Italian Diplomatic and Military

Failures and the Rise of Fascism in the

World War One Era

Anthony Rosado
With the onset of the Great War, the Kingdom of Italy found itself torn between which of the

Powers to fight alongside; although they had been members of the Triple Alliance alongside

Germany and Austria-Hungary since 18821, Italy’s promises of territorial expansion (both within

Europe and colonial possessions) were stymied by her so called allies, and thus the Italians

sought an arrangement that would be more profitable. In May of 1915, disillusioned with the

Triple Alliance and enticed by offers of colonial concessions from the Triple Entente, Italy

entered the war and declared war against Austria-Hungary, and by extension the German and

Ottoman Empires. The next three years of conflicts would be a fatal series of setbacks, blunders

and failures; by the time the war was over Italy will have lost nearly 650,000 soldiers2 and

suffered a further 500,000 civilian deaths from epidemics and starvation.3 The ill feelings from

the loss of men as well as prestige was further exacerbated by perceived slights by the victorious

Entente Powers, who bestowed upon the Italians little of the territorial demands they had been

assured. This climate of unrest and dissatisfaction in the early interwar period led to an outcry of

social and political instability, which directly led to the rise of Italian Fascism under Benito

Mussolini.

Prior to the unification of Italy in 1871, the Kingdom of Italy controlled much of the

peninsula, save for the northeastern region known as the Kingdom of Lombardy-Venetia which

was ruled by the Austrian Empire. Encouraged by the Italian nationalist movement of Italian

1
Christopher Seton-Watson, Italy from Liberalism to Fascism 1870-1925 (Great Britain: Methuen & Co
Ltd, 1967), 111
2
Great Britain War Office, Statistics of the military effort of the British Empire during the Great War, 1914-1920.
(London, H.M. Stationary Office) Internet Archive.
3
L. Hersch., La mortalité causée par la guerre mondiale ( Metron: The International Review of Statistics, 1927)
Vol 7.Pages 52–59
Irredentism (Irredentismo Italiano), the loosely affiliated Italian states fought a number of

independence wars against foreign occupiers in a period known as the Risorgimento.4 From 1848

the Italians fought for independence in a series of three stages; while the first was rather

unsuccessful and yielded no gains, it brought a number of revolutionaries to prominence such as

Giuseppe Garibaldi. The second stage of the wars saw the Kingdom of Sardinia gain the support

of the French Empire; the Sardinians would to cede Nice and Savoy in return for French support,

which benefited France by weakening its regional rival Austria5. In the third stage in 1866, the

Italians (now unified under Sardinia as the Kingdom of Italy) emerged victorious and claimed

Lombardy-Venetia. Within five years the Kingdom would also annex Rome and complete the

unification in 1871.6 With the establishment of the kingdom and securing of its de-jure territory,

Italy immediately began strengthening its position on the world stage; the Italians embraced the

concept of mare nostrum (Latin for “our sea”) dictated by the Ancient Romans who saw

themselves as having total jurisdiction over the Mediterranean Sea. For many nationalists, it was

only right that the newly minted kingdom embrace its historical traditions.7 The first and most

reasonable target of colonization was Tunisia, an Ottoman province that was not only in the

vicinity, but boasted a sizable Italian minority population. The attempt to secure the area was

resisted by the French, who themselves acted upon the territory and invaded on the pretense of

repelling a nomadic raid; they would sign The Treaty of Bardo with the Ottomans in 1881 which

4
Rene Albrecht-Carrie, Italy from Napoleon to Mussolini (New York: Columbia University Press, 1950),
82
5
Christopher Seton-Watson, Italy from Liberalism to Fascism 1870-1925 (Great Britain: Methuen & Co
Ltd, 1967), 6
6
Rene Albrecht-Carrie, Italy from Napoleon to Mussolini (New York: Columbia University Press, 1950),
48
7
Raymond Betts, The False Dawn: European Imperialism in the Nineteenth Century (Minnesota:
University of Minnesota Press, 1975)
gave Tunis the status of a French protectorate.8 The British failure to push for Italian demands

and the French’s outright outmaneuvering of Italian colonial ambitions left the Italian public

furious9and now left the country isolated from the other European powers; the British had proven

unreliable, the French had “stolen” Tunisia and the Austrians were still viewed as foreign

oppressors with designs of subjugation. Despite lingering animosity to the Austrians, the Italians

agreed in May of 1882 to form the Triple Alliance with Austria-Hungary and the German

Empire. The three nations came together and promised each others support in the even of a

defensive war against any other European powers, as well as assured the end of “German or

Austrian intrigues with the Vatican”10 which was a leading issue regarding the Roman Question

(the status of the Papal States and Rome’s independence under the Pope as its sovereign).

