Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Mount Weather Meeting Minutes: 1968
Mount Weather Meeting Minutes: 1968
.........-----
_.
/ \I
. j
,. ..
FEDERAL AGENCY REPRESENTATNES MEETING I ..-/ .---·
SPECIAL FACILITIES DNISION '------------- _/ /
Attending:
Mr.
Bernard T. Gallagher, Chairman Mr. Elmo Jensen
Mr.
Claude Ashby Mr. John Larson
Col.
James E. Barrett Mr. Terence McCracken
Mr.
W. Lee CoVins Mr. John Mcintire
Mr.
Thomas Gibson Mr. Charles Miller
~r. James S. Hafer Mr. Charles Moore
Mr. Thomas Hagan Mr. David Moses
Dr. Isaac Zigler
Mr. Gallagher chaired the meeting and made the following announcements:
1. A notice has been distributed that next week ' s meeting will be held in
the Main Briefing Room and a special filrri will be shown.
3. A group from Carlisle Barracks will visit for a briefing and tour on
January 9.
Mr. Hafer distributed General Taylor's speech and announced the imminent distribu-
tion of the Compendium of the Operations Plan. He also stated that arrangements were
trying to be worked out to offer certain undergraduate courses to site personnel.
Mr. Hagan reported that the Emergency Broadcast System Test used a taped message--
the first time this procedure had been used so far as he knew. Mr. Moore explained
why the tape was used and suggested that the accompanying script was interesting and
i nformative and should be made available to all the FAR'S.
Mr. Jensen (NRAC) stated that NRAC would distribute copies of proceedings of a
recently held executive seminar on "Administration of National Security Policy"
at Kingsport, N. Y ., and a symposium on "Problems of Recovery of a Nuclear
Attack" recently held at Point Comfort, Va, Mr. Jensen also volunteered to
give a review of the Iron Mountain Report he gave at the seminar if the FAR'S
wished.
Dr. Zigler asked the general question, "What benefit does one receive from
participating in CCPX's?" A general discussion ensued.
Col. Barrett announced that the Automatic Entry Message System would soon be
installed and put into operation. A discussion ensued about the techniques,
procedures, and difficulties associated with the introduction of the new system.
radio, our officials who cable piles of messages to our Government all contribute to the I
news which then flashes across our television screens and across the headlines of our
papers, today bringing us· a message of goOd news, tomorrow bad news·~ but' rarely wi tb
any explanation of what it all really means. As the coming Presid~ntial campaign
~-.. .
p~·ceeds, inevitably our political leader~ on both sides will be re~xamlnin~ ·their
positions a~d reappraising the basic factors involved in'South Viet-Nam an~ their
significance for tr..e United States. · I suspect there will be a growing sea.rch for
alternatives in the feeling that, if we are not s~tisfied generally with the present .
situation, ·rrc should soe if we can not do batter. For these reasons_, I have taken for
. .•
I think that, before we can proceed ;nth a discussion of alternatives, ·~ must ask
OUrselves, alternatives to what? Presumably _we mean alternatives to tha course of action
.,.e are nou following - hence,. we need to agree at the
1 I
outset
.
of any discussions ot
. I
aiternatives -as to what are
.
out present objectives and
:
their supporting strategy.
. !
S~ch agreement should not be hard to reach in spite of those ~6 say that they ·
•
·d on't know ·what our present policy is. I take serious ~~nt with such statements
beca~se it seems to me our policy is clear and can be stated simply in one paragraph.
Our poli~ consists of an objective and a coheront strategy designed to obtain that
objective. And, furthermore, our objective has not varied since 1954. Three Presidents
and three Administrations have sta~ed it in essentially the same sense, although some-
lI
times in slightly differing war~se \
i
I take tonight for the statement of our objective President Johnson's words in
Baltimore in April, 1965 when he said, "Our objective is the independence of South
Viet-Nam and its freedom from attack. We want nothing for ourselves, only t~~t the
people in South Viot-Nam be allowed to guide their 01-m country in their own way." "r /
submit th'lt that is clear, ·it is unambiguous. In simple English, tt states that r~e t~cek l
. . . I
two things in South Viet-Nam, a cessation of the Communist-directed agp,rossion from NortE
•
Viet-Nam ar,ainst South Viet-Nam, and the right of self-detennination for the people ot
South Viet-Nan • . These are not new principles of behavior; they have guided oUr foreign
'
policy since vlorld vlar I in many political conflicts throughout the world. The ob-
. .
jective in Viet-Nam is not only simple and clear but it is limite~ in the s_ense that
it asks for no unconditional surrender, nothing which is vital to those who are promoti~
Now, i f we have identified the overall objective, what. is our strategy, how are we
trying .to attain our objective? Again, I think a simple ansHer will explain our efforts
i·Te are trying to do tHo things; first, He are trying to use graduat~d milit~ry force
" '.in order to protect the population of South Viet-Nam against. the .depredations and
COPY LBJ LIBRARY
.. .. _. -
..
\: v
3/ .
terrorist attacks of the guerrillas who for '
thirteen years have been trying to impose a
communist state on South Viet-Nam aganst the wishe~ of the vast majority of South
.
;
Vietn.:unese. At the same time that our forces ·are undertaking ·. to give security tp the
. I
people, they are tr,Ying to inflict m~imum losses ai,ainst the militar,y and paramilitary
: . i
forces of the enemy in order to convince the leaders of Hanoi that no militar,y victo~
absorbed into the society of South Viet-Nam or will be returned to North Viet-Nam. A·
• !'. •• • •
new nation will then arise iri South Viet-Nam comparable to ~he new nation that arose in
. .
