ASSIGNMENT ON

“INTER-STATE COUNCIL : IT’S ROLE AND

INTER-STATE RIVER DISPUTE”
SUBMITTED FOR THE PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENT

FOR

THE AWARD OF DEGREE OF

LL.M. [1 YEAR]

CENTRE FOR POST GRADUATE LEGAL STUDIES

BABASAHEB BHIMRAO AMBEDKAR UNIVERSITY

2017-18

Submitted To: Submitted By:

Dr. SK . CHADHA PARUL ANAND
PROFESSOR, LL.M. [ONE YEAR]

S.L.S., B.B.A.U.,
ENROLL NO. – 084/17

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 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I acknowledge my indebtedness to my respected coursecoordinator Dr. SK. CHADHA for the assistance
offered by him. I am highly obliged to him for all his quality lectures and regular guidance. The able
guidance given by himduring the preparation of my assignment deserve a special mention. I am
sincerely thankful for the benevolent assistance and guidance extended by him in preparing my
assignment. The patient hearing and the friendly interaction of the faculty with the student is highly
appreciative.

I am thankful to all the faculty members of the department of Centre for Post Graduate Legal
Studies who have encouraged and helped me to complete my assignment. I also extend my gratification
to our Librarian for providing me relevant books for the research work.

Last but not the least; I am thankful to the almighty, my family members especially my Parents
and all my batch mates & friends who have supported directly or indirectly while working on my
assignment.

Date: 25thApril., 2018

Place: Lucknow

One Year LL.M.

Enrolment No. – 084/17

Semester – 2nd

Session: 2017-18

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 TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. INTRODUCTION……………………………………………………………………………4

1.1 INTER-STATE COUNCIL…………………………………………………………4

1.2 FUNCTION OF THE COUNCIL…………………………………………………..5
1.3 ROLE OF THE COUNCIL…………………………………………………………5
1.4 APPOINTMENT OF THE COUNCIL……………………………………………..5

2. DIFFERENT BODIES CREATED UNDER ARTICLE 263……………………………….6

3. REGIONAL COUNCILS……………………………………………………………………8

4. ESTABLISHMENT OF INTER-STATE COUNCIL………………………………………..9

5. DUTIES, PROCDURE AND SECRETARIATEOF THE COUNCIL…………………….12

5.1 DUTIES OF THE COUNCIL………………………………………………………..12

5.2 PROCEDURE OF THE COUNCIL………………………………………………….12

5.3 SECRETARIATE OF THE COUNCIL………………………………………………12

5.4 11th MEETING OF THE INTER-STATE COUNCIL………………………………..13

6. INTER- STATE WATER DISPUTES AND FULL FAITH AND CREDIT CLAUSE……..15

6.1 INTER- STATE WATER DISPUTES……………………………………………….15

6.2 FULL FAITH AND CREDIT CLAUSE…………………………………………….17

7. CONCLUSION……………………………………………………………………………….19

BIBLIOGRAPHY

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 CHAPTER - 1
INTRODUCTION

CO -ORDINATION BETWEEN STATES – COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM

Though a federal constitution involves the sovereignty of the units within their respective
territorial limits it is not possible for them to remain in complete isolation from each other and
the very exercise of internal sovereignty by the units require its recognition by and co-ordination
of other units of the federation. Federal constitutions therefore generally provide certain rules for
co-operation which the units are expected to take into consideration while dealing with each
other .This co-ordination between the states and the centre is called co-operative federalism.

“The formation of an Inter-State Council as envisaged in Article 263 of the constitution is long
overdue. The Conference of the Council of Chief Ministers held on March 20, 1983, on the
initiative of the Karnataka Chief Minister, was a significant constitutional development. Active
co-operation among the States should be institutionalized and States must solve their Inter- state
problems by mutual discussion and negotiation. For example, problems regarding electricity,
water and rivers should be sorted out by the States themselves without the intervention of the
Centre. Imaginative co-operation between the States would be a most fruitful way of
counteracting excessive domination by the Centre”.1

1.1 INTER-STATE COUNCIL

Article 263 provides that the President may by order appoint an Inter State Council if it appears
to him that public interest would be served by its establishment .The President may define the
organization, procedure and duties of the Council .Generally, it may be charged with the duty of꞉

A. inquiring into and advising upon disputes which may have arisen between states ;

1
Nani A. Palkhivala – WE THE PEOPLE

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B. investigating and discussing subjects in which some or all of the states ,or the union and one
or more of the states , have a common interest;
C. making recommendations upon any subject and, in particular, recommendations for the
better co-ordination of policy and action with respect to that subject.
It appears from the above that the council is envisaged to be an advisory body having no
authority to give a binding decision .The council’s function to inquire and advice upon Inter
State disputes is complimentary to the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction under Article 131 to decide
a legal controversy between the governments.