Italy’s alliance with the central European states however proved to be quite tenuous;

despite the Triple Alliance being renewed on numerous occasions up until 1915, there still

existed sizable distrust between Italy and Austria-Hungary regarding the Trentino region as well

as continued historical tension. By the early 1900’s Italian desires of South Tyrol, Dalmatia and

other regions of the Balkans under Austro-Hungarian control left many disillusioned with

continued cooperation with Austria-Hungary and by extension the Germans. Around this time

the Kingdom of Italy held secret negotiations with the Third French Republic, ensuring neutrality

between the two states in the event of war11 as well as strategizing North African colonization

8
Christopher Seton-Watson, Italy from Liberalism to Fascism 1870-1925 (Great Britain: Methuen & Co
Ltd, 1967), 109

9
Ibid,, 110
10
Ibid,, 112
11
Anderson, Frank Maloy and Amos Shartle Hershey, Handbook for the Diplomatic History of Europe,
Asia, and Africa 1870-1914 (Washington, National Board for Historical Service. Government Printing
Office, 1918).
efforts to be equally split between the two.12 In 1911, the Italians declared war on the weakening

Ottoman Empire in an effort to expand its territory and annex Tripoli (modern day Libya). The

war was a success and gained Italy an additional African colony, yet would have dire

consequences for the Triple Alliance. Not only were Germany and Austria-Hungary attempting

to establish friendly relations with the Ottomans, the failure of the Ottoman army led numerous

Balkan states to declare independence after being inspired by the Italian victory, further

weakening the potential ally.13 The Balkan states however would play their own role in breaking

Italy away from the Triple Alliance, as well as causing the overall outbreak of the war. One of

the provisions of the Triple Alliance was to prevent Italy or Austria-Hungary from taking any

action in the Balkans without securing the approval of the other members of the alliance14 (Italy

had a desire to occupy Albania and other areas).15 With the assassination of Archduke Ferdinand

in 1914, Austria-Hungary sent an ultimatum to Serbia demanding an investigation be held as

well as a number of punitive concessions and restrictions to be placed upon Serbia.16 While

Austria-Hungary discussed the ultimatums with the Germans and received the go-ahead to issue

them, they had not consulted with the Italians. This was seen as a breach of the Triple Alliance

terms, and in addition to the fact that the agreement was to be viewed as a defensive pact, by

Austria-Hungary not consulting with Italy and initiating an offensive war, the Italians viewed the

agreement as nullified and thus were not obligated to answer the call to arms when the First

World War began in 1914.17

12
Ibid
13
Rene Albrecht-Carrie, Italy from Napoleon to Mussolini (New York: Columbia University Press, 1950),
89
14
Ibid,, 413
15
Ibid, 414
16
Ibid,, 413
17
Ibid,, 429
 With the war fully in effect, the Italians had maintained neutrality at its onset. Italian

irredentism became quite strong and advocated joining the Entente Powers in order to demand

concessions from Austria-Hungary. In addition to that, Italy was left to feel as a second-rate

member of the Alliance due to being left out of the negotiations of the Serbian ultimatum.

Popular opinion of neutrality was quite strong and supported by a number of leftist entities

(including Benito Mussolini who at the time still identified as a left-wing party member),

although a number of nationalists believed that Italy could only be strengthened through conflict

and that remaining neutral was cowardly.18 After failed neutral negotiations to secure Tyrol and

Trentino in 191519, the Italians approached Great Britain in an effort to offer Italian support for

the Triple Entente provided the reward for allegiance proved significant. By March 9th of 1915
20
Great Britain was compelled to comply with Italy’s demands in order to gain their support

against the Germans, who had been mounting pressure against British and French lines in the

west. The Italians would be granted a large portion of Austro-Hungarian holdings in the Balkan

states including Istria, Dalmatia, Tyrol, and a number of other smaller areas scattered throughout

the Balkans.21 In addition to this, the colonies of the German Empire in Asia and Africa were to

be seized by the victorious Entente powers and be granted to Italy. Although the Treaty was

agreed upon and Italy entered the war on the side of the Entente to pursue its irredentist desires,

the decision was not well received amongst the government; Prime Minister Antonio Salandra

found himself opposed by many members of the government, and after some failed negotiations

he and the government resigned.22 It was not until a series of demonstrations and intervention by

18
Ibid,, 416
19
Ibid, 429
20
Ibid,, 431
21
American Society of International Law. Volume 15, (Oxford University Press, 1921), 253
22
Rene Albrecht-Carrie, Italy from Napoleon to Mussolini (New York: Columbia University Press, 1950),
101
King Victor Emmanuel III23 was Salandra’s resignation refused, and the declaration of war

passed in the senate. Although the country celebrated and the nationalists proclaimed a great new

chapter in the Kingdom’s history, the declaration of war had nearly torn the young nation apart.

