9. CHORZOW FACTORY CASE (Germany v. Poland)
Its translation by the
FACTS:
 The case concerned the expropriation by Poland of a
factory at Chorzow contrary, as the court had held, to the
Geneva Convention of 1922 between Germany and Poland
on Upper Silesia. Germany had a contract with a company,
where the company undertook to establish and construct a
nitrate factory at Chorzow, Upper Silesiain Poland.
Subsequently, Germany and Poland signed a convention
concerning the Upper Silesia of Geneva. A Poland national
was then delegated with the full powers to take charge of
the factory, thus, causing the end of the contract between
Germany and the companies. Poland thereafter
expropriated the factory at Chorzow causing Germany to
bring an action in behalf of the companies in violation of the
Geneva Conventions.
ISSUE: WON the compensation due to German Government is
limited to the value of the undertaking at the moment of
dispossession plus interest to the day of payment.
RULING: The action of Poland is not an expropriation.
Reparation must, as far as possible, wipe out all the
consequences of the illegal act and re-establish the situation
that would, in all probability have existed if that act had not been
committed and restitution in kind, or, if not possible, payment of
the sum corresponding to the value which a restitution in kind
would bear are the principle which would serve to determine the
amount of compensation due for an act contrary to international
law. The limitation would only be admissible if the Polish
Government had the right to expropriate, and if it’s wrongful act
consisted merely in not having paid the two companies the just
price of what was expropriated. The impossibility, on which the
parties agreed, of restoring the Chorzow factory could therefore
have no other effect but that of substituting payment of the value
of the undertaking for restitution; it would not be in conformity
either with the principles of law or with the wish of the parties to
infer from that agreement that the question of compensation
must henceforth be dealt with as though an expropriation
properly so called was involved.
10. NORTH AMERICAN DREDGING COMPANY CLAIM 1926,
MEXICO-US GENERAL CLAIMS COMMISSION 1926
FACTS:
 This case is before this Commission on a motion of the
Mexican Agent to dismiss. It is put forward by the United
States of America on behalf of North American Dredging
Company of Texas, an American corporation, for the
recovery of the sum of $233,523.30 with interest thereon,
the amount of losses and damages alleged to have been
suffered by claimant for breaches of a contract for dredging
at the port of Salina Cruz, Mexico, which contract was
entered into between the claimant and the Government of
Mexico, November 23, 1912. The contract was signed at
Mexico City. The Government of Mexico was a party to it. It
had for its subject matter services to be rendered by the
claimant in Mexico. Payment therefor was to be made in
Mexico.
 Article 18, incorporated by Mexico as an indispensable
provision, not separable from the other provisions of the
contract, was subscribed to by the claimant for the purpose
of securing the award of the contract.
Mexican Agent reads as follows:
 "The contractor and all persons who, as employees or in
any other capacity, may be engaged in the execution of the
work under this contract either directly or indirectly, shall be
considered as Mexicans in all matters, within the Republic
of Mexico, concerning the execution of such work and the
fulfillment of this contract. They shall not claim, nor shall
they have, with regard to the interests and the business
connected with this contract, any other rights or means to
enforce the same than those granted by the laws of the
Republic to Mexicans nor shall they enjoy any other rights
than those established in favor of Mexicans. They are
consequently deprived of any rights as aliens, and under no
conditions shall the intervention of foreign diplomatic agents
be permitted, in any matter related to this contract."
 It is evident that its purpose was to bind the claimant to be
governed by the laws of Mexico and to use the remedies
existing under such laws. The claimant should be governed
by those laws and remedies; which Mexico had provided for
the protection of its own citizens.
 The jurisdiction of the Commission is challenged in this
case on the grounds:
1) That claims based on an alleged nonperformance of
contract obligations are outside the jurisdiction of this
Commission; and
2) That a contract containing the so-called Calvo clause
deprives the party subscribing said clause of the right
to submit any claims connected with his contract to an
international commission.
ISSUE: WON the Calvo Clause in this case must be recognized.
RULING: No. The right to seek redress is a sovereign
prerogative of a state and a private individual has no right to
waive the State’s right. The Calvo clause is neither upheld by all
outstanding international authorities and by the soundest among
international awards nor is it universally rejected. The
commission does not hesitate to declare that there exists no
international rule prohibiting the sovereign right of a nation to
protect its citizens abroad from being subject to any limitation
under any circumstances.
