Bartolome vs.
SSS & Scanmar Maritime Services (2014) Moreover, this ruling finds support on the fact that even though
FACTS:
John Colcol died in a work-related accident while he was employed
as an electrician by Scanmar Maritime Services, Inc. He was
enrolled under the government’s Employees’ Compensation
Program (ECP).
Since John was childless and unmarried, petitioner Bernardina P.
Bartolome, John’s biological mother and, allegedly, sole remaining
beneficiary, filed a claim for death benefits with the SSS.
However, SSS denied the claim, stating that the petitioner is not
considered as the parent of John as he was legally adopted by
Cornelio Colcol, the victim’s great grandfather, therefore
Bernardina cannot be considered as John’s beneficiary because she
is not the deceased’s legitimate parent. Cornelio Colcol, however,
already died on October 26, 1987, less than three years since the
decree of John’s adoption became final.
ISSUE:
Do the biological parents of the covered qualify as the deceased’s
dependent parent and, thus, entitled to the death benefits?
HELD:
YES. when Cornelio, in 1985, adopted John, then about two (2)
years old, petitioner’s parental authority over John was severed.
However, lest it be overlooked, one key detail the ECC missed,
aside from Cornelio’s death, was that when the adoptive parent
died less than three (3) years after the adoption decree, John was
still a minor, at about four (4) years of age.
John’s minority at the time of his adopter’s death is a significant
factor in the case at bar. Under such circumstance, parental
authority should be deemed to have reverted in favor of the
biological parents.
parental authority is severed by virtue of adoption, the ties
between the adoptee and the biological parents are not entirely
eliminated. To demonstrate, the biological parents, insome
instances, are able to inherit from the adopted, as can be gleaned
from Art. 190 of the Family Code:
Art. 190. Legal or intestate succession to the estate of the adopted
shall be governed by the following rules:
xxx
(2) When the parents, legitimate or illegitimate, or the legitimate
ascendants of the adopted concur withthe adopter, they shall divide
the entire estate, one-half tobe inherited by the parents or
ascendants and the other half, by the adopters;
xxx
(6) When only collateral blood relatives of the adopted survive, then
the ordinary rules of legal or intestate succession shall apply.
Similarly, at the time of Cornelio Colcol’s death, which was prior to
the effectivity of the Family Code, the governing provision is Art.
984 of the New Civil Code, which provides:
Art. 984. In case of the death of an adopted child, leaving no children
or descendants, his parents and relatives by consanguinity and not
by adoption, shall be his legal heirs.
From the provisions, it is clear that the biological parents retain
their rights of succession tothe estate of their child who was the
subject of adoption. While the benefits arising from the death of an
SSS covered employee do not form part of the estate of the
adopted child, the pertinent provision on legal or intestate
succession at least reveals the policy on the rights of the biological
parents and those by adoption vis-à-vis the right to receive
benefits from the adopted. In the same way that certain rights still
attach by virtue of the blood relation, so too should certain
obligations, which, We rule, include the exercise of parental
authority, in the event of the untimely passing of their minor
offspring’s adoptive parent.
Thus, the Court rules that Cornelio’s death at the time of John’s
minority resulted in the restoration of petitioner’s parental
authority over the adopted child.
Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corp. vs Court of Appeals (1993)
FACTS:
Private respondent Clarita T. Camacho (private respondent for
short) was the operator of a gasoline station in Naguilian Road,
Baguio City, wherein she sells petitioner Shell's petroleum
products. Sometime in April 1983, private respondent requested
petitioner to conduct a hydro-pressure test on the underground
storage tanks of the said station in order to determine whether or
not the sales losses she was incurring for the past several months
were due to leakages therein. Petitioner acceded to the said
request and on April 27, 1983, one Jesus "Jessie" Feliciano together
with other workers, came to private respondent's station with a
Job Order from petitioner to perform the hydro-pressure test.
Jesse conducted the necessary procedures to carry out the test.
At around 5:30 a.m., private respondent's husband opened the
station and started selling gasoline. But at about 6:00 a.m., the
customers who had bought gasoline returned to the station
complaining that their vehicles stalled because there was water in
the gasoline that they bought. On account of this, private
respondent was constrained to replace the gasoline sold to the
said customers. However, a certain Eduardo Villanueva, one of the
customers, filed a complaint with the police against private
respondent for selling the adulterated gasoline. In addition, he
caused the incident to be published in two local newspapers.
Meanwhile, petitioner undertook to settle the criminal complaint
filed by Villanueva. Subsequently, Villanueva filed an Affidavit of
Desistance. Thereafter, private respondent demanded from
petitioner the payment of damages in the amount of P10,000.00.
Petitioner, instead, offered private respondent additional credit
line and other beneficial terms, which offer was, however, rejected.
Subsequently, or on October 12, 1983, private respondent filed
before the trial court a complaint for damages against petitioner
due to the latter's alleged negligence in the conduct of the hydro-
pressure test in her gasoline station. For its part, petitioner denied
liability because, according to it, the hydro-pressure test on the
underground storage tanks was conducted by an independent
contractor.
RTC: dismissed private respondent's complaint for damages
CA: reversed the RTC and held petitioner liable for the damage
caused to private respondent as a result of the hydro-pressure test
conducted by Jesus Feliciano
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner should be held accountable for the
damage to private respondent due to the hydro-pressure test
conducted by Jesus Feliciano.
HELD:
It is a well-entrenched rule that an employer-employee
relationship must exist before an employer may be held liable for
the negligence of his employee. It is likewise firmly settled that the
existence or non-existence of the employer-employee relationship
is commonly to be determined by examination of certain factors or
aspects of that relationship. These include: (a) the manner of
selection and engagement of the putative employee; (b) the mode
of payment of wages; (c) the presence or absence of a power to
control the putative employee's conduct, although the latter is the
most important element.
