TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT,

1882
PROJECT

DOCTRINE OF LIS PENDENS

Submitted to : Submitted by :
Dr. Qazi Usman AnanyUpadhyay
B.A.LLB(Hons)
nd
2 Year Self Finance

Faculty of Law
Jamia Milia Islamia
New Delhi
 Acknowledgement
It gives me immense pleasure and gratitude to thank my Property Law
teacher Dr.Qazi Usman who has helped me in each possible way that
one could . My project without him help would had been a much
difficult task.
I would like to thank staff of the faculty of law library of Jamia
Millia Islamia for helping me in searching valuable information .

Yours Sincerely
Anany Upadhyay
INTRODUCTION
The Transfer of Property Act [hereinafter ‘TOPA’] is a legislation that filled the
lacuna in the set up of Indian Laws. This lacuna was a combined result of the fact
that earlier, with a predominant panchayati system, custom was the main tool of
effectuating transfers. However, a little before Independence, this trend had
changed to English Law which governed the field of transfer of property. While
it was a welcome change as it brought a standard rule across the country, it was a
flawed concept as the English idea of justice could not be applied strictly to the
socio-economic potpourri of Indian conditions. What followed was a slightly
adapted form of the same rules by modifying it using judicially-created notions
of equity justice and good conscience. There were certain instances when this
discretion would go contrary to the precedent set by the application of English
Law and thus, create further confusion.
It would be acceptable to state thus, that there would have been a fundamental
requirement of a domestic legislation which could create a compendium of the
applicable English Law on the matter in India along with these judicially created
notions of equity justice. With the advent of TOPA, one such principle of lis
pendens was introduced which acted as a regulator on the transfers effectuated.
The concept of lis pendens is a common law concept which pertains to the parties
to a litigation, the subject matter of which is property. It aims to prevent the
alienation of the said property when the litigation concerning the same is pending
before the court.
This project will delineate the meaning, purpose and implementation of the
concept of lis pendens and its application in the TOPA and other legislations like
the Code of Civil Procedure. The researcher will analyze the scope of Section 52
of the TOPA and its application in Property Law. Finally, the project will look
into the pertinent judgments on the said doctrine and attempt to formulate a model
of how the application of lis pendens has changed over the years and the ultimate
end it has served.

DOCTRINE OF LIS PENDENS

(Sec. 52)
The question of lis pendens is dealt with substantially in Section 52 of the
Transfer of Property Act. Section 52 states:
“During the pendency in any Court having authority [...] of any suit or proceeding
which is not collusive and in which any right to immovable property is directly
and specifically in question, the property cannot be transferred or otherwise dealt
with by any party to the suit or proceeding so as to affect the rights of any other
party thereto under any decree or order which may be made therein except under
the authority of the court and on such terms as it may impose.”

MEANING
From a plain reading of Section 52, it is clear that the underlying aim of the same
is to protect the sanctity of court proceedings, the subject matter of which is
immovable property. To elaborate, there will be instances when two parties will
go to court with a dispute at the centre of which lies immovable property. Once,
they approach the court, the property in question is assigned a special status. This
is so as the determination of the court ultimately decides the rights of the parties
over the property. With this material determination at stake, it would be extremely
prejudicial to the rights of any party, if the other transferred the property in
question, before the court arrives at an outcome in the pending litigation. Such an
act would defeat the entire purpose of the litigation process and would render the
determination of the court null and void. The ramification of such an act even
amounts to subverting the jurisdiction of the court as the party’s action of
transferring the property before his right to do so, has been confirmed by the court
amounts to contempt of the court proceedings.

AMENDMENT
Section 52 has been amended by Section 14 of the Transfer of Property
(Amendment) Act, 1929. The word ‘pendency’ has been substituted for the words
‘active prosecution’ which gave rise to many conflicts of decisions. The words
‘any suit or proceedings, which is not collusive’ have been substituted for the
words ‘a contentious suit or proceeding’ which also led to conflicting decisions
on the question as to “when a suit or proceeding became contentious”. To remove
this latter conflict, an explanation is also added, fixing the time during which, a
suit is deemed to be pending for the purposes of the section.

