Enrile v. Sandiganbayan G.R. No.

213847

Date of Promulgation: August 18, 2015

Facts:
On June 5, 2014 Senator Juan Ponce Enrile was charged by the Office of the Ombudsman with plunder in the
Sandiganbayan on the basis of his purported involvement in the diversion and misuse of appropriations under the
Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF). The case is a petition for certiorari to annul the decision of the
Sandiganbayan denying his Motion to fix bail and Motion for Reconsideration on the following grounds: (a) The
prosecution failed to show conclusively that Enrile, if ever convicted, is punishable by reclusion perpetua; (b) The
prosecution failed to show that evidence of Enrile’s guilt is strong; (c) Enrile is not a flight risk.

Issue:
Whether or not Enrile can bail -YES

Ruling:
1. The purpose of the bail is to guarantee the appearance of the accused at the trial.
2. It is the Philippine’s responsibility in the international community under the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights “….of protecting and promoting the right of every person to liberty and due process…under the
obligation to make available to every person under detention such remedies which safeguard their fundamental
right to liberty. These remedies include the right to be admitted to bail”.
3. Enrile is not a flight risk because of his social and political standing and his having immediately surrendered to
the authorities upon being charged in court.
4. The currently fragile state of Enrile’s health is a compelling justification for his admission to bail. (Chronic
hypertension, diffuse atherosclerotic cardiovascular disease, Atrial and Ventricular Arrhythmia, etc.)

GRACE POE VS COMELEC

(Case Digest: GR 221697, GR 221698-700 March 8, 2016)

Facts:
In her COC for presidency for the May 2016 elections, Grace Poe declared that she is a natural-born citizen and that her
residence in the Philippines up to the day before 9 May 2016 would be 10 years and 11 months counted from 24 May
2005.
May 24, 2005 was the day she came to the Philippines after deciding to stay in the PH for good. Before that however,
and even afterwards, she has been going to and fro between US and Philippines. She was born in 1968, found as
newborn infant in Iloilo, and was legally adopted. She immigrated to the US in 1991 and was naturalized as American
citizen in 2001. On July 18, 2006, the BI granted her petition declaring that she had reacquired her Filipino citizenship
under RA 9225. She registered as a voter and obtained a new Philippine passport. In 2010, before assuming her post as
an appointed chairperson of the MTRCB, she renounced her American citizenship to satisfy the RA 9225 requirement .
From then on, she stopped using her American passport.
Petitions were filed before the COMELEC to deny or cancel her candidacy on the ground particularly, among others, that
she cannot be considered a natural-born Filipino citizen since she cannot prove that her biological parents or either of
them were Filipinos. The COMELEC en banc cancelled her candidacy on the ground that she is in want of citizenship and
residence requirements, and that she committed material misrepresentations in her COC.
On certiorari, the SC reversed the ruling and held (9-6 votes) that Poe is qualified as a candidate for Presidency. Three
justices, however, abstained to vote on the natural-born citizenship issue

ISSUE
W/N Grace Poe-Llamanzares is a natural-born Filipino citizen (Read Dissent)

Held:
Yes, Grace Poe might be and is considerably a natural-born Filipino. For that, she satisfies one of the constitutional
requirements that only natural-born Filipinos may run for presidency.
First, there is a high probability that Grace Poe’s parents are Filipinos. Her physical features are typical of Filipinos. The
fact that she was abandoned as an infant in a municipality where the population of the Philippines is overwhelmingly
Filipinos such that there would be more than 99% chance that a child born in such province is a Filipino is also a
circumstantial evidence of her parents’ nationality. That probability and the evidence on which it is based are admissible
under Rule 128, Section 4 of the Revised Rules on Evidence. To assume otherwise is to accept the absurd, if not the
virtually impossible, as the norm.

Second, by votes of 7-5, the SC pronounced that foundlings are as a class, natural-born citizens. This is based on the
finding that the deliberations of the 1934 Constitutional Convention show that the framers intended foundlings to be
covered by the enumeration. While the 1935 Constitution’s enumeration is silent as to foundlings, there is no restrictive
language which would definitely exclude foundlings either. Because of silence and ambiguity in the enumeration with
respect to foundlings, the SC felt the need to examine the intent of the framers.
Third, that foundlings are automatically conferred with natural-born citizenship is supported by treaties and the general
principles of international law. Although the Philippines is not a signatory to some of these treaties, it adheres to the
customary rule to presume foundlings as having born of the country in which the foundling is found.

