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CONTENTS

PREFACE v

KEY JUDGMENTS vii

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. ix

I WHY INTELLIGENCEREFORM " 1

II US STRATEGY 5

III INTELLIGENCE AND THE "INFORMATION AGE" II

IV ANALYSIS AND ESTIMATES 21

V HUMAN INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION 31

VI TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION 39

VII COVERT ACTION 45

VIII COUNTE~LLIG~CE 55

IX CONCLUSION 65

ENDNOTES 73

MEMBERS OF THE WORKING GROUP ON INTELLIGENCE REFORM 81

ABOUT THE AtmlORS 83

 PREFACE

This report was prepared for the Working Group on IntelligenceReform. The Working Group is
a project of the National Strategy Information Center's Consortium for the Study of Intelligence
(CSI). It is the only ongoing, unclassified forum in which leading government and nongovernment
intelligence experts regularly exchange ideas aboutthe future ofUS intelligence and discuss proposals
for its reform. Members ofthe Working Group include current and former senior intelligence officials,
current and former senior officials in the Departments of State and Defense, Democratic and
Republican staff membersof the congressional oversight committees, and academic specialists.

The Working Group was established in 1992, well before the wave of criticism of the performance
ofUS intelligence that led to the creationofthe Commissionon the Roles and Capabilities of the US
Intelligence Community. Dissatisfied with the substance and limited character of the intelligence
reformdebateas it emerged in the early 1990s, CSI established the Working Group to stimulate and
expand that debate.1

With the arrest of CIA officer Aldrich Ames in 1994 as a spy for the Soviet Union, the interest in
reformtook on new urgencyand intensity. In reaction, the US Congress enacted legislation, signed
by President Clinton, creating the bipartisan Commission on the Roles and Capabilities of the US
Intelligence Community. Following the November 1994 elections and the resulting change in its
leadership, the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence announced that it, too, intended
to conduct a review of future US intelligencerequirements and capabilities. In addition, a number
of nongovernmenta1 organizations have produced or are slated to produce reports concerned with
the same topic. Why, then, another?

The simplest and most direct answer is that the composition ofthe Working Group provides it with
unusual insight into the world of inteliigence and, given its now four-year-long effort to promote
serious discussion about intelligence reform, it has a duty to contribute to the current debate. The
report, prepared by Gary Schmitt and Abe Shulsky, draws on those discussions.

The report itself is not a detailed, "down-in-the-weeds" review of the Intelligence Community.
UncIassified, it could hardly be otherwise. Yet, at a time when the basic objectives and capabilities
of the US intelligence effort are under review, it is reasonable to argue that what is required is not
a documentwith a lengthylistof specific recommendations but an array ofprinciples and assumptions
that might guide the practice of US intelligencein the future. Clarity about these fundamentals will
be essential if specific proposals for reform are to be adequately understood and properly assessed.
J
Although it does not providean extended list ofspecific recommendations for change, the report does
havea pointofviewrespecting the basicelements of intelligence - collection, analysis, covert action,
and counterintelligence -- and the principles and organizational behavior that should guide their
conduct. And, while the report uses this division of intelligence to discuss a number of reform ideas,
it also argues that the elements of intelligence cannot stand alone. Underlying the report's logic is

v
 the view that the elements are interrelated to varying degrees and that a significant failure in one can
have serious consequences for the others. Moreover, defining each element's specific tasks is tied
to understanding the challenges posed by the particular security enviromnent a country finds itself in
and, in tum, the strategies a govermnent adopts to meet those challenges.

The core of the report is a series of chapters devoted to each of the four elements of intelligence;
however, separate chapters are devoted to espionage and technical intelligence collection, and these
raise special questions. These chapters are preceded by three which set the stage. They review the
reasons for interest in reform and note changes, social as well as technological, that argue for a US
Intelligence Community different from that molded by World War IT and the Cold War.

The report is not intended to reflect a consensus of the Working Group. Rather, it is intended to
provide a focus for further reflection and debate.

Roy Godson Ernest May

Co-Chairmen

Working Group on Intelligence Reform

April 1996

I,
-=-'"- - - - - - - - - ­
KEY JUDGMENTS

• TheInte1ligence Community (Ie) developedduring the Cold War; and has not existed under
"nonna1" international circumstances. It is a mistake to extend automaticallythe dominant
Cold War reform agenda -- centra1ization of the IC under the Director of Central
Intelligence's (DCI) authority in the name ofefficiency - to the new circumstances,

• The "Information Age" makes many new sources of information available to the government;
such as commercial satellite photo reconnaissance. The IC cannot hope to encompass all
information relevant to foreign and national security policy, and should not even try. The
issue is one of "comparative advantage" of the IC over other information sources.

• TheIC'smajor "comparative advantage" lies in obtaining information others try to keep secret
and penetrating below the "surface" impression created by publiclyavailable information to
determine whether an adversary is deceiving us or denyingus key information.

• Counterintelligence (CI) therefore has to be more than just catching spies (counterespionage);
it has to guard the integrity of the government's information collection and analysis process
by penetrating, understanding, and possiblymanipulating an adversary's intelligence efforts
against us.

• Reinvigorating and integrating CI into collection, analysis, and covert action has been ignored
by the other reports on the future of intelligence; this reflects a long-standing failure of
American intelligence to develop and utilize a comprehensive CI strategy.

• The demise ofthe SovietUnion implies not that human intelligence (Humint) collectionis no
longer needed, but rather that thereare new opportunities to use it more effectively. This will
require greater use of nonofficial cover (NOC) arrangements (e.g., US officials and assets
who do not operate from US embassies) for those involved in clandestine collection and
shouldinclude maintaining a strong DoD Humint capability.
•
• The development of technical intelligence collection systems will have to adjust to an era of
constrained budgets; we canno longerafford to buythe most advanced capabilities regardless
of cost, and will have to consider trade-offs, Nevertheless, global intelligence coverage is a
key US national security asset that should be retained; enhanced technical collection
capabilities are alsobecoming vital fur military operations. Suchcapabilities, however, cannot
be obtained on the cheap.

• Intelligence analysis must continue recent trends that make it more relevant to policymakers,
by emphasizing the forces that shape a givensituation and identifying those that are amenable
to US influence, rather than by focusing on single-point predictions ofthe future as if it were
foreordained.

• Covertaction(CA)must be seenas one foreign policy tool among many, and integrated into
the foreign policy process more fully. It has an important role to play under current
conditions, including fighting "transnational threats" such as international organized crime,
terrorism, and especially proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. It also has a role in
supporting the transition to liberal democracies abroad and countering efforts to frustrate
these transitions.

VII
1.
_

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report examines intelligence reform issues at an important point in American history:

• The Cold War's end has had a major impact on the security environment and, in turn, the
nation's strategies and policies.
• The Aldrich Ames espionage case highlighted major weaknesses at the heart of American
intelligence.
• Profound advances in the processing and communication of information, and in information's
general availability, hold significant implications for the Intelligence Community and the
government as a whole.

The repon differs from others in that it does not address specific organizational issues; rather, it
challenges the governing paradigm ofintelligence which has influenced the Intelligence Community's
development during the past half-centuryand offers an alternative path for the future.

The Information Age

The government has generallybeen slower to respond to the revolutionary changes associated with
the Information Age than the private sector. However, with the Intelligence Community facing an
era ofconstrained budgets but expanding requirements, it is imperative that the implications ofthis
change in the availability of information be thought through. To guide that process, two key
questions should be addressed: First, what "comparative advantage" does the Intelligence Community
enjoy, compared to other sources, in providing a particular type of information? And, second, what
are the best organizational structures and operational procedures for making this new flood of
information useful to the policymaker and the military operator?

Era of Strategic Uncertainty

Complicatingany review ofintelligence's future is the fact that, while the United States has moved
into a new security era, it has not yet achieved a consensus on a new national security strategy, which
would guide and prioritize intelligence efforts. As a consequence, intelligence will be pressed by
] policymakers to address a complex mix of traditional and nontraditional concerns and to shift
attentionamongthem much more rapidlythan in the past. The Intelligence Community will also be
expected to deal with the new and unexpected on shon notice. In an era defined by strategic uncer­
tainty, this requires a community that is flexible, invites analytic competition, and maintains a surge
capability across all ofintelligence.

In addition, the more fluid international situation mayprovidepolicymakers with greater opponunities
for influencing the security environment, and not just reacting to it. The challenge for intelligence will
x THE FuTuRE OF US JN1ELLIGENCE
be to take a more active role in identifying these opportunities and maintaining the capability to take
advantage of them covertly, if that is what is required.

Intelligence Analysis

During the past several years, the understanding of intelligence analysis has begun to change. In a
major departure from previous views, senior intelligence officials are far more likely to state that the
primary goal of analysis should not be prediction. Instead, the emphasis has rightly shifted toward
making analysis more useful to policymakers and military operators.

In most cases, this will mean bringinganalysis bureaucratically closer to policy and reconceptualizing
its task by breaking down some of the barriers between it and policy deliberations. For example, it
has long been held that intelligence assessments should not discuss possible US policy options or deal
directlywith the capabilities ofUS military systems or the strategy and tactics for using them. Yet,
adhering to these distinctions may make the resulting analysis less useful.

In this light, the warning function should be revised to include an explicit consideration of its
usefulnessto policy. Warning memoranda should not deal only with possible "red" events. Instead,
they should be produced in the context of a warning system that explicitly deals with such issues as
the event's imminence, the additional signs that might be expected before it occurs, and the probability
that we will be able to detect and recognize them, etc., and relate them to alternative US responses
and readiness postures. This would recognize that the goal of warning is not to avoid subjective
"surprise," but to ensure, as far as possible, that when the event occurs, we are postured to take the
appropriate action in response.

Similarly, new forms of estimates should be developed that explicitly look at both the external
situation and US opportunities for dealing with it. They would be joint intelligence-policy documents,
prepared by ad hoc groups of experts drawn from relevant agencies. And, finally, the opportunities
and forums for competitive analysis within the Intelligence Community should be expanded not only
to assist a full range of policy deliberations but also to guard against any politicization that might
result from lowering the wall between intelligence and policy.

With respect to the scope of analysis, a major change the government faces in the post-Cold War
world is dealing with a larger number of nations; understanding these foreign societies and
governments and the ways in which they differ from Western democratic states is a major analytic
task. However, it does not necessarily follow that this work involves secret information nor is it clear
that the Intelligence Community should be tasked with this effort. For a number of reasons,
government support for reinvigorated "area studies" both outside of government and in quasi­
governmental think tanks may be a more beneficial means for addressing this need.

Similarly, the Community should not attempt to become the government's CNN. Its comparative
advantage in the area of "current intelligence" lies in its ability to provide policymakers with some
 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY XI

context for an initial report, a judgment about the report's reliability and, through the targeting of
collection assets, additional information to confirm, dispute, or round out prelirninary accounts.

Clandestine Human Collection

The new world envirorunent opens up new possibilities for human intelligence collection (humint)
compared with the Cold War, when our primary intelligence target was a "counterintelligence state"
characterized by pervasive secrecy and security. Taking advantage of these opportunities will require
a greater operational flexibility, including, for example, the greater use of officers operating not out
ofUS embassies butundervarious forms of "nonofficial cover" (NOCs). For example, such officers,
operating in the commercial and banking sectors, will be better placed with respect to efforts directed
against weapons proliferation and organized crime. In addition, it will be necessary to create a "surge
capability," perhaps bycreating an intelligence "reserve" of former officers and others with expertise
in various regions, to deal with unforeseen demands for collection.

Manyofthe new requirements for humanintelligence will involvenations in which the armed forces
are involved in peacekeeping or othertypes of "operations other than war." In general, these will be
countries undergoing someamount of chaos, which implies a more permissive envirorunent for human
collection than would exist in a country with a strong, effective government. These considerations
suggest that the recent effort to create an effective military human intelligence collection capability
should be continued. To be successful, however, this effort has to be supported by a long-term
commitment on the part of the services and the Department of Defense to build a professional
intelligence cadre within the military. It is also important that the mechanism established for
coordinating CIA and military human intelligence operations ensures the efficient deployment of
collectionresources without subordinating one organization to the other, and losing in the process
the benefits associated with havingtwo distinctcollection efforts.

Technical Collection

The huge costsinvolved in maintaining a "state of the art" technical intelligence collection capability
will create tremendous budget pressures in the coming years. This will require greater attention to
capability vs. cost trade-offs than during the Cold War when a policyof building the technologically
most advanced systems could be justified on the grounds ofthe seriousness ofthe threat posed by the
Soviet nuclear forces. Thepossibility of deploying smaller, but still capable systems at reduced costs
should be studied to determine its feasibility and the savings obtainable. Also, further study should
be conducted of the possibility of making use of commercial imaging systems to supplement
intelligence systems; issues such as tasking procedures, the responsiveness of commercial systems in
terms of speed and reliability, and the maintenance of confidentiality have to be addressed.

The increasing tactical military usefulness of technical collection systems, including satellite-based
imagery, means that greater attention must be paid to the intelligence "architecture," i.e., the system
 OF US INTEllIGENCE

, this intelligenceto the field in a timely manner. At the same time, profound changes
aeld, the so-called Revolution in Military Affairs, will increase requirements for
Lor military operations -- for example, precision guided munitions require more precise
., the target, and longer-range battlefieldsystems may require information about targets that
oe directly acquired by the operator ofthe system. Thus, greater flexibility will be required
tc .>UTe that maximum benefit is obtained from all collection systems, including those traditionally
categorized as "national," as well as new ones, such as long-range unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs)
that may have both "national" and "tactical" characteristics. This suggests that, whatever the
anticipated benefits in terms of efficiency, bureaucratic centralization of technical collection efforts
must be approached carefully to ensure that the ability to make full use of the systems is not
compromised in the process.

New technological advances also make possible new methods of technical collection, including
collection by means of small, clandestinelydeployed devices. In general, it is important to ensure that
the boldness that led, in the 1950s, to the early generations of overhead systems not be lacking in the
future. One possible source of this type of vision would be a reinvigorated President's Foreign
Intelligence Advisory Board (pFIAB), whose members would include those with the technical
expertise to advise on possible new collection means.

Finally, with the demise of the Soviet Union, there was an expectation that expenditures on technical
collection might be substantially reduced. However, maintaining the kind of high-quality global
coverage still demanded by policymakers cannot be done cheaply. Moreover, technical collection of
various sorts is integral to implementation of the Revolution in Military Affairs. In short, when all
is said and done, technical collection is, and will remain, an expensive business.

Covert Action

For reasons having to do with American history, law, and political culture, the argument has taken
hold that covert action (CA) should be a measure oflast resort taken by the government to deal with
only exceptional threats to the nation's security. From this perspective, with the end of the Soviet
Union, CA should become for all intents and purposes nonexistent. However, there are many reasons
to doubt this argument and its premises, and the post-Cold War world still presents many situations ­
terrorism, weapons proliferation, narcotics trafficking, regimes in transition from autocratic rule. and
the growth of Islamic extremism -- in which CA may be an important ingredient for achieving high­
priority objectives. Instead of treating CA as an exceptional technique, it should be treated as one
foreign policy tool among many, and assessed accordingly.

j One reason this is not now done is that the spectrum of activities now categorized as "covert action"
under the law's finding and reporting requirements is relatively broad. Consideration should be given
I to redefining the term to exclude routine operations directed against transnational threats, such as
international terrorism, narcotics trafficking, and organized crime. This would facilitate the approval
I
process for such actions, and would emphasize that they do not involve major policy issues.
I
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 ExEcUTIVE SUMMARY xm
Furthermore, steps should be taken to ensure that the government's national security decision making
apparatus considers potential covert action along with other policy tools in a more fully integrated
manner than at present. Several methods are possible, either by giving an existing national security
policy agency or body (such as the State Department or the NSC) more direct responsibility for
developing CA programs and ensuring that it is used where appropriate, or by treating the CIA's
Directorate of Operations as a policy agency for this purpose.

Ultimately, a robust CA capability will not only be able to help combat contemporary threats, but will
facilitate the development of capabilities which otherwise would not be available in the future for a
more serious crisis. Indeed, the argument that CA should be used in only exceptional circumstances
ignores the fiIct that, under such a policy, the capability - the network of agents, experienced officers,
and infrastructure - to conduct CA effectively is unlikely to be available when needed.

CounterinteUigence

To the extent that the heart ofthe intelligence endeavor is the struggle between adversarial services,
counterintelligence may be seen as coextensive with intelligence itself Yet CI is also one of the four
elements of intelligence and, as such, is typically separated from analysis, collection, and covert
action. The result has often been that a narrow view of CI -- one that essentially equates it with
security and counterespionage -- has prevailed in this country.

The recently created interagency counterintelligence groups, the National Counterintelligence Policy
Board and the National Counterintelligence Center, should be used to move us beyond this con­
stricted view. They should be directed to develop a comprehensive counterintelligence strategy for
dealing with the entire range of threats posed by foreign intelligence services (and perhaps other
clandestine organizations, such as transnational criminal or terrorist groups, as well). In addition to
espionage, the threats posed by foreign services can include covert action of various sorts, double
agent operations, "spoofing" of technical intelligence collectors, and deception operations targeting
our intelligence and other national security organizations.

In response to these threats, a national strategy must provide guidance not only for security and
counterespionage activities, but for our attempts to penetrate and manipulate the threat organizations
as well. Within the Intelligence Community, such a national strategy would help ensure that
counterintelligenceconsiderations are taken into account in the other elements of intelligence; among
other things, it would highlight the need for counterintelligence analysis to understand foreign
intelligence threats. And a national CI strategy would provide a basis for determining counter­
intelligence resource requirements.

In support ofthe above, counterintelligence analysis capabilities will have to be enhanced in order to
address adequately such topics as the sources of threat, US vulnerabilities, and the objectives,
operational methods, and vulnerabilitiesof adversary services. As the recent history of Iraq's success
in concealing its weapons programs indicates, there is a continuing need to develop and devote
 XIV THE Fu11JRE OF US INTELLIGENCE

analytic resources to examine whether an adversary is engaged in deception operations; to this end,
with respect to selected, high-priority issues, "red teams" should be created to investigate in detail
the possible use of cover, concealment, and deception techniques against us.

Within the CIA, a cultural change is necessary to banish the "Angletonophobia" that still hampers
counterintelligence activities and that was reflected in key aspects ofthe Ames espionage case; the
prestige and bureaucratic clout of counterintelligence must be enhanced. In particular, the CIA
should provideadequatecareer development paths for counterintelligence officers, including analysts,
to foster the necessary expertise. Consideration should be given to the creation of a
counterintelligence staff to ensure the vigorous investigation of cases as they arise, to review the
operational security ofongoing operations and make sure that personnel and other security practices
are informed by the best possible understanding of the threats and opportunities we face.

A New Paradigm for Intelligence

The considerations discussed in this report, taken together, amount to a revision of the reigning
paradigm concerning intelligence: what it is, how it relates to policy, and how the organizationsthat
engage in it should be structured.

The report offers a new paradigm underwhich the government's information-related agencies would
become more diverse organizationally and functionally. For example, no longer would the NRO
(National Reconnaissance Office) be the solesourceofsatellite-based photography; a new mechanism
would be developed to allow the government to make use of commercially available satellite
photography to supplement its technical intelligence collection capabilities. At the same time, and
in contrast with past practice ,and doctrine, the Intelligence Community's border with the policy
community and military operatorswould become less rigid and more permeable. For example, joint
intelligence-policy documents might replace the traditional "estimates" that eschew consideration of
US policy options and opportunities; as for the military, more direct forms of support and
communication between intelligence agencies and units in the field will be required as warfighters
enter an era in which the information requirements of weapon systemsare increasing rapidly.

Under this new view, the community would not be leaderless; it would still require a leader to help
coordinate its activities andto provide overallpolicydirection under presidential and NSC guidance.
However, there would be no attempt to give him direct budgetary or administrative control over its
various components.

This might be seen by some as simply an implicit recognition of the fact that, despite numerous
"reform" efforts, the goal ofgivingthe DCI such sweepingauthority remains elusive; however, it is
this report's view that the failure of centralization efforts can be seen as reflecting the reasonable
needs of the various components of the national securitybureaucracy. In any case, the centralized
I model was probably better suited to the Cold War, with its emphasis on "national" level intelligence
\
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1
 ExECUTIVE SUMMARY XV

about the Soviet strategic nuclear threat, than to the present period when departmental, regional, and
tactical intelligence requirements have exploded and gained new urgency.

The large variety of information collection and analysis activities conducted by or on behalf of the
government would go beyond the ambit of "intelligence" to include such things as the use of imagery
from commercial satellite systems; joint intelligence-policy groups to produce "net assessments" or
other comprehensive reviews of situations and the policy options to address them; and the creation
of quasi-governmental analysis centers on specific topics to make optimal use of expertise existing
in academia or other sectors ofthe society.

On the other hand, certain activities would remain clearly within the intelligence ambit and would be
the core concerns ofthe government's chiefintelligence official. Clandestine human collection would
be one such activity and the conduct of covert action, another. In addition, this official would be
responsible for the implementation of counterintelligence policy and the coordination of
counterintelligence activities (although counterespionage within the United States would remain an
FBI function). In short, traditional intelligence activities would remain as a kind of core of
intelligence, surrounded by the larger set of information activities. Intelligence, in the narrow sense,
however, would still be responsible for safeguarding the larger effort against penetration and
deception efforts by foreign intelligence agencies and transnational groups.

STRUCTURE AND SCOPE OF THIS REPORT

For the sake of convenience, the elements of intelligence -- analysis, collection, covert action, and
counterintelligence -- are discussed separately. However, a key contention of the report is that the
elements must be understood in Cdnjunction with each other, and that their interrelationships must
be strengthened. Some steps in this direction (such as the creation of "centers" in which collectors
and analysts dealing with the same subject matter can interact more vigorously and informally) have
already been taken; more remains to be done, especially in order to ensure that counterintelligence
concerns and perspectives are properly integrated into the conduct of analysis, collection, and covert
action.

The report is concerned with the present; its concepts and recommendations are meant to be
applicable now. Of course, one oftoday's tasks is to make sure that we create a structure that can
readily adapt to the future security environment and that facilitates the identification and development
oftomorrow's technologies and their exploitation.
 I

WHY INTELLIGENCE REFORM

Motivations for Reform

With the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, there was a great deal of interest in the question of
how the Intelligence Comnnmity (Ie) shouldadapt to the post-Cold War world. The debate became
more focused in 1992, when the chairmen of the Senate and House Intelligence Committees each
introduced comprehensive intelligence reorganization and reform bills; less radical versions of some
oftheirproposals were implemented administratively by then-Director of Central Intelligence (DCl)
Robert Gates. In the fall of 1994, Congress legislated the creation of a Commission on the Roles and
Capabilities of the United States Intelligence Community (originally chaired by the late Les Aspin,
who was succeeded by Harold Brown); the Commission reported its findings in March 1996.
Concurrently, the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives
engaged in a major study of the future ofintelligence, called the Intelligence Community ofthe 21st
Century (IC21). At the same time, a variety of private organizations prepared other reports, ofwhich
this is one.

That there should be this burst of interest in the question of how the Intelligence Community (Ie)
should function is hardly surprising. Broadly speaking, there were three reasons for undertakinga
major review of intelligence issues at this time; two of them are well-known and often discussed,
while the third, which is somewhat lessobvious, nevertheless underlies manyof the currently debated
intelligence issues.

End ofthe Cold WIlT

First, the end ofthe Cold Warhas obviously had a major impact on the national security environment
andon national security strategy and policies. Since intelligence is meant to support this strategy and
thesepolicies, these changes obviously have an importantimpact on intelligence as well; at the same
time, the funds available for intelligence have decreased in real terms, and are likelyto continue to
do so, in step with the decline in the overall defensebudget.

The end of the Cold War has brought about changes in the Intelligence Community's tasks.
Obviously, the priorconcentration on the Soviet military threat, especially the strategic nuclear threat,
isgone. In its place, there are a multitude of tasks which have gained in importance, relatively and
perhaps absolutely, in its stead.

It has oftenbeen noted that recent years have seen a much greater pace ofUS military activity than
befure. In addition to the Persian Gulf War in 1991 and the invasionofPanama in 1989, there have
been a series of military operations other than war, rangingfrom humanitarian relief operations to
2 THE FuTuRE OF US INTELLIGENCE

peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and "nation building." These operations generate demands for
intelligence support at the theater and taeticalleveL

There has also been an increase in the salience of a whole set of threats to national security, such as
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, international narcotics trafficking, international
organized crime, and international terrorism. In some cases (e.g., terrorism), these threats existed
before, and the attention paidto themfluctuated depending on how serious a problem they appeared
to be at the time; they can now, however, be accorded a higher relative intelligence priority than
heretofore, given the disappearance of the Sovietmilitary threat. In other cases, such as international
organized crime, the threat itself has probably increased, in part because of the increased openness
of the world's economy and financial systems, and in part because regime transitions in many parts
of the world have led to the collapse of effectivelaw enforcement on the tenitories of the affected
states. (These trends are synergistic in their effects: groups that are able to establishthemselves in
an area with weak government are often able to act more effectively in other parts of the world.) In
still others, suchas the proliferation of nuclear weapons and advancedweapons-related technology,
an existing threat has been madepotentiaIly more serious by the collapse of the Soviet Union and the
reduced ability of the governments of the successor states to exercise control over the nuclear
facilities, materials and know-how they inherited.

