The Progress and “Urgency” of Modeling in Sociology.

The
Concept of “Generative Model” and its Implementation.
byGianluca Manzo
GEMASS [Groupe d’Étude des Méthodes de l’Analyse Sociologique de la Sorbonne], 190, avenue de
France CS n° 71345 75648 - Paris cedex 13.

gianluca.manzo.at.cnrs.fr

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L’Année sociologique
2007/1 (Vol. 57)

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 Introduction

1
In an undoubtedly harsh assessment, contemporary sociology, unlike classical
sociology, has been criticized for excluding a certain number of basic theoretical and
methodological problems from its agenda. Indeed, its current state of crisis (real or
imaginary) is to some extent related to these oversights (Boudon 1998a, 13–14).
2
The subject of this article concerns one of the major issues that I feel contemporary
sociology has effectively overlooked, namely, the place that the systematic
construction of models should occupy in this field. In this respect, it is of particular
note that a recent publication involving an analysis of the concept of the “model” as
adopted in a number of disciplines (including the natural sciences as well as the
social sciences) does not contain a single chapter on sociology (Nouvel 2002).
3
I believe—and this is the fundamental argument of this article—that sociologists
should accord a significant place to “models.” This is due to the fact that, whether
we like it or not, every social phenomenon relies on the multiple overlapping of
actions, interactions, and structures, giving rise to chains (of variable length) of
feedback loops. My impression is that sociologists will never be able to grasp the
complexity of the flow of events caused by these loops. To attempt to reproduce it,
often by focusing on analysis of the micro levels, would be senseless, and to ignore
it by remaining at the societal level in terms of the relationships between aggregate
quantities would be to give up trying to understand the sources behind these
systematic regularities.
4
The “model” might, therefore, constitute a suitable cognitive and practical tool
through which to master the complexity of reality, thus avoiding the two solutions
noted above—solutions which, in a variety of more or less sophisticated forms, of
course, have been used by sociologists in the past to try to resolve the difficulties
encountered in the analysis of a given object. The use of “models” as an approach
requires abstraction and simplification first of all and, secondly, a means of
evaluating the discrepancy that exists between the results of the simplification
operation and the actual explanandum. In addition, the logical sequence in
“modeling” requires us to gradually advance with the construction of “local”
models, followed by increasingly complex ones and, finally, by combining them (in
a spirit that is highly reminiscent of Merton’s “middle-range theory” (1967)).
5
Might I be so bold as to quote the following passage in order to support my
argument with an example from the past?
6
Generally speaking, we study things that vary by imperceptible degrees. The closer
the representation we make of them to reality, the more it tends to become
quantitative. We often express this by saying that, in perfecting themselves, the
sciences tend to become quantitative. [...] For a long time, political economy was
almost entirely qualitative; then, with pure economics, it became quantitative, at
least in theory. We will, therefore, attempt to make similar progress in sociology and
to substitute quantitative for qualitative considerations, for, although imperfect—
even very imperfect—the former are always slightly more worthwhile than the
latter. [back-translated from the French]
(Pareto 1917–1919, 63–64)
7
And yet, we now know that the revolution in economics referred to by Pareto has
benefited precisely from the central place occupied by “modeling” in this discipline
in the past (Armatte 2005, 99–102; Walliser 1999, 128–137; Walliser 2002). Ought
we not therefore to expect that the progress advocated by Pareto will take even
longer to achieve in sociology while a failure to grasp the importance of the concept
of “model” persists?
8
We could immediately reply to this question in the negative, noting that this concept
is in itself extremely ambiguous (Bunge 1973a), and, in addition, that it is used by
sociologists in many different ways (Fararo 2005a). It might also be possible to raise
the objection that we do not yet have the adequate tools to “‘implement” (with the
dual meaning of formalizing and deductively analyzing) models that are sufficiently
versatile for them to be of use to sociologists. In this respect, we would certainly be
brought back to earth by being reminded of the difficulties connected with the use of
mathematical formalism in sociology.
9
In short, this article constitutes an attempt to do away with these reservations.
Firstly, my intention is to restrict the use of the concept of “model” to that of
“generative model.” This concept has the advantage of clearly demonstrating the
fundamental “ingredients” as well as the formal constraints that sociologists should
use during the conceptual development of a “model.” Following this, I will run
through some of the distinctive interpretations of the concept of “model” in
sociology, with the intention of showing that this terminological pluralism refers, in
reality, to different modalities of “formalization” and ways of studying theoretical
models. The aim of this second part is to suggest that these different forms of
“modeling” do not all have the same capacity for implementing a “generative
model.” In this respect, I would particularly like to draw the reader’s attention to a
recent type of “computational model,” agent-based modeling, which seems to be
able to carry out this task in an exhaustive manner. On this specific point, my
methodological reasoning will therefore refer to the concept of “multiagent systems”
as “artificial microcosms,” an analogy that has also been formulated by eminent
computer scientists, albeit in terms that are different from ours (see Ferber 2006).
10
Finally, I will put forward a schema that incorporates the numerous aspects of the
concept of “model” referred to during the course of this article. I am, therefore,
aiming to put forward a research grid that can assist in the design, development, and
establishment of a type of sociology that is genuinely centered around the activity of
“modeling.”[1] I would like to point out here that I have already...[1]

1. Theoretical Development: “Generative Models”

11
I agree with Bunge in considering that the rigor of a discipline depends on the
coherence with which it develops models with a specific purpose in mind namely,
“mechanisms.” Indeed, this type of model aims to clarify how the observed
phenomena arise. Models of mechanisms resemble a “translucent box” rather than a
“black box.”
12
In sociology, models that have “mechanisms” as their object have been given a
precise name, that of “generative models” (Boudon 1979a; Fararo 1969). As a first
approximation, they might be defined as simplified conceptual representations, the
consequences of which would include all the observations requiring explanation (c.f.
also Schelling 1978, 89).[2] It is already clear that a model can only be regarded...[2]

13
As I shall attempt to demonstrate, a “generative model” can (and must) be
characterized from two points of view: 1) according to its constituent parts
(“mechanisms”); and 2) according to its structure (“complex methodological
individualism”).

