2. TRINIDAD O. LACHICA, Complainant, vs.
JUDGE
JUDICIARY SUSPENSION AND DISCIPLINARY CASES
1. ANTONIO OCENAR, complainant, vs. JUDGE
ODELON S. MABUTIN, respondent. A.M. No. MTJ-05-
1582 February 28, 2005
The duties of a judge, in case an application for bail is filed, are to:
(1) notify the prosecutor of the hearing on the application for
bail or require him to submit his recommendation;
(2) conduct a hearing on the application for bail whether or
not the prosecution presents evidence to show that the
guilt of the accused is strong, to enable the court to
exercise its discretion;
(3) decide whether the evidence of guilt of the accused is
strong based on the summary of evidence of the
prosecution; and
(4) if the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the
accused upon the approval of the bailbond.
Applying the foregoing, this Court finds that Respondent has more
than sufficiently complied with the requirements of the law before his
approval of the bail application of accused Monsanto, negating a
charge that he was remiss in his duty. Clearly, the prosecutor
assigned to the court to appear in behalf of the People was notified
of the hearing on the application for bail and directed to make a
recommendation. The bail application was heard on different
occasions before the same was granted. The Order allowing the
accused to be released on bail on the ground that the evidence of his
guilt was not strong was based on and contained a summary of the
evidence of the prosecution as required by the law.
On the authority of the respondent to grant bail, the long settled rule
is that a municipal judge conducting a preliminary investigation of a
person in custody and charged with a capital offense has the
authority to grant bail.17Rule 114, Section 17 of The Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, provides:
SEC. 17. Bail, where filed. – (a) Bail in the amount fixed may be filed
with the court where the case is pending, or in the absence or
unavailability of the judge thereof, with any regional trial judge,
metropolitan trial judge, municipal trial judge, or municipal circuit
trial judge in the province, city, or municipality. If the accused is
arrested in a province, city, or municipality other than where the
case is pending, bail may also be filed with any Regional Trial Court
of said place, or if no judge thereof is available, with any
metropolitan trial judge, municipal trial judge, or municipal circuit
trial judge therein.
In sum, the acts of respondent judge were all in accordance with law
and settled jurisprudence.l^vvphi1.net
In administrative proceedings, the complainant has the burden of
proving the allegations in his complaint with SUBSTANTIAL
EVIDENCE,18 i.e., that amount of relevant evidence which a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a
conclusion.19 In the absence of evidence to the contrary, a judge
enjoys the PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY in the performance
of his functions.20
While it is our duty to investigate and determine the truth behind
every matter in complaints against judges and other court personnel,
it is also our duty to see to it that they are protected and exonerated
from baseless administrative charges. The Court will not shirk from
its responsibility of imposing discipline upon its magistrates, but
neither will it hesitate to shield them from unfounded suits that serve
to disrupt rather than promote the orderly administration of justice.21
WHEREFORE, the Complaint is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
ROSABELLA M. TORMIS, Municipal Trial Court in
Cities, Branch 4, Cebu City, Respondent. A.M. No.
MTJ-05-1609 February 28, 2006
It must be stressed that the ESSENCE OF DUE PROCESS in
administrative proceedings is the opportunity to explain one’s
side or seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained
of.17 Owing to the foregoing confluence of events aggravated by the
delay in our postal system, the Court is inclined to grant the request
of respondent judge.
In an administrative case, if the respondent judge must be
disciplined for grave misconduct or any grave offense, the evidence
against the miscreant magistrate should be competent and should be
derived from direct knowledge.18The Judiciary to which the
respondent belongs demands no less. Before any of its members
could be faulted, it should only be after due investigation and after
presentation of the required quantum of evidence especially because
the charge is punitive by nature.19
Any administrative complaint leveled against a judge must be
examined with a discriminating eye for its consequential effects are
by nature penal in character, such that the respondent judge
stands to face the sanction of dismissal, disbarment, or suspension.
As champion – at other times tormentor – of trial and appellate
judges, this Court must be unrelenting in weeding the judiciary of
unscrupulous magistrates, but it must also be quick in dismissing
administrative complaints which serve no other purpose than to
harass them.20
It has been said "[t]he wheels of justice would run smoothly not only
if the judiciary is purged of the debilitating presence of recreant
judges, but also importantly, if the members who perform their
functions conscientiously are not hampered by groundless and
vexatious charges. In its attempt to cleanse the Aegean stables, so
to speak, this Court must tread on with utmost circumspection and
prudence to make sure that only the guilty is denounced and the
innocent absolved."21 It must be stressed in this regard that in cases
where the charges involved are misconduct in office, willful neglect,
corruption or incompetency, the general rules as to admissibility of
evidence in criminal trials apply and the culpability of the
respondent should be established beyond reasonable
doubt.22
Thus, as in criminal cases where the dictates of due process is
observed with utmost stringence, the respondent judge in this
administrative complaint should likewise be given full opportunity
upon reasonable notice23 to defend herself and to adduce evidence in
support thereof for the Court will not allow itself to be an instrument
that would destroy the reputation of any member of the bench by
pronouncing guilt on the basis of incomplete evidence or mere
speculation.24
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the motion of respondent
Judge Rosabella M. Tormis, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 4,
Cebu City for a reinvestigation of the above-captioned case is
GRANTED. The records of the case are ordered REMANDED to the
Office of the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City
for further proceedings.
3. A.M. No. RTJ-13-2361 [Formerly OCA IPI No. 13-
4144-RTJ], February 02, 2016 OFFICE OF THE
COURT ADMINISTRATOR, Complainant,
v. PRESIDING JUDGE JOSEPH CEDRICK O. RUIZ,
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 61, MAKATI
CITY, Respondent.
I. The Court's disciplinary powers over justices and judges
Section 6, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution grants the Supreme
Court administrative supervision over all courts and their
personnel. This grant empowers the Supreme Court to oversee the
JUDICIARY SUSPENSION AND DISCIPLINARY CASES |1
judges' and court personnel's administrative compliance with all laws, 11. Alcoholism and/or vicious habits, (emphasis supplied)
rules, and regulations,9 and to take administrative actions against
them if they violate these legal norms.10
The respondent's convictions by the Sandiganbayan for violation of
Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 and for malversation of public funds
In the exercise of this power, the Court has promulgated rules of
confirm that the administrative charges for which he may be found
procedure in the discipline of judges. Section 1, Rule 140 of the
liable are serious charges under Section 8(2) of Rule 140 of the Rules
Rules of Court, as amended by A. M. No. 01-8-10-SC, provides:
of Court, as amended. Malversation is likewise considered as a
serious charge since it is a crime involving moral turpitude.
SECTION 1. How instituted. Proceedings for the discipline of
Judges of regular and special courts and Justices of the Court of
While the term MORAL TURPITUDE does not have one specific
Appeals and the Sandiganbayan may be instituted motu proprio by
definition that lends itself to easy and ready application,12 it
the Supreme Court or upon a verified complaint, supported by
has been defined as an act of baseness, vileness, or the
affidavits of persons who have personal knowledge of the facts
depravity in the performance of private and social duties
alleged therein or by documents which may substantiate said
that man owes to his fellow man or to society in general.13
allegations, or upon an anonymous complaint, supported by
public records of indubitable integrity. The complaint shall be in
Notably, jurisprudence has categorized the FOLLOWING ACTS AS
writing and shall state clearly and concisely the acts and omissions
CRIMES INVOLVING MORAL TURPITUDE: abduction with
constituting violations of standards of conduct prescribed for Judges
consent, bigamy, concubinage, smuggling, rape, attempted bribery,
by law, the Rules of Court, or the Code of Judicial
profiteering, robbery, murder, estafa, theft, illicit sexual relations
Conduct.cralawlawlibrary
with a fellow worker, violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, intriguing
against honor, violation of the Anti-Fencing Law, violation of the
Based on this rule, disciplinary proceedings against sitting
Dangerous Drugs Act, perjury, forgery, direct bribery, frustrated
judges and justices may be instituted:
homicide, adultery, arson, evasion of income tax, barratry, blackmail,
(a) motu proprio, by the Court itself;
bribery, duelling, embezzlement, extortion, forgery, libel, making
(b) upon verified complaint, supported by the affidavits of
fraudulent proof of loss on insurance contract, mutilation of public
persons with personal knowledge of the facts alleged, or
records, fabrication of evidence, offenses against pension laws,
by documents substantiating the allegations; or
perjury, seduction under the promise of marriage, estafa, falsification
(c) upon anonymous complaint supported by public records of
of public document, and estafa thru falsification of public document.
indubitable integrity.11
To our mind, malversation - considering its nature - should not be
It was pursuant to this power that the Court - on its own initiative -
categorized any differently from the above listed crimes. The act of
ordered the re-docketing of the OCA's report as a formal complaint
embezzling public funds or property is immoral in itself; it is a
against the respondent and as a regular administrative matter f
conduct clearly contrary to the accepted standards of justice,
or the Court's consideration.
honesty, and good morals.14
The Court likewise possesses the POWER TO PREVENTIVELY
The preventive suspension we impose pending investigation is not a
SUSPEND an administratively charged judge until a final decision is
penalty but serves only as a preventive measure as we explained
reached, particularly when a serious charge is involved and a strong
above. Because it is not a penalty, ITS IMPOSITION DOES NOT
likelihood of guilt exists. This POWER IS INHERENT in the Court's
VIOLATE THE RIGHT OF THE ACCUSED TO BE PRESUMED
power of administrative supervision over all courts and their
INNOCENT. It also matters not that the offenses for which the
personnel as a measure to allow unhampered formal investigation. It
respondent had been convicted were committed in 2001 when he
is likewise A PREVENTIVE MEASURE to shield the public from any
was still the Mayor of Dapitan City.15As explained below, it is likewise
further damage that the continued exercise by the judge of the
immaterial that his criminal convictions by the Sandiganbayan are
functions of his office may cause.
still on appeal with this Court.
In the present case, we placed the respondent under preventive
Optional early retirement
suspension because he is alleged to have committed transgressions
that are classified as serious under Section 8, Rule 140 of the Rules
In any case, that a judge has retired or has otherwise been
of Court, which provides:
separated from the service does not necessarily divest the Court of
SEC. 8. Serious charges. - Serious charges include:
its jurisdiction to rule on complaints filed while he was still in the
service. As we held in Gallos v. Cordero:20
1. Bribery, direct or indirect;
The jurisdiction that was ours at the time of the filing of the
2. Dishonesty and violations of the Anti-Graft and administrative complaint was not lost by the mere fact that
Corrupt Practices Law (R.A. No. 3019); the respondent had ceased in office during the pendency of
his case. The Court retains jurisdiction either to pronounce the
respondent public official innocent of the charges or declare him
3. Gross misconduct constituting violations of the Code of
guilty thereof. A contrary rule would be fraught with injustice and
Judicial Conduct;
pregnant with dreadful and dangerous implications x x

4. Knowingly rendering an unjust judgment or order as Nor does separation from office render a pending
determined by a competent court in an appropriate proceeding; administrative charge moot and academic.21

5. Conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude; II. Administrative Liability

6. Willful failure to pay a just debt; In the present case, our task is not to determine the correctness of
the Sandiganbayan's ruling in Criminal Case Nos. 27467-68, a case
that is separately pending before us and which we shall consider
7. Borrowing money or property from lawyers and litigants in
under the evidentiary rules and procedures of our criminal laws.
a case pending before the court;
In the present proceedings, our function is limited to the
8. Immorality; determination of whether substantial evidence exists to hold
the respondent administratively liable for acts he is alleged to
9. Gross ignorance of the law or procedure; have committed while he was still the mayor of Dapitan City.

