GRACE J. GARCIA, a.k.a. GRACE J. GARCIA-RECIO, petitioner, v. REDERICK A. RECIO, respondent.

G.R. No. 138322, October 2, 2001

FACTS:

Respondent Rederick Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian citizen, in Malabon, Rizal, on March
1, 1987. They lived together as husband and wife in Australia. On May 18, 1989, a decree of divorce, purportedly dissolving
the marriage, was issued by an Australian family court. On June 26, 1992, respondent became an Australian citizen and
was married again to petitioner Grace Garcia-Recio, a Filipina on January 12, 1994 in Cabanatuan City. In their application
for a marriage license, respondent was declared as “single” and “Filipino.”

Starting October 22, 1995, petitioner and respondent lived separately without prior judicial dissolution of their marriage.
On March 3, 1998, petitioner filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the ground of bigamy. Respondent
allegedly had a prior subsisting marriage at the time he married her. On his Answer, Rederick contended that his first
marriage was validly dissolved; thus, he was legally capacitated to marry Grace.

On July 7, 1998 or about five years after the couple’s wedding and while the suit for the declaration of nullity was pending ,
respondent was able to secure a divorce decree from a family court in Sydney, Australia because the “marriage had
irretrievably broken down.”

The Regional Trial Court declared the marriage of Rederick and Grace Recio dissolved on the ground that the Australian
divorce had ended the marriage of the couple thus there was no more marital union to nullify or annul.

ISSUE:

1.) Whether or not the divorce between respondent and Editha Samson was proven.

2.) Whether or not respondent was proven to be legally capacitated to marry petitioner.

RULING:

1st issue:

The Supreme Court ruled that the mere presentation of the divorce decree of respondent’s marriage to Samson is
insufficient. Before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce
as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it. Furthermore, the divorce decree between respondent
and Editha Samson appears to be an authentic one issued by an Australian family court. However, appearance is not
sufficient; compliance with the aforementioned rules on evidence must be demonstrated.

2nd issue:

Australian divorce decree contains a restriction that reads:

“1. A party to a marriage who marries again before this decree becomes absolute (unless the other party has died) commits
the offence of bigamy.”

This quotation bolsters our contention that the divorrecce obtained by respondent may have been restricted. It did not
absolutely establish his legal capacity to remarry according to his national law. Hence, the Court find no basis for the ruling
of the trial court, which erroneously assumed that the Australian divorce ipso facto restored respondent’s capacity to remarry
despite the paucity of evidence on this matter.

The Supreme Court remanded the case to the court a quo for the purpose of receiving evidence. The Court mentioned that
they cannot grant petitioner’s prayer to declare her marriage to respondent null and void because of the question on latter’s
legal capacity to marry.
VAN DORN vs. ROMILLO, G.R. No. L-68470 October 8, 1985

FACTS:
Alice Reyes, the petitioner is a citizen of the Philippines while private respondent Richard Upton is a citizen of the United
States. They were married in Hong Kong in 1972 and they established residence in the Philippines. They had two children
and they were divorced in Nevada, USA in 1982. The petitioner remarried in Nevada to Theodore Van Dorn. The private
responded filed against petitioner stating that the petitioner’s business is a conjugal property of the parties and that
respondent is declared with right to manage the conjugal property. Petitioner moved to dismiss the case on the ground
that the cause of action is barred by previous judgment in the divorce proceedings before the Nevada Court, where
respondent acknowledged that they had no community property as of June 11, 1982.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the private respondent as petitioner’s husband is entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets?

RULING:
The petition is granted. Complaint is dismissed.
The policy against absolute divorce cover only Philippine nationals. However, aliens may obtain divorce abroad, which
may be recognized in the Philippines provided they are valid according to their national law.
From the standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves marriage, the divorce in Nevada released private
respondent from the marriage between them with the petitioner. Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is
no longer the husband of petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case as petitioner’s husband entitled to
exercise control over conjugal assets. He is estopped by his own representation before said court from asserting his right
over the alleged conjugal property.