LIS PENDENS
The doctrine of lis pendens gets its origins from the latin maxim ‘Pendente lite
nihil innovetur’ which implies during the pendency of the suit, nothing new must
be introduced. The concept of lis pendens has been enshrined in Section 52. This
doctrine provides for the protection of the rights of the parties to litigation. It
states that during the pendency of a suit, the parties cannot alienate the property
which is the crux of the dispute so as to prevent them from causing harm to each
other.
Lis Pendens is the power a court enjoys over the property which is the subject
matter of the dispute. The exposition of this doctrine indicates that the
requirement for this concept arises from the very nature of the control exercised
by the court over the property which is the subject matter of the dispute. This is
the power of preventing the alienation of the same property till the time the
dispute is settled finally by the court. This doctrine literally means pending suit
and amounts to the jurisdiction, power and control that the court exercises in order
to prevent alienation of the property, the rights over which are hitherto undecided.
The purpose behind the implementation of this concept is that the rights of the
parties to the litigation must be protected from infringement. This is done by
assigning a special status to the property which is the subject matter of the dispute.
When the parties have come before the court to let it decide about their rights
over a certain property, it is necessary that no party is allowed the benefit of
alienating the said property. Allowing this power to a party would subvert the
jurisdiction of the court. This power would be an affront to the decision of the
court hearing the dispute. It would lead to the frustration of the decree of the
court.
This is so as the duty of the court is to adjudicate upon the rights of the parties
regarding the property in question. If one of the parties can alienate the same
property, it would nullify the point of the entire litigation and put the other party
at a disadvantage as he is left remediless. To prevent this unfair eventuality, the
concept of lis pendens acts as a check on the power of alienation of property to
prevent infringement of the rights of the parties. By doing so, the subject matter
of the dispute does not become a nullity and infructuous.
Various decisions have held that the concept not only prevents transfer of rights
over the property but is wide enough to include all dealings with the property to
affect the rights of the party thereto. Thus, this doctrine has a wide ambit in its
application.
The effect of this doctrine is that if the concerned property is alienated to a third
party, that party will be affected by the decree passed by the court. This is an
anomaly considering the fact that the third party has not even been impleaded in
the matter. The property over which the rights of the parties to the litigation were
to be decided now vests with the alienee. Owing to this, his right over the
property is subject to the order or decree of the court. By doing so, the object of
the original suit is not defeated.
The effect of lis pendens arises from the fact that rights cannot be given to an
assignee of the alienator over the original holder of the property. The law protects
the right of the parties to not have their rights over the property in question
vitiated owing to the act of one party. It also protects the rights of the original
holder against the demands of the alienee. The alienee is made bound to the
decision of the court as well and cannot override the interests of the holder of the
property.

SCOPE OF LIS PENDENS

The scope of lis pendens even though wide, does not actually bar transfers
effectuated by the parties during the pendency of the suit. It merely keeps all
transfers on hold and its validity is dependent on the outcome of the pending suit.
This means that the alienee who is the beneficiary of the transfer will be affected
by the order of the court and will be bound by it.
In other words, this section aims to maintain status quo ante until the final
determination is made by the court. Only after this pendency comes to an end
after the passing of the decree or order will the rights of the parties to the suit and
if the case demands, of the alienee be decided conclusively.

Whether notice is basis of lis pendens?

No’. It is expediency.---The doctrine of lis pendens is not founded upon any of
the peculiar tenets of the courts of Equity as to implied or constructive notice. It
is a doctrine common to the court both of laws and of equity and rests upon
expediency and public policy rather than on notice.
Where a litigation is pending between a plaintiff and a defendant as to the right
of a particular estate, the necessities of mankind require that the decision of the
court in a suit shall be binding, not only on the litigating parties, but also on those
who derive title under them by alienations made pending the suit whether such
alienees had or had not notice of the pending proceedings. If this were not so,
there could be no certainty that litigation would ever come to an end. A mortgage
or sale made before the final decree to a person who had no choice of the pending
proceedings would always render a new suit necessary, and so indeterminable
litigation might be the consequence.
In Deepak Bhai Manibhai Patel v. State of Gujarat,1 Section 52 read with Gujarat
amendment (Bombay Act 14 of 1939), the question was whether order of
Mamlatdar denying entry of the registered document on grounds of lis pendens
is legal and valid or not? In this case, petitioner got the notice of lis pendens
registered under Section 18 of Registrating Act. This notice was made necessary
by Gujarat amendment of Section 52 before the lis pendens to apply. The court

