Gowans - Practical Identities and Autonomy Korsgaard's Reformation of Kant's Moral Philosophy

International Phenomenological Society
Practical Identities and Autonomy: Korsgaard's Reformation of Kant's Moral Philosophy

Author(s): Christopher W. Gowans
Source: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 64, No. 3 (May, 2002), pp. 546-570
Published by: International Phenomenological Society
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3070968
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
Vol. LXIV, No. 3, May 2002
Practical Identities and Autonomy:

Korsgaard' s Reformation of Kant's
Moral Philosophy
CHRISTOPHER W. GOWANS
Fordham University
Kant has long been taxed with an inability to explain the detailed normative co
our lives by making universalizability the sole arbiter of our values. Kor
addresses one form of this critique by defending a Kantian theory amended by
ingly attractive conception of practical identities. Identities are dependent
contingent circumstances of each person's world. Hence, obligations issuing fro
differ from Kantian moral obligations in not applying to all persons. Still, K
takes Kantian autonomy to mean the normativity of all obligations is rooted in
salizability. The wealth of values informing our lives is thus said to be accom
within a Kantian framework.
After briefly explaining Korsgaard's understanding of practical identities and their

role in her reformation of Kant's moral philosophy, I argue that she gives an inadequate
explanation of how the obligations that arise from a person's practical identities derive
their authority from the person's will. I then consider how her position might be devel-
oped to meet this objection in accordance with her allegiance to "constructivism" and I
argue that the epistemic commitments of people's actual identities makes it unlikely that
such a development could preserve Kantian autonomy as she interprets it.
In various ways Kant's moral philosophy has long been taxed with an inabil-
ity to explain the detailed normative content of our lives on account of
making pure practical reason-in particular, universalizability-the sole
arbiter of our values. In her important, recent work, The Sources of Norma-
tivity, Christine M. Korsgaard addresses one form of this critique by defend-
ing a Kantian moral philosophy significantly amended by what looks to be
an attractive conception of practical identity, understood as the source of the
values that guide our lives.' Practical identities are mostly dependent on the
Christine M. Korsgaard, with G. A. Cohen, Raymond Geuss, Thomas Nagel, and Bernard
Williams as commentators, and Onora O'Neill as editor, The Sources of Normativity
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). Parenthetical page references in the
main body of the text are to this volume; unless otherwise noted, page references in the
notes are also to this volume. Korsgaard's contribution consists of four lectures (ending
on p. 166) and a reply to the commentators (beginning on p. 219); my citations are mainly
to the former, but occasionally to the latter.
546 CHRISTOPHER W. GOWANS
contingent circumstances of each person's social world, and they vary from
person to person. Hence, the obligations that issue from these identities typi-
cally differ from familiar Kantian moral obligations in not applying to all
rational beings. At the same time, Korsgaard takes Kant's doctrine of auton-
omy to mean that the normativity of all obligations is rooted in the law of
the will, the principle of acting only on maxims that could be willed as laws.
In this way, the rich array of values that inform our lives is said to be
accommodated within a Kantian framework.
After briefly explaining Korsgaard's understanding of practical identities

and their role in her reformation of Kant's moral philosophy (section I), I
argue that she gives an inadequate explanation of how the obligations that
arise from a person's practical identities derive their authority from the
person's will (section II). I then consider how her position might be devel-
oped to meet this objection in accordance with her allegiance to
"constructivism" (section III) and I argue that the epistemic commitments of
people's actual identities makes it unlikely that such a development could
preserve Kantian autonomy as she interprets it (section IV).
I. The Nature and Role of Practical Identities
Korsgaard's account of practical identities is part of a defense of

answer to what she calls "the normative question," the first-person
question "Why should I be moral?" According to this answer, an age
be moral because "the laws of morality are the laws of the agent's
(19). This answer is defended as superior to three other moder
including realism, the view that one should be moral because t
claims describe "intrinsically normative entities" in the world.2 K
maintains that a Kantian "ethics of autonomy is the only one consi
the metaphysics of the moder world," a metaphysics in which "the
longer the good" (4-5).
The Kantian answer emerges from an extended argument for t
that, if a person acts for reasons, then he or she must acknowledge
tivity of moral obligations.3 To begin, Korsgaard says that, b
human mind is essentially self-conscious or reflective, we can ask
desire whether it provides a reason for action. This presupposes t
free to endorse or reject our desires, and to act accordingly-that
2 Korsgaard calls this "substantive moral realism"; she distinguishes it from

realism," the view that there are correct and incorrect answers to mora
because there is a proper procedure for answering them (35). Though she
former, she accepts the latter. I discuss this further in section III below.
3 The argument is presented in the third lecture plus the beginning and end of
is also the main topic of her reply to the commentators.
A PRACTICAL IDENTITIES AND AUTONOMY 547
phrase we act "under the idea of freedom."4 To choose freely is to choose in a
way that is both self-determining and in accordance with law (the latter
because a free will is a form of both causality and reason). Because the will is
self-determining, no law can be imposed on it from the outside. Hence, the
will must have its own law, and this can only be that we are "to act only on
a maxim which we could will to be a law" (98). This, Korsgaard says, is the
law of a free will.5
So much looks to be familiar Kantian territory. Korsgaard's innovation is
to claim that, as reflective, a person must have a practical identity (typically
several), a conception of yourself "under which you find your life to be worth
living and your actions to be worth undertaking" (101). As examples of prac-
tical identities, she lists: being a woman, mother, lover, friend, citizen,
student, egoist, or wanton; being a member of a family, ethnic group,
profession, or movement; being an adherent of a religion; and, as will appear
shortly, being a "Citizen of the Kingdom of Ends."6 Korsgaard says that
when we consider whether or not to endorse a desire, we ask "whether the
maxim of acting on it can be willed as a law by a being with the identity in
question" (113). If it can, there is a reason to act on the desire; if it cannot,
there is an obligation not to do so. As such, Korsgaard takes our practical
identities to have enormous importance to us. They are the source of much
that we do and regard as valuable in our lives. To violate a fundamental obli-
gation is to lose your integrity: it is to "no longer be who you are" and "to
be for all practical purposes dead or worse than dead" (102).
Korsgaard claims that this account shows that you must be "a law to
yourself' and hence that Kant is right in thinking that "our autonomy is the
source of obligation." In determining your obligations by considering what a
person with your practical identity can will as a law, your authority-"the
authority of your own mind and will"-"is beyond question and does not need
to be established" (104). Values, Korsgaard says, "are not discovered by intui-
tion to be 'out there' in the world." As good maxims, those that have the
form of law, they are produced by "our own legislative wills" and hence are
"created by human beings" (112).
4 Korsgaard briefly explains and defends Kant's conception of freedom on pp. 94-97. My
discussion here presupposes this conception.
5 On pp. 98-100 Korsgaard calls this law "the categorical imperative" and distinguishes it
from what she calls "the moral law" (quoted below). As she recognizes, this is a distinc-
tion Kant does not make; and her terminology departs from his since what she calls the
moral law he frequently calls the categorical imperative.
6 See pp. 101, 105-7, 113 and 120. Elsewhere Korsgaard rejects the idea that "gender has
to be or should be a deep fact about the identity of a human being" ["A Note on the
Value of Gender-Identification," in Women, Culture and Development: A Study of
Human Capabilities, ed. by Martha C. Nussbaum and Jonathan Glover (Oxford: Claren-
don Press, 1995), p. 401].
Yet this is not the end of the story. So far it might seem that just about
anything could be a legitimate practical identity. But there is an important
respect in which this is not the case. Though it is mostly contingent which
practical identities a person has, it is necessary, for a person acting for
reasons, that the person have some practical identity; otherwise, according to
the argument above, there would be no reason to do anything. But the neces-
sity of having some identity is based, not on any particular contingent iden-
tity, but on what stands behind them all: a person's human identity as a
"reflective animal who needs reasons to act" (121). As a consequence, a
person has reasons to act only if the particular identities that generate them
are valued, and these identities (whatever they may be) are valued only if the
human identity that requires them is valued, where this latter identity includes
the humanity of oneself as well as others.7 The necessity of valuing our
human identity thereby gives us a "moral identity" that in the final analysis
(to quickly point to the conclusion) makes each of us a Citizen of the King-
dom of Ends who must follow "the moral law" that instructs us to "act only
on maxims that all rational beings could agree to act on together in a work-
able cooperative system" (99).8 In this way, Korsgaard concludes, "all value
depends on the value of humanity" (121). The upshot is that our contingent
practical identities are governed by the obligations of our more fundamental
moral identity.
II. A Problem with the Normativity of Practical Identities

