Article VI.

Legislative Power
Section 30
172. First Lepanto Ceramics vs. CA [G.R. No. 110571, March 10, 1994]

Facts:
The Omnibus Investments Code of 1981 as amended provided that appeals from
decisions of the Board of Investments (BOI) shall be the exclusive jurisdiction of the CA.
Just a few months after the 1987 Constitution took effect (July 17, 1987), the Omnibus
Investments Code of 1987 (EO 226) was promulgated which provided in Art 82 thereof
that such appeals be directly filed with the SC. The SC later promulgated, under its rule-
making power, Circular No. 1-91 which confirmed that jurisdiction of the CA over
appeals from the decisions of the BOI. SC’s Second Division, relying on said Circular,
accordingly sustained the appellate jurisdiction of the CA in this present case. Petitioner
now move to reconsider and question the Second Division’s ruling which provided:

“….although the right to appeal granted by Art 82 of EO 226 is a

substantive right which cannot be modified by a rule of procedure,
nonetheless, questions concerning where and in what manner the appeal
can be brought are only matters of procedure which this Court has the
power to regulate.”

They contend that Circular No. 191 (a rule of procedure) cannot be deemed to have
superseded Art 82 of EO 226, which is a legislation.
Issue:
Was the Court correct in sustaining the appellate jurisdiction of the CA in decisions from
the Board of Investments?
Held:
Yes. EO 226 was promulgated after the 1987 Constitution took effect February 2, 1987.
Thus, Art 82 of EO 226, which provides for increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the
SC, is invalid and therefore never became effective for the concurrence of the Court was
no sought in its enactment. Thus, the Omnibus Investments Code of 1981 as amended
still stands. The exclusive jurisdiction on appeals from decisions of the BOI belongs to
the CA.

173. Diaz V. CA, (G.R. No. 109698, December 5, 1994)

Facts:

On 23 January 1991, Davao Light and Power Company, Inc. (DLPC) filed with the
Energy Regulatory Board (ERB) an application for the approval of the sound value
appraisal of its property in service.
The Asian Appraisal Company valued the property and equipment of DLPC as of 12
March 1990 at One Billion One Hundred Forty One Million Seven Hundred Seventy
Four Thousand Pesos (P1,141,774,000.00).

On 6 December 1992, ERB approved the application of DLPC after deducting Fourteen
Million Eight Hundred Thousand Pesos (P14,800,000.00) worth of property and
equipment which were not used by DLPC in its operation.

On 6 July 1992, petitioners filed a petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme
Court assailing the decision of ERB on the ground of lack of jurisdiction and/or grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.

In our resolution of 8 September 1992, the Supreme Court referred the case for proper
disposition to the Court of Appeals which subsequently dismissed the petition on the
ground that (1) the filing of the petition for review with the Supreme Court was a wrong
mode of appeal, and (2) the petition did not comply with the provisions of Supreme Court
Circular 1-88 in that (a) it did not state the date when the petitioners received notice of
the ERB decision, (b) it did not state the date when the petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration, and (c) it inconsistently alleged different dates when petitioners
supposedly received the denial of their motion by ERB.

On 18 December 1992, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration contending that our
resolution of 8 September 1992 was a directive for the Court of Appeals to disregard the
above circular.

In its resolution of 24 March 1993, the Court of Appeals denied the motion for
reconsideration for lack of merit.

Issue:

Whether or not E.O. No. 172 is violative of Section 30, Article VI of the Constitution

Held:

Yes.

Since Sec. 10 of E.O. No. 172 was enacted without the advice and concurrence of the
Supreme Court, this provision never became effective, with the result that it cannot be
deemed to have amended the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980. Consequently, the
authority of the Court of Appeals to decide cases from the Board of Energy, now ERB,
remains.
174. SBMA V. COMELEC (G.R. No. 125416, September 26, 1996)

Facts:
On March 13, 1992, Congress enacted RA. 7227 (The Bases Conversion and
Development Act of 1992), which created the Subic Economic Zone. RA 7227 likewise
created SBMA to implement the declared national policy of converting the Subic military
reservation into alternative productive uses.
On November 24, 1992, the American navy turned over the Subic military reservation to
the Philippines government. Immediately,petitioner commenced the implementation of its
task, particularly the preservation of the sea-ports, airport, buildings, houses and other
installations left by the American navy.
On April 1993, the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong, Bataan passed Pambayang
Kapasyahan Bilang 10, Serye 1993, expressing therein its absolute concurrence, as
required by said Sec. 12 of RA 7227, to join the Subic Special Economic Zone and
submitted such to the Office of the President.
On May 24, 1993, respondents Garcia filed a petition with the Sangguniang Bayan of
Morong to annul Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg.10, Serye 1993.
The petition prayed for the following: a) to nullify PambayangKapasyang Blg. 10 for
Morong to join the Subic Special Economi Zone,b) to allow Morong to join provided
conditions are met.
The Sangguniang Bayan ng Morong acted upon the petition by promulgating Pambayang
Kapasyahan Blg. 18, Serye 1993, requesting Congress of the Philippines so amend
certain provisions of RA 7227.
Not satisfied, respondents resorted to their power initiative under the LGC of 1991.
On July 6, 1993, COMELEC denied the petition for local initiative on the ground that the
subject thereof was merely a resolution and not an ordinance.
On February 1, 1995, the President issued Proclamation No. 532 defining the metes and
bounds of the SSEZ including therein the portion of the former naval base within the
territorial jurisdiction of the Municipality of Morong.
On June 18, 19956, respondent Comelec issued Resolution No. 2845and 2848, adopting a
"Calendar of Activities for local referendum and providing for "the rules and guidelines
to govern the conduct of the referendum.
On July 10, 1996, SBMA instituted a petition for certiorari contesting the validity of
Resolution No. 2848 alleging that public respondent is intent on proceeding with a local
initiative that proposes an amendment of a national law.

