Phil 8: Introduction to Philosophy of Science

Outline 23: Explanation Continued

I. Causation- Empiricist Concerns

 It seems we could deal with the counterexamples to the D-N model by invoking
causation. The length of the shadow fails to explain the height of the flagpole because
the height of the flagpole is a cause of the length of the shadow.
 But many empiricist philosophers are suspicious of causation on epistemic grounds:
we can only ever observe correlation.
 Furthermore, metaphysical theories of causation (i.e. theories of what causation is)
are difficult to formulate. We’ll look at a simple theory of causation: a toy example
of a probabilistic theory of causation.

II. Causation- A toy counterfactual theory

 Counterfactual: A counterfactual is a conditional of the form “Had P been the case,
then Q would have been the case.”
 Perhaps we can develop a theory of causation in terms of counterfactuals. Here’s a
simple first pass: C causes E if and only if had C not occurred then E wouldn’t have
occurred.
 But that’s too simple. Suppose Billy and Susie plan to break a window by throwing a
rock at it. Billy throws the rock at the window causing it to break. But had Billy not
thrown the rock, then Susie would have. So it’s not the case that had Billy not
thrown the rock, then the window wouldn’t have broken. Nevertheless, surely Billy
causes the window to break.
 Let’s try to fix our theory: C causes E if and only if had C not occurred and
everything else been the same, then E would not have occurred.
 But that won’t work either.
o We can’t hold everything else fixed.
o Second, consider a case where Billy throw his rock and then Susie throws
shortly afterwards. Had Billy not thrown, and Susie’s throw been the same,
then the window still would have broken.

III. Causation- A toy probabilistic theory

 Perhaps we can develop a theory of causation in terms of probabilistic relationships.
Here’s a simple first pass: C causes E if and only if C is positively statistically
relevant to E (i.e. P(C|E)>P(C))
 But that won’t work since effects are positively statistically relevant to their causes.
 Let’s try to fix that worry: C causes E if and only if C is positively statistically
relevant to E and there is no D that makes C statistically irrelevant to E -- that is, no
D such that Pr(E|D) = Pr(E|D.C).
 But are there cases where C causes E but C is not positively statistically relevant to
E?
IV. Unificationist Theories of Explanation

 Unificationist theory: explanation in science is a matter of connecting up a diverse set

of facts by subsuming theM under a set of basic patterns and laws.
 Scientific theories aim to develop explanatory schemata that can be used again and again
in a wide variety of cases.
 Phillip Kitcher has the most well developed unificationist theory of explanation.
Kitcher attempts to improve on the D-N model without invoking the notion of
causation. On Kitcher’s view, a good explanatory schema can be invoked to explain
a wide variety of phenomena.
o Kitcher hopes to deal with the flagpole/shadow example by invoking
unification. Compare two different patterns of explanation: One pattern
explains the dimensions of a man-made object in terms of its origin and
development. Another pattern explains the dimensions of a man-made
object in terms of the shadow it casts while illuminated. The former
explanation is better than is the latter because the former explains more than
does the latter.
o Does this strategy work for the eclipse case?

V. Causation and Unification

 Many philosophers supposed that unificationist theories of explanation and causal
theories of explanation are competitors.
 But perhaps there are two kinds of perfectly good explanations- some are causal and
some unify.
 In fact, perhaps there are many kinds of perfectly good explanations.