INFANT JULIAN YUSAY CARAM, v. ATTY. MARIJOY D. SEGUI, et. al.

G.R. No. 193652, 5 August 2014, EN BANC, (Villarama, Jr., J.)

The Amparo rule cannot be properly applied when it is extant from the pleadings filed
that what is involved is the issue of child custody and the exercise of parental rights over a child,
who, for all intents and purposes, has been legally considered a ward of the State.

Ma. Christina Yusay Caram became pregnant with Marcelino Constantino

III without the benefit of marriage. After getting pregnant, Christina misled
Marcelino into believing that she had an abortion when, in fact,she intended to have
the child adopted through Sun and Moon Home for Children in Paranaque City
placing her family in a potentially embarrassing situation for having a second
illegitimate son. Marcelino died without knowing about the birth of his son. During
the wake, Christina disclosed to his family that she and the deceased had a son that
she gave up for adoption.

The DSWD issued a certificate declaring Baby Julian as “Legally Available

for Adoption”. He was “matched” with the spouses Vergel and Filomina Medina.
Christina changed her mind about the adoption and wrote a letter to the DSWD
asking for the suspension of Baby Julian’s adoption proceedings. However, the
DSWD Assistant Secretary informed her that the certificate declaring Baby Julian
legally available for adoption had attained finality or three months have elapsed after
Christina signed the Deed of Voluntary Commitment, which terminated her
parental authority and effectively made Baby Julian a ward of the State. She filed a
petition for the issuance of a Writ of Amparo before the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
seeking to obtain custody of Baby Julian. The RTC dismissed the petition and held
that Christina availed of the wrong remedy to regain custody of her child.

ISSUE:

Is Writ of Amparo the proper recourse for obtaining parental authority and
custody of a minor child?

RULING:

No.In this case, Christina alleged that the DSWD officers caused her
“enforced separation” from Baby Julian and that their action amounted to an
“enforced disappearance” within the context of the Amparo rule. Contrary to her
position, however, DSWD officers never concealed Baby Julian’s whereabouts. In
fact, Christina obtained a copy of the DSWD’s Memorandum explicitly stating that
Baby Julian was in the custody of the Medina Spouses when she filed her petition
before the RTC. Christina’s directly accusing DSWD of forcibly separating her from
her child and placing the latter up for adoption, supposedly without complying with
the necessary legal requisites to qualify the child for adoption, clearly indicates that
she is not searching for a lost child asserting her parental authority over the child
and contesting custody over him.

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 The privilege of the Writ of Amparo is a remedy available to victims of extra-
judicial killings and enforced disappearances or threats of a similar nature, regardless
of whether the perpetrator of the unlawful act or omission is a public official or
employee or a private individual. It is envisioned basically to protect and guarantee
the right to life, liberty and security of persons, free from fears and threats that
vitiate the quality of life.

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 NESTOR CHING & ANDREW WELLINGTON v.
SUBIC BAY GOLF AND COUNTRY CLUB, INC., et al.
G.R. No. 174353, 10 September 2014, FIRST DIVISION, (De Castro, J.)

A shareholder’s derivative suit seeks to recover for the benefit of the corporation and its
whole body of shareholders when injury is caused to the corporation that may not otherwise be
redressed because of failure of the corporation to act. Thus, ‘the action is derivative, i.e., in the
corporate right, if the gravamen of the complaint is injury to the corporation, or to the whole body of
its stock and property without any severance or distribution among individual holders, or it seeks to
recover assets for the corporation or to prevent the dissipation of its assets.’

Nestor Ching and Andrew Wellington (Ching and Wellington) filed a

Complaint with the Regional Trial Court on behalf of the members of Subic Bay
Golf and Country Club, Inc. (SBGCCI) against it and its Board of Directors and
officers. Ching and Wellington claimed that the Subic Bay Golfers and Shareholders
Inc. (SBGSI) did not disclose to them the amendment which allegedly made the
shares non-proprietary, as it takes away the right of the shareholders to participate in
the pro-rata distribution of the assets of the corporation after its dissolution.
According to Ching and Wellington, this is in fraud of the stockholders who only
discovered the amendment when they filed a case for injunction to restrain the
corporation from suspending their rights to use all the facilities of the club.

The RTC dismissed the complaint saying that the action is a derivative suit.
Ching and Wellington argued that the complaint was not a derivative suit. They
claim that they filed the suit in their own right as stockholders against the officers
and Board of Directors of the SBGCCI. However the SBGCCI claimed by way of
defense that Ching and Wellington failed to show that it was authorized by SBGSI
to file the Complaint on its behalf as well as the requisites for filing a derivative suit.

ISSUES:

1. Is the petition filed by Nestor Ching and Andrew Wellington a derivative suit?
2. Does being minor stockholders of SBGSI give them personality to file a
complaint against SBGSI?

RULING:

1. No. Derivative suit must be differentiated from individual and

representative or class suits and it is based on wrongful or fraudulent acts of
directors or other persons. Where a stockholder or member is denied the right of
inspection, his suit would be individual because the wrong is done to him personally
and not to the other stockholders or the corporation. Where the wrong is done to a
group of stockholders, as where preferred stockholders’ rights are violated, a class or
representative suit will be proper for the protection of all stockholders belonging to
the same group. But where the acts complained of constitute a wrong to the

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corporation itself, the cause of action belongs to the corporation and not to the
individual stockholder or member.

Ching and Welington’s only possible cause of action as minority

stockholders against the actions of the Board of Directors is the common law right
to file a derivative suit. The legal standing of minority stockholders to bring
derivative suits is not a statutory right, there being no provision in the Corporation
Code or related statutes authorizing the same, but is instead a product of
jurisprudence based on equity.

2. No. At the outset, it should be noted that the Complaint in question

appears to have been filed only by the two petitioners, namely Nestor Ching and
Andrew Wellington, who each own one stock in SBGCCI. While the caption of the
Complaint also names the “Subic Bay Golfers and Shareholders Inc. for and in
behalf of all its members,” Ching and Welington did not attach any authorization
from said SBGCCI or its members to file the Complaint. Thus, the Complaint is
deemed filed only by Ching and Welington and not by SBGSI.

UST Law Review, Vol. LIX, No. 1, May 2015