Article

Journal of Research in Crime and

Delinquency
48(2) 271-297
Networks of ª The Author(s) 2011
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DOI: 10.1177/0022427810391535

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Assessing the
Structural
Vulnerability of
Drug Markets
Aili Malm1 and Gisela Bichler2

Abstract
Uncovering the resiliency of ties between individuals involved in criminal
enterprise will contribute to our understanding of how illicit markets func-
tion. To examine activities along the entire drug market commodity chain,
this study extracted information about individuals involved or associated
with trafficking (1,998 people) from police intelligence reports generated
from 2004 to 2006. Significant differences were found for centrality and
cohesion across market niches. Results show that the highest fragmentation
potential lies with individuals who are involved with smuggling, supply, and
financing, particularly when these individuals are also involved in other
niches. Variability in small-world and scale-free properties suggest that
interdiction strategies must be tailored to niche characteristics.

1
California State University, Long Beach, CA, USA
2
California State University, San Bernardino, CA, USA

Corresponding Author:
Aili Malm, California State University, Long Beach, CA 90840, USA
Email: amalm@csulb.edu
272 Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency 48(2)

Keywords
social network analysis, criminal enterprise, illicit drug market, commodity
chain

Introduction
Generally, illicit markets involve the distribution of products through a
commodity chain (Pearson and Hobbs 2001; Raab and Milward 2003).
Commodity chains account for the sequence of operations leading from the
extraction of raw materials to the consumption of final products. Most
often, these chains are conceptualized as a series of successive nodes repre-
senting processes linked by transactions; each node adds value to the com-
modity (Rodrigue 2008). Analyzing the illicit drugs commodity chain
requires identifying collaboration between actors located within activity
niches linking raw materials to market absorption, either through retail or
consumption.
While all distribution networks are susceptible to changing market
conditions (e.g., technological and transportation improvements aid net-
work efficiency and recession depresses commodity flow), variation in
the structural characteristics of networks will affect their resilience
(Chase-Dunn, Kawano, and Brewer 2000; McGrath and Krackhardt
2003). It follows that uncovering the structure of connections among
individuals involved in criminal enterprise1 will contribute to our under-
standing of how illicit markets function (Raab and Milward 2003). In
turn, this will lead to policy directives aimed at key pressure points
to maximize crime prevention efforts (e.g., Caulkins 1993, 1997;
McGloin 2005).
The present study is innovative for two reasons. First, studying a
commodity chain requires methods designed to uncover subgroup charac-
teristics of networks of interdependent actors or groups. Techniques
from social network analysis (SNA)2 can be used to identify the structure
and characteristics of niches within networks; as such, applying a unique
combination of SNA techniques presents an original avenue to test niche-
specific hypotheses about illicit market structure. Second, surmounting the
challenge of studying illicit trade leads researchers to tap different data
sources: surveillance records (Eck and Gersh 2000; Morselli and Petit 2007;
Van de Bunt, Kleemans, and de Poot 2007), court transcripts (Natarajan
2000, 2006), offender interviews (Pearson and Hobbes 2001), and police
reports (Sarnecki 2001; Xu and Chen 2008). While each source provides
unique insight into illicit enterprise, noted limitations may distort
Malm and Bichler 273

descriptions of how a commodity chain functions. By harvesting illicit net-

work information from multiple data systems, this study stands to offer a
more comprehensive assessment of niche structures than research using a
single source.
Following a brief review of illicit drug market niche characteristics,
applicable SNA methods and potential data sources are examined. Then, the
process used to generate the multisystem data is described in detail. Despite
noted limitations, the results discussed in this article provide some indica-
tion of the potential niche-specific vulnerability in the face of targeted
law enforcement efforts.

Illicit Markets
Distilling the common elements of various models capturing the roles,
functions, and structures of groups involved in the illicit drug commodity
chain (see e.g., Johnson, Dunlap, and Tourigny 2000; or Natarajan 2006),
reveals several links in the supply chain—source (production and
smuggling), supply, sales, and feeders (finance and parasite behavior).
Figure 1 provides a visual representation of the linkage between market
niches. While there is consistency in classifying niches or roles within
illicit trade, some contradiction exists in the cohesiveness of these niches
(the degree of interconnectedness of individuals working within a niche)
and the centrality of actors (the number of connections or ties one actor
has relative to others).
Recent studies of illicit drug markets reveal that a range of network
structures exist with large-scale mafias operating in certain markets, small
flexible groups operating at the mid-level of local and regional trade, and
freelancing individuals hired for courier activity at the retail level (Dorn,
Oette, and White 1998; Dorn, Levi, and King 2005). Thus, each market
niche should exhibit somewhat unique network characteristics. For exam-
ple, smuggling or regional transport of large drug shipments tends to be
conducted by small, semipermanent, highly organized, cohesive groups
(Bruinsma and Bernasco 2004; Dorn et al. 1998; Pearson and Hobbs
2001; Reuter and Hagga 1989) connected to legitimate business activity
within source and destination countries (Ruggiero 2000). Suppliers tend
to be loosely organized clusters of people (Eck and Gersh 2000; Natara-
jan and Belanger 1998) with involvement in multiple niches (Pearson and
Hobbs 2001) and a flat organizational structure. Retail activity typically
involves autonomous clusters of individuals who are relatively uncon-
nected to other market activity (Johnson et al. 2000).
274 Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency 48(2)

Figure 1. Illicit drug market commodity chain.