 What Mexico asked of the North American Dredging
Company of Texas as a condition for awarding it the
contract it sought is that under no condition shall the
intervention of foreign diplomatic agents or of claimants’
state in any matter related to the contract. The claimant
subscribed to such contract and promised to do so.
 Commission holds that the claimant may do such promise,
but at the same time holds of that he cannot deprive the
government of his nation of its right of applying international
remedies to violations of international law committed to his
damage. Calvo Clause could not deprive the claimant of his
American citizenship and all that it implies.
 It being impossible to prove the illegality of the said
provision, under the limitations indicated, by adducing
generally recognized rules of positive international law, it
apparently can only be contested by invoking its incongruity
to the law of nature (natural rights) and its inconsistency
with the rights of nations. The Commission ventures to
suggest that it would strengthen and stimulate friendly
 relations between nations if in the future such important
clauses in contracts as article 18 in the contract in question
were couched in such clear, simple, and straightforward
language, frankly expressing its purpose with all necessary
limitations.
 The foregoing pertains to the power of the claimant to bind
itself by contract. It is clear that the claimant could not under
any circumstances bind its Government with respect to
remedies for violations of international law.
 As the claimant voluntarily entered into a legal contract
binding itself not to call as to this contract upon its
Government to intervene in its behalf, and as all of its claim
relates to this contract, and as therefore it cannot present
its claim to its Government for interposition or espousal
before this Commission, the second ground of the notion to
dismiss is sustained.
 The Commission decides that the case as presented is not
within its jurisdiction and the motion of the Mexican Agent
to dismiss it is sustained and the case is hereby dismissed
without prejudice to the claimant to pursue his remedies
elsewhere or to seek remedies before this Commission for
claims arising after the signing of the Treaty of September
8, 1923.
11. ISLAND OF PALMAS CASE (UNITED STATES V. THE
NETHERLANDS)
APRIL 4, 1928
FACTS:
 The Islands of Palmas (or Miangas) is a single, isolated
island, not one of several islands clustered together. It lies
about halfway between Cape San Augustin (Mindanao,
Philippine Islands) and the most northerly island of the
Nanusa (Nanoesa) group (Netherlands East Indies).
 The visit by General Leonard Wood led to the statement by
the US that the Island of Palmas (or Miangas), undoubtedly
included in the "archipelago known as the Philippine
Islands", as delimited by Article III of the Treaty of Paris, and
ceded in virtue of the said article to the United States, was
considered by the Netherlands as forming part of the
territory of their possessions in the East Indies.
 The United States, as successor to the rights of Spain over
the Philippines, bases its title in the first place on discovery.
The existence of sovereignty thus acquired is, in the
American view, confirmed by treaty, in particular by the
Treaty of Miinster, of 1648, to which Spain and the
Netherlands are themselves Contracting Parlies. As,
according to the same argument, nothing has occurred of a
nature, in international law, to cause the acquired title to
disappear, this latter title was intact at the moment when,
Spain ceded the Philippines to the United States. In these
circumstances, it is, in the American view, unnecessary to
establish facts showing the actual display of sovereignty.
The United States Government finally maintains that
Palmas (or Miangas) forms a geographical part of the
Philippine group and in virtue of the principle of contiguity
belongs to the Power having the sovereignty over the
Philippines.
 According to the Netherlands Government, on the other
hand, the fact of discovery by Spain is not proved, nor yet
any other form of acquisition, and even if Spain had at any
moment had a title, such title had been lost. The principle of
contiguity is contested.
 The Netherlands Government's main argument endeavours
to show that the Netherlands, represented for this purpose
in the first period of colonization by the East India Company,
have possessed and exercised rights of sovereignty from
1677, or probably from a date prior even to 1648, to the
present day. This sovereignty arose out of conventions
entered into with native princes of the Island of Sangi (the
main island of the Talautse (Sangi) Isles), establishing the
suzerainty of the Netherlands over the territories of these
princes, including Palmas (or Miangas). The state of affairs
thus set up is claimed to be validated by international
treaties. The facts alleged in support of the Netherlands
arguments are, in the United States Government's view, not
proved, and, even if they were proved, they would not
create a title of sovereignty, or would not concern the Island
of Palmas.