There is much that is likely to be controversial in the argument of the last
section. But my interest here is not with this argument per se, but with the
understanding of practical identities that is employed in it. Hence, in the
discussion that follows I provisionally accept other aspects of the argument
in order to focus on this issue. At one point, Korsgaard herself seems to raise
the question that concerns me. She writes:
Most of the ways in which we identify ourselves are contingent upon our particular
circumstances, or relative to the social worlds in which we live. How can we be bound by
obligations which spring from conceptions of our identity which are not in themselves
necessary? (129)
I take Korsgaard to be asking why we should suppose that obligations that

issue from contingent practical identities are normative for us. Her answer is
twofold. First, since our humanity requires us to have some contingent prac-
tical identities, the ones we have "derive part of their importance, and so part
of their normativity," from our necessary moral identity (129; emphasis
7 Korsgaard maintains that valuing one's own humanity requires valuing the humanity of
all persons (see pp. 121 and 132-45).
8 Korsgaard says that our moral identity is one of our practical identities, but unlike the
others it is necessary for the reason just given (see pp. 121-22 and 129).
added). Second, practical identities that are "fundamentally inconsistent with
the value of humanity must be given up" (130).9 In other words, a contingent
practical identity is normative for a person in the sense of being morally
permissible so long as it does not fundamentally conflict with the moral law.
Let us refer to morally permissible practical identities as weakly normative.
Korsgaard does provide a partial answer to her question. But it is not a
complete answer because any identity fulfills the requirement to have some
identity, and more importantly, for a given person, many different and
incompatible possible practical identities are weakly normative. For example,
consistent with my moral identity as a human being, I may or may not
become a father, I may choose this or that profession, I may belong to this
religion or that one, I may embrace or reject my ethnic heritage, and so on.
Indeed, Korsgaard acknowledges as much. "Moral identity," she says in
response to Bernard Williams, "does not swamp other forms of identity: no
one is simply a moral agent and nothing more" (125). Hence, from the stand-
point of the agent deliberating about how to live, a standpoint that is central
to Korsgaard's entire argument, choices have to be made among the weakly
normative practical identities that are possible. Moreover, in thinking about
this, we do not ordinarily suppose that any such identity is as good as any
other: we believe there is more to a good life than a morally permissible life.
In particular, we think that some practical identities are better than others, and
that we ought to seek those that are (for ourselves if not for other persons)
among the best or at least the better ones that are possible.
Since this point is crucial to my argument, it will help to give some
examples. Each of the following could be at least a part of a morally permis-
sible identity in a person's life: playing tic-tac-toe several times a day,
watching re-runs of the television show I Love Lucy as often as possible,
designing and maintaining a Japanese garden in one's backyard, and trying to
understand the full meaning of the Dead Sea Scrolls. Each of these activities
could be an object of concern and an organizing principle in a person's life;
none necessarily would be morally impermissible (though of course they
could be, for example, if they become obsessions that prevented fulfillment
of moral obligations). However, it would be implausible to think that each of
these identities is equally (or incommensurably) valuable: some are plainly
better than others, however difficult it may be to explain why. A person
capable of each would thus do better, ceteris paribus, to choose some rather
than others. At any rate, this is an essential assumption in the remainder of
this paper.
9 Though "a practical identity that is in and of itself contradictory to the value of humanity"
is ruled out (in her "Reply" she accepts the example of the Mafioso), Korsgaard allows
that a practical identity that conflicts with our moral identity "in this or that case" is not;
and she seems prepared to deny that "moral obligations always trump others" (pp. 125-
26).
The aforementioned examples suggest that a weakly normative practical
identity could be trivial or of little value. But if practical identities are to pro-
vide us with obligations (and reasons) that are normative and sometimes of
great strength and importance, as Korsgaard supposes, then such identities
must be more than weakly normative; for we typically think a trivial or
minimally valuable identity would not provide a person with genuine obliga-
tions-or at least not with very compelling ones. It is true that other factors
might plausibly be thought to strengthen the normativity of obligations issu-
ing from an identity that is merely morally permissible (for example, that the
agent has long maintained it, or once made a commitment to it). But these
factors alone could do little to convert a trivial identity into a source of
significant obligations. A long-standing devotion to tic-tac-toe might ground
a weak obligation to play again today, but this is hardly the sort of obliga-
tion Korsgaard needs or has in mind. What is clearly essential to raising an
identity from being merely permissible to being a source of important obliga-
tions is that it be truly valuable; and only insofar as the identity is among the
best or the better one's available would it provide obligations the violation of
which would leave a person "for all practical purposes dead" (102).
Let us define strongly normative practical identities as those that are
morally permissible and are sufficiently valuable (sometimes by being among
the best or the better available for a person) that they may be the source of
those obligations the respect for which gives real worth to our lives-the
worth Korsgaard plainly means to capture when she speaks of identities as
that in terms of which "you find your life to be worth living" (101). Since
the obligations that arise from an identity can have significant normative
force only insofar as the identity is strongly normative, a full answer to
Korsgaard's question needs to explain how a contingent practical identity can
be strongly normative (as perhaps the first part of her answer grants in saying
that only part of the normativity of an identity is derived from our moral
identity).
The problem is that it is difficult to see how this can be explained by
Korsgaard's theory of autonomy that grounds normativity solely in the will.
According to this theory, the principle of the will is what can be willed as a
law. Now, given a practical identity that is strongly normative, a person
evaluating desires need only consider what a will with that identity could will
as a law. But in determining whether an identity is strongly normative in the
first place, a person can only consider what a will with a moral identity could
will as a law; and, since such a will could will any weakly normative iden-
tity, this cannot be a basis for determining which among these identities are
strongly normative. Nor, it seems, would other plausible, formal principles
of the will, such as Onora O'Neill's Principles of Rational Intending, be
sufficient to establish which identities are strongly normative.'1 It is thus
perplexing how there could be a basis in the will alone that explains the
strong normativity of an identity (and, more generally, how one permissible
identity could be better than another)."!
To further understand this problem, it will help to look at what Korsgaard
says about how we come to have and revise practical identities. On the one
hand, she repeatedly insists on the contingency of our identities: "most of the
self-conceptions which govern us are contingent" (120). This means both that
they could have been and could be otherwise, in contrast to moral identity,
and that they depend in part on circumstances outside the agent's control (as
in the quotation at the beginning of this section). In a comment on the
second sense of contingency, Korsgaard says (in a concession to Williams)
that it is "a kind of immaturity not to accept the deep role of contingency in
human life" that is connected with the fact that we "stumble into some of our
deepest concerns." She asserts that "the mature attitude is the one that
actively embraces" contingency, "not the one that passively endures it" (241).
The general fact that our practical identities depend partly on conditions
beyond our control is thus neither to be regretted nor resisted. In this respect,
the autonomy of the will is not so deep as to completely transcend the exten-
sively conditioned nature of our lives.
On the other hand, because practical identities are only partly dependent on
circumstances outside the agent, and because they can be otherwise, Korsgaard
says that "we may at any point come to question the normativity of one or
another of our practical identities" (129).12 She suggests that "this can happen
in a variety of ways" that are "perfectly familiar to us all" (120). For exam-
ple: conflicts between identities may require giving one up; circumstances
may bring us to call an identity into question; and "rational reflection" may
lead us to discard an identity. In fact, rational reflection is always required for
'0 See "Consistency in Action" in her Constructions of Reason: Explorations of Kant's Prac-
tical Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), pp. 81-104. Her princi-
ples, which elaborate on Kant's constraint on hypothetical imperatives, all concern the
consistency or coherence of the will. As such, they could rule out certain identities or
conjunctions of identities, but they would not be sufficient to establish which are among
the better or the best. Korsgaard discusses the normative status of hypothetical impera-
tives on p. 36.
This objection is analogous to, but not the same as, the traditional "no content" objection
to the universalizability formulation of Kant's categorical imperative (one version of the
class of objections to Kant I noted at the opening of the paper). Korsgaard discusses this
briefly on pp. 99-100 and 220-22. My argument here is not that Korsgaard's moral law
rules out no practical identities (I am supposing that it does), but that it provides no basis
for choosing among the remaining permissible identities and hence for determining which
among these are strongly normative. In this connection, see the different but related
comments by Geuss on pp. 190-92 and the concern expressed by Nagel on p. 204.
12 In a different context, she notes that "the element of arbitrariness and contingency" at
the basis of our values "does not commit us to accepting everything that nature provides"
(253).
Korsgaard because, as reflective beings, when we give up or adopt a practical
identity we must do so for some reason. Since to act for a reason is always to
act on the basis of some law,13 it is presumably at this point that autonomy
enters her account. Roughly speaking, a practical identity is strongly norma-
tive for a person insofar as he or she has a reason for thinking it is genuinely
valuable. However, since the source of a reason may be variously construed (a
realist might say it lies in an apprehension of what is objectively good in the
world) the determination of strongly normative identities will be autonomous
only if the source of this reason is found solely in the will.
Korsgaard appears to address this issue when she says that, though our
practical identities are "to some extent, given to us" by culture and nature, "it
is also clear that we enter into their construction" and "make an active contri-
bution" to them (239-40). This would seem to suggest that what makes prac-
tical identities strongly normative depends not simply on what is given to the
agent, but on the constructive activity of the agent's will. It is this activity,
she says, that allows us to "identify with them in a strong way" (240). How-
ever, Korsgaard has rather little to say about the nature of this activity.
Sometimes it reveals a conflict, but then there must be some ground for reso-
lution; other times, it shows an identity to be "silly or jejune," or again
"neurotic or phobic or fetishistic," but these judgments presuppose values
that must be established.14 The ultimate basis of this constructive activity
turns out to be surprisingly passive. In a key passage, elaborating the afore-
mentioned active embrace of contingency, she writes:
For Kant urges us to take things to be important because they are important to us. And this
means that we must do so in full acceptance of the fact that what specifically is important to us
is at bottom contingent and conditional, determined by biological, psychological, and historical
conditions that themselves are neither justified nor unjustified, but simply there. In a deep way,
all of our particular values are ones we just happen to hold. (242; cf. 122)'5
Later she says that "Kant's theory of value invites us to accept and even cele-
brate" such facts as that "certain interests and concerns and loves are just the
ones we have" (253). These passages suggest that a strongly normative prac-
tical identity is established in something like the following way: first, an
agent A observes the contingent fact that X is important to A; second, A
infers from this that X is important; and finally, on the basis of this, A
commits to making X (at least a part of) a practical identity by making this
identity a law for A (on the assumption that the identity is permitted by the
moral law).
3 See p. 232.
4 See pp. 120 and 253-54.
5 Perplexity about these passages is expressed in Allan Gibbard's review essay, "Morality
as Consistency in Living: Korsgaard's Kantian Lectures," Ethics 110 (1999), pp. 149-50.
On account of the final step, this account does make an action of the will
necessary for a practical identity to be strongly normative. In fact, it is only
with this step that normativity arises: "we command ourselves," Korsgaard
says, "to do what we find it would be a good idea to do" (105). In this, she
may be correct: without committing ourselves to an identity, it could not be
a source of obligations for us; it would merely be a possible way we could
live. But in the absence of proper guidance, this commitment is not sufficient
for strong normativity, something Korsgaard effectively acknowledges in
making the role of the will merely to command on the basis of what already
has been established, namely that X is important (a "good idea").'6 The will
plays no role in establishing that X is important; this is said to follow (for
A) from the fact that X is important to A, and, as Korsgaard emphasizes, X's
being important to A is something that happens to A, not something that A
does. Hence, in ascertaining that a practical identity is strongly normative,
the will provides no critical force: it gives no basis for establishing that the
identity is truly valuable. In the end, strong normative force depends crucially
on the fact that X is important to A, a fact that is "determined" by various
contingent conditions. In view of the objection stated earlier, this is not an
unexpected result: since the principle of the will is simply what can be willed
as a law, there appear to be no resources in the will for determining which
practical identities are strongly normative.
In this respect, Korsgaard's claim that autonomy is the source of the
normativity of practical obligations (and reasons) is at best misleading. As
argued earlier, these obligations have significant normative force only insofar
as they issue from practical identities that are strongly normative; but the
determination of strong normativity depends at least as much on what
happens to the agent as on what the agent does. Hence, on Korsgaard's
account, though these obligations presuppose an act of the will, the role of
the will is simply to follow the lead of what lies outside it.
Much of Korsgaard's argument is centered on a familiar Kantian contrast
between what is inside and outside the will. Deliberation and choice are
portrayed, not in terms of the strongest desire prevailing, but in terms of an