1
A.I.R. 2007 Guj. 1.
held that order of Mamlatdar was not proper. He must enter the fact of registry
that suits in respect of that property is pening in revenue record.
The doctrine tends to prevent one party to a suit making an assignment
inconsistent with the rights which may be established in the suit and which might
require a further party to be impleaded in order to make effectual the court’s
decree. The basis of the doctrine of lis pendens is that the parties to a suit cannot
be allowed to shorten the arms of the court in dealing with the suit by transfers to
third party. The broad purpose of this section is to maintain the status quo
unaffected by the act of any party to the litigation pending its determination. The
applicability of the section does not depend on matters of proof strength or
weakness of the case on one side or the other in bona fide proceedings.
The leading case on this doctrine in india is Faiyaz Hussain Khan v. Prag
Narain,2 in which the privy council quoted with approval the observations of
Turner, L.J. and Lord Cranworth in Bellamy’s case, and many other cases in this
country involving the question of lis pendens which have been decided on the
same principle. The rule is not based on the doctrine of notice but on expediency,
i.e., the necessity for final adjudication.
In Sanjay Verma v. Manik Roy,3 (2007) denying the right to the buyer, during
pendency of a suit, any right of impleadment except with leave of the court the
Supreme Court held that lis pendens is based on equity; justice and good
conscience. Relying on Privy Council decisions, in Motilal v. Karrabuldin,4 and
Pranath Roy v. Rookea Begum,5 the Supreme Court in this case held, that lis
pendens rests on equitable and just foundation that it will be impossible to bring
an action or suit to a successful termination if alienations are permitted to prevail.
A transferee pendente lite is bound by the decree just as much as that as if he was
a party to the suit. This principle being one of public policy, no question of good
faith or bona fides arises.
In Faiyaz Hussain’s case, a mortgagee sued to enforce his mortgage but before
service of summons, the mortgagor effected a puisne mortgage. The prior
mortgagee continued his suit and brought the property to sale without making the
puisne mortgagee a party. The privy council held that in the sale, the puisne
mortgagee’s right to redeem the prior mortgage was extinguished. Their
Lordships were unable to agree to the view which prevailed in India that a suit
contentious in its origin and nature was contentious within the meaning of Section
52 of the Act until a summons is served upon the opposite-party. The court found
no authority for such a view in Transfer of Property Act and observed that it will
lead to very inconvenient results in India where evasion of service is quite
2
29 All. 339.
3
A.I.R. 2007 S.C. 1332.
4
25 Cal. 179 (1898).
5
7 M.I.A. 323.
frequent. The word ‘contentions’ referred to the origin and nature of the suit and
not to the conduct of the plaintiff with reference to its prosecution. The effect of
the application of the doctrine is that it does not annul the conveyance, but only
renders it subservient to the rights of the parties to the litigation.
The basis of the doctrine is expediency and public policy. As it has been rightly
observed in Govinda Pillai v. Aiyyapan Krishnan,6 that: “the foundation for the
doctrine of lis pendens does not rest upon notices, actual or constructive; it rest
solely upon necessity---the necessity that neither party to the litigation should
alienate the property in dispute so as to affect his opponents.”
In National Textile Corporation (U.P.) Ltd., Kanpur v. Swadeshi Cotton Mills
Co. Ltd. And others,7 it was held that Section 52 enacts the doctrine of lis pendens.
It imposes a prohibition on transfer or otherwise dealing with any other property
during the pendency of the suit, provided the conditions laid down in the section
are satisfied. The principle of lis pendens rests on the foundation that it would
plainly be impossible that any action or suit could be brought to a successful
termination, if alienations lis pendens, were permitted to prevail. The plaintiff
would be liable in every case to be defeated by the defendants alienating before
the judgment or decree and would be driven to commence his proceedings de
novo, subject ‘again to be defeated by some course of proceeding. Section 52
creates only a right to be enforced, to avoid a transfer made, pendent lite, because
such transfers are not void , but voidable and that too, at the option of the affected
party’ at the proceedings, pending when the transfer is affected. Ex-hypothesis,
the right accrues only to such parties and in such circumstances as are expressly
envisaged under Section 52. One who claims the right must establish the same
before he can enforce it.

Sword and Shield both

The right contemplated under Section 52 no doubt can be used both as a sword
and shield, depending on such facts as to (i) what right or interest is transferred,
(ii) who the affected party is, and (iii) how and, in what manner , the transfer is
likely to ‘affect’ any party to the pending ‘proceeding’. It can be used as a shield
in a subsequent or the same proceeding between the same parties. Any person
who would like to use it as sword, must however, first establish his right to do so
when, in any subsequent proceeding objection is taken to his claim to do so.
Indeed, if the transfer was not avoided by any of the parties proceeding likely to
be affected by such transfer, the transferee is not prevented from claiming that
the right to avoid the transfer was lost and that nothing survived to be enforced.