1.1 The Building Blocks of the “Generative Model”: “The

Mechanisms”
14
The idea of a “mechanism” is not new. The epistemology and methodology behind
many “hard sciences” (biology, physics, chemistry, or medicine, for example) have
relied, at least since the seventeenth century, on the experimental demonstration and
modeling of “mechanisms” (Machamer, Darden, and Craver 2000). Past traces of
this approach are equally manifest in sociology, originating with the “classics”
(Boudon 2005a, chap. 6; Cherkaoui 1998, chap. 3; Cherkaoui 2005a, chap. 1 and 2;
Elster 2003, 44–48; Fararo 1989, 134–137, 345, 346). Although, undoubtedly,
Merton (1949, 103, 106, chap. 11, 371–379; 1967, 43) has contributed to the
introduction of some of the analytical characteristics of this idea into modern
sociology, it certainly has its roots in the 1960s and 1970s, as much in terms of its
epistemological background (Harré 1972; Harré and Secord 1972; Bunge 1997;
2004) as from the point of view of its application (Boudon 1973, 1976, 1979a;
Davidovitch and Boudon 1964; Fararo 1969; Schelling 1971; 1978; Sorensen 1976).
This long history should not be forgotten (c.f. also Philosophy of Social
Science [2004, 34, 2 and 3]), despite the fact that the concept of “mechanism” has
been attracting an increasing amount of attention since the 1990s and that a
genuinely sociological approach—the so-called "analytical sociology" (Barbera
2004; Cherkaoui 2005; Hedström 2005; Hedström and Swedberg 1998a and b)—is
currently developing in relation to it.
15
And yet, in order to counter the conceptual cloud currently surrounding the concept
of “mechanism” (Mahoney 2001, 577–582), with the intention of defining it, we
should, on the one hand, ask ourselves the purpose of a “mechanism,” while at the
same time questioning its content.
16
Regarding the former, a mechanism has the epistemic function of clarifying how and
why a relationship (or a structure of relationships) has been generated (Harré 1972,
6, 118). What is at issue is “mode of production of phenomena” (Cherkaoui 1998,
chap. 3) so that by understanding mechanisms in this way, we are able to capture
their distinguishing characteristic, that of “generativity” (Fararo 1989, 39–43). This
idea inspires us to look for the emergence, production, and cause of what is
observed. This is, moreover, the reason why mechanisms and “generators” are very
often descriptively linked. Whether they are perceived as the world’s real entities
(Harré 1972; Bunge 1997, 2004; Fararo 1989) or, on the contrary, as analytical
structures (Stinchcombe 1991; Hedström and Swedberg 1998b), the shared premise
is as follows: what is observed at level k must be explained as the effect of one or
more instances—mechanisms —that are located more deeply at level k – n. If Y and
X are any two phenomena, a mechanism does not act on the values or behavior of X
and Y taken individually but on the process of the emergence of the relationship as
such (form and nature). A “mechanism” should not therefore be confused with a
"confounder" (Mahoney 2001, 508; Pawson 1989, 130–131).[3] As I have noted above, we

are now in a better position...[3]

17
If we might venture to adapt a definition adopted from biology (Machamer, Darden,
and Craver 2000), a “mechanism” could be defined, in view of its content, as a
coherent body of entities (structures and agents), systematic relationships between
these entities (a system of influence, interaction, and interdependence), and activities
(choice, actions, exchanges, etc.). By consequence, the concept of mechanism may
be defined by distinguishing three general sub-components (Hedström and
Swedberg 1998b, 21–23; c.f. also Tilly 2001).
18
a) “Situational mechanisms” or “macro-micro mechanisms” focus on the manner in
which contextual elements constrain the autonomy of agents. In spite of the
differences that exist between the numerous mechanisms that fall within the scope of
this class, they all refer to the way in which elements that pre-exist a particular
individual affect one or more components of his/her actions. They thus allow the
clarification of how a link between a macro element and a micro element is
created.[4] Adaptive and counter-adaptive preferences are an example...[4]

19
In order to reject any “mechanistic” interpretation of a mechanism, we should point
out here that “situational mechanisms” should be perceived as being based on
numerous “filtration” processes put in place by actors in order to deal with elements
that are imposed on them. Maintaining that a structural element, whatever it may be,
affects the activity of the actor through the effects that it has on the components of
his/her action (beliefs, preferences, and opportunities) is not the same as maintaining
that it determines it. The structure is merely the “parameter” of the “action”; in the
same way as, in an analytical equation of a straight line (Y = aX + b), for
example, a relates only to the slope of the straight line and not to the final value of
Y. If the structural element defines the range of possibilities, the actor is not, for all
that, deprived of the strategic power of initiative, inventiveness, and creativity (Joas
1999). The capacity that actors have for regaining control of structural constraints
(Archer 2004) makes the link between “structure” and “action” (a link which
“situational mechanisms” claim to explain) merely probabilistic and conditional
rather than deterministic and unconditional.
20
b) Next, if it is a matter of understanding how the beliefs, intentions, and
opportunities of an actor come together in order to produce a particular action,
“action-formation mechanisms” or “micro-micro mechanisms” would be brought
into play. We might relate them to the stylized image of the actor that the sociologist
decides to use and, more particularly, to the idea of rationality with which they wish
to endow the individual.[5] We should note, however, that it would be appropriate...[5]

21
In this respect, above and beyond the variety of the interpretations available
(Goldthorpe 2000, chap. 6), we might first allude to the instrumental and
consequentialist notion of rationality. Here, the generative principle of individual
choice relates to future consequences in terms of personal well-being (interest or
utility) that agents are able to derive from the action being carried out, relative to the
costs involved in completing it.[6] The hegemonic ambitions of certain large economic

programs,...[6] Then, we might call for an “adaptive,” “pragmatic,” and “progressive”

concept of rationality (a concept that derives from the repeated and evolutionary
games theory (Abell 1996), according to which actors will shape their actions, not
according to the future consequences of that action, but in accordance with past
strategies that have demonstrated a capacity to adapt to the environment (Macy
1997). We should also consider the notion of rationality, sometimes referred to as
“sideward-looking” (Barbera 2004, 118), according to which actors will shape their
actions in imitation of those carried out by others that have proved to be effective.
Hence, the actions of others are understood to represent a source of information
(Hedström 1998).
22
We should finally mention the “cognitive” notion of rationality, according to which
actors have the ability to theorize the context in which they are acting and to develop
systems in which their motives are subjectively perceived as justifiable from the
point of view of the material, symbolic, and cognitive resources at their disposal (c.f.
Boudon 2003, for a recent overview). This notion of rationality generally serves two
purposes. On the one hand, since it accepts that the “motives” of actors may be
essentially different, other notions of rationality might be included. On the other
hand, cognitive rationality, as applied to the descriptive, as much as prescriptive, or
normative domains, appears not only as a “means rationality,” but as an “ends
rationality.”[7] Lindenberg (2000) engages in a stimulating discussion... [7]

