The Effects of Social Media On Crisis Communication: A Case Study of The Response Strategy Performed by Research in Motion

The effects of social media on crisis
communication: A case study of the response

strategy performed by Research in Motion
By Sidsel Hilding-Hamann
Supervisor: Tomasz Fediuk

Marketing and Management Communication
Department of Language and Business Communication
Aarhus University
Submission: 3rd of May 2012

Exam no.: 300609
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BA thesis in Marketing and Management Communication Sidsel Hilding-Hamann
Table of Contents
Summary 3
Introduction 3
Problem statement 4
Delimitations 4
Literature review 4
What defines a crisis? 4
Crisis types 5
Wrongdoings 7
Benoit’s Image Restoration Strategy 7
Situational Crisis Communication Theory 9
Crisis history 10
Defining social media 10
How is social media affecting crisis communication? 11
Social media as a tool 12
Social media as two-way communication 13
Method 13
Research in Motion 14
Introduction to RIM 14
The crisis history of RIM 14
The October Outage 15
Analysis of RIM’s crisis strategy 15
Introduction to RIM’s social media strategy 15
The news media response 16
Characterizing the crisis 17
Rhetorical analysis of RIM’s response strategy on Facebook 19
The preliminary strategy 19
As the crisis deepens 20
Restoring conditions 21
Rhetorical analysis of RIM’s response strategy on Youtube 21
Discussion 23
Conclusion 25
References 26
Appendix 1 30
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Summary
This thesis explores how social media can be used as a tool in crisis communication. Employing
theory on crises put forth by Coombs and Fediuk among others as foundation together with
Benoit’s image restoration strategy, the ideas are juxtaposed social media theory presented by e.g.
Wigley and Zhang. Using this literature as a framework, the study examines the online crisis
strategy performed by the mobile company Research in Motion during a four-day network outage.
The analysis takes material from Facebook and Youtube as its starting point. The findings of the
thesis suggest that social media can be used as a beneficial tool when utilized effectively but also
correspondingly harmful when not used accordingly. The factor of immediacy seems to be
paramount to consider when navigating crises in an online world as well as the fact that
stakeholders expect faster, more efficient communication when communicating through these
conduits. Recommendations include assigning more value to crisis history and attribution of
responsibility, as well as tailoring response strategies to the traits of social media to a higher
degree.
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Introduction
From live updates on the Haiti earthquake in 2010 to the image of US Airways emergency landing
on the Hudson River, it is no longer unusual for world wide news stories to be broken through
social media channels such as Twitter, Youtube and Facebook, rather than being distributed by
Reuters etc (CrisisBlogger, 2011, August 11; Auer, 2011). This development has given way to an
entirely new way of communicating, one that is highly viral and characterized by immediacy
(Wigley & Zhang, 2011). According to Coombs and Holladay, what this means is that
“Stakeholders have greater expectations of near immediate communication about events, including
crisis communication.” (p. 379). If this is true, companies need to optimize their ability to handle
crises in the social media world. Currently, two thirds of companies worldwide have started
utilizing social media (McCorkindale, 2009). Unfortunately, few of the companies are able to
incorporate them into their crisis communication strategies successfully. Therefore it is necessary
to gain a better understanding of the characteristics of the world that crisis departments are now
navigating in, as well as which beneficial strategies to adopt and how to administer them. There
exists a scarce amount of theory-grounded research on effective handling of a crisis within the
online world (Jin, Liu & Austin 2011). Many scholars highlight effects-based results, which
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include reception analysis and qualitative surveys in order to determine the consequences of
specific communicative decisions (e.g. Coombs & Holladay, 2009). Other examples include form-
based research on various media types, and, finally, papers conducting content-based research on
specific communication efforts performed by companies (e.g. Wigley & Fontenot, 2010). This
thesis will focus on the latter, examining the October BlackBerry crisis. The study will include an
analysis of the crisis and RIM’s response strategy. Furthermore, the analysis will look at social
media and which possibilities, as well as limitations, they provide companies with in times of
crisis. The study will take into account that the world of social media is a highly discussed one,
and that some communicators doubt its credibility, as well as the tools it can provide.
Problem statement
How do companies navigate crises in an online world?
Delimitations
The case study will examine RIM’s use of Facebook and Youtube specifically, although it could
have been interesting to also look at use of other social media platforms such as Twitter. It seems a
valid argument that including a study of Twitter would have provided a more nuanced analysis of
RIM’s rhetorical strategies on the social media platform. RIM was also fairly active on this
medium. Unfortunately, due to limitations of the thesis length this aspect has been omitted. Also,
the rapid speed of news coverage on the Internet means that e.g. tweets quickly become outdated
and difficult to backtrack compared to Facebook, which now includes the “Timeline” device, as
well as Youtube, which functions more as a database than a daily notice board. Another factor that
has been given less weight is the response of stakeholders and the news media. Naturally, articles
from the period of the crisis have been studied and quotes pulled out in order to portray their
stance towards RIM but a concrete paragraph on reception analysis has not been included. The
thesis seeks to investigate how social media has changed crisis communication and in particular
how RIM has chosen to navigate its most recent crisis, rather than explore the audience reception
of it.
Literature review
What defines a crisis?

