Department of History, National University of Singapore

The Class Structure of Burma: Continuity and Change

Author(s): Moshe Lissak
Source: Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, Vol. 1, No. 1 (Mar., 1970), pp. 60-73
Published by: Cambridge University Press on behalf of Department of History, National University of
Singapore
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The Class Structure of Burma:

Continuity and Change

MOSHE LISSAK

I
Introduction
The purpose of this article is to review some of the changes that have taken place
in the stratification of Burmese society since the thirties, and find out to what extent

signs of a more modern class structure can be discerned and of what it consists.

Developing countries have great difficulty in creating conditions conducive to the

rapid modernisation of their economy and society. To bring this about is a common
goal of both civilian and military regimes, though their style and mode of action may
be different. Much has been written about the obstacles encountered by the elites of
these countries in the political, ideological and cultural spheres, but relatively little
research has been done on the processes of social stratification that are going on within
them. Many of these societies, of which Burma is one, are fairly pluralistic from the
ethnic, linguistic and religious point of view and ethnic and religious affiliation is distinctly
related to occupational category, political status and geographic concentration. This
interferes with the attainment of a high level of national integration and the emergence
of a modern, open class structure devoid of elements at various
particularistic
stratificational stages of the hierarchy. Obviously, it is not the only obstacle. There
also is the interaction between town and country, the westernized elite and the traditional
?
sectors, the vast economic and cultural disparity between different strata all problems
that are no less than the interrelation of the ethnic minorities and their
important
interaction with the dominant ethnic religious sector.
The vulnerable spots of a developing, heterogeneous society, one that
especially
contains numerous ethnic enclaves, are best revealed by an examination
particularistic
of the following issues:
(a) the scope and rate of change in the occupational structure and the economic differential
between different social strata,
(b) the real potential for social and economic mobility and the aspiration of the various sectors
of the population,

(c) to what extent any changes in these variables tend to obscure the identity between ethnic
and ecological affiliation and occupational and prestige categories ?whether they have
led to psychological, normative and structural conditions that stimulate greater interaction
between different status groups.
As far as is known,
comprehensiveno study has been conducted in Burma on
these issues, and as a modest
substitute we have examined the data material published
at various times, and usually compiled for different purposes from those we are concerned
with here. Nevertheless, even this rather material is likely to cast some
fragmentary
light on the in question. The material referred to relates to in the
problems changes
occupational structure and the process of urbanization; and further includes some rather

sketchy information on mobility patterns and social image and status symbols, as well
as on the social hierarchy and the stratification of the population of Burma until the
militarv coud of 1962.1

i The is a list of books and papers

following dealing with the history, geography, population,
economy, and religions of Burma: J.S. Furnivall, The Government of Modern Burma, Institute
of Pacific Relations, New York, 1960. (Second edition) J.S. Furnivall, An Introduction to the
Political Economy of Burma, People's Literature Committee and House, Rangoon, 1957. Aye
Hlaing, "Trends of Economic Growth and Income Distribution in Burma 1870-1946", Journal
of the Burma Research Society, Vol. XLVII, June 1964, Part I, pp. 89-148. Manning Nash, The
Golden Road to Modernity: Village Life in Contemporary Burma, John Wiley and Son, 1965.
Lucian W. Pye, Politics Personality and Nation Building: Burma's Search for Identity, Yale
University Press, 1962. Josef Silverstein, "Burma", in M.G. Kahin, Government and Politics of
Southeast Asia, Cornell University Press, 1959, pp. 75-182. Donald E. Smith, Religion and Politics
in Burma, Princeton University Press, 1965. Hugh Tinker, The Union of Burma, Oxford University
Press, 1961. Frank N. Tr?ger, Building a Welfare State in Burma 1948-1956, Institute of Pacific

60

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The Class Structure of Burma: Continuity and Change 61
II
We shall refer mainly to the post-independence period, but the point of departure
will be the last decade of British rule in Burma. No distinction was made between
sub-periods, for although some changes in the stratification order took place during
the British period, these were marginal, so that only the more important ones need
be mentioned.
Let us first present some of the findings of the 1931 census, the last one published
under British rule. From the occupational distribution given in Table 1 it is evident
that agriculture and forestry was the dominant occupational category comprising 69.6%
of the population, the other two categories that had some significance were industry
? ?
mainly processing of rice and other foodstuffs with 10.7% and trade, with 9.0%

Table 1

Occupational Structure, 1931 (%)

Occupation Workers

Agriculture and Forestry 69-6

Exploitation of Minerals 0-6

Industry 10-7

Transportation 3-6
Trade 90
Public Force 0-5
Public administration 0-7
Professions and Liberal Arts 3-2
Persons Living on Income 01
Domestic Services 0-7

Insufficiently described 0-9

Unproductive 0-4

Total 1000

Source: Surider K. Mehta, The Labor Force in Urban Burma and Rangoon, 1953, A Comparative
Study. Ph.D. Thesis, University of Chicago, 1959, p. 52.

