4. OCA v. Judge Eliza Yu, A.M. No. MTJ-12-1813, Nov.

22, 2016

FACTS: Eliza B. Yu's Motion for Reconsideration with Explanation for the Show Cause Order decision promulgated on
November 22, 2016 disposing against her as follows:

The Court finds and pronounces respondent Judge Elizabeth Yu guilty of gross insubordination; gross ignorance of the law;
gross misconduct; grave abuse of authority; oppression; and conduct unbecoming of a judicial official; and, dismisses her
from the service effective immediately, with forfeiture of all her benefits S, except accrued leave credits, and further
disqualifies her from reinstatement or appointment to any public office or employment.

In her motion, the respondent repeatedly denies committing all the administrative offenses for which she was held guilty,
and insists on the absence of proof to support the findings against her. She pleads that the Court reconsiders based on the
following:

1. Noncompliance with A.O. No. 19-2011 The complaint against her was premature because of the pendency of her protest
against night court duty. A.O. No. 19-2011 did not carry a penal provision, and was only directory because of the use of the
permissive word may. She did not refuse to obey A.O. No. 19-2011

2. Refusal to honor the appointments of Ms. Mariejoy P. Lagman and Ms. Leilani Tejero-Lopez The respondent claims that
she did not refuse to honor the appointment. She merely exercised her statutory right as a judge to question the appointment
of the branch clerk of court assigned to her sala.

3. Show-cause order respondent issued against fellow judges. It was premature to rule that she thereby abused and committed
misconduct because she did not issue any ruling on the explanation by the other judges. She did not violate Section 5, Canon
3 and Section 8, Canon 4 of the Code of Judicial Conduct.

4. Refusal to sign the leave of absence of Mr. Noel Labid The refusal to sign the application for leave of absence had factual
and legal bases. Moreover, she should be presumed to have acted in good faith if she misconstrued the rules on approval of
application of leave.

5. Allowing on-the-job trainees The respondent claims that she did not order the trainees to perform judicial tasks. She had
no personal knowledge that the trainees were made to serve as assistant court stenographers. Based on what she heard, the
trainees were only in the premises of her court for a few hours. She reminds that she allowed the trainees to merely observe
proceedings.

6. Designation of an officer-in-charge and ordering reception of evidence by a non-lawyer The respondent denies having
violated CSC Memorandum Circular No. 06-05 when she designated an officer-in-charge. There was no proof showing that
she willfully and deliberately intended to cause public damage.

7. Allowing criminal proceedings to continue despite the absence of counsel The respondent merely followed the Rules of
Criminal Procedure in allowing criminal proceedings despite absence of counsel.

8. Sending of inappropriate email messages The respondent maintains that the e-mail messages were hearsay because the
certification by the SC-MISO was not presented to her, depriving her of the opportunity to object. Her granting access by
the MISO to her private e-mails was conditional to prove tampering. Her Lycos e-mail account was hacked. She did not
completely waive her right to privacy. Considering that she did not authenticate said e-mail messages, the same were
inadmissible for being hearsay.

ISSUE: Whether Respondent should be removed from the Judiciary as well as be disbarred.

RULING: YES. The respondent's Motion for Reconsideration is denied for lack of merit. The submissions tendered in the
respondent's Motion for Reconsideration with Explanation for the Show Cause Order were matters that the Court had already
exhaustively considered and fully resolved in the decision of November 22, 2016.
 The respondent's accountability did not end with her removal from the Judiciary. In the decision of November 22, 2016, we
declared that her misdemeanor as a member of the Bench could also cause her expulsion from the Legal Profession through
disbarment. Consequently, we directed her to show good and sufficient cause why her actions and actuations should not
also be considered grounds for her disbarment.

Accordingly, gross misconduct, violation of the Lawyer's Oath, and willful disobedience of any lawful order by the Court
constitute grounds to disbar an attorney. In the respondent's case, she was herein found to have committed all of these
grounds for disbarment, warranting her immediate disbarment as a consequence. The Court deem it worthwhile to remind
that the penalty of disbarment being hereby imposed does not equate to stripping the respondent of the source of livelihood
her disbarment is intended to protect the administration of justice by ensuring that those taking part in it as attorneys should
be competent, honorable and reliable to enable the courts and the clients they serve to rightly repose their confidence in
them.

5. Libarios vs. Dabalos, 199 SCRA 48 (1991)

FACTS: Former Mayor Mariano Corvera, Sr. was shot by Pablo Macapas inside the courtroom of respondent Judge
Dabalos, after a hearing in a frustrated murder case against said Pablo Macapas. Corvera, Sr. was the private complainant
in the aforesaid criminal case, while Mayor Tranquilino Calo, Jr. was appearing as counsel of Macapas. A formal charge of
murder was filed with against Pablo Macapas, Mayor Tranquilino Calo, Jr., and his driver-bodyguard Belarmino Alloco,
and (2) other "John Does". Macapas was a bodyguard of respondent Calo, Jr. The information filed against them carries a
“NO BAIL” recommendation.
Judge Rosarito Mabalos, without conducting any prior hearing, directed the issuance of a warrant of arrest against the
accused, fixing at the same time the bail for accused Calo, Jr. and Allocod at P50,000.00 each; however, no bail was
recommended for the temporary release of accused Macapas. Respondent judge fixed bail for the temporary release of
accused Calo, Jr. and Allocod on the ground that they were not charged as co-principals by cooperation or inducement, and
that the evidence of guilt against them was merely circumstantial. Respondent judge said that if Calo Jr., was the mastermind
of said murder, and if he was Calo Jr., he would not have handed over the gun to Macapas (within the vicinity of the hall of
justice) as what had been alleged by the witnesses. Respondent said that it was his opinion that the guilt of Calo, Jr., and
Alloco was not strong and having been out on bail already, the hearing to determine whether or not their guilt is strong is
no longer necessary.

Thus, an administrative complaint filed by Roan I. Libarios for and on behalf of his client Mariano Corvera, Jr. son of
Corvera, Sr., against respondent judge, for grave ignorance of the law, grave abuse of discretion, gross misconduct and
partiality.

ISSUE: Whether respondent judge was independent and impartial in deciding the case

RULING: No. Respondent judge was warned and fined P20,000.00. Respondent judge should not have allowed himself to
be swayed into issuing an order fixing bail for the temporary release of the accused charged with murder, without a hearing,
which is contrary to established principles of law. Furthermore, considering that respondent judge had a close association
with respondent Calo, Jr. as a former employee of the said accused, prudence and regard for his position as judge demanded
that he should have refrained from fixing the bail of said accused and from concluding that the evidence against him was
merely "circumstantial", in order to avoid any doubt as to his judicial impartiality. Respondent judge should have waited
for the raffle of the case and allowed the judge to whom the case was actually raffled to resolve the issue of fixing the bail
of said accused, if he was bailable. A judge should not only render a just, correct and impartial decision but should do so in
a manner as to be free from any suspicion as to his fairness, impartiality and integrity.

6. Tan vs. Rosete, 437 SCRA 581 (2004)

FACTS:
1. Complainant filed the instant complaint against Respondent Judge for violation of Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of Court
and the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (Republic Act No. 3019).
2. Complainant claims that respondent judge, through his staff, required her to pay the amount of P150,000.00 for him to
render judgment in her favor in the two criminal cases she filed.
3. Respondent Judge, on the other hand, asserts that it was complainant who attempted to bribe him by offering to pay for the
down payment of the car he was planning to buy, and she even sought the intervention of then San Juan Mayor Jinggoy
Estrada to persuade him to rule for the complainant in Criminal Cases Nos. 59440 and 66120.
 ISSUE: Whether or not the acts committed by Respondent Judge violate the standard of judicial conduct?

RULING: The Court ruled that respondent’s act of sending a member of his staff to talk with complainant and show copies
of his draft decisions, and his act of meeting with litigants outside the office premises beyond office hours violate the
standard of judicial conduct required to be observed by members of the Bench. They constitute gross misconduct which is
punishable under Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of Court.

After a thorough evaluation of the testimonies of all the witnesses, as well as the documentary evidence presented by both
parties, the court find the complainant’s version more trustworthy. Not only did she testify with clarity and in full detail,
but she also presented during the investigation the unsigned copy of the draft decision of respondent judge in Criminal Case
No. 59440 given to her by a member of his staff. Said documentary evidence supports her allegation that a member of
complainant’s staff met with her, showed her copies of respondent judge’s draft decisions in Criminal Cases Nos. 59440
and 66120, and demanded, in behalf of respondent judge, that she pays P150,000.00 for the reversal of the disposition of
said cases. It would be impossible for complainant to obtain a copy of a judge’s draft decision, it being highly confidential,
if not through the judge himself or from the people in his office. And an ordinary employee in the court cannot promise a
litigant the reversal of a case’s disposition if not assured by the judge who drafted the decision.

The court repeatedly admonished that judges shall adhere to the highest tenets of judicial conduct. They must be the
embodiment of competence, integrity and independence. A judge must not only be pure but above suspicion. This is not
without reason. The exacting standards of conduct demanded from judges are designed to promote public confidence in the
integrity and impartiality of the judiciary because the people’s confidence in the judicial system is founded not only on the
magnitude of legal knowledge and the diligence of the members of the bench, but also on the highest standard of integrity
and moral uprightness they are expected to possess. When the judge himself becomes the transgressor of any law which he
is sworn to apply, he places his office in disrepute, encourages disrespect for the law and impairs public confidence in the
integrity and impartiality of the judiciary itself. It is therefore paramount that a judge’s personal behavior both in the
performance of his duties and his daily life, be free from any appearance of impropriety as to be beyond reproach.

Respondent Judge Maxwel S. Rosete is suspended from office without salary and other benefits for four (4) months.

7. Ramirez vs. Corpus-Macandog, 144 SCRA 462 (1986)

FACTS: Judge Antonia Corpuz-Macandog of the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, Branch CXX, stands
charged in six separate complaints of various forms of misconduct in the performance of her official duties.

1. Administrative Matter No. R-351-RTJ.

When reposndent Judge Ramirez ordered the arrest of a Deputy Sheriff in a case of ownership which was
originally held by another judge and he ordered the arrest when in fact it was not his duty;

2. Administrative Matter No. R-359-RTJ.

When the said respondent Judge failed to act on a motion duly filed by complainants and said that it was
remamded for study. Likewise, cited that respondent judge failed to order the service of summons and copy of
the third-party complaint on the third-party defendant.

3. Administrative Matter No. R-621-RTJ

Victoria L. Torres charged respondent judge with ignorance of the law, graft or deliberate distortion of
the law for pecuniary motives. She alleged that respondent judge had indiscriminately issued restraining orders
without conducting hearings on the applications for the issuance of preliminary injunctions and had reiterated
restraining orders after the lapse of the mandatory twenty [20] days; that she issued restraining orders against the
enforcement of the writs of execution in ejectment cases decided by other RTC branches of Caloocan City which
are of co-equal jurisdiction; that she has cited for contempt lawyers and sheriffs of other branches whom she
fancies to have offended her,

4. Administrative Matter No. R-684-RTJ

 Failure of respondent judge to decide Civil Case No. C-9831 entitled, "Federico S. Cruz v. Esperanza
Lazaro," despite the case having been submitted for decision for more than 18 months. Further, respondent judge
had been drawing her salary during the entire time that the case was pending decision, respondent judge is likewise
guilty of falsification in view of the certification required of judges before they could draw their salaries to the
effect that they have decided all cases assigned to them on or before the end of three months counted from the
time a case is submitted for decision.

5. Administrative Matter No. R-687-RTJ –

Jesus Alba charges respondent judge with gross incompetence, partiality and knowingly rendering an
unjust decision. Complainant is the offended party in Criminal Case No. C-23527 [84] entitled "People v.
Cabel" for frustrated murder assigned to respondent's court. The decision acquitting the accused was promulgated
allegedly in the absence of complainant and his counsel, so that complainant learned about the decision only thru
a neighbor. Complainant challenged the decision as erroneous for the reasons that the testimony of the accused
on the alleged self-defense was not convincing,

Upon being required to comment, respondent explained in detail the reasons why she did not give credence to the
version of the prosecution. She ended with the conclusion that the decision in said criminal case is just and in
consonance with the evidence presented by the parties.

6. Administrative Matter No. 86-4-9987-RTC

When respondent Judge insisted on rendering a judgement of dismissing a petition for consolidation of
cases when in fact such case was raffled to another Judge (Judge Angeles), and not in her sala.

ISSUE: Whether respondent Judge Corpuz-Macandog violated the Code of Judicial Conduct

RULING: Yes. Judge Corpuz-Macandog was specifically liable under the 1st, 3rd, 4th, and 6th of the 6 complaints
but is acquitted for the 2nd and 5th complaints because such was done in the scope and performance of his duties.
Judges are required to observe due care in the performance of their official duties. They are likewise charged with
the knowledge of internal rules and procedures, especially those which relate to the scope of their authority. They
are duty bound to observe and abide by these rules and procedures, designed, as they are, primarily to ensure the
orderly administration of justice.

Respondent Judge Macandog has shown herself to be mentally and morally unfit to remain in her office. Her
removal must perforce be effected.

WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Antonia Corpuz-Macandog is hereby ordered dismissed from the service, with
forfeiture of all retirement benefits and pay, and with prejudice to reinstatement in any branch of the government
or any of its agencies or instrumentalities.

8. In re Complaint of Mrs. Rotilla Marcos Against Judge F. Marcos, 360 SCRA 539 (2001)
FACTS: Mrs. Rotilla Marcos, wife of Judge Ferdinand Marcos, and her children wrote a letter to Chief Justice Narvasa
alleging, among others, that ever since Mr. Marcos was appointed as a judge of the RTC Cebu City, they have only been
receiving a minimal amount which was insufficient for their education and for their sustenance; that they were made to
believe that he was only receiving a small remuneration as an RTC Judge; that he was enjoying his extra-ordinary allowance,
local and city allowances, bonuses, amelioration pays, and 14th month pays; that he even got his second quincena of
November direct in Manila when he was enjoying his one-week leave of absence with his mistress.
The case remained suspended until the Honorable Chief Justice Davide, Jr. reported to the Court En Banc, the scandalous
incident he witnessed at the Fun Run sponsored by the Philippine Judges Association. According to CJ Davide, a woman
who was reported to be Judge Marcos’ querida accompanied him. Judge Marcos and the querida joined the Judges at the
temporary place reserved for the Judges and during the latter's breakfast thereat were seated near each other. Chief Justice
Davide then pulled Judge Marcos aside to validate the facts about the latter’s illicit relationship with the woman. The latter
admitted, among other things, that he had been living with the woman, Mae Tacaldo, for three (3) years already, and that
 he was separated from his wife. Judge Marcos defense was that his actions should be excused and mitigated since his wife
was also guilty of immorality.

ISSUE: Whether Judge Marcos was wanting of moral integrity by keeping a mistress

RULING: YES. Keeping a mistress is certainly not an act one would expect of a judge who is expected to possess the
highest standard of morality and decency. Moreover, respondent's posture that Mrs. Marcos is also guilty of immorality
does not excuse nor even mitigate his actions. It is respondent's private action that is being investigated not his wife's.
Bringing Ms. Tacaldo to public functions was not in good taste considering that Judge Marcos was still very much married
even if he and his wife Rotilla were already living separately. He had no right to flaunt Maydelane Tacaldo as if she was
his wife. This conduct is certainly unbecoming of a judge whose conduct must at all times be beyond reproach.
Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos has demonstrated himself to be wanting of moral integrity. He has violated the code of Judicial
Conduct which requires every judge to be the embodiment of competence, integrity, and independence and to avoid the
appearance of impropriety in all activities as to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.
The charge of immorality proven against respondent judge demonstrates his unfitness to remain in office and continue to
discharge the functions and duties of a judge. Having tarnished the image of the Judiciary, respondent must be meted out
the severest form of disciplinary sanction - dismissal from the service.
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, respondent judge Ferdinand J. Marcos of the Regional Trial Court
of Cebu City is DISMISSED from the service, with prejudice to his reinstatement or appointment to any public office
including government owned or controlled corporations, and forfeiture of his retirement benefits, if he is entitled to any.

9. Dela Cruz vs. Bersamira, 336 SCRA 353 (2000)

FACTS: The complaint, in sum, alleges that respondent as the presiding judge in whose sala three (3) crminal cases are
pending, gravely abused his discretion and exhibited evident partiality by:
1. socializing in posh restaurants particularly in Marios Restaurant, Quezon City and the Shangri-la EDSA Plaza with then
Congresswoman Venice Agana, mother of the accused Roberto Agana, together with their counsel, Atty. Narciso Cruz;
2. issuing unreasonable orders for postponement which unjustly delay the administration of justice; and
3. allowing the two accused, Roberto Agana and his live-in partner, Sarah Resula, to submit to a drug test thereby postponing
the trial of the cases indefinitely.

INVESTIGATING COMMISSIONER
Respondents official conduct had not been entirely free from the appearance of impropriety, neither has the
respondent remained above suspicion in his official actuations in connection with the criminal cases involving Agana and
Resula. He has fallen short of the requirements of probity and independence.[20] A judges conduct should be above
reproach, and in the discharge of his official duties, he should be conscientious, thorough, courteous, patient, punctual, just,
impartial.
Justice Vidallon-Magtolis recommended that respondent be fined the sum of Ten Thousand (P10,000.00) Pesos
with a stern warning that a repetition of the acts complained of will be dealt with more severely.

ISSUE: Whether the respondent’s conduct warrants the imposition of sanctions against him.

RULING: Yes. A judge’s personal behavior both in the performance of his duties and his daily life must be free from
the appearance of impropriety as to be beyond reproach.-
By the very nature of the bench, judges, more than the average man, are required to observe an exacting standard of morality
and decency. The character of a judge is perceived by the people not only through his official acts but also through his
private morals as reflected in his external behavior. It is therefore paramount that a judge’s personal behavior both in the
performance of his duties and his daily life; be free from the appearance of impropriety as to be beyond reproach.
It is improper for a judge to meet privately with the accused without the presence of the complainant.-
A judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all his activities. A judge is not only required to be
impartial; he must also appear to be impartial. Public confidence in the judiciary is eroded by irresponsible or improper
conduct of judges. Fraternizing with litigants tarnishes this appearance. It was, thus, held that it is improper for a judge to
meet privately with the accused without the presence of the complainant.

DISPOSITION: Respondent Judge is hereby FINED in the amount of Ten Thousand (P10,000.00). Further, he is
REPRIMANDED and sternly warned that a repetition of similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
10. Re Letter of Pres. Justice Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr. on CA-GR SP No. 103692, Sept. 29, 2008
Facts: [PLEASE READ THE FULL TEXT] CA Presiding Justice Vasquez wrote a letter addressed to the SC charging
justices of the CA involved in Antonio Rosete et al v SEC of impropriety. To assist in its investigation, a 3-person panel of
investigators was constituted by SC. The Panel of Investigators found out that Justice Roxas, being part of the Special Ninth
Division together with Justices Sabio and Dimaranan-Vidal, made false declarations as to how he handled the case. The
supposed Transcript of Final Decision was not a true transcript of the minutes of the deliberation on the case but a purely a
transcript from memory because no notes/stenographer/tape recorder was present/used. There was in fact no previous
deliberations. Justice Roxas also did not submit a report as ponente for deliberation. Also, his testimony that the decision
he brought to Justice D-Vidal was a draft for her to read and not to for her to sign is false as confirmed by Justice Vidal
herself, who called Justice Roxas a liar.

Issue: Whether the fabrications and falsehoods that Justice Roxas blithely proferred to the Panel in explanation/justification
of his questioned handling of the Meralco case demonstrated that he lacks the qualification of integrity and honesty expected
of a magistrate and a member of the appellate court.

Held: YES. Under Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, dishonesty is considered a serious offense that may warrant the penalty
of dismissal from the service. Under the Rule IV, Section 52 of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service, dishonesty is likewise considered a grave offense and warrants the penalty of dismissal even for the first offense.
In the past, the Court has had the occasion to rule that: dishonesty and falsification are considered grave offenses warranting
the penalty of dismissal from service upon the commission of the first offense. On numerous occasions, the Court did not
hesitate to impose such extreme punishment on employees found guilty of these offenses. Dishonesty, being in the nature
of a grave offense, carries the extreme penalty of dismissal from the service with forfeiture of retirement benefits except
accrued leave credits, and perpetual disqualification for re-employment in the government service. Dishonesty has no place
in the judiciary.

11. In re Undated Letter of Mr. Luis C. Biraogo, February 24, 2009

Facts:
The Supreme Court, en banc, continued its deliberations on the draft of Justice Ruben Reyes in 3 consolidated cases
(Limkaichong case). Since there was no further objection, the En Banc approved it. Being printed on Gilbert paper,
Justice Reyes immediately circulated the ponencia during the same session. However, they decided to withhold the
promulgation of the Gilbert copy because 9 justices wanted to concur only in the result (if the majority concurred only in
result, the ponencia would have no doctrinal value). They decided to hold oral arguments.
Biraogo, a petitioner in one of the 3 cases, held a press conference and circulated to the media an undated letter
signed by him together with a photocopy of the unpromulgated ponencia. He insinuated that the Court unlawfully and
with improper motives withheld the promulgation of the ponencia.
Since the unauthorized release of the copy infringed on the confidential deliberations of the SC and constituted contempt of
court, the SC directed an investigation. The Investigating Committee found that the leak came from Justice Reyes himself.
Hence, he must be liable for grave misconduct.

Issue:
W/N Justice Reyes is liable for gross misconduct

Held:
YES. He is suspended from the practice of law indefinitely. The New Code of Judicial Conduct provides that confidential
information* acquired by justices and judges in their official capacity shall not be used or disclosed for any other purposes
not related to their judicial duties.
*Information not yet made public concerning the work of any justice or judge relating to pending cases.