Issues:
1. WON Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in promulgating Resolution No.
2848 which governs the conduct of the referendum proposing to annul or repeal
Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10
2. WON the questioned local initiative covers a subject within the powersof the people of
Morong to enact; i.e., whether such initiative "seeks the amendment of a national law."

Held:
1. YES. COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion.

FIRST. The process started by private respondents was an INITIATIVE but respondent
Comelec made preparations for a REFERENDUM only.

In fact, in the body of the Resolution as reproduced in the footnote below,the word
"referendum" is repeated at least 27 times, but "initiative" is not mentioned at all. The
Comelec labeled the exercise as a "Referendum"; the counting of votes was entrusted to a
"Referendum Committee"; the documents were called "referendum returns"; the
canvassers, "Referendum Board of Canvassers" and the ballots themselves bore the
description"referendum". To repeat, not once was the word "initiative" used in said body
of Resolution No. 2848. And yet, this exercise is unquestionably an INITIATIVE.

As defined, Initiative is the power of the people to propose bills and laws,and to enact or
reject them at the polls independent of the legislative assembly. On the other hand,
referendum is the right reserved to the people to adopt or reject any act or measure which
has been passed by a legislative body and which in most cases would without action on
the part of electors become a law.

In initiative and referendum, the Comelec exercises administration and supervision of the
process itself, akin to its powers over the conduct of elections. These law-making powers
belong to the people, hence the respondent Commission cannot control or change the
substance or the content of legislation.

2. The local initiative is NOT ultra vires because the municipal resolution is still in the
proposal stage and not yet an approved law.

The municipal resolution is still in the proposal stage. It is not yet an approved law.
Should the people reject it, then there would be nothing to contest and to adjudicate. It is
only when the people have voted for it and it has become an approved ordinance or
resolution that rights and obligations can be enforced or implemented thereunder. At this
point, it is merely a proposal and the writ or prohibition cannot issue upon a mere
conjecture or possibility. Constitutionally speaking, courts may decide only actual
controversies, not hypothetical questions or cases.
In the present case, it is quite clear that the Court has authority to review Comelec
Resolution No. 2848 to determine the commission of grave abuse of discretion. However,
it does not have the same authority in regard to the proposed initiative since it has not
been promulgated or approved, or passed upon by any "branch or instrumentality" or
lower court, for that matter. The Commission on Elections itself has made no reviewable
pronouncements about the issues brought by the pleadings. The Comelec simply included
verbatim the proposal in its questioned Resolution No. 2848. Hence, there is really no
decision or action made by a branch, instrumentality or court which this Court could take
cognizance of and acquire jurisdiction over, in the exercise of its review powers.

Article VII. Executive Department

Section 1
175. Marcos V. Manglapuz (G.R. No. 88211, September 18, 1989)
Facts:
Former President Ferdinand E. Marcos was deposed from the presidency via the non-
violent “people power” revolution and was forced into exile. Marcos, in his deathbed, has
signified his wish to return to the Philippines to die. But President Corazon Aquino,
considering the dire consequences to the nation of his return at a time when the stability
of government is threatened from various directions and the economy is just beginning to
rise and move forward, has stood firmly on the decision to bar the return of Marcos and
his family.
Aquino barred Marcos from returning due to possible threats & following supervening
events:

1. failed Manila Hotel coup in 1986 led by Marcos leaders

2. channel 7 taken over by rebels & loyalists
3. plan of Marcoses to return w/ mercenaries aboard a chartered plane of a Lebanese
arms dealer. This is to prove that they can stir trouble from afar
4. Honasan’s failed coup
5. Communist insurgency movements
6. secessionist movements in Mindanao
7. devastated economy because of

1. accumulated foreign debt

2. plunder of nation by Marcos & cronies

Marcos filed for a petition of mandamus and prohibition to order the respondents to issue
them their travel documents and prevent the implementation of President Aquino’s
decision to bar Marcos from returning in the Philippines. Petitioner questions Aquino’s
power to bar his return in the country. He also questioned the claim of the President that
the decision was made in the interest of national security, public safety and health.
Petitioner also claimed that the President acted outside her jurisdiction.
According to the Marcoses, such act deprives them of their right to life, liberty, property
without due process and equal protection of the laws. They also said that it deprives them
of their right to travel which according to Section 6, Article 3 of the constitution, may
only be impaired by a court order.
Issues:

1. Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the Constitution, the
President may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines.
2. Whether or not the President acted arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when she determined that the return of
the Marcoses to the Philippines poses a serious threat to national interest and
welfare and decided to bar their return.