10. Partisan political activities; and In this determination, it is immaterial that the respondent was not
JUDICIARY SUSPENSION AND DISCIPLINARY CASES |2
yet a member of the Judiciary when he allegedly committed the acts
imputed to him; JUDGES MAY BE DISCIPLINED FOR ACTS
COMMITTED PRIOR TO THEIR APPOINTMENT TO THE JUDICIARY.
Our Rules itself recognizes this situation, as it provides for the
immediate forwarding to the Supreme Court for disposition and
adjudication of charges against justices and judges before the IBP,
including those filed prior to their appointment to the judiciary. It
need not be shown that the respondent continued to do the act or
acts complained of; it is SUFFICIENT that the evidence on
record supports the charge/s against the respondent
through proof that the respondent committed the imputed
act/s violative of the Code of Judicial Conduct and the applicable
provisions of the Rules of Court.22
In Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge Sardido,23 the Court
definitively ruled that:
The acts or omissions of a judge may well constitute at the same
time both a criminal act and an administrative offense. Whether
the criminal case against Judge Hurtado relates to an act
committed before or after he became a judge is of no
moment. Neither is it material that an MTC judge will be trying an
RTC judge in the criminal case. A criminal case against an attorney
or judge is distinct and separate from an administrative case against
him. The dismissal of the criminal case does not warrant the
dismissal of an administrative case arising from the same set of
facts, x x x (emphases supplied)
We reiterate that ONLY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE is required to
support our conclusions in administrative
proceedings.24 SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE is that amount of relevant
evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
justify a conclusion. The STANDARD OF SUBSTANTIAL IS
SATISFIED WHEN there is reasonable ground to believe that
the respondent is responsible for the misconduct complained
of, even if such might not be overwhelming or even
preponderant.25
That the respondent committed acts constituting malversation or
violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act should be
adjudged in the same manner that other acts classified as serious
charges under Rule 140 should be weighed — through substantial
evidence.26 Expressed from the point of view of criminal law,
evidence to support a conviction in a criminal case is not necessary
in an administrative proceeding like the present case.
III. The Appropriate Penalty
Section 11 of Rule 140, as amended, states that [i]f the respondent
is guilty of a serious charge, any of the following sanctions may be
imposed:
(a) dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the
benefits as the Court may determine, and disqualification
from reinstatement or appointment to any public office,
including government-owned or -controlled corporations;
(b) suspension from office without salary and other benefits
for more than three but not exceeding six months; or
(c) a fine of more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding
P40,000.00.
We emphasize that judges should be the embodiment of
competence, integrity, and independence, and their conduct should
be above reproach. They must adhere to exacting standards of
morality, decency, and probity. A magistrate is judged, not only
by his official acts, but also by his private morality and
actions. Our people can only look up to him as an upright man
worthy of judging his fellow citizens' acts if he is both qualified and
proficient in law, and equipped with the morality that qualifies him
for that higher plane that standing as a judge entails.
In Conrado Abe Lopez v. Judge Rogelio S. Lucmayon,32 we ruled
that:
The Code of Judicial Ethics mandates that the conduct of a judge
must be free of a whiff of impropriety not only with respect to his
performance of his judicial duties, but also to his behavior outside his
sala as a private individual. There is NO DICHOTOMY OF
MORALITY: A PUBLIC OFFICIAL IS ALSO JUDGED BY HIS
PRIVATE MORALS. The Code dictates that a judge, in order to
promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the
judiciary, must behave with propriety at all times. As we have
recently explained, a judge's official life cannot simply be detached or
separated from his personal existence. (emphasis ours)
ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER NO. 02-9-02-SC (WHICH TOOK
EFFECT ON OCTOBER 1, 2002) provides that an administrative
case against a judge of a regular court based on grounds which are
also grounds for the disciplinary action against members of the Bar,
shall be considered as disciplinary proceedings against such judge as
a member of the Bar. It also states that judgment in both
respects may be incorporated in one decision or resolution.
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, on the other hand,
provides that a lawyer may be removed or suspended from the
practice of law, among others, for conviction of a crime involving
moral turpitude:
Sec. 27. Attorneys removed or suspended by the Supreme Court on
what grounds. — A member of the bar may be removed or
suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any
deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly
immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving
moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required
to take before the admission to practice, or for a wilfull disobedience
of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willful
appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to
do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain,
either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes
malpractice.
In Bengco v. Bernardo,34 we ruled that it is not sound judicial policy
to await the final resolution of a criminal case before a complaint
against a lawyer may be acted upon; otherwise, this Court will be
rendered helpless to apply the rules on admission to, and continuing
membership in the legal profession during the whole period that the
criminal case is pending final disposition, when the objectives of the
two proceedings are vastly disparate. Disciplinary proceedings
involve no private interest and afford no redress for private
grievance. They are undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public
welfare and to save courts of justice from persons unfit to practice
law. The attorney is called to answer to the court for his conduct as
an officer of the court.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, Judge Joseph Cedrick O. Ruiz is
hereby DISMISSED FROM THE SERVICE with forfeiture of all
benefits, except accrued leave credits, and with prejudice to
reemployment in the Government or any of its subdivisions,
instrumentalities, or agencies including government-owned and -
controlled corporations. As a consequence of this ruling, Judge Ruiz
is likewise declared DISBARRED and STRICKEN FROM the roll of
attorneys.
4. HEINZ R. HECK, complainant, vs.JUDGE ANTHONY E.
SANTOS, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 19,
CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY,1respondent. A.M. No. RTJ-
01-1657 February 23, 2004
May a retired judge charged with notarizing documents without the
requisite notary commission more than twenty years ago be
disciplined therefor?
The Procedural Issues
On the Applicability of Resolution A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC
On September 17, 2002, we issued Resolution A.M. No. 02-9-02-
SC,13 to wit:
Some administrative cases against Justices of the Court of Appeals
and the Sandiganbayan; judges of regular and special courts; and
the court officials who are lawyers are based on grounds which are
JUDICIARY SUSPENSION AND DISCIPLINARY CASES |3
likewise grounds for the disciplinary action of members of the Bar for
violation of the Lawyer’s Oath, the Code of Professional
Responsibility, and the Canons of Professional Ethics, or for such
other forms of breaches of conduct that have been traditionally
recognized as grounds for the discipline of lawyers.
In any of the foregoing instances, the administrative case shall also
be considered a disciplinary action against the respondent justice,
judge or court official concerned as a member of the Bar. The
respondent may forthwith be required to comment on the complaint
and show cause why he should not also be suspended, disbarred or
otherwise disciplinary sanctioned as a member of the Bar. Judgment
in both respects may be incorporated in one decision or resolution.
Before the Court approved this resolution, administrative and
disbarment cases against members of the bar who were likewise
members of the court were treated separately. Thus, pursuant to the
new rule, administrative cases against erring justices of the
CA and the Sandiganbayan, judges, and lawyers in the
government service may be automatically treated as
disbarment cases. The Resolution, which took effect on October 1,
2002, also provides that it shall supplement Rule 140 of the Rules of
Court, and shall apply to administrative cases already filed where the
respondents HAVE NOT YET BEEN REQUIRED TO COMMENT on the
complaints.
Clearly, the instant case is not covered by the foregoing resolution,
since the respondent filed his Answer/Comment on June 13, 2001.
The Procedure To Be Followed In Disbarment Cases Involving A
Retired Judge For Acts Committed While He Was Still A Practicing
Lawyer
The undisputed facts are as follows: (1) the respondent is a retired
judge; (2) the complainant prays for his disbarment; and (3) the acts
constituting the ground for disbarment were committed when the
respondent was still a practicing lawyer, before his appointment to
the judiciary. Thus, the respondent is being charged not for acts
committed as a judge; he is charged, as a member of the bar, with
notarizing documents without the requisite notarial commission
therefor.
Section 1, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court on Disbarment and
Discipline of Attorneys provides:
Section 1. Proceedings for the disbarment, suspension, or discipline
of attorneys may be taken by the Supreme Court motu proprio, or by
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) upon verified complaint of
any person. The complaint shall state clearly, and concisely the facts
complained of and shall be supported by affidavits of persons having
personal knowledge of the facts therein alleged and/or by such
documents as may substantiate said facts.
The IBP Board of Governors may, motu proprio or upon referral by
the Supreme Court or by a Chapter Board of Officers, or at the
instance of any person, initiate and prosecute proper charges against
erring attorneys including those in the government service: Provided,
however, That all charges against Justices of the Court of Tax
Appeals and lower courts, even if lawyers are jointly charged with
them, shall be filed with the Supreme Court: Provided, further, That
charges filed against Justices and Judges before the IBP, including
those filed prior to their appointment to the Judiciary, shall be
immediately forwarded to the Supreme Court for disposition and
adjudication.14
The investigation may thereafter commence either before the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), in accordance with Sections 2
to Sections 12 of Rule 139-B, or before the Supreme Court in
accordance with Sections 13 and 14, thus:
Section 13. Supreme Court Investigators. - In proceedings
initiated motu proprio by the Supreme Court or in other proceedings
when the interest of justice so requires, the Supreme Court may
refer the case for investigation to the Solicitor General or to any
officer of the Supreme Court or judge of a lower court, in which case
the investigation shall proceed in the same manner provided in
Sections 6 to 11 hereof, save that the review of the report shall be
conducted directly by the Supreme Court.
Section 14. Report of the Solicitor General or other Court designated
Investigator. Based upon the evidence adduced at the investigation,
the Solicitor General or other Investigator designated by the
Supreme Court shall submit to the Supreme Court a report
containing his findings of fact and recommendations together with
the record and all the evidence presented in the investigation for the
final action of the Supreme Court.
It is clear from the Rules then that a complaint for disbarment is
cognizable by the Court itself, and its indorsement to the IBP is not
mandatory. The Court may refer the complaint for investigation,
report and recommendation to the Solicitor General, any officer of
the court or a judge of a lower court, on which the Court will
thereafter base its final action.15
Although the respondent has already retired from the judiciary, he is
still considered as a member of the bar and as such, is not immune
to the disciplining arm of the Supreme Court, pursuant to Article VIII,
Section 616of the 1987 Constitution. Furthermore, at the time of the
filing of the complaint, the respondent was still the presiding judge of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 19, Cagayan de Oro City. As such,
the complaint was cognizable by the Court itself, as the Rule
mandates that in case the respondent is a justice of the Court of Tax
Appeals or the lower court, the complaint shall be filed with the
Supreme Court.17
The Substantive Issues
The Retirement Or Resignation Of A Judge Will Not Preclude The
Filing Thereafter Of An Administrative Charge Against Him For Which
He Shall Still Be Held Answerable If Found Liable Therefor
The fact that a judge has retired or has otherwise been separated
from the service does not necessarily divest the Court of its
jurisdiction to determine the veracity of the allegations of the
complaint, pursuant to its disciplinary authority over members of the
bench.
However, recognizing "the proliferation of unfounded or malicious
administrative or criminal cases against members of the judiciary for
purposes of harassment," we issued A.M. No. 03-10-01-SC20 which
took effect on November 3, 2003.
Thus, in order for an administrative complaint against a retiring or
retired judge or justice to be dismissed outright, the following
REQUISITES must concur: (1) the complaint must have been filed
within six months from the compulsory retirement of the judge or
justice; (2) the cause of action must have occurred at least a year
before such filing; and, (3) it is shown that the complaint
was intended to harass the respondent.
A Judge May Be Disciplined For Acts Committed Before His
Appointment To The Judiciary
It is settled that a judge may be disciplined for acts committed prior
to his appointment to the judiciary.22 In fact, even the new Rule itself
recognizes this, as it provides for the immediate forwarding to the
Supreme Court for disposition and adjudication of charges
against justices and judges before the IBP, including those filed prior
to their appointment to the judiciary.23 It need not be shown that the
respondent continued the doing of the act or acts complained of; it is
sufficient that the evidence on record supports the charge on the
respondent, considering the gravity of the offense.
JUDICIARY SUSPENSION AND DISCIPLINARY CASES |4
Indeed, there is jurisprudence to the effect that the act complained
of must be continuing in order for the respondent judge to be
disciplined therefor. In Sevilla v. Salubre,24 the respondent judge was
charged with violating Canon 16 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, for acts committed while he was still a practicing
lawyer. The respondent therein refused to turn over the funds of his
client despite demands, and persisted in his refusal even after he
was appointed as a judge. However, the Court also stated in this
case that the respondent’s subsequent appointment as a judge will
not exculpate him from taking responsibility for the consequences of
his acts as an officer of the court.25
Notarizing Documents Without The Requisite Commission Therefore
Constitutes Malpractice, If Not The Crime Of Falsification Of Public
Documents
The Court has characterized a lawyer’s act of notarizing documents
without the requisite commission therefore as "reprehensible,
constituting as it does not only malpractice, but also the crime of
falsification of public documents."34 For such reprehensible conduct,
the Court has sanctioned erring lawyers by suspension from the
practice of law, revocation of the notarial commission and
disqualification from acting as such, and even disbarment.35
In the case of Nunga v. Viray,36 the Court had the occasion to state -
Where the notarization of a document is done by a member of the
Philippine Bar at a time when he has no authorization or commission
to do so, the offender may be subjected to disciplinary action. For
one, performing a notarial [act] without such commission is a
violation of the lawyer’s oath to obey the laws, more specifically, the
Notarial Law. Then, too, by making it appear that he is duly
commissioned when he is not, he is, for all legal intents and
purposes, indulging in deliberate falsehood, which the lawyer’s oath
similarly proscribes. These violations fall squarely within the
prohibition of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which provides: "A lawyer shall not engage in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct."37
An Administrative Complaint Against A Member Of The Bar Does Not
Prescribe
The qualification of good moral character is a requirement
which is not dispensed with upon admission to membership
of the bar. This qualification is not only a condition precedent to
admission to the legal profession, but its continued possession is
essential to maintain one’s good standing in the profession. It is a
continuing requirement to the practice of law and therefore does not
preclude a subsequent judicial inquiry, upon proper complaint, into
any question concerning one’s mental or moral fitness before he
became a lawyer. This is because his admission to practice merely
creates a rebuttable presumption that he has all the qualifications to
become a lawyer.44 The rule is settled that a lawyer may be
suspended or disbarred for any misconduct, even if it pertains to his
private activities, as long as it shows him to be wanting in moral
character, honesty, probity or good demeanor. Possession of good
moral character is not only a prerequisite to admission to the bar but
also a continuing requirement to the practice of law.45
Furthermore, administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class
of their own, distinct from and may proceed independently of civil
and criminal cases.46
Pursuant to the foregoing, there can be no other conclusion than
that an administrative complaint against an erring lawyer who was
thereafter appointed as a judge, albeit filed only after twenty-four
years after the offending act was committed, is not barred by
prescription. No matter how much time has elapsed from the time of
the commission of the act complained of and the time of the
institution of the complaint, erring members of the bench and bar
cannot escape the disciplining arm of the Court. Thus, even the lapse