agent in the form of a will standing over and above its desires and deciding for
some reason which should prevail.'7 Hence, desires are said to have their
source outside the will and to generate reasons and obligations only when
they are subjected to the critical scrutiny of the law of the will.18 But this
scrutiny turns out to be less critical than one might have thought. Moral
permissibility, of course, is a genuine constraint; my point is not to deny
16 Since the will is free, I assume it could refuse to commit to what has been judged impor-
tant, or it could commit to what has been judged unimportant. This just goes to show that
commitment by the will is not sufficient for strong normativity.
'7 For example, see pp. 100, 113 and 227 ff.
18 For complexities in this account, see pp. 238-42.
this. But beyond permissibility, what I find important to me is fundamental
to establishing my identities and hence my reasons and obligations; and on
Korsgaard's account, that something is important to me is, if not simply a
desire, at least very much like a desire in being determined by contingent
circumstances outside the will.
III. Identity Constructivism

So far I have pointed to a problem with what Korsgaard says about the strong
normativity of practical identities in view of her theory of autonomy as the
source of normativity. I now consider the possibility of developing her
account so as to provide an understanding of the normative force of practical
identities that, in the spirit of Kant, regards us as less passive with respect to
our identities by being more critical about them than Korsgaard seems to
allow. The topic is important insofar as practical identities are the basis of
much that we think is worthwhile in our lives, and yet it is difficult to see
how they could have a role in Kant's conception of morality. Korsgaard
herself says she introduced practical identities partly to improve on Kant's too
harsh and simple "division between natural impulses that do not belong to
my proper self and rational impulses that do" as well as his connected dichot-
omy of self-love and morality (240; cf. 250). It should also be seen relatedly
as an effort to respond to recent critiques by, among others, Williams and
communitarians such as Michael Sandel (both of whom are mentioned) that
Kantian universality cannot account for the moral particularity of our
lives-critiques that in part update the traditional claim that Kant cannot
make sense of what Hegel called Sittlichkeit.
When we think about how to live our lives, both with an eye to meeting
our various obligations and to what would constitute a meaningful and fulfill-
ing existence, we do commonly think in terms of specific conceptions of
ourselves defined to an extent by reference to the categories of practical identi-
ties Korsgaard mentions. But neither Kant's moral law nor desires as he
understands them (corresponding to the two poles of his standard practical
dualism between reason and experience) seem sufficient to fully explain the
normative features of these identities. The categorical imperative may distin-
guish between impermissible and permissible identities, but it cannot provide
enough guidance for determining which among the latter are sufficiently valu-
able to be strongly normative.19 Kantian desires, on the other hand, oscillate
'9 Of course, it may be argued that the categorical imperative could provide this guidance.
But I take Korsgaard correctly to deny this. The universal law formulation she is
concerned with (and which is crucial to Kant's understanding of autonomy) could
conceivably render fewer identities morally permissible than is commonly supposed, but
since it is a test that admits only a yes-or-no answer it cannot underwrite qualitative
distinctions about better and worse lives among those that are permissible. Other formu-
lations of Kant's categorical imperative, such as that concerning respecting persons as
ends, or Kant's account of the imperfect duties to develop our talents and promote the
unstably between being alien objects of contempt a rational being could do
without and that which, when satisfied, constitute happiness, the complement
of the good will in Kant's conception of the complete good. His account of
desires is thus an unlikely resource for thinking fruitfully about practical
identities.20 Korsgaard aims to fill this lacuna.
What appears most obviously problematic in her discussion is not simply
how little she says about our reflections concerning strongly normative iden-
tities, but how little she could say given the nature of her theory. Finding
insufficient guidance in the law of the will, with its sole criterion of what can
be willed as a law, and rejecting other sources of value such as are suggested
in realist accounts, Korsgaard can only appeal in the end to what, as it
contingently happens, turns out to be important to us. In this respect, she
seems to acquiesce to one of the least plausible features of many forms of the
aforementioned critique of Kant: their rather uncritical passivity in the face of
existing ways of life. Given the critical force of the moral law, this acquies-
cence is importantly qualified, but it is still significant. Korsgaard does say,
as we might expect in a Kantian outlook, that our identities are both given to
us and constructed by us; but her elucidation of the latter ends up putting
much more emphasis on what we happen to find important than such an
outlook would lead one to expect-at least if we take seriously Kant's general
prescription, "to criticism everything must submit."21 In any case, we ordi-
narily suppose there is a good deal more to say about our rationale for choices
among morally permissible ways of life than Korsgaard at least explicitly
allows.
To develop a modification of her account, let us begin by considering how