1.2 FUNCTION OF THE COUNCIL

The council can deal with any controversy whether legal or not, but its function is advisory
unlike that of the court which gives a binding decision. The council is envisaged to be a
mechanism of intergovernmental consultation. The Supreme Court can decide intergovernmental
disputes of a legal nature. But there may arise inter governmental disputes of a non – legal
character and the council can play a role in settling such disputes.

1.3 ROLE OF THE COUNCIL

The council can play a role in promoting vertical [Centre- State] and horizontal [Inter-State]
intergovernmental co-operation and co-ordination.

1.4 APPOINTMENT OF THE COUNCIL

The council may be appointed either on a permanent basis or from time to time on an ad hoc
basis. It is also possible to appoint not only one but any number of such bodies to deal with
various matters as Article 263 is of a general nature. Such a council could deal with any matter
whether of a legal or non – legal character in which the state themselves or the center and the
states may be interested. The function of the council to inquire and advice upon interstate
disputes might be regarded as complimentary to Article 1312 under which the Supreme Court can
decide a legal controversy among the government.

2
Original jurisdiction of the supreme court

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The main idea underlying the provision is to enable the creation of a regular and recognized
machinery of inter- governmental consultation so that coordination may be maintained amongst
the various governments in such matters as agriculture, forestry, irrigation, education, etc.

CHAPTER – 2
DIFFERENT BODIES CREATED UNDER ARTICLE 263

Not much use has been made of Article 263 so far and only a few bodies of minor importance
have been created under it. THE CENTRAL COUNCIL OF HEALTH, created by a
Presidential Order under Article 263, consists of the Central Health Minister as the Chairman,
and the State Health Ministers as members. The Council is an advisory body.

Its functions are꞉

A. to consider and recommend broad lines of policy in regard to all matters concerning health;
B. to make proposals for legislation in this area ;
C. to examine the whole field of possible co-operation in regard to inter- state quarantine during
festivals and outbreaks of epidemics;
D. to recommend to the central government the method of distribution of grants-in- aid for
health purposes to the states ;
E. to review the work accomplished with the help of these grants and;
F. to establish organizations invested with appropriate functions to maintain and promote co-
operation between the Central and State Health Administrations.

All questions are decided by a majority of members present at a meeting.

Another similar body is the CENTRAL COUNCIL OF LOCAL SELF-GOVERNMENT

which consists of the UNION MINISTER OF HEALTH as Chairman and the State Ministers for
Local Self-Government as members. It is an advisory body.

The following duties are performed by it꞉

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 A. to consider and recommend broad lines of policy in regard to matters concerning local
self-government;
B. to make proposal for legislation in the area of local self- government;
C. laying down the pattern of development for India as a whole;
D. to examine the whole field of possible co-operation in regard to local self- government
matters and to draw up a common programme of action;
E. to recommend to the Central Government allocation of available financial assistance to
local bodies including village panchayats, and;
F. to review periodically the work accomplished in the area with the Central assistance.

It meets once a year and takes decisions by a majority vote.

………………………………………………………………………………………………………

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 CHAPTER -3
REGIONAL COUNCILS

The State Re- Organization Act, 1956 has set up four regional councils under Article 263 for
making recommendations for the better co-ordination of policy and action with respect to sales
tax, a State subject. A regional council has been established in each of the four zones- Northern,
Eastern, Western and Southern. Each regional council is to consist of the Secretary in charge of
sales tax, and the Commissioner of Sales tax in each of the States and Union Territories
concerned, the Deputy Secretary to the Government of India in charge of sales tax and the
Deputy Secretary to the Government of India, in the Ministry Of Home Affairs, in charge of the
Union Territories concerned. The Under Secretary to the Government of India, in the Ministry of
Finance, in charge of sales tax is to function as the Secretary of each regional council and
convene its meetings. All administrative work relating to the regional councils is to be attended
to by the Sales –tax Branch of the Ministry of Finance of the Government of India.

A decision taken at a meeting of a council is recommendatory in nature and is to be forwarded to

the Governments concerned for implementation. If a recommendation made by a council is not
implemented by a State or a Union Territory, and if the council thinks that its non-
implementation would adversely affect the interests of any other State or Union Territory, the
council may recommend that the matter may be discussed at a meeting of the Ministers in charge
of sales tax in the States and the Union Territories comprised in the zone to be presided over by
the Union Minister of State in the Ministry of Finance. A council matters relating to the levy of
sales-tax [including Central sales tax] in any States or Union Territory in the zone.

