Bagong Bayani vs. COMELEC Page 34 Ending

3/3/2018 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 359
698 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party vs. Commission on Elections
*
G.R. No. 147589. June 26, 2001.
ANG BAGONG BAYANI-OFW LABOR PARTY (under the

acronym OFW), represented herein by its secretary-general,
MOHAMMAD OMAR FAJARDO, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION
ON ELECTIONS; CITIZENS DRUG WATCH; MAMAMAYAN
AYAW SA DROGA; GO! GO! PHILIPPINES; THE TRUE
MARCOS LOYALIST ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES;
PHILIPPINE LOCAL AUTONOMY; CITIZENS MOVEMENT
FOR JUSTICE, ECONOMY, ENVIRONMENT AND PEACE;
CHAMBER OF REAL ESTATE BUILDERS ASSOCIATION;
SPORTS & HEALTH ADVANCEMENT FOUNDATION, INC.;
ANG LAKAS NG OVERSEAS CONTRACT WORKERS (OCW);
BAGONG BAYANI ORGANIZATION and others under
“Organizations/Coalitions” of Omnibus Resolution No. 3785;
PARTIDO NG MASANG PILIPINO; LAKAS NUCD-UMDP;
NATIONALIST PEOPLE’S COALITION; LABAN NG
DEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO; AKSYON DEMOKRATIKO;
PDP-LABAN; LIBERAL PARTY; NACIONALISTA PARTY; ANG
BUHAY HAYAANG YUMABONG; and others under “Political
Parties” of Omnibus Resolution No. 3785, respondents.
*
G.R. No. 147613. June 26, 2001.
BAYAN MUNA, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS;

NATIONALIST PEOPLE’s COALITION (NPC); LABAN NG DE
_______________
* EN BANC.
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VOL. 359, JUNE 6, 2001 699

http://www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/00000161e78963c559a3969d003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 1/61
MOKRATIKONG PILIPINO (LDP); PARTIDO NG MASANG

PILIPINO (PMP); LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP; LIBERAL PARTY;
MAMAMAYANG AYAW SA DROGA; CREBA; NATIONAL
FEDERATION OF SUGARCANE PLANTERS; JEEP; and
BAGONG BAYANI ORGANIZATION, respondents.
Election Law; Actions; Certiorari; Pleadings and Practice; Under

both the Constitution and the Rules of Court, a challenge on the validity of a
Comelec Resolution for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion
may be brought before the Supreme Court in a verified petition for
certiorari under Rule 65.—At bottom, petitioners attack the validity of
Comelec Omnibus Resolution 3785 for having been issued with grave abuse
of discretion, insofar as it allowed respondents to participate in the party-list
elections of 2001. Indeed, under both the Constitution and the Rules of
Court, such challenge may be brought before this Court in a verified petition
for certiorari under Rule 65.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Motions for Reconsideration; No motion
for reconsideration of a Comelec en banc resolution, order or decision is
possible, the same being a prohibited pleading.—The assailed Omnibus
Resolution was promulgated by Respondent Commission en banc; hence, no
motion for reconsideration was possible, it being a prohibited pleading
under Section 1 (d), Rule 13 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Certiorari is available, notwithstanding the
presence of other remedies, “where the issue raised is one purely of law,
where public interest is involved, and in case of urgency.”—In any event,
this case presents an exception to the rule that certiorari shall lie only in the
absence of any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy. It has been held
that certiorari is available, notwithstanding the presence of other remedies,
“where the issue raised is one purely of law, where public interest is
involved, and in case of urgency.” Indeed, the instant case is indubitably
imbued with public interest and with extreme urgency, for it potentially
involves the composition of 20 percent of the House of Representatives.
Same; Same; Same; Educative Function of the Supreme Court.—
Moreover, this case raises transcendental constitutional issues on the party-
list system, which this Court must urgently resolve, consistent with its duty
to “formulate guiding and controlling constitutional principles, precepts,
doctrines, or rules.”
700
Same; Same; Same; Procedural requirements “may be glossed over to

prevent a miscarriage of justice, when the issue involves the principle of
social justice x x x when the decision sought to be set aside is a nullity, or

when the need for relief is extremely urgent.”—Procedural requirements
“may be glossed over to prevent a miscarriage of justice, when the issue
involves the principle of social justice x x x when the decision sought to be
set aside is a nullity, or when the need for relief is extremely urgent and
certiorari is the only adequate and speedy remedy available.”
Same; Party-List System; Under the Constitution and Republic Act
(RA) 7941, political parties cannot be disqualified from the party-list
elections merely on the ground that they are political parties.—We now rule
on this issue. Under the Constitution and RA 7941, private respondents
cannot be disqualified from the party-list elections, merely on the ground
that they are political parties. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution,
provides that members of the House of Representatives may “be elected
through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral
parties or organizations.”
Same; Same; The key words in the statutory policy set out in RA 7941
are “proportional representation,” “marginalized and underrepresented,”
and “lack [of] well-defined constituencies.”—The foregoing provision
mandates a state policy of promoting proportional representation by means
of the Filipino-style party-list system, which will “enable” the election to
the House of Representatives of Filipino citizens, 1. who belong to
marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties; and 2.
who lack well-defined constituencies; but 3. who could contribute to the
formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the
nation as a whole. The key words in this policy are “proportional
representation,” “marginalized and underrepresented,” and “lack [of] well-
defined constituencies.”
Same; Same; Words and Phrases; “Proportional representation” does
not refer to the number of people in a particular district, but rather to the
representation of the “marginalized and underrepresented” as exemplified
by the enumeration in Section 5 of the law—namely, “labor, peasant,
fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly,
handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and
professionals.”—“Proportional representation” here does not refer to the
number of people in a particular district, because the party-list election is
national in scope. Neither does it allude to numerical strength in a distressed
or oppressed group. Rather, it refers to the representation of the
“marginalized and underrepresented” as exemplified by the enumeration in
Section 5 of the
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VOL. 359, JUNE 26, 2001 701
law; namely, “labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural

communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas
workers, and professionals.”
Same; Same; The party-list organization or party must factually and
truly represent the marginalized and underrepresented constituencies
mentioned in Section 5, and the persons nominated by the party-list
candidate-organization must be “Filipino citizens belonging to
marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties.”—It
is not enough for the candidate to claim representation of the marginalized
and underrepresented, because representation is easy to claim and to feign.
The partylist organization or party must factually and truly represent the
marginalized and underrepresented constituencies mentioned in Section 5.
Concurrently, the persons nominated by the party-list candidate-organization
must be “Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented
sectors, organizations and parties.”
Same; Same; Words and Phrases; “Lack of well-defined
constituenc[y]” refers to the absence of a traditionally identifiable electoral
groups, like voters of a congressional district or territorial unit of
government.—“Lack of well-defined constituenc[y]” refers to the absence
of a traditionally identifiable electoral group, like voters of a congressional
district or territorial unit of government. Rather, it points again to those with
disparate interests identified with the “marginalized or underrepresented.”
Same; Same; Statutory Construction; Noscitur A Sociis; It is a
fundamental principle of statutory construction that words employed in a
statute are interpreted in connection with, and their meaning is ascertained
by reference to, the words and the phrases with which they are associated or
related.—While the enumeration of marginalized and underrepresented
sectors is not exclusive, it demonstrates the clear intent of the law that not
all sectors can be represented under the party-list system. It is a fundamental
principle of statutory construction that words employed in a statute are
interpreted in connection with, and their meaning is ascertained by reference
to, the words and the phrases with which they are associated or related.
Thus, the meaning of a term in a statute may be limited, qualified or
specialized by those in immediate association.
Same; Same; The party-list system seeks to enable certain Filipino
citizens.—specifically those belonging to marginalized and
underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties—to be elected to the
House of Representatives, and the assertion of the Office of the Solicitor
General that the party-list system is not exclusive to the marginalized and
underrepre
702

sented disregards the clear statutory policy.—The declared policy of RA

7941 contravenes the position of the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG).
We stress that the party-list system seeks to enable certain Filipino citizens
—specifically those belonging to marginalized and underrepresented
sectors, organizations and parties—to be elected to the House of
Representatives. The assertion of the OSG that the party-list system is not
exclusive to the marginalized and underrepresented disregards the clear
statutory policy. Its claim that even the super-rich and overrepresented can
participate desecrates the spirit of the party-list system.
Same; Same; Allowing the non-matginalized and overrepresented to
vie for the remaining seats under the party-list system would not only dilute,
but also prejudice the chance of the marginalized and underrepresented,
contrary to the intention of the law to enhance it.—Verily, allowing the non-
marginalized and overrepresented to vie for the remaining seats under the
party-list system would not only dilute, but also prejudice the chance of the
marginalized and underrepresented, contrary to the intention of the law to
enhance it. The party-list system is a tool for the benefit of the
underprivileged; the law could not have given the same tool to others, to the
prejudice of the intended beneficiaries.
Same; Same; Constitutional Law; Statutory Construction; Verba Legis;
The fundamental principle in constitutional construction is that the primary
source from which to ascertain constitutional intent or purpose is the
language of the provision itself.—The fundamental principle in
constitutional construction, however, is that the primary source from which
to ascertain constitutional intent or purpose is the language of the provision
itself. The presumption is that the words in which the constitutional
provisions are couched express the objective sought to be attained. In other
words, verba legis still prevails. Only when the meaning of the words used
is unclear and equivocal should resort be made to extraneous aids of
construction and interpretation, such as the proceedings of the
Constitutional Commission or Convention, in order to shed light on and
ascertain the true intent or purpose of the provision being construed.
Same; Same; Same; The function of all judicial and quasi-judicial
instrumentalities is to apply the law as they find it, not to reinvent or
second-guess it.—When a lower court, or a quasi-judicial agency like the
Commission on Elections, violates or ignores the Constitution or the law, its
action can be struck down by this Court on the ground of grave abuse of
discretion. Indeed, the function of all judicial and quasi-judicial
instrumentalities is to apply the law as they find it, not to reinvent or
second-guess it.
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VOL. 359, JUNE 26, 2001 703
Ang Bagong Bayqni-OFW Labor Party vs. Commission on Elections

Same; Same; Guidelines for Screening Party-List Participants,—The

Court, therefore, deems it proper to remand the case to the Comelec fqr the
latter to determine, after summary evidentiary hearings, whether the 154
parties and organizations allowed to participate in the party-list elections
comply with the requirements of the law. In this light, the Court finds it
appropriate to lay down the following guidelines, culled from the law and
the Constitution, to assist the Comelec in its work. First, the political party,
sector, organization or coalition must represent the marginalized and
underrepresented groups identified in Section 5 of RA 7941. Second, while
even major political parties are expressly allowed by RA 7941 and the
Constitution to participate in the party-list system, they must comply with
the declared statutory policy enabling Filipino citizens belonging to
marginalized and underrepresented sectors to be elected to the House of
Representatives. Third, the religious sector may not be represented in the
party-list system. Fourth, a party or an organization must not be disqualified
under Section 6 of RA 7941. Fifth, the party or organization must not be an
adjunct of, or a project organized or an entity funded or assisted by, the
government. Sixth, the party must not only comply with t)ie requirements of
the law. Its nominees must likewise do so. Seventh, not only candidate party
or organization must represent marginalized and underrepresented sectors.
So also must its nominees. Eighth, while lacking a well-defined political
constituency, the nominee must likewise be able to contribute to the
formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the
nation as a whole.
VITUG, J,, Separate (Dissenting) Opinion:
Election Law; Party-List System; Neither Article 6, Section 5(2) of the

Constitution, nor R.A. 7941 intended to guarantee representation to all
sectors of society and, let alone, hand it over only to underrepresented and
marginalized sectors.—It would seem to me that, construed along with
Section 3(d) of the statute, defining a “sectoral party,” the enumeration was
intended to qualify only “sectoral parties” and not the other eligible groups
(e.g., political parties, sectoral organizations and coalitions). Neither Article
6, Section 5(2), nor R,A, 7941 intended to guarantee representation to all
sectors of society and, let alone, hand it over only to underrepresented and
marginalized sectors. The real aim, if the will of the majority of the
Commissioners were to be respected, was to introduce the concept of party-
list representation.
Same; Same; Words and Phrases; “Political Party,” “Sectoral Party,”
“Sectoral Organization,” and “Coalition,” Defined; The party-list system is
limited to four groups—1) political parties, 2) sectoral parties, 3) sectoral
704
organizations, and 4) coalitions.—The party-list system is limited to four

groups—1) political parties, 2) sectoral parties, 3) sectoral organizations,
and 4) coalitions. A political party is an organized group of citizens
advocating an ideology, or platform, principles or policies for the general
conduct of government and which, as the most immediate means of securing
their adoption, regularly nominates and supports certain of its leaders and
members as candidates for public office. A sectoral party is an organized
group of citizens belonging to identifiable sectors, such as those enumerated
in Article 6, Section 5(2), of the 1987 Constitution, which includes the
labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities and women and
those added by R.A. 7941 like the fisherfolk, elderly, handicapped, veterans,
overseas workers and professionals. A sectoral organization is a group of
citizens who share the same or similar attributes or characteristics,
employment, interests or concerns. Coalition is an aggrupation of duly
registered national, regional, sectoral parties or organizations for election
purposes.
Same; Same; A feature of the party-list system is that political parties,
sectoral groups and organizations, coalitions and aggrupation acquire the
status of “candidates” and their nominees relegated to mere agents.—A
feature of the party-list system is that political parties, sectoral groups and
organizations, coalitions and aggrupation acquire the status of “candidates”
and their nominees relegated to mere agents. Thus, if a party-list
representative dies, becomes physically incapacitated, removed from office
by the party or the organization he represents, resigns, or is disqualified
during his term, his party can send another person to take his place for the
remaining period, provided the replacement is next in succession in the list
of nominees submitted to the COMELEC upon registration. Furthermore, a
party-list representative who switches party affiliations during his term
forfeits his seat. So, also, if a person changes his sectoral affiliation within 6
months before the election, he will not be eligible for nomination in party-
list representative under his new party or organization.
Same; Same; Constitutional Law; Statutory Construction; Judicial
Legislation; Courts are bound to suppose that any inconveniences involved
in the application of constitutional provisions according to their plain terms
and import have been considered in advance and accepted as less
intolerable than those avoided, or as compensated by countervailing
advantages; The ponencia itself, in ruling as it does, may unwittingly, be
crossing the limits of judicial review and treading the dangerous waters of
judicial legislation, and more importantly, of a constitutional amendment.—
The polestar in the constructions of constitutions always remains—“effect
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VOL. 359, JUNE 26, 2001 705

must be given to the intent of the framers of the organic law and of the
people adopting it.” The law, in its clear formulation cannot give this
tribunal the elbow-room for construction. Courts are bound to suppose that
any inconveniences involved in the application of constitutional provisions
according to their plain terms and import have been considered in advance
and accepted as less intolerable than those avoided, or as compensated by
countervailing advantages. The ponencia itself, in ruling as it does, may
unwittingly, be crossing the limits of judicial review and treading the
dangerous waters of judicial legislation, and more importantly, of a
constitutional amendment. While, the lament of herein petitioners is
understandable, the remedy lies not with this Court but with the people
themselves through an amendment of their work as and when better counsel
prevails.
MENDOZA, J., Dissenting opinion:
Election Law; Party-List System; Constitutional Law; Statutory