we think about these matters from the standpoint of our particular practical
identities. Of course, given the differences among these identities, there is no
one way we think. One indication of the need for a more subtle and resource-
ful account of our reflections on these questions is the fact that Korsgaard
lumps together under the single heading of practical identities a set of catego-
ries that are individually broad and collectively diverse.22 For example, being
a friend, a member of a profession, a member of an ethnic group, and an
well-being of others, might be thought to enable more to be said about these distinctions,
but I doubt that this would be sufficient to answer this objection, and Korsgaard does not
suggest that it would.
20 For example, see Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, tr. by H. J. Paton (New
York: Harper & Row, 1964), pp. 399 and 428, and Critique of Practical Reason, tr. by
Lewis White Beck (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1956), p. 110. Except for the first
Critique, all references to Kant are according to the pagination of the Preussische
Akademie edition.
21 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, tr. by Norman Kemp Smith (New York: St
Martin's Press, 1965), p. Axii.
22 In view of recent concerns, her list is familiar with the exception of two omissions: there
is no mention of race or sexual orientation.
adherent of a religion each encompass considerable terrain and at the same
time are strikingly different from one another. Detailed examination of our
understanding of what Korsgaard calls practical identities is likely to reveal as
much variety as uniformity.
In some cases, Korsgaard may well be right: we may correctly think that
something is worthwhile simply because we believe it to be so-for exam-
ple, enjoying raspberry sorbet or being in love with a particular person
(however, especially with respect to the latter, it is easy to see how reflection
could put the value in question). But very often this is not the case. From the
standpoint of many practical identities, that something is important is under-
stood to be a function, not merely of its being important to us, but of some-
thing that is independent of and ought to guide this impulse. In these cases,
rather than simply acknowledging that such and such is valuable to us, we
often wonder if our belief about what is valuable is correct; and in order to
determine this, we may engage in lengthy, arduous, and impassioned thought
and discussion (or on some occasions quiet, meditative reflection and conver-
sation). Consider, for example, persons whose identities center on God, our
Buddha-nature, the biosphere, La France, various professions, etc. Inquiries
into the meaning, value, and implications of these identities suggest that
many practical identities presuppose some objective understanding of values,
though the form and extent of this may vary. In fact, it was this understand-
ing that was tacitly assumed in the last section when I claimed that we ordi-
narily think that some permissible identities are better than others.
The traditional and, for many, natural interpretation of the objectivity of
values is realism, the view that what is valuable depends not on any reaction
of ours but on the independent nature of things. Since this interpretation is
widely accepted, it is surprising that Korsgaard, who emphasizes the impor-
tance of how the world looks from the perspective of agents, shows so little
appreciation of this perspective in this respect. Prior to her defense of a
Kantian approach, she rejects realist theories of value as nothing more than
expressions of confidence.23 But she endeavors to make Kant plausible by
introducing practical identities that, as often understood, appear to presuppose
some realist theory of value. In view of her antirealist construal of these iden-
tities, some might argue that Korsgaard has not so much accounted for ordi-
nary moral practices as she has subtly undermined or at least significantly
transformed them, not by subjecting them to Kant's moral law, but by
precluding realist resources for thinking intelligently about them. In any case,
it is clear that she argues that insofar as identities have realist presuppositions
they are mistaken, and this stands in apparent tension with her general aim of
incorporating our ordinary identities into a Kantian account.
23 See pp. 40-41.
It is worth a brief digression to consider whether in this respect Kors-
gaard's interpretation of Kant is correct. Kant does appear to reject realism
with respect to the moral law,24 but does he reject realism with respect to all
values? Korsgaard presents her comprehensive antirealism as Kant's own, but
there may be reason to question her claim that "Kant urges us to take things
to be important because they are important to us."25 Kant certainly appears
to think there are goods nature requires us to regard as important. For exam-
ple, our talents are "capacities for greater perfection which form part of
nature's purpose for humanity in our person."26 The moral law has priority
over other forms of goodness: its unconditional authority requires grounding
in pure practical reason rather than in heteronymous sources, and no good
may be pursued by morally impermissible means. Moreover, acting out of
respect for the moral law, as the only unqualified good, is the highest good,
and so the good of happiness must be proportionate to so acting.27 But it
seems consistent with these claims to maintain that some goods have a justi-
fication outside both the moral law and what contingently happens to be
important to us. On this reading of Kant, we respect the autonomy of the
will so long as we make it our first priority to act in accordance with the
principle of the will, but doing this does not preclude recognizing goods
whose authority lies outside the will.28
This suggests that it might be possible to develop a Kantian understand-
ing of the strong normativity of (at least some) practical identities along
familiar realist lines. However, there are also reasons to resist this approach.
First, although Kant regularly speaks of nature's purposes in his moral
philosophy, the status of these remarks is perplexing in view of his
commitment to skepticism about teleology in nature.29 Second, though not
inconceivable, it would be prima facie surprising if realism accounted for the
objectivity of some values but not others. Finally, our practical identities
24 However, see Allen W. Wood, Kant's Ethical Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, 1999), pp. 157 and 374-75 (note 4).
25 See also her Creating the Kingdom of Ends (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1996), Introduction and chs. 4, 8, and 9.
26 Groundwork, p. 430. The context is the application of the second formulation of the cate-
gorical imperative, but it is clear that this principle is not derived from the categorical
imperative, but is employed in applying it.
27 Kant states that "the moral law is that which first defines the concept of the good"
(Critique of Practical Reason, p. 64). I take this to express the aforementioned priority of
the moral law in understanding the good.
28 On this interpretation, cf. Roger J. Sullivan, "The Categorical Imperative and the Natural
Law," Proceedings of the Sixth International Kant Congress, vol. II, part 2, ed. by
Gerhard Funke and Thomas M. Seebohm (Washington D.C.: Center for Advanced
Research in Phenomenology and University Press of America, 1989), pp. 219-28. For a
different critique of Korsgaard's interpretation of Kant on this point, see Hannah
Ginsborg, "Korsgaard on Choosing Nonmoral Ends," Ethics 109 (1998), pp. 5-21.
29 This raises complex issues of interpretation, especially in view of Kant's discussion of
teleology in the third Critique.
appear so closely tied to the particularities of history and culture, and in some
cases to those of personal background and experience, that it seems unlikely
their normativity could be fully and adequately explained in terms of realism.
In any case, irrespective of the correct interpretation of Kant himself, to
introduce a realism about values would be a serious departure from Kors-
gaard's position. For she clearly endorses a constructivist account of the
objectivity of values.
In her discussion of realism, Korsgaard distinguishes substantive norma-
tive realism from procedural normative realism. Both views affirm that there
are right and wrong answers to moral questions concerning the concepts of
the good as well as the right. But the first view says there are such answers
because "there are moral facts or truths," while for the second view this is
because "there is some correct or best procedure for answering" these ques-
tions (35). She cites the "constructive procedure" of John Rawls as an exam-
ple of procedural normative realism, and she explicitly endorses a procedural
rather than any substantive realism.30 Later, in her "Reply," she employs
more common terminology and distinguishes Thomas Nagel's realism from
her own constructivism (see 245-46). Regardless of terminology, Korsgaard
makes it clear that she believes there are correct and incorrect answers to ques-
tions about values, not because there are "mind-independent" facts or truths
about these values, but because there is a correct procedure for constructing
them. "Values are constructed by a procedure," she says, "the procedure of
making laws for ourselves" (112). Hence, there is no question that she is
committed generally to some constructivist account of the objectivity of val-
ues, and it is reasonable to suppose that she is likewise committed specifi-
cally to a constructivist understanding of the strong normativity of morally
permissible identities (henceforth, I will employ 'constructivism' rather than
the more cumbersome 'procedural realism' in reference to this commitment).
However, as shown in the last section, the details of her account are
unclear and problematic in this respect. In order to further evaluate her posi-
tion, what needs to be considered is how a constructivism about the strong
normativity of identities could be developed. To begin, it will help to return
to her claim, in the text cited above, that what is important to us is "deter-
mined by biological, psychological, and historical conditions" (242). That
various conditions of human life are relevant to importance is also stressed in
her collection of essays, Creating the Kingdom of Ends. There she argues that
30 In a recent article I read after this paper was completed, Rachel Cohon argues that
Korsgaard has reason to agree that, prior to an act of the will, "some of our inclinations
are already reasons," and on this basis she tries to move Korsgaard in the direction of
substantive realism. See "The Roots of Reasons," The Philosophical Review 109 (2000),
p. 74 (n. 8). As I noted, substantive realism is a possible philosophical response to the
issues I have raised. However, as Cohon recognizes, Korsgaard expressly affirms pro-
cedural rather than substantive realism; and this is the position I explore here.
value or goodness is conferred on things by our rational choices, but she also
makes it evident that various conditions are relevant to what is good for us
(and by implication to what could be strongly normative practical identities,
though she does not employ the concept). For example, she says that, so
long as we have a good will, "the things that are important to us can be
good: good because of our desires and interests and loves and because of the
physiological, psychological, economic, historical, symbolic, and other
conditions under which human beings live."31 But what exactly is the signifi-
cance of these conditions?
The answer is not clear, but sometimes it seems that they causally neces-
sitate or constrain our sense of what is important.32 Insofar as this were the
case, it would appear that Korsgaard is committed to supposing we are quite
passive with respect to our identities and have little opportunity for choosing
among morally permissible alternatives. However, this cannot be the whole
story. To put the matter in the Kantian terms favored by Korsgaard, from the
practical standpoint, we suppose that the relationship between these condi-
tions and our values is mediated by beliefs about these conditions, beliefs we
may rationally evaluate as more or less accurate. What these conditions are,
their origin and relative degree of stability, and the extent to which and ways
in which they are relevant to our values are all matters of interpretation
and-perhaps more significantly-misinterpretation. For example, suppose a
person with an Irish Catholic upbringing thinks it is important to preserve
that heritage (or alternatively to rebel against it). This thought depends in part
on various beliefs the person has concerning that heritage (such as what it
prescribes and what the consequences of following these prescriptions would
be), and coming to recognize that some of these beliefs were false, mislead-
ing, or irrelevant might provide a reason for modifying the thought. So there
cannot be a direct inference from the person's thinking it important to
preserve the heritage to it actually being important. In addition, there must be
an evaluation of the beliefs presupposed by the thought.
It is obvious that there are facts about the conditions of a person's life that
are relevant to what the person thinks is important. Sometimes these are
specific to the person, as in the case of upbringing and education, and some-
times they are more general, as in the case of biology, history, or culture.
But in all cases, thoughts about what is important are partly based on an
understanding of these facts that may be accurate or inaccurate. Insofar as it is
inaccurate, the thought is at least potentially undermined. Hence, a rational
agent would not take what he or she regards as important at face value: the
aim would be to adjust what is taken to be important in light of a correct
31 Kingdom of Ends, p. 273.

