No. L-66620.
September 24, 1986 against the defendant to collect their respective claims, each of which was
REMEDIO V. FLORES, petitioner, vs. HON. JUDGE HEILIA S.
MALLARE-PHILLIPPS, IGNACIO BINONGCAL & FERNANDO
CALION, respondents.
Jurisdiction; Where a plaintiff sues a defendant the total demand
furnishes the jurisdictional test irrespective of whether the several causes of
action arose out of different transactions, although their joinder would be
merely permissive, not mandatory.—This argument is partly correct. There is
no difference between the former and present rules in cases where a plaintiff
sues a defendant on two or more separate causes of action. In such cases, the
amount of the demand shall be the totality of the claims in all the causes of
action irrespective of whether the causes of action arose out of the same or
different transactions. If the total demand exceeds twenty thousand pesos,
then the regional trial court has jurisdiction. Needless to state, if the causes of
action are separate and independent, their joinder in one complaint is
permissive and not mandatory, and any cause of action where the amount of
the demand is twenty thousand pesos or less may be the subject of a separate
complaint filed with a metropolitan or municipal trial court.
Same; Where two or more plaintiffs sue one defendant in a single
complaint or one plaintiff sues several defendants in a single complaint,
based on several causes of action for or against each, respectively, the
totality rule applies only where (a) the causes of action arose from the same
series of transactions; and (b) there is a common question of fact or law
among them.—Under the present law, the totality rule is applied also to cases
where two or more plaintiffs having separate causes of action against a
defendant join in a single complaint, as well as to cases where a plaintiff has
separate causes of action against two or more defendants joined in a single
complaint. However, the causes of action in favor of the two or more plaintiffs
or against the two or more defendants should arise out of the same
transaction or series of transactions and there should be a common question
of law or fact, as provided in Section 6 of Rule 3.
Same; Same.—The difference between the former and present rules in
cases of permissive joinder of parties may be illustrated by the two cases
which were cited in the case of Vda. de Rosario vs. Justice of the Peace
(supra) as exceptions to the totality rule. In the case of Soriano y Cia vs. Jose
(86 Phil. 523), where twenty-nine dismissed employees joined in a complaint
within the jurisdiction of the municipal court although the total exceeded the
jurisdictional amount, this Court held that under the law then the municipal
court had jurisdiction. In said case, although the plaintiffs’ demands were
separate, distinct and independent of one another, their joint suit was
authorized under Section 6 of Rule 3 and each separate claim furnished the
jurisdictional test. In the case of International Colleges, Inc. vs. Argonza (90
Phil. 470), where twenty-five dismissed teachers jointly sued the defendant
for unpaid salaries, this Court also held that the municipal court had
jurisdiction because the amount of each claim was within, although the total
exceeded, its jurisdiction and it was a case of permissive joinder of parties
plaintiff under Section 6 of Rule 3.
Same; Same.—Under the present law, the two cases above cited
(assuming they do not fall under the Labor Code) would be under the
jurisdiction of the regional trial court. Similarly, in the above-cited cases of
Brillo vs. Buklatan and Gacula vs. Martinez (supra), if the separate claims
against the several defendants arose out of the same transaction or series of
transactions and there is a common question of law or fact, they would now be
under the jurisdiction of the regional trial court.
Same; Same.—In the case at bar, the lower court correctly held that the
jurisdictional test is subject to the rules on joinder of parties pursuant to
Section 5 of Rule 2 and Section 6 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court and that, after
a careful scrutiny of the complaint, it appears that there is a misjoinder of
parties for the reason that the claims against respondents Binongcal and
Calion are separate and distinct and neither of which falls within its
jurisdiction.
APPEAL by certiorari from the order of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio
City.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
FERIA, J.:
The Court rules that the application of the totality rule under Section
33(1) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 and Section 11 of the Interim Rules is
subject to the requirements for the permissive joinder of parties under Section
6 of Rule 3 which provides as follows:
 “Permissive joinder of parties.—All persons in whom or against whom
any right to relief in respect to or arising out of the same transaction
or series of transactions is alleged to exist, whether jointly, severally,
or in the alternative, may, except as otherwise provided in these rules,
join as plaintiffs or be joined as defendants in one complaint, where
any question of law or fact common to all such plaintiffs or to all such
defendants may arise in the action; but the court may make such
orders as may be just to prevent any plaintiff or defendant from being
embarrassed or put to expense in connection with any proceedings in
which he may have no interest.”
Petitioner has appealed by certiorari from the order of Judge Heilia S.
Mallare-Phillipps of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City and Benguet
Province which dismissed his complaint for lack of jurisdiction. Petitioner did
not attach to his petition a copy of his complaint in the erroneous belief that
the entire original record of the case shall be transmitted to this Court
pursuant to the second paragraph of Section 39 of BP 129. This provision
applies only to ordinary appeals from the regional trial court to the Court of
Appeals (Section 20 of the Interim Rules). Appeals to this Court by petition
for review on certiorari are governed by Rule 45 of the Rules of Court (Section
25 of the Interim Rules).
However, the order appealed from states that the first cause of action
alleged in the complaint was against respondent Ignacio Binongcal for
refusing to pay the amount of P11,643.00 representing cost of truck tires
which he purchased on credit from petitioner on various occasions from
August to October, 1981; and the second cause of action was against
respondent Fernando Calion for allegedly refusing to pay the amount
ofP10,212.00 representing cost of truck tires which he purchasedon credit
from petitioner on several occasions from March,1981 to January, 1982.
On December 15, 1983, counsel for respondent Binongcal filed a Motion to
Dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction since the amount of the demand
against said respondent was only P11,643.00, and under Section 19(8) of BP
129 the regional trial court shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction if the
amount of the demand is more than twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00). It
was further averred in said motion that although another person, Fernando
Calion, was allegedly indebted to petitioner in the amount of P10,212.00, his
obligation was separate and distinct from that of the other respondent. At the
hearing of said Motion to Dismiss, counsel for respondent Calion joined in
moving for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction. Counsel for petitioner opposed the Motion to Dismiss. As above
stated, the trial court dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction.
Petitioner maintains that the lower court has jurisdiction over the case
following the “novel” totality rule introduced in Section 33(1) of BP 129 and
Section 11 of the Interim Rules.
The pertinent portion of Section 33(1) of BP 129 reads as follows:
“x x x Provided, That where there are several claims or causes of
action between the same or different parties, embodied in the same
complaint, the amount of the demand shall be the totality of the
claims in all the causes of action, irrespective of whether the causes of
action arose out of the same or different transactions. x x x”
Section 11 of the Interim Rules provides thus:
“Application of the totality rule.—In actions where the jurisdiction of
the court is dependent on the amount involved, the test of jurisdiction
shall be the aggregate sum of all the money demands, exclusive only of
interest and costs, irrespective of whether or not the separate claims
are owned by or due to different parties. If any demand is for damages
in a civil action, the amount thereof must be specifically alleged.”
Petitioner compares the above-quoted provisions with the pertinent
portion of the former rule under Section 88 of the Judiciary Act of 1948 as
amended which reads as follows:
“x x x Where there are several claims or causes of action between the
same parties embodied in the same complaint, the amount of the
demand shall be the totality of the demand in all the causes of action,
irrespective of whether the causes of action arose out of the same or
different transactions; but where the claims or causes of action joined
in a single complaint are separately owned by or due to different
parties, each separate claim shall furnish the jurisdictional test. x x x”
and argues that with the deletion of the proviso in the former rule, the totality
rule was reduced to clarity and brevity and the jurisdictional test is the totality
of the claims in all, not in each, of the causes of action, irrespective of whether
the causes of action arose out of the same or different transactions.
This argument is partly correct. There is no difference between the former
and present rules in cases where a plaintiff sues a defendant on two or more
separate causes of action. In such cases, the amount of the demand shall be
the totality of the claims in all the causes of action irrespective of whether the
causes of action arose out of the same or different transactions. If the total
demand exceeds twenty thousand pesos, then the regional trial court has
jurisdiction. Needless to state, if the causes of action are separate and
independent, their joinder in one complaint is permissive and not mandatory,
and any cause of action where the amount of the demand is twenty thousand
pesos or less may be the subject of a separate complaint filed with a
metropolitan or municipal trial court.
On the other hand, there is a difference between the former and present
rules in cases where two or more plaintiffs having separate causes of action
against a defendant join in a single complaint. Under the former rule, “where
the claims or causes of action joined in a single complaint are separately
owned by or due to different parties, each separate claim shall furnish the
jurisdictional test” (Section 88 of the Judiciary Act of 1948 as
amended, supra). This was based on the ruling in the case of Vda. de Rosario
vs. Justice of the Peace, 99 Phil. 693. As worded, the former rule applied only
to cases of permissive joinder of parties plaintiff. However, it was also
applicable to cases of permissive joinder of parties defendant, as may be
deduced from the ruling in the case of Brillo vs. Buklatan, thus:
“Furthermore, the first cause of action is composed of separate claims
against several defendants of different amounts each of which is not
more than P2,000 and falls under the jurisdiction of the justice of the
peace court under section 88 of Republic Act No. 296. The several
claims do not seem to arise from the same transaction or series of
transactions and there seem to be no questions of law or of fact
common to all the defendants as may warrant their joinder under
Rule 3, section 6. Therefore, if new complaints are to be filed in the
name of the real party in interest they should be filed in the justice of
the peace court.” (87 Phil. 519, 520, reiterated in Gacula vs.
Martinez, 88 Phil. 142, 146)
Under the present law, the totality rule is applied also to cases where two
or more plaintiffs having separate causes of action against a defendant join in
a single complaint, as well as to cases where a plaintiff has separate causes of
action against two or more defendants joined in a single complaint. However,
the causes of action in favor of the two or more plaintiffs or against the two or
more defendants should arise out of the same transaction or series of
transactions and there should be a common question of law or fact, as
provided in Section 6 of Rule 3.
The difference between the former and present rules in cases of permissive
joinder of parties may be illustrated by the two cases which were cited in the
case of Vda. de Rosario vs. Justice of the Peace (supra) as exceptions to the
totality rule. In the case of Soriano y Cia vs. Jose (86 Phil. 523), where twenty-
nine dismissed employees joined in a complaint against the defendant to
collect their respective claims, each of which was within the jurisdiction of the
municipal court although the total exceeded the jurisdictional amount, this
Court held that under the law then the municipal court had jurisdiction. In
said case, although the plaintiffs’ demands were separate, distinct and
independent of one another, their joint suit was authorized under Section 6 of
Rule 3 and each separate claim furnished the jurisdictional test. In the case of
International Colleges, Inc. vs. Argonza (90 Phil. 470), where twenty-five
dismissed teachers jointly sued the defendant for unpaid salaries, this Court
also held that the municipal court had jurisdiction because the amount of
each claim was within, although the total exceeded, its jurisdiction and it was
a case of permissive joinder of parties plaintiff under Section 6 of Rule 3.
Under the present law, the two cases above cited (assuming they do not fall
under the Labor Code) would be under the jurisdiction of the regional trial
court. Similarly, in the above-cited cases of Brillo vs. Buklatan and Gacula vs.
Martinez(supra), if the separate claims against the several defendants arose
out of the same transaction or series of transactions and there is a common
question of law or fact, they would now be under the jurisdiction of the
regional trial court.
In other words, in cases of permissive joinder of parties, whether as
plaintiffs or as defendants, under Section 6 of Rule 3, the total of all the claims
shall now furnish the jurisdictional test. Needless to state also, if instead of
joining or being joined in one complaint separate actions are filed by or
against the parties, the amount demanded in each complaint shall furnish the
jurisdictional test.

In the case at bar, the lower court correctly held that the jurisdictional test
is subject to the rules on joinder of parties pursuant to Section 5 of Rule 2 and
Section 6 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court and that, after a careful scrutiny of
the complaint, it appears that there is a misjoinder of parties for the reason
that the claims against respondents Binongcal and Calion are separate and
distinct and neither of which falls within its jurisdiction.

WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is affirmed, without

pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.
 No. L-40010. May 26, 1975.*
RUSSEL R. ENERIO, DARROW O. ENERIO, and VIRGINIA
RODRIGUEZ, plaintiffs, vs. HON. NESTOR B. ALAMPAY,
SONETRAN CO., INC., ERNESTO KHO, and MAX VILLEGAS Y
YANSON, respondents.
Courts; Jurisdiction; In assessing whether a claim for damages falls
within jurisdiction of a court of first instance or a municipal court the total
demand, including the claim for moral and exemplary damages and
attorney’s fees, should be included.—The totality of the demand in suits for
recovery of sums of money between the same parties, i.e., the total or
aggregate amount demanded in the complaint constitutes the basis of
jurisdiction and for determining the jurisdictional amount in civil cases. Here
petitioners’ total claim of P978.00 for actual damages, P10,000.00-moral
damages, P15,000.00-exemplary damages and P3,000.00-attorney’s fees,
etc., was clearly in excess of P10,000 and therefore properly fell within the
jurisdiction of respondent court of first instance.
Same; Same; Trial court may not motu proprio and without hearing
exclude from the jurisdictional amount the claims for moral and exemplary
damages.—The respondent court could not arbitrarily isolate petitioners’
lesser claim for actual damages and without hearing and proofs rule out
petitioners’ other claims for moral and exemplary damages as “bloated” and
summarily dismiss motu proprio the case as not falling within its jurisdiction
contrary to the very allegations on the face of the complaint.
Same; Same; Pre-trial; Trial court may narrow down issue of amount
of recoverable damages at the pre-trial if it believes that plaintiffs claim for
damages had been exaggerated. But it has to assume jurisdiction over the
case and render judgment instead of dismissing the same and shifting
jurisdiction to the municipal court.—Respondent’s contention in their
comment that “since the award of said amount (of moral and exemplary
damages) is discretionary on its (respondent court) part, it believed that
plaintiffs cannot recover a total amount in excess of P10,000.00, hence, there
is basis for the court in dismissing the complaint on ground of lack of
jurisdiction” is manifestly erroneous. If such were the case, respondent court
should have narrowed down the issue at the pre-trial to the question and
amount of recoverable damages, if any, and proceeded to receive the parties’
proofs thereon and thereafter rendered judgment on the merits, even utterly
refusing any award of moral or exemplary damages to petitioners if this were
its determination. This simply means that it should have properly assumed
and exercised its jurisdiction and disposed of the case on the merits rather
than erroneously dismissed the complaint for alleged lack of jurisdiction with
all the attendant delay caused thereby and the remand of the case back to it.
PETITION for review on certiorari of an order of the Court of First Instance of
Negros Occidental. Alampay, J.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
TEEHANKEE, J.:
The Court sets aside respondent court’s dismissal order for alleged lack of
jurisdiction. The totality of the demand in suits for recovery of sums of money
between the same parties furnishes the jurisdictional test and since
petitioners’ total claim for actual, moral and exemplary damages and
attorney’s fees was clearly in excess of P10,000.00 and came close to
P30,000.00, it properly fell within the jurisdiction of respondent court of first
instance.
On May 27, 1974, petitioners as plaintiffs filed with respondent court of
first instance of Negros Occidental presided by respondent Judge Nestor B.
Alampay a complaint for the recovery of actual, moral and exemplary
damages and attorney’s fees and costs of litigation totalling close to
P30,000.00 against private respondents Sonetran Co., Inc., Ernesto Kho and
Max Villegas y Yanson as defendants as a result of the physical injuries caused
petitioner-minor, Russel Enerio, eight years of age (herein represented by his
parents, the co-petitioners) when bumped on the road on January 15, 1974 by
a passenger bus of respondents driven allegedly “in a very reckless, negligent
and imprudent manner” by respondent Max Villegas.
Respondents filed in due course their answer with counter-claim for
P20,000.-moral damages and P2,000.-attorney’s fees.
Pre-trial was held by respondent court on November 27, 1974 and on said
date, without its jurisdiction having been questioned or placed in issue by
respondents, it issued moto proprio an order dismissing the complaint on the
ground that “without the claims for moral and exemplary damages, this case
will not fall within the jurisdiction of the court of first instance,” without
prejudice to re-filing in the court of proper jurisdiction and without costs, as
petitioners-plaintiffs had been allowed by it to file the case as paupers-
litigants. The pertinent portion of the dismissal order reads as follows:
“At the pre-trial of this case the attention of the counsel for the
plaintiffs was drawn to the allegations of the complaint which limit the
claim for actual damages of the plaintiff minor, Russel Enerio, to the
amount of P478.00 corresponding to hospital and doctor’s bills and
medicines and for the miscellaneous expenses attendant to his care
after he was bumped by a passenger bus of the defendant company. In
same complaint, plaintiff Darrow O. Enerio, father of said minor,
claims the amount of P500.00, representing his alleged loss of income
during the period while attending to his injured son. All such claim for
actual damages would thus be in the total amount of only P978.00.
Along with these considerations, the court notes that plaintiffs seek
moral damages in the sum of P10,000.00, exemplary damages in the
sum of P15,000.00 and an award for attorney’s fees of P3,000.00 and
expenses of litigation in the sum of P500.00. Without the claims for
moral and exemplary damages, this case will not fall within the
jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance.
“It is therefore the considered view of the court, considering the
minimal amount of the claim of the plaintiffs for actual damages, that
the moral and exemplary damages recited and claimed for in the
complaint is but an obvious means taken to circumvent the provisions
of the Judiciary Act with respect to the jurisdiction of inferior courts
and the Courts of First Instance, respectively. The disproportionate
and bloated claims for moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s
fees in this instance reflect that such were merely placed in the
complaint in order to shift jurisdiction to this court, but that under the
recited facts this case should not be taken cognizance of due to the
limited amount that is actually involved. To tolerate the imposition of
this case on this court can open the floodgates to parties who may
then institute slight physical injury cases in the Courts of First
Instance on mere assertions of clearly disproportionate and
imprudent claims for moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s
fees, with the resulting effect of adding burden to the docket and load
of the superior courts.
xxx xxx x x x.”
Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari of the dismissal order.
Upon consideration of respondents’ comment and of petitioners’ reply
thereto, the Court resolved to treat the case as a special civil action and
dispense with the filing of briefs for an expeditious determination of the
simple issue of jurisdiction involved.
It is well settled and beyond question that the jurisdiction of a court over a
case is determined by the allegations of the complaint, and since petitioners’
complaint asserted a total demand, exclusive of interest of over P10,000.00
(and sought recovery of damages of close to P30,000.00) the case clearly falls
within the original jurisdiction of respondent court of first instance as
provided by section 44 of the Judiciary Act, Republic Act 296 as amended.
The totality of the demand in suits for recovery of sums of money between
the same parties, i.e. the total or aggregate amount demanded in the
complaint constitutes the basis of jurisdiction and for determining the
jurisdictional amount in civil cases. Here petitioners’ total claim of P978.00
1
for actual damages, P10,000.-moral damages, P15,000.-exemplary damages
and P3,000.-attorney’s fees, etc., was clearly in excess of P10,000.00 and
therefore properly fell within the jurisdiction of respondent court of first
instance. Respondent court could not arbitrarily isolate petitioners’ lesser
claim for actual damages and without hearing and proofs rule out petitioners’
other claims for moral and exemplary damages as “bloated” and summarily
dismiss motu proprio the case as not falling within its jurisdiction contrary to
the very allegations on the face of the complaint.
Petitioners contend with reason that their complaint asserted lawful
demands for the imposition of moral and exemplary or corrective damages
against respondents “to serve as deterrent against reckless driving” on the
basis of their specific allegations in their complaint that respondents’ bus “was
running very fast and was being driven ... in a very reckless, negligent and
imprudent manner, in utter violation of the Revised Motor Vehicle Law and
the traffic rules and regulations and without due regard to life and property”
and “that as a result of the injuries received by minor plaintiff, plaintiffs
suffered physically and underwent mental torture and worried, wounded
feelings, serious anxiety...”
2
Petitioners have disclaimed any “bloating” of their claim for moral and
exemplary damages as merely surmised by respondent court without having
given petitioners their day in court and without having received the proofs of
the parties. Petitioners rightfully contend that it is not the lesser nature of the
injuries suffered by the minor or the relatively modest amount of actual
damages incurred by them in the hospitalization of the injured son and the
father’s loss of income but the gross and wanton negligence of private
respondents in the operation of their public vehicle which resulted in the
injuries inflicted upon the minor (as alleged and if proven by them at the trial)
that would be decisive and controlling on the matter of moral and exemplary
damages claimed by them. Petitioners have cause to complain, therefore, that
respondent court in refusing motu proprio to take cognizance of the case on
the ground that the claims for damages were “bloated” in effect prejudged the
case without hearing and without the evidence, and wrongfully barred them
from seeking moral and exemplary damages in excess of P10,000.00 by
dismissing their suit before it and requiring them to file their action in the
inferior courts, where their total claim for damages would be limited to not
more than P10,000.00.
There appears no valid justification in the record for respondent court’s
bare conclusion that petitioners’ claim for damages were “bloated” in order to
shift jurisdiction to it rather than to the inferior courts and that the filing of
the case with it amounted to an “imposition of this case on this court.”
Respondents’ contention in their comment that “since the award of said
amount (of moral and exemplary damages) is discretionary on its (respondent
court) part, it believed that plaintiffs cannot recover a total amount in excess
of P10,000.00, hence, there is basis for the court in dismissing the complaint
on ground of lack of jurisdiction” is manifestly erroneous. If such were the
case, respondent court should have narrowed down the issue at the pre-trial
to the question and amount of recoverable damages, if any, and proceeded to
receive the parties’ proofs thereon and thereafter rendered judgment on the
merits, even utterly refusing any award of moral or exemplary damages to
petitioners if this were its determination. This simply means that it should
have properly assumed and exercised its jurisdiction and disposed of the
case on the merits rather than erroneously dismissed the complaint for
alleged lack of jurisdiction with all the attendant delay caused thereby and the
remand of the case back to it.
ACCORDINGLY, the dismissal order appealed from is hereby annulled and
set aside and the case is ordered remanded to the court a quo for trial and
adjudication on the merits. Without costs.
Notes.—A civil action to annul an order of a justice of the peace court
obtained through fraud falls within the jurisdiction of the courts of first
instance. (Ragudo vs. Pasno, 4 SCRA 926).
Where the complaint does not show prior possession and neither does it
allege that plaintiff was deprived of possession by any of the means
mentioned in Rule 72 of the Rules of Court, namely, force, intimidation,
threats, strategy and stealth, that would have made out a case for forcible
entry, nor that the right of possession of the defendant had terminated, and
occupancy was being unlawfully withheld so as to constitute unlawful
detainer, the Court of First Instance, not Justice of the Peace Court shall have
jurisdiction (Valderrama Lumber Manufacturer’s Co., Inc. vs. L. S.
Sarmiento Co., Inc., 5 SCRA 287).
Laws conferring jurisdiction on inferior courts of demands below certain
amounts do not forbid a determination of said demands in the superior court,
where they are connected with larger claims or with a type of demand solely
within the jurisdiction of the superior court. (Fireman’s Fund Insurance Co.
vs. Compania General de Tabascos de Filipinas, 19 SCRA 874).
In case of a concurrent jurisdiction, it is axiomatic that the court first
acquiring jurisdiction excludes the other courts. (Laquian vs. Baltazar, 31
SCRA 551). Thus, where the assignment of a case to the municipal court was
made after the Court of First Instance had no longer exclusive but concurrent
jurisdiction over the case, the assignment is erroneous, for well-settled is the
rule that where several courts have concurrent jurisdiction over the same
offense, the court which first acquire jurisdiction of the prosecution retains it
to the exclusion of the others. (Encarnacion vs. Baltazar, 1 SCRA 860).
After voluntarily submitting a cause and encountering an adverse decision
on the merits, it is too late for the loser to question the jurisdiction or power
of the Court. (People vs. Munar, 53 SCRA 278).
 No. L-75919. May 7, 1987. * that the basis of assessment of the docket fee should be the amount of
MANCHESTER DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, ET AL.,
petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, CITYLAND DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, STEPHEN ROXAS, ANDREW LUISON, GRACE
LUISON and JOSE DE MAISIP, respondents.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Complaint; Filing Fees; Environmental
facts of Magaspi vs. Ramolete case, different from case at bar.—lnthe
Magaspi case, the action was considered not only one for recovery of
ownership but also for damages, so that the filing fee for the damages should
be the basis of assessment. Although the payment of the docketing fee of
P60.00 was found to be insufficient, nevertheless, it was held that since the
payment was the result of an "honest difference of opinion as to the correct
amount to be paid as docket fee" the court had acquired jurisdiction over the
"
case and the proceedings thereafter had were proper and regular." Hence, as
the amended complaint superseded the original complaint, the allegations of
damages in the amended complaint should be the basis of the computation of
the filing fee. In the present case no such honest difference of opinion was
possible as the allegations of the complaint, the designation and the prayer
show clearly that it is an action for damages and specific performance. The
docketing fee should be assessed by considering the amount of damages as
alleged in the original complaint.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Case is deemed filed only upon payment of
the docket fee regardless of actual date of filing in court.—As reiterated in the
Magaspi case the rule is well-settled "that a case is deemed filed only upon
payment of the docket fee regardless of the actual date of filing in court."
Thus, in the present case the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the
case by the payment of only P410.00 as docket fee. Neither can the
amendment of the complaint thereby vest jurisdiction upon the Court. For all
legal purposes there is no such original complaint that was duly filed which
could be amended. Consequently, the order admitting the amended complaint
and all subsequent proceedings and actions taken by the trial court are null
and void.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Basis of assessment of the docket fee should
be the amount of damages in the original complaint and not in the amended
complaint.—The Court of Appeals therefore, aptly ruled in the present case
damages sought in the original complaint and not in the amended complaint.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Attorneys; Court frowns at practice of
counsel who filed the original complaint of omitting any specification of the
amount of damages in the prayer although the amount of over P78 million is
alleged in the body of the complaint which is clearly intended to thwart
payment of correct filing fees.—The Court cannot close this case without
making the observation that it frowns at the practice of counsel who filed the
original complaint in this case of omitting any specification of the amount of
damages in the prayer although the amount of over P 78 million is alleged in
the body of the complaint. This is clearly intended for no other purpose than
to evade the payment of the correct filing fees if not to mislead the docket
clerk in the assessment of the filing fee. This fraudulent practice was
compounded when, even as this Court had taken cognizance of the anomaly
and ordered an investigation, petitioner through another counsel filed an
amended complaint, deleting all mention of the amount of damages being
asked for in the body of the complaint. It was only when in obedience to the
order of this Court of October 18, 1985, the trial court directed that the
amount of damages be specified in the amended complaint, that petitioners'
counsel wrote the damages sought in the much reduced amount of
P10,000,000.00 in the body of the complaint but not in the prayer thereof.
The design to avoid payment of the required docket f ee is obvious.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Warning of Supreme Court that
drastic action will be taken upon a repetition of the unethical practice.—The
Court serves warning that it will take drastic action upon a repetition of this
unethical practice.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Requirement that henceforth all complaints,
petitions, answers and other similar pleadings should specify the amount of
damages prayed for not only in the body of the pleading but also in the
prayer, and that the damages should be considered in the assessment of the
filing fees; Any pleading that fails to comply with the requirement shall not
be accepted or admitted.—To put a stop to this irregularity, henceforth all
complaints, petitions, answers and other similar pleadings should specify the
amount of damages being prayed for not only in the body of the pleading but
also in the prayer, and said damages shall be considered in the assessment of
the filing fees in any case. Any pleading that fails to comply with this
requirement shall not be accepted nor admitted, or shall otherwise be
expunged from the record.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Jurisdiction; Court acquires jurisdiction
over any case only upon payment of the prescribed docket fee; An
amendment of the complaint or similar pleading will not vest jurisdiction in
the court, much less payment of the docket fee based on amount in the
amended pleading Magaspi vs. Ramolete case which is inconsistent with this
decision, is reversed.—The Court acquires jurisdiction over any case only
upon the payment of the prescribed docket fee. An amendment of the
complaint or similar pleading will not thereby vest jurisdiction in the Court,
much less the payment of the docket fee based on the amounts sought in the
amended pleading. The ruling in the Magaspi case in so far as it is
inconsistent with this pronouncement is overturned and reversed.
PETITION to review the decision of the Court of Appeals,
The facts are stated in the resolution of the Court.
RESOLUTION
GANCAYCO, J.:
Acting on the motion f or reconsideration of the resolution of the Second
Division of January 28, 1987 and. another motion to refer the case to and to
be heard in oral argument by the Court En Banc filed by petitioners, the
motion to refer the case to the Court en banc is granted but the motion to set
the case f or oral argument is denied.
Petitioners in support of their contention that the filing fee must be
assessed on the basis of the amended complaint cite the case of Magaspi vs.
Ramolete. They contend that the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the
1 maybe gleaned from the allegations of the complaint as well as the
filing fee should be levied by considering the amount of damages sought in the
original complaint.
The environmental facts of said case differ from the present in that—
1. 1.The Magaspi case was an action for recovery of ownership and
possession of a parcel of land with damages, while the present case is
2
an action for torts and damages and specific performance with
prayer for temporary restraining order, etc.3
2. 2.In the Magaspi case, the prayer in the complaint seeks not only the
annulment of title of the defendant to the property, the declaration of
ownership and delivery of possession thereof to plaintiffs but also
asks for the payment of actual, moral, exemplary damages and
attorney's fees arising therefrom in the amounts specified therein.
However, in the present case, the prayer is for the issuance of a writ
of preliminary prohibitory injunction during the pendency of the
action against the defendants' announced forfeiture of the sum of P3
Million paid by the plaintiff s for the property in question, to attach
such property of defendants that maybe sufficient to satisfy any
judgment that maybe rendered, and after hearing, to order
defendants to execute a contract of purchase and sale of the subject
property and annul defendants' illegal forfeiture of the money of
plaintiff, ordering defendants jointly and severally to pay plaintiff
actual, compensatory and exemplary damages as well as 25% of said
amounts as maybe proved during the trial as attorney's fees and
declaring the tender of payment of the purchase price of plaintiff
valid and producing the effect of payment and to make the injunction
permanent. The amount of damages sought is not specified in the
prayer although the body of the complaint alleges the total amount of
over P78 Million as damages suffered by plaintiff.5
Upon the filing of the complaint there was an honest difference of opinion
as to the nature of the action in the Magaspi case. The complaint was
considered as primarily an action for recovery of ownership and possession of
a parcel of land. The damages stated were treated as merely ancillary to the
main cause of action. Thus, the docket fee of only P60.00 and P10.00 for the
sheriff s fee were paid.6
In the present case there can be no such honest difference of opinion. As
designation thereof, it is both an action for damages and specific
performance. The docket fee paid upon filing of complaint in the amount only
of P410.00 by considering the action to be merely one for specific
performance where the amount involved is not capable of pecuniary
estimation is obviously erroneous. Although the total amount of damages
sought is not stated in the prayer of the complaint yet it is spelled out in the
body of the complaint totalling in the amount of P78,750,000.00 which
should be the basis of assessment of the f iling fee.
When this under-assessment of the filing fee in this case was brought to
the attention of this Court together with similar other cases an investigation
was immediately ordered by the Court. Meanwhile plaintiff through another
counsel with leave of court filed an amended complaint on September 12,
1985 for the inclusion of Philips Wire and Cable Corporation as co-plaintiff
and by eliminating any mention of the amount of damages in the body of the
complaint. The prayer in the original complaint was maintained. After this
Court issued an order on October 15, 1985 ordering the re-assessment of the
docket fee in the present case and other cases that were investigated, on
November 12, 1985 the trial court directed plaintiffs to rectify the amended
complaint by stating the amounts which they are asking for. It was only then
that plaintiffs specified the amount of damages in the body of the complaint in
the reduced amount of P10,000,000.00.7 Still no amount of damages were
specified in the prayer. Said amended complaint was admitted.
On the other hand, in the Magaspi case, the trial court ordered the
plaintiffs to pay the amount of P3,104.00 as filing fee covering the damages
alleged in the original complaint as it did not consider the damages to be
merely ancillary or incidental to the action for recovery of ownership and
possession of real property.8An amended complaint was filed by plaintiff with
leave of court to include the government of the Republic as defendant and
reducing the amount of damages, and attorney's fees prayed for to
P100,000.00. Said amended complaint was also admitted.9
In the Magaspi case, the action was considered not only one for recovery of
ownership but also for damages, so that the filing fee for the damages should
be the basis of assessment. Although the payment of the docketing fee of
P60.00 was found to be insufficient, nevertheless, it was held that since the
payment was the result of an "honest difference of opinion as to the correct
amount to be paid as docket fee" the court "had acquired jurisdiction over the
case and the proceedings thereafter had were proper and regular." 10Hence, as
the amended complaint superseded the original complaint, the allegations of
damages in the amended complaint should be the basis of the computation of
the filing fee.11
In the present case no such honest difference of opinion was possible as the
allegations of the complaint, the designation and the prayer show clearly that
it is an action for damages and specific performance. The docketing fee should
be assessed by considering the amount of damages as alleged in the original
complaint.
As reiterated in the Magaspi case the rule is well-settled "that a case is
deemed filed only upon payment of the docket fee regardless of the actual
date of filing in court."12Thus, in the present case the trial court did not
acquire jurisdiction over the case by the payment of only P410.00 as docket
fee. Neither can the amendment of the complaint thereby vest jurisdiction
upon the Court.13For all legal purposes there is no such original complaint
that was duly filed which could be amended. Consequently, the order
admitting the amended complaint and all subsequent proceedings and actions
taken by the trial court are null and void.
The Court of Appeals therefore, aptly ruled in the present case that the
basis of assessment of the docket fee should be the amount of damages sought
in the original complaint and not in the amended complaint.
The Court cannot close this case without making the observation that it
frowns at the practice of counsel who filed the original complaint in this case
of omitting any specification of the amount of damages in the prayer although
the amount of over P78 million is alleged in the body of the complaint. This is
clearly intended for no other purpose than to evade the payment of the correct
filing fees if not to mislead the docket clerk in the assessment of the filing fee.
This fraudulent practice was compounded when, even as this Court had taken
cognizance of the anomaly and ordered an investigation, petitioner through
another counsel filed an amended complaint, deleting all mention of the
amount of damages being asked for in the body of the complaint It was only
when in obedience to the order of this Court of October 18, 1985, the trial
court directed that the amount of damages be specified in the amended
complaint, that petitioners' counsel wrote the damages sought in the much
reduced amount of P 10,000,000.00 in the body of the complaint but not in
the prayer thereof. The design to avoid payment of the required docket fee is
obvious.
The Court serves warning that it will take drastic action upon a repetition
of this unethical practice.
 To put a stop to this irregularity, henceforth all complaints, petitions,
answers and other similar pleadings should specify the amount of damages
being prayed for not only in the body of the pleading but also in the prayer,
and said damages shall be considered in the assessment of the filing fees in
any case. Any pleading that fails to comply with this requirement shall not be
accepted nor admitted, or shall otherwise be expunged from the record.

The Court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the
prescribed docket fee. An amendment of the complaint or similar pleading
will not thereby vest jurisdiction in the Court, much less the payment of the
docket fee based on the amounts sought in the amended pleading. The ruling
in the Magaspi case14 in so far as it is inconsistent with this pronouncement is
overturned and reversed.

WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is denied for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.
 G.R. Nos. 79937-38.February 13, 1989. * Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Judgments; Lien; When the
SUN INSURANCE OFFICE, LTD., (SIOL), E.B. PHILIPPS AND D.J. judgment of the courts awards a claim not specified in the pleading, the
WARBY, petitioners, vs.HON. MAXIMIANO C. ASUNCION, additional filing fee shall constitute a lien on the judgment.—Where the trial
Presiding Judge, Branch 104, Regional Trial Court, Quezon City court acquires jurisdiction over a claim by the filing of the appropriate
and MANUEL CHUA UY PO TIONG, respondents. pleading and payment of the prescribed filing fee but, subsequently, the
judgment awards a claim not specified in the pleading, or if specified the same
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Actions; Statutes regulating the has been left for determination by the court, the additional filing fee therefor
procedure of courts are applicable to actions pending and undetermined at shall constitute a lien on the judgment. It shall be the responsibility of the
the time of their passage.—On the other hand, private respondent claims that Clerk of Court or his duly authorized deputy to enforce said lien and assess
the ruling in Manchester cannot apply retroactively to Civil Case No. Q-41177 and collect the additional fee.
for at the time said civil case was filed in court there was no
such Manchesterruling as yet. Further, private respondent avers that what is PETITION to review the decision of the Court of Appeals.
applicable is the ruling of this Court in Magaspi v. Ramolete,wherein this
Court held that the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the case even if the The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
docket fee paid was insufficient. The contention that Manchester cannot apply
retroactively to this case is untenable. Statutes regulating the procedure of the GANCAYCO, J.:
courts will be construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at
Again the Court is asked to resolve the issue of whether or not a court
the time of their passage. Procedural laws are retrospective in that sense and
acquires jurisdiction over a case when the correct and proper docket fee has
to that extent.
not been paid.
Same; Same; Same; Jurisdiction; Complaint; Docket Fees; It is not only
On February 28, 1984, petitioner Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. (SIOL for
the filing of the complaint, but the payment of the prescribed docket fee, that
brevity) filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Metro
vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the
Manila for the consignation of a premium refund on a fire insurance policy
action.—It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory
with a prayer for the judicial declaration of its nullity against private
pleading, but the payment of the prescribed docket fee, that vests a trial court
respondent Manuel Uy Po Tiong. Private respondent was declared in default
with jurisdiction over the subject-matter or nature of the action. Where the
for failure to file the required answer within the reglementary period.
filing of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of the docket
fee, the court may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in no
On the other hand, on March 28, 1984, private respondent filed a
case beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.
complaint in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for the refund of
premiums and the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment which was
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; PermissiveCounterclaims; Thi
docketed as Civil Case No. Q-41177, initially against petitioner SIOL, and
rd-Party Claims; Permissive counter-claims, third-party claims and the like
thereafter including E.B. Philipps and D.J. Warby as additional defendants.
shall not be considered filed until and unless the prescribed filing fee is paid.
The complaint sought, among others, the payment of actual, compensatory,
—The same rule applies to permissive counterclaims, third-party claims and
moral, exemplary and liquidated damages, attorney’s fees, expenses of
similar pleadings, which shall not be considered filed until and unless the
litigation and costs of the suit. Although the prayer in the complaint did not
filing fee prescribed therefor is paid. The court may also allow payment of said
quantify the amount of damages sought said amount may be inferred from the
fee within a reasonable time but also in no case beyond its applicable
body of the complaint to be about Fifty Million Pesos (P50,000,000.00).
prescriptive or reglementary period.
 Only the amount of P210.00 was paid by private respondent as docket fee
which prompted petitioners’ counsel to raise his objection. Said objection was
disregarded by respondent Judge Jose P. Castro who was then presiding over
said case.
Upon the order of this Court, the records of said case together with twenty-
two other cases assigned to different branches of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City which were under investigation for under-assessment of docket
fees were transmitted to this Court. The Court thereafter returned the said
records to the trial court with the directive that they be reraffled to the other
judges in Quezon City, to the exclusion of Judge Castro. Civil Case No. Q-
41177 was re-raffled to Branch 104, a sala which was then vacant.
On October 15, 1985, the Court en banc issued a Resolution in
Administrative Case No. 85-10-8752-RTC directing the judges in said cases to
reassess the docket fees and that in case of deficiency, to order its payment.
The Resolution also requires all clerks of court to issue certificates of re-
assessment of docket fees. All litigants were likewise required to specify in
their pleadings the amount sought to be recovered in their complaints.
On December 16, 1985, Judge Antonio P. Solano, to whose sala Civil Case
No. Q-41177 was temporarily assigned, issued an order to the Clerk of Court
instructing him to issue a certificate of assessment of the docket fee paid by
private respondent and, in case of deficiency, to include the same in said
certificate.
On Jaunary 7, 1984, to forestall a default, a cautionary answer was filed by
petitioners. On August 30, 1984, an amended complaint was filed by private
respondent including the two additional defendants aforestated.
Judge Maximiano C. Asuncion, to whom Civil Case No. Q-41177 was
thereafter assigned, after his assumption into office on January 16, 1986,
issued a Supplemental Order requiring the parties in the case to comment on
the Clerk of Court’s letter-report signifying her difficulty in complying with
the Resolution of this Court of October 15, 1985 since the pleadings filed by
private respondent did not indicate the exact amount sought to be recovered.
On January 23, 1986, private respondent filed a “Compliance” and a “Re-
Amended Complaint” stating therein a claim of “not less than
P10,000,000.00 as actual compensatory damages” in the prayer. In the body
of the said second amended complaint however, private respondent alleges
actual and compensatory damages and attorney’s fees in the total amount of
about P44,601,623.70.
On January 24, 1986, Judge Asuncion issued another Order admitting the
second amended complaint and stating therein that the same constituted
proper compliance with the Resolution of this Court and that a copy thereof
should be furnished the Clerk of Court for the reassessment of the docket fees.
The reassessment by the Clerk of Court based on private respondent’s claim of
“not less than P10,000,000.00 as actual and compensatory damages”
amounted to P39,786.00 as docket fee. This was subsequently paid by private
respondent.
Petitioners then filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals
questioning the said order of Judge Asuncion dated January 24, 1986.
On April 24, 1986, private respondent filed a supplemental complaint
alleging an additional claim of P20,000,000.00 as damages so the total claim
amounts to about P64,601,623.70. On October 16, 1986, or some seven
months after filing the supplemental complaint, the private respondent paid
the additional docket fee of P80,396.00. 1
On August 13, 1987, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision ruling,
among others, as follows:
“WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Denying due course to the petition in CA-G.R. SP No. L-
09715 insofar as it seeks annulment of the order
1. (a)denying petitioners’ motion to dismiss the complaint, as
amended, and
2. (b)granting the writ of preliminary attachment, but giving
due course to the portion thereof questioning the
reassessment of the docketing fee, and requiring the
Honorable respondent Court to reassess the docketing fee
to be paid by private respondent on the basis of the amount
of P25,401,707.00.” 2
Hence, the instant petition.