Korea after the termination of hostilities there.
.
That, then, is the hope of our presen
.
course of action.
J • .
1
I
criticism, many of us quite' properly will say if this is not the best v~y to do our
. ~ .
business, if this is not the be3t course of action to protect the interests of the -
. .
United States and of our allies, what are the alternatives which offer greater promise?
I \
First, let me say what ~sn't an alternative • . It is not an alternative to say that
we should--keep out of a remote, insfgnificant country like South Viet-Nam. That might
have been an alternative in 1954, but is not in 1967. It does us no good to wring our
hands in regret over what we did in the past. Personally, I have no regret for most
past decisions of Viet-Nam policy but many peopl~~nd I can't dispute their right to
feel that way. But the point is that we are up to ~ur governmental neck in South Viet•
. \
.
Nam and it does no good to say we wish we weren't there, that we shouldn't be there. We .
are there, and the decision-makers of our Government must live with that fact and you and
\
I must help them carry on from that point.
II
What are the real alternatives beyond the course of action which we are following?
~
I don't like to appear to sloganize but slogans seem ~ e~ential _to at~ract attention. I I
would say that the . slogans describing the four coursetor action which I consider the only•
real alternatives are: ~e, Pull Out; tt:lo, Pull Back; three, All Out; four, "Stick it
Out 11 , the cource we are net-T following. tr you will pennit me, letts take them in order
'
and talk about the pros and cons of each.
Let's first talk about "Pull out." How exactly wo would go about pulline out of
I '
Viet-Nam if v~ decided to do so in a short period of time,
. .
I frankly don't know. The
French, however, found a ·1-1a.y. They elected · I1endes-France to the P.r emiershiP. in the
.
summer of 1954 with a mandate tq get out of South Viet-Nam and he executed that mandate
by announcing that within one month he must have an agreement with the Communists for
French evacuation or he and his countrymen woul~ go home anyWay. This pell-mell dash
to the conference table resulted in the series of agreements which wore formalized in
19.54 in Vict ... Nam nrrl nt Genova which runountod to an ~to tm,I,j' ovor South Viet-N~
.
-
" and North Viet-Nam . to the Communists -vrhile the Fronch Hashed their hands and "~nt home.
... ~ - ··
'
. I'
'
I don't thil')k we Hould do it that way· - I hope riot - :but that was one way to got out
.
and I don't exactly know ho,., the American proponents of the "Pull Out" solution ~:ould
. I
bad, what are the pros and what are the cono of tho "Pull Out~" On the pro side, thoso I
who~ arGue for this case would ·say1 I think, that a Pull Out would stop this waste I
of our resources in South Viet-Nam '~ich runs into billions
, of dollars
.
a year. Further-
I
• I
more, it· '1-,'0uld remove the danger to peace which all miiitary conflicts entail in this ·
. :
confined nuclear world of todny o.nd it rrould end tho intern11tionnl cr:tticif;m 1o~h:tch the
I
United Statoo is receiving from mnrtr qunrtoro, gonornlly fran thooo d:intnnt countries
l-lhich feel far enough removed to be unaffected by the issues represented in South Viet-U
Finally, I think the argument of the pros would include the point that our pation 1
woefully op1i.t today by the Viet-Nam issue, would be reunited upon the eliminatio-n of the
. /
I .
Viet-Nam problem by our withdrawal. These, I think, are the usua~ arguments which one -
.
hears for a Pull Out.
Now what are · the cons against the 11 Pull Out"? The obvious one is that it would be .
a resounding defeat for the United States foreign policy, the lowering of a flag which ha
.
been nailed to the mast of our Asian policy, 1-lith nails .driven in by both Democratic
and Republican administrationso I call it a resounding defeat because it would resound
.
throughout the world, not only through Asia but through Europe as well and through the
. '
United _States, the Halls of Congress and every element of our soci~ty- the . tidings
:-. .. .
that, for the first time· since becbming a world leader., the United States had
. '
suffered
a humiliating defeaV abroad.
\ . Some would call this defeat seriousj others would call .it disastrous. It would
ccrtai~ly be aerious .and perhaps disastrous because it would register a victo~ for the
Go-called '11-lar of National Liberation" technique "1hich ha·s been proclaimed in Hanoi,
~ Moscow and Peking .as the favorite tactic of tho future for expansive communism. ~
.. .·.
. .
This nc,., "-capon cons:lsts of tho twc of nubvcr:>ivo cuorrtlln wnri'nro 1io tunnel under the
dofcnsos of .wcak 1 non-Communist nations into tho heart of the citadel, u~ing tho Fifth ·
~oiunm methods of subversion w~P~d the Civil \·Tar in Sp~in before 'Horld War
,/ .
II. ·
Hhat would be the effect in South Viet-Nam · if lore followed the "Pull Out" solution? I
I I
don't knot.J for sure but certainly South Viet-Nam 't.zould soon become absorbed into North
Viet-Nam, an umdlling cDptivo oi' thnt Communist state. In this case, I would like to
call your attention to t-Jhat took place fran 1954 to 19,6 in North Viet-Nrun while Ho Chi .I
Ninh was conr.olidating his Communist state. Historians ostimut.c that at loact 50 1 000
~ ~
i~~~a~n
• . I
indeed we sacrificed our friends in South Viet-Nam to this ruthless gang in Hanoi, we
~hi(~~~~
could eXpect to witness a far greater bloodbath thanA we t.Jatchea in horror kl HungM7 in
1956.