The agricultural population was divided into three broad categories. (See Table 2)
1. Owner cultivators (38% of the principal workers)
?
2. Tenant cultivators 22%
?
3. Agricultural labourers 40%
In plain language this means that by 1931 about 62% of all persons engaged in
agriculture were landless owing to a long process of evictions which began in the 19th
century and continued until the Second World War. Thus, not only did the over

whelming majority of the labour force live in rural areas and engage in farming, but
most of it consisted of rural proletariat. In some parts of the country, especially in
lower Burma, the percentage of land owners was still smaller than the overall figures
would indicate.2
Most of the urban population, as many as 75.0% of the urban labour force, were

engaged in the processing and supply of materials in industry, transportation and trade.
About 12% were classified under administration, public security and the free professions.3

Relations, New
York, 1956. Louis J. Walinsky, Economie Development in Burma 1955-1960, The
Twentieth Century Fund, New York, 1962. John F. Cady, A History of Modern Burma, Cornell
University Press, 1958.
2 "Southeast Asian Dual or Multiple?", The Journal
Manning, Nash, Society, of Asian Studies,
Vol. XXIII, No. 3, May 1964, p. 419.
3 R. M. "Urbanization: The Burmese Journal Burma Research
Sundrum, Experience", of
Society, Vol. XL, June 1957, Part I, Table XVIII.

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 M.
62 Lissak
Table 2
Rural Agricultural Population 1931 by Type of Farmer

Type of Farmer N %

Cultivating Owner 38
1,118,000
Tenant Cultivators 22
690,000
Agricultural Labourers 1,292,000 40
Total: Principal Workers 3,100,000 100
Working Dependents 515,000

TOTAL 3,613,000

Adjusted from R. M. Sundrum, Census Data on the Labor Force and the Income Distribution
in Burma, Department of Economic Statistics and Commerce, University of Rangoon, 1958, Table
13.

In a colonial a multi-ethnic one, such as Burma became through

society, particularly
the influx of Indians and Chinese after the British conquest, the occupational structure
of the population alone means little without it being related to the ethnic distribution.
In 1931 the ethnic composition of the population of Burma was as follows:

Burmese 65-7%
Other indigenous groups 24-6%
Indian 70%
Indo-Burmese 1 -2%
Chinese 1-3%
Europeans 0-2 %
Total 1000%

Table 3 clearly shows the relationship between ethnic origin and occupational
structure in 1931. In agriculture, trade and industry, the Burmese consisting of 56%
of the total are represented more or less according to their numbers.
employment figure
are, however, under-represented in mining, transport, the public security forces
They
and administration. They are surprisingly over-represented in the professions
public
and liberal arts, probably because the Buddhist monks were classified in this category.4
The Chinese, on the other hand, consisting of only 15% of the total of persons
are in mining, and still more so
employed, over-represented industry, transportation
in trade. This is even more marked among the non-Burmese-born Indians, whose
share in the total employment was only 8% but who made up 43-4% of the public
security forces; 43-2% of the transportation sector; 36-3% of the mining sector and
26-6% of the public administration. Already in the 1930s this applies to other
categories as well. Accordingly, the Chinese and especially the Indians occupied rather
in most and exposure to new ideas,
important positions occupations places offering
known as the of modernization. The effects on social mobility
generally by-products
and on the stratification hierarchy of the thirties are obvious. "An ethnic division
of labour placed the Burmese at the bottom of the ladder, concentrating them in the
agricultural and extractive sectors of the economy, tying them to money lent by small
5
capitalists, and binding their welfare to the fluctuations of the world market in rice."
These figures describe the situation not only in the thirties, but also in the forties.
Table 4 the structure in 1953-4, and although no exact
represents occupational
with the 1931 in Table 1 is possible, some inferences can be
comparison figures given
made.
The percentage engaged in agriculture was 62-7% instead of 69.6% in spite of
the population growth. The professional category went down from 3-2% in 1931 to
4 R. M. Census Data on the Labor Force and the Income Distribution in Burma,
Sundrum,
Department of Economics, Statistics and Commerce, University of Rangoon, 1958, p. 17.
5 M.
Nash, op. cit., p. 413.

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The Class Structure of Burma: Continuity and Change 63

1-2% in 1953-4, and though it must be remembered that "one of the most important
categories relates to persons in religious orders who were included under the professional
group in the pre-war census, but were omitted from the occupational classification
altogether as being institutional persons in the later census",6 its share evidently did
not go up. The only significant increase was in the administration sector; the number
of civil servants grew in absolute and in relative terms.7 Clearly, since the thirties

Table 3

Labour Force Participants by Race and Occupation, 1931 (%)

In
In dians
dians Born Euro
Other Born out Indo peans
Indige in side Bur- And Anglo
All Bur neous Chi Bur Bur ma Allied In Other
Races mese Races nese ma ma Races Races dian Races

All
Occupations 1000 55-8 321 1-5 1-6 7-9 0-9 01 01

Farming 1000 56-7 38-0 0-5 1-6 2-5 0-7

Mining 1000 33-5 150 9-8 10 36-3 0-3 1-4 0-4

Industry 1000 56-7 24-1 2-3 11 14-7 0-9 01 01

Transport 1000 40-5 8-3 2-6 2-5 43-2 1-5 0-6 0-6 01
Trade 1000 59-2 141 6-9 1-6 15-6 2-2 01 01 01
Public Forces 1000 31-3 15-9 0-3 20 43-4 0-8 5-8 0-5
Public Ad
ministration 100-0 37-4 25-5 1-3 2-3 26-6 1-9 0-8 1-7 01
Professional
and other
Liberal Arts 1000 671 24-8 0-7 0-8 4-4 0-8 0-5 0-6 01

Source: Mehta, op. cit., p. 399.

