Vollmer 1

Quinn Vollmer

Professor Lori Bedell

CAS 137H

6 November 2017

Intuition and Tradition to Quantitative Analysis:

Major League Baseball’s Abandonment of “The Book”

With the first overall pick in the 1980 Major League Baseball Draft, the New York Mets

were seriously considering picking up high school senior Billy Beane. Standing 6-feet-4-inches

tall and weighing 195 pounds, Beane was a scout’s dream. The Met’s front office drooled over

the scouting reports; Beane, they prophesized, was to be a five-tool player by the time he was

ready for the majors. With a full ride to Stanford University also on the table, teams were

reluctant to draft Beane for fear of wasting an invaluable first-round pick. The Mets did draft

Beane – but with the twenty-third pick of the first round – and, in light of a $125,000 signing

bonus, he turned down a free Stanford Education (Lewis 7 – 12)

Beane worked his way through the minor league divisions, the raving scouting reports

and high-hopes of the Met’s front office counteracting his underwhelming performance. From

1984 to 1989, Beane made largely sporadic and short-lived big league appearances with four

different teams. Overall, he appeared in 148 Major League games, mustering a .219 batting

average and a negative WAR – two statistics that will later explained to be pitiful (“Billy

Beane”).

For the scouts who praised Beane and the teams who had invested in him, his lack of

success was puzzling. For Billy Beane, this experience was torturous. In 1990, after another

disillusioning minor league assignment, he approached Oakland Athletics’ General Manager

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Sandy Alderson and successfully petitioned for a job as a scout for the organization. Seven years

later, he was himself the Athletics’ General Manager and the overseer of the organization’s

unimpressive budget (Lewis 55 – 62).

As a baseball analyst, Beane’s scouting strategy opposed the widespread one that had

picked him out as special. He asked himself the heretical question: how can a baseball team

spend its limited funds most efficiently? This simple, seemingly intuitive question led to the

construction of Athletics teams that averaged 98 wins per season and appeared in the playoffs

every season from 2000 to 2004 – all on a “shoe-string” budget (Thaler and Sunstein). Beane

was not the first to ask these conspicuous questions, however.

These events, the subject of the book and its film-adaptation Moneyball, are the initial

flames of the metaphorical fire that is baseball’s statistical revolution. Billy Beane provided the

kindling for an ember created by Bill James. In 1977, James published the first of his Baseball

Abstracts, where he first outlined his unique, quantitative perspective on baseball. His writings,

now legendary, grew quite popular in the 1980s but were dismissed by Major League front

offices – until Billy Beane. The Athletics’ glaring success could not be ignored and, with tens, if

not hundreds, of millions of dollars on the line, the other major league teams followed suit. This

fire, started by Bill James and fanned by Billy Beane, has engulfed all aspects of Major League

Baseball. Teams are abandoning “The Book” – the traditions and conventional wisdom of

baseball – in favor of the quantitative and objective approach originally cultivated and

implemented by Bill James and Billy Beane, respectively. Statistical analysis presently plays an

instrumental role in how Major League teams are constructed, gameplay strategy, and how fans

interact with the sport.

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DEFINING “THE BOOK”

Baseball is full of traditions; the ceremonial first pitch, singing “Take Me Out to the Ball Game”

during the seventh inning stretch, throwing the homerun balls hit by the opponent back onto the

field, etc. Conventional baseball strategy, too, is full of strange practices. These widespread

baseball strategies, outlined in the metaphorical “Book”, are instilled in little leaguers and

utilized by big league managers alike.

Throughout Major League history, managers have developed their own slightly unique

strategies. In large part, they all subscribe to the teachings of strategies like “small ball” – which

emphasizes practices like the sacrifice bunt, the hit-and-run, and base stealing – and an

unfounded infatuation with sluggers. Generally, baseball managers and fans alike overemphasize

the role of the offense, neglecting the equivalently, albeit less thrilling, important defensive and

pitching aspects of the game. Conventional thought in regards to pitching also suffers from some

illogicality. Teams invested heavily in strong starting pitchers, not only expecting, but

depending, on them to throw close to the 27 required outs in a nine-inning game. Bull pens were

shallow and unreliable, and managers tried their best to avoid deploying a relief arm. The mid-

to-late twentieth century did see the emergence of the strategic “Closer” – a specialized relief

pitcher who secures their team’s win by earning the last three out of the game. Even this

apparently clever system is logically flawed: why not use your best relief pitcher in a more

crucial situation, such as a tied game, rather than to secure a three-run lead in the ninth inning – a

situation in which a team already has a 97 percent chance of winning (Thaler and Sunstein).