Construction; The most important single factor in determining the intention
of the people from whom the Constitution emanated is the language in
which it is expressed; Textually, Art. VI, §5(1)(2) of the Constitution
provides no basis for petitioners’ contention that whether it is sectoral
representation or party-list system the purpose is to provide exclusive
representation for “marginalized sectors,” by which term petitioners mean
the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women,
and youth sectors.—“The most important single factor in determining the
intention of the people from whom the Constitution emanated is the
language in which it is expressed.” The text of Art. VI, §5(1)(2) is quite
clear. It provides for a party-list system of “registered, regional, and sectoral
parties or organizations,” not for sectoral representation. Only for three
consecutive terms following the ratification of the Constitution and only
with respect to one-half of the seats allotted to party-list representatives does
it allow sectoral representation. Textually, Art. VI, §5(1)(2) provides no
basis for petitioners’ contention that whether it is sectoral representation or
party-list system the purpose is to provide exclusive representation for
“marginalized sectors,” by which term petitioners mean the labor, peasant,
urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, and youth sectors.
Same; Same; Same; Same; To the extent that it assures parties or
candidates a percentage of seats in the legislature that reflects their public
support, the party-list system enables marginalized and underrepresented
sectors to obtain seats in the House of Representatives.—Under the partylist
system, a party or candidate need not come in first in order to win seats in
the legislature. On the other hand, in the “winner-take-all” single
706
seat district, the votes cast for a losing candidate are wasted as only those
who vote for the winner are represented. To the extent then that it assures
parties or candidates a percentage of seats in the legislature that reflects
their public support, the party-list system enables marginalized and
underrepresented sectors (such as, but not limited to, the labor, peasant,
urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, and youth sectors) to
obtain seats in the House of Representatives. Otherwise, the party-list
system does not guarantee to these sectors seats in the legislature.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission show that the party-list system is not limited to the
“marginalized and underrepresented” sectors referred to by petitioners, but
that it is a type of proportional representation intended to give voice to those
who may not have the necessary number to win a seat in a district but are
sufficiently numerous to give them a seat nationwide.—The deliberations of
the Constitutional Commission show that the party-list system is not limited
to the “marginalized and underrepresented” sectors referred to by
petitioners, i.e., labor, peasants, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, women, and the youth, but that it is a type of proportional
representation intended to give voice to those who may not have the
necessary number to win a seat in a district but are sufficiently numerous to
give them a seat nationwide. It, therefore, misreads the debates on Art. VI,
§5(1)(2) to say that “Although Commissioners Villacorta and Monsod
differed in their proposals as to the details of the party-list system, both
proponents worked within the framework that the party-list system is for the
‘marginalized’ as termed by Comm. Villacorta and the ‘underrepresented’ as
termed by Comm. Monsod, which he defined as those which are “always
third or fourth place in each of the districts.”
Same; Same; Same; The Supreme Court cannot hold that the partylist
system is reserved for the labor, peasants, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, women, and youth without changing entirely the meaning of
the Constitution which in fact mandates exactly the opposite of the reserved
seats system when it provides in Art. IX, C, §6 that “A free and open party
system shall be allowed to evolve according to the free choice of the people,
subject to the provisions of this Article.”—A problem was placed before the
Constitutional Commission that the existing “winner-take-all” one-seat
district system of election leaves blocks of voters underrepresented. To this
problem of underrepresentation two solutions were proposed: sectoral
representation and party-list system or proportional representation. The
Constitutional Commission chose the party-list system, This Court cannot
hold that the party-list system is reserved for the labor,
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VOL. 359, JUNE 26, 2001 707
peasants, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, and youth

as petitioners contend without changing entirely the meaning of the
Constitution which in fact mandates exactly the Opposite of the reserved
seats system when it provides in Art. IX, C, §6 that “A free and open party
system shall be allowed to evolve according to the free choice of the people,
subject to the provisions of this Article.” Thus, neither textual nor historical
consideration yields support for the view that the party-list system is
designed exclusively for labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, women, and youth sectors.
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS in the Supreme Court. Certiorari.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Neri, Javier, Colmenares for petitioner Bayan Muna.
The Solicitor General for COMELEC.
Chan, Robles and Associates for Citizens Drug Watch
Foundation, Inc.
Cruz, Cruz & Navarro III for Mamamayan Ayaw sa Droga.
Brillantes, Navarro, Jumamil, Arcilla, Escolin & Martinez
Law Offices for The True Marcos Loyalist Association of the
Philippines.
Fracis A, Ver for Phil. Local Autonomy Movement.
Yap, Crisanto, Salvador & Calderon and Fornier & Fornier
Law Office for Chamber of Real Estate Builders Association.
McAskell, Equilla, & Associates for Ang Lakas ng Overseas
Contract Workers.
Juan Carlos T. Cuna and Antonio Dollete & Associates for
Partido ng Masang Pilipino.
Buhag, Kapunan, Migallos & Perez for Aksyon Demokratiko.
Tonisito M.C. Umali for Liberal Party.
Yulo and Bello Law Offices for LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP.
Ceferino Padua Law Office, Gerardo A. Del Afundo Law
Office and Antonio R. Bautista & Partners for Bagong Bayani
Organization.
708

PANGANIBAN, J.:
The party-list system is a social justice tool designed not only to

give more law to the great masses of our people who have less in
life, but also to enable them to become veritable lawmakers

themselves, empowered to participate directly in the enactment of
laws designed to benefit them. It intends to make the marginalized
and the underrepresented not merely passive recipients of the State’s
benevolence, but active participants in the mainstream of
representative democracy. Thus, allowing all individuals and groups,
including those which now dominate district elections, to have the
same opportunity to participate in party-list elections would
desecrate this lofty objective and mongrelize the social justice
mechanism into an atrocious veneer for traditional politics.
The Case
Before us are two Petitions under Rule 65 of the 1

Rales of Court,
challenging Omnibus Resolution No. 3785 issued by the
Commission on Elections (Comelec) on March 26, 2001. This
Resolution approved the participation of 154 organizations and
parties, including those herein impleaded, in the 2001 party-list
elections. Petitioners seek the disqualification of private
respondents, arguing mainly that the party-list system was intended
to benefit the marginalized and underrepresented; not the
mainstream political parties, the non-marginalized or
overrepresented.
The Factual Antecedents
With the onset of the 2001 elections, the Comelec received several
Petitions for registration filed by sectoral parties, organizations and
political parties. According to the Comelec, “[verifications were
made as to the status and capacity of these parties and organizations
and hearings were scheduled day and night until the last party w[as]
heard. With the number of these petitions and the
_______________
1 Signed by Chairman Alfredo L. Benipayo and Commissioners Luzviminda G.

Tancangco, Rufino S.B. Javier, Ralph C. Lantion, Mehol K. Sadain, Resurrecion Z.
Borra and Florentino A. Tuason, Jr.
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VOL. 359, JUNE 26, 2001 709

observance of the legal and procedural requirements, review of these

petitions as well as deliberations takes a longer process in order to
arrive at a decision and as a result the two (2) divisions promulgated
a separate Omnibus Resolution and individual resolution on political

parties. These numerous petitions and processes observed in the
disposition of these petition [s] hinder the early release of the
Omnibus Resolutions of 2
the Divisions which were promulgated only
on 10 February 2001.”
Thereafter, before the February 12, 2001 deadline prescribed
under Comelec Resolution No. 3426 dated December 22, 2000, the
registered parties and organizations filed their respective
Manifestations, stating their intention to participate in the party-list
elections. Other sectoral and political parties and organizations
whose registrations were denied also filed Motions for
Reconsideration, together with Manifestations of their intent to
participate in the party list elections. Still other registered parties
filed their Manifestations beyond the deadline.
The Comelec gave due course or approved the Manifestations (or
accreditations) of 151 parties and organizations, but denied those of
several others in its assailed March 26, 2001 Omnibus Resolution
No. 3785, which we quote:
“We carefully deliberated the foregoing matters, having in mind that this
system of proportional representation scheme will encourage multi-partisan
[sic] and enhance the inability of small, new or sectoral parties or
organization to directly participate in this electoral window.
“It will be noted that as defined, the ‘party-list system’ is a ‘mechanism
of proportional representation’ in the election of representatives to the
House of Representatives from national, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations or coalitions thereof registered with the Commission on
Elections.
“However, in the course of our review of the matters at bar, we must
recognize the fact that there is a need to keep the number of sectoral parties,
organizations and coalitions, down to a manageable level, keeping only
those who substantially comply with the rules and regulations and
_______________
2 Omnibus Resolution No. 3785, p. 13; rollo (GR No. 147589), p. 40.
710

more importantly the sufficiency of the Manifestations

3
or evidence on the
Motions for Reconsiderations or Oppositions.”
On April 10, 2001, Akbayan Citizens Action Party filed before the
Comelec a Petition praying that “the names of [some of herein
respondents] be deleted from the ‘Certified List of Political
Parties/Sectoral Parties/Organizations/Coalitions Participating in the
Party List System for the May 14, 2001 Elections’ and that said
certified list be accordingly amended.” It also asked, as an
alternative, that the votes cast for the said respondents not be
counted or 4 canvassed, and that the latter’s nominees not be
proclaimed. On April 11, 2001, Bayan Muna and Bayan Muna-
Youth also filed a Petition for Cancellation 5of Registration and
Nomination against some of herein respondents.
On April 18, 2001, the Comelec required the respondents in the
two disqualification cases to file Comments within three days 6from
notice. It also set the date for hearing
7
on April 26, 2001, but
subsequently reset it to May 3, 2001. During the hearing, however,
Commissioner Ralph C. Lantion 8merely directed the parties to
submit their respective memoranda.
Meanwhile, dissatisfied with the pace of the 9
Comelec, Ang
Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party filed a Petition before this Court
on April 16, 2001. This Petition, docketed as GR No. 147589,
assailed Comelec Omnibus
10
Resolution No. 3785. In its Resolution
dated April 17, 2001, the Court directed respondents to comment
on the11Petition within a non-extendible period of five days from
notice.
_______________
3 Ibid., pp. 21-22; rollo, pp. 48-49.

4 Rollo (GR No. 147589), pp. 272-273.
5 Rollo (GR No. 147589), pp. 250-263.
6 Rollo (GR No. 147589), pp. 282-283.
7 See rollo (GR No. 147613), p. 223.
8 TSN (GR No. 147589 and 147613), May 17, 2001, p. 49.
9 Rollo (GR No. 147589), pp. 4-73.
10 Rollo (GR No. 147589), p. 74.
11 Comments were filed by MAD, Bagong Bayani, The True Marcos Loyalists, the
Comelec, Partido ng Masang Pilipino, the Liberal Party, the Office of the Solicitor
General, CREBA, Lakas-NUCD-UMDP, the Philip
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VOL. 359, JUNE 26, 2001 711

On April 17, 2001, 12

Petitioner Bayan Muna also filed before this
Court a Petition, docketed as GR No. 147613, also challenging
Comelec Omnibus 13
Resolution No. 3785. In its Resolution dated
May 9, 2001, the Court ordered the consolidation of the two
Petitions before it; directed respondents named in the second
Petition to file their respective Comments on or before noon of May
15, 2001; and called the parties to an Oral Argument on May 17,
2001. It added that the Comelec may proceed with the counting and
canvassing of votes cast for the party-list elections, but barred the
proclamation of any winner
14
therein, until further orders of the Court.
Thereafter, Comments on the second Petition were received by
the Court and, on May 17, 2001, the Oral Argument was conducted
as scheduled. In an Order given in open court, the parties were
directed to submit their respective Memoranda15
simultaneously
within a non-extendible period of five days.
Issues:
During the hearing on May 17, 2001, the Court directed the parties
to address the following issues:
“1. Whether or not recourse under Rule 65 is proper under the

premises. More specifically, is there no other plain, speedy
or adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law?
_______________
pine Local Autonomy Movement, Aksyon Demokratiko, Citizens Drug Watch

Foundation, Ang Buhay Hayaang Yumabong, Ang Lakas ng OCW, and Sports and
Health Foundation.
12 Rollo (GR No. 147613), pp. 3-45.
13 Rollo (GR No. 147613), p. 46.
14 These were filed by the Office of the Solicitor General, the Comelec, The
Bagong Bayani Organization, Mamamayan Ayaw sa Droga, and the Philippine Local
Autonomy Movement.
15 Memoranda were filed by Petitioners Bayan Muna and Ang Bagong Bayani-
OFW Labor Party; and Respondents Mamamayan Ayaw sa Droga, CREBA, the
Bagong Bayani Organization, the Office of the Solicitor General, and Aksyon
Demokratiko. Manifestations instead of memoranda were filed by Lakas-NUCD and
OCW.
712