Table 4
Labour Force Participants, by Occupation, 1953-4

(Estimates)

Occupations Percentage

Professions 1-2

Managerial 1-9
Sales 9-6

Farming 62-7

Mining 0-5

Transport 1-8
Crafts 10-6
Services 111
Miscellaneous 0-4

Source: R. S. Sundrum, Ibid, Table IX.

6 R. M. Census data ..., op. cit., p. 17.

Sundrum,
7 to one source, the number of clerks increased to 250,000, three times the pre-war
According
figure. See H. Tinker, 1961, op. cit., p. 156.

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64 M. Lissak
no significant change had occurred in the occupational structure, and salient symptoms
of stagnation and even of regression may be discerned as compared with typical
industrialized societies.

Another aspect that is relevant to an understanding of the stratification hierarchy

is the economic sector distribution or employment status of the labour force. In this

respect, Burmese statistics distinguishes between:

1. hired workers in the private sector 3. self-employed workers

2. hired workers in the government sector 4. unpaid workers

Table 5 shows that farmers are divided almost equally between private land owners,
(36-8%) and hired workers (32-0%).8 It is difficult to compare these figures with the
1931 figures where an additional distinction was made between tenants and labourers
(see Table 2), but dependents or unpaid family workers were not listed separately.
Nevertheless, it seems that thepercentage of own account workers in agriculture remained

mainly stable. Hired labourers in the private sector also constituted the majority of
persons employed in mining and in crafts. Hence considering only the three occupations
? ?
of the rural sector farming, mining and crafts it appears that there were

significantly more hired labourers than "own account" workers. When all occupations
are taken into account, it is seen that 401% (including the private and government
sectors) were hired workers and 35-7% self-employed. Moreover, considering the 24-2%
of unpaid family workers, many of whom should probably be classified among the
self-employed, the proportion of hired labourers is still impressive.

Table 5
Labour Force Participants, by Employment Status, 1953-4

Occupations Private Government Own Account Unpaid

Workers Family
Workers

Total Urban 41-7 13 3 38-9 61

Total Rural 38-6 1-5 35-7 24-2
Professional 25-5 42-8 30-9 0-9
151 45-4 39-5
Managerial 28-2 470 24-8
391 38-6 22-3
Sales 10-5 01 79-8 9-6
3-9 841 120
Farming 33-6 0-5 48-7 17-2
320 01 36-8 311
Mining 93-4 6-6
861 10-7 0-2

Transport 47-7 101 40-8 1-4

42-9 91 50-7 3-3
Crafts 65-4 90 20-7 4-9
49-5 5-7 320 12-8
Services 95-8 19-4 40 0-8
96-9 21 0-9 01
Miscellaneous 961
0-3 970 1-9 0-2

Source: R. M. Sundrum, Ibid., Table XIV, p. 17.

8 The rest were workers and were more or less divided

unpaid family presumably equally
among these two categories.

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The Class Structure of Burma: Continuity and Change 65
In principle, the situation in the cities was quite similar. There were more employees
than self-employed, although as in the rural sector, the difference was not big. As
many as 42-8% of the professionals were government employees, and only 25-5% worked
in private firms, while the rest were self-employed. The proportions were about the
same among the managerial workers. Trade, on the other hand, was heavily concentrated
in the hands of private merchants to the extent of 79-8% in 1953-54.9
Unfortunately, no systematic data are available on the between the
relationships
ethnic and occupational structure after Burma became independent. It is clear, however,
that radical changes have taken place since mainly due to the departure of the Europeans
and Indians.
In sum, in the fifties, the Burmese labour force both in the urban and rural sectors
was composed of hired labourers, small traders and craftsmen and civil servants.
mainly
The Burmese were conspicuously absent from the middle class, which until the late
fifties consisted of Chinese and Indians.

Ill
Students of the relationship between stratification and modernization attach great
importance to the well known desirable effect on the one hand and the undesirable
effects of urbanization in developing countries on the other hand. As far as the
undesirable effects are concerned they for example rate the disruptive tendencies resulting
from large scale and rapid urbanization when large unskilled masses cannot be integrated,
at least in the short run, either economically, socially or We shall try to
politically.
examine to what extent such apprehensions are justified as far as Burma is concerned.10
Urbanization in Burma was a rather slow and restricted process. Moreover, although
it began as early as the beginning of the 19th century, there also seem to have been
some trends in the opposite direction. (See Table 6) Thus, the proportion of the urban
population went down during the first quarter of the 20th century, and was restored
to its former size only in the late forties and early fifties when large numbers moved
to the towns; at least 756,000 in 1948-1952, and about 127,000 in 1953.11 The decrease
of the urban sector in the first quarter of the 20th century was largely due to expansions
of the rural sector brought about by the transfer of some of the indigenous population
from the towns to uncultivated areas in the provinces. The decrease might have been

Table 6
Urban and Total Population, 1891-1953

Urban Population Total Population Percentage

(000) (000)

1891 947 7,722 12-3

1901 991 10,491 9-5
1911 1,127 12,115 9-3
1921 1,292 13,212 9-8
1931 1,520 14,667 10-4
? ?
1941 16,824
1953 2,579 19,045 13-5
Source: R. M. Sundrum, "Urbanization; The Burmese Experience", The Journal of Burma
Research Society, Vol. XL, June 1957, Part 1, Table III.