ISSUE: Whether the Island of Palmas (or Miangas) in its entirety
forms a part of territory belonging to the United States of
America or of Netherlands territory.
RULING: Island of Palmas belongs to the Netherlands.
 If the claim to sovereignty is based on the continuous and
peaceful display of State authority, the fact of such display
must be shown precisely in relation to the disputed territory.
It is not necessary that there should be a special
administration established in this territory; but it cannot
suffice for the territory to be attached to another by a legal
relation which is not recognized in international law as valid
against a State contesting this claim to sovereignty; what is
essential in such a case is the continuous and peaceful
display of actual power in the contested region.
 An inchoate title cannot prevail over a definite title founded
on continuous and peaceful display of sovereignty. The
continuous and peaceful display of territorial sovereignty is
as good as title. Discovery alone, without any subsequent
act, cannot suffice to prove sovereignty over the island.
There is no positive rule of international law that islands
situated outside territorial waters should belong to a state
whose territory forms the nearest continent or large island.
No one contested the exercise of territorial rights by the
Netherlands from 1700 to 1906. The title of discovery, at
best an inchoate title, does not prevail over the Netherlands,
claim of sovereignty.
12.CLIPPERTON ISLAND ARBITRATION CASE
France v. Mexico
26 Am. J. int’l L. 390 (1932)
FACTS:
 Clipperton Island is a small uninhabited island located in the
eastern part of the Pacific Ocean some 1,200km Southeast
of Mexico. It was named after John Clipperton, an English
pirate who is said to have passed the island. The island was
first discovered by 2 French. The first scientific expidition
took place in 1725 under Frenchman M. Bocage, who lived
on the island for several months. In 1858, A French Naval
Officer claimed sovereignty on it. This fact was notified to
the French Consulate who in turn informed the Government
of Hawaii.
 Other claimants include the United States and Mexico
 Very little was done by France in relation to the island until
in 1897 when a French warship visited the island. It was
followed a month later by a Mexican warship landing there
and forcing the three inhabitants to raise the Mexican flag
and asserting its claims to sovereignty. A colony was
thereafter established, and a series of military governors
was posted. France insisted on its ownership over the
island.
ISSUE:
1) WON the island should be awarded to Franc
2) WON France had fulfilled the twin requirements of territorial
occupation:
a) intention and will to exercise sovereignty (animus
occupandi) and
b) the actual taking of possession of the territory.
RULING:
1) YES. At the time of the French Proclamation in 1858, the
island had the status of territorium nullius, and therefore,
susceptible of an effective occupation.
2) YES. Regarding the first condition, the arbitrator attributed
to the French Proclamation of 1858 her intention to consider
the insland as her territory. The second requirement
consisted of the actual, and not the nominal, taking of
possession. The degree of authority to be exercised in order
to constitute actual possession depended upon the nature
of the territory. In this case, the island was awarded to
France on the ground that it was legitimately acquired by it
in 1858, and the symbolic proclamation was treated as an
act of possession.
It is beyond doubt that by immemorial usage having the
force of law, besides the animus occupandi, the actual, and
not the nominal, taking of possession is a necessary
condition of occupation. This taking of possession consists
in the act, or series of acts, by which the occupying state
reduces to its possession the territory in question and takes
steps to exercise exclusive authority there. Strictly
speaking, and in ordinary cases, that only takes place when
the state establishes in the territory itself an organization
capable of making its laws respected. But this step is,
properly speaking, but a means of procedure to the taking
of possession, and, therefore, is not identical with the latter.
There may also be cases where it is unnecessary to have
recourse to this method. Thus, if a territory, by virtue of the
fact that it was completely uninhabited, is, from the first
moment when the occupying state makes its appearance
there, at the absolute and undisputed disposition of that
state, from that moment the taking of possession must be
considered as accomplished, and the occupation is thereby
completed.
NOTE: In respect of small islands, isolated territories or small,
desolate and unihabited islands, symbolic annexation may be
sufficient to establish exclusive title.