PIONEER CONCRETE PHILIPPINES v. TODARO

254 SCRA 153 June 8, 2007

FACTS
Antonio D. Todaro (Todaro) filed with the RTC of Makati City, a complaint for Sum of Money and Damages with Preliminary
Attachment against Pioneer International Limited (PIL), Pioneer Concrete Philippines, Inc. (PCPI), Pioneer Philippines
Holdings, Inc. (PPHI), John G. McDonald (McDonald) and Philip J. Klepzig (Klepzig).

Todaro alleged that PIL is a corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of Australia and is principally engaged
in the ready-mix concrete and concrete aggregates business; PPHI is the company established by PIL to own and hold the
stocks of its operating company in the Philippines; PCPI is the company established by PIL to undertake its business of
ready-mix concrete, concrete aggregates and quarrying operations in the Philippines; McDonald is the Chief Executive of
the Hongkong office of PIL; and, Klepzig is the President and Managing Director of PPHI and PCPI; Todaro has been the
managing director of Betonval Readyconcrete, Inc. (Betonval), a company engaged in pre-mixed concrete and concrete
aggregate production; he resigned from Betonval in February 1996; in May 1996, PIL contacted Todaro and asked him if
he was available to join them in connection with their intention to establish a ready-mix concrete plant and other related
operations in the Philippines; Todaro informed PIL of his availability and interest to join them; subsequently, PIL and Todaro
came to an agreement wherein the former consented to engage the services of the latter as a consultant for two to three
months, after which, he would be employed as the manager of PIL's ready-mix concrete operations should the company
decide to invest in the Philippines; subsequently, PIL started its operations in the Philippines; however, it refused to comply
with its undertaking to employ Todaro on a permanent basis. Instead of filing an Answer, PPHI, PCPI and Klepzig separately
moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that the complaint states no cause of action, that the RTC has no jurisdiction
over the subject matter of the complaint, as the same is within the jurisdiction of the NLRC, and that the complaint should
be dismissed on the basis of the doctrine of forum non conveniens. RTC dismissed the MTD which was affirmed by the CA.

ISSUE
W/N the RTC should have dismissed the case on the basis of forum non conveniens due to a presence of a foreign element

RULING
NO. Whether a suit should be entertained or dismissed on the basis of said doctrine depends largely upon the facts of the
particular case and is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. In the case ofCommunication Materials and
Design, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, this Court held that "xxx [a] Philippine Court may assume jurisdiction over the case if it
chooses to do so; provided, that the following requisites are met: (1) that the Philippine Court is one to which the parties
may conveniently resort to; (2) that the Philippine Court is in a position to make an intelligent decision as to the law and the
facts; and, (3) that the Philippine Court has or is likely to have power to enforce its decision."
The doctrine of forum non conveniens should not be used as a ground for a motion to dismiss because Sec. 1, Rule 16 of
the Rules of Court does not include said doctrine as a ground. This Court further ruled that while it is within the discretion
of the trial court to abstain from assuming jurisdiction on this ground, it should do so only after vital facts are established, to
determine whether special circumstances require the court’s desistance; and that the propriety of dismissing a case based
on this principle of forum non conveniens requires a factual determination, hence it is more properly considered a matter of
defense.

Note: the case was also being dismissed on the ground that there was no cause of action but SC held that there was cause
of action, to sustain a motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action, the complaint must show that the claim for relief does
not exist, rather than that a claim has been defectively stated, or is ambiguous, indefinite or uncertain. And it was also
argued in this case that jurisdiction is with the NLRC and not with the RTC. SC held it was with RTC, SC has consistently
held that where no employer-employee relationship exists between the parties and no issue is involved which may be
resolved by reference to the Labor Code, other labor statutes or any collective bargaining agreement, it is the RTC that has
jurisdiction.