12. Allegations made under oath at the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee Hearing against Associate Justice Gregory Ong,
A.M. No. 09-2-89-SC, September 23, 2014
FACTS: In the middle of 2013, the local media ran an expose involving the "pork barrel scam." In the course of the
investigation conducted by the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, the names of certain government officials and other
individuals were mentioned by "whistle-blowers," among whom is incumbent Sandiganbayan Associate Justice Gregory S.
Ong, herein respondent.
Marina Sula Sula executed a Sworn Statement before the NBI that in the sixteen (16) years that she worked with
Ms. Napoles, she witnessed several personalities visit theri offices and join them as their special guests during our parties
and other special occasions, among them is Justice Gregory Ong.
The social news network Rappler published an article by Aries Rufo entitled "Exclusive: Napoles Parties with Anti-Graft
Court Justice" showing a photograph of Senator Jinggoy Estrada (Senator Estrada), one of the main public figures involved
in the pork barrel scam, together with Mrs. Napoles and respondent. The reporter had interviewed respondent who quickly
denied knowing Mrs. Napoles and recalled that the photograph was probably taken in one of the parties frequently hosted
by Senator Estrada who is his longtime friend. Respondent also supposedly admitted that given the ongoing pork barrel
controversy, the picture gains a different context.
Sula executed a "Karagdagang Sinumpaang Salaysay " wherein she gave details regarding those persons named in her sworn
statement, alleged to have visited their office or attended their events, thus: xxx Justice GREGORY ONG - Isang beses ko
po siyang nakitang nagpunta sa office sa 2501 Discovery Centre, Ortigas at nakita ko po silang magkausap ni Madam
JANET NAPOLES sa conference room. Xxx
Before the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, Sula confirmed her statement regarding Justice Ong.
In a letter addressed to Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno, respondent meticulously explained the controversial
photograph which raised questions on his integrity as a magistrate, particularly in connection with the decision rendered by
the Sandiganbayan' s Fourth Division in the Kevlar helmet cases, which convicted some of the accused but acquitted Mrs.
Napoles.
As to the Kevlar helmet cases, respondent said it was impossible for him to have been advising Mrs. Napoles as even the
article itself noted that Mrs. Napoles' own brother, Reynald L. Lim, a co-accused in the case, was convicted by the
Sandiganbayan. He stressed that these cases were decided on the merits by the Sandiganbayan, acting as a collegial body
and he was not even the ponente of the decision.
Chief Justice Sereno then requested the Court En Banc to conduct an investigation motu proprio under this Court's power
of administrative supervision over members of the judiciary and members of the legal profession.

RECOMMENDATION
Respondent Justice Gregory S. Ong be found GUILTY of gross misconduct, dishonesty, and impropriety, all in violations
of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary and be meted the penalty of DISMISSAL from the service
WITH FORFEITURE of all retirement benefits, excluding accrued leave credits, and WITH PREJUDICE to reemployment
to any government, including government-owned or controlled corporations.

ISSUE: Whether the respondent judge is guilty of impropriety on account of his dealing and socializing with Napoles.

RULING: Yes. The conduct of respondent gave cause for the public in general to doubt the honesty and fairness of his
participation in the Kevlar case and the integrity of our courts of justice.
A judicial office traces a line around his official as well as personal conduct, a price one has to pay for o ccupying an exalted
position in the judiciary, beyond which he may not freely venture. Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct enjoins a judge
to avoid not just impropriety in the performance of judicial duties but in all his activities whether in his public or private
life. He must conduct himself in a manner that gives no ground for reproach.
It is not necessary to the proper performance of judicial duty that judges should live in retirement or seclusion; it is
desirable that, so far as the reasonable attention to the completion of their work will permit, they continue to mingle in social
intercourse, and that they should not discontinue their interests in or appearance at meetings of members at the bar. A judge
should, however, in pending or prospective litigation before him be scrupulously careful to avoid such action as may
reasonably tend to waken the suspicion that his social or business relations or friendships constitute an element in
determining his judicial course.
The rule on propriety was intended to cover not only pending and prospective litigations. Judges must, at all times,
be beyond reproach and should avoid even the mere suggestion of partiality and impropriety.
It does not matter that the case is no longer pending when improper acts were committed by the judge. Because
magistrates are under constant public scrutiny, the termination of a case will not deter public criticisms for acts which may
cast suspicion on its disposition or resolution. As what transpired in this case, respondent's association with Napoles has
unfortunately dragged the Judiciary into the "Pork Barrel" controversy which initially involved only legislative and
executive officials. Worse, Napoles' much-flaunted "contact" in the judiciary is no less than a Justice of the Sandiganbayan,
 our special court tasked with hearing graft cases. We cannot, by any stretch of indulgence and compassion, consider
respondent's transgression as a simple misconduct.

DISPOSITION: the Court finds respondent Sandiganbayan Associate Justice Gregory S. Ong GUILTY of GROSS
MISCONDUCT, DISHONESTY and IMPROPRIETY, all in violations of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the
Philippine Judiciary, for which he is hereby DISMISSED from the service, with forfeiture of all retirement benefits, except
accrued leave credits, if any, and with prejudice to reemployment in any branch, agency or instrumentality of the government
including government-owned or -controlled corporations.

13. People vs. Veneracion, 249 SCRA 244 (1995)

FACTS: In August 1994, four accused were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape with homicide committed against
a seven year old girl. The Presiding judge was Lorenzo Veneracion.
Under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code which treats of the crime of Rape with Homicide, the penalty
imposable shall be death. However, Judge Veneracion refused to impose the death penalty but instead he sentenced the four
accused to reclusion perpetua. The city prosecutor filed a motion for reconsideration praying that the penalty of death be
imposed upon the four accused but the judge refused to act.

ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Veneracion has the discretion to impose a lesser penalty than that imposed by law.

HELD: NO. The Supreme Court ruled that the law mandates that after an adjudication of guilt, the judge should impose
the proper penalty provided for by the law on the accused regardless of his own religious or moral beliefs. In this case, the
judge must impose the death penalty. This is consistent in the rule laid down in the Civil Code (Article 9 thereof) which
provides that no judge or court shall decline to render judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity, or insufficiency of the
laws.

1. Jorda vs. Judge Bitas, A.M. RTJ-14-2376, March 5, 2014, 718 SCRA 1 (2014)
FACTS: this involved Consolidated Complaints filed by Prosecutor Leo C. Tabao, Office of the City Prosecutor, Tacloban
City and Ma. Liza M. Jorda, Associate City Prosecutor, Tacloban City, respectively, against respondent Judge Crisologo
S. Bitas (respondent judge), Presiding Judge, (RTC), Tacloban City, for Grave Abuse of Authority, Irregularity in the
Performance of Official Duties, Bias and Patiality. the complaint stemmed from criminal cases: Qualified Trafficking and
Violation of Article VI, Section 10 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7610.
Complainant pointed out that respondent judge’s line of questions went beyond judicial authority and discretion.
Upon investigation, complainant claimed to have discovered that the family members of respondent judge are close
associates of Miralles. Prompted by hostile events during the trial, complainant filed a motion for inhibition against
respondent judge, who denied the motion. During the hearing, complainant alleged that respondent judge publicly
humiliated her and exhibited his anger and animosity towards her for filing the motion for inhibition. Respondent judge was
quoted saying, among others things, that:
“I don’t want to see your face! Why did you file the motion for inhibition when it should have been Attorney Sionne
Gaspay who should have filed the same [?]”
“You better transfer to another court! You are being influenced by politicians. I am not a close family friend of
the Miralles(es), it is my sister who is now in the United States who was close to the Miralles(es).”
“So you are questioning the integrity of this court, you better transfer to another court.”
“I don’t want to see your face.”
Complainant added that when she was supposed to conduct the cross-examination, respondent judge stated off-the-
record: “I don’t want you to participate anymore,” and refused to allow her to do the cross-examination.
Due to the continued hostility of respondent judge towards complainant during the subsequent hearings of the case,
complainant opted to transfer to another court, pursuant to an office order issued by City Prosecutor Ruperto Golong.
On April 7, 2011, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) directed respondent judge to comment on the complaint
against him.

ISSUE: Whether respondent judge’s actuations in the court premises during the hearing of the petition for commitment to
the DSWD constitute abuse of authority and manifest partiality to the accused

RULING: YES. The Court noted the improper language of respondent judge directed towards complainants in his Answers
and Comments where he criticized them for their incompetence in handling the subject case. Respondent Bitas’ use of
 abusive and insulting words, tending to project complainant’s ignorance of the laws and procedure, prompted by his belief
that the latter mishandled the cause of his client is obviously and clearly insensitive, distasteful, and inexcusable.
Complainants, likewise, cannot be blamed for being suspicious of respondent’s bias to the accused considering that the
former can be associated with the accused following his admission that his sister was a classmate of one Nora Miralles.
Considering the apprehension and reservation of the complainants, prudence dictates that respondent should have inhibited
himself from hearing the case. Such abuse of power and authority could only invite disrespect from counsels and from the
public
In pending or prospective litigations before them, judges should be scrupulously careful to avoid anything that may tend to
awaken the suspicion that their personal, social or sundry relations could influence their objectivity. Not only must judges
possess proficiency in law, they must also act and behave in such manner that would assure litigants and their counsel of
the judges’ competence, integrity and independence. Even on the face of boorish behavior from those he deals with, he
ought to conduct himself in a manner befitting a gentleman and a high officer of the court
Judge Crisologo Bitas suspended from service for 3 months and 1 day without pay, with warning against repetition of similar
offense.

2. Marcos, Sr. vs. Arcangel, 258 SCRA 517 (1996)

1. Complainant is a 61y.o. retiree, married to one Ruth Jovellar and has 5 children. The family resided in BRC Village,
Catalunan Pequeño, Davao City. Spouses Wilfredo and Flordeliza Cañas moved into complainant’s neighborhood.
They became the nearest neighbors of complainant, houses being 45 meters apart.
2. A domestic helper of Cañases sought help for alleged maltreatment she received from her employers.
3. Complainant, who was then the incumbent Purok Leader, referred the matter to barangay authorities. The dispute
was resolved but the relation of Marces and Cañases became strained.
4. One time, Mrs. Cañas had an exchange of words with Mrs. Marces and the latter’s daughter, during which they
hurled invectives at each other. It was triggered by a fight between the turkeys of the family.
5. The following day, Mrs. Cañas, with her sister and a neighbor, boarded a passenger jeepney despite the fact that
there were no more seats available because complainant was riding that vehicle. Mrs. Cañas intended to cause the
complainant’s arrest because as the jeepney neared the police station, Cañas asked the dirver to stop the vehicle.
She got off and called a policeman and had the complinant Ben D. Marces arrested.
6. The arrest was made in the basis of alias warrants handed to the police by Mrs. Cañas. The warrants were issued by
MTCC Judge Edipolo Sarabia in 3 criminal cases against herein complainant for violations of BP 22. Complainant
was detained for one night without knowledge of his family.
7. Complainant saw Judge Sarabia and explained that the cases against him had long been amicably settled. The judge
told him that he did not really know anything about the cases and that he had only been requested by respondent
Judge Paul Arcangel to issue the warrants.
8. Cañas filed a case against complainant in the Barangay. Mediation conferences were conducted between the two
families. Although he had not been asked to, respondent Judge Arcangel attended the conferences.
 walked in and out of the hall
 introduced himself as the executive Judge of RTC Davao in an attempt to influence the barangay officialsd
 accompanied Mrs. Cañas and acted as the baby sitter of the latter’s daughter.
9. The barangay officials failed to amicably settle the dispute.
10. The feud between the families worsened. A violent confrontation happened and as a result of which, parties were
injured.
11. Armed men in uniform arrived in two military vehicles and arrested the members of complainant’s family and took
them to Davao Metrodiscom Headquarters. The arrests were made on orders of certain Col. Nelson Estares.
12. The investigating officer found probable cause and filed charges of attempted murder against complainant, his wife
and son. Complainant alleges that respondent Judge took advantage of his position and influenced the conduct of
the preliminary investigation. At the time of applications for bail bond were being baing made, the respondent judge
arrived and questioned the validity of the bond posted.
13. Because of these events, complainant questioned the interest of the Judge in the dispute between the 2 families. All
they knew was that Judge’s car was often parked in front of house of Mrs. Canas, especially when Mr. Cañas was
working away overtime.
14. COMMENT of respondent judge:
 charges are false, malicious and utterly baseless
 the same were filed merely to gratify complainant’s personal spite and animosity against him
 complaint was filed in anticipation of the cases which the respondent intends to file against the complainant
for slander and threats.
  The warrants were valid in connection with the pending cases against complainant which could not be
served due to complainant’s connections with the officers of the warrant section.
 Denied that he acted as escort to Mrs. Cañas. He went to the Barangay to file his own complaint against
Ruth Marces and daughter Lydia.
 Denied that he has illicit relations with Mrs. Cañas. They are only business partners in the manufacture of
appliance protectors.
15. Report and Recommendation of Associate Justice Purisima: DISMISSAL of the charges for insufficiency of
evidence EXCEPT the charge that respondent judge attended the mediation conferences between the feuding
families and tried to intervene. Penalty: be admonished and sternly warned.

ISSUE: WON the respondent Judge is guilty of impropriety therefore violating the Code of Judicial Conduct

RULING: YES. Court finds the conclusions of the investigator that respondent judge is guilty of improper conduct to be
fully supported by the evidence in the record. HOWEVER, the report of the investigating Justice fails to consider other
serious allegations in the complaint of which there is also sufficient evidence in the record, to wit:
1.) caused the issuance of alias warrants of arrest by requesting another judge, before whom the case against
the complainant was pending
2.) Arrest would have not been made without the intervention of respondent judge.

These charges were actually admitted by respondent judge. The criminal cases against complainants have been in archive
since 1983. Its discovery and revival was made possible upon the request for verification and its status and information by
Judge Arcangel. Respondent justifies his intervention on the ground that complainant Marcos has been able to evade service
of the warrants because of connections with the warrant officers of Davao City. Even if this had been the case, it would not
excuse respondent judge in using his own influence. Clearly, respondent intervened in the feud between the two families
and such interference was not limited to the barangay mediation proceedings but extended to various stages of the conflict.
The Court finds the actuations of the respondent judge improper and censurable. Respondent is the visible representation
of the law, the intermediary between conflicting interest, and the embodiment of the people’s sense of justice. Unless it
was a case filed with his court, it was improper for him to intervene in a dispute or controversy.

3. Tan vs. Pacuribot, 540 SCRA 246 (2009)

CASE SUMMARY: Judge Pacuribot was charged with Sexual harassment by Sherlita O. Tan, Court Stenographer and
by Johanna M. Villafranca Clerk II, Gingoog City. The investigator found respondent judge guilty. Thus, Investigating
Justice Dy-Liacco Flores recommended: Inasmuch as what is imputed against respondent Judge connotes a misconduct so
grave that, if proven, would entail dismissal from the bench. The court agrees in the recommendation of the Investigating
Justice. By having sexual intercourse with Ms Tan and Ms. Villafranca, his subordinates, respondent violated the trust
reposed on his high office and completely failed to live up to the noble ideals and strict standards of morality required of
members of the Judiciary. WHEREFORE, Judge Rexel M. Pacuribot is hereby DISMISSED from the service for gross
misconduct and immorality

FACTS: Three consolidated-complaints were filed against Executive Judge Rexel M. Pacuribot of the RTC of Gingoog
charging him with: 1. Sexual harassment- filed by Sherlita O. Tan, Court Stenographer and by Johanna M. Villafranca
Clerk II, Gingoog City; 2. terrorizing and harassing most of the employees, both casual and contractual, of the Hall of
Justice of Gingoog City filed by a “concerned citizens;

Tan’s story

When miss tan was attending a wedding in CDO, Judge Pacurot called her and offered to bring her to Agora Bus Terminal
but she politely refused. Aware that he has the tendency to humiliate anyone in public when he is angry, she decided to
abruptly leave the wedding reception and complied.

Unfortunately, instead of bringing her to the bus terminal, she was brought to a motel. Knowing the implications, she
protested: “Why did you bring me here, sir? Didn’t I tell you that I will just take a taxicab to the Agora Terminal?” He
rudely told her: “Shut up! As if you are still a virgin!” Respondent judge [Judge Pacuribot] then directed her to get down
the car. Timorously, she obeyed.
 In the motel, [Judge Pacuribot] ordered Ms. Tan to undress. Frightened by the gun that the judge was carrying, Ms. Tan
obeyed everything the judge told her to the point of having sexual intercourse. After that, instead of bringing her to the bus
terminal, the judge brought and left her to another hotel. The judge went back to the conference he was attending. Meantime,
through his cell phone, he kept calling her that night and threatening her to watch out in the office if she would disobey.

The harassment continued when she was back to work in his office. The judge even rented a room in her house and
when her husband is not around, she would find him knocking on her window and ordering her to go to his room.

Ms. Tan’s helplessness against the sexual abuses and advances of her judge was gnawing on her. She found it revolting.
She finally mustered enough courage to come out in the open to free herself. She filed criminal charges of rape, acts of
lasciviousness and sexual harassments against [Judge Pacuribot] but no lawyer in Gingoog City would even want to accept
her case. The criminal cases were dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. She re-filed the case with the Prosecutor’s Office of
Cagayan de Oro City. They were also dismissed.

Villafranca’s Story

Ms. Villafranca first met respondent judge at the lobby near the Probation Office at the Hall of Justice of Gingoog City
where she holds office. She then received a call from [Judge Pacuribot]. After their talk, he asked her if he could call again
for chitchat. She answered “Ok lang. Later, she began to receive text messages from him, telling her how beautiful and sexy
she is, how the mini skirt suited her, etc. Then, he started inviting her for dinner. Knowing him to be married and the fact
that she is married, she declined these invitations citing an inoffensive excuse which is her evening teaching. But she found
him persistent. One time, he took offense at her refusal, saying “Why don’t you come with me? I AM A JUDGE! Why
should you refuse me? Why do you go with Dondi and not with me when I AM A JUDGE?”

In the last week of February 2005, Ms. Villafranca got a call from [Judge Pacuribot] who was fuming mad because she
refused his dinner invitations. Scared, she finally relented. She was fetched for the dinner and while she was talking to him,
she saw him brought out his clutch bag, took out his gun, cocked it and put it in between them.

Instead of going to the restaurant agreed upon, she was brought to a motel in Butuan City. In the motel, respondent judge
forced her to have sexual intercourse. Because respondent judge had a gun, she obeyed everything he said. She recalled that
he tried penetration more than three times, but was unsuccessful. Ms. Villafranca then got up, and put on her underwear and
pants. [Judge Pacuribot] also got up and took his cell phone and took photos of her half naked.

Back to work the next day, the judge called twice. When the phone rung again, she picked it up. It was [Judge Pacuribot].
After recognizing her voice, he belittled her yelling: “Prostitute! Devil! Animal! Why don’t you pick up the phone?” Days
passed as he continued to threaten her with the publication of her half naked picture.

The judge even told her to file an annulment case against her husband. Later, he asked her to sign what Ms. Villa-franca
calls a “ridiculous document” he drafted wherein it purported to show that she and her husband agreed that each of them
may freely cohabit with a third person. She signed it in the face of his threats. Worse, he asked her to ask her husband to
sign the same document.

Indeed, when her husband found her with kiss marks, she suffered from her husband’s beating. Citing her husband’s
beating her, Ms. Villafranca pleaded to [Judge Pacuribot] to stop molesting her. He countered with an unusual suggestion—
File a rape case against him.

In his Comment,9 Judge Pacuribot denied the charges of Ms. Tan and Villafranca for “lack of factual and legal
bases”; and opposed the allegations on the ground that the same were motivated by revenge and were part of a
comprehensive and sinister plan to drive him out of service.

In particular, Judge Pacuribot denied the alleged rape incidents on 20-21 October 2004 in Cagayan de Oro City, and
interposed the defense of alibi. He contended that he was in faraway Gingoog City. He stated that on Mondays, he reports
for his duties in Gingoog City, and goes home to Cagayan de Oro City only on Fridays. He, thus, concluded that it was
impossible for him to be with Ms. Tan on 20 and 21 October 2004, a Wednesday and a Thursday, respectively. He argued
that no proof existed to show his physical presence in Cagayan de Oro City on those dates; hence, the presumption of his
continuing physical presence in his station during the inclusive period alluded to ran in his favor.
HELD: Ms. Villafranca’s story of rape and repeated sexual harassments is credible. [Judge Pacuribot’s] defense of denial
and alibi failed to overcome complainants’ evidence.

Investigator, thus, finds [Judge Pacuribot] guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the charges of rape committed on October
20 and 21, 2004 in Cagayan de Oro City, and guilty of sexual harassments committed in respondent judge’s chamber in
RTC, Branch 27, Hall of Justice, Gingoog City against Ms. Sherlita O. Tan.

One can see in these two cases a common strategy used by [Judge Pacuribot] in achieving his vile purposes. He used
deceit on Ms. Tan. He used deceit on Ms. Villafranca. He used intimidation on Ms. Tan and he used it on Ms. Villafranca.
He makes use of a substantial blackmail against both.

[Judge Pacuribot’s] theory that all these charges are part of the sinister plan to oust [Judge Pacuribot] from office at the
instigation of Ms. Waniwan is far fetched. But the court held “No married woman would subject herself to public scrutiny
and humiliation to foist a false charge of rape

In sum, [Judge Pacuribot] should be made administratively liable for the charges against him in A.M. Nos. RTJ-06-1982
and RTJ-06-1983.

Black’s Law Dictionary defines integrity to mean “soundness or moral principle and character.” It is said to be
synonymous with “probity,” “honesty,” and “uprightness.” The evidence adduced indubitably show that [Judge Pacuribot]
lacks the honesty in dealing with his two subordinates herein. Not only did he fail to live up to the high moral standard
expected of a member of the Judiciary but he has transgressed the norms of morality expected of every person.

Indeed, [Judge Pacuribot’s] reprehensible acts amount to gross misconduct, and immorality the depravity of which is
quite rare. They undoubtedly violated the Code of Judicial Conduct. They are classified as severe charges under Section 8,
Rule 140 of the Rules of Court.