9 Within this context the growth of the urban population from 10-4% to 15-4% since 1931
should also
be mentioned as well as the slight rise in the percentage of living in cities with a
population of less than 10,000 and the slight decline in the percentage living in cities of more
than 100,000. See Surider K. Mehta, The Labor Force in Urban Burma and Rangoon 1953: A
Comparative Study, Ph. D. Thesis, University of Chicago, 1959, pp. 45-46.
10 See for
example G. Myrdal, Asian Drama, Pantheon, 1968, p. 470. G. Br?ese, Urbanization
in Newly Developing Countries, Prentice Hall, 1966, pp. 44-46.
11 R. M. "Urbanisation: The Burmese
Sundrum, Experience", op. cit., p. 123.

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66 M. Lissak

greater still had it not been for a simultaneous invasion of the towns by members of
?
"alien races" Indians and Chinese, beginning in the last quarter of the 19th century.
The trend was reversed when agriculture suffered heavily in the economic depression
of the thirties when farmers sank into debt and were consequently evicted from their
land so that the flow of the rural proletariat into the cities was resumed. This movement
was sustained until the Second World War. As the cities were, at least economically,
to absorb such a massive immigration, this had many repercussions on the
unprepared
administration and the political apparatus.
It would be misleading to describe the process of urbanization generally without
stressing the prominent role played by Rangoon. Table 7 shows its rapid growth
with the other three cities Moulmein and Bassein) ever since
compared big (Mandalay,
1891. By 1953, Rangoon had 737,000 inhabitants ? one quarter of the total urban
of Burma. It should again be underlined that the cities and towns of Burma,
population
Rangoon, attracted not only the indigenous races, but primarily Indians and
notably
Chinese. Table 8 indicates that in 1931 the indigenous races accounted for only 59%
of the urban population and not until 1953 did they constitute 84%, more or less
to their in the total But even as late as 1953 the so
equivalent weight population.12
called exogenous groups made up about 30%. In 1931 these groups constituted 65%
of the population of Rangoon.
Urbanization in Burma,
especially the growth of Rangoon is very reminiscent
of urbanization patterns in other societies of Southeast Asia and underdeveloped
countries.13 In several respects, the starting point was the same in many Asian countries.
In both instances the cities formed the core of urbanization, but the process
royal
and its consequences were widely divergent. The main reason for this divergence is
that in the developing countries urbanization took place under a colonial regime. The
bland assumption that colonial rule curbed urbanization is misguided, but since the
entire economic of the colonies was geared to the specific interests of
development
the alien these interests and their ideology were naturally reflected
metropolis, underlying
in this process as well. A salient example is the liberal policy adopted towards Indian
and Chinese immigration which was promoted by the British, because they considered
the Indians and the Chinese to be best suited for administrative, military, and economic
functions.

Table 7
Population Growth inRangoon and Other Cities

Rangoon Secondary Towns

Census Population Average Populations Ratio

(000) (000)

180-3
1891 91-51-97
234-9
1901 91-42-57
293-3
1911 77-73-57
1921 3420 406
84-3
400-4
1931 86-4
4-63
7371
1953 122-2603

Source: R. M. Sundrum, Ibid., Table IX.

12 Not but also the more educated tended to concentrate in the

only minority groups, people
cities, particularly in Rangoon. In the thirties 2/3 of persons with college and higher degrees and
3/4 of persons holding degrees in engineering, education, law and medicine were living in Rangoon.
It may also be interesting to add that until the fifties the age-sex composition of the urban
population, especially in Rangoon, was highly abnormal, mainly because of the large floating
population of foreign migrants. The sharp decline in the post-war period is reflected in the higher
sex ratio found in the 1953 census.
13 For a of patterns of urbanization in Europe and developing countries
comparative analysis
see: Gideon Sjoberg, The Pre-industrial City: Past and Present, The Free Press, 1965.

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The Class Structure of Burma: Continuity and Change 67
A most characteristic feature of urbanization in Southeast Asia is the emergence of
what have been called 'primate cities'. The 'primate city' is one which predominates
over the other cities and towns of a country: in size it is many times as large as the
next largest city. True, this kind of city exists also in Europe (London, Copenhagen,
etc.), but in contrast to the European cities the 'primate city' was developed by strangers,
and its rate of growth was conditioned to colonial policy rather than by the interests
of the colony's hinterland. The impact of the metropolis was felt both in its physical
outlay and in the composition of its population. The result was that the alienation
?
and estrangement between the primate city and other cities not to mention the rural
?
sector was far greater than between European "primate cities" and their hinterland.
Small wonder then, that these cities "failed to perform their natural function (in and
for their own countries), in such a way as to be commercial centres of internal trade,
financial centres for internal transactions or even as cultural clearing ground".14 More
over, because of foreign dominance, native industrial enterprise was unable to get on
its feet.