\
1-lha.t -vrould be the effect on Red China if, at this critical point in Chinese history 1
when -that nation is virtually impotent fran internal strife, the United States should
abandon the struggle in Viet-Nam? I t~uuld suspect that such conduct would greatly en-
courage the leaders who will emerge from the present turbulence to an increasingly
i'Jhat the effect _"'·rould b~ at home in the United States if He accepted defeat in
Viet-Nam, I frankly don't know. I think perhaps we can learn something !rom what
happened in France after the Hendes-France governmez:1t h<l:d tdthdra1-m from Viet-nam. The
'
~ ...
.
complete d_iscreditati<;m of the politicians responsible for this retreat opened the way
. . .
t~ the authoritarian paulist rogim~ which took over power a f~w years later and remains
in pOilOr today. I d~ubt "1-Thether our Oim country could absorb such a defeat without
~
G'W"-~ damat,;e to our gover:runental", ~olitical arrl soclal structure.
Fortunately, very feto~. ~f our citizens' have thus far publ~cly adyocated the "Pull
'
Out." Even in the anonymity of the polls, only about 10 to 11 percent of thoso polled
..
COPY LBJ LIBRARY
indicuto thoy are for a. "Pull Out." But I notice that certain pooplo _tr,y to give a
certain reBi)octabillty _to propositions which in offoct l-lOllld amount to a "Pull Out"
. .
by adding qualifying phrases such as "Let's get out with honor" or "let's get out as
second alternat:i.ve I mentioned, _the "Pull Back?" In this case 1 we do have many voicos
throughout the country which, in effect, are proposing a "Pull Back." A "Pull Back,"'
fjround ~ction of our troops against the enemy"; sometimes it includes "Withhold sending _
reinforcements from _the United States to South Viet-Nam"; and sometimes extend_s to the ·
....
s~-called ";tnclave" strate~. This latter carries with it -the connotation that not
only do we stop fig~ting but _we quit the -battlefield, withdraw into defensive areas~
generally
.
along the
. . coast,
..
dig in and hope that the other side will . tire of our
' -
presence and will eyentually propose sane kind of solution that we can accept.
1·1hat are the pros· and cons of this "Bull Back" alternative? I think the proponents
. .
would argue something·- like this: _ A reduction of our military efforts would -tend to
". • r:
defuse the situation an~ _would take out same of the tension created by the armed confli
(.. ·
which is going on at prese~t. They t'lould probably add that -it _would tend to encourage
an _atmosphere favorabl_e .t? negotiations which vtould eventuaily lead _to peace. Also,
ti1ey might.. poiiit out that it l·muld reduce the cost i~ dollars . and losses
' in men and
.
.
:. . . . ( · . . . - . .
_would tend to assua~e the criticism which is b~ing directed at the United States from-
. 'I
man~ quarters •. _ ~. ..
.
Now, let's look at the oth~r aide. Hhat's wrong vrl.th a "Pull Back"? ·- To me,
. -
Od.dly, . those Hho favor a "Pull B.ack'' often deny this progress and describe tho -
present situation aa stagnated. Yet, they then propose ground rules for oUr conduct
. ...: .
. .
which ,,ould assure complete stagnation - one created by ourselves. Beyond this con-
-
sideration 1 it ~uuld mean the abandonment, at least in part, of the Vietnamese civil
v.:ould tie down our f~rces in static, defensive positions to ~ecome targets for the
~. . . . . .
enemy'~,.. art_
i llery and sabotaGe raiders while our men qat on t~ defensive and ·Haited · for
battlefield . .; lJOW. would they .feel? ..They would have 'a right to con::Jider themselves
abandoned and s'ta'rt looking for soma ~ray · to seek accommodation with the Conununist leaders·
' ..
in the Far East.
Hhat I would worry inost about would be the effect on Hanoi, the governnent with
.
'Hhich we need to reach a settlement satisfactory to our policy objectives.
.
If we
voluntarily pull back from the battlefield, that withdra~ml would seem to them a
'
precursor of victory, and we would lose any chance of getting them to a negotiation table
Now, we get to the third option 'Hpich was the "All Out" alternative, sometimes
phrased as: "Win quick or get out." This course of action places the emphasis on ··
military victory, on the utilization ot'more of our military strength faster and ldth
. . . ~
. fewer ~cstrains, on the elimination of the gradualism,.. which we are applying ~ our
case of an invasion of
Hha t aro the pros and cons of this · al tcrnativo? Again, I shall quote tho proponents
as I understand their arc;urnonta. They, I think, Hould Gay that thi~ alternative alla..rs '
us for the first time to use our vast military potential without res·braint; to strim
.. ..
I •
fast and docbi vely and hopefully to·· roach an early decision and thereby to cconanizo
thoso losses which result from a war of attrition; to utilize to tho .1\llleot all the
advant.nges \.rhich ,,u have ao a ercat induotrinl nation. On tho poycho1or,ical nino., the
.
aratuncnt is that 1 if indocd WO mobili~o tho country llO propoocd, WO Would olimln.'ltO many
of the doubts, uncertainties and uneasiness that we feel about the present coUrse o~
..
action and the neod for it. We would pull the countr,y together and unite it as it has
never been real~ united on tho Viet-Nam situation before and., thuo 1 we could attain
I
success 'before our resolution flags. Many of\the proponents of this course of action
concerned over the question of our : long-te~ rccolution to stay with our un-
. are deeply
. . . I . .
congenial task in Viet-Nam and this concern inclines them to this drastic alternative.
l. .