DOH v Phil Pharmawealth GR No. 182358

Department of Health, Secretary Alfredo Romualdez, USec. Margarita Galon, petitioner;
Philippine Pharmawealth, Inc, respondent;

February 20, 2013

Second Division
Del Castillo, J.

FACTS:
1. On December 22, 1998, Administrative Order (AO) No. 27 series of 1995 was issued by then Department of
Health Secretary Alfredo G. Romualdez. AO 27 sets the guidelines and procedure for accreditation of government
suppliers of pharmaceutical products for sale or distribution to the public, such accreditation to be valid for three years
but subject to annual review.
2. On January 25, 2000, Secretary Romualdez issued AO 10 series of 2006 which amended AO 27. Under Sec 7 of
AO 10, accreditation period for government suppliers of pharmaceutical products was reduced to 2 years. Also,
accreditation of Pharmaceutical companies may be recalled, suspended or revoked after due deliberation and proper
notice by the DOH Accreditation Committee, through its Chairman.
3. Sec 7 of AO 10 was later amended AO 66 series of 2008 which stated that the 2 year accreditation may be
recalled, suspended or revoked only after due deliberation, hearing and notice by the DOH Accreditation Committee,
through its Chairman.
4. On August 28, 2000, the DOH issued Memorandum No. 171-C9 which provided for a list and category of
sanctions to be imposed on accredited government suppliers. In line with Memorandum No. 171-C, the DOH, through
former Undersecretary Ma. Margarita M. Galon, issued Memorandum No. 209 series of 2000 inviting representatives of
24 accredited drug companies, including herein respondent Phil Pharmawealth, Inc. (PPI) to a meeting on October 27,
2000.
5. During the meeting, Undersecretary Galon handed them copies of a document entitled “Report on Violative
Products” issued by the Bureau of Food and Drugs (BFAD), which detailed violations or adverse findings relative to these
accredited drug companies’ products. PPI’s products were included as BFAD found that PPI’s products sold to the public
were unfit for human consumption.
6. The companies were directed to submit their respective explanations on the findings within 10 days. PPI did not
submit its reply on time. Instead, it submitted a letter stating that it is referring the matter to its lawyers for preparation
of a reply but with no indicated date of compliance, which DOH Usec Galon found untenable, thus she informed PPI thru
letter that its accreditation had been suspended for two years in accordance with AO 10 and Memorandum No. 171-C.
PPI thru letter, demanded that Usec Galon cease and desist from enforcing the suspension under pain of legal redress.
7. PPI then filed a complaint to declare certain DOH issuances (Memorandum No. 171-C, AO 10, Series 2000, Usec
Galon’s suspension order; and AO 14, Series 2001) null and void for being in violation of Section 26, Republic Act 3720,
with prayer for injunction and damages against Usec Galon and later DOH Secretary Dayrit. It claimed that its
accreditation was suspended without due notice and hearing. It prayed that it be awarded moral damages, attorneys
fees and costs of suit.
8. The respondent DOH officials filed a motion to dismiss, alleging that it gave PPI the opportunity to explain but it
did not do so in a timely manner. The suspension was necessary to stop the distribution and sale of substandard
products. In a Manifestation and Motion, the DOH officials further moved to dismiss the case as it was a suit against the
State; the complaint was improperly verified; and the corporate officer lacked the authority to file the suit. The Regional
Trial Court dismissed the case, holding that the suit is against the State, thus the principle of immunity form suit is
applicable.
9. On appeal to the CA, however, the latter reversed and set aside the RTC decision. According to the CA, it was
premature for the RTC to have dismissed the case, as the cause of actions were sufficiently alleged in the complaint.
Further, by filing a complaint, the DOH officials hypothetically admitted the allegations in the complaint-that they were
being sued in their official and private capacities. Thus the DOH officials, herein petitioners, elevated the case to the
Supreme Court, arguing that PPI’s prayer for damages should be considered a suit against the State for it would require
the needed appropriation to satisfy PPI’s claim for damages should it win. In issuing the assailed DOH issuances, they
acted within the scope of their authority, hence should not be made to account individually. Petition was granted.

ISSUE:
Whether or not DOH, in this circumstance, is under the mantle of state immunity.