Developing a comprehensive description of niche structure is critical as

knowledge of current market structures is fundamental to framing strategies
used to combat illicit trade. Criminal enterprise is dynamic and network
structure should adjust to law enforcement activity, shifting dynamics of legal
enterprise, and market demand. If market activity truly ranges along a conti-
nuum—anchored at one end with highly structured, hierarchical trading oper-
ations and on the other with collaboration that more closely resembles loosely
networked, small clusters of individuals operating as cottage industries—then
initiatives to disrupt the commodity chain must be tailored to network
properties. Alternatively, if niche-specific characteristics are not present and
a substantial portion of the illicit drug network is comprised of small groups
of entrepreneurs linked through co-offending, family, or ethnic ties (e.g., Chin
and Zang 2003; Eck and Gersh 2000) with short supply chains (flat or shallow
pyramids), fluidity between roles, and occupation of dual roles (Pearson and
Hobbs 2001; Raab and Milward 2003), then a single comprehensive directive
would be warranted. SNA is uniquely equipped to uncover subgroup charac-
teristics operating within a larger network and thus, this technique can be
used to identify niche-specific characteristics of illicit commodity chains.
Malm and Bichler 275

Applying Social Network Concepts to

Criminal Networks
SNA has been used to examine collaborative crime networks such as gangs
(McGloin 2005; Xu and Chen 2008), juvenile delinquency and co-offending
(Sarnecki 2001), automobile theft rings (Morselli and Roy 2008), terrorist
groups (Medina and Hepner 2008; Xu and Chen 2008), and crime groups
involved in drug trafficking (Morselli and Petit 2007; Natarajan 2006). Col-
lectively, this research highlights the utility of identifying central actors
among collaborating criminals. Advancing the use of SNA to understand
illicit markets with the aim of suggesting foci for law enforcement opera-
tions would be strengthened by using a theoretical framework integrating
small-world and scale-free principles (Medina and Hepner 2008; Xu and
Chen 2008), with measures of network vulnerability (McGloin 2005;
Morselli and Petit 2007).
In small-world networks (see Watts and Stogatz 1998), nodes (actors)
are linked to all others through a short average number of connections or
ties (usually less than six). Further, there is a high likelihood of clustering
between affiliates. Network failure is less likely as high levels of clustering
leave many nodes in a position to replace a removed individual (Medina and
Hepner 2008); therefore, network disruption will require repeated strikes on
multiple nodes (see Figure 2 subgroup A).
Networks may also exhibit scale-free properties including a small
percentage of highly connected individuals. These highly connected indi-
viduals are termed hubs. For example, in Figure 2, subgroup A has less
scale-free properties than subgroup B due to more interconnectedness
within subgroup A. This supports the rapid diffusion of information and
suggests that the network is more hierarchically organized with a few indi-
viduals having many ties relative to others (Natarajan 2006). These net-
works are particularly vulnerable to attacks aimed at removing the hubs
(Medina and Hepner 2008; Xu and Chen 2008).
Network vulnerability identifies people who act in a bridging capacity
between subgroups. Figure 2 shows seven nodes that link two subgroups.
When removed, people filling these positions have the greatest potential
to fragment the flow of information through the network (Sparrow
1991:264). McGloin (2005) posited that targeting nodes with bridging ties
will enhance policing efforts to disrupt networks. To illustrate network
redundancy, in Figure 2, Hub 2 of subgroup B is linked to subgroup A
through two nodes. To sever the ties between subgroup A and hub 2, both
nodes 4 and 5 would have to be eliminated.
276 Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency 48(2)

Figure 2. Theoretical representation of small-world and scale-free networks.

Gauging network resiliency involves assessing clustering within sub-

groups, identifying pivotal individuals holding central positions within the
network, and quantifying the potential to disrupt commodity and informa-
tion flows by removing specific nodes (Borgatti and Everett 2006). Thus,
it is necessary to explore small-world, scale-free, and vulnerability charac-
teristics. One issue that may confound the interpretation of SNA statistics
tapping small-world, scale-free, and vulnerability, is that within criminal
enterprise, key individuals may camouflage ties to mask leadership roles
by purposely work through intermediaries (Medina and Hepner 2008). As
illustrated in Figure 2, Hubs 1 and 2 are working through Node 7. Moreover,
the notion of efficient communication across groups is offset by the need to
reduce exposure to detection; thus, groups will inhibit clustering to mini-
mize detection (Medina and Hepner 2008). As illustrated in Figure 2, Node
1 is protected from direct exposure, and possibly detection, by working
through nodes 2, 3, and 6. This contrived isolation and lack of interdepen-
dency may account for why some illicit markets appear to resemble cottage
industries (Eck and Gersh 2000).
Statistical interpretability may be improved by generating more
complete network data. To this end, those interested in exploring criminal
network structure have concentrated on a single organization (Morselli
Malm and Bichler 277

and Petit 2007; Natarajan 2000, 2006) or a number of unconnected

organizations involved in the same type of crime rather than the entire
commodity chain (McGloin 2005; Natarajan and Belanger 1998). More
recently, efforts have turned toward identifying optimal data sources
(Xu and Chen 2008).

