LEAGUE OF CITIES vs.
COMELEC cases
November 18, 2008
ISSUES J. Carpio
1. WON Cityhood Laws violate Section Cityhood Laws VIOLATE Sections 6 and 10,
Article X of the Constitution
10, Article X of the Constitution
YES, exemption in RA 9009 is PROSPECTIVE
a) Is the exemption from income
in application since RA 9009 took effect in
requirement under RA 9009 June 30, 2001 while the Cityhood Bills
prospective or retroactive in became a law (December 2007) more than
5 years later.
application?
RA 9009 (an earlier law to the Cityhood Laws)
is not being applied retroactively, but
prospectively
b) Is the criteria for the YES. Congress must prescribe in the LGC all
criteria for the creation of LGUs. Creation of
creation of LGUs only be
LGUs must follow the criteria in the LGC and
prescribed in the Local NOT in any other law (i.e. RA 9009).
The clear intent of the Constitution is to insure
Government Code?
that the creation of cities and other political
units must follow the same uniform, non-
discriminatory criteria found solely in the Local
Government Code. Any derogation or
deviation from the criteria prescribed in the
Local Government Code violates Section 10,
Article X of the Constitution.
c) Is RA 9009 an amendatory RA 9009 is an AMENDATORY LAW to the
law of the LGC or a separate LGC since it amended Sec. 450 of the LGC
increasing the income requirement from
law?
P20 million to P100 million for the creation
of a city.
In enacting RA 9009, Congress did not grant
any exemption to respondent municipalities,
even though their cityhood bills were pending
in Congress when Congress passed RA 9009.
The Cityhood Laws, all enacted after the
December 21, 2009
J. Velasco
Cityhood Laws DID not violate Sec. 10, Art. X
of the Constitution
NO, the criteria need not be embodied in
the Local Government Code only, although
the LGC is the ideal repository to ensure
element of uniformity – this is consistent
with the plenary legislative power of
Congress.
Congress can even, after making a
codification, enact an amendatory law, adding
to the existing layers of indicators earlier
codified, just as efficaciously as it may reduce
the same. In this case, the amendatory RA
9009 upped the already codified income
requirement from PhP 20 million to PhP 100
million
Did Congress intend to exempt the LGUs
covered by the cityhood laws from the
higher income requirement in RA 9009?
YES, it was the intent of the lawmakers to
exempt the LGUs from the higher income
requirement when they approved the
cityhood laws considering that the
August 24, 2010 February 15, 2011
J. Carpio J. Bersamin
Cityhood Laws VIOLATED Sec. 10, Art. X of the Cityhood Laws DID not violate Sec. 10, Art. X
Constitution of the Constitution
NO, the criteria need not be embodied in
YES, the criteria for the creation of LGUs
the Local Government Code only - Congress
should only be prescribed by the Local
has the power to alter or modify it as it did
Government Code. The Constitution requires
when it enacted R.A. No. 9009. Such power of
Congress to stipulate in the Local Government
amendment of laws was again exercised when
Code all the criteria necessary for the creation
Congress enacted the Cityhood Laws.
of a city, including the conversion of a
municipality into a city. Congress cannot write
Congress deemed it wiser to exempt
such criteria in any other law, like the Cityhood
respondent municipalities from such a
Laws.
belatedly imposed modified income
requirement in order to uphold its higher
The clear intent of the Constitution is to insure
calling of putting flesh and blood to the very
that the creation of cities and other political
intent and thrust of the LGC, which is
units must follow the same uniform, non-
countryside development and autonomy,
discriminatory criteria found solely in the Local
especially accounting for these municipalities
Government Code.
as engines for economic growth in their
respective provinces.
RA 9009 is an AMENDATORY LAW to the
Did Congress intend to exempt the LGUs
LGC to increase the income requirement from
covered by the cityhood laws from the
P20 million to P100 million for the creation of
higher income requirement in RA 9009?
a city. This took effect on 30 June 2001.
Hence, from that moment the Local
Government Code required that any
YES, Congress intended that those with
municipality desiring to become a city must pending cityhood bills during the 11th
satisfy the P100 million income
Congress would not be covered by the new
requirement. Section 450 of the Local and higher income requirement of P100
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 effectivity of RA 9009, explicitly exempt
respondent municipalities from the increased
income requirement. Such exemption clearly
violates Section 10, Article X of the
Constitution and is thus patently
unconstitutional. To be valid, such
exemption must be written in the Local
Government Code and not in any other law,
including the Cityhood Laws.
d) Do the Cityhood Laws violate YES, the Cityhood Laws VIOLATE
constitutional mandate of a fair and
Sec. 6, Art. X of the
equitable share in the distribution of
Constitution on the fair and national taxes. If the criteria in creating local
equitable share in the national government units are not uniform and
