Stud East Eur Thought (2010) 62:63–70

DOI 10.1007/s11212-010-9100-4

‘‘The tragedy’’ of German philosophy. Remarks

on reception of German philosophy in the Russian
religious thought (of S. Bulgakov and others)

Jan Krasicki

Published online: 16 February 2010

Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2010

Abstract The article deals with Bulgakov’s critique of Hegel’s monistic system.
For Bulgakov, Hegelian monism is an example of philosophical reductionism which
aims at reducing the question of Being, the latter expressed by a proposition and
constituted by the inseparable unity of three elements (person as hypostasis, its
meaning and the essence of Being), to its second principle. Contrary to Hegel,
Bulgakov claims that no philosophy can begin with and as itself—it has to be
initiated with a datum. This is in fact where the tragedy of German philosophy, and
each monistic philosophy, starts.

Keywords Propositions
Meaning
Being
Monism
Dogma

Personalism

Sentence (judgment) and being

In The Philosophy of Tragedy Bulgakov1 wrote that there are three basic self-
definitions of thought, being a starting point for themselves and defining their

1
The title of this article alludes to S. N. Bulgakov’s book written during his stay in Crimea, when he
worked on his last philosophical texts, before he entered his ‘‘theological’’ period in the 1930s. The fruit
of the years spent in the South of Russia were basically two philosophical works The Tragedy of

Translation reviewed and edited by E.M. Swiderski.

J. Krasicki
Uniwersytet Wrocławski, Zakład Antropologii Filozoficznej, Instytut Filozofii,
Ul. Koszarowa 3, 51-149 Wrocław, Poland
e-mail: instfil@uni.wroc.pl

J. Krasicki (&)
Ul. Szarych Szeregów 52/3, 45-258 Opole, Poland
e-mail: jkra@uni.opole.pl

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64 J. Krasicki

orientation. All philosophical systems can be divided according to these three

principles-self-definitions. They are:
1. Hypostasis, in other words the person.
2. The idea of hypostasis or its ideal image, logos, meaning.
3. Substantial being as unity of all three moments, or definitions, or states of
being.
These three principles-self-definitions of thought find their expression in the
formula: ,,I am something’’ (Ja est’ Necˇto), reflecting the scheme of being.
According to Bulgakov, this three-fold, indivisible formula, containing in itself
tri-unity and the triple nature of the moments, is divided by any given philosophy—
in a ‘‘heretical’’ manner—by selecting one of the three as its ‘‘leading principle.’’
(According to this criterion, one can cross out, as Bulgakov puts it, each ‘‘heretical’’
style of a given philosophizing.)
However, the impermissibility of such a step is indicated by the act of ‘‘self-
consciousness’’ itself, in which there appears, as in any culminating act of thinking,
the triple nature of the moments, tri-unity, expressed in a simple judgment: ‘‘I am
A.’’(Bulgakov 1993, p. 317). The structure of elements of self-consciousness, as
thinking itself, corresponds to the structure of the proposition (judgment): subject,
predicate, copula (in the logical-grammatical sense) (Bulgakov 1993, p. 318). Self-
consciousness, spirit, has the ‘‘proposition’’ as its image. The spirit is a living
proposition, incessantly realizing itself (Bulgakov 1993, p. 318). At the same time
the proposition is the ‘‘image’’ of being, of what really exists, of substance. As the
Russian theologian claims, in the proposition there is contained the essence and
image of being, the proposition carries its mystery in itself, because in it there is
hidden the image of the triple nature of being (Bulgakov 1993, p. 318).
According to Bulgakov, in a general sense, not only our thinking is the
proposition incessantly realizing itself, consisting of subject, predicate, copula, but
also our entire life. Each ontological monism is, in fact, oblivious of this ‘‘mystery’’
contained in the proposition, which is Bulgakov’s charge, most of all, against the
systems of German idealism. Moreover, this insensitivity is characteristic not only
of ontological monism aiming at separation of the three indivisible elements and
their reduction to one of them: subject, predicate, or copula (Bulgakov 1993, p. 318–
319) but in fact it is also characteristic of any philosophical system, because it is
based on the ‘‘philosophy of identity’’ (filosofija tozˇdestva), proclaiming as the only
principle either subject, or predicate, or copula, and either deriving everthing else
from it or reducing everything to it (Bulgakov 1993, p. 319). Such derivation is not
only the essence and source of every monism, but also of the true ‘‘tragedy of
philosophy.’’ (Bulgakov 1993, p. 314). Bulgakov claims that the primal and initial
unity, negating the triple nature of the proposition is the root of each philosophical
system and of its tragedy (Bulgakov 1993, p. 319). It is, however, a false and dead
unity, and it is no wonder that Bulgakov perceives the history of philosophy as the