Nature and Sources of Criminal Network Data

Generally, researchers tap one of four primary sources of criminal network
data: surveillance data, interview data, experiential police data, and police
intelligence files. Each method offers notable strengths, and suffers from
limitations that create information gaps when used to create networks (see
Fijnaut and Marx 1995; Sheptycki 1998). This leads some scholars to call
for integrating sources in a multisystems approach to network generation
(Van de Bunt et al. 2007; Xu and Chen 2008).
Surveillance data. Several used surveillance data (communications made
through telephone, e-mail, or personal contact) collected through the course
of a criminal investigation (Morselli and Roy 2008; Natarajan 2006). This
ensures that the network is generated from objective communication
rather than police perceptions. However, given that cases link all of the indi-
viduals charged to the same crime group/organization, regional information
about a market will be incomplete (Natarajan 2006). As most illicit net-
works involve individuals and small factions with more ambiguous, fuzzy
boundaries (Sparrow 1991), this artificial group boundary produces sample
selection bias (Wasserman and Faust 1994) if used to study an entire drug
market.
Interview data. Pearson and Hobbes (2001) used interviews with con-
victed drug offenders, in addition to experiential knowledge of law enforce-
ment personnel, to gather information on the structure of the ‘‘middle’’ of
the drug market commodity chain. While useful, individuals at various lev-
els of the drug market are unlikely to know what goes on above or below
them (Pearson and Hobbes 2001). As such, using interviews to generate
an illicit trade network would require interviewing a saturated sample of
active offenders.
Experiential police data. Studies of delinquent networks have also collected
information from the experiential knowledge of police officers (McGloin
2005; Sarnecki 2001; Sarnecki and Pettersson 2001). To overcome analytic
problems raised by boundary misspecification, information can be gathered
on the social networks of individuals rather than collecting data about groups.
McGloin (2005) suggests that collecting information from police about
278 Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency 48(2)

individuals and their associations can help to refute inaccurate perceptions

about organizational cohesion and false associations and centrality. As with
other data sources, using police experience alone may not provide a compre-
hensive network; directives may produce detailed knowledge about some
individuals but little about others, thereby leaving large gaps in the network.
Police crime reports. Network boundary concerns could be assuaged using
incident and arrest reports (Xu and Chen 2003, 2008; Xu et al. 2004). For
instance, Xu and Chen (2008) found that the statistics used to describe a
methamphetamine network built from crime incident reports were robust
even with the random addition or removal of 10 percent of ties between
individuals. However, assessments of network completeness for networks
built from crime reports show that while efficiency is high, it failed to
produce links 30 percent of the time (Xu and Chen 2003; Xu et al. 2004).
Generally crime reports were shown to be viable sources for studying net-
works; however, these sources face significant limitations due to: missing
co-offending information,3 misspecification of nodes and ties due to errors
produced by aliases, lack of event context, presence of coincidental links
(Xu and Chen 2003; Xu et al. 2004),4 and selection bias created by jurisdic-
tional boundaries (Xu and Chen 2008).
There are significant strengths in combining data from experiential
police interviews, crime reports, and intelligence reports (as demonstrated
by the Dutch Organized Crime Monitor, Van de Bunt et al. 2007). For
example, integrating the experiential knowledge of intelligence officers
with data from crime reports reduces the noted limitations of relying on
crime reports (Xu and Chen 2003) and police perceptions. As demonstrated
by Van de Bunt et al. (2007), drawing information from many official data
systems may offer an opportunity to minimize the extent of structural gaps
and improve measures of network characteristics.

Aims of the Current Study

Using data drawn from several police data systems (intelligence files, arrest
and incident reports, completed police investigations, police experience,
and surveillance records), this study explores a wide range of market activ-
ity. Rather than setting artificial ‘‘group’’ boundaries that are imposed when
looking at a single investigation or court proceeding, this study builds an
illicit trade network of individuals associated with a wide range of drug
market activity for a large geographic region.
This presents an opportunity to test for structural differences among
niches within an illicit commodity chain. It is anticipated that:
Malm and Bichler 279

Hypothesis 1: Individuals involved in production and transporting (i.e.,

smuggling) will exhibit high small-world properties. This follows
from research showing that smuggling tends to be conducted by small
clustered groups operating within cohesive networks (Bruinsma and
Bernasco 2004; Dorn et al. 1998; Pearson and Hobbs 2001; Reuter
and Hagga 1989).
Hypothesis 2: Those involved in supplying drugs will be characterized
by both small-world and scale-free properties as suppliers tend to
belong to loosely organized clusters of people (Eck and Gersh
2000; Natarajan and Belanger 1998) with a few highly connected
individuals—hubs (Pearson and Hobbs 2001).
Hypothesis 3: Networked individuals involved in sales will be charac-
terized by high small-world properties. This is drawn from research
showing that retail activity typically involves autonomous clusters
of individuals who are relatively unconnected to other market activ-
ity and thus, network failure or complete fragmentation is unlikely
(Johnson et al. 2000; Pearson and Hobbs 2001).

With limited empirical investigation into the financial or parasite niches,

formally stated hypotheses are premature.

Method
Data Source
Annually, the Criminal Intelligence Service Canada (CISC) and the
Royal Canadian Mounted Police (2000) consolidate all current (occur-
ring within three years) strategic information about known criminal
groups involved in organized crime into a National Threat Assessment
Report. Organized crime is defined by the Canadian Criminal Code as
crime committed by any group of at least three people, punishable by
more than five years in prison that has a material benefit, meaning the
primary motive is profit (C.C.C. Section 467.1). Essentially, this broad
definition includes all individuals who work cooperatively in a criminal
enterprise.
Data for this project were extracted from the 2007 ‘‘E’’ Division
Provincial Threat Assessment (PTA) report.5 This report compiles informa-
tion about individuals and groups operating with in British Columbia and the
Yukon Territory during 2004 to 2006. Beginning with a list of known crime
groups and individuals from the preceding 2006 PTA, about 40 RCMP intel-
ligence officers queried national information systems (reviewing thousands
280 Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency 48(2)