According to historian Christopher Seton-Watson-

“Italy thus entered the war with jubilation but in an atmosphere of civil war. Beneath the
surface the country was deeply divided. The peasants answered their mobilisation summonses
obediently, but to many it seemed a war manufactured by the signori and the towns. An arden
minority had imposed its will, just as fifty five years before a minority had achieved unification.
During the crisis the neutralists, especially the socialists, had denounced the piazza and praised
Gilotti (Salandra’s predecessor) for defending parliamentary privileges.”24

With the entry of Italy into the Great War, the Entente Powers were greatly relieved at

their ability to open up a new front in Europe. Fought predominantly in the mountainous border

region between Austria and Italy, the Italian Front served to relieve some of the pressure from

Britain, France and Russia. With the failure of the Gallipoli Campaign looming, it was more

crucial than ever for the Italians to join the fray. As army chief of staff Luigi Cadorna mobilized

the soldiers along the newly established front, things at first seemed promising; they

outnumbered the Austro-Hungarians roughly three to one.25 However, at a closer glance it

became apparent that the Italians, despite having a rather large numerical advantage was ill-

prepared for combat operations. The most major obstacle was the terrain of the staging grounds:

The S shaped front stretched for over 400 miles across mountains and hill terrain that made

traversing it difficult, let alone staging attacks against the Austro-Hungarians fortified hill

positions.26 What further exacerbated this geographic difficulty was Cadorna’s own tactical

23
Christopher Seton-Watson, Italy from Liberalism to Fascism 1870-1925 (Great Britain: Methuen & Co
Ltd, 1967), 448

24
Ibid,, 449
25
Ibid,, 451
26
Ibid, 450
“acumen.” A career soldier and officer since the 1870’s, Cadorna clinged far too tightly to the

Napoleonic military traditions of infantry formations, orderly deployments and the like.The most

lethal of his beliefs being what he perceived as the objective truth that “winning means going

forward”27 and that a constant offensive approach will demoralize your enemy and allow you to

claim victory. In the hills and mountains and in the trenches that became so integral to the First

World War, facing machine gun fire, barbed wire and artillery strikes this tactic was as lethal as

it was obsolete. The Italian officer core was greatly lacking as well, and around half of its total

enlisted men were illiterate.28 The army was also lacking greatly in modernized artillery and

machine gun units; this can partly be attributed to Cadorna, prior to the Italian entry into the war,

having distributed 25,000 copies a military tactics pamphlet he had written in 1888, and

incorrectly claiming that the warfare that had occured on the Western Front had verified his

offensive assault tactical thinking.29 The terrain also impacted the Italians ability to shuttle

supplies to the front lines and get the wounded back for treatment; guns and ammunition had to

be shuttled via mule and cable car as opposed to mechanized transportation which lowered the

overall effectiveness of their supply trains.30

The Entente Powers themselves were having difficulties regarding coordination with one

another; Italian entry into the war was meant to occur simultaneously with a Russian offensive,

27
Mark Thompson, The White War: Life and Death on the Italian Front (New York: Basic Books, 2008),
54
28
Ibid,, 54
29
Ibid,, 58
30
John McDonald, Caporetto and the Isonzo Campaign: The Italian Front 1915-1918 (South Yorkshire:
Pen & Sword Books Ltd, 2011), Kindle Edition Location 423/2389
but the plan fell through.31 A major obstacle was the relationship between Serbia, Russia, and

Italy regarding Balkan possessions in the event of a victory. Prior to Italian entry into the war,

the Russians were fearful that with an Entente victory, the seizure of Austro-Hungarian holdings

in the Balkans would be claimed by the Italians, and thus their Slavic cousins would simply lose

one foreign overlord in place of another. With the signing of the Treaty of London, none of the

Balkan states were consulted regarding the granting of Italy control over large parts of the

region; Serbia specifically was not consulted and represented one of the largest Entente armies in

the region at the time. While a number of synchronized offensives were launched in order to

relieve beleaguered Russian solidiers, the Serbians launched no offensives and instead

recuperated its forces and anticipated an attack; Cadorna himself believed that the Serbs and

Austro-Hungarians had negotiated some secret pact of neutrality32 (ironic given Italy’s own

circumstances of entering the war). Interestingly enough, despite the declaration of war against

Austria-Hungary and the Ottoman Empire, the Kingdom of Italy as of August of 1915 had still

not declared war on Germany. Despite the Treaty of London requiring this, the Italian

government had stalled in its declaration in order to not entice the Germans to send troops into

the Isonzo Front, an area they had more than enough trouble securing faced only with Austro-

Hungarian resistance.33 In turn, this led the British and France to hold Italy as an aloof ally that

had little stake in their countries, and thus the British and French were unwilling to provide Italy

with large amounts of supplies and munitions, viewing them as essential to their own war efforts.

Italian Foreign Minister Sidney Sonnino was unwilling to attend diplomatic meetings with the

31
Rene Albrecht-Carrie, Italy from Napoleon to Mussolini (New York: Columbia University Press, 1950),
102

32
Christopher Seton-Watson, Italy from Liberalism to Fascism 1870-1925 (Great Britain: Methuen & Co
Ltd, 1967), 453
33
Ibid,, 454
Entente until well into 1916, making cooperation even more difficult. The damaged relations

between the Entente Powers would have lasting consequences: when it came time to divide the

concessions of the fallen empires, Clemenceau and Lloyd George would not only take into

account the small amount of success the Italian army had in their fighting, but also their own

ally’s unwillingness to cooperate.

