Drugs - Crack and the Decay of the Inner City:

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Crack and the Social, Moral, and Economic Decay of the Inner City 

  

Societal and ethnographic reports have link the arrival of crack to gang violence, high murder rates,
poverty, and family disruption. Popular opinion seemed to indicate that the introduction of crack cocaine
has led to increases in central-city crime and accelerated trends toward overall inner-city decay in
America.. This manuscript will established (1) briefly what crack cocaine is (2) when it was introduced (3)
if there is a direct link between the introduction of crack cocaine and an increase decadence in the social
and economic life of the American community (4) and why this drug had such a significant influence. 

  

Crack could be known as "the poor man's drug" because it provided an alternative to a more expensive
drug, cocaine. The introduction of crack cocaine amounts to a technological innovation in the market for
cocaine intoxication. Crack cocaine is a derivative of powered cocaine, made by dissolving cocaine
powder in water, adding baking soda, and boiling the mixture until a solid base separates from the
solution. This process does not change the chemical composition of the active cocaine alkaloid, but it
does change the manner by which it may be ingested. Once converted into crack, the cocaine can be
smoked, which allows the cocaine molecules to concentrate in the brain much more rapidly than is
possible by taking powdered cocaine intranasally (Stein,1992). Because the euphoric effects of cocaine
have more to do with the speed at which the alkaloid concentrates in the brain than with the level of the
drug in the body, crack is the more intoxicating form of the drug. This fast delivery to the brain is cause by
the large pulmonary area available for diffusion and absorption due to cocaine smoking (Ellwood and
Gawin, 1988). Crack cocaine produces feelings of well-being, mental exhilaration, reduced appetite and
great physical strength in the short term. The after-effects can include tiredness, depression, panic,
anxiety and death. Long term users may believe to have develop tolerance, and therefore, are tempted to
increase doses for a more intense effect which can lead to overdose. With continued use of this drug,
paranoid psychosis can be seen (Cook and Laub, 1990). Since our course (MCB 165) deals much with
the chemical effects of cocaine/crack, there is no need for much explanation on that particular topic. 

  

Crack has become widespread phenomenon because of the user's strong physical dependency to it.
Moreover, the price of crack is the same as powdered cocaine when measured on a molecule-for-
molecule basis (Charles, 1993). Thus the process of synthesizing crack from powdered cocaine reduces
the unit cost of cocaine intoxication, which defines the meaning of a "technological innovation" (Stein,
1992). Hence, we can observe the motivation in the birth of this particular "poor man's drug" in a chemical
and economic point of view. 

  

The next question we must answer in order to provide a possible correlation between crack cocaine and
inner-city decay is when this drug was introduced. The following research was conducted by the Jay Roffy
from the school of public policy at the University of California at Los Angeles. Crack cocaine introduction
was dated in three ways; (1)police data, (2) emergency room admissions data, and (3) data from
Congressional Testimony. First, in 1991 various police departments (where crack was an epidemic
problem) were surveyed about the effect that crack had on their city. The surveys were addressed to the
chief of police in each city, and included a question about the date when they had first encountered crack.
From this data, the reported introduction dates range from 1983 in Atlanta to 1991 in Milwaukee. The
majority of the cities, including Los Angeles and New York, had 1986 (Cork, 1996). 

  

Next, crack introduction dates were inferred from data provided by hospital emergency room admissions
that are published by NIDA as part of the Drug Awareness Warning Network. DAWN reports the number
of drug-related emergency room admissions in a given metropolitan area by the type of drug involved in
the event. In addition, DAWN also reports how the drug is administered among cocaine-related ER
events. This is important because a discrete jump in the fraction of cocaine-related ER events attributed
to smoked cocaine could be use as evidence that crack has been introduced. Data provided from
emergency room admissions range from 1982 in Atlanta to 1987 in Dallas, New Orleans. Like the police
data, this data also had a majority of it's date falling in 1986 (Cork, 1996) 

  

For a few of the largest cities, such as New York, Los Angeles, additional information is available from a
number of congressional hearings held between 1985 and 1990. Based on the testimony of police chiefs
from the respective cities, congressional hearings place introduction date at 1986 for New York, late 1985
for Detroit, 1986 for Dallas and 1988 for Chicago. This information nearly matches the information from
the survey of police departments due to the similar sources. Nevertheless, it is reassuring that the
information provided in 1991, when crack problem had become endemic in many cities, was the same as
that provided to the Congressional committees in the mid- 1980's when the problem was an urgent matter
for the surveyed police departments (Cork, 1996) 

  

The relative decline of the inner-city is not only the result of crack introduction but could be the reason for
it's introduction. It is important to note that the introduction of crack cocaine coincidence with the further
widening of the social and economic classes in America's communities. Structural shifts within the
economy during this time under Ronald Reagan's reign resulted in the relocation of manufacturing
industries to locations outside the central city causing further competition in the work force. Innovations in
technology also contribute to a larger cleft in the two opposing economic sectors residing in the central
cities. These economic factors weigh heavily in the introduction of crack cocaine by an economic deprived
sector in the community- poor, young males. 