During the pendency of this petition and in conformity with the said
judgment of respondent court, private respondent paid the additional docket
fee of P62,432.90 on April 28, 1988. 3
The main thrust of the petition is that the Court of Appeals erred in not
finding that the lower court did not acquire jurisdiction over Civil Case No. Q-
41177 on the ground of non-payment of the correct and proper docket fee.
Petitioners allege that while it may be true that private respondent had paid
the amount of P182,824.90 as docket fee as herein-above related, and
considering that the total amount sought to be recovered in the amended and
supplemental complaint is P64,601,623.70 the docket fee that should be paid
by private respondent is P257,810.49, more or less. Not having paid the same,
petitioners contend that the complaint should be dismissed and all incidents
arising therefrom should be annulled. In support of their theory, petitioners
cite the latest ruling of the Court in Manchester Development Corporation vs.
CA, as follows:
4
“The Court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the
payment of the prescribed docket fee. An amendment of the complaint
or similar pleading will not thereby vest jurisdiction in the Court,
much less the payment of the docket fee based on the amounts sought
in the amended pleading. The ruling in the Magaspi Case in so far as it
is inconsistent with this pronouncement is overturned and reversed.”
On the other hand, private respondent claims that the ruling
in Manchester cannot apply retroactively to Civil Case No. Q-41177 for at the
time said civil case was filed in court there was no such Manchester ruling as
yet. Further, private respondent avers that what is applicable is the ruling of
this Court in Magaspi v. Ramolete, wherein this Court held that the trial court
5
acquired jurisdiction over the case even if the docket fee paid was insufficient.
The contention that Manchester cannot apply retroactively to this case is
untenable. Statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed as
applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage.
Procedural laws are retrospective in that sense and to that extent. 6
In Lazaro vs. Endencia and Andres, this Court held that the payment of
7
the full amount of the docket fee is an indispensable step for the perfection of
an appeal. In a forcible entry and detainer case before the justice of the peace
court of Manaoag, Pangasinan, after notice of a judgment dismissing the case,
the plaintiff filed a notice of appeal with said court but he deposited only
P8.00 for the docket fee, instead of P16.00 as required, within the
reglementary period of appeal of five (5) days after receiving notice of
judgment. Plaintiff deposited the additional P8.00 to complete the amount of
the docket fee only fourteen (14) days later. On the basis of these facts, this
court held that the Court of First Instance did not acquire jurisdiction to hear
and determine the appeal as the appeal was not thereby perfected.
In Lee vs. Republic, the petitioner filed a verified declaration of intention
8
to become a Filipino citizen by sending it through registered mail to the Office
of the Solicitor General in 1953 but the required filing fee was paid only in
1956, barely 5-1/2 months prior to the filing of the petition for citizenship.
This Court ruled that the declaration was not filed in accordance with the legal
requirement that such declaration should be filed at least one year before the
filing of the petition for citizenship. Citing Lazaro,this Court concluded that
the filing of petitioner’s declaration of intention on October 23, 1953 produced
no legal effect until the required filing fee was paid on May 23, 1956.
In Malimit vs. Degamo, the
9
same principles enunciated
in Lazaro and Lee were applied. It was an original petition for quo
warranto contesting the right to office of proclaimed candidates which was
mailed, addressed to the clerk of the Court of First Instance, within the one-
week period after the proclamation as provided therefor by law. However, the
10
required docket fees were paid only after the expiration of said period.
Consequently, this Court held that the date of such payment must be deemed
to be the real date of filing of aforesaid petition and not the date when it was
mailed.
Again, in Garica vs. Vasquez, this Court reiterated the rule that the docket
11
fee must be paid before a court will act on a petition or complaint. However,
we also held that said rule is not applicable when petitioner seeks the probate
of several wills of the same decedent as he is not required to file a separate
action for each will but instead he may have other wills probated in the same
special proceeding then pending before the same court.
Then in Magaspi, this Court reiterated the ruling in Malimit and Lee that
12
a case is deemed filed only upon payment of the docket fee regardless of the
actual date of its filing in court. Said case involved a complaint for recovery of
ownership and possession of a parcel of land with damages filed in the Court
of First Instance of Cebu. Upon the payment of P60.00 for the docket fee and
10.00 for the sheriffs fee, the complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. R-
11882. The prayer of the complaint sought that the Transfer Certificate of Title
issued in the name of the defendant be declared as null and void. It was also
prayed that plaintiff be declared as owner thereof to whom the proper title
should be issued, and that defendant be made to pay monthly rentals of
P3,500.00 from June 2, 1948 up to the time the property is delivered to
plaintiff, P500,000.00 as moral damages, attorney’s fees in the amount of
P250,000.00, the costs of the action and exemplary damages in the amount
ofP500,000.00.
The defendant then filed a motion to compel the plaintiff to pay the correct
amount of the docket fee to which an opposition was filed by the plaintiff
alleging that the action was for the recovery of a parcel of land so the docket
fee must be based on its assessed value and that the amount of P60.00 was
the correct docketing fee. The trial court ordered the plaintiff to pay P3,l04.00
as filing fee.
The plaintiff then filed a motion to admit the amended complaint to
include the Republic as the defendant. In the prayer of the amended
complaint the exemplary damages earlier sought was eliminated. The
amended prayer merely sought moral damages as the court may determine,
attorney’s fees of P100,000.00 and the costs of the action. The defendant filed
an opposition to the amended complaint. The opposition notwithstanding, the
amended complaint was admitted by the trial court. The trial court reiterated
its order for the payment of the additional docket fee which plaintiff assailed
and then challenged before this Court. Plaintiff alleged that he paid the total
docket fee in the amount of P60.00 and that if he has to pay the additional fee
it must be based on the amended complaint.
The question posed, therefore, was whether or not the plaintiff may be
considered to have filed the case even if the docketing fee paid was not
sufficient. In Magaspi, We reiterated the rule that the case was deemed filed
only upon the payment of the correct amount for the docket fee regardless of
the actual date of the filing of the complaint; that there was an honest
difference of opinion as to the correct amount to be paid as docket fee in that
as the action appears to be one for the recovery of property the docket fee of
P60.00 was correct; and that as the action is also one for damages, We upheld
the assessment of the additional docket fee based on the damages alleged in
the amended complaint as against the assessment of the trial court which was
based on the damages alleged in the original complaint.
However, as aforecited, this Court overturned Magaspi in Manchester.
Manchester involves an action for torts and damages and specific
performance with a prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order,
etc. The prayer in said case is for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
prohibitory injunction during the pendency of the action against the
defendants’ announced forfeiture of the sum of P3 Million paid by the
plaintiffs for the property in question, the attachment of such property of
defendants that may be sufficient to satisfy any judgment that may be
rendered, and, after hearing, the issuance of an order requiring defendants to
execute a contract of purchase and sale of the subject property and annul
defendants’ illegal forfeiture of the money of plaintiff. It was also prayed that
the defendants be made to pay the plaintiff, jointly and severally, actual,
compensatory and exemplary damages as well as 25% of said amounts as may
be proved during the trial for attorney’s fees. The plaintiff also asked the trial
court to declare the tender of payment of the purchase price of plaintiff valid
and sufficient for purposes of payment, and to make the injunction
permanent. The amount of damages sought is not specified in the prayer
although the body of the complaint alleges the total amount of over P78
Millon allegedly suffered by plaintiff.
Upon the filing of the complaint, the plaintiff paid the amount of only
P410.00 for the docket fee based on the nature of the action for specific
performance where the amount involved is not capable of pecuniary
estimation. However, it was obvious from the allegations of the complaint as
well as its designation that the action was one for damages and specific
performance. Thus, this court held the plaintiff must be assessed the correct
docket fee computed against the amount of damages of about P78 Million,
although the same was not spelled out in the prayer of the complaint.
Meanwhile, plaintiff through another counsel, with leave of court, filed an
amended complaint on September 12, 1985 by the inclusion of another co-
plaintiff and eliminating any mention of the amount of damages in the body of
the complaint. The prayer in the original complaint was maintained.
 On October 15, 1985, this Court ordered the re-assessment of the docket
fee in the said case and other cases that were investigated. On November 12,
1985, the trial court directed the plaintiff to rectify the amended complaint by
stating the amounts which they were asking for. This plaintiff did as
instructed. In the body of the complaint the amount of damages alleged was
reduced to P10,000,000.00 but still no amount of damages was specified in
the prayer. Said amended complaint was admitted.
Applying the principle in Magaspi that “the case is deemed filed only upon
payment of the docket fee regardless of the actual date of filing in court,” this
Court held that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case by
payment of only P410.00 for the docket fee. Neither can the amendment of
the complaint thereby vest jurisdiction upon the Court. For all legal purposes
there was no such original complaint duly filed which could be amended.
Consequently, the order admitting the amended complaint and all subsequent
proceedings and actions taken by the trial court were declared null and void. 13
The present case, as above discussed, is among the several cases of under-
assessment of docket fee which were investigated by this Court together
with Manchester. The facts and circumstances of this case are similar
to Manchester. In the body of the original complaint, the total amount of
damages sought amounted to about P50 Million. In the prayer, the amount of
damages asked for was not stated. The action was for the refund of the
premium and the issuance of the writ of preliminary attachment with
damages. The amount of only P210.00 was paid for the docket fee. On
January 23, 1986, private respondent filed an amended complaint wherein in
the prayer it is asked that he be awarded no less than P10,000,000.00 as
actual and exemplary damages but in the body of the complaint the amount of
his pecuniary claim is approximately P44,601,623.70. Said amended
complaint was admitted and the private respondent was reassessed the
additional docket fee of P39,786.00 based on his prayer of not less than
P10,000,000.00 in damages, which he paid.
On April 24, 1986, private respondent filed a supplemental complaint
alleging an additional claim of P20,000,000.00 in damages so that his total
claim is approximately P64,601,620.70. On October 16, 1986, private
respondent paid an additional docket fee of P80,396.00. After the
promulgation of the decision of the respondent court on August 31, 1987
wherein private respondent was ordered to be reassessed for additional
docket fee, and during the pendency of this petition, and after the
promulgation of Manchester,on April 28, 1988, private respondent paid an
additional docket fee of P62,132.92. Although private respondent appears to
have paid a total amount of P182,824.90 for the docket fee considering the
total amount of his claim in the amended and supplemental complaint
amounting to about P64,601,620.70, petitioner insists that private
respondent must pay a docket fee of P257,810.49.
The principle in Manchester could very well be applied in the present case.
The pattern and the intent to defraud the government of the docket fee due it
is obvious not only in the filing of the original complaint but also in the filing
of the second amended complaint.
However, in Manchester,petitioner did not pay any additional docket fee
untill the case was decided by this Court on May 7, 1987. Thus,
in Manchester, due to the fraud committed on the government, this Court
held that the court a quo did not acquire jurisdiction over the case and that
the amended complaint could not have been admitted inasmuch as the
original complaint was null and void.
In the present case, a more liberal interpretation of the rules is called for
considering that, unlike Manchester, private respondent demonstrated his
willingness to abide by the rules by paying the additional docket fees as
required. The promulgation of the decision in Manchestermust have had that
sobering influence on private respondent who thus paid the additional docket
fee as ordered by the respondent court. It triggered his change of stance by
manifesting his willingness to pay such additional docket fee as may be
ordered.
Nevertheless, petitioners contend that the docket fee that was paid is still
insufficient considering the total amount of the claim. This is a matter which
the clerk of court of the lower court and/or his duly authorized docket clerk or
clerk in-charge should determine and, thereafter, if any amount is found due,
he must require the private respondent to pay the same. Thus, the Court rules
as follows:
1. 1.It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory
pleading, but the payment of the prescribed docket fee, that vests a
trial court with jurisdiction over the subject-matter or nature of the
 action. Where the filing of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied
by payment of the docket fee, the court may allow payment of the fee
within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable
prescriptive or reglementary period.

2. 2.The same rule applies to permissive counterclaims, third-party

claims and similar pleadings, which shall not be considered filed
until and unless the filing fee prescribed therefor is paid. The court
may also allow payment of said fee within a reasonable time but also
in no case beyond its applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.

3. 3.Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a claim by the filing
of the appropriate pleading and payment of the prescribed filing fee
but, subsequently, the judgment awards a claim not specified in the
pleading, or if specified the same has been left for determination by
the court, the additional filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien on
the judgment. It shall be the responsibility of the Clerk of Court or
his duly authorized deputy to enforce said lien and assess and collect
the additional fee.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

The Clerk of Court of the court a quo is hereby instructed to reassess and
determine the additional filing fee that should be paid by private respondent
considering the total amount of the claim sought in the original complaint and
the supplemental complaint as may be gleaned from the allegations and the
prayer thereof and to require private respondent to pay the deficiency, if any,
without pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.

Note.—Court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon payment of the
prescribed docket fee. An amendment of the complaint or similar pleading
will not vest jurisdiction in the court, much less payment of the docket fee
based on amount in the amended pleading. (Manchester Development
Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 149 SCRA 562.)
 G.R. Nos. 88075-77.December 20, 1989. * property, or any interest therein, except actions for forcible entry into and
MAXIMO TACAY, PONCIANO PANES and ANTONIA NOEL,
petitioners, vs. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF TAGUM, Davao del
Norte, Branches 1 and 2, Presided by Hon. Marcial Fernandez and
Hon. Jesus Matas, respectively, PATSITA GAMUTAN, Clerk of
Court, and GODOFREDO PINEDA, respondents.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Judgment; Dismissal of petition for
failure to comply with Circular No. 1-88; Copies of challenged orders were
not certified by the clerk of court or his duly authorized representative but
by petitioner’s counsel which is not allowed.—It should be dismissed for
failure to comply with this Court’s Circular No. 1-88 (effective January 1,
1989). The copies of the challenged Orders thereto attached were not certified
by the proper Clerk of Court or his duly authorized representative.
Certification was made by the petitioners’ counsel, which is not allowed.
Same; Same; Actions; Jurisdiction; Determinative of the court’s
jurisdiction in actions for recovery of possession of real property is the
nature thereof, not the amount of the damages allegedly arising from or
connected with the issue of title or possession, and regardless of the value of
the property.—It is true that the complaints do not state the amounts being
claimed as actual, moral and nominal damages. It is also true, however, that
the actions are not basically for the recovery of sums of money. They are
principally for recovery of possession of real property, in the nature of
an accion publiciana. Determinative of the court’s jurisdiction in this type of
actions is the nature thereof, not the amount of the damages allegedly arising
from or connected with the issue of title or possession, and regardless of the
value of the property. Quite obviously, an action for recovery of possession of
real property (such as an accion plenaria de posesion) or the title thereof, or
for partition or condemnation of, or the foreclosure of a mortgage on, said real
property—in other words, a real action—may be commenced and prosecuted
without an accompanying claim for actual, moral, nominal or exemplary
damages; and such an action would fall within the exclusive, original
jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts under
B.P. 129; Application of the rule.—Batas Pambansa Bilang 129 provides that
Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction inter
alia over “all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real
unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which is
conferred upon Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts.” The rule applies regardless of the value of the
real property involved, whether it be worth more than P20,000.00 or
not, infra. The rule also applies even where the complaint involving realty
also prays for an award of damages; the amount of those damages would be
immaterial to the question of the Court’s jurisdiction. The rule is unlike that
in other cases—e.g., actions simply for recovery of money or of personal
property, or actions in admiralty and maritime jurisdiction—in which the
amount claimed, or the value of the personal property, is determinative of
jurisdiction; i.e., the value of the personal property or the amount claimed
should exceed twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) in order to be cognizable
by the Regional Trial Court.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Filing Fees; Circular No. 7ofthe Supreme
Court cannot be invoked as authority for dismissal of the actions at bar;
Circular was avowedly inspired by the Manchester ruling.—Circular No. 7 of
this Court, dated March 24, 1988, cannot thus be invoked, as the petitioner
does, as authority for the dismissal of the actions at bar. That circular,
avowedly inspired by the doctrine laid down in Manchester Development
Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 149 SCRA 562 (May 7, 1987), has but
limited application to said actions, as shall presently be discussed. Moreover,
the rules therein laid down have since been clarified and amplified by the
Court’s subsequent decision in Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. (SIOL)
v. Asuncion, et al., G.R. Nos..79937-38, February 13, 1989.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Purpose of Circular No. 7.—Circular
No. 7 was aimed at the practice of certain parties who omit from the prayer of
their complaints “any specification of the amount of damages,” the omission
being “clearly intended for no other purpose than to evade the payment of the
correct filing fees if not to mislead the docket clerk, in the assessment of the
filing fee.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Requirement in Circular No. 7 that
complaints, etc. should specify the amount of damages being prayed for not
only in the body of the pleading but also in the prayer has not been altered;
New rule that trial courts are now authorized to allow payment of the fee
within a reasonable time but not beyond the prescriptive or reglementary
period; For damages arising after the filing of the complaint or similar
pleading, the additional filing fee shall constitute a lien on the judgment.—As
will be noted, the requirement in Circular No. 7 that complaints, petitions,
answers, and similar pleadings should specify the amount of damages being
prayed for not only in the body of the pleading but also in the prayer, has not
been altered. What has been revised is the rule that subsequent “amendment
of the complaint or similar pleading will not thereby vest jurisdiction in the
Court, much less the payment of the docket fee based on the amount sought in
the amended pleading,” the trial court now being authorized to allow payment
of the fee within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable
prescriptive or reglementary period. Moreover, a new rule has been added,
governing awards of claims not specified in the pleading—i.e., damages
arising after the filing of the complaint or similar pleading—as to which the
additional filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien on the judgment.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Where the action is purely for
recovery of money or damages, the docket fees are assessed on the basis of
the aggregate amount claimed, exclusive only of interests and costs.—Where
the action is purely for the recovery of money or damages, the docket fees are
assessed on the basis of the aggregate amount claimed, exclusive only of
interests and costs. In this case, the complaint or similar pleading should,
according to Circular No. 7 of this Court, “specify the amount of damages
being prayed for not only in the body of the pleading but also in the prayer,
and said damages shall be considered in the assessment of the filing fees in
any case.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Rules to be applied where the
complaint or similar pleading sets out a claim purely for money or
damages, and there is no precise statement of the amounts being claimed, or
where the pleading specifies the amount of every claim, but the fees paid are
insufficient.—Two situations may arise. One is where the complaint or similar
pleading sets out a claim purely for money or damages and there is no precise
statement of the amounts being claimed. In this event the rule is that the
pleading will “not be accepted nor admitted, or shall otherwise be expunged
from the record.” In other words, the complaint or pleading may be
dismissed, or the claims as to which the amounts are unspecified may be
expunged, although as aforestated the Court may, on motion, permit
amendment of the complaint and payment of the fees provided the claim has
not in the meantime become time-barred. The other is where the pleading
does specify the amount of every claim, but the fees paid are insufficient; and
here again, the rule now is that the court may allow a reasonable time for the
payment of the prescribed fees, or the balance thereof, and upon such
payment, the defect is cured and the court may properly take cognizance of
the action, unless in the meantime prescription has set in and consequently
barred the right of action.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Where the action involves real
property and a related claim for damages, the legal fees shall be assessed on
the basis of both the value of the property and the total amount of related
damages sought; Rule where no amounts of the damages are specified.—
Where the action involves real property and a related claim for damages as
well, the legal fees shall be assessed on the basis of both (a) the value of the
property and (b) the total amount of related damages sought. The Court
acquires jurisdiction over the action if the filing of the initiatory pleading is
accompanied by the payment of the requisite fees, or, if the fees are not paid
at the time of the filing of the pleading, as of the time of full payment of the
fees within such reasonable time as the court may grant, unless, of course,
prescription has set in in the meantime. But where—as in the case at bar—the
fees prescribed for an action involving real property have been paid, but the
amounts of certain of the related damages (actual, moral and nominal) being
demanded are unspecified, the action may not be dismissed. The Court
undeniably has jurisdiction over the action involving the real property,
acquiring it upon the filing of the complaint or similar pleading and payment
of the prescribed fee. And it is not divested of that authority by the
circumstance that it may not have acquired jurisdiction over the
accompanying claims for damages because of lack of specification thereof.
What should be done is simply to expunge those claims for damages as to
which no amounts are stated, which is what the respondent Courts did, or
allow, on motion, a reasonable time for the amendment of the complaints so
as to allege the precise amount of each item of damages and accept payment
of the requisite fees therefor within the relevant prescriptive period.
JOINT PETITION for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus to review the
orders of the Regional Trial Court of Tagum, Davao del Norte, Br. 1 and 2.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
RESOLUTION
NARVASA, J.:
In the Regional Trial Court at Tagum, Davao del Norte, three (3) actions for
1
recovery of possession (acciones publicianas ) were separately instituted by
2
Godofredo Pineda against three (3) defendants, docketed as follows:
1. 1)vs. Antonia NoelCivil Case No. 2209
2. 2)vs. Ponciano PanesCivil Case No. 2210
3. 3)vs. Maximo TacayCivil Case No. 2211.
Civil Cases Numbered 2209 and 2211 were raffled to Branch I of the Trial
Court, presided over by Judge Marcial Hernandez. Civil No. 2210 was
assigned to Branch 2, presided over by Judge Jesus Matas.
The complaints all alleged the same essential facts: (1) Pineda was the
3
owner of a parcel of land measuring 790 square meters, his ownership being
evidenced by TCT No. T-46560; (2) the previous owner had allowed the
defendants to occupy portions of the land by mere tolerance; (3) having
himself need to use the property, Pineda had made demands on the
defendants to vacate the property and pay reasonable rentals therefor, but
these demands had been refused; and (4) the last demand had been made
more than a year prior to the commencement of suit. The complaints prayed
for the same reliefs, to wit:
1. 1)that plaintiff be declared owner of the areas occupied by the defendants;
2. 2)that defendants and their “privies and allies” be ordered to vacate and
deliver the portions of the land usurped by them;
3. 3)that each defendant be ordered to pay:
1. 1)P2,000 as monthly rents from February, 1987;
2. 2)“Actual damages, as proven;”
3. 3)“Moral and nominal damages as the Honorable Court may fix;” 4
4. 4)“P30,000.00, “as attorney’s fees, and representation fees of P5,000.00 per
day of appearance;”
and
1. 4)that he (Pineda) be granted such “further relief and remedies x x just and
equitable in the premises.”
The prayer of each complaint contained a handwritten notation (evidently
made by plaintiffs counsel) reading, “P5,000.00 as and for,” immediately
above the typewritten words, “Actual damages, as proven,” the intention
apparently being to make the entire phrase read, “5,000.00 as and for actual
damages as proven.” 5
Motions to dismiss were filed in behalf of each of the defendants by
common counsel. Every motion alleged that the Trial Court had not acquired
6
jurisdiction of the case—
“. . . for the reason that the x x complaint violates the mandatory and
clear provision of Circular No. 7 of the x x Supreme Court dated March
24, 1988, by failing to specify all the amounts of damages which
plaintiff is claiming from defendant;” and
“. . . for x x failure (of the complaint) to even allege the basic
requirement as to the assessed value of the subject lot in dispute.”
Judge Matas denied the motion to dismiss filed in Civil Case No. 2210 but
ordered the expunction of the “allegations in paragraph 11 of the x x complaint
regarding moral as well as nominal damages.” On motion of defendant Panes,
7
Judge Matas later ordered the striking out, too, of the “handwritten amount of
‘P5,000.00 as and for,’ including the typewritten words ‘actual damages as
proven’ x x in sub-paragraph b of paragraph 4 in the conclusion and prayer of
the complaint x x.” 8
The motions to dismiss submitted in Civil Cases Numbered 2211 and 2209
were also denied in separate orders promulgated by Judge Marcial
Fernandez. His Order in Case No. 2209 dated March 15, 1989 (a) declared
9
that since the “action at bar is for Reivindicatoria, Damages and Attorney’s
fees x x (d)efinitely this Court has the exclusive jurisdiction,” (b) that the
claims for actual, moral and nominal damages “are only one aspect of the
cause of action,” and (c) because of absence of specification of the amounts
claimed as moral, nominal and actual damages, they should be “expunged
from the records.”
Ascribing grave abuse of discretion to both Judges Matas and Fernandez in
the rendition of the Orders above described, the defendants in all three (3)
actions have filed with this Court a “Joint Petition” for certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus, with prayer for temporary restraining order and/or writ of
preliminary prohibitory injunction,” praying essentially that said orders be
annulled and respondent judges directed to dismiss all the complaints
“without prejudice to private respondent Pineda’s re-filing a similar
complaint that complies with Circular No. 7.” The joint petition (a) re-
asserted the proposition that because the complaints had failed to state the
amounts being claimed as actual, moral and nominal damages, the Trial
Courts aquo had not acquired jurisdiction over the three (3) actions in
question—indeed, the respondent Clerk of Court should not have accepted the
complaints which initiated said suits, and (b) it was not proper merely to
expunge the claims for damages and allow “the so-called cause of action for
‘reivindicatoria’ to remain for trial” by itself.
10
The joint petition should be, as it is hereby, dismissed. It should be
dismissed for failure to comply with this Court’s Circular No. 1-88 (effective
January 1, 1989). The copies of the challenged Orders thereto attached were11
not certified by the proper Clerk of Court or his duly authorized
representative. Certification was made by the petitioners’ counsel, which is
not allowed.
The petition should be dismissed, too, for another equally important
reason. It fails to demonstrate any grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
respondent Judges in rendering the Orders complained of or, for that matter,
the existence of any proper cause for the issuance of the writ of mandamus.
On the contrary, the orders appear to have correctly applied the law to the
admitted facts.
It is true that the complaints do not state the amounts being claimed as
actual, moral and nominal damages. It is also true, however, that the actions
are not basically for the recovery of sums of money. They are principally for
recovery of possession of real property, in the nature of an accion publiciana.
Determinative of the court’s jurisdiction in this type of actions is the nature
thereof, not the amount of the damages allegedly arising from or connected
with the issue of title or possession, and regardless of the value of the
property. Quite obviously, an action for recovery of possession of real
property (such as an accion plenaria de posesion) or the title thereof, or for
12
partition or condemnation of, or the foreclosure of a mortgage on, said real
property —in other words, a real action—may be commenced and prosecuted
13
without an accompanying claim for actual, moral, nominal or exemplary
damages; and such an action would fall within the exclusive, original
jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court.
Batas Pambansa Bilang 129 provides that Regional Trial Courts shall
exercise exclusive original jurisdiction inter alia over “all civil actions which
involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein,
except actions for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or
buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon Metropolitan
Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts.” The 14
rule applies regardless of the value of the real property involved, whether it be
worth more than P20,000.00 or not, infra. The rule also applies even where
the complaint involving realty also prays for an award of damages; the
amount of those damages would be immaterial to the question of the Court’s
jurisdiction. The rule is unlike that in other cases—e.g., actions simply for
recovery of money or of personal property, or actions in admiralty and
15
maritime jurisdiction —in which the amount claimed, or the value of the
16 17
personal property, is determinative of jurisdiction; i.e., the value of the
personal property or the amount claimed should exceed twenty thousand
pesos (P20,000.00) in order to be cognizable by the Regional Trial Court.
Circular No. 7 of this Court, dated March 24, 1988, cannot thus be invoked,
as the petitioner does, as authority for the dismissal of the actions at bar. That
circular, avowedly inspired by the doctrine laid down in Manchester
Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 149 SCRA 562 (May 7, 1987),
has but limited application to said actions, as shall presently be discussed.
Moreover, the rules therein laid down have since been clarified and amplified
by the Court’s subsequent decision in Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. (SIOL)
v. Asuncion, et al., G.R. Nos. 79937-38, February 13, 1989.
Circular No. 7 was aimed at the practice of certain parties who omit from
the prayer of their complaints “any specification of the amount of damages,”
the omission being “clearly intended for no other purposes than to evade the
payment of the correct filing fees if not to mislead the docket clerk, in the
assessment of the filing fee.” The following rules were therefore set down:
1. 1.All complaints, petitions, answers, and similar pleadings should
specify the amount of damages being prayed for not only in the body
of the pleading but also in the prayer, and said damages shall be
considered in the assessment of the filing fees in any case.
2. 2.Any pleading that fails to comply with this requirement shall not be
accepted nor admitted, or shall otherwise be expunged from the
record.
3. 3.The Court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment
of the prescribed docket fee. An amendment of the complaint or
similar pleading will not thereby vest jurisdiction in the Court, much
less the payment of the docket fee based on the amount sought in the
amended pleading.
The clarificatory and additional rules laid down in Sun Insurance
Office, Ltd. v. Asuncion, supra, read as follows:
1. 1.It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory
pleading, but (also) the payment of the prescribed docket fee that
vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject-matter or nature
of the action. Where the filing of the initiatory pleading is not
accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the court may allow
payment of
1. the fee within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable
prescriptive or reglementary period.
2. 2.The same rule applies to permissive counterclaims, third-party
claims and similar pleadings, which shall not be considered filed
until and unless the filing fee prescribed therefor is paid. The court
may also allow payment of said fee within a reasonable time but also
in no case beyond its applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.
3. 3.Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a claim by the filing
of the appropriate pleading and payment of the prescribed filing fee
but, subsequently, the judgment awards a claim not specified in the
pleading, or if specified, the same has been left for determination by
the court, the additional filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien on
the judgment. It shall be the responsibility of the Clerk of Court or
his duly authorized deputy to enforce said lien and assess and collect
the additional fee.”
As will be noted, the requirement in Circular No. 7 that complaints,
petitions, answers, and similar pleadings should specify the amount of
damages being prayed for not only in the body of the pleading but also in the
prayer, has not been altered. What has been revised is the rule that
subsequent “amendment of the complaint or similar pleading will not thereby
vest jurisdiction in the Court, much less the payment of the docket fee based
on the amount sought in the amended pleading,” the trial court now being
authorized to allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in no case
beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period. Moreover, a new
rule has been added, governing awards of claims not specified in the pleading
—i.e., damages arising after the filing of the complaint or similar pleading—as
to which the additional filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien on the
judgment.
Now, under the Rules of Court, docket or filing fees are assessed on the
basis of the “sum claimed,” on the one hand, or the “value of the property in
litigation or the value of the estate,” on the other. There are, in other words,
18
as already above intimated, actions or proceedings involving real property, in
which the value of the property is immaterial to the court’s jurisdiction,
account thereof being taken merely for assessment of the legal fees; and there
are actions or proceedings, involving personal property or the recovery of
money and/or damages, in which the value of the property or the amount of
the demand is decisive of the trial court’s competence (aside from being the
basis for fixing the corresponding docket fees). 19
Where the action is purely for the recovery of money or damages, the
docket fees are assessed on the basis of the aggregate amount claimed,
exclusive only of interests and costs. In this case, the complaint or similar
pleading should, according to Circular No. 7 of this Court, “specify the amount
of damages being prayed for not only in the body of the pleading but also in
the prayer, and said damages shall be considered in the assessment of the
filing fees in any case.”
 Two situations may arise. One is where the complaint or similar pleading WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED, without pronouncement as to
sets out a claim purely for money or damages and there is no precise costs.
statement of the amounts being claimed. In this event the rule is that the
pleading will “not be accepted nor admitted, or shall otherwise be expunged Notes.—Jurisdiction is determined by the law in force at the time of the
from the record.” In other words, the complaint or pleading may be commencement of the action. (Lee vs. Municipal Trial Court of Legaspi, 145
dismissed, or the claims as to which the amounts are unspecified may be SCRA 408.)
expunged, although as aforestated the Court may, on motion, permit
amendment of the complaint and payment of the fees provided the claim has There is no rule authorizing a court personnel or branch clerk of court to
not in the meantime become time-barred. The other is where the pleading issue a “notice of case status.” (Koh vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 144
does specify the amount of every claim, but the fees paid are insufficient; and SCRA 259.)
here again, the rule now is that the court may allow a reasonable time for the
payment of the prescribed fees, or the balance thereof, and upon such
payment, the defect is cured and the court may properly take cognizance of
the action, unless in the meantime prescription has set in and consequently
barred the right of action.