Tenchavez vs Escano

FACTS:
27 years old Vicenta Escano who belong to a prominent Filipino Family of Spanish ancestry got married on Feburary 24,
1948 with Pastor Tenchavez, 32 years old engineer, and ex-army officer before Catholic chaplain Lt. Moises
Lavares. The marriage was a culmination of the love affair of the couple and was duly registered in the local civil
registry. A certain Pacita Noel came to be their match-maker and go-between who had an amorous relationship with
Tenchavez as written by a San Carlos college student where she and Vicenta are studying. Vicenta and Pastor are
supposed to renew their vows/ marriage in a church as suggested by Vicenta’s parents. However after translating the
said letter to Vicenta’s dad , he disagreed for a new marriage. Vicenta continued leaving with her parents in Cebu while
Pastor went back to work in Manila.

Vicenta applied for a passport indicating that she was single and when it was approved she left for the United States and
filed a complaint for divorce against Pastor which was later on approved and issued by the Second Judicial Court of the
State of Nevada. She then sought for the annulment of her marriage to the Archbishop of Cebu. Vicenta married Russell
Leo Moran, an American, in Nevada and has begotten children. She acquired citizenship on August 8, 1958. Petitioner
filed a complaint against Vicenta and her parents whom he alleged to have dissuaded Vicenta from joining her husband.

ISSUE: Whether the divorce sought by Vicenta Escano is valid and binding upon courts of the Philippines.

HELD:
Civil Code of the Philippines does not admit divorce. Philippine courts cannot give recognition on foreign decrees of
absolute divorce between Filipino citizens because it would be a violation of the Civil Code. Such grant would arise to
discrimination in favor of rich citizens who can afford divorce in foreign countries. The adulterous relationship of Escano
with her American husband is enough grounds for the legal separation prayed by Tenchavez. In the eyes of Philippine
laws, Tenchavez and Escano are still married. A foreign divorce between Filipinos sought and decreed is not entitled to
recognition neither is the marriage of the divorcee entitled to validity in the Philippines. Thus, the desertion and securing
of an invalid divorce decree by one spouse entitled the other for damages.

WHEREFORE, the decision under appeal is hereby modified as follows;

(1) Adjudging plaintiff-appellant Pastor Tenchavez entitled to a decree of legal separation from defendant Vicenta F.
Escaño;
(2) Sentencing defendant-appellee Vicenta Escaño to pay plaintiff-appellant Tenchavez the amount of P25,000 for
damages and attorneys' fees;
(3) Sentencing appellant Pastor Tenchavez to pay the appellee, Mamerto Escaño and the estate of his wife, the deceased
Mena Escaño, P5,000 by way of damages and attorneys' fees.
CADALIN ET AL VS. POEA ET AL

FACTS:
This is a consolidation of 3 cases of SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS in the Supreme Court for Certiorari.

On June 6, 1984, Cadalin, Amul and Evangelista, in their own behalf and on behalf of 728 other OCWs instituted a class
suit by filing an “Amended Complaint” with the POEA for money claims arising from their recruitment by ASIA
INTERNATIONAL BUILDERS CORPORATION (AIBC) and employment by BROWN & ROOT INTERNATIONAL, INC
(BRI) which is a foreign corporation with headquarters in Houston, Texas, and is engaged in construction; while AIBC is a
domestic corporation licensed as a service contractor to recruit, mobilize and deploy Filipino workers for overseas
employment on behalf of its foreign principals.

The amended complaint sought the payment of the unexpired portion of the employment contracts, which was terminated
prematurely, and secondarily, the payment of the interest of the earnings of the Travel and Reserved Fund; interest on all
the unpaid benefits; area wage and salary differential pay; fringe benefits; reimbursement of SSS and premium not
remitted to the SSS; refund of withholding tax not remitted to the BIR; penalties for committing prohibited practices; as
well as the suspension of the license of AIBC and the accreditation of BRII

On October 2, 1984, the POEA Administrator denied the “Motion to Strike Out of the Records” filed by AIBC but required
the claimants to correct the deficiencies in the complaint pointed out.