of considerable time, from the commission of the offending act to the
institution of the administrative complaint, will not erase the
administrative culpability of a lawyer who notarizes documents
without the requisite authority therefor.
At Most, The Delay In The Institution Of The Administrative Case
Would Merely Mitigate The Respondent’s Liability
Time and again, we have stressed the settled principle that the
practice of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed by the State on
those who show that they possess the qualifications required by law
for the conferment of such privilege. Membership in the bar is a
privilege burdened with conditions. A high sense of morality,
honesty, and fair dealing is expected and required of a member of
the bar.52 By his actuations, the respondent failed to live up to such
standards;53 he undermined the confidence of the public on notarial
documents and thereby breached Canon I of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which requires lawyers to uphold the
Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for the
law and legal processes. The respondent also violated Rule 1.01
thereof which proscribes lawyers from engaging in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.54 In representing that he
was possessed of the requisite notarial commission when he was, in
fact, not so authorized, the respondent also violated Rule 10.01 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility and his oath as a lawyer that
he shall do no falsehood.
The supreme penalty of disbarment is meted out only in clear cases
of misconduct that seriously affect the standing and character of the
lawyer as an officer of the court. While we will not hesitate to
remove an erring attorney from the esteemed brotherhood of
lawyers where the evidence calls for it, we will likewise not disbar
him where a lesser penalty will suffice to accomplish the desired
end.55 Furthermore, a tempering of justice is mandated in this case,
considering that the complaint against the respondent was filed
twenty-four years after the commission of the act complained
of;56 that there was no private offended party who came forward and
claimed to have been adversely affected by the documents so
notarized by the respondent; and, the fact that the respondent is a
retired judge who deserves to enjoy the full measure of his well-
earned retirement benefits.57 The Court finds that a fine of P5,000.00
is justified in this case.
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Anthony E. Santos is found
GUILTY of notarizing documents without the requisite notarial
commission therefor. He is hereby ORDERED to pay a fine in the
amount of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00).
5. A.M. No. P-97-1247 May 14, 1997
(Formerly A.M. OCA I.P.I.1 No. 95-71-P) NARITA
RABE, complainant, vs. DELSA M. FLORES,
Interpreter III, RTC, Branch IV, Panabo,
Davao, respondent.
It is well to stress once again the constitutional declaration that a
"(p)ublic office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must
at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost
responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency, act with patriotism and
justice, and lead modest lives." 12
We have repeatedly held that although every office in the
government service is a public trust, no position exacts a greater
demand for moral righteousness and uprightness from an individual
than in the judiciary. Personnel in the judiciary should conduct
themselves in such a manner as to be beyond reproach and
suspicion, and free from any appearance of impropriety in their
personal behavior, not only in the discharge of their official duties
but also in their everyday life. They are strictly mandated to maintain
good moral character at all times and to observe irreproachable
behavior so as not to outrage public decency. 13
6. G.R. No. 74930 February 13, 1989 RICARDO
VALMONTE, et al. vs . FELICIANO BELMONTE,
JR., respondent.
JUDICIARY SUSPENSION AND DISCIPLINARY CASES |5
The pertinent provision under the 1987 Constitution is Art. 111, Sec.
7 which states:
The right of the people to information on matters of public concern
shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents,
and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as
well as to government research data used as basis for policy
development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations
as may be provided by law.
The right of access to information was also recognized in the 1973
Constitution, Art. IV Sec. 6 of which provided:
The right of the people to information on 'matters of public concern
shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents and
papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, shall be
afforded the citizen subject to such limitations as may be provided by
law.
The right to information is an essential premise of a meaningful right
to speech and expression. But this is not to say that the right to
information is merely an adjunct of and therefore restricted in
application by the exercise of the freedoms of speech and of the
press. Far from it. The right to information goes hand-in-hand with
the constitutional policies of full public disclosure * and honesty in
the public service. ** It is meant to enhance the widening role of
the citizenry in governmental decision-making as well as in checking
abuse in government.
Yet, like all the constitutional guarantees, THE RIGHT TO
INFORMATION IS NOT ABSOLUTE. As stated in Legaspi, the
people's right to information is limited to "matters of public
concern," and is further "subject to such limitations as may
be provided by law." Similarly, the State's policy of full disclosure
is LIMITED TO "TRANSACTIONS INVOLVING PUBLIC
INTEREST," AND IS "SUBJECT TO REASONABLE
CONDITIONS PRESCRIBED BY LAW."
Hence, before mandamus may issue, it must be clear that the
information sought is of "public interest" or "public concern," and is
not exempted by law from the operation of the constitutional
guarantee [Legazpi v. Civil Service Commission, supra, at p. 542.]
The Court has always grappled with the meanings of the terms
"public interest" and "public concern".
Whether the matter at issue is of interest or importance, as it relates
to or affects the public.
The information sought by petitioners in this case is the truth of
reports that certain Members of the Batasang Pambansa belonging
to the opposition were able to secure "clean" loans from the GSIS
immediately before the February 7, 1986 election through the
intercession of th eformer First Lady, Mrs. Imelda Marcos.
The GSIS is a trustee of contributions from the government and its
employees and the administrator of various insurance programs for
the benefit of the latter. Undeniably, its funds assume a public
character
In sum, the public nature of the loanable funds of the GSIS and the
public office held by the alleged borrowers make the information
sought clearly a matter of public interest and concern.
A second requisite must be met before the right to information may
be enforced through mandamus proceedings, viz., that the
information sought must NOT BE AMONG THOSE EXCLUDED BY
LAW.
When the information requested from the government intrudes into
the privacy of a citizen, a potential conflict between the rights to
information and to privacy may arise. However, the competing
interests of these rights need not be resolved in this case. Apparent
from the above-quoted statement of the Court in Morfe is that the
right to privacy belongs to the individual in his private capacity, and
not to public and governmental agencies like the GSIS. Moreover,
the right cannot be invoked by juridical entities like the GSIS. As held
in the case of Vassar College v. Loose Wills Biscuit Co. [197 F. 982
(1912)], a corporation has no right of privacy in its name since the
entire basis of the right to privacy is an injury to the feelings and
sensibilities of the party and a corporation would have no such
ground for relief.
Neither can the GSIS through its General Manager, the respondent,
invoke the right to privacy of its borrowers. The right is purely
personal in nature [Cf. Atkinson v. John Doherty & Co., 121 Mich
372, 80 N.W. 285, 46 L.RA. 219 (1899); Schuyler v. Curtis, 147 N.Y.
434, 42 N.E. 22, 31 L.R.A. 286 (1895)), and hence may be invoked
only by the person whose privacy is claimed to be violated.
It may be observed, however, that in the instant case, the concerned
borrowers themselves may not succeed if they choose to invoke their
right to privacy, considering the public offices they were holding at
the time the loans were alleged to have been granted. It cannot be
denied that because of the interest they generate and their
newsworthiness, public figures, most especially those holding
responsible positions in government, enjoy a more limited right to
privacy as compared to ordinary individuals, their actions being
subject to closer public scrutiny [Cf.Ayer Productions Pty. Ltd. v.
Capulong, G.R. Nos. 82380 and 82398, April 29, 1988; See
also Cohen v. Marx, 211 P. 2d 321 (1949).]
In fine, petitioners are entitled to access to the documents
evidencing loans granted by the GSIS, subject to reasonable
regulations that the latter may promulgate relating to the manner
and hours of examination, to the end that damage to or loss of the
records may be avoided, that undue interference with the duties of
the custodian of the records may be prevented and that the right of
other persons entitled to inspect the records may be insured [Legaspi
v. Civil Service Commission, supra at p. 538, quoting Subido v.
Ozaeta, 80 Phil. 383, 387.] The petition, as to the second and third
alternative acts sought to be done by petitioners, is meritorious.
However, the same cannot be said with regard to the first act sought
by petitioners, i.e., "to furnish petitioners the list of the names of the
Batasang Pambansa members belonging to the UNIDO and PDP-
Laban who were able to secure clean loans immediately before the
February 7 election thru the intercession/marginal note of the then
First Lady Imelda Marcos."
Although citizens are afforded the right to information and, pursuant
thereto, are entitled to "access to official records," the Constitution
does not accord them a right to compel custodians of official records
to prepare lists, abstracts, summaries and the like in their desire to
acquire information on matters of public concern.
7. A.M. No. RTJ-01-1655 July 8, 2004
(Formerly OCA IPI 91-1174- RTJ) ATTY. GRACE M.
VELOSO AND MA. JOEYLYNN B.
QUIÑONES, complainants, vs. JUDGE ANACLETO M.
CAMINADE, RTC, Branch 6, Cebu City, respondent.
Those who serve in the judiciary, particularly justices and judges,
must not only know the law but must also possess the highest
degree of integrity and probity, and an unquestionable moral
uprightness both in their public and private lives.2
We have repeatedly held that, while every office in the government
service is a public trust, no position exacts greater moral
righteousness than a seat in the judiciary.3 Performing as he does an
exalted role in the administration of justice, a judge must pay a high
price for the honor bestowed upon him. Thus, a judge must comport
himself at all times in such a manner that his conduct, official or
JUDICIARY SUSPENSION AND DISCIPLINARY CASES |6
otherwise, can weather the most exacting scrutiny of the public that
looks up to him as the epitome of integrity and justice.4
Canons 35 and 46 of the new Code of Judicial Conduct mandate,
respectively, that "judges shall ensure that not only is their conduct
above reproach, but that it is perceived to be so in the view of the
reasonable observer" and that "judges shall avoid improprieties and
the appearance of impropriety in all of their activities." These very
stringent standards of decorum are demanded of all magistrates and
employees of the courts.
Section 8 of Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended, considers a
violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct as a serious offense. A
respondent found guilty of a serious charge may be meted the
penalty of: (1) dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of
the benefits as the Court may determine, and disqualification from
reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including
government-owned or controlled corporations, provided, that the
forfeiture of benefits shall in no case include accrued leave credits;
(2) suspension from office without salary and other benefits for
more than three but not exceeding six months; or (3) a fine of more
than P20,000 but not exceeding P40,000.
WHEREFORE, respondent judge is found guilty of violating Canons
3 and 4 of the new Code of Judicial Conduct by committing sexual
harassment and is hereby SUSPENDED from office for a period of
six months without pay effective immediately, with the warning that
a repetition of the same offense shall be punished with dismissal
from the service.
8. TRINIDAD O. LACHICA, A.M. No. MTJ-05-1609 v. JUDGE
ROSABELLA M. TORMIS, Municipal Trial Court in Cities,
In the Judiciary, moral integrity is more than a cardinal virtue, it is a
necessity.[14] Respondent must bear in mind that the exacting
standards of conduct demanded from judges are designed to
promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the
judiciary.[15] When the judge himself becomes the transgressor of the
law which he is sworn to apply, he places his office in disrepute,
encourages disrespect for the law and impairs public confidence in
the integrity of the judiciary itself.[16]
Misconduct is defined as any unlawful conduct of a person concerned
in the administration of justice prejudicial to the rights of parties or
to the right determination of the cause. It generally means wrongful,
improper or unlawful conduct motivated by a premeditated,
obstinate or intentional purpose.[17] To justify the taking of drastic
disciplinary action, as is what is sought by complainant in this case,
the law requires that the error or mistake must be gross or patent,
malicious, deliberate or in bad faith.[18]
It need not be overemphasized that in receiving the cash bond
respondent judge ran afoul with Rule 114 of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure.
A judge is not one of those authorized to receive
the deposit of cash as bail, nor should such cash be
kept in the office of the judge.
Gross misconduct under Section 8(3), Rule 140 of the Revised Rules
of Court, as amended, is classified as a serious offense punishable by
any of the sanctions enumerated in Section 11 of the same Rule
which provides that:
SEC. 11. Sanctions. A. If the respondent is guilty of a
serious charge, any of the following sanctions may be
imposed:
1. Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits
as the Court may determine, and disqualification from
reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including
government-owned or controlled corporations. Provided, however,
that the forfeiture of benefits shall in no case include accrued leave
credits;
2. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for
more than three (3) but not exceeding six (6) months; or
3. A fine of more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00.
WHEREFORE, Rosabella M. Tormis, Presiding Judge, Municipal Trial
Court in Cities, Cebu City, Branch IV, is found GUILTY of gross
misconduct and is SUSPENDEDfrom office for six (6) months
without salary and other benefits and STERNLY WARNED that a
repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more
severely.
9. A.M. No. MTJ-16-1886ANONYMOUS
COMPLAINT, Complainant vs.PRESIDING JUDGE
EXEQUIL L. DAGALA, MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL
COURT, DAPASOCORRO, DAP A, SURIGAO DEL
NORTE, Respondent
Section 1 of Rule 140 states that proceedings for the discipline of
judges and justices of lower courts may be instituted in three ways:
by the Supreme Court motu proprio, through a verified complaint,
and through an anonymous complaint. A verified complaint must be
supported by affidavits of persons who have personal knowledge of
the facts alleged or by documents which may substantiate the
allegations. An anonymous complaint, on the other hand, should be
supported by public records of indubitable integrity.25
While anonymous complaints should always be treated with
great caution, the anonymity of the complaint does not, in
itself, justify its outright dismissal.26 The Court will act on an
anonymous complaint –
x x x provided its allegations can be reliably verified and
properly substantiated by competent evidence, like public
records of indubitable integrity, "thus needing no corroboration by
evidence to be offered by the complainant, whose identity and
integrity could hardly be material where the matter involved is of
public interest," or the declarations by the respondents themselves in
reaction to the allegations, where such declarations are, properly
speaking, admissions worthy of consideration for not being self-
serving.27 (Citations omitted.)
Since a disciplinary case is an administrative proceeding, technical
rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied and
administrative due process cannot be fully equated with due process
in its strict judicial sense.28Administrative due process essentially
means "an opportunity to explain one's side or an opportunity to
seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of."29 When
the Court acts motu proprio, this opportunity arises through the filing
of a comment upon order of the Court.1âwphi1 In a case where the
proceedings are initiated by a complaint, the Rules of Court state
that the complaint must state the acts or omissions constituting a
violation of our ethical rules. To our mind, this is the standard of
what suffices as information as to the allegations against a
respondent. It is sufficient that the acts or omissions complained of
are clearly identified.
In light of these findings, we concur with the OCA's conclusion that
Judge Dagala is guilty of gross misconduct. Misconduct has been
defined as an intentional wrongdoing or a deliberate
violation of a rule of law or standard of behavior, especially
by a government official. Misconduct is considered grave
where the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the
law, or flagrant disregard of established rules are present.36
We also agree with the OCA's findings that Judge Dagala is guilty of
immorality.
We have repeatedly said that members of the Judiciary are
commanded by law to exhibit the highest degree of moral certitude
and is bound by the highest standards of honesty and
integrity.43 In Regir v. Regir,44 we held:
JUDICIARY SUSPENSION AND DISCIPLINARY CASES |7
It is morally reprehensible for a married man or woman to maintain
intimate relations with a person other than his or her spouse.
Moreover, immorality is not based alone on illicit sexual intercourse.
It is not confined to sexual matters, but includes conducts
inconsistent with rectitude, or indicative of corruption, indecency,
depravity, and dissoluteness; or is willful, flagrant or shameless
conduct showing moral indifference to opinions of respectable
members of the community, and an inconsiderate attitude toward
good order and public welfare.45
Immorality is a recognized ground for the discipline of
judges and justices under the Rules of Court.46 The New Canon