Perhaps the pinnacle of unsubstantiated baseball traditions was previously illustrated by Billy

Beane’s story. Traditional baseball scouting entirely relied on the subjective evaluation of

players by “experts” – guys who had been around baseball their entire life and could allegedly
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spot talent via intuition and experience. Of course, the human mind is prone to an array of biases

and logical fallacies that would render scouting reports by and large unreliable. Bill James and

other sabermetricians were able to shine an objective light on the irrationally of “The Book”,

employing statistics to discredit many of these traditional practices.

PRE – SABERMETRIC BASEBALL STATISTICS

Statistics have always been a part of baseball. Puerzer argues that “the initial popularity of

baseball may have been due to the ease with which statistics were used to describe the game”

(39). Henry Chadwick, a New York sportswriter, developed the box score and versions of

elementary baseball statistics like batting average as early as 1858. As a part of a larger paradigm

shift in America, baseball fans and managers adopted a more “scientific” perspective of baseball.

The box score and bare-bones statistics – like batting average, hits, runs, homeruns, and runs-

batted-in (RBIs) – were the extent of the quantitative analysis, however (Baumer and Matthews

1). Bill James’ writings investigated the validity of these primitive statistics, and developed more

conclusive methods of appraising a player’s performance.

SABERMETRICS & MODERN DATA COLLECTION

The now-legendary Bill James first coined the term sabermetrics in 1980, three years after the

release of his first Abstract, defining it as “the search for objective knowledge about baseball”

(“A Guide to Sabermetric Research”). The “saber” prefix honors the Society for American

Baseball Research (SABR).

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The genesis of this movement began when James’ questioned the truthfulness of basic

baseball statistics. For instance, he criticized the credence placed in batting average as a

comprehensive measure of a player’s offensive performance. A walk is just as productive as a

base hit, yet was ignored in this calculation. Contrary to the doctrine of “small ball”, statistical

analysis shows that “[s]acrifice bunts are rarely a good strategy, and steals are vastly overrated”

– runners with a base-stealing success rate below 75 percent actually reduce runs scored rather

than increase them (Thaler and Sunstein). In the evaluation of defensive performance, statistics

like number of errors or fielding percentage do not account for factors like where or how hard

the ball was hit. Sabermetricians did not only recognize these faults, they adjusted for

inaccuracies using complex statistical methods and intensive data analysis. Metrics like on-base

percentage (OBP), slugging percentage (SLG), and their combination – on-base plus slugging

(OPS) – provide a more valuable evaluation of a player’s contribution to a team’s offense.

Additionally, individual players can be evaluated with more precisely by removing the

influences of teammates and other situational variables. The “magnum opus” of sabermetrics,

according to Baumer and Matthews, is the wins above replacement (WAR) figure. WAR

measures the “wins added [by a player] relative to a hypothetical ‘replacement player’”, and

because it is easily understood and intuitively significant, calculating WAR has become a

popular performance analysis method.

The early creation and adoption of the box score has allowed sabermetricians and

baseball historians to analyze the performance of baseball players throughout Major League

history. Modern data collection, made possible by advances in technology, far surpasses the level

of detail recorded by a box score. PITCHf/x, a system that debuted in the 2006 and is now

installed in every MLB park, tracks the speeds, trajectories, and locations of pitches (DiMeo).
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The newest endeavor in data collection is called Statcast – a system that records the spin rate of

pitched balls, the vertical angle of a batted ball, the time elapsed between a pitcher’s first

movement and a potential base-stealer’s initial movement, the efficiency of a fielder’s initial

movement towards a batted ball, and a host of other incogitable figures (“Statcast: Glossary of

terms”). These innovative methods of performance quantification and data collection give

players, managers, fans, and front office decisions-makers a more complete and correct

assessment of individual performance than ever before.