The Ames Case

The second reason for undertaking a review at this time is the Ames espionage case. This case
highlighted counterintelligence as an area ofmajor weakness in the Intelligence Community, and in
fact served as the primary political trigger for the Congress and the president to create the
Commission on the Roles and Capabilities of the US Intelligence Community. The Ames case
crystaIIiz.ed a series of criticisms that had been leveled against the CIA's performance during the Cold
War, but the weaknesses it revealed remained important since they could be exploited by other
adversaries, even those much less sophisticated, in intelligence terms, than the old Soviet Union.

The "InformDtion Age"

Finally, there is a third reason for the current review, which is much more amorphous and difficult
to understand, and whose consequences for intelligence are lessclear. Yet it is clearly very important;
it has aIready changed the waymanyorganizations - especially business corporations - operate, and
it is likelyto have important effects on government as well.

From the technical point of view, the driving factor is the tremendous technological progress that has
been made in the processing and communication of information. However, technological change is
only a small part of the picture: more important are the behavioral and institutional changes that
result from the focus on information as the key to organizational activity. In the military arena, what
is often referred to as the Revolution in Military Affairs depends critically on the enhanced usefulness
of information for the targeting of new types of precision strike weapons and the enhanced abilityto
collect, process, and disseminate that information in a timely manner. The usual name for the new
environment being created is the "information age."
 ·t

WHY lNTELLIGENCE REFORM 3

The effect ofthesechanges shows up in several different forms. At one level, it suggests new ways
inwhichinfonnation can be circulated and used within government, so as to make policy making and
implementation moreeffective. While this affects the entire government, it is perhaps most important
within the military services. As the experience of the Gulf War indicates, the organization of
communications is becoming an even more critical elementfor war fighting.

In addition, it focuses attention on the increase in the amount of information available throughout the
entire society, both within noninte1ligence parts of the government and outside the government. From
the perspective of the "information age," it becomes more and more important to see how
government can successfully make use of the information that is produced and disseminated
elsewherein the society.

Reform in the Past

The current interest in intelligence reform recalls the earlier period of the mid- to late-1970s when
there was also a great deal ofinterest in this issue. At that time, the immediate impetus came from
revelations -- both in the press and, later, as a result of the work of the two congressional
investigatory committees (headed by Senator Frank Church and Representative Otis Pike) that were
established in 1975-76 -- concerningvarious past intelligence activities that were considered to be
illegal or improper. Thus, much ofthe effort involved in drafting the so-called intelligence "charters"
went intothe writing ofdetailed regulations to cover the clandestine aspects ofintelligence activity.

During the second halfofthe 1970s, much of the debate concerned whether new restrictions should
be imposed on the IC and, if so, what kind and how severe they should be. For example, during this
period Congress passed the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, which required warrants for
wiretaps for foreign intelligence and counterintelligence collection, and established the standards for
issuing them. Congress also required that covert action programs be undertaken pursuant only to
presidential "findings" of their importance to national security, and that the congressional intelligence
oversight committees be informed,

At the same time, however, there was another tendency with respect to reform efforts, which was to
centralize control of the pluralistic Intelligence Community agencies under the Director ofCentral
Intelligence. This agenda predated the mid-1970s era ofintelligence revelations; indeed, it can be
traced back to the late 1940s, whenthe Cold War national security apparatus -- including the National
Security Council (NSC), the Department of Defense (DoD), and the Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA) itself -- was being established.

Centraliz:ation was intended to allow for a more efficient use of resources and to make it possible to
do away with duplication of effort betweenvariousagencies. In addition, this agenda was supported
by the view that moving intelligence operations under the control of the DCI and away from their
parent departments and organizations (mainly, the Defense Department and the military services)
would make management more responsible and improvethe objectivity of the intelligence product,
which would no longerbe affected by the budgetary or policy preferences of the parent organizations.
 ,,.-_il_ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -.•:;• .t.t,2I11i1~J_

4 THE FUTIJRE OF US INTELLIGENCE

Whilesteps in thisdirection had been taken earlier,"there was renewed attention to the possibility of
strengthening the role ofthe DCI in the late 1970s. However, although centralization was a frequent
goal of intelligence reformers during this period, it should be noted that it was never achieved in
anything likethe desired degree; departmental realities remained to sta1I more thoroughgoing efforts
at consolidation.

As a counterpoint to this agenda, there also developed a critique ofthe Intelligence Community that
focused on a different set ofquestions more directly related to the quality ofthe intelligence product
and the effectiveness ofits operations. This agenda called for a broadening of human intelligence
collection and a recognition that much of what it collected was not accessible by technical collection
methods; an improvement in the quality and relevance of intelligence analysis by making its
assumptions and its treatment ofevidence more transparent to the consumer; a more comprehensive
understanding of counterintelligence and its crucial importance for the intelligence enterprise as a
whole; and the integration ofcovert action with the other elements of intelligence in order to support
them and to enhance its effectiveness as an important foreign policy tool filling the gap between
diplomacy and military force. While this critique achieved some intellectual influence, it did not
become the centerpiece of a political reform effort.

The State ofthe Debate in 1995

Despite the general recognition that the end of the Cold War implied a need for the IC to adjust to
the new international circumstances, the reform debate has tended to have a relatively narrow focus.
For the most part, it has continued the Cold War theme of centralizing the IC, mainly in the interest
of efficiency (e.g., avoiding duplication of effort among the various agencies). At the same time,
there has been increased interest in a number ofnontraditional topics, the so-called "new issues" of
economic competitiveness, "environmental security," epidemiology, and many others. One result has
beenthe desireto create, in the words of SenatorDavid Boren, former chairman of the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence, a "world-class think tank" at Langley, Virginia that would be competent
to deal with the entire gamut of "nontraditional," as well as the traditional, national security issues.

This report has taken a different tack; it begins with the view that the whole of intelligence must be
reviewedinthe light of the three motivations for reform discussed above. The IC with which we are
familiar is a product ofthe Cold War, with some roots going back to World War n. Thus, unlike the
armedforces and the State Department, which have existed throughout the nation's history, in periods
of peace and "normalcy" as well as periods of hot or cold war, the IC faces what for it is an
unprecedented international security environment. Many of the IC's characteristic features were
influenced by the specific circumstances in which it was established; the passing of those
circumstances and the emergence ofnew conditions suggests the need for a more thorough review
of the IC, its objectives, functions, and components. This review requires, moreover, that we be
mindful ofthe nature ofinteUigence and its essential principles;indeed, it is only by recourse to these
fundamentals that we will be ableto judge which features ofthe IC are appropriate for the post-Cold
War world and which should be changed.
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 II

US STRATEGY

Since the purpose ofintelligence is to facilitate the formation and implementation of national security
policy, which in tum should be guided by an overallnational security strategy, it would seem logical
to conclude that the reorganization and reform of the Intelligence Community should derive from a
consideration ofthe national security strategy it is ultimately meant to serve. Unfortunately, this ideal
procedure, difficult to follow under any circumstances, is particularlyutopian at present.

With the disappearance of the Soviet threat, the countering of which had been the overarching US
national security objective for decades, it is not surprising that US strategy should be in a state of
confusion. Of course, the appropriate bureaucracies still produce documents on the subject.
However, it is clear that no overall consensus on national security strategy has yet been achieved.
It is possible that a consensus couldariserelatively rapidly in the face of a particularlydramatic event
on the international scene. However, in the absence of such an event, it is likelyto be a long time
before the United States possesses a national security strategy as clear and as enduring as the
"containment" strategy.

In general, it is unclear to what extent the United States will seek to maintain the global leadership
rolewhich it inherited as the "sole remaining superpower" following the collapse of the Soviet Union
and the consequent end of the Cold War. Nor is it clear how such a goal -- the maintenance of sole
superpower status - would be pursued should the United States decide to do so. On the other hand,
ifthat is not the US goal, then it is unclear what type ofintemational system is envisaged as replacing
the current one. Thus, important elements of strategy that should guide the organization and
operation ofintelligence are simply lacking.

Given the absence of an overall strategic objective, there is little clarity about the criteria according
to which the United States may choose to be involved or not in specific situations. While some
general objectives (such as the promotion of democracy) may be articulated under the heading of
"engagement," they do not provide any sense of what larger strategic stake is being served, and hence
whether and, if so, how the United States is likelyto act in a given case.

Nevertheless, to some extent, the United States will retain a global leadership position whether it
wants to or not; as the unsuccessful experimentwith "European leadership" with respect to Bosnia
following the break-up of Yugoslavia indicates, certain problems find their way to our doorstep wiIIy­
nilly. In addition, certain domestic political realities will impinge on national security decision makers.
Finally, our national security behavior will continue to be affected by both the current alliance
structure, which involves the United States in the defense of the NATO countries, Japan, and South
Korea; and the reliance ofthe industrial world (including the United States) on imported oil, which
requires us to be concerned about the stabilityof the Persian Gulf. Thus, it is possible to list certain
6 THE FuTuRE OF US lNrELLIGENCE

types oftraditional foreign policy/national security issues that US administrations will, for the foresee- .
able future, be forced to deal with, whatever their views on national security strategy.

In addition, it is clear that dynamic economic forces have been unleashed that are capable of.
producing major changes in global economic, and hence political and military, relations in the next •
decades. While one could imagine political changes that would retard, stop, or reverse these .
economic trends, such political events seem improbable at present; in any case, they would be so .
disruptive of the global order that, were they to occur, the world would look very different along
many different dimensions, and consideration ofthem would be essentially irrelevant for present plan­
ning purposes. It would be, for example, impossible and pointless to devise a plan now for how
intelligence should function in a future world ofUS economic autarky, ofthe division of the world
into hostile trading blocs, and so forth. Thus, for the purpose of analyzing the workings of the
Intelligence Community, we may assume that certain trends, driven by economic and technological
factors, will continue.

InteUigence Priorities

On this basis, and with the appropriate caveats, we can outline some intelligence priorities for the next
decades. These are likely to be important for the conduct ofUS national security strategy no matter
who is in office or what their particular foreign policy preferences are. Many of these are traditional
national security concerns, focusing predominantly on threats from other states (" state-centric"
concerns.) Other concerns, less traditional from the perspective of those concerned with national
security, involve threats emanating from groups other than states, typically operating across national
boundaries ("transnational" concerns.)

Among the former, there are, first, the trouble spots where major US interests are threatened. One
is the Korean peninsula, where the world's most heavily armed Stalinist regime engages in a
continuing military confrontation with South Korea, a US ally. Another is the Persian Gulf; where
the military threat to Saudi Arabia and the other oil producing nations ofthe Persian Gulfhas been
reduced, but, as the menacing Iraqi troop movements of October 1994 showed, not entirely
elirninated.

In addition, there are nonallied countries (Russia and China being by far the most important) whose
current or potential military strength make them matters of intelligence interest from a longer term
perspective. Whatever the state of current policy toward, and relations with, these states, there will
have to be an ongoing interest in their political, military, and economic development.

Tracking the efforts ofvarious states to acquire weapons of mass destruction (nuclear, chemical, and
biological weapons, as well as delivery means, especiaIIy those capable of reaching the United States)
is likely to remain an important intelligence priority. Various technological trends have facilitated
proliferation; in addition, the collapse of the Soviet Union means that vast amounts of sensitive
_l,·
~~.~_.~c.' -*i

US STRAlEGY 7

material and equipment, as well as trainedmanpower, are under much looser control than before, and
may become available to the highest bidder.

Similarly, the United States has become involved, for various reasons, often because of the
disintegration of state authority on a given territory, in a series of minor military actions (called
Operations Other than War (OOTW») across the globe. Although these are "optional," in the sense
that no significant US national security interest is at stake, their frequency in the post-Cold War
period suggeststhat our involvement results from fairly strong domestic political forces. Therefore,
we haveto asswne that there will be more ofthe samein the future, although, of course, it is difficult,
if not impossible, to predict exactly where.

Thus far, this list ofintelligencetopics has been traditional in nature. There are, however, a set of
lesstraditional "transnational" (IN) issues that have risen to greater prominence. First and foremost
amongthem are a set of concerns -- such as international terrorism, organized crime, and narcotics
trafficking - that straddle the boundary between intelligenceand national security, on one hand, and
law enforcement, on the other. In general, these problems have grown along with improvements in
telecommunications and transportation, the "globalization" of the world economic system, and the
disintegration, in many areas, of effective governmental authority. They pose a particular set of
problems dealingwith the use of intelligence to collect information in support of the efforts of law
enforcement agencies; this raises the conflict between the protection of intelligence sources and
methods, on one hand, and the use ofthe intelligence information in court proceedings, on the other.
In areas of strategic importance to the United States, intelligence may have to complement law
enforcement by acting to protect political and economic institutions.

Finally, there are a series ofother "newissues," such as economic competitiveness, ecological issues,
epidemiology, and so on. The motivation for raising these concerns is the view that it is in these areas
that the major threats to our well-being will arise, rather than from criminal activity or traditional
national security threats. Whatever the truth of this assertion, it is clear that these are important
matters that could, under some circumstances, have major consequences. Whether they should be
dealtwith by intelligence agencies -- assuming governmental interest in these issues - is a question
that will be addressed more systematically in the next chapter.

A Strategy for Uncertainty

While the previous section covers the variety of possible intelligence topics, it could not, in the
absence ofan overall national strategy, claimto determine specific targets or to prioritize them. In
an era of uncertainty, there can be no optimal plan for marshaling national security resources,
including intelligence resources.

In theory, thissuggests that the organization ofintelligenceshould be aimed at securing considerable

. flexibility. And, indeed, certain steps can be taken in this direction. For example, the creation of an

"intelligence reserve," i.e., a cadre ofretired intelligence officers or others with operational, linguistic,

 8 THE FuTuRE OF US INrELLIGENCE

or analytic expertise relevant to a given country or region of the world, would provide the ability to
respond to unforeseen situations at relatively low cost. There also may be other ways to create a
"surge capability" by enabling intelligence personnel or collection capabilities to shift focus from one
country or region to another relatively quickly. Similarly, a "surge" analytic capability might be
formed by establishing a system for rapidly tapping expertise outside the Intelligence Community or
the govenunent as a whole. For example, a mechanism by means of which academic experts on a
given region could be consulted quickly and confidentially would be a valuable supplement to the
analytic capability that the govenunent supports on a full-time basis.

However, there are probably limits to what can be accomplished along these lines. Budget constraints
make it difficult to build in all the flexibility one might want; in a cost conscious era, the maintenance
of this type of surge capability, while more immediate requirements are unmet or underfunded, is sure
to be questioned and under pressure eliminated for budgetary reasons.

Thus, some kind of "managed" flexibility will be required! Some judgments must be made about
priorities, while maintaining as much flexibility as possible. Intelligence itself will have an important
role to play in helping set these priorities; it will have to be willing to fight for resources to cover
topics that it regards as potentially significant but that may not be of immediate policy interest.
Nevertheless, experience teaches us that our ability to see into the future is quite limited; while
intelligence will have to make such forecasts, it can't rely too heavily on getting them right.

One way to alleviate the danger that the importance of a new intelligence topic will not be foreseen
would be to allow different viewpoints to flourish and engage in competition with each other. By
making it possible for unconventional voices to get a hearing, the risk of missing an important new
development may be reduced, although not, ofcourse, eliminated. This competition can be facilitated
by maintaining as decentralized a structure as possible, which would also permit some resources to
be devoted to pursuing "heterodox" lines of inquiry. Despite the pressures for greater efficiency, too
centralized a control of resources might choke off important collection or analytic efforts that are
based on dissenting views ofwhat threats will be paramount in the future.

In addition, the Intelligence Community must be structured so as to be able to adapt quickly after new
threats or concerns emerge. Again, this implies a relatively decentralized organization in which
;, "
decisions can be taken quickly. The kind of complicated structure, with many coordinating
mechanisms, that might seem desirable in order to achieve greater efficiencies, would nevertheless
make it harder to react to changed circumstances with imaginative new programs. This does not
imply that the IC should betotally dispersed or without common leadership; however, it does suggest
that more contemporary types of "flat" management structures, which minimize the traditional
directive forms ofcontrol in favor of more interactive and informal ones, should be used as a model.

Finally, a more fluid and uncertain international situation also creates greater possibilities for
influencingthe security environment and not just reacting to it. Covert action, as one foreign policy
tool among many for exerting such influence, could therefore have a more important role to play.
While this depends directly on policy decisions taken outside the IC (and, of course, on the
 USSTRAmGY 9

willingness to use other foreign policy tools as well), intelligence nevertheless may have to playa
more active role in laying out what the opportunities are, and in ensuring that it has the capability to
take advantage ofthem.

As this discussion suggests, a world that is more uncertain -- even though, all in all, much safer -­
than that ofthe Cold War requires a robust intelligence capability. However, because the intelligence
budget is contained, for reasons ofsecrecy, within that of the Department ofDefense, the assumption
hasbeen that cuts in the defense budget should be borne proportionately by intelligence as well. But
in an age ofuncertainty and defense cuts, this proposition needs to be examined. To the extent that
the defense drawdown reduces our margin of error with respect to unexpected threats, the relative
contribution of intelligence to our national security grows rather than diminishes in importance.

Some changes required by the new situation (for example, the broadening of our human intelligence
collectionefforts to deal with transnational threats) will require increased expenditures. Others, such
as the fact that we no longer need to focus so much attention on the minutiae ofthe military readiness
of the forces of the former Warsaw Pact, permit savings. (However, it may be that most ofthose
savings have already been taken.) While overall reductions in intelligence expenditures may be
possible, this cannot be assumed a priori merely on the basis of the end of the Cold War.
 III

INTELLIGENCE AND THE "INFORMATION AGE"

Intelligence information is a subset of information generally; however, it is often not clear what
properties ofa given bit ofinformation should, or do, characterize it as intelligence.

In recent years, for example, some have come close to sayingthat the scope of intelligence ought to
contain allrelevant information about the externalworld that a government might find useful; under
this view, for example, the Intelligence Community should collect and produce intelligence about
environmental matters. Others, however, want to restrict intelligence's scope to information related
to national security affairs, more traditionally understood. Further complicating matters is the
uncertainty regarding the character ofthe data that is to be collected and used. For some, the heart
of intelligence work lies with obtaining and protecting secrets; for others, intelligence's task is to
provide whatever information -- classified or not -- that might assist the government in formulating
and conducting its foreign and defense affairs. Between these various and contrasting conceptions
ofintelligence, American practice has sometimes veered; on the whole, however, it has leaned toward
the more expansive view.

To understand how this more expansive vision ofintelligence has come about, the first section in this
chapter provides a briefoverview ofthe evolutionofintelligence and poses the question of whether
the currentview of intelligence's scope is still appropriate. In examining this question, the chapter's
remaining sections employ concepts associatedwith the "information age" revolution to gain a fresh
perspective. The chapter then concludes by offering two key concepts for determining the future role
ofintelligence vis a vis the overallinformation requirements ofgovernment.

Setting tbe Stage

Governments rely on information to formulate policies and then to implementthem. A great deal -­
in fact, most - ofthisinformation reaches government officials by means ofinformal, or, at any rate,
not particularly organized, channels. Similarly, most of the analysis of this information occurs in the
courseofthe ordinary work ofgovernment. Every time a subordinatewrites a memo to a boss, he
or she is doing some amount ofinformation "analysis." But, governments also set up more formal
mechanisms for the collection, analysis, and transmission ofinformation. This happens throughout
the government, but in a very episodic fashion.

For example, consider the question ofeconomic statistics. If nothing else, governments have always
collected taxes, and, in the process of so doing, have generated economic data But at some point,
they decided that, in order to improve the formulation and implementation of economic, fiscal, and
monetary policy, they needed better information, and started creating agencies such as the Bureau
12 THE FuTuRE OF US INTELLIGENCE

of Labor Statistics, whose specific function is to coUect, organize, and disseminate economic
statistics. They also created organizations to analyze the data in support of policyrnakers.

Governments, with rare exception, have always had to know what was going on in foreign countries.
Traders, sailors, occasional envoys, and other travelers provided information from the earliest times;
however, by the late Middle Ages, official government representatives (ambassadors) became the
major source of government information on events in foreign countries. But, in this case, in the
United States at least, no formal, separate analysis of the information occurred - the policymaker (in
ThomasJefferson's time, the Secretary of State, but later on, a desk officer) analyzed the information
reported by the embassy, added to it information from other sources, and tried to figure out what was
going on and what it meant for US policy. In this case, there was no separation ofthe analysisand
policy-formulationfunctions.

What we in the United States know as the practice of intelligence began as the use of specialized
methods (originally, covert coUection by means of human agents, i.e., espionage, and code breaking)
to gain information (in addition to that otherwise available) concerning foreign countries, their
policies, and their intrigues in one's own country. The information to be coUected was treated as
secret by the foreign country to which it pertained; hence, the need for specialized methods to get
around the barriers to acquiring it erected by the foreign country. TypicaUy, this activity was handled
at the highest levels ofgovernment. In wartime, activities of this sort conducted to obtain militarily
useful information were typicaUy handled directly by the army's commander-in-chief

As a by and largeindependent matter (at least conceptually), modern government and, in particular,
armies and navies discovered that the process of coUecting, analyzing, and disseminating information
could profitably be treated in a more self-conscious fashion, using specialized organizations and
personnel. In particular, modern military organizations designated a special staff officer to handle this
function fur the commander; while this individual also dealt with "secret" information, the officer's
overaU responsibilitywas the broader one of preparing an assessment of an adversary's capabilities
and intentions, using aU sources ofinformation.

This development was part of the rise of general staffs in the military establishments of the mid­
nineteenth century. It reflected the need to assess the overaU military and economic strength of
potential or actual adversaries in an age when technological advances and economic growth were
occurring rapidly, and when a nation's economic potential and technological prowess were becoming
a more and more important determinant of its military power. While secret information could be
useful in this regard, a great deal of the important data was availablefrom "open source" material.
For example, the great powers of the nineteenth century discussed -- relatively openly - information
related to such topics as military doctrine and training, military-industrial potential, technological
advances in armaments and manufacturing processes, and so on.

In the twentieth century, the existence of totalitarian states, especiaUy the Soviet Union, posed a
much greater chaUenge, since much information that had been routinely made available in public
sources was now kept secret. This was not only true of military matters (for example, the entire
~ia;~.,

_.'--------------­
lN1'ELLIGENCE AND THE "INFORMATION AGE" 13

defense budget was kept secret') but of ordinary political matters as well, such as the political
struggles among the leadership. S Specialized methods were now necessary to obtain any relevant
data, not only fur understanding military developments, but for political ones as well. Thus, not only
the military conunander, but also the civilian national security policymaker, needed a "G-2," a foreign
intelligence deputy or advisor.

Where does this leave us now? Well, for one thing, as the above history indicates, intelligence
concerns over the years have broadened considerably. And if the steel-producing capacity of a
country was once thought to be a vital piece of intelligence, then, under an expanded notion of
national security, it may seem reasonableto widen intelligence's purview to such areas as economic
competitiveness and environmental issues. But, doingso, ofcourse, strains our common sense notion
that intelligence should focus on a more select subset ofgovernment's information needs.

Moreover, the notion that one government agency should strive to become the sole repository of
national security information for the government runs counter to the logic of the "information age."
The rapid progress in technologies related to telecommunications and data processing has resulted
in profound changes in the ways in which organizations handle information and understand their own
information needs. (Indeed, suchchanges have formed the core ofa more fundamental reshapingof
organizational structures throughout the corporate world.) Broadly stated, the defining problem in
providing government with national security information is no longer its paucity as it was during the
Cold War. Today, and in the future, the issue will be how government can efficiently and effectively
draw on the new and expanding sources ofinformation outside itself and, in turn, determine which
categories of information intelligence should be specifically employed to collect, process, and
disseminate.

The Scope of Intelligence

From the perspective of the government's information needs, one can begin to address various
questions concerning the "scope" of intelligence in terms both of the methods of collecting infor­
mation and ofthe subject matter. The key to doing so, however, is to look at the comparative
advantages and disadvantages for the government in having the IntelligenceCommunity, as opposed
to some other entity, carry out a particular mission or function.

For example, some specialized collectiontechniques, such as the recruiting and exploiting ofagents
with access to secretinformation, must obviously remain within the purview of intelligence. On the
other hand, what about the possibility ofobtaining information from the proliferation of news media
in the formerly Communist countries? Given the obstacles, such as the scarcity of some relevant
language skills and regional expertise, as well as the technical difficulty of obtaining some of the
publications or receiving someof the broadcasts, there is a case to be made that the government will
not reap the full benefit from such sources if it does not provide for a systematicway of collecting
and exploiting these new sources of information. But, the question is, should this function be
performed withinthe Intelligence Community?
 14 THE FuroRE OF US INrELLIGENCE

In terms of comparative advantage, incorporation within the IC might facilitate the fusion of this
information with secret information, providinggovernment officials with what has sometimes been
called "one-stop shopping" for their information needs. On the other hand, keeping the activity
outside the IC might enable one to make better use ofthe language skills and expertise that exist in
academia or elsewhere in American society and which, for a number or reasons, is nearly impossible
to retain inside ofgovernment.

Similarly, one can foresee the proliferation of commercial services that will provide information of
a type hitherto available only via the IC's technical intelligence systems, such as overhead
reconnaissance. Whether and how the government should make use of such services is another
question ofcomparative advantage, involving questions of cost, flexibility, usability, and releasability
ofinformation, among other things.