of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary requires judges to
avoid "impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all their
activities."47
In Castillo v. Calanog, Jr.48 (Castillo), we laid down the DOCTRINE
OF NO DICHOTOMY OF MORALITY. We explained why judges as
public officials are also judged by their private morals:
The Code of Judicial Ethics mandates that the conduct of a judge
must be free of a whiff of impropriety not only with respect to his
performance of his judicial duties, but also to his behavior outside his
sala and as a private individual. There is no dichotomy of
morality: a public official is also judged by his private
morals. The Code dictates that a judge, in order to promote public
confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary, must
behave with propriety at all times. As we have very recently
explained, a judge's official life [cannot] simply be detached or
separated from his personal existence. Thus:
The Court has consistently held that absence of criminal liability
does not preclude disciplinary action.54 As in the case of
disciplinary action of lawyers, acquittal of criminal charges is not a
bar to ·administrative proceedings. In Pangan v. Ramos,55 we held
that "[t]he standards of the legal profession are not satisfied by
conduct which merely enables one to escape the penalties of criminal
law. Moreover, this Court in disbarment proceedings is acting in an
entirely different capacity from that which courts assume in trying
criminal cases."56
WHEREFORE, premises considered, Judge Exequil L. Dagala is
hereby found GUILTY of IMMORALITY and GROSS
MISCONDUCT. Accordingly, he is DISMISSED from the service
with FORFEITURE of his retirement and other benefits except
accrued leave credits, and PERPETUALLY DISQUALIFIED from
re-employment in any government agency or instrumentality,
including any government-owned and controlled corporation or
government financial institution.
10. A.M. No. RTJ-06-1982 December 14, 2007
(Formerly A.M. No. 05-12-757-RTC) SHERLITA O.
TAN, complainant, vs. JUDGE REXEL M. PACURIBOT,
Regional Trial Court, Branch 27, Gingoog
City, respondent.
Mere denial cannot prevail over the positive testimony of a witness.
A mere denial, like alibi, is a self-serving negative evidence, which
cannot be accorded greater evidentiary weight than the declaration
of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters. As between
a categorical testimony that rings the truth on one hand, and bare
denial on the other, the former is generally held to prevail.
As held in People vs. Espino delay in the commission of rape is not
an indication of fabricated charge. Many victims of rape never
complain or file criminal charges against the rapist, for they prefer to
silently bear the ignominy and pain, rather than reveal their shame
to the world or risk the offender’s making good on his threats. This is
understandable, considering the inbred modesty of Filipinas and their
aversion to the public disclosure of matters affecting their honor.
All those who don the judicial robe must always instill in their minds
the exhortation that [T]he administration of justice is a mission.
Judges, from the lowest to the highest levels are the gems in the
vast government bureaucracy, beacon lights looked upon as the
embodiments of all that is right, just and proper, the ultimate
weapons against injustice and oppression. The Judiciary
hemorrhages every time a Judge himself transgresses the very law
he is sworn to uphold and defend at all costs. This should not come
to pass.
Judge Rexel M. Pacuribot was DISMISSED from the service for gross
misconduct and immorality prejudicial to the best interests of the
service, with forfeiture of all retirement benefits and with prejudice
to re-employment in any branch of the government, including
government-owned and controlled corporations, except the money
value of accrued earned leave credits.he was ORDERED to cease and
desist immediately from rendering any order or decision; or from
continuing any proceedings, in any case whatsoever, effective upon
receipt of a copy of this Decision. Lastly, he was REQUIRED to SHOW
CAUSE why he should not be disbarred as a member of the
Philippine Bar.
11. Aa REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Complainant,
vs. JUDGE RAMON S. CAGUIOA, Respondent.
FIRST CASE: Taxes are the lifeblood of the government, and it is of
public interest that the collection of which should not be restrained.
The improper issuance of the Writ of Preliminary Injunction was
aggravated by the inadequate injunctive bond.
To make matters worse, respondent judge failed to observe the
constitutionally-guaranteed right of the Republic to due process.
Records show that the Office of the Solicitor General was not served
copies of the motions for intervention. Thus, respondent judge
should not have acted upon such motions without the necessary
proof of service on all parties, much less, proceeded with their
hearing ex parte, to the prejudice of the Republic and other
respondents. The investigating justice stressed that respondent
judge disregarded the right of the Republic to due process, not only
once, but five times in all the motions for intervention filed by the
intervenors-corporations.
SECOND CASE: Respondent judge again issued a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction that did not satisfy the legal requisites for its
issuance, and which was enforced outside his territorial jurisdiction.
The applicant, in this case, questions his reassignment as District
Collector of the Port of Subic to the Port of Cagayan de Oro. We
uphold the ruling of the Court of Appeals that the applicant failed to
establish that he has a clear and unmistakable right that was violated
so as to warrant the issuance of a preliminary injunction. He could
not claim a vested right to his position in the Port of Subic. A public
office is not a private property.
Further, the Writ of Preliminary Injunction was issued to enjoin acts
performed outside the territorial jurisdiction of respondent judge. It
was directed against government officials whose offices in Manila are
outside the territorial jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court of
Olongapo City.
FIRST AND SECOND CASES: We find respondent judge guilty of
gross ignorance of the law and conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service.
Ignorance of the law is the mainspring of injustice. Judges are called
upon to exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with statutes
and procedural rules. Basic rules should be at the palm of their
hands. Their inexcusable failure to observe basic laws and rules will
render them administratively liable. Where the law involved is simple
and elementary, lack of conversance with it constitutes gross
ignorance of the law. "Verily, for transgressing the elementary
jurisdictional limits of his court, respondent should be
administratively liable for gross ignorance of the
law."
"When the inefficiency springs from a failure to consider so basic and
elemental a rule, a law or a principle in the discharge of his
functions, a judge is either too incompetent and undeserving of the
position and title he holds or he is too vicious that the oversight or
JUDICIARY SUSPENSION AND DISCIPLINARY CASES |8
omission was deliberately done in bad faith and in grave abuse of
judicial
authority."
Respondent Ramon S. Caguioa, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial
Court of Olongapo City, Branch 74 is found GUILTY of gross
ignorance of the law and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of
the service, and is hereby ordered DISMISSED FROM THE SERVICE
with forfeiture of retirement benefits, except leave credits.
THIRD CASE: Respondent judge issued a Writ of Execution without
basis. The Writ ordered respondent sheriff to place private
respondents in possession of the disputed property, even when no
adjudication of even possessory rights over the subject property was
made.
Respondent judge did not adjudicate any rights of the parties and
resolved no other matter except the dismissal of the case on the
ground of "prescription." Thus, the order to place private
respondents in possession of the disputed property is not necessarily
included in or necessary to the judgment of dismissal of the case on
the ground of "prescription."
Respondent Ramon S. Caguioa, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial
Court of Olongapo City, Branch 74 is found GUILTY of simple
misconduct, and is hereby ordered SUSPENDED from office without
pay, for a period of THREE MONTHS.
12. A.M. OCA IPI No. 11-184-CA-J January 31,
2012 RE: VERIFIED COMPLAINT OF ENGR. OSCAR
L. ONGJOCO, CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD/CEO OF
FH-GYMN MULTI-PURPOSE AND TRANSPORT
SERVICE COOPERATIVE, AGAINST HON. JUAN Q.
ENRIQUEZ, JR., HON. RAMON M. BATO, JR. AND
HON. FLORITO S. MACALINO, ASSOCIATE
JUSTICES, COURT OF APPEALS
Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution, which provides as follows:
Section 14. No decision shall be rendered by any court without
expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on
which it is based.
No petition for review or motion for reconsideration of a decision
of the court shall be refused due course or denied without
starting the legal basis therefor.
The essential purpose of the constitutional provision is to require that
a judicial decision be clear on why a party has prevailed under the
law as applied to the facts as proved; the provision nowhere
demands that a point-by-point consideration and resolution of the
issues raised by the parties are necessary.12
This constitutional provision deals with the disposition of petitions
for review and of motions for reconsideration. In appellate courts,
the rule does not require any comprehensive statement of facts or
mention of the applicable law, but merely a statement of the "legal
basis" for denying due course.
Thus, there is sufficient compliance with the constitutional
requirement when a collegiate appellate court, after deliberation,
decides to deny a motion; states that the questions raised are factual
or have already been passed upon; or cites some other legal basis.
There is no need to explain fully the court’s denial, since the facts
and the law have already been laid out in the assailed Decision.
(Emphasis supplied)
Time and again, it has been held, no less than by the Supreme
Court, that mere suspicions and speculations can never be the basis
of conviction in a criminal case. Guided by the same doctrinal rule,
this Office is not duty-bound to proceed with the indictment of the
public respondents as charged. Indeed well entrenched is the rule
that "(t)he purpose of a preliminary investigation is to secure the
innocent against hasty, malicious and oppressive prosecution and to
protect him from an open and public accusation of crime, from the
trouble, expense and anxiety of a public trial, and also to protect the
state from useless and expensive trials (Joint Resolution, October 17,
2005, Rollo pp. 142-143).
Moreover, petitioners failed to rebut the presumption of regularity in
the performance of the official duties of respondents by affirmative
evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty. The presumption
prevails and becomes conclusive until it is overcome by no less than
clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. Every reasonable
intendment will be made in support of the presumption and in case
of doubt as to an officer’s act being lawful or unlawful, construction
should be in favor of its lawfulness (Bustillo vs. People of the
Philippines, G.R. No. 160718, May 12, 2010).
Disciplinary proceedings and criminal actions brought against any
judge in relation to the performance of his official functions are
neither complementary to nor suppletory of appropriate judicial
remedies, nor a substitute for such remedies.21 Any party who may
feel aggrieved should resort to these remedies, and exhaust them,
instead of resorting to disciplinary proceedings and criminal actions.
We explained why in In Re: Joaquin T. Borromeo:22
Given the nature of the judicial function, the power vested by the
Constitution in the Supreme Court and the lower courts established
by law, the question submits to only one answer: the administrative
or criminal remedies are neither alternative or cumulative to judicial
review where such review is available, and must wait on the result
thereof.
In this regard, we reiterate that a judge’s failure to correctly interpret
the law or to properly appreciate the evidence presented does not
necessarily incur administrative liability,23 for to hold him
administratively accountable for every erroneous ruling or decision
he renders, assuming he has erred, will be nothing short of
harassment and will make his position doubly unbearable. His judicial
office will then be rendered untenable, because no one called upon
to try the facts or to interpret the law in the process of administering
justice can be infallible in his judgment.24Administrative sanction
and criminal liability should be visited on him only when the
error is so gross, deliberate and malicious, or is committed
with evident bad faith,25 or only in clear cases of violations
by him of the standards and norms of propriety and good
behavior prescribed by law and the rules of procedure, or
fixed and defined by pertinent jurisprudence.26
13. A.M. OCA IPI No. 12-201-CA-J FEBRUARY
19, 2013 ETHELWOLDO E. FERNANDEZ, ANTONIO
A. HENSON and ANGEL S. ONG, Complainants, vs.
COURT OF APPEALS ASSOCIATE JUSTICES RAMON
M. BATO, JR., ISAIAS P. DICDICAN and EDUARDO
B. PERALTA, JR., Respondents.
Rule 140 of the Rules of Court provides the procedure for
the discipline of Justices of the CA and the Sandiganbayan
and Judges of regular and special courts.
Under Rule 140,17 there are three ways by which administrative
proceedings may be instituted against justices of the CA and the
Sandiganbayan and judges of regular and special courts: (1) motu
proprio by the Supreme Court; (2) upon verified complaint (as in this
complaint) with affidavits of persons having personal knowledge of
the facts alleged therein or by documents which may substantiate
said allegations; or (3) upon an anonymous complaint supported by
public records of indubitable integrity.18
In this verified administrative complaint, the essential facts
comprising the conduct of the respondent Justices of the CA
complained of are not disputed, and are verifiable from the copies of
orders and pleadings attached to the complaint and to the comments
of the respondent Justices. There is, thus, no need to assign the
JUDICIARY SUSPENSION AND DISCIPLINARY CASES |9
matter to a retired member of the Supreme Court for evaluation,
report, and recommendation.
The pertinent provisions of the 2009 IRCA relevant to the instant
administrative complaint are Sections 2(d), 4 and 5 of Rule VI,
quoted below as follows:
Sec. 2. Justices Who May Participate in the Adjudication of Cases.― 
xxxx
(d) When, in an original action or petition for review, any of the
following proceedings has been taken, namely: (i) giving due course;
(ii) granting temporary restraining order, writ of preliminary
injunction, or new trial; (iii) granting an application for writ of habeas
corpus, amparo, or habeas data; (iv) granting an application for a
freeze order; and (v) granting judicial authorization under the Human
Security Act of 2007, the case shall remain with the Justice to whom
the case is assigned and the Justices who participated therein,
regardless of their transfer to other Divisions in the same station. x x
x.
Sec. 4. Hearing on Preliminary Injunction.―The requirement of a
hearing on an application for preliminary injunction is satisfied with
the issuance by the Court of a resolution served upon the party
sought to be enjoined requiring him to comment on said application
within a period of not more than ten (10) days from notice. Said
party may attach to his comment documents which may show why
the application for preliminary injunction should be denied. The Court
may require the party seeking the injunctive relief to file his reply to
the comment within five (5) days from receipt of the latter.
If the party sought to be enjoined fails to file his comment as
provided for in the preceding paragraph, the Court may resolve the
application on the basis of the petition and its annexes.
The preceding paragraphs notwithstanding, the Court may, in its
sound discretion, set the application for a preliminary injunction for
hearing during which the parties may present their respective
positions or submit evidence in support thereof.
Sec. 5. Action by a Justice.―All members of the Division shall act
upon an application for temporary restraining order and preliminary
injunction. However, if the matter is of extreme urgency and a
Justice is absent, the two other Justices shall act upon the
application. If only the ponente is present, then he/she shall act
alone upon the application. The action of the two Justices or of
the ponente shall, however, be submitted on the next working day to
the absent member or members of the Division for ratification,
modification or recall.
Justice Bato, sitting as acting senior member of the Special
14th Division of the CA, had authority to act on the urgent
motions to resolve the petitioners’ application for writ of
preliminary injunction.
Section 4, Rule VI of the 2009 IRCA provides that the
requirement of a hearing for preliminary injunction is
satisfied with the issuance of a resolution requiring the party
sought to be enjoined to comment on the application within
10 days from notice.
The members of the Special 14th Division acted collectively
and in good faith and their Resolution granting a writ of
preliminary injunction in the consolidated CA petitions
enjoys a presumption of regularity.
Having established that the herein complainants have no personality
to assail the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the CA’s former
Special 14th Division, we cannot now permit them to harass the CA
Justices who issued the same. For even granting that the issuance of
the writ was erroneous, as a matter of public policy a magistrate
cannot be held administratively liable for every discretionary but
erroneous order he issues.40 The settled rule is that "a Judge cannot
be held to account civilly, criminally or administratively for an
erroneous decision rendered by him in good faith."41 The case
of Cortes v. Sandiganbayan42 is instructive. We quote:
It must be stressed that as a matter of policy, the acts of a judge in
his judicial capacity are not subject to disciplinary action. He cannot
be subjected to liability — civil, criminal or administrative — for any
of his official acts, no matter how erroneous, as long as he acts in
good faith. Only judicial errors tainted with fraud, dishonesty, gross
ignorance, bad faith or deliberate intent to do an injustice will be
administratively sanctioned. To hold otherwise would be to render
judicial office untenable, for no one called upon to try the facts or
interpret the law in the process of administering justice can be
infallible in his judgment.
It is also worth mentioning that the provisions of Article 204 of the