AFFECT ON GAMEPLAY

Defense. Even without scrupulous data collection, the likely direction of some players’ batted

balls can be predicted confidently. Despite the predictability of these batters, strategic adjustment

of fielders has historically been strictly reserved for left-handed, extreme pull-hitters. First

deployed by the 1948 Cleveland Indians in response to Ted Williams, the infield shift proved

quite effective. The increased data collection in modern baseball means teams have access to a

comprehensive account of a player’s hitting tendencies. In recent years, the Tampa Bay Rays

have lead a league-wide movement towards more aggressive and frequent shifting. In order to

combat the disadvantage of having one of baseball’s lowest payrolls, Tampa Bay has relied on

savvy management and innovative statistical analysis to find success. After studying individual

opposing batters and adjusting their infielders accordingly – regardless of which side of the plate

they hit from – the Rays have seen significant results. Less ground balls become hits for the

team, “translating into a 1.7-game improvement in the team’s won-lost record” (“Paradigm

shift”). If the team wanted to see the same improvement by signing a free-agent player, they

would have to hand over $8 million. Other teams caught on quick, too. The frequency of shifts
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deployed across the Major Leagues has increased dramatically, and, subsequently, the share of

ground balls that become hits for the league as a whole decreased from 23.7 to 22.6 between

2011 and 2012 (Dewan).

Offense. 11.8 percent of all hits between 1994 to 2005 were homeruns. Featuring an

unprecedented level of homerun hitting, this was dubbed the long-ball era. An explanation for

this trend can be found in the time period’s other name: the steroid era. It’s now 2017, and strict,

league-wide drug testing is in place – but some 14 percent of all hits in the 2017 Major League

season were homeruns. With performance-enhancing drugs out of the question, the reason

behind this significant increase in homerun slugging is an adjustment of hitting mechanics using

the data collected by the Statcast system. Players have identified the strategic advantage of the

uppercut swing, and adjusted their strokes to increase launch angle and produce more fly balls,

line drives, and homeruns and fewer groundballs. In 2015, the first year this data was available,

the average launch angle was 10 degrees. In 2017, alongside a 0.9 degree increase in average

launch angle, the league-wide frequency of extra-base hits, quantified using isolation percentage

(ISO), neared the record value set during the height of the steroid era (Greenberg).

AFFECT ON TEAM BUILDING

Scouting, Drafting, & Player Acquisition. Billy Beane refused to abide by the system that failed

him. This system can be encapsulated by one scouts take on Beane: “I never looked at a single

statistic of Billy’s. It couldn’t have crossed my mind…. He had it all” (Thaler and Sunstein). The

Athletics under Beane did not draft players out of high school – because the numbers show they

are much less likely to succeed compared to players drafted out of college. Beane and his
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assistant Paul DePodesta often projected players’ performances using computer simulations,

never actually seeing the player play (Thaler and Sunstein). Baseball scouting has slowly and

painfully distanced itself from the subjective scouting report, increasingly relying on the

numbers. The statistical revolution and increased availability of baseball data has also allowed

teams to make more accurate decisions regarding their drafting, free-agent signing, and trading

decisions. By analyzing the team as a whole and identifying overall weaknesses, teams can

precisely target these weaknesses by acquiring players with specific, objectively quantified skill

sets.

One of the many uncertainties that managers and GMs must face in baseball is the health

of their players. At a moment’s notice, a star player can go down, and with him, the team’s

playoff aspirations. As demonstrated by Beane and the Athletics, statistical methods can help

alleviate the anxiety of losing players to injury. After their 2001 102-win season, the A’s lost the

three players widely considered their best and their season was dismissed as an inevitable failure.

Quantitative analysis was used to identify statistical equivalents to their lost players and they

ended up winning 103 games during the 2002 season. Whereas long-term injury or the loss of a

star player could spell doom for many teams, quantitative methods provides teams with a way to

mitigate the effects of these unfortunate events.

