MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, ALEXANDER S. DEYTO and RUBEN A.

SAPITULA, v ROSARIO GOPEZ LIM

G.R. No. 184769 October 5, 2010 EN BANC (CARPIO MORALES)

Doctrine:

The writs of amparo and habeas data will not issue to protect purely property or commercial
concerns nor when the grounds invoked in support of the petitions therefore are vague or
doubtful. Employment constitutes a property right under the context of the due process clause of
the Constitution.

Facts:
A letter was sent to the Meralco admin department in bulacan denouncing Lim, an administrative
clerk. She was ordered to be transferred to Alabang due to concerns over her safety. She
complained under the premise that the transfer was a denial of her due process. She wrote a letter
stating that:
“It appears that the veracity of these accusations and threats to be [sic] highly suspicious,
doubtful or are just mere jokes if they existed at all.” She added, “instead of the management
supposedly extending favor to me, the net result and effect of management action would be a
punitive one.” She asked for deferment thereafter. Since the company didn’t respond, she filed
for a writ of habeas data in the Bulacan RTC due to meralco’s omission of provding her with
details about the report of the letter. To her, this constituted a violation of her liberty and
security. She asked for disclosure of the data and measures for keeping the confidentiality of the
data.
Meralco filed a reply saying that the jurisdiction was with the NLRC and that the petition wasn’t
in order.
Trial court ruled in her favor.
In the SC, Meralco petitioned that Habeas Data applies to entities engaged in the gathering,
collecting or storing of data or information regarding an aggrieved party’s person, family or
home
Issue:

Is Habeas Data the right remedy for Lim?

Held:
No, petition dismissed. “Section 1. Habeas Data. – The writ of habeas data is a remedy available
to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an
unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee or of a private individual or entity
engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding the person,
family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party”
It’s a forum for enforcing one’s right to the truth. Like amparo, habeas data was a response to
killings and enforced disappearances.
Castillo v Cruz- and habeas data will NOT issue to protect purely property or commercial
concerns nor when the grounds invoked in support of the petitions therefor are vague or doubtful.
Employment is a property right in the due process clause. Lim was concerned with her
employment, one that can be solved in the NLRC.
There was no violation of respondent’s right to privacy. Respondent even said that the letters
were mere jokes and even conceded the fact that the issue was labor related due to references to
“real intent of management”.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v YOLANDA CADACIO GRANADA

G. R. No. 187512 June 13, 2012 SECOND DIVISION (SERENO)

Doctrine:

Even if the RTC erred in ruling that therespondent was able to prove her “well-founded belief”
that her absent spouse was already dead, such order already final and can no longer be modified
or reversed. Indeed, “[n]othing is more settled in law than that when a judgment becomes final
and executory, it becomes immutable and unalterable. The same may no longer be modified in
any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous
conclusion of fact or law.”
Facts:

Cyrus and Yolanda Granada, both employees of Sumida Electric Company, got married in 1993.

Sometime in May 1994, when Sumida Electric Philippines closed down, Cyrus went to Taiwan
to seek employment. Yolanda claimed that from that time, she did not receive any
communication from her husband, notwithstanding efforts to locate him. Her brother testified
that he had asked the relatives of Cyrus regarding the latter’s whereabouts, to no avail.

After nine (9) years of waiting, Yolanda filed a Petition to have Cyrus declared presumptively
dead with the RTC Lipa City. On 7 February 2005, the RTC rendered a Decision declaring Cyrus
as presumptively dead.

On 10 March 2005, petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by the OSG, filed a
Motion for Reconsideration of this Decision. Petitioner argued that Yolanda had failed to exert
earnest efforts to locate Cyrus and thus failed to prove her well-founded belief that he was
already dead. The motion was denied. The OSG then elevated the case on appeal to the Court of
Appeals. Yolanda filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the CA had no jurisdiction over
the appeal. She argued that her Petition for Declaration of Presumptive Death, based on Article
41 of the Family Code, was a summary judicial proceeding, in which the judgment is
immediately final and executory and, thus, not appealable.

The appellate court granted Yolanda’s Motion to Dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
Citing Republic v. Bermudez-Lorino, the CA ruled that a petition for declaration of presumptive
death under Rule 41 of the Family Code is a summary proceeding. Thus, judgment thereon is
immediately final and executory upon notice to the parties.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration, which was denied. Hence, the present petition under Rule
45.

Issues:
Is the order of the RTC in a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death is
immediately final and executory upon notice to the parties and, hence, is not subject to ordinary
appeal?

Did the CA err in affirming the RTC’s grant of the petition for declaration of presumptive death
based on evidence that respondent had presented?

Held:

Yes, the declaration of presumptive death is finaland immediately executory. Even if the RTC
erred in granting the petition, such order can no longer be assailed.

A petition for declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse for the purpose of
contracting a subsequent marriage under Article 41 of the Family Code is a summary proceeding
“as provided for” under the Family Code. Taken together, Articles 41, 238, 247 and 253 of the
Family Code provide that since a petition for declaration of presumptive death is a summary
proceeding, the judgment of the court therein shall be immediately final and executory.