HELD:
As a general rule, a state may not be sued. However, if it consents, either expressly or impliedly, then it may be the
subject of a suit. There is express consent when a law, either special or general, so provides. On the other hand, there is
implied consent when the state “enters into a contract or it itself commences litigation.” However, it must be clarified
that when a state enters into a contract, it does not automatically mean that it has waived its nonsuability. The State
“will be deemed to have impliedly waived its non-suability [only] if it has entered into a contract in its proprietary or
private capacity. [However,] when the contract involves its sovereign or governmental capacity, x x x no such waiver
may be implied.” “Statutory provisions waiving state immunity are construed in strictissimi juris. For, waiver of immunity
is in derogation of sovereignty.”

ANGARA VS ELECTORAL COMMISSION

G.R. No. L-45081 July 15 1936

FACTS:
Jose Angara and Pedro Ynsua, Miguel Castillo and Dionisio Mayor were candidates voted for the position of member of
the National Assembly for the 1st district of Tayabas province.
On Oct 17 1935, the provincial board of canvassers proclaimed Angara as member-elect of the Nat'l Assembly for
garnering the most number of votes. He then took his oath of office on Nov 15th. On Dec 3rd, Nat'l Assembly passed
Res. No 8 which declared with finality the victory of Angara. On Dec 8, Ynsua filed before the Electoral Commission a
motion of protest against the election of Angara, that he be declared elected member of the Nat'l Assembly. Electoral
Commission passed a resolution in Dec 9th as the last day for the filing of the protests against the election, returns and
qualifications of the members of the National Assembly. On Dec 20, Angara filed before the Elec. Commission a motion
to dismiss the protest that the protest in question was filed out of the prescribed period. The Elec. Commission denied
Angara's petition.
Angara prayed for the issuance of writ of prohibition to restrain and prohibit the Electoral Commission taking further
cognizance of Ynsua's protest. He contended that the Constitution confers exclusive jurisdiction upon the said Electoral
Commissions as regards the merits of contested elections to the Nat'l Assembly and the Supreme Court therefore has no
jurisdiction to hear the case.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the SC has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the controversy;
Whether or not The Electoral Commission has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction.
RULING:

In this case, the nature of the present controversy shows the necessity of a final constitutional arbiter to determine the
conflict of authority between two agencies created by the Constitution. The court has jurisdiction over the Electoral
Commission and the subject matter of the present controversy for the purpose of determining the character, scope and
extent of the constitutional grant to the Electoral Commission as "the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly." (Sec 4 Art. VI 1935 Constitution). It is held,
therefore, that the Electoral Commission was acting within the legitimate exercise of its constitutional prerogative in
assuming to take cognizance of the election protest filed by Ynsua.

BIRAOGO V. PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION 2010,

G. R. No. 192935. December 7, 2010

FACT:

E.O No. 1 establishing the Philippine Truth Commission (PTC) of 2010 was signed by President Aquino. The said PTC is a
mere branch formed under the Office of the President tasked to investigate reports of graft and corruption committed
by third-level public officers and employees, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories during the previous
administration and submit their findings and recommendations to the President, Congress and the Ombudsman.
However, PTC is not a quasi-judicial body, it cannot adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve, settle or render awards in disputes
between parties. Its job is to investigate, collect and asses evidences gathered and make recommendations. It has
subpoena powers but it has no power to cite people in contempt or even arrest. It cannot determine for such facts if
probable cause exist as to warrant the filing of an information in our courts of law.

Petitioners contends the Constitutionality of the E.O. on the grounds that.

It violates separation of powers as it arrogates the power of Congress to create a public office and appropriate funds for
its operation;
The provisions of Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31 of the Administrative Code of 1987 cannot legitimize E.O. No. 1
because the delegated authority of the President to structurally reorganize the Office of the President to achieve
economy, simplicity, and efficiency does not include the power to create an entirely new office was inexistent like the
Truth Commission;
The E.O illegally amended the Constitution when it made the Truth Commission and vesting it the power duplicating and
even exceeding those of the Office of the Ombudsman and the DOJ.
It violates the equal protection clause

ISSUE:

WHETHER OR NOT the said E.O is unconstitutional.