IV

A more comprehensive picture of the Burmese class structure may be obtained by

studying the income distribution and its development. Here it must be borne in mind
that in the fifties Burma was one of the poorest countries in Southeast Asia. According
to figures quoted by Russett,15 Burma ranked in 1957 as the 113*5th among 122 countries
in terms of G.N.P. per capita which was $57 a year. Table 9 presents both the aggregate
and average annual incomes of various occupations in 1953-4. The lowest income
was (K. 377?$75)16 earned by the service occupation and the highest by administrative
employees who earned about 4 times as much (K. 1,420?$284). The total average
income was K. 592 ($118).
Compared with the rather unsystematic pre-war data, it seems that since the thirties
real income had decreased.17 With regard to the income distribution in the rural and
urban sectors, (see Table 10), two points should be noted.18 First, in every occupational
category wages in the cities were higher than in the rural areas, the ratio being
approximately 1:2. Second, in the highest income span was between civil servants and
services employees with a ratio of 1:3:5, while in the urban areas the highest differential
was between civil servants and farmers with a ratio of 1:3.
The income differentials between occupations, sectors and sexes is only one income
aspect of social differentiation. Another important aspect is the relative size of each
income category. Table 11 provides instructive information on the urban distribution

Table 8
Urban Population, by Ethnic Composition and Sex Ratio

1931Census 1953Census
Race

Percentage Sex Percentage Sex

ratio ratio

Indigenous races 59 101 84 103

Indians & Pakistanis 30 27 10 55
Chinese 5 49 6 83
Other 6 96 83
Source: R. M. Sundrum, Ibid., Table XIII.

14 R. M. "Urbanism ..., op. cit., pp. 111-112.

Sundrum,
15 B. M.
Russett and others, World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators, Yale University
Press, New Haven and London, 1964, pp. 155-157.
16 $ i = K5.
17 These refer to national See also H. Tinker
findings averages. op. cit., p. 155.
18 For further see L.J. Walinsky,
details, op. cit., p. 37.

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 68
M. Lissak
Table 9
Occupational Classification of Personal Incomes, 1953-54

Occupations Total Income Average Income

(inmillions of Kyats) (Kyats)

Professions 131
1,193
Managerial 277
1,420
Sales 514
638
Farming 1,805539
Mining 754
32
Transport 177
755
Crafts 567
467
Services 377
332
Miscellaneous 35
1,311
TOTAL 3,710 592

Source: R. M. Sundrum, Census Data ..., op. cit., Table XVII.

sector in 1957.19 It appears that in dollars, two-fifths of the urban working population
earned less than $157.50, more than half, less than $210 and more than 85% less than
$ 420 per annum (or $35 per month).20

Table 10
Labour Force Participants, by Occupation,
- 54
and Average Income, 1953

Occupation Average Income for Census Year (Kyats)

Urban Rural

Professions 1,789
1,088
Managerial 2,2751,269
Sales 1,133 551
Farming 713 508
Mining 1,020707
Transport 688
1,136
Crafts 852 517
Services 749 311
Miscellaneous 1,579
1,264
TOTAL 1,102502

Source: R. M. Sundrum, Ibid., Table VII.

From all this it may be concluded that:

(a) Burma in the fifties still ranked at the bottom of the scale in standard of living as measured
by per-capita income.

!9 The 1957 census gathered data on population and cottage industries in 252 centres classified
as townships, including 708,000 households with a total population of close to 3-3 million. Data
on income were taken from a sample of 11 million persons aged 11 years or more, who had been
gainfully occupied for at least some time during the year of the census.
20 For further see in F.N. a Welfare State ..., op. cit., p. 73.
information, Tr?ger, Building
Josef Silverstein, "Problems in Burma: Economic, Political, and Diplomatic", Asian Survey, Vol.
VII, No. 2, February 1967, p. 120.

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The Class Structure of Burma: Continuity and Change 69
Table 11
Urban Population by Income Groups, 1957

Per Cent Persons above the age of 11

Average Annual Income of Total who did some work during
Sample the year (thousands)

Total 1000 1,108-7

Under K 250 8-8 97-2
K 250-K 499 14-9 164-9
K 500-K 749 17-2 190-6
K 750-K 999 12-2 134-4
K 1,000-K 1,999 32-9 364-2
K 2,000-K 2,999 6-3 700
K 3,000-K 3,999 3-9 431
K 4,000-K 4,999 1.2 13.3
K 5,000-K 7,499 1.4 15.9
K 7,500-and over 1.0 11.5

Source: Walinsky, Economic Development in Burma, op. cit., Table 3, p. 37.