32 In addition to the passages cited in the last paragraph, see Kingdom of Ends, pp. 226, 243,
266, and 272.
understanding of the aforementioned conditions. Generalization of this kind of
consideration leads to a familiar form of constructivism that Korsgaard would
seem to have reason to endorse in response to the issues raised in the last
section. On this account, what a person thinks is important actually is
important, but only if what he or she thinks is not the result of some epis-
temic deficiency-a mistaken belief, understanding, interpretation, inference,
etc.-concerning the conditions of the person's life. The correct procedure for
determining whether something is truly important or valuable for a person is
to consider whether the person would endorse it under epistemically ideal
conditions that preclude such mistakes.
Of course, Korsgaard does not directly endorse or develop such an account.
But her constructivist orientation combined with her aim to elucidate the
implications of rational agency would appear to commit her to some such
position. For a rational agent would regard what it takes to be important as
being genuinely important only insofar as its views in this respect were not
the result of epistemic deficiencies. In order to consider how Korsgaard's
constructivism might be developed, let us adapt a well-known posi-
tion-Rawls's understanding of good plans of life in A Theory of Justice-to
the case of practical identities. According to Rawls, a person's good is deter-
mined by his or her rational plan of life. In brief, a plan of life is rational for
a person if and only if the plan is "consistent with the principles of rational
choice" and would be chosen by the person "with full deliberative rational-
ity."33 The principles of rational choice require us to choose effective means
and to choose plans that will achieve greater rather than fewer aims as well as
those that have a greater rather than a lesser probability of success. Full
deliberative rationality requires that the person possess knowledge and aware-
ness of relevant facts and make no mistakes in reasoning. In sum, for Rawls,
a plan of life is good for a person if and only if the person would choose it
when fully rational and adequately informed in relevant respects.
There are two features of Rawls's account worth noting. First, as just
indicated, it places epistemic constraints on what could count as a person's
good. Second, it makes a person's good depend on what the person would
choose under these constraints. According to Rawls, "while rational princi-
ples can focus our judgments and set up guidelines for reflection, we must
finally choose for ourselves."34 Apropos of these points, let us say that
Rawls's theory contains respectively an Epistemic Condition and a Discre-
tion Condition (taking these terms to represent the general concepts of epis-
temic constraints and choice under these constraints, where the particular
specification of these concepts may take different forms-as will be seen
33 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971), p.
408.
34 Rawls, Theory, p. 416.
below). There is reason to think a plausible development of Korsgaard's
account of practical identities would also contain some rendition of both
conditions. The first is required to meet the concerns about objectivity raised
above. The second is needed because of Korsgaard's emphasis on choice in the
creation of values: she says that "we adopt" practical identities and for this
reason "we may identify with them in a deep way" (239-40).35 In view of
this, let us provisionally suppose that a practical identity I is strongly norma-
tive for a person P if and only if the following criteria are met: (1) I is
morally permissible and (2) if P were fully rational and adequately informed in
relevant respects, then P would choose I (hereafter Identity Constructivism).
My point is not that Korsgaard is explicitly committed to the details of this
position, but that it provides a reasonable extension of her theory that can
serve as a reference point for exploring the prospects the theory has for over-
coming the difficulties raised above.
On the one hand, it might seem that this position provides just what
Korsgaard needs. Identity Constructivism is not a form of substantive real-
ism: it makes our choices matter in determining which identities are strongly
normative. But Identity Constructivism is a form of procedural realism that
provides a measure of objectivity: our choices matter only insofar as they
meet certain epistemic constraints [those specified in (2)]. Hence, we are no
longer at the mercy of what we merely happen to find important. By requiring
us to strive to meet the epistemic constraints, Identity Constructivism opens
up a space for critically evaluating whether or not what we think is important
really is, a space that is not adequately explained in Korsgaard's account as
she presented it. She is correct to insist that our identities are contingent
upon the conditions of biology, history, culture, etc., and that we are born
into communities and traditions that variously require and/or permit the prac-
tical identities that make up the necessities and possibilities of our social
world. But once we fully appreciate that these inherited communities and
traditions embody (some of) our ancestors' beliefs about the conditions of
human life, and that our own de facto identities are developed out of this
inheritance, we need to engage in the now familiar forms of critique that seek
to uncover the myths, hidden motivations, idiosyncratic circumstances, and
the like that often enter into such beliefs. These revelations may cast doubt
on the normativity of what hitherto we have thought important, for example
by showing that our identities have a different character than we supposed, or
that they actually serve ends that, once disclosed, we would regard as dubious
or at least unworthy of our attention. Only with the understanding of the
epistemically ideal agent (that is, the agent who fully meets the specified
epistemic constraints) would our choices provide criteria of what is actually
important for us. A practical identity that resulted from these choices could
35 Cf. Kingdom of Ends, pp. 265-66.
reasonably appear to be a source of obligations respect for which could give
meaning to our lives.
On the other hand, positions similar to Identity Constructivism-that is,
constructivist accounts of the good containing both an Epistemic Condition
and a Discretion Condition-have been subjected to a barrage of criticism in
recent years.36 For example, questions have been raised as to whether greater
information might sometimes adversely affect our choices, whether the order
in which information is presented would modify our choices, whether non-
cognitive motivations would influence our choices, whether the constructivist
test might not yield a determinate answer, whether some things of (apparent)
value would fail to be revealed by such choices, etc. Affirmative answers to
these questions have been put forward as undermining any constructivist
account of the good, and it might be thought that Korsgaard's own theory
could not be developed in a way that is immune to such criticisms.
These objections are certainly potentially relevant to Identity Constructiv-
ism and a defense of it would have to show that they are not decisive. In any
case, the criticism I wish to pursue here is different: it concerns the prospects
for developing a constructivist account specifically of practical identities as a
way of defending a Kantian conception of autonomy as the source of all obli-
gations. I will argue that introducing practical identities gives rise to, and
cannot reasonably resolve, yet another form of the question whether pure
practical reason in the form of universal law can make sense of the normative
particularity of our lives.
IV. A Problem for Identity Constructivism: the Epistemic