Revised Penal Code as to "rendering knowingly unjust judgment"
refer to an individual judge who does so "in any case submitted to
him for decision" and has no application to the members of a
collegiate court such as the Sandiganbayan or its divisions, who
reach their conclusions in consultation and accordingly render their
collective judgment after due deliberation. It also follows,
consequently, that a charge of violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act on the ground that such a collective decision is "unjust"
cannot prosper.
The remedy of the aggrieved party is not to file an administrative
complaint against the judge, but to elevate the assailed decision or
order to the higher court for review and correction. An administrative
complaint is not an appropriate remedy where judicial recourse is still
available, such as a motion for reconsideration, an appeal, or a
petition for certiorari, unless the assailed order or decision is tainted
with fraud, malice, or dishonesty. x x x.43(Citations omitted)
It was also emphasized in the above case that as an established rule,
an administrative, civil or criminal action against a judge cannot be a
substitute for an appea1.44
WHEREFORE, premises considered, A.M. OCA IPI No. 12-201- CA-J
is hereby DISMISSED.
14. A.M. No. MTJ-07-1667 April 10,
2012OFFICE OF THE COURT
ADMINISTRATOR, Complainant,
vs.JUDGE JAMES V. GO and Clerk of Court MA.
ELMER M. ROSALES, Municipal Trial Court in Cities
(MTCC), Branch 2, Butuan City, Respondents.
Resolutions of this Court should not be treated lightly. As a judge,
respondent must be the first to exhibit respect for authority.20
Judges should respect the orders and decisions of higher tribunals
much more so this Court from which all other courts should take
their bearings. A resolution of the Supreme Court should not be
construed as a mere request and should not be complied with
partially, inadequately or selectively.
In Guerrero v. Judge Deray,22 the Court held that a judge "who
deliberately and continuously fails and refuses to comply with the
resolution of [the Supreme] Court is guilty of gross misconduct and
insubordination." This ruling was reiterated in Dela Cruz v.
Vallarta23 and Visbal v. Tormis.24 Also in Guerrero, this Court held that
"indifference or defiance to the Court’s orders or resolutions may be
punished with dismissal, suspension or fine as warranted by the
circumstances."25
15. G.R. No. 179914 June 16, 2014 SPOUSES
REYNALDO AND HILLY G. SOMBILON, Petitioners,
JUDICIARY SUSPENSION AND DISCIPLINARY CASES | 10
 vs. ATTY. REY FERDINAND GARAY AND PHILIPPINE
NATIONAL BANK, Respondents.
Records show that spouses Sombilon failed to comply with the three-
day notice rule and the required proof of service embodied in
Sections 4, 5, and 6 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court, thereby
rendering the motion fatally defective. Despite this, Judge Venadas,
Sr. still took cognizance of the motion filed by spouses Sombilon,
depriving PNB and Atty. Garay of their right to due process.
Blatant disregard of basic, elementary, and well-known rules of
procedure and law is gross ignorance of the law,83which is classified
as a serious charge under Rule 140, Section 8 of the Rules of Court,
as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC, punishable by either dismissal
from service, suspension for more than three months but not
exceeding six months, or a fine of more than ₱20,000.00 but not
exceeding ₱40,000.00.84
In Administrative Matter No. RTJ-06-2000, Judge Rolando S.
Venadas, Sr. of the Regional Trial Court of Malaybalay City,
Bukidnon, Branch 8, is hereby found guilty of grave abuse of
authority bordering on gross ignorance of the law and is ordered to
pay a FINE of TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (₱20,000.00) to be
deducted from the withheld amount of ₱100,000.00 from his
retirement benefits pursuant to the April 18, 2007 Resolution in A.M.
No. 12600-Ret.
16. A.M. MTJ No. 04-1526 February 2, 2004
JOCELYN V. GRAGEDA, complainant vs. JUDGE NIETO
T. TRESVALLES,* Municipal Trial Court, Virac,
Catanduanes, respondent.
We agree that the respondent judge is administratively liable for
granting bail to an accused charged with murder without conducting
the requisite bail hearing.
The importance of a hearing in applications for bail should once more
be emphasized. Section 8, Rule 114 provides as follows:
Sec. 8. Burden of proof in bail application. - At the hearing of an
application for bail filed by a person who is in custody for the
commission of an offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua,
or life imprisonment, the prosecution has the burden of showing that
the evidence of guilt is strong. The evidence presented during the
bail hearing shall be considered automatically reproduced at the trial
but, upon motion of either party, the court may recall any witness for
additional examination unless the latter is dead, or otherwise, unable
to testify.
The importance of the Rule lies on the fact that on the result of the
bail hearing depends the right of an accused to provisional liberty
vis-à-vis the duty of the State to protect the people against
dangerous elements. The resolution of the issue affects important
norms in our society: liberty on one hand, and order on the other. To
minimize, if not eliminate, error and arbitrariness in a judge’s
decision, the Rules require the judge to hear the parties and then
make an intelligent assessment of their evidence.9
The respondent’s argument that a hearing is "only necessary if there
is an application for admission to bail" is erroneous. As found by the
Executive Judge:
…[T]he fact that the accused has not even filed yet any application
for bail at the time bail was fixed on December 5, 2000 aggravates
matters. To state the obvious, there was no occasion for the
respondent Judge to exercise any discretion on the matter of bail at
that point in time as the accused was not asking to be released on
temporary liberty. The respondent Judge should have followed the
straight and trodden path, well-traveled by members of the bench,
that bail should not be allowed in cases of murder. It might also be
worth mentioning, in passing, that the right to bail may be waived
considering its personal nature. It arises from the time one is placed
in the custody of the law. The fact that the respondent Judge already
granted bail when the accused has not been arrested yet compounds
the aggravation.10
We likewise agree with the finding of the Executive Judge that the
respondent’s CLAIM OF GOOD FAITH WILL NOT EXONERATE
HIM FROM ADMINISTRATIVE LIABILITY.
The respondent Judge also argues in his Position Paper submitted to
the undersigned Executive Judge that there is absolutely no evidence
to show that he was motivated by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty or
corruption in granting bail. As such, he argues that his act which was
done in his official capacity is not subject to disciplinary action.
Unfortunately for the respondent Judge, it is already settled that
when a judge grants bail to a person charged with a capital
offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or
life imprisonment without conducting the required [bail]
hearing, he is considered guilty of ignorance or
incompetence the gravity of which cannot be excused by a
claim of good faith or excusable negligence. …12
A judge owes it to himself and his office to know by heart basic legal
principles and to harness his legal know-how correctly and justly –
anything less than that is constitutive of the serious charge of gross
ignorance of the law, perhaps, grave misconduct.16 In Celestina B.
Corpuz vs. Judge Orlando F. Siapno,17 we had the occasion to state,
thus:
When a judge displays an utter unfamiliarity with the law and the
rules, he erodes the confidence of the public in the courts. A judge
owes the public and the court the duty to be proficient in the law and
is expected to keep abreast of laws and the prevailing jurisprudence.
Ignorance of the law by a judge can easily be the mainspring of
injustice.18
While the Executive Judge agreed that the respondent should be
held administratively liable, it was recommended that he be merely
reprimanded, as "a balancing of the equities involved should tilt the
scales in favor of the respondent for his loyalty, diligence and
reliability." Thus:
17. A.M. No. RTJ-10-2255 January 17, 2011
(Formerly OCA IPI No. 10-3335-RTJ) SPOUSES
DEMOCRITO AND OLIVIA LAGO, Complainants,
vs. JUDGE GODOFREDO B. ABUL, JR., REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 43, GINGOOG
CITY, Respondent.
When an application for a writ of preliminary injunction or a
temporary restraining order is included in a complaint or any
initiatory pleading, the case, if filed in a multiple-sala court, shall be
raffled only after notice to and in the presence of the adverse party
or the person to be enjoined. In any event, such notice shall be
preceded, or contemporaneously accompanied by service of
summons, together with a copy of the complaint or initiatory
pleading and the applicant’s affidavit and bond, upon the adverse
party in the Philippines.
However, where the summons could not be served personally or by
substituted service despite diligent efforts, or the adverse party is a
resident of the Philippines temporarily absent therefrom or is a
nonresident thereof, the requirement of prior or contemporaneous
service of summons shall not apply.
(d) The application for a temporary restraining order shall thereafter
be acted upon only after all parties are heard in a summary hearing
which shall be conducted within twenty-four (24) hours after the
sheriff’s return of service and/or the records are received by the
branch selected by raffle and to which the records shall be
transmitted immediately.
JUDICIARY SUSPENSION AND DISCIPLINARY CASES | 11
Culled from the foregoing provisions, particularly with respect to the
second paragraph of Section 5, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, as
amended, it is clear that, on the matter of the issuance of an ex
parte 72-hour TRO, an executive judge of a multiple-sala court
(applicable to respondent judge), or the presiding judge of a single-
sala court, is empowered to issue the same in matters of extreme
emergency, in order to prevent grave injustice and irreparable injury
to the applicant. However, it is also an unequivocal provision that,
after the issuance of the 72-hour TRO, the executive judge of a
multiple-sala court is bound to comply with Section 4(c) of the same
rule with respect to the service of summons and the documents to
be served therewith.
The records of this case clearly show that respondent judge failed to
cause the raffle of Civil Case No. 2009-905, since RTC, Gingoog City,
is a multiple-sala court, or to cause the notification and service of
summons to complainants after he issued the 72-hour TRO.
Respondent judge’s July 7, 2009 Order was explicit when the civil
case was set for summary hearing on July 14, 2009, purportedly to
determine whether or not the TRO issued could be extended for
another period. Thus, it is manifest that respondent judge had
directly assumed jurisdiction over the civil action and all together
disregarded the mandatory requirements of Section 4(c), Rule 58,
relative to the raffle in the presence of the parties, and service of
summons. This is gross error.
Even assuming that there was a valid raffle to RTC, Branch 43,
Gingoog City, where respondent judge acts as the presiding
magistrate, the supposed extreme urgency of the issuance of the 72-
hour TRO was belied by his setting of the required summary hearing
for the determination of the necessity of extending the 72-hour TRO
to 20 days, one week after the issuance thereof. Indeed, Section 5,
Rule 58 is explicit that such summary hearing must be conducted
within the said 72-hour period.
What is more appalling is that respondent judge extended the 72-
hour TRO, which had already and obviously expired, into a full 20-
day TRO. An already expired TRO can no longer be extended.
Beyond such time, the TRO automatically expires, unless,
before the expiration of the said period, he, supposedly in
his capacity as presiding judge to whom the case was
raffled, conducted the required summary hearing in order to
extend the TRO’s lifetime.
Again, Rule 58, as amended, mandates a full and comprehensive
hearing for the determination of the propriety of the issuance of a
writ of preliminary injunction, separate from the summary hearing
for the extension of the 72-hour TRO. The preliminary injunction
prayed for by the applicant can only be heard after the trial court has
ordered the issuance of the usual 20-day TRO. Within that period of
20 days, the court shall order the party sought to be enjoined to
show cause at a specified time and place why the injunction should
not be granted. During that same period, the court shall also
determine the propriety of granting the preliminary injunction and
then issue the corresponding order to that effect. In the case of
respondent judge, he gravely failed to comply with what the rule
requires, i.e., to give complainants the opportunity to comment or
object, through a full-blown hearing, to the writ of injunction prayed
for. Instead, respondent judge railroaded the entire process by
treating the summary hearing for the extension of the TRO as the
very same hearing required for the issuance of the writ of
preliminary injunction.1avvphi1
Verily, the absence of the hearing required by the Rules of Court is
downright reprehensible and, thus, should not be countenanced. The
requirement of a hearing is so fundamental that failure to comply
with it not only amounts to gross ignorance of rules and procedure,
but also to an outright denial of due process to the party denied such
a hearing. Undoubtedly, the acts and omissions of respondent judge
warrant sanction from this Court.
Though not every judicial error bespeaks ignorance of the law or of
the rules, and that, when committed in good faith, does not warrant
administrative sanction, the rule applies only in cases within the
parameters of tolerable misjudgment. When the law or the rule is so
elementary, not to be aware of it or to act as if one does not know it
constitutes gross ignorance of the law. One who accepts the exalted
position of a judge owes the public and the court proficiency in the
law, and the duty to maintain professional competence at all times.
When a judge displays an utter lack of familiarity with the rules, he
erodes the confidence of the public in the courts. A judge is expected
to keep abreast of the developments and amendments thereto, as
well as of prevailing jurisprudence. Ignorance of the law by a judge
can easily be the mainspring of injustice.15
In the absence of fraud, dishonesty, or corruption, the acts of a
judge in his judicial capacity are not subject to disciplinary action.
However, the assailed judicial acts must not be in gross violation of
clearly established law or procedure, which every judge must be
familiar with. Every magistrate presiding over a court of law must
have the basic rules at the palm of his hands and maintain
professional competence at all times.16
18. A.M. No. RTJ-10-2255 February 8, 2012
(Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 10-3335-RTJ) SPOUSES
DEMOCRITO and OLIVIA LAGO, Complainants,
vs. JUDGE GODOFREDO B. ABUL, JR., Regional Trial
Court, Branch 43, Gingoog City, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
It is a settled doctrine that judges are not administratively
responsible for what they may do in the exercise of their judicial
functions when acting within their legal powers and jurisdiction.6 Not
every error or mistake that a judge commits in the performance of
his duties renders him liable, unless he is shown to have acted in bad
faith or with deliberate intent to do an injustice.7 To hold otherwise
would be to render judicial office untenable, for no one called upon
to try the facts or interpret the law in the process of administering
justice can be infallible in his judgment.8
To constitute gross ignorance of the law, it is not enough that the
subject decision, order or actuation of the respondent judge in the
performance of his official duties is contrary to existing law and
jurisprudence but, most importantly, he must be moved by bad faith,
fraud, dishonesty or corruption.9
In this case, complainants failed to show that Judge Abul was
motivated by bad faith, ill will or malicious motive when he granted
the TRO and preliminary injunction. Complainants did not adduce
any proof to show that impropriety and bias attended the actions of
the respondent judge.
19. A.M. No. CA-04-38. March 31, 2004 FRANCISCO
GALMAN CRUZ, appellee, vs. JUSTICE PORTIA
ALIÑO-HORMACHUELOS, JUDGE VICTORIA
FERNANDEZ-BERNARDO, JUDGE CAESAR A.
CASANOVA, JUDGE RENATO C. FRANCISCO, JUDGE
MANUEL D. J. SYCIANGCO and JUDGE ESTER R.
CHUA-YU, appellants.
The Court has consistently held that judges will not be held
administratively liable for mere errors of judgment in their rulings or
decisions absent a showing of malice or gross ignorance on their
part. Bad faith or malice cannot be inferred simply because the
judgment is adverse to a party. To hold a judge administratively
accountable for every erroneous ruling or decision he renders,
assuming that he has erred, would be nothing short of harassment
and would make his position unbearable.20 Much less can a judge be
so held accountable where to all indications, as in this case, the
judgment complained of is far from erroneous. The judgment in the
ejectment case has gone through all the levels of review, it is high
time that any doubts on the validity of the decision be laid to rest.
Furthermore, there is no cogent reason to delve into the allegations
of connivance, fraud and deception between Governor Pagdanganan
and the judges of Bulacan as they are not sustained by an iota of
JUDICIARY SUSPENSION AND DISCIPLINARY CASES | 12
evidence but are only based on the unfounded perception of
complainant. Familiarity between Governor Pagdanganan and the
judges of Bulacan is insufficient proof, as connivance or conspiracy
transcends companionship. This Court can not give credence to
charges based on mere suspicion or speculation.21 It is well settled
that in administrative proceedings, the complainant has the burden
of proving by substantial evidence the allegations in his
complaint.22 In the absence of contrary evidence, what will prevail is
the presumption that the respondents have regularly performed their
official duties,23 as in this case.
Complainant may strongly disagree with the decisions of the
respondents but unsubstantiated allegations of grave misconduct and
gross ignorance of the law serve no purpose other than to harass
judges and cast doubt on the integrity of the entire judiciary. As a
member of the bar for half a century,24 complainant should know
better than to file an unfounded administrative complaint.
20. A.M. No. RTJ-04-1888. February 11, 2005]
EDGARDO O. MAQUIRAN, complainant, vs. JUDGE
JESUS L. GRAGEDA, respondent.
DECISION
. . . [A]s a matter of policy, in the absence of fraud, dishonesty or
corruption, the acts of a judge in his judicial capacity are not subject
to disciplinary action even though such acts are erroneous. He