discriminatory, there can be no fair and just
taxes?
distribution of the national taxes to local
government units. A city with an annual
income of only P20 million, all other criteria
being equal, should not receive the same
share in national taxes as a city with an annual
income of P100 million or more. Since the
Cityhood Laws do not follow the income
criterion in Section 450 of the Local
Government Code, they prevent the fair and
just distribution of the Internal Revenue
Allotment.
e) Should there be resort to the NO. Sec. 450 of the LGC is CLEAR and
deliberations of Congress UNAMBIGUOUS. Congress, in enacting RA
9009 to amend Section 450 of the Local
(extrinsic aids) for statutory
Government Code, did not provide any
construction? exemption from the increased income
cityhood bills were proposed much earlier
than the approval of RA 9009
What was the rationale behind the
enactment of RA 9009 – increasing the
income requirement?
To prevent the mad rush of municipalities
wanting to be converted into cities
In this case, Congress knew, when RA 9009 was
being deliberated, of the pendency of the
cityhood bills.
RATIO LEGIS EST ANIMA (intent of the law)
(1) Legislative intent that the pending
cityhood bills would be outside the P100
million requirement
(2) RA 9009 would not have any retroactive
effect insofar as the cityhood bills are
concerned
Given the foregoing perspective, it is not amiss
to state that the basis for the inclusion of the
exemption clause of the cityhood laws is
the clear-cut intent of Congress of not
according retroactive effect to RA 9009.
Not only do the congressional records bear
the legislative intent of exempting the
cityhood laws from the income requirement of
PhP 100 million. Congress has now made its
intention to exempt express in the challenged
cityhood laws.
Are the deliberations of the 11th and 12th
Congress without significance and would not
qualify as extrinsic aids since Congress is
not a continuing body?
NO, given that the cityhood bills were already
being deliberated again during the 13th
Congress after being tossed around in the 11th
& 12th Congress. It is immaterial if Congress
Government Code, as amended by RA 9009,
does not contain any exemption from this
income requirement.
The Cityhood Laws, all enacted after the
effectivity of RA 9009, explicitly exempt
respondent municipalities from the increased
income requirement in Section 450 of the
Local Government Code, as amended by RA
9009. Such exemption clearly violates Section
10, Article X of the Constitution and is thus
patently unconstitutional. To be valid, such
exemption must be written in the Local
Government Code and not in any other law,
including the Cityhood Laws.
The language of RA 9009 is plain, simple,
and clear. RA 9009 amended Section 450 of
the Local Government Code of 1991 by
increasing the income requirement for the
creation of cities. There are no exemptions
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million imposed by R.A. No. 9009. When the
LGC was amended by R.A. No. 9009, the
amendment carried with it both the letter and
the intent of the law, and such were
incorporated in the LGC by which the
compliance of the Cityhood Laws was gauged.
Notwithstanding that both the 11th and 12th
Congress failed to act upon the pending
cityhood bills, both the letter and intent of
Section 450 of the LGC, as amended by R.A.
No. 9009, were carried on until the 13th
Congress, when the Cityhood Laws were
enacted. The exemption clauses found in the
individual Cityhood Laws are the express
articulation of that intent to exempt
respondent municipalities from the coverage
of R.A. No. 9009.
Indeed, these municipalities have proven
themselves viable and capable to become
component cities of their respective provinces.
It is also acknowledged that they were centers
of trade and commerce, points of convergence
of transportation, rich havens of agricultural,
mineral, and other natural resources, and
flourishing tourism spots.
Did RA 9009 in effect amended the LGC?
YES. Undeniably, R.A. No. 9009 amended
the LGC. But it is also true that, in effect, the
Cityhood Laws amended R.A. No. 9009
through the exemption clauses found
therein.
Since the Cityhood Laws explicitly exempted
the concerned municipalities from the
amendatory R.A. No. 9009, such Cityhood
Laws are, therefore, also amendments to
the LGC itself. For this reason, we reverse the
November 18, 2008 Decision and the August
24, 2010 Resolution on their strained and
stringent view that the Cityhood Laws,
particularly their exemption clauses, are not
found in the LGC.
 requirement, not even to respondent
municipalities whose cityhood bills were then
pending when Congress passed RA 9009.
Since the law is clear, plain and unambiguous
that any municipality desiring to convert into
a city must meet the increased income
requirement
is not continuing body; what is important is from this income requirement. Since the law
that the deliberations of Congress (i.e. is clear, plain and unambiguous that any
cityhood laws in relation to RA 9009) WERE municipality desiring to convert into a city
PART OF ITS LEGISLATIVE HISTORY and must meet the increased income
may be CONSULTED AS EXTRINSIC AIDS requirement, there is no reason to go
beyond the letter of the law.