[Judge Pacuribot’s] acts indubitably went far beyond the bounds of decency and morality. He raped and repeatedly
sexually assaulted, not only one, but two female, married subordinates. He did not only violate his victims’ womanhood
and their dignities as persons but he aimed to weaken, then eventually destroy two families. By such act, [Judge Pacuribot]
disgraced his noble office, as well as the judiciary, in the eyes of the public. He has shown himself unworthy of the judicial
robe.

Thus, Investigating Justice Dy-Liacco Flores recommended: Inasmuch as what is imputed against respondent Judge
connotes a misconduct so grave that, if proven, would entail dismissal from the bench, the quantum of proof required should
be more than substantial.

This court agrees in the recommendation of the Investigating Justice. With the avowed objective of promoting
confidence in the Judiciary, the Code of Judicial Conduct has the following provisions:
Canon I Rule 1.01: A Judge should be the embodiment of competence, integrity and independence.

Canon II Rule 2.00: A Judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities. Rule 2.01: A
judge should so behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.

We also stressed in Castillo v. Calanog, Jr. 15 that:

“The Code of Judicial Ethics mandates that the conduct of a judge must be free of [even] a whiff of impropriety not only
with respect to his performance of his judicial duties, but also to his behavior outside his sala and as a private individual.
There is no dichotomy of morality: a public official is also judged by his private morals. The Code dictates that a judge, in
order to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary, must behave with propriety at all times.

In sum, we concur with the Investigating Justice in holding that complainants were able to muster the requisite quantum
of evidence to prove their charges against Judge Pacuribot. By having sexual intercourse with Ms Tan and Ms. Villafranca,
his subordinates, respondent violated the trust reposed on his high office and completely failed to live up to the noble ideals
and strict standards of morality required of members of the Judiciary.

WHEREFORE, Judge Rexel M. Pacuribot is hereby DISMISSED from the service for gross misconduct and immorality
prejudicial to the best interests of the service, with forfeiture of all retirement benefits and with prejudice to re-employment
 in any branch of the government, including government-owned and controlled corporations, except the money value of
accrued earned leave credits. Lastly, respondent judge is REQUIRED to SHOW CAUSE why he should not be disbarred as
a member of the Philippine Bar.

4. Guanzon vs. Rufon, 537 SCRA 38 (2009)

Facts: Petiotioner narrates the facts as follows: In one of the first hearings of my case, when Atty. Rowena Guanzon was
not assisting me but another counsel, I was shocked when Judge Anastacio Rufon, inside the court with so many people
present, said to me "next time you see your husband, open your arms and legs." I felt humiliated and insulted, and was glad
that the hearing did not proceed because the respondent was not present.

The following day, I called Atty. Rowena Guanzon and reported Judge Rufon’s foul language and intolerable conduct to
her.

Respondent had, of course, taken great pains to refute the foregoing allegations complete with transcript of stenographic
notes taken in Civil Case as well as the orders issued in the case. In denying the charges leveled against him, however,
appropriate note may be taken of the fact that respondent’s January 20, 2006 comment admitted his use of "frank language"
in court when exhorting litigants to settle their differences and his resort to "strong and colorful" words whenever he has
had a drink or two, albeit after office hours.

Issue: Whether Respondent is guilty of vulgar and unbecoming conduct

Ruling: Yes. Respondent should bear in mind that a judge holds a position in the community that is looked up to with honor
and privilege. Although judges are subject to human limitations, it cannot be over-emphasized that no position is more
demanding as regards moral righteousness and uprightness of any individual than a seat on the Bench. Because a judge is
always looked upon as being the visible representation of law and, from him, the people draw much of their will and
awareness to obey legal mandates; it has been rightfully ruled that moral integrity is more than a cardinal virtue in the
judiciary; it is a necessity.

Thus, we declare respondent judge guilty of vulgar and unbecoming conduct considered a light charge under Section 10(1),
Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of Court, punishable under Section 11(C) of the same Rule.

respondent Judge Anastacio C. Rufon is found guilty of vulgar and unbecoming conduct and is FINED in the amount of
₱5,000.00, with a warning that a repetition of a similar offense in the future shall be dealt with more severely.

5. Castro vs. Malazo, 99 SCRA 165 (1980)

FACTS: Romeo Tibay filed a complaint for reliquidation, leasehold, and fixing of rental with damages with The Court of
Agrarian Relationsagainst Felicidad Castro, (the complainant herein), and Enriqueta Salcedo-Cruz, the owner of the piece
of land in Pangasinan. Alleging that he was a tenant or agricultural lessee of the said landholding, Tibay prayed that Castro
be restrained from dispossessing him of his tenancy.

On August 14, 1972, the spouses Felicidad Torio-Castro and Bonifacio Castro instituted CAR Case (against Romeo Tibay,
Alfonso Cruz and Enriqueta Salcedo Cruz also before the Court of Agrarian Relations, alleging that they were the lessees
of Francisca Quinto, the deceased mother of Enriqueta Salcedo Cruz, and that Tibay had forcibly entered the premises. They
prayed for reinstatement as tenants or lessees of the landholding, and for fixing of rental and damages.

On January 29, 1976, complainant herein addressed a letter to the SC complaining and charging respondent with delay in
deciding CAR – Castro case. The said letter was referred to the respondent judge on February 12, 1976, for comment, where
he said that the Castro case has been decided last Sep. 9,1975 but the same was not released because he wanted to release
the same simultaneously with the Tibay Case. CA found respondent not guilty of delay as the Castro case was filed within
the 30-day period required by law having been decided on Sep. 9,1975.

ISSUE: Whether respondent Judge should be exonerated from the alleged delay in deciding the Castro Case
 RULING: No. SC ruled that while the records support the claim of respondent that he signed the decision on September
15, 1975 and that consequently, the charge of ante-dating the questioned decision in Castro Case is devoid of merit,
nevertheless, by respondent's own admission he deliberately, deferred the promulgation of the same. Respondent did not
file the decision with the Clerk of Court, which filing is the essential act that constitutes rendition of the decision and gives
it validity and binding effect, for otherwise, the Judge can readily change, alter, revise, or modify his decision while the
same is under his personal control and custody. The rule is well established that the filing of the derision, judgment or order
with the Clerk of Court, not the date of the writing of the decision or judgment, nor the signing thereof or even the
promulgation thereof, that constitutes rendition thereof.
We must once more impress upon the members of the Judiciary their sworn duty of administering justice without undue
delay under the time-honored precept that justice delayed, is justice denied. The present clogged condition of the courts'
docket in all levels of our judicial system cannot be cleared unless each and every judge earnestly and painstakingly takes
it upon himself to comply faithfully with the mandate of the law. No less important than the speedy termination of hearings
and trials of cases is the promptness and dispatch in the making of decisions and judgment, the signing thereof and filing
the same with the Clerk of Court.

Respondent is hereby reprimanded.

6. Office of the Court Administrator vs. Judge Floro, 486 SCRA 66 (2006)
FACTS:

1. Atty. Floro graduated in ALS and placed 13th in the 1983 bar exams.
2. He applied for judgeship in 1995 and 1998.
a. In both applications, he failed the psychological exams.
b. But due to his impressive academic record, JBC allowed his appointed after a favorable second opinion from private
practicioners
3. Upon Judge Floro’s request, OCA conducted an audit on his sala.
4. The audit team recommended that its report be considered as an administrative complaint against Judge Floro and that he
be subjected to an appropriate psychological and mental exam.
5. Judge Florentino Floro is faced with a multitude of charges, concerning his qualifications as a judge. The charges alleged
certain and multiple abuses of his role as administrator of justice.
6. Above all these charges, he is also purported to believe in “duwendes” and psychic powers. The court ruled that some of
the charges were substantial enough to be violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct, and that his unusual beliefs,
irrespective of whether valid or not, has affected his actions, and threw shade on the cold impartiality required of him as a
member of the judiciary.

ISSUES: (1) Whether or not Judge Floro is guilty of simple misconduct and unbecoming conduct;
(2) Whether or not Judge Floro is fit to be a judge

RULING: (1) YES.

 Simple Misconduct – circulates calling cards with his name as an RTC Judge, indicating that he is a bar topnotcher in 1983
bar exams with full second honors from Ateneo Law School
o Before the start of the session, he is introduced with the same qualifications
o He violated Canon 2, Rule 2.02 of Code of Judicial Conduct because there is no evidence of corrupt motivation, but of thirst
of recognition
 Unbecoming Conduct
o Judge Floro is charged with partiality in criminal cases where he declared he is pro-accused
 He admitted to Atty. Dizon and her staff, including the PAO that he is pro-accused bec his brother and sis-in law has been
accused of so many unfounded offenses
o He is also charged of openly criticizing the ROC and the PH judicial system and using highly improper language during
court proceedings
 “Kabulukan ng hustisya”; “ROC has no use”
 “Luka-luka yang babaeng yan” against a witness

(2) NO. Judge Floro cannot remain as RTC Judge bec of the findings of mental impairment that renders him unable to
perform the functions of his office.
 Judge Floro admitted that he believes in “psychic visions” of foreseeing the future bec of his power in “psychic
phenomenon”
 He believes in dwendes and the power of his dwarf friends
 He has likened himself as an “angel of death” who can inflict pains on people.
 He wears blue robes during court sessions, only wearing black on Fridays to recharge his powers
 He conducts healing sessions during break time.

As such he does not meet the requirement of objectivity and his competence for judicial tasks leaves much to be desired.
His belief system indubitably shows his inability to function with cold neutrality of an impartial judge.

7. In re Sotto, 82 Phil 595 (1949)

FACTS: Atty. Vicente Sotto was required to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt in connection with
his written statement of the Supreme Court's decision in the matter of Angel Parazo's case, which was published in Manila
Times and in other newspapers in the locality.

Sotto was given ten days more besides the five originally given him to file his answer, and although his answer was filed
after the expiration of the period of time given him the said answer was admitted. He does not deny the authenticity of the
statement as it has been published. He however, contends that under section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, which
confers upon this Supreme Court the power to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure, the Supreme
Court has has no power to impose correctional penalties upon the citizens, and it can only impose fines and imprisonment
by virtue of a law, and has to be promulgated by Congress with the approval of the Chief Executive. He also alleges in his
answer that "in the exercise of the freedom of speech guaranteed by the Constitution, the respondent made his statement in
the press with the utmost good faith and with no intention of offending any of the majority of the honorable members of
this high Tribunal, who, in his opinion, erroneously decided the Parazo case; but he has not attacked, or intended to attack
the honesty or integrity of any one.”

ISSUE: Whether or not Sotto is guilty of contempt.

RULING: The Court finds that the respondent Sotto knowingly published false imputations against its members. He
accused them of such depravity as to have committed "blunders and injustices deliberately." He has maliciously branded
them to be incompetent, narrow-minded, perpetrators of evil, "a constant peril to liberty and democracy," to be the opposite
of those who were the honor and glory of the Philippines judiciary, to be needing a lesson in law, to be rendering an
intolerable sentence, to be needing replacement by better qualified justices.

Respondent has not presented any evidence or offered any to support his slanderous imputations, and no single word can be
found in his answer showing that he ever believed that the imputations are based on fact.

It is also well settled that an attorney as an officer of the court is under special obligation to be respectful in his conduct and
communication to the courts, he may be removed from office or stricken from the roll of attorneys as being guilty of flagrant
misconduct.

8. Guerrero vs. Villamor, 179 SCRA 355 (1989)

FACTS: Consequent to the dismissal of the Criminal Cases for Qualified Theft filed by George Carlos against Gloria Naval
by respondent Judge Adriano R. Villamor, herein petitioner George D. Carlos, thru his lawyer and herein co-petitioner
Antonio T. Guerrero filed an action for damages against respondent judge for knowingly rendering an unjust judgment in
the aforesaid consolidated criminal cases.
Instead of answering the complaint, Judge Villamor issued an order declaring Carlos and his lawyer, Antonio Guerrero
guilty of direct contempt for degrading the respect and dignity of the court through the use of derogatory and contemptuous
language before the court; defiling the court with abusive, offensive and disrespectful language in their complaint for
Damages. To stop the coercive force of the Order of Contempt issued by respondent judge, petitioners filed a petition for
certiorari with preliminary injunction or restraining order. It is also contended that respondent stands liable for serious
misconduct and ignorance of the law for adjudging complainants guilty of direct contempt despite their non-presence in
court. They assert that no direct contempt could have been committed judge in the complaint for damages because whatever
was mentioned therein was not made "before" respondent judge while in session or in recess from judicial proceedings or
in any matter involving the exercise of judicial function of the Court while it is at work on a case before it. SC issued a
restraining order against respondent.
 ISSUE: Whether or not the language employed in the complaint for Damages is contemptuous
RULING: No. The statement of petitioner are merely descriptive of his plaintiff’s cause of action based on his reaction to
what he perceived as a willful infliction of injury on him by de the defendant judge. Strong words were used to lay stress
on the gravity and degree of moral anguish suffered by petitioner Carlos as a result of the dismissal of the subject criminal
cases to justify the award of damages being sought. Moreover, use of disrespectful or contemptuous language against a
particular judge in pleadings presented in another court or proceeding is indirect, not direct, contempt as it is not
tantamount to a misbehavior in the presence of or so near a court or judge as to interrupt the administration of justice.
Furthermore, the Order of Direct Contempt was issued without charge and hearing which should be set aside for being null
and void.
Be that as it may, lawyers, on the other hand, should bear in mind their basic duty "to observe and maintain the respect due
to the courts of justice and judicial officers and (to) insist on similar conduct by others." This respectful attitude towards the
court is to be observed, "not for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but for the maintenance of its
supreme importance." And it is "through a scrupulous preference for respectful language that a lawyer best demonstrates
his observance of the respect due to the courts and judicial officers ...
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is GRANTED. The assailed Order of Direct Contempt of Court dated
December 11, 1987 is declared NULL and VOID. The Temporary Restraining Order issued on March 22, 1988 is hereby
made permanent.

9. Bueno vs. Raneses, A.C. No. 8383, December 11, 2012, 687 SCRA 711 (2012)
FACTS: Bueno hired Atty. Rañeses to represent her in a Civil Case. Bueno alleged that Atty. Rañeses asked for P10,000.00.
This amount would allegedly be divided between him and Judge Nidea, the judge hearing the Civil Case, so that they would
not lose the case. Atty. Rañeses told Bueno not to tell anyone about the matter. She immediately sold a pig and a refrigerator
to raise the demanded amount, and gave it to Atty. Rañeses.
According to Bueno, Atty. Rañeses asked for another P5,000.00 because the amount she had previously given was
inadequate. Bueno then sold her sala set and colored television to raise the demanded amount, which she again delivered to
Atty. Rañeses.
Bueno later discovered that the trial court had required Atty. Rañeses to comment on the adverse party’s offer of evidence
and to submit their memorandum on the case, but Atty. Rañeses failed to comply with the court’s directive. According to
Bueno, Atty. Rañeses concealed this development from her. In fact, she was shocked when a court sheriff arrived to execute
the decision against them.
When she confronted Atty. Rañeses about the court-issued certification, Atty. Rañeses simply denied any knowledge of the
decision.
In a separate affidavit, Bueno related another instance where Atty. Rañeses asked his client for money to win a case. Bueno’s
aunt paid P5,000.00, allegedly to be given to a Court of Appeals judge who presides over a criminal case pending in his
sala. Her demanded for a receipt but he refused to issue a receipt, telling her that none of his clients ever dared to demand a
receipt for sums received from them.

THE INVESTIGATING COMMISSIONER’S FINDINGS

Commissioner Limpingco recommended that Atty. Rañeses be absolved of the charge of negligence, but found him guilty
of soliciting money to bribe a judge.
Bueno failed to provide the court records and certifications that she indicated as attachments to her complaint. Commissioner
Limpingco, however, found Bueno’s allegation that Atty. Rañeses solicited money to bribe judges to be credible. According
to Commissioner Limpingco, the act of soliciting money to bribe a judge is, by its nature, done in secret. He observed that
Bueno had consistently affirmed her statements in her affidavit, while Atty. Rañeses did nothing to refute them.

ISSUE: Whether Atty. Rañeses merits the ultimate administrative penalty of disbarment.

RULING: Yes. First, he extracted money from his client for a purpose that is both false and fraudulent.1âwphi1 It is false
because no bribery apparently took place as Atty. Rañeses in fact lost the case. It is fraudulent because the professed purpose
of the exaction was the crime of bribery. Beyond these, he maligned the judge and the Judiciary by giving the impression
that court cases are won, not on the merits, but through deceitful means – a decidedly black mark against the Judiciary. Last
but not the least, Atty. Rañeses grossly disrespected the IBP by his cavalier attitude towards its disciplinary proceedings.

DISPOSITION: Atty. Ramon A. Rañeses is hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law, effective upon his receipt of
this Decision. The Office of the Bar Confidant is DIRECTED to delete his name from the Roll of Attorneys. Costs against
the respondent.
10. Interview with Atty. Lorna Kapunan on Corruption in the Judiciary, A.M. No. 13-
Facts: The Court in its resolution, required Atty. Kapunan to submit an explanation because, in an interview by Anthony
Taberna in his show UKG, she made unwarranted remarks which tended to erode public trust and confidence in the judiciary
by making unfounded insinuations that some meber can easily be bribed at the expense of justice.

Atty. Kapunan avers that the topic was her life as a lawyer and she made certain statements pertaining to corruption in the
judiciary, however, claims that she refrained from using grossly disrespectful and derogatory language and did not intent to
insult, malign or bring the Court into disrepute.

Held: Well-recognized is the right of a lawyer, both as an office of the court and as a citizen, to criticize the courts or any
of its officers. This right, however, is not without limitations. Comments made against the courts must not go beyond the
bounds of courtesy and fairness in order not to destroy the people's trust in the judicial system. As a member of the Bar, she
is under obligaiton to maintain at all times a respectful attitude toward the courts.

11. 11-09-SC, Resolution, dated 12 August 2014

12. Areola vs. Mendoza, A.C. No. 10135, January 15, 2014
FACTS: In the letter-complaint of Areola, he stated that he was filing the complaint in behalf of his co-detainees. He alleged
that, during Prisoners Week, Atty. Mendoza, visited the Jail and called all detainees with pending cases before the RTC,
where she was assigned, to attend her speech/lecture. Areola claimed that Atty. Mendoza stated the following during her
speech:
"O kayong may mga kasong drugs na may pangpiyansa o pang- areglo ay maging praktikal sana kayo kung gusto ninyong
makalaya agad. Upang makatiyak kayo na hindi masasayang ang pera ninyo ay sa akin ninyo ibigay o ng kamag-anak ninyo
ang pera at ako na ang bahalang maglagay kay Judge Martin at Fiscal banqui; at kayong mga detenidong mga babae na no
bail ang kaso sa drugs, iyak-iyakan lang ninyo si Judge Martin at palalayain na kayo. Malambot ang puso noon."
The Investigating Commissioner stated that the Complainant is knowledgeable in the field of law. While he may be of
service to his fellow detainees, he must, however, be subservient to the skills and knowledge of a full fledged lawyer. He
however found no convincing evidence to prove that Atty. Mendoza received money from Areola’s co-detainees as alleged.
Nonetheless, Atty. Mendoza admitted in her Answer that she advised her clients and their relatives to approach the judge
and the fiscal "to beg and cry" so that their motions would be granted and their cases against them would be dismissed. To
the Investigating Commissioner, this is highly unethical and improper as the act of Atty. Mendoza degrades the image of
and lessens the confidence of the public in the judiciary. The Investigating Commissioner recommended that Atty. Mendoza
be suspended from the practice of law for a period of two (2) months.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Mendoza is liable for giving improper advice to her clients in violation of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.

RULING: Yes, the Court agrees with the IBP Board of Governors that Atty. Mendoza made irresponsible advices to her
clients when she said "Iyak-iyakan lang ninyo si Judge Martin at palalayain na kayo. Malambot ang puso noon." Atty.
Mendoza’s improper advice only lessens the confidence of the public in our legal system. Judges must be free to judge,
without pressure or influence from external forces or factors according to the merits of a case. Atty. Mendoza’s careless
remark is uncalled for.

DISPOSITION: The Court finds Atty. Maria Vilma Mendoza GUILTY of giving improper advice to her clients in violation
of Rule 1.02 and Rule 15.07 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and is accordingly meted out the penalty of
REPRIMAND, with the STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar act will be dealt with more severely.

13. Ting Dumali vs. Torres, 427 SCRA 108 (2004)

Facts: Atty. Torres consented to his client's forgery and false testimonies (that his client and a sister are the only heirs of
the decedent who left properties, when in fact there are 6 heirs-children)
Issue: should atty torres be disbarred.
Ruling: Yes. Disbarred.

1. Masinsin vs. Albano, 232 SCRA 631 (1994)

 FACTS: This case emerged from an ejectment suit filed by Vicente Caneda against Miguel and Thelma Masinsin. As a
result of the case, the trial court ordered the spouses to vacate the premises, to remove their house/apartment, to surrender
possession of the subject land, and to pay the sum of P100 a month from January 1987 as compensation for the use of the
premises until the land is actually vacated. No appeal having been taken therefrom, the judgment became final and
executory.
 On August 22, 1985, the Masinsins filed a petition for certiorari before the RTC of Manila seeking the annulment of the
decision of the ejectment case and to set aside the order of its execution. Petition was dismissed.

 On October 7 1985, a complaint for “Annulment of the judgment, Lease Contract and Damages” was filed by the
Masinsins asking for the nullification of the judgment in the ejectment case. The complaint was dismissed due to res
judicata.

 Petitioners appealed to the CA but the CA affirmed the decision of the trial court.

 When petitioners refused to remove their house, a demolition order was issued. But before the completion of the
demolition, a restraining order was issued by the RTC following a petition for certiorari, with preliminary injunction and
for declaratory relief. Petition again was denied.