23
Thus, the construction of a “micro-micro mechanism” raises the problem of a choice
of one concept of rationality among numerous possibilities. Since the fundamental
purpose of a generative model is to represent regularity at the societal level, the
degree of realism behind the notion of rationality to be retained is only part of the
problem. Indeed, the intention behind the “micro-micro mechanism” is not to give a
detailed reconstruction of the behavior of each individual. Therefore, the type of
rationality selected should vary according to the complexity of the macrosocial
regularity under investigation. I believe that this is the meaning of the principles of
“decreasing abstraction” and “sufficient complexity” put forward by Lindenberg
(1992; 1998; 2002).
24
Since it is now a matter of clarifying the modalities involving a combination of
individual actions, we should finally turn to the mechanisms known as
“transformational mechanisms” or “micro-macro mechanisms.” Their importance is
paramount in sociological theory, owing to the fact that any outcome as far as
society is concerned is reached through them (Boudon 1977; 1979b, chap. 4, 5, 6;
1984, 66–71).
25
We will now put forward a distinction between two general types of
“transformational mechanism” namely, “simple aggregation mechanisms” on the
one hand and “complex aggregation mechanisms,” on the other. These two types of
mechanisms refer to two different modalities in which actors' actions are combined
and thus to different ways of moving from the individual to the collective level.
26
In the case of the former, agents are not interconnected and act independently of one
another. In this situation (solipsistic, one might say), there is a direct transition from
the individual level to the level of the “society.” Actions are combined by a simple
juxtaposition, or by their “addition.” The path from one level to the other presents no
particular difficulty, with the “sum” being derived directly from the “parts.” Thus, if
this type of path from “micro” to “macro,” realized through the simple
aggregation of independent individual actions, allows for the passage from “action”
to “structure,” as a general rule, and in the absence of more precise details, the
structure in question will be of a very particular nature. It might be more correct to
refer to an “aggregate level” rather than a “macro” level.[8] “Suicide rates” are a notable

example of this type...[8]

27
It is quite another matter when “complex aggregation mechanisms” are present.
These relate to any situation in which the action of one actor has a bearing on the
beliefs, preferences, and/or opportunities of another agent.
28
This interdependence comes in many forms, which can be likened to a continuum
covering a range from pure and simple imitation to strategic interaction (Abell
2000). Each of these modes of interdependence can take on a “direct” or an
“indirect” form (Boudon 1979b, 130). In the former, the actors are networked. The
modification of beliefs, preferences, and/or opportunities takes place as part of a
personal interaction. These are adjacent interactions supportive of a potential
“complex aggregation mechanism.” This is what is known as a “dyadic interaction
effect” (Barbera 2004, 80–85). In the latter, on the other hand, the interdependence
of agents is not as a consequence of their proximity and adjacency, but is rather the
effect of aggregates stemming from past actions. Among these types of indirect
interdependence, “parametric interdependence” (Abell 1996) and “strategic
interdependence” (Abell 2000; Barbera 2004, 127–132) are particularly
important.[9] In the case of the former, when yet another actor acts,... [9]

29
Whatever the type of interdependence in question, its presence implies that a
knowledge of the characteristics of each person taken individually is insufficient to
determine the result at a “societal” level. A “leap” comes between the initial action
and its systematic result. The latter would be “original” in comparison with the
former, owing to the play of interactions and mutual points of reference that exist
between agents. It is only in this situation that we would speak of “emergence” (on
this concept, c.f. Cherkaoui 1998; Sawyer 2001; Stephan 1999; 2002). The notion of
“macro” should probably be reserved for this specific situation.
30
The distinction between “simple aggregation” and “complex aggregation” is of an
analytical nature, however. We would be entitled to describe the “structural level” as
“macro” or simply as “aggregate” depending on whether we are able to bring
“mechanisms” relating to interdependence structures into action or not. I believe that
emergence is therefore an analytical problem that derives from the type of theory
being constructed by the sociologist rather than constituting a characteristic of social
reality as such. In order to qualify this position, I am tempted to speak of an
“analytical emergentism.”
31
Nonetheless, whether it is a question of a “situational mechanism,” an “action-
formation mechanism,” or a “transformational mechanism,” an essential
characteristic must now be made explicit. Every mechanism and, a fortiori, every
combination of mechanisms (c.f. below) is generally indiscernible. Metaphorically
speaking, mechanisms might be described as “invisible codes” (Cherkaoui 2005, 1).
A mechanism can, therefore, only be conjectured (Bunge 1997, 420) or imagined
(Harré and Secord 1972, 67, 71–73) by the scholar. In order to be able to study it, a
theory must first be constructed, and then be given a stylized and abstract
representation (Hedström and Swedberg 1998b; Hedström 2005, chap. 1), in other
words, a model. As highlighted by Bunge, however, “there is no method, let alone a
logic, for conjecturing mechanisms [...] [it] is an art, not a technique” (2004, 200).
32
This challenge is tentatively taken up by the “generative model.”

1.2 Structure of the “Generative Model”: “Complex

Methodological Individualism”
33
I believe that it is unrealistic to suppose that mechanisms of a single type would be
sufficient to reproduce the different facets of a social phenomenon. This is why it is
more often a matter of surmising a “concatenation” of mechanisms or a “molecular
mechanism” or a “generator,” depending on the terminology that one prefers (see
Gambetta (1998), Elster (1998), or Fararo (1989, 75, 144), respectively).
34
This collection of mechanisms might have a regular basic form which we might
represent by modifying the famous diagram usually attributed to Coleman (1986a,
1322; 1990, 5–21).
- Fig. 1. — Adaptation of the Coleman Boat – Static Form of a “Generative Model”

35
Indeed, among the three general classes of mechanisms that I have just described, at
least one micro-micro type of mechanism should be present. Since only actors are
able to connect, transform, construct, or destroy aspects of social reality (Abell
2004, 293), the idea of “generativity” would be meaningless without a reference to
individual actions (Bunge 1997, 447; Fararo 1989, 146). However, the shaping of
action cannot be understood without referring to a pre-existing context (Esser 1998;
Popper 1967) so that at least one macro-micro type of mechanism is also necessary.
However, since, for sociologists, a reconstruction of the behavior of actors is not an
end in itself (Coleman 1986a, 1321), we should provide ourselves with the means of
passing from the level of action to that of “structure.” At least one “micro-macro
mechanism” is therefore necessary.
36
Thus, the basic form of a “generative model” is based on a specific variety of
methodological individualism, namely one that rejects the identification of the
“micro-foundation” of the analysis with its “micro-reduction.” A “generative model”
depends on the admission of the analytical primacy of the actors, as well as their
motives and actions. In this sense, it is committed to methodological individualism.
This is a form of non-reductionist individualism however, since the analytical
primacy of the actor coexists with the admission of the importance of social
“structures” first and foremost, followed by systems of the direct and indirect
interdependencies that are continually being created among actors.[10] The notion of

“structure” is notorious for its diversity...[10]

