Guimba, Nueva Ecija. Along the way, they were flagged down at a checkpoint set up by the Traffic
Command. Dela Cuz was unable to show her license and the vehicles registration, but the police
officers let them through after she told them that she is the wife of Gerry Venturina.

They stopped by Laur, Nueva Ecija to borrow money from a friend of Dela Cruz, after which they
proceeded to Peridas house in Guimba. That same night, Dela Cruz drove back to Plaridel. Before
she left, Estrella tried to borrow money from Dela Cruz for his fare back to Plaridel but she turned him
down. So, Estrella had to stay in Guimba for three days until he was able to borrow money from
Peridas on the pretext that he was going to fetch Dela Cruz.

When Estrella arrived in Plaridel, he informed his elder sister about the incident. Together, they
reported the matter to Capt. Ileto and SPO4 Ireneo Mauricio, then to NBI-Pulilan, where he turned
over the sando and t-shirt which Peridas asked him to burn. The investigation led to the recovery of
the corpse of Ysmael Mananquil in Pulilan, Bulacan as well as the taxicab used by accused-
appellants, which was found five meters away from the residence of Dela Cruz. Eventually, accused-
appellants Dela Cruz and Peridas were arrested.

In her defense, accused-appellants Erlinda Dela Cruz alleged that at 2:00 a.m. of January 15, 1998,
she was asleep in her house in Ma. Lourdes Subdivision, Tabang, Plaridel, Bulacan, together with her
siblings, children and accused-appellant Larry Peridas. On January 16, 1998, she stayed home to do
her chores. On January 18, 1998, she stayed home in the morning and, in the evening, went to the
Monte Carlo Videoke in Baliuag where she worked. She claimed that during all this time, she never
saw Meliton Estrella.[7]

Accused-appellant Larry Peridas likewise testified that he was sleeping in the house of Dela Cruz on
January 15, 1998, when the alleged crimes took place. He stayed there for a few days and helped in
the housework.[8]

One Reynaldo Trinidad corroborated accused-appellants testimonies that they were in Dela Cruzs
house on the date and time of the alleged commission of the crimes.[9]

After trial, the lower court rendered judgment against accused-appellants. Hence, this appeal,
which raises the following issues:

WHETHER OR NOT THE SO-CALLED INVESTIGATION OF THESE TWO CASES HAVE BEEN IMPROPERLY
MADE AND WRONGLY EXECUTED.

II

WHETHER OR NOT THE PRESIDING JUDGE RELIED HEAVILY ON WITNESS MELITON ESTRELLAS PERJURED
TESTIMONY.

III

WHETHER OR NOT CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE ARE APPLICABLE IN THESE CASES.

IV

WHETHER OR NOT DEFENSE EVIDENCE HAVE BEEN GLOSSED OVER AND GIVEN SCANT CONSIDERATION
BY THE TRIAL COURT.

In their joint brief, accused-appellants allege that the following irregularities attended the
investigation of the case, to wit: (1) that nothing was done by the authorities from the time Capt. de
Armas of Plaridel called that a cadaver was retrieved from Barangay Agnaya until January 22, 1998,
when Inspector Ileto received information about a carnapping and murder incident; (2) that Meliton
Estrella actually gave himself up for his implication in the murder and carnapping; (3) that Inspector
Ileto and SPO4 Mauricio did not conduct an investigation but merely relied on the NBI report which
was a complete falsehood; (4) that the subject taxicab, which was parked adjacent to the PNP Crime
Laboratory, was not subjected to physical and forensic investigation; (5) that the NBI and PNP
committed shortcuts in pursuing the investigation; (6) that NBI Agent Serafin Gil is not a lawyer and
violated their rights under the Miranda doctrine; and (7) that Inspector Ileto is a graduate of Bulacan
National Agricultural School with no background in criminal investigation and intelligence.

The above arguments involve factual issues, the resolution of which require our re-evaluation of the
trial courts findings of facts. To do so, however, will be an unnecessary deviation from the
jurisprudential rule that conclusions of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses are generally not
disturbed by appellate courts. Trial courts are in a better position to decide the issues, having heard
the witnesses themselves and observed their deportment and manner of testifying during the trial.[10]
The exception to this rule is where there is proof of some fact or circumstance of weight and influence
that might have been overlooked, or its significance misinterpreted, by the trial court which, if
properly considered, could affect the result of the case.

After a meticulous review of the records, we find no compelling reason to depart from such rule.

The evidence on record show that, contrary to accused-appellants assertion, it was only on January
22, 1998 that SPO4 Ireneo Mauricio, Capt. Ileto[11] and NBI Agent Serafin Gil[12] first came to know,
through Meliton Estrella, about the carnapping of the taxicab, the killing of the driver thereof and the
subsequent dumping of the body somewhere in Pulilan. Acting on the information given by Estrella,
they were able to recover the subject vehicle at Dela Cruzs house in Agnaya, Plaridel, Bulacan, and
asked the family of Ysmael Mananquil to identify his decomposing corpse.

Anent the claim that Dela Cruz was arrested without warrant, forced to sign a document, and
detained for more or less 3 to 4 weeks,[13] there is no showing that she objected to the manner of her
arrest and detention before she entered her plea and participated in the trial. Pertinent hereto is our
ruling in People v. Lopez,[14] to wit:

[I]t is too late for appellant to raise the question of his arrest without a warrant. When accused-
appellant was arrested and a case was filed against him, he pleaded not guilty upon arraignment,
participated in the trial and presented his evidence. Appellant is thus estopped from questioning the
legality of his arrest. It is well-settled that any objection involving a warrant of arrest or procedure in
the acquisition by the court of jurisdiction over the person of an accused must be made before he
enters his plea, otherwise the objection is deemed waived. Besides, this issue is being raised for the
first time by appellant. He did not move for the quashal of the information before the trial court on
this ground. Consequently, any irregularity attendant to his arrest, if any, was cured when he
voluntarily submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the trial court by entering a plea of not guilty and by
participating in the trial. Moreover, the illegal arrest of an accused is not sufficient cause for setting
aside a valid judgment rendered upon a sufficient complaint after trial free from error.

Coming now to the sufficiency of proof of their guilt, accused-appellants contend that the testimony
of Meliton Estrella was perjured; that the evidence against them consisted of circumstantial evidence
which was not sufficient to establish their guilt; and that the trial court merely glossed over and gave
scant consideration to the evidence they presented.

The contentions lack merit. We agree with the trial courts findings that the testimony of prosecution
witness Meliton Estrella was clear, straightforward and devoid of any signs of artificiality. Moreover, no
improper motive was imputed on Estrella who positively identified both accused-appellants as the
perpetrators of the offense.[15]

Accused-appellants next assail the trial courts reliance on circumstantial evidence. We have long
held that circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction in criminal cases where there is more
than one circumstance derived from the facts duly given and the combination of all is such as to
produce conviction beyond reasonable doubt. The test for accepting circumstantial evidence as
proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt is: the series of circumstances duly proved must be consistent
with each other and that each and every circumstance must be consistent with the accuseds guilt
and inconsistent with his innocence.[16]

In the case at bar, the trial court based its judgment of conviction on the following established facts:
that Dela Cruz and Peridas arrived in Plaridel at 2:30 in the morning of January 15, 1998 on board a
taxicab; that the accessories of the taxicab were removed and its license plate was replaced; that
accused-appellants were unable to produce the registration papers of the vehicle; that the subject
vehicle was identified as the one driven by Ysmael Mananquil before its loss on January 15, 1998; and
that the missing taxicab was recovered by the police from Dela Cruz.[17]

We find that the foregoing facts constitute an unbroken chain of events that undeniably point to the
culpability of accused-appellants for violation of the Anti-Carnapping Act. The testimony of Meliton
Estrella was corroborated by the testimony of SPO4 Mauricio, NBI Agent Serafin Gil and Capt. Ileto.
The testimony of the police officers carried with it the presumption of regularity in the performance of
official functions.[18] Moreover, accused-appellants failed to overcome the disputable presumption
that a person found in possession of a thing taken in the doing of a recent wrongful act is the taker
and the doer of the whole act.[19]

The trial court convicted accused-appellant Larry Peridas only of homicide based on its finding of
guilt due to Peridas admission to Meliton Estrella that he had disposed of (tinapos) Manaquil, whose
body was dumped in Pulilan, Bulacan, where it was later found by the police. Prior to that, Estrella
saw Peridas stepping on the head of Manaquil on the floor of the carnapped vehicle. In other words,
it was Peridas who was with the victim when the latter was last seen alive by Estrella.[20] However, the
allegations of evident premeditation, abuse of superior strength and treachery as qualifying
circumstances were not sufficiently established, thus the crime committed was only homicide.[21]

In Aballe v. People,[22] we held that the declaration of an accused expressly acknowledging

his guilt of the offense may be given in evidence against him and any person,
otherwise competent to testify as a witness, who heard the confession, is competent to testify as to
the substance of what he heard if he heard and understood it. The said witness need not repeat
verbatim the oral confession; it suffices if he gives its substance.