Respondent Court of Appeals concluded that Feliciano was not an
independent contractor but was under the control and supervision
of petitioner in the performance of the hydro-pressure test, hence,
it held petitioner liable for the former's acts and omissions.
We are not in accord with the above finding of respondent Court of
Appeals. As aptly held by the trial court, petitioner did not exercise
control and supervision over Feliciano with regard to the manner
in which he conducted the hydro-pressure test.
Feliciano is independently maintaining a business under a duly
registered business name, "JFS Repair and Maintenance Service,"
and is duly registered with the Bureau of Domestic Trade. He does
not enjoy a fixed salary but instead charges a lump sum
consideration for every piece of work he accomplishes. If he is not
able to finish his work, he does not get paid, as what happened in
this case. Further, Feliciano utilizes his own tools and equipment
and has a complement of workers. Neither is he required to work
on a regular basis. Instead, he merely awaits calls from clients such
as petitioner whenever repairs and maintenance services are
requested. Moreover, Feliciano does not exclusively service
petitioner because he can accept other business but not from other
oil companies. All these are the hallmarks of an independent
contractor.
Being an independent contractor, Feliciano is responsible for his
own acts and omissions. As he alone was in control over the
manner of how he was to undertake the hydro-pressure test, he
alone must bear the consequences of his negligence, if any, in the
conduct of the same.
Anent the issue of damages, the same has been rendered moot by
the failure of private respondent to establish an employer-
employee relationship between petitioner and Feliciano. Absent
said relationship, petitioner cannot be held liable for the acts and
omissions of the independent contractor, Feliciano.
Decision of CA is set aside and RTC decision is reinstated.
Mercury Drug Corporation vs De Leon (2008)
FACTS:
Respondent Raul T. De Leon was the presiding judge of Branch
258, Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Paraaque. He noticed that his
left eye was reddish. He also had difficulty reading. Dr. Charles
Milla, a friend for dinner at the Foohyui Restaurant, prescribed to
him the drugs “Cortisporin Opthalmic” and “Ceftin.” The good
judge went to a branch of Mercury Drug Store Corporation to buy
the prescribed medicines. He showed his prescription to a
pharmacist assistant. He subsequently got the medicine handed
over by the assistant.
When he applied the drop on his left eye, he felt “searing pain.” He
rinsed it with water but the pain did not subside. He then
discovered that he was given the wrong medicine or “Cortisporin
Otic Solution.”
The judge returned to the same Mercury Drug branch. The
assistant did not apologize and instead replied that she was unable
to fully read the prescription. Her supervisor was the one who
apologized and merely informed the judge that they did not have
on stock the medicine that he needed.
The judge wrote Mercury Drug, through its president about the
incident but did not get a response. Two sales persons went to his
office and informed him that their supervisor was busy with other
matters. With no apology or explanation forthcoming, he filed a
complaint for damages against Mercury Drug.
Mercury Drug argued that the proximate cause was the judge’s
own negligence. And that he should have first read and checked to
see if he had the right eye solution. Also, Mercury Drug explained
that there is no available medicine known as “Cortisporin
Opthalmic” in the Philippine market. What was written on the
piece of paper De Leon presented was “Cortisporin Solution” and
the pharmacist assistant gave him the only available “Cortisporin
Solution” in the market. Which leads one to ask, since his eye was
troubling him, how could you expect him to read the label?
Moreover, Mercury argued that the judge failed to present a
proper prescription as it lacked the required information
concerning the attending doctor’s name and license number. He
was entertained only because he was a regular customer of their
branch.
RTC ruled in favor of Respondent De Leon.
CA dismissed the appeal of Petitioner Mercury.
ISSUE:
WON Mercury and Ganzon had exercised the degree of diligence
expected of them
HELD:
Mercury Drug and Ganzon failed to exercise the highest degree of
diligence expected of them. Mercury Drug and Ganzon cannot
exculpate themselves from any liability. As active players in the
field of dispensing medicines to the public, the highest degree of
care and diligence is expected of them.
The profession of pharmacy demands care and skill, and druggists
must exercise care of a specially high degree, the highest degree of
care known to practical men. In other words, druggists must
exercise the highest practicable degree of prudence and vigilance,
and the most exact and reliable safeguards consistent with the
reasonable conduct of the business, so that human life may not
constantly be exposed to the danger flowing from the substitution
of deadly poisons for harmless medicines.
One holding himself out as competent to handle drugs, having
rightful access to them, and relied upon by those dealing with him
to exercise that high degree of caution and care called for by the
peculiarly dangerous nature of the business, cannot be heard to
say that his mistake by which he furnishes a customer the most
deadly of drugs for those comparatively harmless, is not in itself
gross negligence.
In cases where an injury is caused by the negligence of an
employee, there instantly arises a presumption of law that there
has been negligence on the part of the employer, either in the
selection or supervision of one’s employees. This presumption
may be rebutted by a clear showing that the employer has
exercised the care and diligence of a good father of the family.90
Mercury Drug failed to overcome such presumption.
As a buyer, De Leon relied on the expertise and experience of
Mercury Drug and its employees in dispensing to him the right
medicine. This Court has ruled that in the purchase and sale of
drugs, the buyer and seller do not stand at arms length. There
exists an imperative duty on the seller or the druggist to take
precaution to prevent death or injury to any person who relies on
one’s absolute honesty and peculiar learning.
The award of damages is proper and shall only be reduced
considering the peculiar facts of the case. Moral damages include
physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety,
besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social
humiliation, and similar injury. Though incapable of pecuniary
computation, moral damages may be recovered if they are the
proximate result of defendant’s wrongful act or omission.