37
As far as the first of these is concerned (the analytical primacy of the actor), many
contemporary sociologists are increasingly in agreement with considering the
intentionality and rationality of action as the most appropriate starting point (c.f.
Marini 1992; Déchaux 2002; c.f. also European Sociological
Review 1996; Sociologie et Société 2002). This hypothesis would, indeed, have an
“explanatory privilege” in the sense that no additional question can be asked once it
has been demonstrated that the phenomenon under investigation stems from a
combination of intentional and rational actions (Coleman 1986b, 1). As I have
already pointed out, since only actors are capable of “connecting” and
“transforming” (Abell 2004, 293), there can be no real sources of causality other
than individuals and their actions (Hedström and Swedberg 1998b, 11-13). In this
sense, black boxes are then eliminated from the explanation (Boudon 1998b).
However, it is also a question of a “privilege or logical priority” insofar as a
hypothesis concerning the intentionality and rationality of action provides the
analysis with a point of departure (Coleman and Fararo 1992, chap. 14–15;
Goldthorpe 2000, chap. 6, 134).[11] This idea is, moreover, a familiar one in sociology...[11] This
hypothesis would have an added advantage that could be described as “normative,”
in the sense that the actors themselves appear to be rational, claiming this quality for
their actions (Elster 2001, 12763). We should finally mention the necessity of
referring to rational individual action in order to make progress with the
conceptualization of the problem of the interconnection of the micro- and macro-
levels (Abell 1992; Friedman and Hechter 1998). In order to clarify this point, we
should effectively ask ourselves where and how a particular social structure came
into being. The reference to individual action thus becomes indispensable.[12] This idea

has already also been clearly formulated...[12]

38
As far as the second is concerned (the admission of the importance of social
“structures”), it would seem that the interest in action, revived since the late 1970s,
comes in part from a more pronounced desire to combine action and structure and to
articulate the micro and macro levels of the analysis (Giesen 1987). In my view,
although there is a tendency to equate methodological individualism with its
“atomistic” and “reductionist” forms, the numerous arguments found in literature
suggest the existence of an alternative in which the systematic combination of
“action” and “structure” is advocated, as is illustrated in figure 1 (c.f. also Boudon
1979a, 296).
39
It is found, for example, in some of the German and Dutch sociological writings of
the 1970s, referred to as “structural individualism” (Lindenberg 1977; Wippler
1978; Raub 1982). It is also found in French sociology where it is called by the same
name “individualisme structurel” (Boudon 1983, 3), or is referred to by slightly
differently labels, such as “individualisme institutionnel [institutional
individualism]” (Bourricaud 1977). Jean-Pierre Dupuy (1992) talks about “complex
methodological individualism” to refer to the complex notion of methodological
individualism, which “conflicts as much with simple methodological individualism
as with holism. [...] Complex methodological individualism emphasizes the link that
constantly unifies the individual and collective levels” (Dupuy 1992, 19).
40
Among British social theorists, the approach known as “morphogenetic” (Archer
1995) is overtly dependent on the mutual connection between these two levels of
analysis. However, significantly, this “hybrid” form of methodological
individualism is also present in the philosophy of science.[13] This is also the case in

economics, particularly in...[13] Bhaskar refers to a “transformational model” (Archer 1995,

137–141) and Bunge advocates a combination of holism and individualism that he
describes as “systemism” (1997, 441; 2004). Philip Pettit (1993) suggests the notion
of “holistic individualism.”
41
Thus, “Coleman’s Boat”—seen in figure 1—puts forward a form of methodological
individualism that is less unusual than one might originally have supposed. As has
already been noted (Udehn 2001, 307), the content of “Coleman’s Boat” actually
equates to the formula “M=MmSM’,” through which Boudon (1984, 40) expresses
his notion of methodological individualism.[14] This is, in fact, why Bunge refers to the “Coleman-

Boudon...[14] I would like to suggest that Archer’s “morphogenetic” cycle (1995, 76),
that is to say the sequence of “structural conditioning—social interaction—structural
elaboration,” largely equates to the link “macro-micro-macro” proposed by Coleman
and Boudon. Several authors have, moreover, recognized this basic similarity,
extending it further to include Dupuy’s “complex methodological individualism”
(Caillé 2004, 37).
42
The “generative model” therefore implies that “structure” and “action” should be
considered as separable from an analytical point of view, which necessarily leads to
hypotheses concerning modalities in which they reciprocally refer back to each
other. “Macro-micro mechanisms,” “micro-micro mechanisms,” and “micro-macro
mechanisms” form the supply source (for modeling) of these points of reference. In
this respect, we might say that a “generative model” depends on a form of complex
methodological individualism.
43
I believe that it is an original solution to the problem—recurrent in sociology (Cuin
2000)—of the relationships between “structure” and “action.” For those who have
attempted to resolve it, the other interesting possibility concerns the consideration of
“structure” and “action” as two indissoluble and mutually constituent sides of social
reality. Giddens’ (1984) “theory of structuration” seems to me to represent the
clearest example of this type of solution, along with Bourdieu’s “genetic
structuralism” as Axel van den Berg (1998) has suggested. Some theorists of
"complexity," such as Morin also frame the problem of the relationship between the
individual and society in terms of inseparability and mutual co-production.[15] The

“inseparability” hypothesis appears to be integral...[15] Both micro and “macro-reduction” are

rejected from this particular point of view, in which both operations are deemed
equally useless: “structure” and “action” continually co-produce each other, thus
producing the social. In my view, the idea of the “duality of structure” poses the
following problem: by perceiving “structure” and “action” as indissoluble and
mutually constitutive, we cannot think of them as having reciprocal connections.
Consequently, the problem of the relationship between the individual and the group
remains unresolved: it is in reality blurred. This is why Archer (1994, chap. 4)
describes this solution as “central conflation or elision.” Reduction is operated here
through a combination of different levels of analysis (c.f. also Sawyer 2005, chap.
7).
44
However, according to the definition provided here, a “generative model” avoids
this impasse, prompting the scholar to restore every social phenomenon with its
dynamic character. This is the result of the fact that “structure” and “action” take
place on two temporal scales that are out of step. In terms of an action that unfolds at
given moment t, the structure is always further back in time: it is the result, most
often unintentional, of interdependent actions that have taken place at given
moment t-l (Abell 1996, 261; 2003; Archer 1995; Coleman 1993, 63). The
construction of a “generative model” requires us to envisage all societal regularity as
the consequence of a chain of “structure-action-structure” connections. Its aim is to
unravel the labyrinth of mechanisms underlying these chains.
45
Thus, by adding complexity to figure 1, we can establish the basic form for a
“generative model” with respect to its dynamic side in the following manner (see
illustration on the following page).
46
It is important to note that the different levels of analysis that a “generative model”
attempts to combine, all retain their relative autonomy.
- Fig. 2 – Dynamic Form of a “Generative Model”