(b) In most occupations the real average income had not risen since the beginning of
the forties, and in some it seems to have actually gone down.
(c) The average income differential between the highest and lowest occupational
categories was about 1 to 4, and between the extreme income the
groups span
was, of course, much greater. The income of a supreme for example, was
judge,
about K. 3,000 ($600) and that of an unskilled worker about K. 90 per month, a
ratio of 1:30.
(d) For all occupations the income level in the cities was twice that in the rural areas.
(e) Again the income level of men was twice that of women.
if) Employees in government-public sectors earned a income than
higher private
employees or even than persons.
self-employed
(g) The annual income of more than 62 % of the labour force in the cities was between
K. 500 and K. ? to Walinsky, that part of the
1,999 ($100 $400). According
population which might be defined as belonging to the middle class (earning more
than $2,000 per year), in 1957 consisted of less than 0-5% of the population. Accor
dingly, from the economic aspect the social differentiation in the fifties was practically
the same as in the thirties. The only difference being in the changed relationship
between the economic-occupational and ethnic The Indians and
composition.
Chinese were ousted from their positions in trade and but
administration, only
a very small segment of the the new elite which after Burma
population, emerged
achieved its independence, reaped the benefits of this change.21

So far some basic statistical data have been those data are
presented. Although
indispensable for anyanalysis of stratification, one certainly should pay attention to
the cultural and symbolic manifestations of the stratificational order as well. Some of
these manifestations, especially those associated with mobility and the components of
prestige and status will be discussed here.
The channels of mobility in Burma, even in the were never
pre-British period,
governed by rigid religious norms nor were there any other moral sanctions that
prescribed a rigid stratified system in terms of the quality and the number of alternatives
open to individuals and groups. "Social place in the hierarchical and in the spatial
21 R.A. "Burmese
Holmes, Domestic Policy: The Politics of Burmanization", Asian Survey,
Vol. VII, No. 3, March 1967, pp. 188-197.

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 70 M. Lissak
sense, was not fixed. There was change, and the rise and fall of
fluidity, intrigue, royal
and individual fortunes."22 This substantial conceptual flexibility conflicted with the
cruel rigid reality, especially after the British conquest. De facto, channels of mobility
were for all practical purposes non-existent. The Burmese did not and could not move
into the modern spheres of the economy. They were also restricted in the political
field by the obstacles the British put in the way of a broadly-based national movement.
Those who nevertheless chose a political career, were left with only few career openings.
At most they could attain cabinet posts lacking any real responsibilities. "The ambitious
one ?
only had direction in which to turn, one avenue of possible advance toward
the domain of officialdom."23
After a decade or more of independence and the rise of a new civilian political
elite, the principal channels of mobility seem to have changed but little. After, as well
as before the coup, the peasantry, the small traders, the few industrial workers had
gained little scope for economic expansion. The only slight signs of new mobility are
discernible in the bureaucracy, the traditional channel of mobility. Most opportunities
came with its
expansion and diversification. Also in the political field, some measure
of change came about when the various parties, active prior to the coup, established
a bureaucratic apparatus of their own.
Even less information is available on the possible effects of the bureaucratic nature
of the channels of mobility and social aspiration, the conception of the ideal pattern
of social stratification, than is available on the effective class structure. "status
Studying
bases and symbols" and prestige of various occupations in the Burmese the
society,
relative absence of sanctified and institutionalized ascriptive status variables and criteria
is immediately apparent. The relative flexibility and universalistic flavours of the status
images is reflected in some of the key concepts used in descriptions of power-relations
and evaluation of personal prestige and social position.
One of
these key concepts is Awza. of"Awza is a function
relationship, the
important thing being that in every group there is someone who has Awza. The
components of Awza include the characteristics we would normally associate with power:
?
influence and prestige among them respectability, wisdom and knowledge, a degree
of religiosity, a commanding presence, and skill and ease in handling Awza
authority.
also implies a likeable a touch of modesty, and considerable sex
personality, usually
appeal. Wealth in itself may not be absolutely essential, but one must give the
impression of not being worried about matters of daily living, of being able to live
beyond one's visible means, or best of all, of no visible means of support but
having
still living comfortably."24
Nash refers to this concept in conjunction with two other concepts Pon and Gon
and contends that only all three together properly define the relationship between power,
influence and authority. Pon "means power to carry out plans, to bend others to one's
will, to move destiny to one's advantage. The Awza of a man with Pon stems from
his personal (italics mine) powers, his marked and conspicuous abilities to succeed in
this world."25 "It connotes a sterling personal character of special religious learning
or or even the trait of in Pon and Awza are
piety, impartiality disputes. power
dimensions of social relations. Gon is the moral content."26
The interesting thing in these definitions is their particularistic and ascriptive element.
They are far from being as dominant as similar concepts would be in the terminology
of power-relations in the traditional society of India or in feudal societies, for instance.
To a great extent the referred to these concepts are and although
qualities by personal
authority is needed for them to be materialized, their authority does not necessarily
derive from a traditional power position, despite the importance of such position in
traditional Burmese society.
The great importance which Burmese attach to Awza and Gon implies a great respect

22 M. "Southeast Asian .. ", op.

Nash, Society cit., p. 418.
21 L.W.
Pye, op. cit., p. 63.
24 L.W.
Pye, op. cit., p. 147.
25 M. in Upper Asian Vol. No.
Nash, "Party Building Burma", Survey, Ill, 4, April 1963,
p. 147.
26 Ibid.