“2. Whether or not political parties may participate in the

partylist elections.
“3. Whether or not the party-list system is exclusive to
‘marginalized and underrepresented’ sectors and
organizations.
“4. Whether or not the Comelec committed grave abuse of
discretion
16
in promulgating Omnibus Resolution No. 3785.”
The Court’s Ruling
The Petitions are partly meritorious. These cases should be

remanded to the Comelec which will determine, after summary
evidentiary hearings, whether the 154 parties and organizations
enumerated in the assailed Omnibus Resolution satisfy the
requirements of the Constitution and RA 7941, as specified in this
Decision.
First Issue:
Recourse Under Rule 65
Respondents contend that the recourse of both petitioners under

Rule 65 is improper because there are other 17plain, speedy and
adequate remedies in the ordinary course of law. The Office of the
Solicitor General argues that petitioners should have filed before the
Comelec a petition either for disqualification or for cancellation of
registration, pursuant to
18
Sections 19, 20, 21 and 19
22 of Comelec
Resolution No. 3307-A dated November 9, 2000.
We disagree. At bottom, petitioners attack the validity of
Comelec Omnibus Resolution 3785 for having been issued with
grave abuse of discretion, insofar as it allowed respondents to
participate
_______________
16 See the May 17, 2001 Resolution, p. 2; rollo (GR No. 147613), p. 88.
17 See, e.g., the Bagong Bayani Organization’s Memorandum, pp. 3-4; Aksyon
Demokratiko’s Memorandum, pp. 2-3; and MAD’s Memorandum, pp. 3-6.
18 Rules and regulations governing the filing of a petition for registration, a
manifestation to participate, and the names of nominees under the party-list system of
representation in connection with the May 14, 2001 national and local elections.
19 OSG’s Memorandum, pp. 6-14; rollo (GR No. 147613), pp. 151-159.
713
VOL. 359, JUNE 26, 2001 713

in the party-list
20
elections of 2001. Indeed, under both the
Constitution and the Rules of Court, such challenge may be
brought before this Court in a verified petition for certiorari under
Rule 65.
Moreover, the assailed Omnibus Resolution was promulgated by
Respondent Commission en banc; hence, no motion for
reconsideration was possible, it being a prohibited pleading 21

under
Section 1 (d), Rule 13 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure.
The Court also notes that Petitioner Bayan Muna had filed before
the Comelec a Petition for Cancellation of Registration22
and
Nomination against some of herein respondents. The Comelec,
however, did not act on that Petition. In view of the pendency of the
elections, Petitioner Bayan Muna sought succor from this Court, for
there was no other adequate recourse at the time. Subsequent events
have proven the urgency of petitioner’s action; to this date, the
Comelec has not yet formally resolved the Petition before it. But a
resolution may just be a formality because the Comelec, through the
Office of the Solicitor General, has made its position on the matter
quite clear.
In any event, this case presents an exception to the rule that
certiorari shall lie only in the absence of any other plain, speedy
_______________
20 Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, provides: “Judicial power includes

the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which
are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.”
21 SECTION 1. What pleadings are not allowed.—The following pleadings are not
allowed:
xxx xxx xxx
d) motion for reconsideration of an en banc ruling, resolution, order or decision
except in election offense cases;
xxx xxx xxx
22 Docketed as SPA 01-113. As earlier noted, Akbayan also filed before the
Comelec a similar Petition, docketed as SPA-01-109. See Annexes 1 and 2, Comment
of the Office of the Solicitor General; rollo (GR No. 147589), pp. 250 et seq. and 266
et seq.
714

23
and adequate remedy. It has been held that certiorari is available,
notwithstanding the presence of other remedies, “where the issue
raised is one purely
24
of law, where public interest is involved, and in
case of urgency.” Indeed, the instant case is indubitably imbued
with public interest and with extreme urgency, for it potentially
involves the composition of 20 percent of the House of
Representatives.
Moreover, this case raises transcendental constitutional issues on
the party-list system, which this Court must urgently resolve,
consistent with its duty to “formulate guiding and 25

controlling
constitutional principles, precepts, doctrines, or rules.”
Finally, procedural requirements “may be glossed over to prevent
a miscarriage of justice, when the issue involves the principle of
social justice x x x when the decision sought to be set aside is a
nullity, or when the need for relief is extremely urgent
26
and certiorari
is the only adequate and speedy remedy available.”
Second Issue:
Participation of Political Parties
In its Petition, Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party contends that

“the inclusion of political parties in the party-list system
27
is the most
objectionable portion of the questioned Resolution.” For its
_______________
23 Section 1, Rule 65. See Filoteo v. Sandiganbayan, 263 SCRA 222, October 16,
1996; BF Corporation v. CA, 288 SCRA 267, March 27, 1998; GSIS v. Olisa, 304
SCRA 421, March 10, 1999; National Steel Corporation v. CA, GR No. 134437,
January 31, 2000, 324 SCRA 208; Sahali v. Comelec, GR No. 134169, February 2,
2000, 324 SCRA 510.
24 Republic v. Sandiganbayan, 269 SCRA 316, March 7, 1997, per Panganiban, J.
See also ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation v. Commission on Elections, GR No.
133486, January 28, 2000, 323 SCRA 811; Central Bank v. Cloribel, 44 SCRA 307,
April 11, 1972.
25 Salonga v. Cruz Paño, 134 SCRA 438, February 18, 1985, per Gutierrez, Jr., J.
See also Tañada v. Angara, 272 SCRA 18, May 2, 1997; Guingona v. Gonzales, 219
SCRA 326, March 1, 1993.
26 ABS-CBN v. Comelec, GR No. 133486, January 28, 2000, 323 SCRA 811, per
Panganiban, J.
27 Petition of Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party, p. 15; rollo (GR No,
147589), p. 18.
715
VOL. 359, JUNE 26, 2001 715

part, Petitioner Bayan

28
Muna objects to the participation of “major
political parties.” On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor
General, like the impleaded political parties, submits that the
Constitution and RA No. 7941 allow political parties to participate
in the party-list elections. It argues that the party-list system is, in
fact, open to all29 “registered national, regional and sectoral parties or
organizations.”
We now rule on this issue. Under the Constitution and RA 7941,
private respondents cannot be disqualified from the party-list
elections, merely on the ground that they are political parties.

Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, provides that members of
the House of Representatives may “be elected through a party-list
system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations.”
Furthermore, under Sections 7 and 8, Article IX (C) of the
Constitution, political parties may be registered under the party-list
system.
“Sec. 7. No votes cast in favor of a political party, organization, or coalition

shall be valid, except for those registered under the party-list system as
provided in this Constitution.
“Sec. 8. Political parties, or organizations or coalitions registered under
the party-list system, shall not be represented in the voter’s registration
boards, boards of election inspectors, boards of canvassers, or other similar
bodies. However, they 30
shall be entitled to appoint poll watchers in
accordance with law.”
During the deliberations in the Constitutional Commission, Comm.

Christian S. Monsod pointed out that the participants in the party-list
system may
31
“be a regional party, a sectoral party, a national party,
UNIDO, Magsasaka, or a regional party in Min-
_______________
28 Petition of Bayan Muna, p. 18; rollo (GR No. 147613), p. 20.

29 OSG Comment, p. 18; rollo (GR No. 147589), p. 244.
30 Emphasis supplied. See also §§17 and 18, Article VI of the Constitution.
31 It may be noted that when the Constitution was being drafted in the early days
of the post-Marcos era, UNIDO was the dominant political party.
716

32
danao.” This was also clear from the
33
following exchange between
Comms. Jaime Tadeo and Blas Ople:
“MR. TADEO. Naniniwala ba kayo na ang party list ay pwedeng

paghati-hatian ng UNIDO, PDP-Laban, PNP, Liberal at
Nacionalista?
MR. OPLE. Maaari yan sapagkat bukas ang party-list system sa
lahat ng mga partido.”
Indeed, Commissioner Monsod stated that the purpose of the party-

list provision was to open up the system, in order to give a chance to
parties that consistently place third or34 fourth in congressional district
elections to win a seat in Congress. He explained: The purpose of
this is to open the system. In the past elections, we found out that
there were certain groups or parties that, if we count their votes
nationwide, have about 1,000,000 or 1,500,000 votes. But they were
always third or fourth place in each of the districts. So, they have no
voice in the Assembly. But this way, they would have five or six
representatives in the Assembly even if they would not win
individually in legislative districts. So, that is essentially the
mechanics, the purpose and objectives of the partylist system.”
For its part, Section 2 of RA 7941 also provides for “a party-list
system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or
organizations or coalitions thereof, x x x.” Section 3 expressly states
that a “party” is “either a political party or a sectoral party or a
coalition of parties.” More to the point, the law defines “political
party” as “an organized group of citizens advocating an ideology or
platform, principles and policies for the general conduct of
government and which, as the most immediate means of securing
their adoption, regularly nominates and supports certain of its
leaders and members as candidates for public office.”
Furthermore, Section 11 of RA 7941 leaves no doubt as to the
participation of political parties in the party-list system. We quote
the pertinent provision below:
_______________
32 Record of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. II, p. 86.

717
VOL. 359, JUNE 26, 2001 717

“x x x x x x x x x
“For purposes of the May 1998 elections, the first five (5) major political
parties on the basis of party representation in the House of Representatives
at the start of the Tenth Congress of the Philippines shall not be entitled to
participate in the party-list system.
“x x x x x x x x x
Indubitably, therefore, political parties—even the major ones—may

participate in the party-list elections.
Third Issue:
Marginalized and Underrepresented
That political parties may participate in the party-list elections does

not mean, however, that any political party—or any organization or
group for that matter—may do so. The requisite character of these

parties or organizations must be consistent with the purpose of the
party-list system, as laid down in the Constitution and RA 7941.
Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, provides as follows:
“(1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not

more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise
fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts
apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the
Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of
their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform
and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law,
shall be elected through a party-list system of registered
national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.
(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per
centum of the total number of representatives including
those under the party list. For three consecutive terms after
the ratification of this Constitution, one-half of the seats
allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as
provided by law, by selection or election from the labor,
peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities,
women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided
by law, except the religious sector.” (Emphasis supplied.)
Notwithstanding the sparse language of the provision, a

distinguished member of the Constitutional Commission declared
that the purpose of the party-list provision was to give “genuine
power
718

to our people” in Congress. Hence, when the provision was

discussed, he exultantly announced: “On this first day of August
1986, we shall, hopefully, usher in a new chapter to our national 35
history, by giving genuine power to our people in the legislature.”
The foregoing provision on the party-list system is not self-
executory. It is, in fact, interspersed with phrases like “in accordance
with law” or “as may be provided by law”; it was thus up to
Congress to sculpt in granite the lofty objective of the Constitution.
Hence, RA 7941 was enacted. It laid out the statutory policy in this
wise:
“SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy.—The State shall promote proportional

representation in the election of representatives to the House of
Representatives through a party-list system of registered national, regional
and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof, which will enable

Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors,
organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined political constituencies
but who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate
legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole, to become members of the
House of Representatives. Towards this end, the State shall develop and
guarantee a full, free and open party system in order to attain the broadest
possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of
Representatives by enhancing their chances to compete for and win seats in
the legislature, and shall provide the simplest scheme possible.”
The Marginalized and Underrepresented

to Become Lawmakers Themselves
The foregoing provision mandates a state policy of promoting
proportional representation by means of the Filipino-style partylist
system, which will “enable” the election to the House of
Representatives of Filipino citizens.
1. who belong to marginalized and underrepresented sectors,

organizations and parties; and
2. who lack well-defined constituencies; but
_______________
719
VOL. 359, JUNE 26, 2001 719

3. who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of

appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a
whole.
The key words in this policy are “proportional representation,”

“marginalized and underrepresented,” and “lack [of] well-defined
constituencies.”
“Proportional representation” here does not refer to the number
of people in a particular district, because the party-list election is
national in scope. Neither does it allude to numerical strength in a
distressed or oppressed group. Rather, it refers to the representation
of the “marginalized and underrepresented” as exemplified by the
enumeration in Section 5 of the law; namely, “labor, peasant,
fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly,
professionals.”
However, it is not enough for the candidate to claim

representation of the marginalized and underrepresented, because
representation is easy to claim and to feign. The party-list
organization or party must factually and truly represent the
marginalized
36
and underrepresented constituencies mentioned in
Section 5. Concurrently, the persons nominated by the party-list
candidate-organization must be “Filipino citizens belonging to
marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and
parties.”
Finally, “lack of well-defined constituency]” refers to the absence
of a traditionally identifiable electoral group, like voters of a
congressional district or territorial unit of government. Rather, it
points again to those with disparate interests identified with the
“marginalized or underrepresented.”
In the end, the role of the Comelec is to see to it that only those
Filipinos who are “marginalized and underrepresented” become
members of Congress under the party-list system, Filipino-style.
The intent of the Constitution is clear: to give genuine power to
the people, not only by giving more law to those who have less in
life, but more so by enabling them to become veritable lawmakers
themselves. Consistent with this intent, the policy of the imple-
_______________
36 Infra.
720

menting law, we repeat, is likewise clear: “to enable Filipino citizens

belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors,
organizations and parties, x x x, to become members of the House of
Representatives.” Where the language37of the law is clear, it must be
applied according to its express terms.
The marginalized and underrepresented sectors to be represented
under the party-list system are enumerated in Section 5 of RA 7941,
which states:
“SEC. 5. Registration.—Any organized group of persons may register as a

party, organization or coalition for purposes of the party-list system by filing
with the COMELEC not later than ninety (90) days before the election a
petition verified by its president or secretary stating its desire to participate
in the party-list system as a national, regional or sectoral party or
organization or a coalition of such parties or organizations, attaching thereto
its constitution, by-laws, platform or program of government, list of
officers, coalition agreement and other relevant information as the
COMELEC may require: Provided, that the sector shall include labor,
peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly,
professionals.”
While the enumeration of marginalized and underrepresented sectors

is not exclusive, it demonstrates the clear intent of the law that not
all sectors can be represented under the party-list system. It is a
fundamental principle of statutory construction that words employed
in a statute are interpreted in connection with, and their meaning is
ascertained by reference to, the words and the phrases with which
they are associated or related. Thus, the meaning of a term in a
statute may be limited, 38
qualified or specialized by those in
immediate association.
_______________
37 Azarcon v. Sandiganbayan, 268 SCRA 747, February 26, 1997; Ramirez v. CA,
248 SCRA 590, September 28, 1995.
38 82 C.J.S. Statutes §331.
721
VOL. 359, JUNE 26, 2001 721

