Fredrik Mansfield TA: Emily Willard Section: AB

1) The “scorched earth” campaigns in El Salvador were, as Rufina Amaya Mírquez accounts to Mark
Danner, extreme methods of suppressing guerilla movements by “kill[ing] everything down to the
ground,” including women and children (Danner). Human rights groups such as the International Red
Cross were called upon to validate the atrocities in El Mozote as genocide and massacre. Despite
American and Salvadoran government attempts to invalidate these claims, “scorched earth” tactics
remain criticized by many human rights activists as genocidal massacres (Danner).

The “scorched earth” campaigns in El Salvador hold striking resemblance to drone strikes in Pakistan.
First, both military strategies target more than known militant enemies. While this is explicit in the
concept of “scorched earth” strategy, drone strikes are touted by the US government as “surgically
precise” and has “minimal downsides or collateral impacts” (“Living”). Despite this projected notion that
drones successfully target only known militants, former drone operators have confessed that their
operations involved a methodology of “cutting the grass before it grows out of control,” which
sometimes meant targeting children who were referred to as “fun-sized terrorists” (Pilkington).
Furthermore, “the [American] government presumes that all military-age males killed in drone strikes
are combatants” (“Living”). In the US’s drone strike operations, innocent civilians are not only accidental
casualties, but are often targeted in order to eliminate the risk of them eventually becoming a terrorist.
“Scorched earth” and American drone strike campaigns operate under the same tactics (while neither
would admit to it) – the best way to eliminate a militant threat is to have a wider aim and target
anything and anyone that could eventually be a threat or benefit the cause of the threat.

Notably, the civilian response is similar in both El Salvador and Pakistan. The guerrilla groups used the
violence of the Salvadoran government and the general distrust toward the government to recruit new
members. As Tito mentioned in the class interview, he joined the guerrilla movement because he felt he
was going to be “killed anyway.” Overwhelming evidence suggests the same is happening in Pakistan.
The Stanford report “Living Under Drones” points toward evidence that “US strikes have facilitated
recruitment to violent non-state armed groups, and motivated further violent attacks.” Brave New
Films’ “Unmanned: America’s Drone Wars,” shares many stories of Pakistani civilians who attest to this
reality, expressing that the more Pakistani deaths by drones, the more hatred and militant uprising there
will be against the US. While the US attempting to suppress terrorist uprising, in reality it is providing the
motivational fuel.

One of the biggest differences, however, between US drone strikes and “scorched earth” campaigning is
the element of direct violence. “Scorched earth” campaigns are carried out by soldiers’ direct actions.
Danner describes a scene of a soldier unwilling to kill kids for the operation, his fellow soldier insisting
that it’s necessary. Danner later shares the details of the soldier’s actions, including “slashing some
[children] with machetes, crushing the skulls of others with the butts of their rifles.” This type of direct
violence is vastly different from the indirect killing via drone strike. Michael Haas, former drone
operator, describes the targets of drone strikes as “just black blobs on a screen” (Pilkington).

As a result, another difference between the campaigns becomes evident. Salvadoran soldiers are fully
aware of their actions and of the killings they commit, as seen above. In order to be a soldier and
complete your task, a certain commitment to violence must take place. For American drone operators,
however, the disconnect from the violence means that average civilians can complete deadly tasks. In
training new recruits, Haas notes that “many of the younger intake were gung-ho about the power they
wielded at their fingertips,” revealing the ability for the Air Force to recruit naïve youth to commit
atrocious acts (Pilkington).

2) The psychological effects of the drone violence and surveillance compared in numerous ways to
living under authoritarian rule. Primarily, fear was a widespread psychological result. Disappearances
have been widely used by authoritarian governments to silence antagonistic voices, and “families…
[with] few exceptions were immobilized by their own fear of disappearing” (Sluzki). The fear of
disappearance, and overall fear of the government, has a strong detrimental effect on the psychological
health of people. Such an effect can manifest in different ways – for an anonymous woman in Argentina,
her constant fear made her hyper-alert, perhaps even paranoid, to everyday noises (Sluzki). Similarly,
Pakistani victims of drone violence and other members of the community report great fear. One man
notes in “Unmanned: America’s Drone Wars,” “I’m really afraid now, especially at night. I don’t go out. I
jump at every sound.” The realistic fear that anyone could be a target of a drone strike in Pakistan
creates a culture of fear, where everyone suffers psychologically.

Another similarity is how the oppressive regime (in the case of Pakistan, the American government) in
each case was protested. This may seem like an obvious conclusion, but in Pakistan as well as
authoritarian-ruled nations, fear of expressing dissent was prevalent. The fact that vocal protest is a
common theme in times of oppression – the “Madres de Plaza de Mayo” being an example from
Argentina, the October 27, 2011 meeting of tribal elders, international media, victims, and the general
public to discuss the problem of drone strikes being just one example from Pakistan – reveals the self-
risking leadership present even in times of duress (Sluzki; “Unmanned”).

The psychological effects of drone violence and authoritarian rule differ as well. One major difference is
the method in which the fear was instigated. For authoritarian regimes, repressive policies such as
“censorship, curfews, proscription of meetings, abductions, torture, imprisonment, surveillance, and
disappearances” are implemented to establish control and fear amongst the people (Sluzki). In Pakistan,
however, the United States is not maintaining a governmental presence. The use of drones to be able to
stealthily attack anyone at any time is what causes the deep-seated fear amongst civilians. This
distinction is necessary to make, because the Pakistani civilians have the illusion of freedom – without
troops on the ground manning the streets, the US can turn a blind eye to the effect its drone policies are
having on the civilian population.