Now let's look at the other side of the ledger., the )'9'ons.~ To use our military
strength at higher levels of intensity implies that there are important targets remainin
to be destroyed, tangible things that we can hit. The unhappy fact is that we don't hav
many targets of that kind. On the ground, we have an elusive guerrilla enemy• Regard-
less of our strength in numbers, lro can not be sure at a given place and moment to find
• , I •
him waiting to do battle~ Nor are there identifiable pieces of terrain which if taken I
J
results~· ·
.l
will produce decisive military \
· I
. i
In the air -war, iffl have the same problem - no target system which by any applicatioJ
. \
of the criteria of strategic bombing of World 'rf~r II is i·: orthy of strategic attack.
'
Of the targets available in North Viet-Nam, there are virtually none which vle have not
I
I
hit which have any real military significance. About all that remains
. . are the urban
I ~ centers,· particularly the fapita~ Hanoi. But ap~ rt from humanitarian consi?-erations,
there are strong pr~cti~l · reasons for conserving the seat .of a government with which we
'.
may wish to deal in negotiating a final settlement of a guerrilla war which, without ·
. I
A significant expansion of the ground action r.ould create a requiremen~ for more
.. ..
-~~· ·
many : wW .
are talking· about/more divlsions and it lnll take time to make ready, transport and
I
I
deploy ~·for action. This means heavy increases in manpouer reqnirements, dollar
costs, and international r~sks. These considerations are sufficiently serious, I think,
. I ,
to cause us to pause befor~ we opt for this alte~native and abandon our present course or
1
action. So, let's consider· 1mat we are present~i doing and see whether such a change. is
ne·cessary and justified.
Our present course of ~ction, the "Stick It Out" alternative, has its pros and cons
·like the· oth~rs. On the pro side, I -would say that it has the advantage of clear e.v iden
that it is succeeding, that significant progress is being made. On the tactical battle-
\
field, the enemy has not scored a victory worthy of the name in nearly two years • On the
political front, progress has been particularly notable and I r/Ould like to comment upon
internal politics after the overthrow of Diem l-Ias the most discouraging factor of that
constitutionality, fturing the past y~ar tho South Vietnamese have had five general
1789, aided by the vast experience of the Founding Fathers to accomplis~ such a transitit
I
to ·s table constitutional government. Yet, this littl~ people with no background or
p_olitical experience, under conditions incredi~ly difficult, has in three years of war-
fare reached the point where t}Jcy ln ve, at lea~t, made a beeinning of constitutional
goverrment.
..
".
.
I. . •
I i
Another indication of 'progress is the -increased proportion of tho population secure
I from the Viet Cong. iihen I left in 196>, about 50 percent of the population lived in
I comparative security; now that figure is about 67 percent. So we are clearly succeeding
I
j
on many fronts, perhaps ~ot\as fast as we would like but nevertheless progress is being
i·
!'
Furt.hermore, this progress is taking place with minimum risk of e:r.pansion of the
I
1-mr outside of Viet-Nam. A short time ago, there Here many voices raised in \-mrning tha
\ .
w~ were on a head-on collision course with Red China or with the Soviet Union or with
both. The fact is that we have had no such collision and I think the indicators ver,y
sorrows and burdens which this conflict has caused among our people, as a nation we
remaind~ comparatively untouched by the effects of war. vle are hav~ng our guris and
butter too~
·.
vlell then, what are the cons 'Hhich oppose our present course of action? '"e hear
them on all sides. Many· of you will voice them in replying, "General, you say wo' r~
making progress but. we're not making progress fast enough. It's far too slow. You
ca·nt t tell us when it is going to end. There is no light at the end of the tunnel.
I '
Hanoi and Ho Chi Hinh appear unyielding." '\
I
"Furthermore, General, here at home it. is hard to' explain tl'rl:s wa~. He don't under...
stand it. No one has ever told , us ~J:y mat the real issues are. · This gradualism you
have talked about, this progressive use of military force we have~' never known in our
As a result, this policy is losing domestic support and will eventually collapse in
I
domestic bankruptcy." / . ..
" I mieht add, in renponso to such criticism, that when we are discourar,ed nt hcmo
. . . .. .
. . .. .
•·
' l~'-" .
and our voices rise in opposition to "What our governmc~t is doing, Hanoi hears, Hanoi
'
is encouraGed and the succoas of our policy .ia joopardizod by our own doubts and mio ..
·i
givings. ·
So there "We have them, ladies and gentlemen, the pros and cons of four different
~lternatives. I don't know how they impress you but, as I see them, none ia attractive
without reservations and all are subject to objections of varying shades of gravity.
pull out or to pull back amounts to the abandonment of the basic objective which we
. .. .
-
. .
/
I
have . set for ourselves, an indeperrlent Viet ....Nam free from attack. : And in abandoning
that objective we would .lnve to accept the bitter consequences of ~~ defeat.
The "All Out" alternative, the military solution, retains tho basic objective but
puts main reliance upon the effectiveness o~ oven~helming military force. The course
we are now on, tho "Stick It Out" alternative, retains the objective and continues to
adhere to a balanced str~tegy in · spite of the evidence of gro-vrl.ng public impatience
and loss of popular support • .
In the light of all these considerations, 'What do. you think we should do? Hould
you change our policy and 1 i f so 1 which way would you go? If any change is made, it
. should be done _•d.th a · clear ~ecognition. that no cha~e is "for free'.'J that a~y change
. \ '
may entail consequences no less serious and perhaps much more serious than staying on
our present course. Thank you very much.
'
..
•. ·. .