In the recent case of People v. Zuela,[23] we ruled that an admission made to a private person is
admissible in evidence against the declarant pursuant to Rule 130, Section 26 of the Rules of Court,
which states that the act, declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be given in
evidence against him.

In their defense, accused-appellants can only raise alibi and bare denial. Alibi is the weakest of all
defenses, because it is easy to concoct and difficult to disprove. For alibi to prosper, it is not enough
to prove that the defendant was somewhere else when the crime was committed; he must likewise
demonstrate that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime at the
time. Furthermore, alibi cannot prevail over the positive and unequivocal identification of accused-
appellants. Categorical and consistent positive identification, absent any showing of ill-motive on the
part of the eyewitness testifying on the matter, prevails over accused-appellant's defense of denial
and alibi. Unless substantiated by clear and convincing proof, such defense is negative, self-serving,
and undeserving of any weight in law.[24]

The trial court was correct in convicting accused-appellants separately on the charges of
carnapping and homicide, rather than qualified carnapping or aggravated form of carnapping,[25]
as defined in Section 14 of Republic Act No. 6539, as amended by Section 20 of Republic Act No.
7659, which imposes the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death whenever the owner, driver or
occupant of the carnapped motor vehicle is killed in the course of the commission of the
carnapping or on the occasion thereof.

In the case at bar, accused-appellants were charged separately with the crimes of carnapping and
murder. We cannot convict them of the crime of qualified carnapping, which consists of the two
crimes alleged in the two separate information, without impairing their constitutional right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against them.[26]

However, the trial court erred in imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua for the crime of
carnapping, considering that the Information neither alleged that the victim was killed in the course
of the commission of the carnapping or on occasion thereof,[27] or that the carnapping was
committed by means of violence against or intimidation of any person. The crime alleged being only
carnapping under the first clause of R.A. 6539, Section 14, as amended, the proper penalty to be
imposed must not be less than fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months and not more than
seventeen (17) years and four (4) months. Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law[28], if the offense is
punished by a special law, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence, the
maximum term of which shall not exceed the maximum fixed by said law and the minimum term shall
not be less than the minimum prescribed by the same. Thus, we hold that the proper penalty to be
imposed on each of the accused-appellants is an indeterminate sentence of fourteen (14) years and
eight (8) months, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months, as maximum.

On the other hand, the penalty for homicide is reclusion temporal, the range of which is from twelve
(12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, and
there being no modifying circumstance, we hereby sentence accused-appellant Larry Peridas to a
prison term of eight (8) years, four (4) months and ten (10) days of prision mayor, as minimum, to
fourteen (14) years, ten (10) months and twenty (20) days of reclusion temporal, as maximum[29]

Finally, we reduce the award of Seventy Five Thousand Pesos (P75,000.00) ordered by the trial court
as indemnity for the victims death to Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00), consistent with current
jurisprudence.[30]

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 78, Malolos,
Bulacan, in Criminal Case No. 828-M-98, finding accused-appellant LARRY PERIDAS guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of homicide, is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that he is sentenced to an
indeterminate prison term of eight (8) years, four (4) months and ten (10) days of prision mayor, as
minimum, to fourteen (14) years, ten (10) months and twenty (20) days of reclusion temporal, as
maximum. In addition, said accused-appellant LARRY PERIDAS is ordered to pay death indemnity to
the heirs of Ysmael Mananquil in the amount of P50,000.00.

The decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 78, Malolos, Bulacan, in Criminal Case No. 829-M-98,
finding accused-appellants LARRY PERIDAS and ERLINDA DELA CRUZ guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of violation of Republic Act No. 6539, as amended, is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that said
accused-appellants are sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of fourteen (14) years and eight
(8) months, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months, as maximum.

Costs de officio.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-61356-57 September 30, 1986

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
FELICISIMO JARA, REYMUNDO VERGARA and ROBERTO BERNADAS, defendants-appellants.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

We are once again constrained to take a hard look into the sufficiency of extra-judicial confessions
as the sole basis for the imposition of the supreme penalty of DEATH.

The three appellants were all sentenced to death in Criminal Case No. 2564 for robbery with
homicide. In the companion case of parricide, one was sentenced to another death penalty while
the two other appellants received sentenced ranging from 12 to 20 years of imprisonment.

Our task is made difficult by the fact that the crimes were specially ruthless and barbarous in their
commission. No less than the counsel for the appellants states that the people of Puerto Princesa are
no strangers to crime and that the frequency of criminal acts in their city has somehow benumbed
the sensibilities of its citizens. Yet, the discovery on June 9, 1978 of the brutally and badly bashed
corpses of two well-known and loved women of their community was still shocking to their senses.

There is the added factor that the police officers who investigated the crime and secured the
confessions seemed so certain that indeed the three appellants are the malefactors. The confessions
are convincing in their details. The trial court noted that "both victims were assaulted and killed with
the might and fury of one really who had harbored so long a grudge and hate" and only Felicisimo
Jara had that kind of ill-will against his estranged wife and her female companion. Moreover, Jara, a
recidivist for the crime of homicide, was characterized as an experienced killer. There must be
many residents of Puerto Princesa who are thus convinced about the correct solution of the crime.
And perhaps, the appellants could have been the killers.
The function of this Court, however, is not to indulge in surmises or probabilities. The issue before us is
whether or not the evidence of guilt is admissible under the standards fixed by the Constitution and if
the quantum of proof, which we are allowed by the Constitution to consider, establishes guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.

The decision of the former Court of First Instance of Palawan, 7th Judicial District, Branch 1 in the
consolidated cases of People of the Philippines versus Felicisimo Jara, et al. (Criminal Case No. 2564)
for Robbery with Homicide and People of the Philippines vs. Felicisimo Jara, et al. (Criminal Case No.
2565) for Parricide is involved in this automatic review. All the three accused in Criminal Case No.
2564 were sentenced to suffer the maximum penalty of death, to indemnify jointly and severally the
heirs of the deceased Amparo Bantigue in the sum of Pl,000.00, the amount stolen, and the sum of
P12,000.00. In Criminal Case No. 2565, for the killing of Luisa Jara, accused Felicisimo Jara was found
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of parricide and meted out the maximum penalty of
death while the two other accused were found guilty of homicide and sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of twelve (12) years of prision mayor as minimum to twenty (20) years of
reclusion temporal as maximum. All the accused were ordered to indemnify jointly and severally the
heirs of Luisa Jara in the sum of P12,000.00.

The information for the crime of robbery with homicide in Criminal Case No. 2564 reads as follows:

That on or about the 9th day of June, 1978, about 1:30 o'clock in the morning, at Malvar St., Puerto
Princesa City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping each other, with intent to kill,
evident premeditation and treachery, after gaining entrance to the house thru the window, an
opening not intended for entrance or egress, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
strike with a hammer Amparo Vda. de Bantigue hitting her on the vital parts of her body and stab
with a scissor while she was soundly sleeping in her bedroom with one Luisa Jara, thereby causing her
instantaneous death as a result thereof, and that after killing Amparo Vda. de Bantigue, accused in
conspiracy with each other, with intent to gain and without the consent of the owner thereof, took,
stole and carried away a piggy bank and a buddha bank containing money in the amount of not
more than P200.00, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of Amparo Vda. de Bantigue, in the
total amount of TWELVE THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED PESOS (P12,200.00) Philippine Currency.

