THE LEGISLATURE (Art. VI)
o Sec. 2 of RA 9006 declares the principles and objectives of
Term and Tenure
Farias v. Exec Sec (2003 Callejo, Sr., J.)
FACTS:
 Petitioners were Rodolfo Farias, Mauel Garcia, Francis Escudero,
and Agapito Aquino. At the time of the filing, they were members of
the minority bloc in the HOR.
 Petitioners seek the declaration of unconstitutionality of Sec. 14 of
RA 9006 (The Fair Election Act) as it expressly repeals Sec. 67 of
BP 881 (The Omnibus Election Code) which provides: “Any elective
official, whether national or local, running for any office other than the
one which he is holding in a permanent capacity, except for President
and Vice-President, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his
office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.”
 Petitioners contend that the repeal of Sec. 67 of the Omnibus
Election Code was not embraced in the title of RA 9006 (AN ACT TO
ENHANCE THE HOLDING OF FREE, ORDERLY, HONEST,
PEACEFUL, AND CREDIBLE ELECTIONS THROUGH FAIR
ELECTION PRACTICES), nor was it germane to the subject matter of
the RA.
o RA 9006 deals with the lifting of the ban on the use of media
for election propaganda and the elimination of unfair election
practices, while Sec. 67 imposes a limitation on elective
officials who run for office other than the one they are already
holding by considering them resigned upon the filing of their
COC.
 Petitioners also assert that Sec. 14 of RA 9006 violates the equal
protection clause because it repeals Sec. 67 but leaves Sec. 66 of
the OEC. Sec. 66 imposes a similar limitation but on appointive
officials.
 The Respondents contend that the petitioners have no legal standing
to present the suit. They also invoked the enrolled bill doctrine, and
also argued that the titled of RA 9006 is broad enough to encompass
all processes involved in an election. They also contend that elective
and appointive officials cannot be treated the same.
ISSUE: W/N Sec. 14 of RA 9006 is unconstitutional.
HELD: NO.
 The Court adopted a liberal stance of the procedural matter of
standing, since the petitioners were members of Congress and are
allowed to challenge the validity of acts and the like.
 According to Sec. 26(1) Art. VI of the Constitution, “Every bill
passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall
be expressed in the title thereof.”
o The title need not be an abstract or index of the Act.
the act, stating that “The State shall ensure that bona fide
candidates for any public office shall be free from any form of
harassment and discrimination.”
o The Court is convinced that the title of RA 9006 and its
objectives are comprehensive enough to include the repeal of
Sec. 67 of OEC, since requiring the repeal to be in the title is
to insist that the title be an index of the Act.
 The Court held that an act having a single general subject, indicated
in the title, may contain any number of provisions, no matter how
diverse they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent with or
foreign to the general subject, and may be considered in furtherance
of such subject by providing for the method and means of carrying
out the general subject.
 By repealing Sec. 67 but retaining Sec. 66 of the Omnibus Election
Code, the legislators deemed it proper to treat these two classes of
officials (elective and appointive) differently with respect to the effect
on their tenure in the office of the filing of the certificates of candidacy
for any position other than those occupied by them.
 The Court also upheld the enrolled bill doctrine.
Qualifications
Limbona v. COMELEC (2009 Nachura, J.)
FACTS:
 Petitioner Norlaine Limbona and her husband Mohammad each filed
a COC for Mayor of Pantar, Lanao del Norte for the May 2007
elections.
 Private respondent Malik Alingan filed disqualification cases against
the petitioner and her husband, on the grounds that they lacked the
one-year residency requirement and that they were not registered
voters of Pantar.
 Petitioner subsequently withdrew her COC and filed a motion to
dismiss the case against her for mootness.
 COMELEC disqualified Mohammad for failure to comply with the
residency requirement. Petitioner then filed her COC as substitute
candidate. Aligan filed a petition for disqualification against her.
 The COMELEC 2nd Division disqualified Limbona, and held that she
lacked the residency requirement.
o Her domicile of origin was Maguing. When she got married
she became a resident of Barangay Rapsun, Marawi City,
where Mohammad was Barangay Chairman.
o It was held that Barangay Rapsun was her domicile under the
Family Code.
 The COMELEC En Banc affirmed the disqualification.
 Limbona argues that she resided for almost 2 years before the May
2007 elections in Pantar, and that even if her husband was Punong
Barangay of Rapsun he never abandoned Pantar as his domicile of
origin.
ISSUE: W/N Limbona should be disqualified.
HELD: YES.
 The Court upheld the decision of the COMELEC.
 The first disqualification case filed against Limbona already resolved
the issue. It held that:
o For purposes of election law, the question of residence is
mainly one of intention. The 3 rules are: (1) that a man must
have a residence or domicile somewhere; (2) that where once
established it remains until a new one is acquired; and (3) a
man can have but one domicile at a time.
o In order to acquire a domicile by choice, there must concur (1)
residence or bodily presence in the new locality, (2) an
intention to remain there, and (3) an intention to abandon the
old domicile. A persons domicile once established is
considered to continue and will not be deemed lost until a
new one is established.
o The Petitioner’s claim that she resided in Panta for almost 20
months prior to the elections is self-serving and
unsubstantiated. It is alleged that respondent has been
staying, sleeping and doing business in her house for more
than 20 months in Lower Kalanganan and yet, there is no
independent and competent evidence that would corroborate
such statement.
o The filing of her Certificate of Candidacy in Pantar, standing
alone, is not sufficient to hold that she has chosen Pantar as
her new residence.
o Mohammad’s domicile was only established on November
2006. Under the Family Code, it only follows that the
petitioner effected the change in her domicile on the same
date.
Apportionment and Reapportionment
Bagabuyo v. COMELEC (2008 Brion, J.)