Opposing “The Book”. Statistically innovative teams can gain the competitive advantage by

analyzing the strengths, weaknesses, and general strategy of their opponents and constructing a

roster and developing a strategy to play directly off those vulnerabilities. Those teams and front

offices that still play by “The Book” are, therefore, at an impossible disadvantage regardless of

their budget. For instance, the A’s defeated teams neglecting to assemble a solid bullpen by
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acquiring players who hit consistently “deep into the count”, thereby exhausting opposing

starting pitchers and forcing teams to resort to their weak relief arms.

Furthermore, conventionally successful teams revolve around a single or few star players

that are exceptional in some domains of the game, but often lacking in others. Importantly, these

individuals often command superfluous salaries. Quantitative analysis has shown the importance

and cost-effectiveness of the complete player. Rather than a star-centered team, unconventionally

successful teams like the early 2000’s Athletics and the mid-2010’s Royals have deployed

relatively complete players at all positions (Leavengood). Such teams do not have an

overwhelmingly dominant player or a Yankees-level payroll, but their thorough, flexible, injury-

resistant, and financially modest roster yields wins – which is all that matters in the end.

Relief Pitching. The Kansas City Royals’ success in the 2015 MLB Season and World Series can

be attributed to the aforementioned roster-wide depth. But a key and unique component of this

2000s-Athletics-esque was its exceptional bull pen. The Royals’ main pitching staff was, at best,

solid. But the team was designed without the traditional expectation for starting pitchers to work

far into the game. Instead, the management removed starters before things got messy, and let

their reliable relief arms go to work. When their star relief pitcher, Greg Holland, suffered a

season-ending injury, the Royals’ bullpen remained effective due to its depth (Leavengood). The

Royals’ success story, along with those of teams using similar methods, is likely to inspire

widespread adoption of these practices in order to share in or negate the competitive advantage

they presently hold.

AFFECT ON FAN INTERACTION

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Accesibility of Statistics. Not only are baseball statistics accessible, they are inescapable for the

modern baseball fan. Of course, the scoreboard graphic never leaves the screen of a televised

game. For every plate appearance, a graphic reveals the player’s batting average, homeruns,

RBIs, and other basic statistics. In some situations, the player’s statistics against a left or right-

handed pitcher may pop up or, given a sufficient sample size, that individual’s quantitative

performance against the particular pitcher they are facing. When a relief pitcher is brought in,

commentators may discuss metrics like outs per game or walks plus hits per inning pitched

(WHIP). PITCHf/x technology has been utilized since 2006 to give television audiences an

objective analysis of ball-and-strike calls. Especially savvy fans can visit online sources like the

Statcast database at MLB.com or the advanced sabermetric analysis of players at baseball-

reference.com to develop an especially thorough understanding of baseball trends and strategy.

The conclusion of each season always ends in debate over the rightful recipients of each

league’s Most Valuable Player (MVP), Cy Young, and Rookie of the Year Awards. Quantitative

analysis has provided a more objective method for analyzing these controversies. Turning on

ESPN following the 2012 Major League season, one would likely encounter a discussion of the

American League MVP debate. The Detroit Tigers’ Miguel Cabrera earned league highs in

batting average, homeruns, and RBIs – an achievement called the Triple Crown – but LA

Angels’ Mike Trout obtained an astounding WAR of 10.8 (compared to Cabrera’s 7.2). Prior to

the Sabermetric Revolution, MVP debate and voting depended more heavily on elementary, even

misleading statistics and subjective conclusions.

Fantasy Baseball. Fantasy sports, now a multi-billion-dollar industry, originated in the early

1980s with Rotisserie League Baseball – a baseball management simulation game developed and
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publicized by sportswriter Daniel Okrent and friends. Players were evaluated in this fantasy

league using eight performance categories: batting average, homeruns, RBIs, stolen bases, wins,

saves, ERA, and WHIP. Rotisserie Baseball was “instrumental in introducing a great variety of

statistical terms and concepts to a broad audience” (Myers 331). Later, statistics like on-base

average and slugging percentage – more valuable predictors of performance – were used by

Rotisserie leagues, popularizing and spreading an understanding of advanced baseball statistics.