CONTRARY TO LAW and committed with aggravating circumstances of Recidivism with respect to
accused Felicisimo Jara, the latter having been previously convicted of the crime of homicide in the
Court of First Instance of Iloilo, and the aggravating circumstance against all the accused that the
crime was committed with treachery, in the dwelling of the offended party, in the nighttime, and with
respect to accused Reymundo Vergara and Roberto Bernadas, for having participated in the
commission of the crime in consideration of a prize or reward.

In Criminal Case No. 2565, the information charged the accused as follows:

That on or about June 9, 1978, at about 1:30 o'clock in the morning, at Malvar St., Puerto Princesa
City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping each other with intent to kill, treachery
and evident premeditation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously strike several times,
with a hammer one Luisa Jara, who is the lawfully wedded wife of accused Felicisimo Jara, and
thereafter, stabbed her with a scissor in her chest and abdomen, while the latter was soundly
sleeping with one Amparo Vda. de Bantigue, resulting to the instantaneous death of said Luisa Jara,
to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of said Luisa Jara in the amount of TWELVE THOUSAND
(P12,000.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency,

CONTRARY TO LAW and committed with the aggravating circumstances of Recidivism with respect
to accused Felicisimo Jara, the latter having been previously convicted of the crime of homicide in
the CFI of Iloilo, and the aggravating circumstance against all the accused, namely: (1) that the
crime was committed in the dwelling of the offended party, (2) in the nighttime, (3) and treachery;
and the aggravating circumstance against accused Reymundo Vergara and Roberto Bernadas of
having participated in the commission of the crime in consideration of a prize or reward.

All the accused pleaded not guilty during the arraignment. On motion by the prosecution and the
defense, the court a quo ordered a joint trial of the two cases which arose from one incident and
where the witnesses are the same.
The facts according to the prosecution are as follows:

At about 6:00 o'clock in the early morning of June 9, 1978, the waitresses at Alvin's Canteen situated
in Malvar Street, Puerto Princesa City, wondered why their employer, the deceased Amparo
Bantigue, did not answer when they called at her door that morning (p. 7, TSN, March 21, 1979). They
went to the kitchen and peeped through a hole. They saw Amparo and Luisa Jara seemingly asleep.
They again went to the door and knocked but still no answer came. The waitresses called one of
Luisa Jara's waitresses at Aileen's canteen next door. Becoming apprehensive, they went back to the
kitchen for a second look. They discovered the following- . Amparo and Luisa were both lying in bed;
Luisa was dressed only in her underwear and there was dried blood in one of her hands; Amparo,
seemingly asleep, lay beside her (pp. 9-11, TSN, March 21, 1979). Finally, they decided to inform
Luisa's daughter, Minerva, about their apprehension. When they met Minerva at the public market,
she tearfully accompanied them back to Amparo's room. When no one answered their knocking,
Minerva kicked open the door. (pp. 11-12, TSN, March 21, 1979). Inside, they found the two women
dead from wounds inflicted on their persons (p. 13, TSN, March 21, 1979).

The husband of Luisa, appellant Felicisimo Jara, then entered the room and saw the condition of the
victims (p. 15, TSN, March 21, 1979).

Inside the room, several ceramic piggy banks belonging to Amparo containing coins estimated in
the amount of P1,000.00 were missing (p. 43, TSN, February 6, 1979). Scattered underneath the
window of Amparo's bedroom were coins and bits and pieces of what used to be ceramic piggy
banks (Exh. F; pp. 17-20, TSN' Feb. 6, 1979).

Later, two suspects in the killing, appellants Reymundo Vergara and Roberto Bernadas. were
apprehended (pp. 59-60, TSN, March 19, 1979). After investigation, they confessed their guilt to the
Provincial Commander of the Philippine Constabulary in Palawan and other police investigators (pp.
26-31, TSN, May 28, 1979). They
also positively Identified appellant Felicisimo Jara as
the mastermind who had plotted the killing and who promised them a fee of
P1,000.00 each for their participation (Exhibits O and N). Before the City Fiscal and First
Assistant Fiscal of Puerto Princesa City, respectively, appellants Vergara and Bernadas subscribed
and swore to their extra-judicial statements wherein they narrated their role and that of Felicisimo
Jara in the killing (see Exhibits O and N).

Thereafter, the killing was reenacted before the military authorities and the public, with appellants
Vergara and Bernadas participating (p. 14, TSN, July 19, 1979).

The autopsy reports (Exhibits "A" and "C") submitted by Dr. Rufino Ynzon, the City Health Officer of
Puerto Princesa on the examination of the cadavers of the deceased victims indicate that death in
both cases resulted from "hemorrhage, intra-cranial secondary to multiple comminuted-depressed
fracture of the cranial bones." Amparo Bantigue's wounds were described as follows:

POST MORTEM FINDINGS

1. Wound, macerated, roughly oval in shape, about 1 l/4 inches in length with depressed-
comminuted fracture of the underlying bone located at the forehead, right, upper portion.

2. Wound, macerated, roughly oval in shape, about 1 1/3 inches in length, with depressed-
comminuted fracture of the underlying bone located at the forehead, central portion.

3. Wound, macerated, roughly circular in shape, about 1 1/5 inches in length with depressed-
comminuted fracture of the underlying bone located at the forehead, medially to the left eyebrow.

4. Wound, macerated, roughly triangular in shape with depressed -comminuted fracture of the
underlying bone located above the left eyebrow. 5. Wound, macerated, elongated with fracture of
the alveolar bone, located at the upper lip, central portion.

6. Wound, macerated, elongated, about 31/2 inches in length with depressed-comminuted fracture
of the underlying bone with brain tissue coming out located at the left parieto temporal region.

7. Wound, macerated, elongated, about 21/2 inches in length with depressed-comminuted fracture
of the underlying bone located at the left temporal region, anterior portion.
8. Wound, macerated, elongated, about 2 inches in length, with depressed-comminuted fracture of
the underlying bone, located at the left face.

9. Wound, macerated, roughly oval in shape, about 2 inches in length, with depressed-comminuted
fracture of the underlying bone, located at the right temporal region.

10. Wound, macerated, elongated, about 2 inches in length with depressed-comminuted fracture of
the underlying bone located at the right face.

11. Wound, stabbed, about an inch in length at the right chest, between the 3rd and 4th intercostal
space, penetrating the thoracic cavity involving the right lung.

12. Wound, stabbed, about 1 inch in length, located at the chest, central portion, penetrating the
sternum, then thoracic cavity piercing the right auricle, heart.

13. Wound, stabbed, about 1 inch in length, located at the right upper abdomen penetrating the
abdominal cavity involving the liver and stomach. (Exhibit "A").

CAUSE OF DEATH: HEMORRHAGE INTRA-CRANIAL SEC. TO MULTIPLE COMMINUTED-DEPRESSED

FRACTURE OF THE CRANIAL BONES."

On the other hand, Luisa Jara suffered from the following wounds:

POST MORTEM FINDINGS

1. Wound,macerated,roughly circular in shape,about 1 1/2 inches in diameter with depressed-

comminuted fracture of the underlying bones, located at the right frontal region.

2. Wound, macerated, with a letter T shape, about 2 inches in length, with depressed-comminuted
fracture of the underlying bone, located at the central portion of the frontal region.

3. Wound, macerated, roughly triangular in shape, about 1 1/2 inches in length with depressed-
comminuted fracture of the underlying bone, located at the right side of the nose.

4. Wound, macerated, roughly elongated in shape, about 1 inch in length, with depressed-
comminuted fracture of the underlying bone, located at the left eyebrow, lateral portion.

5. Wound, macerated, roughly oval in shape, about 2 inches in length, with depressed-
comminuted fracture of the underlying bone, located at the left lateral portion of the forehead.

6. Wound, macerated, roughly oval in shape, about 2 inches in length, with depressed-comminuted
fracture of the underlying bone, located at the parietal region, left.

7. Wound, macerated, roughly elongated in shape about 1 inch in length with depressed-
comminuted fracture of the underlying bone, located at the temporal region, left.

8. Wound, macerated, roughly elongated in shape, about 11/2 inches in length with depressed-
comminuted fracture of the underlying bone, located at the temporal region, left.