cannot be subjected to liability civil, criminal or administrative - for
any of his official acts, no matter how erroneous, as long as he acts
in good faith. In such a case, the remedy of the aggrieved party is
not to file an administrative complaint against the judge but to
elevate the error to the higher court for review and correction. The
Court has to be shown acts or conduct of the judge clearly indicative
of arbitrariness or prejudice before the latter can be branded the
stigma of being biased and partial. Thus, not every error or mistake
that a judge commits in the performance of his duties renders him
liable, unless he is shown to have acted in bad faith or with
deliberate intent to do an injustice. Good faith and absence of
malice, corrupt motives or improper considerations are sufficient
defenses in which a judge charged with ignorance of the law can find
refuge.
Finally, complainant also charges respondent of knowingly rendering
unjust judgment under Art. 206 of the Revised Penal Code, which
constitutes a serious charge under Section 8, Rule 140 of the Rules
of Court,[21] for his Orders dated June 30, 2003 and September 29,
2003. We find the same devoid of merit. As a rule, the acts of a
judge which pertain to his judicial functions are not subject
to disciplinary power unless they are committed with fraud,
dishonesty, corruption or bad faith.
A charge of knowingly rendering an unjust judgment constitutes a
criminal offense. The keyword in said offense is knowingly. Thus, the
complainant must not only prove beyond reasonable doubt that the
judgment is patently contrary to law or not supported by the
evidence but that it was also made with deliberate intent to
perpetrate an injustice. A judges mere error in the interpretation or
application of the law per se will not warrant the imposition of an
administrative sanction against him for no one is infallible. Good faith
and absence of malice, corrupt motives or improper consideration
are sufficient defenses that will protect a judicial officer from the
charge of rendering an unjust decision.
Moreover, the alleged error committed by respondent in issuing the
subject Orders pertains to the exercise of his adjudicative functions.
Such error cannot be corrected through administrative proceedings
but should instead be assailed through judicial remedies.[24] As held
in Flores vs. Abesamis:[25]
As everyone knows, the law provides ample judicial remedies against
errors or irregularities being committed by a Trial Court in the
exercise of its jurisdiction. The ordinary remedies against errors or
irregularities which may be regarded as normal in nature (i.e., error
in appreciation or admission of evidence, or in construction or
application of procedural or substantive law or legal principle) include
a motion for reconsideration (or after rendition of judgment or final
order, a motion for new trial), and appeal. The extraordinary
remedies against error or irregularities which may be deemed
extraordinary in character (i.e., whimsical, capricious, despotic
exercise of power or neglect of duty, etc.) are, inter alia, the special
civil action of certiorari, prohibition or mandamus, or a motion for
inhibition, a petition for change of venue, as the case may be.
Now, the established doctrine and policy is that disciplinary
proceedings and criminal actions against Judges are not
complementary or suppletory of, nor a substitute for, these judicial
remedies, whether ordinary or extraordinary. Resort to and
exhaustion of these judicial remedies, as well as the entry of
judgment in the corresponding action or proceeding, are pre-
requisites for the taking of other measures against the persons of the
judges concerned, whether of civil, administrative, or criminal nature.
It is only after the available judicial remedies have been exhausted
and the appellate tribunals have spoken with finality, that the door to
an inquiry into his criminal, civil, or administrative liability may be
said to have opened, or closed.
Law and logic decree that administrative or criminal remedies are
neither alternative nor cumulative to judicial review where such
review is available, and must wait on the result thereof. Indeed,
since judges must be free to judge, without pressure or influence
from external forces or factors, they should not be subject to
intimidation, the fear of civil, criminal or administrative sanctions for
acts they may do and dispositions they may make in the
performance of their duties and functions; and it is sound rule, which
must be recognized independently of statute, that judges are not
generally liable for acts done within the scope of their jurisdiction
and in good faith; and that exceptionally, prosecution of the judge
can be had only if "there be a final declaration by a competent court
in some appropriate proceeding of the manifestly unjust character of
the challenged judgment or order, and ** also evidence of malice or
bad faith, ignorance of inexcusable negligence, on the part of the
judge in rendering said judgment or order" or under the stringent
circumstances set out in Article 32 of the Civil Code.
21. A.M. No. CA-09-47-J February 13, 2009
[Formerly A.M. OCA IPI No. 08-121-CA-J] GENARO
SANTIAGO III, Complainant, vs.JUSTICE JUAN Q.
ENRIQUEZ, JR. of the Thirteenth [13th] Division,
Court of Appeals, Respondent.
That cases cited to support a Decision are not applicable, and the
appreciation of evidence and facts is erroneous, do not necessarily
warrant the filing of an administrative complaint against a judge,
unless the Decision is tainted with fraud, malice or dishonesty or with
deliberate intent to cause injustice.23
The remedy of the aggrieved party is not to file an administrative
complaint against the judge, but to elevate the assailed decision or
order to the higher court for review and correction. An administrative
complaint is not an appropriate remedy where judicial recourse is still
available, such as a motion for reconsideration, an appeal, or a
petition for certiorari, unless the assailed order or decision is tainted
with fraud, malice, or dishonesty…
The Court has to be shown acts or conduct of the judge clearly
indicative of the arbitrariness or prejudice before the latter can be
branded the stigma of being biased and partial. Thus, unless he is
shown to have acted in bad faith or with deliberate intent to do an
injustice, not every error or mistake that a judge commits in the
performance of his duties renders him liable…The failure to interpret
the law or to properly appreciate the evidence presented does not
necessarily render a judge administratively liable.24 (Italics in the
original; underscoring supplied)
Assuming arguendo that respondent’s citation of cases in support of
the Decision and his appreciation of the facts and evidence were
JUDICIARY SUSPENSION AND DISCIPLINARY CASES | 13
erroneous, since there is no showing that the Decision,
reconsideration of which was still pending at the time the present
complaint was filed, is tainted with fraud, malice or dishonesty or
was rendered with deliberate intent to cause injustice, the complaint
must be dismissed.
The PRINCIPLE OF "JUDICIAL IMMUNITY" insulates judges,
and even Justices of superior courts, from being held to account
criminally, civilly or administratively for an erroneous decision
rendered in good faith.25 To hold otherwise would render judicial
office untenable. No one called upon to try the facts or interpret the
law in the process of administering justice could be infallible in his
judgment.26
. . . A judicial officer cannot be called to account in a civil action for
acts done by him in the exercise of his judicial function, however
erroneous. In the words of Alzua and Arnalot v. Johnson, " … it is a
general principle of the highest importance to the proper
administration of justice that a judicial officer, in exercising the
authority vested in him, shall be free to act upon his own
convictions, without apprehension of personal consequences to
himself." This concept of judicial immunity rests upon consideration
of public policy, its purpose being to preserve the integrity and
independence of the judiciary. This principle is of universal
application and applies to all grades of judicial officers from the
highest judge of the nation and to the lowest officer who sits as a
court.27 (Italics in the original; emphasis and underscoring supplied)
A charge of violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act on
the ground that a collective decision is "unjust" cannot prosper.
Consequently, the filing of charges against a single member of a
division of the appellate court is inappropriate. 29 (Underscoring
supplied)
22. A.M. No. P-03-1757 December 10,
2003GRIO LENDING SERVICES, complainant,
vs. SALVACION SERMONIA, CLERK IV, REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 26, ILOILO
CITY, respondent.
Further, Section 23, Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rules Implementing
the 1987 Administrative Code defines "just debts" as including those
"claims the existence and justness of which are admitted by the
debtor." It cannot be gainsaid that the respondent admitted the
existence of her debt to the complainant in this case.
The same rule classifies the willful failure to pay just debts as a light
offense and prescribes the penalty of reprimand for the first offense,
suspension for one (1) to thirty (30) days for the second offense,
and dismissal for the third offense. Apparently, this is the
respondent’s first offense; hence, the penalty of reprimand is proper.
It must be stressed that the penalty imposed by the law is not
directed at the respondent’s private life but at her actuation
unbecoming a public official.3
It bears stressing at this point that employees of the judiciary should
be living examples of uprightness not only in the performance of
official duties but also in their personal and private dealing with other
people so as to preserve at all times
23. A.M. No. P-09-2633 OCA v. ROLANDO C. TOMAS and
ANGELINA C. RILLORTA, former Officers-in-Charge,
Regional Trial Court, Santiago City, Isabela
Judge Madrid is Guilty of Grave Misconduct and Serious
Dishonesty
Public office is a public trust. This constitutional principle requires a
judge, like any other public servant and more so because of his
exalted position in the Judiciary, to exhibit at all times the highest
degree of honesty and integrity. As the visible representation of the
law tasked with dispensing justice, a judge should conduct himself at
all times in a manner that would merit the respect and confidence of
the people.7
Misconduct is defined as a transgression of some established and
definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, unlawful
behavior, willful in character, improper or wrong behavior.9 The
misconduct is grave if it involves any of the additional elements of
corruption, willful intent to violate the law, or to disregard
established rules, which must be established by substantia] evidence.
As distinguished from simple misconduct, the elements of corruption,
clear intent to violate the law, or flagrant disregard of established
rule must be manifest in a charge of grave misconduct.10
Dishonesty, on the other hand, is defined as a disposition to lie,
cheat, deceive, or defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack
of honesty, probity or integrity in principle; lack of fairness and
straightforwardness; disposition to defraud, deceive or betray.11
A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC, which provides:
Some administrative cases against Justices of the Court of Appeals
and the Sandiganbayan; judges of regular and special courts; and
court officials who are lawyers are based on grounds which are
likewise grounds for the disciplinary action of members of the Bar for
violation of the Lawyer’s Oath, the Code of Professional
Responsibility, and the Canons of Professional Ethics, or for such
other forms of breaches of conduct that have been traditionally
recognized as grounds for the discipline of lawyers.
In any of the foregoing instances, the administrative case shall also
be considered a disciplinary action against the respondent Justice,
judge or court official concerned as a member of the Bar. The
respondent may forthwith be required to comment on the complaint
and show cause why he should not also be suspended, disbarred or
otherwise disciplinarily sanctioned as a member of the Bar. Judgment
in both respects may be incorporated in one decision or resolution.
Accordingly, Judge Madrid is directed to show cause why she should
not be disbarred for violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, particularly Canons 116 and 717 and Rule
1.0118 thereof.
Penalties on Judge Madrid and Rillorta
As this Court has repeatedly stated, the conduct and behavior of
everyone connected with an office charged with the dispensation of
justice, from the presiding judge to the lowest clerk, should be
circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility.23 The Court
has not hesitated to impose the ultimate penalty on those who have
fallen short of their accountabilities. Any conduct that violates the
norms of public accountability and diminishes, or even tends to
diminish, the faith of the people in the justice system has never been
and will never be tolerated or condoned by this Court.24
24. A.M. No. RTJ-01-1638 December 8, 2003
ATTY. MANUEL T. MOLINA, complainant,
vs. JUDGE BENEDICTO A. PAZ, Regional Trial Court,
Branch 6, Aparri, Cagayan and JUDGE SEGUNDO B.
CATRAL, Regional Trial Court, Branch 8, Aparri,
Cagayan, respondents.
The retirement of a judge or any judicial officer from the service
does not preclude the finding of any administrative liability to which
he should still be answerable.8 The withdrawal or recantation of the
complainant by the administrative charges does not necessarily result
in the dismissal of the administrative case. We have repeatedly ruled
that:
xxx, withdrawal of a complaint or subsequent desistance by the
complainant in an administrative case does not necessarily warrant
its dismissal. Administrative actions cannot depend on the will or
pleasure of the complainant who may, for reasons of his own,
condone what may be detestable. Neither can the Court be bound by
the unilateral act of the complainant in a matter relating to its
disciplinary power. The Court does not dismiss administrative cases
against members of the Bench merely on the basis of withdrawal of
JUDICIARY SUSPENSION AND DISCIPLINARY CASES | 14
the charges. Desistance cannot divest the Court of its jurisdiction to
investigate and decide the complaint against the respondent. To be
sure, public interest is at stake in the conduct and actuations of
officials and employees of the judiciary. And the program and efforts
of this Court in improving the delivery of justice to the people should
not be frustrated and put to naught by private arrangements
between the parties.9
Respondent Judge Paz may have good and noble intentions.
However, the Code of Judicial Conduct11 mandates that a judge
should be the embodiment of competence, integrity, and
independence. He should so behave at all times as to promote public
confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary, and avoid
impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities. His
personal behavior, not only while in the performance of official duties
but also outside the court, must be beyond reproach, for he is the
visible personification of law and of justice.12
Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct states:
A judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety
in all activities.
RULE 2.01. - A judge should so behave at all times as to promote
public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.
xxx
RULE 2.04. – A judge shall refrain from influencing in any manner
the outcome of litigation or dispute pending before another court or
administrative agency.
Even the personal behavior of judges in their everyday lives should
be beyond reproach. Judges should avoid even the slightest
infraction of the law.13 Those who occupy exalted positions in the
administration of justice must pay a high price for the honor
bestowed on them. Their private as well as their official conduct
must be always free from the appearance of impropriety.14
Judges should be extra prudent in associating with litigants and
counsel appearing before them to avoid even a mere perception of
possible bias or partiality. Judges need not live in seclusion, nor
avoid all social interrelations. When time and work commitments
permit, judges may continue to relate to members of the bar in
worthwhile endeavors in such fields of interest as are in keeping with
the noble objectives of the legal profession.
However, in pending or prospective litigations before them, judges
should be scrupulously careful to avoid anything that may tend to
awaken the suspicion that their personal, social or sundry relations
could influence their objectivity. Not only must judges possess
proficiency in law, they must also act and behave in such manner
that would assure litigants and their counsel of the judges’
competence, integrity and independence.15
Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct provides that a judge should
avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all his
activities. A judge must not only be impartial, he must also appear to
be impartial. Public confidence in the judiciary is eroded by
irresponsible or improper conduct of judges. Fraternizing with
litigants tarnishes this appearance.16
25. A.M. No. 755-MJ January 31, 1978 ROGELIO
PESOLE, complainant, vs. MUNICIPAL JUDGE LUCIO
L. RODRIGUEZ, of Tabogon, Cebu. respondent.
The rule is that charges of misconduct against judges should be
proven by clear and convincing evidence, otherwise they should be
dismissed. Thus, in Valle v. Campos. Jr., 1 where the complainant in
like mariner as the complaint in the present case, manifested in
writing that he was withdrawing his complaint because he was no
longer interested in the further prosecution of the case, We
dismissed the complaint because the charges thereon could not be
substantiated. so, too, in Pawaki v. Malik, 2 where the complainant
appeared for the hearing of the administrative case without counsel
and witnesses, and, upon being asked if he was ready to proceed
with the investigation of the charges filed against respondent judge
therein, manifested that he was withdrawing his complaint for the
simple reason that he had no evidence to support it, We dismissed
the complainant to substantiate the charges. Considering that in the
present case complainant not only failed to present any evidence to
substantiate his complaint but, on the other hand, respondent has
presented proofs which show the falsity of the charges, We can do
no less than approve the recommendation of the Investigating
Judge.
It may be apropos to mention here that in certain cases, the
acceptance by the President of respondent's courtesy resignation
does not necessarily render the case moot or deprive Us of the
authority to investigate the charges. In Perez v. Abiera, 3 We have
said that the rule that the resignation or retirement of the
respondent in an administrative case renders the case moot and
academic is not a hard and fast rule. Each case is to be resolved in