AIB and BRII kept on filing Motion for Extension of Time to file their answer. The POEA kept on granting such motions.

On November 14, 1984, claimants filed an opposition to the motions for extension of time and asked that AIBC and BRII
declared in default for failure to file their answers.

On December 27, 1984, the POEA Administrator issued an order directing AIBC and BRII to file their answers within ten
days from receipt of the order.

(at madami pang motions ang na-file, new complainants joined the case, ang daming inavail na remedies ng both parties)
On June 19, 1987, AIBC finally submitted its answer to the complaint. At the same hearing, the parties were given a
period of 15 days from said date within which to submit their respective position papers. On February 24, 1988, AIBC and
BRII submitted position paper. On October 27, 1988, AIBC and BRII filed a “Consolidated Reply,” POEA Adminitartor
rendered his decision which awarded the amount of $824, 652.44 in favor of only 324 complainants. Claimants submitted
their “Appeal Memorandum For Partial Appeal” from the decision of the POEA. AIBC also filed its MR and/or appeal in
addition to the “Notice of Appeal” filed earlier.

NLRC promulgated its Resolution, modifying the decision of the POEA. The resolution removed some of the benefits
awarded in favor of the claimants. NLRC denied all the MRs. Hence, these petitions filed by the claimants and by AlBC
and BRII.

The case rooted from the Labor Law enacted by Bahrain where most of the complainants were deployed. His Majesty Ise
Bin Selman Al Kaifa, Amir of Bahrain, issued his Amiri Decree No. 23 on June 16, 1176, otherwise known re the Labour
Law for the Private Sector. Some of the provision of Amiri Decree No. 23 that are relevant to the claims of the
complainants-appellants are as follows:

“Art. 79: x x x A worker shall receive payment for each extra hour equivalent to his wage entitlement increased by a
minimum of twenty-rive per centurn thereof for hours worked during the day; and by a minimum off fifty per centurn
thereof for hours worked during the night which shall be deemed to being from seven o’clock in the evening until seven
o’clock in the morning .”

Art. 80: Friday shall be deemed to be a weekly day of rest on full pay.
If employee worked, 150% of his normal wage shall be paid to him x x x.”

Art. 81; x x x When conditions of work require the worker to work on any official holiday, he shall be paid an additional
sum equivalent to 150% of his normal wage.”

Art. 84: Every worker who has completed one year’s continuous service with his employer shall be entitled to Laos on full
pay for a period of not less than 21 days for each year increased to a period not less than 28 days after five continuous
years of service.”
A worker shall be entitled to such leave upon a quantum meruit in respect of the proportion of his service in that year.”

Art. 107: A contract of employment made for a period of indefinite duration may be terminated by either party thereto after
giving the other party prior notice before such termination, in writing, in respect of monthly paid workers and fifteen days’
notice in respect of other workers. The party terminating a contract without the required notice shall pay to the other party
compensation equivalent to the amount of wages payable to the worker for the period of such notice or the unexpired
portion thereof.”

Art. Ill: x x x the employer concerned shall pay to such worker, upon termination of employment, a leaving indemnity for
the period of his employment calculated on the basis of fifteen days’ wages for each year of the first three years of service
and of one month’s wages for each year of service thereafter. Such worker shall be entitled to payment of leaving
indemnity upon a quantum meruit in proportion to the period of his service completed within a year.”

ISSUE:

1. WON the foreign law should govern or the contract of the parties.(WON the complainants who have worked in Bahrain
are entitled to the above-mentioned benefits provided by Amiri Decree No. 23 of Bahrain).

2. WON the Bahrain Law should apply in the case. (Assuming it is applicable WON complainants’ claim for the benefits
provided therein have prescribed.)

3. Whether or not the instant cases qualify as; a class suit (siningit ko nalang)
(the rest of the issues in the full text of the case refer to Labor Law)

RULING:

1. NLRC set aside Section 1, Rule 129 of the 1989 Revised Rules on Evidence governing the pleading and proof of a
foreign law and admitted in evidence a simple copy of the Bahrain’s Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 (Labour Law for the
Private Sector).