9. Wound, macerated, roughly stellate in shape, about 2 inches in length, with depressed-
comminuted fracture of the underlying bone, located at the left mandibular region.

10. Wound, macerated, roughly oval in shape, about 1 l/2 inches in length, with depressed-
comminuted fracture of the underlying bone, located at the left face.

11. Wound,incised,about l 3/4 inches in length, located at the left upper portion of neck, left side.

12. Wound, macerated, roughly elongated in shape, about 3 inches in length with depressed-
comminuted fracture of the underlying bone, located at the right temporal region.

13. Contusion with hematoma, circular in shape, located laterally from the right eyebrow.

14. Wound, macerated, roughly elongated in shape about 2 inches in length with depressed-
comminuted fracture of the underlying bone, located at the occipital region, upper portion.
15. Wound, stabbed, about 1 inch in length, located at the chest, central portion penetrating inside
the thoracic cavity involving heart and lung.

16. Wound, stabbed, about 1 inch in length, located at the level of typhoid process penetrating the
thoracic cavity involving the right lung, lower lobe. (Exhibit "C")

CAUSE OF DEATH: HEMORRHAGE, INTRA-CRANIAL SEC. TO MULTIPLE COMMINUTED-DEPRESSED

FRACTURE OF THE CRANIAL BONES.

Felicisimo Jara denied the charge that he was the one who killed his wife, Luisa, together with her
friend, Amparo Bantigue. He interposed alibi as a defense and testified that at the time the killings
took place at Alvin's Canteen at Malvar Street, Puerto Princesa City, he was fast asleep with his
grandchildren at his step-daughter's house in Pineda Subdivision. The other accused, Reymundo
Vergara and Roberto Bernadas retracted their respective extra-judicial confessions admitting their
participation in the crimes charged and Identifying their mastermind" as the accused Jara during
proceedings before the Inquest Fiscal. They contested the admissibility of the extra-judicial
confessions and the subsequent re- enactment of the crime on the ground that their participations in
these occasions were not free and voluntary and were without the benefit of counsel.

The court below ruled that the extra-judicial confessions of the accused Bernadas and Vergara
(Exhibits "N" and "O", respectively), together with the proof of corpus delicti of the special crime of
robbery with homicide established the guilt of the accused beyond moral certainty.

In their brief, the accused-appellants contended that the court a quo erred:

IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED DESPITE THE UTTER ABSENCE OF ANY KIND OF EVIDENCE, DIRECT OR
CIRCUMSTANTIAL.

II

IN ADMITTING THE ALLEGED EXTRA-JUDICIAL CONFESSIONS OF ACCUSED-APPELLANTS REYMUNDO

VERGARA AND ROBERTO BERNADAS WHICH WERE TAKEN THRU FORCE AND WITHOUT BENEFIT OF
COUNSEL.

III

IN ADMITTING THE ALLEGED EXTRA-JUDICIAL CONFESSIONS OF ACCUSED-APPELLANTS REYMUNDO

VERGARA AND ROBERTO BERNADAS AGAINST THEIR CO-ACCUSED-APPELLANT FELICISIMO JARA.

IV

IN FINDING THE PRESENCE OF CONSPIRACY DESPITE THE ABSENCE OF PROOF THEREOF.

IN ALLOWING THE PLAYING OF AN ALLEGED TAPED CONFESSION.

VI

IN ADMITTING THE PICTURES, EXHS. "T" TO "T- 23", WHICH WERE NEVER PROPERLY IDENTIFIED.

All these assigned errors boil down to the issue of whether or not there is sufficient evidence as borne
by the records to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.

Section 20, Article IV of the Constitution provides:

No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. Any person under investigation for the
commission of an offense shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of
such right. No force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free will shall
be used against him. Any confession obtained in violation of this section shall be inadmissible in
evidence.
There is no dispute that the confessions in these cases were obtained in the absence of counsel.
According to the records, there was a waiver by the accused-appellants of their right to counsel.

Was the waiver valid?

We are constrained to answer this question in the negative.

Before the extrajudicial confession of appellant Bernadas was reduced to writing, Pfc. Henry E. Pulga,
in the presence of four other police officers, made the following "Pasubali" followed by the answer,
"Opo":

PASUBALI: Ikaw ay nasa ilalim ng isang pagsisiyasat at dahil dito ay ipinababatid namin sa iyo ang
iyong mga karapatan na sa ilalim ng ating Bagong Saligang Batas ay ikaw ay may karapatang
kumuha ng isang manananggol o abogado ayon sa sarili mong pili mayroon ka ring karapatan na
hindi maaaring piliting sumagot sa anumang itatanong sa iyo sa alinmang Hukuman sa Pilipinas.
Nauunawaan mo ba ang lahat ng mga ipinaliwanag namin sa iyo ngayon?

SAGOT: Opo.

Likewise, in the case of the accused Vergara, the foreword of Ms signed sworn statement reads:

TANONG: Marunong po ba kayong sumulat bumasa ng tagalog at umunawa ng wikang tagalog na

siya nating gagamitin sa pagsisiyasat na ito?

SAGOT: Nakakaunawa po ako at nakakabasa pero sa pagsulat ay hindi masyado.

PALIWANAG: Kung gayon po ay ipinababatid ko sa inyo ang inyong karapatan na kayo ay

maaaring manatiling tahimik kung inyong nais, magbigay o tumangging magbigay ng inyong
salaysay, maaari din na kayo ay sumangguni muna sa isang abogado kung nais ninyo at ang lahat
po ng inyong sasabihin ay maaaring gamiting pabor o laban sa inyo sa anumang Hukuman dito sa
ating kapuluan ngayong alam na ninyo ang ilan sa inyong karapatan kayo po ba naman ay handa
na ngayong magsalaysay kahit na kayo ay wala pang abogadong kaharap na siyang
mangangalaga sa inyong karapatan at lahat po ng inyong sasabihin ay pawang katutuhanan
lamang

SAGOT: Opo.

(SGD.) REYMUNDO VERGARA

DELA CRUZ

PATUNAY: Ako si Reymundo Vergara dela Cruz ay nagsasaad na ipinaalam sa akin ang aking
karapatang manatiling tahimik, kung aking nanaisin, na ang lahat na aking sasabihin ay maaaring
gamiting pabor o laban sa akin at nalaman ko rin na ako ay maaaring kumuha ng sarili kong
abogado na siyang nangangalaga ng aking karapatan na kung hindi ko kayang kumuha ay
bibigyan ako ng pamahalaan.

Nauunawaan ko ang mga karapatang ito, handa at kusang loob akong nagbibigay ng aking
salaysay ngayon, sa tanong at sagot na paraan. Hindi ko na kailangan ang tulong ng isang
abogado, nauunawaan ko ang aking ginagawa, walang pananakot, pananakit, pangako, pabuya
o anuman na ginawa sa akin upang ako ay magsalaysay. Ito ay sarili kong kagustuhan.

(SGD.) REYMUNDO VERGARA

DELA CRUZ

This stereotyped "advice" appearing in practically all extrajudicial confessions which are later
repudiated has assumed the nature of a "legal form" or model. Police investigators either
automatically type it together with the curt "Opo" as the answer or ask the accused to sign it or even
copy it in their handwriting. Its tired, punctilious, fixed, and artificially stately style does not create an
impression of voluntariness or even understanding on the part of the accused. The showing of a
spontaneous, free, and unconstrained giving up of a right is missing.
Whenever a protection given by the Constitution is waived by the person entitled to that protection,
the presumption is always against the waiver. Consequently, the prosecution must prove with strongly
convincing evidence to the satisfaction of this Court that indeed the accused willingly and voluntarily
submitted his confession and knowingly and deliberately manifested that he was not interested in
having a lawyer assist him during the taking of that confession. That proof is missing in this case.

The records sustain the appellants' contention that their extrajudicial confessions bear clear earmarks
of illegality and improbability.

The Solicitor General gives the following arguments for voluntariness:

An extra-judicial confession is generally presumed to have been voluntarily executed (People v.

Castañeda, 93 SCRA 56). The confessant carries the burden of convincing the trial judge that his
admissions are involuntary or untrue (People v. Ramos, 94 SCRA 842).