It is generally recognized that the drugstore business is imbued
with public interest. This cannot be more real for Mercury Drug,
the country’s biggest drugstore chain. This Court cannot tolerate
any form of negligence which can jeopardize the health and safety
of its loyal patrons. Moreover, this Court will not countenance the
cavalier manner it treated De Leon. Not only does a pharmacy owe
a customer the duty of reasonable care, but it is also duty-bound to
accord one with respect.
 US vs. Cabiling (1907)
FACTS:
Testimony of Mrs. Allen
The defendant, Juan Cabiling, was a student of the Government
school at Ormoc, and the deceased was the principal of said school.
On the morning of November 22, 1905, a normal school was
opened at Ormoc for the training of teachers from the various
towns on the western coast of Leyte. Mr. Allen was authorized to
select from the students those who were to be promoted to said
school. The defendant was one of those who desired to attend said
school, and on the morning in question as soon as the class under
the direction of Mrs. Allen assembled the defendant, who was one
of the students of said class, inquired of Mrs. Allen if he was not
going to be in said normal class, and upon being answered 'no' he
stated that he was not satisfied. Mrs. Allen went on with the
recitation with which she was then engaged, and while she was
thus engaged the defendant kept talking in a very rude manner,
grumbled and refused to study, wherefore she told him two or
three times to stop because she must hear the recitation; a little
later, as soon as the recitation in class four was over, and Mrs.
Allen, desired to turn back to part second of the book for review,
because they had no other books, the defendant told her that
grammars must be available and that he was not satisfied, as there
arrived of supply of same, and upon being answered that the
grammars were for the normal school teachers, the defendant got
up and said to Mrs. Allen that she had told a lie by telling him that
he could go into the normal school and now he was held back in
the lower grade. In view of this behavior of the defendant, Mrs.
Allen said that she would go to talk with Mr. Allen and have him
settle the matter. Mrs. Allen left the room in the direction of the
library, where Mr. Allen was, and told him that it would be better
to send the defendant home and tell him to come back at 2 p. m.
The deceased gave his assent and followed Mrs. Allen into the
room, where the defendant was, and coming to the place where
the latter sat, Mr. Allen said to him: "What is the matter with you
this morning, Juan? If you are not satisfied here you may go away."
The defendant upon hearing these words, rushed upon the
deceased and stabbed him in the stomach; the deceased pushed
him back a distance of about 4 feet, and then the defendant gave
deceased a second blow in the same place, whereupon the
deceased caught the defendant by the right hand wherein he had
the knife, and by the neck. At this stage of the struggle the
lieutenant of the municipal police arrived and pointing his
revolver at the defendant separated them and took the knife away
from the defendant.
Her evidence is corroborated by that of Wilbur Chamberlain,
another eyewitness, and by that of James F. Godward, who
witnessed the termination of the struggle.
Defense
. . That on the morning in question, after Mrs. Allen had distributed
some paper for the lesson in arithmetic, she left the room and
shortly afterwards the deceased came and, taking the defendant by
one ear, caused him to stand up and then kicked him, took him by
the arms with both hands and shook him against a table, which fell
down, and again advancing to where the defendant was standing
took him by the neck and tried to throw him upon the floor; then
the police arrived and took Cabiling to the municipal building. All
the witnesses for the defendant admitted that when the deceased
arrived the defendant had a knife in his hands and was sharpening
a pencil with it, but they stated positively that they had not seen
him assail the deceased nor strike him with said knife. The
defendant himself flatly denied this fact.
The substance of the evidence on both sides is correctly stated in
the quotations above made. Allen died as a result of these wounds.
After a careful and somewhat lengthy analysis of the testimony of
the witnesses on both sides, the Attorney General finds that the
testimony of the witnesses for the prosecution is more reliable
than that of the witnesses for the defense.
HELD:
The court found that the defendant is guilty of murder and not
homicide. Among the circumstances which qualify the act, there is
mentioned in article 403 "treachery" (alevosia). The killing was
done with a pocketknife. It is very apparent from the evidence that
Allen had no suspicion that the defendant intended to make any
attack upon him, and there is nothing to show that Allen knew that
the defendant had this knife in his possession. It has been held in
the supreme court of Spain that a sudden and unexpected attack
upon another is proof of treachery.
The punishment for the crime of murder consists of three degrees.
The minimum degree, which is the maximum degree of the penalty
known as cadena temporal, is imprisonment from seventeen years
four months and one day to twenty years, the medium degree is
life imprisonment, and the maximum degree is death.
In the case at bar it was proven that the defendant was born of the
12th day of September, 1888, and was, therefore, at the time of the
offense was committed 17 years and 2 months old. The penalty
above mentioned for the crime of murder is, by the terms of the
Penal Code, inflicted only upon those persons who are more than
18 years old. By the provisions of article 85 of the said code, if the
defendant is more that 15 years and less than 18 years of age, the
penalty provided in article 403 can not be inflicted, but in its place
there must be inflicted the penalty immediately inferior to the one
indicated by that article. The highest of the common crimes known
to our law are parricide and robbery with homicide, but if the
person who commits either one of these crimes is under 18 years
of age, the greatest punishment which can be inflicted upon him is
imprisonment for twenty years. In this case the punishment to be
imposed upon the defendant is the penalty immediately inferior to
that provided in article 403. That penalty consists of two
indivisible penalties, namely, death and life imprisonment; and the
maximum degree of a divisible penalty, namely, cadena temporal.
By article 75, paragraph 3, of the Penal Code it is provided, that the
penalty immediately inferior to such penalty, as the one named in
article 403 shall be the medium and minimum degrees of the
divisible penalty and the maximum degree of the penalty which
follows the divisible penalty in the general scale. Applying that
article to the case at bar, it results that the penalty applicable is the
maximum degree of presidio mayor to the medium degree of
cadena temporal; that is to say, imprisonment from ten years and
one day to seventeen years and four months.