of police intelligence reports and crime reports),6 interviewed law enforce-

ment personnel and prosecutors, examined wiretap transcripts, and conducted
offender interviews. Information was consolidated into Strategic Intelligence
Assessments (SIA); these narratives include information about all members
of the crime group, co-offending information, their demographic characteris-
tics, description of criminal activity, role played in the criminal organization,
and all associates including legitimate business partners, relatives, friends,
and co-offenders. The following is an excerpt of an SIA (with details and
names changed):
SMITH et al are involved in cocaine and marihuana trafficking as well as
marihuana cultivation and illegal gaming. Involvement in prostitution and
‘‘beating for hire’’ is also suspected.
Brothers George SMITH and Alfred SMITH are marijuana distributors.
The SMITH brothers often use Geoff BARRETT as their exporter. BAR-
RETT provides imported cocaine for the SMITH brothers to distribute.
George SMITH is a director of TAROT PROPERTIES Inc. in which Mike
WONG, the son of Ingemar WONG, is a secretary. The SMITH brothers are
believed to have some familial relation with Ingemar WONG. It is believed
that Ingemar WONG has many family members working in marihuana grow-
ing operations. Ingemar WONG provides marihuana for the SMITH brothers.
The SMITH brothers are directors in numerous businesses, two of which
have been newly established in 2007. Optimal Management Ltd. was incor-
porated on 2007-07-02 by Ron OBWUGE, an associate of the KICKERS MC
and a close friend of Alfred SMITH. Alfred SMITH and Johnny FRANCOIS
are also Directors for this company.

Network Description
To generate the network, two researchers extracted from the report, all indi-
viduals involved or affiliated with criminal enterprise (e.g., known rela-
tives, friends, co-offenders, or legitimate business associates). Ties7 and
demographic details were recorded for each person (dates of birth, gender,
and status). In total, this process revealed 2,197 individuals connected to
129 crime groups. A binary, symmetric (nondirectional) matrix was gener-
ated as the duration of the relationship, frequency of contact, or strength of
the tie between individuals were not recorded. In an undirected network,
such as in this study, two individuals are members of the same component
if there is a tie connecting them (Borgatti, Everett, and Freeman 2002).
About 92 percent (1,998 individuals) were directly involved in drug market
activity or associated with someone engaging in drug distribution. This
Malm and Bichler 281

network has a density of 0.002, suggesting that .2 percent of the possible ties
were observed. Drug activity was arranged in 26 isolated components (ranging
in size from 2 to 50) and one principle component, containing 1,696 nodes and
2,206 ties. Following from other network studies (Barabasi et al. 2002; Xu and
Chen 2008), the principle component was extracted and network analysis was
performed (Borgatti et al. 2002). The component is 90 percent male and
85 percent of the individuals fall between the ages of 21 and 50.

Variables
Market activity niche. Of the 1,696 individuals contained in the principal
component, 739 were known to be directly involved in drug activity. Given
that some individuals were involved in multiple activities, market niche
involved a two-stage classification process. First, activity was assessed for
complexity: 71 percent were associated with a single niche, 28.8 percent were
involved with two related market niches,8 and 0.3 percent (two individuals)
were involved in controlling activity along the entire commodity chain.9 The
second phase involved classifying the market niche (or dominant market niche
if complex drug activity was found). Six distinct activity niches were used.

 Production refers to individuals involved with the actual growth or

creation of illicit drugs. About 8.1 percent of individuals were involved
in production activity; 2.9 percent of actors filled complex roles.
 Transport includes importing and exporting drugs, as well as
transporting large quantities of drugs within a domestic market. About
24.3 percent of individuals were involved in smuggling or courier
activity; 16 percent of actors filled complex roles.
 Suppliers were involved with collecting and distributing drugs to deal-
ers. About 20.2 percent of individuals acted as suppliers; 2.7 percent
were involved in other activity as well.
 Retail activity included street-level drug sales. At least 38.5 percent of
people were involved in retail; 18.3 percent were also involved in other
activity.
 Parasites classed illicit activity plaguing or feeding off the illicit market.
This involves extortion and robbery of grow-operations. About
3.5 percent of individuals were involved in this niche. There were no
individuals engaged in complex parasitic behavior.
 Financial classed activity related to money laundering, stock fraud, and
financing operations. About 3.3 percent of the actors were involved in
financial activity. There was no complex financial behavior.
282 Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency 48(2)

Number of drugs. Drug type handled classified into a dichotomous variable

based on the number of drugs trafficked: mono drug handling (57 percent of
individuals) and poly drug involvement (43 percent). Of note, most mono
drug handling involved cocaine (34 percent) and marijuana (16 percent). Poly
drug activity mainly involved the combination of cocaine and marijuana
(26 percent).

Network statistics.
1. Small-world. Small-world characteristics are generally assessed through
two statistics, the clustering coefficient and average path length. The
clustering coefficient measures the likelihood that any two nodes that are
connected to the same node are connected themselves (values range from
.00 to 1.0). The average clustering coefficient for the drug network is rel-
atively high, compared with the random network, at .45 (see Table 1). In
small-world networks, all nodes are connected to each other through a
small number of links (short average path length). The average path
length is 6.97. This path length is lower than what would be expected
by chance. Overall, the drug network has small-world characteristics.
2. Scale-free. Scale-free characteristics can be identified through degree
centrality and by fitting a power curve to the cumulative distribution of
degree centrality scores. Degree centrality is the count of the number
of ties attached to a given individual (Freeman 1979). Individuals with
high degree centrality have more connections. The average number of ties
in the principal component is 2.60. The cumulative distribution of degree
centrality scores regressed against a power distribution revealed the pres-
ence of significant hubs (Exponent 7.24 [SE ¼ .18], R2 ¼ .87, K2 ¼ 21.66
[p < .001]). While the R2 illustrates that the curve estimation (power dis-
tribution) fits the principal component, the residual diagnostics reveal
notable variation that might suggest hidden niche-level variation.10
3. Network vulnerability. Vulnerability is measured through fragmenta-
tion and betweenness centrality. Fragmentation scores estimate the
proportion of disconnected pairs of individuals that result when an
individual is removed from the network (Borgatti 2003). Larger
fragmentation scores illustrate less network cohesion. The average
fragmentation score for the drug network is .02, suggesting that the
removal of the average node will fragment the network by 2 percent.
This value is far lower than the random graphs. Betweenness centrality
is the number of times that an individual is between a pair of other people
(see Freeman 1979) and is taken to reflect the extent to which a node or
person mediates connections between people. Being positioned in this
 Table 1. Characteristics of Market Niches
Drug Network Source Supply Sales Feeder