A council is to meet at least once in six months. All questions are to be decided by a majority of
votes of the members. Joint meetings of two or more regional councils can also be held if
necessary. The main purpose in establishing these councils is to secure a measure of uniformity
in the rates of sales tax and other matters pertaining thereto in respect of the States in each zone.
Sales tax has a very close relationship with, and an indiscriminate exercise of power to levy sales

Page 8
 tax may injure movement of commodities in inter-state trade and commerce and hence the great
need for co-ordinating the State sales taxation to the extent possible.

CHAPTER- 4

ESTABLISHMENT OF INTER STATE COUNCIL

A study team of the Administrative Reforms Commission suggested the establishment of an

Inter-State Council under Article 263 with a view to strengthen co-operation and co-ordination
and evolution of common policies among the Central and State Governments in many areas
where the measures taken by these governments from time to time are mutually interactive. 3 The
economy of the country being indivisible, it exerts constant pressure towards administrative
unity. The process of co-operation among the governments can be strengthened by evolving a
proper apparatus for mutual consultation.

Consultation among the Central and State Governments goes on even at present, but most of the
time it is carried on through ad hoc bodies like the conferences of the Central and State Ministers
dealing with various subjects. These conferences meet at irregular intervals, without much
preparatory work, and often with a heavy agenda to transact within a short period. Then, there is
no instrument to pursue the follow- up action on the decisions taken at these conferences. The
study team, therefore, suggested that the present- day numerous ad hoc bodies should be
replaced by one standing body to which issues of national importance can be referred and which
can advice on them authoritatively after taking all aspects of the problem into account. A single
body can look at various problems in the perspective of the whole.

The President of India in exercise of the powers under Article 263 has constituted the Inter-
State Council on May 28, 1990.The proposed council should consist of the [a] Prime Minister [b]
a few Central Ministers [c] State Chief Ministers or their nominees, and [d] others who may be co-
opted, or invited to its meetings. All issues of national importance in which States are interested
can be placed before this forum except the inter- state boundary disputes and the appointment of

3
Report Of The Study Team, A.R.C., ON CENTE-STATE RELATIONSHIPS,I,294-305[1967]

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federal officers like the State Governors, the Chief Justice of India, the Chief Election
Commissioner, etc.

The Commission endorsed the suggestion of establishing the Inter- State Council so that the Inter-
State or Centre- State differences may be settled by mutual discussion.4 The Commission did not
work out the details of the types of functions which such a council can discharge. It only made a
general statement that “the establishment of an Inter- State Council would be conducive to better
understanding.”

There has been a demand for the setting up of such a council by some State Chief Ministers so that
federal problems may be discussed on a formal basis. The Central Government, however, remains
cool to the idea and is diffident about the advisability of creating such a body. Presumably, its
misgivings are that once such a body is appointed, the States will seek to use it to intrude into
those matters which fall within the decision- making area of the Central Cabinet, e.g., appointment
of State Governors, application of Article 356, etc., matters on which Central- State controversies
arise now and then.

Because of its apprehensions that some States may seek to use the council to undermine its
position, the Central Government prefers to keep the processes of consultation more or less ad hoc
and makes use of the provisions of Article 263 to set up only such bodies as have well- defined
and narrow terms of reference. For consultation in regard to economic matters there is the National
Development Council. Nevertheless, there appears to be a good case for appointment of a non-
political, advisory body under Article 263 to keep the intergovernmental relationship under
constant review, study problems in that area on an objective and dispassionate basis and project
solutions of major issues. Being free of politics, its recommendations may receive a greater
acceptability.5

A model for the purpose is furnished by the Advisory Commission on Inter - governmental
Relations setup in the U.S.A. in 1959 with the following purposes and functions꞉ [A] to bring
together representatives of various governments to consider common problems; [B] to provide a
forum for discussion of the administration and co- ordination of federal grant programmes

4
A.R.C.Report On Center-State Relationships, 32-35[1969]
5
Report of the Rajmannar Committee appointed by the Tamil Nadu Government in 1971

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requiring inter- governmental co-operation; [C] to give critical attention to controls involved with
administration of federal grant programmes; [D] to make available technical assistance to the
executive and legislative branches of the federal government in the review of proposed legislation
to determine its over- all effect on the federal system; [E] to encourage discussion and study of
emerging public problems likely to require inter- governmental co-operation; [F] to recommend
within the framework of the constitution , the most desirable allocation of governmental functions,
responsibilities and revenues among several levels of government; [G] to recommend methods for
co-ordinating and simplifying tax laws and administrative practices to achieve a more orderly and
less competitive fiscal relationship between the governments.