If none of the extenuating circumstances mentioned in article 9 of
the Penal Code, nor any of the aggravating circumstances
mentioned in article 10 are proven, the penalty should be inflicted
in the medium degree, that is from twelve years and one day to
fourteen years and eight months.
The evidence shows that the defendant, so far from being an
ignorant boy, was one of the most, if not the most, intelligent in his
class, and in such cases we have never considered article 11 as an
extenuating circumstance.
As to the aggravating circumstance, we agree with the Attorney-
General that of known premeditation was not proven, and that
circumstance 20 of article 10 was proven. That provision of article
10 is as follows:
When the act is committed with insult or in disregard for the
respect which may be due the aggrieved party on account of his
rank, age, or sex, or when it is committed in his dwelling, if he has
not given provocation.
It is applicable to this case because the person attacked was the
teacher and the person attacking was the pupil.
There being one aggravating circumstance and no extenuating
circumstance, the penalty must according to the law, be imposed
in the maximum degree and we fix it at fourteen years eight
months and one day of imprisonment (cadena temporal).
 Rosaldes vs People (2014)
FACTS:
The petitioner Felina Rosaldes, a public schoolteacher, was
charged and found guilty of child abuse punished under RA 7610.
It appears from the records that seven year old Michael Ryan
Gonzales, then a Grade 1 pupil, was hurriedly entering his
classroom when he accidentally bumped the knew of his teacher,
herein petitioner, who was then asleep on a bamboo sofa.
Petitioner asked Michael to apologize, the latter, however,
proceeded instead to his seat. Petitioner then pinched Michael on
his thigh, held him up by his armpits and pushed him to the floor
causing him to hit a desk and, consequently, losing his
consciousness. Petitioner proceeded to pick Michael by his ears
and repeatedly slammed him down on the floor.
Petitioner contends that she did not deliberately inflict the
physical injuries suffered by Michael to maltreat or malign him in a
manner that would debase, demean or degrade his dignity and
avers that her maltreatment is only an act of discipline that she as
a schoolteacher could reasonably do towards the development of
the child.
ISSUE:
Is petitioner guilty of the crime of child abuse punishable under RA
7610
HELD:
YES, petitioner Rosaldes is guilty of violation of RA 7610. Although
the petitioner, as a schoolteacher, could duly discipline Michael
Ryan as her pupil, her infliction of the physical injuries on him was
unnecessary, violent and excessive. The boy even fainted from the
violence suffered at her hands.
Section 3 of Republic Act No. 7610 defines child abuse:
xxxx
(b) “Child abuse” refers to the maltreatment, whether
habitual
or not, of the child which includes any of the following:
(1) Psychological and physical abuse, neglect, cruelty,
sexual
abuse and emotional maltreatment;
(2) Any act by deeds or words which debases, degrades
or
demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as a
human being;
(3) Unreasonable deprivation of his basic needs for
survival, such
as food and shelter; or
(4) Failure to immediately give medical treatment to an
injured
child resulting in serious impairment of his growth and
development or in
his permanent incapacity or death.
xxxx
In the crime charged against the petitioner, therefore, the
maltreatment may consist of an act by deeds or by words that
debases, degrades or demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity of a
child as a human being. The act need not be habitual. The physical
pain experienced by the victim had been aggravated by an
emotional trauma that caused him to stop going to school
altogether out of fear of the petitioner, compelling his parents to
transfer him to another school where he had to adjust again. Such
established circumstances proved beyond reasonable doubt that
the petitioner was guilty of child abuse by deeds that degraded
and demeaned the intrinsic worth and dignity of Michael Ryan as a
human being.
Hence, petitioner Rosaldes is guilty of the crime of child abuse
punished under RA 7610.
 Bongalon vs People (2013)
FACTS:
Bongalon was charged for the crime of child abuse under Sec. 10
(a) of RA 7610. Bongalon allegedly physically abused and/or
maltreated Jayson (12 years old) with his palm hitting the latter at
his back and by slapping said minor hitting his left check and
uttering derogatory remarks to the latterâs family. On his part,
Bongalon denied having physically abused or maltreated Jayson
but only confronted him when the latter threw stones at her
daughters, calling them as âKimiâ and for burning one of
his daughterâs hair. Both the RTC and CA held Bongalon guilty
of child abuse.
ISSUE: Whether or not the acts of Bongalon constituted child
abuse within the purview RA 7610.
RULING:
NO. Sec 10 (a), Art. VI of RA 7610 under which Bongalon was
charged states:
Sec. 10. Other Acts of Neglect, Abuse, Cruelty or Exploitation and
other Conditions Prejudicial to the Child’s Development:
(a) Any person who shall commit any other acts of child abuse,
cruelty or exploitation or be responsible for other conditions
prejudicial to the child’s development including those covered by Art.
59 of PD 603, as amended, but not covered by the RPC, as amended,
shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period.
Child abuse, on the other hand, is defined by Sec. 3 (b) as
maltreatment, whether habitual or not, of the child which includes:
xxx
(2.) Any acts by deeds or words which debases, degrades, or
demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as a human
being;
xxx
Not every instance of the laying of hands on a child constitutes
child abuse. Only when the laying of hands is shown beyond
reasonable doubt to be intended by the accused to debase,
degrade, or demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of the child as
a human being should it be punished as child abuse. Otherwise, it
is punished under RPC. In this case, the records showed that the
laying of hands on Jayson have been done at the spur of the
moment and in anger, indicative of his being overwhelmed by his
fatherly concern for the personal safety of his own minor
daughters who had just suffered harm at the hands of Jayson and
his companion. With the loss of his self-control, he lacked the
specific intent to debase, degrade, or demean the intrinsic worth
and dignity of the child as a human being that was so essential in
the crime of child abuse.
