Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Code of Criminal
Code of Criminal
(CHANDIGARH)
PRINCIPLES OF FRAMING OF
CHARGES
SAMAL1979
[Type the document title]
Section- d
INDEX
ACKNOWLEDGMENT.......................................................................................................II
TABLE OF CASES.............................................................................................................III
INTRODUCTION.................................................................................................................1
MEANING OF CHARGE......................................................................................................2
JOINDER OF CHARGES......................................................................................................4
FRAMING OF CHARGE.......................................................................................................10
BIBLIOGRAPHY.................................................................................................................IV
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
I would like to thank our Honourable teacher Dr. Amrit kaur, for
without her valuable guidance, constant encouragement and detailed
approach would not have made it possible for me to make a proper
research for the topic- Principles of Framing of Charges. Her précised
examples, detailed descriptions and enthusiastic approach made my
efforts to flourish in a right direction.
TABLE OF CASES
I. INTRODUCTION
In the State v. Ajit Kumar Saha2 the material on record did not show a
prima facie case but the charges were framed by the Magistrate. Since
there was no application of mind by the Magistrate the order framing
charges was set aside by the High Court. It is a basic principle of law
that before summoning a person to face a charge and more particularly
when a charge sheet is actually framed, the court concerned must be
equipped with at least prima facie material to show that the person who
is sought to be charged is guilty of an offence alleged against him.3
5
Birichh Bhuian v. State of Bihar AIR 1963 SC 1120
6
Manna Lal v. State 1967 Cr LJ 1272; Shyam Sunder Ker v. State 1960 Cr LJ 310; Krishnan v. The State AIR
1958 LJ 516
7
Chittranjandas v. State of W.B. AIR 1963 SC 1696
8
Suraj Pal v. State of U.P. AIR 1955 SC 419
CHARGE
The charge may not specify particular items or exact dates. The charge
framed in the above manner shall be deemed to be a charge of one
offence within the meaning of Section 219 provided that the time
included between the first and last of such dates shall not exceed one
year. Where it is impossible to specify the particular date on which the
offence was committed, it will be sufficient to state two dates between
which the offence was committed.9 It is permissible to state in a charge
under Section 212(1) that the particular offence was committed on or
about certain date.10
The object of Section 213 is twofold: first to ensure that the accused has
sufficient notice of the matter with which he is charged as otherwise he
will be seriously prejudiced in his defence,12 and secondly to enable the
court to keep in view the real points in issue and to confine the
evidence to such points.
9
Banamali Tripathy v. Emperor AIR 1943 Pat 212
10
Chittaranjan Das v. State of W.B. AIR 1963 SC 1696
11
Wazir Singh v. Emperor AIR 1942 Oudh 89
12
Krishnan v. The State AIR 1958 Ker 94
13
Jaswantrai Manilal Akhaney v. State of Bombay AIR 1956 SC 575
The Code gives ample power to the courts to alter or amend a charge
provided that the accused has not to face for a new offence or is not
prejudiced either by keeping him in the dark about that charge or in not
giving a full opportunity of meeting it and putting forward any defence
open to him, on the charge finally preferred against him.17 Any addition
or alteration of a charge will not be illegal only when it does not
prejudice the accused.18
14
Bhimbadhar Pradhan v. State of Orissa AIR 1956 SC 469
15
Babulal v. Emperor AIR 1938 PC 130
16
Sukha v. State of Rajasthan AIR 1956 SC 513
17
Kantilal v. State of Maharashtra AIR 1970 SC 359
18
Mathura Thakur (1901) 6 CWN 72
19
Ramalinga Odayar v. Emperor AIR 1929 Mad 200
20
Moosa Abdul Rahiman v. State of Kerala 1982 Cr. LJ 1384 (Ker)
21
Kantilal v. State of Maharashtra AIR 1970 SC 359
The object of the rule embodied in Section 218 is to ensure a fair trial
and to see that the accused is not bewildered by having been asked to
defend several unconnected charges or distinct offences lumped
together in one charge or in separate charges.22 There is no exception to
the rule that there should be separate charge for each offence. The first
part of this section relates to framing of charges. Section 218 is
mandatory and for every distinct offence, there should be a separate
charge excepting in those cases which are specified in the code. Where
two dacoities are committed in two different houses on the same night a