On May 23rd, 1915, the Italian army launched its first major offensive on the Isonzo

Front. The main objective of this assault was to penetrate a small corridor in the mountains that

the Austro-Hungarians had yet to securely garrison and exploit the hole, allowing Italian troops

to funnel in and push the front into Austria. The main target was the fortress town of Gorizia; if

the Italians could take this it would allow them to establish a new line which could then be

fortified allowing them to withstand any Central Powers counterattacks and establish a new

staging point. Despite Cadorna moving 400,000 men to the area in order to begin the offensive,

they were initially beset with a number of complications; Cadorna saw fit to dismiss one of his

commanders, and the mans replacement, the Duke of Aosta, did not arrive to head his battalion

until the day the offensive was set to begin.34 In addition to this, the Austrians formulated a

highly successful disinformation and intelligence campaign; they were not nearly ready to defend

the area but allowed the Italians to gain wind of false reports stating that the 100,000 Austro-

Hungarian soldiers had been deployed and were ready to resist an Italian offensive. In addition to

this, the local populace voluntarily aided the Austro-Hungarian troops in setting up defensive

positions and barriers, and even fed the Italians faulty reports of impassable terrain and booby

34
Mark Thompson, The White War: Life and Death on the Italian Front (New York: Basic Books, 2008),
62
traps that did not exist.35 This disinformation campaign discouraged the Italians from carrying

onward with the assault as they had planned, which gave the Austro-Hungarians ample time to

prepare their defenses and muster men to the front. Once the attack was ordered, the Italians had

a fair amount of early success in pushing forward; the moderately large shipbuilding town of

Monfalcone was captured on June 9th, Krn on June 16th,36 yet their success was not widespread

along the 400 mile front, and in many locations they faced tough Austro-Hungarian resistance, or

the Austrians simply retreated and allowed the Italians to take their positions. While the Italians

seemed to be making progress, they had killed few enemy soldiers37 and instead allowed the

Austrians more time to build a more defensible line. Cadorna’s own tactics did not help the

matter as well, as Italian troops slowly came into contact with military technology they were

either unfamiliar with or had little of their own such as machine gun posts and hand grenades.38

Utilizing his Napoleonic advance tactics, Cadorna would have sent around 15,000 men to their

deaths by July 7th, with the Austro-Hungarians losing around 9,000.39 With the end of the First

Battle of Caporetto, the Italians had achieved little aside from capturing a few strategic points.

The Austro-Hungarians had been given ample opportunity to establish a defensive line and

would now be greatly reinforced. Regardless of their minor success, the hard fighting and

massive casualties on both sides of the conflict showed the Italians that their expectations to push

35
Ibid,, 64
36
Ibid,, 72
37
G. Irving Root, Battles in the Alps: A History of the Italian Front of the First World War (Baltimore:
PublishAmerica, 2008), Kindle Edition Location 1129
38
John McDonald, Caporetto and the Isonzo Campaign: The Italian Front 1915-1918 (South Yorkshire:
Pen & Sword Books Ltd, 2011), Kindle Edition Location 440/2389
39
Mark Thompson, The White War: Life and Death on the Italian Front (New York: Basic Books, 2008),
111
through to Vienna would not only not come soon, but they would have to fight for every inch

along the way.40

The First Battle of the Isonzo was a staggering blow not only to military moral but also

amongst the civilians and the politicians. Salandra and Sonnino had decided to push to join the

Entente Powers hoping for a quick a decisive end to the war, which would allow Italy to pursue

its irredentist aspirations as well as secure new territory in the Balkans. No doubt they were

further encouraged by British and French military officials who did not see the war lasting

beyond a year and were certain of a victory if the Italians could put pressure on Austria-Hungary.

Within a month of the declaration and stagnated advance of Cadorna’s forces, the reality had

become quite clear. Prime Minister Salandra had written to Sonnino a month later wondering if

they in fact should have waited to see the war develop further before joining a particular side. To

see a Entente Powers’ leaders (as well as fluctuating levels of the population) so divided and

fickle about what side to be on in a war they are already fighting in gives a level of insight of

perhaps why the Italians had such little success. A number of Italian military experts claimed that

the Italians would be victorious simply because of the close cohesion and makeup of their troops.

The Italian soldiers were said to share a heritage that united them together in the bonds of

fraternity and nationalism. The Austro-Hungarian troops however were enlisted from a number

of various ethnicities: Austrian, Hungarian, Czech, Croat, and its safe to assume that some ethnic

Italians living in the Balkan area were mobilized to fight against their countrymen. While there is

some fundamental belief that this would be a suitable morale boost to their homogenized troop

makeup, it still shows the Italian High Command suffers from the same archaic affliction as