the context of the circumstance present thereat. Thus, We explained:
... (T)he jurisdiction that was Ours at the time of filing of the
administrative complaint was not lost by the mere fact that the
respondent public official had ceased to be in office during the
pendency of his case. The Court retains its jurisdiction either to
pronounce the respondent official innocent of the charges or declare
him guilty thereof. A contrary rule would be fraught with injustices
and pregnant with dreadful and dangerous implications. ... If
innocent, respondent official merits vindication of his name and
integrity as he leaves the government which he has served well and
faithfully; if guilty, he deserve to receive the corresponding censure
and a penalty proper and imposable under the situation.
26. A.M. No. 12535-Ret April 22, 2008 RE:
Application for Retirement/Gratuity Benefits under
R.A. No. 910 as amended by R.A. No. 5095 and P.D.
No. 1438 filed by Mrs. Cecilia Butacan, surviving
spouse of the late Hon. Jimmy R. Butacan (former
Judge, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 4,
Tuguegarao City), who died on July 28, 2005.
May the heirs of a judge who was found guilty of gross neglect of
duty and dismissed from the service with disqualification from
holding public office for an offense committed before he was
appointed judge, be entitled to gratuity benefits?
The Court does not agree with the OCA Legal Office and the OCA.
The dismissal of the administrative case against Judge Butacan by
reason of his demise is in accordance with Bote v. Judge
Eduardo19 where the Court held that in view of the death of Judge
Escudero, for humanitarian reasons, it is inappropriate to impose any
administrative liability of a punitive nature; and declared the
administrative complaint against the respondent Judge, dismissed,
closed and terminated.
What then is the effect of the final decision of the CA affirming the
CSC Resolution dated April 12, 1996 finding Judge Butacan, as then
Chief of the Legal Division of CSC Regional Office No. 2, guilty of
grave misconduct and gross neglect of duty and imposing the
penalty of dismissal from service with all the accessory penalties
including disqualification from holding public office and forfeiture of
benefits?
The Court resolves that upon the demise of Judge Butacan on July
28, 2005, his heirs are entitled to all gratuity benefits under R.A. No.
910, to be reckoned from June 19, 1995, the date of his appointment
as MTCC Judge up to September 11, 2004 when the CA Decision
affirming the CSC Resolution, became final and executory.
In any event, his appointment to the judiciary does not erase any
misfeasance which he may have committed while in the CSC.
In effect, his appointment as MTCC judge is conditional, that is,
subject to the final determination of the administrative complaint
against him. And this is where the role of the judiciary came in. Upon
being notified by the CSC of the conviction of Judge Butacan for
JUDICIARY SUSPENSION AND DISCIPLINARY CASES | 15
grave misconduct and gross neglect of duty, the OCA initiated the
corresponding administrative complaint against Judge Butacan. This
step finds support in Heck v. Santos20 where the Court held that
while the infraction was committed before the respondent’s
appointment as judge, the Court may still discipline him therefor.
However, upon his demise, the administrative complaint of the OCA
had to be considered closed and terminated. As it stands therefore,
there is no valid reason why the heirs of Judge Butacan should not
be entitled to gratuity benefits for the period he rendered service as
MTCC Judge up to the finality of the CSC Resolution on September
11, 2004 which imposed the penalty of "dismissal from service with
all the accessory penalties including disqualification from holding
public office and forfeiture of benefits."
27. [A.C. No. 3086. May 31, 1989.] IN RE: Petition for
the dismissal from the service and/or disbarment of
JUDGE BALTAZAR R. DIZON, Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 113.
HON. ALEXANDER A. PADILLA, Commissioner of
Customs, petitioner-complainant.
JUDICIAL ETHICS; JUDGES; ORDER OF DISMISSAL MAY BE
MODIFIED UNDER EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES; CASE AT BAR.
— After another painstaking look at the records of this administrative
case, we have decided to act favorably on the respondent’s plea to
view with less rigor the error of judgment he committed. We have
also taken into account the long government service of the
respondent spanning more than twenty-six (26) years. There is no
clear indication from the records that the respondent’s assailed
decision was inspired by corrupt motives or a reprehensible purpose
to set the plainly guilty free. There is gross misjudgment — yes, but
not a deliberate twisting of facts to justify his decision. His plea that
because the penalty for violation of CB Circular No. 960 was that
provided for in the Revised Penal Code, he believed that intent or
malice was an essential element of the offense of course deserves
but scant consideration. But because such belief is clearly wrong
does not rule out its being held and acted upon in good faith, not
from improper motives. There is likewise no question that he did not
transgress the procedural requirements needed for the rendition of a
judgment in a criminal case. The facts are all stated in the decision.
It was his egregiously erroneous interpretation of the law which led
us to discipline the Respondent. Respondent Judge Dizon has, in our
view, sincerely evinced a humble repentance. He admits his errors in
interpreting the law but he pleads that they are not of such gravity
as to deserve a penalty of "virtually capital punishment." Our
decision to dismiss the respondent Judge took effect on February 23,
1988. On the basis of the foregoing considerations, we feel he has
been sufficiently punished for the administrative infraction. We,
therefore, order his reinstatement.
(A) JUDGE CAN NOT BE HELD TO ACCOUNT OR ANSWER,
CRIMINALLY, CIVILLY, OR ADMINISTRATIVELY, FOR AN
ERRONEOUS DECISION RENDERED BY HIM IN GOOD
FAITH."
"It is a truism that the learning process in law does not stop upon
graduation from college and admission to the Bar. There should be,
on the contrary, more sustained intellectual effort on the part of the
members of the legal profession. Certainly, judges are not exempt
from this obligation. It is even more incumbent on them as they are
thought of as the oracles of law.’ There is likely then to be a
disillusionment in the judicial process if, as did happen here, an
occupant of the bench was found to be woefully lacking in legal
knowledge. . . . The efforts for improvement in the mode of
administering the government in all its manifold complexity would
come to naught if our people can harbor the suspicion that judges do
not even know what the law is."cralaw virtua1aw library
While the Court does not require perfection and infallibility, it
reasonably expects a faithful and intelligent discharge of duty by
those who are selected to fill the positions of administrators of
justice.
We are not unmindful of the fact that in a few other recent decisions,
this Court also applied the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur in judging the
errant Judge’s misdeeds. (People v. Valenzuela, 135 SCRA 712
[1985]; Cathay Pacific Airways v. Romillo, 142 SCRA 262 [1986];
Prudential Bank v. Castro, 142 SCRA 223 [1986]; and Consolidated
Bank and Trust Corporation v. Capistrano, 159 SCRA 47 [1988] We
differentiate this case from these cited cases.chanrobles virtual
lawlibrary
In these res ipsa loquitur resolutions, there was on the face of the
assailed decisions, an inexplicable grave error bereft of any
redeeming feature, a patent railroading of a case to bring about an
unjust decision, or a manifestly deliberate intent to wreak an
injustice against a hapless party. The facts themselves, previously
proven or admitted, were of such a character as to give rise to a
strong inference that evil intent was present. SUCH INTENT, IN
SHORT, WAS CLEARLY DEDUCIBLE FROM WHAT WAS
ALREADY OF RECORD.
28. G.R. No. L-64276 March 4, 1986CATHAY PACIFIC
AIRWAYS, LTD., petitioner, vs. HON. MANUEL V.
ROMILLO, JR., ETC., ET AL., respondents.
. . . no prejudice could have been caused to plaintiff by the
admission of defendant's answer, since the latter had not yet been
declared in default and plaintiff had not yet presented her evidence
on the merits. The lower court, therefore, in the exercise of its
discretion petition, should have admitted defendant's answer instead
of declaration her in default. (p. 893.)
It should be borne in mind that the policy of the law is to have every
litigated case tried on the merits as much as possible. It is for this
reason that judgments by default are frowned upon.
Time and again the Court has enjoined trial judges to act with
circumspection and not to precipitately declare parties in default,
needlessly compelling the aggrieved party to undergo the additional
expense, anxiety and delay of seeking the intervention of the
appeciate courts and depriving them of the much needed time and
attention that could instead have well been devoted to the study and
disposition of more complex and complicated cases and issues. (Akut
vs. Court of Appeals, 116 SCRA 213, 220.)
29. A.M. No. 06-9-545-RTC January 31, 2008 Re:
CONVICTION OF JUDGE ADORACION G. ANGELES,
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 121, CALOOCAN
CITY IN CRIMINAL CASE NOS. Q-97-69655 to 56
FOR CHILD ABUSE
Contempt of court is a defiance of the authority, justice or dignity of
the court, such conduct as tends to bring the authority and
administration of the law into disrespect or to interfere with or
prejudice parties, litigant or their witnesses during litigation.
There are two kinds of contempt punishable by law: direct contempt
and indirect contempt. Direct contempt is committed when a person
is guilty of misbehavior in the presence of or so near a court as to
obstruct or interrupt the proceedings before the same, including
disrespect toward the court, offensive personalities toward others, or
refusal to be sworn or to answer as a witness, or to subscribe an
affidavit or deposition when lawfully required to do so. Indirect
contempt or constructive contempt is that which is committed out of
the presence of the court. Any improper conduct tending, directly or
indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of
justice would constitute indirect contempt.
In all other cases, charges for indirect contempt shall be
commenced by a verified petition with supporting particulars
and certified true copies of documents or papers involved
therein, and upon full compliance with the requirements for
filing initiatory pleadings for civil actions in the court
concerned . . . . (Emphasis supplied)
JUDICIARY SUSPENSION AND DISCIPLINARY CASES | 16
A lawyer is an officer of the Court. It is a lawyer's sworn and moral corrupt, partial, or oppressive. As heretofore stated, the
duty to help build and not unnecessarily destroy the people's high undersigned finds no proof beyond reasonable doubt along
esteem and regard for the courts so essential to the proper that line.
administration of justice.
In order that a judge may be held liable for knowingly rendering an
An act unrelated to a judge's discharge of judicial functions may give unjust judgment, it must be shown beyond doubt that the judgment
rise to administrative liability even when such act constitutes a is unjust as it is contrary to law or is not supported by the evidence,
violation of penal law. When the issue is administrative liability, the and the same was made with conscious and deliberate intent to do
quantum of proof required is only substantial evidence, or that an injustice. "Es tan preciso," commented Viada, "que la falta se
amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept cometa a sabiendas, esto es, con malicia, con voluntad reflexiva, que
as adequate to support a conclusion. Evidence to support a en cada de uno de estos articulos vemos consignada dicha expresion
conviction in a criminal case is not necessary, and the dismissal of para que por nadie y en ningun caso se confunda la falta de justicia
the criminal case against the respondent in an administrative case is producida por ignorancia, la preocupacion o el error, con la que solo
not a ground for the dismissal of the administrative inspira la enemistad, el odio o cualquiera otra pasion bastarda y
case. CONVERSELY, CONVICTION IN THE CRIMINAL CASE corrompida. Esta es la prevaricacion verdadera."1
WILL NOT AUTOMATICALLY WARRANT A FINDING OF GUILT
IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE CASE. We emphasize the well-settled
To hold a judge liable for the rendition of a manifestly unjust
rule that criminal and civil cases are altogether different from
judgment by reason of inexcusable negligence or ignorance, it must
administrative matters, and each must be disposed of according to
be shown, according to Groizard, that although he has acted without
the facts and the law applicable to it.
malice, he failed to observe in the performance of his duty, that
diligence, prudence and care which the law is entitled to exact in the
In Nuñez v. Atty. Arturo B. Astorga,38 the Court held that the mere rendering of any public service.2 Negligence and ignorance are
existence of pending criminal charges against the respondent-lawyer inexcusable if they imply a manifest injustice which cannot be
cannot be a ground for disbarment or suspension of the latter. To explained by a reasonable interpretation.3 Inexcusable mistake only
hold otherwise would open the door to harassment of attorneys exists in the legal concept when it implies a manifest injustice, that is
through the mere filing of numerous criminal cases against them. to say, such injustice which cannot be explained by a reasonable
interpretation, even though there is a misunderstanding or error of
the law applied, in the contrary it results, logically and reasonably,
30. A.C. No. 134-J January 21, 1974 IN RE: THE HON.
and in a very clear and indisputable manner, in the notorious
RAFAEL C. CLIMACO, JUDGE OF THE COURT OF
violation of the legal precept.4
FIRST INSTANCE OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL,
BRANCH I, SILAY CITY.
It is also well-settled that a judicial officer, when required to
exercise his judgment or discretion, is not liable criminally,
Be that as it may, under Section 173 of the Revised Administrative
for any error he commits, provided he acts in good faith.
Code, the grounds for removal of a judge of first instance are (1)
serious misconduct and (2) inefficiency. FOR SERIOUS
MISCONDUCT TO EXIST, THERE MUST BE RELIABLE 31. A.M. No. 227-RTJ October 13, 1986 GREGORIO R.
EVIDENCE SHOWING THAT THE JUDICIAL ACTS ABAD, complainant, vs.ILDEFONSO BLEZA, respondent.
COMPLAINED OF WERE CORRUPT OR INSPIRED BY AN
INTENTION TO VIOLATE THE LAW, OR WERE IN PERSISTENT
Coming to the question of respondent's culpability of the charges
DISREGARD OF WELL-KNOWN LEGAL RULES. (In re
thus levelled against him on the basis of the facts, the arguments
Impeachment of Hon. Antonio Horrilleno, 43 Phil. 212). In the case
and the applicable provisions of law, it appears inescapable that
at bar, there has been no proof that in issuing the order of
respondent has not committed any wrongdoing to evoke disciplinary
September 5, 1968 (Exh. B), and in rendering a judgment of
action in acquitting Ponce of attempted homicide. The ground for
acquittal the respondent Judge was inspired by a dishonest or
acquittal was insufficiency of evidence due to inconsistencies of the
corrupt intention which prompted him to violate the law or to
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses which he specifically
disregard well-known legal rules. In fact, in spite of the biting
pointed out in the decision. In addition, respondent found that Ponce
language of the complainants in their complaint and in their
never pulled the gun tucked at his waist during the incident,
memorandum, they admit that the respondent Judge is not dishonest
although prosecution witnesses testified otherwise. In the face of
as far as they know. Of course, there has been an insinuation that
conflicting evidence, it is difficult to impute dishonesty and unfairness
"respondent Judge prostituted this Court and acquitted, obviously in
to respondent in arriving at his conclusion as to which side told the
bad faith, Councilor Caramonte of Bantayan, province of Cebu, in all
truth. And even if he made an error in his perception of the facts as
likelihood because of the dirty hands of power politics." Inasmuch
he saw them, it cannot be justly presumed that he did it in bad faith
as proceedings against judges as the case at bar, have been
or with malicious intent. FOR NOT EVERY ERROR OR MISTAKE
said to be governed by the rules of law applicable to penal
OF A JUDGE IN THE PERFORMANCE OF HIS DUTIES MAKES
cases, the charges must, therefore, be proved beyond
HIM LIABLE THEREFOR. TO HOLD A JUDGE
reasonable doubt (In re Horrilleno, supra), and it is
ADMINISTRATIVELY ACCOUNTABLE FOR EVERY
incumbent upon the complainants to prove their case not by
ERRONEOUS RULING OR DECISION HE RENDERS,
a preponderance of evidence but beyond a reasonable doubt,
ASSUMING THAT HE HAS ERRED, WOULD BE NOTHING
and in this venture, it is believed they failed. There is,
SHORT OF HARASSMENT AND WOULD MAKE HIS POSITION
indeed, a paucity of proof that respondent Judge has acted
UNBEARABLE.
partially, or maliciously, or corruptly, or arbitrarily or
oppressively.
In the case of Ajeno v. Inserto (71 SCRA 166, 172), this Court held
that: ... Even in the remaining years of his stay in the judiciary, he
xxx xxx xxx
should keep abreast with the changes in the law and with the latest
decisions and precedents. Although a judge is nearing retirement, he
In issuing the order of Sept. 5, 1968, respondent Judge as stated in should not relax in his study of the law and court decisions. Service
his answer, was guided by the Model Code of Evidence cited by Chief in the judiciary means a continuous study and research on the law
Justice Moran in his Comments on the Rules of Court. Whether in from beginning to end...
taking judicial notice of the facts stated in the order of September 5,
1968, respondent Judge erred or not, it is believed, this is not the
The records fail to show malice, ill-will or even bias on the
proper forum to dwell on the matter. Since this is an
part of respondent judge. His decision pointed out, one by one,
administrative case against him the controlling factor should
the glaring inconsistencies in the prosecution's evidence which led to
be the circumstances surrounding the issuance of such order
the exculpation of defendant Ponce. In Pabalan v. Guevarra (74
— whether in doing so the respondent Judge was arbitrary,
JUDICIARY SUSPENSION AND DISCIPLINARY CASES | 17
SCRA 53, 58), this Court held that ... Even on the assumption
that the judicial officer has erred in the appraisal of the
evidence, he cannot be held administratively or civilly liable
for his judicial action. A judicial officer cannot be called to
account in a civil action for acts done by him in the exercise
of his judicial function however erroneous...