Held:
No to both issues. Petition dismissed.
Separation of power dictates that each department has exclusive powers. According to
Section 1, Article VII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, “the executive power shall be
vested in the President of the Philippines.” However, it does not define what is meant by
“executive power” although in the same article it touches on exercise of certain powers
by the President, i.e., the power of control over all executive departments, bureaus and
offices, the power to execute the laws, the appointing power to grant reprieves,
commutations and pardons… (art VII secfs. 14-23). Although the constitution outlines
tasks of the president, this list is not defined & exclusive. She has residual &
discretionary powers not stated in the Constitution which include the power to protect the
general welfare of the people. She is obliged to protect the people, promote their welfare
& advance national interest. (Art. II, Sec. 4-5 of the Constitution). Residual powers,
according to Theodore Roosevelt, dictate that the President can do anything which is not
forbidden in the Constitution (Corwin, supra at 153), inevitable to vest discretionary
powers on the President (Hyman, American President) and that the president has to
maintain peace during times of emergency but also on the day-to-day operation of the
State.
The rights Marcoses are invoking are not absolute. They’re flexible depending on the
circumstances. The request of the Marcoses to be allowed to return to the Philippines
cannot be considered in the light solely of the constitutional provisions guaranteeing
liberty of abode and the right to travel, subject to certain exceptions, or of case law which
clearly never contemplated situations even remotely similar to the present one. It must be
treated as a matter that is appropriately addressed to those residual unstated powers of the
President which are implicit in and correlative to the paramount duty residing in that
office to safeguard and protect general welfare. In that context, such request or demand
should submit to the exercise of a broader discretion on the part of the President to
determine whether it must be granted or denied.
For issue number 2, the question for the court to determine is whether or not there exist
factual basis for the President to conclude that it was in the national interest to bar the
return of the Marcoses in the Philippines. It is proven that there are factual bases in her
decision. The supervening events that happened before her decision are factual. The
President must take preemptive measures for the self-preservation of the country &
protection of the people. She has to uphold the Constitution.

176. Estrada V. Arroyo (G.R. No. 146710, March 2, 2001)

Facts:
Estrada was inaugurated as president of the Republic of the Philippines on June 30, 1998
with Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as his Vice President.
In October 2000, Ilocos Sur governor Luis “Chavit” Singson, a close friend of the
President, alleged that he had personally given Estrada money as payoff from jueteng
hidden in a bank account known as “Jose Velarde” – a grassroots-based numbers game.
Singson’s allegation also caused controversy across the nation, which culminated in the
House of Representatives’ filing of an impeachment case against Estrada on November
13, 2000. House Speaker Manny Villar fast-tracked the impeachment complaint. The
impeachment suit was brought to the Senate and an impeachment court was formed, with
Chief Justice Hilario Davide, Jr. as presiding officer. Estrada, pleaded “not guilty”.
The exposé immediately ignited reactions of rage. On January 18, a crowd continued to
grow at EDSA, bolstered by students from private schools and left-wing organizations.
Activists from the group Bayan and Akbayan as well as lawyers of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines and other bar associations joined in the thousands of protesters.
On January 19, The Philippine National Police and the Armed Forces of the Philippines
also withdrew their support for Estrada and joined the crowd at EDSA Shrine.
At 2:00pm, Estrada appeared on television for the first time since the beginning of the
protests and maintains that he will not resign. He said that he wanted the impeachment
trial to continue, stressing that only a guilty verdict will remove him from office.
At 6:15pm, Estrada again appeared on television, calling for a snap presidential election
to be held concurrently with congressional and local elections on May 14, 2001. He
added that he will not run in this election.
OnJanuary 20, the Supreme Court declared that the seat of presidency was vacant, saying
that Estrada “constructively resigned his post”. Noon of the same day, Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo took her oath of office in the presence of the crowd at EDSA, becoming the 14th
president of the Philippines.
At 2:00 pm, Estrada released a letter saying he had “strong and serious doubts about the
legality and constitutionality of her proclamation as president”, but saying he would give
up his office to avoid being an obstacle to healing the nation. Estrada and his family later
left Malacañang Palace.
A heap of cases then succeeded Estrada’s leaving the palace, which he countered by
filing a peition for prohibition with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. It sought
to enjoin the respondent Ombudsman from “conducting any further proceedings in cases
filed against him not until his term as president ends. He also prayed for judgment
“confirming petitioner to be the lawful and incumbent President of the Republic of the
Philippines temporarily unable to discharge the duties of his office, and declaring
respondent to have taken her oath as and to be holding the Office of the President, only in
an acting capacity pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution.”
Issues:
1.) Whether or not the case at bar a political or justiciable issue. If justiciable, whether
or not petitioner Estrada was a president-on-leave or did he truly resign.
2.) Whether or not petitioner may invoke immunity from suits.