f) Was the intent of the 11th NO, the 11th Congress intent was NOT
Congress (to exempt the WRITTEN into the Local Government Code.
While members of 11th Congress discussed
municipalities from higher
exempting the respondent municipalities from
income requirement) written RA 9009, however Congress did not write
into the LGC? this exemption into law given that it could
have easily included such exemption. This is
fatal to the cause of respondent municipalities
because such exemption must appear in RA
9009 as an amendment to Section 450 of the
Local Government Code.

g) Are the deliberations of the

NO, the deliberations of 11th Congress are
11th Congress of the Cityhood INAPPLICABLE since Congress is not a
bills applicable to construe continuing body. All the hearings and
deliberations conducted during the 11th
laws passed by subsequent
Congress on unapproved bills also became
Congresses? worthless upon the adjournment of the 11th
Congress. These hearings and deliberations
cannot be used to interpret bills enacted into
law in the 13th or subsequent Congresses.

2. WON Cityhood Laws violate the
equal protection clause
YES, the Cityhood Laws VIOLATE the equal
protection clause. If Section 450 of the Local
Government Code, as amended by RA 9009,
contained an exemption to the P100 million
annual income requirement, criteria could be
assailed on the ground of absence of valid
classification. But Sec. 450 as amended by
RA 9009 does not contain the exemption.
The exemption in the Cityhood Laws are
unconstitutional
NO, the Cityhood Laws DO NOT VIOLATE YES, the Cityhood Laws VIOLATE the equal NO, the Cityhood Laws DO NOT VIOLATE
the equal protection clause protection clause the equal protection clause since there was
VALID CLASSIFCATION
Can the other LGUs claim that their IRA
would be substantially reduced on account
of the conversion of the respondent
municipalities?
NO, since there is no deprivation of
property resulting from the enactment of
the cityhood laws. Indeed, it is presumptuous
on the part of the LCP member-cities to
already stake a claim on the IRA, as if it were

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** Granting that exemption from the
higher income requirement is included
in RA 9009 as amendatory to Sec.
450 LGC, would it still violate the
equal protection clause?
a) Was there substantial
distinction?
YES, such exemption would still violate the
equal protection clause. The exemption
provision merely states, "Exemption from
Republic Act No. 9009 ─ The City of x x x shall
be exempted from the income requirement
prescribed under Republic Act No. 9009." This
one sentence exemption provision contains no
classification standards or guidelines
differentiating the exempted municipalities
from those that are not exempted.
The exemption will be based solely on the fact
that the 16 municipalities had cityhood bills
pending in the 11th Congress when RA 9009
was enacted. This is not a valid classification
between those entitled and those not entitled
to exemption from the P100 million income
requirement.
NO, there is no substantial distinction
between the municipalities with pending
cityhood bills and municipalities that did
not have pending cityhood bills. The mere
pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th
Congress is not a material difference to
distinguish one municipality from another for
the purpose of the income requirement.
their property, as the IRA is yet to be allocated.
For the same reason, the municipalities that
are not covered by the uniform exemption
clause in the cityhood laws cannot validly
invoke constitutional protection. For, at this
point, the conversion of a municipality into a
city will only affect its status as a political unit,
but not its property as such.
YES, there is SUBSTANTIAL DISTINCTION.
Respondent LGUs, which are subjected only to
the erstwhile PhP 20 million income criterion
instead of the stringent income requirement
prescribed in RA 9009, are substantially
different from other municipalities desirous to
be cities.
They were qualified cityhood applicants
before the enactment of RA 009. Because of
events they had absolutely nothing to do with,
a spoiler in the form of RA 9009 supervened.
Now, then, to impose on them the much
higher income requirement after what they
have gone through would appear to be
indeed unfair
Is the classification germane to the purpose
of the law?
YES. The exemption of respondent
LGUs/municipalities from the PhP 100 million
income requirement was meant to reduce the
inequality occasioned by the passage of the
amendatory RA 9009. Respondent
municipalities and the 33 other municipalities,
NO, there is no substantial distinction
between municipalities with pending cityhood
bills in the 11th Congress and municipalities
that did not have pending bills. The mere
pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th
Congress is not a material difference to
distinguish one municipality from another
for the purpose of the income requirement.
The pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th
Congress does not affect or determine the
level of income of a municipality.
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YES, there is SUBSTANTIAL DISTINCTION.
It should be pointed out that the imposition
of the P100 million average annual income
requirement for the creation of component
cities was arbitrarily made. To be sure, there
was no evidence or empirical data, such as
inflation rates, to support the choice of this
amount. The imposition of a very high
income requirement of P100 million,
increased from P20 million, was simply to
make it extremely difficult for
municipalities to become component cities.
Verily, the determination of the existence of
substantial distinction with respect to
respondent municipalities does not simply lie
on the mere pendency of their cityhood bills
during the 11th Congress.
Indeed, substantial distinction lies in the
capacity and viability of respondent
municipalities to become component cities of
their respective provinces. Congress, by
enacting the Cityhood Laws, recognized
this capacity and viability of respondent
 which had already been elevated to city status, municipalities to become the State’s
were all found to be qualified under the old partners in accelerating economic growth
Sec. 450 of the LGC of 1991 during the 11th and development in the provincial regions,
Congress. As such, both respondent LGUs and which is the very thrust of the LGC, manifested
the 33 other former municipalities are under by the pendency of their cityhood bills during
like circumstances and conditions. the 11th Congress and their relentless pursuit
for cityhood up to the present.