13. EASTERN GREENLAND CASE
PCIJ 1933
FACTS:
 A suit was instituted before the Permanent Court of
International Justice (PCIJ) by Denmark against Norway
over the legal status of certain territories in Eastern
Greenland. The dispute arose when Norwegian
Government on 10 July 1931 proclaimed that it proceeded
to occupy certain territories of Eastern Greenland which as
contented by Denmark are subject to sovereignty of Crown
of Denmark
 It is established that Greenland was discovered around 900
A.D. and was colonized 100 years after by Eric the Red of
the Norwegian origin. At that time two settlements called
Eystribygd and Vestribygd existed as an independent State
for some time; however, latter they became tributary to the
kingdom of Norway in the 13th century. These settlements
disappeared before 1500
 In 1774, the State of Denmark had monopoly over the trade
activities in Greenland. Norway contended that Greenland,
in general, mean the colonized part of the West coast and
where as Denmark viewed Greenland as encompassing
whole island of Greenland.
 After a war that broke out between Denmark and Sweden
and her allies, Denmark was made to sign the Peace Treaty
of Kiel in 1814 according to which the Kingdom of Norway,
excluding Greenland, the Faeroe Isles and Iceland, was
seceded to Sweden.
 On July 10th, 1931 by a Norwegian Royal Resolution the
King of Norway declared the occupation of the country in
Eastern Greenland. It was until 1931 there was no claim by
any sovereign other than Denmark to the sovereignty over
Greenland
 The Danish Government contended that Norway had given
certain undertakings recognizing its sovereignty over
Greenland to the effect that, after termination of the Union
between Denmark and Norway in 1814, the latter undertook
not to contend the Danish claim of sovereignty over
Greenland as to effect the conclusion that Norway
acknowledged Danish sovereignty and consequently it
cannot occupy of any part thereof. Moreover, one of the
bases for the Denmark's claim was the statement made by
Foreign Minister of Norway Mr. Ihlen in July, 1919 that
would render Norway’s claim for sovereignty futile.
 On the other hand, Norway contented that his statement,
would not bind the Norwegian Government as it lacked
requisite authority, therefore, invalid. That Ihlen's
declaration is a mere diplomatic assurance of the
benevolent attitude of the Norwegian Government in the
event of subsequent negotiations concerning a definitive
settlement and that verbal declaration is not internationally
binding.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Ihlen declaration is valid and binding
over the state parties.
RULING: YES.
 The Ihlen Declaration was a statement made on 22 July
1919 by the Foreign minister of Norway, Nils Claus Ihlen,
on the topic of Denmark's sovereignty over Greenland, in
which Ihlen declared verbally to the Danish Minister that
 "...the plans of the Royal [Danish] Government respecting
Danish sovereignty over the whole of Greenland...would be
met with no difficulties on the part of Norway.
 PCIJ stated that it considers the declaration beyond all
disputes that a reply of this nature given by the Minister for
Foreign Affairs on behalf of his Government in response to
a request by the diplomatic representative of a foreign
power, in regard to a question falling within his province, is
binding upon the country to which the Minister belongs
 The affirmative reply by the Minister had the ability of
creating a bilateral engagement. Even if there is no such
engagement, what Norway desired from Denmark
regarding Spitzbegen is similar to Denmark's wish from
Norway. Hence the reply by Mr. Ihlen on July 22nd, 1919 is
definitely affirmative.
14. ANGLO- NORWEGIAN FISHERIES CASE
FACTS:
 Since 1911 British trawlers had been seized and
condemned for violating measures taken by the Norwegian
Government specifying the limits within which fishing was
prohibited to foreigners. In 1935, a Decree was adopted
establishing the lines of delimitation of the Norwegian
fisheries zone.
 On 28 September 1949, the Government of the United
Kingdom filed with the Registry of the ICJ an application
instituting proceedings against Norway. The subject of the
proceedings was the validity, under international law, of the
lines of delimitation of the Norwegian fisheries zone.
 The application referred to the declarations by which the
United Kingdom and Norway had accepted the compulsory
jurisdiction of the ICJ in accordance with Article 36 (2) of its
Statute.
ISSUE: Whether the Norwegian Government was entitled to
delimit a fisheries zone, in accordance with international law,
extending seaward to 4 nautical miles from those lines and
exclusively reserved for its own nationals
HELD: YES. The Judgment was rendered on 18 December
1951:
a) By 10 votes to 2 the Court held that "the method employed
for the delimitation of the fisheries zone by the Royal
Norwegian Decree of July 12th 1935 is not contrary to
international law"
b) By 8 votes to 4 the Court held that "the base-lines fixed by
the said Decree in application of this method are not
contrary to international law".