Where the action involves real property and a related claim for damages as
well, the legal fees shall be assessed on the basis of both (a) the value of the
property and (b) the total amount of related damages sought. The Court
acquires jurisdiction over the action if the filing of the initiatory pleading is
accompanied by the payment of the requisite fees, or, if the fees are not paid
at the time of the filing of the pleading, as of the time of full payment of the
fees within such reasonable time as the court may grant, unless, of course,
prescription has set in in the meantime. But where—as in the case at bar—the
fees prescribed for an action involving real property have been paid, but the
amounts of certain of the related damages (actual, moral and nominal) being
demanded are unspecified, the action may not be dismissed. The Court
undeniably has jurisdiction over the action involving the real property,
acquiring it upon the filing of the complaint or similar pleading and payment
of the prescribed fee. And it is not divested of that authority by the
circumstance that it may not have acquired jurisdiction over the
accompanying claims for damages because of lack of specification thereof.
What should be done is simply to expunge those claims for damages as to
which no amounts are stated, which is what the respondent Courts did, or
allow, on motion, a reasonable time for the amendment of the complaints so
as to allege the precise amount of each item of damages and accept payment
of the requisite fees therefor within the relevant prescriptive period.
 G.R. No. 149227. December 11, 2003. * dismissal; second, such power should be used by the court in conjunction with
LA SALETTE COLLEGE, Represented by Its President, FR. ROMEO
GONZALES, MS; and JESUS T. BAYAUA, Dean of Student Services,
petitioners, vs. VICTOR C. PILOTIN, respondent.
Actions; Appeals; Docket Fees; Pleadings and Practice; The payment of
docket fees is not a trivial matter—these fees are necessary to defray court
expenses in the handling of cases.—The payment of docket fees is not a trivial
matter. These fees are necessary to defray court expenses in the handling of
cases. For this reason, and to secure a just and speedy disposition of every
action and proceeding, the Rules on Civil Procedure mandates the payment of
docket and other lawful fees within the prescribed period. Otherwise, the
jurisdiction of the proper court to handle a case is adversely affected.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Full payment of the appellate docket fees
within the prescribed period is mandatory, even jurisdictional, for the
perfection of the appeal.—Accordingly, in order to perfect an appeal from a
decision rendered by the RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, the
following requirements must be complied with. First, within 15 days, a notice
of appeal must be filed with the court that rendered the judgment or final
order sought to be appealed; second, such notice must be served on the
adverse party; and third, within the same 15-day period, the full amount of
appellate court docket and other legal fees must be paid to the clerk of the
court that rendered the judgment or final order. It should be noted that full
payment of the appellate docket fees within the prescribed period is
mandatory, even jurisdictional, for the perfection of the appeal. Otherwise,
the appellate court would not be able to act on the subject matter of the
action, and the decision or final order sought to be appealed from would
become final and executory.
Same; Same; Same; Failure to pay appellate docket fees within the
reglementary period allows only discretionary, not automatic, dismissal,
which power should be used by the court in conjunction with its exercise of
sound discretion in accordance with the tenets of justice and fair play, as
well as with a great deal of circumspection in consideration of all attendant
circumstances.—Notwithstanding the mandatory nature of the requirement of
payment of appellate docket fees, we also recognize that its strict application
is qualified by the following: first, failure to pay those fees within the
reglementary period allows only discretionary, not automatic,
its exercise of sound discretion in accordance with the tenets of justice and
fair play, as well as with a great deal of circumspection in consideration of all
attendant circumstances.
Attorneys; Lawyers are not merely representatives of the parties but,
first and foremost, officers of the court—they are obliged to observe rules of
procedure in good faith, not to misuse them to defeat the ends of justice.—On
this point, petitioners’ counsel is reminded of the role that lawyers play in the
dispensation of justice. Bayas v. Sandiganbayan held thus: “Lawyers are not
merely representatives of the parties but, first and foremost, officers of the
court. As such, one of their duties—assisting in the speedy and efficient
administration of justice—is more significant than that of [the cause of] their
client, rightly or wrongly. x x x. We stress that candor in all dealings is the
very essence of membership in the legal profession. Lawyers are obliged to
observe rules of procedure in good faith, not to misuse them to defeat the
ends of justice.”
Docket Fees; The payment of docket fees is an essential requirement for
the perfection of an appeal.—We stress that the payment of docket fees is not
a mere technicality of law or procedure, but an essential requirement for the
perfection of an appeal. Without such payment, the appellate court does not
acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action, and the decision or
final order sought to be appealed from becomes final and executory. As laid
down in Barangay 24 of Legaspi City v. Imperial: “The right to appeal is not
a natural right or a part of due process. It is purely a statutory privilege, and
may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of
the law. Well-rooted is the principle that perfection of an appeal within the
statutory or reglementary period is not only mandatory but also jurisdictional
and failure to do so renders the questioned decision final and executory, and
deprives the appellate court of jurisdiction to alter the final judgment much
less to entertain the appeal.”
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decisions of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
An appeal is not perfected by the mere filing of a Notice of Appeal that has
been served on the adverse party. The docket fees must likewise be paid
within the reglementary period. Petitioners have failed to show why they
merit an exception to these stringent rules.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
1
seeking to set aside the November 16, 2000 and the June 22, 2001
2
Resolutions of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV UDK No. 0236C. The
3
November 16, 2000 Resolution disposed as follows:
“In view of the foregoing, Appellee’s ‘Motion for Reconsideration’ is
GRANTED. The Resolution, dated March 14, 2000, is hereby
RECALLED and SET ASIDE and the appeal is hereby DISMISSED.” 4
The June 22, 2001 Resolution denied reconsideration.
The Facts
The facts of the case are narrated by the trial court as follows:
5
“[Respondent] is a bonafide student of [petitioner] College dating
back [to] the school year 1988-1989 taking up the degree of Bachelor
of Science in Commerce. In the enrollment period for the second
semester held on October 22 to November 5, 1993, [respondent] was
denied re-enrollment, despite repeated pleas by x x x himself and by
other interested parties and his lawyer.
“On November 16, 1993, he filed his complaint and asked for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction to compel
[petitioner college to] re-admit him. On December 28, 1993, an Order
was issued directing [petitioner college] to admit [respondent] for the
second semester but still [petitioner college] refused to re-admit
[respondent], despite implementation of said order and the pleas of
[respondent] thru his counsel so that he could catch up with the bulk
of the school days of the semester and could graduate.
“Because of the adamant refusal of [respondent] school in re-
admitting him and his defiance to the order and because the period of
the second semester [was] already about to close, [respondent]
amended his complaint and concentrate[d] on damages, hence, this
case.
“On the other hand, the [petitioner college] alleged that it opened its
enrollment period for the second semester of school year 1993-1994
on 11 October 1993 up to 22 October, 1993 to 05 November, 1993.
However, classes for the second semester of that school year
commenced on 25 October, 1993. During these periods for enrolment,
[respondent] never enrolled with the x x x College and neither did he
accomplish the basic requirements for enrolment. However, on 05
November, 1993, the x x x College was in receipt of a letter from Atty.
Quirino L. Pilotin dated on that same date requesting for a
reconsideration of an alleged decision denying enrolment to the
[respondent]. Upon receipt of the said letter, it was endorsed to
[Respondent] Bayaua who in turn wrote Atty. Pilotin explaining
among others that was not denied enrolment but rather [the] latter
did not enroll with the said College. Considering, however, that the x x
x College started its regular classes on 25 October, 1993, in the event
[respondent] was able to enroll on 6 November, 1993, he would have
then exceeded the required absences for his supposed enrolled
subjects.
“Since plaintiff failed to enroll on the last day for enrolment, there is
no reason why the x x x College should relax its rules to accommodate
[respondent]. The x x x College merely imposed its disciplining
authority when it sets dates for the period to enroll and the matter of
admission of students is within the ambit of academic freedom and
beyond the province of the Courts to decide.” 6
On November 17, 1998, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of
respondent. Petitioners received the Decision on November 26, 1998. On the
7
same date, they filed a Notice of Appeal, which the RTC approved on
December 2, 1998.
Respondent moved for a reconsideration thereof on the ground of
petitioners’ failure to pay the docket fees within the reglementary period. The
trial court, however, denied the Motion in its April 23, 1999 Order. 8
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
 In its November 29, 1999 Resolution, the CA dismissed the appeal of
petitioners for their failure to pay “the required docketing fee within the
period for filing an appeal.” But, upon their motion, the CA granted, in a
9
Resolution dated March 14, 2000, reconsideration of their appeal, which it
reinstated “in the interest of substantial justice and considering that
[petitioners] already paid the docket fees.” Respondent moved for a
10
reconsideration on March 29, 2000.
After reexamining the records of the case, the CA, in the challenged
November 16, 2000 Resolution, dismissed the appeal filed by petitioners,
because “the docket fees were only paid after one (1) year and eleven (11)
months from the filing of the notice of appeal.” It deemed it imperative to
11
reverse the March 14, 2000 Resolution “to conform with the law and long
settled jurisprudence” on the matter. Thus, in the June 22, 2001 Resolution,
12
it denied their Motion for Reconsideration.
Hence, this Petition. 13
Issues
Petitioners submit the following issues for our consideration:
1. “1.Whether or not the appeal was seasonably filed;
2. “2.With all due respect, the Court of Appeals did not have the
authority to dismiss the appeal.”
14
In the main, the case revolves around the timeliness of the payment of the
docket fees.
The Court’s Ruling
The Petition has no merit.
Sole Issue: Timeliness of Payment of Appellate Court Docket Fees
The payment of docket fees is not a trivial matter. These fees are necessary
to defray court expenses in the handling of cases. For this reason, and to
15
secure a just and speedy disposition of every action and proceeding, the Rules
16
on Civil Procedure mandates the payment of docket and other lawful fees
17
within the prescribed period. Otherwise, the jurisdiction of the proper court to
handle a case is adversely affected. 18
The above rule applies squarely to this case, in which the judgment issued
by the RTC, in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, was elevated to the CA
for review. Rule 41 of the Rules on Civil Procedure provides the essential
requirements for making such an appeal, as follows:
“SEC. 2. Modes of appeal.—
“(a) Ordinary appeal.—The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases
decided by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its original
jurisdiction shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal with the court
which rendered the judgment or final order appealed from and
serving a copy thereof upon the adverse party. x x x.
“x x x x x x x x x
“SEC. 3. Period of ordinary appeal.—The appeal shall be taken
within fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment or final order
appealed from. x x x.
“SEC. 4. Appellate court docket and other lawful fees.—Within the
period for taking an appeal, the appellant shall pay to the clerk of
court which rendered the judgment or final order appealed from, the
full amount of the appellate court docket and other lawful fees. Proof
of payment of said fees shall be transmitted to the appellate court
together with the original record or the record on appeal.
“SEC. 9. Perfection of appeal; effect thereof.—A party’s appeal by
notice of appeal is deemed perfected as to him upon the filing of the
notice of appeal in due time. “x x x x x x x x x.
“In appeals by notice of appeal, the court loses jurisdiction over the
case upon the perfection of the appeals filed in due time and the
expiration of the time to appeal of the other parties. “x x x xxx x
x x.”
Accordingly, in order to perfect an appeal from a decision rendered by the
RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, the following requirements
must be complied with. First, within 15 days, a notice of appeal must be filed
with the court that rendered the judgment or final order sought to be
appealed; second, such notice must be served on the adverse party;
and third, within the same 15-day period, the full amount of appellate court
docket and other legal fees must be paid to the clerk of the court that rendered
the judgment or final order.
It should be noted that full payment of the appellate docket fees within the
prescribed period is mandatory, even jurisdictional, for the perfection of the
19 20
relaxing the Rules when we declared therein that “the appellate court may
extend the time for the payment of the docket fees if appellant is able to show
that there is a justifiable reason for x x x the failure to pay the correct amount
of docket fees within the prescribed period, like fraud, accident, mistake,
excusable negligence, or a similar supervening casualty, without fault on the
part of the appellant.”
27

appeal. Otherwise, the appellate court would not be able to act on the subject
matter of the action, and the decision or final order sought to be appealed
21
from would become final and executory. 22
In the present case, petitioners insist that they seasonably paid the docket
fees. After resolving thrice the timeliness of the payment of the docket fees,
the CA finally found that these had been paid one (1) year and 11 days from
the filing of their notice of appeal.
To recapitulate, on November 26, 1998, petitioners received the November
17, 1998 RTC Decision. Consequently, they had 15 days to file their Notice of
Appeal. They did so on November 26, 1998, but failed to pay the docket fees.
A review of the records shows that they paid these only on July 8, 1999, or
In the present case, petitioners have not shown any satisfactory reason to
warrant the relaxation of the Rules. In fact, the manner in which they
presented their case before us leaves too much to be desired. Indeed, we are
almost tempted to say that they tried to mislead—nay, deceive—this Court as
well as the appellate court.
The present case calls for the adjudication of whether petitioners paid the
docket fees on time. Hence, it is essential that they specify the exact
dates when they filed their notice of appeal and paid the corresponding
docket fees. But nowhere in their pleadings did they do so. All they said was
that the appeal had been seasonably filed.
23

after almost seven (7) months from the mandated last day for payment, which
was December 11, 1998. Clearly, the November 17, 1998 RTC Decision, which
petitioners sought to appeal, had long become final and executory.
Relaxation of the Rule on Nonpayment of Docket Fees
Notwithstanding the mandatory nature of the requirement of payment of
In accordance with the requisites for the perfection of an appeal as
enumerated earlier, petitioners should have (1) filed a notice of appeal with
the RTC of Santiago, Isabela; within 15 days from the issuance of the trial
court Decision being appealed; (2) paid the docket fees within the same
period; and (3) served the notice to the adverse party.
True, petitioners filed their Notice of Appeal within the prescribed period,
but they paid the docket fees only seven (7) months thereafter. They
adamantly insisted on page 6 of their Petition that “the appeal was
28

appellate docket fees, we also recognize that its strict application is qualified
by the following: first, failure to pay those fees within the reglementary period
allows only discretionary, not automatic, dismissal; second,such power should
be used by the court in conjunction with its exercise of sound discretion in
accordance with the tenets of justice and fair play, as well as with a great deal
seasonably filed,” but later said that the “the appeal fee was paid immediately
after 23 April 1999 when the court a quodenied the respondent’s motion for
reconsideration and approved the appeal. x x x. With the foregoing therefore,
the notice of appeal was seasonably filed with the payment of docket fees on
time.”29

of circumspection in consideration of all attendant circumstances. 24

They admitted, though, that because of the “excusable negligence or

In Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority v. Mangubat, the 25

payment of the docket fees was delayed by six (6) days, but the late payment
was accepted, because the party showed willingness to abide by the Rules by
immediately paying those fees. Yambao v. Court of Appeals saw us again
26
mistake” of their counsel, the official receipts for the Notice of Appeal had not
been attached. They reasoned that they had failed to transmit the proof of
payment of the docket fees to the CA, because such “provision of civil
procedure was relatively new x x x at that time.” At any event, respondent
30 failure to do so renders the questioned decision final and executory,
denies being served such notice. 31 and deprives the appellate court of jurisdiction to alter the final
judgment much less to entertain the appeal.”
37