40
John McDonald, Caporetto and the Isonzo Campaign: The Italian Front 1915-1918 (South Yorkshire:
Pen & Sword Books Ltd, 2011), Kindle Edition Location 775/2389
Cadorna; they cling too closely to outdated ideals and do not depend enough on the technology

that had halted their advance in Isonzo. Furthermore, the sharing of a national identity does little

when the soldiers themselves have such little in common to begin with. In Giani Stuparich’s (an

ethnic Italian living in Austria-Hungary) memoirs of his time as an Italian volunteer he recounts

a number of instances which completely nullify this romantic view of warfare-

“A sergeant in the reserves made ‘loudly incomprehensible speeches about humanity, barbarism,
sacrifice, duty and many other muddled concepts’. Looking for distraction from the chatter,
Stuparich noticed a silent figure in the corner of the carriage. ‘He is not listening or talking, he is
the only one rapt in a preoccupation that he cannot account for, but it fevers his expression and
stiffens his limbs, paralysing his soul in an intense stupor.’ His mouth hung open, his eyes were
fixed and shining. He was a peasant in uniform, perhaps leaving home for the first time in his
life, probably fluent only in dialect. The nameless man was still far from the front, but even now
he could not grasp what was happening. Wrenched from his family and routine for reasons
neither explained nor understood, he was in shock. While the writer saw this and was moved, too
much separated them for a friendly word to be uttered.”41

Despite having a shared cultural heritage, the noble born Stuparich has little (if anything) in

common with this individual who has never strayed away from his birth area and will now be

whisked away into a violent conflict for reasons unknown; despite sympathy for his plight,

Stuparich realizes that the endearing words of a stranger will have no effect. Stuparich himself is

also readily dismissive of the grandiose proclamations of the sergeant. This trend of

romanticizing warfare was not something only unique to the Italians however; it was widespread

across the battlefields and field hospitals of the war. As information from the front is censored

and edited before it arrives in the civilian centers, the recruits and conscripted peasants arrived

on the battlefield and are faced with sights of gore and carnage. Gone are the orderly and strict

fighting practices of the bygone age that Cadorna looked upon so fondly. By the time trench

warfare erupts on the Isonzo Front, it is some of the worst across all of Europe; trenches are

41
Mark Thompson, The White War: Life and Death on the Italian Front (New York: Basic Books, 2008),
65 The quote itself is in the third person and is taken from a report on Stuparich’s biography
being dug in rocky, bumpy terrain and carved painstakingly into glacial outcroppings. Despite

this, Cadorna believed that not a change in numbers would break the Austro-Hungarian, but

instead fresh bodies to overwhelm their positions. He recognized the need to secure the Austro-

Hungarian positions at higher elevations before beginning a full assault, as these would lessen

the overall resistance.

On July 18th, Cadorna ordered the Third Army to seize Mt. San Michele; despite not

learning from his prior mistakes and ordering an uphill charge against fortified machine gun

positions, Cadorna had the foresight to first order an artillery shelling of the Austro-Hungarian

positions in order to soften their resistance. A total of 2,500 shells were fired prior to the forward

push, which killed a number of Austro-Hungarian troops and successfully disrupted a number of

their defences.42 While the first day of the push yielded no gains, Cadorna resolved to make a

second attempt the next day. The capture of San Michele opened a new gateway to Gorizia and

signaled what was up to that point the most significant of Italian gains thus far. This was not to

last however, as the Austro-Hungarians returned fire with a salvo of artillery strikes to soften the

peaks new holders, which was then followed up with a counterattack spearheaded by elite

mountain troops.43 The Italians, unable to secure their position due to a lack of supplies and little

or no machine gun entrenchments, lost control of the peak after five continuous hours of fighting

and brutal hand to hand combat.44 The brutal couple of weeks that made up the Second Battle

were considered some of the most brutal of the entire campaign; the Alpini (alpine soldiers) of

42
John McDonald, Caporetto and the Isonzo Campaign: The Italian Front 1915-1918 (South Yorkshire:
Pen & Sword Books Ltd, 2011), Kindle Edition Location 855/2389
43
Ibid,, Kindle Edition Location 878/2389
44
Ibid,, Kindle Edition Location 883/2389
the Italians in particular suffered massive casualties in the back and forth fighting.45 With triple

the amount of casualties on both sides compared to the first battle, Cadorna had still not made

any meaningful gains despite thousands of casualties. This trend would continue throughout the

remaining battles of the Isonzo campaign up until the Twelfth Battle of the Isonzo which took

place in October-November of 1917. This battle was unique in the campaign however; with the

Russian Empire withdrawn from the war and a truce signed between them and the Central

Powers, the German Empire was able to dislodge dozens of divisions from the Eastern Front and

send them to bolster the Austro-Hungarian forces.46 In addition to this, the hard fighting in the

Eleventh Battle of the Isonzo led the Austrians, as well as the German general staff to believe

that another Italian offensive would finally achieve the successful push that Cadorna was looking

for, and shatter the Austrian line.47 With the Russians beaten, and the Americans making their

way to the Western Front in droves with fresh bodies, the Kaiser realized that now more than

ever it was essential to aid Karl I. Despite the forceful offensive that followed, it was not meant

to push into Italy, as it was known that Italy itself was too heavily guarded, and was receiving

regular supplies from Britain and France. The Germans instead intended to press the Italian line

hard enough for force them back, and prevent them from having the capability to launch an

offensive until the following year; this would give the Austro-Hungarians ample time to

recuperate after the hard fought campaign.48 The Germans at first successfully hid their presence

during the preparations; they moved only at night, donned Austrian uniforms and broadcasted

false reports on civilian radio channels in order to confuse Italian intelligence.49 The Italian