Complex Complex Complex Complex

Actual Randoma Production Production Transport Transport Supply Supply Retail Retail Financial Parasite

Descriptive statistics
Nodes 1,696 1,696 14 25 38 121 15 94 104 134 32 35
Age (SD) 36 (11) N/A 44 (9) 37 (10) 43 (9) 41 (6) 42 (9) 35 (9) 29 (10) 32 (10) 50 (13) 29 (11)
Proportion poly .47 N/A .19 .04 .47 .42 .60 .38 .90 .34 .59 .30
drug
Small-world properties
Clustering .44 (.42) .001 (.00þ) .38 (.38) .58 (.40) .24 (.23) .45 (.20) .10 (.17) .34 (.29) .40 (.39) .47 (30) .25 (.25) .57 (.40)
coefficient (SD)
Path length (SD) 6.97 (1.19) 7.44 (1.20) 7.35 (1.56) 6.60 (1.60) 6.20 (1.60) 6.90 (2.38) 5.86 (2.04) 6.74 (1.50) 6.86 (1.93) 6.68 (1.95) 7.63 (2.91) 7.20 (2.77)
Scale-free properties
Degree centrality 2.60 (5.28) 2.60 (NA) 5.36 (5.00) 2.88 (2.90) 8.32 (4.00) 4.44 (9.69) 10.20 (10.00) 4.84 (4.60) 2.71 (4.49) 2.66 (2.67) 4.72 (4.03) 2.46 (3.22)
(SD)
Power-law slope 7.24 (.18) 25.67 (1.08) 17.35 (.45) 13.27 (.30) 21.24 (.70) 14.94 (.29) 28.71 (1.95) 12.58 (.13) 5.67 (.04) 8.99 (.28) 15.18 (.36) 9.73 (.37)
(SD)
2
R (df) .87 (32) .94 (9) .91 (23) .93 (23) .97 (28) .93 (28) .89 (28) .98 (28) .99 (28) .83 (28) .91 (25) .80 (25)
K2 (sig.) 21.66 (.00þ) 2.12 (.35) 2.42 (.30) 2.06 (.36) 8.57 (.01) 2.31 (.32) 9.61 (.01) 7.62 (.02) 1.34 (.51) 17.70 (.00þ) .96 (.62) 5.13 (.08)
Network vulnerability
Betweenness 3,939 4,390 10,042 1,809 35,646 10,053 54,733 10,257 4,062 4,540 12,952 2,151
centrality (SD) (18,902) (5,629) (7,993) (4,388) (6,280) (9,637) (21,827) (10,955) (9,353) (10,090) (7,673) (4,800)
Fragmentation .02 (.02) .20 (N/A) .03 (.01) .01 (.01) .08(.02) .03 (.01) .08 (.02) .03 (.01) .02 (.01) .02 (.01) .04 (.01) .01 (.005)
(SD)

Note: a. In order to provide a comparison point for the network statistics, 30 random graph counterparts were produced with the same number of nodes, number of
links, density, and degree centrality as the principal component.

283
284 Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency 48(2)

way gives individuals the potential to bridge groups thereby control-

ling the flow of commodities or information between pairs of people.
The average betweenness centrality of 3,939 is moderately high and
comparable to the random graph. The low average fragmentation and
moderate betweenness scores illustrate that there is low to moderate
fragmentation potential for the drug network; however, the large range
in values adds to the necessity of exploring network fragmentation
based on niche.

Results
Table 1 presents basic network descriptive statistics along with measures of
small-world properties, scale-free properties, and network vulnerability.
These statistics were calculated for each market niche.

Descriptive Statistics
On average, individuals involved in the complex activities of production,
smuggling, and supply are older than those simply involved in one niche.
Financial roles tend to attract the oldest individuals, with a mean age of
50. Further, individuals closer to the source of the commodity chain are
generally older than individuals involved in sales and parasitic behavior.
It appears that a greater proportion of individuals involved in complex
activity, regardless of niche, tend to handle multiple types of drugs com-
pared to individuals involved in a single niche. The greatest differences are
found in supply (60 percent of those active in complex supply vs. 38 percent
for simple supply) and sales (90 percent for complex activity and 34 percent
for those involved in just sales). Additionally, individuals involved in finan-
cial activity are more apt to be associated with multiple drug types.