Held:
The Court defines a political issue as “those questions which, under the Constitution, are
to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full
discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the
government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a
particular measure.”
The Court made a distinction between the Aquino presidency and the Arroyo presidency.
The Court said that while the Aquino government was a government spawned by the
direct demand of the people in defiance to the 1973 Constitution, overthrowing the old
government entirely, the Arroyo government on the other hand was a government
exercising under the 1987 constitution, wherein only the office of the president was
affected. In the former, it The question of whether the previous president (president
Estrada) truly resigned subjects it to judicial review. The Court held that the issue is legal
and not political.
For the president to be deemed as having resigned there must be intent to resign and the
intent must be coupled by acts of relinquishment. It is important to follow the succession
of events that struck petitioner prior his leaving the palace. Furthermore, the quoted
statements extracted from the Angara diaries, detailed Estrada’s implied resignation On
top of all these, the press release he issued regarding is acknowledgement of the oath-
taking of Arroyo as president despite his questioning of its legality and his emphasis on
leaving the presidential seat for the sake of peace. The Court held that petitioner Estrada
had resigned by the use of the totality test: prior, contemporaneous and posterior facts
and circumstantial evidence bearing a material relevance on the issue.
As to the issue of the peitioner’s contention that he is immuned from suits, the Court held
that petitioner is no longer entitled to absolute immunity from suit. The Court added that,
given the intent of the 1987 Constitution to breathe life to the policy that a public office is
a public trust, the petitioner, as a non-sitting President, cannot claim executive immunity
for his alleged criminal acts committed while a sitting President. From the deliberations,
the intent of the framers is clear that the immunity of the president from suit is concurrent
only with his tenure(the term during which the incumbent actually holds office) and not
his term (time during which the officer may claim to hold the office as of right, and fixes
the interval after which the several incumbents shall succeed one another).
177. Soliven V. Makasiar (G.R. No. 82585, November 14, 1988)

Facts:
Pres. Cory Aquino filed a criminal complaint for libel against Beltran. Beltran argues that
"the reasons which necessitate presidential immunity from suit impose a correlative
disability to file suit". He contends that if criminal proceedings ensue by virtue of the
President's filing of her complaint-affidavit, she may subsequently have to be a witness
for the prosecution, bringing her under the trial court's jurisdiction. This would in an
indirect way defeat her privilege of immunity from suit, as by testifying on the witness
stand, she would be exposing herself to possible contempt of court or perjury. Beltran
also contends that he could not be held liable for libel because of the privileged character
of the publication. He also says that to allow the libel case to proceed would produce a
“chilling effect” on press freedom.

Issue:
Whether or not the President of the Philippines, under the Constitution, may initiate
criminal proceedings against the petitioners through the filing of a complaint-affidavit.

Held:
The rationale for the grant to the President of the privilege of immunity from suit is to
assure the exercise of Presidential duties and functions free from any hindrance or
distraction, considering that being the Chief Executive of the Government is a job that,
aside from requiring all of the office holder's time, also demands undivided attention.
But this privilege of immunity from suit, pertains to the President by virtue of the office
and may be invoked only by the holder of the office; not by any other person in the
President's behalf. Thus, an accused in a criminal case in which the President is
complainant cannot raise the presidential privilege as a defense to prevent the case from
proceeding against such accused.
Moreover, there is nothing in our laws that would prevent the President from waiving the
privilege. Thus, if so minded the President may shed the protection afforded by the
privilege and submit to the court's jurisdiction. The choice of whether to exercise the
privilege or to waive it is solely the President's prerogative. It is a decision that cannot be
assumed and imposed by any other person.