single rolled up charge embracing both dacoities should not be
framed.23
(a)Exception 1 to the basic rule: Section 219 makes a provision for one
trial of three offences of the same kind committed by one accused
within a period of 12 months whether committed in respect of the
same person or not. For the application of this section, it is necessary
that:
a) The offences must be of the same kind
b) That they must be committed within the space of 12 months
from the first to last
c) That the number of them should not exceed three.25
22
Aftab Ahmad Khan v. State of Hyderabad AIR 1954 SC 436
23
Chandrama Prasaa Chaman (1951) 1 Cal 539
24
Ravinder Pal Singh v. State of Punjab 2004 Cri LJ 1322 (P&H)
25
M.R. Menon v. Kerala State 1973 Cr. LJ 394
26
Sri Ram Varma v. State AIR 1956 All 466
27
G.N.Kulkarni v. State 1973 Cri LJ 551
28
Emperor v. Dhaneshram AIR 1927 Nag 223
(d) Exception 4 to the basic rule: Same act falling under different
definitions of offences such offences may be tried at one trial. If
several acts of which one or more than one would by itself or
themselves constitute an offence, constitute when combined a
different offence, the person accused of them may be charged with
and tried at one trial for the offence constituted by such acts when
combined and for any offence constituted by anyone or more of
such acts—Section 220(3). This section may be conveniently read
with Section 71 of the IPC which inter alia provides that ‘where
(f) Exception 6 to the basic rule: Where it is doubtful what offence has
been committed. According to sub-section (1) of Section 221
several offences under this section need not necessarily be offences
of same kind but may be offences of different kinds. The essential
thing is that all of such offences must arise out of a single act or set
of acts. The court under this section may frame cumulative charges
or charges in the alternative. But a charge alternatively of two
different offences under different section of IPC based on same
facts is not permissible under this section. For example a person
Clause (b) states that the joinder of three charges under Section 420
of the IPC against one accused with three charges of abetment of
those offences against another accused is legally permissible and
proper.33
Clause (c) states the words “within the meaning of Section 219”
indicate that, what was meant by the words “offence of the same
kind” in clause (c) of Section 223 is the same thing as was meant
by the identical expression used in Section 219(1) defined in
Section 219(2) and nothing more. If it was intention of the
legislature to provide that the number of offences for which several
accused persons could be tried under clause (c) of Section 223
should be limited to three as provided in Section 219(1), the
legislature would have expressed the same in so many words.
Clause (d) states that the offence of conspiracy and the offences
committed by each conspirator in pursuance of the conspiracy are
‘offences committed in the course of the same transaction’ within
the meaning of Section 220 and persons accused of such offences
can be tried jointly by one trial. The common concert and
agreement which constitute the conspiracy serve to unify the acts
done under it. Identity of time is not essential in determining
whether certain events form the same transaction within the
meaning of Section 223. It is the continuity of action and the
sameness of purpose that determine whether the events constitute
the same transaction.
Clause (e) states an offence which includes theft means an offence
of which theft is an essential ingredient.
Clause (f) states that the expression “possession of which has been
transferred by one offence” refers to the original theft of the
property stolen on one occasion. Therefore where different
properties stolen at one theft were received by several persons at
different times, all or any of such receivers can be tried jointly for
their offences of receiving stolen properties. However persons
found in possession of such stolen properties secured by different
thefts cannot be tried jointly under this clause.
33
K Satwant Singh v. State of Punjab AIR 1960 SC 226
The basic rule regarding charge is that for every distinct offence there
shall be a separate charge and for every such charge there shall be a
separate trial. The only exception recognised is contained in Sections
219, 220, 221 and 223. Therefore separate trial is the rule and the joint
trial is an exception. The sections containing the exception are only
enabling provisions. A court has got the discretion to order a separate
trial even though the case is covered by one of the exceptions enabling
a joint trial. A joint trial of a very large number of charges is very much
to be deprecated even though it is not prohibited by law. A separate trial
is always desirable whenever there is risk of prejudice to the accused in
a joint trial.