 Petitioners again filed the same suit before a different branch of the Manila RTC. Petition was ultimately dismissed on
August 23, 1990.

 In this present petition for certiorari and prohibition, petitioners contend that the MTC of Manila has lost jurisdiction to
enforce its decision in the ejectment suit, when the property in question was proclaimed an area for priority development
by the National Housing Authority on December 1 1987 by authority of PD2016
ISSUE: Whether the acts of the petitioner’s lawyer (Gregorio T. Fabros) would merit a disciplinary sanction from the Court
RULING: Yes, the SC held that never again should the practice of parties of trifling with judicial processes be
countenanced. This case is evident predilection of petitioners, through different counsel, to file pleadings, one after another,
from which not even this Court has been spared. The utter lack of merit of the complaints and petitions simply evinces the
deliberate intent of petitioners to prolong and delay the inevitable execution of a decision that has long become final and
executory. Four times did the petitioners, with the assistance of counsel, try to nullity the same MTC decision before
different branches of the court, trifling with judicial processes.
The lawyer’s oath to which we have all subscribed in solemn agreement in dedicating ourselves to the pursuit of justice, is
not a mere fictile of words, drift and hollow, but a sacred trust that we must uphold and keep inviolable. Perhaps, it is time
we are here reminded of that pledge.
The petition was DISMISSED; petitioners’ counsel of record was strongly CENSURED and WARNED that a similar
infraction of the lawyer’s oath in the future will be dealt with most severely.

2. Young vs. Batuegas, 403 SCRA 123 (2003)

FACTS: On December 29, 2000, Atty. Walter T. Young filed a Verified Affidavit-Complaint for disbarment against Attys.
Ceasar G. Batuegas, Miguelito Nazareno V. Llantino and Franklin Q. Susa for allegedly committing deliberate falsehood
in court and violating the lawyer's oath. Complainant is the private prosecutor in Criminal Case No. 00-187627 for Murder,
entitled "People of the Philippines versus Crisanto Arana, Jr.", pending before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch
27. On December 13, 2000, respondents Batuegas and Llantino, as counsel for accused, filed a Manifestation with Motion
for Bail, alleging that the "accused has voluntarily surrendered to a person in authority. As such, he is now under detention."
Upon personal verification with the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) where accused Arana allegedly
surrendered, complainant learned that he surrendered only on December 14, 2000, as shown by the Certificate of Detention
executed by Atty. Rogelio M. Mamauag, Chief of the Security Management Division of the NBI. Respondent Susa, the
Branch Clerk of Court of RTC of Manila, Branch 27, calendared the motion on December 15, 2000 despite the foregoing
irregularity and other formal defects, namely, the lack of notice of hearing to the private complainant, violation of the three-
day notice rule, and the failure to attach the Certificate of Detention. Respondents filed their respective comments, declaring
that on December 13, 2000, upon learning that a warrant of arrest was issued against their client, they filed the Manifestation
with Motion for Bail with the trial court. Then they immediately fetched the accused in Cavite and brought him to the NBI
to voluntarily surrender. However, due to heavy traffic, they arrived at the NBI at 2:00 a.m. the next day; hence, the
certificate of detention indicated that the accused surrendered on December 14, 2000. They argued that there was neither
 unethical conduct nor falsehood in the subject pleading as their client has voluntarily surrendered and was detained at the
NBI.
As regards the lack of notice of hearing, they contend that complainant, as private prosecutor, was not entitled to
any notice. Nevertheless, they furnished the State and City prosecutors copies of the motion with notice of hearing thereof.
Moreover, the hearing of a motion on shorter notice is allowed under Rule 15, Sec. 4(2) of the Rules of Court. For his part,
respondent Susa argues in his comment that he was no longer in court when his co-respondents filed the Manifestation with
Motion for Bail. Ms. Teofila A. Peña, Clerk III, received the said Motion and noticed that it was set for hearing on December
15, 2000 and the Certificate of Detention was not attached. However, the presiding judge instructed her to receive the
Motion subject to the presentation of the Certificate of Detention before the hearing. Thus, the inclusion of the Motion in
the court's calendar on December 15, 2000 was authorized by the presiding judge and, thus, was done by respondent Susa
in faithful performance of his ministerial duty.

ISSUE: WON the respondent lawyers are guilty of falsehood.

RULING: YES, they are guilty of falsehood. A lawyer must be a disciple of truth. He swore upon his admission to the Bar
that he will "do no falsehood nor consent to the doing of any in court" and he shall "conduct himself as a lawyer according
to the best of his knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to his clients. "He should bear in
mind that as an officer of the court his high vocation is to correctly inform the court upon the law and the facts of the case
and to aid it in doing justice and arriving at correct conclusion. The courts, on the other hand, are entitled to expect only
complete honesty from lawyers appearing and pleading before them. While a lawyer has the solemn duty to defend his
client's rights and is expected to display the utmost zeal in defense of his client's cause, his conduct must never be at the
expense of truth.
The Court may disbar or suspend a lawyer for misconduct, whether in his professional or private capacity, which shows
him to be wanting in moral character, in honesty, probity, and good demeanor, thus proving unworthy to continue as an
officer of the court. Evidently, respondent lawyers fell short of the duties and responsibilities expected from them as
members of the bar. Anticipating that their Motion for Bail will be denied by the court if it found that it had no jurisdiction
over the person of the accused, they craftily concealed the truth by alleging that accused had voluntarily surrendered to a
person in authority and was under detention. Obviously, such artifice was a deliberate ruse to mislead the court and thereby
contribute to injustice. To knowingly allege an untrue statement of fact in the pleading is a contemptuous conduct that we
strongly condemn. They violated their oath when they resorted to deception.

3. Insular Life Employees Co. vs. Insular Life Association, 37 SCRA 244 (1971)
This is a labor case. In relation to Legal Ethics, the facts of the case are:
The petitioners ask this Court to cite for contempt the respondent Presiding Judge Arsenio Martinez of the Court of Industrial
Relations and the counsels for the private respondents, on the ground that the former wrote the following in his decision
subject of the instant petition for certiorari, while the latter quoted the same on pages 90-91 of the respondents' brief: .

... Says the Supreme Court in the following decisions:

In a proceeding for unfair labor practice, involving a determination as to whether or not the acts of the employees concerned
justified the adoption of the employer of disciplinary measures against them, the mere fact that the employees may be able
to put up a valid defense in a criminal prosecution for the same acts, does not erase or neutralize the employer's right to
impose discipline on said employees. For it is settled that not even the acquittal of an employee of the criminal charge
against him is a bar to the employer's right to impose discipline on its employees, should the act upon which the criminal
charged was based constitute nevertheless an activity inimical to the employer's interest... The act of the employees now
under consideration may be considered as a misconduct which is a just cause for dismissal. (Lopez, Sr., et al. vs. Chronicle
Publication Employees Ass'n. et al., G.R. No. L-20179-81, December 28, 1964.)

The two pertinent paragraphs in the above-cited decision which contained the underscored portions of the above citation
read however as follows:

Differently as regard the dismissal of Orlando Aquino and Carmelito Vicente, we are inclined to uphold the action taken by
the employer as proper disciplinary measure. A reading of the article which allegedly caused their dismissal reveals that it
really contains an insinuation albeit subtly of the supposed exertion of political pressure by the Manila Chronicle
management upon the City Fiscal's Office, resulting in the non-filing of the case against the employer. In rejecting the
employer's theory that the dismissal of Vicente and Aquino was justified, the lower court considered the article as "a report
 of some acts and omissions of an Assistant Fiscal in the exercise of his official functions" and, therefore, does away with
the presumption of malice. This being a proceeding for unfair labor practice, the matter should not have been viewed or
gauged in the light of the doctrine on a publisher's culpability under the Penal Code. We are not here to determine whether
the employees' act could stand criminal prosecution, but only to find out whether the aforesaid act justifies the adoption by
the employer of disciplinary measure against them. This is not sustaining the ruling that the publication in question is
qualified privileged, but even on the assumption that this is so, the exempting character thereof under the Penal Code does
not necessarily erase or neutralize its effect on the employer's interest which may warrant employment of disciplinary
measure. For it must be remembered that not even the acquittal of an employee, of the criminal charges against him, is a
bar to the employer's right to impose discipline on its employees, should the act upon which the criminal charges was based
constitute nevertheless an activity inimical to the employer's interest.

In the herein case, it appears to us that for an employee to publish his "suspicion," which actually amounts to a public
accusation, that his employer is exerting political pressure on a public official to thwart some legitimate activities on the
employees, which charge, in the least, would sully the employer's reputation, can be nothing but an act inimical to the said
employer's interest. And the fact that the same was made in the union newspaper does not alter its deleterious character nor
shield or protect a reprehensible act on the ground that it is a union activity, because such end can be achieved without resort
to improper conduct or behavior. The act of the employees now under consideration may be considered as a misconduct
which is a just cause for dismissal.

It is plain to the naked eye that the 60 un-underscored words of the paragraph quoted by the respondent Judge do not appear
in the pertinent paragraph of this Court's decision in L-20179-81. Moreover, the first underscored sentence in the quoted
paragraph starts with "For it is settled ..." whereas it reads, "For it must be remembered ...," in this Court's decision. Finally,
the second and last underlined sentence in the quoted paragraph of the respondent Judge's decision, appears not in the same
paragraph of this Court's decision where the other sentence is, but in the immediately succeeding paragraph.

ISSUE: Whether the error warrant an indictment for contempt against the respondent Judge and the respondents' counsels.

RULING: No. The apparent error does not seem to warrant an indictment for contempt against the respondent Judge and
the respondents' counsels. We are inclined to believe that the misquotation is more a result of clerical ineptitude than a
deliberate attempt on the part of the respondent Judge to mislead. We fully realize how saddled with many pending cases
are the courts of the land, and it is not difficult to imagine that because of the pressure of their varied and multifarious work,
clerical errors may escape their notice. Upon the other hand, the respondents' counsels have the prima facie right to rely on
the quotation as it appears in the respondent Judge's decision, to copy it verbatim, and to incorporate it in their brief. Anyway,
the import of the underscored sentences of the quotation in the respondent Judge's decision is substantially the same as, and
faithfully reflects, the particular ruling in this Court's decision.
Be that as it may, we must articulate our firm view that in citing this Court's decisions and rulings, it is the bounden
duty of courts, judges and lawyers to reproduce or copy the same word-for-word and punctuation mark-for-
punctuation mark. Indeed, there is a salient and salutary reason why they should do this. Only from this Tribunal's
decisions and rulings do all other courts, as well as lawyers and litigants, take their bearings. This is because the decisions
referred to in article 8 of the Civil Code which reads, "Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution
shall form a part of the legal system of the Philippines," are only those enunciated by this Court of last resort.

DISPOSITION: It is our view, nonetheless, that for their mistake, they should be, as they are hereby, admonished to be
more careful when citing jurisprudence in the future.

4. Hipos, Sr. vs. Bay, 581 SCRA 674 (2009)

Facts: Two Informations for the crime of rape and one Information for the crime of acts of lasciviousness were filed against
petitioners Darryl Hipos et al., before Branch 86 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. Petitioners filed their Joint
Memorandum to Dismiss the Case[s] before the City Prosecutor. They claimed that there was no probable cause to hold
them liable for the crimes charged. The Office of the City Prosecutor issued a Resolution on the reinvestigation affirming
the Informations.

2nd Assistant City Prosecutor Lamberto C. de Vera, treating the Joint Memorandum to Dismiss the Case as an appeal of
the 10 August 2004 Resolution, reversed the Resolution dated 10 August 2004, holding that there was lack of probable
 cause. On the same date, the City Prosecutor filed a Motion to Withdraw Informations before Judge Bay. Judge Bay denied
the Motion to Withdraw Informations in an Order of even date.

Petitioners pray that we compel the trial court to do is to grant the Office of the City Prosecutors Motion for Withdrawal of
Informations against petitioners, by way of mandamus.

In it’s arguments, like what was done to the SC’s ruling in Sanchez, petitioners took specific statements from the SC’s
Decision, carefully cutting off the portions which would expose the real import of its pronouncements.

Issue: Whether there is a violation of Rule 10.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility

Ruling: Yes. The statement of petitioners’ counsel is utterly misleading. There is no such statement in our Decision
in Ledesma Case. The excerpt from Ledesma, which appears to have a resemblance to the statement allegedly quoted from
said case provides: No Grave Abuse of Discretion in the Resolution of the Secretary of Justice, In the light of recent holdings
in Marcelo and Martinez; and considering that the issue of the correctness of the justice secretary’s resolution has been
amply threshed out in petitioner’s letter, the information, the resolution of the secretary of justice, the motion to dismiss,
and even the exhaustive discussion in the motion for reconsideration—all of which were submitted to the court—the trial
judge committed grave abuse of discretion when it denied the motion to withdraw the information, based solely on
his bare and ambiguous reliance on Crespo. The trial court’s order is inconsistent with our repetitive calls for an
independent and competent assessment of the issue(s) presented in the motion to dismiss. The trial judge was tasked
to evaluate the secretary’s recommendation finding the absence of probable cause to hold petitioner criminally liable for
libel. He failed to do so. He merely ruled to proceed with the trial without stating his reasons for disregarding the secretary’s
recommendation. It very much appears that the counsel of petitioners is purposely misleading this Court, in violation of
Rule 10.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides: Rule 10.02—A lawyer shall not knowingly
misquote or misrepresent the contents of a paper, the language or the argument of opposing counsel, or the text of a decision
or authority, or knowingly cite as law a provision already rendered inoperative by repel or amendment, or assert as a fact
that which has not been proved. Counsel’s use of block quotation and quotation marks signifies that he intends to make it
appear that the passages are the exact words of the Court. Furthermore, putting the words “Underscoring ours” after the text
implies that, except for the underscoring, the text is a faithful reproduction of the original. Accordingly, we are ordering
Atty. Procopio S. Beltran, Jr. to show cause why he should not be disciplined as a member of the Bar.

5. Re: Letter of the UP Law Faculty, 633 SCRA 428 (2010), March 8, 2011
(Guys mahaba kasi sinali ko yung controversial statement ng UP Law profeesors para you’ll have an idea on what they were
trying to raise. But I strongly suggest na you read the full text.)

FACTS: For disposition of the Court are the various submissions of the 37 respondent UP law professors in response to the
Resolution dated October 19, 2010 (the Show Cause Resolution), directing them to show cause why they should not be
disciplined as members of the Bar for violation of specific provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility enumerated
therein.
This case involves the alleged plagiarism made in the ponencia of Associate Justice Mariano del Castillo (Justice Del
Castillo) in Vinuya, et al. v. Executive Secretary. (Consti Case on “Malaya Lolas” -Comfort Women during WWII, which
MR was dismissed by the SC.)
Counsel for the Malaya Lolas, Attys. H. Harry L. Roque, Jr. (Atty. Roque) and Romel Regalado Bagares (Atty. Bagares),
filed a supplemental MR where they posited for the first time their charge of plagiarism as one of the grounds for
reconsideration of the Vinuya decision.

According to Attys. Roque and Bagares, the works allegedly plagiarized in the Vinuya decision were namely: (1) Evan J.
Criddle and Evan Fox-Decent’s article "A Fiduciary Theory of Jus Cogens;” (2) Christian J. Tams’ book Enforcing Erga
Omnes Obligations in International Law; and (3) Mark Ellis’ article "Breaking the Silence: On Rape as an International
Crime." (Tams and Ellis, sent letters to the SC re their sentiments on the alleged plagiarism of their work”.

On August 9, 2010, a statement dated July 27, 2010, entitled "Restoring Integrity: A Statement by the Faculty of the
University of the Philippines College of Law on the Allegations of Plagiarism and Misrepresentation in the Supreme Court".

This was the Statement:

RESTORING INTEGRITY

A STATEMENT BY THE FACULTY OF

THE UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF LAW
ON THE ALLEGATIONS OF PLAGIARISM AND MISREPRESENTATION
IN THE SUPREME COURT

An extraordinary act of injustice has again been committed against the brave Filipinas who had suffered abuse during a time
of war. After they courageously came out with their very personal stories of abuse and suffering as "comfort women",
waited for almost two decades for any meaningful relief from their own government as well as from the government of
Japan, got their hopes up for a semblance of judicial recourse in the case of Vinuya v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 162230
(28 April 2010), they only had these hopes crushed by a singularly reprehensible act of dishonesty and misrepresentation
by the Highest Court of the land.

It is within this frame that the Faculty of the University of the Philippines College of Law views the charge that an Associate
Justice of the Supreme Court committed plagiarism and misrepresentation in Vinuya v. Executive Secretary. The plagiarism
and misrepresentation are not only affronts to the individual scholars whose work have been appropriated without correct
attribution, but also a serious threat to the integrity and credibility of the Philippine Judicial System.

In common parlance, ‘plagiarism’ is the appropriation and misrepresentation of another person’s work as one’s own. In the
field of writing, it is cheating at best, and stealing at worst. It constitutes a taking of someone else’s ideas and expressions,
including all the effort and creativity that went into committing such ideas and expressions into writing, and then making it
appear that such ideas and expressions were originally created by the taker. It is dishonesty, pure and simple. A judicial
system that allows plagiarism in any form is one that allows dishonesty. Since all judicial decisions form part of the law of
the land, to allow plagiarism in the Supreme Court is to allow the production of laws by dishonest means. Evidently, this is
a complete perversion and falsification of the ends of justice.

A comparison of the Vinuya decision and the original source material shows that the ponente merely copied select portions
of other legal writers’ works and interspersed them into the decision as if they were his own, original work. Under the
circumstances, however, because the Decision has been promulgated by the Court, the Decision now becomes the Court’s
and no longer just the ponente’s. Thus the Court also bears the responsibility for the Decision. In the absence of any mention
of the original writers’ names and the publications from which they came, the thing speaks for itself.

So far there have been unsatisfactory responses from the ponente of this case and the spokesman of the Court.

It is argued, for example, that the inclusion of the footnotes from the original articles is a reference to the ‘primary’ sources
relied upon. This cursory explanation is not acceptable, because the original authors’ writings and the effort they put into
finding and summarizing those primary sources are precisely the subject of plagiarism. The inclusion of the footnotes
together with portions of their writings in fact aggravates, instead of mitigates, the plagiarism since it provides additional
evidence of a deliberate intention to appropriate the original authors’ work of organizing and analyzing those primary
sources.

It is also argued that the Members of the Court cannot be expected to be familiar with all legal and scholarly journals. This
is also not acceptable, because personal unfamiliarity with sources all the more demands correct and careful attribution and
citation of the material relied upon. It is a matter of diligence and competence expected of all Magistrates of the Highest
Court of the Land.

But a far more serious matter is the objection of the original writers, Professors Evan Criddle and Evan Fox-Descent, that the
High Court actually misrepresents the conclusions of their work entitled "A Fiduciary Theory of Jus Cogens," the main
source of the plagiarized text. In this article they argue that the classification of the crimes of rape, torture, and sexual slavery
as crimes against humanity have attained the status of jus cogens, making it obligatory upon the State to seek remedies on
behalf of its aggrieved citizens. Yet, the Vinuya decision uses parts of the same article to arrive at the contrary conclusion.
This exacerbates the intellectual dishonesty of copying works without attribution by transforming it into an act of intellectual
fraud by copying works in order to mislead and deceive.
The case is a potential landmark decision in International Law, because it deals with State liability and responsibility for
personal injury and damage suffered in a time of war, and the role of the injured parties’ home States in the pursuit of
remedies against such injury or damage. National courts rarely have such opportunities to make an international impact.
That the petitioners were Filipino "comfort women" who suffered from horrific abuse during the Second World War made
it incumbent on the Court of last resort to afford them every solicitude. But instead of acting with urgency on this case, the
Court delayed its resolution for almost seven years, oblivious to the deaths of many of the petitioners seeking justice from
the Court. When it dismissed the Vinuya petition based on misrepresented and plagiarized materials, the Court decided this
case based on polluted sources. By so doing, the Supreme Court added insult to injury by failing to actually exercise its
"power to urge and exhort the Executive Department to take up the claims of the Vinuya petitioners. Its callous disposition,
coupled with false sympathy and nonchalance, belies a more alarming lack of concern for even the most basic values of
decency and respect. The reputation of the Philippine Supreme Court and the standing of the Philippine legal profession
before other Judiciaries and legal systems are truly at stake.

The High Court cannot accommodate less than absolute honesty in its decisions and cannot accept excuses for failure to
attain the highest standards of conduct imposed upon all members of the Bench and Bar because these undermine the very
foundation of its authority and power in a democratic society. Given the Court’s recent history and the controversy that
surrounded it, it cannot allow the charges of such clear and obvious plagiarism to pass without sanction as this would only
further erode faith and confidence in the judicial system. And in light of the significance of this decision to the quest for
justice not only of Filipino women, but of women elsewhere in the world who have suffered the horrors of sexual abuse and
exploitation in times of war, the Court cannot coldly deny relief and justice to the petitioners on the basis of pilfered and
misinterpreted texts.

The Court cannot regain its credibility and maintain its moral authority without ensuring that its own conduct, whether
collectively or through its Members, is beyond reproach. This necessarily includes ensuring that not only the content, but
also the processes of preparing and writing its own decisions, are credible and beyond question. The Vinuya Decision must
be conscientiously reviewed and not casually cast aside, if not for the purpose of sanction, then at least for the purpose of
reflection and guidance. It is an absolutely essential step toward the establishment of a higher standard of professional care
and practical scholarship in the Bench and Bar, which are critical to improving the system of administration of justice in the
Philippines. It is also a very crucial step in ensuring the position of the Supreme Court as the Final Arbiter of all
controversies: a position that requires competence and integrity completely above any and all reproach, in accordance with
the exacting demands of judicial and professional ethics.