By express provision of law, the judgment of the court in a summary proceeding shall be
immediately final and executory. As a matter of course, it follows that no appeal can be had of
the trial court’s judgment in a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of
an absent spouse under Article 41 of the Family Code. It goes without saying, however, that an
aggrieved party may file a petition for certiorari to question abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction. Such petition should be filed in the Court of Appeals in accordance with the
Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts. To be sure, even if the Court’s original jurisdiction to issue a
writ of certiorari is concurrent with the RTCs and the Court of Appeals in certain cases, such
concurrence does not sanction an unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum. From the
decision of the Court of Appeals, the losing party may then file a petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court with the Supreme Court. This is because the errors which
the court may commit in the exercise of jurisdiction are merely errors of judgment which are the
proper subject of an appeal.
In sum, under Article 41 of the Family Code, the losing party in a summary proceeding for the
declaration of presumptive death may file a petition for certiorari with the CA on the ground that,
in rendering judgment thereon, the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction. From the decision of the CA, the aggrieved party may elevate the matter to
this Court via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

Petitioner also assails the RTC’s grant of the Petition for Declaration of Presumptive Death of
the absent spouse of respondent on the ground that she had not adduced the evidence required to
establish a well-founded belief that her absent spouse was already dead, as expressly required by
Article 41 of the Family Code.

For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph, the
spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration
of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the
absent spouse.

The spouse present is, thus, burdened to prove that his spouse has been absent and that he has a
well-founded belief that the absent spouse is already dead before the present spouse may contract
a subsequent marriage. The law does not define what is meant by a well-grounded belief is a
state of the mind or condition prompting the doing of an overt act. It may be proved by direct
evidence or circumstantial evidence which may tend, even in a slight degree, to elucidate the
inquiry or assist to a determination probably founded in truth. Any fact or circumstance relating
to the character, habits, conditions, attachments, prosperity and objects of life which usually
control the conduct of men, and are the motives of their actions, was, so far as it tends to explain
or characterize their disappearance or throw light on their intentions, competence evidence on the
ultimate question of his death.

The belief of the present spouse must be the result of proper and honest to goodness inquiries
and efforts to ascertain the whereabouts of the absent spouse and whether the absent spouse is
still alive or is already dead. Whether or not the spouse present acted on a well-founded belief of
death of the absent spouse depends upon the inquiries to be drawn from a great many
circumstances occurring before and after the disappearance of the absent spouse and the nature
and extent of the inquiries made by present spouse. (Footnotes omitted, underscoring supplied.)

Applying the foregoing standards to the present case, petitioner points out that respondent
Yolanda did not initiate a diligent search to locate her absent husband. While her brother
Diosdado Cadacio testified to having inquired about the whereabouts of Cyrus from the latter’s
relatives, these relatives were not presented to corroborate Diosdado’s testimony. In short,
respondent was allegedly not diligent in her search for her husband. Petitioner argues

that if she were, she would have sought information from the Taiwanese Consular Office or
assistance from other government agencies in Taiwan or the Philippines. She could have also
utilized mass media for this end, but she did not. Worse, she failed to explain these omissions.

The Republic’s arguments are well-taken. Nevertheless, we are constrained to deny the Petition.

The RTC ruling on the issue of whether respondent was able to prove her “well-founded belief”
that her absent spouse was already dead prior to her filing of the Petition to declare him
presumptively dead is already final and can no longer be modified or reversed. Indeed,
“[n]othing is more settled in law than that when a judgment becomes final and executory, it
becomes immutable and unalterable. The same may no longer be modified in any respect, even if
the modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or
law.

IN THE MATTER OF THE CHANGE OF NAME OF YAP EK SIU v REPUBLIC OF

THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. L-25437 April 28, 1969 EN BANC (SANCHEZ)

Doctrine:
It must not be forgotten that the State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and
entities for purposes of identification, and that a change of name is a privilege and not a matter of
right."

Facts:

Petitioner-appellee Yap Ek Siu instituted an action for change of name on February 13, 1965 in
the Court of First Instance of Negros Oriental seeking to change his name to William Tanchon.
Notwithstanding an opposition filed by the City Fiscal of Dumaguete on behalf of the Republic
of the Philippines on July 20, 1965, the lower court, in a decision of August 4th of that year,
granted such petition. The Republic appealed. There being a failure to comply with the standard
set forth by the Supreme Court in order that the privilege of a change of name would be
judicially allowed the court reversed.

The reason for a change of his name to William Tanchon, petitioner declared that since his
childhood days, his Filipino playmates called him William; that he also desires to have his family
name of Yap changed to Tanchon in due respect to his father named Pio Tanchon who has been
authorized by the Court of First Instance of Negros Oriental to use said name per its Decision in
Special Proceeding No. S-42 dated July 9, 1962

Petitioner makes it plain and clear that he is still a Chinese citizen, and that his intention in filing
this petition for change of name is not to escape or evade his civil obligations; that he has filed
his income tax returns for the year 1964.

Issue:
Did the Petitioner show proper or reasonable cause, or any compelling reason which may justify
such change of name as required by the law?

Held:

No. The following may be considered, among others, as proper and reasonable causes that may
warrant the grant of a petition for change of name: (1) when the name is ridiculous, tainted with
dishonor, or is extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (2) when the request for change is a
consequence of a change of status, such as when a natural child is acknowledged or legitimated;
and (3) when the change is necessary to avoid confusion

In the light of what was set forth in the decision appealed from, it cannot be said that there is a
proper or reasonable cause, much less a compelling reason, to justify such a change of name. As
the decision itself admitted, petitioner "is still a Chinese citizen" although his father apparently
had become naturalized. Under the circumstances, it would be productive of confusion if after he
has been using his present name all the while in both his personal and business dealings, he
would thereafter be known differently. It is not enough that his Filipino playmates from his
childhood days have called him William. Nor is the plea that a sense of filial respect, his father
having been authorized to use the name Tanchon, that persuasive.