  

To determine the link between crack cocaine and community decay, we must understand why this
particular drug became so popular in inner-city life. We've already talked about how the introduction of
crack helped reduce the unit cost of cocaine intoxication while providing more of a physical dependency.
With the emergence of crack, the more stabled organized crime groups that had been responsible for the
distribution of heroin and cocaine gave way to independent, low-level crack sellers. Driven by high profits,
crack distribution escalated in neighborhoods that experienced social and economic troubles. Crack
introduction was based on a need to move up in the economic ladder while operating in a market that
freely allows for dealers to sell crack at a minimal cost. Basically, the emergence and widespread
distribution of crack was due to economic reasons. Evidently, crack cocaine use and distribution became
popular in cities that were in social and economic chaos such as Los Angeles and Atlanta. "As a result of
the low-skill levels and minimal initial resource outlay required to sell crack, systemic violence flourished
as a growing army of young, enthusiastic inner-city crack sellers attempt to defend their economic
investment." (Inciardi, 1994) Once the drug became embedded in the particular communities, the
economic environment that was best suited for it's survival caused further social disintegration within that
city. An environment that was based on violence and deceit as an avenue for the crack dealers to protect
their economic interests. In order for these drug distributors to evade intrusion from police crackdowns
and rival into their livelihood, there would have to be an increase in crime, violence, and lawlessness
associated with drug-trafficking within these helpless communities. Crack cocaine's addictive properties
did not help the growing influx of dealers. As the market demand continue to increase, competition
became the principal driving force that allow dealing crack cocaine a profitable business. 
  

One way to gauge urban decay in the records of criminal activities. Since it has been documented in this
manuscript that the introduction of crack cocaine in a majority of cities was in the mid 1980s', it would be
advantageous to observe the correlation between emergence of crack and crime rates. The number of
reported offenses for the crime categories (murder, robbery, aggravated assault) are published by the FBI
in it's annual Uniform Crime Reports. It is broken down by central-cities and suburbs. This is beneficial to
this study because one can estimate the effect of the introduction of crack on urban crime by comparing
changes in central city crime rates to relative changes in suburban crime rates within metropolitan areas.
In effect, we use the suburbs in a given area as a control for the central city. 

  

Annual crime rate provided by FBI was based on number of crimes per 100,000 residents within that
area. Although there's considerable variation in crime rates by the FBI, central cities are more crime-
ridden than the suburbs. For this particular manuscript, it is better to observed the crime rates in central
cities before and after the introduction of crack cocaine. For most of the offenses in the crime categories,
results seem to suggest that the emergence of crack had a significant influence in the rise of these
particular crimes. For example, the effect on murder indicates that crack cocaine caused murder rates to
rise by 4.4 per 100,000 population, an amount equal to 18.7 percent (+/- 2.7) of the before-crack murder
rate in the central cities. The statistics for robbery (up 27%) and aggravate assault (up ~50%) provide
ample evidence for crack cocaine causing crime rates to increase substantially. Although other factors
such as decreasing wages during this time period may cause crime rates to increase, the introduction of
crack cocaine and it's profound influence on it's respective communities can not be underscore.(Inciardi,
1994) 

  

Although there are multiple ways that this technological innovation of the mid 1980s' have affect the
community, the three main consequence discussed in this manuscript are : (1) destruction of a strong
nuclear family household (2) driving out middle and working- class Americans from their crack infested
communities (3) disintegration of the education system. Crack cocaine infested economically- deprived
cities that were, at that time, barely clinging onto social and moral ethics. The drug brought with it a new
set of values and beliefs that devalued normal social and economic interactions. This new lifestyle of
"easy money" emphasized deception and violence, as oppose to hard work and normal means of earning
the buck. Crack, the poor man's drug, gave the destitute public a new attitude that anyone can be a crack
dealer and earn money without the hard work. 