The Party-List System Desecrated

by the OSG Contentions
Notwithstanding the unmistakable statutory policy, the Office of the
Solicitor General submits that RA No. 7941 “does not limit the
participation in the party-list system 39
to the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors of society.” In fact, it contends
40
that any
party or group that is not disqualified under Section 6 of RA 7941
may participate in the elections. Hence, it admitted during the Oral
Argument that even an organization representing the super rich of
Forbes Park
41
or Dasmarinas Village could participate in the party-list
elections.
The declared policy of RA 7941 contravenes the position of the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG). We stress that the party-list
system seeks to enable certain Filipino citizens—specifically those
organizations and parties—to be elected to the House of
Representatives. The assertion of the OSG that the party-list system
is not exclusive to the marginalized and underrepresented disregards
the clear statutory policy. Its claim that even the super-rich and
overrepresented can participate desecrates the spirit of the party-list
system.
Indeed, the law grafted to address the peculiar disadvantages of

Payatas hovel dwellers cannot be appropriated by the mansion
owners of Forbes Park. The interests of these two sectors are
manifestly disparate; hence, the OSG’s position to treat them
similarly defies reason and common sense. In 42
contrast, and with
admirable candor, Atty. Lorna Patajo-Kapunan admitted during the
Oral Argument that a group of bankers, industrialists and sugar
planters could not join43 the party-list system as representatives of
their respective sectors.
While the business moguls and the mega-rich are, numerically
speaking, a tiny minority, they are neither marginalized nor un-
_______________
39 OSG Comment, p. 18; rollo (GR No. 147589), p. 244.

40 Infra.
41 TSN, May 17, 2001, pp. 147-148.
42 Counsel of Aksyon Demokratiko.
43 TSN, May 17, 2001, pp. 178-180.
722

derrepresented, for the stark reality is that their economic clout

engenders political power more awesome than their numerical
limitation. Traditionally, political power does not necessarily
emanate from the size of one’s constituency; indeed, it is likely to
arise more directly from the number and amount of one’s bank
accounts.
It is ironic, therefore, that the marginalized and underrepresented
in our midst are the majority who wallow in poverty, destitution and
infirmity. It was for them that the party-list system was enacted—to
give them not only genuine hope, but genuine power; to give them
the opportunity to be elected and to represent the specific concerns
of their constituencies; and simply to give them a direct voice in
Congress and in the larger affairs of the State. In its noblest sense,
the party-list system truly empowers the masses and ushers a new
hope for genuine change. Verily, it invites those marginalized and
underrepresented in the past—the farm hands, the fisher folk, the
urban poor, even those in the underground movement—to come out
and participate, as indeed many of them came out and participated
during the last elections. The State cannot now disappoint and
frustrate them by disabling and desecrating this social justice
vehicle.
Because the marginalized and underrepresented had not been
able to win in the congressional district elections normally
dominated by traditional politicians and vested groups, 20 percent of

the seats in the House of Representatives were set aside for the
party-list system. In arguing that even those sectors who normally
controlled 80 percent of the seats in the House could participate in
the party-list elections for the remaining 20 percent, the OSG and
the Comelec disregard the fundamental difference between the
congressional district elections and the party-list elections.
As earlier noted, 44the purpose of the party-list provision was to
open up the system, in order to enhance the chance of sectoral
groups and organizations to gain representation in the House of
_______________
44 Supra. See also §6, Article IX (C) of the Constitution, which reads: “A free and
open party system shall be allowed to evolve according to the free choice of the
people, subject to the provisions of this Article.”
723
VOL. 359, JUNE 26, 2001 723

45
Representatives through the simplest scheme possible. Logic shows
that the system has been opened to those who have never gotten a
foothold within it—those who cannot otherwise win in regular
elections and who therefore need the “simplest scheme possible” to
do so. Conversely, it would be illogical to open the system to those
who have long been within it—those privileged sectors that have
long dominated the congressional district elections.
The import of the open party-list system may be more vividly
understood when compared to a student dormitory “open house,”
which by its nature allows outsiders to enter the facilities.
Obviously, the “open house” is for the benefit of outsiders only, not
the dormers themselves who can enter the dormitory even without
such special privilege. In the same vein, the open party-list system is
only for the “outsiders” who cannot get elected through regular
elections otherwise; it is not for the non-marginalized or
overrepresented who already fill the ranks of Congress.
Verily, allowing the non-marginalized and overrepresented to vie
for the remaining seats under the party-list system would not only
dilute, but also prejudice the chance of the marginalized and
underrepresented, contrary to the intention of the law to enhance it.
The party-list system is a tool for the benefit of the underprivileged;
the law could not have given the same tool to others, to the prejudice
of the intended beneficiaries.
This Court, therefore, cannot allow the party-list system to be
sullied and prostituted by those who are neither marginalized nor
underrepresented. It cannot let that flicker of hope be snuffed out.
The clear state policy must permeate every discussion of the

qualification of political parties and other organizations under the
party-list system.
_______________
45 Section 2 of RA 7941 states in part as follows: “x x x. Towards this end, the

State shall develop and guarantee a full, free and open party system in order to attain
the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House
of Representatives by enhancing their chances to compete for and win seats in the
legislature, and shall provide the simplest scheme possible.”
724

Refutation of the
Separate Opinions
The Separate Opinions of our distinguished colleagues, Justices Jose
C. Vitug and Vicente V. Mendoza, are anchored mainly on the
supposed intent of the framers of the Constitution as culled from
their deliberations.
The fundamental principle in constitutional construction,
however, is that the primary source from which to ascertain
constitutional intent or purpose is the language of the provision
itself. The presumption is that the words in which the constitutional46
provisions are couched express the objective sought to be attained.
In other words, verba legis still prevails. Only when the meaning of
the words used is unclear and equivocal should resort be made to
extraneous aids of construction and interpretation, such as the
proceedings of the Constitutional Commission or Convention, in
order to shed light on and 47ascertain the true intent or purpose of the
provision being construed.
Indeed, as cited in the Separate Opinion of Justice Mendoza, 48
this
Court stated in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary that
“the debates and proceedings of the constitutional convention [may
be consulted] in order to arrive at the reason and purpose of the
resulting Constitution x x x only when other guides fail as said
proceedings are powerless to vary the terms of the Constitution
when the meaning is clear. Debates in the constitutional convention
‘are of value as showing the views of the individual members, and
as indicating the reason for their votes, but they give us no light as to
the views of the large majority who did not talk, much less of the
mass or our fellow citizens whose votes at the polls gave that
instrument the force of fundamental law. We think it safer to
construe the constitution from what appears upon its face’ The
_______________
46 JM Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure Administration, 31 SCRA 413, February
18, 1970; cited in Ruben C. Agpalo, Statutory Construction, 1990 ed., p. 311. See also
Gold Creek Mining Corp. v. Rodriguez, 66 Phil. 259,264(1938).
47 See Agpalo, ibid., p. 313.
48 194 SCRA 317, February 22, 1991, per Fernan, C.J.; quoting Commonwealth v.
Ralph, 111 Pa 365, 3 Atl. 220.
725
VOL. 359, JUNE 26, 2001 725

proper interpretation therefore depends more on how it was

understood by the people adopting it than in the framers’
understanding thereof.”
Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, relative to the party-list
system, is couched in clear terms: the mechanics of the system shall
be provided by law. Pursuant thereto, Congress enacted RA 7941. In
understanding and implementing party-list representation, we should
therefore look at the law first. Only when we find its provisions
ambiguous should the use of extraneous aids of construction be
resorted to.
But, as discussed earlier, the intent of the law is obvious and
clear from its plain words. Section 2 thereof unequivocally states
that the party-list system of electing congressional representatives
was designed to “enable underrepresented sectors, organizations and
parties, and who lack well-defined political constituencies but who
could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate
legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole x x x.” The criteria
for participation is well defined. Thus, there is no need for recourse
to constitutional deliberations, not even to the proceedings of
Congress. In any event, the framers’ deliberations merely express
their individual opinions and are, at best, only persuasive in
construing the meaning and purpose of the constitution or statute.
Be it remembered that the constitutionality or validity of Sections
2 and 5 of RA 7941 is not an issue here. Hence, they remain parts of
the law, which must be applied plainly and simply.
Fourth Issue:
Grave Abuse of Discretion
From its assailed Omnibus Resolution, it is manifest that the

Comelec failed to appreciate fully the clear policy of the law and the
Constitution. On the contrary, it seems to have ignored the facet of
the party-list system discussed above. The OSG as its counsel
admitted before the Court that any group, even the non-marginalized
and overrepresented, could field candidates in the party-list

elections.
726

When a lower court, or a quasi-judicial agency like the Commission

on Elections, violates or ignores the Constitution or the law, its
action can be struck 49down by this Court on the ground of grave
abuse of discretion. Indeed, the function of all judicial and
quasijudicial instrumentalities50is to apply the law as they find it, not
to reinvent or second-guess it.
In its Memorandum, Petitioner Bayan Muna passionately pleads
for the outright disqualification of the major political parties—
Respondents Lakas-NUCD, LDP, NPC, LP and PMP—on the
ground that under Comelec Resolution No. 4073, they have been
accredited as the five (six, including PDP-Laban) major political
parties in the May 14, 2001 elections. It argues that because of this,
they have the “advantage of getting official Comelec Election
Returns, Certificates of Canvass, preferred poll watchers x x x.” We
note, however, that this accreditation does not refer to the partylist
election, but, inter alia, to the election of district representatives for
the purpose of determining which parties would be entitled to
watchers under Section 26 of Republic Act No. 7166.
What is needed under the present circumstances, however, is a
factual determination of whether respondents herein and, for that
matter, all the 154 previously approved groups, have the necessary
qualifications to participate in the party-list elections, pursuant to the
Constitution and the law.
Bayan Muna also urges us to immediately rule out Respondent
Mamamayan Ayaw sa Droga (MAD), because “it is a government
entity using government resources 51
and privileges.” This Court,
however, is not a trier of facts, It is not equipped to receive
evidence and determine the truth of such factual allegations.
_______________
49 Tañada v. Angara, 272 SCRA 18, May 2, 1997. See also Santiago v. Guingona,
298 SCRA 756, November 18, 1998; Miranda v. Aguirre, 314 SCRA 603, September
16, 1999; Garcia v. HRET, 312 SCRA 353, August 12, 1999.
50 Veterans Federation Party, et al v. Comelec, et al., GR No. 136781, October 6,
2000, 342 SCRA 244.
51 See Valmonte v. Court of Appeals, 303 SCRA 278, February 18, 1999; Inciong,
Jr. v. CA, 257 SCRA 578, June 26, 1996; Palomado v. NLRC, 257 SCRA 680, June
28, 1996; Heirs of the Late Teodoro Guaring,
727
VOL. 359, JUNE 26, 2001 727

Basic rudiments of due process require that respondents should first

be given an opportunity to show that they qualify under the
guidelines promulgated in this Decision, before they can be deprived
of their right to participate in and be elected under the party-list
system.
Guidelines for Screening

Party-List Participants
The Court, therefore, deems it proper to remand the case to the
Comelec for the latter to determine, after summary evidentiary
hearings, whether the 154 parties and organizations allowed to
participate in the party-list elections comply with the requirements
of the law. In this light, the Court finds it appropriate to lay down the
following guidelines, culled from the law and the Constitution, to
assist the Comelec in its work.
First, the political party, sector, organization or coalition must
represent the marginalized and underrepresented groups identified in
Section 5 of RA 7941. In other words, it must show—through its
constitution, articles of incorporation, bylaws, history, platform of
government and track record—that it represents and seeks to uplift
marginalized and underrepresented sectors. Verily, majority of its
membership should belong to the marginalized and
underrepresented. And it must demonstrate that in a conflict of
interests, it has chosen or is likely to choose the interest of such
sectors.
Second, while even major political parties are expressly allowed
by RA 7941 and the Constitution to participate in the party-list
system, they must comply with the declared statutory policy of
enabling “Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and
underrepresented sectors x x x to be elected to the House of
Representatives.” In other words, while they are not disqualified
merely on the ground that they are political parties, they must show,
however, that they represent the interests of the marginalized and
underrepresented. The counsel of Aksyon Demokratiko and other
simi-
_______________
Jr. v. CA, 269 SCRA 283, March 7, 1997; Sebreño v. Central Board of Assessment
Appeals, 270 SCRA 360, March 24, 1997; PCGG v. Cojuangco, Jr., 302 SCRA 217,
January 27, 1999.
728

larly situated political parties admitted as much during the Oral

Argument, as the following quote shows:
“JUSTICE PANGANIBAN: I am not disputing that in my question.

All I am saying is, the political party must claim to represent the
marginalized and underrepresented sectors? 52
ATTY. KAPUNAN: Yes, Your Honor, the answer is yes.”
53
Third, in view of the objections directed against the registration of
Ang Buhay Hayaang Yumabong, which is allegedly a religious
group, the Court notes the express constitutional provision that the
religious sector may not be represented in the party-list system. The
extent of the constitutional proscription is demonstrated by the
following discussion during the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission:
“MR. OPLE. x x x In the event that a certain religious sect with

nationwide and even international networks of members and
supporters, in order to circumvent this prohibition, decides to
form its own political party in emulation of those parties I had
mentioned earlier as deriving their inspiration and philosophies
from well-established religious faiths, will that also not fall
within this prohibition?
MR. MONSOD. If the evidence shows that the intention is to go
around the prohibition, then54
certainly the Comelec can pierce
through the legal fiction.”
The following discussion is also pertinent:
“MR. VILLACORTA. When the Commissioner proposed “EXCEPT

RELIGIOUS GROUPS,” he is not, of course, prohibiting priests,
imams or pastors who may be elected by, say, the indigenous
community sector to represent their group.
_______________
52 TSN, May 17, 2001, p. 180.