Section 4
178. Brillantes V. COMELEC (G.R. No. 163193, June 15, 2004)
Facts:
On December 22, 1997, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 8436 authorizing the
COMELEC to use an automated election system (AES) for the process of voting,
counting of votes and canvassing/consolidating the results of the national and local
elections. It also required the COMELEC to acquire automated counting machines
(ACMs), computer equipment, devices and materials and adopt new electoral forms and
printing materials.
The COMELEC initially intended to implement the said automation during the May 11,
1998 presidential elections, particularly in counting the votes collected from the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). However, the failure of the
machines to correctly read a number of automated ballots discontinued its
implementation.
Contributions for the establishment of the AES persisted that even President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo issued Executive Order No. 172 on January 24, 2003, allocating the
sum of P2,500,000,000 to exclusively fund the AES in time for the May 10, 2004
elections. On February 10, 2003, upon the request of the COMELEC, President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo issued Executive Order No. 175 authorizing the release of a further
supplemental P500 million budget for the AES project of the COMELEC.
The Supreme Court resolved the COMELEC to maintain the old and manual voting and
counting system for the May 10, 2004 elections after contract negations with companies
Mega Pacific Consortium (the supplier of the computerized voting/counting machines)
were discontinued. Despite this impediment, the COMELEC nevertheless continued the
electronic transmission of advanced unofficial results of the 2004 elections for national,
provincial and municipal positions, also dubbed as an "unofficial quick count."
Petitioner contends that the respondent COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to excess of Jurisdiction in the issuance of Resolution No. 6712. Respondent
COMELEC contends that its advancement in tabulation procedures is allowed within the
statutory confines of section 52 (i) of the Omnibus Election Code that:
Prescribe(s) the use or adoption of the latest technological and electronic devices, taking
into account the situation prevailing in the area and the funds available for the purpose.
Provided, That the Commission shall notify the authorized representatives of accredited
political parties and candidates in areas affected by the use or adoption of technological
and electronic devices not less than thirty days prior to the effectivity of the use of such
devices.
Issue:
Whether or not Resolution No. 6712 dated April 28, 2004 issued by the COMELEC in
authorizing the use of election funds in consolidating the election results for the May 10,
2004 elections should be declared VOID, as it is unconstitutional.

Held:
YES. For violating section 4 of Article VII. The said Resolution No. 6712 pre-empts the
sole authority of the Congress to canvass the votes of the election returns for the
President and the Vice-President.
Art. VII, Sec. 4 of the 1987: Resolution Preempts the sole and exclusive authority vested
in the Congress to canvass the votes for the election of President and Vice-President. It is
a grave error on the part of the respondent to have ignored the misapprehensions
addressed by Senate President Franklin M. Drilon to COMELEC Chairman Benjamin
Abalos during the 2004 saying that such act would be in violation of the Constitution
(section 4 of Article VII):
"any quick count to be conducted by the Commission on said positions would in effect
constitute a canvass of the votes of the President and Vice-President, which not only
would be pre-emptive of the authority of Congress, but would also be lacking of any
constitutional authority."
The existence of an accredited Citizen’s arm: Under Section 27 of Rep. Act No. 7166, as
amended by Rep. Act No. 8173, and reiterated in Section 18 of Rep. Act No. 8436, the
accredited citizen’s arm - in this case, NAMFREL - is exclusively authorized to use a
copy of the election returns in the conduct of an "unofficial" counting of the votes,
whether for the national or the local elections. No other entity, including the respondent
COMELEC itself, is authorized to use a copy of the election returns for purposes of
conducting an "unofficial" count.
In addition, the second or third copy of the election returns, while required to be
delivered to the COMELEC under the said laws, are not intended for undertaking an
"unofficial" count. The said copies are archived and unsealed only when needed by to
verify election results in connection with resolving election disputes that may be
established.
Inapplicability of Section 52(i) of the Omnibus Election Code: The Court contends that
Section 52(i) of the Omnibus Election Code, which is cited by the COMELEC as the
statutory basis for the assailed resolution, does not cover the use of the latest
technological and election devices for "unofficial" tabulations of votes. Moreover, the
COMELEC failed to notify the authorized representatives of accredited political parties
and all candidates in areas affected by the use or adoption of technological and electronic
devices not less than thirty days prior to the effectivity of the use of such devices, after
failing to submit any document proving that it had notified all political parties of the
intended adoption of Resolution No. 6712.

179. Lopez V. Senate (G.R. No. 163556, June 8, 2004)

Facts:
Ruy Elias C. Lopez, Representative representing the 3rd Legislative District of the City
of Davao, asks this Court to declare unconstitutional the Rules of the Joint Public Session
of Congress on Canvassing the Votes Cast for Presidential and Vice¬Presidential
Candidates in the May 10, 2004 Elections, which the Senate and the House of
Representatives, in joint session, approved, after much debate, on 28 May 2004.
He argues that under our constitutional system, the powers of government are distributed
among three (3) independent branches of government. The very important and delicate
power and authority to open all certificates of canvass of votes for Presidential and
Vice¬Presidential and Vice¬Presidential Candidates are solely and exclusively vested by
the Constitution in the President of the Senate, just as the very important and delicate
power and authority to determine the authenticity and due executions (sic) of all
certificates of canvass and to canvass the votes cast for Presidential and
Vice¬Presidential Candidates are solely and exclusively vested by the Constitution in the
Congress as one whole body." Any attempt to delegate these powers or a portion thereof
to any other person or entity — whether within or without the Congress — is
unconstitutional on the principle that potestas delegata non potest delegari.
Petitioner thus contends that the Canvassing Rules are unconstitutional because: 1) It
constitutes a delegation of legislative power to a Joint Committee of Congress; 2) It
constitutes an amendment of Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution; 3) It deprives him
of his rights and prerogatives as a Member of Congress; and 4) By the passage of the
Canvassing Rules, Congress has neglected to perform an act which the Constitution
specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from office.
Issue:
Whether the Rules violate Article VII, Section 4 of the Constitution.