NLRC applied the Amiri Deere, No. 23 of 1976, which provides for greater benefits than those stipulated in the overseas-
employment contracts of the claimants. It was of the belief that where the laws of the host country are more favorable and
beneficial to the workers, then the laws of the host country shall form part of the overseas employment contract. It
approved the observation of the POEA Administrator that in labor proceedings, all doubts in the implementation of the
provisions of the Labor Code and its implementing regulations shall be resolved in favor of labor.

The overseas-employment contracts, which were prepared by AIBC and BRII themselves, provided that the laws of the
host country became applicable to said contracts if they offer terms and conditions more favorable than those stipulated
therein. However there was a part of the employment contract which provides that the compensation of the employee may
be “adjusted downward so that the total computation plus the non-waivable benefits shall be equivalent to the
compensation” therein agree,’ another part of the same provision categorically states “that total remuneration and benefits
do not fall below that of the host country regulation and custom.”

Any ambiguity in the overseas-employment contracts should be interpreted against AIBC and BRII, the parties that drafted
it. Article 1377 of the Civil Code of the Philippines provides:
‘The interpretation of obscure words or stipulations in a contract shall not favor the party who caused the obscurity.”

Said rule of interpretation is applicable to contracts of adhesion where there is already a prepared form containing the
stipulations of the employment contract and the employees merely “take it or leave it.” The presumption is that there was
an imposition by one party against the other and that the employees signed the contracts out of necessity that reduced
their bargaining power.
We read the overseas employment contracts in question as adopting the provisions of the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 as
part and parcel thereof. The parties to a contract may select the law by which it is to be governed. In such a case, the
foreign law is adopted as a “system” to regulate the relations of the parties, including questions of their capacity to enter
into the contract, the formalities to be observed by them, matters of performance, and so forth. Instead of adopting the
entire mass of the foreign law, the parties may just agree that specific provisions of a foreign statute shall be deemed
incorporated into their contract “as a set of terms.” By such reference to the provisions of the foreign law, the contract
does not become a foreign contract to be governed by the foreign law. The said law does not operate as a statute but as a
set of contractual terms deemed written in the contract.

A basic policy of contract is to protect the expectation of the parties. Such party expectation is protected by giving effect to
the parties’ own choice of the applicable law. The choice of law must, however, bear some relationship the parties or their
transaction. There is no question that the contracts sought to be enforced by claimants have a direct connection with the
Bahrain law because the services were rendered in that country.

2. NLRC ruled that the prescriptive period for the filing of the claims of the complainants was 3 years, as provided in
Article 291 of the Labor Code of the Philippines, and not ten years as provided in Article 1144 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines nor one year as provided in the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976.

Article 156 of the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 provides:

“A claim arising out of a contract of employment shall not actionable after the lapse of one year from the date of the expiry
of the Contract”.

As a general rule, a foreign procedural law will not be applied in the forum (local court), Procedural matters, such as
service of process, joinder of actions, period and requisites for appeal, and so forth, are governed by the laws of the
forum. This is true even if the action is based upon a foreign substantive law.

A law on prescription of actions is sui generis in Conflict of Laws in the sense that it may be viewed either as procedural or
substantive, depending on the characterization given such a law. In Bournias v. Atlantic Maritime Company (220 F. 2d.
152, 2d Cir. [1955]), where the issue was the applicability of the Panama Labor Code in a case filed in the State of New
York for claims arising from said Code, the claims would have prescribed under the Panamanian Law but not under the
Statute of Limitations of New York. The U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals held that the Panamanian Law was procedural as it
was not “specifically intended to be substantive,” hence, the prescriptive period provided in the law of the forum should
apply. The Court observed: “. . . we are dealing with a statute of limitations of a foreign country, and it is not clear on the
face of the statute that its purpose was to limit the enforceability, outside as well as within the foreign country concerned,
of the substantive rights to which the statute pertains. We think that as a yardstick for determining whether that was the
purpose, this test is the most satisfactory one.