Assuming arguendo that the period of appeal was interrupted by

respondent’s motion for reconsideration of the RTC’s approval of petitioners’ WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed Resolutions
notice of appeal, the required docket fees for the latter were still not paid on AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners. SO ORDERED.
time. From November 23, 1998, when petitioners filed their Notice of Appeal,
until April 23, 1999, when the trial court approved it with finality, they made Notes.—While a court may refuse to entertain a suit for non-payment of
no effort to pay those fees. It took them more than two (2) months to docket fees, such failure does not preclude it, however, from taking
“immediately pay” the docket fees after being informed of the April 23, 1999 cognizance of the case as circumstances may so warrant or when the ends of
Order denying respondent’s motion for reconsideration of the RTC Order justice would be best served if the case were to be given due course—the
approving petitioners’ Notice of Appeal. This lapse of time hardly reflected failure to pay the appeal docketing fee confers a discretionary authority, not
sincere willingness to abide by the Rules, especially when respondent had mandatory charge, on the part to dismiss an appeal. (Public Estates Authority
raised the very issue of nonpayment of docket fees as early as December 28, vs. Yujuico, 351 SCRA 280[2001])
1998.
Where the filing of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment
On this point, petitioners’ counsel is reminded of the role that lawyers play of the docket fee, the court may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable
in the dispensation of justice. Bayas v. Sandiganbayan held thus:
32
time but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.
(Cabutihan vs. Landcenter Construction & Development Corporation, 383
“Lawyers are not merely representatives of the parties but, first and SCRA 353[2002])
foremost, officers of the court. As such, one of their duties—assisting
in the speedy and efficient administration of justice—is more
significant than that of [the cause of] their client, rightly or wrongly.
x x x. We stress that candor in all dealings is the very essence of
membership in the legal profession. Lawyers are obliged to observe
rules of procedure in good faith, not to misuse them to defeat the
ends of justice.”
33

We stress that the payment of docket fees is not a mere technicality of

law or procedure, but an essential requirement for the perfection of an
appeal. Without such payment, the appellate court does not acquire
34

jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action, and the decision or final
order sought to be appealed from becomes final and executory. As laid down
35

in Barangay 24 of Legaspi City v. Imperial: 36

“The right to appeal is not a natural right or a part of due process. It is

purely a statutory privilege, and may be exercised only in the manner
and in accordance with the provisions of the law. Well-rooted is the
principle that perfection of an appeal within the statutory or
reglementary period is not only mandatory but also jurisdictional and
 G.R. No. 116121. July 18, 2011.*
THE HEIRS OF THE LATE RUBEN REINOSO, SR., represented by
Ruben Reinoso Jr., petitioners, vs.COURT OF APPEALS,
PONCIANO TAPALES, JOSE GUBALLA, and FILWRITERS
GUARANTY ASSURANCE CORPORATION, respondent. **
Actions; Docket Fees; The rule is that payment in full of the docket fees
within the prescribed period is mandatory; Where the party does not
deliberately intend to defraud the court in payment of docket fees, and
manifests its willingness to abide by the rules by paying additional docket
fees when required by the court, the liberal doctrine enunciated in Sun
Insurance Office, Ltd. v. Asuncion, 170 SCRA 274 (1989) and not the strict
regulations set in Manchester v. Court of Appeals, 149 SCRA 562 (1987), will
apply.—The rule is that payment in full of the docket fees within the
prescribed period is mandatory. In Manchester v. Court of Appeals, 149
SCRA 562 (1987), it was held that a court acquires jurisdiction over any case
only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fee. The strict application of
this rule was, however, relaxed two (2) years after in the case of Sun
Insurance Office, Ltd. v. Asuncion, 170 SCRA 274 (1989), wherein the Court
decreed that where the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by the payment
of the docket fee, the court may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable
period of time, but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or
reglementary period. This ruling was made on the premise that the plaintiff
had demonstrated his willingness to abide by the rules by paying the
additional docket fees required. Thus, in the more recent case of United
Overseas Bank v. Ros, 529 SCRA 334 (2007), the Court explained that where
the party does not deliberately intend to defraud the court in payment of
docket fees, and manifests its willingness to abide by the rules by paying
additional docket fees when required by the court, the liberal doctrine
enunciated in Sun Insurance Office, Ltd., and not the strict regulations set
in Manchester, will apply.
Same; Same; Procedural Rules and Technicalities; While there is a
crying need to unclog court dockets on the one hand, there is, on the other, a
greater demand for resolving genuine disputes fairly and equitably, for it is
far better to dispose of a case on the merit which is a primordial end, rather
than on a technicality that may result in injustice.—While there is a crying
need to unclog court dockets on the one hand, there is, on the other, a greater
demand for resolving genuine disputes fairly and equitably, for it is far better
to dispose of a case on the merit which is a primordial end, rather than on a
technicality that may result in injustice. In this case, it cannot be denied that
the case was litigated before the RTC and said trial court had already rendered
a decision. While it was at that level, the matter of non-payment of docket fees
was never an issue. It was only the CA which motu propiodismissed the case
for said reason. Considering the foregoing, there is a need to suspend the
strict application of the rules so that the petitioners would be able to fully and
finally prosecute their claim on the merits at the appellate level rather than
fail to secure justice on a technicality, for, indeed, the general objective of
procedure is to facilitate the application of justice to the rival claims of
contending parties, bearing always in mind that procedure is not to hinder but
to promote the administration of justice.
Same; Same; Same; The intent of the Court is clear to afford litigants
full opportunity to comply with the new rules and to temper enforcement of
sanctions in view of the recency of the changes introduced by the new rules.
—The Court also takes into account the fact that the case was filed before
the Manchester ruling came out. Even if said ruling could be applied
retroactively, liberality should be accorded to the petitioners in view of the
recency then of the ruling. Leniency because of recency was applied to the
cases of FarEastern Shipping Company v. Court of Appeals, 297 SCRA 30
(1998), and Spouses Jimmy and Patri Chan v. RTC of Zamboanga, 427 SCRA
796 (2004), In the case of Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority v.
Mangubat (Mactan), 312 SCRA 463 (1999), it was stated that the “intent of
the Court is clear to afford litigants full opportunity to comply with the new
rules and to temper enforcement of sanctions in view of the recency of the
changes introduced by the new rules.” In Mactan, the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) also failed to pay the correct docket fees on time.
Same; Same; Where the court in its final judgment awards a claim not
alleged, or a relief different from, or more than that claimed in the pleading,
the party concerned shall pay the additional fees which shall constitute a
lien on the judgment in satisfaction of said lien.—The petitioners, however,
are liable for the difference between the actual fees paid and the correct
payable docket fees to be assessed by the clerk of court which shall constitute
a lien on the judgment pursuant to Section 2 of Rule 141 which provides: SEC.
2. Fees in lien.—Where the court in its final judgment awards a claim not
alleged, or a relief different from, or more than that claimed in the pleading,
the party concerned shall pay the additional fees which shall constitute a lien
on the judgment in satisfaction of said lien. The clerk of court shall assess and
collect the corresponding fees.
Same; Same; Remand of Cases; Considering that the case at bench
has been pending for more than 30 years and the records thereof are
already before this Court, a remand of the case to the Court of Appeals (CA)
would only unnecessarily prolong its resolution—in the higher interest of
substantial justice and to spare the parties from further delay, the Court will
resolve the case on the merits.—As the Court has taken the position that it
would be grossly unjust if petitioners’ claim would be dismissed on a strict
application of the Manchester doctrine, the appropriate action, under
ordinary circumstances, would be for the Court to remand the case to the CA.
Considering, however, that the case at bench has been pending for more than
30 years and the records thereof are already before this Court, a remand of
the case to the CA would only unnecessarily prolong its resolution. In the
higher interest of substantial justice and to spare the parties from further
delay, the Court will resolve the case on the merits.
Quasi-Delicts; Negligence; While ending up on the opposite lane is not
conclusive proof of fault in automobile collisions, the position of the two
vehicles, as depicted in the sketch of the police officers, clearly shows that it
was the truck that hit the jeepney.—While ending up on the opposite lane is
not conclusive proof of fault in automobile collisions, the position of the two
vehicles, as depicted in the sketch of the police officers, clearly shows that it
was the truck that hit the jeepney. The evidentiary records disclosed that the
truck was speeding along E. Rodriguez, heading towards Santolan Street,
while the passenger jeepney was coming from the opposite direction. When
the truck reached a certain point near the Meralco Post No. J9-450, the front
portion of the truck hit the left middle side portion of the passenger jeepney,
causing damage to both vehicles and injuries to the driver and passengers of
the jeepney. The truck driver should have been more careful, because, at that
time, a portion of E. Rodriguez Avenue was under repair and a wooden
barricade was placed in the middle thereof.
Same; Same; Whenever an employee’s negligence causes damage or
injury to another, there instantly arises a presumption juris tantum that the
employer failed to exercise diligentissimi patris families in the selection or
supervision of his employee.—Whenever an employee’s negligence causes
damage or injury to another, there instantly arises a presumption juris
tantum that the employer failed to exercise diligentissimi patris families in
the selection or supervision of his employee. Thus, in the selection of
prospective employees, employers are required to examine them as to their
qualification, experience and service record. With respect to the supervision
of employees, employers must formulate standard operating procedures,
monitor their implementation, and impose disciplinary measures for breaches
thereof. These facts must be shown by concrete proof, including documentary
evidence.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court
of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
MENDOZA, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review assailing the May 20, 1994
Decision and June 30, 1994 Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-
1 2
G.R. CV No. 19395, which set aside the March 22, 1988 Decision of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 8, Manila (RTC) for non-payment of docket fees.
The dispositive portion of the CA decision reads:
“IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from is
SET ASIDE and REVERSED and the complaint in this case is ordered
DISMISSED.
No costs pronouncement.
SO ORDERED.”
The complaint for damages arose from the collision of a
passenger jeepney and a truck at around 7:00 o’clock in the evening of June
14, 1979 along E. Rodriguez Avenue, Quezon City. As a result, a passenger of
the jeepney, Ruben Reinoso, Sr. (Reinoso), was killed. The
passenger jeepney was owned by Ponciano Tapales (Tapales) and driven by
Alejandro Santos (Santos), while the truck was owned by Jose
Guballa (Guballa)and driven by Mariano Geronimo (Geronimo).
On November 7, 1979, the heirs of Reinoso (petitioners)filed a complaint
for damages against Tapales and Guballa. In turn, Guballa filed a third party
complaint against Filwriters Guaranty Assurance Corporation (FGAC) under
Policy Number OV-09527.
 On March 22, 1988, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of the petitioners JUDGMENT
and against Guballa. The decision in part, reads: WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
In favor of plaintiffs for the death of Ruben Reinoso,
Sr………………………………………………………….P250,000.00;
“In favor of herein plaintiffs and against defendant Jose Guballa: In favor of defendant Ponciano Tapales due to damage of his passenger
jeepney…………………………………….…P44,000.00;
1. For the death of Ruben Reinoso, P30,000.00 In favor of defendant Jose Guballa under Policy No. OV-
Sr………………. 09527………………………………………………....P60,000.00;
All the specified accounts with 6% legal rate of interest per annum from date of
2. Loss of earnings (monthly income at the 120,000.00 complaint until fully paid (Reformina vs. Tomol, 139 SCRA 260; and finally;8
time of death (P2,000.00 Court used P1,000.00
only per month (or P12,000.00 only per year) & On appeal, the CA, in its Decision dated May 20, 1994, set aside
victim then being 55 at death had ten (10) years and reversed the RTC decision and dismissed the complaint on the
life expectancy … ground of non-payment of docket fees pursuant to the doctrine
3. Mortuary, Medical & funeral expenses and 15,000.00
laid down in Manchester v. CA. In addition, the CA ruled that
4

all incidental expenses in the wake in serving

those who
since prescription had set in, petitioners could no longer pay the
condoled……………………………………………….……. required docket fees. 5

4. Moral damages ………………….. 50,000.00

…………………... Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the CA decision
5. Exemplary damages ……………... 25,000.00 but it was denied in a resolution dated June 30, 1994. Hence, this 6

…………………. appeal, anchored on the following

6. Litigation expenses 15,000.00 GROUNDS:
…………………………………. A. The Court of Appeals MISAPPLIED THE RULING of the
7. Attorney’s fees ……………………….………………. 25,000.00 Supreme Court in the case of Manchester Corporation vs. Court of
Or a total of P250,000.00 Appeals to this case.
For damages to property: B. The issue on the specification of the damages appearing in the
In favor of defendant Ponciano Tapales and against prayer of the Complaint was NEVER PLACED IN ISSUE BY ANY OF
defendant Jose Guballa: THE PARTIES IN THE COURT OF ORIGIN (REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT) NOR IN THE COURT OF APPEALS.
or a total of P44,000.00
Under the 3rd party complaint against 3rd party defendant Filwriters C. The issues of the case revolve around the more substantial
Guaranty Assurance Corporation, the Court hereby renders judgment in favor issue as to the negligence of the private respondents and their
of said 3rd party plaintiff by way of 3rd party liability under policy No. OV- culpability to petitioners.”
09527 in the amount of P50,000.00 undertaking plus P10,000.00 as and for
attorney’s fees. The petitioners argue that the ruling in Manchester should not have been
For all the foregoing, it is the well considered view of the Court that applied retroactively in this case, since it was filed prior to the promulgation
plaintiffs, defendant Ponciano Tapales and 3rd Party plaintiff Jose Guballa of the Manchester decision in 1987. They plead that though this Court stated
established their claims as specified above, respectively. Totality of evidence that failure to state the correct amount of damages would lead to the dismissal
preponderance in their favor. of the complaint, said doctrine should be applied prospectively.