6
A.I.R. 1957 Ker. 10.
7
2000(1) A.W.C. 2.11 (NOC).
In order that a transfer may be void as being hit by the provisions of Section 52,
it has to be established that it has affected the rights of any other party to the suit.
If a party challenges, a transfer on the basis of the doctrine of lis pendens, it has
to be establish that the transfer was made with a view to affecting and defeating
the rights of the plaintiff under a decree or order which may be passed in the case
and that it has been defeated.
By this doctrine, it is intended to strike at attempts by the parties to a suit to curtail
the jurisdiction of the court by private dealings which may remove the subject-
matter of litigation from the power of the court to decide a pending dispute and
frustrate its decree.

First---Pendency
The first of the condition is that a suit or proceeding must be pending. The
meaning of the expression ‘pendency of a suit or proceeding’ is now given in the
explanation added to the section by the Amending Act, 20 of 1929. Briefly
speaking the pendency of a suit starts with the presentation of a plaint in a
competent court. If the plaint is presented in a wrong court, and a transfer of an
immovable property to which the plaint relates is made during the pendency of
the suit in such court, the doctrine of lis pendens would not apply. If the plaint is
returned for being presented to another court with competent jurisdiction, the
pendency of the suit does not begin until the plaint is presented to the proper
court. Similarly, if a plaint presented with in-sufficient court fee is returned by
the court, and the plaintiff represents it, after paying the proper fee, and then the
plaint is registered as admitted on the later date, it is a later date, which must be
taken as the institution of the suit. A transfer of property made between the date
of original presentation and the later date is not affected by lis pendens as no suit
was pending at that time. In a pauper suit, the pendency commences from the time
of the presentation of the application for leave to sue in forma pauperis when it
is admitted, but not if it is rejected. It is not correct to say that lis in such a case
commences only after the application is admitted and the plaint is registered as a
suit.

“Bona fide purchaser for value without notice; whether applies to lis pendens
matter---‘No’
In padmja v. Errathil Sanjeev,8 suit for the specific performance of an agreement
to sell was pending. The suit property was sold to third party. This third party
filed an application claiming that she is bonafide purchaser for value without

8
A.I.R. 2007 (NOC) 70 Ker.
notice as such decree is not operative against her. She claimed that plaintiff is not
entitled to get sale executed. He is not entitled to dispossess her.
The question was whether section 19(b) to Specific Relief Act would apply oe
Section 52 of T.P. Act would apply. The court held that Section 19(b) would not
apply. The application was rejected and plea of bona fide purchaser for value
without notice was held not permissible.
The court held that Section 19(b) applies prior to the suit being filed. Section 52
applies after suit is filed. Parties are governed by Section 52 when suit has been
filed prior to transfer. Section 52 of T.P. Act overrides Section 19(b) of Specific
Relief Act. Both the sections operate in different fields. A title hit by Section 52
cannot be protected by Section 52 cannot be protected by Section 19(b).
The question whether subsequent transferee is having the possession of the
property or whether he has paid proper consideration in to his transferee or
whether he was aware of the litigation is not at all material or relevant
consideration in Section 52.

SUIT OR PROCEEDING
The doctrine of lis pendens applies whether it is a suit or is simply a judicial
proceeding. For example, during pendency of application for appointment of
guardian, execution proceeding, maintenance pendent lite, etc., Section 52 would
apply. However a proceeding before a settlement officer cannot attract the
doctrine. But proceeding before Registrar of Co-operative societies does attract
the application of Section 52. It is a proceeding before a court.
As soon as the petition to set aside the ex parte order is allowed, the proceeding
gets a new lease of life and will be deemed to have been pending even during the
period between the ex parte order and the date of order setting aside the ex parte
order.

LIS PENDENS ALIENEE

In (2009) (3) ALJ (NOC) 495 (Ori.), the execution was challenged by lis pendens
purchaser in possession of the suit property. The question was whether lis
pendens alienee acquires any title? The court said ‘No’ he did not, particularly on
facts of the case wherein rights, title and interest of the decree holder in suit
property was affirmed upto second appeal. The petitioner lis pendens alienee was
not entitled to keep possession of the suit property. This was more so when
execution is pending. However, in Gujarat case,9 such alienee was held to be
proper party for being impleaded in pending suit.