45
Ibid,, Kindle Edition Location 889/2389
46
Ibid,, Kindle Edition Location 1879/2389
47
Mark Thompson, The White War: Life and Death on the Italian Front (New York: Basic Books, 2008),
295
48
Ibid,, 296
49
Ibid,, 297
military had some suspicions of German presence (a number of Austro-Hungarian deserters also

informed their captors of an impending offensive)50, but Cadorna dismissed these as rumors and

falsehoods. Ignoring these warnings and dismissing any possible attack, the Italian forces were

sparsely distributed across the front, & the Austro-Hungarian and German forces took the

Italians entirely by surprise. The preliminary action by the Germans was the destruction of

Italian artillery positions, which was immediately followed with the deployment of poison gas

shells. The poison was a combination of phosgene and diphenylchloroarsine; the gas masks

distributed to the Italian soldiers was only protective against chlorine gas. A number of Italian

troops attempted to flee, but around 500 were killed in the initial salvos.51

Cadorna had, up to this point, had a very mixed rate of success in the conflict; his tactical

decisions are still questioned due to the massive loss of Italian soldiers with little to no

significant gain. Up until the actual Battle of Caporetto had begun, Cadorna had ignored a

number of signs of a possible assault, and not only doubted the presence of German soldiers, but

balked at the idea that the enemy would prepare an assault before four or five months had

passed.52 When word of the bombardment had reached him, he was still cynical about a major

offensive-

“In Udine, 40 kilometres from Flitsch, Cadorna rises at 05:00, as always, to find his boots
polished and uniform ironed by his bedside. After breakfasting on milk, coffee and savoyard
biscuits with butter, he writes the daily letter to his family. This morning, he remarks that the
worsening weather favours the defence. He is, he adds, perfectly calm and confident. At the
06:00 briefing, he learns that the second line on the upper Isonzo is under heavy shelling. He
interprets the fact that there has been no assault as support for his view that this attack is a feint,
intended to divert attention from the Carso.”53

50
Ibid,, 298
51
Leonard Haber, The Poisonous Cloud: Chemical Warfare in the First World War. (New York: Clarendon
Press, 1986), 186
52
Mark Thompson, The White War: Life and Death on the Italian Front (New York: Basic Books, 2008),
298

53
Ibid,, 301
All along the front, the joint German-Austro-Hungarian bombardment and offensive has

devastating consequences. By the time Cadorna is made aware of the scale of the offensive,

some 20,000 Italian soldiers, caught completely unaware, have been captured.54 Cadorna,

however, refused to accept the blame and instead attributed the calatamy to his soldiers lack of

resolve and discipline, saying that “Napoleon himself could not do anything in this position.”55

The shattering of the Italians on the Isonzo Front threatened the entire Entente war effort.

Cadorna (despite his attempts at dismissing his folly as a crisis of poor soldiery) was held

personally responsible for the disastrous outcome at Caporetto. The French and British general

staff recommended that he be relieved from his position of chief of staff, which was carried out

by the new Prime Minister Vittorio Orlando on November 9th, 1917.56 Much to the Italians

fortune, the new Prime Minister successfully appealed to the British, French, and Americans for

military aid in not only securing the region, but resuming Cadorna’s original stated task of

pushing the Austro-Hungarians back to Vienna. Coinciding with the Italian offensives of 1918, a

number of demonstrations had broken out amongst the constituent nations of the Austro-

Hungarian Empire. With the war carrying on and morale across the continent shattered, the

prediction of the multi-ethnic forces of the Austro-Hungarian army became realized; the men

were unwilling to continue fighting and dying for their foreign suzerains.57 At the Battle of

54
Ibid,, 308
55
Ibid,, 308
56
Christopher Seton-Watson, Italy from Liberalism to Fascism 1870-1925 (Great Britain: Methuen & Co
Ltd, 1967), 482
57
Mark Thompson, The White War: Life and Death on the Italian Front (New York: Basic Books, 2008),
359
Vittorio Veneto in November of 1918, the combined forces of the Entente, spearheaded by the

Italian divisions, totally broke the Austro-Hungarian army; over 350,000 prisoners were taken

and nearly 3000 artillery pieces seized.58With the defeat of the Austro-Hungarian army, Emperor

Karl I agreed to terms with the Entente Powers. Seeing their ally knocked from the war and

severely weakened after four years of constant warfare, the German Empire conceded defeat.