Footnote 1 continued
Philosophy (Tragedija filosofii) and Philosophy of Names (Filosofija imeni). My reflections focus on the
first one. Let us add that it was published in German in Darmstadt in 1917.

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sequence of tragic failures. Its symbolic image is the melting wax of Icarus wings
(Bulgakov 1993, p. 319).
The principle of the propostion, or of real being, or even of life itself, in other
words of the principle of ‘‘proposition-judgment’’ reveals the structure of ‘‘being’’
(suscˇee). It shows that the basis of being is not one (edinicˇna), but triple in its unity
(troistvenna vo edinstve), and false monism, the pretension of the philosophy of
identity, is the source, primal error, ,,pq-som wetdo1‘‘of philosophy (Bulgakov
1993, p. 319).
The substance is one, but, as Bulgakov says, it is triple at the same time. It is
impossible and impermissible to overcome dialectically this tension of unity and
multiplicity. The person, hypostasis, in other words the self, exists, retaining its
nature, i.e. ‘‘incessant predicating’’ and its never fully expressed (ne izrekaemoe)
revelation realized as its being. The substance exists not only according to itself (po
sebe), as a subject, but also for itself (dlja sebja), as predicate, at the same time in
itself and for itself, in the copula as a being (Bulgakov 1993, p. 319 The lack of
acceptance of this triple nature in unity is the main cause of blundering ontological
monism. These three principles are dialectical moments of the same (odnogo to),
canceling each other (snimajusˇcˇije i uprazdnijusˇcˇijesja) in synthesis, they exist
simultaneously and possess equal rights, they are so to say roots of being, revealing
in their unity the life of the substance (Bulgakov 1993, p. 319) and the ‘‘image’’ of
being, of what is alive.

Hypostasis (person, subject) and being

Let us notice that in his analysis and statements Bulgakov is close to the philosophy
of dialogue as the philosophy of ‘‘new thinking’’ (Baran 1988) and ‘‘the thinking of
speech.’’ (Zak 1988) Similarly to F. Rosenzweig’s philosophy (Rosenzweig 1998),
his criticism is also directed against Hegelian philosophy, defined by the author of
The Star of Salvation as an ‘‘empty logical game.’’ Hegel’s aspiration to embrace
reality in its entirety meant for Rosenzweig ‘‘the end of philosophy’’ and at the same
time the apex of thought from which there was only ‘‘one step into the abyss.’’
(Zak 1988) Speech and language are in themselves revelation. As M. Buber wrote,
the world does not consist of separate words but of ,,pairs,’’ the most basic of which
are I-YOU and I-IT. Hegel’s thought is contained completely in the second one.
Using the language of the philosophy of dialogue, one can not turn to Hegel’s God-
Absolute with the help of the dialogical ‘‘words-principles’’ I-YOU (Buber 1991)
or, from another point of view, one cannot ‘‘pray’’ to God,(Time 2000, p. 97) which
was always the most basic question for the Russian religious thought.
In Philosophy of Names Bulgakov states that neither Kant, nor Fichte, nor Hegel
noticed language, for which reason they were often victims of this ignorance.2 He
quotes Humboldt who said that ‘‘Speech is a creative organ of thinking’’ and that

2
Cf. Bulgakov (1998), p.11. Humboldt’s words: ,,die Sprache ist das Bildende Organ der Gedanken’’,
,,es gibt keine Gedanken ohne Sprache, und das menschliche Denken wird erst durch der Sprache’’.