However, considering that Jayson suffered physical injury
requiring five to seven days of medical attention, Bongalon is liable
for slight physical injuries under Art. 266 (1) of the RPC. In
imposing the correct penalty, however, we have to consider the
mitigating circumstance of passion or obfuscation under Article 13
(6) of the Revised Penal Code, because the petitioner lost his
reason and self-control, thereby diminishing the exercise of his
will power. Passion or obfuscation may lawfully arise from causes
existing only in the honest belief of the accused. It is relevant to
mention, too, that in passion or obfuscation, the offender suffers a
diminution of intelligence and intent. With his having acted under
the belief that Jayson and Roldan had thrown stones at his two
minor daughters, and that Jayson had burned Cherrlyn’s hair, the
petitioner was entitled to the mitigating circumstance of passion.
Arresto menor is prescribed in its minimum period (i.e., one day to
10 days) in the absence of any aggravating circumstance that
offset the mitigating circumstance of passion. Accordingly, with
the Indeterminate Sentence Law being inapplicable due to the
penalty imposed not exceeding one year, the petitioner shall suffer
a straight penalty of 10 days of arresto menor.”
 School of the Holy Spirit of QC vs Taguiam (2008)
FACTS:
Respondent Taguiam was the class adviser of a Grade 5 class of
petitioner school. After obtaining permission from the principal,
they were allowed to use the school swimming poolfor their year-
end activity. With this, respondent Taguiam distributed the
parent’s/guardian’s permit forms to the students.
The permit form of student Chiara Mae was unsigned. But because
the mother personally brought her to the school with her packed
lunch and swimsuit, Taguiam concluded that the mother allowed
her to join. Before the activity started, respondent warned the
pupils who did not know how to swim to avoid the deeper area.
However, while the pupils were swimming, two of them sneaked
out. Respondent went after them to verify where they were going.
Unfortunately, while respondent was away, Chiara Mae drowned.
When respondent returned, the maintenance man was already
administering cardiopulmonary resuscitation on Chiara Mae. She
was still alive when respondent rushed her to the General Malvar
Hospital where she was pronounced dead on arrival.
The petitioner school conducted a clarificatory hearing to which
respondent attended and submitted her Affidavit of Explanation. A
month later, petitioner school dismissed respondent on the
ground of gross negligence resulting to loss of trust and
confidence.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent’s dismissal on the ground of gross
negligence resulting to loss of trust and confidence was valid
HELD:
Yes. Under Article 282 of the Labor Code, gross and habitual
neglect of duties is a valid ground for an employer to terminate an
employee. Gross negligence implies a want or absence of or a
failure to exercise slight care or diligence, or the entire absence of
care. It evinces a thoughtless disregard of consequences without
exerting any effort to avoid them. Habitual neglect implies
repeated failure to perform one’s duties for a period of time,
depending upon the circumstances.
The SC concluded that respondent had been grossly negligent.
First, it is undisputed that Chiara Mae’s permit form was unsigned.
Yet, respondent allowed her to join the activity because she
assumed that Chiara Mae’s mother has allowed her to join it by
personally bringing her to the school with her packed lunch and
swimsuit. Second, it was respondent’s responsibility as Class
Adviser to supervise her class in all activities sanctioned by the
school. Thus, she should have coordinated with the school to
ensure that proper safeguards, such as adequate first aid and
sufficient adult personnel, were present during their activity. She
should have been mindful of the fact that with the number of
pupils involved, it would be impossible for her by herself alone to
keep an eye on each one of them.
Notably, respondent’s negligence, although gross, was not
habitual. In view of the considerable resultant damage, however,
the SC agreed that the cause is sufficient to dismiss respondent.
Indeed, the sufficiency of the evidence as well as the resultant
damage to the employer should be considered in the dismissal of
the employee. In this case, the damage went as far as claiming the
life of a child.
Aquinas School vs Inton (2011)
FACTS:
Jose Luis was a grade three student at the Aquinas School, while
Sister Margarita was a religion teacher who started teaching at the
school only that year. On July 14, 1998m while Sister Margarita
was writing on the blackboard, Jose Luis left his assigned seat and
went to a classmate to play a prank on the latter. Despite Sister
Margarita’s instruction for him to go back to his seat, Jose Luis
kept on going back again. Unable to tolerate anymore the child’s
behavior, Sister Margarita approached Jose Luis and kicked him on
the leg several times; pulled and shoved his head on his
classmate’s seat, and told him to stay in on the floor and finish
copying the notes on the board while seated on the floor. Because
of this, Jose Luis’s parents, Jose and Ma. Victoria, filed a case for
damages against Aquinas School and Sister Margarita. They also
filed a separate criminal case for violation of Republic Act 7610
against Sister Margarita, to which she pleaded guilty.
The RTC held Sister Margarita liable for damages but absolved the
school. Upon appeal to the Court of Appeals, the latter affirmed the
RTC judgment but found the school liable for damages under
Article 2180 of the Civil Code, finding that an employer-employee
relationship existed between it and Sister Margarita. Both parties
appealed the CA decision.
On one hand, the school contended that it cannot be held liable,
insisting that it was the congregation who selected Sister
Margarita to catechise its grade three students, pursuant to the
school’s agreement with the congregation for the latter to send
sisters so it can fulfil its ministry of catechising students. On the
other hand, the spouses sought to increase the amount of damages
awarded by the courts.
ISSUE:
WON the CA was correct in holding Aquinas solidarily liable with
Yamyamin for the damages awarded to Jose Luis.
HELD:
The CA is incorrect. Aquinas University is absolved from paying
damages to Jose Luis.