Small-World Properties
Under small-world properties, the average clustering coefficient is signifi-
cantly greater than the random graphs for all niches; however, there is great
variation between niches. The niches with the highest clustering are the
simple niches of production, smuggling, retail, and parasite. In reference
to average path length, all of the niches, with the exception of financial, are
shorter than the random graphs. The shortest average path length belongs to
individuals in the complex transport and complex supply niches. In sum,
while all of the niches display some small-world properties, simple niches
have higher small-world properties than complex niches.
Malm and Bichler 285

Scale-Free Properties
In terms of scale-free properties, degree centrality scores are highest for
those involved in complex transport and complex supply. The power curve
fits most niches fairly well; the poorest fit involved parasitic behavior (R2 ¼
.80) and retail (R2 ¼ .83). By far the largest exponents, indicating the
shallowest distributions, exist within complex activity involving transport
(usually smuggling), supply, retail, and financial activity; suggesting that
there are several well-connected individuals (hubs). With one exception
(retail), residuals are normally distributed.
In all comparisons, simple niches tended to have greater scale-free prop-
erties than complex niches, with the exception of complex retail that shows
high scale-free tendencies; this is the result of low average degree central-
ities in conjunction with well-fitting power-law distributions with moderate
slopes. This pattern is shown in the flatness of the curves in Figure 3A
(movement niches) and Figure 3B (supply niches). In both, the complex
curve climbs slower because there is a greater degree of variation among
degree centrality scores, or in other words, a more even or equitable distri-
bution of ties exists.

Network Vulnerability
In general, the results indicate that drug market niche is a significant vari-
able in assessing the vulnerability of the drug market. Betweenness cen-
trality values show that individuals in complex transport, complex supply,
and financial niches are more likely to locate themselves in positions that
may have more influence over the flow of drugs through the commodity
chain. Fragmentation scores reveal substantive variation by market niche.
Complex transport, complex supply, and financial niches have substan-
tially higher fragmentation (between 4 and 8 percent). It is important
to note that even the highest average fragmentation niches in the
observed network are far lower than the average fragmentation of the ran-
dom network (19.6 percent). Niches at the far ends of the commodity
chain, production and retail, show the lowest promise for network
fragmentation.
Figure 4 illustrates the networked individuals within each market
niche; the size of the circle representing each person varies according
to fragmentation scores. Multiple connections are apparent between indi-
viduals involved in source niches (production, smuggling, and complex
transportation) with suppliers and suppliers with retailers. This gives
visual support to the statistical results that suppliers have the highest
286 Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency 48(2)

Figure 3. Cumulative degree distribution for selected niches. A. Transport and

complex transport niches. B. Supply and complex supply activity.
Malm and Bichler 287

Financial

Complex
Complex Complex
Producon Complex
Transport Supply
Retail

Courier

Producon Transport Parasite Supply Retail

Figure 4. Principle component sociogram.

bridging potential in the network. In general, there is a concentration of

individuals within complex transport (i.e., smuggling) and to a lesser
extent complex supply, which if removed, would substantially fragment
the network.

Discussion
The illicit drug network examined here was built from multiple data sys-
tems with the aim of testing whether different niches within the drug com-
modity chain have varying network structures, with highly connected
individuals operating in certain markets, small flexible groups operating
at the mid-level of local and regional trade, and autonomous operators
working in retail (Dorn et al. 1998; Dorn et al. 2005). Alternatively, regard-
less of market niche, illicit drug markets could be characterized as networks
of small groups of entrepreneurs with limited susceptibility to interdiction
efforts (e.g., Bruinsma and Bernasco 2004; Chin and Zang 2003; Eck and
Gersh 2000; Natarajan 2006). While these results found significant struc-
tural differences between niches, study limitations may somewhat restrict
the generalizability of these findings. If these findings hold up under scru-
tiny, clear policy implications follow ascertaining the niche that a crime
group operates in will help to determine which crime control and suppres-
sion strategies would have maximum impact that a crime group operates in
will help to determine.
288 Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency 48(2)

Table 2. Drug Market Niche Result Summary

Niche Class Small-World Scale-Free Vulnerability Target

Source
Production Complex Moderate Moderate High Hub and bridge
Single role High High Low Repeated hub
Transportation Complex Moderate Moderate High Bridge
Single role High High Moderate Repeated hub
Supply Complex Moderate Low High Bridge
Single role High High Moderate Repeated hub
Retail Complex Moderate High Low Repeated hub
Single role High Moderate Low N/A
Financial Single role Low High High Hub and bridge
Parasite Single role High High Low Repeated hub

Implications for Network Resilience

Small-world, scale-free, and flexibility properties can have a significant
effect on a network’s susceptibility to failure and attacks from law enforce-
ment (Xu and Chen 2008). These findings (summarized in Table 2) suggest
that differing levels of network resilience exist, indicating that random or
repeated progressive attacks to reduce the pool of replacement offenders,
particularly those occupying hub or bridge positions, will have different
levels of success depending on niche type and complexity.
Our first hypothesis asserts that individuals involved in production and
moving large quantities of drugs will exhibit high small-world properties,
and thus, will have high network resiliency against random attack. The
results show this to be overly simplistic. Not only are networks of domestic
producers and transporters structurally different, simple and complex activ-
ity within these niches must also be distinguished. Individuals who specia-
lize in production or transport show high small-world and scale-free
properties, making repeated hub attacks the most appropriate interdiction
effort for these niches. Conversely, producers who also work in other niches
do not demonstrate small-world characteristics, but have scale-free proper-
ties and vulnerability, making hub and bridge attacks most appropriate.
Individuals involved in moving large quantities of drugs (i.e., smug-
glers), whom also are involved in other activities, do not show high
small-world or scale-free properties. Instead, they are among the highest
in terms of vulnerability. This niche contains many nodes with high frag-
mentation potential, suggesting that interdiction efforts should focus on
bridge attacks. Extensive repetition (removal of several successive bridges)
Malm and Bichler 289