The Court further noted: “Applying that test here it appears to us that the libellant is entitled to succeed, for the
respondents have failed to satisfy us that the Panamanian period of limitation in question was specifically aimed against
the particular rights which the libellant seeks to enforce. The Panama Labor Code is a statute having broad objectives.”
The American court applied the statute of limitations of New York, instead of the Panamanian law, after finding that there
was no showing that the Panamanian law on prescription was intended to be substantive. Being considered merely a
procedural law even in Panama, it has to give way to the law of the forum (local Court) on prescription of actions.

However the characterization of a statute into a procedural or substantive law becomes irrelevant when the country of the
forum (local Court) has a “borrowing statute.” Said statute has the practical effect of treating the foreign statute of
limitation as one of substance. A “borrowing statute” directs the state of the forum (local Court) to apply the foreign statute
of limitations to the pending claims based on a foreign law. While there are several kinds of “borrowing statutes,” one form
provides that an action barred by the laws of the place where it accrued will not be enforced in the forum even though the
local statute was not run against it.

Section 48 of Code of Civil Procedure is of this kind. It provides: “If by the laws of the state or country where the cause of
action arose, the action is barred, it is also barred in the Philippine Islands.”

Section 48 has not been repealed or amended by the Civil Code of the Philippines. In the light of the 1987 Constitution,
however, Section 48 cannot be enforced ex proprio vigore insofar as it ordains the application in this jurisdiction of Section
156 of the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976.

The courts of the forum (local Court) will not enforce any foreign claim obnoxious to the forum’s public policy. To enforce
the one-year prescriptive period of the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 as regards the claims in question would contravene
the public policy on the protection to labor.

In the Declaration of Principles and State Policies, the 1987 Constitution emphasized that:“The state shall promote social
justice in all phases of national development” (Sec. 10).
‘The state affirms labor as a primary social economic force. It shall protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare”
(Sec. 18).

In Article XIII on Social Justice and Human Rights, the 1987 Constitution provides:
“Sec. 3. The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized and unorganized, and promote full
employment and equality of employment opportunities for all.”

Thus, the applicable law on prescription is the Philippine law.

The next question is whether the prescriptive period governing the filing of the claims is 3 years, as provided by the Labor
Code or 10 years, as provided by the Civil Code of the Philippines.

Article 1144 of the Civil Code of the Philippines provides:

“The following actions must be brought within ten years from the time the right of action accross:

(1) Upon a written contract; (2) Upon an obligation created by law; (3) Upon a judgment”
In this case, the claim for pay differentials is primarily anchored on the written contracts between the litigants, the ten-year
prescriptive period provided by Art. 1144(l) of the New Civil Code should govern.

Testate of Amos Bellis vs. Edward A. Bellis, et al

FACTS:

Amos G. Bellis was a citizen of the State of Texas and of the United States. He had five legitimate children with his first wife
(whom he divorced), three legitimate children with his second wife (who survived him) and, finally, three illegitimate children.

6 years prior Amos Bellis’ death, he executed two(2) wills, apportioning the remainder of his estate and properties to his
seven surviving children. The appellants filed their oppositions to the project of partition claiming that they have been
deprived of their legitimes to which they were entitled according to the Philippine law. Appellants argued that the deceased
wanted his Philippine estate to be governed by the Philippine law, thus the creation of two separate wills.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Philippine law be applied in the case in the determination of the illegitimate children’s successional rights

RULING:

Court ruled that provision in a foreigner’s will to the effect that his properties shall be distributed in accordance with Philippine
law and not with his national law, is illegal and void, for his national law cannot be ignored in view of those matters that
Article 10 — now Article 16 — of the Civil Code states said national law should govern.

Where the testator was a citizen of Texas and domiciled in Texas, the intrinsic validity of his will should be governed by his
national law. Since Texas law does not require legitimes, then his will, which deprived his illegitimate children of the
legitimes, is valid.