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The Class Structure of Burma: Continuity and Change 71
for the exercise of power and the authority to do so. "There are few cultures that
attach greater to power as a value than the Burmese. Consideration of
importance
power and status so even social in Burma that life tends to become
" permeate
27
relationships
highly politicized.
These qualities are intensified by the loosely structured character of the society,
and they are very highly referred as a means of exchange and accumulation of power
and prestige.28
Many characteristics of Burmese society may be attributed to the images of Awza
and Gon but they are certainly not the only social determinants. At least two other
criteria are present; one is traditional and the other is a direct result of modernization.
The traditional criterion is the concept of accumulated merit for the attainment of
religious goals. "The goal toward which all Buddishts are struggling is the escape
from the constant cycle of rebirth in this or other worlds, in human or non-human
form. The goal of Nirvana, or more immediately of rebirth in a higher state in the
next existence, by a fear of hell
is balanced or rebirth in a "lower" existence or non
human form. Progress toward eternal bliss is dependent upon the store of Karma
which in turn is dependent upon the merit or demerit earned by one's actions in this
existence."29 The importance attached to this criterion especially in traditional sectors

explains the reverential attitude to monks, whose social status is not based on economic
and political pre-eminence in the instrumental and narrow meaning of these terms, but
rather on their "association with popular religious values, ideals, and concepts or
In the monks' observance of vows and ... the Bur
morality. religious precepts
mese have a visible, living example of life which, according to their view, is so
full of merit and as free from sin as is possible in this world."30 The high social
status of the monks, at least in the eyes of the believers, also stems from their significant
role, as a literate elite versed in Burmese and Pali scriptures, in the transmission of
cultural values to the young.31
The modern criterion is education. Since the conquest of Burma by the British
and the establishment of a modern administration, education has become the most

promising avenue for social mobility. Since at one time was the best
college degree
and virtually only means for social and economic advancement, many parents urge
their children to go to college regardless of whether they are qualified and whether
their studies prepare them for the more technical jobs that have since become available.
High school and university education became so highly regarded that "the university
student who failed their examination continued to try year after year,"32 till they acquired
the title to which they aspired. The prestige was not, however, conferred to education
as such but only as a means for entering the administration. The status of academicians
was not very high and has apparently decreased in post-independent days.33 The esteem
in which education was held was not coupled with an equally high regard for the skills
of the specialist.

VI

Burma's class order especially its social hierarchy is thus basically loosely structured
and flexible. Burma was lucky to escape the Indian blight of caste. Its citizens have
enjoyed a certain measure of social mobility and avoided extremes of economic stratifica
tion. The commitment of Burma's leaders to socialism and their well meant, though

27 L.W.
Pye, op. cit., p. 146.
28 An of the importance of these qualities and of their impact on everyday
illuminating example
life is given by M. Nash, The Golden Road ..., op. cit., Ch. 3, and Ch. 7, and M. Nash,
"Party Building ...", op. cit.
29 David E. Pfanner and J. Ingersoll, "Theravada Buddhism and Village Economic Behavior:
A Burmese and Thai Comparison", Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 21, No. 3, May 1962, p. 343,
and Mya Maung, "Cultural Values and Economic Change", Asian Survey, Vol. IV, No. 3, March
1964, p. 759.
30 D.E. Ibid.
Pfanner,
3i D.E.
Pfanner, op. cit., pp. 344, 349.
32 Josef Silverstein and Julian Wohl, "University Students and Politics in Burma", Pacific
Affairs, Vol. XXXVII, No. 1, Spring 1964, p. 54.
33 Joseh Universities in Southeast
Fischer, Asia, Ohio State University Press, Ohio, 1964, p. 29.

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 72 M. Lissak
unsuccessful, attempt to build a welfare state (Pyidautha), has at least on the normative
level also helped to blur potential and real differences and to legitimate universalistic
channels of mobility. Moreover, an effort was made to belittle and deprecate the
economic component of social status It would nevertheless be wrong to describe Burma
as a country any distinct status group. Most such groups are a legacy
totally lacking
of colonial rule or have in the course of modernization while some are founded
emerged
on subjective status images. The legacy of colonial rule is reflected in the highly
significant distinction made between "Westerness" and adherents of traditional culture
which also includes some in between groups. The fact that in colonial times the most
highly respected occupational and economic functions tended to be concentrated in
the bureaucracy and the military, certainly reinforced the internal cohesion of the
Westernized group.
The party bureaucracy attracted another social group, placed between the Westernized
and the traditional groups. Although the politicians who came from these intermediate
groups were in many respects closer to the intelligentsia and the higher civil servants

they did not necessarily mitigate the conflict with the "Westerness" or help to bridge
the difference. In fact, if there was any conflict with class overtones, it was precisely
the clash between "politicians and the administration".34 The administrative elite

apparently had attained considerable internal solidarity as a result of two internally