Commitments of Practical Identities
A common difficulty for constructivist theories of the good arises fro

fact that there is a tension between the Epistemic Condition and the
36 For example, see Elizabeth Anderson, Value in Ethics and Economics (Cambrid
Harvard University Press, 1993), pp. 129-40; Don Loeb, "Full-Information The
the Good," Social Theory and Practice 21 (1995), pp. 1-30; Connie S. Rosati, "P
Perspectives, and Full Information Accounts of the Good, Ethics 105 (1995), pp.
and "Naturalism, Normativity, and the Open Question Argument, Noas 29 (1995),
70; David Sobel, "Full Information Accounts of Well-Being," Ethics 104 (1994
810; and J. David Velleman, "Brandt's Definition of 'Good'," Philosophical Re
(1988), pp. 353-71. Each of these critiques mentions Rawls, but they tend to foc
related theories in Richard B. Brandt, A Theory of the Good and the Right (Oxford
endon Press, 1979), chs. 1 and 6, and Peter Railton, "Facts and Values," Philos
Topics 14 (1986), pp. 5-31 and "Moral Realism," Philosophical Review 95 (198
163-207. Similar theories are also found in Steven L. Darwall, Impartial Reason
NY: Cornell University Press, 1983), chs. 8 and 9, and James Griffin, Well Be
Meaning, Measurement, and Moral Importance (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986),
and 2. I employ Rawls as a point of departure above because he is broadly wit
Kantian tradition, his account is well-known, and Korsgaard describes him as a
dural realist (she refers to the account of justice in terms of the original posit
Rawls himself notes the parallel between this and his account of the good in terms
informed and rational choice; see Theory, p. 421).
tion Condition.37 The first demands that there be some distance between the
actual agent and the epistemically ideal agent, while the second insists that
this distance not be too great. On the one hand, the ideal agent must be suffi-
ciently rational and well-informed that it not possess the particular prejudices,
misunderstandings, and other cognitive deficiencies the actual agent happens
to have. This is necessary to provide a truly objective sense of value. On the
other hand, the ideal agent cannot be so purified as to bear no relationship to
who in particular the actual agent is. Otherwise the choices of the ideal agent
would not be ones the actual agent would have any reason to regard as being
in some significant sense its own.
One form of this difficulty that is especially pertinent to Identity
Constructivism is based on the fact that actual agents already have practical
identities and these identities often have implications for the proper specifica-
tion of the epistemic constraints indicated in the Epistemic Condition. That
is, from the perspectives of persons with different practical identities there
may be different and sometimes conflicting views about the correct under-
standing of the Epistemic Condition. This is not to say that there are no
features that would be common to any plausible account of the Epistemic
Condition. It is consistent with my argument that there are such features (for
example, having full relevant information, respect for evidence, willingness
to take seriously implications and consistency, etc.). Nonetheless, to have a
practical identity often means having a set of beliefs that imply a particular
understanding about which epistemic constraints are relevant to properly
evaluating practical identities; and those with different practical identities
often disagree about these beliefs. In this respect, practical identities often
have epistemic commitments.
The ways in which this is true vary considerably. From the perspective of
diverse identities, it might be believed that the ideal agent should pray, think
in the cool hour of the intellect, or reflect with the passion of the pure of
heart. Or the ideal agent might variously be thought to require such virtues as
practical wisdom, humility, piety, self-respect, compassion, or specific forms
of impartiality. For the purpose of my argument, it will be sufficient to
describe two examples of epistemic commitments of identities in more detail.
The first concerns language. Suppose it were said that the epistemically ideal
agent for me should speak Chinese as a first and only language. On this
view, what practical identities would be strongly normative for me would
depend on what 'T' would choose under a set of epistemic constraints that
includes my speaking Chinese and not English. Since English is my first
language and I do not speak Chinese, this is likely to be regarded as an
implausible construal of the Epistemic Condition. But the reason it is
37 Others have noted this. For example, see Loeb, "Full-Information Theories," p. 2 and
Rosati, "Persons," pp. 310-11.
implausible is not that language is epistemically irrelevant (if that were the
case, the restriction might seem odd but fairly harmless). Rather, the reason
is that language is epistemically relevant and Chinese is not my language. To
speak a language with full fluency is to find it not only natural, but appropri-
ate, to employ a linguistic set of concepts, similes, metaphors, analogies,
proverbs, exemplars, etc. in interpreting our experiences and desires. This set
is rooted in the history and culture of those who speak the language. It repre-
sents the "received wisdom" or "common sense" of those persons (and of
course it might include much that reflects prejudice or ignorance). To some
extent, the linguistic set of one language may overlap with those of other
languages (for example, sometimes similar proverbs are found in many
languages). But there are often significant differences, and this is certainly
true in the case of English and Chinese. Hence, it makes an epistemic differ-
ence what language my ideal agent would speak: the English-speaking
version would interpret what I find important from a very different perspective
than the Chinese-speaking version.
In addition, speaking a language is itself part of at least some practical
identities. For those who speak, and have no reason to do anything but speak,
a single language this fact may not be apparent. But for those whose circum-
stances are such that more than one language might be spoken-for example,
for immigrants or those under colonial rule-the choice of what language to
speak (or, more complexly, when, where, with whom, how, and to what
extent to speak one language or another) can itself be a choice about personal
identity. Thus we can understand the Algerian-born novelist Assia Djebar's
concern "that going from colloquial Arabic to French would a bring a loss of
all that was truly alive."38 For persons confronted with a choice about which
language or languages to speak, the choice frequently pertains to identity: for
example, whether to accommodate to or resist one's oppressors, to assimilate
in a new land or maintain strong ties with the homeland, to become part of
the family of one's spouse or remain aloof, to become more cosmopolitan or
remain provincial, etc. Hence, the specification of the language of an ideal
agent may already favor some practical identities-and ways of thinking asso-
ciated with those identities-at the expense of others. (It would be too strong
to say it simply begs the question; after all, actual agents often have reason
to speak another language than their own and come to recognize this.) The
specification of language may be no less significant for those who face no
such choice of language. It may seem obvious to many English-speaking
Americans that their ideal agent should speak English. But this is by no
means an identity-neutral specification. It may well express a tacit commit-
ment to thinking as Americans (of a certain kind) think.
38 Assia Djebar, Women of Algiers in Their Apartment, tr. by Marjolijn de Jager (Charlottes-
ville: University Press of Virginia, 1992), p. 2.
The second example concerns Buddhist forms of mental concentra-
tion-usually translated as "meditation"-such as mindfulness (sati). Thera-
vada Buddhism (the tradition to which these remarks refer) regard these
meditation techniques as essential for achieving an enlightenment that
involves knowledge both of what is real and of how to live a life free of
suffering (dukkha). Hence, meditation is purported to be cognitive in that it
is understood as an essential part of the process of coming to apprehend real-
ity correctly so as to live well (it is not the whole of the process; other
aspects include intellectual and moral dimensions, as described in the
"eightfold path").39 From a Buddhist perspective, any adequate specification of
the Epistemic Condition would have to make reference to meditation. The
idea that a correct understanding of a good life, or of strongly normative prac-
tical identities, could be realized without meditation is inconceivable. Some-
one who already identifies with Buddhism would thus believe that Identity
Constructivism would have to be interpreted or modified so as to require that
the ideal agent undertake the meditation techniques. For those who do not
identify with Buddhism, on the other hand, it is not ordinarily thought that
the ideal agent should employ these mental disciplines. In sum, there is a
disagreement between Buddhists and non-Buddhists over the proper specifica-
tion of the Epistemic Condition.40
These examples show ways in which practical identities have epistemic
commitments, and they are clearly relevant to what Korsgaard has in mind,
since she lists as examples of practical identities both ethnic groups (for
which language is typically a defining feature) and religions. Moreover,
choices about language and religion may well be choices among (in Kantian
terms) morally permissible alternatives, but equally they may be critical in
determining whether or not a person has a worthwhile and fulfilling life. Let
39 For example, see "Satipatthana Sutta" in The Middle Length Discourses of the Buddha, tr.
by Bhikkhu Nanamoli and Bhikkhu Bodhi (Boston: Wisdom Publications, 1995), pp. 145-
55. For discussion of the role of meditation in Buddhism, see Peter Harvey, An Introduc-
tion to Buddhism: Teachings, History and Practices (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1990), pp. 68-70 and 253-55, and especially K. N. Jayatilleke, Early Buddhist
Theory of Knowledge (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1963), ch. 9. In his critique of
Brandt, Velleman raises an objection based on "meditation" understood as an instance of
"noncognitive forms of therapy" (pp. 358-59). However, this is not an apt description of
Buddhist meditation, at least in the Theravada tradition. The mental disciplines are tech-
niques for acquiring a form of objective knowledge and hence are directly relevant to
the Epistemic Condition.
40 There is in fact a deeper objection in Buddhism to the general constructivist project of
defining our good in terms of the fulfillment of desires or aims that survive some epis-
temic test. For example, Rawls says that "someone is happy when his [rational] plans are
going well, his more important aspirations being fulfilled, and he feels sure that his good
fortune will endure" (Theory, p. 409). Buddhism flatly and fundamentally contends that
this understanding of happiness is based on an illusion and that someone who so under-
stands happiness is guaranteed not to find it. In brief, a central tenet of Buddhism is that
happiness is achieved not by fulfillment of desires but by detachment from them.
us now consider the significance of the epistemic commitments of practical
identities for the development of her position. To do this, I will discuss four
ways that may initially appear plausible (called minimal, maximal, relative,
and critical) in which Identity Constructivism could be modified in order to
take into account the fact that those with different identities often have differ-
ent and conflicting views about how the Epistemic Condition should be
understood.
Minimal. We might define the Epistemic Condition only in terms of