53 Petition of Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party, p. 16; rollo (GR No.
147589), p. 19.
54 Record of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. I, p. 636.
729
VOL. 359, JUNE 26, 2001 729

REV. RIGOS. Not at all, but I am objecting to anybody who

represents the Iglesia ni 55Kristo, the Catholic Church, the
Protestant Church et cetera.”
Furthermore, the Constitution provides 56that “religious

denominations and sects shall 57
not be registered.” The prohibition
was explained by a member of the Constitutional Commission in
this wise: “[T]he prohibition is on any religious organization
registering as a political party. I do not see any prohibition here
against a priest running as a candidate. That is not prohibited
58
here; it
is the registration of a religious sect as a political party.”
Fourth, a party or an organization must not be disqualified under
Section 6 of RA 7941, which enumerates the grounds for
disqualification as follows:
“(1) It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or

association organized for religious purposes;
2. It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal;
3. It is a foreign party or organization;
4. It is receiving support from any foreign government,
foreign political party, foundation, organization, whether
directly or through any of its officers or members or
indirectly through third parties for partisan election
purposes;
5. It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations
relating to elections;
6. It declares untruthful statements in its petition;
7. It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or
8. It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections
or fails to obtain at least two per centum (2%) of the votes
cast under the party-list system in the two (2) preceding 59
elections for the constituency in which it has registered.”
_______________

56 §2 (5), Article IX (C).
57 Christian S. Monsod.
58 Record of the Constitutional Commission. Vol. I, p. 634.
59 See also §11, Comelec Resolution No. 3307-A.
730

Note should be taken of paragraph 5, which disqualifies a party or

group for violation of or failure to comply with election laws and
regulations. These laws include Section 2 of RA 7941, which states
that the party-list system seeks to “enable Filipino citizens belonging
to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and
parties x x x to become members of the House of Representatives.”
A party or an organization, therefore, that does not comply with this
policy must be disqualified.
Fifth, the party or organization must not be an adjunct of, or a
project organized or an entity funded or assisted by, the government.
By the very nature of the party-list system, the party or organization
must be a group of citizens, organized by citizens and operated by
citizens. It must be independent of the government. The
participation of the government or its60 officials in the affairs, of a
party-list candidate is not only illegal and unfair to other parties,
but also deleterious to the objective of the law: to enable citizens
belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors and
organizations to be elected to the House of Representatives.
Sixth, the party must not only comply with the requirements of
the law; its nominees must likewise do so. Section 9 of RA 7941
reads as follows:
“SEC. 9. Qualifications of Party-List Nominees.—No person shall be

nominated as party-list representative unless he is a natural-born citizen of
the Philippines, a registered voter, a resident of the Philippines for a period
of not less than one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election,
able to read and write, a bona fide member of the party or organization
which he seeks to represent for at least ninety (90) days preceding the day of
the election, and is at least twenty-five (25) years of age on the day of the
election.
In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twenty-five
(25) but not more than thirty (30) years of age on the day of the election.
Any youth sectoral representative who attains the age of thirty (30) during
his term shall be allowed to continue in office until the expiration of his
term.”
_______________
60 See §2 (4), Article IX (B) of the Constitution. See also Article 261 (o), BP 881.
731
VOL. 359, JUNE 26, 2001 731

Seventh, not only the candidate party or organization must represent

marginalized and underrepresented sectors; so also must its
nominees. To repeat, under Section 2 of RA 7941, the nominees
must be Filipino citizens “who belong to marginalized and

underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties.” Surely, the
interests of the youth cannot be fully represented by a retiree; neither
can those of the urban poor or the working class, by an industrialist.
To allow otherwise is to betray the State policy to give genuine
representation to the marginalized and underrepresented.
Eighth, as previously discussed, while lacking a well-defined
political constituency, the nominee must likewise be able to
contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate
legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole. Senator Jose Lina
explained during the bicameral committee proceedings that “the
nominee of a party, national
61
or regional, is not going to represent a
particular district x x x.”
Epilogue
The linchpin of this case is the clear and plain policy of the law: “to
enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and
underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack
well-defined political constituencies but who could contribute to the
formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will
benefit the nation as a whole, to become members of the House of
Representatives.”
Crucial to the resolution of this case is the fundamental social
justice principle that those who have less in life should have more in
law. The party-list system is one such tool intended to benefit those
who have less in life. It gives the great masses of our people genuine
hope and genuine power. It is a message to the destitute and the
prejudiced, and even to those in the underground, that change is
possible. It is an invitation for them to come out of their limbo and
seize the opportunity.
_______________
61 The bicameral conference committee on the disagreeing provision of Senate Bill

No. 1913 and House Bill No. 3040, January 31, 1994, p. 4.
732

Clearly, therefore, the Court cannot accept the submissions of the

Comelec and the other respondents that the party-list system is,
without any qualification, open to all. Such position does not only
weaken the electoral chances of the marginalized and
underrepresented; it also prejudices them. It would gut the substance
of the party-list system. Instead of generating hope, it would create a
mirage. Instead of enabling the marginalized, it would further

weaken them and aggravate their marginalization.
In effect, the Comelec would have us believe that the party-list
provisions of the Constitution and RA 7941 are nothing more than a
play on dubious words, a mockery of noble intentions, and an empty
offering on the altar of people empowerment. Surely, this could not
have been the intention of the framers of the Constitution and the
makers of RA 7941.
WHEREFORE, this case is REMANDED to the Comelec, which
is hereby DIRECTED to immediately conduct summary evidentiary
hearings on the qualifications of the party-list participants in the
light of the guidelines enunciated in this Decision. Considering the
extreme urgency of determining the winners in the last partylist
elections, the Comelec is directed to begin its hearings for the parties
and organizations that appear to have garnered such number of votes
as to qualify for seats in the House of Representatives. The Comelec
is further DIRECTED to submit to this Court its compliance report
within 30 days from notice hereof.
The Resolution of this Court dated May 9, 2001, directing the
Comelec “to refrain from proclaiming any winner” during the last
party-list election, shall remain in force until after the Comelec itself
will have complied and reported its compliance with the foregoing
disposition.
This Decision is immediately executory upon the Commission on
Elections’ receipt thereof. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, Puno, Kapunan, Pardo, Buena and Gonzaga-Reyes,

JJ., concur.
Davide, Jr. (C.J.) and Bellosillo, J., In the result.
Vitug, J., Please see dissenting opinion.
733
VOL. 359, JUNE 26, 2001 733

Mendoza, J., See dissenting opinion.

Quisumbing, De Leon, Jr. and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., Join
the dissenting opinion of Justice V. Mendoza.
Ynares-Santiago, J., Abroad on Official Business.
SEPARATE (DISSENTING) OPINION
VITUG, J.:
The 1987 Constitution, crafted at a time when the euphoria of the

1986 People Power had barely subsided, recognized the vigor
infused by civilian society in a cleansing political reform and
focused itself on institutionalizing civilian participation in daily
governance. A cause for concern was the not-too-unlikely
perpetuation of a single party in power—a convenient contrivance
for authoritarian rule. Article VI, Section 5, subsection 2, of the
1987 Charter—
THE PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVES SHALL CONSTITUTE

TWENTY PER CENTUM OF THE TOTAL NUMBER OF
REPRESENTATIVES INCLUDING THOSE UNDER THE PARTY LIST
FOR THREE CONSECUTIVE TERMS. AFTER THE RATIFICATION OF
THIS CONSTITUTION, ONE-HALF OF THE SEATS ALLOCATED TO
PARTYLIST REPRESENTATIVE SHALL BE FILLED, AS PROVIDED
BY LAW, BY SELECTION OR ELECTION FROM THE LABOR,
PEASANT, URBAN POOR, INDIGENOUS CULTURAL
COMMUNITIES, WOMEN, YOUTH, AND SUCH OTHER SECTORS AS
MAY BE PROVIDED BY LAW, EXCEPT THE RELIGIOUS SECTOR.—
was the result of long-drawn deliberations and compromises.

Immediately, after the resumption of the next Congress, then
president Corazon C. Aquino, exercising her transitory appointing
powers, assigned to the reserved seats in the Lower House,
representatives of the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, women and youth sector. The assignment was made
from a selected list of names submitted by the sectors themselves.
The sectors would continue to enjoy these reserved seats for the next
three terms; thenceforth, they would have to participate in an
electoral contest to secure their representation in Congress.
734

Article 6, Section 5(2), however, not being self-executing, would

wait for the legislature to ordain the enabling law. Congress was to
be circumscribed by the terms expressed in Article 6, Section 5(2).
—First, the system should only apply to the election of 20% of the
total composition of the House of Representatives, second, it would
prescribe a mandatory proportional representation scheme, and,
third, it would allow participating parties and organizations to be
represented in voter’s registration boards, board of election
inspectors, parties and organizations or similar entities.
On 03 March 1995, Republic Act 7941, also known as “An Act
Providing for the Election of Party-List Representatives Through the
Party-List System, and Appropriating Funds Therefor,” was enacted.
The enabling law laid the basis for COMELEC Resolution No.
2847, issued on July 1996, prescribing the “Rules and Regulations
Governing the Elections of the Party-List Representatives through
the Party-List System.” In the May 1998 first party-list elections, the
sectors were required, to test, for the first time, their political mettle
in an open electoral contest with other parties, groups and
organizations under a party-list system. While the elections had a
low-voter turnout, seen largely as a result of public unawareness of
an electoral innovation, the recent 2001 multiparty list elections,
however, were different. This time, a huge number of parties, groups
and coalitions applied for registration with, and subsequently
obtained accreditation from, the COMELEC. Six of these groups
were established political parties, namely PARTIDO NG MASANG
PILIPINO, LAKAS NUCD-UMDP, NATIONALIST PEOPLE’S
COALITION, LABAN NG DEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO,
AKSYON DEMOKRATIKO, LIBERAL PARTY, NACIONALISTA
PARTY and PDP-LABAN.
The instant petition prays for the exclusion of these major parties
on the ground that their participation does not level the playing field
for less known and less organized sectoral groups still in dire need
of election logistics and machinery. Arguing that the system is open
to the underrepresented and marginalized sectors, as well as other
parties but only on the condition that the latter field sectoral
candidates themselves, herein petitioner sought the disqualification
of the large major political parties and groups which do not represent
any “genuine” sectoral interest.
735
VOL. 359, JUNE 26, 2001 735

A perusal of the novel electoral engineering, introduced by the

Constitution into the electoral system, would show the pertinent
provisions to be stoically quiet on the qualifications of a party, group
or coalition to participate under the party-list system. Instead, it has
opted to rely on a subsequent statutory enactment to provide for the
system’s focal particulars, which now lead us to the enabling law
itself. Section 2 of R.A. 7941 reads—
“The State shall promote proportional representation in the election of

representatives to the House of Representatives through a party-list system
of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or
coalitions thereof, which will enable the Filipino citizens belonging to the
marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, and
who lacked well-defined political constituencies but who could contribute to
the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the
nation as a whole, to become members of the House of Representatives.
Towards this end, the State shall develop and guarantee a full, free and open
party system in order to attain the broadest possible representation of party,
sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives, by enhancing
their chances to compete for and win seats in the legislature, and shall
provide the simplest scheme possible.”
The draft provisions on what was to become Article VI, Section 5,

subsection (2), of the 1987 Constitution took off from two staunch
positions—the first headed by Commissioner Villacorta, advocating
that of the 20 per centum of the total seats in Congress to be
allocated to party-list representatives half were to be reserved to
appointees from the marginalized and underrepresented sectors. The
proposal was opposed by some Commissioners. Mr. Monsod
expressed the difficulty in delimiting the sectors that needed
representation. He was of the view that reserving seats for the
marginalized and underrepresented sectors would stunt their
development into full-pledged parties equipped with electoral
machinery potent enough to further the sectoral interests to be
represented. The Villacorta group, on the other hand, was
apprehensive that pitting the unorganized and less-moneyed sectoral
groups in an electoral contest would be like placing babes in the
lion’s den, so to speak, with the bigger and more established
political parties ultimately gobbling them up. R.A. 7941 recognized
this concern when it banned the first five major political parties on
the basis of party
736

representation in the House of Representatives from participating in

the party-list system for the first party-list elections held in 1998
(and to be automatically lifted starting with the 2001 elections). The
advocates for permanent seats for sectoral representatives made an
effort towards a compromise—that the party-list system be open
only to underrepresented and marginalized sectors. This proposal
was further whittled down by allocating only half of the seats under
the party-list system to candidates from the sectors which would
garner the required number of votes. The majority was unyielding.
Voting 19-22, the proposal for permanent seats, and in the
alternative the reservation of the party-list system to the sectoral
groups, was voted down. The only concession the Villacorta group
was able to muster was an assurance of reserved seats for selected
sectors for three consecutive terms after the enactment of the 1987
Constitution, by which time they would be expected to gather and
solidify their electoral base and brace themselves in the multi-party
electoral contest with the more veteran political groups.
The system, designed to accommodate as many groups as

possible, abhors the monopoly of representation in the Lower
House. This intent is evident in the statutory imposition of the three-
seat cap, which prescribes the limit to1 the number of seats that may
be gained by a party or organization. Votes garnered in excess of
6% of the total votes cast do not entitle the party to more than three
seats.
There is no express provision of the Constitution or in the
enabling law that disallows major political parties from participating
in the party-list system and, at the same time, from fielding
candidates for legislative district representatives.
Perhaps the present controversy stems from a confusion of the
actual character of the party-list system. At first glance, it gives the
impression of being a combination of proportional representation for
non-traditional parties and sectoral representation. The first,
proportional representation, on one end, is intended for no other
reason than to open up the electoral process for broader participation
and representation. Sectoral representation on the other,
_______________
1 Section 11(b), R.A. 7941.
737
VOL. 359, JUNE 26, 2001 737