FACTS:
 Cagayan de Oro used to have only one legislative district. But in
2006, CdO Congressman Constantino Jaraula sponsored a bill to
have two legislative districts in CdO instead.
 The law was passed (RA 9371) hence two legislative districts were
created.
 Rogelio Bagabuyo assailed the validity of the said law and he went
immediately to the Supreme Court to enjoin the COMELEC from
enforcing the law in the upcoming elections.
 Bagabuyo was contending that the 2nd district was created without a
plebiscite which he averred was required by the Constitution.
ISSUE: W/N a plebiscite was required in the case at bar.
HELD: NO.
 RA 9371 merely increased the representation of Cagayan de Oro City
in the House of Representatives and Sangguniang Panglungsod
pursuant to Section 5, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution;
 the criteria established under Section 10, Article X of the 1987
Constitution only apply when there is a creation, division, merger,
abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries of a province, city,
municipality, or barangay;
o in this case, no such creation, division, merger, abolition or
alteration of boundaries of a local government unit took place;
and R.A. No. 9371 did not bring about any change in
Cagayan de Oro’s territory, population and income
classification; hence, no plebiscite is required.
o What happened here was a reapportionment of a single
legislative district into two legislative districts.
o Reapportionment is the realignment or change in legislative
districts brought about by changes in population and
mandated by the constitutional requirement of equality of
representation.
 Before, Cagayan de Oro had only one congressman and 12 city
council members citywide for its population of approximately 500,000.
By having two legislative districts, each of them with one
congressman, Cagayan de Oro now effectively has two
congressmen, each one representing 250,000 of the city’s
population. This easily means better access to their congressman
since each one now services only 250,000 constituents as against
the 500,000.
Aquino v. COMELEC (2010 Perez, J.)
FACTS:
 Petitioners Sen. Benigno Auino III and Mayor Jesse Robredo seek
the declaration of unconstitutionality of RA 9716 (An Act
Reapportioning the Composition of the First (1st) and Second (2nd)
Legislative Districts in the Province of Camarines Sur and Thereby
Creating a New Legislative District From Such Reapportionment).
 RA 9716 created an additional legislative district for Camarines Sur
by reconfiguring the existing first and second legislative districts of
the province.
 The first district municipalities were combined with the second district
municipalities to form a new second legislative district.
 Petitioners contend that the reapportionment violates the
constitutional standard that requires the minimum population of
250,000 for the creation of a legislative district, since the proposed
district will end up with only a population of 176,383.
 Petitioners invoked Sec. 5(3) Art. VI of the Consti, which states that
“Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or
each province, shall have at least one representative.”
 The Respondents contend that there is a distinction between cities
and provinces drawn by Sec. 5(3) Art. VI. They argue that the
250,000 minimum population is only a requirement for the creation of
a legislative district in a city. They deny a fixed population
requirement for the reapportionment of districts in provinces.
ISSUE: W/N RA 9716 is unconstitutional.
HELD: NO.
 There is a plain and clear distinction between the entitlement of a city
to a district on one hand, and the entitlement of a province to a district
on the other. For a province is entitled to at least a representative,
there is nothing mentioned about the population. Meanwhile, a city
must first meet a population minimum of 250,000 in order to be
similarly entitled.
 It should be clearly read that Section 5(3) of the constitution requires
a 250,000 minimum population only for a city to be entitled to a
representative, but not so for a province.
o The Province of Camarines Sur, with an estimated population
of 1,693,821 in 2007 is ─ based on the formula and constant
number of 250,000 used by the Constitutional Commission in
nationally apportioning legislative districts among provinces
and cities ─ entitled to two (2) districts in addition to the four
(4) that it was given in the 1986 apportionment. Significantly,
petitioner Aquino concedes this point. In other words, Section
5 of Article VI as clearly written allows and does not prohibit
an additional district for the Province of Camarines Sur, such
as that provided for in Republic Act No. 9786;
o Based on the pith and pitch of the exchanges on the
Ordinance on the protests and complaints against strict
conformity with the population standard, and more importantly
based on the final districting in the Ordinance on
considerations other than population, the reapportionment or
the recomposition of the first and second legislative districts in
the Province of Camarines Sur that resulted in the creation of
a new legislative district is valid even if the population of the
new district is 176,383 and not 250,000 as insisted upon by
the petitioners.
o The factors mentioned during the deliberations on House Bill
No. 4264, were: (a) the dialects spoken in the grouped
municipalities; (b) the size of the original groupings compared
to that of the regrouped municipalities; (c) the natural division
separating the municipality subject of the discussion from the
reconfigured District One; and (d) the balancing of the areas
of the three districts resulting from the redistricting of Districts
One and Two.
o Each of such factors and in relation to the others considered
together, with the increased population of the erstwhile
Districts One and Two, point to the utter absence of abuse of
discretion, much less grave abuse of discretion, that would
warrant the invalidation of Republic Act No. 9716.
Party List
Veterans Federation Party v. COMELEC (2000 Panganiban, J.)
FACTS:
 Complying with its constitutional duty to provide by law the selection
or election of party-list representatives, Congress enacted RA 7941.
Under this statutes policy declaration, the State shall
"promote proportional representation in the election of
representatives to the House of Representatives through a party-list
system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or
organizations or coalitions thereof…”
 On May 11, 1998, the first election for party-list representation was
held simultaneously with the national elections. A total of 123 parties,
organizations and coalitions participated.
 On June 26, 1998, the COMELEC en banc proclaimed thirteen (13)
party-list representatives from twelve (12) parties and organizations,
which had obtained at least two percent of the total number of votes
cast for the party-list system. Two of the proclaimed representatives
belonged to Petitioner APEC, which obtained 5.5 percent of the
votes.