Held:
“ Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution expressly empowers Congress “to promulgate
its rules for the canvassing of the certificates. ”In Arroyo v. de Venecia (277 SCRA 268,
August 14,1997), the Court ruled that it had no power to review the internal proceedings
of Congress, unless there is a clear violation of the Constitution. Likewise, Santiago v.
Guingona, (298 SCRA 756,November 18, 1998) held that the Court – under the doctrine
of separation of powers– has “no authority to interfere” in the “exclusive realm” of a co-
equal branch, absent a showing of grave abuse of discretion. The Court has no authority
to restrict or limit the exercise of congressional prerogatives granted by the Constitution..
In the exercise of this power, Congress may validly delegate the initial determination of
the authenticity and due execution of the certificates of canvass to a Joint Congressional
Committee, composed of members of the House of Representatives and of the Senate.
The creation of the Joint Committee does not constitute grave abuse and cannot be said to
have deprived petitioner and the other members of Congress of their congressional
prerogatives, because under the very Rules under attack, the decisions and final report of
the said Committee shall be subject to the approval of the joint session of Congress, the
two Houses voting separately.

180. Pormento V. Estrada (G.R. No. 191988, August 21, 2010)

Facts:
Estrada was elected President of the Republic of the Philippines in the May 1998
elections. He sought the presidency again in the May 2010 elections. Pormento opposed
Estrada’s candidacy and filed a petition for disqualification. COMELEC (Division)
denied his petition as well as his subsequent Motion for Reconsideration (En Banc).
Pormento then filed the present petition for certiorari before the Court. In the meantime,
Estrada was able to participate as a candidate for President in the May 10, 2010 elections
where he garnered the second highest number of votes.
Issue:
Is Estrada disqualified to run for presidency in the May 2010 elections in view of the
prohibition in the Constitution which states that: "[t]he President shall not be eligible for
any reelection?
Held:
Private respondent was not elected President the second time he ran. Since the issue on
the proper interpretation of the phrase any reelection will be premised on a persons
second (whether immediate or not) election as President, there is no case or controversy
to be resolved in this case. No live conflict of legal rights exists. There is in this case no
definite, concrete, real or substantial controversy that touches on the legal relations of
parties having adverse legal interests. No specific relief may conclusively be decreed
upon by this Court in this case that will benefit any of the parties herein. As such, one of
the essential requisites for the exercise of the power of judicial review, the existence of an
actual case or controversy, is sorely lacking in this case.
As a rule, this Court may only adjudicate actual, ongoing controversies.The Court is not
empowered to decide moot questions or abstract propositions, or to declare principles or
rules of law which cannot affect the result as to the thing in issue in the case before it. In
other words, when a case is moot, it becomes non-justiciable.
An action is considered moot when it no longer presents a justiciable controversy because
the issues involved have become academic or dead or when the matter in dispute has
already been resolved and hence, one is not entitled to judicial intervention unless the
issue is likely to be raised again between the parties. There is nothing for the court to
resolve as the determination thereof has been overtaken by subsequent events.
Section 13
181. Doromal V. Sandiganbayan (G.R. No. 85468, September 7, 1989)

Facts:

Quintin S. Doromal, a former Commissioner of the Presidential Commission on Good

Government (PCGG), for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (RA
3019), Sec. 3(h), in connection with his shareholdings and position as president and
director of the Doromal International Trading Corporation (DITC) which submitted bids
to supply P61 million worth of electronic, electrical, automotive, mechanical and
airconditioning equipment to the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (or DECS)
and the National Manpower and Youth Council (or NMYC).

An information was then filed by the “Tanodbayan” against Doromal for the said
violation and a preliminary investigation was conducted.
The petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition questioning the
jurisdiction of the “Tanodbayan” to file the information without the approval of the
Ombudsman.

The Supreme Court held that the incumbent Tanodbayan (called Special Prosecutor under
the 1987 Constitution and who is supposed to retain powers and duties NOT GIVEN to
the Ombudsman) is clearly without authority to conduct preliminary investigations and to
direct the filing of criminal cases with the Sandiganbayan, except upon orders of the
Ombudsman. Subsequently annulling the information filed by the “Tanodbayan”.

A new information, duly approved by the Ombudsman, was filed in the Sandiganbayan,
alleging that the Doromal, a public officer, being then a Commissioner of the Presidential
Commission on Good Government, did then and there wilfully and unlawfully,
participate in a business through the Doromal International Trading Corporation, a
family corporation of which he is the President, and which company participated in the
biddings conducted by the Department of Education, Culture and Sports and the National
Manpower & Youth Council, which act or participation is prohibited by law and the
constitution.

The petitioner filed a motion to quash the information on the ground that it was invalid
since there had been no preliminary investigation for the new information that was filed
against him.

The motion was denied by Sandiganbayan claiming that another preliminary

investigation is unnecessary because both old and new information involve the same
subject matter.

Issues:
Whether or not the act of Doromal would constitute a violation of the Constitution.
Whether or not preliminary investigation is necessary even if both informations involve
the same subject matter.
Whether or not the information shall be effected as invalid due to the absence of
preliminary investigation.