  
Crack cocaine's most significant influence in leading to social erosion in urban cities is in the destruction
of the nuclear family household. Attacking at the heart of the community (the family), this drug gave
young, poor kids new heroes and role models to look up to. Notorious crack dealers were given legendary
status on the streets by supplanting fathers as the new authoritative figures. The introduction of crack
established a "vertically-controlled selling organizations". In other words, dealers on top of the drug
pyramid would look for cheap low-level sellers to meet their increasing demands. Flashing gold watches
and driving nice cars, it wasn't too easy for these "new-age businessmen" to induced young and
impressionable teenagers to join their new family. The phenomenon occurred at a time when the family
household of these communities could least afford it. Due to the widening gap between the rich and the
poor sectors, the nuclear family was already on shaky grounds. The lifestyle presented by the introduction
of crack cocaine seemed to have further severed the family's relationship, which has yet to be fully
recover. . In the 1980s', ghetto communities saw a mass exodus of middle and working-class citizens.
This mass migration seem to have occurred at about the same time as the introduction of crack cocaine
in these cities. It is still debatable as to whether it was the crack cocaine that led to the migration or vice
versa. Which ever the case may be, the emergence of crack did not seem to have help halt the mass
exodus of hard working professionals from cities that were depriving of social and economic constants. It
was these same citizens that were keeping the community together by reinforcing societal norms and
values. They provided their cities with a stable and moral environment which soon were displaced by
depravity and violence of the crack age. Joblessness caused by the lack of investment of businessmen
into these communities skyrocketed further by the crack cocaine explosion of the mid 1980s'. Armies of
crack dealers implanted themselves securely into these societies while driving away investors and hard
working citizens. 

  

Lastly the crack cocaine explosion further eradicated the need for public education by providing easier
avenues for making money. This technological innovation gave young teens a new reward system based
on making easy money. More importantly, it gave them independence. Independence from their parents;
independence from employers; independence from responsibility. There seemed to be no need for higher
education when crack distribution appears to yield the most profitable margin with less amount of
investment. Whether the investment is time or capital, life in the fast lane seems to be the only way to
excel in life. Although drug dealing was always popular in these communities, the process of synthesizing
crack from expensive, powdered cocaine reduced the unit of cost for cocaine intoxication. This allowed for
a larger sector of society ( especially teens ) to ride this new wave of economic opportunity. Unlike other
basic institutions within the community, such as church, the educational system was more under attack
because young teens provided the necessary fuel for the crack age to exploded. 

  

The purpose of this manuscript was to established that the introduction of crack cocaine led to social,
morally, and economic decay of American communities that they infested. First, we traced the birth of
crack as a cheap alternative to another popular drug, cocaine. By still maintaining, as well as expediting
the euphoric effects of cocaine, crack became an instant economic success. By changing the way it was
administered, crack reduced the unit cost for cocaine intoxication while inducing more physical
dependency by it's users. Secondly, we tried to pin point the actual time period that it was introduced.
This would allow us the ability to observe actual effects of crack. We used data from 3 different sources to
determine when crack enter America's communities: (1) police data (2) emergency room admissions data
(3) congressional testimony. All 3 of our sources seem to confirmed that the modal introduction year as
1986 (Los Angeles, New York) while ranging from 1982 to 1990, depending on the city. Next, we try to
establish that one way to statistically determine urban decay is by looking at the crime rates around the
country. Using information from the FBI's Uniform Crime Reports, crime categories (murder, robbery, and
aggravated assault) were analyzed based on crimes per 100,000. Since we have already established a
modal introduction date for crack in big metropolitan cities, we can now compared crime rates for pre-
crack versus post-crack era. In every category, there were great increase in crime rates. Finally we took a
look at the economic and social damage brought on by the emergence of crack cocaine. Three main
observations that were discussed in this manuscript was (1) breakdown of the nuclear family (2) the mass
exodus of middle class Americans (3) the disintegration of the educational system. Although all three
evidence for decay are inter-related, we critically analyzed each individual issue as to why they were such
easy prey to the new crack age. 

  

The emergence of crack cocaine was a phenomenon in American history. Known as the poor man's drug,
it appeared at a time in American history that was overwhelmed with social and economic strife. This
technological innovation became more of an economic revelation. Catching the eyes of the poor, it
opened up new economic opportunities with seemingly limitless rewards. What they didn't see was that it
was only a short-term economic solution. The long-term consequences for these American communities
far outweighs any positives emerging from the crack age. As a matter of a fact, these urban cities may
never recover.
New Sports Stadiums and Taxpayer Abuse:

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New Sports Stadiums and Taxpayer Abuse 

  

  

Five Works Cited       There seems to be a domino effect through out the U.S., new stadiums are being
built, teams are demanding that their city build them a new stadium to play in but it is not necessary to
build these stadiums. The most obvious change in new stadiums is coming from baseball. In the last 10-
15 years many new baseball stadiums have been built, but who is paying for these stadiums? The teams
and the owners that are demanding the stadiums, or the taxpayers? The answer is that taxpayers are
picking up a huge amount of the cost to build a new stadium. 