contradicting developments: their achievements, especially under British rule and their
frustration as natives whose way to the top power positions was barred. The distinc
tiveness and sense of alienation of this status group was not diminished by independence,
for not only was it unable to realize its old aspirations but it was gradually ousted
from most key positions.
The political elite was much less cohesive and integrated than the administrative
elite. Incessant rifts were caused by personal ambitions and intensive political
profound
and ideological differences of opinion. Though as an intermediate group in terms of
exposure to Western culture it was able to act as broker between the top leaders and
the "masses" this role did not contribute to its subjective sense of unity and solidarity.
By and large no other status groups can be discerned. Below the national elite the
social order is fairly undifferentiated and there is hardly a stratification approaching
that of a class structure. People are not class conscious nor do they organize as separate
classes politically or in more diffuse non-political settings. This, however, does not
include monks, who constitute a distinct, though not homogeneous, group from an
institutional and in some respects also from a political point of view. Already before
1962 they had gone a long way towards independent political organization compared
with the urban proletariat or the peasantry. Both the trade unions and the farmers'

organization served rather as a political tool in the hands of the political elite than
as a focus of class consolidation. The reasons for this are complex. Some of them

may be sought in Burma's political heritage. The lack of confrontation between exploited
employees and employers, which prompted the rise of militant trade unions, employers'
organizations in the West, may also be partly responsible; for in Burma the public
services and joint government and private ventures were the only ones to have strong
trade unions whose activities were curbed by law.

VII
Summary and Preliminary Conclusions
The facts and evaluations here were designed to outline some of the
presented
characteristics of the Burmese class-structure. Of particular relevance seems to be the

occupational structure and its modification during the last three or four decades. The
income distribution among various occupational groups also helped in this characteriza
tion. The differentiation and cooperation between the different elites was described,
together with the setting in which they function, the qualification for admission and
the patterns of mobility comparing the standard of aspirations with the channels available.
In this context roles and status were discussed including the rough after status
image

34 For a detailed of the clash between these two see L.W. op. cit., pp.
analysis elites, Pye,
48, 77.

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The Class Structure of Burma: Continuity and Change 73

components, status symbols and

preferred the
occupational hierarchy in terms of social

prestige. Finally the internal cohesiveness of the social strata in so far as distinct
self-conscious entities are concerned was examined.
The material presented may be summed up as follows:35
1. The population of Burma was split into two main parts: a small elite concentrated
in government administration, party bureaucracy and the military on the one hand,
and the peasants, small traders, business and hired labourers on the other hand. In
between the two is a very small group of middle-class people and skilled workers.
2. Although the average income level was exceedingly low, at least until 1962, the
span between the highest and lowest income categories was rather great.
3. The modern elite was small and though the internal differentiation is slight the
antagonism is considerable. Before the coup the main adversary groups (excluding
the underground) were administrators, politicians and students. The elite groups
enjoyed little autonomy and freedom of action as there was no alternative outlet
except the government bureaucracy, the military and an
underdeveloped party
bureaucracy. The weakness of the legal opposition parties and trade unions,
the small number of independent economic organizations made it difficult for

oppositional elite to develop and be institutionalized in relatively independent

power positions. This had many repercussions on the already limited ability of
the political and social centre to cope with economic and political problems.
4. Despite the generally universalistic criteria, for acceptance in the various elite
groups, and the not insignificant de facto mobility, channels for such upward
mobility were few and restricted to certain sectors of the political and government
bureaucracy. This enabled the ruling elite to exert much influence on the chanelling
of desirable recruits, but created permanent pressure from unemployed or under

employed high school and university graduates.

5. Leaving the ethnic minorities aside, crystallized class-oriented groups were very
rare, and the main criteria for belonging to the few that existed were the type
of education received and the amount of exposure to Western culture. This

dividing line drawn by these criteria did not coincide entirely with that between
town and countryside. There was little difference in this respect between the
majority of the urban and the rural population.
Accordingly, Burma's class structure appears to be in a state of extensive flux.
It would seem, therefore, that the primary problem is to achieve a more institutionalized
differentiation of the sub-elite strata. This would particularly bridge the gap between
the elites and the rest of the population and facilitate communication as there would
be more "non congruent"36 status groups capable of serving as intermediaries between
the elites and the more sophisticated, differentiated population.

35 If minorities are included, this statement has to be modified. Without the effects
ignoring
of the interaction between ethnic minorities and the Burmese majority on the class structure, this
issue seems to be related rather to the vulnerability of the political structure and the problem of
national identity.
36 For the relevance of the concept "status to questions of social
congruency" integration
and mobility, see for example: John Galtung, "Rank and Social Integration. A Multidimensional
Approach", in Joseph Berger, Morris Zelditch, Jr., and Bo Anderson (eds.), Sociological Theories
in Progress, Houghton Mifflin Co., Boston, 1966, Vol. 1, pp. 145-198. Gerhard E. Lenski, "Status
Crystallization: A Non-Vertical Dimension of Social Status", American Sociological Review, Vol.
19, No. 4, August 1954, pp. 405-413. Moshe Lissak, Social Mobility in Israel, Israel Universities
Press, 1969.

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