epistemic constraints that would be acceptable to all different morally permis-
sible identities. This least-common-denominator approach may be what some
constructivists have in mind in including only proper reasoning and knowl-
edge of facts in the Epistemic Condition. Moreover, this approach need not
be empty (there might be constraints acceptable to all, at least at some level
of generality) and it may well be coherent. But why should we suppose that
this minimal specification is the correct specification? The reason cannot be
the mere fact that all agree, since the constraints are supposed to express an
idea of objectivity and not simply points of consensus. Moreover, from the
standpoint of many identities, such a specification would not be correct (for
example, the Buddhist would object that it excludes meditation, and some
Christians might complain that it contains no notion of humility). These
disagreements are not resolved by including only that about which there is
agreement. In addition, it is not clear what this account would mean in terms
of language. The ideal agent presumably would think in terms of a language
that excludes elements of the aforementioned linguistic set that are not shared
by all languages. In comparison with actual languages, this minimal
language would be severely impoverished. It is hard to see that choices result-
ing from thinking in terms of such a language should be the standard for
determining the strong normativity of identities. Once again, relying on fewer
resources does not guarantee better thinking even if the resources are shared.
Maximal. An alternative at the opposite extreme would be to define the
Epistemic Condition so as to include all the constraints proposed by different
permissible identities. It is doubtful that this is a coherent approach. Since
actual agents can speak more than one language, it is conceivable that an
ideal epistemic agent could speak all languages. However, it is not obvious
that an ideal agent could find the linguistic resources of each language equally
appropriate to employ: the metaphors, proverbs and the like may pull in too
many diverse and conflicting directions. In any case, the main difficulty here
is that practical identities are committed to conflicting ideas about which
epistemic constraints are appropriate and which are not. For example, many
non-Buddhists do not simply fail to engage in meditation; they regard
Buddhist meditation as an inappropriate means of learning how to live a good
life (ust as some persons consider Christian humility as similarly inappro-
priate). An ideal agent that employs inconsistent epistemic standards in the
sense of thinking that meditation is both essential and inappropriate is not a
coherent idea. A weaker but still inclusive approach would be to define the
ideal agent as accepting all epistemic constraints of permissible identities
without holding any views to the effect that some of these constraints are
inappropriate. However, the application of such constraints may produce
conflicting guidance, and in the absence of some ordering principle about
which constraints are more important than others in these cases such an ideal
agent may give no determinate answer concerning which identities are
strongly normative. Merely adding constraints together provides us with no
ordering principle; and different practical identities will disagree about what
this principle should be.41
Neither the minimal nor maximal approaches are tenable. The next two
possibilities are more promising, and I believe the choice between them is
the central choice a development of Korsgaard's position must face-but
neither comports well with Kantian autonomy.
Relative. The Epistemic Condition could be defined for each agent in
terms of an idealized version of epistemic constraints the agent is already
committed to in virtue of his or her actual practical identities. For example,
the Buddhist would include meditation, but the non-Buddhist would not; my
ideal agent would speak English while someone else's might speak Chinese.
This account has an advantage lacking in both the minimal and maximal
accounts: each agent would have a strong prima facie reason to regard as
authoritative the dictates of his or her ideal agent. After all, the ideal agent
would choose on the basis of standards the actual agent already accepts and
would fulfill those standards better than the actual agent does. If the Epis-
temic Condition were understood in this way, the tension with the Discretion
Condition would lessen. There would be a significant sense in which an
actual agent would have reason to regard the choices of the ideal agent as his
or her own. On the other hand, because of the idealization involved, this
approach would still provide a substantial measure of objectivity. It would
not simply beg the question in favor of existing identities; it is conceivable
that the standards of an identity ideally applied would lead to the rejection of
that identity in favor of another (for example, because the standards are found
to undermine themselves, conflict with one another, have unacceptable
results, be seriously incomplete, etc.).
This account is one direction Korsgaard could go in developing Identity
Constructivism. It would combine the emphasis she places on the contin-
gency of our identities with an appreciation of the importance of rational
reflection about them that one would expect in a critical philosophy.
41 For analogous difficulties, see Anderson, Value, p. 138 and Velleman, "Brandt's," pp.
368-70.
However, many would regard this approach as insufficiently critical because it
makes the epistemic constraints of the ideal agent for each actual agent depend
upon the identities the actual agent happens to have. For this reason, this
account would involve a significant departure from her claim that Kantian
autonomy explains the normativity of all obligations, including those rooted
in practical identities. For the determination of which weakly normative iden-
tities are strongly normative depends, not simply on what could be willed as
a law, but on contingent facts about the epistemic standards implied by the
identities of actual agents. From the perspective of Kant himself, this looks
to be an example of what he calls heteronomy rather than autonomy.42 This
objection leads to the next and final alternative I will discuss.
Critical. The conflicts generated by the epistemic commitments of practi-
cal identities might be regarded less as a fact to be accommodated to than as a
problem to be overcome. On this approach, the conflicts among the epis-
temic constraints suggested by different practical identities would be resolved,
and a specification of the Epistemic Condition would be given that would be
correct for any agent irrespective of different actual identities. For example, it
would be determined whether or not Buddhist meditation is essential to a
proper understanding of the strong normativity of identities, and on this basis
meditation would or would not be included in the Epistemic Condition for all
persons. Likewise, the ideal agent would speak an ideal language that incor-
porates the positive epistemic resources of existing languages without includ-
ing their defects. A critical account appears to be closest to the spirit of
Kant's philosophy and, if successful, it would overcome the difficulties of the
previous three accounts. However, this approach has difficulties of its own.
One danger is that the Discretion Condition would be compromised.
Suppose the critical account included Buddhist meditation among the
constraints of the ideal agent. Non-Buddhists may well find it implausible to
suppose that the choices of such an ideal agent are in an important respect
their own. To consider them as their own, they would first need to be given
reason to think meditation is an essential epistemic constraint; and this
means they would need to be given reason to modify their practical identities.
Hence, identities would be evaluated in two stages: first, it would be deter-
mined whether they are consistent with the idealized epistemic constraints of
the critical account, and second it would be determined whether they would be
chosen by the agent under those constraints. This approach would be more
critical of existing practical identities than Korsgaard's comments about the
active embrace of the contingency of our identities suggest. The challenge for
the critical account is to develop a set of ideali7ed constraints that each actual
agent would have compelling reason to accept irrespective of conflicting
42 See Groundwork, pp. 441-44 and Critique of Practical Reason, p. 64.
constraints that might be implied by the actual identities he or she has at the
outset.
The difficulty is that it is hard to see how this challenge could be met
within the confines of a Kantian doctrine of autonomy. According to this
doctrine, the sole criterion of evaluation is the principle of the will, namely,
what could be willed as a universal law. But it is implausible to suppose that
this principle could adjudicate the conflicting epistemic constraints suggested
by the various practical identities most people take to make their lives mean-
ingful and worthwhile. For example, it would seem that an epistemic obliga-
tion to meditate could be willed as a universal law and that an epistemi
obligation not to meditate could also be willed as a universal law. In neither
case would willing such a universal law result in a contradiction in the will.43
Again, it is difficult to see how the universal law test could determine which
metaphors or a proverbs should be included in an ideal language. Hence
Kantian autonomy is not an adequate basis for developing the critical
approach. Just as the test of what could be willed as a law is not a sufficient
ground for determining which weakly normative identities are strongl
normative, so it is not a sufficient ground for specifying the Epistemi
Condition that defines the correct criteria for making this determination.44
Though other modifications of Identity Constructivism might be envi-
sioned to take into account the epistemic commitments of practical identities
the discussion of these four approaches is enough to warrant the conclusion
that no plausible development of Korsgaard's position-that is, a constructiv
ist account of the strong normativity of identities-is likely that preserves
her claims concerning Kantian autonomy. The introduction of practical identi
ties may have appeared to be a promising enrichment of Kant's mora
philosophy, but it gives rise to new problems, analogous to some old ones,
concerning the capacity of autonomy to bear the normative weight Korsgaar
and (on her interpretation) Kant assign it.45
43 It might be objected that an epistemic obligation to meditate could not be willed as