With the defeat of the Central Powers, the possibility of peace finally loomed over the

horizon. For the Italians, peace was a welcome respite; they had fought a fearsome campaign

over the last three years not only in the Isonzo Campaign, but in various other theatres of

Europe.59 Aside from the end of hostilities, this meant that the Italians were due their reward for

their allegiance; the goal of irredentism was within their grasp, as well as the promise of

additional concessions in the region as well as new colonial holdings seized from German

administration. Vittorio Orlando was a member of the colloquial “Big Four” which consisted of

the leaders of the victorious Entente Powers, and it seemed as though the Italians were to be

given their expected due. What was not expected however was the push by President Woodrow

Wilson in his famous Fourteen Points Plan to secure independence for a number of ethnic states

who had been under the control of the Central Powers; included in these states were fragments of

areas that had been promised to Italy in the Treaty of London, namely the regions of Dalmatia

and Albania. The German overseas colonies, instead of being given to Italy were divided by

Britain and France as protectorates and dependencies. Another aspect of the Treaty of London

58
Ibid,, 363
59
Christopher Seton-Watson, Italy from Liberalism to Fascism 1870-1925 (Great Britain: Methuen & Co
Ltd, 1967), 373. The Italians were deployed to Albania to help defend the small polity from Austro-
Hungarian incursions along the Salonika Front, divisions were sent to aid the Entente on the Western
Front, and Italy had a leading role in the supressions of the Senussi religious sect in Libya & Egypt
which was overlooked was the concession of Ottoman land holdings in Africa, another promise

that was not enforced. Vittorio Orlando, however, signed the Treaty of Versailles on behalf of

the Italian nation. Normally, the terms of the Treaty of London would have most likely not

reached the public. This was changed however the previous year, when the Bolsheviks in Russia

had published a number of diplomatic cables in order to foster social unrest amongst the

commoners of Europe, the contents of the Treaty of London being one of them.60 The uproar in

Italy was flaring up to its pre-war levels, with both sides of the political spectrum up in arms; the

right and nationalists were angered that the Italians gained few if any of the goals of irredentism,

while the left was furious at the pre-war decision to subjugate the Slavic ethnic groups of the

Balkan states and deny them independence. On the nationalist side, Isonzo veteran and later a

nationalist poet and Gabriele D’Annunzio led a group of veterans and irredentists to seize the

city of Fiume (in modern day Croatia) and proclaim it an independent state seeking annexation

by the Kingdom of Italy.61 Although his venture was unsuccessful, it had a lasting impact on the

right-wing nationalist movement in Italy, and the black shirts and slogans used by his supporters

would have an even more profound impact on another nationalist who was slowly gaining

prominence in Italy.

Benito Mussolini was the son of a working man and a socialist; he was named by his

father in honor of the Mexican leftist President Benito Juarez.62 Mussolini in early adolescence

frequented socialist circles, and was a proponent of the violent overthrow of capitalism and

60
Ibid,, 493
61
Rene Albrecht-Carrie, Italy from Napoleon to Mussolini (New York: Columbia University Press, 1950),
128

Ibid,, 150. Mussolini’s middle names were also given in honor of Italian socialists Andrea Costa and
62

Amilcare Cipriani.
Western liberal democracy.63 Just prior to the outbreak of the First World War, Mussolini was a

staunch advocate of the writings of Marx as well as a number of Italian anarchists. What

happened after this however is one of the most significant events in Italian history in the 20th

century; although initially opposed to intervention in the Great War and the imperialist

tendencies of the Italian colonialists, Mussolini slowly became a proponent of leftist nationalism

and began to actively advocate for Italy’s joining of the Entente Powers. His initial drive to

support this was to overthrow the Habsburg monarchy which had sought to suppress socialism

and cruelly subjugated numerous peoples.64 His opinions caused him to be shunned and expelled

from the Socialist Party, which refused any support of war regardless of the circumstances. This

experience led Mussolini to become disillusioned with the concept of class struggle, and he

sought to spread nationalist tendencies across class lines to appeal to all members of the society,

not simply the marginalized.65

Mussolini’s transformation led the the belief that national identity was far more important

than something as simple as social classes and that the nation must be pushed onward be

revolutionaries regardless of their class. He founded an organization known as the Revolutionary

Fasci for International Action (or fascists in English).66 Having reversed his earlier hesitance of

military service, he joined the army and served with distinction; he was wounded in the fighting.

Mussolini saw firsthand what the Italians had sacrificed in the war, and he was one of the many

thousands who were furious at the lack of concessions given to Italy. Mussolini began to pursue

63
Ibid,, 150
64
Emile Ludwig, Nine Etched in Life. (Ayer Company Publishers, 1934 (original) 1969), 321.
65
Rene Albrecht-Carrie, Italy from Napoleon to Mussolini (New York: Columbia University Press, 1950),
153
66
Spencer Tucker,. Encyclopedia of World War I: a political, social, and military history. Volumes 1-5 ((Santa
Barbara, California, 2005)
an imperialist and nationalist policy that advocated the seizure of lands of biological

“lesser`races”; referring to the Slavic groups of the Balkans-

“When dealing with such a race as Slavic – inferior and barbarian – we must not pursue the
carrot, but the stick policy ... We should not be afraid of new victims ... The Italian border should
run across the Brenner Pass, Monte Nevoso and the Dinaric Alps ... I would say we can easily
sacrifice 500,000 barbaric Slavs for 50,000 Italians …”67

With utilizing phrases like this in the context of biological superiority, as well as Mussolini’s

desire for spazio vitale68 (vital space) for the Italian people show the influence he had on fascist

movements throughout Europe, namely the ones in Germany under Adolf Hitler.