Held:
Yes, as to the first and second issuses. No, as to the third issue. Petition was granted by
the Supreme Court.

(1) The presence of a signed document bearing the signature of Doromal as part of the
application to bid shows that he can rightfully be charged with having participated in a
business which act is absolutely prohibited by Section 13 of Article VII of the
Constitution" because "the DITC remained a family corporation in which Doromal has at
least an indirect interest."
Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution provides that "the President, Vice-
President, the members of the Cabinet and their deputies or assistants shall not during
their tenure directly or indirectly participate in any business.

(2) The right of the accused to a preliminary investigation is "a substantial one." Its denial
over his opposition is a "prejudicial error, in that it subjects the accused to the loss of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law" provided by the Constitution.

Since the first information was annulled, the preliminary investigation conducted at that
time shall also be considered as void. Due to that fact, a new preliminary investigation
must be conducted.

(3) The absence of preliminary investigation does not affect the court's jurisdiction over
the case. Nor do they impair the validity of the information or otherwise render it
defective; but, if there were no preliminary investigations and the defendants, before
entering their plea, invite the attention of the court to their absence, the court, instead of
dismissing the information should conduct such investigation, order the fiscal to conduct
it or remand the case to the inferior court so that the preliminary investigation may be
conducted.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is granted. The Sandiganbayan
shall immediately remand Criminal Case No. 12893 to the Office of the Ombudsman for
preliminary investigation and shall hold in abeyance the proceedings before it pending
the result of such investigation.

182. Civil Liberties Union V. Executive Secretary (G.R. No. 83896, February 22,
1991)
Facts:
Petitioners: Ignacio P. Lacsina, Luis R. Mauricio, Antonio R. Quintos and Juan T. David
for petitioners in 83896 and Juan T. David for petitioners in 83815. Both petitions were
consolidated and are being resolved jointly as both seek a declaration of the
unconstitutionality of Executive Order No. 284 issued by President Corazon C. Aquino
on July 25, 1987.
Executive Order No. 284, according to the petitioners allows members of the Cabinet,
their undersecretaries and assistant secretaries to hold other than government offices or
positions in addition to their primary positions. The pertinent provisions of EO 284 is as
follows:
Section 1: A cabinet member, undersecretary or assistant secretary or other appointive
officials of the Executive Department may in addition to his primary position, hold not
more than two positions in the government and government corporations and receive the
corresponding compensation therefor.
Section 2: If they hold more positions more than what is required in section 1, they must
relinquish the excess position in favor of the subordinate official who is next in rank, but
in no case shall any official hold more than two positions other than his primary position.
Section 3: AT least 1/3 of the members of the boards of such corporation should either be
a secretary, or undersecretary, or assistant secretary.
The petitioners are challenging EO 284’s constitutionality because it adds exceptions to
Section 13 of Article VII other than those provided in the constitution. According to the
petitioners, the only exceptions against holding any other office or employment in
government are those provided in the Constitution namely: 1. The Vice President may be
appointed as a Member of the Cabinet under Section 3 par.2 of Article VII. 2. The
secretary of justice is an ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of
Sec. 8 of article VIII.
Issue:
Whether or not Executive Order No. 284 is constitutional.

Held:
No. It is unconstitutional. Petition granted. Executive Order No. 284 was declared null
and void.
In the light of the construction given to Section 13 of Article VII, Executive Order No.
284 is unconstitutional. By restricting the number of positions that Cabinet members,
undersecretaries or assistant secretaries may hold in addition their primary position to not
more that two positions in the government and government corporations, EO 284 actually
allows them to hold multiple offices or employment in direct contravention of the express
mandate of Sec. 13 of Article VII of the 1987 Constitution prohibiting them from doing
so, unless otherwise provided in the 1987 Constitution itself.
The phrase “unless otherwise provided in this constitution” must be given a literal
interpretation to refer only to those particular instances cited in the constitution itself:
Sec. 3 Art VII and Sec. 8 Art. VIII.