One can alsouse this approach in looking at the variousfunctional areas with which national security
(or other governmental) policy deals, and ask what should be the IC's role with respect to them. This
issue has recently come up with respect to the so-called "new issues," such as economic
competitiveness and the envirorunent. In these cases, the role of secret information is much less
important than in the traditional national security area; in addition, the amount of expertise in these
areas available elsewhere in the society is much greater. Thus, assessing comparative advantage
suggests that the IC should have a smallerrole in these issues.

The Role of "InfonnatioD Specialists"

As alreadynoted, the IC is only one source of information for government officials among many; a
great dealofinformation reaches, or, at any rate, is available to, policymakers outside traditional IC
channels. Various changes, boththose in the international political envirorunent and those associated
with the "information revolution," suggest that more such information will be available in the future.
In addition, the complexity of the media via which such information is available is also likely to
increase; as more and more information is available "on line," locating and retrieving it in an efficient
manner may require familiarity with the data sources and search techniques that busy policyrnakers
may neither have nor be readily able to acquire. Although a twelve-year-old with a modem can easily
"surfthe net," locating a specific bit of informationand filtering out the chafffrom the wheat can be
a time-consuming task. All of this suggests that more focused attention should be paid to the
handling of nonintelligence information channelsthat have always been important but which have
operated in an informal and unexamined manner.

',j. " Although the existence and increasing availability of sources of information outside traditional
. intelligence channels present important opportunities for the policyrnaker, they also create some
.. problems:

• how to locate these sources

r • how to evaluate their reliability
_ f
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.... illliiiiiiiillill_ _....i

INTELLIGENCE AND TIlE "INFORMATION AGE" IS

• how to analyze the informationthey provide and fuse it with information available via
intelligence channels
• how to preserve confidentiality with respect to the identity of the issues in which the
policyrnaker is interested

These issues are hardly new. But the key question is whether the changes noted above are of such
magnitude as to require that they be addressed more self-consciously than has been the case in the
past. In particular, do policymakers need "information specialists" to help them sort through the
welter ofsources that the "information age" makes available to them?

Currently, this "infonnation function" is performed in three ways:

• by the policyrnakers themselves

• by their staffs
• by intelligence analysts, either in the policymaker's department or some centralized
entity, like the CIA. (Thus, these analysts are the only "information specialists" in the
executive branch.")

Each of these has certain advantages and disadvantages. Policymakers are, of course, ultimately
responsible for their actions and so have to have confidence that the relevant information has been
received and properly understood. Thus, at least some of the analysis has to be their own.
Furthermore, they may have access to information sources that others do not: high-level
communications with other governments," the thoughts and plans of high-level officials of our own
government and certain key nongovernmental actors (such as business leaders, "gray beards," etc.)
In addition, some policyrnakers will have more extensive experience in the given policy area than
intelligence analysts or staff members (who are likely to be younger.)

On the other hand, policymakers are simplytoo busy to do much information gathering and analysis,
other than reading the newspaper, highly sensitive cables (whose circulation is restricted and hence
cannot be handled by subordinates) and some materials that have been selected and highlighted by
their staff. Inevitably, most oftheir information will reach them in excerpted or analyzed form, either
in briefings or in written summaries. In addition, as committed participants in the policy process, they
may lack the necessary distance to question assumptions or to consider seriously "heretical"
possibilities.

Unlike their bosses, staff members can have the time to gather and analyze much of the necessary
information. Sincethey are also involvedin the policy making process, they should know what issues
are relevant, what kinds of objectives are being sought, and so forth. Except for the most sensitive
items, they will be cognizant of interactions with other governments or other parts of their own
government. In general, they will enjoy the trust of their bosses; however, there may be cases in
which superiors wish to explore issues without their staffs becoming aware of the fact.
16 THE FuTuRE OF US INTELLIGENCE

Nevertheless, staff members are likely to be focused more on policy formation than on information
gathering and analysis; in general, their promotion path would lead to positions with more policy
making responsibility, Accordingly, they may not develop the necessary expertise in the information
area, In any case, these information-related responsibilities will have a lower priority than those
related to policy formation; they will not in general have the time to develop their substantive
knowledge beyond the "intellectual capital" they possessed when they entered on their position,
Furthermore, they typically will have neither access nor expertise relevant to specialized intelligence
sources and methods; thus, they may not be able to fuse the information that reaches them from
intelligence agencies with other information. They may be subject to pressure from their superiors
to ensure that any analyses they produce support policy preferences or decisionsalready taken.

Finally, intelligence analysts are fully focused on the information tasks and are free from direct
responsibility for policy choices. Their career paths remainwithin the information arena, although
it is often the case that an analyst must become a manager of analysts in order to advance
professionally. Not forrnally being a part of the policy process, it may be easier for policymak:ers to
ask themquestions that hint at policy choices that would be too controversial to be discussed more
widely within the policy bureaucracies. Intelligence analysts have access to and familiarity with
specialized intelligence sources and methods, and so are better able to fuse information from these
channels with other information. Finally, they are -- or, at least, should be - trained to evaluate the
possibility that what appears as valid information is in fact the product ofan adversary's deception
effort,

However, the use of intelligence analysts has certain drawbacks, as well. A lack ofclose and direct
knowledge of the government's policy options may make their product less useful than it might
otherwise be, both because it reduces its relevanceand timeliness, and because it can lead an analyst
to underestimate the extent to whichothers' actions are taken in anticipation of, or in response to, the
analyst's own government's policies or activities. In particular, the prevailing "taboo" within
intelligence on analyzing one's own capabilities or strategies may make it difficult for intelligence
analysts to provide an accurate and useful picture of the state of the "balance offorces" between
ourselves and anotherparty, In addition, intelligence analysts may tend, for a number of reasons, to
ignore sources ofinformation outside the usual intelligence channels; this may result, for example,
because such sources maybe more difficult to use (raising greater questions, for example, about their
reliability) or, perhaps, because outsiders may be less willing to cooperate with an intelligence
organizationthan with another government agency.

Another dimension of this question relates to the fact that there are various kinds of processing or
analysis ofinformation that may be necessary,

• Current intelligence, i.e., the rapid dissemination of the most relevant, time-urgent
information. Obviously, in some cases, this must reach the policymakerwith as little delay
as possible, requiring perhaps a special mechanism (e.g., electronic dissemination). While
someanalysis may be necessaryfor context, what may be more important is the opportunity
for policymakers to interact with collectors and analysts to satisfythemselves about the item's
 .1.' iiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiii •

lNrErLlGENCE ANDTIlE "INFORMATION AGE" 17

meaning and reliability. In many cases, however, it should be realized that the Ie cannot, and
should not try to, compete withnewsorganizations suchas CNN in terms ofglobal coverage;
what is required is an ability to provide context or interpretation to news reports.

• Basic intelligence (data base or order of battle information.) This requires specialized
intelligence analysts to compile and maintain information ofthis sort. To some extent, this
may evenbe an intra-intelligence function; that is, the main customers for information ofthis
sort maybe otherintelligence analysts. Such a situation is often regarded as an indication of
an intelligence pathology (the "self-licking ice cream cone") but there are obviously cases (for
example, maintaining the "orders of battle" offoreign armed forces) that are necessary.

• Academic (interpretive) analysis and prediction. This is perhaps the most difficult case; while
certain types of analytic expertise may be required in some cases, it is hard to avoid the
conclusion that, in many instances, the amount of analytic expertise involved is overstated.
In other words, the types of assessments and predictions involved in most intelligence
estimates are the result ofgeneral reasoning of which the policymakerand his staff are more
or lessequally capable. At the highest level, there is a case for having this type ofwork done
in a joint policy-intelligence forum.

• Analysis of opportunities and threats. Intelligence analysts have always been responsible for
providing warning of impending events that could damagenational security interests; it is only
recently, however, that attention has been paid to the question of whether they should be
expected to signal the existence of opportunities that might otherwise be overlooked to
advance them. Since, in both cases, the point is to alert policymakers to events outside the
circle of their routine concerns, it makes sense to have the function reside with intelligence
analysts who are not caught up in the policy making routine. On the other hand, the
usefulness of this information very much depends on the analysts' understanding what
interests the policymakers are concerned to protect or advance; furthermore, the ability of the
policymakers to make use of the information often requires that they understand just what
information intelligence can or is likely to be able to provide.

• "Red teaming," i.e., the analysis ofan adversary's opportunities and possible strategies. This
type of analysis goes beyond what is typical of intelligence analysis, but may be required to
make clear the real implications for policymakers of the intelligence information and
conclusions. It requires both those familiar with the intelligence information as well as
specialists inthe particular area involved. Ad hoc workinggroups, whose members are drawn
from both intelligence and policy communities, would be required.

• Gaming and "net assessment," i.e., analyses that focus on the interaction between one's
capabilities, objectives, and strategies and those ofone's adversaries. This may be the most
comprehensive form ofanalysis for certain questions. It requires equal levels offamiliarity
with "red" and "blue" data, as wellas a willingness to question current conventional wisdom.
It should probably be done "off-line" in in-house or external "think tanks."
18 11mFuTuRE OF US INTELLIGENCE

In brief, as the above discussion suggests, it is possible to distinguish among a number of analytic
products or activities. There is no a priori reason to assume that each of these should be handled in
the same way or by the same people.

Information Dissemination: Technology and Organization

Rapid technological advance in the areas oftelecommunications and information processing is bound
to have major implications for intelligence. Unfortunately, the government is often the last
organization to make use of such opportunities; in addition, legitimate concerns about the security
of information hinder the absorption of commercial telecommunication products and raise costs
substantially. Nevertheless, some progress is being made in exploiting these possibilities.
Technologies such as secure communication, including video conferencing, interactive data bases,
etc., can all be exploited to make the intelligence product more readily and usefuUy available to the
policymaker.

However, the nub of the issue is not technological. The major barriers to be overcome have to do
with bureaucratic organization and institutional "culture." At present, a lot of attention is being paid
within the IC to the question ofhow to make intelligence analysis more relevant to the policymaker.·

Fundamentally, this wiU require readjusting our notion of the relationship between intelligence and
policymaking. Much of the current relationship derives from a concern for "objectivity," i.e., a
concern to reduce the risk that politicalpi efei ences will dictate or contaminate intelligence judgments.
While this is an important consideration, it is by no means unique to the IC. Throughout government,
there are "experts" (economists, natural scientists, etc.) on whose advice policymakers rely;
nevertheless, it has not been thought necessary to bureaucratically separate these experts from the
policymakersthey advise in order to prevent "politicization. ,,9 In any case, direct interaction between
intelligence analyst and policymaker enables the latter to understand what the intelligencejudgment
is based on, how solid it is, what might cause it to change, what kind of unexpected events are
possible, and how much and what kind of warning might be available before they occur.

Similarly, in the military arena, the concern for what is often called intelligence "architecture" deals
with this same question: the problem ofgetting the right piece of intelligence to the right place at the
right time. The pace of modem warfare and the existence of precision weapons have greatly
increased the demands on intelligence and the huge amounts of data involved have placed great
burdens on communications systems. As the difficulties encountered in the Gulf War make clear,
intelligence disseminationcannot be considered an afterthought. Rather, it must be as integral a part
of the planning process as logistics.

Yet, the solution to the problems encountered cannot be simply the expansion of the communications
capacity. Rather, the "intelligence architecture" must consider more carefuUy what kinds of
information will be needed where, and in what degree of detail. New methods, perhaps including the
 •

INTElLIGENCE AND TIIE "INFORMATION AGE" 19

use of artificial intelligence, will have to be adopted to manage the dissemination of intelligence
information so as to get the maximum benefitfrom the available information without overloading the
communications system or, for that matter, the operators themselves.

Conclusion

Throughout the society, new technologies for the processing and transmission of information are
leading to the "reinventing" of organizational structures. Governmental organizations have been
slower to respond for a number of reasons; in addition to normal bureaucratic inertia, there are a
series oflegitimate concerns such as security and the need to maintain accountability. Nevertheless,
the predictable strains on the IC, if only in terms of constrained budgets and expanding requirements,
will force some rethinking.

Drawing on the concept ofan "information age," one can speci1Y at least two sets of issues which will
have to be addressed:

First, the government will need to determine what the "comparative advantage" of the IC is over
other sources ofinformation that are or can be made available to it. In an age when nonintelligence
and nongovernmental sources of information are burgeoning, when the collection and analysis
requirements of policymakers are less easy to define, and when the resources available are likely to
shrink, it is imperative that the scope of the IC's activities be governed by the unique (but limited)
advantages it retains over other sources of information.

Second, greater attention must be paid to making the available flood of information more useful to
the policymaker and the military operator. Technology can obviously facilitate improvements in this
area. However, establishing the right bureaucratic structures and corresponding organizational
cultures are equally, if not more, important.
 IV

ANALYSIS AND ESTIMATES

Analysis, as an element ofintelligence, covers a broad spectrum of activities, from the most technical
type of work, such as telemetry analysis, to the most speculative, such as an assessment of the
political, economic, military, and social development of China over the next decades. Even if one
limits intelligence analysis to traditional security concerns (which many argue should not be done),
it covers a wide range of topics, from foreign orders ofbattle and weapon systems characteristics,
to political developments in foreign countries, to their economic potential, to their communications
infrastructure. It works at a variety of time scales, from seconds or minutes (e.g., warning of the
launch of a ballistic missile) to months or even years (e.g., preparation of a major intelligence
estimate). Some ofits methodsare unique to the Intelligence Community while others resemble those
of journalism or academia. Finally, intelligence analysis represents only one of the sources from
whichpolicymakers obtain the information they require; especially at the more speculative end ofthe
spectrum, it becomesdifficult to draw a clearboundary between analysis and other activities intended
to inform policymakers.

Thus, it is not surprising that it is hard to make general statements about the specific purpose of
analysis, how it should be conducted, what institutional forms are most effective or how mistakes or
failures can be best avoided. Nor is it possible to cover all possible topics related to it. This chapter
attemptsto dealwith a number of issues concerning analysis which have received attention in recent
debates or which, in our judgment, appearto be in particular need of discussion. The chapter begins
withthe question ofthe scope ofanalysis in the post-ColdWar world and then discusses the problems
encowrtered with key "art forms" (current intelligence, indications and warning, and estimates) that
the IC has used to convey its product to the consumer. The conclusion argues that the seemingly
common sense view that sees prediction as the goal of analysisis wrong; ultimately, the purpose of
analysis is to helpthe policymaker shapethe future, not to predict it. In recent years, the articulation
of this point by seniorofficials, including by a CIA Deputy Director of Intelligence, has begun a major
cultural change within parts of the analytic community.

The Scope of Analysis in the Post-Cold War World

A major changethe government faces in the post-ColdWar world is the necessity of dealing in depth
with a muchlarger number ofcountries and transnational issues. For example, what is often required
is information about a society that would enable policymakers to understand how it operates,
especially with respect to those characteristics in which it differs from the Western democratic
societies with which the policymaker is most familiar. This does not necessarily involve secret
information, although human intelligence that reveals what is going on "behind the scenes" among
the country's elite mightbe very useful, especially with respect to countries in which key events at the
top of the political pyramid are not covered by the media and tend to be hidden from public view.
22 THE FuTURE OF US IN'rELLIGENCE

Duringthe Cold War, it took a great deal oftime and effort to do this vis-a-vis the Soviet Union and,
evenby the time of its collapse, we were not as successfu1 inunderstanding its dynamics as we would
have liked. The process required developing specialized techniques and resources (e.g.,
Kremlinology, in support of which the CIA developed a massive biographic data base) and vast
amounts of research. Now, however, our task may be even more difficult, since I) there is greater
uncertainty about which societieswe should devote our efforts to understanding (e.g., few thought
to develop an understanding of the peculiarities of Somali societybefore we suddenly found ourselves
involved there) and 2) some societies with which we have to be concerned (e.g., China, India, and
Japan) are in many respects more "foreign" to us than even the old Soviet Union.

The national security agencies of government need a better understanding of these societies and
should be willing to supportthe necessary research; however, it is not at aU clear that the government,
let alonethe Intelligence Community, must do aU or most of the work. "Area studies" in universities
and in thinktanks may be somewhat less popular and vigorous than they used to be, but government
funding could help; in particular, support for language training in less-studied languages would be
useful. But such area studies need not be limited to academia; indeed, some academic area studies
have been capturedby particular schools of thought that are quite theoretical or ideological, or both.
As an alternative, government could support area studies centers under a variety of auspices, either
governmental (for example, a new entity associated with the State Department) or quasi­
governmental (on the model of the Smithsonian Institution) in the United States or even abroad.
Such centers would be established so as to have sufficientdistance from the policymaking agencies
to preserve their independence and credibility; nevertheless, they would be required to ensure that
their work remained generaUy relevant for policymakers.

This effort is important because the proliferation ofinformation sources does not, by itself, implya
greater degree of understanding offoreign cultures or events. Indeed, many have argued that this
plethora of data may provide a deceptive confidence that one understands matters better than is in
fact the case, and that thereforeobstructs rather than helps the gaining ofan in-depth understanding.

Current InteUigence

Current intelligence stands at the opposite pole, in terms of time urgency, to the type of analysis
discussed above. Changesin telecomnwnicaiions technology make possible improvements in the way
in which this function is performed; for various reasons, these improvements will be demanded by
policymakers and warfighters.

One of these reasons may be called the "CNN effect": as news is disseminated to the public more
quickly, government officials feel impelledto react to it more quickly, as well, At a minimum, they
will not want to be surprised by a reporter's request to comment on events about which they do not
yet know. Thisposes a dilemma for the IC: it is not really equipped, in terms ofglobal coverage and
instantaneous reporting, to compete with the news media and, more important, it is not clear why it
is in the national interest for it to try. On the other hand, the IC runs the risk of provoking its
 ANALYSIS AND ESTIMAlES 23

consumers' dissatisfaction if it gets "scooped" by CNN or has to admit that it doesn't have any
information on the latest hot story.

The IC's comparative advantage in this area would seem to be its ability to 1) comment on the current
reporting as it is received, placing it in context and assessing the reliability of the initial reports, and
2) target collection assets to collect additional information to round out (or contradict) the picture
conveyed by the news media. However, neither of these functions can be done instantaneously;
during the interim, the news report will be the only game in town.

To reduce this gap to a minimum would probably require that the IC expand the operations centers
it currently possesses with this task in mind. In particular, analysts would have to monitor, on a
continuing basis, incoming news reporting, including most, if not all, of the world's wire services, in
addition to intelligence and other government traffic. Quicker methods of disseminating information
to policymakers, which are already under development, would also be necessary. Again, it is far from
clear whether this is a wise use of IC resources; nevertheless, the desire of policymakers for up-to­
the-minute information, and their fear of being caught unaware, may push intelligence in this
direction.

During a crisis or war, this demand for current intelligence is of course intensified. Furthermore, the
changes in warfare that go under the general rubric of the "Revolution in Military Affairs" (RMA)
imply a much greater need for current intelligence, especially ofthe sort that is supplied by what are
called "national" systems. In particular, the use of space for the collection oftaetica1 intelligence
implies the need for more complex intelligence "architectures" that can get information to the field
in "real time. "

In the Gulf War, some systems (e.g., ballistic missile launch warnings) were improvised. More
generally, the requirement to use information from national systems in support ofwarfighters will
mean, among other things, that analysis must be accelerated -- and automated when and where
possible - as well as integrated more closely into the collection and dissemination process. This will
imply a willingness to be flexible with respect to institutional arrangements in order to reduce
timeliness as much as possible.

Surprise, Warning, and Opportunity

During the Cold War, US intelligence -- fearing a nuclear Pearl Harbor -- fashioned an extensive
indications and warning (J&W) system and methodology. With the demise of the Soviet Union, this
concern has become less of an intelligence priority. Nevertheless, although the relative significance
ofbeing "surprised" has decreased, the general uncertainty of the international environment portends
a greater likelihood that US policymakers will face and have to concern themselves with unexpected
events and situations.
 24 THE FuTuRE OF US INTELLIGENCE

Although everyone recognizes that intelligence exists to serve policy, discussions of "surprise" or
"intelligencefailure" often proceed in isolation from consideration ofthe policies that were or were
not adopted, or the actions that were or were not taken. Perhaps because so many participants in the
debate are academics, it sometimes sounds as if one were grading an examination: intelligence gets
an K with respect to question one, but only a·C on question two. One result of this can be
arguments about whether intelligence did in fact "warn" of a certain event: that is, whose fault is it
that we were surprised?

Whatever value this score keeping may have bureaucratically, it obscures what should be the real
issue in intelligencereform: i.e., how to ensure that the operational steps taken are appropriate to the
situation. For example, if the question is one of"surprise attack," then the measure of effectiveness
should be not "Were we surprised?" but "Were we at the appropriate level ofreadiness?" In case of
a "surprise attack," it is better to be subjectively surprised but at a high level of readiness, than to be
effectively unready, even though expecting the attack.

Although to discuss this fully would force one to deal with issues that go beyond intelligence, it is
important to keep this context in mind. Ultimately, one must look at the intelligence and
policy/operations sides of the equation at the same time.

It is often stated in the literature dealing with this subject that intelligence provided the warning, but
that the policymakers did not heed it; the implicationis that the former did their job wen, but the latter
did not. While this may be the case at times, one has to look more closely at the intelligence
component to determine whether the warning was provided in an appropriate way. For example, one
can hardly be satisfied with a warning of a portentous event that is provided in a vague or obscure
manner.

More fundamentaUy, one has to ask whether the intelligence warning carries the necessary credibility
or persuasiveness. Although the policymaker might simply refuse to listen to or heed advice that
should have been convincing, it may also be the case that intelligence bears some responsibility for
the warning's lack of credibility. Hence, intelligence analysts have to build credibility by the quality
ofthe product. This involves making clear what the evidence is, laying out the reasoning clearly and,
above all, being open about what is speculation and what is hard fact. While classification problems
may make this difficult, it is nonetheless essential for credibility. Briefings and other forms of
personal contact may be more effective in this regard, since they aUow the policymak:er to question
the analyst at greater length on any part ofthe analysis that initiaUystrikes him as unpersuasive."

Finally, it is not enough just to convey a warning with a given degree of probability; the policymak:er
must understand not only what the assessment is now, but also what kind of indications he or she can
.' >;~
expect to receive in the future if the event being warned of should come to pass. For example, if
intelligence warns that there is a likelihood of a coup d'etat in country X, then it is important that the
policymaker understand that he is unlikely to receive any further, less ambiguous, short-term warning
of it. Any preparations have to be made with that in mind.
 ANALYSIS AND ESTIMA1ES 25

Ultimately, policies/precautions taken with respect to a warning have to be consistent with the
probabilitythat a warning will be issued; how ambiguous or unambiguous that warning will be; and
when, relative to the event itself; it is likely to be issued. This point is, of course, obvious; however,
the discussions of surprise tend to obscure it, since they focus solely on the question of whether a
warning was issued.

Similarconsiderations apply to the question of whether policymakers missed an opportunity to take

some advantageous action because the intelligence analysis that would have supported it was lacking
or incorrect. Although this is logically similar to the case of surprise, it tends not to be treated that
way in the literature; while intelligence analysts are supposed to be able to identify an adverse event
of which policymakers should be wamed (even if they didn't ask about it), the same has not, in the
past, been the case for opportunities.

Recently, however, this has begun to change, and more attention has been paid to "opportunities
analysis. "In this construct, analysts are supposed to alert policymakers to opportunities, as well as
dangers, that exist in a given situation. This would require, among other things, that analysts be
sufficiently close to the policy process to understand policy objectives. As noted below, in the
discussion of estimates, this could be accomplished by closer contacts or by the creation of joint
policy-intelligence working groups on specific topics.

Estimates

Traditionally, we use the term "estimate" to refer to the most prestigious, most authoritative, most
comprehensive, most fully "processed" product of the IC. It is often considered the "peak" of the
analytic element of intelligence. It seeks nothing less than to explain some particular situation of
importance to policymakers,analyzing all the relevant dimensions, assessing the forces at work, and
providing some judgment or forecast as to how the situation will evolve. Typically, its purpose is
stated to be assisting the policymakerswho must deal with that situation to do so in the most effective
manner possible.

Certain desiderata of an estimate are easy to state and need not be dwelled upon at great length:

• It should be based on all availablerelevant data, whether that data comes from open sources,
is collected via intelligence channels, or is acquired through other nonpublic means (e.g.,
diplomatic contacts or law enforcement activity.)

• It should be "objective" in the sense that conclusions are not altered to promote a given policy
or to serve the political or bureaucratic interests of the consumers of the estimate or, for that
matter, its producers.
 26 THE FunlRE OF US INTELLIGENCE
. i
These desiderata havebeenadduced as the reasons whythere should be a central intelligence agency,
although, strictly speaking, such an arrangement is neither necessary nor sufficient with respect to
either of them.

The first desideratum implies that the preparers of the estimate have access to "all source"
intelligence. Although this might be achieved if they work for a "central" agency or director, it can
also be accomplished by means of a requirement and mechanism to share information among
departmental intelligence agencies. 11

The second is often taken to imply that the estimators should work in an organization that is
"independent" ofthe polieymakers, (Of course, this is, literally speaking, impossible: an intelligence
agency must work for someone, if only the president.) The concern is that estimators who work for
a policymaking department (e.g., State or Defense) wouldfeel pressure to bias their estimates in order
to support the position of their superiors.