The commission functions in an advisory capacity and its main task is to increase the effectiveness
of the federal system by debating various alternatives. A similar body to suggest and study various
alternative solutions to the issues causing friction in the inter- governmental relationship is called
for in India as well6.

The Sarkaria Commission has again recommended the setting up of an all- embracing Inter- Stare
Council under Article 263. Since 1967, parties or coalition of parties other than the one running
the Central Government, have come in power in the States. These State Government of diverse
hues have different views on regional and inter-State problems. In such a situation, the setting up
of a standing Inter-State Council with a comprehensive charter under Article 263 has become an
imperative necessity. The council is to consist of the Prime Minister as the Chairman, all States
Chief Ministers and all Union Cabinet Ministers dealing with subjects of common interest to the
Union and the States as members.

………………………………………………………………………………………………………

6
WRIGHT, Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, Public Adm. Review, 193[1965].

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 CHAPTER – 5

DUTIES, PROCEDURE AND SECRETARIATE OF THE COUNCIL

5.1 DUTIES OF THE COUNCIL – The Council shall be a recommendatory body and it shall
perform the following duties꞉-

A. investigate and discuss subjects of common interest;

B. make recommendations for the better co-ordination of policy and actions on such subjects;

C. deliberate on such matters of general interest to the States referred by the Chairman to the
council.7

In 1990, in Dabur India Ltd v. State of Uttar Pradesh,8 the Supreme Court suggested the setting
up of a Council under Article 263 to discuss and sort out problems of Central – State taxation.

5.2 PROCEDURE OF THE COUNCIL - The Council shall, in the conduct of its business,
observe the following procedure꞉-

A. the Council shall adopt guidelines for identifying and selecting issues to be brought before it;

B. the council may meet at least thrice in every year at such time and place as the Chairman
decides;

C. the meetings of the Council shall be held in camera;

D. the members [including the Chairman] shall from the question for a meeting of the Council;

E. all questions at a meeting of Council shall be decided by consensus;

F. the Council may in the conduct of its business observe such other procedure as it may with the

5.3 SECRETARIATE OF THE COUNCIL – The Council shall have a secretariate consisting
of such officers and staff as the Chairman thinks fit to appoint.

7
Report, 237-241
8
AIR 1990 SC1814꞉[199]4 SCC 113.

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5.4 11th MEETING OF INTER- STATE COUNCIL –

The Inter –State Council meeting was convened after a gap of 10 years. The last meeting of the
Inter – State Council was held in 2006. The previous UPA government had convened just two
meetings in its 10 years tenure. Prime Minister Narendra Modi, with Union ministers Rajnath
Singh and Sushma Swaraj among others, on 16th July chaired the 11th meeting of Inter- State
Council in New Delhi [Rashtrapati Bhavan]. Prime Minister has discussed a host of issues under
this meeting such as that the States to focus on intelligence sharing to help the country stay
“alert” to and “updated” on internal security challenges, inter-state relations and atrocities on SC
and STs, school education, direct benefit schemes, Aadhaar Card, good governance-Right to
Information and economic and social planning.

The Prime Minister is the Chairman of the Council while six of his senior Cabinet Ministers –
Rajnath Singh, Sushma Swaraj, Arun Jaitley, M Venkaiah Naidu, Nitin Gadkari, Manohar
Parrikar- were nominated by him as members. The Chief Ministers, Lieutenant Governors of the
Union Territories and 17 Union Ministers are members of the Inter-State Council. Prime
Minister Modi was interacted with the Chief Ministers on a single platform for the FIRST time
since coming into power two years ago.

POINTS SUGGESTED BY PRIME MINISTER IN THE MEETING-

 Internal security could not be strengthened unless the states and centre focused on sharing
intelligence;
 With close co-operation, we will not only strengthen the centre-state relations but also
make a better future for the citizens;
 It would be difficult for any government to successfully implement a scheme on its own.
Therefore, provision of adequate financial resources is as important as the responsibility
for implementation. He asked the States to increasingly use this forum as an effective
instrument to strengthen democracy, society and polity.
 The Prime Minister noted that with the acceptance of the 14th Finance Commission’s
recommendations the States share in Central taxes increased from 32 per cent to 42 per
cent. The total amount received by the States from the Centre during 2015-16 is 21 per
cent higher than the amount received in 2014-15.