With these considerations, and bearing in mind the solemn duties and trust reposed upon them as teachers in the profession
of Law, it is the opinion of the Faculty of the University of the Philippine College of Law that:

(1) The plagiarism committed in the case of Vinuya v. Executive Secretary is unacceptable, unethical and in breach of the
high standards of moral conduct and judicial and professional competence expected of the Supreme Court;

(2) Such a fundamental breach endangers the integrity and credibility of the entire Supreme Court and undermines the
foundations of the Philippine judicial system by allowing implicitly the decision of cases and the establishment of legal
precedents through dubious means;

(3) The same breach and consequent disposition of the Vinuya case does violence to the primordial function of the Supreme
Court as the ultimate dispenser of justice to all those who have been left without legal or equitable recourse, such as the
petitioners therein;

(4) In light of the extremely serious and far-reaching nature of the dishonesty and to save the honor and dignity of the
Supreme Court as an institution, it is necessary for the ponente of Vinuya v. Executive Secretary to resign his position,
without prejudice to any other sanctions that the Court may consider appropriate;

(5) The Supreme Court must take this opportunity to review the manner by which it conducts research, prepares drafts,
reaches and finalizes decisions in order to prevent a recurrence of similar acts, and to provide clear and concise guidance to
the Bench and Bar to ensure only the highest quality of legal research and writing in pleadings, practice, and adjudication.

Malcolm Hall, University of the Philippines College of Law, Quezon City, 27 July 2010.
 Signed by 37 UP Law Proffessors (one was not a member of the bar)

ISSUE: Whether should be disciplined as Members of the Bar under Canons 1, 11, and 13 and Rules 1.02 and 11.05 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility
RULING: Indeed, in a long line of cases, including those cited in respondents’ submissions, this Court has held that the
right to criticize the courts and judicial officers must be balanced against the equally primordial concern that the
independence of the Judiciary be protected from due influence or interference. In cases where the critics are not only citizens
but members of the Bar, jurisprudence has repeatedly affirmed the authority of this Court to discipline lawyers whose
statements regarding the courts and fellow lawyers, whether judicial or extrajudicial, have exceeded the limits of fair
comment and common decency.

With respect to good faith, respondents’ allegations presented two main ideas: (a) the validity of their position regarding
the plagiarism charge against Justice Del Castillo, and (b) their pure motive to spur this Court to take the correct action on
said issue.

The Court has already clarified that it is not the expression of respondents’ staunch belief that Justice Del Castillo has
committed a misconduct that the majority of this Court has found so unbecoming in the Show Cause Resolution. No matter
how firm a lawyer’s conviction in the righteousness of his cause there is simply no excuse for denigrating the courts and
engaging in public behavior that tends to put the courts and the legal profession into disrepute.

Thus:

(1) With respect to Prof. Vasquez, after favorably noting his submission, the Court finds his Compliance to be satisfactory.

(2) The Common Compliance of 35 respondents, namely, Attys. Marvic M.V.F. Leonen, Froilan M. Bacungan, Pacifico A.
Agabin, Merlin M. Magallona, Salvador T. Carlota, Carmelo V. Sison, Patricia R.P. Salvador Daway, Dante B. Gatmaytan,
Theodore O. Te, Florin T. Hilbay, Jay L. Batongbacal, Evelyn (Leo) D. Battad, Gwen G. De Vera, Solomon F. Lumba,
Rommel J. Casis, Jose Gerardo A. Alampay, Miguel R. Armovit, Arthur P. Autea, Rosa Maria J. Bautista, Mark R. Bocobo,
Dan P. Calica, Tristan A. Catindig, Sandra Marie O. Coronel, Rosario O. Gallo, Concepcion L. Jardeleza, Antonio G.M. La
Viña, Carina C. Laforteza, Jose C. Laureta, Rodolfo Noel S. Quimbo, Antonio M. Santos, Gmeleen Faye B. Tomboc,
Nicholas Felix L. Ty, Evalyn G. Ursua, Susan D. Villanueva and Dina D. Lucenario, is found UNSATISFACTORY. These
35 respondent law professors are reminded of their lawyerly duty, under Canons 1, 11 and 13 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, to give due respect to the Court and to refrain from intemperate and offensive language tending to influence
the Court on pending matters or to denigrate the Court and the administration of justice and warned that the same or similar
act in the future shall be dealt with more severely.

(3) The separate Compliance of Dean Marvic M.V.F. Leonen regarding the charge of violation of Canon 10 is found
UNSATISFACTORY. He is further ADMONISHED to be more mindful of his duty, as a member of the Bar, an officer of
the Court, and a Dean and professor of law, to observe full candor and honesty in his dealings with the Court and warned
that the same or similar act in the future shall be dealt with more severely.

(4) Prof. Lynch, who is not a member of the Philippine bar, is excused from these proceedings. However, he is reminded
that while he is engaged as a professor in a Philippine law school he should strive to be a model of responsible and
professional conduct to his students even without the threat of sanction from this Court

6. Re: Letter of the UP Law Faculty, 644 SCRA 543 (2011), June 7, 2011
FACTS:

1. Shortly after the promulgation of the Supreme Court decision in Vinuya v. Executive Secretary, the counsel for the
petitioners therein filed, 1) a Motion for Reconsideration reiterating the fundamental responsibility of states in protecting
its citizens’ human rights specifically pertaining to jus cogens norms; and, 2) a supplement thereto asserting that the Vinuya
decision was plagiarized from different sources and that the true intents of the plagiarized sources were twisted by the
ponente to suit the arguments laid down in said decision.
2. Thereafter, an ethics committee tasked to investigate the veracity of the alleged plagiarism, the authors who were
purportedly plagiarized sent their respective letters to the Supreme Court.
3. Due to this, the faculty of UP College of Law came up with a statement (Restoring Integrity Statement), which alleged
plagiarism against Justice del Castillo, treating the same not only as an established fact, but as a truth. Said statement was
posted online and at the College’s bulletin board and was submitted to the Supreme Court.
4. The manner in presenting the arguments and the language used therein, the Court believed, were inappropriate considering
its signatories are lawyers. Thus, the Supreme Court issued a Show Cause Resolution directing respondents to show cause
why they should not be disciplined as members of the Bar for violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Show Cause Resolution violates respondents’ academic freedom as law professors

RULING: No. The Show Cause Resolution does not violate respondents’ academic freedom as law professors

There is nothing in the Show Cause Resolution that dictates upon respondents the subject matter they can teach and the
manner of their instruction. Moreover, it is not inconsistent with the principle of academic freedom for this Court to subject
lawyers who teach law to disciplinary action for contumacious conduct and speech, coupled with undue intervention in
favor of a party in a pending case, without observing proper procedure, even if purportedly done in their capacity as teachers.

Academic freedom cannot be successfully invoked by respondents in this case. The constitutional right to freedom of
expression of members of the Bar may be circumscribed by their ethical duties as lawyers to give due respect to the courts
and to uphold the public’s faith in the legal profession and the justice system. The Court believes that the reason that
freedom of expression may be so delimited in the case of lawyers applies with greater force to the academic freedom of law
professors.

The Court reiterates that lawyers when they teach law are considered engaged in the practice of law. Unlike professors in
other disciplines and more than lawyers who do not teach law, respondents are bound by their oath to uphold the ethical
standards of the legal profession. Thus, their actions as law professors must be measured against the same canons of
professional responsibility applicable to acts of members of the Bar as the fact of their being law professors is inextricably
entwined with the fact that they are lawyers.

The right to criticize the courts and judicial officers must be balanced against the equally primordial concern that the
independence of the Judiciary be protected from due influence or interference. In cases where the critics are not only citizens
but members of the Bar, jurisprudence has repeatedly affirmed the authority of this Court to discipline lawyers whose
statements regarding the courts and fellow lawyers, whether judicial or extrajudicial, have exceeded the limits of fair
comment and common decency.

7. In the Matter of Charges of Plagiarism against Associate Justice Mariano Del Castillo 2011
On April 28, 2010, the Supreme Court issued a decision which dismissed a petition filed by the Malaya Lolas Organization
in the case of Vinuya vs Romulo. Atty. Herminio Harry Roque Jr., counsel for Vinuya et al, questioned the said decision.
He raised, among others, that the ponente in said case, Justice Mariano del Castillo, plagiarized three books when the
honorable Justice “twisted the true intents” of these books to support the assailed decision. These books were:
a. A Fiduciary Theory of Jus Cogens by Evan J. Criddle and Evan Fox-Descent, Yale Journal of International Law (2009);
b. Breaking the Silence: Rape as an International Crime by Mark Ellis, Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law
(2006); and
c. Enforcing Erga Omnes Obligations by Christian J. Tams, Cambridge University Press (2005).
As such, Justice del Castillo is guilty of plagiarism, misconduct, and at least inexcusable negligence.
Interestingly, even the three foreign authors mentioned above, stated that their works were used inappropriately by Justice
Del Castillo and that the assailed decision is different from what their works advocated.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is plagiarism in the case at bar.
RULING: No. Even if there is (as emphasized by the Supreme Court in its ruling on the Motion for Reconsideration filed
by Vinuya et al in 2011), the rule on plagiarism cannot be applied to judicial bodies.
No Plagiarism
 According to Black’s Law Dictionary: Plagiarism is the “deliberate and knowing presentation of another person’s original
ideas or creative expressions as one’s own.”
This cannot be the case here because as proved by evidence, in the original drafts of the assailed decision, there was
attribution to the three authors but due to errors made by Justice del Castillo’s researcher, the attributions were inadvertently
deleted. There is therefore no intent by Justice del Castillo to take these foreign works as his own.
But in plagiarism, intent is immaterial.
On this note, the Supreme Court stated that in its past decisions, (i.e. U.P Board of Regents vs CA, 313 SCRA 404), the
Supreme Court never indicated that intent is not material in plagiarism. To adopt a strict rule in applying plagiarism in all
cases leaves no room for errors. This would be very disadvantageous in cases, like this, where there are reasonable and
logical explanations.
On the foreign authors’ claim that their works were used inappropriately
According to the Supreme Court, the passages lifted from their works were merely used as background facts in establishing
the state on international law at various stages of its development. The Supreme Court went on to state that the foreign
authors’ works can support conflicting theories. The Supreme Court also stated that since the attributions to said authors
were accidentally deleted, it is impossible to conclude that Justice del Castillo twisted the advocacies that the works espouse.
No Misconduct
Justice del Castillo is not guilty of misconduct. The error here is in good faith. There was no malice, fraud or corruption.
No Inexcusable Negligence
The error of Justice del Castillo’s researcher is not reflective of his gross negligence. The researcher is a highly competent
one. The researcher earned scholarly degrees here and abroad from reputable educational institutions. The researcher
finished third in her class and 4th in the bar examinations. Her error was merely due to the fact that the software she used,
Microsoft Word, lacked features to apprise her that certain important portions of her drafts are being deleted inadvertently.
Such error on her part cannot be said to be constitutive of gross negligence nor can it be said that Justice del Castillo was
grossly negligent when he assigned the case to her. Further, assigning cases to researchers has been a long standing practice
to assist justices in drafting decisions. It must be emphasized though that prior to assignment, the justice has already spelled
out his position to the researcher and in every sense, the justice is in control in the writing of the draft.

8. Cf. Vinuya vs. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 162230, April 28, 2010
FACTS: Petitioners are members of the MALAYA LOLAS, a non-stock, non-profit organization established for the purpose
of providing aid to the victims of rape by Japanese military forces in the Philippines during the Second World War.
Petitioners claim that since 1998, they have approached the Executive Department through the DOJ, DFA, and OSG, requesting
assistance in filing a claim against the Japanese officials and military officers who ordered the establishment of the comfort women
stations in the Philippines. However, officials of the Executive Department declined to assist the petitioners, and took the position that
the individual claims of the comfort women for compensation had already been fully satisfied by Japans compliance with the Peace
Treaty between the Philippines and Japan.

Petitioners argue that the general waiver of claims made by the Philippine government in the Treaty of Peace with Japan is void. They
allege that the prohibition against these international crimes is jus cogens norms from which no derogation is possible; as such, in
waiving the claims of Filipina comfort women and failing to espouse their complaints against Japan, the Philippine government is in
breach of its legal obligation not to afford impunity for crimes against humanity.

ISSUE: Whether the Executive Department committed grave abuse of discretion in not espousing petitioner’s claims for official
apology and other forms of reparations against Japan.

RULING: No. The petition lacks merit. The Constitution has entrusted to the Executive Department the conduct of foreign relations
for the Philippines. Whether or not to espouse petitioners’ claim against the Government of Japan is left to the exclusive determination
and judgment of the Executive Department. The Court cannot interfere with or question the wisdom of the conduct of foreign relations
by the Executive Department. Accordingly, we cannot direct the Executive Department, either by writ of certiorari or injunction, to
conduct our foreign relations with Japan in a certain manner.

There is a broad range of vitally important areas that must be regularly decided by the Executive Department without either challenge
or interference by the Judiciary. One such area involves the delicate arena of foreign relations. It would be strange indeed if the courts
 and the executive spoke with different voices in the realm of foreign policy. Precisely because of the nature of the questions presented,
and the lapse of more than 60 years since the conduct complained of, we make no attempt to lay down general guidelines covering other
situations not involved here, and confine the opinion only to the very questions necessary to reach a decision on this matter.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DISMISSED.

9. In re Lozanos, A.M. No. 10-1-13-SC and 109-9-SC, June 15, 2012

FACTS: In the Supreme Court Resolution of June 15, 2010, the Supreme Court found Atty. Lozano and Atty. Evangeline
Lozano-Endriano guilty of grave professional misconduct when they misquoted or misused constitutional provisions in their
pleadings in order to impute unjust acts to members of this Court.
However, in the past two years during which Atty. Lozano has been suspended, he has repeatedly expressed his
willingness to admit his error, to observe the rules and standards in the practice of law, and to serve the ends of justice if he
should be reinstated. And in these two years, the Supreme Court has not been informed of any act that would indicate that
Atty. Lozano had acted in any unscrupulous practices unsuitable to a member of the bar.
Atty. Lozano filed letter-petitions addressed to the Supreme Court en ban for the lifting of the indefinite suspension from
the practice of law imposed by the Court in its Resolution of June 15, 2010.

RULING: Professional misconduct involving the misuse of constitutional provisions for the purpose of insulting Members
of this Court is a serious breach of the rigid standards that a member of good standing of the legal profession must faithfully
comply with. Thus, the penalty of indefinite suspension was imposed before.
While this Court will not hesitate to discipline its erring officers, it will not prolong a penalty after it has been shown that
the purpose for imposing it had already been served. From Atty. Lozano’s letters-petitions, we discern that his suspension
had already impressed upon him the need for care and caution in his representations as an officer of this Court.
Under these circumstances, this Court decides to grant Atty. Lozano’s letters-petitions with the expectation that he shall
now avoid going to the extreme of employing contortions of and misusing legal provisions and principles to justify his
positions, and instead focus his energies and talents towards a lawyer’s primary aim of promoting the speedy and efficient
administration of justice.

DISPOSITION: We hereby LIFT the indefinite suspension from the practice of law of Atty. Oliver Lozano and
REINSTATE him to the status of a member in good standing in so far as the suspension imposed him by this Court is
concerned.

10. Embido vs. Pe, Jr., A.C. No. 6832, October 22, 2013, 708 SCRA 1 (2013)
FACTS: Atty. Ronel F. Sustituya, Clerk of Court of the RTC, received a written communication from Mr. Ballam Delaney
Hunt, a Solicitor in the United Kingdom (UK). The letter requested a copy of the decision rendered by Judge Rafael O.
Penuela in the case entitled In the Matter of the Declaration of Presumptive Death of Rey Laserna, whose petitioner was
one Shirley Quioyo.

RTC received another letter from Mr. Hunt, reiterating the request for a copy of the decision in the same case. Judge Penuela
instructed the civil docket clerk to retrieve the records of Special Proceedings Case No. 084 entitled In the Matter of the
Declaration of Presumptive Death of Rey Laserna. It was then discovered that the RTC had no record of SP No. 084 wherein
Shirley Quioyo was the petitioner.

Informed that the requested decision and case records did not exist, Mr. Hunt sent a letter attaching a machine copy of the
purported decision in SP No. 084 that had been presented by Shirley Quioyo in court proceedings in the UK. After
comparing the two documents and ascertaining that the document attached to the letter was a falsified court document,
Judge Penuela wrote Mr. Hunt to apprise him of the situation.

The discovery of the falsified decision prompted the Clerk of Court to communicate on the situation in writing to the NBI,
triggering the investigation of the falsification.

After conducting its investigation, the NBI forwarded to the Office of the Ombudsman for Visayas the records of the
investigation, with a recommendation that the respondent be prosecuted for falsification of public document under Article
171, 1 and 2, of the RPC, and for violation of Section 3(a) of RA 3019 (The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act). The
NBI likewise recommended to the Office of the Court Administrator that disbarment proceedings be commenced against
the respondent.
 ISSUE: Should respondent be disbarred?

RULING: Yes. Gross immorality, conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or fraudulent transactions can justify a
lawyer’s disbarment or suspension from the practice of law. Specifically, the deliberate falsification of the court decision
by the respondent was an act that reflected a high degree of moral turpitude on his part. Worse, the act made a mockery of
the administration of justice in this country, given the purpose of the falsification, which was to mislead a foreign tribunal
on the personal status of a person. He thereby became unworthy of continuing as a member of the Bar.

11. Madrid vs. Dealca, A.C. No. 7474, September 9, 2014

All lawyers are bound to uphold the dignity and authority of the courts, and to promote confidence in the fair
administration of justice. It is the respect for the courts that guarantees the stability of the judicial institution; else wise,
the institution would be resting on a very shaky foundation.

Facts: Judge Jose L. Madrid is the presiding judge in Branch 51 of the Regional Trial Court in Sorsogon City. Atty. Dealca
sought to replace Atty. Vicente Judar who had filed a motion to withdraw as counsel for the accused in the case entitled
“People of the Philippines vs. Philip William Arsenault.” He moved that the criminal case be raffled to another RTC branch.
The motion to re-raffle the case and to appear as the new counsel of the accused were denied by Judge Madrid.

Consequently, Judge Madrid filed a letter complaint4 in the Office of the Bar Confidant citing Atty. Dealca’s unethical
practice of entering his appearance and then moving for the inhibition of the presiding judge on the pretext of previous
adverse incidents between them.

Atty. Dealca asserted that Judge Madrid’s issuance of the February 14, 2007 order unconstitutionally and unlawfully
deprived the accused of the right to counsel, to due process, and to a fair and impartial trial; that Judge Madrid exhibited
bias in failing to act on the motion to lift and set aside the warrant of arrest issued against the accused; and that it should be
Judge Madrid himself who should be disbarred and accordingly dismissed from the Judiciary for gross ignorance of the law.

The IBP-Sorsogon submitted its report and findings that Atty. Dealca had filed five (5) administrative cases by himself
and as counsel for the complainants against court officers, judges and personnel as a consequence of the IBP Election and
incidents in cases that respondent had handled as counsel for the parties in the said cases. The first four (4) cases are
precipitated by the adverse ruling rendered by the court against the clients of the respondent that instead of resorting to the
remedies available under the Rules of Procedure, respondent assisted his clients in filing administrative and criminal case
against the judges and personnel of the court.

The IBP Commissioner recommended that Atty Dealca be suspended from the practice of law for a period of six
months. IBP Commissioner Hababag ultimately submitted his Report and Recommendation finding Atty. Dealca guilty of
violating the Lawyer’s Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility by filing frivolous administrative and criminal
complaints; recommending that he be suspended from the practice of law for one (1) year. Upon review by the IBP-Board
of Governors, modified the recommendation and dismissed the administrative complaint for its lack of merit. Judge Madrid
filed a petition which was treated as a motion for reconsideration but was denied.

Issue/s:

1. Whether or not Atty. Dealca filed frivolous administrative and criminal complaints against judges and court
personnel in violation of the Lawyer’s Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility.

2. Whether or not Atty. Dealca was guilty of unethical practice in seeking the inhibition of Judge Madrid in the criminal
case.

Ruling:

1. Yes, Atty. Dealca had filed frivolous administrative and criminal complaints against judges and court personnel in
violation of the Lawyer’s Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility.
 The Lawyer’s Oath is a source of obligations and duties for every lawyer, and any violation thereof by an attorney
constitutes a ground for disbarment, suspension, or other disciplinary action. The oath exhorts upon the members of the Bar
not to "wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit." These are not mere facile words, drift
and hollow, but a sacred trust that must be upheld and keep inviolable.

The duty has also been expressly embodied in Rule 1.03, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

Rule 1.03 – A lawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive or interest, encourage any suit or proceeding or delay
any man’s cause.

His being an officer of the court should have impelled him to see to it that the orderly administration of justice must
not be unduly impeded. Indeed, as he must resist the whims and caprices of his clients and temper his clients’ propensities
to litigate, so must he equally guard himself against his own impulses of initiating unfounded suits. While it is the Court’s
duty to investigate and uncover the truth behind charges against judges and lawyers, it is equally its duty to shield them
from unfounded suits that are intended to vex and harass them, among other things.

Moreover, Atty. Dealca must be mindful of his mission to assist the courts in the proper administration of justice. He
disregarded his mission because his filing of the unfounded complaints, including this one against Judge Madrid, increased
the workload of the Judiciary. Although no person should be penalized for the exercise of the right to litigate, the right must
nonetheless be exercised in good faith. Atty. Dealca’s bringing of the numerous administrative and criminal complaints
against judges, court personnel and his fellow lawyers did not evince any good faith on his part, considering that he made
allegations against them therein that he could not substantially prove, and are rightfully deemed frivolous and unworthy of
the Court’s precious time and serious consideration.

2. Yes, Atty. Dealca violated Canon 11 and Rule 11.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Lawyers are licensed officers of the courts empowered to appear, prosecute and defend the legal causes for their clients.
As a consequence, peculiar duties, responsibilities and liabilities are devolved upon them by law. Verily, their membership
in the Bar imposes certain obligations upon them.