To be completely consistent, this defense of an "independent" (i.e., dependent only on the president)
intelligence agency would have to argue that the president, unlike his SUbordinates, will have no
interest in "cooking the books." However, it would appear that this would be true only if the
estimators communicated with the president on a totally confidential basis; the president has no
rational motive for wishing to alter an estimatethat is unfavorable to his policyprovided that others
(and, in particular, political opponents) will not see it and hence will not be able to use it against him.
Withrespect to written estimates, however, this is essentially impossible; even if the president were
to take the extraordinary step ofwithholding an "unfavorable" estimate from cabinet members (who
might try to alter or undermine the president's position by leakingit), the current understanding of
congressional oversight implies that the intelligence committees cannot be so denied.

Furthercomplicating the issue ofobjectivity is the possibility that an organizationwill develop its own
set of bureaucratic interests independently of those ofits boss. For example, during the 1950sand
1960s, the CIA had an interest in arguing that estimates of Soviet military strength by intelligence
agencies within the Department of Defense (military serviceintelligence, and, after 1961, the DIA)
were overstated, since that helpedjustify its acquisition of an independent analytic capability in that
area. Moreover, once an organization has staked out a position, it acquires an interest in defending
that view, as a matter of professional reputation, if nothing else.

Thus, while objectivity remains a desideratum, it is unfortunately the case that no institutional
arrangement can guarantee it. Given that every intelligence agency has to work for somebody, one
palliative that seems particularly useful is competitive analysis, i.e., a system by which various analytic
centers, working for different bosses, develop their own views on the same topics; if nothing else, the
resulting debateshould (1) makeit more difficult for agenciesto "cook" their assessments in a facile
fashion, (2) sharpen everyone's thinking, and (3) alert policymakers to the range of possibilities.

Another important safeguard is to insist on greater rigor and lucidityin the handling of the evidence
and inthe presenting ofinferences and judgments. The more transparent the chain of reasoning, the

L:'
 ANALYSIS AND ESTlMAlES 27
harder it should be for unacknowledged biases to affect the conclusions. This also facilitates
competitive analysis, since it should be easier to test the various analysesagainst each other when the
evidence and reasoning are more clearly exposed.

These desiderata, however, do not take us very far in defining what an estimate is and how it should
be written. In the short description given above, the elementthat raises the most difficult questions
is that relating to forecasting. In general, it has often been thought that estimates should offer predic­
tions about how the situation will evolve; however, there is probably less and less support among
social scientists for the notion that such predictions are possible. Furthermore, this produces a
dilemma: for many, ifnot most, situations of interest to policymakers, their future evolution will be
determinedto a large extent by what the United States does with respect to them.P

In theory, one could imagine that an estimate would get around this difficulty by offering a set of
conditional predictions ofthe form: ifthe US does Xl> then Y1 will occur, if'X, then Y z, and so forth.
However, this implies that the range of policy options is already obvious. Although what the main
alternatives are may be relatively clear, they can typically be implemented in many different ways;
indeed, it maybe that the task ofdetermining how to implement a given policy is precisely what most
requires the fine-grained analysis of the forces at work that the estimate can provide.

A similar issuearises with respect to the question of which aspects of a situation should be considered
in greatest detail in preparing an estimate. Although all "objectively" relevant aspects must be
considered, greatestattention should be paid to those that are more amenable to policy influence; but
the choice of aspects to try to influence is itselfa policydecision. For example, an estimate on the
subject of international terrorism should ofcoursediscuss the basicpolitical and psychological causes;
however, greater attention should be paid, for example, to the sources of financial and logistical
supportfor international terrorist groups, since this aspect of the situation may be more amenable to
influence by US policy. But the decision as to which sources of support should be investigated in
detail depends in part on the policy decision as to which countries or groups the US should try to
pressure.

Thus, the estimative process must be an interactive one between the intelligence and policy
communities; the old "Sherman Kent" model in which intelligence provides input to the policy process
from afar appears too simplistic. Indeed, one might question whetherestimation should be considered
an "intelligence" function at all; would it not make more sense to view it as more explicitly a part of
the policy process?

This may appear to be a merely semantic matter of no particular importance; nevertheless, important
consequences -- political, bureaucratic, and intellectual -- could result.

• The executive branch would be better able to keep the estimates confidential. As internal
deliberative documents, theywould not routinely have to be made available to Congress, nor
would they be affected by the DCI's responsibility to keep Congress "fully and currently
informed" of intelligence matters. Thus, it mightbe possible for them to deal more frankly
28 THE FuTuRE OF US INTELLIGENCE

with lines of analysis that undercut current policies or that might suggest adopting contro­
versial alternativesto them.

• The process of preparing estimates could be accelerated by relaxing some of the onerous
bureaucratic requirements that derive from the necessityofIC-wide coordination of drafts.
Some of the "watering down" that occurs in the attempt to reach a common text would be
avoided, and policymakers would become more aware ofthe significant differencesofview
amonganalysts on the key questions. On the other hand, the useful part ofthe coordination
process- forcing the various analyses to confront each other, thereby clarifying the bases on
which the differentjudgmentsare reached -- should be retained.

• The process could make use of expertise found outside the IC, in other parts of the
government or even outside it.

• Estimates could, where appropriate, more fully consider US capabilities and options. This
would avoid the problem faced, for example, in 1978 when estimators tried to assess the
chances that the Shahof Iran would remain in power, without fully considering the question
ofwhat the US would or would not do to help him, which was arguablythe most important
variable. In particular, this fonnat would highlight the importance of makingthe estimators
aware of what the US might be doing covertly with respect to the given situation, and of
taking that into account.

• Estimates could make use of new formats or methods, e.g., "net assessment" (the explicit
comparison of US and adversary capabilities and strategies, and the trends in the relationship
between them) or "red teaming" (the development of strategies that might be used by an
adversary to thwart US achievement ofits objectives.)

• Finally, this procedure would openly admit that estimates involvea great deal of speculative
judgment andhencecannot be reduced to a matter of technical, nonpolitical expertise (as can,
for example, telemetry analysis). Intelligence analysts may have certain advantages in this
regard, but their analytic superiority over others is not necessarily compelling; other forms of
expertise may be equa1ly useful. In particular, this would avoid the perception that the
rejection ofan estimative judgment is necessarily an irrational act, akin to, if not "killing the
messenger" who brings badnews, at leastignoring him. Rather, it would make it clearer that
most estimativejudgments are sufficiently speculative that reasonable men may disagree with
respect to them. By separating out the specu1ative judgments from the "hard facts," the
respect accorded to the latter would be increased.

As currently configured, however, estimates performanother function which should be kept in mind.
Being the most authoritative and coordinated IC judgments, they require, in their preparation, that
the divergent views within the IC be assessed, tested against one another, etc. Hopefully, in this
process, inconvenient facts are confronted, reasoning is strengthened and tightened, gaps in the
available data are highlighted, the precise points on which the differences of opinion turn are made
 ANALYSIS ANDESTIMA1ES 29

clear, and so forth; in other words, the process can encouragea certain intellectual rigor, and can help
ensurethat all available information is broughtto the table and is incorporated in the finaljudgments.
Thusthe process offorcing the different parts of the IC to try to reach a common position can be an
intellectually useful one.

In addition, the requirement to produce estimates forces the IC to maintain a knowledge base and
expertise with respect to a given situation; the periodic consolidation of that knowledge in the
estimate may be viewed as a kind of audit which indicates where the knowledge base is adequate and
where it is lacking. 'This is of value to the government in the long run, even if there is no immediate
"market" for the estimate.

Conclusion

Comparedwith the earlyyears ofthe Cold War, commentators on intelligence analysis have become
much more circumspect about what it can be expected to achieve. Most now agree with Richard
Betts's 1978 article which asserted that intelligence failures and surprises are inevitable." During the
19805, many academic students of intelligence questioned whether prediction can reasonably be put
forward as the goal ofintelligence analysis, and in the I990s this view has been put forward by senior
intelligence officialsand policyrnakers as well."

Although Betts is surely right that perfection is unattainable in intelligence matters, that ofcourse
does not excuse us from striving to make whatever improvements are possible. Although every
institutional solution may be shown to be insufficient, that does not mean that they are equally so.
Rather, one must try to diagnose the most common ailments to which the IC is subject and devise
remedies for them, even if the remedies themselves, as Betts argues, may create difficulties oftheir
own. If a mend's characteristic fault is to be impetuous, it is reasonable to tell him to look before he
leaps, even though proverbial wisdom also tells us that he who hesitates is lost.

For example, to the extent that American intelligence analysis suffers from a tendency to defer to the
"conventional wisdom," then competitive analysis (to focus on one possible mechanism), which
enables differing views to surface and be supported at a high level (as opposed to be suffocated at a
lowerlevel in the hierarchy), is a worthwhile antidote. Of course, such a procedure may give more
weightthan is due to eccentric opinions. As discussed above, one's final decision would depend on
whether one regarded conformity or eccentricity as the more characteristic fault."

Similarly, to the extent that "mirror imaging" - the tendency to believe that members of other cultures
and political societies will behave in the same way that we would were we in their shoes -- is a
characteristic flaw of our intelligence analysis, area studies that immerse one in a foreign language,
culture, and history can be an antidote. The opposing danger here is the belief, which area experts
sometimes fall into, that those whose culture they are studying are somehow prisoners of their
environment who cannot adapt to changed circumstances." Again, the issue is, which is the more
30 THE Fu11JRE OF US INTELLIGENCE

likely American failing: overemphasizing the similarities or the differences among individuals of
various cultures?

The abandonment ofprediction as the standard of analysis -- as set forth by some senior intelligence
officials - marks a major shift, and its implications have yet to be fully developed. In a recent essay,
former Deputy Director of Intelligence Douglas MacEachin explored some of the possible
implications of how this shift might be conducted and judged. Key among them were 1) making the
contnbution of the "needs of the user -- the policymaker ... the measure of performance" employed
by managers within the Intelligence Commwlity; 2) emphasizing "facts" over analytic "opinions"; and
3) making more transparent the "linchpin" assumptions and factors "that are likely to govern the
outcome of dynamic situations." MacEachin highlighted the inappropriateness of using prediction
as the standard of analytic excellence by comparing it to a scout who, having been sent out by a
football coach to observe next week's opponent, reported to his boss, "you're going to lose." ClearlY'1
the coach did not want a prediction; he wanted an assessment of the strengths and weakness of the
opposing players and coaches. Combined with his knowledge of his own players and his familiarity
with the game, that information would enable him to develop a game plan that increased his team's
chance of success."
 v

HUMAN INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION

Implications for Humint in the Post-Cold War International Environment

For well-known reasons, the Soviet Union, especially in the early years of the Cold War, was a
particularly difficult target for humanintelligence operations. Despite notable successes,,. we had
to tum to technical intelligence collection methods to assure reliable coverage of key Soviet strategic
developments. In addition, the nature of the Soviet target encouraged reliance on official cover,
because both I) operating in the Soviet Unionwithoutembassy fiJcilities and diplomatic immunity was
difficult and risky, and 2) operations in third countries were often targeted against the official Soviet
representatives stationed in that country, access to whom could be best obtained by placing our own
officers in diplomatic positions.

Present conditions are far different. Many high-priority targets present a much more permissive
environment for humint collection. Although Stalinist states like North Korea still exist, regimes in
which we havesome current interest are morelikely to be weak or failed regimes. For most of these
stateswhosemilitary capabilities are ofa limited nature, US policymakers are more concerned with
the intentions of a small number of'leaders than with a precise accounting oftheir military arsenal.
These intentionsare often to be obtained through clandestine human collection.

In addition, the US military has been involved in a numberofwhat are now called "operations other
than war" (DDTW) such as the restoration of President Aristide to power in Haiti. Under the
circumstances, it becomes important to collect on political, social, economic, and military
developments in these theaters of operation; again, compared to those encountered in the former
SovietUnion, the obstacles to humint collectionin these cases are relatively small. Not only could
humint yield military data more quickly than technical collection methods would," but it might be the
only way to collect vital information on political attitudes and intentionswithin the elites.

Another category of targets of increasing interest deals with the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction (WMD). While in one important case (North Korea), this type oftarget resembles the
old Soviet Unionin its hardnessj" more typically this is not the case. Most ofthese countries (such
as Iran and Iraq) are dependent on the rest of the world, primarily the Western industrialized
countries, for key imports for their WMD programs, for education for their future scientists and
technicians, and for keeping abreast of relevant scientific developments. These contacts create
avenues of access for human intelligence collection.

In addition, "proliferation of WMD" should probably be regarded as only a special - albeit very
important - caseofthe more general phenomenon of the proliferation of advanced weapons systems.
In most cases, the countries againstwhich we might take military action are importers, rather than
32 THE FuTuRE OF US IN'rEUIGENCE

producers, of sophisticated weapons systems; this may provide humint access for tracking this
weapons flow and discovering key characteristics of the resulting enemy order of battle.

Finally, there are a series ofissues, such as counterterrorism, counternarcotics, and the fight against
transnational organized crime, that straddle.the linebetween intelligence and law enforcement. An
intelligence (as opposed toa law enforcement) perspective" is required in these areas for several
reasons: I) one must try tb prevent the criminal activity from taking place rather than rely on the
deterrent effect of identifying the perpetrators afterwards; 2) one must understand the structure of
the organizations involved in order to prevent the crimina1 activity from occurring, or to identify those
responsible for it; and 3) penetrating the organization is one of the most effective methods of
countering the activity. Although these organizations may have an established infrastructure
(buildings, communications, etc.) to target, human intelligence is nevertheless required to collect
against them effectively; in addition, oncein place, agents maybe tasked to counter the organization's
activities directly (e.g., by neutra1izing explosive devices).

The considerations noted do not, however, determine whether this type of collection activity should
be the responsibility ofthe Directorate ofOperations or oflaw enforcement agencies such as the FBI
or DEA On one hand, the DO is already set up to operate outside the United States. On the other,
there are advantages in law enforcement agencieshaving their own agents abroad. For example, the
fact that some ofthe information collected may eventually have to be used in criminal prosecutions
suggests that law enforcement agencies, whose procedures already recognize this issue, may be
preferable.f

Overt Humint

The magnitude ofthese changes, especially those in the former Communist countries, has suggested
to somethat overt humint can replace traditional espionage. Indeed, much more information can be
collected overtly by diplomats, and military and other attaches, and it would be foolish not to try to
exploit these means as much as possible, The National Humint Requirements Tasking Center, under
the CIA's DeputyDirectorfor Operations, has been established to coordinate overt and covert humint
collection and to ensure that, where possible, overt collection is used. In addition, businessmen,
scholars, jouma1ists, and other private citizens are in a position to learn about the areas to which they
travel and in which they maylive for extended periods, although many would be hesitant to cooperate
with an intelligence organization.

Despite these opportunities, overt collection cannot totally supplant clandestinehuman intelligence
collection. Governments and other target groups will still strive to keep key bits of information,
especially operational details, secret, and will become suspicious of anyone who asks too many
questions. Thus, the traditional techniques of espionage will remain necessary.
 , .

HUMAN INTELLIGENCE COILECTION 33

Defense Humint

In the aftermath of the Gulf War, there were complaints that the CIA had not been sufficiently
supportive ofthe military effort, One result was the creation of a new position, -- Assistant Deputy
Director ofOperations for Military AffiIirs (ADDOIMA) -- who was to be responsible for facilitating
DO efforts on behalf of deployed forces."

Another response has been an attempt to re-invigorate human intelligence collection within the
Department ofDefense (DoD). This involved creating a Defense Humint Service (DHS) and giving
the DIA Director centralized control over all DoD humint activities, including the overt collection
activities of the defense attaches, and all Defense Department covert collection operations; "for the
first time, the DIA Director has the authority, and not just the responsibility, to truly be the DoD
HUMINT manager.... "24 Thus, the DIA is poised to become a more important factor in human
intelligence collection, alongside the CIA, somewhat along the lines of the GRUIKGB model. Ifwe
assume clandestine humint is going to be relatively more important in the future, then there is clearly
an advantage in having both the CIA and the DIA in the field. In addition, the existence of two
agencies will probably complicate adversaries' counterintelligence efforts, just as the existence of two
Soviet human intelligence collection capabilities, in the KGB and the GRU, made our
counterintelligence problem more difficult.

Military humint, which in the recent past has been dominated by the army, has generally been
conducted out ofmi1itary "bases" in safe areas, such as the former West Germany, South Korea, and
in Panama. This obviously limited access to sources. Since defense attaches were normally not
engaged in clandestine collection, little activity was conducted out of embassies. As a result, the CIA
had effectively the sole opportunity to recruit senior military officers or other high officials with
access to military information. The new Defense Humint Service gives DoD an opportunity to
recruit these types of agents directly, using, among other resources, its attaches and liaison officers.

The DHS may be particularly useful in OOTWs, in which human intelligence collection against
governmental targets, militias and other irregular military units, political groups and their economic
activity may be required. According to a DIA statement to Defense Week, the DHS was used in
direct support ofthe intervention in Haiti. 21

The House ofRepresentatives Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) has concluded
that "the basic organizational and operational concept behind the DHS appears sound,... ,,26
Nevertheless, there are at least two major issues to be resolved; the ultimate worth of the effort will
depend on how well they can be handled.

First, how professional will the new Defense effort be? Traditionally, the military services have had
only a marginal interest in supporting intelligence careers; now, they are expected to support
intelligence professionals who will be responsible to joint or civilian (i.e., not service) authority. I"'.,,,'

While, in the Goldwater-Nichols era, joint assignments have increased in prestige, it will still take a I
great deal ofeffort to ensure that there is sufficient attention given to training and career development
34 THE FuruRE OF US INTELLIGENCE

in this area. In addition, the military's record with respect to counterintelligence is, like the CIA's,
uneven. As a relatively new entity, however, maybe the DRS will be more receptive to the need to
address CI considerations.

Second, how will the division of labor between the DRS and the DO be managed? In general, the
DRS has been asked to focus on the needs of the theater commander while the CIA deals with
national/strategic targets, Nevertheless, it would probably be a mistake to insist on too hard and fast
a division. With its larger size and broader coverage, the CIA should be able to provide valuable
military information as it has at times in the past. However, while recent initiatives to improve the
CIA's support to the military are useful, this does not obviate the need for a military humint
capability: it is still the case that a largely civilian organization will not, over the long term, be likely
to remain focused on the gathering ofmilitary intelligence in support of a theater commander.

Similarly, the DRS may, through its military targets, often be able to provide high-level political and
strategic intelligence (particularly with respect to those countries in which the military often
intervenes in political matters). While this type of flexibility will impose greater coordination
requirements on the two agencies, it seems worthwhile in terms of possible increased yield as well
as the complication of the adversary's counterintelligence problem. The difficulty will be to ensure
the necessary coordination between the DHS and the DO, without subordinating the former to the
latter to such an extent that the benefits of having two separate organizations are lost.

Finally, it will be necessary to compensate for the weak bureaucratic position of an organization like
the DRS, which is likely to be resented as an interloper by both the DO and the military service
intelligence agencies.

Tasking

With respect to the tasking of collection, humint suffers from major drawbacks as compared to, for
example, overhead (space-based) photography. In the latter case, orbits can be calculated and
weather predictions made; as a result, one can say that there is an X percent chance that one will have
access to a given point on the surface of the earth at a given time." The prospects for human
intelligence collection are not calculable in the same way; even when one is able to identify precisely
which foreign government files contain the required information, one can have no assurance that one
will be able to recruit an agent" from the perhaps small group of people who have access to it.

Furthermore, it is often difficult to know, even in general terms, where one should be looking. This
problem has probably worsened due to the end of the Cold War. Organizations such as the Soviet
KGB, GRU, Strategic Rocket Forces, or military design bureaus were obvious, although hard,
targets. As already noted, today it is not clear even which countries will be of the greatest interest
for human intelligencecollection purposes. Even after one has assigned a high priority to a problem
area, for example, Iranian acquisition of WMD and other advanced weapon capabilities, it is not
obvious which are the best targets for human intelligence collection. One may not know which
 HUMAN INIELLIGENCE COLLECTION 35

organizations in Iran are responsible for what functions; beyond that, one would have to balancethe
difficulty of penetrating the relevant organizations against the usefulness of alternative approaches,
e.g., the penetration of suppliers or middlemen. Finally, once one has penetrated a relevant target,
one still has the task ofinstructing one's agent on what he should be looking for: certain types of
electronic equipment may be very important, while related types are essentially uninteresting.

In short, we can think of the human intelligence tasking process as comprising three levels:

• identifying and prioritizing issues, problemsand/or areas of concern;

• determining how to approach those issues(i.e., which targets to penetrate); and
• tasking the penetrations with respect to the specific pieces ofinformationrequired.

Throughout this tasking process, there must be an interchangewith policymakers and analysts. At
the most general level (that of identifying the issues), the policymakers must be involved, although
the traditional model accordingto which the policymakers promulgate requirements which are then
transmitted to the collectors is probably too simplistic. Even at this stage, some amount of interaction
is probably necessary among policymakers, analysts, and collectors. For example, given current
policy, one might try to determinewhat circumstances are likelyto lead us to engage in an OOTW,
at which point analysis might give some indication ofwhere those circumstancesare likely to exist.
Of course, this type of prediction would be very uncertain, and it would be a policy decision to
determine how many resources should be devoted to hedging against various possibilities.

As a consequence, consideration must be given to creating a "surge" humint capacity. In some ways,
this is paradoxical, even impossible, Humint collection generaUy depends on the long-term cultivation
ofhwnan contactswith access to the specific information required; an officer or agent with good ties
to the elite of one country cannot be simply "refocused" on another. Nevertheless, some types of
"non-official cover"officers (NOCs) maybe exploitable in this manner. For example, a businessman
might develop contactsin several countries in a region inthe course ofhis ordinary activity; this might
facilitate operations in anyone of them that might suddenly become "hot." Similarly, a Vienna-based
dealer in electronic equipment or chemicals might gain access to a large circle of businessmen who
might be engaged in sensitive and often illicit transactions. A Bahamas-based "offshore" bank,
established as a proprietary, could attract all sorts of business that would be ofintelligence interest.

On the other hand, although Haiti was by no means a "denied area," we would not have had, prior
to 1991, sufficient interest in it to haveinvested significant resources in developing a stable of agents.
1lJus, it would haverequired a "surge capability" of some sort to be able to focus collection quickly
once Haiti became an important target.

At the next level (determining the approach) preliminary analysis is often very useful. Using the
Iranian example, one would need some description of the weapons acquisition process in order to
identify the various targets and assess which were likelyto be the most fiuitful. (At this stage, one
would also try to assess the relative usefulness of the various collection disciplines; this paper,
however, addresses only humint.) The tendency in recent years to bring together DO officers and
 36 THE Fu1URE OF US lNrELLIGENCE

Directorate of Intelligence (DI) analysts in various "centers," such as the Non-Proliferation Center
(NPC) is motivated in part by this requirement. Along the same lines, consideration is being given
to the establishment of various othertypes of "partnerships" between DO collectors and DI analysts.

The third level (tasking the collection of specific pieces of information) will require the greatest
amountof interaction betweenpolicymakers and analysts, on one hand, and collectors, on the other.
In technical areas, such as WMD proliferation, the indicators of sensitive activity may be quite
specific: is Iran trying to acquire a particular type of electronic device or a specific chemical? In
general, targeting this type of information will require a high degree of cooperation, in the "centers,"
between analysts and collectors. Similarly, in crises, policymakers may request relatively specific
typesofinformation; in particular, the significance ofany given piece ofinformation may depend on
what US policy is; e.g., whether or not there is any indication of an adversary's taking action to
oppose a planned US military move.

In general, the management ofhumint collection will become a more difficult job, requiring a greater
sophistication on the part ofthe managers and greater flexibility in designing the types of structures,
suchas the new centers, that will facilitate interactionamong collectors, analysts, and policymakers.
But it will also require a more broad-gauge review of government information needs, intelligence
requirements, and an assessment ofhumint's advantages and drawbacks with respect to meeting them.

Although policymakers at the NSC-Ievel must be engaged in this process, it is unrealistic to expect
that they will be able to provide very clear priorities. Attempts to do so are likely to result in alI­
inclusive "laundry lists" of intelligence requirements; in any case, policymakers are likely to be
reluctant to state explicitly that they do not require information on a given subject, lest they look
foolish should the next year's crisis involve precisely that country or issue.

Thus, it will ultimately be up to the DCI to formulate overall priorities in a way that can help the DO
and the Defense Humint Service to orient themselves to the new environment. This is probably
crucial in helping guide human intelligence operations as they confront a whole series of questions
concerning such questions as official vs. non-official cover, recruitment strategies, career patterns,
and so on.