Another difference between the psychological effects on Pakistani civilians and civilians under
authoritarian rule is the effect on children. Pakistani Child Psychology Specialist Dr. Muhammad Ismael
shares that “[drone violence] has the worst effects on children when they see the dead or injured”
(“Unmanned”). Being exposed to the graphic realities of drone violence, particularly if it affects a loved
one, can be traumatic for children. In authoritarian regimes, however, many children are shielded from
any knowledge about their parents’ involvement in the insurgency. Juan Gelman from Buenos Aires
writes how his son and his son’s wife were kidnapped and killed by the Argentinian military, but their
child, his grandchild, was adopted into a family sympathetic to the government. While this can be
devastating for the family of the child, the child was not exposed to the violence. While this cannot be
stated as superior or inferior for the child in the long-term, the childhood trauma of witnessing graphic
violence is avoided.
3) I believe there are many lessons that can be discerned and learned from Latin America’s
counterinsurgency wars that would ensure better human rights outcomes, as well as overall global
outcomes, in the US’ contemporary War on Terror. The most significant and fundamental lesson which I
believe needs to be understood is that there are almost undoubtedly always negative results when the
US sees itself as the police of the world. This larger lesson can be broken down into many smaller
lessons which can be discerned from the counterinsurgency wars in Latin America.

The first lesson is that US involvement in foreign countries often leads to political and economic
instability. From the second lecture of this class, “500 Years in 50 Minutes,” Professor Godoy shared how
in the late 1800s/early 1900s, many Latin American countries opened their economies to trade and
foreign investment. As a result, US corporations swooped in (The United Fruit Company being a strong
example) and exploited the Latin American countries and their resources for maximum profit. The
insurgent movements are in direct response to the economic distress caused by US corporations. US
involvement in Latin American politics and supporting authoritarian regimes is largely a result of
economic incentive, trying to protect their current and future economic assets in Latin American
countries.

This can be seen already in the Middle East – Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda were once supported by
the CIA; the US’ continued involvement in the Middle East, in particular the War on Iraq – has created
instability that allowed ISIS to emerge (Chengu; Lemons). Further acts of terror on foreign soil, like the
drone strikes, is already being linked to increased strength and numbers in anti-American terrorist
groups, as described in the Stanford report, “Living Under Drones.” Continuing to be involved in Pakistan
and the many other countries in which America has troops is only going to further instigate terrorism.

Another lesson is that insurgency is the common people’s response to governmental oppression. In the
case of Chile, widespread social and political tumult led to political movements to challenge the status
quo, such as the Nueva Canción movement. However, in the 1964 election, a Christian democrat won
the election largely due to the CIA funding more than half of his campaign. In 1970, though, the people
championed the reformist coalition Unidad Popular led by Salvador Allende, who became elected on
September 4th of that year. The US government responding by suppressing the Chilean economy and
fueling a coup against Allende. While the history of Chile and other Latin American countries is certainly
complex, it is clear that the United States hold at least some of the responsibility for the instability of
Latin American countries, yet when they inevitably revolt, the US attempts to silence the people.

A third lesson is that the United States in poorly informed, or has the freedom to feign ignorance, when
being involved in affairs outside of its borders. The violence in El Mozote is a great example of this.
While guerrilla members and human rights activists were criticizing the genocidal massacre, the United
States denied that a massacre had taken place, and suggested that the Salvadoran government was
making a “significant effort to comply with internationally recognized human rights” (Danner). Likewise,
only three months after the murder of forty two civilians by drone strike, Former Chief Counterterrorism
Advisor John O Brennan told the public “for the past year, there hasn’t been a single collateral death”
(“Unmanned”). Because of the physical distance from the violence, the US can hide or remain ignorant
to the calamity it is causing.
 Works Cited

Chengu, Garikai. "How the US Helped Create Al Qaeda and ISIS." Counterpunch. 2014. Accessed
February 05, 2016. http://www.counterpunch.org/2014/09/19/how-the-us-helped-create-al-qaeda-and-
isis/.

Danner, Mark. "The Truth of El Mozote." MarkDanner.com. Accessed February 05, 2016.
http://www.markdanner.com/articles/the-truth-of-el-mozote.

Gelman, Juan, and Joan Lindgren. Unthinkable Tenderness: Selected Poems. Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1997.

Lemons, Alexander. "Iraq Vet: We Created ISIS-Now We Need a Plan to Defeat It." Time. Accessed
February 05, 2016. http://time.com/4117585/paris-attacks-isis-war/.

“Living Under Drones.” Stanford Law School’s International Human Rights and Conflict Resolution Clinic
and NYU School of Law’s Global Justice Clinic. September 2012. Accessed February 5, 2016.
http://chrgj.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/Living-Under-Drones.pdf

Pilkington, Ed. "Life as a Drone Operator: 'Ever Step on Ants and Never Give It Another Thought?'" The
Guardian. 2015. Accessed February 05, 2016. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/nov/18/life-as-
a-drone-pilot-creech-air-force-base-nevada.

Sluzki, Carlos E. "Deception and Fear in Politically Oppressive Contexts: Its Trickle-Down Effect on
Families." Review of Policy Research 22, no. 5 (2005): 625-35.

"Unmanned: America's Drone Wars.” Brave New Films. Accessed February 05, 2016.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mpzk7OdbjBw.