The trial court in this case was not convinced that the extrajudicial confessions of appellants were
made involuntarily. Consider the following reasons for the court's refusal to lend credence to
appellants' claim:

(1) Apart from appellants' self-serving claim no other evidence on record supports the allegation of
involuntariness (People v. Villa, 93 SCRA 716).

(2) On the contrary, several prosecution witnesses testified that the confessions were voluntarily
given.

(3) Appellants' oral and written confessions given at various times to several investigating authorities,
not to mention the public re-enactment of the crime itself, did not vary and they revealed details
only the assailants could have possibly known (People v. Ty Sui Wong, 83 SCRA 125; People v. Bautista
y Aquino, 92 SCRA 465).

(4) Appellants' confessions were corroborated by the existence of corpus delicti established by
independent evidence (People v. Francisco, 93 SCRA 351).

(5) The claim of coercion cannot prevail over the testimony of the subscribing fiscal that said
confession was voluntary (People v. Caramonte, 94 SCRA 150).

The People v. Castañeda ruling applies to a crime committed before the Bill of Rights was amended
to include Section 20 on the right to remain silent and to counsel and to be informed of such right.
The presumption that "no one would declare anything against himself unless such declarations were
true" assumes that such declarations are given freely and voluntarily. The new Constitution, in
expressly adopting the so-called Miranda v. Arizona (384 U.S. 436) rule, has reversed the presumption.
The prosecution must now prove that an extrajudicial confession was voluntarily given, instead of
relying on a presumption and requiring the accused to offset it. There would have been no need to
amend the centuries old provisions of the Bill of Rights and to expressly add the interdiction that "no
force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free will shall be used
against him (the person being investigated)" if the framers intended us to continue applying the pre-
1973 or pre-amendment presumptions.

Miranda v. Arizona, in explaining the rule which the U.S. Supreme Court adopted, states:

While the admissions or confessions of the prisoner, when voluntarily and freely made, have always
ranked high in the scale of incriminating evidence, if an accused person be asked to explain his
apparent connection with a crime under investigation, the ease with which the questions put to him
may assume an inquisitorial character, the temptation to press the witness unduly, to browbeat him if
he be timid or reluctant, to push him into a corner and to entrap him into fatal contradictions, which
is so painfully evident . . . made the (continental) system so odious as to give rise to a demand for its
total abolition.

It is natural and to be expected that the police officers who secured the confessions in these cases
should testify that the statements were voluntarily given. However, the records show that the
interrogations were conducted incommunicado in a police-dominated atmosphere. When appellant
Bernadas gave his confession, his companions in the room were five police officers. The only people
with Vergara when he confessed were also police investigators.
We quote some more passages from Miranda:

Again we stress that the modern practice of in-custody interrogation is psychologically rather than
physically oriented. As we have stated before, 'Since Chambers v. Florida, 309, US 227 [84 L ed 716, 60
S Ct 472], this Court has recognized that coercion can be mental as well as physical, and that the
blood of the accused is not the only hallmark of an unconstitutional inquisition.' Blackburn v.
Alabama, 361 US 199, 206, 4 L ed 2d 242, 247, 80 S Ct 274 (1960). Interrogation still takes place in
privacy. Privacy results in secrecy and this in turn results in a gap in our knowledge as to what in fact
goes on in the interrogation rooms. A valuable source of information about present police practices,
however, may be found in various police manuals and texts which document procedures employed
with success in the past, and which recommend various other effective tactics. These texts are used
by law enforcement agencies themselves as guides. It should be noted that these texts professedly
present the most enlightened and effective means presently used to obtain statements through
custodial interrogation. By considering these texts and other data, it is possible to describe
procedures observed and noted around the country.

The officers are told by the manuals that the 'principal psychological factor contributing to a
successful interrogation is privacy-being alone with the person under interrogation.' The efficacy of
this tactic has been explained as follows:

If at all practicable, the interrogation should take place in the investigator's office or at least in a
room of his own choice. The subject should be deprived of every psychological advantage. In his
own home he may be confident, indignant, or recalcitrant. He is more keenly aware of his rights and
more reluctant to tell of his indiscretions or criminal behavior within the walls of his home. Moreover his
family and other friends are nearby, their presence lending moral support. In his own office, the
investigator possesses all the advantages. The atmosphere suggests the invincibility of the forces of
the law.

To highlight the isolation and unfamiliar surroundings, the manuals instruct the police to display an air
of confidence in the suspect's guilt and from outward appearance to maintain only an interest in
confirming certain details. The guilt of the subject is to be posited as a fact. The interrogator should
direct his comments toward the reasons why the subject committed the act, rather than court failure
by asking the subject whether he did it. Like other men, perhaps the subject has a bad family life,
had an unhappy childhood, had too much to drink, had an unrequited desire for women. The
officers are instructed to minimize the moral seriousness of the offense, to cast blame on the victim or
on society. These tactics are designed to put the subject in a psychological state where his story is
but an elaboration of what the police purport to know already-that he is guilty. Explanations to the
contrary are dismissed and discouraged.

The texts thus stress that the major qualities an interrogator should possess are patience and
perseverance. One writer describes the efficacy of these characteristics in this manner:

In the preceding paragraphs emphasis has been placed on kindness and stratagems. The
investigator wilt however, encounter many situations where the sheer weight of his personality wig be
the deciding factor. Where emotional appeals and tricks are employed to no avail he must rely on
an oppressive atmosphere of dogged persistence. He must interrogate steadily and without relent,
leaving the subject no prospect of surcease. He must dominate his subject and overwhelm him with
his inexorable will to obtain the truth. He should interrogate for a spell of several hours pausing only for
the subject's necessities in acknowledgment of the need to avoid a charge of duress that can be
technically substantiated. In a serious case, the interrogation may continue for days, with the
required intervals for food and sleep, but without respite from the atmosphere of domination. It is
possible in this way to induce the subject to talk without resorting to duress or coercion. The method
should be used only when the guilt of the subject appears highly probable. ' " (384 US at pp. 448-451)

The cited police manuals state that the above methods should be used only when the guilt of the
subject appears highly probable. As earlier stated, the investigators in the cases now before us
appear to have been convinced that the accused-appellants were the culprits. Nonetheless,
the evils of incommunicado interrogations without adequate safeguards to
insure voluntariness could still result in the conviction of innocent persons. More
important, what the Constitution commands must be obeyed even at the risk of letting even
hardened criminals mix once more with the law-abiding world.
As to the re-enactment, the extra-judicial-confessions served as a script for what was to follow.
Pictures re-enacting a crime which are based on an inadmissible confession are themselves
inadmissible.

There are other factors to be considered in these cases. Vergara and Barnadas had been detained
for more than two (2) weeks before they decided to give "voluntary" confessions. We doubt if it was
two weeks of soul-searching and introspection alone which led them to confess. There must have
been other persuasions.

There were two sensational murder cases in Palawan which preceded the killings now before us, The
PC command and the Integrated National Police were under pressure to "solve" these additional
sensational killings.

The counsel for appellants mentions a factor not refuted by the appellee in its brief, namely:

LT. COL. SABAS IMBONG, SGT. EUGENIO ENRIQUEZ, PFC HENRY PULGA and CPL. ADOLFO JAGMIS — all
are connected with the Provincial Constabulary Command which investigated the case, prematurely
publicized the solution of the case with the alleged 'extra-judicial confessions' of two (2) accused,
but who were rebuffed when the two (2) accused, upon the first opportunity to do so in public, which
was the preliminary investigation, recanted and retracted their alleged 'extra-judicial confessions' as
they were taken with the use of force, violence, and intimidation, was prepared by the investigators
themselves, and without benefit of counsel.

All are comrades in-arms of Pat. Mamerto Bantigue, who is the son of the deceased Amparo
Bantigue. Pat. Bantigue was implicated in several coercion and physical injuries cases filed with the
City Court by persons who had been physically attacked and violated by him in connection with the
murder of his mother. Likewise, he evaded justice by escaping from the law after murdering a
companion of accused Jara and attempting to kill the latter. He remains at large.