COPY LBJ LI BRARY
FEDERAL AGENCY REPRESENTATIVES MEETING
SPECIAL FACILITIES DIVISION
Attending:
Mr. B. T. Gallagher, Chairman Mr. James Mason
Mr. W. Lee Collins Mr. Charles Miller
Dr. Michael Donahoe Mr. Charles Moore
Mr. Thomas Gibson Mr. David Moses
~: James S. Hafer Dr. Lehman Nickell
Mr. Thomas Hagan Mr. Frederick ]:. ..:Richmond
Mr. Walter Handy Mr. Max A. Rutzick
Mr. Thomas McEwan Mr. Douglas Stone
Mr. Walter McEldowney Mr. G. H. C. Tredick
Mr. John Mcintire _Dr. Isaac Zigler
The meeting was held in the Main Briefing Room. to allow for the showing of a
documentary film titled "SL-1. " This is an Atomic Energy Commission film
detailing the events leading up to the nuclear accident in the Atomic Reactor
at Arco, Idaho, through the actual accident, and for a period six months follow-
ing. A number of guests were present for the viewing.
1. The IEPC Meeting will be held here on February 13; gave resume'
of agenda.
2. A tour of the Nuclear Reactor at Fort Belvoir is being set up for all
interested parties.
Attending:
Mr. J. Leo Bourassa, Chairman Mr. Thomas McEwan
Mr. Claude Ashby Mr. Charles Miller
Lt. Col. Robert Boyles, II Mr. Charles Moore
Mr. W. Lee Collins Mr. Alexander Muir
Mr. Thomas Gibson Dr. Lehman Nickell
Mr. George Grace Mr. Max Rutzick
~James Hafer Mr. Wilbur Scarborough
Mr. Thomas Hagan Major E. L. Shippers
Mr. Walter Handy Mr. Douglas Stone
Mr. John Larson Mr. Paul Sundberg
Mr. Terence McCracken Mr. G. H. C. Tredick
Mr. Walter McEldowney Dr. Isaac Zigler
-2-
Mr. McEwan asked if the pneumatic tube system could be extended. The Chairman
explained the background of the system and stated that, for reasons primarily of
cost, any further extension is extremely doubtful.
Majo..: Shippers explained briefly the new Automatic Message Entry System (AMES)
that is being installed here. It was suggested, and he agreed, that a demonstration
of the system will be given the FAR'S as soon as feasible.
Mr. Handy, referring to Dr. Zigler's question at the last FAR Meeting of the benefit
gained from participation in CCPX's, stated that a week ago he would. have raised the
same question; however, since last week, he had visited his EOF and watched the
personnel engaged in the exercise. It was his view and the view of those personnel
who participated that the experience and practice was very beneficial.
All of the WAE 's with one exception have been cleared and are engaged in train.ing
for Message Center assignments. This has increased our emergency capabilities
significantly.
.I
I
I
Attending:
Mr. J. Leo Bourassa, Chairman Mr. Walter McEldowney
Mr. Claude Ashby Mr. Thomas McEwan
Mr. Nathan Barrey Mr. John Mcintire
Lt. Col. Robert Boyles, II Mr. Charles Miller
Mr. W. Lee Collins Mr. Charles Moore
Mr. Bernard T. Gallagher Mr. David Moses
Mr. Thomas Gibson Dr. Lehman Nickell
Mr. James Hafer Mr. Max Rutzick
Mr. Thomas Hagan Mr. Joseph Sahm
Mr. Walter Handy Mr. Douglas Stone
Mr. John Larson Mr. G. H. C. Tredick
Mr. Terence McCracken Mr. Harold C. Wood, Sr.
1. No tours are scheduled for the remainder of January; two tours are
tentatively scheduled for February.
4. Dr. Zigler's presentation of the Age Group Study will be made next week.
The Chairman introduced Mr. Gallagher who gave a briefing on the NORAD NBC
Data Standardization Conference he attended January 16- 19, 1968. A discussion
ensued following the briefing.
Mr. Miller (Post Office) announced he would be on leave for the next three weeks.
He also stated that he had discussed with his Agency the subject of a replacement
for him when he retires. The Chairman stated that OEP was concerned about
agency representation and that this problem was being discussed on a higher
level by our office downtown.
Mr. Handy suggested that "in-house" exercises should be held in order to test
many of the organizations and procedures that were not tested because of the
cancellation of REX. There was general agreement with this suggestion and the .
Chairman stated that such "in-house" exercises are contemplated and would be
held if possible. Mr. Handy also expressed concern over the new DEFCORD
System and equipment that is supposed to become operational in May. He feels
that the present system and equipment operates well. He felt that the agencies
should have been included in discussions before the decision to adopt the system
had been made. Based on the information he has on the system at this time, there
appears to be little if any advantage in adopting a new system. He asked the FAR's
to bring this matter to the attention of their Defense Coordinators. The Chairman
suggested the matter be referred to Mr. John O'Neill in the Government Readiness
Office.
Attending:
Mr. J. Leo Bourassa, Chairman Mr. Walter McEldowney
Mr. Claude Ashby Mr. Thomas McEwan
Lt. Col. Robert Boyles, II Mr. Charles Moore
Mr. W. Lee Collins Mr. Alexander Muir
Mr. Bernard T. Gallagher Dr. Lehman Nickell
Mr. Thomas Gibson Mr. Max Rutzick
Mr. George Grace Mr. Wilbur Scarborough
Mr. James Hafer Maj. E. L. Shippers
Mr. Thomas Hagan Mr. Douglas Stone
'' • Mr. Walter Handy Mr. G. H. C. Tredick
Mr. 1ohn Larson Mr. Paul Sundberg
Mr. Terence McCracken Dr. Isaac Zigler
2. Information on the IEPC Agenda for the February 13 Meeting was provided.
Dr. Zigler made a presentation of the Public Health Study on "Age Group of
Population Assigned to SFD." A discussion ensued.