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66 J. Krasicki

‘‘there is no thought without speech and human thinking emerges out of speech.’’
(Bulgakov 1998, p. 11).
Hypostasis eludes conceptual knowing and remains outside the borders of
knowing. However, this indefiniteness is not emptiness, ‘‘logical zero.’’ On the
contrary, hypostasis is the premise of what the subject thinks logically. The thought
does not stand on its own feet, but on the ‘‘feet’’ of what is not the thought. Self is a
noumen, spirit, and it is forever transcendent for the thought. But what is
transcendent is linked with what is immanent, inner, the external reveals itself
through the internal. Hypostasis is not the psychological, nor can it be defined
epistemologically as Kantian ‘‘transcendental unity of apperception.’’ (Bulgakov
1993, p. 320). It is both of time and timeless. It exists outside time, it is eternal,
although not in the same manner as God. As Bulgakov claims, the hypostatical self
is the Subject of all predicates, its life is this predicate, infinite in its width and depth
(Bulgakov 1993, p. 321).
The life of the subject is not in thought itself but in being. According to the
‘‘witness of the proposition,’’ the essence of relationship is not created by identity
but by contradiction. The philosophy of identity reduces all the parts to one: either
subject, or predicate, or copula. Relationship undermines each monism (Bulgakov
1993, p. 518–519). That is why philosophy of identity can not be philosophy of
relationship, as is is particularly visible in German idealism. The basis of what
exists is not one but triple in oneness. This shows why every logic is powerless in
the face of the mystery of being.
The proposition: ‘‘I am A,’’ being the ‘‘cell’’ of thought, entails, according to
Bulgakov, a fundamental rejection of the principle of identity. Were it otherwise,
identity of words would follow (tozˇeslovija: I–I—I–I … —I etc.), which would
mean futile self-repetition or the self-devouring of the self (Bulgakov 1993, p. 518–
519). However, in the very statement ‘‘I’’ ‘‘not-I’’ is already present. Subject and
predicate express not the logical analysis, deduction or syllogism, but ‘‘illogical’’
synthesis, or more precisely, the one ‘‘beyond logic.’’ ‘‘I’’ is ‘‘not-I’’. I = not-I. ‘‘I’’
reveals itself in ‘‘not-I’’ and through ‘‘not-I.’’ As Bulgakov concludes, the
proposition always contains the synthesis of ‘‘I’’ and ‘‘not-I.’’ (Bulgakov 1993,
p. 323–324). It means the simultaneous violation of two logical principles, identity
and of contradiction.

I and not-I

The question emerges, how is it possible for the subject to be defined by predicate,
‘‘I’’ in ‘‘not-I’’? Logically it is impossible to account for this, although it has the
power of a ‘‘logical fact.’’ (Bulgakov 1993, p. 324) It proves that thought itself can
not understand itself in its very making: the relationship between subject and
predicate can not be described as thinking, but only as ‘‘giving birth, as the word.’’
‘‘I,’’ as hypostasis, is closed ‘‘within itself’’ and inaccessible ‘‘to oneself,’’ and it is
only in its interior, its depth, that it should give birth to one’s own ‘‘revelation,’’ it
should ‘‘reveal’’ itself in its own ‘‘revelation.’’ In this sense, each real ‘‘I’’ is both
‘‘I’’ and ‘‘not-I.’’ (Bulgakov 1993, p. 324–325).