(b) Where facts are proved which reduce the offence charged to
a minor offence. But there can be no conviction for major
offence on a charge of minor one. This section is an
exception to the rule that a person cannot be convicted of an
offence with which he is not charged.
When a charge containing more heads than one is framed and the
conviction has been had on one or more of them the complainant or the
person conducting the prosecution may with the consent of the Court
withdraw the remaining charge or charges or the Court may of its own
accord stay enquiry or trial of such charge. The withdrawal of charge or
the stay of enquiry or trial is possible only on the conviction being on
any other charge. Section 224 allows withdrawal or stay of charges only
when conviction has been passed on one or more of the charges. When
before the beginning of the trial the public prosecutor withdraws the
charge of the offence under one head the section has no application.
Before invoking provisions of Sections 227 and 228 dealing with trials
before the Court of Session, no court takes note of Section 226 which
obliges the prosecution to describe the charge brought against the
accused and state by what evidence the guilt of the accused would be
proved. This point was stressed by the two-Judge Bench in Satish
Mehra v. Delhi Admn.34 But it is a matter of regret that neither the
courts nor the prosecution complies with this section. It may reduce the
workload of the courts if the trial courts insist upon the prosecution to
strictly comply with the provisions of Section 226 of the Code
inasmuch as the courts can discharge the accused if there is no prima
facie case.
34
1996 (3) Crime 85 SC
35
S.L.P. (Crl.) No. 6374 of 2010
"12. Now the next question is whether a prima facie case has been
made out against the appellant. In exercising powers under Section 227
of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the settled position of law is that the
Judge while considering the question of framing the charges under the
said section has the undoubted power to sift and weigh the evidence for
the limited purpose of finding out whether or not a prima facie case
against the accused has been made out; where the materials placed
before the court disclose grave suspicion against the accused which has
not been properly explained the court will be fully justified in framing a
charge and proceeding with the trial; by and large if two views are
equally possible and the Judge is satisfied that the evidence produced
before him while giving rise to some suspicion but not grave suspicion
against the accused, he will be fully justified to discharge the accused,
and in exercising jurisdiction under Section 227 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, the Judge cannot act merely as a post office or a
mouthpiece of the prosecution, but has to consider the broad
probabilities of the case, the total effect of the evidence and the
documents produced before the court but should not make a roving
enquiry into the pros and cons of the matter and weigh the evidence as
if he was conducting a trial (see Union of India v. Prafulla Kumar
Samal).
16. It is clear that at the initial stage, if there is a strong suspicion which
leads the Court to think that there is ground for presuming that the
accused has committed an offence, then it is not open to the court to say
that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.
The presumption of the guilt of the accused which is to be drawn at the
initial stage is only for the purpose of deciding prima facie whether the
Court should proceed with the trial or not. If the evidence which the
prosecution proposes to adduce prove the guilt of the accused even if
fully accepted before it is challenged in cross-examination or rebutted
36
(2002) 2 SCC 135
(ii) Where the materials placed before the Court disclose grave
suspicion against the accused which has not been properly explained,
the Court will be fully justified in framing a charge and proceeding
with the trial.
a roving enquiry into the pros and cons of the matter and weigh the
evidence as if he was conducting a trial.
(iv) If on the basis of the material on record, the Court could form an
opinion that the accused might have committed offence, it can frame
the charge, though for conviction the conclusion is required to be
proved beyond reasonable doubt that the accused has committed the
offence.
(v) At the time of framing of the charges, the probative value of the
material on record cannot be gone into but before framing a charge the
Court must apply its judicial mind on the material placed on record and
must be satisfied that the commission of offence by the accused was
possible.
(vi) At the stage of Sections 227 and 228, the Court is required to
evaluate the material and documents on record with a view to find out if
the facts emerging therefrom taken at their face value discloses the
existence of all the ingredients constituting the alleged offence. For this
limited purpose, sift the evidence as it cannot be expected even at that
initial stage to accept all that the prosecution states as gospel truth even
if it is opposed to common sense or the broad probabilities of the case.