Mr. Bourassa announced his resignation from OEP effective March 1, 1968.
He thanked the FAR'S for their cooperation and support of many years with the
Special Facilities Division.
Attending:
Mr. J. Leo Bourassa, Chairman Mr. George Lynn
Lt. Col. Robert Boyles, ll Mr. John Mcintire
Mr. W. Lee Collins Mr. Charles Moore
Mr. John Devlin Mr. Alexander Muir
Mr. William Elder Dr. Lehman Nickell
Mr. B. T. Gallagher Mr. Max Rutzick
Mr. Thomas Gibson Maj. E. L. Shippers
Mr. James Hafer Mr. Jerome Votel
Mr. Thomas Hagan Mr. Harold C. Wood, Sr.
Mr. James Killough Mr. William Wright
Mr. John Larson Dr. Isaac Zigler
2. IEPC Meeting will be held here February 13. Bus will leave Winder
Building at 7:30a.m. and travel to SFD without any stops.
Attending:
2. The visit of the Director of .OEP scheduled for today has been post-
poned due to the illness of Mr. Phillips. The visit is rescheduled
for February 21.
Mr. Larson asked if any further information had been received on the data bank
study suggested by Mr. Truppner. A long and vigorous discussion ensued concern-
ing_the study and other related topics, i.e., NRAC programs.
Attending:
Mr. J. Leo Bourassa, Chairman Mr. Walter McEldowney
Mr. W. Lee Collins Mr. John Mcintire
Mr. William Elder Mr. Charles Miller
Mr. Arthur Frey Mr. Charles Moore
Mr. B. T. Gallagher Mr. David Moses
Mr. James Hafer Mr. Alexander Muir
Mr. Thomas Hagan Mr. Wilbur Scarborough
Mr. Walter Handy · Mr. Douglas Stone
Mr. John Larson Mr. G. H. C. Tredick
Mr. Terence McCracken Major Frank Yon
Dr. Isaac Zigler
1. Col. Blake, USAF, will present a briefing at the FAR Meeting next week.
3. A trip to Ft. Belvoir to visit the Nuclear Reactor has been arranged
for the FAR'S on March ~1. Details will be provided later regarding
transportation, etc.
Mr. Miller, PO, announced that the Truppner Committee Report is due in April.
Mr. Bourassa thanked all of the FAR'S for the cooperation and support they had
provided him as Chief, Special Facilities Division, over the years. He extended
them an invitation to visit him at Smith Mountain Lake.
Attending:
Mr. B. T. Gallagher, Chairman Mr. Terence McCracken
Mr. Claude Ashby Mr. Thomas McEwan
Mr. Nathan Barrey Mr. Charles Miller
Lt. Col. Robert Boyles, II Mr. John Mills
Mr. John W. Chesley Mr. Charles Moore
Mr. W. Lee Collins Mr. David Moses
Mr. William Elder Mr. Alexander Muir
Mr. Thomas Gibson Mr. Max Rutzick
Mr. James Hafer Mr. Paul Sundberg
Mr. Thomas Hagan Mr. G. H. C. Tredick
Mr. Walter Handy Mr. William Wright
Mr. William J. Harrison Major Frank Yon
Mr. John Larson Dr. Isaac Zigler
1. Arrangements have been made for the visit to Fort Belvoir on Thursday,
March 21. Transportation will leave the east parking lot, Area A, at
0730. Agencies are requested to provide names of those going by
March 14.
Mr. Gallagher introduced Lt. Col. Raymond Blake, USAF, who briefed on U. S. Air
Force Disaster Operations. A question and answer discussion followed the presentation.
Attending:
Mr. James S. Hafer, Chairman Mr. Thomas Hagan
Mr. Claude Ashby Mr. Thomas McEwan
LTC Robert Boyles, II Mr. Charles Miller
Mr. W. Lee Collins Mr. Charles Moore
Mr. John Devlin Dr. Lehman Nickell
Mr. William Elder Mr. Wilbur Scarborough
Mr. Thomas Gibson Maj. E. L. Shippers
Mr. G. H. C. Tredick
2. Coffee will be served at future FAR Meetings, and there will be increased
emphasis on briefings and participation by outsiders in various formats.
3. Dr. Zigler has copies for distribution to FAR'S of the Civil Service
Commission publication, "Recognizing and Supervising Troubled
Employees. "
4. There will be a briefing at 11 a.m. today for Mr. Handy and Treasury
. Department party, to which others are invited.
LTC Boyles briefed the FAR'S on transportation arrangements for the Fort Belvoir
trip on March 21 .
Mr. Moore suggested that MCL personnel be re-invited to attend future FAR Meetings.
Mr. Miller presented a briefing and showed slides covering his recent trip to South
America. MCL personnel were invited to and attended his presentation.
····.'
i·
1
'
Attending:
9. The MCL move to We stgate has been postponed until J -,. me 10.
Courier service will be changed at that time.
11. Trips to NORAD and to Ft. Ritchie for FAR 1 s may be arranged
if enough response is received.