universal law because those who meditate typically come to have conflicting beliefs
However, with respect to Buddhist meditation, Buddhism denies this, and surely it is
possible that it is correct. Hence, there is no guarantee that the universal law test would
rule it out.
44 Nor would other formal principles of the will, such as those of O'Neill cited in note 10
above, be sufficient. Perhaps additional resources in Kant, specifically the claims abou
the scope and limits of knowledge in the first Critique, might enable more to be said about
this. This is presumably the direction a thorough Kantian might pursue, and I cannot rule
it out here. But analogous difficulties may surface, namely, whether pure theoretical
reason has the critical force Kant alleges. In any case, these issues go beyond Kors-
gaard's claims on behalf of autonomy in Sources.
45 I have benefited from helpful comments on this paper by Jonathan Adler, Jeffre
Blustein, Robert N. Johnson, Michael Stocker, and an anonymous referee for this journal.

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Practical Identities and Autonomy: Korsgaard's Reformation of Kant's Moral Philosophy

Practical Identities and Autonomy:

After briefly explaining Korsgaard's understanding of practical identities and their

546 CHRISTOPHER W. GOWANS

After briefly explaining Korsgaard's understanding of practical identities

I. The Nature and Role of Practical Identities

Korsgaard's account of practical identities is part of a defense of

2 Korsgaard calls this "substantive moral realism"; she distinguishes it from

A PRACTICAL IDENTITIES AND AUTONOMY 547

548 CHRISTOPHER W. GOWANS

II. A Problem with the Normativity of Practical Identities

I take Korsgaard to be asking why we should suppose that obligations that

A PRACTICAL IDENTITIES AND AUTONOMY 549

550 CHRISTOPHER W. GOWANS

A PRACTICAL IDENTITIES AND AUTONOMY 551

552 CHRISTOPHER W. GOWANS

A PRACTICAL IDENTITIES AND AUTONOMY 553

portrayed, not in terms of the strongest desire prevailing, but in terms of an

554 CHRISTOPHER W. GOWANS

III. Identity Constructivism

A PRACTICAL IDENTITIES AND AUTONOMY 555

To develop a modification of her account, let us begin by considering how

556 CHRISTOPHER W. GOWANS

23 See pp. 40-41.

A PRACTICAL IDENTITIES AND AUTONOMY 557

558 CHRISTOPHER W. GOWANS

A PRACTICAL IDENTITIES AND AUTONOMY 559

31 Kingdom of Ends, p. 273.

560 CHRISTOPHER W. GOWANS

A PRACTICAL IDENTITIES AND AUTONOMY 561

35 Cf. Kingdom of Ends, pp. 265-66.

562 CHRISTOPHER W. GOWANS

IV. A Problem for Identity Constructivism: the Epistemic

A common difficulty for constructivist theories of the good arises fro

A PRACTICAL IDENTITIES AND AUTONOMY 563

564 CHRISTOPHER W. GOWANS

A PRACTICAL IDENTITIES AND AUTONOMY 565

566 CHRISTOPHER W. GOWANS

Minimal. We might define the Epistemic Condition only in terms of

A PRACTICAL IDENTITIES AND AUTONOMY 567

568 CHRISTOPHER W. GOWANS

42 See Groundwork, pp. 441-44 and Critique of Practical Reason, p. 64.

A PRACTICAL IDENTITIES AND AUTONOMY 569

43 It might be objected that an epistemic obligation to meditate could not be willed as

570 CHRISTOPHER W. GOWANS

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Gowans - Practical Identities and Autonomy Korsgaard's Reformation of Kant's Moral Philosophy

Gowans - Practical Identities and Autonomy Korsgaard's Reformation of Kant's Moral Philosophy