 On July 6, 1998, PAG-ASA (People's Progressive Alliance for Peace
and Good Government Towards Alleviation of Poverty and Social
Advancement) filed with the COMELEC a "Petition to Proclaim [the]
Full Number of Party-List Representatives provided by the
Constitution."
o It alleged that the filling up of the twenty percent membership
of party-list representatives in the House of Representatives,
as provided under the Constitution, was mandatory.
 o It further claimed that the literal application of the two percent
vote requirement and the three-seat limit under RA 7941
would defeat this constitutional provision, for only 25
nominees would be declared winners, short of the 52 party-
list representatives who should actually sit in the House.
 Thereafter, nine other party-list organizations filed their respective
Motions for Intervention, seeking the same relief as that sought by
PAG-ASA on substantially the same grounds. Likewise, PAG-ASA's
Petition was joined by other party-list organizations in a Manifestation
they filed on August 28, 1998. These organizations were COCOFED,
Senior Citizens, AKAP, AKSYON, PINATUBO, NUPA, PRP, AMIN,
PCCI, AMMA-KATIPUNAN, OCW-UNIFIL, KAMPIL, MAHARLIKA,
AFW, Women Power, Inc., Ang Lakas OCW, FEJODAP, CUP,
Veterans Care, Bantay Bayan, 4L, AWATU, PMP, ATUCP, ALU and
BIGAS.
 On October 15, 1998, the COMELEC Second Division promulgated
the present assailed Resolution granting PAG-ASA's Petition. It also
ordered the proclamation of herein 38 respondents who, in addition to
the 14 already sitting, would thus total 52 party-list representatives.
o It held that "at all times, the total number of congressional
seats must be filled up by eighty (80%) percent district
representatives and twenty (20%) percent party-list
representatives."
o In allocating the 52 seats, it disregarded the two percent-vote
requirement prescribed under Section 11 (b) of RA 7941.
Instead, it identified three "elements of the party-list system,"
which should supposedly determine "how the 52 seats should
be filled up”.
ISSUES:
1. W/N the 20% allocation for party-list representatives in Sec. 5(2)
Art VI of the Consti mandatory. NO.
2. W/N Sec. 11 of RA 7941 is constitutional. YES.
HELD:
1. The subject provision merely provides a ceiling for the party-list seats
in the House of Representatives. The Constitution vested Congress
with the broad power to define and prescribe the mechanics of the
party-list system of representatives. In the exercise of its
constitutional prerogative, Congress deemed it necessary to require
parties participating in the system to obtain at least 2% of the total
votes cast for the party list system to be entitled to a party-list seat.
Congress wanted to ensure that only those parties having a sufficient
number of constituents deserving of representation are actually
represented in Congress.
2. In imposing a two percent threshold, Congress wanted to ensure that
only those parties, organizations and coalitions having a sufficient
number of constituents deserving of representation are actually
represented in Congress. This intent can be gleaned from the
deliberations on the proposed bill. The two percent threshold is
consistent not only with the intent of the framers of the Constitution
and the law, but with the very essence of "representation." Under a
republican or representative state, all government authority emanates
from the people, but is exercised by representatives chosen by them.
But to have meaningful representation, the elected persons must
have the mandate of a sufficient number of people. Otherwise, in a
legislature that features the party-list system, the result might be the
proliferation of small groups which are incapable of contributing
significant legislation, and which might even pose a threat to the
stability of Congress. Thus, even legislative districts are apportioned
according to "the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the
basis of a uniform and progressive ratio" to ensure meaningful local
representation.
Bagong Bayani v. COMELEC (2001 Panganiban, J.)
FACTS:
 COMELEC received several petitions for registration filed by sectoral
parties, organizations, and political parties for the 2001 elections. The
review of the petitions took a longer process in order to arrive at a
decision and as a result the 2 divisions of COMELEC promulgated a
separate Omnibus Resolution and individual resolution on political
parties.
 The registered parties and organizations filed their respective
Manifestations, stating their intention to participate in the party-list
elections.
 Other sectoral and political parties and organizations whose
registrations were denied also filed Motions for Reconsideration,
together with Manifestations of their intent to participate in the party-
list elections. Still other registered parties filed their Manifestations
beyond the deadline.
 The COMELEC gave due course or approved the Manifestations (or
accreditations) of 154 parties and organizations, but denied those of
several others in Omnibus Resolution 3785.
 Akbayan Citizens Action Party filed a petition praying for the
COMELEC to delete the names of some of the respondents from the
Certified List of Political Parties/Sectoral
Parties/Organizations/Coalitions Participating in the Party List System
for the May 14, 2001 Elections and that the list be amended. It also
 asked, as an alternative, that the votes cast for the respondents not
be counted.
ISSUE: W/N the respondents may participate in the party-list elections.
HELD: NO.
 The private respondents cannot be disqualified from the party-list
elections merely because they are political parties.
o Sec. 5 Art VI of the Consti provides that members of the HOR
may "be elected through a party-list system of registered
national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations."
o Furthermore, under Secs. 7 and 8 Art. IX (C) of the Consti,
political parties may be registered under the party-list system.
 However, the participation of political parties in the party-list elections
does not mean that any political party, organization, or group may do
so.
o Under Sec. 5 Art. VI of the Consti, “one-half of the seats
allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as
provided by law, by selection or election from the labor,
peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities,
women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by
law, except the religious sector."
o Since this provision is not self-executing, RA 7941 (The
Party-List Law) was enacted and laid out its policies.
o RA 7941 mandates a state policy of promoting proportional
representation by means of the Filipino-style party-list system,
which will "enable" the election to the House of
Representatives of Filipino citizens, (1) who belong to
marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations
and parties; and (2) who lack well-defined constituencies; but
(3) who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of
appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole.
o The role of the COMELEC is to see to it that only those
Filipinos who are "marginalized and underrepresented"
become members of Congress under the party-list system.
o The Constitution intends to give genuine power to the people
by enabling them to become lawmakers themselves.