Memorandum ·
TO Those Listed Below April 15, 1968
~~r..P~L-
Bernard T. Gallagher, Acting Chief
Attending:
Mr. B. T. Gallagher, Chairman Mr. Charles Miller
Mr. William Elder . Mr. Charles Moore
Mr. Arthur Frey Dr. Lehman Nickell
Mr. Thomas Gibson Mr. Max Rutzick
Mr. James Hafer Mr. Douglas Stone
Mr. Thomas Hagan Mr. G. H. C. ·Tredick
Mr. William Harrison Mr. Jerome Vote!
Dr. Isaac Zigler
Attending:
Mr. B.. T. Gallagher, Chairman Mr. Walter McEldowney
LTC Robert Boyles, II Mr. John Mcintire
Mr. W. Lee Collins Mr. Charles Miller
Mr. Thomas Gibson Dr. Lehman Nickell
Mr .. James Hafer Mr. Max Rutzick
Mr. Thomas Hagan MAJ Frank Yon
Mr. John Larson
The Chairman-·
1. Reviewed the visit by Gov. Price Daniel, Director of OEP, on April 23.
Mr. Hafer reviewed briefly discussions at a site planning board meeting Monday.
MAJ Yon outlined the planning for the Communications Conference on April 25. He
also announced a visit by MG Walter E. Lotz, Commanding General, Strategic
Communications Command, on May'l-..
Mr. Miller and other FARS requested an improved method of transfer of classified
material in the OEP Mail Room. The Chairman said he would take the matter up with
the OEP Director of Administration, Mr. Rice.
The Chairman said that it was planned for the OEP Group B Augmentees
to SFD to be here May 14 for briefings and training.
LTC Boyles explained the operation of the new cooling towers, designed
to save water, which would be constructed in Area A.
Mr. Morrison reported on the telephone strike and said there would be
no interruption in service.
- 2 -
Attending:
Mr. B. T. Gallagher, Chairman Mr. John Mcintire
Mr. Claude Ashby Mr. Charles Miller
COLJames E. Barrett Mr. Charles Moore
Mr. W. Lee Collins Mr. David Moses
Mr. William Elder Mr. Alexander Muir
Mr. Thomas Gibson Dr. Lehman Nickell
Mr. Thomas Hagan Mr. A. L. A. Patti
Mr. Walter Handy Mr. Max Rutzick
Mr. William Harrison Mr. Joseph Sahm
Mr. John Larson Mr. G. H. C. Tredick
Mr. Walter McEldowney Dr. Isaac Zigler
Mr. Thomas McEwan
2. The OE.P Group B Augmentees' visit, previously announced for May 14, has
been reset for May 20.
3. Plan D copies at SFD have been exhausted; FARS should request their
agencies to supply additional copies. Plan Cis under revision.
Following a discussion of whether NRAC library and maps should be moved from SFD,
the Chairman said he . would investigate the matter further.
Mr. Patti briefed on the schedule of tests and exercises through 1970 and detailed various
aspects of the planning. Classified minutes of the presentation will be sent to the FARS
later.
-2-
Mr. Larson questioned the caliber of the TV programs in the Cafeteria during the
lunch period. The Chairman agreed and said use of TV in the Cafeteria will hereafter
be restricted.
Mr. Handy said he had difficulty calling from Dallas to SFD on FTS. COL Barrett
explained the cause of this problem. Since it appeared that some of the Federal
Agency Representatives' telephone cards were out of date, the Chairman announced
that current cards wo~ld be distributed later in the day.
Attending:
Mr. James Hafer, Chairman Mr. Walter McEldowney
Mr. Claude Ashby Mr. Thomas McEwan
LTC Robert Boyles, II Mr. Charles Moore
Mr. W. Lee Collins Mr. Alexander Muir
Mr. Thomas Gibson Dr. Lehman Nickell
Mr. Thomas Hagan Mr. Wilbur Scarborough
Mr. John Larson Mr. Harold. C. Wood, Sr.
MAJ Frank Yon
2. A briefing and tour will be held Saturday, Ma.y 18, for the newly
designated Acting Deputy Director of OEP, Mr. Mordecai M. Merker.
Representatives of USAICA and WV AO reported that their supporting
personnel have been notified and are ready.
3. On Monday, May 20, the Group B Augmentees will be here for a seminar
in the morning and a small in-house exercise in the afternoon. The
Chairman expressed hope that in the future more in-house exercises
could be held with FAR participation.
4. On Tuesday, May 28, a briefing and tour will be held for members· of
the National Academy of Sciences.
The Federal Ag.e ncy Representatives who attended the Resource Evaluation meeting
on Tuesday, May 14, reported they felt that a member of the OEP/SFD staff should
attend these meetings. The next scheduled meeting is to be held in the Winder Bt1Uding
on May 29 at ten o'clock.
Attending:
Mr. B. T. Gallagher, Chairman Mr. Thomas McEwan
Mr. Claude Ashby Mr. John Mcintire
LTC Robert M. Boyles, II Mr. Charles Miller
Mr. W. Lee Collins Mr. Charles Moore
Dr. Michael Donahoe Dr. Lehman Nickell
Mr. Thomas Gibson Mr. Max Rutzick
Mr. Thomas Hagan Mr. Wilbur Scarborough
Mr. Walter Handy Mr. Benjamin E. Tennyson
Mr. John Larson Mr. G. H. C. Tredick
Mr. Walter McEldowney Dr. Isaac Zigler
2. A briefing and tour was held Saturday, May 18, for Mr. M. M .. Merker,
Acting Deputy Director, OEP.
3. The transcript of Mr. Patti's briefing here on May 9 was sent to him for
editing on May 10 and as yet we have not received his corrected copy.