 It was agreed from the outset by both Parties and by the
Court that Norway had the right to claim a 4-mile belt of
territorial sea, that the fjords and sunds along the coastline,
which have the character of a bay or of legal straits, should
be considered Norwegian for historical reasons, and that
the territorial sea should be measured from the line of the
low-water mark.
 The Court found itself obliged to decide whether the
relevant low-water mark was that of the mainland or of the
skjaergaard, and concluded that it was the outer line of the
skjaergaard that must be taken into account in delimiting the
belt of Norwegian territorial waters.
 The instant case required the application of a third
delimitation method according to which the belt of the
territorial waters must follow the general direction of the
coast. Such a method consisted of selecting appropriate
points on the low-water mark and drawing straight lines
between them.
 On the basis of the evidence presented, the Court
established the existence and the constituent elements of
the Norwegian system of delimitation and found that the
system had been applied consistently and uninterruptedly
from 1869 until the time when the dispute arose. From the
standpoint of international law, it held that the application of
the Norwegian system had encountered no opposition from
foreign States.
 The Court found that the lines drawn were in accordance
with the traditional Norwegian system and, moreover,
pointed out that they were a result of a careful study initiated
by the Norwegian authorities as far back as 1911.
 In addition, the Court considered that "traditional rights
reserved to the inhabitants of the Kingdom over fishing
grounds ... founded on the vital needs of the population and
attested by very ancient and peaceful usage, may
legitimately be taken into account in drawing a line, which,
moreover, appears to the Court to have been kept within the
bounds of what is moderate and reasonable".
15. LAURIPZHEN VS LARSAN
FACTS:
 A Danish seaman, Larsen, brought suit under Jones Act to
recover for injuries on the Danish ship, the Randa, while
docked in Cuba.
 Larsen based assertion of federal jurisdiction on board
reading of Jones Act, that encompassed all sailors, and on
Lauritzen company’s significant NY business contracts.
The Statute stated: Any seaman who shall suffer personal
injury in the course of his employment may, at his election,
maintain an action for damages at law, with the right of trial
by jury, and in such action all statutes of the United States
modifying or extending the common-law right or remedy in
cases of personal injury to railway employees shall apply.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Danish Law should apply?
RULING: The Danish Law should apply.
 The Court ruled that under the Law of the Flag, each state
under international law may determine for itself the
conditions on which it will grant its nationality to a merchant
ship, thereby accepting responsibility for it and acquiring
authority over it. Nationality is evidenced to the world by the
ship’s papers and its flag.
 The Law of the flag supersedes the territorial principle (even
for criminal jurisdiction of personnel of a merchant ship),
because it is deemed to be a part of the territory of that
sovereignty (whose flag it flies), and not to lose that
character when in navigable waters within the territorial
limits of another sovereignty. The Court also held that all
matters of discipline and all things done on board which
affected only the vessel or those belonging to it, and do not
 involve the peace or dignity of the country or the port’s
tranquility, should be left by the local government to be dealt
with by the authorities of the nation to which the vessel
belongs as the laws of that nation or the interests of its
commerce requires.
16. SAUDI ARABIA V. ARABIAN AMERICAN OIL COMPANY
(ARAMCO)
FACTS:
 The present case is an arbitration relating to the
interpretation of the 1933 Concession Agreement between
the Government of the State of Saudi Arabia (Government)
and Aramco giving Aramco exclusive rights to transport oil
extracted from its concession in Saudi Arabia.
 Article 1 of the 1933 Concession Agreement provides that
“The Government hereby grants to the Company on the
terms and conditions hereinafter mentioned, and with
respect to the area defined below, the exclusive right, for a
period of 60 years from the effective date hereof to explore,
prospect, drill for, extract, treat, manufacture, transport,
deal with, carry away, and export Petroleum…” Thus, under
the Concession, Aramco has the exclusive right:
1. to search for petroleum (explore and prospect
2. to extract oil (drill for and extract
3. to refine petroleum and produce its derivatives ( treat
and manufacture
4. to transport petroleum, to sell it abroad, and to dispose
of it commercially (transport, deal with, carry away and
export)
 Article 22 of the 1933 Concession Agreement provides that
“It is understood, of course, that the Company has theright
to use all means and facilities it may deem necessary or
advisable in order to exercise the rights grantedunder this
contract so as to carry out the purpose of this enterprise…”
 Subsequently, in 1954, the Government concluded the
Onassis Agreement which gave the Saudi ArabianMaritime
Tankers. Ltd (Satco) a 30 years right of priority for the
transport of Saudi Arab Oil.
