Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Edrial Vs Quilat2
Edrial Vs Quilat2
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Parties who prayed for and were granted several postponements and
caused repeated delays cannot ask for the reopening of the trial for the purpose
of presenting additional evidence. After squandering several opportunities
given them to ventilate their claims, they can no longer complain of alleged
violation of their right to due process.
The Case
(CA) in CA-GR SP No. 42660. The CA affirmed the Order of the trial court,
[3]
which had denied their Motion to Reopen the Case and to allow them to
complete the presentation of their evidence. The assailed Decision disposed as
follows: [4]
The Facts
follows:
"Atty. Gerardo Lituanas, a lawyer of the LAPIL (IBP) Negros Oriental, who was also
an [e]lection [r]egistrar of the COMELEC, filed the complaint in 1975;
"On December 16, 1986, the Citizen Legal Assistance Office (CLAO) entered its
appearance as new [private respondents'] counsel after Atty. Gerardo Lituanas has
filed his withdrawal. The subsequent events are as follows:
September 9, 1987
The hearing was suspended for the reason that the Court would
require the [private respondents] to submit a certification from
the Bureau of Forest Development that the land involved in this
case [was] not a part of the public forest.
The hearing was aborted due to the fact that the Bureau of
Forest Development report ha[d] not yet been finished.
July 5, 1988
December 8, 1988
No hearing was held as the certification from the Bureau of
Forest Development [was] being awaited.
Atty. Eleccion did not appear. Hearing [was] reset to December 10,
11 and 12.
Atty. Eleccion did not appear. The case [was] submitted for
decision as of th[at] day.
August 21, 1992
Court granted the prayer of Atty. Sedillo and the case [was] set
for hearing on March 22, 29 and April 5 1993.
Atty. Sedillo did not present evidence but instead moved for a
resetting of the hearing to April 12, 1993. He [was] advised by
the Court to be prepared on the next scheduled hearing.
June 4, 1993
July 2, 1993
October 7, 1993
Atty. Bongaciso was presented as second witness for the
[petitioners]. His testimony [was] terminated and hearing [was]
reset to December 13, 1993.
May 6, 1994
July 4, 1994
October 3, 1994
The hearing [was] reset to November 17, 1994 due to non-
availability of [petitioners'] witness Atty. Roque Bonganciso
who [was] on recall.
There [was] talk about [a] proposed settlement, hearing [was] held
in abeyance.
January 6, 1995
The hearing set for [this day] was cancelled as the Judge [was]
on leave and reset to September 8, 1995.
September 8, 1995
February 9, 1996
The Court issued an order setting the case [for] April 26,
1996. This order was received by the wife of the [Petitioner]
Mauro Edrial, Jr.
July 8, 1996
September 6, 1996
October 2, 1996
Issues
Petitioners submit that the CA erred in affirming the twin Orders of the
Dumaguete City RTC, Branch 39. They contend that a reversal thereof would
have allowed them to complete their presentation of evidence. Hence, by
affirming those Orders, the CA allegedly violated their right to due process. [8]
Main Issue
Counsel for petitioners alleges that the addresses of his clients on file in his
law firm were incorrect; hence, the notices and other forms of communication
he had sent to them were not received. He allegedly discovered this fact only
after he had filed his withdrawal as their counsel. He also argues that the denial
of the Motion to Reopen Trial was "plainly capricious and oppressive" because
private respondents were equally guilty of delay and procrastination. Finally, he
maintains that allowing petitioners to present their remaining evidence would
be "in the interest of substantial due process and humane justice."
Respondents disagree, reasoning that the trial court thrice reconsidered its
Order to submit the case for decision; that is, petitioners were given several
opportunities to present their evidence, but they squandered them. Petitioners,
they further point out, were intentionally seeking to delay the resolution of the
case because they were in physical possession of the land in dispute.
Counsel's excuses are unsatisfactory and unacceptable. The CA ruled that
petitioners were given "more than enough time" to complete their presentation
of evidence. Respondents rested their case as early as September
1992. Petitioners' lawyer, at his own request, was allowed to start presenting
evidence only on April 12, 1993. From that day until April 26, 1996 or for a
period of three years, counsel presented only two witnesses. The trial judge
was in fact liberal in granting petitioners' Motions for Postponement. But enough
was enough; when they attempted to delay the trial some more, the trial judge
finally and correctly refused to go along.
True, respondents also asked for continuances, but petitioners were
ultimately to blame for the inexcusable delay. The case was submitted for
decision three times -- on December 11, 1990, October 30, 1992, and February
27, 1995 - but petitioners and/or their counsel did not appear in court each
time. After having failed to take advantage of opportunities to ventilate their
claims below, parties may no longer be accorded the same chances, in the
absence of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court, as in this
case.[9]
case.
It is highly suspicious how the counsel for petitioners continued to represent
his clients effectively for several years despite allegedly having lost their correct
addresses. It was definitely his duty to know the correct ones. Indeed, it was
too late for him to do so after he had withdrawn as their counsel. According to
him, after April 16, 1996, he sent an office employee to verify the whereabouts
of Mauro Edrial Jr. The inquiry yielded the information that Mauro actually
resided in San Jose, Negros Oriental, and that Susan Edrial Valenzuela resided
in Gomez St., Dumaguete City. He should have undertaken the search before
[12]
would unduly delay a case, impede the execution of a judgment or misuse court
processes (Rule 12.04).
For the benefit of the bench and bar, worth repeating is the CA's reminder
to petitioners' counsel of his duty to his client and to the court:
"Being an officer of the court a lawyer is part of the machinery in the administration
of justice. Like the court itself, he is an instrument to advance its ends-the speedy,
efficient, impartial, correct and inexpensive adjudication of cases and the prompt
satisfaction of final judgments. A lawyer should not only help attain these objectives
but should likewise avoid any unethical or improper practices that impede, obstruct or
prevent their realization, charged as he is with the primary task of assisting in the
speedy and efficient administration of justice."
[14]