47
As far as “structures” are concerned, the possible presence of “complex aggregation
mechanisms” will mean that the latter are the emergent products of individual
actions. Although these actions constitute their ultimate founding principles, the
presence of one (or several) interdependent structures filters actors' actions taken
individually, thus introducing a “leap” between the “micro” and “macro” levels. We
might then speak of an “ascending discontinuity” between “action” and “structure.”
As far as “actions” are concerned, recognizing the unique character of structures that
have come into being does not therefore necessarily mean, however, that we should
deny the autonomy of the actors who act later on. The presence of “situational
mechanisms” ensures that agents theorize “structure” by applying different sorts of
“filter.” This makes the behavior of the actor an “emergent” product in relation to
the “structure,” that is to say, one that is fundamentally original with regard to what
we might expect to observe if the action was based solely upon it. Since we are
positioned along the downward section of the “Coleman boat” we should therefore
speak of a “descending discontinuity” between “structure” and “action.”
48
Two elements seem to me to justify, therefore, the term “complex methodological
individualism,” a term that I am giving to the basic form of every “generative
model.” Firstly, these models attempt to disentangle the interplay of overlapping
elements in a number of mechanisms related to different analytical levels and of
which the effects are dynamically entangled. It could be said that the intention
behind a “generative model” is to represent in a stylized form “the complexity of
mechanisms” underpinned by any macrosocial uniformity that the sociologist wishes
not only to describe, but also to explain.[16] The idea of the “complexity of generative

mechanisms”...[16] Secondly, a “generative model” attaches particular importance to

“complex aggregation mechanisms,” that is to say, mechanisms concerning the
numerous systems of interdependence (direct and indirect) that link the actors
together. In this respect, models of this type relate to one of the distinctive features
of the so-called “complexity” approach (an approach that is definitely
heterogeneous, c.f. Alexrod and Cohen 2000, 46–53), that is to say, the consistent
attention that it devotes to the interdependence of constituent entities of a system, as
well as to the emergent phenomena that result from it (Atlan 1991; Morgan 2005;
Morin 1999, chap. 4; Simon 1996, chap. 7, 1999; Weisbuch 2003). On this point, we
should note, however, that sociology does not lack pioneers. By the end of the
1970s, Boudon had already stated for example, that “societies should be considered
as complex labyrinths of systems of interaction” (1979 b, 113).

2. The Formalization and Analysis of the “Generative

Model”

49
If we agree to base theoretical activity in sociology on the systematic construction of
“generative models,” there is, nevertheless, one important problem to resolve—that
of its “implementation.” Since the model is conceived theoretically, it is effectively
a matter of designing an appropriate form for it (the formalization of the model) in
order to be able to work out its consequences (the analysis of the model).
50
Determining the degree of conformity between the results and the empirical
regularities to be explained is a prerequisite for ascertaining a “presumption of
validity and realism” in the posited mechanisms. Moreover, some authors have
expressed doubts concerning the legitimacy of a process of reasoning that claims to
explain phenomena observed by invisible entities, namely, mechanisms (Mahoney
2004; Sica 2004). In order to counter this criticism, I believe that it is important to
tackle the problem of the “implementation” and study of the “generative model” in a
manner other than the purely verbal.

2.1 “Statistical Models”

51
(Multivariate) statistical methods certainly constitute the most widespread
mathematical application used in sociology. As Fararo (2005a) has noted moreover,
one of the interpretations most frequently given to the concept of the model in our
discipline is precisely that of “statistical model.” Given its omnipresence, it would
be quite normal if we were to turn to statistical techniques in order to “implement” a
“generative model.”
52
This solution would seem to have its not insignificant limitations, however. We
should make clear from the outset that, despite its recurrent use, the very concept of
a “statistical model” is not without ambiguity. In fact, on the one hand, through an
undesirable linguistic shift, this concept blurs the distinction between the formalism
used to express the model (mathematical language) and the tools used to evaluate it,
which belong to statistics (particularly inferential statistics) –itself, in turn, merely a
branch of mathematics (Barbut 1994, 2000). On the other hand, speaking of
“statistical models” is also unfortunate, as the term “model” conceals the theoretical
inadequacy of “statistical models” from the point of view of sociology (Esser 1996).
Indeed, “statistical models” depend most often on hypotheses that take the form of
relationships between variables (linear as opposed to non-linear; additive rather than
multiplicative, etc.), the conditions that should be respected in order to evaluate
relationships (the form taken by the distribution of variables and the distribution of
errors, etc.), and the constraints needed to estimate the parameters (the sum of
parameters equal to zero, the product of parameters equal to one, etc.). However, the
first type of hypothesis is only loosely related to precise sociological hypotheses
(Clogg and Haritou 1997, 88, 93; Goldthorpe 2000, chap. 8, 98; Sorensen 1998, 238,
239, 243–244) while the two others are difficultly justified in sociological terms
(Freedman 1991a, 311). It is likely, therefore, that a “statistical model” will serve a
purely descriptive purpose.[17] This is probably why Grusky and DiCarlo (2001) have...[17]

53
Thus, the ambiguities contained in the very concept of “statistical model” suggest a
first source of tension between it and the “generative model,” namely, that of their
different objectives. Indeed, viewed in epistemological terms, a theoretical model
centered around mechanisms is diametrically opposed to a model centered around
variables, since the latter is quite simply unable to provide an explanation.
54
Sophisticated though they are, the parameters of “statistical models” are only
expressive of the intensity, sign and, possibly, the form of the link between two or
more aspects of reality, which are operationalized under the form of variables. On
the other hand, in these models nothing is made of the sources behind this link
(Boudon 1976; Bunge 1997; Hedström 2005, 31–36, chap. 5; Sorensen 1998). In the
absence of a way of modeling the mechanisms underlying the observed
relationships, the explanation is hollow. In this case, no characteristic of causality
can be attributed to the action of X on Y. Neither can the attribution of the causality
of an observed connection be justified by the temporal (or logical) precedence of X
in relation to Y or by the resistance of their link to the introduction of a third set of
variables, W. A “statistical model”—of which the basic logic has sometimes been
described as “correlation analysis” (Mahoney 2001)—depends on a notion of
causality which we might call “successionist causality” to adopt terms used by Harré
(1972, 116, 121, 136–137). A “generative model” however, is based on what Harré
has described as “generative causality” (c.f. also Goldthorpe 2000, chap. 7, 151,
154–155).[18] We should note that an explanation based on “mechanisms”... [18]