"Delta Delta Omega"

Perhaps the most vexing problems currently facing the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) are
those connected with the management of the CIA's Directorate ofOperations (DO). The problems
are well known: from the Ames case, to the lawsuit brought by a group offemale DO officers, to the
I
Guatemala issue, the DO has been buffeted by an unusual amount of turmoil. According to press
reports, these problems havetakenan enormous toll on the morale ofthe DO,29 and DCI John Deutch
has said that it needs "a new generation ofleaders. ,,30
 HUMAN lNTEILIGENCE COLLECTION 37

In a speech on July 18, 1994, former DCI James Woolsey said that the DO cannot "function as a
fraternity ... whereby once you are initiated, you're considered a trusted member for life." Indeed,
the DO is the type of organization that is vulnerable to this kind of problem: elite, secretive, and
requiring on the part ofits members high esprit de corps and a willingness to face danger. They are
necessarily engaged in deceiving many ofthose with whom they come in day-to-day contact and, even
with their fellow citizens (including mends and family members), they must practice a pervasive
secrecy about who they are and what they do that does not come naturally to us. At the same time,
they rely on each other and must be able to trust each other. It is not surprising they come to see the
world as sharply divided between "them" (whom one must deceive, or, at any rate, keep in the dark)
and "us" (who must be seen as thoroughly trustworthy).

Such an organization easily develops an internal sense ofwhat is acceptable and what is not that may
not correspond with the rules as they exist on the books; failings shared by otherwise highly regarded
members of the group soon come to be tolerated, and no longer seriously regarded as failings."

But DCI John Deutch has suggested that the DO's problems go beyond these issues of personnel
management and of dealing with "insiders" and "outsiders." His report to Congress concerning
SovietlRussian double agent operations against the United States (faci1itated by Ames's treachery)
indicates that core professional standards were not upheld by senior officials over a protracted period
of time.

According to Deutch, a damage assessment concluded that

consumers of intelligence were not informed that some of the most sensitive human
intelligence reporting they received came from agents known or suspected at the time to be
under the control ofthe KGB, and later the SVR [the Russian foreign intelligence service].
This finding was substantiated by a detailed audit done by the CIA's Inspector General."
(emphasis added)

A rationale for this behavior was provided by a former CIA official who was interviewed by the
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. According to the Committee,

This former CIA official conceded that he knew intelligence data came from Soviet controlled
sources and that he disseminated such data to the highest levels of our government without
disclosing the fact that it came from controlled sources. Among his reasons for why he
believed that he had acted entirely properly was that he believed the information being
provided was true and that disclosure of the controlled source would have made it harder to
"sell" the intelligence to policymakers."

In other words, this official was willing to mislead policymakers about the reliability of the
information provided; he was willing to deceive them into thinking that a conclusion he had reached
based on other evidence had come "from the horse's mouth," i.e., from a human intelligence agent
with direct access to the information.
38 THE FuTuRE OF US lNTELLIGENCE

Another swprising lapseofprofessionalism involved the failure of the DO to keep adequate records;
the damage assessment team discovered that it was impossible to determine which sources certain
reports had come from, and hence whether they shouldbe regarded as tainted."

In general, it appears the DO, for understandable but ultimately insufficient reasons, has difficulty
adjusting to non-DO leadership and difficulty in fuUy trusting authorities from outside the DO's
ranks." This is likely to mean that it will be difficult for outside leadership to bring about changes
in the way in which the DO operates," But a determined DCI, in team with a DO aware of the need
for change, couldmakewhatever adjustments are necessary to address both the concerns of the new
security environment and standing problems. These adjustments are likely to include I) the fielding
of more NOCs, 2) recruiting of older individuals with varied backgrounds, especially for NOC
positions, 3) recruiting ofindividuals with varied linguistic and cultural backgrounds, 4) trainingin
new subjects, 5) closer cooperation with the analytic community, and 6) an increased wiUingness to
integrate counterintelligence concernsin DO operations.

Conclusion

The new environment, far from making human intelligence coUection obsolete, in fact opens up new
opportunities for it to contribute to national security. Key issues will be determining the longer-term
priorities in a detailed enough way to be useful for planning humint activities, and creating a "surge"
capability to deal with those cases, like Haiti or Somalia, where the United States, often on short
notice, becomes heavily (and, in particular, militarily) involved in an area. These two situations may
differ in various ways: for example, the longer-term targets will likely be relatively "hard" (e.g., the
key scientists in the Iraqi or Iranian WMD programs), while targets related to an ongoing or
anticipated military action may be somewhat softer (e.g., clan members or weU-connected
businessmen in Somalia.)

To capitalize on theseopportunities, our human intelligence coUection capability must become more
flexible. The reorganizationand reinvigoration of defense humint is potentially a step in the right
direction. In addition, more use must be made ofNOCs of various sorts. Recruitment shouldbe
reexamined in this light, and consideration given to the establishment of some sort of "intelligence
reserve." But, inthe final analysis, these improvements will result in better support to policy-making
and military operations only to the degree that policymakers and commanders have confidence in the
overall competence of the clandestine human service and the information it provides. Any human
collection effort that ignores this requirement, or takes it too lightly, risks its credibility with its
customers.
 VI

TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION

Technical intelligence collection (techint) has been an area of great US strength and relative
advantage in the past; it enables us to exploit areas of superior national technological capability,
particularly our superiority in computer and telecommunication technology, and the related skills of
miniaturization. From the 1950s to the end of the Cold War, it was a vital source of intelligence on
Soviet strategic nuclear forces; it was able to compensate for the difficulty and, at times, the practical
impossibility, of conductingtraditionalhuman espionageagainst a "counterintelligence state."

This success has led at times to the overvaluation of technical intelligence?' It has also fostered a
view that technical intelligence collection can operate independently of the rest of intelligence.
However, in many cases, it has turned out that "cueing" from other sources was crucial in targeting
technical intelligence collection resources. In addition, other sources are often necessary to help
develop the "signatures" that make possible the interpretation of technically collected data. Thus,
despite the wizardry embodied in technical collection systems, we must rememberto view intelligence
targeting and collection as a whole; techint must be coordinated with other forms of collection, and,
within the world of technical collection, we must be flexible enough to use the results of one
collectiondiscipline to support another.

This chapter discusses some ofthe reform proposals that have been made with respect to technical
intelligence collection. Given the advances that have occurred and will occur in the relevant
technologies, there are tremendous opportunities inthis area. To exploit them, however, will require
greater flexibility in the way in which we think about technical collection's development, its
management, and its uses in this new era.

Changes in the Political-Military Environment

With the end of the Cold War has come a substantial broadening of the target set for technical
collection. There is much less concentration on obtaining virtually "complete" coverage of one
country (the SovietUnion) and less concernwith order of battle (OOB) and scientific and technical
(S&T) intelligence on its strategic nuclearforces.

Instead, there is a greaterconcentration on transient targets, for example, those regions ofthe world
that are ofcurrent political interest and whereUS troops maybe deployed, in many cases to conduct
a humanitarian relief mission or some other "operation other than war" (OOTW). With respect to
these countries or regions, however, there will have been less opportunity to build up fundamental
databases describing the specific targets, their locationsand their characteristics. Consequently, to
be fully effective, technical intelligence collection will be even more dependent on "cueing" from other
sources.
 40 THE FuTuRE OF US IN1ELLIGENCE

At the same time, the military technological advances that underlie what is known as the Revolution
in Military Affairs (RMA) have made it both necessary and possible for information from "national­
level" systems to be supplied to a battlefield commander for immediate, tactical use. While this
concept pre-dated the end of the Cold War, most technical intelligence collection (especially
imagery) had previously been focused on strategic targets, whose primary audience was in
Washington.

Recent experiences, in the Gulf War and in Bosnia (e.g., the O'Grady shoot down) have made clear
the difficulties ofgetting technically collected information to the engaged forces quickly enough to
be useful. In the former case, the main problems had to do with incompatible communications
systems, and with the large amount of bandwidth required to transmit imagery; the latter case
highlighted the importance ofvery rapidly communicating (on the order of minutes) tactically vital
data from the collector to the consumer.

There are, of course, still important long-term strategic targets of the S&T type (e.g., the North
Korean nuclear program); but these targets will not have the absolute priority that the Soviet target
had during the Cold War, and coverage ofthem will have to be balanced against more numerous and,
in some cases, more immediate requirements.

The Current "Reform" Agenda

DCI John Deutch has proposed two major reform initiatives that would affect technical intelligence
collection. First, he wishes to create a new National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA), on the
model of the National Security Agency (NSA) - the focal point for signals intelligence. This agency
would combine current defense and inteIligenceorganizations that operate imagery platforms, process
and interpret the data, and disseminate the product. In the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 1996, Congress has blocked the creation of the NIMA until it has a chance to review and
comment on the plan.

Although the creation of an NIMA could lead to certain efficiencies (for example, facilitating cost
comparisons across different platforms), it runs the risk of making it harder to compare imagery to
other collection disciplines, and of complicating the process of putting more than one capability on
a single satellite. It may also tend to freeze current lines of development of new systems, particularly
in an era of tight budgets when the bureaucratic imperative is typically to preserve current programs.
In addition, centra1izing the photo-interpretation process may make it harder to bring other sources
of expertise to bear, which is important for establishing the "signatures" that facilitate interpretation.

A second initiative involves absorbing the Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities (TIARA)
program of the Department of Defense more fully into the IC, especially for budgetary purposes.
This too may result in greater efficiency; a common argument in the past has been that the TIARA
program contains unnecessary duplication because the overall program management is not able to

l
 TEcHNICAL INlELLIGENCE COLLECTION 41

force the military services to meld similar programs together. Thus, some consolidation may be
necessary to save money.

On the other hand, this type of centralization within the IC may make it harder to develop the close
relationships between the producers and consumers of intelligence, that are necessary to ensure that
intelligence is timely and relevant. As noted above, the trends in the RMA suggest that more rapid
and direct communication between "sensor" and "shooter" will be required in the future; this may be
hampered by the centralization of intelligence production and the consequent lengthening of the
coordination process.

To some extent, this danger may be mitigated by a closer relationship between the DCI and the
secretary of defense and the assignment of a higher intelligence priority to support to the warfighter.
However, it is dangerous to design bureaucratic relationships around specific personalities; in any
case, most of the issues that would arise in this context are not, and cannot be, resolved at the top
ofthe bureaucratic hierarchy. Instead, they must be dealt with lower down; if difficulties arise, they
will come from the necessity to coordinate myriads of details between the military services and IC
staffs, such as the Community Management Staff (CMS), which are not particularly acquainted with
the details of the weapons systems being supported or of the operational modalities of the military
organizations employing them. In general, military organizations are likely to be best qualified to
manage intelligence processes to support military doctrine and tactics.

Thus, the optimal solution may lie somewhere between the current situation and the proposed change.
There may be a case to be made for further consolidation of TIARA management within DoD, to
avoid overlaps. On the other hand, as the connection between intelligence and weapons systems
becomes closer and closer, it would probably be ill advised to establish bureaucratic boundaries that
make it harder to develop the two in tandem, and to ensure that the information flow is as automatic
and rapid as it will need to be.

Another reform proposal, which originated in the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,
involves the design philosophy for future technical intelligence collection systems. In the past, the
high priority attached to S&T intelligence concerning Soviet strategic nuclear forces has meant that
successive generations ofcollection systems have tended to push against the technological "frontier."
The primary requirement was to maximize system performance, even those that led to extremely
expensive systems, which, in turn, meant that only a small number of each could be acquired and
deployed.

The House proposal for "small" satellites (or "smallsats") is based on the premise that future funding
constraints will mean that systems will have to be designed to balance performance against cost; it
may not be necessary to build the best system possible within current technological constraints. By
concentrating development resources on building smaller, less complex and hence cheaper satellites,
we may be able to achieve a more sustainable set of capabilities. The authorization bill refers this
issue to a study panel to be appointed by the DCI.
42 THE Fu1URE OF US INTEWGENCE

While this proposal raises an important issue -- the need to find some method oftrading off between
capability and cost - it is unclear how much difference it can make in the long run as far as costs are
concerned. On one hand, a willingness to pull back from the "technological frontier" may yield
certain advantages. For example, it may prove possible to use more "off the shelf' hardware, whose
prices (especially in the telecommunication and computer areas) have been falling rapidly. The
commercialization of the space launch business should lead to lower satellite launch costs, if
commercial launch vehicles can be used.

On the other hand, a large percentage of the cost of a technical collection system is incurred in
operating the system and running the ground stations that control the system, receive its
transmissions, and process and interpret the data. Controlling these costs may prove difficult;
although some artificial intelligence systems may be developed (e.g., to compare subsequent images
ofthe same area in order to automatically call attention to changes), they are likely themselves to be
very expensive. Similarly, on-board processing, which may be advantageous from some perspectives,
would not be inexpensive, either.

The "smallsat" proposal deserves closer study, not least because it explicitly raises the issue of how
to balance capabilities against cost -- but it may not prove to yield as much in savings as hoped.

In considering the capabilities vs. cost trade-off, one cannot avoid discussing the proliferation of
unclassified, commercial technical collection systems that appears to be on the horizon. These
ventures will primarilyinvolve space-based imagery systems, perhaps with multispectral capabilities.
This development will have at least two important impacts on technical intelligence collection
operations.

First, commercialization of some ofthe relevant technologies may drive down prices in some areas.
However, the real impact ofthis is difficult to judge; reductions in the cost oftechnologies relevant
to the commercial systems may not have much impact on the cost ofthe much more capable classified
systems. In any case, there is the possibility that launch costs will fall as the commercial space launch
business becomes more competitive.

Second, since some categories of targets may not require imagery ofthe highest resolution, there is
the possibility of making use of the commercial services to fill requirements otherwise met by the
more sophisticated classified systems. (In some cases, it may be important to keep secret the fact that
a given target is of interest; whether this will rule out the use of a commercial system depends on the
types of security arrangements that can be developed.) However, whether this will actually save
much money is unclear; assuming that the most capable systems are still deployed, the marginal cost
of using them to service targets of this type may be small. Nevertheless, the possibility of using
commercial systems for some targets may provide some "surge" capability and make the overall
system more flexible.
 TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION 43

The Future of Technical Collection

One important question that current reform efforts have not addressed is that of facilitating future
developments in the technical intelligence collectionarea. In particular, where will the major steps
forward -- that is, those that make use of new phenomenologies _. come from?

In the past, outside scientific advice (for example, from the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory
1 Board (pFIAB)) was important in creating momentum for the exploitation of new technologies. In
other cases, the DCI provided the impetus.

At present, it is not clear whether this type oftechnological vision can come from these sources. In
recent years, the PFIAB has not been veryactive and it does not contain the same wealth of scientific
talent as in the past, and the CIA's Science and Technology Directorate (DDS&T) has fewer
resourcesand is less central to the process. In addition, NSA and (if created) the National Imagery
and Mapping Agency (NIMA) may be morefocused on operating the current systems and in making
incremental improvements to them. In any case, the next major advances in sensors may involve
phenomonologies that do not fall into the bailiwick of either agency. For example, the Gulf War
highlighted the requirement for better sensors for detecting chemical and biological agents. These
will presumably differ significantly fromcurrentsystems and, generally speaking, would not fall under
the heading of either imageryor signalsintelligence systems.

Another change from past circumstances has to do with the proliferationof ethics rules that make it
hard for top scientists and technologists to do work in the government for several years if they wish
ultimately to pursue a career in industry. This affects younger individuals in particular, since their
opportunities to return to industry are hampered. Today, in contrast with the past, the optimal time
for a government tour is at the end ofone's career,just prior to retirement.

Finally, we should be open to the possibility that new political and technological developments may
favorsystems other than space-based platforms. Airborne platforms remain an important part of our
technical collection capability, especially for the military; even if it is impossibleto overfly the target
area, one can, depending on flight altitude and sensor range, see a distance into it from the periphery.
In addition, the development of unmanned vehicles may enable us to substitute for space-based
platforms over dangerous areas (especially if the cost per vehicle can be minimized). Finally, any
number of 'close-in'technical collection systems (e.g., sophisticated bugs, sniffers of various kinds,
radiation detectors, etc.) can be used in areas where access is relatively free or where it may be
possible to implant sensors clandestinely. To the extent that there are fewer "denied areas" along the
lines ofthe former SovietUnion, there is a greater scope for use of these types of collection systems.
\1
Any reorganization of technical collection agencies should take into account these possibilities. To
the extent that future developments will look very different from our current systems, it would be a
mistake to concentrate power and authority over budgets in large, single discipline-based
organizations that are primarily concerned with operating current systems. Instead, policymakers and
senior Intelligence Communityofficials will have to recognize that new initiativesin these areas are
44 THE FuTuRE OF US lNTEUIGENCE

likely to come from unpredictable directions and that the Ie as a whole has to be structured so as
to be able to exploit new ideas from a variety of sources.

Another issue deals with the effect on the procurement system of constrained budgets, which reduce
the commercial attractiveness of the business. At the same time, the government agencies involved
tend to become more conservative in approach as they try to preserve existing systems, and hence
tend to become locked into long-term relationships with specific contractors. The resulting loss of
competition can lead to higher costs and less innovation.

Conclusion

With the demise ofthe Soviet Union, there was a not unreasonable expectation that expenditures on
technical collection might be substantially reduced. However, maintaining high-quality global
coverage cannot be done cheaply. Moreover, technical collection ofvarious sorts is and will remain
vitaI for the implementation ofthe Revolution in Military Affairs. In short, when all is said and done,
technical intelligence collection is, and will remain, an expensive business.

But there is no sensible alternative open to us; possession of this capability is a tremendous US
advantage -- both military and political - which we would be foolish to give up. For example, our
unique possession ofthis type of global coverage provides tremendous leverage with respect to other
governments who are dependent on us for up-to-the-minute intelligence coverage of ongoing crises."
And, ofcourse, our status as the world's only superpower is dependent on our willingness to retain
a superpower's technical collection capability.

In addition to money, however, vision and scientific/technological imagination will be required to

preserve and bolster this unique global capability. In particular, we must be able to generate, assess
and implement ideas as radical and visionary in current circumstances as spaced-based imagery
collection was in the latter half of the 1950s. It is probably impossible to design a bureaucratic
structure that can guarantee this, but it is easy to imagine one that can thwart it.
 VII

COVERT ACTION

The Debate over Covert Action

Covert action (CA) has been subjected to more criticism over the years than any other element of
intelligence. From time to time - for example, in the deliberations of the Church Committee ­
serious consideration has been given to the abolition of CA altogether, at least in peacetime. A less
extreme variant of this view is that it should be considered only as a "last resort," i.e., a procedure
that is inherently so problematic that it can be justified onlywhen absolutelynecessary to deal with
a major threat to national security. In this vein, one might argue that, with the end of the Soviet
threat, CA should become practically nonexistent.

Aside from the issues of its efficacy and riskiness, which will be discussed below, the arguments
against CA may be grouped into three categories:

• As a secret activity, CA obstructs democratic accountability: how can the public hold its
officials accountable ifit doesn't know what they are doing? Secrecy, moreover, creates the
risk that the government will take actions that the publicwould oppose on political or moral
grounds.

• CAsometimes involves the use of ethically dubious means (such as assassination or sabotage)
or the support of groups that use such means.

• CA typically involves interference in the domestic affairs of other countries (albeit, on

occasion, on the side of the legitimate government).

Democratic Legitimacy

While the argument of democratic legitimacy is often overstated -- the government must, and
routinely does, conducta lot ofits business in secret, especially, but not only, in the national security
area - it does raise an important point. IfCA is being used to pursue a policy so that the policy itself
(as opposed to the specific means) need not be publicly acknowledged (thus sparing the
administration inconvenient questions or criticism), thenquestions ofdemocratic legitimacy do indeed
arise.

Yet, if one acceptsthe proposition -- discussed below -- that CA should be regarded as one foreign
policy tool among many, then this will not often be a major problem: CA will typically be used in
conjunction with other policy tools, alldirected towardthe same objective. If so, the objective of the
policy will be publicly acknowledged and hence subject to public debate. For example, US opposition
to the Sovietinvasion of Afghanistan and support for the Afghan resistance were not secret; the fact
46 THE FuTuRE OF US INrnU.IGENCE

that details about what and howmaterial supportwas provided were withheld from the public did not
raise issues of democratic legitimacy.

Nevertheless, there might be particular cases in which CA is used to achieve results contrary to
official policy. For example, at some point, the French government evidently suspected that the US
administration, despite its official policy of supporting the Bosnian arms embargo, had in fact
provided arms to the Bosnian government in circumvention of it. Regardless of the truth of this
accusation -- and it is included here only as a hypothetical example - it is not hard to see that such
a manner of proceeding could be advantageous under some circumstances. In this case, there would
be soliddiplomatic reasonsfor seeking to conceal such an activity, even at the cost of misleading not
onlyforeigners, but the American public as well. Thus, although such situations may be rare, it would
seem imprudent to rule them out altogether. A rule of thumb an administration might apply for
dealing with such situations is the following: if our action were to become public, could (and would)
we defend it, or would we be forced to treat it as a scandal.

A similar argument can be made about the means employed by (as opposed to the policy objectives
ot) covert action. Since the details of CA must be kept secret (even where the policy objective is
acknowledged), the public cannotjudge whether the means employed are acceptable to it.39 In this
regard, the rule of thumb would seem to be same: would the administration be willing to defend
publicly the means adopted?

Oneargument (perhaps the strongest) for congressional oversight rests on this last point: by serving
as a "sounding board" (that is, as a surrogate for public opinion), the intelligence committees help the
administration gauge whether or not a certain action would be defensible if it became publicly
known."

In the final analysis, the problem offitting CA with democratic theory can be mitigated but not fully
resolved. As with any other secretgovernment action, e.g., a confidential diplomaticinitiative, or the
development of a "black" weapon system, a decision to undertake a particular program rests with
government officials whose election implies a vested trust by citizens but whose accountability is
general, rather than specificand detailed, in nature.

Norms ofInternotiolUll Conduct

In theory, an international system based on the equality of sovereign states (the "Westphalian"
system) implies a prohibition against "interference" in the internal affairs of other countries. The
reality, of course, has been far different.

At the start of the Cold War, the CA programs directed at strengthening the democratic forces in
Western Europe were defended on the grounds that we were justified in counterbalancing Soviet
supportfor the Communist parties and related organizations in those countries. Indeed, the orthodox
Communist notion of an inevitable and protracted struggle in the course of which socialism would
triumph over capitalism on a global basis impliedthat the notion of noninterference in the affairs of
 COVERT ACTION 47

other countries was fundamentally illusory. Given the internationalization of both capital and labor,
to say nothing ofthe magnitude of the stakes, there was no prospect that the struggle could be neatly
compartmented within national boundaries.

From the democratic perspective, the question could be raised whether it was not legitimate to help
a people resist a tyrannical regime. This argument was often phrased in terms of the promotion of
human rights, which large parts of both ends of the American political spectrum saw, albeit not
without controversy, as a legitimate motive for some sort of interference.

Finally, given the stakes, there were arguments made on the basis of national security necessities,
which were resorted to especially in cases where the alternative to a pro-Soviet regime did not
measure up to American or West European standards ofdemocracy and human rights.

In the post-Cold War period, the prestige of liberal democracy has risen so high that interference on
its behalftends to be almost noncontroversial, at least in principle. For example, in the case ofHaiti,
the US and the UN blatantly interfered in support of democratically elected President Aristide against
the military junta that had overthrown him in a coup d'etat. While US policy was debated vigorously
on several grounds, there was almost no dispute with respect to the question of whether it was
justifiable for us (or the UN) to violate traditional notions of state sovereignty. Should another
ideology become a powerful and recognized competitor to liberal democracy (e.g., some form of
Islamism or East Asian Neo-Authoritarianism), then liberal democracy's right to intervene in order
to promote itself will no doubt be once again challenged.

In addition, there is what might be called the "Hitler paradox," that is, the coming to power by
constitutional means, in a democracy, ofa leader who intends to abolish democracy. To what extent
the United States should treat such a ruler as democratic and not interfere is a difficult question. Of
course, no democracy can survive if a majority of the population consistently prefers a nondemocratic
alternative;" it is less clear whether the United States should accord such a nondemocratic choice the
same respect that it accords a democratic government.

The EjJieacy of Covert Actio"

Finally, in the debate over CA there is the question of how efficacious or risky a tool it has actually
proved to be. What, in fact, is the historical record?

To some extent, the public debate has been distorted by a tendency to emphasize the failures and
downplay the successes, At the risk of caricature, one can say that there has developed a
conventional wisdom on the subject that asserts that a few early "successes" -- the overthrow of
Arbenz in Guatemala and Mossadeqh in Iran (which weren't really successes given those countries'
subsequent histories) -led to a government wide hubris with respect to covert action, which in tum
produced a string of CA failures -- our support for the anti-Sukarno rebellion in Indonesia, the Bay
of Pigs and the attempts to assassinate Castro, and the attempt to prevent the election of Allende as
president of Chile in 1970.
 48 THE FuTuRE OF US lNTEILlGENCE

Not onlydoes this conventional wisdomapplya strange standard, (e.g., it judges an operation in Iran
in 1953 to be a failure because of what happened 25 years later) but, more importantly, it takes too
narrow a viewofwhat has been a much morevaried set of activities. For example, it ignores the anti­
Conununist activities in supportofthe Marshall Plan and NATO in Western Europe in the late 19405
and 1950s, as well as efforts aimed at Eastern Europe, such as the creation and initial support for
Radio Free Europe and RadioLiberty. In addition, it tends to ignore reports of successful programs
of more recent vintage, such as the support to the Afghan resistance, democratic elements in post­
Salazar Portugal, Solidarity in Poland, and even the Contras in Nicaragua."