Utilizing his oratory skills as well as encouraging his fellow fascists with promises of

nationalist success and bolstered Italian prestige, Mussolini was able to turn the hurt feelings

from the war into a desire for a dominant Italy in world affairs, and to claim what they had been

rightfully owed for the contributions at the Isonzo Front. Mussolini borrowed a phrase utilized

by Gabriele D’Annunzio, which described the outcome of the First World War as a vittoria

mutilata or mutilated victory.69 Mussolini blamed the weakness of Italy’s army, the

incompetence of the Italian general staff, and the treachery of Britain, France, and the United

States for Italy’s suffering during the war and the massive turmoil and runaway debt plaguing the

country in its aftermath. After being elected to the Chamber of Deputies in 1921, the following

year Mussolini rallied thousands of his supporters and in the March on Rome, he demanded

fascist control of the government. Fearful of his newfound power and ravenous followers, King

67
Jože Pirjevec, The Strategy of the Occupiers. Resistance, Suffering, Hope: The Slovene Partisan
Movement 1941–1945 (PDF), 27
68
Davide Rodogno,. Fascism's European Empire: Italian Occupation During the Second World War.
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006)
69
Alan Cassels. Mussolini’s Early Diplomacy (Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1970), 80-81
Victor Emmanuel agreed to force Prime Minister Facta to resign, and Benito Mussolini was

appointed in his stead.70

The story of Italy’s involvement in the First World War and the subsequent rise of the

fascists is nothing short of tragic. A proud nation with prestigious ambitions found itself alone on

all sides both before and after the war, yet there were still individuals in the country on both

sides of the political spectrum who refused to give up on their nation. A series of blunders both

on the battlefield and at the negotiating table left a number of Italians hurt and dejected; they did

not only feel anger at the foreign powers that prevented Italy’s rise, but they were also angry

with their own politicians and military leaders whom they viewed as incompetent, ignorant and

self serving. Viewing the low morale amongst the troops during Caporetto and the anger of the

Italian populace in the wake of the Versailles Treaty, it is quite apparent how, in four years time,

a radical movement such as the fascists would be able to garner so much popular support that

they would be able to launch what was essentially a coup sanctioned by the king himself. But

who truly deserves the blame for this series of events? Cadorna and the other soldiers, who

allowed their fondness of the past and stubborn natures to cloud their ability to see the future?

Was it Prime Minister Salandra’s fickle behavior in deciding whom to cast his lot in with? Or

could it even be Britain and France, who were quick to make promises they had no intention of

keeping in return for immediate aid? Based on what has been presented here, it is quite apparent

that all of these aforementioned points contributed, as well as a number of other trends that

persist deep within the nationalist and imperialist culture. In the end, the tragedy of Italy serves

as a harsh reminder that warfare takes a much larger toll than what can be seen on the battlefield,

and the suffering it causes is not always merely physical.

70
Ibid,, 186
 Bibliography

Books & Journals-

Alan Cassels. Mussolini’s Early Diplomacy (Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1970)

American Society of International Law. Volume 15, (Oxford University Press, 1921)

Christopher Seton-Watson, Italy from Liberalism to Fascism 1870-1925 (Great Britain: Methuen & Co Ltd,
1967)
Davide Rodogno,. Fascism's European Empire: Italian Occupation During the Second World War. (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2006)

Emile Ludwig, Nine Etched in Life. (Ayer Company Publishers, 1934 (original) 1969)

Frank Maloy Anderson and Amos Shartle Hershey, Handbook for the Diplomatic History of Europe, Asia,
and Africa 1870-1914 (Washington, National Board for Historical Service. Government Printing Office,
1918).

G.Irving Root, Battles in the Alps: A History of the Italian Front of the First World War (Baltimore:
PublishAmerica, 2008)

John McDonald, Caporetto and the Isonzo Campaign: The Italian Front 1915-1918 (South Yorkshire: Pen
& Sword Books Ltd, 2011)

John R. Schindler, Isonzo: The Forgotten Sacrifice of the Great War (Westport: Praeger Publishing, 2001)

Leonard Haber, The Poisonous Cloud: Chemical Warfare in the First World War. (New York: Clarendon
Press, 1986), 186

L. Hersch., La mortalité causée par la guerre mondiale ( Metron: The International Review of Statistics, 1927)

Mark Thompson, The White War: Life and Death on the Italian Front (New York: Basic Books, 2008)

Raymond Betts, The False Dawn: European Imperialism in the Nineteenth Century (Minnesota: University
of Minnesota Press, 1975)

Rene Albrecht-Carrie, Italy from Napoleon to Mussolini (New York: Columbia University Press, 1950)

Spencer Tucker,. Encyclopedia of World War I: a political, social, and military history. Volumes 1-5 ((Santa
Barbara, California, 2005)

Online Articles/ PDFs

Great Britain War Office, Statistics of the military effort of the British Empire during the Great War, 1914-1920.
(London, H.M. Stationery Office) https://archive.org/details/statisticsofmili00grea

Jože Pirjevec, The Strategy of the Occupiers. Resistance, Suffering, Hope: The Slovene Partisan
Movement 1941–1945 (PDF) http://www.znaci.net/00001/179.pdf