Rule 11.04 — A lawyer shall not attribute to a Judge motives not supported by the record or have no materiality
to the case.

In light of the foregoing canons, all lawyers are bound to uphold the dignity and authority of the courts, and to promote
confidence in the fair administration of justice. It is the respect for the courts that guarantees the stability of the judicial
institution; else wise, the institution would be resting on a very shaky foundation.

The right of a party to seek the inhibition or disqualification of a judge who does not appear to be wholly free,
disinterested, impartial and independent in handling the case must be balanced with the latter’s sacred duty to decide cases
without fear of repression. Thus, it was incumbent upon Atty. Dealca to establish by clear and convincing evidence the
ground of bias and prejudice in order to disqualify Judge Madrid from participating in a particular trial in which Atty. Dealca
was participating as a counsel. The latter’s bare allegations of Judge Madrid’s partiality or hostility did not suffice, because
the presumption that Judge Madrid would undertake his noble role to dispense justice according to law and the evidence
and without fear or favor should only be overcome by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary.

12. Maceda vs. Vasquez, 221 SCRA 464 (1993)

FACTS: In his affidavit-complaint dated April 18, 1991 filed before the Office of the Ombudsman, respondent Napoleon
A. Abiera of the Public Attorney's Office alleged that petitioner had falsified his Certificate of Service 1 dated February 6,
1989, by certifying "that all civil and criminal cases which have been submitted for decision or determination for a period
of 90 days have been determined and decided on or before January 31, 1998," when in truth and in fact, petitioner knew
that no decision had been rendered in five (5) civil and ten (10) criminal cases that have been submitted for decision.
Respondent Abiera further alleged that petitioner similarly falsified his certificates of service for the months of February,
April, May, June, July and August, all in 1989; and the months beginning January up to September 1990, or for a total of
seventeen (17) months.
 ISSUE: whether the Office of the Ombudsman could entertain a criminal complaint for the alleged falsification of a judge's
certification submitted to the Supreme Court, and assuming that it can, whether a referral should be made first to the Supreme
Court.

RULING:
1. Office of the Ombudsman has jurisdiction to investigate offense committed by judge whether or not offense relates to
official duties.
A judge who falsifies his certificate of service is administratively liable to the Supreme Court for serious misconduct and
inefficiency under Section 1, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, and criminally liable to the State under the Revised Penal
Code for his felonious act.
2. Jurisdiction to investigate offense related to official duties subject to prior administrative action taken against judge by
Supreme Court
In the absence of any administrative action taken against him by this Court with regard to his certificates of service, the
investigation being conducted by the Ombudsman encroaches into the Court's power of administrative supervision over all
courts and its personnel, in violation of the doctrine of separation of powers.
3. Procedure to be observed by Ombudsman regarding complaint against judge or other court employee
4. Ombudsman cannot subpoena Supreme Court and its personnel.

DISPOSITION: The Ombudsman is hereby directed to dismiss the complaint filed by public respondent Atty. Napoleon
A. Abiera and to refer the same to this Court for appropriate action.

13. Nestle Phils. vs. Sanchez, 154 SCRA 542 (1987)

Unions intensified the intermittent pickets they had been conducting since June 17, 1987 in front of the Padre Faura gate of
the Supreme Court building. They set up pickets' quarters on the pavement in front of the Supreme Court building, at times
obstructing access to and egress from the Court's premises and offices of justices, officials and employees. They constructed
provisional shelters along the sidewalks, set up a kitchen and littered the place with food containers and trash in utter
disregard of proper hygiene and sanitation. They waved their red streamers and placards with slogans, and took turns
haranguing the court all day long with the use of loudspeakers.
Court en banc issued a resolution giving the said unions the opportunity to withdraw graciously and requiring Messrs. Tony
Avelino, Lito Payabyab, Eugene San Pedro, Dante Escasura, Emil Sayao and Nelson Centeno, union leaders of respondent
Union of Filipro Employees in the Nestle case and their counsel of record, Atty. Jose C. Espinas; and Messrs. Ernesto
Facundo, Fausto Gapuz, Jr. and Antonio Gonzales, union leaders of petitioner Kimberly Independent Labor Union for
Solidarity, Activism and Nationalism-Olalia in the Kimberly case to appear before the Court on July 14, 1987 at 10:30 A.M.
and then and there to SHOW CAUSE why they should not be held in contempt of court. Atty. Jose C. Espinas was further
required to SHOW CAUSE why he should not be administratively dealt with.
Atty. Espinas, for himself and in behalf of the union leaders concerned, apologized to the Court for the above-described
acts, together with an assurance that they will not be repeated. He likewise manifested to the Court that he had explained
to the picketers why their actions were wrong and that the cited persons were willing to suffer such penalty as may be
warranted under the circumstances.
Issue: Should Atty. Espinas, union leaders and other participants of said picketing be held liable for disciplinary actions?
Ruling: No.
SC accept the apologies offered by the respondents and at this time, forego the imposition of the sanction warranted by the
contemptuous acts described earlier.
XXX the individuals herein cited who are non-lawyers are not knowledgeable in the intricacies of substantive and adjective
laws. They are not aware that even as the rights of free speech and of assembly are protected by the Constitution, any
attempt to pressure or influence courts of justice through the exercise of either right amounts to an abuse thereof is no longer
within the ambit of constitutional protection, nor did they realize that any such efforts to influence the course of justice
constitutes contempt of court. The duty and responsibility of advising them, therefore, rest primarily and heavily upon the
shoulders of their counsel of record. Atty. Jose C. Espinas, when his attention was called by this Court, did his best to
demonstrate to the pickets the untenability of their acts and posture. Let this incident therefore serve as a reminder to all
members of the legal profession that it is their duty as officers of the court to properly apprise their clients on matters of
decorum and proper attitude toward courts of justice, and to labor leaders of the importance of a continuing educational
program for their members.
WHEREFORE, the contempt charges against herein respondents are DISMISSED. Henceforth, no demonstrations or
pickets
1. In re De Vera, 385 SCRA 285 (2003)
FACTS: On December 11, 2001, the Court En Banc issued the Resolution directing respondent Atty. Leonard De Vera to
explain why he should not be cited for indirect contempt of court for uttering some allegedly contemptuous statements in
relation to the case involving the constitutionality of the Plunder Law (Republic Act No. 7080) which was then pending
resolution.
Quoted hereunder are newspaper articles with contemptuous statements attributed to Atty. Leonard De Vera:
PHILIPPINE DAILY INQUIRER
Tuesday, November 6, 2001
Erap camp blamed for oust-Badoy maneuvers
Plunder Law
De Vera asked the Supreme Court to dispel rumors that it would vote in favor of a petition filed by Estrada’s lawyers to
declare the plunder law unconstitutional for its supposed vagueness.
De Vera said he and his group were “greatly disturbed” by the rumors from Supreme Court insiders. Reports said that SC
justices were tied 6-6 over the constitutionality of the Plunder Law, with two other justices still undecided and uttered most
likely to inhibit, said Plunder Watch, a coalition formed by civil society and militant groups to monitor the prosecution of
Estrada.
“We are afraid that the Estrada camp’s effort to coerce, bribe, or influence the justices—considering that it has a P500
million slush fund from the aborted power grab that May—will most likely result in a pro-Estrada decision declaring the
Plunder Law either unconstitutional or vague,” the group said.

PHILIPPINE DAILY INQUIRER

Monday, November 19, 2001
SC under pressure from Erap pals, foes
xxx
“People are getting dangerously, passionate . . . emotionally charged.” said lawyer Leonard de Vera of the Equal Justice
for All Movement and a leading member of the Estrada Resign movement.
He voiced his concern that a decision by the high tribunal rendering the plunder law unconstitutional would trigger mass
actions, probably more massive than those that led to People Power II.
xxx
De Vera warned of a crisis far worse than the “jueteng” scandal that led to People Power II if the rumor turned out to be
true.
“People wouldn’t just swallow any Supreme Court decision that is basically wrong. Sovereignty must prevail.”

Atty. De Vera admitted to making the statements but that these were factually accurate and that these are within his right of
freedom of speech. Also, his second statement is allegedly historically correct (Marcos and Erap’s times) but that both
statements are not to degrade the court, to destroy public confidence and to bring it into disrepute.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. De Vera’s acts constitute a violation of the provisions of the Code of professional
responsibility.
RULING Yes. Freedom of speech is not absolute, and must be balanced with the requirements of equally important public
interests, such as the maintenance of the integrity of the courts and orderly functioning of the administration of justice. It is
respondent’s duty as an officer of the court, to uphold the dignity and authority of the courts and to promote confidence in
the fair administration of justice and in the Supreme Court as the last bulwark of justice and democracy. Respondent’s
utterances as quoted above, while the case of Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan was pending consideration by the same Court,
belies his protestation of good faith but were clearly made to mobilize public opinion and bring pressure on the Court. De
Vera is in abuse of his right.
Atty. De Vera was guilty for indirect contempt.

2. Perez vs. Estrada, 360 SCRA 248 (2001)

FACTS: This is a motion for reconsideration of the decision denying petitioners’ request for permission to televise and
broadcast live the trial of former President Estrada before the Sandiganbayan. The motion was filed by the Secretary of
Justice, as one of the petitioners, who argues that there is really no conflict between the right of the people to public
information and the freedom of the press, on the one hand, and, on the other, the right of the accused to a fair trial; that if
there is a clash between these rights, it must be resolved in favor of the right of the people and the press because the people,
as the repository of sovereignty, are entitled to information; and that live media coverage is a safeguard against attempts by
any party to use the courts as instruments for the pursuit of selfish interests.
 On the other hand, former President Joseph E. Estrada reiterates his objection to the live TV and radio coverage of his trial
on the ground that its allowance will violate the sub judice rule and that, based on his experience with the impeachment
trial, live media coverage will only pave the way for so-called "expert commentary" which can trigger massive
demonstrations aimed at pressuring the Sandiganbayan to render a decision one way or the other. Mr. Estrada contends that
the right of the people to information may be served through other means less distracting, degrading, and prejudicial than
live TV and radio coverage.

ISSUE: Whether or not television and radio coverage of plunder case be allowed.
RULING: No. The presence of television cameras inside the courtroom also places additional responsibilities on the trial
judge. In addition to his duties of listening to the testimonies of the witnesses, receiving documentary and object evidence,
ruling on motions and objections and ensuring that the accused receives a fair trial, he must also supervise the television
crew present in his courtroom20 to make sure that they do not disrupt the proceedings. Even the behavior of the judges
themselves may be unduly influenced by such media presence, for although they are supposed to be more impervious to
external pressures with respect to the cases pending before them, they still experience the same psychological reactions as
laymen.

Judges and justices are also human beings. They cannot remain oblivious to the pressures that media can bear on them both
directly and in the shaping of public opinion. Thus, any occasion that would give the impression that in rendering judgment,
the judge was swayed by public opinion or any other factor extraneous to the evidence at hand should be avoided. As Chief
Justice Taft in Tumey vs. Ohio,21 eloquently put it:

x x x the requirement of due process of law in judicial procedure is not satisfied by the argument that men of the highest
honor and the greatest self-sacrifice could carry it on without danger of injustice. Every procedure which would offer a
possible temptation to the average man . . . to forget the burden of proof required to convict the defendant, or which might
lead him not to hold the balance nice, clear and true between the State and the accused, denies the latter due process of law.
Re: Request Radio-TV Coverage of the Trial in the Sandiganbayan of the Plunder Cases Against the Former President
Joseph E. Estrada, 360 SCRA 248, A.M. No. 01-4-03-SC June 29, 2001

3. Cruz vs. Salva, 105 Phil. 115 (1959)

GIVING WIDE PUBLICITY AND SENSATIONALISM TO INVESTIGATION CONSTITUTES CONTEMPT
OF COURT.—In the case at bar, while the Provincial Fiscal has established a justification for his reinvestigation
of the case although the same is on appeal and pending consideration by this Tribunal, however, said Fiscal
committed a grievous error and poor judgment when he allowed, even encouraged, the reinvestigation to be
conducted with much fanfare, publicity and sensationalism. Such actuations of the Fiscal constitute contempt of
court punishable by public censure.
FACTS: This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction filed by Timoteo V. Cruz against
Francisco G. H. Salva, in his capacity as City Fiscal of Pasay City, to restrain him from continuing with the
preliminary investigation he was conducting in September, 1957 in connection with the killing of Manuel Monroy
which took place on June 15, 1953 in Pasay City.

Following the killing of Manuel Monroy in 1953 a number of persons were accused as involved and implicated in
said crime. After a long trial, the Court of found Oscar Castelo and several others guilty of the crime of murder and
sentenced them to death. They all appealed. Oscar Castelo sought a new trial which was granted and upon retrial,
he was again found guilty.

It seems that pending appeal, the late President Magsaysay ordered a reinvestigation of the case. Intelligence agents
of the Philippine Constabulary and investigators of Malacañang conducted the investigation, questioned a number
of people and obtained what would appear to be confession, pointing to persons, other than those convicted and
sentenced by the trial court, as the real killers of Manuel Monroy.

Counsel for Oscar Castelo and his co-defendants wrote to respondent Fiscal Salva to conduct a reinvestigation of
the case presumably on the basis of the affidavits and confessions. Taking advantage of this opportunity, counsel
for the appellants filed a motion for new trial.

In the meantime, the Chief, Philippine Constabulary, had sent to the Office of Fiscal Salva copies of the same
affidavits and confessions and written statements, of which the motion for new trial was based, and respondent
 Salva proceeded to conduct a reinvestigation designating for said purpose a committee of three composed of himself
as chairman and Assistant City Attorneys Herminio A. Avendañio and Ernesto A. Bernabe

In connection with said preliminary investigation being conducted by the committee, petitioner Timoteo Cruz was
subpoenaed by respondent to appear at his office on September 21, 1957, to testify. Cruz wrote to respondent Salva
asking for the transfer of the preliminary investigation due to the fact that his counsel, Atty. Crispin Baizas, would
attend a hearing on that same day in Naga City.
On the rescheduled day, Atty. Baizas appeared for petitioner Cruz, questioned the jurisdiction of the committee to
conduct the preliminary investigation

ISSUE: is the manner in which said investigation was conducted by the respondent.

HELD: If, as contended by him, the purpose of said investigation was only to acquaint himself with and evaluate
the evidence involved in the affidavits and confessions of Sergio Eduardo, Cosme Camo and others by questioning
them, then he, respondent, could well have conducted the investigation in his office, quietly, unobtrusively and
without much fanfare, much less publicity.

However, according to the petitioner and not denied by the respondent, the investigation was conducted not in
respondent's office but in the session hall of the Municipal Court of Pasay City evidently, to accommodate the big
crowd that wanted to witness the proceeding, including members of the press. A number of microphones were
installed. Reporters were everywhere and photographers were busy taking pictures. In other words, apparently with
the permission of, if not the encouragement by the respondent, news photographers and newsmen had a field day.
Not only this, but in the course of the investigation, as shown by the transcript of the stenographic notes taken
during said investigation, on two occasions, the first, after Oscar Caymo had concluded his testimony, respondent
Salva, addressing the newspapermen said, "Gentlemen of the press, if you want to ask questions I am willing to let
you do so and the questions asked will be reproduced as my own"; and the second, after Jose Maratella y de Guzman
had finished testifying and respondent Salva, addressing the newsmen, again said, "Gentlemen of the press is free
to ask question to the witness if you want to. We are willing to adopt the questions as ours."

The newspapers certainly played up and gave wide publicity to what took place during the investigation.

In view of the foregoing, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is granted in part and denied in part. Considering the
conclusion arrived at by us, respondent Francisco G. H. Salva is hereby publicly reprehended and censured for the uncalled
for and wide publicity and sensationalism that he had given to and allowed in connection with his investigation, which we
consider and find to be contempt of court; and, furthermore, he is warned that a repetition of the same would meet with a
more severe disciplinary action and penalty. No costs.

4. Foodsphere, Inc. vs. Mauricio, 593 SCRA

FACTS: A certain Alberto Cordero (Cordero) purportedly bought from a grocery in Valenzuela City canned goods
including a can of CDO Liver spread. As Cordero and his relatives were eating bread with the CDO Liver spread, they
found the spread to be sour and soon discovered a colony of worms inside the can. This was complained before the BFAD.
After conciliation meetings between Cordero and the petitioner, the Corderos eventually forged a KASUNDUAN seeking
the withdrawal of their complaint before the BFAD. The BFAD thus dismissed the complaint. Respondent, Atty. Mauricio,
Jr., who affixed his signature to the KASUNDUAN as a witness, later wrote in one of his articles/columns in a tabloid that
he prepared the document.

Respondent wrote in his columns in the tabloids articles which put complainant in bad light. Thus, in Balitang Patas
BATAS, he wrote an article captioned KADIRI ANG CDO LIVER SPREAD! In another article, he wrote IBA PANG
PRODUKTO NG CDO SILIPIN! which appeared in the same publication in its September 7-13, 2004 issue. And still in the
same publication, its September 14-20, 2004 issue, he wrote another article entitled DAPAT BANG PIGILIN ANG CDO.

Respondent continued his tirade against complainant in his column LAGING HANDA published in another
tabloid, BAGONG TIKTIK.
 Complainant filed criminal complaints against respondent and several others for Libel and Threatening to Publish Libel
under Articles 353 and 356 of the Revised Penal Code before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City and
Valenzuela City. The complaints were pending at the time of the filing of the present administrative complaint. Despite the
pendency of the civil case against him and the issuance of a status quo order restraining/enjoining further publishing,
televising and broadcasting of any matter relative to the complaint of CDO, respondent continued with his attacks against
complainant and its products.

ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility.

HELD: YES. Respondent suspended for three (3) years from the practice of law.

The respondent lawyer also violated Rule 13.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which mandates: A lawyer shall
not make public statements in the media regarding a pending case tending to arouse public opinion for or against a party.
For despite the pendency of the civil case against him and the issuance of a status quo order restraining/enjoining further
publishing, televising and broadcasting of any matter relative to the complaint of CDO, respondent continued with his
attacks against complainant and its products. At the same time, respondent violated Canon 1 also of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which mandates lawyers to “uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law
and legal processes.” For he defied said status quo order, despite his (respondent’s) oath as a member of the legal profession
to “obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities.”

5. Maglasang vs. People, 190 SCRA 306 (1990)

FACTS: For non-payment of legal fees amounting to P316.50 and failure to attach in the MR the duplicate original or
certified true copies of the assailed orders. The MR was denied with finality. (Khalyxto Perez Maglasang vs. People of the
Philippines, Presiding Judge, Ernesto B. Templado).
Three months later, the Court received from Atty. Castellano a copy of a complaint dated December 19, 1989, filed with
the Office of the President of the Philippines whereby Khalyxto Perez Maglasang, through his lawyer, Atty. Castellano, as
complainant, accused all the five Justices of the Court's Second Division with "biases and/or ignorance of the law or
knowingly rendering unjust judgments or resolution." The complaint was signed by Atty. Castellano "for the complainant"
with the conformity of one Calixto B. Maglasang, allegedly the father of accused-complainant Khalyxto. 6 By reason of the
strong and intemperate language of the complaint and its improper filing with the Office of the President, which, as he
should know as a lawyer, has no jurisdiction to discipline, much more, remove, Justices of the Supreme Court.

Atty. Castellano further alleged that the letter should not be used by the SC to discipline him as it was addressed to President
Corazon Aquino and that the letter was made in good faith.

ISSUE: Whether his criticism on the SC Justices and the Cort as well constitute a gross violation of the duty of respect to
courts (Canon 11)
RULING: Yes. It is clear that the case was lost not by the alleged injustices Atty. Castellano irresponsibly ascribed to the
members of the Court's Second Division, but simply because of his inexcusable negligence and incompetence. Atty.
Castellano, however, seeks to pass on the blame for his deficiencies to the Court, in the hope of salvaging his reputation
before his client. The arrogance displayed by counsel in insisting that the Court has no jurisdiction to question his act of
having complained before the Office of the President, and in claiming that a contempt order is used as a weapon by judges
and justices against practicing lawyers, however, reveals all too plainly that he was not honestly motivated in his criticism.
Rather, Atty. Castellano's complaint is a vilification of the honor and integrity of the Justices of the Second Division of the
Court and an impeachment of their capacity to render justice according to law.
Atty. Marceliano L. Castellano is found guilty of CONTEMPT OF COURT and IMPROPER CONDUCT as a member of
the Bar and an officer of the Court, and is hereby ordered to PAY 15 days from and after the finality of this Resolution a
fine of One Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos, or SUFFER ten (10) days imprisonment in the municipal jail of Calatrava, Negros
Occidental in case he fails to pay the fine seasonably, and SUSPENDED from the practice of law throughout the Philippines
for six (6) months as soon as this Resolution becomes final, with a WARNING that a repetition of any misconduct on his
part will be dealt with more severely.

Samson vs. Caballero, A.M. No. RTJ-08-2138, August 5, 2009, 595 SCRA 423 (2009)
 FACTS: Complainant Olga Samson alleged disclosed that, on behalf of Community Rural Bank of Guimba (Nueva Ecija),
Inc., she had filed criminal and administrative charges for grave abuse of authority, against Judge Virgilio Caballero, when
he was still a public prosecutor. According to the complainant, respondent, during his JBC interviews, deliberately
concealed the fact that he had pending administrative charges against him.
Respondent alleged that he disclosed such case during his interviews. But Complainant averred that on his Personal Data
Sheet, he checked the box indicating No to the question “Have you ever been formally charged? “ On the basis of the
pleadings and documents presented by both parties, the OCA found respondent administratively liable for dishonesty and
falsification of an official document for his false statement in his PDS. It recommended respondents dismissal from the
service with forfeiture of retirement benefits, except accrued leave credits, and with prejudice to re-employment in the
government service.
ISSUE: Whether respondent judge should be dismessed from service

RULING: Yes. Regrettably, we are convinced of respondent’s capacity to lie and evade the truth. His dishonesty misled
the JBC and tarnished the image of the judiciary. He does not even seem remorseful for what he did as he sees nothing
wrong with it. Respondent, a judge, knows (or should have known) fully well that the making of a false statement in his
PDS could subject him to dismissal. This Court will not allow him to evade the consequences of his dishonesty. Being a
former public prosecutor and a judge now, it is his duty to ensure that all the laws and rules of the land are followed to the
letter. His being a judge makes it all the more unacceptable. There was an obvious lack of integrity, the most fundamental
qualification of a member of the judiciary.
For violating Canons 1, (1.01), 7, 10 (10.01), 11, and. Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, which strictly enjoins a
lawyer from committing acts of deceit, Respondent Judge was found guilty of dishonesty and falsification of an official
document. He is ordered DISMISSED from service and is likewise DISBARRED for violation of abovementioned Canons
of the CPR and his name STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys.