RULING:

Yes, E.O No. 1 should be struck down as it is violative of the equal protection clause. The Chief Executive’s power to
create the Ad hoc Investigating Committee cannot be doubted. Having been constitutionally granted full control of the
Executive Department, to which respondents belong, the President has the obligation to ensure that all executive
officials and employees faithfully comply with the law. With AO 298 as mandate, the legality of the investigation is
sustained. Such validity is not affected by the fact that the investigating team and the PCAGC had the same composition,
or that the former used the offices and facilities of the latter in conducting the inquiry.
US VS RUIZ
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, CAPT. JAMES E. GALLOWAY, WILLIAM I. COLLINS and ROBERT GOHIER, petitioners,
vs.
HON. V. M. RUIZ, Presiding Judge of Branch XV, Court of First Instance of Rizal and ELIGIO DE GUZMAN & CO., INC.,
respondents.

G.R. No. L-35645 May 22, 1985

Facts:

This is a petition to review, set aside certain orders and restrain perpetually the proceedings done by Hon. Ruiz for lack
of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court.

The United States of America had a naval base in Subic, Zambales. The base was one of those provided in the Military
Bases Agreement between the Philippines and the United States. Sometime in May, 1972, the United States invited the
submission of bids for a couple of repair projects. Eligio de Guzman land Co., Inc. responded to the invitation and
submitted bids. Subsequent thereto, the company received from the US two telegrams requesting it to confirm its price
proposals and for the name of its bonding company. The company construed this as an acceptance of its offer so they
complied with the requests. The company received a letter which was signed by William I. Collins of Department of the
Navy of the United States, also one of the petitioners herein informing that the company did not qualify to receive an
award for the projects because of its previous unsatisfactory performance rating in repairs, and that the projects were
awarded to third parties. For this reason, a suit for specific performance was filed by him against the US.

Issues:

Whether or not the US naval base in bidding for said contracts exercise governmental functions to be able to invoke
state immunity.

Rulings:

Yes. The Supreme Court held that the contract relates to the exercise of its sovereign functions. In this case the projects
are an integral part of the naval base which is devoted to the defense of both the United States and the Philippines,
indisputably a function of the government of the highest order, they are not utilized for nor dedicated to commercial or
business purposes.

The restrictive application of state immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise out of commercial transactions
of the foreign sovereign. Its commercial activities of economic affairs. A state may be descended to the level of an
individual and can thus be deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be sued. Only when it enters into business
contracts.

MIRIAM SANTIAGO VS SANDIGANBAYAN

G.R. No. 128055 April 18, 2001

FACTS:

A group of employees of the Commission of Immigration and Deportation (CID) filed a complaint for violation of Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act against then CID Commissioner Miriam Defensor-Santiago. It was alleged that petitioner,
with evident bad faith and manifest partiality in the exercise of her official functions, approved the application for
legalization of the stay of several disqualified aliens. The Sandiganbayan then issued an order for her suspension
effective for 90 days.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan has authority to decree a 90-day preventive suspension against a Senator of the
Republic of the Philippines

RULING:
The doctrine of separation of powers by itself may not be deemed to have effectively excluded members of Congress
from Republic Act No. 3019 nor from its sanctions. The maxim simply recognizes each of the three co-equal and
independent, albeit coordinate, branches of the government - the Legislative, the Executive and the Judiciary - has
exclusive prerogatives and cognizance within its own sphere of influence and effectively prevents one branch from
unduly intruding into the internal affairs of either branch. It would appear, indeed, to be a ministerial duty of the court
to issue an order of suspension upon determination of the validity of the information filed before it. Once the
information is found to be sufficient in form and substance, the court is bound to issue an order of suspension as a
matter of course, and there seems to be "no ifs and buts about it.
In issuing the preventive suspension of petitioner, the Sandiganbayan merely adhered to the clear and unequivocal
mandate of the law, as well as the jurisprudence in which the Court has, more than once, upheld Sandiganbayan's
authority to decree the suspension of public officials and employees indicted before it. Section 13 of Republic Act No.
3019 does not state that the public officer concerned must be suspended only in the office where he is alleged to have
committed the acts with which he has been charged. Thus, it has been held that the use of the word “office” would
indicate that it applies to any office which the officer charged may be holding, and not only the particular office under
which he stands accused. Attention might be called to the fact that Criminal Case No. 16698 has been decided by the
First Division of the Sandiganbayan on 06 December 1999, acquitting herein petitioner. The Court, nevertheless, deems
it appropriate to render this decision for future guidance on the significant issue raised by petitioner.