Lokin v. COMELEC (2010 Bersamin, J.)
FACTS:
 The Citizens’ Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC) was one of the
groups registered under the party-list system that manifested their
intent to participate in the May 2007 elections.
 CIBAC submitted a list of 5 nominees from which its representatives
would be chosen should it obtain the required number of qualifying
votes. They were: (1) Emmanuel Joel J. Villanueva; (2) herein
petitioner Luis K. Lokin, Jr.; (3) Cinchona C. Cruz-Gonzales; (4)
Sherwin Tugna; and (5) Emil L. Galang.
 However, CIBAC amended its list of nominees, wherein it withdrew
Lokin, Tugna, and Galang, and substituted Armi Jane R. Borje as one
of the nominees.
 CIBAC filed with COMELEC a motion seeking the proclamation of
Lokin as its second nominee. It asserted that CIBAC was entitled to a
second seat and Lokin to a proclamation. Villanueva and Cruz-
Gonzales opposed.
 COMELEC issued a resolution docketed as EM 07-054, which it
resolved tp se the matter pertaining to the validity of the withdrawal of
the nominations of Lokin, Tugna, and Galang and the substitution of
Borje for proper disposition and hearing.
 CIBAC was formally declared entitled to an additional seat. However,
Lokin could not be sworn in because of the pendency of EM 07-054.
 COMELEC resolved EM 07-054, approving the withdrawal. As a
result, Cruz-Gonzales was proclaimed as the official second nominee
of CIBAC and she took her oath of office and paty-list representative.
 Lokin seeks to compel COMELEC to proclaim him as the official
second nominee of CIBAC. He alleges that Resolution 7804
(approving the withdrawals and the substitution) expanded Sec. 8 of
RA 7941.
ISSUE: W/N Sec. 13 of Resolution 7804 is valid.
HELD: NO.
 Under certain circumstances, the Legislature can delegate to
executive officers and administrative boards the authority to adopt
and promulgate IRRs (Implementing Rules and Regulations).
o To be valid, the administrative IRRs must comply with the
following requisites: 1. Its promulgation must be authorized by
the Legislature; 2. It must be within the scope of the authority
given by the Legislature; 3. It must be promulgated in
accordance with the prescribed procedure; and 4. It must be
reasonable.
 In addition to the powers and functions conferred upon it by the
Constitution, the COMELEC is also charged to promulgate IRRs
implementing the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code or other
laws that the COMELEC enforces and administers.
o In promulgating Resolution 7804, COMELEC met the first and
third requisites.
 Under Sec. 8 of RA 7941:
o No change of names or alteration of the order of nominees
shall be allowed after the same shall have been submitted to
the COMELEC except in cases where the nominee dies, or
withdraws in writing his nomination, becomes incapacitated in
 which case the name of the substitute nominee shall be
placed last in the list. Incumbent sectoral representatives in
the House of Representatives who are nominated in the
party-list system shall not be considered resigned.
 The provision must be read literally because its language is plain and
free from ambiguity, and expresses a single, definite, and sensible
meaning.
 Under Sec. 13 of Resolution 7804
o A party-list nominee may be substituted only when he dies, or
his nomination is withdrawn by the party, or he becomes
incapacitated to continue as such, or he withdraws his
acceptance to a nomination.
 Unlike Sec. 9 of RA 7941, the abovementioned regulation provides
four instances, the fourth being when the "nomination is withdrawn by
the party."
o The COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in expanding
RA 7941.
o The IRRs the COMELEC issues for that purpose should
always accord with the law to be implemented, and should
not override, supplant, or modify the law.
Election
Tolentino v. COMELEC (2004 Carpio, J.)
FACTS:
 Pres. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo nominated Sen. Teofisto Guingona,
Jr. as VP. Congress confirmed the nomination and Guingona took his
oath.
 Senate passed Resolution 84, certifying the existence of a vacancy
in the Senate. It called on COMELEC to fill the vacancy thru a special
election to be held with the May 2001 regular elections. It further
provided that the candidate garnering the 13th highest votes shall
serve only for the unexpired term of Guingona.
 Respondents Ralph Recto and Gregorio Honasan ranked 12th and
13th in the elections, in Resolution 01-005.
 Petitioners Arturo Tolentino and Arturo Mojica filed a petition for
prohibition, seeking to enjoing COMELEC from proclaiming Honasa
as the winner for a single 3-year term.
o They contend that COMELEC had no jurisdiction to issue
Resolution 01-005 because (1) it failed to notify the electorate
of the position to be filled in the special election as required
under Section 2 of Republic Act No. 6645 (R.A. No. 6645);
(2) it failed to require senatorial candidates to indicate in their
certificates of candidacy whether they seek election under the
special or regular elections as allegedly required under
Section 73 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881; and,
consequently, (3) it failed to specify
in the Voters Information Sheet the candidates seeking
election under the special or regular senatorial elections as
purportedly required under Section 4, paragraph 4 of
Republic Act No. 6646 (R.A. No. 6646).
o Petitioners claim that if held simultaneously, a special and a
regular election must be distinguished in the documentation
as well as in the canvassing of their results.
ISSUE: W/N the special election is valid.
HELD: YES.
 In a special election to fill a vacancy, the rule is that a statute that
expressly provides that an election to fill a vacancy shall be held at
the next general elections fixes the date at which the special election
is to be held and operates as the call for that election. Consequently,
an election held at the time thus prescribed is not invalidated by the
fact that the body charged by law with the duty of calling the election
failed to do so. This is because the right and duty to hold the election
emanate from the statute and not from any call for the election by
some authority and the law thus charges voters with knowledge of the
time and place of the election.
 RA 6646 provides tat in case of vacancy in the Senate, the special
election to fill such vacancy shall be held simultaneously with the next
succeeding regular election.
o COMELECs failure to give the additional notice did not
negate the calling of such special election, much less
invalidate it.