  

Before the Depression stadiums were built by using private funds, some of these stadiums include:
Wrigley Field, Tiger Stadium, Yankee Stadium, and Fenway Park ("Sports Pork", 3). All of these parks are
very memorable for lots of reasons, mostly the players that played and or play there. Why when these
stadiums were built were they a fraction of the cost that it is to build a stadium today? In the 1980's
America was spending about 1.5 billion on new stadiums; in the 1990's it spent 11 billion ("Walls Come",
2). Furthermore, in 1967 the cost to build the Kingdome was 67 million, in 1999 the cost to build Safeco
Field was 517.6 million. On top of the cost difference, not only was the Kingdome multi purpose but also it
held more people. The capacity of the Kingdome for baseball seating was 59,166; the seating at the new
Safeco Field is 46,621. Although the Kingdome was starting to fall apart, it was decades away from its
useful life ("Walls Come", 2). In fact, in 1994 tiles fell from the ceiling and the cost to fix was 70 million,
which was done. It is possible that one could argue that Seattle was in need of a new stadium. To build a
stadium and have an estimated price is one thing, but having tons of extras added on that are going to
have the cost overrun by 100 million dollars is a little ridiculous. 
  

Many other cities are also either building new stadiums or contemplating it, 46 major league stadiums and
arenas have been built or renovated for teams and 49 more are under construction or in the planning
stages ("Debating", 1). Of the 10 highest valued Major League Baseball teams, 6 moved into new
stadiums in the 1990's. The new stadiums are very nice and fun to go to, but where is the line supposed
to be drawn as far as how much it should cost to build? Safeco Field is a very nice stadium but some of
the finishing touches that were added could have been done without. Some of the things that accounted
for the 100 million cost overrun were broken down as follows: 2.3 million for delays caused by bad
weather, 4.2 million for extra finishing touches, 1.4million for concession improvements, 2.1 million to
upgrade the sound and video system, 1.7 million to architect/engineer fees, 5.5 million for extra concrete
needed for expansion and 2.1 million for contract settlements ("Stadium Costs Up", 1). All of these extra
costs became a big issue in the city of Seattle. Although there were the overrun charges there are
benefits to the stadium, for example, the stadiums retractable roof is was built to protect against Seattle's
rain, it also provides something else; if the roof is open against the wind it cost approximately ten dollars
to move it, but if the roof is open with the wind its motors act like generators and the motion actually
creates seven dollars of electricity ("Giving Holiday", 1). The estimated cost of the stadium was originally
400 million, when the elected officials ignored the votes against a hike in sale tax and other things to pay
for the overcharges; people were very upset ("Sports Pork", 9). The team itself stated in the beginning
that they would pay any overrun charges, but when it came to a total of 100 million dollars the team
fought the charges. As it turned out the taxpayers ended up paying the difference by such adjustments as
raising hotel rates and taxes, mostly because a week a couple of weeks later the Mariners were in an
exciting playoff series with the New York Yankees, which in turn made the public forget about the issues
at hand and persuaded them to think all the costs were worth it. One of the classic signs of the new
stadiums being built in the 1990's is that the fields are paid for mostly by the taxpayers but are named for
the owners or corporations ("Sports Pork", 8). Seattle's Safeco Field is a perfect example of this. This is
not what should be happening if the owners and or corporations are not going to step up to the plate and
help out. 

  

Taxpayers funding the new stadiums are very beneficial to the teams for many reasons. For one they are
relieved of any financing cost, which can run anywhere from 10 to 20 million per year. Secondly, new
expanded revenues are taken through luxury suites, club seats, stadium naming rights and other
advertising. Thirdly, teams often don't have to pay property taxes on the new stadiums ("Sports Pork",
17). The players are getting out of cost left and right. Most people think it doesn't matter anyway,
whatever the player makes in his salary per year, if it is not put back in building the stadium will be put
back by things such as shopping or house taxes in that area. This is not true, the majority of players don't
usually live in the city that they play for, they may have a house that they stay at for the season but the
majority of their money is spent in another city where their family does their shopping and where they
reside and do their shopping during the off season. 