“The Court has consistently applied the “four-fold test” to
determine the existence of an employer-employee relationship:
the employer (a) selects and engages the employee; (b) pays his
wages; (c) has power to dismiss him; and (d) has control over his
work. Of these, the most crucial is the element of control. Control
refers to the right of the employer, whether actually exercised or
reserved, to control the work of the employee as well as the means
and methods by which he accomplishes the same.
In this case, the school directress testified that Aquinas had an
agreement with a congregation of sisters under which, in order to
fulfill its ministry, the congregation would send religion teachers
to Aquinas to provide catechesis to its students. Aquinas insists
that it was not the school but Yamyamin’s religious congregation
that chose her for the task of catechizing the school’s grade three
students, much like the way bishops designate the catechists who
would teach religion in public schools. Under the circumstances, it
was quite evident that Aquinas did not have control over
Yamyamin’s teaching methods. The Intons had not refuted the
school directress’ testimony in this regard. Consequently, it was
error for the CA to hold Aquinas solidarily liable with Yamyamin.
Of course, Aquinas still had the responsibility of taking steps to
ensure that only qualified outside catechists are allowed to teach
its young students. In this regard, it cannot be said that Aquinas
took no steps to avoid the occurrence of improper conduct
towards the students by their religion teacher.
First, Yamyamin’s transcript of records, certificates, and diplomas
showed that she was qualified to teach religion.
Second, there is no question that Aquinas ascertained that
Yamyamin came from a legitimate religious congregation of sisters
and that, given her Christian training, the school had reason to
assume that she would behave properly towards the students.
Third, the school gave Yamyamin a copy of the school’s
Administrative Faculty Staff Manual that set the standards for
handling students. It also required her to attend a teaching
orientation before she was allowed to teach beginning that June of
1998.

Fourth, the school pre-approved the content of the course she was
to teach to ensure that she was really catechizing the students.
And fifth, the school had a program for subjecting Yamyamin to
classroom evaluation. Unfortunately, since she was new and it was
just the start of the school year, Aquinas did not have sufficient
opportunity to observe her methods. At any rate, it acted
promptly to relieve her of her assignment as soon as the school
learned of the incident. It cannot be said that Aquinas was guilty of
outright neglect.
Regarding the Intons’ plea for an award of greater amounts of
damages, the Court finds no justification for this since they did not
appeal from the decision of the CA. The Intons prayed for the
increase only in their comment to the petition. They thus cannot
obtain from this Court any affirmative relief other than those that
the CA already granted them in its decision.”
Cudia vs The Superintendent of PMA (2015)
FACTS:
Aldrin Jeff Cudia was a member of the Philippine Military Academy
(PMA) Siklab Diwa Class of 2014. On November 14, 2013, Cudia’s
class had a lesson examination in their Operations Research (OR)
subject the schedule of which was from 1:30pm to 3pm.
However, after he submitted his exam paper, Cudia made a query
to their OR teacher. Said teacher, then asked Cudia to wait for her.
Cudia complied and as a result, he was late for his next class
(English). Later, the English teacher reported Cudia for being late.
In his explanation, Cudia averred that he was late because his OR
class was dismissed a bit late. The tactical officer (TO) tasked to
look upon the matter concluded that Cudia lied when he said that
their OR class was dismissed late because the OR teacher said she
never dismissed her class late. Thus, Cudia was meted with
demerits and touring hours because of said infraction.
Cudia did not agree with the penalty hence he asked the TO about
it. Not content with the explanation of the TO, Cudia said he will be
appealing the penalty he incurred to the senior tactical officer
(STO). The TO then asked Cudia to write his appeal.
In his appeal, Cudia stated that his being late was out of his control
because his OR class was dismissed at 3pm while his English class
started at 3pm also. To that the TO replied: that on record, and
based on the interview with the teachers concerned, the OR
teacher did not dismiss them (the class) beyond 3pm and the
English class started at 3:05pm, not 3pm; that besides, under PMA
rules, once a student submitted his examination paper, he is
dismissed from said class and may be excused to leave the
classroom, hence, Cudia was in fact dismissed well before 3pm;
that it was a lie for Cudia to state that the class was dismissed late
because again, on that day in the OR class, each student was
dismissed as they submit their examination, and were not
dismissed as a class; that if Cudia was ordered by the teacher to
stay, it was not because such transaction was initiated by the
teacher, rather, it was initiated by Cudia (because of his query to
the teacher), although there were at least two students with Cudia
at that time querying the teacher, the three of them cannot be
considered a “class”; Cudia could just have stated all that instead of
saying that his class was dismissed a bit late, hence he lied. The
STO sustained the decision of the TO.
Later, the TO reported Cudia to the PMA’s Honor Committee (HC)
for allegedly violating the Honor Code. Allegedly, Cudia lied in his
written appeal when he said his class was dismissed late hence, as
a result, he was late for his next class.
The Honor Code is PMA’s basis for the minimum standard of
behavior required of their cadets. Any violation thereof may be a
ground to separate a cadet from PMA.
Cudia submitted an explanation to the HC. Thereafter, the HC,
which is composed of nine (9) cadets, conducted an investigation.
After two hearings and after the parties involved were heard and
with their witnesses presented, the HC reconvened and the
members cast their vote. The initial vote was 8-1: 8 found Cudia
guilty and 1 acquitted Cudia. Under PMA rules (Honor System), a
dissenting vote means the acquittal of Cudia. However, they also
have a practice of chambering where the members, particularly
the dissenter, are made to explain their vote. This is to avoid the
“tyranny of the minority”. After the chambering, the dissenter was
convinced that his initial “not guilty vote” was improper, hence he
changed the same and the final vote became 9-0. Thus, Cudia was
immediately placed inside PMA’s holding center.
Cudia appealed to the HC chairman but his appeal was denied.