Of course, judging the effect of any CA program is difficult: how can one determine, for example,
whether East Europe would have evolved differently in the absence ofRadio Free Europe, or how
the Italian elections of 1948 would have turned out in the absence of US involvement?" Similarly,
it is hard to judge the effect of revelations of CA programs: while leftists around the world
condemned the United States for its putative involvement in the overthrow of Allende, that by itself
does not disprove Machiavelli's view of the relative advantage ofbeing feared as opposed to being
loved.

Finally, one must take account ofthe viewthat CA has often been considered as a "last resort" by US
policymakers, i.e., a technique to be turned to when other methods either have failed or appear
unavailing. But, if this is so, then it would be reasonable to conclude that CA is being used
disproportionately in difficult situations, wheresuccessis least likely to be achieved. Its record under
those circumstances may not say much about its potential when used in a wider range of cases.

The "Cll1tu,al" CriJjqlle

A more sophisticated variant ofthese arguments runs along the following lines: whatever the merits
or drawbacks of CA, the United States, as compared to other great powers, is culturally unfit for
using such a technique. Various reasons can be adduced in support of this proposition: the greater
openness of our governmental processes, includinggreater legislative involvement; our discomfort
with realpolitik justifications for foreign policy actions; the large size and disorderliness of our
national security decision-making apparatus; our tendency to make explicit in the form of/egal rules
(e.g., the ExecutiveOrder prohibition on assassination) things that other nations are willing to leave
unsaid.

One piece of evidence for this supposed mismatchbetween our political culture and CA is that the
United States is the only country that acknowledges its use ofCA, that explicitly denies its head of
state the ability to "plausibly deny" involvement in any given CA activity, and believes that CA must
be validated by some kind of democratic process and debate (such as congressional oversight).
Clearly, the United States, unlike other countries, is unable or unwilling to allow CA to be one of
those arcana imperiithat is accepted as a fact oflife but not talked about.

However, even if one accepts this characterization of American political culture, it does not
necessarily follow that the United States shouldsimply giveup CA as a foreign policy tool. Changing

I
 COVERT ACTION 49

world circumstances, greater familiarity with the concept as a result of public discussion, and (as
noted) the lack of a strong global ideological opposition to many of our objectives, all suggest that
the prospects for effective CA may not be as bleak as this critique implies. It does, however, alert
us to the peculiar political context in which this debate occurs.

Defining "Covert Action"

While the question of the definition of CA may seem rather pedantic, it has important implications.
Indeed, many of the criticisms discussed above seem to be connected with the fact that the concept
of CA lumps together a whole series of activities under a rubric that has included such sensational
events as attempted assassinations. Thus, the tendency has been to view CA as a very special type
of activity that requires, at the least, special (and especially skeptical) attention and handling. This
has made it harder to look at the various types of activities included under the CA rubric as foreign
policy tools to be used where appropriate, given their specific characteristics. Thus, it is worthwhile
to spend some time on the details of the definition of CA, if only to note how broad and ill-defined
a concept it really is.

After a legislative history dating back to the Hughes-Ryan amendment of 1974, the phrase "covert
action" was finally given a statutory definition" in the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal 1991.
That definition is:

The tenn "covert action" means an activity or activities ofthe United States Government to
influence political, economic, or military conditions abroad, where it is intended that the role
ofthe United States Government will not be apparent or acknowledged publicly, ..."

From a theoretical point of view, this definition is subject to serious difficulties. The problem,
however, is not one of drafting; rather, the concept of "covert action" as it has been used over the
past decades, is a very broad and rather ambiguous one. Indeed, one could well argue that, as now
understood, "covert action" is not a very helpful concept and ought to be replaced by a series ofmore
precise terms that would differentiate among the various types of CA activities; for example, one
might wish to categorize covert operations undertaken to disrupt the production and transportation
of narcotics and the laundering of the proceeds as "countemarcotics action" rather than CA.
However, for historical reasons, this is unlikely to happen and the term "covert action" will most
likely remain in use.

Because the basic concept (i.e., exercising influence from "behind the scenes") is so broad, any
definition of it has to include a series of exceptions to make it workable; indeed, as embodied in
current law, the definition of CA, immediately after the phrase cited above, goes on explicitly to
exclude, among other things:

• "traditional diplomatic activities" (since the basic definition could cover confidential
diplomatic exchanges.)
50 THE FuTuRE OF US INTElLIGENCE

• "traditional counterintelligence (CI) activities" (which may influence an adversary's

understanding and hence behavior by means of the provision of misinformation or the
selective concealment of true information)

• "traditional law enforcement activities" (which may involve the use of penetration agents to
thwart criminal activity.)

An example of the first exemption might be as follows: a confidential diplomatic initiative could be
undertaken to persuade a fureign government to take a given public stance on an issue. In this case,
the role of the US government in inducing the foreign government to behave in that manner would
be neither "publiclyacknowledged" nor "apparent" to the public or to other governments. (It would
be apparent to the officials of the foreign government whom the United States had contacted, but
perhaps not to other officials of that government.) In theory, whether such activity constitutes
"covert action" depends on whether it can be considered "traditional" diplomatic activity; as a prac­
tical matter, it would probably depend on whether the State Department or the CIA officers delivered
the message.

The Conference Committee report discussed the second exemption at some length:

The definition of"covert action" expressly exempts "traditional counterintelligence activities,"

which include double agent operations and operations to fiustrate intelligence collection
activities by hostile foreign powers. The ordinary objectives of such traditional counterintelli­
gence activities might include influencing the intelligence gathered by foreign powers
regarding specific United States military capabilities, intentions, or operations. The conferees
agree that the fact that such activities may have a substantia! influence on the militmy planS
and programs of certain fureilW powers does not make them "covert action." However, there
is a line beyond which such activities could, at least in theory, be undertaken to effect I!ll\illr
chanees in the national defense policies of such foreilW powers or to provoke sii"ificant
militmy responses by such foreilW powers. If such activities were to be undertaken for such
purposes, they would exceed the ordinary objectives of traditional counterintelligence
activities and would constitute "covert action." (emphasis added)"

This explanation raises as many questions as it answers. It appears to ignore the whole realm of
nonmilitary counterintelligence, e.g., double agent operations intended to deceive an adversary about
US political conditions or intentions, or about the operations ofUS intelligence itself It implies that,
in general, deception operations are not part of"traditional counterintelligence," although the dividing
line -- between activities that "may have a substantial influence on the military plans and programs
of certain foreign powers" and those that are "undertaken to effect major changes in [their] national
defense policies" - is far from clear.

Similar issues arise with respect to law enforcement. Especially when operating abroad, US law
enforcement may have to make use of agents ofinfluence and deception, e.g., to lure a terrorist from
 COVERT ACTION 51

his foreign haven on to a ship in internationalwaters where he may be seized by US law enforcement
officers. Does this constitute "traditional law enforcement?"

With respect to the main body of the definition of"covert action," further ambiguity arises from the
failure to specify to whom the sponsorship of the activity should be "apparent" in order to exclude
it from the category of CA. In practice, the concept of CA includes some relatively routine
"government-to-government" activities, such as secretly providing security or other support to a
friendly government. These activities are typically considered CA although the US involvement is
of course known to officials of the other government.

One Tool Among Many

This terminological confusion is not accidental; influencing foreign events and conditions is, in a
sense, the central focus of foreign and national security policy. Since much of this activity is
necessarily conducted in secret, it is not surprising that, as defined, CA potentially covers such a wide
range of phenomena.

From this perspective, the types of activities that fall under the rubric of CA should be seen as one
set oftools among many that a nation might use to achieve its objectives. Unfortunately, the history
of CA since World War II has tended to sensationalize it, and to cause it to be viewed in isolation.
This has affected not only the public debate, but also, to some extent, the government's management
of it.

There have been a succession of interagency committees that have dealt with CA, and, since 1974,
there has been the requirement for a presidential "finding." Nevertheless, it has proved difficult to
integrate CA fully into the process ofplanning and implementing foreign policy. Among the reasons
for this are:

• Primacy ofDiplomacy. Diplomacy, i.e., formalized government-to-government contact, is

of course an important foreign policytool, but it is not the only important one. (Indeed, many
have argued that changes in telecommunications and political life have meant that traditional
diplomacy is declining in relative importance.) It is, however, the province of the State
Department, which is also the key foreign policy agency ofthe government. Thus, not only
CA, but also foreign aid and public diplomacy (direct communicationwith foreign populations
as conducted by USIA and VOA), are often not fully utilized as foreign policy tools and
integrated in an overall strategy.

• "Stigma"ofIntelligence. Intelligence activitieshave the potential to disrupt relations with the

host state, and the use of diplomatic positions as "cover" for intelligence agents only
complicates the lives of foreign service officers, by bringing them under suspicion. In
addition, the past reputation of the CIA's DO officers as "cowboys" lives on. All in all, this
52 1lIE FuTuRE OF US INTELLIGENCE

probably creates a view among foreign serviceofficers of intelligence as something best kept
far away from.

• Local Coordination. The ambassador is the head of the "country team," i.e., he has
cognizance over all US activity in the country, involving all the foreign policy tools.
However, the extentto which ambassadors have taken an interest in intelligence operations,
or are kept apprised of operations, varies widely.

• Classification. In many cases, even the analysts in the CIA's Directorate ofIntelligence (D!)
have not had access to information about CA, to say nothing of State Department desk
officers. Thus, knowledge of CA is often limited by and large to senior officials, who are
typically forced to concentrate on the crisis du jour.

• Policy Coordination. The coordination ofthe disparate foreign policy tools is a difficult task
under any circumstances, and has not been a noticeable strength of the US Government. CA
poses special problems, as noted.

One step that has the possibility of helping integrate CA into the policy process is the creation of
various functional "centers" (such as the Non-Proliferation Center) which bring together DO and Dl
officials, along with some representatives of the rest of the Intelligence Community, to address a
given problem. While not formally "policy" organizations, these centers can encourage "opportunity
analysis," i.e., intelligence analysis that focuses on what can be done about a specific problem. This
should facilitate the generation of CA proposals to deal with these issues.

Nevertheless, as intelligence - rather than joint intelligence-policy - bodies, the centers are likely to
be reactive in their approach. Thus, intelligence that a country of proliferation concern was about to
procure a piece of sensitive equipment might trigger proposals designed to thwart that shipment.
However, a broader policy focus would be necessary to propose a CA program designed, for
example, to cause that country to pursue solutions to problems in its WMD programs that result in
technological dead ends.

Ultimately, if CA is to be used to its maximum extent as a foreign policy tool, it is necessary that a
bureaucratic "player" who is fuUy a part of the policy process be responsiblefor proposing ways in
whichthe tool might be used. In simplistic terms, that probably means that either 1) the responsibility
for foreign policy formulation and coordination be placed squarely in an interagency body (such as
the National Security Council staff) or 2) the State Department take on a special responsibility for
the integration orCA (which, unlike military or trade policy, does not have a departmental sponsor)
intothe foreign policy process, or 3) the DO (or the DO-DI "centers") become full-fledged players
in the foreign policy arena.

If CA is to be used more routinely, as one foreign policy tool among many, then other agencies of
government than the DO will have to become more involved in planning and perhaps implementing.
 COVERT ACTION 53

programs. Although thereare obviously limits, imposed by securityconcerns, as to how far this can
go, a certain "demystification" ofCA will be necessary if this is to occur.

Covert Action in the Post-Cold War World

As noted at the beginning of this paper, thereis a school ofthought that holds that CA should be rare,
or maybe even nonexistent, in the post-Cold War era. This view, however, mistakenlyassociates a
wholerangeofactivities - someofwhich are relatively routineor benign -- with the most sensational
and problematic examples ofCA and judges all of them by standards appropriate only to a small part
of the entire group.

Recognition of this problem suggests some effort should be made -- through legislation, a new
executive order, and/orbureaucratic directives - to begin distinguishing among the various types of
covertaction and the oversight, notification, and management requirements suitable for each. This
approach might also be expanded to provide appropriate rules for covert programs in areas about
which a finn consensus clearly exists in support of US policy objectives, such as in the areas of
counterproliferation or counterterrorism.

In general, the post-Cold Warworld will create many new situationsin which CA will be particularly
useful. Indeed, a review of some ofthe major national security challenges facing the United States
showsthat various types ofCA will haveimportant roles to play in meeting them. To argue that they
should not be used because, at the extreme, the concept ofCA could also encompass the assassina­
tion offoreign leaders, would be to mistakethe words for the things themselves.

For example, political influence operations in some ofthe states on the territory ofthe former Soviet
Unionmaybe not only easier to conduct -- given the less vigilant security systems ofthese states -­
but also more necessary as their transitions to less autocratic forms are challenged by a variety of
internal and external factors. Similarly, the challenge of militant, anti-WesternIslarnism in key states
ofthe Middle East and Central Asia, and in the Moslem diaspora suggests a role for covert political
action. But, ofcourse, a keyto suchoperations is oftena networkofagents in a position to influence
sectors of these societies or govenunents. However, given current approaches to CA, which put a
premium on addressing the crisis of the moment, it is unlikely that the long-term planning and
developmental work necessary to establishsuch an infrastructureis being carried out.

The post-Cold War world has also seen an increased use of US armed forces abroad for a wide
variety of purposes: containinginstability, alleviating human suffering, and promoting democracy,
among others. This is not the place to debate the appropriateness of any particular use of armed force
in suchan "operation other than war (OOTW)." However, it is hard to see why CA, where possible,
should not be used to accomplish or facilitate these same purposes. This is particularlytrue because
many ofthe regimes whose behavior we wish to affect are likelyto be less security-minded than the
Communistregimes ofthe Cold War, and less ideologically committed, hence easier to influence.
l,..,._.......__.. .~IIIIIIIl ....lIIIIIIIIIIiilllllllIllllllllllllXIllll!--!!!!IIIII!j

54 1HE FuroRE OF US INTELLIGENCE

In addition to OOTW, the post-Cold War world has been characterized by a concern about the
increasingly transnational character of certain types of crime, such as organized crime ("mafias,"
including those involved in attempted smuggling of fissile materials out of the former Soviet Union),
narcotics trafficking, and international terrorism. To some extent, we have tried to deal with these
issues by expanding the concept of US jurisdiction and law enforcement activity (perhaps most
notably in the arrest, trial, and conviction of Panamanian President Manuel Noriega for drug
trafficking.) Nevertheless, law enforcement cannot be the only tool, if only because major elements
in some foreign governments, whose cooperation we would require, may be uncooperative,
ineffective, or conupt. Thus, CA teclmiques for preventing or disrupting criminal activity should also
have a place.

In addition, the WMD programs of many nations of proliferation concern depend on the importation
(often illegal according to the laws ofthe exporting state) of sensitive materials and equipment. This
creates the opportunity to obstruct these transactions (either by law enforcement means, or CA
techniques) or, more creatively, to tamper covertly with this material or equipment in order to hinder
the development program. Penetration ofthe networks by means ofwhich this material is procured
could pay big dividends in this regard. Again, considering that the United States has used methods
ranging from war (e.g., Iraq) to the providing of massive incentives (e.g., North Korea) to fight
proliferation, it is hard to see why computer viruses or other types of tampering or obstruction should
be ruled out.

Many ofthese trends suggest that we will become more and more concerned in the future with threats
that straddle the boundary between "law enforcement" and "national security" issues. For example,
the question of computer security and information warfare is one such area where the distinction
between "crime" and "act of war" may be very difficult to discern. This is an area in which a robust
capability, most of which would be of necessity subject to strict secrecy, will be required to defend
against threats to our own systems, to determine when an attack has occurred and who is responsible,
and, depending on circumstances, to take action against the perpetrators.

Many observers believe that the future international environment will be characterized by
ungovernability, as criminal and terrorist groups exploit the "globalization" of international life
(greater ease of travel, internationalization of commerce and finance, greater interconnectedness of
computers and telecommunications systems, etc.) to escape surveillance and control by governments.
Greater cooperation among governments will be required, but not all governments will be
cooperative; the United States may find that, in some cases, it has to act unilaterally or in a coalition
with those governments that are cooperative to deal with these threats. In many cases, secrecy will
be necessary or beneficial.

Finally, a robust CA program will not only be able to help combat these problems on a routine basis,
but will also faci1itate the development ofcapabilities which otherwise would not be available in case
of a more serious crisis. Indeed, the argument that CA should be used only in exceptional
circumstances involving an extremely grave threat to national security ignores the fact that, under
such a policy, the capability - the network of agents, an experienced group of officers, the expertise
and the infrastructure -- to conduct CA effectively is unlikely to be available when it is needed.
 VIII

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

Counterintelligence (CI) is the most difficult of the four elements of intelligence to discuss in a
comprehensive fashion. To the extent that the heart of the intelligence endeavor is the struggle
between adversarial intelligence services, counterintelligence may be seen as coextensive with
intelligence itself. (This is illustrated by occasional high-level statements to the effect that "every
intelligence officer must be his own counterintelligence officer.") Indeed, if it succeeds in penetrating
the adversary's intelligence services, CI will be an important source of "positive" foreign intelligence
as well.

Conversely, CI failuresput positive collection capabilities -- technical and human -- at risk. Once an
adversary understands those capabilities, he can either deny them (e.g., arrest agents, hide items from
photo reconnaissance or suppress communications) or, even worse, use them to deceive those
collecting by deliberately making false information available for them to collect. Thus, the scope of
CI is, in this sense, equal to that of intelligence as a whole.

Nevertheless, CI is also one of the four elements of intelligence, and, as such, is viewed as being
differentfrom analysis, collection, and covert action. Unfortunately, the result, in the United States,
has often been that a narrow view of CI -- one that essentially equates it with security and
counterespionage - has prevailed. While these activities, which seek to prevent adversary services
from acquiring sensitiveinformationfrom our documents, communications, or personnel, are indeed
important, CI, correctly understood, extends far beyond them.

Thus, what is required is a national strategy for dealing with the entire range of threats to the United
States posed by foreign intelligence services (as well as other clandestine organizations, such as
transnational terrorist groups or "mafias.") In addition to espionage, the threats posed by foreign
services can include covert action of various sorts, double agent operations, "spoofing" of technical
intelligence collectors, and deception operations targeting our intelligence and other national security
organizations. Taking its guidance from overall national security objectives, a national CI strategy
must deal with all these possibilities.

To support such a strategy, there must be an analyticcapability to assess the threat and determine our
vulnerabilities, thereby helping allocate the resources available to protect against it. This has
traditionally been a weakness ofUS intelligence. In particular, the link between an analysis of the
threat and our corresponding vulnerabilities, on one hand, and our security and counterespionage
efforts, on the other, has often been relatively tenuous.

This chapter begins with a discussionofcounterespionage, focusing on the Ames case, which played
a major role in leading Congress to create the presidential commission on intelligence. It then
 ~'., ,.,

56 THE FuTuRE OF US INrELLIGENCE

considers the problem ofcounterdeception, i.e., detecting an adversary's attempts to deceive. It then
returns to the question of the need for a national strategy for CI.

Counterespionage and the Ames Case

While CI is, in general terms, the countering of an adversary's intelligence apparatus (to foil or
manipulate his intelligence activities, as well as to gain insight into his other actions), we can begin
our consideration ofit with those actions whose purpose is to prevent an adversary from acquiring
sensitive information we wish to keep from him. For bureaucratic purposes, the more routine types
ofactivities directed toward this end (regulations requiring that secret documents be kept locked up
in safes, proceduresfor investigating the backgrounds of potential employees, etc.) usually go by the
name of "security," although conceptually they should be thought of as part of CI. Counter­
espionage, the preventing and stopping ofthe adversary's espionage activity directed against oneself
is a related part of CI directed to the same end.

The Aldrich Ames case is the latest in a long list of espionage activities directed against the United
States that have raised questions about the adequacy ofUS counterespionage and CI, in general."
As muchas any other single factor, it was the Ames case that led to the creation ofthe Commission
on the Roles and Capabilities of the US Intelligence Community. Nevertheless, there has been
remarkably littlediscussion ofthe exact nature ofthe failure or failures, or even of whether the case
ought to be considered a failure at all." It is necessary to review the Ames case, not in order to
assign blame to any individual or organization, but to see what lessons can be learned from it.

In various public statements, former DCI James Woolsey emphasized the view that the fundamental
problem was the failure ofthe personnel system ofthe CIA's Directorate of Operations (DO) to do
something about the pre-traitorous Ames, who, in retrospect at least, was an accident waiting to
happen." Instead, the system gave him a key CI job. Although Woolsey has attributed this to a
failure of intra-DO communications, it is probably more significant as a statement about the DO's
view of the relative importance ofCI and ofits noncareer enhancing status.

More important was the failure to devote sufficient resources and high-level attention to the "mole
hunt." In particular, after the initial compromises sparked an investigation, interest seemed to flag
when the major losses stopped. (Ames was posted to Italy in 1986.) The 1988 creation of the
Counterintelligence Center (CIC),which caused somebureaucratic reshuflling, is also blamed for the
loss of momentum. However,the filet that a bureaucratic reorganization was allowed to slow down
the investigation ofa possible penetration ofthe most damaging kind, is itselfevidence that it was not
being treated as a matter of the highest priority.

More fundamentally, the problem is one of banishing the CIA's "Angletonophobia." Woolsey's
comment that "we all at the CIA want to continue to serve in today's Virginia, not in 17th century
Salem"so illustrates the extent to which, two decades later, memory of the events of the Angleton
period still hinders the creation ofan effective CI system.
 .it . . . .iiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiii _

COUN1ERlNTELLIGENCE 57

Ironically, at the timewhenthe "mole hunt" should have been at its zenith, then DCI Casey, reacting
to criticism fromthe CIA InspectorGeneral and the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board
concerning the handling of the Edward LeeHoward spy case, criticized the DO for its "unwillingness
to accept even as a possibility a DO officer committing espionage for the Soviet Union.,,~l This
unwillingness appears to have been responsible for the filet that, at first, the investigation concentrated
primarily on other possibilities (e.g., the penetration of communications, operational flaws in each
individual case)."

Organizationally, the question comes down to the issue of the legitimacy of a CI culture at the CIA,
andindeed ofthe Intelligence Community as a whole. For example, there must be a career path that
allows officers to specialize in CI and rise within the ranks of the DO. Within this specialization,
certain types of expertise must be available; for example, the Ames investigation was hampered by
the lack of financial expertise capable of investigating the sources of Ames's sudden wealth. In
general, the status of CI must be enhanced so as to attract the highest quality officers. More
generally, the counterespionage activity should be linked with a CI analyticcapability that assesses
threats and vulnerabilities, collection activities directed against an adversary's intelligence services,
and operations designed to exploit any penetrations for larger CI purposes, such as neutralizing an
opposing service.

In the wake of the Ames case, certain steps have been taken along these lines. The creation at the
CIA of an Office of Personnel Security, which brings together officials concerned with personnel,
security, and medical issues related to employees, should enable warning signs to be spotted earlier.
In addition, the staff of this officewill contain a representative ofthe Counterintelligence Center."

In addition, PresidentialDecision Directive 24 (PDD-24) reorganized the NSC-Ievel apparatus for

dealing with Cl (It is discussed below in connection with the need for a national CI strategy.)
Among other things, it directs that the chief of the counterespionage group of the CIA's CIC be a
senior FBI agent. Although this should improveFBI-CIA coordination, it may have the unintended
consequence of inducing the CIA to relax its counterespionage efforts in the belief that this has
become an FBI responsibility.

Fundamentally, the Ames case reflects in large measure the long-standing deprecation of
counterespionage and CI in general within the CIA. The appointment of an assistant deputy director
of operations (ADDO) for counterintelligence and security indicates some awareness ofthis problem:
however, this individual will not have line authority nor will he control any resources. Consequently,
progress on this issue probably requires a more far-reaching cultural change within the CIA and
elsewhere in the IC; in particular, specific counterespionage efforts must be seen in the context ofCI
as a whole, as governed by a national strategy.
[n_~

58 THE FuTuRE OF US lNTELLIGENCE

Risk Management

As already noted, security should conceptually be considered a part of CI. This is of particular
relevance during a period, such as the present one, in which the intelligence threat to the United
States is undergoing major changes. What is learned from the constant monitoring of the threat
should be reflected in changes in security regulations and procedures.

In addition, security must be based on determinations about what information it is worthwhile for us
to protect. The amount of money and effortwe-spend to protect a given piece of information should
be proportionate to the harm that its unauthorized disclosure would cause. Assessments ofthe threat
may provide important indications in this regard.

In its 1994 report, the Joint (i.e., CIAlDoD) Security Commission noted that

getting from the IntelligenceCommunity...the threat information necessary to support

coherent, risk-based security countermeasures...is an ad hoc rather than a systematic
process. In the absence of access to threat assessment information, security policies
have been based on risk avoidance, constrained prirnarily by the availability of
resources. 54

Among other problems noted by the report, there is no single repository of CI information to act as
a clearing-house for the support ofsecurity and countermeasures policymakers. A closer tie between
CI and security is necessary to ensure that security procedures and regulations are addressed to the
actual threat and are cost effective. For example, it has been observed over the course of almost
twenty years that the major espionage cases we have suffered have been motivated by greed rather
than by ideology or other factors. (This contrasts sharply with, for example, the Cambridge group
ofSoviet spies, ofwhom "Kim" Philbyis the best known and most important, or the Americans who
spied for the Soviet Union during the 1930s and 1940s.) In recent years, this has been the basis of
legislative and procedural changes that make financial data on those holding high-level clearances
more readily accessible for security purposes.