Fantasy sports and sabermetrics had a symbiotic relationship, each encouraging the promulgation

of the other and culminating in the extensive popularity of both phenomena.

CONCLUSION

Baseball has always been a game of numbers – most prominently statistics and money. Getting

creative with the statistics has proven quite profitable for many low-budget franchises – to the

point that the high-budget franchises are not only noticing, but adopting and adapting.

Modern success in Major League Baseball is contingent on a team’s desertion of conventional

baseball thought and the adoption of sabermetric and data-based strategy. This paradigm shift

can be observed in the process of player scouting and acquisition (via drafting, free-agent

signing, and trading) by teams’ front offices, as well as in how the game itself is played. The

acknowledgment of the importance of quantitative analysis in baseball has persuaded players,

managers, and coaches to utilize the vast stores of data available to them to modify aspects of the

game like fielder positioning and player mechanics. Finally, the sabermetric revolution began by

Bill James in the late 1970s has transformed how fans interact with and perceive the game.

The cultivation of statistical methods and data-based strategies has created somewhat of

an arms race in professional baseball. As the secret to one team’s success is revealed, it is
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adopted by all the rest, removing it as a competitive advantage. But new, opposing strategies can

always be developed. As America’s pastime grows into this new paradigm, we can only guess as

to what extent statistical analysis will be employed and how that will ultimately affect the

experience that is Major League Baseball.

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Works Cited

Baumer, Benjamin S., and Gregory J. Matthews. "There Is No Avoiding WAR." Chance, vol.

27, no. 3, 2014, pp. 41-44. Taylor & Francis Online.

"Billy Beane." Baseball Reference, www.baseball-reference.com/players/b/beanebi01.shtml.

Accessed 6 Nov. 2017. Raw data.

"Defensive tactics in baseball: Paradigm shift." The Economist, 23 May 2012,

www.economist.com/blogs/gametheory/2012/05/defensive-tactics-baseball. Accessed 6

Nov. 2017.

Dewan, John. "Shift Business." Bill James Online, 16 May 2012,

www.billjamesonline.com/shifty_business/. Accessed 6 Nov. 2017.

DiMeo, Nate. "Baseball's Particle Accelerator." Slate, 15 Aug. 2007,

www.slate.com/articles/sports/sports_nut/2007/08/baseballs_particle_accelerator.html.

Accessed 6 Nov. 2017.

Greenberg, Neil. "The statistical revelation that has MLB hitters bombing more home runs than

the steroid era." Fancy Stats, The Washington Post.

Leavengood, Ted. "Does the Royals’ Success Signal a Paradigm Shift in Baseball Strategy?"

Seamheads.com, The Baseball Gauge, 12 Nov. 2015,

seamheads.com/blog/2015/11/12/does-the-royals-success-signal-a-paradigm-shift-in-

baseball-strategy/. Accessed 6 Nov. 2017.

Lewis, Michael. Moneyball: The Art of Winning an Unfair Game. New York, W.W. Norton,

2003.
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Myers, David. "Fantasy Sports." Encyclopedia of Recreation and Leisure in America, edited by

Gary S. Cross, vol. 1, Charles Schriber's Sons, 2004, pp. 330-32. Gale Virtual Reference

Library. Accessed 6 Nov. 2017.

Puerzer, Richard J. "From Scientific Baseball to Sabermetrics: Professional Baseball as a

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History and Culture, vol. 11, no. 1, 2002, pp. 34-48. Project MUSE,

muse.jhu.edu.ezaccess.libraries.psu.edu/article/24204. Accessed 6 Nov. 2017.

"Statcast: Glossary of Terms." MLB News, MLB.com, 15 Apr. 2015,

m.mlb.com/news/article/118508858/major-league-baseballs-statcast-glossary-of-terms-

of-state-of-the-art-tracking-technology/. Accessed 6 Nov. 2017.

Thaler, Richard H., and Cass R. Sunstein. "Who's On First." New Republic, 1 Sept. 2003,

newrepublic.com/article/61123/whos-first. Accessed 6 Nov. 2017.