presupposes that every underrepresented sector be represented in

Congress. This impression of sectoral-based representation stems
from the provisions of Article 6, Section 5(2), of the Constitution, as
well as R.A. 7941, in enumerating specific sectors to be represented.
In holding that the party list system is open only to the
underrepresented and marginalized sectors, the ponencia places
much reliance on Section 5 of R.A. 7941:
“SEC. 5. Registration.—Any organized group of persons may register as a

in the party-list system as a national, regional or sectoral party or
organization or a coalition of such parties or organizations, attaching thereto
its constitution, bylaws, platform or program of government, list of officers,
coalition agreement and other relevant information as the COMELEC may
require: Provided, That the sectors shall include labor peasant, fisherfolk,
urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women,
youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals.
“The COMELEC shall publish the petition in at least two (2) national
newspapers of general circulation.
“The COMELEC shall, after due notice and hearing, resolve the petition
within fifteen (15) days from the date it was submitted for decision but in no
case not later than sixty (60) days before election.”
It would seem to me that, construed along with Section 3(d) of the

statute, defining a “sectoral party,” the enumeration was intended to
qualify only “sectoral parties” and not the other eligible groups (e.g.,
political parties, sectoral organizations and coalitions). Neither
Article 6, Section 5(2), nor R.A. 7941 intended to guarantee
representation to all sectors of society and, let alone, hand it over
only to underrepresented and marginalized sectors. The real aim, if
the will of the majority of the Commissioners were to be respected,
was to introduce the concept of party-list representation.
The party-list system is limited to four groups—1) political
parties, 2) sectoral parties, 3) sectoral organizations, and 4)
coalitions. A political party is an organized group of citizens
advocating an ideology, or platform, principles or policies for the
general conduct of government and which, as the most immediate
means of secur-
738

ing their adoption, regularly nominates and supports certain of its

leaders and members as candidates for public office. A sectoral party
is an organized group of citizens belonging to identifiable sectors,
such as those enumerated in Article 6, Section 5(2), of the 1987
Constitution, which includes the labor, peasant, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities and women and those added by
R.A. 7941 like the fisherfolk, elderly, handicapped, veterans,
overseas workers and professionals. A sectoral organization is a
group of citizens who share the same or similar attributes or
characteristics, employment, interests or concerns. Coalition is an
aggrupation of duly registered national, regional, sectoral parties or
organizations for election purposes.
A party or organization desiring to join the party-list system is
required to register with the COMELEC, together with a list of its
five nominees for party-list representatives, arranged according to
the group’s order of preference. In every election for the House of
Representatives, each voter casts two votes—one for the district
representative of his choice and another for the party or organization
of his choice. The votes cast for the parties and organizations are
totaled nationwide. In contrast to the election of all other officials
where the rule of plurality (i.e., the candidate with the highest
number of votes wins) is adopted, the number of seats under the

party-list system depends on the number of votes received in
proportion to the total number of votes cast nationwide. On the basis
of the number of registered voters in the recent elections, a group
under the party-list system, should get approximately half a million
votes to be entitled to one seat.
At the center stage of this controversy are the political parties
themselves. Undeniably, political parties are an important feature in
both democratic and authoritarian regimes. By legitimizing the
individuals and institutions that control political power, parties add
an important element of stability to a political system and also help
organize the government and electorate by recruiting candidates,
conducting campaigns, encouraging partisan attachments and
generally educating the public, stimulating voter participation and
providing varying degrees of policy direction to government. The
idea could also be seen as a good training and recruiting ground for
potential leaders. Advocates commend the multi-party
739
VOL. 359, JUNE 26, 2001 739

as allowing the expression and the compromise of the many interests

of a complex society, including a range of ideological differences,
conflicting political values and philosophies. Section 6 of the 1987
Constitution is explicit—“A free and open party system shall 2
be
allowed to evolve according to the free choice of the people.” The
multi-party system of proportional representation broadens the
composition of the House of Representatives to accommodate
sectors and organizations that do not have well-defined political
constituencies and to facilitate access to minority or small parties.
A party-list nominee is subject to basically the 3
same
qualifications applicable to legislative districts candidates, with the
exception of the additional requirement that he be nominated in one
list only, and provided, further, that he is not a candidate for any
elective office or has lost his4 bid for an elective office in the
immediately preceding election. A nominee must actually belong to
the sector which they purport
5
to represent, otherwise, there can be
no true representation. A nominee of the youth sector is further
required to be at least
6
25 but not more than 30 years of age on the
day of the election. Should he, however, attain the age of 30 7during
his term, he is allowed to continue until the expiration thereof. Once
elected, party-list representatives also enjoy the same term, rights
and privileges as do district representatives, except that
_______________
2 Bernas, pp. 355-358.

3 The Constitutional qualifications for legislative districts representatives apply to
party-list nominees—
Section 6, Article 6, 1987 Constitution. No person shall be a member of the House of

Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, and on the day of the
election, at least twenty-five years of age, able to read and write, and except the party-list
representative, a registered voter in the district in which he shall be elected, and a resident
thereof for a period not less than one year immediately preceding the day of the elections.
4 Sections 8, R.A. 7941.

5 Supangan, Jr. vs. Santos, 189 SCRA 56 (1990).
6 Section 9, R.A. 7941.
7 Ibid.
740

8
they are not entitled to the Country-wide Development Fund (CDF).
A feature of the party-list system is that political parties, sectoral
groups and organizations, coalitions and aggrupation acquire the
status of “candidates” and their nominees relegated to mere agents.
Thus, if a party-list representative dies, becomes physically
incapacitated, removed from office by the party or the organization
he represents, resigns, or is disqualified during his term, his party
can send another person to take his place for the remaining period,
provided the replacement is next in succession in the list of
nominees submitted to the COMELEC upon registration.
Furthermore, a party-list representative 9who switches party
affiliations during his term forfeits his seat. So, also, if a person
changes his sectoral affiliation within 6 months before the election,
he will not be eligible for nomination 10
in party-list representative
under his new party or organization.
The argument raised by petitioners could not be said to have been
overlooked as they precisely were the same points subjected to
intense and prolonged deliberations by the members of the
Constitutional Commission.
And, the polestar in the constructions of constitutions always
remains—“effect must be given to the intent11 of the framers of the
organic law and of the people adopting it.” The law, in its clear
formulation cannot give this tribunal the elbow-room for
construction. Courts are bound to suppose that any inconveniences
involved in the application of constitutional provisions according to
their plain terms and import have been considered in advance and
accepted as less intolerable than12
those avoided, or as compensated
by countervailing advantages. The ponencia itself, in ruling as it
does, may unwittingly, be crossing the limits of judicial review and
_______________
8 See the plenary deliberations (2nd reading) of House Bill No. 3043.
9 Section 15, R.A. 7941.
10 Ibid.
11 Whitman vs. Oxford National Bank, 176 US 559, 44 L. Ed. 587, 20 Set. 477.
12 People ex rel. Snowball vs. Pendegast, 96 Cal. 289 St. 126, 110 NE 485.
741
VOL. 359, JUNE 26, 2001 741

treading the dangerous waters of judicial legislation, and more

importantly, of a constitutional amendment. While, the lament of
herein petitioners is understandable, the remedy lies not with this
Court but with the people themselves through an amendment of their
work as and when better counsel prevails.
WHEREFORE, I regret my inability to concur with my
colleagues in their judgment. I am thus constrained to vote for the
dismissal of the petitions.
SEPARATE OPINION
MENDOZA, J., dissenting:
I vote to dismiss the petitions in these cases. I will presently explain

my vote, but before I do so it seems to me necessary to state briefly
the facts and the issues.
The Facts
Petitioner Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party (OFW for short) is
the political agency of the Overseas Filipino Workers Movement, a
non-stock and non-profit organization. On the other hand, petitioner
Bayan Muna is a political party representing peasants, workers,
women, the youth, and other marginalized sectors. Both were
accredited by the Commission on Elections in connection with the
election for party-list representatives on May 14, 2001.
Petitioners brought these suits—in G.R. No. 147589, for
certiorari and, in G.R. No. 147613, for certiorari, prohibition, and
mandamus—for the purpose of seeking the annulment of the
registration of the following parties classified as “political parties”
and “organizations/coalitions” by the Commission on Elections:
Political Parties:
Partido ng Masang Pilipino (PMP),

Lakas NUCD-UMDP (LAKAS NUCD-UMDP),
Nationalist Peoples’ Coalition (NPC),

Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP),
Aksyon Demokratiko (AKSYON),
Partido Demokratiko Pilipino Lakas ng Bayan (PDP-
LABAN),
742

Liberal Party (LP),

Nacionalista Party (NP),
Ang Buhay Hayaang Yumabong
Organizations/Coalitions:
Citizens Drug Watch Foundation, Inc. (DRUG WATCH),

Mamamayan Ayaw sa Droga (MAD),
Go! Go! Philippines Movement (GO, GO PHILIPPINES),
The True Marcos Loyalist (MARCOS LOYALIST),
Philippine Local Autonomy Movement, Inc. (PLAM),
Citizens Movement for Justice, Economy Environment and
Peace
(JEEP),
Chamber of Real Estate Builders Association (CREBA),

Sports and Health Advancement Foundation, Inc.(SHAF),
Ang Lakas ng Overseas Contract Workers (OCW),
Bagong Bayani Organization (BAGONG BAYANI),
National Federation of Sugar Planters (NFSP)
R.A. No. 7941, §5 provides that any party, organization, or coalition

desiring to participate in the party-list system must apply to the
COMELEC for registration not later than 90 days before the
election. On the other hand, §4 of the same law requires that any
party, organization, or coalition which is already registered with the
COMELEC should declare its intention to participate in the party-
list system 90 days before the election.
In its Resolution No. 3785, dated March 26, 2001, the
COMELEC passed upon the applications for registration or
manifestations of intention of several parties, organizations, and
coalitions. On March 28, 2001, it issued a certified list of parties,
organizations, or coalitions entitled to participate in the May 14,
2001 elections. All in all, 148 parties, organizations, and “coalitions

were accredited, including private respondents herein.
Petitioners OFW and Bayan Muna contend that the party-list
system is exclusively for the “marginalized and underrepresented”
sectors of the Philippine society and that there is no way by which
other sectors not so identified, much less the major political parties,
can participate in the party-list elections. Petitioner Bayan Muna in
particular calls attention to the fact that seven of the respondent
political parties (PMP, Lakas NUCD-UMDP, NPC, LDP, AKSYON,
PDP-LABAN, and LP) are actually the major po-
743
VOL. 359, JUNE 26, 2001 743

litical parties in the country today as determined by the COMELEC

in its Resolution No. 4073, dated May 3, 2001, and charges that the
rest of private respondents are “pseudo party-list organizations”
which are actually satellites of the major political parties and of big
businesses.
Bayan Muna argues that the party-list system is intended to
address the problem of ineffective representation of underprivileged
sectors of society and enhance direct people’s action and
participation in the decision-making process to counter-balance the
territorial representation of 80% of the House of Representatives,
and that to allow participation in the party-list system of respondent
political parties and parties/coalitions would be to defeat this
purpose because these parties1
do not represent “marginalized and
underrepresented” sectors. For this reason, Bayan Muna prays that
R.A. No. 7941, §11, par. 2 be declared unconstitutional on the
ground that, by banning the five major political parties from
participating in the party-list system only in the May 1998 elections,
it leaves them free to participate in subsequent elections.
On the other hand, the COMELEC argues:
[B]oth the Constitution and the Party-List System Act clearly allow, and
they do not prohibit, the participation of “registered national, regional, and
sectoral parties or organizations” to participate in the party-list system,
whether or not said parties or organizations
2
represent the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors of society.
It cites the proviso of Art. VI, §5(2) of the Constitution that
For three consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution, one-
half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as
provided by law, by selection or election from the labor peasant, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as
may be provided by law, except the religious sector,
as proof that ““marginalized” sectors are not entitled to permanent

seats in the House of Representatives. In any event, it is contended
_______________
1 Memorandum for Petitioner Bayan Muna, 17-18.