This is but one example ofthe type of substantive CI analysis that will be required to spot trends in
the intelligence threat and to disseminate information on them in a usable form. The concept of "risk
management" implies a much greater emphasis on this type of analysis. This in tum raises difficult
resource allocation issues during a time of decreasing budgets.

Other Approaches to Counterespionage

The approaches discussed so far have been defensive in nature: they involve security measures (that
is, ways of passively guarding the information) and the analysis oflosses when they have occurred
(and been recognized as such). While such measures are necessary, the size and complexity ofthe
national security apparatus implies that, even if the most sophisticated risk management techniques
 COUNTERINTEUJGENCE 59

were implemented, defensive measures would still fail to prevent occasional compromises from occur­
ring. This implies the need for more offensive operations, such as the following:

• double agent operations (to learn about an adversary's modus operandi, to absorb his
resources, and to reduce his incentives to recruit more agents);

• penetration of the adversary's intelligence services (to gain direct knowledge of operations
against oneself; as well as to gain insights into his policy and other activities); and

• deception operations to mislead the adversary (protecting the truth with a "bodyguard of
lies").

While the second is a constant goal, one can expect to succeed in attaining it only rarely. (From the
Soviet/Russian perspective, the Ames case marked the ne pills ultra of this approach, giving them
direct knowledge of CIA and FBI operations against themselves.) The first can be done as a routine
matter, either by "dangling" potential agents in front of the adversary's intelligence officers or by
instructing loyal employees who have been approached by the hostile service to play along.

An additional method ofrunning a double agent operation, by either "turning" or using an unwitting
aetual agent who has been operating against oneself, highlights a potential conflict between CI and
law enforcement approaches. Whereas the latter wishes to bring an agent to trial once he has been
discovered, the former typically prefers to leave the agent in place and use him as a channel (either
witting or unwitting) for feeding misinformation to his handlers. (Whether the direct involvement of
the FBI in the CIA's CIC at the senior level, as noted above, would affect the choice between these
two approaches is not clear.)

The reason is that, ultimately, the purpose of all this activity is to control adversaries understanding
of oneself This can be done defensively, by denying them the truth (and thus leaving them
uninformed about important points) or by deceiving them into believing something other than the
truth. The 1atter is potentially more advantageous, if it leads adversaries to take actions beneficial to
oneself and perhaps harmful to them. Double agent operations are one of the major ways in which
misinformation can be fed into hostile intelligence channels to affect the deception. Similarly,
communications channels known to be vulnerable to interception by the adversary can be used.
Depending on the nature of the deception, other techniques - public statements by officials, and
simulated military activity, to list just two - may also be applicable.

Deception operations require that one develop a clear sense of what one wants one's adversary to
believe, and why (i.e., how that belief will induce one's adversary to take an action beneficial to
oneself); that in tum depends on one's possession of a strategy for accomplishing one's objectives. ss

Since deception operations require feeding inaccurate information to the adversary through as many
different channels as possible, they pose difficult problems of coordination among agencies. For
example, the reports of double agents (who may be run by more than one agency) have to be
60 THE FuTuRE OF US INTELLIGENCE

coordinated with any simulated activity designed to be observed by the adversary. The problem is
evenmore complex if public statements by senior administration officials are to be part of the effort.

One type of peacetime deception that deserves increased attention involves the protection of new
military technologies andtheir application associated with the Revolution in Military Affairs by means
of among other things, the promulgation ofinaccurate "cover" stories about them. Since a number
ofimportant potential adversaries have extensive technical intelligence assets targeted on our military
R&D, methods of either concealing information from these systems, or of misleading them, are
necessary. 56 It is unclear how extensive efforts ofthis sort are at the present time. To the extent that
responsibility for them resides with the CI organizations ofthe individual military services, one might
question whetherthey havethe "clout" necessary to coordinate a comprehensive deception operation,
or giventheir focus on the more mundane aspects ofcounterespionage, an appreciation for its utility.
Reinforcing these concerns is the fact that, except in the army, the CI responsibility in the military
services is assigned to an organizationwhose primary responsibility is law enforcement.

Ceunterdeceptien

IfCI involves the countering of an adversary's intelligence activities directed against oneself then it
should include countering an adversary's CI as well. In particular, it includes protecting oneself
against deception and double agent operations.

One aspect ofthisis the validation of one's own agents and sources; that is, making sure that they are
not double agents or "plants." The US record in this regard is not very promising. During the last
decades ofthe ColdWar, for example, both the Cubans and the East Germans ran extensive double
agent operations against us, involving large numbers of agents over a long period of time.

History suggests that it is very difficult to protect oneself against massive efforts of this kind even
when one fully rea1izes, at leastin principle, that this type ofoperation is possible.57 Obviously, there
is a majorpsychological barrierto ponderingthe possibility that all, or the bulk, of one's sources are
fake and that, as far as results are concerned, one's hard work has been worthless, or worse than
worthless. The bureaucratization of operations, with its routines and its concern for numbers of
sources, numbers of reports, etc., makes it even harder to take seriously the seemingly outlandish
proposition that the whole structure is built on sand.

Thissuggests the needfor a strongCI staffto be able to challenge the bona fides ofagents, especially
in those cases where large numbers of agents appear to support each other's validity. Concerns of
this sort can obviously be overdone, and many argue that Angleton's suspicions prevented the CIA
from recruiting agents in the Soviet Union for a period of years. Nevertheless, for the reasons
discussed, giving this responsibility to the geographic divisions is not an adequate solution. Even if
an operating division could be counted on to test whether a given agent is legitimate, it could not be
expected to show the appropriate amount of suspicion toward a whole network of mutually
supporting agents.
 COUN1ER1NTELLIGENCE 61

A second aspect is counterdeception proper, that is, recognizing the adversary's deception operations
and hence not being taken in by them. In this area, too, history provides reasons for caution. For
example, Iraq was able, in the years before the Gulf War, to deceive the United States with respect
to its nuclear program. 51 Whilemost ofthis depended on concealment, there were elements of active
deception as well -- for example, Iraqi adherence to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and its
j
I
allowing of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections. On a tactical level, Iraqi
willingness to engage in negotiations with Kuwait in the days immediately preceding the invasion
appears to have been part of a deception effort.

Dealing with this type of problem is indeed difficult, and there is no simple solution. However, it
should be possible to set up various ad hoc task: forces to deal with specific cases of possible
deception. For example, "red teams" could investigate questions ofthe following sort: how, given
the Israeli raid on the Osirak reactor in 1981, might the Iraqis attempt to develop a nuclear capability
clandestinely? Such a group would develop scenarios that could then be treated as hypotheses to be
confirmed or disproved on the basis of specific intelligence collection tasks (comparable to the role
of experiments in confirming or disproving scientific hypotheses.) Thus, the hypothesis that Iraq was
using electromagnetic isotope separation as a method of producing fissile material would yield a
tasking to search the Iraqi electricity grid for indications of an otherwise unexplained consumption
of large amounts of electric power.

This type of analysis, which begins with a hypothesis, differs significantly from ordinary analysis,
which begins with what is observed. It is very time-consuming and hence can be applied only
sparingly. Given the commitment of resources involved, it would require policymakers and intel­
ligence officialsjointly to consider the issues with respect to which deception seemed most probable
and most dangerous to the United States. Since the success of such an effort would depend heavily
on the abilityofofficials to "smell out" cases of possible deception, there could be no guarantee that
such a procedure would payoff.

The Need for National and Defense Department Counterintelligence Policy

As the discussion has so far made clear, a major problem ofcounterintelligence, once one gets beyond
the purely defensive measures (security and the analysis of known compromises), is the need for
coordination among different agencies of government, including the multiple entities within 000,
which may have varying bureaucratic interests at stake.

It is unclear, for example, whether any consideration was given to delaying the prosecution of Ames
in order to use him as a conduit for misinformation, once it was determined that he was passing
classified documents to the Russians. Given the value of the information he had already provided,
the Russians would have presumably been disposed to believe almost anything he gave them. Thus,
he would have been a useful conduit for a deception operation. 59
62 THE Fu11JRE OF US INTELLIGENCE

In principle, Ames might also have been left (wittingly or not) in place in order to confirm the bona
fides of double agents we wished to plant on the Russians. If successful, such an operation could
result in a situation in which one controls a large number of the adversary's human intelligence
sources. This in turn would enable one to manipulate or disrupt the adversary's intelligence
operations. Although elegant in theory, and not unprecedented in the history of intelligence, this
would nevertheless be difficult to carry out in practice.

However, in any case, even to consider exploiting such an opportunity would depend on the existence
of a national CI policy requiring the CIA and FBI to consult the rest of the national security
bureaucracy concerning possiblegoals ofa deception or manipulation effort, as well as a coordinating
mechanism able to implement the specific operation.

On the military side, one problem will be determining appropriate methods to conceal major
technological advances, including the propagation of "cover stories." In particular, certain new types
of weapon systems may depend for their effectiveness on keeping secret key characteristics. As
opposed to munitions that depend solely on massive firepower, precision-guided munitions (pGMs)
depend on a particular phenomenology for their accuracy. A munition that is guided, for example,
by infrared emissions from its target may be spoofable once the precise frequency or set of
frequencies it uses is known. In the realm of infonnation warfare, the vulnerability may be even more
acute once an adversary understands the precise way in which a weapon system functions.

This suggests that the militaryshould take a strategic approach to CI that would include "perception
management" operations directed against potential adversaries to manipulate the way in which they
assess certain key military capabilities. This would require reversing the current tendency to limit
military CI to operations directed toward protecting deployed troops from immediate threats such
as terrorism and to double agent operations run for counterespionage purposes. Such a "perception
management" approach would exploit a large number oftechniques including double agent operations
and controlled exposure of selected capabilities to the technical collection efforts of adversaries.

A bureaucratic apparatus for the formation of national counterintelligence policy was established by
PDD-24, which created the National Counterintelligence Policy Board (NCIPB) and, beneath it, the
working-levelNational Counterintelligence Center (NCIC). The NCIC is the focal point for CI threat
assessment and analysis on the national level. Equally important, it is to serve as the source for
strategic guidance on CI, and as the issue coordinator for Cl In theory, these two groups are
bureaucratically situated to provide the sort of strategic guidance for double agent and other CI
operations, and more broadly, to develop a CI strategy for manipulating adversary intelligence
services. However, it is doubtful that they conceive of CI in such a comprehensive fashion.
 COUNTERJNTELLIGENCE 63

Resources

A major issue that a comprehensive CI policy would have to address is that of resources. With
respect to both the National Security Division (NSD) of the FBI, and the CI organizations in the
000, there is reason to believe that there are serious problems in this area.

Since the end of the Cold War, NSD manpower dedicated to counterintelligence has been reduced.
To some extent, this is reasonable, since certain threats, e.g., that posed by the Bloc services acting
in coordination with the KGB, have disappeared. (Although the possibility remains that some
members ofthese services havecontinued to maintain relationships with Russian intelligence without
the permission or knowledge of their superiors.) Nevertheless, it is not clear that the overall
intelligence threat to the United States has decreased greatly. According to government officials, the
Russian intelligence effort remains as substantial as that of the old Soviet services. In addition, the
United States faces a growing Chinese presence; in terms of numbers of people - tourists, students,
businessmen, etc., in addition to diplomats -- the threat has probably increased."

Furthermore, the NSD has been called upon to devote a greater amount ofeffort to threats other than
traditional espionage, including industrial espionage and international organized crime. Under these
circumstances, one must wonder whether adequate resources will be available for CI functions.

A similar issue exists within the 000, where the current emphasis is supporting the security
requirements of the "warfighter," i.e., the regional CINCs. In the absence ofa strong department­
wide CI function, the danger exists that other threats may be ignored.

Conc:lusion

Ironically, althoughit was the Ames case that triggered the creation of the Commission on the Roles
and Capabilities ofthe US Intelligence Community, the Commission's report hardly mentions CI at
all"' This is not an accidental oversight; it reflects the extent to which the general intellectual and
political atmosphere amongboth the public and intelligence professionals in the United States remains
uncongenial to taking counterintelligence seriously. Given this bureaucratic, political, and cultural
bias against CI, if the nation is to have an adequate CI capability, it must be based on deliberate
decisions to create it, embodied in strong organizational structures, and given sustained attention by
senior government officials.
 ..t.i•. .. -_!I!l!!!!!l!!!l!!' ~
i

IX

CONCLUSION

The momentous changes in the international environment and in information-related technologies

suggest that a thoroughrethinking ofthe missions, role, and structure ofthe Intelligence Community
is in order. Yet this reexamination is difficult to achieve. Aside from the usual problems encountered
in dealing with largegovernment bureaucracies, one must overcome the strong hold that the existing
viewofhow intelligence should work has on the imaginations ofthose involved in this reform debate.
Thisprevailing "paradigm" of intelligence consists of assumptions about how intelligence should be
organized, what its fimction and scope is, and what characteristics are most important for it to have.

Furthercomplicating this effort is the fact that, because existing realitydoes not live up to the ideal
embodied in these assumptions, reformers oftentend to become stuck in the rut of trying to make the
reality conform even moreclosely to the paradigm; existing problems are seen not as a consequence
ofthe limitations of the paradigmbut, rather, insufficient adherence to it. Few, as a result, question
the underlying assumptions themselves. Yet, the only way to free ourselves for a more
comprehensive review is to address and critique this paradigm directly, before going on to discuss
possible changes.

The Existing Paradigm

The existing "conventional wisdom" about what intelligence should be takes the CIA as its model;
or, more accurately, the CIA has developed along the lines it has in large measure because of the
paradigm's influence."

Underlying Logic and Assumptions

The various elements of this paradigm can be explained in terms of its underlying logic and
assumptions.

The fllSt element is the need-for all-source, comprehensive intelligence analysis; this is understood
as requiring a centralized effort. The genesis ofthis view lies with the Pearl Harbor experience and
the prevailing interpretation ofthat failure. The widely accepted view is that, although the necessary
bits and pieces of data regarding Japanese intentions existed somewhere in the US government, there
was no one or no organizationthat had access to all of them and could hence see the "big picture."
In part, this was because of a bureaucratic reluctanceto share information, either between the army
and the navy, or between Washington and Hawaii.

Thus, whenthe National Security Act ofl947 createdthe position ofDirector ofCentral Intelligence
and established the CIA, it specified that the DCI wouldhavethe legalauthority to see all intelligence
66 THE FuTuRE OF US INTELLIGENCE

collected by other agencies. This statutory grant of power was seen as the critical antidote to service
and departmental parochialism, which would otherwise lead to the "hoarding" of information. It is
on this key authority, and its rationale, that the Agency's all-source, centralized analytic effort became
preeminent within the Intelligence Community.

This centralizing tendency, which was also manifested in the creation, by the same act, of the
Department ofDefense, has continued until the present. Just as the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986
strengthened the "jointness" of the armed forces, the intelligence reform bills introduced in 1992 by
the chairmen ofthe Senate and House Intelligence Committees were designed to strengthen the DCI's
control ofthe Intelligence Community.

While centralization has remained the main tendency, the rationale has shifted. In recent years, the
emphasis has been more on efficiency, i.e., on the contention that centralized management can save
money by avoiding duplication and overlaps. This reflects the fact that the government-wide sharing
of intelligence information has by and large become routine, without the DCI having to invoke his
legal authority.

A second element is that intelligence must deal with all information necessary for the informed
making and implementing offoreign policy. (This, indeed, is Sherman Kent's definition offoreign
intelligence.) To some extent, this is modeled on the military's notion of intelligence; the J-2 or G-2,
the chief intelligence officer on a commander's staff, is responsible for providing the relevant
environmental information (such as the state of the weather, terrain, infrastructure, and so forth) as
well as information about the enemy's forces, location, and intentions.

But a more significant factor was the concentration of intelligence attention on the Soviet Union, a
nation that practiced pervasive secrecy with respect to almost all aspects of its political, military, and
economic life. Information that other countries published as a matter of course was considered
secret, and other opportunities to learn about what was going on -- through ordinary contacts such
as travel, business, cultural exchanges, diplomats' meetings with members of society, and so forth -­
were severely limited.

Thus, during the course of the Cold War intelligence became practically the sole source of
information about major aspects of the Soviet Union. Once collected, the information required
extensive analysis; this was true not only of data concerning Soviet military forces, but with respect
to the economy as well. A vast analytic effort was required to produce basic Soviet economic
statistics of the type that most countries publish as a matter of course. Even with respect to the
political intelligence that diplomats are best positioned to report on -- for example, intra-elite politics
- specialized methods, such as Kremlinology, were developed in order to decipher the few, elusive
clues that the regime allowed to emerge. In short, reinforced by the experience of having a "closed"
society and its allies as the overriding focus of the country's foreign and defense policy concerns,
intelligence about the Soviet Union became largely synonymous with information about the Soviet
Union.
 CONCLUSION 67

Connected with this notion of intelligence as the comprehensive source of foreign policy-relevant
information, and which is the third element in the prevailing paradigm, is the view that intelligence
can achieve a degree of objectivity that other forms of policymaking expertise can not attain. This
goes far beyond the obvious point that intelligence should not suppress or distort bits and pieces of
information that are "inconvenient" from the point ofthe policymaker: Any subordinate, whether in
a policy or intelligence agency, who did that would be guilty of dereliction of duty.

Rather, the idea is that intelligence can not only honestly report the facts as it collects them, but can
provide an analysis of those facts that will be superior to the analysis others could provide." By
virtue ofits objectivity, i.e., ofthe fact that intelligence analysts need not make policy judgments and
are not required to choose one policy over another, intelligence analysts are free to be guided by their
expertise. Thus, the most authoritative analysis should come from an agency like the CIA, which
does not have a departmental parent with its own policy and budget preferences.

In spite of a growing body of literature that casts doubt on the efficacy ofthis model, the idea that
the views of intelligence analysts, even when admittedly speculative and based on fragmentary
evidence (as is often the case), deserve greater credence than those ofpolicymakers has persevered."
And, in fact, the view of intelligence analysis as necessari1y more "expert" than policymakers'
judgments continues to be reflected in bureaucratic arrangements. The idea of concentrating analytic
resources in a single analytic agency, and of placing that agency at some distance - bureaucratic and
geographic -- from the policymakers derives from this basic view.

According to this approach, the best analytic work can be done in a comprehensive analytic center,
that brings together different types of expertise and is sufficiently free from day-to-day tasking to be
able to engage in long-term research; and it needs isolation from political pressures. The National
Intelligence Estimates (NIEs), which as the most authoritative and comprehensive intelligence
products form a pinnacle ofthe analytic system, best reflect this model. 6'

Of equal importance for understanding the existing paradigm is a consideration of what it tends to
neglect, or omit entirely. Counterintelligence tends to be viewed narrowly; CI is typically identified
with personnel and information security, i.e., keeping the adversary from recruiting one's own people
as agents or from obtaining our secrets from documents or communications. The possibility that the
adversary may be trying to deceive us, and hence that we need constantly to test and question the data
we obtain and the channels by which we obtain it, tends to be ignored; this results from a view that
intelligenceis fundamentally observing foreign circumstances and events and analyzing them, rather
than a battle with an adversary who is trying to withhold vital information from you.

Covert action, according to this paradigm, is not part of intelligence at all, since it is directed at
influencing events rather than learning about them. 66 However, if intelligence is thought of; as
suggested above, as a struggle between adversaries over information and, ultimately, the perceptions
they give rise to, then the manipulation of those perceptions - from the clandestine activities of an
agent ofinfluence to covert support ofpararnilitary forces waging a classic guerrilla struggle -- also
falls within the ambit of intelligence. 67
68 THE Fu1URE OF US INTELLIGENCE

The Reality vs. the Paradigm

Of course, the reality has never corresponded exactly with this paradigm; however, rather than
rethinking it, most of the reform efforts of the past decades have been attempts to change the
institutions so as to reflect the paradigm more precisely. The reluctance to do so has been attributed
primarily to the parochial interests of the various national security bureaucracies which are unwi11ing
to allow a single official, the DCI, to have the sort of power over the elements of the Intelligence
Community that would be necessary. However, this view ignores the possibility that the paradigm
itself is faulty or limited and that some of the resistance to implementing it more fully has been
reasonably based.

First of all, the type of centra1ized analytic capability envisaged by the paradigm was never created.
The Department of Defense and its various components proved unwi11ing to give up their own
analytic organizations. The 1992 reform bills, which would have concentrated all analytic capability
at Langley, represented the high point of this endeavor, but they never came close to enactment.
Moreover, all-source analysis could now be conducted at more than one place, since the sharing of
data among agencies was instituted in an effective manner. Indeed, it seems reasonable to argue that
having such competing analytic centers -- all having access to all-source intelligence, but possessing
different points ofview - provides policymakers better protection against new "Pearl Harbors," i.e.,
against being surprised, than would a single all-inclusive analysis agency.

Second, the scope of intelligence never became quite as broad as envisaged by the paradigm.
Although the CIA established a large capability for studying the Soviet economy and estimating its
size and health, it never established itself as a comparable authority for international economic issues
genera1ly. This issue is particularly salient at the momeot, as intelligence debates what role it should
play in the gathering and analysis of economic information. While, from the Keot perspective, it
would seem anomalous for intelligence not to deal with an issue of such obvious foreign policy
importance, other perspectives suggest that the IC's comparative advantage lay elsewhere than in
covering international economic issues that are studied carefully by many other institutions in the
society.

Finally, the notion that intelligence should be as separate from policy making as possible in order to
preserve its indepeodence has always run up against the desire of policymakers and operators in other
govenuneot departments to keep their own intelligeoce capability to the extent possible. While this
may be dismissed as simple bureaucratic protection of "turf," it may also reflect the reality that
timeliness, accessibility, and the focus of an intelligence product may be as important as a product'S
overall scholarly quality.

Conversely, after an initial period of formal control by the Secretary of State, the covert action
function was integrated fully into the CIA's clandestine service, where by and large it has remained.
Thus, in this case, the CIA does have a policy formulation and implementation function; it is
therefore, in principle at least, subject to the same temptations with regard to intelligence relevant to
CA as intelligeoce units in the State and Defense Departments would be with regard to intelligence
 CONCLUSION 69

that impinges on their parent organizations' policy and budget preferences. For this reason, reformers
have often raised the question of separating CA from the CIA's clandestine collection service.
However, the practical problems involved in running separate clandestine services for CA and for
intelligence collection, which led to the unification ofthe two functions in 1952, have prevented their
being separated again.
! •

Toward a New Paradigm

This paper has argued throughout that the various elements of the traditional paradigm have to be
questioned in the light ofthe end of the Cold War and the development of the new technologies of
the "information age." In each case, this requires rethinking some of the main themes to see if they
make sense under current conditions, or whether alternative approaches might not make more sense.

First, instead of seeking to further centralize the IC, one might ask whether a more diversified
organizational structure might not be advantageous in some cases. For example, the discussion of
intelligence's role with respect to nontraditional issues often seems to assume that, if an issue is
considered important, then it automatically follows that intelligence ought to deal with it. An
alternative approach that assumed a more diversified structure could begin with the notion of
"comparative advantage," i.e., which organization, intelligence or otherwise, is best suited to deal
with a given issue.

In the case ofmany ofthe "nontraditional" issues, expertise now resides elsewhere in the government,
or in various nongovernmental institutions in the society. In most cases, rather than seek to duplicate
it within the IC, it might make more sense to ask how government can best exploit and foster the
expertise that already exists. For example, a government-sponsored research agency, the Centers for
Disease Control (CDC), already possesses extensive epidemiological expertise. Instead of trying to
build up a similar capability in the IC, it would make more sense to determine what kind of
coordinating institutions or procedures would enable CDC to make use of intelligence collection
capabilities when necessary, for example, to track a new virus in a remote region.

Second, centra1ization in the name of efficiency may have to be balanced against the desirability of
greater flexibility in the collection process. Because of both technological and political changes in
the intelligence environment, there may be new collection opportunities if we are able to take
advantage of them.

While overhead systems will remain vital, new airborne and close-in systems can make an important
contribution at lower cost. New technology will facilitate the development of unmanned aerial
vehicles (UAVs) as collection platforms and of ground sensors that can be implanted from the air.
Similarly, extreme miniaturization will make possible a range of sensors that can be emplaced
clandestinely.
70 THE FuTuRE OF US IN1ELUGENCE

As commercial satellite photo reconnaissance becomes available, it will be more important to

distinguish between collection that the adversaryunderstands and that which can catch him unawares.
Obviously, data collected by means of a system the adversary understands must be treated more
skeptically, taking into account that his awareness of the system's capabilities may allow him to use
it as a channel for deceptive information."

Even in the human intelligence collection discipline, new methods, including a greater emphasis on
nonofficial cover officers (Noes) and officers under military cover, may be appropriate under current
conditions. While the classically hard targets remain (e.g., the North Korean government and nuclear
program), other targets may require innovative approaches, for example, the monitoring of cash flows
and establishment of controlled banks to track international narcotics dealers. Some "soft" targets,
such as the monitoring of the popular mood and of local political developments in Bosnia, may
nevertheless be crucial for US foreign policy objectives and the safety of deployed military forces.
A human intelligence collection system that can deal with this wide array of targets will require a
balance between a centralized management system (which keeps the different parts from tripping over
each other) and a flexible decision-making and operational structure that allows for the targeting of
a diverse set of problems.