YES, the fact of pendency of the cityhood

b) Was the classification limited
to existing conditions only?
c) Did the classification apply
equally to all members of the
same class?
YES, the fact of pendency of the cityhood
bills LIMITS the exemption to a specific
condition (i.e. that specific condition will
never happen again) existing at the time of
passage of RA 9009
In the same vein, the exemption provision in
the Cityhood Laws gives the 16 municipalities
a unique advantage based on an arbitrary date
− the filing of their cityhood bills before the
end of the 11th Congress - as against all other
municipalities that want to convert into cities
after the effectivity of RA 9009.
NO, limiting the exemption only to the 16
municipalities violates the requirement
that classification must apply to all similarly
situated. Municipalities with the same
income as the 16 respondent municipalities
cannot convert into cities, while the 16
respondent municipalities can.
NO, the non-retroactive effect of RA 9009
is NOT LIMITED in application only to
conditions existing at the time of its
enactment. It is intended to apply for all time,
as long as the contemplated conditions
obtain. To be more precise, the legislative
intent underlying the enactment of RA 9009 to
exclude would-be-cities from the PhP 100
million criterion would hold sway, as long as
the corresponding cityhood bill has been filed
before the effectivity of RA 9009 and the
concerned municipality qualifies for
conversion into a city under the original
version of Sec. 450 of the LGC of 1991.
YES, the uniform exemption clause would
apply to municipalities that had pending
cityhood bills before the passage of RA
9009 and were compliant with then Sec.
450 of the LGC of 1991, which prescribed an
income requirement of PhP 20 million.
bills LIMITS the exemption to a specific
condition (i.e. that specific condition will
never happen again) existing at the time of
passage of RA 9009.
This violates the requirement that a valid
classification must not be limited to existing
conditions only. In fact, the minority concedes
that the conditions (pendency of the cityhood
bills) adverted to can no longer be repeated.
NO, limiting the exemption only to the 16
municipalities violates the requirement
that classification must apply to all similarly
situated. Municipalities with the same
income as the 16 respondent municipalities
cannot convert into cities, while the 16
respondent municipalities can.
Can the other LGUs claim that their IRA
would be substantially reduced on account
of the conversion of the respondent
municipalities?
NO, the feared reduction of IRA proved to
be FALSE when after the implementation of
the Cityhood Laws, THEIR RESPECTIVE
SHARES INCREASED, not decreased
Congress merely took the 16 municipalities
covered thereby from the disadvantaged
position brought about by the abrupt increase
in the income requirement of R.A. No. 9009,
acknowledging the “privilege” that they have
already given to those newly-converted
component cities, which prior to the
enactment of R.A. No. 9009, were undeniably
in the same footing or “class” as the
respondent municipalities. Congress merely
recognized the capacity and readiness of
respondent municipalities to become
component cities of their respective provinces.

OPERATIVE FACT DOCTRINE

The Operative Fact doctrine does not

operate to constitutionalize the
unconstitutional Cityhood Laws.

Applying the operative fact doctrine to the

present case, the Cityhood Laws remain
unconstitutional because they violate
Section 10, Article X of the Constitution.
However, the effects of the
implementation of the Cityhood Laws
prior to the declaration of their nullity,
such as the payment of salaries and
supplies by the new cities or their
issuance of licenses or execution of
contracts, may be recognized ©asKARLA
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and effective.