55
My belief, however, is that a second source of tension between “statistical models”
and “generative models” stems, not from epistemology, but in more concrete terms
from the structure of multivariate statistical techniques themselves. It is likely that it
is the intrinsic characteristics of these techniques that make it difficult, even
impossible, to implement a “generative model” within it (Manzo 2006a).
56
a) A first point concerns the unobservable character of the “generative model.”
Some of its constituent parts may certainly rely on empirical data, but the logic
behind the functioning of the model in its entirety does not seem to be empirically
definable. It would, therefore, be pointless to hope to understand its configuration
through variables that rely on empirical factors (Mahoney 2001, 581). To assign
“variables” the capacity of detecting mechanisms would necessarily be an artificial
operation, since it is rhetorical and imaginary. At best, statistical techniques are able
to capture the effects of a mechanism, but they cannot represent its detailed structure
or its functioning.
57
b) A second essential point concerns the fact that the very definition of a “generative
mechanism” implies that the observed relationships are produced by entities and
activities below the level on which the relationship is observed. Whilst a “generative
model” may be perceived as a “system” for the generation of data—in the sense that
it allows for the temporary abstraction of empirical data and the artificial production
of its own data—, this change of level is completely absent in a “statistical model.”
All the constructions within it are based on the observed data. No operation relating
to the “production of exogenous information” exists (Stinchcombe 1991, 371). No
matter how sophisticated it is, a “statistical model” only reproduces the initial data in
another form. It does not allow for the stylization of the generation of these
structures, since it does not make use of any element that is external to the empirical
data, as is the case with a “generative model.”
58
c) A third difficulty arises from the capacity of a “statistical model” to deal with the
systems of multiple interdependencies that connect the actors. “Complex
aggregation mechanisms” constitute one of the main components of a “generative
model.” One of the objectives of the latter is the analytical decomposition of the
different systems of direct and indirect influences that connect actors, and enable the
passage from the individual to the societal level. Whatever the statistical technique,
a “variable” derives only from the juxtaposition of information gathered at an
individual level. Actors are regarded as separate from one another, variables only
combining information concerning “solipsistic” actors. From the point of view of
the transition from “micro” to “macro,” multivariate statistics can therefore only
deal with simple forms of aggregation (those that operate through the immediate
juxtaposition of individual actions), remaining silent in relation to complex forms of
aggregation centered on the direct or indirect interdependence of actors (Esser 1996,
162). In other words, a “statistical model” is structurally unsuitable for the
representation and direct modeling of the interaction between actors.[19] The difficulty

related to multivariate statistics is...[19]

59
d) A fourth point deserves to be raised. A “generative model” counts among its
objectives the creation (and transformation) of the social “structures” of emergent
macrosocial phenomena. Given our definition of the “macro” level, it would only be
legitimate to describe societal regularity as “macro” on the condition that we can
make of it the product of actors who are in a position of considerable
interdependence. And yet, if, as I have just pointed out, a “statistical model” is
unable to take into account the structures of interdependence in which the actors are
immersed, it would also be impossible for it to take on board the transition from
“micro” to “macro” (Cherkaoui 2005, chap. 6). Since multivariate statistics can only
deal with forms of “simple aggregation,” meaning that they are based on the
immediate juxtaposition of individual characteristics, they cannot lead to the
“macro” since it is based, by definition, on the presence of structures of
interdependence.
60
This is a sizeable consequence. If we are unable to “create” the elements related to
“structure,” we are a fortiori unable to demonstrate the feedback effects that the
latter can have on successive actions. In other words, a study of the dynamic
concatenations of different levels of analysis is very hard to place within the
framework of standard statistical techniques. The complex form of methodological
individualism contained within every “generative model” therefore remains
inaccessible to “statistical models.”
61
In this respect, advanced techniques, such as time data analysis techniques
(Blossfeld 1998), the numerous variations of multi-level analysis (Courgeau 2003,
chap. 2), or indeed the methods of “optimal matching” (Abbott 1995; Abbott and
Tsay 2000) certainly merit a close examination. These methods have as their
objective the more efficient study of the connection between the micro and macro
levels of analysis through a consideration of “time” and the introduction of different
levels of aggregation, albeit by different routes. Moreover, they bring the dynamic
nature of social phenomena back into the foreground, as well as the coherence of
sequences of events that characterize the existence of both society and the
individual. Even so, it might once again be a question of partial solutions. As these
methods remain based on data that are structurally similar to those used by more
classic techniques, they are unable, directly or dynamically (in the strict sense of the
word) to represent the action of the numerous mechanisms underlying the chain of
these events and that are responsible for their emergence. This is probably why
Sorensen (1998, 265) considers that these advanced techniques have “become just
another way of doing regression analysis with rich opportunities for controlling for
everything.”[20] Beyond the radical nature of Sorensen’s assertion,... [20]

62
Thus, the four problems that I have just outlined seem, at least for the time being, to
present just as many obstacles to the formalization and analysis of a “generative
model” by means of “statistical models.” Without necessarily rejecting their use (I
will return to them in my conclusion), a real change of methodological perspective
seems necessary.

2.2 “Computational" and “Simulation" Models

63
I would like to suggest that certain simulation methods should henceforth provide
the sociologist with an adequate infrastructure for the formalization and, above all,
for the analysis of a “generative model” (c.f. also Manzo 2003, 2005).
64
This involves referring to two more frequent interpretations of the notion of
model—those of “computational" and “simulation" model—whose meaning, as with
the concept of “statistical model,” requires prior clarification.
65
The expression of a “computational model” effectively operates as an amalgamation
between the theoretical model itself and a specific way adopted to formalize it,
namely, computational languages. The expression of a “simulation model,” on the
other hand, operates as a direct leap from the theoretical model itself to the tool used
to analyze it, namely, the simulation technique. However, if the concept of the
“computational model” implies that of the “simulation model” (since a theoretical
model expressed in computational language will be studied by simulation first and
foremost), the reverse is not always true. A model analyzed by simulation might
effectively be formulated in mathematical language.
66
Having clarified these linguistic shifts (which are potentially ambivalent), I should
specify that my argument, according to which a “generative model” can be analyzed
in the most complete manner using simulation methods, echoes previous
suggestions. The idea that an advantageous link exists between “mechanisms” and
“simulation” has been taking shape effectively since the 1960s, both in sociology
(Boudon 1965, 1967, 1973, 1979a; Boudon and Gremy 1977; Coleman 1962, 1965;
Davidovitch and Boudon 1964) and, more generally, in the social sciences
(Guetzkow 1962; c.f. also Archives Européennes de Sociologie 1965; The American
Behavioral Scientist 1965). It is, in fact, during this period, moreover, that Schelling
(1971) provides us with a brilliant illustration of this viewpoint by creating and
manually solving a sort of “cellular automaton” ahead of its time.
67
In consequence, the most recent lines of argument developed by Collins (1988) and
Goldthorpe (2000, chap. 7, 158) in favor of simulation, the increasingly explicit
links created between “artificial intelligence” and sociology (Carley, 1996), as well
as the program of genuine “computational sociology” (Hummon and Fararo 1995),
should be perceived as the most accomplished and palpable recent manifestations of
ideas that have, however, never been entirely foreign to our discipline.
68
The recognition of this past link does not necessarily mean that the route taken
during the period from the 1960s to the present should be underestimated. It is, in
fact, undeniable that, since the start of the 1980s, we have been witnessing a
diffusion and unprecedented development of thought relating to this perspective and
its applications (Bruderer and Maiers 1997; Hummon 1990, 65; Troitzsch 1997, 45).
The fact that a number of authors refer to the “simulation era” (Hartmann 1996, 77,
79, 84, 98) or a “new way of doing social science” (Gilbert 1999, 1486) is
suggestive of the fact that a veritable “silent revolution” has been under way.
Simulation methods currently seem to have come out of the marginal position they
occupied when they were originally suggested in the 1960s (Halpin 1999).[21] Special

issues that important journals have devoted...[21]