It will be distributed to the FAR'S as soon as it is made available.
4. After the scheduled MCL move to Westgate, those people remaining here
and desiring office space in Area A will be consolidated in Building 429.
LTC Boyles requested that any on-site moves resulting from the MCL
move to Westgate be coordinated with the WV AO Office. He also announced
the schedule for the Westgate move will be June 8 and 9. The Chairman
requested that Buildings 405 and 430 be vacated by the end of June.
-2-
The Chairman queried the members as to the:lr wanting copies of the different
military exercise messages. It was brought out that the DEFCON messages
pertaining to these exer_c ises are made available by OCD. It was generally
agreed that ~is was sufficient. ·
. The Chairman again made the offer to see if he could get free air transportation
to NORAD for those FAR'S interested in visiting the installation there. The only
cost for the trip to the individual agencies would be for their personal per diem.
Those interested are to inform Chief, SFD, by May 30.
Mr. John Mcintire gave a briefing on the coming CDEX-68 exercise • . A transcript
of his briefing will be distributed to the members. After questions on CDEX-68
were answered he also entertained questions regarding USAF Postattack Reconnais-
sance •
. Mr. Handy thanked everyone involved in the impromptu briefing on May 22 that
was arranged for Mr. Greenlee of the Treasury Department.
Mr. Moore announced that Defense Commissioner Lee Loevinger has completed
his term of office.
Mr. McEldowney announced that Mr. Joe Romm is now the Director of Civil Defense~
. (The Acting has been removed.)
Following a discussion on the courier schedules, the Chairman said he would investi-
gate the matter further.
_As a result of the general feeling that the MCL Library and map collection should
remain here, the Chairman asked the members for supporting facts to use in present...:
ing this matter. Much discussion followed. Mr. McEwan expressed the need to have
a complete set of Resource File listings here on site, as the only set that was available
is being moved to the EOBA Winder Building. It was pointed out that if the computers
become inoperative, damage assessment cannot be done without this information. The
Chairman announced he would look into the matter and see if a set could be kept here
in Area B.
--; - - . ...
··.
CDEX-68 DRIEFI~G TOFARS
MAY 23 ·, 1963 /
GENERAL •
CDEX- 68, NHICH WILL RU~ CONCURR~!'i '( \H'fH HIGH HEELS 63 • IS
FEDERAL
.,
. ' STATE
z
?.ULI'TARY
!HLITARY PARTICIPATION_. EITHER I.NDEPENDE:--;T OF OR IN :•fiLITARY
PREATTACK
OUR E.HPHASIS AGAIN THIS YEAR i'HLL BB ON PREATTACK ACTIONS
•
ATTACK
DURI:JG TiiE ATTACK PERIOD ~E EXPECT TO HAVE A S~·1ALL SEG~·fcNt
l-
POSTATTACK
---- --
ACTIVE POSTATTACK PLAY ~HLL TERHnt\Tll AT TllE SAHE 'fDIC AS HIGH
CONCLUSIO~l
Attending:
Mr. B. T. Gallagher, Chairman Mr. Walter McEldowney
Mr. Claude Ashby Mr. Thoma.s McEwan
LTC Robert Boyles, II Dr. Lehman Nickell
Mr. Thomas Gibson Mr. Max Rutzick
Mr. William Harrison MAJ Frank Yon
4. . Enough people have indicated their desire to visit NORAD f.'Jr a tour of
Cheyenne Mou.ntab. for us to request tr!lnsportatio:!l from USAF. Interested
perso!lnel will be kept informed.
MAJ Yon ir.d.ka~ed that 3ome employees' dep~ndents have been ma.king personal calls
through the USAICA S'Nitchboard. The operators have been keeping records on this
but have made :.o attempt tc prchibit rh~ calls. Action wiU be taken to tighten control.
Mr. Gibson outlined what he felt was a better method of forecasting wkds used to
determine hllout and indicated that a meeting would be held at the National Meteoro-
logical Center at Suitland, Md. on Wednesday, june 5, to discuss this subject.
A discussion followed.
Attending:
Mr. James S. Hafer, Chairman Mr. John Mcintire
~ W. Lee Collins Mr. James Mason
Mr. Thomas Gibson Mr. Charles Moore
Mr. Thomas Hagan Mr. David Moses
Mr. Walter Handy Mr. Alexander Muir
Mr. John Larson Dr. Lehman. Nickell
Mr. Walter McEldowney Mr. Max Rutzick
Mr. Thomas McEwan MAJ Frank Yon
Dr. Isaac Zigler
2. The Resource File Listings were sent to Westgate by error. They will be
returned and stored in Area B.
3. Work on Building 3 is tentatively scheduled for weekends of June 15, 22, and 29,
from midnight Saturday through 1630 hours on Sunday.
Mr. Gibson reported on the status of tropical storm Abby. At this time he does not see
. any weather problems here due to the storm. He also reported on a meeting held June 5
at the National Meteorological Center regarding methods of forecasting fallout winds.
Dr. Nickell expressed the State Department's thanks for the briefing and tour held on
June 5.
Mr. Handy stated that the Treasury Department would not participate in the June CCPX
as it had been rescheduled after arrangements had been made for their participants to
exercise on the original CCPX dates. They will hold their own exercise on the original
test date with certain selected agencies.
- Dr. John Aber will report here on July 2 to replace Dr. Michael Donahoe.
- Mr . Harold Knight will replace Mr. David Moses on August 1. ·
Mr. Rutzick announced that an informal visit of Department of Labor personnel to discuss
their vital records program has been postponed until some time in July.