A PC Sergeant, Oscar Ponce de Leon, assigned at the PC Medical Dispensary, testified that he
treated Roberto Bernadas for cigarette burns and Reymundo Vergara for a wound at the tip of his
right hand. While the medicine he applied was only merthiolate the possibility cannot be discounted
that in addition to the psychological qqqplosy of incommunicado questioning, lighted cigarettes
and other means of persuasion which leave physical marks were also utilized to secure the
confessions.

Accused Reymundo Vergara was given an opportunity to go qqqscot free by turning state witness.
He refused.

Apart from their extra-judicial confessions, no other evidence to implicate Bernadas and Vergara as
perpetrators of the killing was introduced by the prosecution. Since these confessions are
inadmissible in evidence, the two appellants have to be acquitted.

The strongest evidence against Felicisimo Jara are the extra-judicial confessions of his
two co-accused. Bernadas and Vergara point to Jara as the one who bludgeoned the two
victims with a hammer and then used a pair of scissors in inflicting the stab wounds. He was also
alleged to have offered them P1,000.00 each if they would help him in the killing of his wife.

However, since the confessions of Bernadas and Vergara are inadmissible against them, with more
reason can they not be used against Jara.

Apart from the above extra-judicial confessions, other circumstantial evidence was presented to
support a verdict of conviction. Would such evidence in the absence of the extrajudicial confessions
be sufficient to overturn the presumption of innocence in favor of the accused Jara?

Evidence attesting to the fact that accused Jara and his wife had not been in good terms for about
three years before the killings was presented. They used to quarrel with each other and they had not
been sleeping together since the deceased Luisa Jara slept at Alvin's Canteen together with the
other deceased Amparo Bantigue. Godofredo Anasis nephew of Luisa Jara, testified that his aunt
was a "tomboy" and that she and Amparo Bantigue lived together as "husband and wife." The two
went to the movies together. The relationship of the two women angered Felicisimo Jara and was a
cause of their frequent quarrels. He resented not only his wife but also her woman companion.
The testimony on the fact of Luisa Jara and Amparo Bantigue sleeping together is corroborated by
the fact that they were bludgeoned to death while sleeping on one bed and their bodies discovered
on that same bed. At the Aileen's Canteen managed by the deceased Luisa, accused Felicisimo
Jara did the cooking and whenever he committed even the slightest mistakes, his wife scolded and
cursed him, treating him as though he were only one of the servants of the restaurant. (TSN, May 31,
1979, pp. 1821-1830). The records are replete with testimony to show that Felicisimo Jara had reason
to hate his wife enough to kill her and her companion.

The lower court, in its decision, stated that the nature and the number of wounds, reflected in the
autopsy reports, convincingly show that only a person who had harbored so much hate and
resentment could have inflicted such multiple fatal blows. It opined that accused Jara is the only
person who would have sufficient motive to wish the death of the deceased for he had not been
treated well as a husband by his wife.

During the investigation at the scene of the crime, blood stains were found splattered in the trousers
and shirt worn by accused Jara. His eyeglasses were also smeared with blood. When asked to
explain the presence of said blood stains, accused Jara told the police that before he learned about
the killing, he was with his stepdaughter Minerva Jimenez in the public market dressing chickens.
(TSN, May 28, 1979, pp. 397398) He also said in his testimony in open court that when he saw his wife
lying dead on the bed, he approached her and hugged her in his effort to wake her up. (TSN,
September 30, 1980, p. 1230) After a laboratory examination of the eyeglasses (Exhibit "I"), trousers
(Exhibit "J"), and shirt (Exhibit "K"), the NBI biologist verified in her report that the blood stains were not
chicken blood but human blood (Exhibit "L"). The blood stains found in accused Jara's trousers formed
certain Identical circular patterns, a splattering of blood which, according to the NBI biologist, could
be caused by an instrument like that of a hammner. Such circular patterns will only occur at the time
of the impact of the instrument, the very moment it hits the victim. He further explained that there was
no possibility of the splattering of blood if the victim died hours before because blood starts to
coagulate or clog 15 minutes after the wound is caused. (TSN, March 19, 1979, pp. 227; 244; 248-250)
The blood of the deceased victims in the case at bar had already qqqcoagulated in the morning of
June 9, 1978 when accused Jara claimed that the blood stains on his shirt were smudged when he
hugged his wife.

The NBI biologist, whose findings were later signed by the Chief of the Forensic Chemistry Division
testified that human blood was found on the eyeglasses of appellant Jara, on the front side lower
portion of the left leg of the trousers, at the left buttocks of the pants and the back portion near the
trousers, and smudged human blood stains on the appellant's T-shirt. The human blood stains
were Type B. A failure to get evidence on the blood types of the two victims keeps this second
circumstantial evidence, together with the clear motive, from being well-nigh conclusive. However, it
is still strong evidence in the chain of circumstances pointing to Jara as the killer of his wife.

Another circumstance is the cover-up attempt by Jara. He lied about the blood on his clothes and
eyeglasses. He falsely claimed that the blood came from the chickens he had been slaughtering for
the market. There is no explanation about the source and cause of the human blood stains
splattered all over him.

There is no question that appellant Jara was at the scene of the crime. Upon the discovery of the
bodies 'and the forcible opening of the door, Jara was with the group. He went through the motions
of embracing his wife although the observers noted that even in death there was no love lost
between husband and wife. One of the waitresses at the Alvin's Canteen who saw accused Jara's
reaction as he entered the room where the victims lay dead observed that he shed no tears and his
face did not show any indication of sorrow (TSN, March 21, 1979, pp. 373-374).

The hammer used in the killing is an instrument with which appellant Jara is familiar. It was proven
during the trial of the case that the hammer with the letter "A" on its handle which was one of the
instruments used in the perpetration of the crime belonged to Luisa Jara who had kept it at Aileen's
Canteen where her husband, appellant Jara helped as cook.

Rule 133, Section 5 of the Rules of Court provides:

Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient. — Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for

conviction if:
(a) There is more than one circumstance;

(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and

(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond a
reasonable doubt. (See People v. Duero, 136 SCRA 515).

Circumstantial evidence, as a basis for conviction of crime, should be acted on and weighed with
great caution, particularly where the crime is heinous and the penalty is death, as in the instant
cases. In determining the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence to support a conviction, each case is
to be determined on its own peculiar circumstances and all of the facts and circumstances are to be
considered together as a whole, and, when so considered, may be sufficient to support a conviction,
although one or more of the facts taken separately would not be sufficient for this purpose. (23 CJS p.
555). No general rule has been formulated as to the quantity of circumstantial evidence which wig
suffice for any case, but that matters not. For all that is required is that the circumstances proved
must be consistent with each other, and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is
innocent and with every other rational hypothesis except that of guilt. (People v. Contante, 12 SCRA
653).

The requirements for circumstantial evidence to sustain a conviction are present in this case. The
aforementioned circumstances constitute an unbroken chain leading to one fair and reasonable
conclusion which points to the guilt of the accused jara beyond reasonable doubt (See US v. Villos, 6
Phil. 510; People v. Subano, 73 Phil. 692). Mere denials of the accused as to his participation in the
crime are only self-serving negative evidence which cannot outweigh circumstantial evidence
clearly establishing his active participation in the crime.

The defense of alibi given by the accused Jara is weak. Aside from himself, the only person who
vouched for his presence at some place away from the scene of the crime was his stepdaughter
from whom he had sought abode. Hence, the alibi is made more dubious considering that no other
credible persons were presented who would, in the natural order of things be best situated to support
the tendered alibi (People v. Cabanit, 139 SCRA 94, citing People v. Brioso, 37 SCRA 336; People v.
Bagasala, 39 SCRA 236; People v. Carino, 55 SCRA 516). More importantly, the defense of alibi cannot
prosper because it is not enough to prove that defendant was somewhere else when the crime was
committed. He must, likewise, demonstrate that it was physically impossible for him to have been at
the scene of the crime at that time (People v. Alcantara, 33 SCRA 812). Such proof is wanting in this
case.

The killing of Amparo Bantigue was marked by treachery and evident premeditation. The trial court
noted recidivism insofar as Felicisimo Jara, previously convicted of homicide, was concemed
together with dwelling and nighttime. However, the supposed robbery of the piggy bank and
Buddha bank is proved only by the extra-judicial statements found inadmissible. The offense against
Bantigue was simple murder. Insofar as the parricide case is concerned against accused Jara, the
lower court did not err in finding guilt as having been established beyond reasonable doubt.