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Whatever this revelation would be, it is confirmed and proclaimed by the copula
,,is,’’ grammatically unimportant but meaningful for philosophy as the main
instrument of thought. A is A, it is a common tautology. Without the meaning of
words it is nonsense, but, as the synthesis of ‘‘equal’’ and ‘‘different’’ it possesses deep
meaning. Each is has sense, not so much logical and grammatical as ontological: in it
the self-revelation of hypostasis becomes real. It is the bridge over the chasm,
reconciling existence with being, subject with predicate. It consolidates reality. It is the
basis of the image of being (susˇcˇego). The copula is the life of what exists (Bulgakov
1993, p. 325). The elements are not separated. Pure hypostasis can not be an object of
thought without a predicate, since in itself it is ontic ‘‘zero,’’ a sign without content.
Thanks to the copula ‘‘is’’ becomes something. ‘‘Pure,’’ ‘‘naked’’ hypostasis is
‘‘abstraction,’’ which can be approached by derivation of all definitions of being. The
copula ‘‘is’’ creates one hypostasis out of subject and predicate, one subject, so solid
that no powers of ‘‘heaven, the earth or hell’’ are able to tear it asunder (Bulgakov 1993,
p. 325). That is why ‘‘I’’ can never become ‘‘zero,’’ not even for a wink, for it is
indissolubly united with its predicate and only ‘‘in it’’ and ‘‘through it’’ does ‘‘I’’ exist.
‘‘I,’’ which refers to ‘‘nothing,’’ directed to oneself, is ontic contradiction, ontic
absurdity, metaphysical impossibility. Such an ‘‘I,’’ which does not relate to
anything (ni k cˇemu ne otnositsja), is nothing in itself, ontic ‘‘zero,’’ which is
perfectly reflected in a Russian word ‘‘nik-cˇemnyj,’’ dishonorable, or more literally
‘‘bound to nothing,’’ expressing its negative, both moral and ontic, character.
Therefore, according to Bulgakov, there does not and can not exist any subject, that
would be ‘‘res nullius,’’ that would have no hypostasized face (Bulgakov 1993,
p. 326) In other words, hypostasis is not itself without object, without predicate. It is
always a hypostasis of something, or directed ‘‘to something.’’ It is only the copula
‘‘is’’ that creates a real being uniting any hypostasis in its nature, and this triadic
unity is indivisible. Therefore, as Bulgakov writes, also the predicate, to be itself,
has to belong to ‘‘I,’’ on the one hand, to possess selfhood (obladat’ jajnostju’), to be
close to it, so to say, ‘‘friendly,’’ and on the other, it should be differentiated from it,
it should be the other in relation to ‘‘I,’’ i.e. ‘‘not-I.’’ (Bulgakov 1993, p. 395) Even
though, by putting subject, hypostasis, as the first; predicate, eidor, as the second;
copula, /tri(, as the third, Bulgakov’s dialectics contradicts logic, still in no way
and in no sense is it possible to say that one of them is the synthesis of the two
remaining elements (Bulgakov 1993, p. 395).3 Therefore, as the Russian theologian
emphasizes, the triad—subject, predicate, copula—should be clearly distinguished
from Hegel’s (illusory) dialectical triad (Bulgakov 1993, p. 326).
For Bulgakov, these three moments do not have ‘‘logical nature’’ in the Hegelian
sense, i.e. as dialectical contradictions. Theirs is an ontological relationship, or, if
we understand well Bulgakov’s intentions, a relationship of ‘‘being’’ and not of
‘‘essence’’ (in the sense of metaphysics of being as ‘‘existence,’’ esse) (Gilson 1963,
p. 71). This relationship, which is beyond logic, can not be overcome within logic.
Acceptance of such a solution would mean the triumph of Parmenides’ logical
monism proclaiming that being and thought are one and the same (Bulgakov 1993,
p. 327). What is the subject of thought, i.e. substance, being, is not immanent to