183. Dela Cruz V. Commission on Audit (G.R. No. 138489, November 29, 2001)

Facts:
On September 19, 1997, the COA issued Memorandum No. 97-038 directing all unit
heads/auditors/team leaders of the national government agencies and government-owned
and controlled corporations which have effected payment of any form of additional
compensation or remuneration to cabinet secretaries, their deputies and assistants, or their
representatives, in violation of the rule on multiple positions, to (a) immediately cause the
disallowance of such additional compensation or remuneration given to and received by
the concerned officials, and (b) effect the refund of the same from the time of the finality
of the Supreme Court En Banc Decision in the consolidated cases of Civil Liberties
Union vs. Exexcutive Secretary and Anti-Graft League of the Philippines, Inc. et al. vs.
Secretary of Agrarian Reform, et al., promulgated on February 22, 1991. The COA
Memorandum further stated that the said Supreme Court Decision, which became final
and executory on August 19, 1991, declared Executive Order No. 284 unconstitutional
insofar as it allows Cabinet members, their deputies and assistants to hold other offices,
in addition to their primary offices, and to receive compensation therefor.
Accordingly, on October 23, 1997, NHA Resident Auditor Salvador J. Vasquez issued
Notice of Disallowance No. 97-011-061[5] disallowing in audit the payment of
representation allowances and per diems of "Cabinet members who were the ex- officio
members of the NHA Board of Directors and/or their respective alternates who actually
received the payments." The total disallowed amount of P276,600 paid as representation
allowances and per diems to each of the petitioners.
Petitioners, through then Chairman Dionisio C. Dela Serna of the NHA Board of
Directors, appealed from the Notice of Disallowance to the Commission on Audit[7]
based on the following grounds:
 The Decision of the Supreme Court in Civil Liberties Union and Anti-Graft
League of the Philippines, Inc. was clarified in the Resolution of the Court En
Banc on August 1, 1991, in that the constitutional ban against dual or multiple
positions applies only to the members of the Cabinet, their deputies or assistants.
It does not cover other appointive officials with equivalent rank or those lower
than the position of Assistant Secretary; and
 The NHA Directors are not Secretaries, Undersecretaries or Assistant Secretaries
and that they occupy positions lower than the position of Assistant Secretary.
On September 22, 1998, the COA issued Decision No. 98-381[8] denying petitioners'
appeal, thus:
"After circumspect evaluation of the facts and issues raised herein, this
Commission finds the instant appeal devoid of merit. It must be stressed at
the outset that the Directors concerned were not sitting in the NHA Board
in their own right but as representatives of cabinet members and who are
constitutionally prohibited from holding any other office or employment
and receive compensation therefor, during their tenure (Section 13,
Article VII, Constitution; Civil Liberties Union vs. Executive Secretary,
194 SCRA 317).
Issue:
Whether or not the disallowance of the said remunerations are valid interpretation of
Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.
Held:
On this point, Section 13, Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution, provides:
"SEC. 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies
or assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other
office or employment during their tenure. They shall not, during their tenure, directly or
indirectly practice any other profession, participate in any business, or be financially
interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by the
Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including any
government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly
avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their office.
"The spouse and relatives by consanguinity or affinity within the fourth civil degree of
the President shall not during his tenure be appointed as Members of the Constitutional
Commissions, or the Office of Ombudsman, or as Secretaries, Undersecretaries,
Chairmen, or heads of bureaus of offices, including government-owned or controlled
corporations and their subsidiaries."
Interpreting the foregoing Constitutional provisions, this Court, in Civil Liberties Union
and Anti-Graft League of the Philippines, Inc., held:
"The prohibition against holding dual or multiple offices or employment under Section
13, Article VII of the Constitution must not, however, be construed as applying to posts
occupied by the Executive officials specified therein without additional compensation in
an ex-officio capacity as provided by law and as required by the primary functions of said
officials' office. The reason is that these posts do not comprise `any other office' within
the contemplation of the constitutional prohibition but are properly an imposition of
additional duties and functions on said officials.
"To reiterate, the prohibition under Section 13, Article VII is not to be interpreted as
covering positions held without additional compensation in ex-officio capacities as
provided by law and as required by the primary functions of the concerned official's
office. The term ex-officio means `from office; by virtue of office'. It refers to an
`authority derived from official character merely, not expressly conferred upon the
individual character, but rather annexed to the official position.' Ex-officio likewise
denotes an `act done in an official character, or as a consequence of office, and without
any other appointment or authority than that conferred by the office.' An ex-officio
member of a board is one who is a member by virtue of his title to a certain office, and
without further warrant or appointment. To illustrate, by express provision of law, the
Secretary of Transportation and Communications is the ex-officio Chairman of the Board
of the Philippine Ports Authority, and the Light Rail Transit Authority.
"The ex-officio position being actually and in legal contemplation part of the principal
office, it follows that the official concerned has no right to receive additional
compensation for his services in the said position. The reason is that these services are
already paid for and covered by the compensation attached to his principal office. It
should be obvious that if, say, the Secretary of Finance attends a meeting of the Monetary
Board as an ex-officio member thereof, he is actually and in legal contemplation
performing the primary function of his principal office in defining policy in monetary
banking matters, which come under the jurisdiction of his department. For such
attendance, therefore, he is not entitled to collect any extra compensation, whether it be in
the form of a per diem or an honorarium or an allowance, or some other such euphemism.
By whatever name it is designated, such additional compensation is prohibited by the
Constitution."
Since the Executive Department Secretaries, as ex-oficio members of the NHA Board,
are prohibited from receiving "extra (additional) compensation, whether it be in the form
of a per diem or an honorarium or an allowance, or some other such euphemism," it
follows that petitioners who sit as their alternates cannot likewise be entitled to receive
such compensation. A contrary rule would give petitioners a better right than their
principals.

We thus rule that in rendering its challenged Decision, the COA did not gravely abuse its
discretion.