(vii) If two views are possible and one of them gives rise to suspicion
only, as distinguished from grave suspicion, the trial Judge will be
empowered to discharge the accused and at this stage, he is not to see
whether the trial will end in conviction or acquittal.
The facts of the case lie within a narrow compass and centre round an
alleged conspiracy said to have been entered into between respondents
No. 1 and 2 in order to commit offences under Prevention of Corruption
Act.The second respondent, a Land Acquisition officer, allegedly, by
abusing his official position, concealed the fact that the land which was
the subject matter of acquisition was really Khasmahal land belonging
to the Government and having made it appear that the first respondent
was the undisputed owner of the same, aided and abetted him in getting
a huge sum of money as compensation. The main charge against the
respondents was that between 19-2-1972 to 30-3-1972 the respondent
entered into an agreement For the purpose of obtaining pecuniary
advantage for respondent No. 1 P. K. Samal and in pursuance of the
said conspiracy the second respondent Debi Prasad Jena, who was the
Land Acquisition officer aided and abetted the first respondent in
getting a huge sum of money for a land acquired by the Government
which in fact belonged to the Government itself and respondent No. 1
was a skew thereof. It is averred in the chargesheet that respondent No.
1 by abusing his official position concealed the fact that the land which
was the subject matter of acquisition and was situated in Cuttack
Cantonment was really Khasmahal land belonging to the Government
and having made it appear that he was the undisputed owner of the
same, got a compensation of Rs. 4,18,642.55. The charge-sheet
contains a number of circumstances from which the inference of the
conspiracy is sought to be drawn by the police. After the charge-sheet
was submitted before the Special Judge, the prosecution ousted him to
frame a charge against the respondents. The Special Judge, Puri after
having gone through the charge-sheet and statements made by the
witnesses before the police as also other documents came to the
conclusion that there was no sufficient ground for framing a charge
against the respondents and he accordingly discharged them
under section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 hereinafter
called the Code). The Special Judge has given cogent reasons for
passing the order of discharge. The appellant went up to the High Court
in revision against the order of the Special Judge refusing to frame the
charge, but the High Court dismissed the revision petition filed by the
appellant and maintained the order of discharge passed by the Special
Judge. Thereafter the appellant moved this Court by an application for
special leave which having been granted to the appellant to be heard.
Judgement Passed:
The bench was in complete agreement with the view taken by the High
Court that there was no sufficient ground for trying the accused in the
instant case. Moreover, this Court could be most reluctant to interfere
with concurrent findings of the two courts in the absence of any special
circumstances. For the reasons given above, the judgement of the High
Court was affirmed and the appeal was dismissed.
"(1) That the Judge while considering the question of framing the
charges under Section 227 of the Code has the undoubted power to sift
and weigh the evidence for the limited purpose of finding out whether
or not a prima facie case against the accused has been made out.
(2) Where the materials placed before the Court disclose grave
suspicion against the accused which has not been properly explained
the Court will be fully justified in framing a charge and proceeding
with the trial.
37
1979 AIR 366
(3) The test to determine a prima facie case would naturally depend
upon the facts of each case and it is difficult to lay down a rule of
universal application. By and large however if two views are equally
possible and the Judge is satisfied that the evidence produced before
him while giving rise to some suspicion but not grave suspicion against
the accused, he will be fully within his right to discharge the accused.
(4) That in exercising his jurisdiction under Section 227 of the Code the
Judge which under the present Code is a senior and experienced court
cannot act merely as a Post Office or a mouthpiece of the prosecution,
but has to consider the broad probabilities of the case, the total effect of
the evidence and the documents produced before the Court, any basic
infirmities appearing in the case and so on. This however does not
mean that the Judge should make a roving enquiry into the pros and
cons of the matter and weigh the evidence as if he was conducting a
trial."
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Books
Articles
Websites
http://www.ebc-india.com/lawyer/articles/2002v2a3.htm
http://legalperspectives.blogspot.in/2010/10/framing-of-
charge-in-criminal-trial-law.html
http://www.legalblog.in/2011/08/framing-of-charge-
principles-and-law.html