2 Memorandum for the COMELEC, 23-24.
744

that petitioners’ recourse is not to this Court but to the COMELEC

because whether a party, organization, or coalition represents
“marginalized and underrepresented” sectors is a question of fact,
and this Court is not a trier of facts. The COMELEC states that, as a
matter of fact, petitioner Bayan Muna has pending petitions to
disqualify, based on this ground, respondents NPC, LDP, PMP,
LAKAS NUCD-UMDP, LP, MAD, CREBA, NFSP, JEEP, and
BAGONG BAYANI.
The Issues
The issues in these cases actually come down to the following:
(1) Whether the petitions filed in these cases should be

dismissed for failure of petitioners to exhaust administrative
remedies in the COMELEC; and
(2) Whether the party-list system is exclusively for
“marginalized and underrepresented” sectors of society.
We shall deal with these issues in the order they are stated.
Discussion
I.
While it is true that petitioner Bayan Muna has filed petitions for the
disqualification of respondents, the fact is that when the petitions in
these cases were filed on April 16 and 17, 2001, the elections were
just a month away, and there was doubt whether a resolution of the
petitions for disqualifications was forthcoming. In fact, up to the
time of the elections on May 14, 2001, the cases were still
unresolved. Petitioners, therefore, had no other “plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law” within the meaning
of Rule 65, §§1-2 of the Code of Civil Procedure and were justified
in resorting to the extraordinary remedies of certiorari, prohibition,
and mandamus.
From another point of view, there is no need for petitioners to

await formal resolution of their petitions as the COMELEC had
already indicated in press statements its stand that parties,
organizations, or coalitions, whether or not representing
“marginalized and underrepresented” sectors, could participate in
the elec-
745
VOL. 359, JUNE 26, 2001 745

tion for the party-list system—a fact confirmed by it in its comment

and memorandum in these cases. There is thus no basis for insisting
that petitioners should have exhausted administrative remedies
before coming to this Court.
Nor are the issues raised in these cases factual as the statement of
the second issue above plainly shows. It is only if the question
whether the party-list system is limited to, “marginalized and
underrepresented” sectors is answered in the affirmative will it be
necessary to determine the status of respondents.
II.
At the core of the controversy in these cases is the following
provision of the Constitution:
ART. VI, §5(1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not

more than two hundred fifty members, unless Otherwise fixed by law, who
shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces,
cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of
their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive
ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-
list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations.
(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of
the total number of representatives including those under the party-list. For
three consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution, one-half of
the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by
law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous
cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be
provided by law except the religious sector.
To carry out this provision of the Constitution, Congress enacted the

Party-List System Act (R.A. No. 7941), the pertinent provisions of
which read:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Party.—The State shall promote proportional


Filipinp citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors,
organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined po-
746

litical constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation and

enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole,
to become members of the House of Representatives. Towards this end, the
State shall develop and guarantee a full, free and open party system in order
to attain the broadest possible representation of party, bsectoral or group
interests in the House of Representatives by enhancing their chances to
compete for and win seats in the legislature, and shall provide the simplest
scheme possible.
SEC. 11. Number of Party-List Representatives.—The party-list
representatives shall constitute twenty per centum (20%) of the total number
of the members of the House of Representatives including those under the
party-list.
For purposes of the May 1998 elections, the first five (5) major political
parties on the basis of party representation in the House of Representatives
at the start of the Tenth Congress of the Philippines shall not be entitled to
participate in the party-list system.
In determining the allocation of seats for the second vote, the following
procedure shall be observed:
(a) The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the
highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they garnered
during the elections.
(b) The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two
percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be
entitled to one seat each; Provided, That those garnering more than
two percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in
proportion to their total number of votes: Provided, finally, That
each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more
than three (3) seats.
The most important single factor in determining the intention of the

people from whom the 3
Constitution emanated is the language in
which it is expressed.” The text of Art. VI, §5(1)(2) is quite clear. It
provides for a party-list system of “registered, regional, and sectoral
parties or organizations,” not for sectoral representation. Only for
three consecutive terms following the ratification of the Constitution
and only with respect to one-half of the seats allotted to party-list
representatives does it allow sectoral representation. Textually, Art.
VI, §5(1X2) provides no basis for
_______________
3 Roman Catholic Apostolic Administrator of Davao v. Land Registration

Commission, 102 Phil. 596, 627 (1957).
747
VOL. 359, JUNE 26, 2001 747

petitioners’ contention that whether it is sectoral representation or

party-list system the purpose is to provide exclusive representation
for “marginalized sectors,” by which term petitioners mean the
labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities,
women, and youth sectors.
Indeed, the two systems of representation are not identical. Party-
list representation is a type of proportional representation designed
to give those who otherwise cannot win a seat in the House of
Representatives in district elections a chance to win if they have
sufficient strength on a nationwide basis. (In this sense, these groups
are considered “marginalized and underrepresented.”) Under the
party-list system, representatives are elected from multi-seat districts
in proportion to the number of votes received in contrast to the
“winner-take-all” single-seat district in which, even if a candidate
garners 49.9% of the votes, he gets no seat.
Thus, under the party-list system, a party or candidate need not
come in first in order to win seats in the legislature. On the other
hand, in the “winner-take-all” single-seat district, the votes cast for a
losing candidate are wasted as only those who vote for the winner
are represented. To the extent then that it assures parties or
candidates a percentage of seats in the legislature that reflects their
public support, the party-list system enables marginalized and
underrepresented sectors (such as, but not limited to, the labor,
peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, and
youth sectors) to obtain seats in the House of Representatives.
Otherwise, the party-list system does not guarantee to these sectors
seats in the legislature.
This is the method of representation adopted in the Constitution
as answer to the problem of underrepresentation.
In arguing that the party-list system is exclusively for the
“marginalized and underrepresented sectors,” petitioner Bayan
Muna argues that the constitutional intent in adopting the party-list
system must be searched for in the deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission.
748

The polestar of constitutional interpretation has been4 stated by this

Court in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, as follows:
While it is permissible in this jurisdiction to consult the debates and

proceedings of the constitutional convention in order to arrive at the reason
and purpose of the resulting Constitution, resort thereto may be had only
when other guides fail as said proceedings are powerless to vary the terms
of the Constitution when the meaning is clear. Debates in the constitutional
convention “are of value as showing the views of the individual members,
and as indicating the reason for their votes, but they give Us no light as to
the views of the large majority who did not talk, much less of the mass or
our fellow citizens whose votes at the polls gave that instrument the force of
fundamental law. We think it safer to construe the constitution from what
appears upon its face.” The proper interpretation therefore depends more on
how it was understood by the people adopting it than in the framers’
understanding thereof.
It is worth recalling the celebrated comment of Charles P. Curtis, Jr.

on the role of history in constitutional exegesis:
The intention of the framers of the Constitution, even assuming we could

discover what it was, when it is not adequately expressed in the
Constitution, that is to say, what they meant when they did not say it, surely
that has no binding force upon us. If we look behind or beyond what they
set down in the document, prying into what else they wrote and what they
said, anything we may find is only advisory. They may5sit in at our councils.
There is no reason why we should eavesdrop on theirs.
Be that as it may, the Record of the Constitutional Commission

speaks clearly against petitioners’ reading of Art. VI, §5(1)(2). It
shows clearly that the Constitutional Commission rejected sectoral
representation in preference to proportional representation.
As originally written, §5 of the Draft Article on the Legislative
Department read:
_______________
4 194 SCRA 317, 337-338 (1991), quoting Commonwealth v. Ralph, 111 Pa. 365,
3 Atl. 220 (1886).
5 LIONS UNDER THE THRONE 2 (1947) (emphasis in the original).
749
VOL. 359, JUNE 26, 2001 749

SEC. 5. The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than

two hundred and fifty members who shall be elected from legislative
districts apportioned among the provinces and cities in accordance with the
number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and
progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected from
the sectors and party list. The sectoral or party list representatives shall in
no case exceed twenty percent of the entire membership of the House of
Representatives.
Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous,
compact and adjacent territory, provided, however, that each city with a
population of more than two hundred thousand, or each province, shall have
at least one representative.
Within three years following the return of every census, the Congress
shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standards
provided in this section.
As petitioner Bayan Muna states, two proposals for additional

representation in the House of Representatives were submitted by
the Committee on Legislative Department: one for sectoral
representation, advocated by Commissioner Villacorta, and another
one for party-list system, advocated by Commissioner Monsod. The
two are not the same. As Commissioner Monsod said in explaining
his proposal:
MR. MONSOD. . . .
I would like to make a distinction from the beginning that the proposal
for the party list system is not synonymous with that of the sectoral
representation. Precisely, the party list system seeks to avoid the dilemma of
choice of sectors and who constitute the members of the sectors. . . . In
effect, a sectoral representation in the Assembly would mean that certain
sectors would have reserved seats; that they will choose among themselves
who would sit in those reserved seats. And then, we have the problem of
which sector because as we will notice in Proclamation No. 9, the sectors
cited were the farmers, fishermen, workers, students, professionals,
business, military, academic, ethnic and other similar groups. So these are
the nine sectors that were identified here as “sectoral representatives” to be
represented in this Commission. The problem we had in
_______________
6 Committee on Legislative Power, Committee Report No. 22 (emphasis added).
750

trying to approach sectoral representation in the Assembly was whether to

stop at these nine sectors or include other sectors . . . . Second, we had the
problem of who comprise the farmers. . . . A doctor may be a farmer; a

lawyer may also be a farmer. And so, it is up to the discretion of the person
to say “I am a farmer” so he would be included in that sector.
. . .Under the party-list system, there are no reserved seats for sectors . . .
.This can be a regional party, a sectoral party, a national party, UNIDO,
Magsasaka or a regional party in Mindanao. One need not be a farmer to
say that he wants the farmers’ party to be represented in the Assembly. Any
citizen can vote for any party. At the end of the day, the COMELEC will
then tabulate the votes that had been garnered by each party or each
organization—one does not have to be a political party and register in order
to participate as a party—and count the votes and from there derive the
percentage of the votes that had been cast in favor of a party, organization or
coalition.
....
We feel that this approach gets around the mechanics of sectoral
representation while at the same time making sure that those who really
have a national constituency or sectoral constituency will get a chance to
have a seat in the National Assembly. These sectors or these groups may not
have the constituency to win a seat on a legislative district basis. They may
not be able to win a seat on a district basis but surely, they will have votes
on a nationwide basis.
The purpose of this is to open the system. In the past elections, we found
out that there were certain groups or parties that, if we count their votes
nationwide, have about 1,000,000 or 1,500,000 votes. But they were always
third place or fourth place in each of the districts. So, they have no voice in
the Assembly. But this way, they would have five or six representatives in
the Assembly even if they would not win individually in legislative districts.
So, that is essentially the mechanics, the purpose and objectives of the party
list system.
Commissioner Monsod, therefore, proposed to amend the phrase

“shall be elected from the sectors and party list” in §5 by replacing it
with the following
_______________
7 2 RECORD OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 85-86, session of

Tuesday, July 22, 1986 (emphasis added).
751
VOL. 359, JUNE 26, 2001 751

THROUGH A PARTY LIST SYSTEM OF REGISTERED NATIONAL, 8

REGIONAL OR SECTORAL PARTIES OR ORGANIZATIONS.
Attention should be paid to this proposal because with slight
modification it later became the basis of the present Art. VI, §5(1)(2).
The following exchange took place on the Monsod amendment:
MR. DAVIDE: Madam President, before accepting the proposed

amendment, the Committee would like to get some clarifications.
When the proponent speaks of “OR SECTORAL PARTIES OR

ORGANIZATIONS,” is he referring to any sector which the law may
subsequently define?
MR. MONSOD: . . . The party list system that is being advocated by

this amendment is a system that opens up the list to any regional,
national or sectoral party. . . .
....
MS. AQUINO: The Committee would like to be clarified on this.

Do we understand the proponent correctly that this party list
system is not necessarily synonymous to sectoral representation?
MR. MONSOD: No, it is not necessarily synonymous, but it does
include the right of sectoral parties or organizations to register,
but it is not exclusive to sectoral parties or organizations.
MS. AQUINO: And that it does not likewise reserve any
institutional seat for any sector? In other words, it only enables it
to be a part of the party list if it has the capacity to do so, but it
does not reserve any seat for the sectors.
MR. MONSOD:9
Yes, Madam President, this is not a reserve seat
system.
The proposed amendment was opposed by a group headed by

Commissioner Villacorta, which included Commissioners Tadeo,
Lerum, and Bernas. Lerum said:
MR. LERUM. Madam President, in view of the explanation, I am

objecting to this amendment because it is possible that the la
_______________
8 Id. at 252-253, session of Friday, July 25, 1986.

9 Id. at 253 (emphasis added).
752

bor sector will not be represented considering that those who will
vote are all the voters of the Philippines. In other words, the
representative of labor will be chosen-by all the electors of the
Philippines, and that is not correct. My contention is that the sectoral
representative must be selected by his own

10
constituents, and for that
reason, I am objecting to this amendment.
On the other hand, Tadeo objected on the ground that if allowed to

participate in the party-list system, the major political parties could
gobble up the sectoral parties. He said:
MR. TADEO. . . . .Kapag inilagay natin ang party list, papasukin ng

political parties. Mangigibabaw
11
at kakainin din niyan hanggang
mawala ang sektor.
MR. TADEO. Ang punto lamang namin, pag pinayagan mo ang
UNIDO na isang political party, it will dominate the party list at
mawawalang saysay din iyong sector. Lalamunin mismo ng
political parties ang party list system. Gusto ko lamang bigyan ng
diin ang “reserve.” Hindi ito reserve seat sa marginalized sectors.
Kung titingnan natin itong 198 seats, reserved din ito sa political
parties.
Villacorta said he was objecting to the party-list system because it

would not solve the problem of ineffective representation of the
underprivileged sectors. He said:
For too long since our people attained a semblance of self-government at the
start of this century, our legislators were elected based on their promise that
they would represent the little people of our land. With the exception of a
few patriotic legislators, some of whom are in our Commission today,
members of the National Assemblies, the Congresses, and the Batasans of
the past did not devote themselves enough to the alleviation of the dismal
condition of our country’s poor and lower classes.
....
_______________
10 Id. at 254, session of Friday, July 25, 1986.