Moreover, the petitioners assert that at the time of the filing of the
complaint in 1979, they were not certain of the amount of damages they were
entitled to, because the amount of the lost income would still be finally
determined in the course of the trial of the case. They claim that the
jurisdiction of the trial court remains even if there was failure to pay the
correct filing fee as long as the correct amount would be paid subsequently.
Finally, the petitioners stress that the alleged defect was never put in issue
either in the RTC or in the CA.
The Court finds merit in the petition.
The rule is that payment in full of the docket fees within the prescribed
period is mandatory. In Manchester v. Court of Appeals, it was held that a
8 9
court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the
prescribed docket fee. The strict application of this rule was, however, relaxed
two (2) years after in the case of Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. v.
Asuncion, wherein the Court decreed that where the initiatory pleading is not
10
accompanied by the payment of the docket fee, the court may allow payment
of the fee within a reasonable period of time, but in no case beyond the
applicable prescriptive or reglementary period. This ruling was made on the
premise that the plaintiff had demonstrated his willingness to abide by the
rules by paying the additional docket fees required. Thus, in the more recent
11
case of United Overseas Bank v. Ros, the Court explained that where the
12
party does not deliberately intend to defraud the court in payment of docket
fees, and manifests its willingness to abide by the rules by paying additional
docket fees when required by the court, the liberal doctrine enunciated in Sun
Insurance Office, Ltd., and not the strict regulations set in Manchester, will
apply. It has been on record that the Court, in several instances, allowed the
relaxation of the rule on non-payment of docket fees in order to afford the
parties the opportunity to fully ventilate their cases on the merits. In the case
of La Salette College v. Pilotin, the Court stated:
13
“Notwithstanding the mandatory nature of the requirement of
payment of appellate docket fees, we also recognize that its strict
application is qualified by the following: first, failure to pay those fees
within the reglementary period allows only discretionary, not automatic,
dismissal; second, such power should be used by the court in conjunction
with its exercise of sound discretion in accordance with the tenets of
justice and fair play, as well as with a great deal of circumspection in
consideration of all attendant circumstances.”
14
While there is a crying need to unclog court dockets on the one hand, there
is, on the other, a greater demand for resolving genuine disputes fairly and
equitably, for it is far better to dispose of a case on the merit which is a
15
primordial end, rather than on a technicality that may result in injustice.
In this case, it cannot be denied that the case was litigated before the RTC
and said trial court had already rendered a decision. While it was at that level,
the matter of non-payment of docket fees was never an issue. It was only the
CA which motu propio dismissed the case for said reason.
Considering the foregoing, there is a need to suspend the strict application
of the rules so that the petitioners would be able to fully and finally prosecute
their claim on the merits at the appellate level rather than fail to secure justice
on a technicality, for, indeed, the general objective of procedure is to facilitate
the application of justice to the rival claims of contending parties, bearing
always in mind that procedure is not to hinder but to promote the
administration of justice.16
The Court also takes into account the fact that the case was filed before
the Manchester ruling came out. Even if said ruling could be applied
retroactively, liberality should be accorded to the petitioners in view of the
recency then of the ruling. Leniency because of recency was applied to the
cases of Far Eastern Shipping Company v. Court of Appeals and Spouses17
Jimmy and Patri Chan v. RTC of Zamboanga. In the case of Mactan Cebu
18
International Airport Authority v. Mangubat (Mactan), it was stated that
19
the “intent of the Court is clear to afford litigants full opportunity to comply
with the new rules and to temper enforcement of sanctions in view of
the recency of the changes introduced by the new rules.” In Mactan, the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) also failed to pay the correct docket fees
on time.
We held in another case:
“x x x It bears stressing that the rules of procedure are merely tools
designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. They were conceived and
 promulgated to effectively aid the court in the dispensation of justice.
Courts are not slaves to or robots of technical rules, shorn of judicial
discretion. In rendering justice, courts have always been, as they ought to
be, conscientiously guided by the norm that, on the balance,
technicalities take a backseat against substantive rights, and not the
other way around. Thus, if the application of the Rules would tend to
frustrate rather than promote justice, it is always within the power of the
Court to suspend the Rules, or except a particular case from its
operation.”20
The petitioners, however, are liable for the difference between the actual
fees paid and the correct payable docket fees to be assessed by the clerk of
court which shall constitute a lien on the judgment pursuant to Section 2 of
Rule 141 which provides:
“SEC. 2. Fees in lien.—Where the court in its final judgment awards
a claim not alleged, or a relief different from, or more than that claimed
in the pleading, the party concerned shall pay the additional fees which
shall constitute a lien on the judgment in satisfaction of said lien. The
clerk of court shall assess and collect the corresponding fees.”
As the Court has taken the position that it would be grossly unjust if
petitioners’ claim would be dismissed on a strict application of
the Manchester doctrine, the appropriate action, under ordinary
circumstances, would be for the Court to remand the case to the CA.
Considering, however, that the case at bench has been pending for more than
30 years and the records thereof are already before this Court, a remand of
the case to the CA would only unnecessarily prolong its resolution. In the
higher interest of substantial justice and to spare the parties from further
delay, the Court will resolve the case on the merits.
The facts are beyond dispute. Reinoso, the jeepneypassenger, died as a
result of the collision of a jeepney and a truck on June 14, 1979 at around 7:00
o’clock in the evening along E. Rodriguez Avenue, Quezon City. It was
established that the primary cause of the injury or damage was the negligence
of the truck driver who was driving it at a very fast pace. Based on the sketch
and spot report of the police authorities and the narration of
the jeepneydriver and his passengers, the collision was brought about because
the truck driver suddenly swerved to, and encroached on, the left side portion
of the road in an attempt to avoid a wooden barricade, hitting the
passenger jeepney as a consequence. The analysis of the RTC appears in its
decision as follows:13
“Perusal and careful analysis of evidence adduced as well as proper
consideration of all the circumstances and factors bearing on the issue as
to who is responsible for the instant vehicular mishap convince and
persuade this Court that preponderance of proof is in favor of plaintiffs
and defendant Ponciano Tapales. The greater mass of evidence spread on
the records and its influence support plaintiffs’ plaint including that of
defendant Tapales.
The Land Transportation and Traffic Rule (R.A. No. 4136), reads as
follows:
“Sec. 37. Driving on right side of highway.—Unless a different
course of action is required in the interest of the safety and the security
of life, person or property, or because of unreasonable difficulty of
operation in compliance therewith, every person operating a motor
vehicle or an animal drawn vehicle on highway shall pass to the right
when meeting persons or vehicles coming toward him, and to the left
when overtaking persons or vehicles going the same direction, and
when turning to the left in going from one highway to another, every
vehicle shall be conducted to the right of the center of the intersection
of the highway.”
Having in mind the foregoing provision of law, this Court is
convinced of the veracity of the version of the passenger jeepney driver
Alejandro Santos, (plaintiffs’ and Tapales’ witness) that while running
on lane No. 4 westward bound towards Ortigas Avenue at between 30-
40 kms. per hour (63-64 tsn, Jan. 6, 1984) the “sand & gravel” truck
from the opposite direction driven by Mariano Geronimo, the
headlights of which the former had seen while still at a distance of
about 30-40 meters from the wooden barricade astride lanes 1 and 2,
upon reaching said wooden block suddenly swerved to the left into
lanes 3 and 4 at high speed “napakabilis po ng dating ng truck.” (29 tsn,
Sept. 26, 1985) in the process hitting them (Jeepney passenger) at the
left side up to where the reserve tire was in an oblique manner “pahilis”
(57 tsn, Sept. 26, 1985). The jeepney after it was bumped by the truck
due to the strong impact was thrown “resting on its right side while the
left side was on top of the Bangketa (side walk)”. The passengers of the
jeepney and its driver were injured including two passengers who died.
The left side of the jeepney suffered considerable damage as seen in the
 picture (Exhs. 4 & 5-Tapales, pages 331-332, records) taken while at the
repair shop.
The Court is convinced of the narration of Santos to the effect that
the “gravel & sand” truck was running in high speed on the good
portion of E. Rodriguez Avenue (lane 1 & 2) before the wooden
barricade and (having in mind that it had just delivered its load at the
Corinthian Gardens) so that when suddenly confronted with the
wooden obstacle before it had to avoid the same in a manner of a reflex
reaction or knee-jerk response by forthwith swerving to his left into the
right lanes (lanes 3 & 4). At the time of the bumping, the jeepney was
running on its right lane No. 4 and even during the moments before
said bumping, moving at moderate speed thereon since lane No. 3 was
then somewhat rough because being repaired also according to
Mondalia who has no reason to prevaricate being herself one of those
seriously injured. The narration of Santos and Mondalia are convincing
and consistent in depicting the true facts of the case untainted by
vacillation and therefore, worthy to be relied upon. Their story is
forfeited and confirmed by the sketch drawn by the investigating officer
Pfc. F. Amaba, Traffic Division, NPD, Quezon City who rushed to the
scene of the mishap (Vide: Resolution of Asst. fiscal Elizabeth B. Reyes
marked as Exhs. 7, 7-A, 7-B-Tapales, pp. 166-168, records; the Certified
Copy found on pages 598-600, ibid, with the attached police sketch of
Pfc. Amaba, marked as Exh. 8-Tapales on page 169, ibid; certified copy
of which is on page 594, ibid) indicating the fact that the bumping
indeed occurred at lane No. 4 and showing how the ‘gavel & sand’ truck
is positioned in relation to the jeepney. The said police sketch having
been made right after the accident is a piece of evidence worthy to be
relied upon showing the true facts of the bumping-occurrence. The rule
that official duty had been performed (Sec. 5(m), R-131, and also Sec.
38, R-a30, Rev. Rules of Court)—there being no evidence adduced and
made of record to the contrary—is that said circumstance involving the
two vehicles had been the result of an official investigation and must be
taken as true by this Court.”
21
While ending up on the opposite lane is not conclusive proof of fault in
automobile collisions, the position of the two vehicles, as depicted in the
22
sketch of the police officers, clearly shows that it was the truck that hit
the jeepney. The evidentiary records disclosed that the truck was speeding
along E. Rodriguez, heading towards Santolan Street, while the
passenger jeepneywas coming from the opposite direction. When the truck
reached a certain point near the Meralco Post No. J9-450, the front portion of
the truck hit the left middle side portion of the passenger jeepney, causing
damage to both vehicles and injuries to the driver and passengers of
the jeepney. The truck driver should have been more careful, because, at that
time, a portion of E. Rodriguez Avenue was under repair and a wooden
barricade was placed in the middle thereof.
The Court likewise sustains the finding of the RTC that the truck owner,
Guballa, failed to rebut the presumption of negligence in the hiring and
supervision of his employee. Article 2176, in relation to Article 2180 of the
Civil Code, provides:
“Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another,
there being fault or negligence is obliged to pay for the damage done.
Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation
between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the
provisions of this Chapter.
xxxx
Art.  2180. The obligation imposed by Art. 2176 is demandable not
only for one’s own acts or omissions but also for those of persons for
whom one is responsible.
xxxx
Employers shall be liable for the damage caused by their employees
and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks
even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry.
xxxx
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the
persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a
good father of a family to prevent damage.”
Whenever an employee’s negligence causes damage or injury to another,
there instantly arises a presumption juris tantumthat the employer failed to
exercise diligentissimi patris families in the selection or supervision of his
employee. Thus, in the selection of prospective employees, employers are
23
required to examine them as to their qualification, experience and service
record. With respect to the supervision of employees, employers must
formulate standard operating procedures, monitor their implementation, and
impose disciplinary measures for breaches thereof. These facts must be shown
by concrete proof, including documentary evidence. Thus, the RTC 24
committed no error in finding that the evidence presented by respondent
Guballa was wanting. It ruled:
 “x x x. As expected, defendant Jose Guballa, attempted to overthrow
this presumption of negligence by showing that he had exercised the due
diligence required of him by seeing to it that the driver must check the
vital parts of the vehicle he is assigned to before he leaves the compound
like the oil, water, brakes, gasoline, horn (9 tsn, July 17, 1986); and that
Geronimo had been driving for him sometime in 1976 until the collision
in litigation came about (5-6 tsn, ibid); that whenever his trucks gets out
of the compound to make deliveries, it is always accompanied with two
(2) helpers (16-17 tsn, ibid). This was all which he considered as selection
and supervision in compliance with the law to free himself from any
responsibility. This Court then cannot consider the foregoing as
equivalent to an exercise of all the care of a good father of a family in the
selection and supervision of his driver Mariano Geronimo.” 25

Following the guidelines enunciated in the case of Eastern Shipping Lines,

Inc. v. Court of Appeals, petitioners are entitled to the payment of 12% legal
26

interest per annum on the total amount awarded to be computed from the
time of finality of judgment until fully paid.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The May 20, 1994 Decision and
June 30, 1994 Resolution of the Court of Appeals are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE and the March 22, 1988 Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
8, Manila, is REINSTATED, with the MODIFICATION that the private
respondents should, as they are hereby ordered to, pay interest at the rate of
12% per annum reckoned from the finality of this judgment until fully paid.

The Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, or his duly
authorized deputy, is hereby ordered to compute the correct docket fees and
to enforce the judgment lien by collecting the additional fees from the
petitioners. SO ORDERED.

Notes.—In this case, the principle of social justice—that she who has less
in life should have more in law—ought to find a measure of relevance more
weighty than technicalities. (Brutas vs. Court of Appeals, 369 SCRA 8 [2001])

Payment of docket fees is not necessary for a court to acquire jurisdiction

over the subject matter of a compulsory counterclaim. (Mercado vs. Court of
Appeals, 569 SCRA 503 [2008])
 G.R. No. 176339. January 10, 2011.*
DO-ALL METALS INDUSTRIES, INC., SPS. DOMINGO LIM and
LELY KUNG LIM, petitioners, vs.SECURITY BANK CORP.,
TITOLAIDO E. PAYONGAYONG, EVYLENE C. SISON, PHIL.
INDUSTRIAL SECURITY AGENCY CORP. and GIL SILOS,
respondents.
Actions; Docket Fees; Plaintiffs’ failure to pay the additional filing fees
due on additional claims does not divest the court of jurisdiction it already
had over the case.—On the issue of jurisdiction, respondent Bank argues that
plaintiffs’ failure to pay the filing fees on their supplemental complaint is fatal
to their action. But what the plaintiffs failed to pay was merely the filing fees
for their Supplemental Complaint. The RTC acquired jurisdiction over
plaintiffs’ action from the moment they filed their original complaint
accompanied by the payment of the filing fees due on the same. The plaintiffs’
non-payment of the additional filing fees due on their additional claims did
not divest the RTC of the jurisdiction it already had over the case.
Same; Ex Parte Hearings; Evidence; Witnesses; An ex parte hearing
which had been properly authorized cannot be assailed as less credible.—The
Bank belittles the testimonies of the petitioners’ witnesses for having been
presented ex partebefore the clerk of court. But the ex parte hearing, having
been properly authorized, cannot be assailed as less credible. It was the
Bank’s fault that it was unable to attend the hearing. It cannot profit from its
lack of diligence.
Lease; Damages; Even if the lease has already lapsed, the lessor has no
business harassing and intimidating the lessee and its employees.—While the
lease may have already lapsed, the Bank had no business harassing and
intimidating the Lims and their employees. The RTC was therefore correct in
adjudging moral damages, exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees against the
Bank for the acts of their representatives and building guards.
Actions; Supplemental Complaint; Docket Fees; A supplemental complaint is
like any complaint and the rule is that the filing fees due on a complaint need to be
paid upon its filing—the rules do not require the court to make special assessments
in cases of supplemental complaints.—As to the damages that plaintiffs claim under
their supplemental complaint, their stand is that the RTC committed no error in
admitting the complaint even if they had not paid the filing fees due on it since such
fees constituted a lien anyway on the judgment award. But this after-judgment lien,
which implies that payment depends on a successful execution of the judgment,
applies to cases where the filing fees were incorrectly assessed or paid or where the
court has discretion to fix the amount of the award. None of these circumstances
obtain in this case. Here, the supplemental complaint specified from the beginning
the actual damages that the plaintiffs sought against the Bank. Still plaintiffs paid no
filing fees on the same. And, while petitioners claim that they were willing to pay the
additional fees, they gave no reason for their omission nor offered to pay the same.
They merely said that they did not yet pay the fees because the RTC had not assessed
them for it. But a supplemental complaint is like any complaint and the rule is that
the filing fees due on a complaint need to be paid upon its filing. The rules do not
require the court to make special assessments in cases of supplemental complaints.
To aggravate plaintiffs’ omission, although the Bank brought up the question of their
failure to pay additional filing fees in its motion for reconsideration, plaintiffs made
no effort to make at least a late payment before the case could be submitted for
decision, assuming of course that the prescription of their action had not then set it
in. Clearly, plaintiffs have no excuse for their continuous failure to pay the fees they
owed the court. Consequently, the trial court should have treated their Supplemental
Complaint as not filed.
Same; Same; Same; It is not for a party to a case, or even for the trial court, to
waive the payment of the additional filing fees due on the supplemental complaint—
only the Supreme Court can grant exemptions to the payment of the fees due the
courts and these exemptions are embodied in its rules.—Plaintiffs of course point out
that the Bank itself raised the issue of non-payment of additional filing fees only after
the RTC had rendered its decision in the case. The implication is that the Bank
should be deemed to have waived its objection to such omission. But it is not for a
party to the case or even for the trial court to waive the payment of the additional
filing fees due on the supplemental complaint. Only the Supreme Court can grant
exemptions to the payment of the fees due the courts and these exemptions are
embodied in its rules.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
ABAD, J.:
This case is about the propriety of awarding damages based on claims
embodied in the plaintiff’s supplemental complaint filed without prior
payment of the corresponding filing fees.
 The Facts and the Case
From 1996 to 1997, Dragon Lady Industries, Inc., owned by petitioner
spouses Domingo Lim and Lely Kung Lim (the Lims) took out loans from
respondent Security Bank Corporation (the Bank) that totaled
P92,454,776.45. Unable to pay the loans on time, the Lims assigned some of
their real properties to the Bank to secure the same, including a building and
the lot on which it stands (the property), located at M. de Leon St., Santolan,
Pasig City.1
In 1998 the Bank offered to lease the property to the Lims through
petitioner Do-All Metals Industries, Inc. (DMI) primarily for business
although the Lims were to use part of the property as their residence. DMI
and the Bank executed a two-year lease contract from October 1, 1998 to
September 30, 2000 but the Bank retained the right to pre-terminate the
lease. The contract also provided that, should the Bank decide to sell the
property, DMI shall have the right of first refusal.
On December 3, 1999, before the lease was up, the Bank gave notice to
DMI that it was pre-terminating the lease on December 31, 1999. Wanting to
exercise its right of first refusal, DMI tried to negotiate with the Bank the
terms of its purchase. DMI offered to pay the Bank P8 million for the property
but the latter rejected the offer, suggesting P15 million instead. DMI made a
second offer of P10 million but the Bank declined the same.
While the negotiations were on going, the Lims claimed that they
continued to use the property in their business. But the Bank posted at the
place private security guards from Philippine Industrial Security Agency
(PISA). The Lims also claimed that on several occasions in 2000, the guards,
on instructions of the Bank representatives Titolaido Payongayong and
Evylene Sison, padlocked the entrances to the place and barred the Lims as
well as DMI’s employees from entering the property. One of the guards even
pointed his gun at one employee and shots were fired. Because of this, DMI
was unable to close several projects and contracts with prospective clients.
Further, the Lims alleged that they were unable to retrieve assorted furniture,
equipment, and personal items left at the property.
The Lims eventually filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Pasig City for damages with prayer for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order (TRO) or preliminary injunction against the Bank and its co-
defendants Payongayong, Sison, PISA, and Gil Silos. 2 Answering the
complaint, the Bank pointed out that the lease contract allowed it to sell the
property at any time provided only that it gave DMI the right of first refusal.
DMI had seven days from notice to exercise its option. On September 10, 1999
the Bank gave notice to DMI that it intended to sell the property to a third
party. DMI asked for an extension of its option to buy and the Bank granted it.
But the parties could not agree on a purchase price. The Bank required DMI
to vacate and turnover the property but it failed to do so. As a result, the
Bank’s buyer backed-out of the sale. Despite what happened, the Bank and
DMI continued negotiations for the purchase of the leased premises but they
came to no agreement.
The Bank denied, on the other hand, that its guards harassed DMI and the
Lims. To protect its property, the Bank began posting guards at the building
even before it leased the same to DMI. Indeed, this arrangement benefited
both parties. The Bank alleged that in October of 2000, when the parties
could not come to an agreement regarding the purchase of the property, DMI
vacated the same and peacefully turned over possession to the Bank.
The Bank offered no objection to the issuance of a TRO since it claimed
that it never prevented DMI or its employees from entering or leaving the
building. For this reason, the RTC directed the Bank to allow DMI and the
Lims to enter the building and get the things they left there. The latter
claimed, however, that on entering the building, they were unable to find the
movable properties they left there. In a supplemental complaint, DMI and the
Lims alleged that the Bank surreptitiously took such properties, resulting in
additional actual damages to them of over P27 million.
The RTC set the pre-trial in the case for December 4, 2001. On that date,
however, counsel for the Bank moved to reset the proceeding. The court
denied the motion and allowed DMI and the Lims to present their evidence ex
parte. The court eventually reconsidered its order but only after the plaintiffs
had already presented their evidence and were about to rest their case. The
RTC declined to recall the plaintiffs’ witnesses for cross-examination but
allowed the Bank to present its evidence.3 This prompted the Bank to seek
relief from the Court of Appeals (CA) and eventually from this Court but to no
avail.
 During its turn at the trial, the Bank got to present only defendant
Payongayong, a bank officer. For repeatedly canceling the hearings and
incurring delays, the RTC declared the Bank to have forfeited its right to
present additional evidence and deemed the case submitted for decision.
On September 30, 2004 the RTC rendered a decision in favor of DMI and
the Lims. It ordered the Bank to pay the plaintiffsP27,974,564.00 as actual
damages, P500,000.00 as moral damages, P500,000 as exemplary damages,
and P100,000.00 as attorney’s fees. But the court absolved defendants
Payongayong, Sison, Silos and PISA of any liability.
The Bank moved for reconsideration of the decision, questioning among
other things the RTC’s authority to grant damages considering plaintiffs’
failure to pay the filing fees on their supplemental complaint. The RTC denied
the motion. On appeal to the CA, the latter found for the Bank, reversed the
RTC decision, and dismissed the complaint as well as the counterclaims. 5 DMI
and the Lims filed a motion for reconsideration but the CA denied the same,
hence this petition.
The Issues Presented
The issues presented in this case are:
1. Whether or not the RTC acquired jurisdiction to hear and adjudicate
plaintiff’s supplemental complaint against the Bank considering their failure to pay
the filing fees on the amounts of damages they claim in it;
2. Whether or not the Bank is liable for the intimidation and harassment
committed against DMI and its representatives; and
3.  Whether or not the Bank is liable to DMI and the Lims for the machineries,
equipment, and other properties they allegedly lost after they were barred from the
property.
The Court’s Rulings
One. On the issue of jurisdiction, respondent Bank argues that plaintiffs’
failure to pay the filing fees on their supplemental complaint is fatal to their
action.
But what the plaintiffs failed to pay was merely the filing fees for their
Supplemental Complaint. The RTC acquired jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ action
from the moment they filed their original complaint accompanied by the
payment of the filing fees due on the same. The plaintiffs’ non-payment of the
additional filing fees due on their additional claims did not divest the RTC of
the jurisdiction it already had over the case.6
Two. As to the claim that Bank’s representatives and retained guards
harassed and intimidated DMI’s employees and the Lims, the RTC found
ample proof of such wrongdoings and accordingly awarded damages to the
plaintiffs. But the CA disagreed, discounting the testimony of the police
officers regarding their investigations of the incidents since such officers were
not present when they happened. The CA may be correct in a way but the
plaintiffs presented eyewitnesses who testified out of personal knowledge. The
police officers testified merely to point out that there had been trouble at the
place and their investigations yielded their findings.
The Bank belittles the testimonies of the petitioners’ witnesses for having
been presented ex parte before the clerk of court. But the ex partehearing,
having been properly authorized, cannot be assailed as less credible. It was
the Bank’s fault that it was unable to attend the hearing. It cannot profit from
its lack of diligence.
Domingo Lim and some employees of DMI testified regarding the Bank
guards’ unmitigated use of their superior strength and firepower. Their
testimonies were never refuted. Police Inspector Priscillo dela Paz testified
that he responded to several complaints regarding shooting incidents at the
leased premises and on one occasion, he found Domingo Lim was locked in
the building. When he asked why Lim had been locked in, a Bank
representative told him that they had instructions to prevent anyone from
taking any property out of the premises. It was only after Dela Paz talked to
the Bank representative that they let Lim out.7
Payongayong, the Bank’s sole witness, denied charges of harassment
against the Bank’s representatives and the guards. But his denial came merely
from reports relayed to him. They were not based on personal knowledge.
While the lease may have already lapsed, the Bank had no business
harassing and intimidating the Lims and their employees. The RTC was
therefore correct in adjudging moral damages, exemplary damages, and
attorney’s fees against the Bank for the acts of their representatives and
building guards.
Three. As to the damages that plaintiffs claim under their supplemental
complaint, their stand is that the RTC committed no error in admitting the
complaint even if they had not paid the filing fees due on it since such fees
constituted a lien anyway on the judgment award. But this after-judgment
lien, which implies that payment depends on a successful execution of the
judgment, applies to cases where the filing fees were incorrectly assessed or
paid or where the court has discretion to fix the amount of the award. 8 None of
these circumstances obtain in this case.
Here, the supplemental complaint specified from the beginning the actual
damages that the plaintiffs sought against the Bank. Still plaintiffs paid no
filing fees on the same. And, while petitioners claim that they were willing to
pay the additional fees, they gave no reason for their omission nor offered to
pay the same. They merely said that they did not yet pay the fees because the
RTC had not assessed them for it. But a supplemental complaint is like any
complaint and the rule is that the filing fees due on a complaint need to be
paid upon its filing.9 The rules do not require the court to make special
assessments in cases of supplemental complaints.
Besides, as correctly pointed out by the CA, plaintiffs had the burden of
proving that the movable properties in question had remained in the premises
and that the bank was responsible for their loss. The only evidence offered to
prove the loss was Domingo Lim’s testimony and some undated and unsigned
inventories. These were self-serving and uncorroborated.
WHEREFORE, the Court PARTIALLY GRANTS the petition and
REINSTATES with modification the decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Pasig City in Civil Case 68184. The Court DIRECTS respondent Security Bank
Corporation to pay petitioners DMI and spouses Domingo and Lely Kung Lim
damages in the following amounts: P500,000.00 as moral damages,
P500,000.00 as exemplary damages, and P100,000.00 for attorney’s fees.
The Court DELETES the award of actual damages of P27,974,564.00. SO
ORDERED.
Note.—A court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon payment of
the prescribed docket fee. (Soller vs. Commission on Elections, 339 SCRA 685
[2000])

To aggravate plaintiffs’ omission, although the Bank brought up the

question of their failure to pay additional filing fees in its motion for
reconsideration, plaintiffs made no effort to make at least a late payment
before the case could be submitted for decision, assuming of course that the
prescription of their action had not then set it in. Clearly, plaintiffs have no
excuse for their continuous failure to pay the fees they owed the court.
Consequently, the trial court should have treated their Supplemental
Complaint as not filed.