might not be necessary if it is possible to identify the operators with highest

betweenness centrality.
The second hypothesis posited that drug suppliers will be characterized
by both small-world and scale-free properties. This is correct for suppliers
that restrict their activity to distribution and do not engage in source, sales,
or financial activity. Complex suppliers who diversify their activity to other
niches do not demonstrate small-world or scale-free characteristics, but they
do have high network vulnerability. This finding supports previous results
(Natarajan 2006; Pearson and Hobbs 2001) showing that suppliers tie indi-
viduals from other niches (higher betweenness centrality). Like complex
transport, interdiction efforts for complex suppliers should focus on bridge
attacks, but extensive repetition is less necessary.
The third hypotheses states that retailers will be characterized by high
small-world characteristics. This is only true when retailers also engage
in other activities (complex retail), otherwise retail is not characterized
by high small-world, scale-free, or network vulnerability characteristics.
The research shows that retailers do not have a high clustering tendency
compared to other niches. This partly contradicts research suggesting that
retailers cluster in teams (Johnson et al. 2000; Pearson and Hobbs 2001).
Interestingly, the retail niche is not particularly susceptible to any form
of attack by law enforcement. These results make street-level sellers poor
targets for police interdiction efforts.
Financiers exhibit scale-free characteristics and high vulnerability.
This maintains Pearson and Hobbs’ contention that individuals involved
in the financing of drug networks are highly connected to other influential
people in the market (2001). Thus, efforts aimed at removing financial
support for the drug industry (e.g., money laundering, financing new drug
enterprise, and covering losses) must be highly targeted. Random attacks
on individuals are unlikely to have much effect as the key to disrupting
this niche lies in finding hubs. Further, removing individuals that appear
to have several associations, but are not actors with truly high degree cen-
trality, may meet with little success. Recall that important people may
mask the nature and volume of associations to elude police. Nonetheless,
identifying and removing individuals bridging groups could potentially
shatter the distribution network.
Individuals involved in parasitic behavior have high small-world and
scale-free properties but not high levels of vulnerability. Parasites to the
drug market are susceptible to repeated hub attacks.
These results also found substantive variation in network structure
between single niches and complex niches. This indicates that more
290 Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency 48(2)

attention needs to be paid to understanding the myriad of activity engaged

in by individuals involved in complex market niches. While past research
found some evidence of overlap in roles (Morselli and Roy 2008; Natarajan
and Belanger 1998; Pearson and Hobbs 2001), none examined the relative
importance of role complexity in network resiliency. Based on the results
found here, future research should continue to explore the intricacies of
complex market activity and the role played by these individuals in the total
network.

Limitations
The primary limitation facing this study concerns its use of known drug
activity. Reliance on data generated by investigative procedures and crime
reports may produce gaps in the social network, and definitional biases
associated with organizational directives can artificially distort the nature
of the networks’ structure. However, given the comprehensiveness of the
data gathering process, and the adequate reliability coefficients produced
during the inter-rater reliability testing, it is unlikely that these limitations
substantively affect the credibility of these results.
Network incompleteness. As with most social network analyses of crimi-
nal behavior, the networks examined here are likely to be somewhat incom-
plete and contain fuzzy boundaries. Several factors can contribute to this
problem. Successful, highly organized crime groups might use a series of
fronts (people and businesses) and this would generate missing data that may
represent critical roles in criminal networks. In addition, identifying unique
individuals from intelligence files, where many crime figures may have a
number of aliases, can be challenging. It is possible that some groups could
appear larger due to counting an individual multiple times; this would mini-
mize the importance of specific individuals because their ties are split
between two identities. Unfortunately, this limitation affects all attempts to
study hidden criminal networks (Morselli and Roy 2008; Xu and Chen 2008).
Organizational directives. These findings may have been distorted by law
enforcement directives and initiatives. For instance, the primary police
agency in the study region has been specifically directed to attend to the
Marijuana Grow Operation situation that may have resulted in overrepre-
sentation of producers and suppliers (see Malm and Tita 2006). Moreover,
prior research suggests that individuals involved in smuggling activity
engage in a varied trading portfolio in illicit, grey and legal markets (e.g.,
Brown and Clarke 2004; Kersel 2007; Tremblay, Talon, and Hurley
2001). It follows, that a substantial amount of quasi-legitimate enterprise
Malm and Bichler 291

with legal entities may have been overlooked during data collection. This
suggests that broadening law enforcement directives to include collecting
data from legitimate enterprise will result in more complete information.
To address these concerns, future research should include data from legit-
imate activities (i.e., real estate and market conditions) and explore the
structural stability of illicit drug distribution networks in response to law
enforcement trends or shifting market conditions of legitimate enterprise.
Investigative procedures. Another limitation arises when the nature of
police investigation is considered. As individuals in the drug market are dis-
covered by the police, their immediate associates are increasingly likely to
become known. As the investigation unfolds, there is an effort to find every-
one in the subgroup. Entire groups could be missed if investigative data are
used exclusively to build the network. It is plausible that this type of data
source could lead observers to see small-world and scale-free properties,
even though the actual network structure is different. Using multisystems
data over a three-year study window, and adopting a broad definition of
criminal enterprise, the probability of this bias occurring was diminished.
Future research should continue investigating the possibility of incorporat-
ing a mixed-methodological approach drawing data from offender inter-
views, victim statements, and noncriminal justice data systems.
National focus. Additionally, limiting analysis to Canadian intelligence
could have potentially missed the multi-commodity brokerage occurring
in transit countries involved in cocaine, heroine, and ecstasy trafficking.
Including data from source and transit countries may have altered the length
and complexity of the commodity chains—transnational linkages are miss-
ing from the analysis. In order to collect more complete data on all niches,
future comparative and cooperative international research on drug com-
modity chains is essential. Most drug supply chains start in source countries
and end in consumer countries. If data are only collected from one side of
the commodity chain, then the network being studied is inherently incom-
plete. To this end, future research should explore the network characteristics
of mono and poly drug distribution networks.
While all of the above concerns are valid, evidence has begun to
emerge supporting the contention that law enforcement intelligence sources
are sufficient to identify robust network descriptions. Xu and Chen (2008)
tested whether network statistics remain robust when up to 10 percent of
known links were removed or 10 percent of unknown links were added
to four different types of criminal networks. They concluded that the
small-world and scale-free properties of the networks observed did not
change when missing links were added or known links were removed; the
292 Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency 48(2)