 The lack of notice did not result in misleading a sufficient number of
voters as would change the result of the special election.
o The notice for the May 2001 elections covered two matters:
(1) that it will hold a special election to fill a vacancy in the
Senate, (2) COMELEC will proclaim the winner as the 13th
candidate who garnered the most votes.
o Petitioners did not prove that COMELEC’s failure to give this
required notice misled a sufficient number of voters or led
them to believe that there was no such special election.
 No such requirement of documenting separately the candidates to
canvass separately the votes cast for the special election exists in our
election laws.
Privileges, Salary, Disqualification
a. Salary
PHILCONSA v. Mathay (1966 Reyes, J.B.L., J.)
FACTS:
 Petitioner PH Constitution Association, Inc. filed a suit against
respondent Acting Auditor General of the PH Ismael Mathay and
Auditor of the Congress of the PH Jose Velasco, seeking to
permanently prohibit them from authorizing or passing in audit the
payment of the increased salaries authorized by RA 4134 to the
Speaker and members of the House of Representatives before
December 30, 1969.
 The 1965-1966 Budget implemented the increase in salary of the
Speaker and members of the House of Representatives set by RA
4134.
 Petitioner contends that RA 4134 violates Sec. 14 Art. VI of the
Constitution, which states that:
o No increase in said compensation shall take effect until after
the expiration of the full term of all the Members of the Senate
and of the House of Representatives approving such,
increase.
 The term of the 8 senators elected in 1963, who took part in the
approval of RA 4134, would have expired only on December 30,
1969; while the term of the members of the House who participated in
the approval of said Act expired on December 30, 1965.
ISSUE: W/N RA 4134 is unconstitutional.
HELD: YES.
 The Constitution required that not only the term of the members of
the HOR expire before the increase becomes effective, but also the
term of the Senators who approved the increase.
 In establishing what might be termed a waiting period before the
increased compensation for legislators becomes fully effective, the
Constitutional provision refers to “all members of the Senate and the
House of Representatives” in the same sentence, as a single unit,
without distinction or separation between them.
 This unitary treatment is emphasized by the fact that the provision
speaks of the “expiration of the full term” of the Senators and
Representatives that approved the measure, using the singular form
and not the plural, thereby rendering more evident the intent to
consider both houses for the purpose as indivisible components of
one single Legislature.
 The use of the word “term” in the singular, when combined with the
following phrase “all the members of the Senate and the House,”
underscores that in the application of Art. VI, Sec. 14(now Sec. 10),
the fundamental consideration is that the terms of office of all
members of the Legislature that enacted the measure must have
expired before the increase in compensation can become operative.
 The Court agreed with petitioner that the increased compensation
provided by RA 4134 is not operative until December 30, 1969, when
the full term of all members of the Senate and House that approved it
will have expired.
Ligot v. Mathay (1974 Teehankee, J.)
FACTS:
 Benjamin Ligot served as a member of the House of Representatives
of the Congress of the Philippines for three consecutive four-year
terms covering a twelve-year span from December 30, 1957 to
December 30, 1969.
 During his second term in office (1961-1965), Republic Act No. 4134
“fixing the salaries of constitutional officials and certain other officials
of the national government” was enacted into law and took effect on
July 1, 1964. The salaries of members of Congress (senators and
congressmen) were increased under said Act from 7,200.00
to 32,000.00 per annum, but the Act expressly provided that said
increases “shall take effect in accordance with the provisions of the
Constitution.”
 Ligot’s term expired on December 30, 1969, so he filed a claim for
retirement under Commonwealth Act No. 186, section 12 (c) as
amended by Republic Act No. 4968 which provided for retirement
gratuity of any official or employee, appointive or elective, with a total
of at least twenty years of service, the last three years of which are
continuous on the basis therein provided “in case of employees
based on the highest rate received and in case of elected officials on
the rates of pay as provided by law.”
 The House of Representatives granted his petition however, Jose
Velasco, the then Congress Auditor refused to so issue certification.
The Auditor General then, Ismael Mathay, also disallowed the same.
 The thrust of Ligot’s appeal is that his claim for retirement gratuity
computed on the basis of the increased salary of P32,000.00 per
annum for members of Congress (which was not applied to him
during his incumbency which ended December 30, 1969, while the
Court held in Philconsa vs. Mathay that such increases would
become operative only for members of Congress elected to serve
therein commencing December 30, 1969) should not have been
disallowed, because at the time of his retirement, the increased
salary for members of Congress “as provided by law” (under Republic
Act 4134) was already P32,000.00 per annum.
ISSUE: W/N Ligot is entitled to the retirement benefit.
HELD: NO.
 To allow Ligot a retirement gratuity computed on the basis of
P32,000.00 per annum would be a subtle way of increasing his
compensation during his term of office and of achieving indirectly
what he could not obtain directly.
  Ligot’s claim cannot be sustained as far as he and other
members of Congress similarly situated whose term of office
ended on December 30, 1969 are concerned for the simple
reason that a retirement gratuity or benefit is a form of
compensation within the purview of the Constitutional provision
limiting their compensation and “other emoluments” to their salary
as provided by law.
 To grant retirement gratuity to members of Congress whose
terms expired on December 30, 1969 computed on the basis of
an increased salary of P32,000.00 per annum (which they were
prohibited by the Constitution from receiving during their term of
office) would be to pay them prohibited emoluments which in
effect increase the salary beyond that which they were permitted
by the Constitution to receive during their incumbency.
 As stressed by the Auditor-General in his decision in the similar
case of Ligot’s colleague, ex-Congressman Melanio Singson,
“Such a scheme would contravene the Constitution for it would
lead to the same prohibited result by enabling administrative
authorities to do indirectly what cannot be done directly.”