32. A.M. No. RTJ-08-2138 August 5, 2009OLGA

M. SAMSON, Complainant, vs.JUDGE VIRGILIO G.
CABALLERO, Respondent.

In Ratti v. Mendoza-De Castro,15 we held that the making of

untruthful statements in the PDS amounts to dishonesty and
falsification of an official document. Dishonesty, being in the nature
of a grave offense, carries the extreme penalty of dismissal from the
service with forfeiture of retirement benefits except accrued leave
credits, and perpetual disqualification from reemployment in the
government service.

Respondent, a judge, knows (or should have known) fully well that
the making of a false statement in his PDS could subject him to
dismissal. This Court will not allow him to evade the consequences of
his dishonesty. Being a former public prosecutor and a judge now, it
is his duty to ensure that all the laws and rules of the land are
followed to the letter. His being a judge makes it all the more
unacceptable. There was an obvious lack of integrity, the most
fundamental qualification of a member of the judiciary.

Time and again, we have emphasized that a judge should conduct

himself in a manner which merits the respect and confidence of the
people at all times, for he is the visible representation of the
law.16 Regrettably, we are convinced of respondent’s capacity to lie
and evade the truth. His dishonesty misled the JBC and tarnished the
image of the judiciary. He does not even seem remorseful for what
he did as he sees nothing wrong with it.

In any of the foregoing instances, the administrative case shall also

be considered a disciplinary action against the respondent justice,
judge or court official concerned as a member of the Bar. The
respondent may forthwith be required to comment on the complaint
and show cause why he should not also be suspended, disbarred or
otherwise disciplinary sanctioned as a member of the Bar. Judgment
in both respects may be incorporated in one decision or resolution.
(Emphasis supplied)

Before the Court approved this resolution, administrative and

disbarment cases against members of the bar who were likewise
members of the court were treated separately.18 However,
pursuant to the new rule, an administrative case against a
judge of a regular court based on grounds which are also
grounds for the disciplinary action against members of the
Bar shall be automatically considered as disciplinary
proceedings against such judge as a member of the Bar.19

This must be so as violation of the fundamental tenets of

judicial conduct embodied in the new Code of Judicial
Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary, the Code of Judicial
Conduct and the Canons of Judicial Ethics constitutes a
breach of the following Canons of the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR):20

JUDICIARY SUSPENSION AND DISCIPLINARY CASES | 18