Phil 8: Introduction to Philosophy of Science

Outline 20: Realism/Anti-Realism

I. Common-Sense Realism

A. Common-sense Realism: Most of the observable physical entities of

common sense and science exist mind-independently.
a. Note! This definition differs from your book’s.

B. Common-sense realism has two distinct dimensions: (1) It says that things
like tables, chairs, dogs, exist and (2) It says that those things exist
independently of us.

C. To be a common-sense anti-realist is to deny (1) or (2).

II. Arguments against common-sense realism

A. Underdetermination worries lead to common-sense anti-realism.

B. Someone who is an anti-realist about common-sense theories is automatically a

scientific anti-realist. But most people are not anti-realists about common-sense
theories. The interesting case is someone is a realist about common sense, but
an anti-realist about scientific theories.

C. So, to argue against scientific realism we need more than underdetermination.

III. Scientific Realism

a. Realism
i. Science aims to give us, in its theories, a literally true description of
the world; and the acceptance of a scientific theory involves the belief
that it is true.
b. Constructive Empiricism
i. Science aims to give us theories which are empirically adequate; and
acceptance of a theory involves as belief only that it is empirically
adequate.
1. Empirical adequacy: Everything that the theory says about
the observable objects and events in the world is true.
2. Observable: x is observable if there are circumstances such
that, if X is present to us under those circumstances, then we
observe it.
IV. Arguments!

A. The Success of Science

i. Realist claim: Scientific theories tend to be successful in that
their observational predictions tend to come out true. The
best explanation of this success is that the unobservable
entities posited really do exist.

ii. Constructive empiricist response: There are other

explanations for the success of science.

B. Inference to the Best Explanation

a. Realist claim: Anti-realists and realists must agree that inference
to the truth of the best explanation is a good argument form.
b. Constructive empiricist response: Compare inference to the truth
of the best explanation with inference to the empirical adequacy of
the best explanation.

C. Observable/Unobservable Distinction
a. Realist claim: There is a continuum in what is supposed to be
detectable. There is no way to draw a non-arbitrary sharp line, so
there is no distinction between observable and unobservable
objects.

b. Realist claim: Even if there is a distinction, it’s too

anthropocentric to tell us anything about what exists.
c. Constructive Empiricist response:
a. Granted, being “observable” is a vague predicate. But
there are lots of vague predicates where we nevertheless
think there is a distinction.

b. What being “observable” means is observable to us.

c. This is a domain in which anthropocentricism is

appropriate.

D. Pessimistic Meta-Induction
i. Constructive empiricist claim: The history of science is a
history of failed theories:

ii. Realist response

i. The history of science is a mixed bag: some failed
theories, some successful theories.
ii. But even if most unobservables posited do not exist,
that doesn’t necessarily support the inference that
currently posited unobservables don’t exist.