Right of impleadment of buyer during lis pendens

In Sanjay Verma v. Manik Roy,10 and Pannalal Renuka v. Kavali11 the question
arose whether a person buying suit property in lis pendens without leave of court
can claim to be impleaded in pending suit. The court said ‘no’, he may have got
good title but it is subject to decree in suit. If his seller wins, he retains property;
if his seller loses, he also loses. He cannot claim to be impleaded. Same view was
held in S. Varadrajan v. Rajam.12

Second---Competent court
The second condition is that the suit or proceeding must be pending in a court of
competent jurisdiction, i.e., having a competency to try the suit. The rule under
the Code of Civil Procedure is that a suit in regard to any immovable property
should be filed in the court within whose jurisdiction the property is situated. But
once the court has jurisdiction, it does not matter that under Section 15 of the
C.P.C. every suit is directed to be instituted in the court of the lowest grade
competent to try it. Section 16, C.P.C. provides for territorial competency and
lays down that suits concerning immovable property shall be instituted where
subject matter is situated. If immovable property is situated within jurisdiction of
different courts, suit can be filed at any place where part of the property is situated
(Section 17). Rules regarding pecuniary competency have been provided by Civil
Court Manual.

Revenue suit and lis pendens

In Paras Mal v. (Miss) Sobhag Devi,13 the defendant deliberately executed a sale
deed of the property in dispute in revenue suit. The court held that Section 52
applied. Section 52 does not envisage any notice of pending proceeding to the
subsequent purchasers. It is the duty of the seller to inform the buyer about

9
A.I.R. 2010 (NOC) Guj. 387
10
A.I.R. 2007 S.C. 1332
11
A.I.R. 2007 A.P. 46
12
A.I.R. 2007 (NOC) 554 (Mad.).
13
A.I.R. 2007 Raj. 73
pendency of suit. Section 52 intends to protect the parties to the litigation against
alienations by their opponents during the pendency of the suit.
Third---Not collusive
The third requirement is that the suit or proceeding must not be collusive. This is
added by the Amendment Act of 1929, in place of the word ‘contentious’. A
collusive suit is not a real suit at all, not a battle, but a sham fight. Collusion in
judicial proceeding is defined in Wharton’s Law Lexicon, 14 th Edition at page
212: “collusion in judicial proceeding is a secret arrangement between two
persons that one should institute a suit against the other in order to obtain the
decision of judicial tribunal for some sinister purpose.”
In Shyam Narain v. D.D.C.,14 the court observed “the broad purpose of Section
52 is to maintain the status quo unaffected by the act of any party to the litigation
pending its determination. The applicability of section cannot depend on matter
of proof or strength or weakness of the case on the one side or the other in
bonafide proceeding.

Fourth---directly in issue
the fourth essential is that a right to an immovable property must be directly and
substantially in issue in the suit or proceedings. This will happen in a suit for
specific performance of a contract to transfer immovable property, a suit on
mortgage, award proceeding on suit for easement or a suit with a result for
partition that property which is allotted to his vendor on partition, or a suit for
partition for mortgage debt.
A mere right to sue, not connected with the ownership of property is not property
and, therefore, where a mere right to sue is in issue, the rule of this section does
not apply. Where no such right is in issue, lis pendens does not apply. Such suits
are suits for debt or damages when the claim is limited to a money demand, or a
suit for recovery for recovery for specific movables or a suit for account, suit for
money-decree, rent, or an application for a personal decree under order XXXIV,
rule 6 of the C.P.C., when the net sale proceeds are insufficient to satisfy the
mortgage, decree, or a suit for maintenance unless a charge has been made on a
specific immovable property mentioned in the plaint by the woman claiming
maintenance.

Fifth---Transfer by any party to the litigation

14
1994 (1) L.C.D. 678
the fifth element for the application of the doctrine is that the property must be
transferred or otherwise dealt with by any of the parties to the suit or proceeding.
The term ‘transferred’ in this section, refer to leases, exchanges, sales and
mortgages. The expression ‘otherwise dealt with’ includes such action like raising
of construction wrongfully. Therefore, a transfer by a person whose title is
paramount to that of the parties to the suit or whose title is not in any way
connected with them is not affected by the doctrine. Similarly, the doctrine does
not apply where the transfer was made pending the suit by a person who was not
a party to the suit at the time of the transfer and who was subsequently made a
party as a representative of the original defendant.
In S.G. Films Exchange v. Brij Nathsinghji,15 the contention was that lease
executed in purported satisfaction of antecedent claim was not hit by Section 52.
The Supreme Court did not agree with this contention and held that it purported
to create entirely new rights pendent lite. Therefore, it was hit by lis pendens.