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  Panchayats and urban local bodies would receive Rs. 2, 87,000 crore during the period of
the 14th Finance Commission substantially higher than last time. The rights of the States
were kept in mind even in revenue from the auction of natural resources. Auctions of coal
blocks will yield Rs. 3.35 lakh crore to the States in the years to come. Auctions of other
mines will yield an additional Rs. 18,000 crore to the States.
 Through amendments to the CAMPA Act (Compensatory Afforestation Fund Bill) the
Centre was trying to free up Rs. 40,000 crore lying in banks for disbursal to the States.
The Centre also wished to share with the States the amount saved as a result of
transparency being introduced in the system.
 The greatest asset of India is its youth as over 30 crore children are now of school-going
age. Hence, the country has the potential to provide the world skilled manpower for many
years to come. The Centre and the States must work together to provide our children an
enabling environment in which they can develop their skills and prepare themselves for
today’s needs. Merely going to school is not education. Education should generate
curiosity among children. It should teach them how to attain and enhance knowledge. It
should motivate them to continuously keep learning throughout their lives.
 Referring to the Aadhaar card, he said the Aadhaar Act, 2016, enabled the government to
use the Aadhaar for direct cash transfer for subsidy and other services. As on date 102
crore Aadhaar cards have been distributed in our country of 128 crore people. Seventy-
nine per cent of our people now have Aadhaar cards. Among adults, 96 per cent people
have the cards. With your support, we shall connect every citizen with an Aadhaar card
by the year-end.
 The Centre launched a scheme under which, if there is a reduction in kerosene
consumption by a State, the Centre would disburse 75 per cent of the resultant savings in
subsidy as grant to that State. He lauded the Congress-ruled Karnataka government for
moving swiftly on this initiative.

………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………

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 CHARTER – 6

INTER STATE WATER DISPUTES AND FULL FAITH AND

CREDIT CLAUES

Because large areas of India are relatively arid, mechanisms for allocating scarce water are
critically important to the welfare of the country's citizens. Water contributes to welfare in
several ways: health (e.g. clean drinking water), agriculture (e.g., irrigation), and industry (e.g.,
hydroelectric power). Because India is a federal democracy, and because rivers cross state
boundaries, constructing efficient and equitable mechanisms for allocating river flows has long
been an important legal and constitutional issue. Numerous inter-state river-water disputes have
erupted since independence. A recent dispute over use of the Yamuna River among the states of
Delhi, Haryana and Uttar Pradesh, was resolved by conferences involving three state Chief
Ministers, as well as the central government. This approach was adopted only after prior
intervention by the Supreme Court had failed. Not all disputes have happy endings, however: for
example, the larger dispute between Karnataka and Tamil Nadu over the waters of the Cauvery
rages on. Inter-state water disputes continue to fester. Such disputes are a persistent phenomenon
in India. Part of the difficulty is the plethora of actors and the complexity of the institutional
environment within which the various parties reach (or fail to reach) agreement. Actors include
state governments (which in turn must be decomposed into professional politicians, political
parties, and interest groups), the national parliament, central ministries, the courts, and ad hoc
water tribunals. These actors negotiate within a rich institutional setting. In general, river-water
disputes have involved state and central politicians, as well as the courts and special tribunals
and commissions set up to arbitrate disputes. Although fairly explicit constitutional provisions
govern inter-state river waters, it is unclear whether existing mechanisms for adjudicating
interstate water disputes are efficient. Indeed, there is growing consensus that existing
institutions are increasingly fail to generate outcomes which contribute to economic growth and
national welfare. Our research seeks to determine which arrangements for conflict resolution are
more effective (i.e., more likely to yield an acceptable outcome) and more efficient. The
Economics of Water It is widely recognized that water has a number of features that create
potential market failure. These may include non-rivalry, non-excludability, externalities, merit
good features, and significant transactions costs. The presence of these factors means that
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although increased reliance on market forces (e.g., one state selling water to another) can
contribute significantly to resolving water issues, there is no escaping from the need for parties to
agree upon a set of rules, an enforcement mechanism, and a prior distribution of property rights.
However, there are situations in which bilateral or multilateral bargaining among concerned state
governments may not be efficient or equitable on its own. One example is that the center can
affect starting positions or threat points in the bargaining game between states. Another is that,
when there is incomplete information, even imperfect central intervention can be better in
expected terms than bilateral bargaining. A third case is when there are multiple issues to be
bargained over, that may also involve spillovers to non-riparian states: the Punjab-Haryana
dispute is an example of such a situation.

The relevant provisions of the Indian Constitution are

• Entry 17 in the State List,

• Entry 56 in the Union List, and

• Article 262.

The first provision makes water a state subject, but qualified by Entry 56 in the Union List,
which states: "Regulation and development of inter-state rivers and river valleys to the extent to
which such regulation and development under the control of the Union is declared by parliament
by law to be expedient in the public interest." Article 262 explicitly grants parliament the right to
legislate over the matters in Entry 56, and also gives it primacy over the Supreme Court. As
documented by Iyer (1994), parliament has not made much use of Entry 56. Various River
Authorities have been proposed, but not legislated or established as bodies vested with powers of
management. Instead, river boards with only advisory powers have been created. Hence, the state
governments dominate the allocation of river waters. Since rivers cross state boundaries, disputes
are inevitable. The Inter-State Water Disputes Act of 1956 was legislated to deal with conflicts,
and included provisions for the establishment of tribunals to adjudicate where direct negotiations
have failed. However, states have sometimes refused to accept the decisions of tribunals.
Therefore, arbitration is not binding. Significantly, the courts have also been ignored on
occasion. Finally, the center has sometimes intervened directly as well, but in the most

Page 16
intractable cases, such as the sharing of the Ravi-Beas waters among Haryana, Jammu and
Kashmir, Rajasthan, and Punjab, central intervention, too, has been unsuccessful. In summary,
an unambiguous institutional mechanism for settling inter-state water disputes does not exist.
Nevertheless, water disputes are sometimes settled. Economic analysis is necessary to illuminate
whether and how water disputes get resolved in India.

India’s Experience :

The Inter-State Water Disputes Act seems to provide fairly clear procedures for handling
disputes. At the same time, however, the law permits considerable discretion, and different
disputes have followed diverse paths to settlement, or in a few cases, continued disagreement. In
this section, we discuss some of the major disputes. The central government has given substantial
attention to water disputes, which began to emerge soon after the framing of the Constitution.
Some common features of the easily settled disputes involved sharing costs and benefits of
specific projects, or relatively specific disagreements over smaller rivers, mostly over well-
defined projects or project proposals. Most settled disputes were characterized by specificity and
well-defined technical and cost issues. Other disputes took much longer to resolve, and some
remain unsettled. While smaller, more specific disputes may be settled more easily, this may still
not be ideal. In particular, while river basins seem the natural unit for dealing with issues of
water sharing, investment and management, they have been the focus of conflict rather than
cooperation in the Indian case. As noted in the introduction, the Indian Parliament has not made
much use of the powers vested in it by Entry 56 of the Union List. No river board has been set up
under this Act. With regard to water projects, India has often adopted project models used by
other countries for its own execution. The Damodar Valley Corporation was modeled on the
Tennessee Valley Authority of the USA. After its creation, tensions and conflicts developed
between the corporation and the participating governments, which hampered its work. So it
never became an autonomous regional river valley development corporation. This lack of clear
delegation of authority, away from politicians, is another theme to which we shall return. In
order to give a better flavor for the nature of the bargaining process, we briefly discuss three
cases: (1) The Krishna-Godavari water dispute ,

(2) The Cauvery water dispute ,

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(3) The Ravi-Beas water dispute.

These cases involve important disputes, and illustrate well the variety of paths that disputes can
take in the Indian institutional context. In the first case, relative success was achieved through
negotiations and through the working of a tribunal. In the other two cases, the institutional
process has been relatively less successful: while these two disputes have both gone to tribunals,
neither one has yet been successfully resolved. The Cauvery Tribunal is still deliberating, while
the Ravi-Beas Tribunal gave its judgment, but it was not made official by the central
government.

Krishna-Godavari water dispute

The Krishna-Godavari water dispute among Maharashtra, Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh (AP),
Madhya Pradesh (MP), and Orissa could not be resolved through negotiations. Here Karnataka
and Andhra Pradesh are the lower riparian states on the river Krishna, and Maharashtra is the
upper riparian state. The dispute was mainly about the inter-state utilization of untapped surplus
water. The Krishna Tribunal reached its decision in 1973, and the award was published in 1976.

The Tribunal relied on the principle of “equitable apportionment” for the actual allocation of the
water. It addressed three issues:

(1) The extent to which the existing uses should be protected as opposed to future or
contemplated uses.

(2) Diversion of water to another watershed.

(3) Rules governing the preferential uses of water.

The Tribunal's rulings were as follows:

• On the first issue, the Tribunal concluded that projects that were in operation or under
consideration as in September 1960 should be preferred to contemplated uses and should be
protected. The Tribunal also judged that except by special consent of the parties, a project
committed after 1960 should not be entitled to any priority over contemplated uses.

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• On the second issue, the Tribunal concluded that diversion of Krishna waters to another
waterline was legal when the water was diverted to areas outside the river basin but within the
political boundaries of the riparian states. It was silent regarding the diversion of water to areas
of non-riparian states.

• On the third issue the Tribunal specified that all existing uses based on diversion of water
outside the basin would receive protection. The Godavari Tribunal commenced hearings in
January 1974, after making its award for the Krishna case. It gave its final award in 1979, but
meanwhile the states continued negotiations among themselves, and reached agreements on all
disputed issues. Hence the Tribunal was merely required to endorse these agreements in its
award. Unlike in the case of other tribunals, there was no quantification of flows, or quantitative
division of these flows: the states divided up the area into sub-basins, and allocated flows from
these sub-basins to individual states – this was similar in approach to the successful Indus
agreement between India and Pakistan. Another difference was that the agreement was not
subject to review, becoming in effect, perpetually valid.

The Ravi-Beas dispute

Punjab and Haryana, the main current parties in this dispute, are both agricultural surplus states,
providing large quantities of grain for the rest of India. Because of the scarcity and uncertainty of
rainfall, irrigation is the mainstay of agriculture. An initial agreement on the sharing of the
waters of the Ravi and Beas after partition was reached in 1955, through an inter-state meeting
convened by the central government. The present dispute between Punjab and Haryana about
Ravi-Beas water started with the reorganization of Punjab in November 1966, when Punjab and
Haryana were carved out as successor states of erstwhile Punjab. The four perennial rivers, Ravi,
Beas, Sutlej and Yamuna flow through both these states, which are heavily dependent on
irrigated agriculture in this arid area. Irrigation became increasingly important in the late 1960s
with the introduction and widespread adoption of high yielding varieties of wheat. As a result of
the protests by Punjab against the 1976 agreement allocating water from Ravi-Beas, further
discussions were conducted (now including Rajasthan as well), and a new agreement was
accepted in 1981. This agreement, reached by a state government allied to the central
government, became a source of continued protest by the political opposition, and lobbies

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outside the formal political process. Punjab entered a period of great strife, and a complex chain
of events led to the constitution of a tribunal to examine the Ravi-Beas issue in 1986. Both states
sought clarifications of aspects of the award by this tribunal, but the center has not provided
these. Hence, the award has not been notified, and does not have the status yet of a final, binding
decision

INTER-STATE WATER DISPUTES [ARTICLE 262] –

In India there are many inter- state rivers and their regulation and development has been a source
of inter – state function. These relate to the use, control and distribution of waters of inter – state
rivers for irrigation and power generation. In the Indian Constitution, water – related matters
within a state are included in the state list, while the matters related to inter – state river waters
are in the union list.

Keeping in view this problem of unending river water disputes, the Constitution framers vested
the power to deal with it, exclusively in Parliament. The Parliament hence, may by law provide
for the adjudication of any dispute or complaint, with regard to use, distribution or control of the
waters. The Inter – State Water Disputes Act was enacted by the Parliament in 1956 according
to which tribunals are set up for adjudication of water disputes referred to them. Article 262 -

[1] Parliament may by law provide for the adjudication of any dispute or complaint with respect
to the use, distribution or control of waters of, or in, any inter-state river or river valley.

[2] Notwithstanding anything in this Constitution, Parliament may by law provide that neither
the Supreme Court nor any other court shall exercise its jurisdiction in respect of any such
dispute or complaint as referred to in Clause [1].

In T.N. Cauvery Sangam v. Union of India,9 the Supreme Court has held that once the Central
government finds that the dispute referred to in the request received from the State government
cannot be settled by negotiations, it becomes mandatory for the Central government to constitute
a tribunal and to refer the dispute to it for adjudication. Further, if the central government fails to

9
AIR 1990 SC 131

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make such a reference, the court may, on an application under Article 32 by an aggrieved party
issue mandamus to the Central government to carry out its statutory obligation.
There was an agreement between the States of Punjab and Haryana to share the water of River
Sutlej. The Punjab Government was to construct the Sutlej- Yamuna Link canal to carry this
water to the State of Haryana but it defaulted in doing so. The State of Haryana filed a suit
against the State of Punjab under Article 131 of the constitution to pass a decree directing the
Punjab Government to construct the canal. The Punjab Government objected to the suit pleading
that it was barred by the Inter- State Water Dispute Act. The Supreme Court negatived the
contention arguing that there was no water- dispute between the States as they had already
agreed to share the water. The question was regarding the obligation of the Punjab Government
to construct the canal as part of the agreement between the two States. The court directed the
Punjab Government to fulfil its obligation by completing the canal within a year.10

In the exercise of power conferred by Article 262, Parliament has passed the River Board Act,
1956 and Inter–State Dispute Act, 1956. The former provides for the regulation and
development of Inter–States rivers and river valleys whereas the latter empowers the Union
government to set up a Tribunal for the adjudication of disputes relating to waters of Inter-State
rivers or river valleys.

6.2 FULL FAITH AND CREDIT CLAUSE [ARTICLE 261] –

Article 261 of the Constitution of India provides that full faith and credit shall be given
throughout the territory of India to all the public acts, records and judicial proceedings of the
Union and of every State. This is a step to promote cooperation and faith between the center and
the states.

Clause [2] empowers the Parliament to lay down by law the mode of proof as well as the effect
of acts and proceedings of one state in another State.

According to clause [3], final judgments or order delivered or passed by civil courts in any part
of the territory of India can be executed anywhere in the country according to law. This is a
constitutional provision which enjoins that a decree shall be executable in any part of the

10
State of Harayana v.State of Punjab, AIR 2002 SC 685꞉[2002]2 SCC 507

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territory of India according to law. The words ‘final judgment’ in this clause include ‘decrees’
also. The clause applies to civil and not to criminal courts. A decree passed by a civil court in
any other State is executable in any other State ‘according to law’ and the word ‘law’ here means
‘procedural’ law relating to the execution of the decrees, e.g., the law of limitation. It does not
refer to the merits of the decision which cannot be re-opened in another court.11

The full faith and credit clause promotes uniformity and unity throughout the territory of India. It
develops a sense of harmony and unity in the country. It promotes cooperation between the
States and the Centre and gives due credit to all the public acts.

CHAPTER -7

CONCLUSION

B.R. Ambedkar once described India and its states as “one integral whole, its people a single
people living under a single imperium derived from a single source”. It was a necessary
sentiment at a time when a newly independent and partitioned nation was trying to frame a
coherent idea of itself. But the political and economic context has changed drastically since then.
The relationship between the centre and the states has failed to keep pace with its evolution.

The Inter –State Council is to be more than a talk shop, the suggestions which are suggested by
the Prime Minister in the latest meeting, is effectively carried out through the instrument called
Inter State Council. The Inter -State Council helped bridge the trust deficit between the centre
and the states. If not always a problem solver, it at least acted as a safety valve.

Inter –State Council with other bodies such as the NITI Aayog’s Governing Council having a
similar composition, including the prime minister, chosen cabinet ministers and chief ministers,
takes action for solving the centre-state issues. This puts the states on more solid footing an

11
Narsing v. Shankar, AIR 1958 ALL776

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essential ingredient in building the atmosphere of cooperation needed for calibrating centre-state
relations.

The Inter-state Council improve centre-state or state inter se [a] with regard to legislating on
education and forests both subjects that have been transferred from the state list to the concurrent
list the centre would do well to consult states more extensively and offer them greater flexibility.
[b] It also discussed the Punchhi Commission report (which interestingly introduced the term
cooperative federalism) on centre-state relations. [c] The ISC is the only multilateral centre-
state forum that operates directly within the framework of the Constitution (Article 263 (b) and
(c)) where contemporary issues like disaster management, terrorism and internal security can be
taken up.

It should function in such a manner that it reflects the equal status of states and the centre. It
should meet once a year. Even though the ISC’s mandate is very broad, its aspiration has
generally been limited to discussing affirmative action, welfare subjects and administrative
efficiency and coordination.

While India needs as many forums as it can get to improve implementation efficiency (given a
massive implementation deficit), the ISC India’s true potential will be achieved only when both
the centre and the states are strong.

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 BIBLIOGRAPHY

BOOKS REFERRED꞉
 J.N. Pandey꞉ The Constitutional Law OF India
 Nani A. Palkhivala꞉WE THE PEOPLE
 Prof. M.P. Jain꞉ Indian Constitutional Law;
 Seervai, H.M. Constitutional Law of Indian-Bombay; N.M. Tripathi, 1991;

INDIAN STATUTES:

 The Constitution of India.

MAGAZINE꞉

1. Economic and Political Weekly.

2. Frontline Magazine.

WEBSITE REFERRED꞉

1. http//www.wikipedia.

2. http//www.google.com

………………………………………………………………………………………………….

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