3
Russian language has abstractum of ,,I,’’ self, ,,jajnost,’’ English selfhood, German Ichkeit.

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thought, but transcendent. Reason never starts its work with thought, with itself, but
with what is different from it. Contrary to Parmenides’, and also Hegel’s, onto-
logic, thinking is never pure self-vision, it does not start with ‘‘zero,’’ with itself, but
always with metaphysical ‘‘data.’’ That is why all philosophical axioms, Bulgakov
claims, can not be deduced but only formulated (Bulgakov 1993, p. 327) In other
words, contrary to the rules of Parmenidian, Hegelian or any other monistic onto-
logic, philosophical thinking can not start with its own dia-ti, with an ‘‘empty’’
place, but by the power of reality itself with the Divine Revelation in the world
(Bulgakov 1993, p. 328).

Philosophical Hlystovsˇcˇizna

This type of Hegelian pretension (pritjazane) evoked sharp reactions from the
Russian philosopher-theologian and the state of mind described above he defined as
philosophical Hlystovsˇcˇizna.4 Commenting on Hegel’s Introduction to Logic
(Bulgakov 1993, p. 463) he stated that this pretension, unique in the history of
philosophy, is nothing but philosophical Hlystovsˇcˇizna, in which Hegel’s mind
identifies itself directly with the mind of Christ. He noticed the same state of mind,
though expressed in a more complex manner, in Encyclopaedia of Philosophical
Sciences (in a quotation referring to 12th v. of Aristotle’s Metaphysics, about
‘‘self-thinking thought’’) (Bulgakov 1993, p. 463–464).
However, irony is not the culmination of Bulgakov’s doubts and opposition.
There arises a question: If God is the principle of the world accessible to pure
thought, how is knowledge of Him possible, the ‘‘pure philosophy’’ that is the
knowledge of God before the creation of the world? It is possible that one should
attribute to Hegel the words of Christ: ‘‘I am the Way, the Truth, and the Life’’
(J 14:6) (Bulgakov 1993, p. 465).5
As Bulgakov claims, in Hegel’s Logic we are embraced by the all-knowing and
all-seeing ‘‘Eye’’ which sees itself and everything around, for it is only the Logic
that makes Hegel a ‘‘Hegelian.’’ The transition from Logic to cosmology is the
transition from panlogism to monologism (Bulgakov 1993, p. 465). The Kingdom of
the Father, the All-mighty Creator is, according to Hegel, the kingdom of Logos.
For him, the second hypostasis is the first, (Bulgakov 1993, p. 465) since the
principle of the world in Hegel’s system is ‘‘the Thought giving birth to itself.’’
Hegel gets rid of the mystery of creation. In this way his logic becomes ontology,
cosmology etc. Hegel’s Logic wants to be the Word, ‘‘theo-logy.’’ (Bulgakov 1993,
p. 312). To be more precise: heretical ‘‘theology.’’
Against such ‘‘logic’’ Bulgakov puts forward his own logic, based on the idea of
‘‘proposition-judgment’’ as the image of being, where the relationship between
subject and predicate can not be conceived as the process of continuous thinking,
but as the ‘‘giving birth,’’ the giving birth to the word itself, in what is not, in fact,

4
Cf. Hlysty, in de Lazari (1999), vol. 2. pp. 373–375.
5
Let us notice that A. Kojève, Hegel’s commentator, arrives at such conclusion and not only such
question. He states directly: ‘‘Hegel was really God.’’. Kojève (1999) p. 396.

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the very word. ‘‘Pure’’ hypostasis is not tangible, as it is beingless, it is a

‘‘substantial zero,’’ in fact, nothing. It is only the copula ‘‘is’’ that becomes the link
between hypostasis and its nature. As Bulgakov claims, it only seemingly sounds as
paromnasy that the copula IS is the life of what really is.