Plaintiffs of course point out that the Bank itself raised the issue of non-
payment of additional filing fees only after the RTC had rendered its decision
in the case. The implication is that the Bank should be deemed to have waived
its objection to such omission. But it is not for a party to the case or even for
the trial court to waive the payment of the additional filing fees due on the
supplemental complaint. Only the Supreme Court can grant exemptions to the
payment of the fees due the courts and these exemptions are embodied in its
rules.
 G.R. No. 154061. January 25, 2012.*
PANAY RAILWAYS INC., petitioner, vs. HEVA MANAGEMENT and
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, PAMPLONA AGRO-
INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION, and SPOUSES CANDELARIA
DAYOT and EDMUNDO DAYOT, respondents.
Remedial Law; Procedural Rules and Technicalities; Statutes and rules
regulating the procedure of courts are considered applicable to actions
pending and unresolved at the time of their passage.—Statutes and rules
regulating the procedure of courts are considered applicable to actions
pending and unresolved at the time of their passage. Procedural laws and
rules are retroactive in that sense and to that extent. The effect of procedural
statutes and rules on the rights of a litigant may not preclude their retroactive
application to pending actions. This retroactive application does not violate
any right of a person adversely affected. Neither is it constitutionally
objectionable. The reason is that, as a general rule, no vested right may attach
to or arise from procedural laws and rules. It has been held that “a person has
no vested right in any particular remedy, and a litigant cannot insist on the
application to the trial of his case, whether civil or criminal, of any other than
the existing rules of procedure.”
Same; Appeals; Docket Fees; The payment of the full amount of the
docket fees is an indispensable step for the perfection of an appeal.—As early
as 1932, in Lazaro v. Endencia, we have held that the payment of the full
amount of the docket fees is an indispensable step for the perfection of an
appeal. The Court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment
of the prescribed docket fees.
Same; Same; The right to appeal is not a natural right and is not part of
due process.—The right to appeal is not a natural right and is not part of due
process. It is merely a statutory privilege, which may be exercised only in
accordance with the law.
Same; Procedural Rules and Technicalities; Procedural rules are not to
be belittled or dismissed simply because their non-observance may result in
prejudice to a party’s substantive rights.—We have repeatedly stated that the
term “substantial justice” is not a magic wand that would automatically
compel this Court to suspend procedural rules. Procedural rules are not to be
belittled or dismissed simply because their non-observance may result in
prejudice to a party’s substantive rights. Like all other rules, they are required
to be followed, except only for the most persuasive of reasons when they may
be relaxed to relieve litigants of an injustice not commensurate with the
degree of their thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedure
prescribed.
Attorneys; Legal Ethics; It is well-settled that the negligence of counsel
binds the client.—We cannot consider counsel’s failure to familiarize himself
with the Revised Rules of Court as a persuasive reason to relax the application
of the Rules. It is well-settled that the negligence of counsel binds the client.
This principle is based on the rule that any act performed by lawyers within
the scope of their general or implied authority is regarded as an act of the
client. Consequently, the mistake or negligence of the counsel of petitioner
may result in the rendition of an unfavorable judgment against it.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the amended decision and resolution of
the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
SERENO, J.:
The present Petition stems from the dismissal by the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Iloilo City of a Notice of Appeal for petitioner’s failure to pay the
corresponding docket fees.
The facts are as follows:
On 20 April 1982, petitioner Panay Railways Inc., a government-owned
and controlled corporation, executed a Real Estate Mortgage Contract
covering several parcels of lands, including Lot No. 6153, in favor of Traders
Royal Bank (TRB) to secure P20 million worth of loan and credit
accommodations. Petitioner excluded certain portions of Lot No. 6153: that
already sold to Shell Co., Inc. referred to as 6153-B, a road referred to as 6153-
C, and a squatter area known as 6153-D.1
Petitioner failed to pay its obligations to TRB, prompting the bank to extra-
judicially foreclose the mortgaged properties including Lot No. 6153. On 20
January 1986, a Certificate of Sale was issued in favor of the bank as the
highest bidder and purchaser. Consequently, the sale of Lot No. 6153 was
registered with the Register of Deeds on 28 January 1986 and annotated at
the back of the transfer certificates of title (TCT) covering the mortgaged
properties.
Thereafter, TRB caused the consolidation of the title in its name on the
basis of a Deed of Sale and an Affidavit of Consolidation after petitioner failed
to exercise the right to redeem the properties. The corresponding TCTs were
subsequently issued in the name of the bank.
On 12 February 1990, TRB filed a Petition for Writ of Possession against
petitioner. During the proceedings, petitioner, through its duly authorized
manager and officer-in-charge and with the assistance of counsel, filed a
Manifestation and Motion to Withdraw Motion for Suspension of the Petition
for the issuance of a writ of possession. 2 The pertinent portions of the
Manifestation and Motion state:
“3. That after going over the records of this case and the case
of Traders Royal Bank vs. Panay Railway, Inc., Civil Case No. 18280,
PRI is irrevocably withdrawing its Motion for Suspension referred to
in paragraph 1 above, and its Motion for Reconsideration referred in
paragraph 2 above and will accept and abide by the September 21,
1990 Order denying the Motion For Suspension;
4. That PRI recognizes and acknowledges petitioner
(TRB) to be the registered owner of Lot 1-A; Lot 3834; Lot
6153; Lot 6158; Lot 6159, and Lot 5 covered by TCT No. T-
84233; T-84234; T-84235; T-84236; T-84237, T-84238 and
T-45724 respectively, free of liens and encumbrances,
except that portion sold to Shell Co. found in Lot 5. That
Petitioner (TRB) as registered owner is entitled to peaceful
ownership and immediate physical possession of said real
properties.
5. That PRI further acknowledges that the Provincial Sheriff
validly foreclosed the Real Estate Mortgage erected by PRI
due to failure to pay the loan of P20,000,000.00. That TRB
was the purchaser of these lots mentioned in paragraph 4 above at
Sheriff’s Auction Sale as evidenced by the Certificate of Sale dated
January 20, 1986 and the Certificates of Titles issued to Petitioner;
6. That PRI further manifests that it has no past, present
or future opposition to the grant of the Writ of Possession to
TRB over the parcels of land mentioned in paragraph 4
above and subject of this Petition and even assuming
“arguendo” that it has, PRI irrevocably waives the same.
That PRI will even assist TRB in securing possession of said
properties as witness against squatters, illegal occupants,
and all other possible claimants;
7. That upon execution hereof, PRI voluntarily surrenders
physical possession and control of the premises of these lots
to TRB, its successors or its assigns, together with all the
buildings, warehouses, offices, and all other permanent
improvements constructed thereon and will attest to the
title and possession of petitioner over said real properties.”
(Emphasis supplied)
TCT No. T-84235 mentioned in the quoted portion above is Lot No. 6153,
which is under dispute.
It was only in 1994 that petitioner realized that the extrajudicial
foreclosure included some excluded properties in the mortgage contract.
Thus, on 19 August 1994, it filed a Complaint for Partial Annulment of
Contract to Sell and Deed of Absolute Sale with Addendum; Cancellation of
Title No. T-89624; and Declaration of Ownership of Real Property with
Reconveyance plus Damages.3
It then filed an Amended Complaint4 on 1 January 1995 and again filed a
Second Amended Complaint5on 8 December 1995.
Meanwhile, respondents filed their respective Motions to Dismiss on these
grounds: (1) petitioner had no legal capacity to sue; (2) there was a waiver, an
abandonment and an extinguishment of petitioner’s claim or demand; (3)
petitioner failed to state a cause of action; and (4) an indispensable party,
namely TRB, was not impleaded.
On 18 July 1997, the RTC issued an Order 6 granting the Motion to Dismiss
of respondents. It held that the Manifestation and Motion filed by petitioner
was a judicial admission of TRB’s ownership of the disputed properties. The
trial court pointed out that the Manifestation was executed by petitioner’s
duly authorized representative with the assistance of counsel. This admission
thus operated as a waiver barring petitioner from claiming otherwise.
 On 11 August 1997, petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal without paying the
necessary docket fees. Immediately thereafter, respondents filed a Motion to
Dismiss Appeal on the ground of nonpayment of docket fees.
In its Opposition,7petitioner alleged that its counsel was not yet familiar
with the revisions of the Rules of Court that became effective only on 1 July
1997. Its representative was likewise not informed by the court personnel that
docket fees needed to be paid upon the filing of the Notice of Appeal.
Furthermore, it contended that the requirement for the payment of docket
fees was not mandatory. It therefore asked the RTC for a liberal interpretation
of the procedural rules on appeals.
On 29 September 1997, the RTC issued an Order 8dismissing the appeal
citing Sec. 4 of Rule 419 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Petitioner thereafter moved for a reconsideration of the Order 10 alleging
that the trial court lost jurisdiction over the case after the former had filed the
Notice of Appeal. Petitioner also alleged that the court erred in failing to relax
procedural rules for the sake of substantial justice.
On 25 November 1997, the RTC denied the Motion.11
On 28 January 1998, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals (CA) a
Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus under Rule 65 alleging that the RTC
had no jurisdiction to dismiss the Notice of Appeal, and that the trial court
had acted with grave abuse of discretion when it strictly applied procedural
rules.
On 29 November 2000, the CA rendered its Decision 12 on the Petition. It
held that while the failure of petitioner to pay the docket and other lawful fees
within the reglementary period was a ground for the dismissal of the appeal
pursuant to Sec. 1 of Rule 50 of the Revised Rules of Court, the jurisdiction to
do so belonged to the CA and not the trial court. Thus, appellate court ruled
that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the appeal
and set aside the latter’s assailed Order dated 29 September 1997.
Thereafter, respondents filed their respective Motions for Reconsideration.
It appears that prior to the promulgation of the CA’s Decision, this Court
issued Administrative Matter (A.M.) No. 00-2-10-SC which took effect on 1
May 2000, amending Rule 4, Sec. 7 and Sec. 13 of Rule 41 of the 1997 Revised
Rules of Court. The circular expressly provided that trial courts may, motu
proprio or upon motion, dismiss an appeal for being filed out of time or for
nonpayment of docket and other lawful fees within the reglementary period.
Subsequently, Circular No. 48-200013 was issued on 29 August 2000 and was
addressed to all lower courts.
By virtue of the amendment to Sec. 41, the CA upheld the questioned
Orders of the trial court by issuing the assailed Amended Decision 14 in the
present Petition granting respondents’ Motion for Reconsideration.
The CA’s action prompted petitioner to file a Motion for Reconsideration
alleging that SC Circular No. 48-2000 should not be given retroactive effect. It
also alleged that the CA should consider the case as exceptionally meritorious.
Petitioner’s counsel, Atty. Rexes V. Alejano, explained that he was yet to
familiarize himself with the Revised Rules of Court, which became effective a
little over a month before he filed the Notice of Appeal. He was thus not aware
that the nonpayment of docket fees might lead to the dismissal of the case.
On 30 May 2002, the CA issued the assailed Resolution 15 denying
petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.
Hence, this Petition.
Petitioner alleges that the CA erred in sustaining the RTC’s dismissal of the
Notice of Appeal. Petitioner contends that the CA had exclusive jurisdiction to
dismiss the Notice of Appeal at the time of filing. Alternatively, petitioner
argues that while the appeal was dismissible for failure to pay docket fees,
substantial justice demands that procedural rules be relaxed in this case.
The Petition has no merit.
Statutes and rules regulating the procedure of courts are considered
applicable to actions pending and unresolved at the time of their passage.
Procedural laws and rules are retroactive in that sense and to that extent. The
effect of procedural statutes and rules on the rights of a litigant may not
preclude their retroactive application to pending actions. This retroactive
application does not violate any right of a person adversely affected. Neither is
it constitutionally objectionable. The reason is that, as a general rule, no
vested right may attach to or arise from procedural laws and rules. It has been
held that “a person has no vested right in any particular remedy, and a litigant
cannot insist on the application to the trial of his case, whether civil or
criminal, of any other than the existing rules of procedure.” 16 More so when, as
in this case, petitioner admits that it was not able to pay the docket fees on
time. Clearly, there were no substantive rights to speak of when the RTC
dismissed the Notice of Appeal.
scope of their general or implied authority is regarded as an act of the client.
Consequently, the mistake or negligence of the counsel of petitioner may
result in the rendition of an unfavorable judgment against it.21
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition is DENIED for lack of
merit. SO ORDERED.
Petition denied.

The argument that the CA had the exclusive jurisdiction to dismiss the
appeal has no merit. When this Court accordingly amended Sec. 13 of Rule 41
through A.M. No. 00-2-10-SC, the RTC’s dismissal of the action may be
considered to have had the imprimatur of the Court. Thus, the CA committed
no reversible error when it sustained the dismissal of the appeal, taking note
of its directive on the matter prior to the promulgation of its Decision.
As early as 1932, in Lazaro v. Endencia,17 we have held that the payment of
the full amount of the docket fees is an indispensable step for the perfection of
an appeal. The Court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the
payment of the prescribed docket fees.18
Notes.—National Power Corporation (NPC) can no longer invoke Republic
Act No. 6395 (NPC Charter), as amended by Presidential Decree No. 938, as
its basis for exemption from the payment of legal fees. (In Re: Exemption of
the National Power Corporation from Payment of Filing/Docket Fees, 615
SCRA 1 [2010])
The rule in permissive counterclaims is that for the trial court to acquire
jurisdiction, the counterclaimant is bound to pay the prescribed docket fees.
(Government Service Insurance System vs. Heirs of Fernando F. Caballero,
632 SCRA 5 [2010])

Moreover, the right to appeal is not a natural right and is not part of due
process. It is merely a statutory privilege, which may be exercised only in
accordance with the law.19

We have repeatedly stated that the term “substantial justice” is not a magic
wand that would automatically compel this Court to suspend procedural rules.
Procedural rules are not to be belittled or dismissed simply because their non-
observance may result in prejudice to a party’s substantive rights. Like all
other rules, they are required to be followed, except only for the most
persuasive of reasons when they may be relaxed to relieve litigants of an
injustice not commensurate with the degree of their thoughtlessness in not
complying with the procedure prescribed.20