Amores v. HRET (2010 Carpio Morales, J.)
FACTS:
 Milagros Amores questions the legality of the assumption of office of
Emmanuel Joel Villanueva as the party-list representative of the
Citizens’ Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC) in the House of
Representatives. Amores’ petition was denied by the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET).
 Amores contends that Villanueva assumed office without a formal
proclamation issued by COMELEC. Villanueva was disqualified as a
nominee for CIBAC’s youth sector since at the time he filed his
Certificate of Candidacy he was already 31 years old and was
beyond the age limit of 30 years old pursuant to RA 7941 or the
Party-List System Act. Villanueva’s change of affiliation from the
youth sector to the overseas Filipino workers and their families sector
was not effected at least 6 months prior to the May 2007 elections to
be qualified to represent the latter sector.
 HRET contends that the age qualification for youth sectoral nominees
under Sec. 9 of RA 7941 was only applicable to those party-lists
exclusively representing the youth sector, which CIBAC is not. HRET
says that there was no change in party-list affiliation, only the sector
in said party-list and no violation of Sec. 15 of RA 7941.
ISSUE: W/N Sections 9 and 15 of RA 7941 applies to the case.
HELD: YES.
 According to Sec. 9 of RA 7941, a nominee of the youth sector
must be at least 25 years old but not more that 30 years old on
the day of the election.
 The Court finds no evidence for HRET’s interpretation that Sec. 9
applied only to those nominated during the first three
congressional terms after the ratification of the Constitution or
until 1998, unless a sectoral party is said to be exclusively
representing the youth sector.
 When the law is clear and free from any doubt or ambiguity, there
is not room for construction or interpretation. There is only room
for interpretation. Since Sec. 9 is contained in RA 7941 or the
Party-List System Act, it covers all youth sector representative
nominees.
 Also, HRET’s ratiocination that Sec. 9 of RA 7941 only applies to
sectoral parties registered exclusively as representing the youth
center has no merit. The maxim ubi lex non distinguit nec nos
distinguire debemus must apply. When the law does not
distinguish, we must not distinguish.
 Sec. 15 of RA 7941 states that any elected party-list
representative who changes his political party or sectoral
affiliation during his term of office shall forfeit his seat: Provided,
that if he changes his political party or sectoral affiliation within six
months before an election, he shall not be eligible for nomination
as party-list representative under his new party or organization.
 The statute is clear and free from ambiguity and must therefore
be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted
interpretation.
b. Freedom from Arrest
Martinez v. Morfe (1972 Fernando, J.)
FACTS:
 Petitioners Manuel Martinez and Fernando Bautista,
Sr. were delegates to the 1972 Constitutional Convention. Both
were facing criminal prosecutions. Martinez was charged for
falsification of a public document before the sala of Judge Jesus
Morfe. While Bautista was charged for violation of the Revised
Election Code.
 The two were later arrested, this is while the Constitutional
Convention was still in session. They now assail the validity of their
arrest.
o They contend that under the 1935 Constitution, they are
immune from arrest because the charges upon which they
were arrested are within the immunity.
ISSUE: W/N the Petitioners are immune from arrest.
 HELD: NO.
 There is, to be sure, a full recognition of the necessity to have
members of Congress, and likewise delegates to the
Constitutional Convention. They are accorded the constitutional
immunity of senators and representatives from arrest during their
attendance at the sessions of Congress and in going to and
returning from the same except in cases of treason, felony and
breach of the peace.
 In the case at bar, the crimes for which Martinez and Bautista
were arrested fall under the category of “breach of peace”.
o Breach of the peace covers any offense whether defined
by the Revised Penal Code or any special statute.
o Therefore, Martinez and Bautista cannot invoke the
privilege from arrest provision of the Constitution.
People v. Jalosjos (2000 Ynares-Santiago, J.)
FACTS:
 Accused Romeo Jalosjos is a member of Congress who was
convicted for 2 counts of statutory rape and 6 acts of lasciviousness
and is pending appeal.
 Jalosjos asks to be allowed to fully discharge the duties of a
Congressman despite having been convicted of a non-bailable
offense.
 Jalosjos argues that the sovereign electorate chose him as their
representative in Congress. Having been re-elected, he has the duty
to perform his functions.
ISSUE: W/N Jalosjos can be allowed to discharge his duties as a
Congressman.
HELD: NO.
 Privilege has to be granted by law, not inferred from the duties of a
position.
 Under the Consti, a member of Congress shall be privileged from
arrest in all offenses punishable by not more than six years.
 The members of Congress cannot compel absent members to attend
sessions if the reason for the absence is a legitimate one. The
confinement of a Congressman charged with a crime punishable by
imprisonment of more than six months is not merely authorized by
law, it has constitutional foundations.
 The accused relied on Aguinaldo v. Santos, wherein the Court
decided that
o “The Court should never remove a public officer for acts done
prior to his present term of office. To do otherwise would be to
deprive the people of their right to elect their officers. When a
people have elected a man to office, it must be assumed that
they did this with the knowledge of his life and character, and
that they disregarded or forgave his fault or misconduct, if he
had been guilty of any. It is not for the Court, by reason of
such fault or misconduct, to practically overrule the will of the
people.”
 However, Aguinaldo deals with the administrative removal of an
officer for acts done prior to his present term of office. It does not
apply to imprisonment arising from the enforcement of criminal law.
 One rationale behind confinement, whether pending appeal or after
final conviction, is public self-defense. Society must protect itself. It
also serves as an example and warning to others.
 Accused also evaded arrest despite a call from his colleagues in the
HOR for him to attend the sessions and to surrender to the
authorities.
 Allowing accused-appellant to attend congressional sessions and
committee meetings for five (5) days or more in a week will virtually
make him a free man with all the privileges appurtenant to his
position. Such an aberrant situation not only elevates accused-
appellant’s status to that of a special class, it also would be a
mockery of the purposes of the correction system.