networks identified through law enforcement sources were robust despite

the likelihood of missing data. Based on this and given the comprehensive-
ness of the data used in the current study, it is unlikely that the networks
identified have missing or incorrect data that would negate the utility of the
current findings.

Conclusion
To close, this study provides insight into the structure of criminal enterprise
along the drug market commodity chain. This study shows that previous
research suggesting that illicit drug markets are comprised of small groups
of networked entrepreneurs (e.g., Bruinsma and Bernasco 2004; Chin and
Zang 2003; Eck and Gersh 2000; Natarajan 2006) paints a picture with
strokes that are too broad. The results support the argument that significant
variation occurs at each niche within the drug market; therefore, character-
izing the network structure of the market as a whole is misleading (Dorn
et al. 1998; Dorn et al. 2005). While individuals exclusively engaged in
activities at the far ends of the market (production and sales) can be char-
acterized as small groups of networked entrepreneurs, individuals occupy-
ing niches within the middle market (smuggling and supply) and individuals
who engage in complex activities are more likely to be highly connected
and have limited replacement potential.
These findings support adopting different law enforcement policies target-
ing different niches within the drug commodity chain. Depending on market
niche, three different law enforcement targets emerge: bridge, hub and
bridge, and repeated hub. Targeting hubs and bridges should be particularly
effective in reducing the robustness of the drug network when focusing on
complex production and financial niches. Repeated attacks on hubs may be
most effective against the simple niche involvement (production, smuggling,
and supply), parasitic behavior, and complex retail activity. Attacking bridges
may be most beneficial when targeting the complex supply and complex
transport niches. Future research comparing results of interdiction policies
targeting different levels of the commodity chain should be conducted. Each
strategy should be assessed in terms of reducing the drug problem, addressing
displacement, and minimizing costs to the department.

Authors’ Note
This project was undertaken by external, independent researchers. Opinions
expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the Royal
Canadian Mounted Police or the Government of Canada.
Malm and Bichler 293

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The authors declared no potential conflicts of interests with respect to the authorship
and/or publication of this article.

Funding
The authors received no financial support for the research and/or authorship of this
article.

Notes
1. Terminology relating to individuals and groups operating in transnational illicit
markets, specifically the terms ‘‘organized crime’’ and ‘‘criminal networks’’ has
fallen into conceptual mud holes. As the focus of the present work is to examine
the structural characteristics of segments of an illicit commodity chain, the term
‘‘criminal enterprise’’ will refer to drug distribution activity and ‘‘crime
groups’’ will refer to collaborating individuals.
2. Social network analysis (SNA) offers a range of analytic tools that enable a user
to explore the associations between interdependent individuals, groups, or clus-
ters of groups.
3. For example, if two individuals were co-offenders, but had never been caught
by police together, then the link would be missed.
4. For instance, if two criminals just happened to be caught at the same crime but
were not true co-offenders, then a false link would appear.
5. The PTA is generated by analysts from the RCMP and Criminal Intelligence
Section of British Columbia (CISBC), with assistance and support from law
enforcement agencies located within the Pacific Region.
6. To ensure the information was current and addressed time lags between activ-
ities occurring and reports being entered into the mainframe databases, each
SIA was discussed with the Human Source Unit—a special RCMP unit tasked
with regularly meeting with all intelligence units to gather information on
current organized crime activity.
7. To test the reliability of coding instructions, 10 intelligence analysts were
provided with two narratives and instructions to extract all individuals (60 people
named) while coding all ties between pairs of people (273). Reliability tests con-
firmed consistency on whether ties were found between individuals (.94 for a tie
being coded when a relationship exists between two people).
8. For example, combination niche activity included: source and movement, smug-
gling and retail, smuggling and supply, smuggling and supply and retail, and
smuggling and movement.
294 Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency 48(2)

9. These individuals were described as being involved in multiple niches of the

drug market (at least three), charged taxes or gave permission to others to sell
drugs in different areas and were connected directly to drug sources.
10. Goodness of fit is assessed through R2 (Xu and Chen 2008) and the normality of
residuals was measured through D’agastino and Pearson Omnibus K2 test and
residual plots (see Poitras 2006 and Oztuna 2006 for a more complete explana-
tion). The K2 tests are significant when the predicted values fall near to the
observed data but not within the 95 percent confidence interval.

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Bios
Aili Malm is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Criminal Justice at
California State University Long Beach. Generally, her published research centers
on the intersection between policing and social policy.
Gisela Bichler is an Associate Professor in the Department of Criminal Justice at
California State University, San Bernardino. Generally, her research explores the
interplay between the environment and offending behavior, investigating the utility
statistical tools to reveal crime patterns, and evaluating problem-oriented policing
and situational crime prevention initiatives. She is founder and director of the Center
for Criminal Justice Research—CSUSB.