We cannot consider counsel’s failure to familiarize himself with the

Revised Rules of Court as a persuasive reason to relax the application of the
Rules. It is well-settled that the negligence of counsel binds the client. This
principle is based on the rule that any act performed by lawyers within the
 G.R. No. 158239. January 25, 2012.*
PRISCILLA ALMA JOSE, petitioner, vs. RAMON C. JAVELLANA,
ET AL., respondents.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; “Final Order” and “Interlocutory Order,”
Distinguished.—The Court has distinguished between final and interlocutory orders
in Pahila-Garrido v. Tortogo, 655 SCRA 553 (2011), thuswise: The distinction
between a final order and an interlocutory order is well known. The first disposes of
the subject matter in its entirety or terminates a particular proceeding or action,
leaving nothing more to be done except to enforce by execution what the court has
determined, but the latter does not completely dispose of the case but leaves
something else to be decided upon. An interlocutory order deals with preliminary
matters and the trial on the merits is yet to be held and the judgment rendered. The
test to ascertain whether or not an order or a judgment is interlocutory or final
is: does the order or judgment leave something to be done in the trial court with
respect to the merits of the case? If it does, the order or judgment is interlocutory;
otherwise, it is final.
Same; Same; The reason for disallowing an appeal from an interlocutory
order is to avoid multiplicity of appeals in a single action, which necessarily
suspends the hearing and decision on the merits of the action during the pendency
of the appeals.—Whether an order is final or interlocutory determines whether
appeal is the correct remedy or not. A final order is appealable, to accord with
the final judgment rule enunciated in Section 1, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court to the
effect that “appeal may be taken from a judgment or final order that completely
disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein when declared by these Rules to
be appealable;” but the remedy from an interlocutory one is not an appeal but a
special civil action for certiorari. The explanation for the differentiation of remedies
given in Pahila-Garrido v. Tortogo, 655 SCRA 553 (2011), is apt: xxx The reason for
disallowing an appeal from an interlocutory order is to avoid multiplicity of appeals
in a single action, which necessarily suspends the hearing and decision on the merits
of the action during the pendency of the appeals. Permitting multiple appeals will
necessarily delay the trial on the merits of the case for a considerable length of time,
and will compel the adverse party to incur unnecessary expenses, for one of the
parties may interpose as many appeals as there are incidental questions raised by
him and as there are interlocutory orders rendered or issued by the lower court. An
interlocutory order may be the subject of an appeal, but only after a judgment has
been rendered, with the ground for appealing the order being included in the appeal
of the judgment itself. The remedy against an interlocutory order not subject of an
appeal is an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65, provided that the
interlocutory order is rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion. Then is certiorari under Rule 65 allowed to be resorted to.
Same; Same; Appeals; Fresh Period Rule; Under the fresh period rule, an
aggrieved party desirous of appealing an adverse judgment or final order is
allowed a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice of appeal in the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) reckoned from receipt of the order denying a motion
for a new trial or motion for reconsideration.—Section 3 of Rule 41 of the Rules of
Court provides: Section 3. Period of ordinary appeal.—The appeal shall be taken
within fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment or final order appealed from.
Where a record on appeal is required, the appellant shall file a notice of appeal and a
record on appeal within thirty (30) days from notice of the judgment or final
order. The period of appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for
new trial or reconsideration. No motion for extension of time to file a
motion for new trial or reconsideration shall be allowed. (n) Under the rule,
Javellana had only the balance of three days from July 13, 2000, or until July 16,
2000, within which to perfect an appeal due to the timely filing of his motion for
reconsideration interrupting the running of the period of appeal. As such, his filing of
the notice of appeal only on July 19, 2000 did not perfect his appeal on time, as
Priscilla insists. The seemingly correct insistence of Priscilla cannot be upheld,
however, considering that the Court meanwhile adopted the fresh period
rule in Neypes v. Court of Appeals, 469 SCRA 633 (2005), by which an aggrieved
party desirous of appealing an adverse judgment or final order is allowed a fresh
period of 15 days within which to file the notice of appeal in the RTC reckoned from
receipt of the order denying a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration.
Same; Same; Same; Forum Shopping; Forum shopping is the act of a party
litigant against whom an adverse judgment has been rendered in one forum
seeking and possibly getting a favorable opinion in another forum, other than by
appeal or the special civil action of certiorari, or the institution of two or more
actions or proceedings grounded on the same cause or supposition that one or the
other court would make a favorable disposition.—The Court expounded on the
nature and purpose of forum shopping in In Re: Reconstitution of Transfer
Certificates of Title Nos. 303168 and 303169 and Issuance of Owner’s Duplicate
Certificates of Title In Lieu of Those Lost, Rolando Edward G. Lim, Petitioner, 624
SCRA 81 (2010): Forum shopping is the act of a party litigant against whom an
adverse judgment has been rendered in one forum seeking and possibly getting a
favorable opinion in another forum, other than by appeal or the special civil action
of certiorari, or the institution of two or more actions or proceedings grounded on
the same cause or supposition that one or the other court would make a favorable
disposition. Forum shopping happens when, in the two or more pending cases, there
is identity of parties, identity of rights or causes of action, and identity of reliefs
sought. Where the elements of litis pendentia are present, and where a final
judgment in one case will amount to res judicatain the other, there is forum
shopping. For litis pendentia to be a ground for the dismissal of an action, there must
be: (a) identity of the parties or at least such as to represent the same interest in both
actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded
on the same acts; and (c) the identity in the two cases should be such that the
judgment which may be rendered in one would, regardless of which party is
successful, amount to resjudicata in the other. For forum shopping to exist, both
actions must involve the same transaction, same essential facts and circumstances
and must raise identical causes of action, subject matter and issues. Clearly, it does
not exist where different orders were questioned, two distinct causes of action and
issues were raised, and two objectives were sought.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
BERSAMIN, J.:
The denial of a motion for reconsideration of an order granting the
defending party’s motion to dismiss is not an interlocutory but a final order
because it puts an end to the particular matter involved, or settles definitely
the matter therein disposed of, as to leave nothing for the trial court to do
other than to execute the order. 1Accordingly, the claiming party has a fresh
period of 15 days from notice of the denial within which to appeal the denial. 2
Antecedents
On September 8, 1979, Margarita Marquez Alma Jose (Margarita) sold for
consideration of P160,000.00 to respondent Ramon Javellana by deed of
conditional sale two parcels of land with areas of 3,675 and 20,936 square
meters located in Barangay Mallis, Guiguinto, Bulacan. They agreed that
Javellana would pay P80,000.00 upon the execution of the deed and the
balance of P80,000.00 upon the registration of the parcels of land under the
Torrens System (the registration being undertaken by Margarita within a
reasonable period of time); and that should Margarita become incapacitated,
her son and attorney-in-fact, Juvenal M. Alma Jose (Juvenal), and her
daughter, petitioner Priscilla M. Alma Jose, would receive the payment of the
balance and proceed with the application for registration.3
After Margarita died and with Juvenal having predeceased Margarita
without issue, the vendor’s undertaking fell on the shoulders of Priscilla, being
Margarita’s sole surviving heir. However, Priscilla did not comply with the
undertaking to cause the registration of the properties under the Torrens
System, and, instead, began to improve the properties by dumping filling
materials therein with the intention of converting the parcels of land into a
residential or industrial subdivision.4Faced with Priscilla’s refusal to comply,
Javellana commenced on February 10, 1997 an action for specific
performance, injunction, and damages against her in the Regional Trial Court
in Malolos, Bulacan (RTC), docketed as Civil Case No. 79-M-97
entitled Ramon C. Javellana, represented by Atty. Guillermo G. Blanco v.
Priscilla Alma Jose.
In Civil Case No. 79-M-97, Javellana averred that upon the execution of the
deed of conditional sale, he had paid the initial amount of P80,000.00 and
had taken possession of the parcels of land; that he had paid the balance of
the purchase price to Juvenal on different dates upon Juvenal’s
representation that Margarita had needed funds for the expenses of
registration and payment of real estate tax; and that in 1996, Priscilla had
called to inquire about the mortgage constituted on the parcels of land; and
that he had told her then that the parcels of land had not been mortgaged but
had been sold to him.5
Javellana prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order or writ
of preliminary injunction to restrain Priscilla from dumping filling materials
in the parcels of land; and that Priscilla be ordered to institute registration
proceedings and then to execute a final deed of sale in his favor. 6
Priscilla filed a motion to dismiss, stating that the complaint was already
barred by prescription; and that the complaint did not state a cause of action. 7
The RTC initially denied Priscilla’s motion to dismiss on February 4,
1998.8However, upon her motion for reconsideration, the RTC reversed itself
on June 24, 1999 and granted the motion to dismiss, opining that Javellana
had no cause of action against her due to her not being bound to comply with
the terms of the deed of conditional sale for not being a party thereto; that
there was no evidence showing the payment of the balance; that he had never
demanded the registration of the land from Margarita or Juvenal, or brought
a suit for specific performance against Margarita or Juvenal; and that his
claim of paying the balance was not credible.9
Javellana moved for reconsideration, contending that the presentation of
evidence of full payment was not necessary at that stage of the proceedings;
and that in resolving a motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to state a
cause of action, the facts alleged in the complaint were hypothetically
admitted and only the allegations in the complaint should be considered in
resolving the motion.10 Nonetheless, he attached to the motion for
reconsideration the receipts showing the payments made to
Juvenal.11 Moreover, he maintained that Priscilla could no longer succeed to
any rights respecting the parcels of land because he had meanwhile acquired
absolute ownership of them; and that the only thing that she, as sole heir, had
inherited from Margarita was the obligation to register them under the
Torrens System
On June 21, 2000, the RTC denied the motion for reconsideration for lack
of any reason to disturb the order of June 24, 1999.13
Accordingly, Javellana filed a notice of appeal from the June 21, 2000
order,14which the RTC gave due course to, and the records were elevated to the
Court of Appeals (CA).
In his appeal (CA-G.R. CV No. 68259), Javellana submitted the following
as errors of the RTC,15 to wit:
I obligation; that the action had not yet prescribed due to its being actually one
THE TRIAL COURT GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING THE FACT
THAT PLAINTIFF-APELLANT HAD LONG COMPLIED WITH THE FULL
PAYMENT OF THE CONSIDERATION OF THE SALE OF THE SUBJECT
PROPERTY AND HAD IMMEDIATELY TAKEN ACTUAL AND PHYSICAL
POSSESSION OF SAID PROPERTY UPON THE SIGNING OF THE CONDITIONAL
DEED OF SALE;
II
THE TRIAL COURT OBVIOUSLY ERRED IN MAKING TWO CONFLICTING
INTERPRETATIONS OF THE PROVISION OF THE CIVIL [CODE],
PARTICULARLY ARTICLE 1911, IN THE LIGHT OF THE TERMS OF THE
CONDITIONAL DEED OF SALE;
III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT DEFENDANT-APPELLEE BEING
NOT A PARTY TO THE CONDITIONAL DEED OF SALE EXECUTED BY HER
MOTHER IN FAVOR OF PLAINTFF-APPELLANT IS NOT BOUND THEREBY AND
CAN NOT BE COMPELLED TO DO THE ACT REQUIRED IN THE SAID DEED OF
CONDITIONAL SALE;
IV
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE AMENDED COMPLAINT
WITHOUT HEARING THE CASE ON THE MERITS.
Priscilla countered that the June 21, 2000 order was not appealable; that
the appeal was not perfected on time; and that Javellana was guilty of forum
shopping.16
It appears that pending the appeal, Javellana also filed a petition
for certiorariin the CA to assail the June 24, 1999 and June 21, 2000 orders
dismissing his complaint (CA-G.R. SP No. 60455). On August 6, 2001,
however, the CA dismissed the petition for certiorari,17finding that the RTC
did not commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing the orders, and holding
that it only committed, at most, an error of judgment correctible by appeal in
issuing the challenged orders.
On November 20, 2002, the CA promulgated its decision in CA-G.R. CV
No. 68259,18 reversing and setting aside the dismissal of Civil Case No. 79-M-
97, and remanding the records to the RTC “for further proceedings in
accordance with law.”19The CA explained that the complaint sufficiently stated
a cause of action; that Priscilla, as sole heir, succeeded to the rights and
obligations of Margarita with respect to the parcels of land; that Margarita’s
undertaking under the contract was not a purely personal obligation but was
transmissible to Priscilla, who was consequently bound to comply with the
for quieting of title that was imprescriptible brought by Javellana who had
actual possession of the properties; and that based on the complaint,
Javellana had been in actual possession since 1979, and the cloud on his title
had come about only when Priscilla had started dumping filling materials on
the premises.20
On May 9, 2003, the CA denied the motion for reconsideration, 21 stating
that it decided to give due course to the appeal even if filed out of time
because Javellana had no intention to delay the proceedings, as in fact he did
not even seek an extension of time to file his appellant’s brief; that current
jurisprudence afforded litigants the amplest opportunity to present their cases
free from the constraints of technicalities, such that even if an appeal was filed
out of time, the appellate court was given the discretion to nonetheless allow
the appeal for justifiable reasons.
 Issues
Priscilla then brought this appeal, averring that the CA thereby erred in not
outrightly dismissing Javellana’s appeal because: (a) the June 21, 2000 RTC
order was not appealable; (b) the notice of appeal had been filed belatedly by
three days; and (c) Javellana was guilty of forum shopping for filing in the CA
a petition for certiorari to assail the orders of the RTC that were the subject
matter of his appeal pending in the CA. She posited that, even if the CA’s
decision to entertain the appeal was affirmed, the RTC’s dismissal of the
complaint should nonetheless be upheld because the complaint stated no
cause of action, and the action had already prescribed.
On his part, Javellana countered that the errors being assigned by Priscilla
involved questions of fact not proper for the Court to review through petition
for review on certiorari; that the June 21, 2000 RTC order, being a final
order, was appealable; that his appeal was perfected on time; and that he was
not guilty of forum shopping because at the time he filed the petition
for certiorari the CA had not yet rendered a decision in CA-G.R. CV No.
68259, and because the issue of ownership raised in CA-G.R. CV No. 68259
was different from the issue of grave abuse of discretion raised in CA-G.R. SP
No. 60455.
Ruling
The petition for review has no merit.
I to avoid multiplicity of appeals in a single action, which necessarily suspends
Denial of the motion for reconsideration of the
order of dismissal was a final order and appealable
Priscilla submits that the order of June 21, 2000 was not the proper subject
of an appeal considering that Section 1 of Rule 41 of the Rules of
Court provides that no appeal may be taken from an order denying a motion
for reconsideration.
Priscilla’s submission is erroneous and cannot be sustained.
First of all, the denial of Javellana’s motion for reconsideration left nothing
more to be done by the RTC because it confirmed the dismissal of Civil Case
No. 79-M-97. It was clearly a final order, not an interlocutory one. The Court
has distinguished between final and interlocutory orders in Pahila-Garrido v.
Tortogo,22 thuswise:
“The distinction between a final order and an interlocutory order is well
known. The first disposes of the subject matter in its entirety or terminates a
particular proceeding or action, leaving nothing more to be done except to
enforce by execution what the court has determined, but the latter does not
completely dispose of the case but leaves something else to be decided upon.
An interlocutory order deals with preliminary matters and the trial on the
merits is yet to be held and the judgment rendered. The test to ascertain
whether or not an order or a judgment is interlocutory or final is: does the
order or judgment leave something to be done in the trial court with
respect to the merits of the case? If it does, the order or judgment is
interlocutory; otherwise, it is final.”
And, secondly, whether an order is final or interlocutory determines
whether appeal is the correct remedy or not. A final order is appealable, to
accord with the final judgment rule enunciated in Section 1, Rule 41 of
the Rules of Court to the effect that “appeal may be taken from a judgment or
final order that completely disposes of the case, or of a particular matter
therein when declared by these Rules to be appealable;”23but the remedy from
an interlocutory one is not an appeal but a special civil action for certiorari.
The explanation for the differentiation of remedies given in Pahila-Garrido v.
Tortogo is apt:
“xxx The reason for disallowing an appeal from an interlocutory order is
the hearing and decision on the merits of the action during the pendency of
the appeals. Permitting multiple appeals will necessarily delay the trial on
the merits of the case for a considerable length of time, and will compel the
adverse party to incur unnecessary expenses, for one of the parties may
interpose as many appeals as there are incidental questions raised by him
and as there are interlocutory orders rendered or issued by the lower court.
An interlocutory order may be the subject of an appeal, but only after a
judgment has been rendered, with the ground for appealing the order being
included in the appeal of the judgment itself.
The remedy against an interlocutory order not subject of an appeal is an
appropriate special civil action under Rule 65, provided that the
interlocutory order is rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction or with
 grave abuse of discretion. Then is certiorariunder Rule 65 allowed to be
resorted to.”
Indeed, the Court has held that an appeal from an order denying a motion
for reconsideration of a final order or judgment is effectively an appeal from
the final order or judgment itself; and has expressly clarified that the
prohibition against appealing an order denying a motion for reconsideration
referred only to a denial of a motion for reconsideration of an interlocutory
order.24
II
Appeal was made on time pursuant to Neypes v. CA
Priscilla insists that Javellana filed his notice of appeal out of time. She
points out that he received a copy of the June 24, 1999 order on July 9, 1999,
and filed his motion for reconsideration on July 21, 1999 (or after the lapse of
12 days); that the RTC denied his motion for reconsideration through the
order of June 21, 2000, a copy of which he received on July 13, 2000; that he
had only three days from July 13, 2000, or until July 16, 2000, within which
to perfect an appeal; and that having filed his notice of appeal on July 19,
2000, his appeal should have been dismissed for being tardy by three days
beyond the expiration of the reglementary period.
Section 3 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court provides:
“Section 3. Period of ordinary appeal.—The appeal shall be taken
within fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment or final order appealed
from. Where a record on appeal is required, the appellant shall file a notice
of appeal and a record on appeal within thirty (30) days from notice of the
judgment or final order.
The period of appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion
for new trial or reconsideration. No motion for extension of time
to file a motion for new trial or reconsideration shall be allowed.”
Under the rule, Javellana had only the balance of three days from July 13,
2000, or until July 16, 2000, within which to perfect an appeal due to the
timely filing of his motion for reconsideration interrupting the running of the
period of appeal. As such, his filing of the notice of appeal only on July 19,
2000 did not perfect his appeal on time, as Priscilla insists.
The seemingly correct insistence of Priscilla cannot be upheld, however,
considering that the Court meanwhile adopted the fresh period
rule in Neypes v. Court of Appeals,25 by which an aggrieved party desirous of
appealing an adverse judgment or final order is allowed a fresh period of 15
days within which to file the notice of appeal in the RTC reckoned from
receipt of the order denying a motion for a new trial or motion for
reconsideration, to wit:
“The Supreme Court may promulgate procedural rules in all courts. It
has the sole prerogative to amend, repeal or even establish new rules for a
more simplified and inexpensive process, and the speedy disposition of
cases. In the rules governing appeals to it and to the Court of Appeals,
particularly Rules 42, 43 and 45, the Court allows extensions of time,
based on justifiable and compelling reasons, for parties to file their
appeals. These extensions may consist of 15 days or more.
To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford
litigants fair opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court deems it practical
to allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice of appeal in
the Regional Trial Court, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a
motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration.
Henceforth, this “fresh period rule” shall also apply to Rule 40
governing appeals from the Municipal Trial Courts to the Regional Trial
Courts; Rule 42 on petitions for review from the Regional Trial Courts to
the Court of Appeals; Rule 43 on appeals from quasi-judicial agencies to
the Court of Appeals and Rule 45 governing appeals by certiorari to the
Supreme Court. The new rule aims to regiment or make the appeal period
uniform, to be counted from receipt of the order denying the motion for
new trial, motion for reconsideration (whether full or partial) or any final
order or resolution.”26
The fresh period rule may be applied to this case, for the Court has already
retroactively extended the fresh period rule to “actions pending and
undetermined at the time of their passage and this will not violate any right of
a person who may feel that he is adversely affected, inasmuch as there are no
vested rights in rules of procedure.”27 According to De los Santos v. Vda. de
Mangubat:28
“Procedural law refers to the adjective law which prescribes rules and
forms of procedure in order that courts may be able to administer justice.
 Procedural laws do not come within the legal conception of a retroactive
law, or the general rule against the retroactive operation of statutes―they
may be given retroactive effect on actions pending and undetermined at the
time of their passage and this will not violate any right of a person who may
feel that he is adversely affected, insomuch as there are no vested rights in
rules of procedure.
The “fresh period rule” is a procedural law as it prescribes a fresh period
of 15 days within which an appeal may be made in the event that the motion
for reconsideration is denied by the lower court. Following the rule on
retroactivity of procedural laws, the “fresh period rule” should be applied to
pending actions, such as the present case.
Also, to deny herein petitioners the benefit of the “fresh period rule” will
amount to injustice, if not absurdity, since the subject notice of judgment
and final order were issued two years later or in the year 2000, as compared
to the notice of judgment and final order in Neypes which were issued in
1998. It will be incongruous and illogical that parties receiving notices of
judgment and final orders issued in the year 1998 will enjoy the benefit of
the “fresh period rule” while those later rulings of the lower courts such as
in the instant case, will not.”
29
Consequently, we rule that Javellana’s notice of appeal was timely filed
pursuant to the fresh period rule.
III
No forum shopping was committed
Priscilla claims that Javellana engaged in forum shopping by filing a notice
of appeal and a petition for certiorari against the same orders. As earlier
noted, he denies that his doing so violated the policy against forum shopping.
The Court expounded on the nature and purpose of forum shopping in In
Re: Reconstitution of Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 303168 and 303169
and Issuance of Owner’s Duplicate Certificates of Title In Lieu of Those Lost,
Rolando Edward G. Lim, Petitioner:30
“Forum shopping is the act of a party litigant against whom an adverse
judgment has been rendered in one forum seeking and possibly getting a
favorable opinion in another forum, other than by appeal or the special
civil action of certiorari, or the institution of two or more actions or
proceedings grounded on the same cause or supposition that one or the
other court would make a favorable disposition. Forum shopping happens
when, in the two or more pending cases, there is identity of parties,
identity of rights or causes of action, and identity of reliefs sought. Where
the elements of litis pendentia are present, and where a final judgment in
one case will amount to res judicatain the other, there is forum shopping.
For litis pendentia to be a ground for the dismissal of an action, there must
be: (a) identity of the parties or at least such as to represent the same
interest in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for,
the relief being founded on the same acts; and (c) the identity in the two
cases should be such that the judgment which may be rendered in one
would, regardless of which party is successful, amount to resjudicata in the
other.
For forum shopping to exist, both actions must involve the same
transaction, same essential facts and circumstances and must raise
identical causes of action, subject matter and issues. Clearly, it does not
exist where different orders were questioned, two distinct causes of action
and issues were raised, and two objectives were sought.”
Should Javellana’s present appeal now be held barred by his filing of the
petition for certiorari in the CA when his appeal in that court was yet
pending?
We are aware that in Young v. Sy,31 in which the petitioner filed a notice of
appeal to elevate the orders concerning the dismissal of her case due to non-
suit to the CA and a petition for certiorari in the CA assailing the same orders
four months later, the Court ruled that the successive filings of the notice of
appeal and the petition for certiorari to attain the same objective of nullifying
the trial court’s dismissal orders constituted forum shopping that warranted
the dismissal of both cases. The Court said:
“Ineluctably, the petitioner, by filing an ordinary appeal and a petition
for certiorari with the CA, engaged in forum shopping. When the petitioner
commenced the appeal, only four months had elapsed prior to her filing with
the CA the Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 and which eventually came
up to this Court by way of the instant Petition (re: Non-Suit). The elements
of litis pendentia are present between the two suits. As the CA, through its
Thirteenth Division, correctly noted, both suits are founded on exactly the
same facts and refer to the same subject matter—the RTC Orders which
dismissed Civil Case No. SP-5703 (2000) for failure to prosecute. In both
cases, the petitioner is seeking the reversal of the RTC orders. The parties,
the rights asserted, the issues professed, and the reliefs prayed for, are all the
 same. It is evident that the judgment of one forum may amount to res
judicata in the other.
xxxx
The remedies of appeal and certiorari under Rule 65 are mutually
exclusive and not alternative or cumulative. This is a firm judicial policy. The
petitioner cannot hedge her case by wagering two or more appeals, and, in
the event that the ordinary appeal lags significantly behind the others, she
cannot post facto validate this circumstance as a demonstration that the
ordinary appeal had not been speedy or adequate enough, in order to justify
the recourse to Rule 65. This practice, if adopted, would sanction the filing of
multiple suits in multiple fora, where each one, as the petitioner couches it,
becomes a “precautionary measure” for the rest, thereby increasing the
chances of a favorable decision. This is the very evil that the proscription on
forum shopping seeks to put right. In Guaranteed Hotels, Inc. v. Baltao, the
Court stated that the grave evil sought to be avoided by the rule against
forum shopping is the rendition by two competent tribunals of two separate
and contradictory decisions. Unscrupulous party litigants, taking advantage
of a variety of competent tribunals, may repeatedly try their luck in several
different fora until a favorable result is reached. To avoid the resultant
confusion, the Court adheres strictly to the rules against forum shopping,
and any violation of these rules results in the dismissal of the case.”
32
The same result was reached in Zosa v. Estrella,33which likewise involved
the successive filing of a notice of appeal and a petition for certiorari to
challenge the same orders, with the Court upholding the CA’s dismissals of
the appeal and the petition for certiorarithrough separate decisions.
Yet, the outcome in Young v. Sy and Zosa v. Estrella is unjust here even if
the orders of the RTC being challenged through appeal and the petition
for certiorari were the same. The unjustness exists because the appeal and the
petition for certiorariactually sought different objectives. In his appeal in CA-
G.R. CV No. 68259, Javellana aimed to undo the RTC’s erroneous dismissal of
Civil Case No. 79-M-97 to clear the way for his judicial demand for specific
performance to be tried and determined in due course by the RTC; but his
petition for certiorari had the ostensible objective “to prevent (Priscilla) from
developing the subject property and from proceeding with the ejectment case
until his appeal is finally resolved,” as the CA explicitly determined in its
decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 60455.34
Nor were the dangers that the adoption of the judicial policy against forum
shopping designed to prevent or to eliminate attendant. The first danger, i.e.,
the multiplicity of suits upon one and the same cause of action, would not
materialize considering that the appeal was a continuity of Civil Case No. 79-
M-97, whereas CA-G.R. SP No. 60455 dealt with an independent ground of
alleged grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
on the part of the RTC. The second danger, i.e., the unethical malpractice of
shopping for a friendly court or judge to ensure a favorable ruling or judgment
after not getting it in the appeal, would not arise because the CA had not yet
decided CA-G.R. CV No. 68259 as of the filing of the petition for certiorari.
Instead, we see the situation of resorting to two inconsistent remedial
approaches to be the result of the tactical misjudgment by Javellana’s counsel
on the efficacy of the appeal to stave off his caretaker’s eviction from the
parcels of land and to prevent the development of them into a residential or
commercial subdivision pending the appeal. In the petition for certiorari,
Javellana explicitly averred that his appeal was “inadequate and not speedy to
prevent private respondent Alma Jose and her transferee/assignee xxx from
developing and disposing of the subject property to other parties to the total
deprivation of petitioner’s rights of possession and ownership over the subject
property,” and that the dismissal by the RTC had “emboldened private
respondents to fully develop the property and for respondent Alma Jose to file
an ejectment case against petitioner’s overseer xxx.” 35Thereby, it became far-
fetched that Javellana brought the petition for certiorari in violation of the
policy against forum shopping.
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition for review on certiorari;
AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on November 20, 2002; and ORDERS
the petitioner to pay the costs of suit. SO ORDERED.
Petition denied, judgment affirmed.
Notes.—An ordinary appeal of a judgment by the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment or
final order appealed from, except in the meantime, a motion for new trial or
reconsideration is filed, in which case, appellant is given a “fresh period” of
fifteen (15) days within which to file the notice of appeal in the RTC, counted
from receipt of the order dismissing the motion for a new trial or motion for
reconsideration. (PCI Leasing and Finance, Inc. vs. Milan, 617 SCRA 258
[2010])
 The dismissal without prejudice of a complaint was not merely an
interlocutory order but a final disposition of a complaint. (Land Bank of the
Philippines vs. Umandap, 635 SCRA 116 [2010])