WHEREFORE, the judgment of the lower court is MODIFIED as follows:

In Crim. Case No. 2564, the accused Bernadas and Vergara are ACQUITTED of the crime of ROBBERY
with HOMICIDE on the ground of reasonable doubt. Accused Jara is CONVICTED of the crime of
MURDER and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of death

In Crim. Case No. 2565, the accused Bernadas and Vergara are likewise ACQUITTED of the crime of
HOMICIDE on the ground of reasonable doubt. Accused Jara is CONVICTED of the crime of
PARRICIDE and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of death.

Considering. however, that the accused Jara is now over 70 years of age, the penalty of death is
lowered to reclusion perpetua.

In both cases, accused Jara is ordered to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Amparo Bantigue and
Luisa Jara in the amount of THIRTY THOUSAND PESOS (P30,000.00), respectively.

SO ORDERED.
 [G.R. No. 142874. July 31, 2002]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. FRANCISCO ABAYON, JOSE ABAYON (at large),
JONATHAN ABAYON, (at large), CELSO ABAYON, PILOY DELA SERNA and IRENEO DE LEON, accused.

This is an automatic review of the 21 January 2000 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Dipolog City
finding Francisco Abayon, Celso Abayon, Piloy dela Serna and Ireneo de Leon guilty of Rape with
Homicide. Each accused was sentenced to death and directed to indemnify the heirs of the victims
the amount of P280,000.00.[1]

On 16 May 1996 a report was made to the Sibuco Municipal Police Station, Sibuco, Zamboanga del
Norte, that the Alibio family, composed of Nelson Alibio, his wife Myrna, and their minor children
Maribel, Ronald and Josephine,[2] was killed at Barangay Sto. Nio, Sibuco, in the evening of 11 May
1994. The report also revealed that the bodies of the victims were buried at the bank of the Tangarak
River.

On 19 July 1996 Police Inspector Edito V. Zapanta, Chief of Police of Sibuco, accompanied by two (2)
other policemen, was led to the grave site of the victims by the person who reported the crime. Three
(3) bones were recovered.

Upon request of the authorities, a medico-legal examination was conducted by the PNP Crime
Laboratory Service, Zamboanga City, to determine the origin of the bones. On 20 August 1996 a
report prepared by Dr. Rodolfo M. Valmoria, Chief of the Medico-Legal Office, Regional Unit 9,
Zamboanga City, was released with the finding that the bones were indeed of human origin.[3]

On 18 November 1996 an Information was filed charging Francisco Abayon, Jose Abayon, Jonathan
Abayon, Celso Abayon, Piloy Dela Serna and Ireneo de Leon with Rape with Multiple Homicide with
the qualifying circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation. The case was raffled to RTC-Br.
27, Siocon, Zamboanga del Norte. Only Francisco Abayon, Celso Abayon, Piloy dela Serna and
Ireneo de Leon were arrested. Jose Abayon and Jonathan Abayon, up to the time of this appeal,
remain at large.

The accused were arraigned on 21 March 1997 and the trial started on 21 October 1997. But since
the accused, with the exception of those who remain at large, were detained at the Zamboanga
del Norte Provincial Jail, Sicayab, Dipolog City, the case was reraffled with the approval of the Court
En Banc to RTC-Br. 9, Dipolog City, which continued hearing the case until its conclusion.

The prosecution presented Vicente Dauba, the person who reported the crime to the police and the
lone eyewitness, as well as Police Inspector Edito V. Zapanta and Dr. Rodolfo M. Valmora.

In convicting the accused, the trial court relied chiefly on the testimony of Vicente Dauba, a tenant
and nephew of the accused Jose Abayon, his maternal grandmother being also an Abayon. At the
time the crime was committed, Vicente claimed he was staying in the house of Jose Abayon in Sto.
Nio, Sibuco, Zamboanga del Norte.

Vicente Dauba testified that Jose Abayon ran for the post of barangay kagawad and won in the 11
May 1994 barangay elections. In the evening of that day, Jose celebrated his victory in his house.
Among those present were his sons Jonathan, Celso and Francisco, sons-in-law Piloy dela Serna and
Ireneo de Leon, Nelson Alibio and Vicente Dauba.

At about 10:00 oclock that evening Jose Abayon decided to transfer to his other house nearby,
occupied by his tenant Nelson Alibio and family. The second house was about thirty (30) meters
away from where the celebration was taking place.[4]

According to Vicente, he noticed that Francisco Abayon left first, followed by the group of Jose
including Nelson. Although he also went down, Vicente did not proceed with the group to the other
house. From the ground he saw clearly what happened inside the house occupied by Nelson
because it was open and lighted by two (2) gas lamps known as lamparillas - one inside the house
and one at the balcony. He recounted that Nelson, who reached his house first, caught Francisco
Abayon sexually assaulting Myrna, Nelsons wife. Nelson forthwith started hitting Francisco.

Upon seeing Francisco and fearing that he might be overpowered by Nelson, Jose and the rest of
the group ganged up on Nelson. Aside from the accused Francisco, Jose, Jonathan, Celso, Piloy and
Ireneo, Vicente also mentioned Rogelio Caete, Piloys Junior, a certain Sito and a certain Janito[5] as
among those who mauled Nelson. They tied his hands with a rope and beat him to death. Jose
Abayon then forced himself upon Myrna while his cohorts held her hands and feet. After satisfying his
lust, Jose ordered the rest to follow after him. Thus, Celso, Jonathan, Piloy and Ireneo took turns in
sexually abusing Myrna, after which, Jose drew a .38 caliber revolver from his waist and shot Nelson
twice, then Myrna once.

Vicente Dauba claimed that he advised the accused not to touch the Alibio children who were
awakened by the disturbance, and who by then were already out in the balcony, but Jose and
Ireneo each got a piece of firewood which they used to beat two (2) of the Alibio children, while
Francisco pulled the head of the third child to death.

With the whole family now dead, Jose ordered the son of Ireneo to get a carabao and a cart where
they could load their victims and bring them to the riverbank of Tangarak about a kilometer away
and bury them there. As they proceeded to the riverbank Vicente followed them to ascertain where
the bodies would be brought presumably for burial.

After the victims were buried, Jose remarked that he would excavate the bones after a year, then
burn them and throw their remains into the river to dispose of any physical evidence, after which, the
group returned to the house of Jose.

The Alibios left twelve (12) sacks of corn, three (3) dozen chickens, two (2) pigs and kitchen utensils in
their house which were divided by the accused among themselves. Although Vicente was not
present when the loot was distributed, he claimed nevertheless that he saw Piloy and Ireneo carrying
the sacks of corn to Tangarak where they lived. He also saw one of the pigs in the possession of Piloy.

All the accused, except those at large, took the witness stand. Their defense rested mainly on denial
and alibi. The substance of their testimonies was that the statements of Vicente Dauba that they
raped Myrna Alibio, killed all the members of the Alibio family, then buried them and thereafter
divided their personal belongings were lies. They denied being present at the house of Jose on the
evening of 11 May 1994, saying they were in Tangarak at the time. Tangarak is about six (6) kilometers
away from Sto. Nio and can only be negotiated by foot as the terrain is hilly.

Francisco Abayon, Piloy dela Serna and Ireneo de Leon testified that Vicente was a tenant in Joses
land but maintained that Vicente was driven out by Jose long before 11 May 1994. They claimed that
on 15 March 1994 Jose and Ireneo boxed Vicente and ejected him from the land he tenanted after
Vicente hacked the leg of Joses carabao that caused its death. They also testified that Vicente
vowed to take revenge on Jose Abayon, thus concluding that it was revenge that prompted Vicente
to testify against them.

The accused now claim that the lower court erred: (a) in convicting them on the basis of the
testimony of Vicente Dauba which suffers from material flaws and exaggerations; (b) in not
discrediting Vicente Dauba; and, (c) in not appreciating their evidence.

Apparently, the thrust of this appeal is to impugn the credibility of witness Vicente Dauba. However,
we have thoroughly examined the records, scrutinized the evidence presented by the parties, and
found no cogent reason to reverse the decision of the trial court.

