JOSE JESUS DISINI et.al v. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE et.

al
G.R. No. 203335 | February 18, 2014
Abad, J.

Doctrines:
1. Determination of an executive officer of probable cause cannot substitute to judicial search
warrant.
2. General warrants are prohibited by the constitution.

FACTS
The petitioners in this case assails the validity of the Sections 12, 14, 15 and 19, among
many others of the Cybercrime Law for allegedly violating the right of the people against
warrantless searches and seizures.

ISSUES AND HOLDING

1. W/N assailed provisions are violative of the right against warrantless searches and
seizures?

a. SECTION 12- Real Time Collection of Data – YES.

Section 12 of the law pertains to the Real Time Collection of Traffic Data which
empowers law-enforcement agencies to collect and record real-time data. It is also provided
in the same section that court warrant is needed to collect/seize data. However, it is
noticeable that Section 12 does not even bother to relate the collection of data to the
probable commission of a particular crime. The only standard mentioned therein is “with
due cause” without even mentioning the purpose for which the data collection will be used.
Absent any ascertainable standard, the phrase “with due cause” justifies a general
gathering of data and is akin to the use of a general warrant which is prohibited by the
Constitution.
The contention that Section 12 may be justified for being akin to a moving vehicle
is untenable. Warrantless search in moving vehicle is associated with the determination of
the police officer of probable cause that a crime has been committed, that there is no
opportunity for getting a warrant, and that unless the search is immediately carried out, the
thing to be searched stands to be removed. These preconditions are not provided in Section
12.

b. SECTION 14- Disclosure of Computer Data- NO

On the other hand, Section 14 pertains to the power of law enforcement agencies to
require any person or service provider to disclose or submit subscriber’s information upon
securing a court warrant. It is being faulted for being tantamount to issuance of subpoena,
which is a judicial function.
However, what is envisioned in Section 14 is merely the enforcement of a duly
issued court warrant. The prescribed procedure would not constitute an unlawful search or
seizure for disclosure will only be made after judicial intervention.

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 c. SECTION 15- Search, seizure and examination of computer data- NO.
Meanwhile, Section 15 gives several powers to law enforcements agencies upon
issuance of a search and seizure warrant including that of to secure computer system and
make or retain a copy of those data, among others. It also provides that law enforcement
agencies may request for an extension of rime to complete the examination and to make a
return thereon but in no case longer than 30 days from date of approval of court. Petitioner
assails this for allegedly supplanting established search and seizure procedures.
Petitioners are mistaken. Section 15 merely enumerated the duties of law
enforcement agencies after securing a valid warrant not it supersedes existing search and
seizures rules but merely supplements them.

d. SECTION 19- Restricting or Blocking Access to Computer Data-YES.

Section 19 gives DOJ the power to restrict or block access to computer data found
to be prima facie violation of the provisions of this law. Petitioners assails this provision
on the ground that it stifles freedom of expression and violative of rights against unlawful
searches and seizures.
Section 2, Article III of the Constitution provides that people have the right to be
secured against unreasonable searches and seizures and that no search warrant shall issue
except upon finding of a probable cause to be personally determined by the judge.
However, by virtue of this section, the government, in effect, seized and places the
computer data under its control and disposition without securing a warrant from the court.
The determination of the executive officer cannot substitute for judicial search warrant.
Moreover, Section 19 also disregards established guidelines to determine validity
on restrictions on speech. As a general rule, there are three tests to determine the validity
of restraints on speech: dangerous tendency, balancing of interest and clear and present
danger rule. However, this section only requires a prima facie showing of violation. It does
not t does not take into consideration any of the three tests mentioned above.

WHEREFORE, the Court DECLARES:

1. VOID for being UNCONSTITUTIONAL:

b. Section 12 that authorizes the collection or recording of traffic data in real-time; and
c. Section 19 of the same Act that authorizes the Department of Justice to restrict or block
access to suspected Computer Data.

2. VALID AND CONSTITUTIONAL:

j. Section 14 that authorizes the disclosure of computer data under a court-issued warrant;
k. Section 15 that authorizes the search, seizure, and examination of computer data under
a court-issued warrant.

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