Philosophy and dogma

A contemporary Russian scholar I. Evlampiev wrote that Bulgakov’s philosophy

developed under the burden of dogma (Evlampiev 2000, p. 372-380,which is not
entirely true. Theological dogma may lead philosophical thought beyond the
barriers philosophy imposes on itself, to which Bulgakov’s thought is a perfect
witness. It can reveal the depth inaccessible to philosophical speculation.
Theological dogma does not have to impede thought. Quite on the contrary, it
may liberate it from philosophical pseudo-dogmas. There are both philosophical and
theological dogmas. As the depth of philosophical thinking is immense philosophy
can draw from both. The problem appears when one’s own statements are
proclaimed to be alpha and omega of all philosophy (Hegel and his school).
Therefore, Bulgakov’s thought can be described as developing both ‘‘under the
burden’’ and ‘‘on the wings of dogma.’’ His creative evolution confirms that it is
thinking ‘‘according to dogma’’ that leads his thought beyond the borders of
‘‘dogma’’ itself—both philosophical and theological.
As Evlampiev writes, dogma not only presses one down, but also enables the
discovery of new philosophical perspectives. Indeed. In Bulgakov’s thought dogma
not only subjugates, it also liberates. It liberates one from the emptiness of notions
dissociated from life and being—susˇcˇem. In this sense, Bulgakov not only continues
the heritage of the father of ‘‘sophiological school,’’ V. Solov’ëv, but also
supersedes it.

Russian personalism and monism of German philosophy

As in the case of other Russian religious thinkers, such an intellectual attitude did
not run into the ground in the criticism of German idealism as the philosophy of
‘‘dead’’ identity (A=A). German thought was for Russian philosophy the ground of
its self-constitution and the source of creative inspiration. This attitude involved
neither imitation of the great philosophical ‘‘models’’ nor the criticism of the
‘‘systems,’’ but the search of its own creative solutions. I have already pointed to
analogies between Rosenzweig’s and Bulgakov’s reception of Hegel. However, the
story does not end here. Independently of the western philosophy of dialogue,
Russian thought as a whole (not only religious), in an autonomous manner, paved
the ways followed in the West by anti-systematic, dialogical philosophy of
F. Rosenzweig, M. Buber and E. Lévinas. This is evidenced by the attempts of
P. Florenski, S. Bulgakov, N. Berdjaev, S. Frank, and L. Karsavin to overcome the
ontologism and monism of the western philosophy of Identity (Identitätsphiloso-
phie)—especially German idealism -, being the source of the true tragedy of the

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western philosophy. The Russians tended to open themselves to dialogic of

F. Rosenzweig, M. Buber, and E. Lévinas, showing the closeness—despite
geographical distance—of these thinkers from the ‘‘East’’ and ‘‘West,’’ who quite
often knew nothing about each other. In the case of Solov’ëv’s sophiological school,
the logic of the self-developing Absolute is replaced by the logic of triple nature
(troicˇnosti)6—analogous to the thinking of the western dialogical philosophers—
resembling rather Levinas’ concept of God ‘‘above being,’’ or God ‘‘other than
being,’’ (Perkowska 2001, p. 340–393) going beyond the ontological rule of identity
in the direction of the rule based on relationship and Otherness. This tendency is
present in the case of both the continuators of Solov’ëv’s sophiological heritage and
those who declaratively depart it, in the case of religious thinkers, such as S. Frank
(the philosophy of ‘‘We’’ or ‘‘We-philosophy’’ (Frank 1996, p. 159)), as well as in
the case of thinkers declaring their ‘‘atheism,’’ e. g. M. Bachtin’s concept of
dialogue (announcing that the basis of his thinking is not ‘‘I’’ but ‘‘We’’ (Boneckaja
1998, 516)). It is ambitious effort, common to the entire tradition of the Russian
religious renaissance, to overcome limitations of ontological monism and barriers
of purely conceptual dialectics through the logic of dialogue and relationship. It is
an attempt to replace the dialectics of concepts with the dialectics of persons.

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6
Cf. Bulgakov (2001); Florenskij (2003); Berdjaev (1952), pp. 59–60; Karsavin (1949). Also:
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