 The accused has also been able to discharge his mandate as a
Congressman while under detention, filing bills and resolutions and
receiving his salaries. Being a detainee, accused-appellant should
not even have been allowed by the prison authorities at the National
Pentientiary to perform these acts.
 While the Constitution guarantees: “x x x nor shall any person be
denied the equal protection of laws.”, this simply means that all
persons similarly situated shall be treated alike both in rights enjoyed
and responsibilities imposed.
 The duties imposed by the “mandate of the people” are multifarious.
The Court cannot validate badges of inequality. The necessities
imposed by public welfare may justify exercise of government
authority to regulate even if thereby certain groups may plausibly
assert that their interests are disregarded.
 Election to the position of Congressman is not a reasonable
classification in criminal law enforcement. The functions and duties of
the office are not substantial distinctions which lift him from the class
of prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty of
movement. Lawful arrest and confinement are germane to the
purposes of the law and apply to all those belonging to the same
class. Hence, the performance of legitimate and even essential duties
by public officers has never been an excuse to free a person validly in
prison.
c. Speech and Debate Clause
Jimenez v. Cabangbang (1966 Concepcion, C.J.)
FACTS:
 Plaintiffs Nicanor Jimenez, Carlos Albert, and Jose Lukban instituted
herein petition to recover damages from the publication of an
allegedly libelous letter of Defendant Bartolome Cabangbang.
 Cabangbang contends that the letter was not libelous, and that even
if it were, it was a privileged communication.
 Cabangbang was a member of the HOR and Chairman of its
Committee on National Defense at the time of the said publication.
ISSUE: W/N Cabangbang is privileged from arrest.
HELD: NO.
 Under the Consti, “The Senators and Members of the House of
Representatives shall in all cases except treason, felony, and breach
of the peace, be privileged from arrest during their attendance at the
sessions of the Congress, and in going to and returning from the
same; and for any speech or debate therein, they shall not be
questioned in any other place.” (Article VI, Section 15.)
o Said expression refers to utterances made by Congressmen
in the performance of their official functions.
o The publication involved in this case does not belong to this
category.
 The letter was an open letter to the President of the PH when
Congress was not in session.
 In causing the publication of the letter, Cabangbang was not
performing his official duty and said communication is not absolutely
privileged.
Pobre v. Defensor Santiago (2009 Velasco, Jr., J.)
FACTS:
 Petitioner Antero Pobre made aware to the Court the contents
of Senator Miriam Defensor - Santiago’s speech delivered on the
Senate floor.
o I am not angry. I am irate. I am foaming in the mouth. I am
homicidal. I am suicidal. I am humiliated, debased, degraded.
And I am not only that, I feel like throwing up to be living my
middle years in a country of this nature. I am nauseated. I spit
on the face of Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and his
cohorts in the Supreme Court, I am no longer interested in the
position [of Chief Justice] if I was to be surrounded by idiots. I
would rather be in another environment but not in the
Supreme Court of idiots.
 To Pobre, the foregoing statements reflected a total disrespect on the
part of the speaker towards then Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban
and the other members of the Court and constituted direct contempt
of court. Accordingly, Pobre asks that disbarment proceedings or
other disciplinary actions be taken against the lady senator.
 Defensor – Santiago argued that the statements she made were
covered by the Constitutional provision on parliamentary immunity
since it was a speech she delivered as the discharge of her duty as a
Senator.
o She claims to have made those comments to expose
anomalies in the selection process of the JBC for the next CJ.
o She invokes Sec. 11 Art. VI which states that “No member
shall be questioned nor be held liable in any other place for
any speech or debate in the Congress or in any committee
thereof.”
ISSUE: W/N Defensor – Santiago can be charged.
HELD: NO.
 Senator Santiagos outburst was directly traceable to what she
considered as an unjust act the JBC had taken in connection with her
application for the position of Chief Justice.
 However, under Sec. 11 Art. VI of the Constitution, she is not
criminally liable since her privilege speech was made while Congress
was in session.
Internal Government of Congress
a. Election of Officers
Defensor - Santiago v. Guingona (1998 Panganiban, J.)***
Facts: On July 31, 1998, Senators Miriam Defensor Santiago and
Francisco S. Tatad instituted an original petition for quo warranto under
Rule 66, Section 5, Rules of Court, seeking the ouster of Senator Teofisto
T. Guingona Jr. as minority leader of the Senate and the declaration of
Senator Tatad as the rightful minority leader.
The following were likewise elected: Senator Ople as president pro
tempore, and Sen. Franklin M. Drilon as majority leader. He explained
that those who had voted for Senator Fernan comprised the "majority,"
while only those who had voted for him, the losing nominee, belonged to
the "minority."
During the discussion on who should constitute the Senate "minority,"
Sen. Juan M. Flavier manifested that the senators belonging to the
Lakas-NUCD-UMDP Party — numbering seven (7) and, thus, also a
minority — had chosen Senator Guingona as the minority leader.
The following session day, the debate on the question continued, with
Senators Santiago and Tatad delivering privilege speeches. On the third
session day, the Senate met in caucus, but still failed to resolve the
issue.

The following day, Senators Santiago and Tatad filed before this Court
the subject petition for quo warranto, alleging in the main that Senator
Guingona had been usurping, unlawfully holding and exercising the
position of Senate minority leader, a position that, according to them,
rightfully belonged to Senator Tatad.
Issue: From the parties' pleadings, the Court formulated the following
issues for resolution:
1. Does the Court have jurisdiction over the petition?
2. Was there an actual violation of the Constitution?
3. Was Respondent Guingona usurping, unlawfully holding and
exercising the position of Senate minority leader?