Sixth---Transfer must affect the other party

The last condition is that transfer must be such as affects the rights of the other
party to the litigation. The words ‘any other party’ mean any other party between
whom the party alienating there is, an issue for decision, which might be
prejudiced by the alienation. The doctrine is intended to protect only the parties
to the litigation against alienations by their opponents pending in issue among the
defendants inter se and one of them alienates the property so as to affect the rights
of other.
The impact of Section 52 is that a transferee is bound by the decree of lis pendens
whether he be contesting a suit or compromising it or would have been an ex
parte sufferer. It is not necessary for the plaintiff to implead the lis pendens
transferee.

Suit by wife or by widow for maintenance

Whether Section 52 applies; ‘no’, in first and ‘yes’, in second situation.
In Karuppanna Gounder v. Rasammal,16 the question was whether lis pendens
applies during pendency of suit by wife claiming maintenance from husband and

15
A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 1810.
16
A.I.R. 2007 Mad. 101
suit property was charged with liability therefore? Whether a family member
buying that property during lis pendens is affected by Section 52?
The court held ‘no’. it is a personal suit and property being purchased by family
member is not hit by Section 52.
The position of widow is different. If she filed suit claiming that charge over suit
property be created for her maintenance, lis pendens applies.
In P. Prabhakar Rao v. P. Krishna,17 the question arose whether a party whose
suit for specific performance of agreement to sell has been dismissed, is it still
open to him to plead Section 53-A when sought to be dispossessed? ‘Yes’, said
Andhra Pradesh High court. This way is open to tenant also provided he pleads
having taken or retained possession in his own right (not as tenant) and proves it
by evidence like municipal tax, electricity, water bill, ration card, identity card
issued by Election Commission, etc.

CONCLUSION
The concept of lis pendens is enshrined within Section 52 of the TOPA. It is a
public policy concept which aims to safeguard the rights of the parties to the suit
by ensuring that the rights over the property in question is not alienated during
the pendency of the suit. This ensures that while the matter is pending in court,
the property is assigned a special status. Thus, with this protection, the suit is
17
A.I.R. 2007 A.P. 163
prevented from being infructuous by an alienation of the property. Not applying
lis pendens would amount to making the decision of the court a nullity.
Section 52 has been discussed in detail in this project. I have delineated how the
concept of lis pendens applies provided the suit is initiated in a court of competent
jurisdiction. Here, the court must pass an order or decree concluding the matter
at hand where the subject matter of the dispute is the property in question. The
court must be competent as it must decide upon the rights of the parties to the
suit.
Finally, this project has gone into numerous case laws to discuss the scope of the
application of the doctrine of lis pendens. Courts, over the decades have decided
upon the application of this doctrine differently, depending upon the type of case
in discussion. It has a sufficiently wide scope and applies even to suits involving
court sales or involuntary sales. Thus, it covers within its ambit, not only
voluntary transfers but involuntary transfers as well. The Delhi High Court has
gone ahead to state that even in cases where the TOPA does not apply, its
underlying principle of lis pendens will still apply.
The concept of lis pendens as enshrined in Section 52 is thus, a welcome concept
and one which will go a long way to protect the rights of the parties over the
property which is the subject matter of the dispute between them. It achieves this
objective along with ensuring that that the parties to the suit as well the third party
to whom the suit has been alienated respects the decree or order of the court.
Thus, the transfer of property during the pendency of the suit is not barred.
However, the transfer will be subject to the finding of the court. This ensures that
justice is not only done but appears to be done.

Bibliography
Act Referred:

Transfer of Property Act, 1882

Registration Act, 1908

Books Referred:

 Universal Publications, The Transfer Of Property Act, Bare Act, 1882.

 Dr. G.P. Tripathi, The Transfer Of Property Act, 1882, (19th Ed 2016)

Websites Referred:
 www.manupartra.com
 www.legalservicesindia.com
 www.scconline.com
 Judis.nic.in
 www.advocatekhoj.com