Thin!, a new approach should address the perennia1 problem ofensuring the relevance and timeliness
of intelligence products. While this issue has been recognized as important, the fear of the loss of
objectivity has prevented the implementation of innovative solutions. Although some progress has
been made in the recognition of this problem, institutional solutions may be ultimately required to
make a major difference.

Recognizing that it is legitimate for the various departments of government and components of the
Department ofDefense to preserve their own intelligence analysis capabilities for their own purposes
is a basic but key, first step. By retaining and strengthening these departmental analytic centers,
policymakers will have access to analysis tailored to their concerns. (In addition, as noted, having
several different groups of analysts address key issues lessens the possibility that the alternatives to
the "conventional wisdom" will be ignored.)

One set of organizational solutions would be to create, either on a permanent or ad hoc basis, joint
intelligence-policygroups to study specific questions. For example, some issues, such as the future
of the short- and intermediate-range ballistic missile threat, may best be considered in the form of a
"net assessment" of the evolving threat and of the US ability to defend against it. This requires
dealing with a range of "blue" issues, including operational questions (such as "Scud hunting"
techniques), which lie outside the bailiwick ofintelligence. A similar technique, "red tearning," allows
for a joint intelligence-policy consideration of what strategies an adversary might employ and how
well we would be able to counter them. By combining both "red" and "blue" perspectives, one avoids
the possiblysterile exercise of trying to predict the adversary's actions and instead is able to focus on
the interaction between the two sides and thus develop a better sense of the strategic situation.
 CONCLUSION 71

On the military side, .the Revolution in Military Affairs is likely to compel a closing of the gap
between intelligence and operators. Certain weapon systems, such as precision-guided munitions,
require much more detailed targeting information; in the future, it may be necessary to update this
information in real time and convey it directly to the delivery vehicle. In such a situation, the
intelligence and operational aspects of the system will have to be closely linked and planned as a
single system. Given that the pace of innovation in this area is likely to be quite rapid, too great a
bureaucratic distance between the operational and intelligence sides will be a serious hindrance.

Similarly, some ofthe new technologies (such as UAVs) will allow certain reconnaissance functions
to be controlled by lower-level military commanders (e.g., at the division level.) While this may not
be efficient in a textbook sense, since it could result in duplication of effort and a failure to allocate
resources in the most efficient manner across the entire theater, it may enable the individual
commander to acquire information that is more timely and relevant and hence enable him to act more
quickly and with greater initiative.

As sensors become more capable, and as the sensor-to-shooter Iinks become more rapid and, in some
cases, automated, the division between "intelligence collection" (as a function of an intelligence
organization) and "reconnaissance" (as a function of a military unit) will become more and more
artificial. For some purposes, overhead systems may provide tactical information for deployed forces,
and may have to transmit that data in seconds or minutes, rather than hours or days.

Fourth, counterintelligence and covert action must be seen not as an afterthought or an auxiliary
function, but as integral to the entire intelligence enterprise. CI has the ultimate function of ensuring
that intelligence collection and analysis is not being manipulated by an adversary. Precisely because
intelligenceis not a matter of obtaining information about a passive subject, but about an adversary
typically seeking to hide or distort the truth, CI must be an ever present concern. And, similarly,
because the intelligence competition is conducted for the sake of securing some political or other
advantage, the advisability of exploiting this information logically follows. For this reason, covert
action is a part of intelligence, not merely for reasons of bureaucratic convenience, but because it
enables the government to make the most direct and effective use of information to achieve its
national security objectives.

Organizing for the Future

Under this new paradigm, the Intelligence Community would become much more diverse
organizationallyand functionally, and its border with the policy community and the military operators
would become less rigid and more permeable. Although a DCI (perhaps renamed the "Director of
National Intelligence") would still be needed to provide coordination, and perhaps to provide some
overall policy direction as the president's chief intelligence officer, he would have less, rather than
more, direct budgetary or administrative control over all the various pieces.
72 THE Flm.JRE OF US INTEllIGENCE

On the other hand, certain activities would remain clearly within the intelligence ambit and would
become the core concerns of the DCI as head of the Intelligence Community. Clandestine human
collection against the harder targets would be one such activity. Covert action would be another,
although some types of operations now classified as CA (such as secret help to a friendly
government) could be excluded. In addition, the DCI would be responsible for overall
counterintelligence policy and the coordination of counterintelligence activities (although
counterespionage within the United States would remain an FBI function.) In short, traditional
intelligence activities would remainas a kind of core of intelligence, surrounded by a much larger set
of information collection and analysis activities undertaken by other government departments and
agencies. Intelligence, in the narrow sense, however, would sti1I be responsible for safeguarding the
larger effort, against penetration by foreign intelligence agencies and deception efforts.
 ENDNOTES

PREFACE

1. Monographs sponsored by the Working Group and essays by some of its members were
published in US Intelligence at the Crossroads: Agendasfor Reform, Roy Godson, Ernest R May,
and Gary Schmitt, eds. (Washington and London: Brassey's, 1995),

CHAPTER I - WHY INTELLIGENCE REFORM

2. Within the 000, for example, intelligence had been centralized to some extent by the creation
of the Defense Intelligence Agency (at the expense of the intelligence units of the individual military
services) in 1961.

CHAPTER II - US STRATEGY

3. For a discussion of managing uncertainty from a broader perspective, see Stephen Peter
Rosen, Winning the Next War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UniversityPress, 1991), pp. 221-50.

CHAPTER m - INTELLIGENCE AND THE "INFORMATION AGE"

4. The Sovietgovernment did publish a single roublefigure as its defense expenditure, but it was
well short ofthe actual amount.

5. Believing that open discussion ofleadership differences would create a political vulnerability
that its enemies could exploit, the Soviet system went to great lengths to conceal any differences of
interestor opinion amongits leaders. Nevertheless, the advantage to a faetionalleader of expressing
his views, albeit in codedform, was apparently sufficiently important that the raw material existed for
the development of "Kremlinology," a specialized method of reading leadership statements to gain
some. insight on the struggles that were going on below the surface.

6. Outsidethe executive branch, Congresshas the Congressional ResearchService of the Library

ofCongressand the Congressional Budget Office, although the latter is not particularly relevant for
national security matters. Until recently, it also had the Office of Technology Assessment.

7. Reported, for example, in EXDIS and Noms State Department cables.

8. For a discussion of this issue, see Douglas MacEachin, "The Tradecraft of Analysis," in US
Intelligence at the Crossroads, pp. 63-74.
74 THEFuTuRE OF US lNrELLIGENCE

9. The bureaucratic separation ignores the fact that large parts of intelligence analysis overlap
with the realm ofpolicy reasoning generally; both rely on judgments that are relatively "soft" in terms
oftheir information base and that depend heavily on the analyst's general understanding of politics
and strategy.

CHAPTER IV - ANALYSIS AND ESTIMATES

10. At least at first, personal contact is probably necessary to establish confidence; afterwards,
informal written products can effectively maintain communication, without having to demonstrate
every point exhaustively. Unfortunately, the high turnover among senior government officials implies
that this type ofrelationship is likely to be short-lived.

11. In any case, the existence ofa central intelligence agency does not guarantee that an effective
mechanism exists to tap into information from other sources (open source information and
nonintelligence government information). Indeed, a departmental agency may find it easier to obtain
some of this information (e.g., information derived from diplomatic contacts); similarly, a
nonintelligence organization might find it easier to make full use of certain kinds of open source
information (e.g., information collected by traveling scholars or businessmen.) Although we use the
term "all-source," it is worth noting that the information one agency collects from a particularly
sensitive source (e.g., a highly placed human agent) may nevertheless be withheld from other parts
of the Intelligence Community.

12. As an aid to policymaking, an estimate is most important precisely with respect to those
situations which the US wishes to influence. Indeed, if the US can not or will not affect the evolution
ofa situation, then the full estimate, with its assessment ofthe forces at work, might not be necessary.
See Willmoore Kendall, "The Function of Intelligence," World Politics, vol. 1, no. 6 (July 1949) for
a discussion of the question of prediction.

13. Richard K. Betts, "Analysis, War, and Decision: Why Intelligence Failures Are Inevitable,"
WorldPolitics 31, no. 1 (October 1978). Betts's pessimism should be compared with the earlier, more
sanguine view of analysis' possibilities implicit in the titles of such works as Sherman Kent's "Truth
Before Power" and Thomas Hughes's The Fate ofFacts ina World ofMen (1976).

14. See, for example, Joseph S. Nye, "Estimating the Future?" in US Intelligence at the
Crossroads: Agendasfor Reform, pp. 91-92.

15. For a succinct discussion of how the problem of conformity might be addressed, see Jack
Davis, " Combating Mindset," in Studies in Intelligence (Winter 1991), pp. 13-19.

16. For example, a common thought among Arabists was that, although one Arab country might
use terrorism or low-level violence against another, it would not conduct an outright invasion. In this
case, "mirror imaging" might have done a better job of understanding Saddam Hussein.
 ENDNOTES 75

17. Douglas 1. MacEachin, "The Tradecraft of Analysis: Challenge and Change in the CIA," US
Intelligence at the Crossroads: Agendasfor Reform, pp. 63-64, 75.

CHAPTER V - HUMAN INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION

18. Unnoticed in the furor of the Ames case was the implication that the United States had had
major humint successes in the pre-1985 period; their magnitude is suggested by the fact that the
Soviets were apparently so shocked that they immediately arrested those involved, although this
risked alerting the United States to Ames's treachery.

19. While technical collection methods could collect this information, it would take time to build
up the necessary databases, to determine the key communications links, etc. Much of this effort could
be avoided by the recruitment of a few well-placed sources.

20. Even this case differs from the former Soviet case in one important respect: many East
European and former Soviet officials, who served in Pyongyang as representatives of allied
governments (and hence were presumably able to learn more than other diplomats), are now readily
accessible to us.

21. This term is meant to refer to the types ofmethods used, rather than the identity of the agency
using them.

22. Of particular importance, is the requirement in US law that prosecutors make available to the
defense any exculpatory evidence. It is unclear how great a threat this might pose to the CIA's ability
to protect sources and methods in a case where its information is used in a prosecution. See Stewart
A. Baker, "Should Spies Be Cops?" in Foreign Policy, no. 97 (Winter 1994), pp. 36-52.

23. In 1995, this position was abolished when a military affairs advisor to the DCI was appointed.

24. Walter Jajko, "The Future of Defense Intelligence," in US Intelligence at the Crossroads:
Agendas for Reform, p. 227. This section relies generally on Jajko's paper, and on Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence, US House ofRepresentatives, Report on the Intelligence Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 1995, Rept. 103-541, pp. 21-22.

25. Tony Capaccio, ''New Pentagon Spy Service Conducted Operations in Haiti," Defense Week,
April 17, 1995, p. I.

26. HPSCI report, op. cit., p. 21. However, it should be noted that the committee's recent report
on the future ofintelligence, "IC21," recommends abolishing DHS and, if necessary, detailing military
officers to a reorganized DO.
76 THEFuTuRE OF US INTELLIGENCE

27. As one approaches the given time, the weather can be predicted more confidently, and X
should rise toward 100 or fall toward zero.

28. In CIA terminology, the CIA employee is called an "officer" while the person the officer
recruits is called an "agent." In FBI terminology, these people would be "agent" and "source,"
respectively.

29. See, for example, David Ignatius, "Downspying the CIA," Washington Post, March 5, 1995,
p. C1.

30. See the account of his confirmation testimony before the Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence in R. Jeffrey Smith, "Deutch Vows to Clean Out Top ofCIA," Washington Post, April
27, 1995, p. A16.

31. Thus, Aldrich Ames, son ofa DO officer and member in good standing ofthe "club," was not
in his pre-espionage years sanctioned or dismissed for drunkenness and other kinds of misbehavior
(such as bringing a woman friend to a "safehouse"). Conversely. "Jane Doe" (the female DO officer
who reportedly settled a sexual harassment suit against the CIA for several hundred thousand dollars)
seems to have originally earned the enmity of some ofher colleagues by seeking disciplinary action
against subordinates who engaged in this type of activity.

32. Statement ofthe Director of Central Intelligence on the Clandestine Services and the Damage
Caused by Aldrich Ames, 7 December 1995, p. 8.

33. Media Advisory: Ames Damage Assessment, Statement, Chairman and Vice Chairman, Senate
Select Committee on Intelligence, December 8, 1995, p. 3.

34. DCI Statement, op. cit., p. 9, note.

35. For example, former DCI Robert Gates, who had an intelligence background but had not
served in the DO, has charged that, as DCI, he was told neither that Aldrich Ames was under
suspicion, nor about the full extent of the losses he caused. Carla Anne Robbins, "CIA's Guatemala
Scandal Tums Up Pressure for Quick, Broad Reform ofIntelligence Services," Wall Street Journal,
April 11, 1995, page A22.

36. For example, despite reported pressure from former DCI Robert Gates for the DO to field
more NOCs, the matter is still unresolved. David Ignatius, op. cit.

CHAPTER VI· TECHNICAL INTElLIGENCE COLLECTION

37. See, for example, the following remarkable claim by former DCI Stansfield Turner:
"Washington can easily construct a system that will detect any significant activity on the surface of
the earth, day or night, under clouds or jungle cover, and with such frequency as to make deliberate
 ENDNOlES 77

evasion difficult.... [Costing] $5 billion to purchase and $1 billion per year to operate...it would be
a bargain." "Intelligence for a New World Order," Foreign Affairs 70, no. 4 (Fall 1991), p. 191.

38. This was important in terms of our ability to lead the anti-Iraq coalition effectively in the Gulf
War. Although, as a result of that experience, other nations are attempting to increase their
independent technical intelligence collection capabilities, they are starting out a long distance behind,
and are likely to find that duplicating US capabilities is beyond their means.

CHAPTER vn - COVERT ACTION

39. With respect to assassination, of course, this issue has been dealt with by means of the
Executive Order prohibition.

40. Of course, "publicly acceptable" is not an adequate synonym for "ethical"; however, to the
extent that the public accepts or even demands unethical behavior, then the secrecy of CA is not the
problem. In addition, public attitudes can change: one wonders if the American public of 1962 would
have reacted the same way to the revelation of the Castro assassination plots as did the public of
1975.

41. Although the examples ofpost-World War IT Germany and Japan should give pause to those
who assert that one cannot impose a democratic form ofgovernment from the outside.

42. The characterization of the Nicaraguan covert program as a success is admittedly

controversial; it would seem, however, that the Sandinistas' willingness to allow a relatively free
election in 1990 was not unconnected with the pressure being exerted by the Contras.

43. Given the nature and number of variables involved in CA's implementation (as with most
national security instruments) it is improbable that much precision can be expected in assessing the
effectiveness of most CA programs. Nevertheless, it is worth considering whether CA programs in
general have in the past fared any better or worse in obtaining their objectives than other national
security tools, such as diplomacy, embargoes, foreign aid, or overt military action.

44. As opposed to the definitions that appeared in the Ford, Carter, and Reagan Executive
Orders.

45. Intelligence Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1991, P.L. 102-88 August 14, 1991, §602
(amending Title V of National Security Act of 1947, by inserting new §§501-503; new §503(e)
contains the quoted definition of covert action.)

46. Conference Report (Report 101-928), Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991,
p.28.
78 THE Fu1URE OF US INTELLIGENCE

CHAPTER vm - COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

47. In addition to the longlistofpenetrations ofUS agencies uncovered in the 1980s and 1990s,
one should note that at least two states -- Cuba and East Germany -- successfully ran extensive
double agent operations against us for years.

48. Some CI professionals have gone so far as to suggest that the Ames case should not be
considered a failure because Ames was ultimately identified as a mole and arrested. A similar
argument was made in the wake of John Walker's arrest in 1985, after having worked for Soviet
intelligence since 1968.

49. While Ames's pre-1985 career was far from stellar, it was not the unrelieved disaster
sometimes portrayed. He got relatively good marks for his work in New York, but failed to perform
on two overseas tours. He did, however, havea problem with alcohol; several supervisors suggested
he receive counseling for it, but there is no record that this ever happened. More immediately, the
circumstances surrounding his divorce and remarriage should have raised some warning flags: he
violated regulations in not reporting his intimate relationship with a foreign national and Agency asset,
and his financial situation became very difficult.

50. Address by James R. Woolsey, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington,
DC, July 18, 1994.

51. Quoted material is from a DCI memo to DDO Clair George, June 4, 1986, as cited in US
Senate, SelectCommitteeon Intelligence, "An Assessment of the Aldrich H. Ames Espionage Case
and Its Implications for US Intelligence," November 1, 1994, p. 27.

52. It was not until October 1986that the CI staff established the "Special Task Force" to review
the compromises in the light of; among other things, which CIA employees had access to those cases.
Senate report (see previous note), pp. 43-44.
In part, this reluctance to look at DO personnel as the source for the compromised Soviet
operations was due to the CIA's(over)confidence in the polygraph as a security tool and investigative
technique. For example, according to the Joint (i.e.,CIAlDoD) Security Commission, a 1993 CIA
study claims that using the polygraph "facilitates the flow of classified information within [CIA],"
"enables the CIA to use minimal internal information systems security checks," and "reduces the need
for domestic physical security countermeasures." ["Redefining Security," February 28, 1994, p. 64.]
Not surprisingly, then, havingbeen favorably polygraphed in 1986 and 1991, Ames was given wide
accessto Agencyoperations and information, despite knowledge within the DO of his problematical
financial and personal affairs.
Nevertheless, Ames claimed that he might have been deterred had he known in 1985 that he
would face a polygraph examination in the near future. (The Agency's routine reinvestigations ofits
personnel were well behind schedule at the time: Ames's previous reinvestigation had been in 1976.)
Transcript of interview with Aldrich Ames conducted by Congressmen Dan Glickman and Larry
Combest, August8, 1994, p. 16, reprinted in ReportofInvestigation: The Aldrich AmesEspionage
 ENDNOTES 79

Case, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, US House of Representatives, (Washington:

GPO, November 30, 1994).

53. "The CIA and the Aldrich Ames Case," Statement ofR James Woolsey, DCI, before the
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, US House of Representatives, September 28, 1994,
p. 16, reprinted in Report ofInvestigation: The Aldrich Ames Espionage Case. (See previous note.)

54. "Redefining Security," February 28, 1994, p. 33.

55. Not surprisingly, given the greater clarity about one's own objectives, it is easier to conceive
of such deception operations in wartime than in time of peace. An additional reason why wartime
deception is more common is that, in war, the adversary is more likely to take quick action on the
basis ofhis beliefsabout the situation; thus, one learns more quickly and more certainly whether the
deception has succeeded. In any case, some "feedback" mechanism that provides insight into the
adversary's perceptions of the situation is often important for successful deception.

56. Hence the term multidisciplinary counterintelligence, or MOCI.

57. As is well known, the British "double cross" system was a remarkably extensive and
successful operation of this sort against Germany in World War II. Thus, it is noteworthy that the
British themselves fell victimto a sma11erversion of the same thing vis-a-vis the Germans (Operation
"North Pole," Holland, 1942-44).

58. See David Kay, "Denial and Deception: The Lesson of Iraq" in US Intelligence at the
Crossroads: Agendasfor Reform, pp. 109-27.

59. It might be objected that, in the post Cold War era, no such deception operation is required
or even conceivable. Nevertheless, we have important differences with Russia on various issues, e.g.,
the sale ofnuclear reactors to Iran A deception operation that would make them hesitant to provide
the reactors could certainly be advantageous.

60. Adding to the CI workload is the large number of espionage investigations opened in the
United States at the end of the Cold War, generated by intelligence provided by recruits, defectors,
and archives of the collapsed Soviet empire.

61. The Commission in its fina1 report states that counterintelligence is "crucial to the success of
the entire" intelligence effort. However, despite these words, the Commission does not discuss what
is required for effective CI - not a single chapter of the report's 14 chapters is concerned with CI -­
but merely refers to the changes made in the wake of the Ames case, noting that it is "too early to
evaluate" whether "these changes will have a long-term positive effect." p.20.
80 THE FuTuRE OF US lNIELLIGENCE

CHAPTER IX - CONCLUSION

62. The paradigm's theoretical underpinnings were laid out in Sherman Kent's 1949 book,
Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy (princeton: Princeton University Press, 1949;
reprint, 1966), which remains the single best explication of this approach to intelligence. For an
extended analysis of that approach and its implications, see Abram Shulsky and Gary Schmitt, Silent
Warfare: Understanding the World ofIntelligence, Second Edition, Revised (Washington, DC:
Brassey's US, 1993), pp. 177-197.

63. As explained by Sherman Kent, the reason that intelligence analysis can make this type of
claim is that it can use a variant of the scientific method, although one associated with the social
sciences rather than the more methodologically advanced and sophisticated natural sciences. In other
words, intelligence analysts deserve the same respect paid to scientists, even if their social science-like
expertise is not as fully developed. This argument reflects the social science optimism ofthe 1940s
and 1950s; it is less common now that social scientists are much less sanguine about enhancing the
"scientific" character oftheir discipline.

64. In some cases, this is reasonable: the analysts have more time to devote to reviewing the
available evidence; they may have greater familiarity with the issues; and they do not have a direct
bureaucratic interest in the result. On the other hand, once one recognizes that intelligence analysis
cannot, on the whole, be made "scientific," one realizes that there may be countervailing arguments
as well. Far from being amateurs with respect to the issues with which they deal (although that is
sometimes the case), policymakers may in fact have academic or practical expertise; they may have
relevant experiences - e.g., negotiating with foreign officials -- that the intelligence analysts do not
possess; and they are forced to confront issues, and to take responsibility for their decisions, in a way
in which intelligence analysts are not.

65. This is less true recently than in previous years when the NIEs presented a single "best
judgment" and relegated dissenting views to footnotes. The attempt to provide within the text more
of the evidence and reasoning on which the judgments are based -- to make the process more
"transparent" -- also represents a departure from the model. See Joseph S. Nye, "Estimating the
Future" in US Intelligence at the Crossroads: Agendasfor Reform, pp. 91-96.

66. Therefore, the argument is often made that covert action should not be part of intelligence
because it may damage objectivity; if an intelligence agency is responsible for carrying out a covert
action, according to this view, its assessments ofthe situation it is trying to influence will be distorted
by a desire to support its program and to demonstrate that it is successful.

67. For an extended discussion of counterintelligence and covert action and their practices in
America, see Roy Godson, Dirty Tricksor Tromp Cards: US Coven Action and Counterintelligence
(Washington, DC: Brassey's US, 1995).

68. David Kay, "Denial and Deception: The Lessons of Iraq" m US Intelligence at the
Crossroads: Agendasfor Reform, pp. 109-27.
 MEMBERS OF THE

WORKING GROUP ON INTELLIGENCE REFORM

Radm. Thomas Brooks, USN (Ret.)

Mr. W. Douglas Gow
Vice President of Government Markets,
Former Associate Deputy Director,
AT&T
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Dr. Eliot Cohen

Mr. David Gries
Director of Strategic Studies,
Former Director, Center for the Study of
School of Advanced International Studies,
Intelligence, CIA
The Johns Hopkins University

Mr. Brian Dailey

Brig. Gen. Walter Jajko, USAF (Ret.)
Vice President,
Assistant to the Secretary for Intelligence
Business Development and Washington
Oversight, Office ofthe Secretary of
Operations, Lockheed Corporation Defense

Dr. Jack Davis Dr. John Keliher

Former Senior Official, Former Director, Office ofNonproliferation
Central Intelligence Agency and National Security,
US Department of Energy
Captain Fred Demech, Jr., USN
Former Executive Director, Mr. Richard Kerr
President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Former Deputy Director of Central
Board Intelligence

Mr. RandaU Fort Dr. Brian LateU

Former Deputy Assistant Secretary for Director, Center for the Study of
Functional Analysis and Research, Intelligence, CIA
US Department of State
Dr. Carnes Lord
Dr. John Foster, Jr.
Former National Security Advisor to the
Chairman,
Vice President
Technology Strategies and Alliances

Mr. Douglas MacEachin

Dr. Roy Godson
Former Deputy Director for Intelligence
Consortium for the Study of Intelligence;
Central Intelligence Agency
Georgetown University

81

Mr. John MacGaffin Dr. Stephen Rosen

Fonner Senior Official, Associate Director, John M. Olin Center
Central Intelligence Agency for International Studies,
Harvard University
Mr. David Major
Fonner Special Assistant to the Assistant Dr. Gary Schmitt
Director, Fonner Executive Director,
Federal Bureau of Investigation President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory
Board
Mr. Andrew Marshall
Director, Net Assessment, Dr. Abram N. Shulsky
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense Senior Fellow,
National Strategy Information Center
Dr. Ernest R. May
Harvard University Mr. Thomas Smeeton
Fonner Administrator/ChiefInvestigator,
Dr. John Millis House Committee on the Judiciary
House Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence Ms. Nina Stewart
Fonner Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Amb. James Nolan Defense
Fonner Director, Office of Foreign Missions,
US Department of State Mr. Robert F. Turner
Associate Director, Center for Law and
Dr. William J. Olson National Security,
Fonner Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, University of Virginia School ofLaw
Bureau of International Narcotics
Lt. Gen. C. Norman Wood, USAF (Ret.)
Mr. George Pickett Fonner Director, Intelligence Community
Director, Staff;
Northrop Grumman Analysis Center President, Armed Forces Communication
and Electronic Association
Ms. Diane Roark
House Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence

82

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