6. Malonzo vs. Principe, 447 SCRA 1 (2004)

FACTS:

1. Julian Malonso claimed that Atty. Pete Principe, without any authority entered his appearance as Malonso's counsel in the
expropriation proceedings initiated by the National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR). In addition, he complained that Atty.
Principe, after illegally representing him in the said case, claimed forty (40%) of the selling price of his land to the
NAPOCOR by way of attorney's fees and, further, in a Motion to Intervene , claimed to be a co-owner of Malonso's property.
2. The Investigating Commissioner concluded that from the evidence presented by both parties, Atty. Principe was guilty of
misrepresentation. Atty. Principe was found to have violated Canon 3, Rule 3.01, Canon 10, Rule 10.01 and Rule 12.04. In
representing himself as Malonsos and the other lot owners legal counsel in the face of the latters opposition, Atty. Principe
was found to be guilty of gross or serious misconduct. Likewise, his act of falsely claiming to be the co-owner of properties
being expropriated and his filing of several actions to frustrate the implementation of the decision approving the compromise
agreement make his conduct constitutive of malpractice. The Report recommended the penalty of two (2) years suspension
from the practice of law.
3. In his Appeal Memorandum, respondent claims that the Resolution No. XVI-2003-241 has no factual and legal basis, the
complaint having been motivated by pure selfishness and greed, and the Resolution itself invalid for having failed to comply
with Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court. According to the respondent, the Investigating Commissioner continued to
investigate the instant case despite the lapse of three months provided under Section 8 of Rule 139-B, without any extension
granted by the Supreme Court. Moreover, in the subsequent review made by the IBP Board of Governors, no actual voting
took place but a mere consensus, and the required number of votes provided by the Rules was not secured considering that
there were only five (5) governors present. Respondent opines that the actions of the IBP Board were aimed at preventing
him from pursuing his known intention to run for IBP National President

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court process was observed in the disbarment case of the respondent.

RULING: No. It is the duty of the Supreme Court to see to it that a lawyer accounts for his behavior towards the court, his
client, his peers in the profession and the public. However, the duty of the Court is not limited to disciplining those guilty
of misconduct, but also to protecting the reputation of those wrongfully charged, much more, those wrongfully found guilty.

It is clear that before a lawyer may be suspended from the practice of law by the IBP, there should be (1) a review of the
investigator’s report; (2) a formal voting; and (3) a vote of at least five (5) members of the Board. The rationale for this rule
 is simple: a decision reached by the Board in compliance with the procedure is the official decision of the Board as a body
and not merely as the collective view of the individual members thereof. This is in keeping with the very nature of a collegial
body which arrives at its decisions only after deliberation, the exchange of views and ideas, and the concurrence of the
required majority vote. Thus, the vote of the majority would be necessary for the validity of the Board’s resolution. Without
a vote having been taken, Resolution No. XVI-2003-241 (CBD Case No. 01-848) is void and has no effect.

This Court underscores the procedural transgression incurred by the IBP Board when it issued Resolution No. XVI-2003-
241 which was reached through a mere consensus, and not through a formal voting, with the required number of votes not
secured. As to the issue of the protracted investigation without the requisite permission from the Supreme Court to extend
the investigation period, we agree with respondent that no such request was made to this Court.

7. Saa vs. IBP-CBD, 598 SCRA 6 (2009)

FACTS: Atty. Freddie Venida, herein private respondent, filed criminal and administrative cases against petitioner Saa
containing the same facts and allegations – violation of Sec 3, RA 3019. Saa filed a disbarment complaint against Venida
in the Supreme Court on Dec 27, 1991 stating that Venida’s act of filing two cases against him was oppressive and
constituted unethical practice.

In a Resolution dated February 17, 1992, Venida was required to comment on the complaint within 10 days. However,
Venida did not comply and just submitted a partial comment January 26, 1993. Supreme Court issued another Resolution
on June 14, 1995 requiring Venida to show costs why he should not be dealt with or held in contempt for failure to comply
with the February 17, 1992 resolution. It was not until September 4, 1995, almost 3 years late, when Venida filed his full
comment which is just a reiteration of his partial comment.

Supreme Court referred the matter to the IBP. In a report dated August 17, 1997 which the IBP Board adopted, Commisioner
Briones the dismissal of the complaint for lack of merit since it found no evidence of unethical practice and that it was not
oppressive. Saa filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied.

ISSUE: Is Atty. Venida guilty of violation the Code of Professional Responsibility?

RULING: Supreme Court upholds the decision of the IBP that there was no grave abuse of discretion in this case. There
was in fact a dearth of evidence showing oppressive or unethical behavior on the part of Atty. Venida. Without convincing
proof that Atty. Venida was motivated by a desire to file baseless legal actions, the findings of the IBP stand.

However, the Supreme Court strongly disapproves Atty. Venida’s refusal to comply with the directives of the court. As a
lawyer, he has the responsibility to follow all legal orders and processes. Worse, he filed his complete comment only on
June 14, 1995 or a little over three years after due date. In both instances, he managed to delay the resolution of the case, a
clear violation of Canon 12 and Rules 1.03 and 12.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Atty. Venida apologized for the late filing of both his partial and full comments. But tried to exculpate himself by saying
he inadvertently misplaced the complaint and had a heavy workload. He even had the temerity to blame a strong typhoon
for the loss of all his files, the complaint included. His excuses tax the imagination. Nevertheless, his apologies
notwithstanding, we find his conduct utterly unacceptable for a member of the legal profession. He must not be allowed to
evade accountability for his omissions

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED IN PART. The charge of oppressive or unethical behavior against
respondent is dismissed. However, for violation of Canons 1 and 12 and Rules 1.03 and 12.04 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, as well as the lawyers oath, Atty. Freddie A. Venida is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for
one (1) year, effective immediately from receipt of this resolution. He is further STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of
the same or similar offense shall be dealt with more severely.

8. Plus Builders, Inc. vs. Revilla, Jr., 578 SCRA 432 (2009)
FACTS: A decision was rendered by the Provincial Adjudicator of Cavite (PARAD) in favor of Plus Builders, Inc. and
against the clients of respondent, Atty. Anastacio E. Revilla, Jr. The PARAD found that respondent’s clients were mere
tenants and not rightful possessors/owners of the subject land. The case was elevated all the way up to the Supreme Court,
with this Court sustaining complainant’s rights over the land. Continuing to pursue his client’s lost cause, respondent was
 found to have committed intentional falsehood; and misused court processes with the intention to delay the execution of the
decision through the filing of several motions, petitions for temporary restraining orders, and the last, an action to quiet title
despite the finality of the decision. Furthermore, he allowed non-lawyers to engage in the unauthorized practice of law
holding themselves out as his partners/associates in the law firm. Respondent is then found guilty of gross misconduct and
is SUSPENDED for two years from the practice of law to which he filed a motion for reconsideration.

Respondent maintains that he did not commit the acts complained of. The courses of action he took were not meant to
unduly delay the execution of the DARAB Decision but were based on his serious study, research and experience as a
litigation lawyer for more than 20 years and on the facts given to him by his clients in the DARAB case. He believes that
the courses of action he took were valid and proper legal theory designed to protect the rights and interests of his clients.
Anent the issue that he permitted his name to be used for unauthorized practice of law, he humbly submits that there was
actually no sufficient evidence to prove the same.

ISSUE: Whether respondent is guilty of misusing court processes

RULING: Yes. A lawyer’s devotion to his clients cause not only requires but also entitles him to deploy every honorable
means to secure for the client what is justly due him or to present every defense provided by law to enable the latter’s cause
to succeed. This obligation, however, is not to be performed at the expense of truth and justice. Under the Code of
Professional Responsibility, a lawyer has the duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice, and is
enjoined from unduly delaying a case by impeding execution of a judgment or by misusing court processes.

However, the Court also knows how to show compassion and will not hesitate to refrain from imposing the appropriate
penalties in the presence of mitigating factors, such as the respondents length of service, acknowledgment of his or her
infractions and feeling of remorse, family circumstances, humanitarian and equitable considerations, and respondents
advanced age, among other things, which have varying significance in the Courts determination of the imposable
penalty. Thus, after a careful consideration of herein respondents motion for reconsideration and humble acknowledgment
of his misfeasance, we are persuaded to extend a degree of leniency towards him. We find the suspension of six (6) months
from the practice of law sufficient in this case.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the letter-request dated August 15, 2008 is NOTED. Respondents Motion for
Reconsideration is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Decision dated September 13, 2006 is hereby MODIFIED in that
respondent is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months, effective upon receipt of this
Resolution. Respondent is DIRECTED to inform the Court of the date of his receipt of said Resolution within ten (10) days
from receipt thereof.

9. PNB vs. Uy Teng Piao, 57 Phil. 337 (1932)

FACTS: In a civil case, one of the attorneys for the plaintiff testified against the defendant.

ISSUE: Is an attorney allowed to be a witness.

RULING: Although the law does not forbid an attorney to be a witness and at the same time an attorney in a cause, the
courts prefer that counsel should not testify as a witness unless it is necessary, and that they should withdraw from the active
management of the case.

10. In re Almacen, 31 SCRA 562 (1970)

FACTS: Atty. Almacen was counsel for the defendant a civil case entitled Yaptichay v. Calero. The trial court rendered
judgment agains his client. Twenty days after he received notice,he moved for its reconsideration but did not notify the
latter of the time and place of hearing on said motion. Meanwhile, the plaintiff moved for execution of the judgment. For
lack of proof of service, ‘the trial court denied both motions. To prove that he did serve on the adverse party a copy of his
first motion for reconsideration, atty. Almacen filed a second MR, however, was ordered withdrawn by the trial court upon
verbal motion of Atty. Almacen himself, who earlier, had already perfected the appeal. MR was denied by CA.

Atty. Almacen’s “Petition to Surrender Lawyer’s Certificate of Title,” was filed in protest against what he therein asserts is
“a great injustice committed against his client by SC”. He indicts SC, in his own phrase, as a tribunal “peopled by men who
are calloused to our pleas for justice, who ignore without reasons their own applicable decisions and commit culpable
 violations of the Constitution with impunity.” His clients, he continues, who was deeply aggrieved by this Court’s “unjust
judgment,” has become one of the sacrificial victims before the altar of hypocrisy.”

He ridicules the members of the Court, saying “that justice as administered by the present members of the Supreme Court
is not only blind, but also deaf and dumb.” He then vows to argue the cause of his client “in the people’s forum,” so that
“people may know of the silent injustices committed by this court’ and that “whatever mistakes, wrongs and injustices that
were committed must never be repeated.” He ends his petition with a prayer that:

“…a resolution issue ordering the Clerk of Court to receive the certificate of the undersigned attorney that at any time in
the future and in the event we regain our faith and confidence, we may retrieve our title to assume the practice of the noblest
profession.”

ISSUE: Whether Atty. Almacen can be held liable for making such statement
HELD: Yes. Well-recognized is the right of a lawyer, both as an officer of the court and as citizen, to criticize in properly
respectful terms and through legitimate channels the acts of courts and judges.

As a citizen and as officer of the court, a lawyer is expected not only to exercise the right, but also to consider it his duty to
avail of such right. No law may abridge this right. Nor is he “professionally answerable for a scrutiny into the official
conduct of the judges, which would not expose him to legal animadversion as a citizen. Atty. Almacen is suspended from
the practice of law until further orders.

11. Soriano and Padilla vs. CA, 363 SCRA 725 (2001)
CONSOLIDATED CASE

FACTS: On October 27, 1988, Deogracias R. Reyes and Rosalina N. Reyes (hereafter, "Deogracias" and "Rosalina") filed
with the Regional Trial Court, Naga City8 a complaint against Socorro Abella-Soriano (hereafter "Socorro")9 for "declaration
and recognition of real right under an implied contract of services, reformation of instrument and damages."

The complaint alleged two causes of action.10

First, Deogracias and Rosalina pleaded that they were employed by Socorro as manager and administrative assistant of her
property and real estate in 1968.11 As "payment for their services," in 1973, Socorro gave Deogracias and Rosalina one
apartment unit12 to use as their dwelling for the duration of their lifetime. A token monthly rental of one hundred fifty pesos
(P150.00) was imposed on them to enable them to supposedly keep their self-respect.13 In the same building, there existed
a unit which Deogracias and Rosalina improved and converted into a pub and restaurant14 at a cost of four hundred fifty
thousand pesos (P450,000.00). For the use of the premises, Socorro collected rent from Deogracias and Rosalina in the
token amount of one thousand five hundred pesos (P1,500.00) a month supposedly for the main purpose of enabling them
"to keep their self respect."15 From 1968 to 1987, Deogracias and Rosalina were able to sell and dispose of all the lots in the
three residential subdivisions16 owned by Socorro, amounting to about ten million pesos (P10,000,000.00). As real estate
manager and administrative assistant, they were also able in the course of twenty years to find qualified tenants for Socorro's
commercial buildings. They supervised the construction and maintenance of Socorro's property and collected rent on behalf
of and for the interest of Socorro. Despite all these efforts, on October 17, 1988, Socorro gave Deogracias and Rosalina
notice to vacate the two units at No. 67 Elias Angeles St., Naga City.17

Deogracias and Rosalina averred that Socorro agreed to allow them to use the two units for the duration of their lifetime as
compensation for their services.18 By now ejecting them from the premises, Socorro reneged on her obligation.19

Second, Deogracias and Rosalina were the owners of two (2) commercial lots with improvements. 20 On May 28, 1986,
Deogracias and Rosalina became indebted to Socorro in the amount of six hundred thirty eight thousand six hundred thirty
five pesos and thirty six centavos (P638,635.36). The parties agreed that to pay for the debt, Deogracias and Rosalina were
to sell the two (2) commercial lots for two million and five hundred thousand pesos (P2.5M) and deliver part of the proceeds
of the sale to Socorro. While looking for a buyer, Deogracias and Rosalina conveyed the property to Socorro by way of first
mortgage. Instead of a real estate mortgage, Socorro prepared two (2) documents, a "deed of absolute sale" 21 covering
Deogracias and Rosalina's property and a "memorandum of agreement."22 Due to the ascendancy of Soccorro over them and
also because of Socorro's repeated assurance that the documents had the same effect as a real estate mortgage, Deogracias
and Rosalina signed the same. Socorro presented the "deed of absolute sale" to the register of deeds of Naga City and as a
consequence TCT Nos. 9388 and 9424 were released in her favor. It was only in September 1988, that Deogracias and
Rosalina discovered that they were deprived of the ownership of their property.23 Thus, Deogracias and Rosalina pray that
their true intention of entering into a real estate mortgage and not an absolute sale be given effect, that the "deed of absolute
sale" and "memorandum of agreement" be declared void and that the T.C.T.s issued in Socorro's name be canceled and new
T.C.T.s be issued in favor of Deogracias and Rosalina.24

On October 28, 1988, Deogracias and Rosalina paid the filing fee of four hundred forty pesos (P440.00) 25 and legal research
fee of ten pesos (P10.00).26 The computation of the filing fee was based on the following amounts:27

"1. P100,000.00 representing the income of the property under litigation received by the defendants from its tenants and
which the plaintiffs prayed to be returned and refunded to them;

"2. P50,000.00 moral damages;

"3. P10,000.00 exemplary damages;

"4. P50,000.00 attorney's fees.

"The total of which amounted to P210,000.00."

On November 29, 1988, Socorro filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the first cause of action was
barred by the pendency of an ejectment case between the same parties over the same premises and that the second cause of
action was premature.28

On December 8, 1998, the Carmelite Sisters on behalf of their benefactress, Socorro, filed with the trial court an urgent ex-
parte motion for restraining order.29 The motion prayed that the trial court immediately issue an ex-parterestraining order
commanding private respondents to "desist from entering the vacant apartments of the building subject of the case or from
urging the tenants thereof to stop paying their rentals to the defendant (Socorro)."

The Carmelite Sisters talked to respondent Judge Naval in his chambers and requested him to immediately act on Socorro's
urgent ex-parte motion for a restraining order. Judge Naval told the Carmelite Sisters that he could not issue the ex-parte
restraining order because a Supreme Court administrative circular required a hearing with notice to the adverse party. To
this statement, Sister Margaret Mary retorted, "Why would Atty. Padilla (Socorro's counsel, Atty. Sabino Padilla, Jr.) ask
for an ex-parte restraining order when according to you that is prohibited by an order or circular of the Supreme Court?
Do you mean Atty. Padilla does not even know that there is such an order or circular, when he has a brother in the Supreme
Court (Associate Justice Teodoro Padilla)."30

On December 16, 1988, the trial court denied Socorro's urgent ex-parte motion for a restraining order. The trial court ruled
that the issue was whether or not petitioner Socorro may be restored to the possession of the property, which she claimed
she was deprived of by means of force, threat and intimidation. According to the trial court, this is a matter which falls
within the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court,31 not the Regional Trial Court.32

On January 16, 1989, the trial court granted Socorro's motion to dismiss with respect to Deogracias and Rosalina's first
cause of action but denied the same insofar as the second cause of action was concerned.33

On the same day, January 16, 1989, Socorro, through counsel, Atty. Padilla, filed a motion to inhibit Judge Naval praying
that the ends of justice would best be served if the case was re-raffled to another judge. Basically, the grounds cited
were: First, while still a law practitioner and politician, Judge Naval was a frequent customer of the restaurant owned by
Deogracias and was a good friend of his. Second, Judge Naval was also a close friend of Rosalina and Deogracias' attorney,
Atty. Dennis B. Recon.34

On January 23, 1989, the trial court denied Socorro's motion to inhibit. We quote the trial court's order:35

"The factual bases of Defendant's motion to inhibit are not true.

"This Presiding Judge while still a law practitioner and politician, was NOT a frequent customer of the Rey-Ves Pub and
Restaurant. To the best of his recollection, this Presiding Judge has eaten and drunk (sic) in said Pub and Restaurant for not
more than five (5) times since then until the present and has not had any personal talk with either or both plaintiffs-spouses.
This Presiding Judge has never become a 'good friend' or even a friend of said spouses.

"Atty. Dennis B. Recon is considered by this Presiding Judge as a friend, just like any other lawyer known to him and
appearing before him, and just like counsel for Defendant, Atty. Sabino Padilla, Jr. This Presiding Judge did not notice any
one of the three Regional Trial Judges assigned in Pili, Camarines Sur to be present in the court room during the last hearing
herein on December 16, 1988, although after the hearing, this Presiding Judge met Hon. Nilo Malanyaon, Presiding Judge
of RTC Branch,32 Pili, Camarines Sur, at the lobby of the Naga City Hall of Justice conferring with Hon. Gregorio A. Manio,
Presiding Judge, Branch 19, Naga City about the Christmas Party of the entire Court personnel which would be held at 5:30
o'clock that afternoon of December 16.

"The inhibition of this Presiding Judge would not have been a problem had Defendant's counsel filed his motion before this
Court had refused to issue ex parte a restraining order despite strong representations therefor by three (3) Sisters of Charity
and their Mother Superior, allegedly upon instructions of Counsel for the Defendant. To grant the 'motion to inhibit' at this
stage of the proceedings when this Court, after hearing, has already denied defendant's motion for issuance of a restraining
order and writ of preliminary injunction, and has already partially denied defendant's motion to dismiss, may create a bad
precedent, and may even adversely affect the integrity of the bar and of the bench because the said Sisters of Charity
impressed upon this Presiding Judge not to be apprehensive in issuing the restraining order ex parte as the Supreme Court
will sustain it, their counsel being a brother of a Justice of the Supreme Court.

"This Presiding Judge believes that he is competent to hear this case and to render judgment which is fair and just to both
parties.

"WHEREFORE, defendant's motion 'to inhibit' is hereby DENIED.

"SO ORDERED.

"Given in Chambers, this 23rd day of January 1989, at the City of Naga, Philippines."

On April 17, 1989, Deogracias and Rosalina filed a "motion to admit attached supplemental complaint."36 The supplemental
complaint pleaded:37

"2. That on March 30, 1989, subsequent to the filing of the above-entitled case and conformably with the true agreement of
the parties herein in their Memorandum of Agreement which they acknowledged before Notary Public Manuel M. Rosales
on 23 June 1986 (Annex 'C', Complaint) and within the 'three (3) years' period provided therein, the herein plaintiffs tendered
to the defendant the amount of SIX HUNDRED THIRTY-EIGHT THOUSAND, SIX HUNDRED THIRTY FIVE PESOS
and THIRTY SIX CENTAVOS, (P638,635.36) Philippine Currency, as payment to the latter of their (Plaintiffs') obligation
to herein defendant;

xxx xxx xxx

"5. That the failure and/or refusal of the defendant to accept said tender of payment to her by the plaintiffs is absolutely
without just cause, and which is clearly a move on her part to let the 3-year period provided in their Memorandum of
Agreement (which will expire on May 28, 1989) elapse and to invoke it to stonewall the recovery by the plaintiffs from her
of the former's 9-door commercial building at Concepcion Grande, Naga City."