69
In this respect, technical developments undoubtedly represent the most far-reaching
advance. Macy (2001) distinguishes three successive waves leading to the formation
of a range of methods so widespread, varied, and disparate that a detailed
explanation would fill an entire manual (such as Gilbert and Troitzsch 1999).
70
Over and above the characteristics of different techniques,[22] It should be noted in passing

that this profusion of...[22] “simulation” can be generally defined as the execution of a
program that translates the theoretical system in which the object under analysis (the
model) is represented in the form of a set of algorithms written in specialized
computerized language. Using these means, the behavior of this type of system can
be studied and observed under different conditions as it evolves dynamically (Macy
2001, 14439; Moretti 2002; Troitzsch 1997, 46; Hanneman and Patrick 1997, 2–3;
Hartmann 1996, 83). Simulation therefore presupposes a prior modeling without
which it could not exist. We always simulate the behavior of an object—the
model—, which needs to be designed in advance. This is why advocates of the
“simulationist approach” in the social sciences often insist on the positive outcome
of simulation relative to theory—sociological theory in particular (Collins 1988,
647–648; Hanneman 1995; Hanneman and Patrick 1997; Hanneman, Collins, and
Mordt 1995, 3; Hegselmann 1996, 222–230; Jacobsen and Bronsen 1997, 98–99).
The theoretical ambition is, moreover, one of the principal objectives of
“computational sociology”, which is particularly well expressed in Carley’s writings
(1994, 1999, 2000).
71
We can immediately see the gulf separating the model being treated by simulation
from the “statistical model.” Instead of being bound by what is measurable and
observable, in a “computational model,” the focus is primarily on theorizing the
object of study. In this respect, these models apparently have a significant affinity
with “generative models.” Before being examined in concrete terms, the “instances”
of which the latter are composed must be theoretically modeled. Thus, if “statistical
models” seem structurally unfit to accommodate a “generative model,” it is quite a
different matter as far as simulation methods are concerned. The latter have been
almost intrinsically created in order to implement them.
72
There are two main points in support of this idea. The first relates to the phase of
“model translation” (Whicker and Sigelman 1991, 37), namely, the operation in
which a computer program incorporating the theoretical model under investigation is
written. Writing a set of algorithms that define how the variables are linked to each
other is the same thing as positing a set of generative mechanisms. Unlike standard
statistical techniques, algorithmic language is written explicitly in order
to formalize the generative hypotheses of the data. The subsequent execution of the
program—therein lies our second point—makes a veritable “animation” of the
possible posited mechanisms. When the model is run, the computer is asked to scroll
through all the instructions (algorithmic language) in turn, with the aim of observing
the results of this dynamic. Using this procedure, we are therefore creating a
virtual process resulting from the posited generative mechanisms as a whole.[23] In

order to visualize this extremely important point,...[23] Thus, as a number of authors have
emphasized, “simulation” essentially equates to generating an information structure
oneself from a set of theoretically significant rules which, in the eyes of the modeler,
lie behind the phenomenon under analysis (Halpin 1999, 1500; Hanneman, Collins
and Mordt 1995, 5). This precisely translates the idea at the essence of a “generative
model,” namely, that of “generativity.”
73
The close link that exists between “mechanisms” and “simulation” is certainly quite
general (Gilbert 1996a, 449; Gilbert 1999, 1485; Gilbert and Troitzsch 1999,
17).[24] It seems to me that this is proved by the recurrent...[24] In my view, however, a particular
type of technique is even better suited to the implementation of a “generative
model.”
74
This concerns the class of methods usually called “agent-based” simulation, the
essence of which consists, on the one hand, of “networks of cellular automata”
(derived from biology and physics, c.f. Hegselmann 1996; Weisbuch 1992) and, on
the other hand, multiagent systems (derived from computer science, particularly the
branch referred to as “distributed artificial intelligence,” c.f. Davidsson 2002). A
considerable body of literature concerning this type of technique has rapidly built up
over the last few years (c.f. among others, Doran 1998; Moss 1998; Sichman, Conte
and Gilbert; Terna 1998). This undoubtedly represents the most recent “wave” in the
history of simulation methods (Macy 2001).
75
Increasing attention is being paid to “multiagent systems” in particular as a tool for
the modeling, formalization, and analysis of the dynamics underlying social
phenomena (Axtell 2006; Gilbert 2006; Sistemi Intelligenti 2005). There is an
increasing amount of interest being shown to them in geography (Sanders 2006),
political science (Axelrod 1997; Cederman 2001; Johnson 1999), and economics
(Bourgine and Nadal 2004; Phan 2004; Phan and Pajot 2005). A fact that is of more
interest to us here is that a similar tendency is in evidence in sociology. The
potential of “multiagent systems” with respect to sociological analysis is beginning
to be recognized (Gilbert 1996b; Hedström 2005, chap. 6; Macy and Willer 2002;
Moretti 2004, chap. 4; Sawyer 2003, 2004a, 2004b, 2005; Squazzoni and Boero
2005).
76
This fast diffusion seems to me to be largely due to the outstanding characteristics of
the very infrastructure of this technique. A “multiagent system” effectively allows
for the individual modeling of entities (the agents), their introduction into network
structures, the study of their dynamic evolution, and thus the establishment of
connections (possibly recursive) between the behavior of these entities, their
interactions, and the system-level regularities that arise from these interactions.
77
On the “ascending” side (that which goes from “micro” to “macro”), this method
allows for the treatment of the essential theoretical problem of the systems of
interdependence that connect individual actions. Above all, one of the chief benefits
of the technique lies in the ability to construct a veritable topology of connections
between agents. Sociology, therefore, has at its disposal a concrete medium for the
formalization and study of the effects of interactions between actors. “Complex
aggregation mechanisms” can thus be represented. The “descending” side (that
which goes from “macro” to “micro”), namely, the relationships between “structure”
and “action” can also be modeled efficiently. Since a multiagent system enables us
to place the agents within multiple network structures and to “store” the partial
results of these interactions, progress can also be made in the understanding of a
second vital theoretical problem, that of the means by which the behavior of an
agent is constrained, both by the presence of another agents and by aggregates that
are constantly being created by this “generalized interdependence.” “Situational
mechanisms” are thus also represented within a multiagent system. In addition, since
there is a possibility of representing even the cognitive components of agents in a
stylized manner (as in “cognitive agent” modeling, c.f. Castelfranchi 1998), “action-
formation mechanisms” might also have a place within a multiagent system.
78
My impression is, therefore, that “computational models”, agent-based models in
particular, probably represent the best framework through which to formalize and
analyze “generative models” from the point of view of both their content
(mechanisms) and their form (complex methodological individualism). The
simulation of this type of computational model allows for the numerous “macro-
micro-macro” loops on which all generative models are based (c.f. §1, fig. 2).
Sociologists therefore have access to a method that allows for the conception and
study of theoretical models which, while falling far short of the complexity of
reality, nonetheless respect its basic configuration.[25] In this respect, the following passage