 The central point in dispute submitted to the Arbitration
Tribunal is to determine what rights were conferred
uponAramco by the Concession Agreement particularly as
regards the transport of Saudi Arab oil by Aramco
Government’ argument : The Concession Agreement purports
to authorize Aramco to explore areas supposed tocontain oil
deposits, and in case of discovery, to extract and produce the
oil, but not to transport by sea . The term “transport” in Article 1
only contemplated the internal transport from the site of the
extraction to the port of loading or the Ras Tanura refinery for
manufacture. It cannot mean external transport, outside the
limits of Saudi Arabia. The exclusive right of transport by sea
was not included within the expectations of the parties, as no
express stipulation to this effect was included in the Agreement.
 The Arbitration Tribunal notes the good faith of the Parties
as regards the resolution of the case.
ISSUE: WON Aramco has the right to transport oil by sea.
RULING: YES. The exclusive right to export granted to Aramco
necessarily implies the right to transport oil by sea.
The Arbitration Tribunal cannot adopt the argument of the
government without straining the meaning of the texts.
 The terms used in Article 1 of the Concession Agreement
to indicate the content of Aramco’s exclusive right must be
understood in their plain, ordinary and usual sense which is
the sense accepted in the oil industry
 In its capacity as first concessionaire, Aramco enjoys
indeed exclusive rights which have the character of
acquired or ' vested ' rights and which cannot be taken away
from it by the Government by means of a contract
concluded with a second concessionaire, even if that
contract were equal to its own contract from a legal point of
view. The principle of respect for acquired rights is one of
the fundamental principles both of public international law
and of the municipal law of most civilized States
 “To transport” – to carry beyond persons or things i.e. from
one place to another, whatever the distance betweenthem.
It does not imply and special means of transportation.
Consequently it can apply to land, water or seatransport. In
connection with the oil business, the methods adopted by
the oil industry cannot be ignored
 According to principles in interpreting concessions, any
restriction on the rights granted by a general clausemust be
expressed in a clear and unequivocal manner if it is to be
invoked against the concessionaire. InArticle 22, only the
transportation by air was expressly excluded. The mere
absence of the words “seatransport” cannot mean its
exclusion.
 The government further claims that the right of transport
across boundary of the territorial waters is granted tothe
concessionaire in one direction only—which is in order to
reach Saudi Arabia and not in order to take itsoil and
products away from the country.
 The arbitration tribunal holds that such contention is not
supported by various texts which constitute theConcession
and overlook the practical utility for Aramco to transport oil
outside the territorial waters.
 The 7984 Offshore Agreement provides that Aramco enjoy
an exclusive right to transport not only within theterritorial
waters, but also across boundary which separates the
waters from the high seas.
 Furthermore, it is impossible to imagine that the parties
would want to give the concessionaire an exclusiveright to
transport restricted to the territorial waters while deny this
right as regard transportation overseaswhich is the only
kind of transportation of real interest to the concessionaire.
 The legal construction resorted to by the Government
appears to be contrary to the nature of things, to theneeds
of commerce, to the real intention of the parties, as well as
the wording of various agreementspertaining to the
concession
17. I’M ALONE CASE
Principle: Hot Pursuit must be continuous
FACTS:
 In 1929 a Canadian registered ship named “I am alone”, a
British ship of Canadian registry controlled and managed by
United States citizens that was sunk.
- It was alleged that the ship was used in smuggling
alcoholic liquor into the United States. At that time, it
was illegal to smuggle alcohol. It was ordered to stop
 for inspection at a point outside the U.S territorial
waters but declined.