11 Id. at 254.
12 Id. at 257.
753
VOL. 359, JUNE 26, 2001 753

These realities convince us that there are no spokesmen and legislators who
can best represent the poor, the 13underprivileged, the marginalized than those
coming from within their ranks.
To Commissioner Villacorta, only reserved seats for the sectors

would give them effective representation:
MR. MONSOD. My amendment merely says that it is THROUGH

A PARTY LIST SYSTEM OF REGISTERED NATIONAL, RE
GIONAL OR SECTORAL PARTIES OR ORGANIZATIONS.
My question is: Does the Honorable Commissioner object to this
amendment?
MR. VILLACORTA. Yes, because it does not guarantee that the
seats reserved for
14
the party list representatives will be reserved
for the sectors.
Because of the impasse, the discussion on Friday, July 25, 1986, on

§5 was suspended to allow the commissioners to come to an
agreement. After one week, a compromise formula was reached by
the two groups and presented to the plenary session of the
Commission on August 1, 1986. In lieu of the phrase “shall be
elected from the sectors and the party list,” it was proposed that the
following be inserted in §5 of the Draft Article:
THROUGH A PARTY LIST SYSTEM OF REGISTERED NATIONAL,

REGIONAL AND SECTORAL PARTIES OR ORGANIZATIONS AS
PROVIDED BY LAW. THE PARTY LIST REPRESENTATIVES SHALL
CONSTITUTE TWENTY PERCENT OF THE TOTAL MEMBERS OF
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES PROVIDED THAT FOR THE
FIRST TWO TERMS AFTER THE RATIFICATION OF THIS
CONSTITUTION TWENTY-FIVE OF THE SEATS ALLOCATED TO
PARTY LIST REPRESENTATIVES SHALL BE FILLED BY
SELECTION OR ELECTION, AS PROVIDED BY LAW FROM THE
LABOR, PEASANT, URBAN POOR AND YOUTH SECTORS.
However, although an agreement had apparently been reached, the

advocates of sectoral representation were not satisfied that it
_______________
13 Id. at 255.
14 Id. at 258.
754

would be allowed only for two terms and only with respect to one-
half of the seats allocated for party-list representatives.
Commissioner Aquino proposed instead the following amendment
of §5:
ELECTED THROUGH A PARTY LIST SYSTEM OF REGISTERED

NATIONAL, REGIONAL AND SECTORAL PARTIES OR
ORGANIZATIONS, AS PROVIDED BY LAW THE PARTY LIST
REPRESENTATIVES SHALL CONSTITUTE TWENTY PERCENT OF

THE TOTAL MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES.
TWENTY-FIVE OF THE SEATS ALLOCATED TO PARTY LIST
REPRESENTATIVES SHALL BE FILLED BY ELECTION, AS
PROVIDED BY LAW, FROM THE LABOR, PEASANT, URBAN POOR,
WOMEN AND YOUTH SECTORS
When put to vote, however, Aquino’s proposal was defeated with- 15

nineteen (19) voting in favor, and twenty-two (22) voting against.
The Commission then voted on the proposed amendment of
Commissioner Monsod. With only a few minor changes, it was16
approved by a vote of thirty-two (32) commissioners against none.
As finally worded, the amendment reads:
SHALL BE FILLED AS PROVIDED BY LAW, BY SELECTION OR

ELECTION, FROM THE LABOR, PEASANT, URBAN POOR,
INDIGENOUS CULTURAL COMMUNITIES, WOMEN, YOUTH, AND
SUCH OTHER SECTORS AS MAY BE PROVIDED BY LAW, EXCEPT
THE RELIGIOUS SECTOR
Thus, the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission show that

the party-list system is not limited to the “marginalized and
underrepresented” sectors referred to by petitioners, i.e., labor,
peasants, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, and
the youth, but that it is a type of proportional representation intended
to give voice to those who may not have the necessary number to
win a seat in a district but are sufficiently numerous to give them a
seat nationwide. It, therefore, misreads the debates on Art. VI, §5(1)
(2) to say that “Although Commissioners Villacorta and Monsod
differed in their proposals as to the details of the
_______________
15 Id. at 584, session of Friday, Aug. 1, 1986.

16 Id. at 589.
755
VOL. 359, JUNE 26, 2001 755

party-list system, both proponents worked within the framework that

the party-list system is for the ‘marginalized’ as termed by Comm.
Villacorta and the ‘underrepresented’ as termed by Comm. Monsod,
which he defined as those17
which are ‘always third or fourth place in
each of the districts.’ ”
Indeed, the two proposals put forth by them are basically
different, and they do not have the same basis. What the advocates
of sectoral representation wanted was permanent reserved seats for
“marginalized sectors” by which they mean the labor, peasant, urban

poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, and youth sectors.
Under Art. VI, §5(2), these sectors were given only one-half of the
seats in the House of Representatives and only for three terms. On
the other hand, the “third or fourth place(rs)” in district elections, for
whom the party-list system was intended, refer to those who may not
win seats in the districts but nationwide may be sufficiently strong to
enable them to be represented in the House. They may include
Villacorta’s “marginalized” or “underprivileged” sectors, but they
are not limited to them. There would have been no need to give the
“marginalized sectors” one-half of the seats for the party-list system
for three terms if the two systems are identical.
The objections raised against the accreditation of private
respondents are the same ones raised by Commissioners Villacorta,
Tadeo, and Lerum, among others, to the Monsod proposal which
became the present Art. VI, §5(1)(2), namely, that certain sectors,
like labor, may not win seats in the House under the party-list
system; that the big parties might gobble up the sectoral parties; that
the party-list system will not solve the problem of ineffective
representation of the “underprivileged sectors.” These objections,
however, did not carry the day, as the members of the Constitutional
Commission voted 32-0 in favor of the Monsod proposal. It is
noteworthy that even those who spoke against the Monsod proposal
did not vote against it. To uphold these objections now would be to
overrule the Constitutional Commission and in effect amend the
Constitution.
_______________
17 Memorandum for petitioner Bayan Muna 13.
756

In sum, a problem was placed before the Constitutional Commission

that the existing “winner-take-all” one-seat district system of
election leaves blocks of voters underrepresented. To this problem of
underrepresentation two solutions were proposed: sectoral
representation and party-list system or proportional representation.
The Constitutional Commission chose the party-list system. This
Court cannot hold that the party-list system is reserved for the labor,
peasants, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, and
youth as petitioners contend without changing entirely the meaning
of the Constitution which in fact mandates exactly the opposite of
the reserved seats system when it provides in Art. IX, C, §6 that “A
free and open party system shall be allowed to evolve according to
the free choice of the people, subject to the provisions of this

Article.”
Thus, neither textual nor historical consideration yields support
for the view that the party-list system is designed exclusively for
labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities,
women, and youth sectors. As Commissioners Ople said in
supporting the Monsod proposal:
In my opinion, this will also create the stimulus for political parties and
mass organizations to seek common ground. For example, we have the
PDP-Laban and the UNIDO. I see no reason why they should not be able to
make common goals with mass organizations so that the very leadership of
these parties can be transformed through the participation of mass
organizations. And if this is true of the administration parties, this will be
true of others like the Partido ng Bayan which is now being formed. There is
no question that they will be attractive to many mass organizations. In the
opposition parties to which we belong, there will be a stimulus for us to
contact mass organizations so that with their participation, the policies of
such parties can be radically transformed because this amendment will
create conditions that will challenge both the mass organizations and the
political parties to come together. And the party list system is certainly
available, although it is open to all the parties. It is understood that the
parties will enter in the roll of the COMELEC the names of representatives
of mass organizations affiliated with them. So that we may, in time, develop
this excellent system that they have in Europe where labor organizations and
cooperatives, for example, distribute themselves either in the Social
Democratic Party and the Christian
757
VOL. 359, JUNE 26, 2001 757

Democratic Party in Germany, and their very presence there has a

transforming
18
effect upon the philosophies and the leadership of those
parties.
With respect to the cancellation of any party registered under the

party-list system, §6 of the Party-List System Act provides:
SEC. 6. Refusal and/or Cancellation of Registration.—The COMELEC

may, motu proprio or upon verified complaint of any interested party, refuse
or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the registration of any national,
regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition on any of the following
grounds:
(1) It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or association

organized for religious purposes;
(2) It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal;
(3) It is a foreign party or organization;

(4) It is receiving support from any foreign government, foreign
political party, foundation, organization, whether directly or
through any of its officers or members or indirectly through third
parties for partisan election purposes;
(5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating
to elections;
(6) It declares untruthful statements in its petition;
(7) It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or
(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails
to obtain at least two per centum (2%) of the votes cast under the
party-list system in the two (2) preceding elections for the
constituency in which it has registered.
Petitioners’ allegations that certain parties or organizations, such as

private respondents MAD and Ang Buhay Hayaang Yumabong, are
disqualified under this provision are for the COMELEC to
determine after due notice and hearing. They are unfit for resolution
in these proceedings.
III.
On the other hand, the majority states:
_______________
18 II RECORD 568, session of Friday, Aug. 1, 1986.
758

The presumption is that the words in which the constitutional provisions are
couched express the objective sought to be attained. In other words, verba
legis still prevails. Only when the meaning of the words used is unclear and
equivocal should resort be made to extraneous aids of construction and
interpretation, such as the proceedings of the Constitutional Commission or
Convention, in order to shed light on and ascertain the true intent or purpose
of the provision being construed.
....
Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, relative to the party-list system,
is couched in clear terms: the mechanics of the system shall be provided by
law. Pursuant thereto, Congress enacted RA 7941. . . . Section 2 thereof
unequivocally states that the party-list system of electing congressional
representatives was designed to “enable underrepresented sectors,

legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole . . .”
With due respect, I think the majority misapprehends the meaning of

§2 of R.A. No. 7941. The provision reads:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Party.—The State shall promote proportional

Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors,
legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole, to become members of the
House of Representatives. Towards this end, the State shall develop and
guarantee a full, free and open party system in order to attain the broadest
possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of
Representatives by enhancing their chances to compete for and win seats in
the legislature, and shall provide the simplest scheme possible.
What this provision simply states is that the purpose of the party-list
system is to promote proportional representation in the election of
representatives to the House of Representatives and, that to achieve
this end, “a full, free and open party system in order to attain the
broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests
in the House of Representatives” shall be guar-
759
VOL. 359, JUNE 26, 2001 759

anteed. Contrary to what the majority claims, §2 does not say that
the party-list system is intended “to enable Filipino citizens
organizations, and parties, and who lack well-defined political
constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation and
enactment of appropriate legislation” to win seats in the House of
Representatives. What it says is that the policy of the law is “to
promote proportional representation through a party-list system of
registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations or
coalitions thereof, which will enable Filipino citizens belonging to
marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations, and
parties, and who lack well-defined political constituencies but who
could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate
legislation” to win seats in the House. For while the representation
of “marginalized and underrepresented” sectors is a basic purpose of
the law, it is not its only purpose. As already explained, the aim of
proportional representation is to enable those who cannot win in the
“winner-take-air district elections a chance of winning. These groups

are not necessarily limited to the sectors mentioned in §5, i.e., labor,
peasants, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities,
the elderly, the handicapped, women, the youth, veterans, overseas
workers, and professionals. These groups can possibly include other
sectors.
Indeed, how can there be a “full, free and open party system” if
the election for the party list system is to be limited to the sectors
which are enumerated in §5 of the law, i.e., labor, peasants,
fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, the elderly,
handicapped, women, the youth, veterans, overseas workers, and
professionals? After all, what is provided for is “a party-list system
of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations” each of which is separately defined in §3 of the law.
That the party-list system is not limited to these groups is also
clear from §5 of the law:
SEC. 5. Registration.—Any organized group of persons may register as a

in the party-list system as a national, regional or
760

sectoral party or organization or a coalition of such parties or organiza tions,

attaching thereto its constitution, bylaws, platform or program of
government, list of officers, coalition agreement and other relevant
information as the COMELEC may require: Provided, That the sectors shall
include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas work
ers, and professionals.
There would be no need to provide specifically for the sectors if the

party-list system is reserved for them.
FOR THE FOREGOING REASONS, the petitions in these cases
should be dismissed.
Case remanded to COMELEC for further proceedings.
Notes.—Courts will decide a question otherwise moot and

academic if it is “capable of repetition, yet evading review.” (Alunan
III vs. Mirasol, 276 SCRA 501 [1997])
To have meaningful representation, the elected persons must
have the mandate of a sufficient number of people. Otherwise, in a
legislature that features the party-list system, the result might be the
proliferation of small groups which are incapable of contributing
significant legislation, and which might even pose a threat to the

stability of Congress. (Veterans Federation Party vs. Commission on
Elections, 342 SCRA 244 [2000])
——o0o——
761
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3/3/2018 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 359

698 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

ANG BAGONG BAYANI-OFW LABOR PARTY (under the

BAYAN MUNA, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS;

VOL. 359, JUNE 6, 2001 699

MOKRATIKONG PILIPINO (LDP); PARTIDO NG MASANG

Election Law; Actions; Certiorari; Pleadings and Practice; Under

700 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party vs. Commission on Elections

Same; Same; Same; Procedural requirements “may be glossed over to

social justice x x x when the decision sought to be set aside is a nullity, or

VOL. 359, JUNE 26, 2001 701

Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party vs. Commission on Elections

law; namely, “labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural

702 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party vs. Commission on Elections

sented disregards the clear statutory policy.—The declared policy of RA

VOL. 359, JUNE 26, 2001 703

Ang Bagong Bayqni-OFW Labor Party vs. Commission on Elections

Same; Same; Guidelines for Screening Party-List Participants,—The

VITUG, J,, Separate (Dissenting) Opinion:

Election Law; Party-List System; Neither Article 6, Section 5(2) of the

704 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party vs. Commission on Elections

organizations, and 4) coalitions.—The party-list system is limited to four

VOL. 359, JUNE 26, 2001 705

Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party vs. Commission on Elections

MENDOZA, J., Dissenting opinion:

Election Law; Party-List System; Constitutional Law; Statutory

706 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party vs. Commission on Elections

VOL. 359, JUNE 26, 2001 707

Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party vs. Commission on Elections

peasants, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, and youth

SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS in the Supreme Court. Certiorari.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

708 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

The party-list system is a social justice tool designed not only to

life, but also to enable them to become veritable lawmakers

Before us are two Petitions under Rule 65 of the 1

The Factual Antecedents

1 Signed by Chairman Alfredo L. Benipayo and Commissioners Luzviminda G.

VOL. 359, JUNE 26, 2001 709

observance of the legal and procedural requirements, review of these

a separate Omnibus Resolution and individual resolution on political

710 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

more importantly the sufficiency of the Manifestations

3 Ibid., pp. 21-22; rollo, pp. 48-49.

VOL. 359, JUNE 26, 2001 711

On April 17, 2001, 12

“1. Whether or not recourse under Rule 65 is proper under the

pine Local Autonomy Movement, Aksyon Demokratiko, Citizens Drug Watch

712 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

“2. Whether or not political parties may participate in the

The Court’s Ruling

The Petitions are partly meritorious. These cases should be

Respondents contend that the recourse of both petitioners under

VOL. 359, JUNE 26, 2001 713

reconsideration was possible, it being a prohibited pleading 21

20 Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, provides: “Judicial power includes

714 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

consistent with its duty to “formulate guiding and 25

In its Petition, Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party contends that

VOL. 359, JUNE 26, 2001 715