  

Ballparks are usually thought to be nostalgic in some sense. There is a feeling of getting back to the old
days and remembering how to have fun and relax. These new stadiums are not only so high tech that it's
hard to remember the old days but they are actually taking away from history. For example, the Kingdome
(which no longer stands) had many historical moments such as the location of the first time a father and a
son had taken the field as players on the same team, or Randy Johnson and Chris Bosio pitching no
hitters. Now, 20 years down the road people will hear of these events happening and will no longer be
able to get a visual s to where this took place because the building no longer stands. Possibly this is what
America wants though; it just seems that it takes away a little bit the meaning of the sport itself when so
many changes are made. The public seems to feel that they thrive on having a major league team in their
city. Sports fans are usually very loyal to their teams and take much pride in the city they live in and the
team that plays there. This gives people a sense of pride in their hometown, and therefore would make
people want to build a new stadium to keep the team happy and also to be able to say that their town has
the nicest or newest stadium. 

  

Another issue that is brought up by the construction of these new stadiums is the job market as well as
the cost to attend a game. It is almost impossible to take an average family of four to a ball game on a
regular basis, the cost of the stadium's seats; food, parking, game programs and souvenirs are all too
much. It seems that the ballparks are almost catering to the corporate elite ("Take Me Out", 2). For right
now it does not seem like such a big deal because people can still attend occasionally and otherwise
catch the games on T.V. but if the stadiums keep catering to the elite, in the long run they are going to
lose fan base which in turn is going to redirect advertisers to promote entertainment such as wrestling of
stock car racing (events that would be less expensive to watch and attend on a regular basis). If this were
to occur advertisers and supporters would quit putting money into the stadium promotions and would lean
more towards television promotion, which in turn would make the stadium generate less and less money.
There would be less attendance and less promotion for the stadium. It makes it tough to root for a team
that you never get to view personally and up close. 

  

As for the job market the new stadiums are taking away from the income of other entertainment and not
producing other jobs to take the place. In a given city there are many forms of entertainment: movies,
bowling, concerts, bars etc. but what happens when you put another source of entertainment in there, so
now instead of four major sources of entertainment you have five which means, in order to have the fifth
source there it takes money away from the other four, there will be less money spent in those four places
and less need for jobs and so on. A study done by Michel Walden, a North Carolina University economics
professor, looked at the growth from 1990 to 1994 in 46 cities and found that cities with major
league sports teams have grown more slowly in the 1990's ("Sports Pork", 20). For example, now that the
Kingdome in Seattle is no longer standing the Seattle Seahawk's are forced to play in Husky Stadium,
which has fewer concessions than the Kingdome did and therefore is another cut in job opportunities. On
the other hand, it would create other little jobs around the area; the guy on the corner selling hats would
get better business because of a new ballpark. However this does not outweigh the business lost at the
other locations. 

  

The question is: "What is the solution?" Do we allow the government to keep playing a role in having the
public pay for the stadiums? If teams were publicly owned and not owned by the government or a
corporation they would be less likely to threaten to leave ("Sports Pork", 22), and would therefore be more
likely to stay and be content with what they have. Some of the solutions that have been brought up are as
follows: Elect the right people, meaning elect the people to office who do not support handing money to
sports teams and who will privatize sports venues currently owned by the public. Another option would be
to employ direct democracy; make sure that the voters have the last say in whether a new stadium is
built. Safeco field was voted down and was eventually built by the slip of a loophole anyway. Another
option for ending the threat from teams to leave unless a new stadium is built would be to eliminate the
federal tax exemption for public sports stadiums. This would raise the cost for cities and states and might
in turn have an effect on the public as to if they are going to think a little harder to think about what is
going to be beneficial for them and the city they live in. This seems it would be the more likely of all the
options because to look at the tax break from an economic perspective it makes no sense to provide a tax
exemption for a sports team that has no relation to the nation's economic well being ("Sports Pork", 24).
Although contrary to all the facts, fans still buy tickets, merchandise, food and still cheer their team on. It
is easy to be persuaded into thinking that a new stadium would be a wonderful idea with the image of a
brand new stadium filled with fans and a winning team. Without the government pro sports would still exist
and thrive, as they did in the past ("Sports Pork", 24). The owners and the players would have to adjust
their financial expectations downward a bit. 

  

The stadiums in most cases should not be built. It is the taxpayer money that is building the stadiums,
which is unfair. The owners and the players do pay some of the cost but the bulk of the amount paid is
done so by the taxpayer's money. Unfortunately this seems to be a domino effect throughout the cities of
the U.S., once one new stadium is built the next city wants a stadium also, which makes it unlikely that
the new stadiums will stop being proposed and built anytime soon. For now all the public can do is to
think a little more carefully about all the effects of a new stadium being built in the city and make wise
voting decisions.