The accused assert that they could not have left the house of the Alibios at the height of Jose
Abayons victory celebration, commit atrocities, and later bury the victims bodies at the Tangarak
River. They claim that it is incredible that they would commit the crime in the presence of Vicente
Dauba and that, after the victims had been buried, Jose would say in Vicentes presence that he
would exhume the bones after a year and burn them so that there would be no evidence left.

But the lower court found Vicentes account of the events that transpired on the eve of 11 May 1994
to be frank, candid and straightforward, unshaken by the skillful cross-examination by the counsel for
the defense.[6] We have held that a witness who testifies in a categorical, straightforward,
spontaneous and frank manner and remains consistent is a credible witness.[7] Indeed, there is
nothing in the testimony of Vicente Dauba that would suggest that he was merely fabricating tales or
embellishing his story to implicate the accused. The flaws, if any, refer only to minor or
inconsequential details which do not affect his credibility or the veracity of his declarations.

We also find no reason to depart from the well-entrenched rule that, in the matter of credibility of
witnesses, the factual findings of the trial court should be respected. It is doctrinally settled that the
assessment of the credibility of the witnesses and their testimonies is a matter best undertaken by the
trial court because of its unique opportunity to observe the witnesses firsthand and to note their
demeanor, conduct and attitude under grueling examination.[8] This assessment is even deemed
conclusive and binding upon the appellate court in the absence of a clear showing that it was
reached arbitrarily, or that the trial court had plainly overlooked certain facts of substance or value
that if considered might affect the result of the case.[9]

We cannot imagine how Vicente Dauba was able to give a consistent narrative of how the crime
was perpetrated and how the bodies of the victims were disposed of if he did not see the actual
incident himself. More than just supplying the authorities with the details regarding the manner by
which the crime was committed and the persons responsible for it, he was even able to point out the
exact burial place of the victims that led to the discovery of their skeletal remains. This is vital and
crucial.

It was not improbable that Vicente Dauba would find himself as an spectator to the outrage
committed by the accused. After all, he was related to most of them. Moreover, he was not only a
tenant-farmer of Jose Abayon upon whose land he depended for his livelihood; he was also residing
in the house of Jose. Given his relation and his status as a member of the household of one of the
accused, it was not implausible that they not only trusted him to keep his silence about the crime but
also would be trusting enough to discuss their devious plans in his presence.

The accused also capitalize on Vicentes delay in reporting the crime. But the Court has already held
that delay of a witness in revealing to the authorities what he knows about a crime does not render
his testimony false.[10] Fear for ones life explains the failure of a witness to a crime to immediately
notify the authorities of what exactly transpired. Once such fear is overcome by a more compelling
need to narrate the truth, then the witness must be welcomed by the courts to help dispense
justice.[11] Also, the natural reticence of most people and their abhorrence to get involved in a
criminal case are of judicial notice.[12]

Vicentes delay in reporting the incident to the authorities was adequately explained. According to
him, the accused threatened to kill him and were already guarding him after the incident. He had
every reason to fear for his life considering that he was still living with one of those he was testifying
against. So much so that when he revealed the matter to the police authorities in May 1996 he did not
return anymore to Sto. Nio but stayed at the police station for four (4) months until he finally moved to
Alicia, Zamboanga del Norte.

The accused posit that a conviction for such a grave crime cannot be had on the sole testimony of
Vicente Dauba. They insist that no independent evidence was presented to show that Myrna Alibio
was raped by the accused or that the bones discovered were those of the victims and that the
accused were responsible for killing them.

We disagree. The testimony of a single witness if credible and positive and satisfies the court as to the
guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt is sufficient to convict.[13] In the instant case, Vicente
gave a clear and convincing narration of the crime pointing to the accused as responsible therefor.
His lone testimony, therefore, is sufficient to support a conviction.

The trial court wisely gave more weight to the declarations of the prosecution witness than to the
testimony of the accused. Their defense consists of denial and alibi. All too often we have ruled that
both denial and alibi are weak defenses which cannot prevail where there is positive identification of
the accused by the prosecution witnesses.[14] Denial is a self-serving negative evidence that cannot
be given greater weight than the declaration of a credible witness who testifies on affirmative
matters.[15] We note that the accused failed to establish that they could not be at the vicinity of the
Alibio house when the rape and killing took place. For the defense of alibi to prosper, the
requirements of time and place must be strictly met.[16] The accused must not only prove
their presence at another place at the time of the commission of the offense but they must also
demonstrate that it would be impossible for them to be at the scene of the crime
when it was committed.[17]

As for the imputation that witness Vicente Dauba had an axe to grind against Jose Abayon and
Ireneo de Leon and thus was impelled by an improper motive in testifying for the prosecution, this
was also properly disregarded by the trial court. While Jose Abayon and Ireneo de Leon supposedly
boxed Vicente, there appears no reason why Francisco, Jonathan and Celso, all surnamed Abayon
and Piloy dela Serna, with whom the witness did not bear any resentment, were also implicated as
participants in the crime. Apart from the testimonies of the accused, this defense is also
uncorroborated by independent and impartial witnesses.

We affirm the lower courts finding that conspiracy attended the commission of the crime. Facts and
circumstances revealed a concerted action on the part of the accused in the execution of the
brutish acts. They left for the Alibio residence at the same time and actively participated in the sexual
abuse of Myrna Alibio by restraining her hands and feet as they took turns in raping her. They banded
together in mauling Nelson Alibio to death and, in order to prevent their being implicated in the
crime, killed the helpless Alibio children. Their acts clearly demonstrated a spontaneous and
collective agreement to accomplish a common criminal design. With conspiracy correctly
appreciated, the act of one becomes imputable to all. Hence, each of the accused is liable for
each rape committed by their companions. Under Art. 335 of The Revised Penal Code, as amended
by RA 7659, the penalty of death shall be imposed when by reason or on occasion of the rape
homicide is committed.

However, while several counts of rape were attempted to be proved during the trial, we note that
the Information that was filed charged only one (1) count of rape with multiple homicide. Under Sec.
13, Rule 110, 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure, an Information should charge only one (1) offense. This
is important to apprise the accused fully of the charge against him so that he may not be confused
in his defense.[18] Furthermore, an accused cannot be convicted of an offense unless it is clearly
charged in the complaint or information since he has that right under the Constitution to be informed
of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. To convict him of an offense other than that
charged in the complaint or information would violate that constitutional right.[19] Hence, the trial
court appropriately convicted the accused of and meted the capital penalty for only one (1) count
of rape with homicide. It is axiomatic that the accused can only be convicted for a crime duly
charged and proved. Besides, this case was brought to us on automatic review and not upon the
initiative of the accused themselves. We are thus called upon to re-examine only their conviction for
a single offense, as found by the trial court, and inquire only into the propriety of the imposition of the
death penalty.

As to the civil liability of the accused, current jurisprudence sets an indemnity of P100,000.00 for the
victim Myrna Alibio since her rape was effectively qualified by circumstances under which the death
penalty is authorized by applicable laws, namely, the death of the rape victim.[20] In addition, the
amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages must be awarded to her heirs without need of proof nor
pleading.[21] A civil indemnity of P50,000.00 as well as moral damages in a similar amount must also
be awarded for the death of Nelson Alibio and his children Maribel, Ronald and Josephine.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the court a quo finding the accused Francisco Abayon, Celso Abayon,
Piloy dela Serna and Ireneo de Leon guilty of rape with homicide and imposing upon them the
supreme penalty of death is AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION that they are jointly and severally
ordered to pay the heirs of Myrna Alibio the amount of P100,000.00 as civil indemnity and P50,000.00
for moral damages.

For the death of Nelson Alibio and their children Maribel, Ronald and Josephine, all surnamed Alibio,
the accused are likewise ordered jointly and severally to pay the heirs of these victims P50,000.00 in
civil indemnity and another P50,000.00 as moral damages for each death or P400,000.00 for civil
indemnity and moral damages, in addition to the amounts mentioned in the immediately
preceeding paragraph.

Upon finality of this Decision, let the records of this case be forwarded to the Office of the President
for the possible exercise of the presidential pardon.[22]

SO ORDERED.