Eventually, the Superintendent of the PMA ordered the dismissal
of Cudia from the PMA.
Cudia and several members of his family then sent letters to
various military officers requesting for a re-investigation. It was
their claim that there were irregularities in the investigation done
by the HC. As a result of such pleas, the case of Cudia was referred
to the Cadet Review and Appeals Board of PMA (CRAB).
Meanwhile, Cudia’s family brought the case to the Commission on
Human Rights (CHR) where it was alleged that PMA’s “sham”
investigation violated Cudia’s rights to due process, education, and
privacy of communication.
Eventually, the CRAB ruled against Cudia. This ruling was affirmed
by the AFP Chief of Staff. But on the other hand, the CHR found in
favor of Cudia.
PMA averred that CHR’s findings are at best recommendatory.
Cudia filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus
before the Supreme Court. PMA opposed the said petition as it
argued that the same is not proper as a matter of policy and that
the court should avoid interfering with military matters.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Cudia’s petitions is proper.
2. Whether or not the PMA can validly dismiss Cudia based on its
findings.
HELD:
1. Mandamus is not proper. Mandamus will not prosper in this
case. Cudia’s prayer that PMA should be compelled to reinstate
him as well as to give him his supposed academic awards is not
proper. The Courts, even the Supreme Court, cannot compel PMA
to do so because the act of restoring Cudia’s rights and
entitlements as a cadet as well as his awards is a discretionary act.
Mandamus cannot be availed against an official or government
agency, in this case PMA, whose duty requires the exercise of
discretion or judgment. Further, such act which PMA was sought
by Cudia to perform is within PMA’s academic freedom as an
educational institution – and such performance is beyond the
jurisdiction of courts.
Certiorari is allowed. The petition for certiorari is allowed because
the issue herein is whether or not PMA and its responsible officers
acted with grave abuse of discretion when it dismissed Cudia.
Under the Constitution, that is the duty of the courts to decide
actual controversies and to determine whether or not a
government branch or instrumentality acted with grave abuse of
discretion. Thus, PMA cannot argue that judicial intervention into
military affairs is not proper as a matter of policy. Suffice it to say
that judicial non-interference in military affairs is not an absolute
rule.
On the civil liberties of PMA cadets
One of the arguments raised by PMA is that cadets, when they
enrolled in the PMA, have surrendered parts of their civil and
political liberties. Hence, when they are disciplined and punished
by the PMA, said cadets cannot question the same, much less,
question it in the courts. in short, they cannot raise due process.
On this, the SC held that such argument is wrong. It is true that a
PMA cadet, by enrolling at PMA, must be prepared to subordinate
his private interests for the proper functioning of the educational
institution he attends to, one that is with a greater degree than a
student at a civilian public school. However, a cadet facing
dismissal from PMA, whose private interests are at stake (life,
liberty, property) which includes his honor, good name, and
integrity, is entitled to due process. No one can be deprived of such
without due process of law and the PMA, even as a military
academy, is not exempt from such strictures. Thus, when Cudia
questioned in court the manner upon which he was dismissed
from the PMA, such controversy may be inquired upon by the
courts.
(Author’s note: PMA, in essence, raised that due process, as
contemplated by the Constitution, is not needed in dismissing a
cadet yet, as can be seen in the below discussion, PMA presented
evidence that due process was, in fact, complied with.)
2. Yes. It is within PMA’s right to academic freedom to decide
whether or not a cadet is still worthy to be part of the institution.
Thus, PMA did not act with grave abuse of discretion when it
dismissed Cudia. In fact, Cudia was accorded due process. In this
case, the investigation of Cudia’s Honor Code violation followed
the prescribed procedure and existing practices in the PMA. He
was notified of the Honor Report submitted by his TO. He was then
given the opportunity to explain the report against him. He was
informed about his options and the entire process that the case
would undergo. The preliminary investigation immediately
followed after he replied and submitted a written explanation.
Upon its completion, the investigating team submitted a written
report together with its recommendation to the HC Chairman. The
HC thereafter reviewed the findings and recommendations. When
the honor case was submitted for formal investigation, a new team
was assigned to conduct the hearing. During the formal
investigation/hearing, he was informed of the charge against him
and given the right to enter his plea. He had the chance to explain
his side, confront the witnesses against him, and present evidence
in his behalf. After a thorough discussion of the HC voting
members, he was found to have violated the Honor Code.
Thereafter, the guilty verdict underwent the review process at the
Academy level – from the OIC of the HC, to the SJA (Staff Judge
Advocate), to the Commandant of Cadets, and to the PMA
Superintendent. A separate investigation was also conducted by
the HTG (Headquarters Tactics Group). Then, upon the directive of
the AFP-GHQ (AFP-General Headquarters) to reinvestigate the
case, a review was conducted by the CRAB. Further, a Fact-Finding
Board/Investigation Body composed of the CRAB members and
the PMA senior officers was constituted to conduct a deliberate
investigation of the case. Finally, he had the opportunity to appeal
to the President. Sadly for him, all had issued unfavorable rulings.
And there is no reason for the SC to disturb the findings of facts by
these bodies.
Academic freedom of the PMA
Cudia would argue that there is no law providing that a guilty
finding by the HC may be used by the PMA to dismiss or
recommend the dismissal of a cadet from the PMA; that Honor
Code violation is not among those listed as justifications for the
attrition of cadets considering that the Honor Code and the Honor
System (manner which PMA conducts investigation of Honor Code
violations) do not state that a guilty cadet is automatically
terminated or dismissed from service.
Such argument is not valid. Even without express provision of a
law, the PMA has regulatory authority to administratively dismiss
erring cadets. Further, there is a law (Commonwealth Act No. 1)
authorizing the President to dismiss cadets. Such power by the
President may be delegated to the PMA Superintendent, who may
exercise direct supervision and control over the cadets.