4. Did Respondent Fernan act with grave abuse of discretion in
recognizing Respondent Guingona as the minority leader?
Held: WHEREFORE, for the above reasons, the petition is hereby
DISMISSED. SO ORDERED.
Ratio: On grounds of respect for the basic concept of separation of
powers, courts may not intervene in the internal affairs of the legislature;
it is not within the province of courts to direct Congress how to do its
work.
Where no specific, operable norms and standards are shown to exist,
then the legislature must be given a real and effective opportunity to
fashion and promulgate as well as to implement them, before the courts
may intervene. Being merely matters of procedure, their observance are
of no concern to the courts, for said rules may be waived or disregarded
by the legislative body at will, upon the concurrence of a majority.
This Court has no authority to interfere and unilaterally intrude into
that exclusive realm, without running afoul of constitutional principles that
it is bound to protect and uphold — the very duty that justifies the Court's
being. Constitutional respect and a becoming regard for the sovereign
acts of a coequal branch prevents this Court from prying into the internal
workings of the Senate.
In view of the Court’s jurisdiction
Petitioners principally invoke Avelino v. Cuenco in arguing that this
Court has jurisdiction to settle the issue of who is the lawful Senate
minority leader. They submit that the definitions of "majority" and
"minority" involve an interpretation of the Constitution.
Upon a motion for reconsideration, however, the Court ultimately
assumed jurisdiction (1) "in the light of subsequent events which justify
its intervention;" and (2) because the resolution of the issue hinged
on the interpretation of the constitutional provision on the presence
of a quorum to hold a session and therein elect a Senate President.
The Court rules that the validity of the selection of members of the
Senate Electoral Tribunal by the senators was not a political question.
The choice of these members did not depend on the Senate's "full
discretionary authority," but was subject to mandatory constitutional
limitations. Thus, the Court held that not only was it clearly within its
jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of the selection proceedings, but it
was also its duty to consider and determine the issue.
"Judicial power includes the duty of the court of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part
of any branch or instrumentality of the Government." - 1987
Constitution
Well-settled is the doctrine, however, that jurisdiction over the subject
matter of a case is determined by the allegations of the complaint or
petition, regardless of whether the plaintiff or petitioner is entitled to
the reliefasserted. In light of the aforesaid allegations of petitioners, it
is clear that this Court has jurisdiction over the petition. It is well
within the power and jurisdiction of the Court to inquire whether indeed
the Senate or its officials committed a violation of the Constitution or
gravely abuse their discretion in exercise of their functions and
prerogatives.
In view of constitutional violation
In effect, while the Constitution mandates that the President of the
Senate must be elected by a number constituting more than one half of
all the members thereof, it does not provide that the members who will
not vote for him shall ipso facto constitute the "minority", who could
thereby elect the minority leader. Verily, no law or regulation states
that the defeated candidate shall automatically become the minority
leader.
Definition of minority and majority
Majority may also refer to "the group, party, or faction with the larger
number of votes," not necessarily more than one half. This is sometimes
referred to as plurality. In contrast, minority is "a group, party, or faction
with a smaller number of votes or adherents than the majority." Between
two unequal parts or numbers comprising a whole or totality, the greater
number would obviously be the majority, while the lesser would be the
minority.
In a government with a multi-party system such as in the Philippines
(as pointed out by petitioners themselves), there could be several
minority parties, one of which has to be identified by the Comelec as the
"dominant minority party" for purposes of the general elections. In the
prevailing composition of the present Senate, members either belong to
different political parties or are independent. No constitutional or statutory
provision prescribes which of the many minority groups or the
independents or a combination thereof has the right to select the minority
leader.
While the Constitution is explicit on the manner of electing a Senate
President and a House Speaker, it is, however, dead silent on the
manner of selecting the other officers in both chambers of
Congress. All that the Charter says is that "each House shall choose
such other officers as it may deem necessary." In this regard, the
Constitution vests in each house of Congress the power "to determine the
rules of its proceedings."
Pursuant thereto, the Senate formulated and adopted a set of rules to
govern its internal affairs. However, the Rules of the Senate do not
provide for the positions of majority and minority leaders. Neither is there
an open clause providing specifically for such offices and prescribing the
manner of creating them or of choosing the holders thereof. At any rate,
such offices, by tradition and long practice, are actually extant.
By unanimous resolution of the members of this party that he be the
minority leader, he was recognized as such by the Senate President.
Such formal recognition by Respondent Fernan came only after at
least two Senate sessions and a caucus, wherein both sides were
liberally allowed to articulate their standpoints.
Under these circumstances, we believe that the Senate President
cannot be accused of "capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment" or of
"an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility."
Where no provision of the Constitution, the laws or even the rules of the
Senate has been clearly shown to have been violated, disregarded or
overlooked, grave abuse of discretion cannot be imputed to Senate
officials for acts done within their competence and authority.

In view of usurpation
Usurpation generally refers to unauthorized arbitrary assumption
and exercise of power by one without color of title or who is not
entitled by law thereto. A quo warranto proceeding is the proper legal
remedy to determine the right or title to the contested public office and to
oust the holder from its enjoyment. The action may be brought by the
solicitor general or a public prosecutor or any person claiming to be
entitled to the public office or position usurped or unlawfully held or
exercise by another.
In order for a quo warranto proceeding to be successful, the person
suing must show that he or she has a clear right to the contested
office or to use or exercise the functions of the office allegedly usurped
or unlawfully held by the respondent. In this case, petitioners present
not sufficient proof of a clear and indubitable franchise to the office
of the Senate minority leader. Furthermore, no grave abuse of
discretion has been shown to characterize any of his specific acts as
minority leader.

In view of Fernan’s recognition of Guingona

"By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious or whimsical
exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of
discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of
positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to
act at all in contemplation of law as where the power is exercised in an
arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility."