STATE OF MICHIGAN IN THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR THE COUNTY OF INGHAM BARBARA MCQUILLAN, Plaintiff, 4 CASE NO: 18-208-CZ v JUDGE CLINTON CANADY EDWARD W. SPARROW HOSPITAL ASSOCIATION, a domestic nonprofit corporation, and SPARROW CARSON HOSPITAL, a domestic nonprofit corporation, Bla sz ua gaaqd Defendants. wee TOM R. PABST (P27872) NOAH S. HURWETZ (P74 Representing Plaintif? Representing Defendants 2503 S. Linden Road 2723 S. State St., Ste. 400 Flint, MI 48532 ‘Ann Arbor, MI 48104 (810) 732-6792 (734) 214-7617 There is no other civil action between these parties arising out of the same transaction or oecurrence as alleged in this complaint pending in this court, nor has any such action been previously filed and dismissed or transferred after having been assigned to a judge. I do not know of any other civil action, not between these parties, arising out of the same transaction or occurrence as alleged in this complaint that is either pending or was previously filed and dismissed, transferred, or otherwise disposed of after having been assigned to a judge in this court. First AMENDED COMPLAINT AND. RELIANCE UPON JURY DEMAND NOW COMES Tom R, Pabst, representing Barbara McQuillan, Plaintiff, and shows unto this Honorable Court as follows: COMMON ALLEGATIONS (1a) That we incorporate by this reference as though expressly restated herein, our original Complaint and Jury Demand 4/2/18, a copy of which is attached hereto as Ex. 1. (1) That at all times pertinent hereto, Barbara McQuillan, Plaintiff, waslis a resident of Clinton County, Michigan, and employed by Defendants herein.(2) _ That at all times pertinent hereto, Defendant Edward W. Sparrow Hospital was/is an entity in Ingham County, Michigan, and employer of Barbara McQuillan, Plaintiff. (3) __ That at all times pertinent hereto, Defendant Sparrow Carson Hospital was/is an entity in Montcalm County, Michigan, and employer of Barbara McQuillan, Plaintiff. (4) _ That at all times pertinent hereto, Defendant Edward W. Sparrow Hospital had some type of symbiotic supervisory/management relationship with Defendant Sparrow Carson Hospital such that all of these Defendants, combined, had supervisory/management power and authority over Barbara MeQuillan, Plaintiff. (5) That pursuant to the venue provision contained in MCLA §15.363, Ingham County, Michigan, is che County of proper venue to file this lawsuit, Count WHISTLEBLOWER VIOLATIONS (6) That we repeat fs 1a-5. (7) That we have an employee protection law in Michigan known as the “Whistleblower’s Protection Act,” being MCLA §15.361, et seg., which provides, in pertinent part, that— “15.362. Discharge threats, or discrimination against employee for reporting violations of law Sec. 2 An employer shall not discharge, threaten, or otherwise discriminate against an employee regarding the employee's compensation, terms, conditions, location, or privileges of employment because the employee, or a person acting on behalf of the employee, reports or is about to report, verbally or in writing, a violation of a suspected violation of a law or regulation or rule promulgated pursuant to law of this state, a political subdivision of this state, or the United States to a public body, unless the employee knows that the report is false, or because an employee is requested by a public body to participate in an investigation, hearing or inquiry held by that public body, or a court action, See MCLA §15,362. (8) That Barbara McQuillan, Plaintiff, engaged in protected activity throughout her employment by reporting, or being about to report, violations or suspected violations of laws, rules. and/or -—regulations, —and/or_-—sby_—participating in investigations/inquiries/hearings/protected activities by a public body, which included, but is not limited to, the following two case examples.‘CASE ONE: (9) That specifically, but not by way of limitation, Barbara McQuillan, Plaintiff, engaged in protected activity by reporting suspected substandard medical care and treatment by doctors at Sparrow Carson Hospital, in particular, Dr. J. David Spencer (hereinafter “Dr. Spencer”). (10) That specifically, Dr. Spencer was an obstetrician who joined Sparrow Carson Hospital in 2016 and had a slow start in recruiting patients. (11) That the procedures Dr. Spencer performed in 2017 had negative incidents which were documented and reported by other employees and caregivers. (12) ‘That due to the dysfunction and conflict of interest within Sparrow Carson OB, the decision was made to elevate the review of Dr, Spencer’s negative incidents to Sparrow medical staff in Lansing, who, without hesitation, allowed Dr. Spencer to continue performing surgeries. (13) That in December 2017/January 2018, during an elective tubal-ligation following delivery, Dr. Spencer's patient lost 400ce of blood. (14) That following the December 2017/January 2018 incident, Barbara McQuillan, Plaintiff, verified the documented occurrence with Joan Sweet and Matt Thompson and insisted that they stop Dr. Spencer from performing surgeries. (15) That a few days later, Plaintiff received notification that Dr. Spencer's elective privileges were suspended and that another physician agreed to proctor Dr. Spencer for future cases. (16) That thereafter, Plaintiff thanked Matt Thompson for following through with regard to Dr. Spencer but reported that she had other concerns regarding his ability to perform on-call and/or emergency surgeries that had yet to be addressed. (17) That in response, Matt Thompson stated — “He's all we've got.” (18) That Plaintiff responded to Matt Thompson by stating — “That’s not acceptable.” (19) That astonishingly, Matt Thompson then repeated his response to Plaintiff ~ “He's all we've got.” (20) That Plaintiff then reported the above to Chief of Staff, Dr. Chris Herald, who, while not disagreeing with Plaintiff, did nothing to address these substandard medical treatment issues.(21) That Plaintiff then reported the above incidents and statements to the State of Michigan for review. (22) That this activity by Barbara McQuillan, Plaintiff, is clearly protected activity within the meaning of Landin v. Healthsource of Michigan, 305 Mich. App. 519 (2014) and MCLA 15.361, et seq. Case Two: (23) That in or about September/October 2017, a 58-year-old male patient presented to the Emergency Department with R/O appendicitis. The surgeon, Dr. Troy Ferguson, admitted the patient, who then sat untreated for at least eight hours, despite the numerous calls, made by the nurses and supervision trying to get a physician to treat him, (24) That the physician who was covering the calls that night, Dr. Robert Seals, who was also the Medical Director, denied and/or refused to see the 58-year-old male patient that night and the next morning. As a result, the patient was transferred to McLaren in critical condition, (25) _ That Plaintiff approached the Vice President of Quality/Risk/Medical Staff for the hospital, Joan Sweet, in the presence of Dr. Chris Herald, Chief of Staff, and asked her if a Root Cause Analysis was planned. (26) That in response, Joan Sweet became upset and defensive and implied that Plaintiff was accusing her of not doing her job. (27) That Plaintiff presented this case to the Sparrow Way Action Committee as a “safety event” and a possible “serious safety event” to be reviewed at the system level because the patient almost died while in their care. (28) That after Plaintiff presented this case to the Committee, Kira Carter- Robinson, Vice President of Affiliates, asked Plaintiff if she was available to meet with her later that day at 3:00 p.m. (29) That immediately following the Committee meeting, the Chief Medical Officer, Dr, Karen Kent, approached Plaintiff about the case. Plaintiff reported her concems to her and she told Plaintiff she should, “send it for Peer review.” (0) That Plaintiff told Dr. Karen Kent she was hesitant to send the case to Peer review as the physician who led that group, Dr. Robert Seals, was the doctor who denied/refused to treat the patient in question. 1) That Dr. Karen Kent abruptly responded, “Then send it to Sparrow medical staff’, which Plaintiff facilitated by going to Dr. Chris Herald to complete the process.(32) That the Root Cause Analysis was scheduled by Joan Sweet; however, Joan Sweet and Matt Thompson intentionally left Plaintiff out of the review. Later, Dr. Herald confirmed that Joan Sweet and Matt Thompson intentionally left Plaintiff out of this review. (33) That Plaintiff spoke with Kevin Cole, the Executive Director of Risk Management at Sparrow, who indicated that under no circumstances should Plaintiff have been left out of this analysis. Kevin Cole further stated that Joan should have shared her action plan with Plaintiff because it was identified as a “serious safety event” and that Plaintiff should go back and, “Just tell Joan.” (34) That Plaintiff attempted to speak with Joan on two separate occasions, with no response, and Plaintiff never saw the “action plan.” Plaintiff also expressed her concerns to Matt Thompson and he stated, “Well, you should be included in most.” (35) That this activity by Barbara McQuillan, Plaintiff, is clearly protected activity within the meaning of Landin v, Healthsource of Michigan, 305 Mich. App. 519 (2014) and MCLA 15,361, et seq. (36) That Defendants discharged and discriminated against Barbara McQuillan, Plaintiff, because she engaged in “protected activity” pursuant to MCLA §15.362. (37) That as a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ violation of MCLA §15.361, ef seg. and Michigan’s Public Policy, Barbara McQuillan, Plaintiff, suffered the following injuries and damages, amongst others: (a) oss of her jobs (b) lost wages, past and future; (© loss of earning capacity; (@ emotional distress and mental anguish, past and future; (©) injury to her feelings, including extreme embarrassment and humiliation, past and future; (damage to her professional reputation, past and future; (g) outrage; (®) —incurrence of actual attorney's fees and costs for having to enforce her legal rights and vindicate herself for the wrongful misconduct of Defendants herein; and (other injuries and damages, the exact nature and extent of which are not now known,(38) That Defendants are directly and/or vicariously liable for the acts and/or omissions and/or misrepresentations and/or tortious misconduct committed by persons who ‘were then and there agents and/or employees and/or officers of Defendants, and acting within the course and scope of said employment and/or agency by reason of the facts hereinabove stated or otherwise known to Defendant herein; or acting in such a way as to bind Defendant pursuant to the Restatement Second Agency, Section 219 (1 & 2). (39) That the damages attributable to the aforesaid injuries far exceed One Hundred ‘Thousand ($100,000.00) Dollars. Count PUBLIC POLICY VIOLATION (40) That we repeat Js 1a-39. (41) That throughout Barbara McQuillan, Plaintiff's, employment with Defendants, she engaged in protected activity by conduct including but not limited to: (a) Executing her duties and/or acting in accordance with law; and/or (6) Exercising a right conferred by law; and/or (©) Refusing to violate a law in the course of her employment. See for example, Landin v, Healthsource of Michigan, 305 Mich App 519 (2014); and Suchodolski v, Michigan Consolidated Gas Co., 412 Mich 692 (1982). (42) That if, for any reason, the aforesaid WPA does not apply, then Barbara McQuillan, Plaintiff, hereby asserts a claim for Violation of Public Policy in the State of Michigan, both separately from and/or in the alternative to Plaintiffs WPA claims. Dudewicz v Norris-Schmidt, Inc., 443 Mich 68, 503 NW2d 645 (1993); Pace v, Edel-Harrelson, M Sup Ct Case # 151374, issued 2/1/16, at fnl9. (43) That as a direct and proximate result of the Defendants’ breach of the public policy of the State of Michigan, Barbara McQuillan, Plaintiff, was caused to suffer the damages hereinbefore set forth in more particularity in §9. (44) That we specifically incorporate by this reference as though expressly restated herein {s 9-34, which show that Barbara McQuillan, Plaintiff, was trying to protect the public from substandard medical care and treatment being meted out by the doctors at Sparrow Carson Hospital. This is protected activity within the meaning of Landin v. Healthsource of Michigan, 305 Mich. App. 519 (2014) and MCLA 15.361, et seq. (45) That Defendants are directly and/or vicariously liable for the acts and/or omissions and/or misrepresentations and/or unlawful misconduct committed by persons who were then and there agents and/or employees and/or officers of Defendants, and acting within the course and scope of said employment and/or agency by reason of the facts hereinabove 6stated or otherwise known to Defendants herein; or acting in such a way as to bind Defendants pursuant to the Restatement Second Agency, Section 219 (1 & 2). Defendants are also liable for acquiescing in, and/or ratifying, the unlawful conduct of others. (46) That upon information and belief, Defendants, and/or _their agents/servants/employees, herein acted in concert with one another and aided and abetted one another, in ways currently unknown to Plaintiff, but well known to Defendants herein, for their own personal reasons, (47) That the damages attributable to the aforesaid injuries far exceed One Hundred Thousand ($100,000.00) Dollars. WHEREFORE, and for all of which damage Barbara McQuillan, Plaintiff, demands judgment against Defendants herein in whatever amount in excess of One Hundred Thousand ($100,000.00) Dollars the trier of fact finds to be fair and just, in accordance with the law and evidence, together with interest, costs, and attorney's fees allowed by law, in particular actual attomey’s fees allowed by MCLA §15.361, et seg. paw ¥-ZY -(Y TOMR. PABST (P27872) Representing Plaintiff RELIANCE UPON JURY DEMAND Plaintiff hereby relies upon the previously filed jury demand. Dated:_ {= uU- ’ Y TOMR. PABST (P2787) Representing PlaintiffSTATE OF MICHIGAN IN THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR THE COUNTY OF INGHAM BARBARA MCQUILLAN, Plaintiff, caseno: 18 JOB “CZ v EDWARD W. SPARROW HOSPITAL SOBGE CUNTON CANADY ASSOCIATION, a domestic nonprofit corporation, and SPARROW CARSON HOSPITAL, a domestic nonprofit corporation, Defendants. TOM R. PABST (P27872) Representing Plaintiff 2503 S. Linden Road Flint, MI 48532 (810) 732-6792 There is no other civil action between these parties arising out of the same transaction or occurrence as alleged in this complaint pending in this court, nor has any such action been previously filed and dismissed or transferred after having been assigned to a judge, I do not know of any other civil action, not between these parties, arising out of the same transaction or occurrence as alleged in this complaint that is either pending or was previously filed and dismissed, transferred, or otherwise disposed of after having been assigned to a Judge in this court. COMPLAINT AND JURY DEMAND NOW COMES Tom R. Pabst, representing Barbara McQuillan, Plaintiff, and shows unto this Honorable Court as follows: COMMON ALLEGATIONS (1) That at all times pertinent hereto, Barbara McQuillan, Plaintiff; waslis a resident of Clinton County, Michigen, and employed by Defendants herein. 2) _ That at all times pertinent hereto, Defendant Edward W. Sparrow Hospital was/is an entity in Ingham County, Michigan, and employer of Barbara MeQuillan, Plaintiff.(3) That at all times pertinent hereto, Defendant Sparrow Carson Hospital was/is an entity in Montcalm County, Michigan, and employer of Barbara McQuillan, Plaintiff. (4) That at all times pertinent hereto, Defendant Edward W. Sparrow Hospital had some type of symbiotic supervisory/management relationship with Defendant Sparrow Carson Hospital such that all of these Defendants, combined, had supervisory/management power and authority over Barbara McQuillan, Plaintiff. (5) That pursuant to the venue provision contained in MCLA §15.363, Ingham County, Michigan, is the County of proper venue to file this lawsuit. COUNTI WHISTLEBLOWER VIOLATIONS (© That we repeat fs 1-5, (7) That we have an employee protection law in Michigan known as the “Whistleblower’s Protection Act,” being MCLA §15.361, ef seg., which provides, in pertinent part, that— “15.362. Discharge threats; or diseri ion against employee for reporting violations of law Sec. 2 An employer shell not discharge, threaten, or otherwise discriminate against an employee regarding the employee's compensation, terms, conditions, location, or privileges of employment because the employee, of a person acting on behalf of the employee, reports or is about to report, verbally or in writing, a violation of a suspected violation of a law or regulation or rule promulgated pursuant to Inw of this state, a political subdivision of this state, or the United States to a public body, unless the employee knows that the report is false, or because an employee is requested by a public body to participate in an investigation, hearing or inquiry held by that public body, or a court action. See MCLA §15,362. (8) That Plaintiff engaged in protected ectivity throughout her employment by reporting, or being about to report, violations or suspected violations of laws, rules and/or regulations, and/or by participating in investigations/inquiries/hearings/protected activities by a public body. (9) That Defendants discharged and discriminated against Barbara McQuillan, Plaintiff, because she engaged in “protected activity” pursuant to MCLA §15.362.(10) That as a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ violation of MCLA §15.361 et seq., Barbara McQuillan, Plaintiff, suffered the following injuries and damages, amongst others: (@) loss of her job; (b) lost wages, past and future; (©) loss of earning capacity; (a) emotional distress and mental anguish, past and future; (©) injury to her feelings, imcluding extreme embarrassment and humiliation, past and futures | (© damage to her professional reputation, past and future; (@) outrage; (h) _incurrence of actual attorney's fees and costs for having to enforce her legal rights and vindicate herself for the ‘wrongful misconduct of Defendants herein; and i) other injuries and damages, the exact nature and extent of which are not now known. (11) That Defendants are directly and/or viceriously liable for the acts and/or omissions and/or misrepresentations and/or tortious misconduct committed by persons who ‘were then and there agents and/or employees and/or officers of Defendants, and acting within the course and scope of said employment and/or agency by reason of the facts hereinabove stated or otherwise known to Defendant herein; or acting in such a way as to bind Defendant pursuant to the Restatement Second Agency, Section 219 (1 & 2), (12) That the damages attributable to the aforesaid injuries far exceed One Hundred Thousand ($100,000.00) Dollars. COUNT IT PUBLIC POLICY VIOLATION (13) That we repeat fs 1-12, (14) That throughout Barbara McQuillan, Plaintiff's, employment with Defendants, she engaged in protected activity by conduct including but not limited to: (@) Executing her duties and/or acting in accordance with laws and/or (b) Exercising a right conferred by law; and/or 3(c) Refusing to violate a law in the course of her employment. See for example, Landin v. Healthsource of Michigan, 305 Mich App 519 (2014); and Suchodolski v. Michigan Consolidated Gas Co., 412 Mich 692 (1982). (15) That if, for any reason, the aforesaid WPA does not apply, then Barbara McQuillan, Plaintiff, hereby asserts a claim for Violation of Public Policy in the State of Michigan, both separately from and/or in the alternative to Plaintiff's WPA claims, Dudewicz v Norris-Schmidt, Inc., 443 Mich 68, 503 NW2d 645 (1993); Pace v. Edel-Harrelson, M Sup Ct Case # 151374, issued 2/1/16, at fn19, (16) That as a direct and proximate result of the Defendants’ breach of the public policy of the State of Michigan, Barbara McQuillan, Plaintiff, was caused to suffer the | damages hereinbefore set forth in more particularity in 9. | | (17) That Defendants are directly and/or vicariously liable for the acts and/or omissions and/or misrepresentations and/or unlawful misconduct committed by persons who were then and there agents and/or employees and/or officers of Defendants, and acting within the course and scope of said employment and/or agency by reason of the facts hereinabove stated or otherwise known to Defendants herein; or acting in such a way as to bind Defendants pursuant to the Restatement Second Agency, Section 219 (1 & 2). Defendants ate also liable for acquiescing in, and/or ratifying, the unlawful conduct of others. (18) That upon information and belief, Defendants, and/or their agents/servants/employees, herein acted in concert with one another and aided and abetted cone another, in ways currently unknown to Plaintiff, but well known to Defendants herein, for | their own personal reasons. (19) That the damages attributable to the aforesaid injuries far exceed One Hundred Thousand ($100,000.00) Dollars. WHEREFORE, and for all of which damage Barbara McQuillan, Plaintiff, demands Judgment against Defendants herein in whatever amount in excess of One Hundred Thousand ($100,000.00) Dollars the trier of fact finds to be fair and just, in accordance with the law and evidence, together with interest, costs, and attorney's fees allowed by law, in particulat actual attorney's fees allowed by MCLA §15.361, et sea. Dated, 2 7 30- ( J —— TOMR. PABST (P27872) Representing Plaintiff