appears to me...[25]

2.3 “Mathematical Models”

79
In order to complete the discussion of modalities for the implementation of a
“generative model,” we should ask whether mathematical language might not also
play an important role in the realization of this objective.
80
It is important to point out first of all that, as with the expression of “computational
model,” that of “mathematical model” involves an implicit shift from the theoretical
model itself to the language through which it is expressed (mathematical language).
Moreover, in many fields of knowledge, the very concept of model is almost
automatically identified with that of “mathematical model.” We often read that for
mathematicians “formalization” is “mathematization” (Barbut 1994).
81
“Mathematical models” have a definite advantage over “statistical models.” The
former cannot exist without the prior theoretical modeling of the phenomenon under
investigation. The stylized representation of a given reality is always what is
mathematized rather than reality as such (Barbut 1994, 8–10; 200, 206–207; Bunge
1973b, 131). This is why a number of authors have maintained that statistical
techniques should be used primarily in order to work out the parameters of a
“mathematical model” intended to represent precise ideas concerning the generative
mechanisms of social phenomena. This is an old tradition inherited from Coleman
(1964) and Sorensen (1976, 1998), the reverberations of which continue to be felt
today (Backman and Edling 1999).
82
The relationship between mathematics and sociology are complex and historically
varied (Barbut 2000; Edling 2002; Martin 2002).
83
“Mathematical sociology” as a specialized form of sociology is an undeniable
historical reality (Scott 1997; The Journal of Mathematical
Sociology 1984; Sociological Forum 1997; Sociological Theory 2000). It is built
precisely on the necessity of “mathematical models” to theorize before being able to
formalize. In spite of the variant that I have just mentioned (directed towards the
empirical evaluation of a mathematical model), mathematical sociology is
essentially a type of “theoretical sociology” (Collins 1988, appendix; Edling 2002,
202; Fararo 1997, 91; Hayes 1984, 325). Mathematical language is chosen here
because of its precision, power, and parsimony in comparison with natural language.
Mathematical language thus ensures the clarification of theory, and the systematic
and logical study of all its consequences, thus enriching the theory's content and
making its structure more articulated. Thus, a sociology that is centered on
mathematical modeling has ambitions and objectives other than a sociology based
on “statistical models” that involve description and empirical quantification (Fararo
2005a, b).[26] This “dualism” is moreover identified with a certain... [26]

84
However, in spite of the fact that “mathematical models” are better equipped to
represent ideas concerning the mechanisms that generate social phenomena, we
might ask whether they necessarily constitute the most effective solution when used
to formalize and analyze really complex “generative models.” In my view, the
answer is to be found in recent developments within mathematical sociology itself.
85
For several years now, there has been a growing recognition that it is in a state of
crisis (Fararo 1997, 89–95; 2005b, 441). Its consolidation, and even survival, seems
less certain today than it did in the past. The section of the American Sociological
Association devoted to “mathematical sociology” only has 185 members (Edling
2002, 2) and, in addition, the members come from an assortment of backgrounds,
not a single one being a qualified “mathematical sociologist” in the strict sense of
the word (Edling 2002, 211 n.). It would seem that mathematical sociology has
relinquished its ambition as a specific subfield of sociological analysis (Scott 1997).
However, what seems to me to be particularly interesting is that, in order to remedy
this impasse, a number of authors are starting to combine “mathematical sociology”
with simulation methods (Fararo and Butts 1999). It is, moreover, precisely as part
of mathematical sociology that the program of “computational sociology” came into
being (Hummon and Fararo 1995). These authors justify the idea of turning to
“computational models” examined using simulation methods on the basis of the
following argument: when the process to be modeled is too complex, mathematical
language no longer allows a model to be drawn up and, when this is still possible, it
may well be that it cannot provide the tools to solve the model analytically (Fararo
and Butts 1999, 35; c.f. also Collins 1998, appendix, fig. A.1).
86
Similar conclusions have been reached by the branch of heterodox economics that is
dependent on “multiagent systems.” Since they come from a very mathematically-
orientated discipline, these economists have asked themselves whether “multiagent
systems” should be considered as a substitute (or as a complement) to the analytical
treatment of classic mathematical models (c.f. among others, Axtell 2000; Epstein
2006, chap. 1, 2; Phan 2006).
87
The answer that has been put forward is that agent-based computational models only
constitute a viable alternative to the mathematical treatment of a model in
particularly complex situations in which mathematical formulation has proved to be
incapable of solving the problem. This is particularly the case in situations in which
it is a matter of representing numerous inextricably connected interactions of
heterogeneous entities in terms of behaviors and preferences. However, as Epstein
(2006, chap. 2) notes, even in these complex cases, “the issue is not whether
equivalent equations exist, but which representation (equations or programs) is most
illuminating.”
88
In this sense, it would be an advantage in terms of the “readability” of a model
(particularly of some of its constituent parts—the interaction between agents, for
example), which might lead to a preference for computational over mathematical
formulation.
89
Thus, in view of the current state of research, we should not rule out a priori the
possibility of the mathematical expression and, above all, the analytical treatment of
a “generative model.” When possible, it appears to me that it would be useful to go
through a phase of mathematical formalization owing to the precision, parsimony
and elegance of its language. Next we would move on to computational language in
order to treat particularly complex “generative models” containing numerous
inextricably-woven systems of interdependence between agents. In this case,
“multiagent” simulation proves to be of paramount importance for the treatment of
these models and to restore their underlying dynamic dimension. The computational
formalization and treatment of a “generative model” by simulation should, thus,
probably not be considered as a substitute for its mathematical formalization. Far
from representing two mutually exclusive stages, these two formalization operations
are rather more representative of two complementary and successive phases of the
same research procedure, enabling the alignment of a model with the empirical data
to be explained