Further, as stated earlier, such power by the PMA is well within its
academic freedom. Academic freedom or, to be precise, the
institutional autonomy of universities and institutions of higher
learning has been enshrined in the Constitution.
The essential freedoms of academic freedom on the part of schools
are as follows;
a. the right to determine who may teach;
b. the right to determine what may be taught;
c. the right to determine how it shall be taught;
d. the right to determine who may be admitted to study.
The Honor Code is just but one way for the PMA to exercise its
academic freedom. If it determines that a cadet violates it, then it
has the right to dismiss said cadet. In this case, based on its
findings, Cudia lied – which is a violation of the Honor Code.
But Cudia’s lie is not even that big; is dismissal from the PMA
really warranted?
The PMA Honor Code does not distinguish between a big lie and a
minor lie. It punishes any form of lying. It does not have a
gradation of penalties. In fact, it is the discretion of the PMA as to
what penalty may be imposed. When Cudia enrolled at PMA, he
agreed to abide by the Honor Code and the Honor System. Thus,
while the punishment may be severe, it is nevertheless reasonable
and not arbitrary, and, therefore, not in violation of due process -
also considering that Cudia, as a cadet, must have known all of
these.
All told, petitioners are not entitled to moral and exemplary
damages in accordance with Articles 19, 2217, 2219 and 2229 of
the Civil Code. The dismissal of Cadet 1CL Cudia from the PMA did
not effectively deprive him of a future. Cliché though it may sound,
being a PMA graduate is not the “be-all and end-all” of his
existence. A cadet separated from the PMA may still continue to
pursue military or civilian career elsewhere without suffering the
stigma attached to his or her dismissal. For one, as suggested by
respondents, DND-AFP Circular No. 13, dated July 15, 1991, on the
enlistment and reenlistment in the AFP Regular Force, provides
under Section 14 (b) thereof that priority shall be given to, among
others, the ex-PMA or PAFFFS cadets.228 If the positions open
does not appeal to his interest for being way below the rank he
could have achieved as a PMA graduate, Cadet 1CL Cudia could still
practice other equally noble profession or calling that is best
suited to his credentials, competence, and potential. Definitely,
nobody can deprive him of that choice.
Filipinas Broadcasting Network Inc. vs Ago Medical &
Educational Center-Bicol Christian College of Medicine (2005)
FACTS:
“Exposé” is a radio documentary program, hosted by Rima and
Alegre, which is aired every morning over DZRC-AM owned by
Filipinas Broadcasting Network, Inc. “Exposé” is heard over Bicol
areas. On December 14&15,1989, Rima and Alegre exposed
various alleged complaints from students, teachers and parents
against AMEC and its administrators. Claiming that the broadcasts
were defamatory, AMEC and the Dean of AMEC’s College of
Medicine, filed a complaint for damages against FBNI, Rima and
Alegrefor the “transmitted malicious imputations, and as such,
destroyed AMEC’s and Ago’s reputation.” AMEC and Ago included
FBNI as defendant for allegedly failing to exercise due diligence in
the selection and supervision of its employees.
FBNI, Rima and Alegre alleged that the broadcasts against
AMEC were fair and true. FBNI, Rima and Alegre claimed that they
were plainly impelled by a sense of public duty to report the
“goings-on in AMEC, [which is] an institution imbued with public
interest.” The trial court rendered a Decision finding FBNI and
Alegre liable for libel except Rima. The trial court held that the
broadcasts are libelous per se. In holding FBNI liable for libel, the
trial court found that FBNI failed to exercise diligence in the
selection and supervision of its employees. In absolving Rima from
the charge, the trial court ruled that Rima’s only participation was
when he agreed with Alegre’s exposé. The trial court found Rima’s
statement within the “bounds of freedom of speech, expression,
and of the press.”
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgment
with modification. CA made Rima solidarily liable with FBNI and
Alegre. Also, CA court denied Ago’s claim for damages and
attorney’s fees because the broadcasts were directed against
AMEC, and not against her. FBNI, Rima and Alegre filed a motion
for reconsideration which the Court of Appeals denied. Hence,
FBNI filed the petition for review.
or reputation of the party libeled goes only in mitigation of
damages. Neither in such a case is the plaintiff required to
introduce evidence of actual damages as a condition precedent to
the recovery of some damages. In this case, the broadcasts are
libelous per se.
Thus, AMEC is entitled to moral damages. However, the
Court found the award of P300,000 moral damages unreasonable.
The record shows that even though the broadcasts were libelous
per se, AMEC has not suffered any substantial or material damage
to its reputation. Therefore, the Court reduced the award of moral
damages from P300,000 to P150,000.

ISSUE:
Whether AMEC is entitled to moral damages.

HELD:

AMEC is entitled to moral damages. A juridical person is generally

not entitled to moral damages because, unlike a natural person, it
cannot experience physical suffering or such sentiments as
wounded feelings, serious anxiety, mental anguish or moral shock.
The Court of Appeals cites Mambulao Lumber Co. v. PNB, et al. to
justify the award of moral damages. However, the Court’s
statement in Mambulao that “a corporation may have a good
reputation which, if besmirched, may also be a ground for the
award of moral damages” is an obiter dictum. Nevertheless,
AMEC’s claim for moral damages falls under item 7 of Article 2219
of the Civil Code. This provision expressly authorizes the recovery
of moral damages in cases of libel, slander or any other form
ofdefamation. Article 2219(7) does not qualify whether the
plaintiff is a natural or juridical person. Therefore, a juridical
person such as a corporation can validly complain for libel or any
other form of defamation and claim for moral damages. Moreover,
where the broadcast is libelous per se, the law implies damages. In
such a case, evidence of an honest mistake or the want of character