On April 28, 1989, the trial court admitted Deogracias' and Rosalina's supplemental complaint.38

On May 22, 1989, Socorro moved to dismiss the supplemental complaint.39

On July 6, 1989, the trial court denied Socorro's motion to dismiss the supplemental complaint.40
On July 12, 1989, the trial court ordered Deogracias and Rosalina to pay a deficiency in the docket fees in the amount of
one thousand seven hundred twelve pesos (P1,712.00).41

On August 3, 1989, Socorro moved for an extension to file a responsive pleading to the supplemental complaint and to reset
pre-trial.

On August 7, 1989, Deogracias and Rosalina complied with the order of July 12, 1989, and paid the additional filing fee.42

On August 11, 1989, the trial court granted Socorro's motion for an extension of time to file a responsive pleading and also
granted the same with respect to the motion to reset pre-trial.

On August 18, 1989, Socorro again moved for another extension of time to file a responsive-pleading and for the resetting
of the pre-trial.

The trial court granted the second motion and gave Socorro an extension of five (5) days.

On August 23, 1989, Socorro again moved for another extension of time to file responsive pleading and to reset pre-trial.
The trial court has not acted on the motion.

On August 26, 1989, Socorro's counsel, Atty. Padilla filed an "omnibus motion for reconsideration of various orders of the
respondent court."43

On September 3, 1989, Deogracias and Rosalina filed an opposition to Socorro's omnibus motion, moved to strike out the
motion and moved to declare Socorro in default with respect to the supplemental complaint.44

On September 13 45 and 15, 1989,46 the trial court denied Socorro's "omnibus motion for reconsideration."

On September 25, 1989, the trial court directed Socorro's counsel, Atty. Padilla to show cause why he should not be cited
for contempt of court.47

Forthwith, on October 9, 1989, Socorro filed with the trial court an opposition to Deogracias' and Rosalina's motion to
declare her in default as to the supplemental complaint48 and an answer to the supplemental complaint.49

On October 23, 1989, the trial court denied Deogracias' and Rosalina's motion to declare petitioner in default and admitted
Socorro's answer to the supplemental complaint.50 Pre-trial was reset to December 15, 1989. The court instructed the parties
to file their pre-trial briefs three (3) days before the scheduled pre-trial.

On December 15, 1989, only Deogracias, Rosalina and their counsel appeared during the pre-trial conference. The trial
court postponed the pre-trial since there was no showing that Socorro and Atty. Padilla were notified thereof. Subsequently,
Atty. Padilla admitted receipt of notice but reasoned that he received such only on the very same date of the pre-trial.51

On January 5, 1990, the same incident occurred and pre-trial was re-set. Atty. Padilla claimed that they did not appear during
the scheduled pre-trial since they received notice thereof five (5) days after.52

On January 17, 1990, Socorro and Atty. Padilla were served with notice that pre-trial and promulgation of judgment on the
contempt charge against Atty. Padilla was set on February 9, 1990.53

On February 2, 1990, Socorro, through Atty. Padilla, mailed her ex-parte motion to reset the scheduled hearing.54The trial
court received the motion on February 7, 1990.55

On February 9, 1990, only Deogracias and Rosalina and their counsel appeared before the court. The court declared Socorro
in default. The court granted the motion to reset the hearing for the promulgation of judgment on the charge of direct
contempt on February 27, 1990, with a warning that should Atty. Padilla fail to appear during the scheduled hearing, he
would be ordered arrested.56
On February 19, 1990, Atty. Padilla was served with notice of the scheduled promulgation of judgment on the charge of
direct contempt.

On February 27, 1990, Atty. Padilla did not appear before the court. The court appointed a counsel-de-oficio for Atty.
Padilla, promulgated judgment against him, found him guilty of direct contempt and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment for five (5) days and to pay a fine of one hundred pesos (P100.00).57

On March 12, 1990, Socorro and Atty. Padilla filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari and mandamus with
temporary restraining order. Socorro assailed the following orders of Judge Naval:58

First, his insistence on exercising jurisdiction over the case notwithstanding Deogracias' and Rosalina's failure to pay the
correct filing fee on their amended complaint. Second, his admission of Deogracias' and Rosalina's amended complaint
which they termed as a "supplemental complaint", despite the fact that it pleaded a cause of action directly contrary to that
stated in the original complaint.59 Third, his refusal to issue an ex-parte restraining order to restrain Deogracias and Rosalina
from seizing possession of the property subject of the case on the ground that he was prohibited from doing so by a certain
Supreme Court Circular and on the ground that the court a quo did not have authority to decide whether Deogracias and
Rosalina forcibly entered and seized occupation of the property in litigation as such issue fell under the jurisdiction of the
municipal trial court, it being a question of "forcible entry and unlawful detainer." Fourth, his refusal to inhibit himself from
hearing the case. Fifth, his unreasonable and violent reaction towards a motion for reconsideration filed by Socorro and
Atty. Padilla, which motion for reconsideration pointed out that:

(1) the insulting accusation Judge Naval hurled at Atty. Padilla was not supported by the facts;

(2) it was Judge Naval's version of the facts that was obviously false and untrue;

(3) that Judge Naval has an "unusual interest" in holding on the case despite the court's lack of jurisdiction over it.

Sixth, his citing of Atty. Padilla for contempt of court. Seventh, his order for the arrest and incarceration of Atty. Padilla for
direct contempt of court.

On June 26, 1991, the Court of Appeals decided:60

"IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING PREMISES, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED except the Orders dated April
28, 1989 and July 6, 1989 which are granted. The Writ of Injunction dated June 18, 1990 is hereby DISSOLVED. Costs
against petitioners.

"SO ORDERED."

On August 17, 1991, Socorro and Atty. Padilla filed with the Supreme Court a petition assailing the aforequoted decision.61

On July 25, 1991, Deogracias and Rosalina filed with the Court of Appeals a motion for partial reconsideration 62 of its
decision of June 26, 1991, assailing the Court of Appeals annulment of the order of the trial court admitting their
supplemental complaint.

On August 21, 1991 the Court of Appeals denied Deogracias' and Rosalina's motion for partial reconsideration.63

On October 16, 1991, Deogracias and Rosalina likewise filed with the Supreme Court a petition for review on certiorari
assailing the aforequoted decision of the Court of Appeals insofar as it annulled the order of the Regional Trial Court
admitting their supplemental complaint.64

On November 6, 1991, the Court resolved to consolidate the two petitions.6

ISSUE: Whether the lawyer acted with proper behavior?

 RULING: NO. Lawyers may not be held to too strict an account for words said in the heat of the moment, because of chagrin
at losing cases, and that the big way is for the court to condone even contemptuous language. While judges must exercise
patience, lawyers must also observe temperate language as well. At this juncture, we admonish all lawyers to observe the
following canons of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which read: “Canon 8. Rule 8.01—A lawyer shall not, in his
professional dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper. “Canon 11—A lawyer shall observe
and maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by others.”
Malicious attacks on courts have in some cases been treated as libel, in other cases as contempt of court, and as a sufficient
ground for disbarment, but mere criticism or comment on the correctness or wrongness, soundness or unsoundness of the
decision of the court in a pending case made in good faith may be tolerated.

12. Lacurom vs. Jacoba, 484 SCRA 206 (2006)

FACTS: The Jacoba-Velasco-Jacoba Law Firm is counsel for plaintiff Alejandro R. Veneracion in a civil case for unlawful
detainer against defendant Federico Barrientos. The MTC rendered judgment in favor of Veneracion but Barrientos appealed
to the RTC. The case was raffled to Branch 30 where Judge Lacurom was sitting as pairing judge. Judge Lacurom issued a
Resolution reversing the earlier judgments rendered in favor of Veneracion.
Veneracions counsel filed a Motion for Reconsideration with Request for Inhibition. In such motion, the counsels
use of the following words and phrases: abhorrent nullity, legal monstrosity, horrendous mistake, horrible error, boner, and
an insult to the judiciary and an anachronism in the judicial process. Atty. Olivia Velasco-Jacoba (Velasco-Jacoba) signed
the motion on behalf of the Jacoba-Velasco-Jacoba Law Firm.
Judge Lacurom found Velasco-Jacoba guilty of contempt and penalized her with imprisonment for five days and a
fine of P1,000.
Velasco-Jacoba moved for reconsideration. She recounted that Atty. Ellis Jacoba (Jacoba), her husband, asked her
to sign the pleading. She did sign the pleading in trusting blind faith on her husband of 35 years with whom she entrusted
her whole life and future. This pleading turned out to be the 30 July 2001 motion which Jacoba drafted but could not sign
because of his then suspension from the practice of law.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE IBP

IBP Commissioner Navarro recommended the suspension of respondents from the practice of law for six months. IBP
Commissioner Navarro found that respondents were prone to using offensive and derogatory remarks and phrases which
amounted to discourtesy and disrespect for authority Although the remarks were not directed at Judge Lacurom personally,
they were aimed at his position as a judge, which is a smack on the judiciary system as a whole.
The IBP Board of Governors adopted IBP Commissioner Navarros Report and Recommendation, except for the length of
suspension which the IBP Board reduced to three months.

ISSUE: Are the by respondents liable under the Code of Professional Responsibility.

RULING: Yes. Well-recognized is the right of a lawyer, both as an officer of the court and as a citizen, to criticize in
properly respectful terms and through legitimate channels the acts of courts and judges. However, even the most hardened
judge would be scarred by the scurrilous attack made by the 30 July 2001 motion on Judge Lacuroms Resolution. On its
face, the Resolution presented the facts correctly and decided the case according to supporting law and jurisprudence.
Though a lawyers language may be forceful and emphatic, it should always be dignified and respectful, befitting the dignity
of the legal profession. The use of unnecessary language is proscribed if we are to promote high esteem in the courts and
trust in judicial administration.

DISPOSITION: SUSPEND Atty. Ellis F. Jacoba from the practice of law for two (2) years effective upon finality of this
Decision. We also SUSPEND Atty. Olivia Velasco-Jacoba from the practice of law for two (2) months effective upon
finality of this Decision. We STERNLY WARN respondents that a repetition of the same or similar infraction shall merit a
more severe sanction.

13. Baculi vs. Battung, A.C. No. 8920, September 28, 2011, 698 SCRA 209 (2011)

1. Supreme Court Bar Matter No. 1755, September 25, 2007

2. Yuhico vs. Gutierrez, A.C. No. 8391, November 23, 2010
 FACTS: Atty. Fred Gutierrez asked for a cash loan of P30,000.00 from Manuel Yuhico. Gutierrez then claimed that he
needed money to pay for the medical expenses of his mother who was seriously ill. Yuhico immediately handed the money.
In turn, Gutierrez promised to pay the loan very soon, since he was expecting to collect his attorney's fees from a Japanese
client. Gutierrez again asked Yuhico for a loan, in the amount of P60,000.00, allegedly to pay the medical expenses of his
wife who was also hospitalized. Again, Yuhico readily issued to Gutierrez a check amounting to P60,000.00. Again,
Gutierrez promised to pay his two loans totaling to P90,000.00 "within a short time." Yuhico asked Gutierrez to pay his
loans. Gutierrez failed to pay and in a text message he asked for an extension of time to pay. Later, thru a text message,
Gutierrez attempted to borrow money from Yuhico again. Gutierrez claimed that his daughter needed P70,000.00 to pay the
fees required to take the licensure examination in the U.S. Medical Board. Gutierrez assured him that he will pay all his
debts within a month. However, this time, Yuhico refused to lend Gutierrez any amount of money. Instead, he demanded
from Gutierrez the payment of his debts. Gutierrez then sent another text message to Yuhico and requested him to give him
another week to pay his debts. Gutierrez failed to make the payment. Yuhico's counsel sent a demand letter to Gutierrez to
pay his debts, but to no avail. Thus, Yuhico filed the instant complaint against Gutierrez before the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines-Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD). On January 12, 2006, the IBP-CBD directed Gutierrez to submit
his Answer on the complaint against him. In a Resolution, IBP-CBD found Gutierrez guilty of non-payment of just debts
and ordered him to return the amount of P90,000.00 to Yuhico, with interest until full payment.
Subsequently, in a Resolution dated December 11, 2008, the, IBP-CBD found Gutierrez guilty of non-payment of just debts
and ordered him to return the amount of Ninety Thousand Pesos (P90,000.00) to Yuhico, with interest until full payment.
In view of the previous disbarment of Gutierrez, the IBP-CBD recommended to the Court that, instead of rendering the
instant case moot, Gutierrez should be disbarred anew effective upon the expiration of the sanction pursuant to the March
26, 2004 Supreme Court Decision. The IBP-CBD explained that while we do not have jurisprudence on the issue of double
or multiple disbarment, the American jurisprudence, however, recognizes double or multiple disbarments as well as the
minimum requirement of five (5) years for readmission to the Bar.
On December 11, 2008, the IBP Board of Governors, in Resolution No. XVIII-2008-649, resolved to adopt the report and
recommendation of the IBP-CBD and approve it with modification as to the payment of the amount of Ninety Thousand
Pesos (P90,000.00), this time, without interest.

ISSUE: Whether or not Gutierrez guilty of non-payment of just debts and likewise guilty of gross misconduct

RULING: Lawyers must, at all times, faithfully perform their duties to society, to the bar, the courts and to their clients,
which include prompt payment of financial obligations. Deliberate failure to pay just debts constitutes gross misconduct,
for which a lawyer may be sanctioned with suspension from the practice of law. Lawyers are instruments for the
administration of justice and vanguards of our legal system. They are expected to maintain not only legal proficiency, but
also a high standard of morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing so that the people’s faith and confidence in the judicial
system is ensured. They must, at all times, faithfully perform their duties to society, to the bar, the courts and to their clients,
which include prompt payment of financial obligations. They must conduct themselves in a manner that reflects the values
and norms of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility. In the instant case, there is no
question as to Gutierrez's guilt. His admission of the loan he contracted and his failure to pay the same leaves no room for
interpretation. Neither can he justify his act of non-payment of debt by his dire financial condition. Gutierrez should not
have contracted loans which are beyond his financial capacity to pay. Likewise, it cannot be overlooked Gutierrez's
propensity of employing deceit and misrepresentations for the purpose of obtaining debts without the intention of paying
them. Records show Gutierrez's pattern of habitually making promises of paying his debts, yet repeatedly failing to deliver.
The series of text messages he sent to Yuhico promising to pay his loans, while simultaneously giving excuses without
actually making good of his promises, is clearly reprehensible. Undoubtedly, his acts demonstrate lack of moral character
to satisfy the responsibilities and duties imposed on lawyers as professionals and as officers of the court. Supreme Court
also noted that in Huyssen v. Atty. Gutierrez, the Court had already disbarred Gutierrez from the practice of law for gross
misconduct due to non-payment of just debts and issuance of bouncing checks.

In view of the foregoing, while we agree with the findings of the IBP, we cannot, however, adopt its recommendation to
disbar Gutierrez for the second time, considering that Gutierrez had already been previously disbarred. Indeed, as the IBP
pointed out, we do not have double or multiple disbarment in our laws or jurisprudence. Neither do we have a law mandating
a minimum 5-year requirement for readmission, as cited by the IBP. Thus, while Gutierrez's infraction calls for the penalty
of disbarment, we cannot disbar him anew.

3. Maniago vs. De Dios, A.C. No. 7472, March 10, 2010

FACTS: The instant case arose from an Affidavit-Complaint dated April 2, 2007 filed by Ligaya
Maniago, seeking the disbarment of Atty. Lourdes I. De Dios for engaging in the practice of law
despite having been suspended by the Court.

Complainant alleged that she filed a criminal case against Hiroshi Miyata, a Japanese national.
The accused was represented by Atty. De Dios. Complainant then learned from the RTC staff that
Atty. De Dios had an outstanding suspension order from the Supreme Court since 2001, and was,
therefore, prohibited from appearing in court. Complainant further alleges that there is a civil case
and another case filed against Miyata, where Atty. De Dios appeared as his counsel. Complainant
averred that Atty. De Dios ought to be disbarred from the practice of law for her flagrant violation
and deliberate disobedience of a lawful order of the Supreme Court.

In her Comment, Atty. De Dios admitted that there were cases filed against her client, Miyata.
She, however, denied that she was under suspension when she appeared as his counsel in the cases
because she already served the 6-month suspension imposed on her.

A problem arose when Judge Josefina Farrales erroneously issued a directive on March 15,
2007, ordering respondent to desist from practicing law and revoking her notarial commission for
the years 2007 and 2008. Knowing that the directive was rather questionable, respondent desisted
from law practice in due deference to the court order. Thereafter, respondent filed a Motion for
Clarification with the Supreme Court on account of Judge Farrales’ letters. Acting on the said
motion, the Court issued a resolution: Considering the motion for clarification, the Court resolves
to DEEM Atty. Lourdes I. De Dios to have SERVED her six (6) month suspension and her
recommencement of law practice on 17 November 2001 as PROPER pursuant to the Resolution dated 30
January 2002.”

In the Resolution, the Court referred the matter to the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) for
evaluation, report and recommendation. Initially, the OBC directed the complainant to file a
supplemental affidavit, stating therein the exact period of appearances of Atty. De Dios.

In compliance therewith, complainant submitted a Supplemental Affidavit in the vernacular,

stating that the suspension of Atty. Dios was base on the letter of Deputy Clerk of Court and Bar
Confidant Ma. Cristina B. Layusa.

A Supplemental Comment was thereafter filed by respondent, stating that there were no new
matters raised in the Supplemental Affidavit, and asserting that “the opinion of Bar Confidant,
Atty. Layusa, as contained in her letter dated 12 February 2007, cannot supersede the Resolution
dated April 23, 2007 of this Honorable Court.” According to her, the resolution should be the “final
nail to the coffin of this case.”

The OBC explained that the letter adverted to by complainant in her affidavit was the OBC’s
reply to an inquiry made by the Office of the Court Administrator regarding the status of Atty. De
Dios.1 Therein, the OBC made it clear that the lifting of the suspension order was not automatic,
following the pronouncement of the Court in J.K. Mercado v. Atty. Eduardo de Vera et. Al.

Thus, according to the OBC, a suspended lawyer must first present proof(s) of his compliance
by submitting certifications from the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and from the Executive
Judge that he has indeed desisted from the practice of law during the period of suspension.
Thereafter, the Court, after evaluation, and upon a favorable recommendation from the OBC, will
issue a resolution lifting the order of suspension and thus allow him to resume the practice of law.
 The OBC alleged that it was unfortunate that this procedure was overlooked in A.C. No. 4943,
where Atty. De Dios was able to resume her practice of law without submitting the required
certifications and passing through the OBC for evaluation. In order to avoid confusion and
conflicting directives from the Court, the OBC recommended that the Court adopt a uniform policy
on the matter of the lifting of the order of suspension of a lawyer from the practice of law.

HELD: The Court notes the Report and Recommendation of the OBC.

It must be remembered that the practice of law is not a right but a mere privilege and, as such, must
bow to the inherent regulatory power of the Supreme Court to exact compliance with the lawyer’s public
responsibilities. Whenever it is made to appear that an attorney is no longer worthy of the trust and
confidence of his clients and of the public, it becomes not only the right but also the duty of the Supreme
Court, which made him one of its officers and gave him the privilege of ministering within its Bar, to
withdraw that privilege. However, as much as the Court will not hesitate to discipline an erring
lawyer, it should, at the same time, also ensure that a lawyer may not be deprived of the freedom
and right to exercise his profession unreasonably.

IN LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, it is hereby RESOLVED that the following guidelines be

observed in the matter of the lifting of an order suspending a lawyer from the practice of law:
1) After a finding that respondent lawyer must be suspended from the practice of law,
the Court shall render a decision imposing the penalty;
2) Unless the Court explicitly states that the decision is immediately executory upon
receipt thereof, respondent has 15 days within which to file a motion for reconsideration
thereof. The denial of said motion shall render the decision final and executory;
3) Upon the expiration of the period of suspension, respondent shall file a Sworn
Statement with the Court, through the Office of the Bar Confidant, stating therein that he
or she has desisted from the practice of law and has not appeared in any court during the
period of his or her suspension;
4) Copies of the Sworn Statement shall be furnished to the Local Chapter of the IBP and
to the Executive Judge of the courts where respondent has pending cases handled by him or
her, and/or where he or she has appeared as counsel;
5) The Sworn Statement shall be considered as proof of respondent’s compliance with
the order of suspension;
6) Any finding or report contrary to the statements made by the lawyer under oath shall
be a ground for the imposition of a more severe punishment, or disbarment, as may be
warranted.

4. A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC - Re: Automatic Conversion of Some Administrative Cases

EN BANC

Gentlemen:

Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated 17 SEPT 2002.

A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC(Re: Automatic Conversion of Some Administrative Cases Against Justices of the Court of Appeals
and the Sandiganbayan; Judges of Regular and Special Courts; and Court Officials Who are Lawyers as Disciplinary
Proceedings Against Them Both as Such Officials and as Members of the Philippine Bar.)
 Some administrative cases against Justices of the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan; judges of regular and special
courts; and court officials who are lawyers are based on grounds which are likewise grounds for the disciplinary action of
members of the Bar for violation of the Lawyer's Oath, the Code of Professional Responsibility, and the Canons of
Professional Ethics, or for such other forms of breaches of conduct that have been traditionally recognized as grounds for
the discipline of lawyers.

In any of the foregoing instances, the administrative case shall also be considered a disciplinary action against the respondent
Justice, judge or court official concerned as a member of the Bar. The respondent may forthwith be required to comment
on the complaint and show cause why he should not also be suspended, disbarred or otherwise disciplinarily sanctioned as
a member of the Bar. Judgment in both respects may be incorporated in one decision or resolution.

This Resolution shall supplement Rule 140 of the Rules of Court and shall take effect on the first day of October 2002. It
shall apply to administrative cases already filed where the respondents have not yet been required to comment on the
complaints.

This Resolution shall be published in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines.

5. Samson vs. Caballera, A.M. No. RTJ-08-2138, August 5, 2009, 595 SCRA 423 (2009)