 This led to a pursuit of the ship by a vessel, Wolcott and
after two days of pursuit it was joined by the coast guard
vessel, Dexter, which eventually sunk the ‘I’m Alone’. This
resulted to death of one person and the rest of the crew was
rescued
 The above actions led to diplomatic row between the US
and Canada. Canada claimed that sinking the ship was
illegal and not justified according to the “Convention
between The United States of America And Great Britain to
Aid in The Prevention of The Smuggling Of Intoxicating
Liquors Into The United States”. The dispute between the
parties was subsequently submitted to a commission
prescribed then by article 4 of that convention
 While the U.S claimed that their actions were justified
pursuant to the Anglo-American Convention signed by the
US and Britain and Britain could raise no objection since it
was within the one hour steaming zone designated by the
convention; Canada contended that the convention did not
confer any right of hot pursuit even within the conventional
limit
 The major point of contention in this case was the location
of the ‘I am alone’ ship was when it was boarded by
Wolcott.
- The Canadian government reiterated that at that time I
am Alone was already out of the conventional limits,
- US on the other hand argued that the ship was nearer
to its shore and within the conventional limits.
- Canada further protested that since ‘I’m Alone’ was
outside the 3 nautical mile limit of US territorial waters
there was no right to pursue the ship beyond the
conventional limit and that the act of sinking it by Dexter
occurred after the ship had left the conventional limits.
The matter was referred for adjudication by the parties
to a commission comprising of Canadian and US
citizens
 The state parties to the dispute cited various provisions in
their tripartite agreement and which they used to justify their
claims. While Britain claimed ships registered in any of the
three countries were free to navigate across the three
territories without any hindrance. USA claimed that the
movement of such ships would be illegal if they were
suspected of ferrying drugs and psychotropic substances.
Canada acknowledged the argument made by the USA but
it contended that according to the convention, the rights of
pursuit conferred by the convention could not be exercised
at a greater distance from the coast of the USA. Therefore
Canada’s position was that USA did not have the right to
hot pursuit.
ISSUE:
a. Whether USA had the right to hot pursuit or not?
b. Whether the hot pursuit of Dextar was legal or not?
RULING: USA had the right of hot pursuit but hot pursuit must
be continuous in nature, therefore the engagement of Dextar is
illegal.
 A decision was made by the tribunal which constituted of
adjudicators from the three countries. The tribunal’s verdict
was that the sinking of the ship was illegal and USA was
directed to pay damages of $50,666
 In making the decision, the court balanced several
questions of law and fact. One of them was that the ship
was found to have been procured for illegal purposes.
This had to be balanced against the fact on whether it was
unlawful to sink the ship.
 Another issue was the ownership of the ship.
- The reason is that although it had been registered in
Canada, it was claimed that it was owned by American
citizens.
- USA cited a provision in the convention which was to
the effect of absolving the pursuing ship from any loss
(even sinking) that is incurred during a hot pursuit.
However, it is agreeable that this was actually
intentional sinking by the pursuing ship
 The ‘I am alone’ case is a landmark case on the Law of the
sea and it has contributed positively in the development of
this field of law. It explicitly set out the parameters of hot
pursuit and to what extent a state may pursue a ship that
has violated its laws. The decision in this case later
influenced inclusion of hot pursuit in various conventions on
the Law of the sea. A clear illustration of this is the
incorporation of hot pursuit in Article 111 of the 1982 United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).
 One of the most contentious aspects as manifested in the
case was on reasonable force. What amounts to
reasonable force? This issue is one that has not been
resolved. Canada had one major concern during these
proceedings. Its contention was whether sinking the ship
the only option left for the USA. Why did they not arrest it?
In a rejoinder to this the respondent state said that from a
military perspective the option to sink the ship.
 With the great developments in the Law of the Sea, the right
to hot pursuit is highly appreciated. However, this right is
subject to reservations.
- The first is that the pursuing country must pay due
regard to the equality of states principle that is
contained in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. Also, the
ship may only pursue the foreign ship to a distance of
12 nautical miles from its territory. It is also required
that the pursuit may only be continued outside the
territorial sea or the contiguous zone if it has been
continuous and not interrupted. An order to stop must
have been given to the vessel before being pursued
and it has defied.
- Another condition is that the pursuit may only be
exercised by warships, military aircraft or ships or
aircraft clearly marked as being on governmental
service, that is, marine police officers.
 Finally, once the ship enters its territorial waters or those of
another state, the pursuit must stop. This is aimed at
observing the principle of territorial sovereignty. However,
foreign states may be allowed to conduct hot pursuit
through territorial waters if certain conditions are met, for
example, when the hot pursuit continues uninterrupted