The Supreme Court held that the illegitimate children are not entitled to the legitimes under the texas law, which is the
national law of the deceased.

Republic vs. Cagandahan,

FACTS: Jennifer Cagandahan filed before the Regional Trial Court Branch 33 of Siniloan, Laguna a Petition for Correction
of Entries in Birth Certificate of her name from Jennifer B. Cagandahan to Jeff Cagandahan and her gender from female
to male. It appearing that Jennifer Cagandahan is suffering from Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia which is a rare medical
condition where afflicted persons possess both male and female characteristics. Jennifer Cagandahan grew up with
secondary male characteristics. To further her petition, Cagandahan presented in court the medical certificate evidencing
that she is suffering from Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia which certificate is issued by Dr. Michael Sionzon of the
Department of Psychiatry, University of the Philippines-Philippine General Hospital, who, in addition, explained that
“Cagandahan genetically is female but because her body secretes male hormones, her female organs did not develop
normally, thus has organs of both male and female.” The lower court decided in her favor but the Office of the Solicitor
General appealed before the Supreme Court invoking that the same was a violation of Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of
Court because the said petition did not implead the local civil registrar.

ISSUE: The issue in this case is the validity of the change of sex or gender and name of respondent as ruled by the lower
court.

HELD: The contention of the Office of the Solicitor General that the petition is fatally defective because it failed to implead
the local civil registrar as well as all persons who have or claim any interest therein is not without merit. However, it must
be stressed that private respondent furnished the local civil registrar a copy of the petition, the order to publish on
December 16, 2003 and all pleadings, orders or processes in the course of the proceedings. In which case, the Supreme
Court ruled that there is substantial compliance of the provisions of Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court. Furthermore,
the Supreme Court held that the determination of a person’s sex appearing in his birth certificate is a legal issue which in
this case should be dealt with utmost care in view of the delicate facts present in this case.

In deciding the case, the Supreme Court brings forth the need to elaborate the term “intersexuality” which is the condition
or let us say a disorder that respondent is undergoing. INTERSEXUALITY applies to human beings who cannot be
classified as either male or female. It is the state of a living thing of a gonochoristic species whose sex chromosomes,
genitalia, and/or secondary sex characteristics are determined to be neither exclusively male nor female. It is said that an
organism with intersex may have biological characteristics of both male and female sexes. In view of the foregoing, the
highest tribunal of the land consider the compassionate calls for recognition of the various degrees of intersex as
variations which should not be subject to outright denial.

The current state of Philippine statutes apparently compels that a person be classified either as a male or as a female, but
this Court is not controlled by mere appearances when nature itself fundamentally negates such rigid classification. That
is, Philippine courts must render judgment based on law and the evidence presented. In the instant case, there is no
denying that evidence points that respondent is male. In determining respondent to be a female, there is no basis for a
change in the birth certificate entry for gender. The Supreme Court held that where the person is biologically or naturally
intersex the determining factor in his gender classification would be what the individual, like respondent, having reached
the age of majority, with good reason thinks of his/her sex. Sexual development in cases of intersex persons makes the
gender classification at birth inconclusive. It is at maturity that the gender of such persons, like respondent, is fixed. The
Court will not consider respondent as having erred in not choosing to undergo treatment in order to become or remain as
a female. Neither will the Court force respondent to undergo treatment and to take medication in order to fit the mold of a
female, as society commonly currently knows this gender of the human species. Respondent is the one who has to live
with his intersex anatomy. To him belongs the human right to the pursuit of happiness and of health. Thus, to him should
belong the primordial choice of what courses of action to take along the path of his sexual development and maturation. In
the absence of evidence that respondent is an “incompetent” and in the absence of evidence to show that classifying
respondent as a male will harm other members of society who are equally entitled to protection under the law, the
Supreme Court affirmed as valid and justified the respondent’s position and his personal judgment of being a male.