In The Handbook of Crisis Communication Coombs defines a crisis as “the perception of an event
that threatens important experiences of stakeholders and can impact the organization’s
performances” (2010, p. 100). In other words, a crisis occurs when a company’s reputation is in
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jeopardy. A reputation is an evaluation of an organization formed by its stakeholders, who in turn

are the people who are affected by or can affect an organization (Mitchell et al, 2007). The
stakeholders evaluate how well an organization is meeting their expectations based on prior
behavior. Reputation is therefore a valuable asset and important to protect. A tarnished reputation
may drive away customers and as a direct effect the company will suffer the consequences often
made blatant by the bottom line (Coombs, 2007).
Although there is no one accepted definition of a crisis, a few generic things can be said about the
concept. Firstly, a crisis is perceptual. This means that a crisis is defined by the perceptions held
about it. Stakeholders perceive crises in a certain way and it is the organization’s job to adjust its
crisis communication to their beliefs. Secondly, a crisis is unpredictable. This is nevertheless not
the same as being unexpected. A crisis can be anticipated, and intelligent companies are aware of
the potential crises in the offing. Thirdly, crises disturb stakeholder expectations. It is expected that
a company complies with the rules and regulations of society but also that it delivers products as
promised (Coombs, 1999). Stakeholders put a great deal of faith in the hands of a company when
buying its product, and it is the company’s responsibly to make sure that e.g. car tires don’t
explode or capsules aren’t poisoned with deadly toxins (Laufer & Coombs, 2006). Finally, it is
important to distinguish between crises and incidents. An incident is “a minor, localized
disruption”. A crisis “disrupts the entire organization” (Coombs, 1999, p. 3). In other words, the
difference between the two has to do with how much damage they cause. A crisis will always have
serious impact and should naturally be taken more seriously than an incident (Coombs, 1999).
Crisis types
Within crisis communication it is important to determine the cause of the crisis and more
specifically the crisis type (Lin, 2007). Several theories have been presented within this field e.g.
crisis clusters within the Situational Crisis Communication Theory (SCCT) framework grouping
crises into victim, accidental and preventable clusters (Coombs, 2007). Coombs also put forth a
crises classification scheme in 1995, which will serve as primary source in defining crisis types.
The scheme distinguishes between four crisis types: faux pas, terrorism, accidents and
transgressions. The different types fit into a matrix where they are further categorized by
external/internal and unintentional/intentional dimensions. A faux pas crisis occurs when an
external agent transforms an unintentional action into a crisis. This implies that the company
considers the action appropriate. The outcome of the crisis depends on which definition the
stakeholders choose to believe. An accident is usually impossible to predict and can happen during
an ordinary day within an organization. This type of crisis leads to minimal organizational
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responsibility due to its random nature. Among accident examples human induced incidents such
as workplace injuries and product flaws can be mentioned, as well as force majeure incidents such
as natural disasters and epidemics. Both types of crises can be equally unintentional however
studies show that stakeholders have a tendency to attribute less blame to a crisis caused by nature
than by human accidents (Egelhoff & Sen, 1992, Cho & Gower, 2006). Although the amount of
blame can vary the organization cannot escape responsibility entirely. Stakeholders expect
organizations to be able to cope with the crisis and therefore a level of accountability always exists
(Coombs, 1995). The third crisis type, terrorism, refers to intentional actions designed to damage
the reputation of an organization. External actors take the actions and therefore the blame also lies
externally. Sabotage, product destruction and violence are examples of terrorism. They all bear
traits of uncontrollability and hostility. In connection with this crisis type it is natural to also talk
about the role of the organization as the suffering victim. This is especially relevant for the
external crises (faux pas and terrorism), seeing as the internal (and especially the intentional) crises
always involve a moderate to high rate of responsibility (Cho & Gower, 2006, Coombs, 1995).
Victimage is an essential part of the reinforcing response strategies of the SCCT. The concept
refers to a situation where the organization claims to be the victim of a crisis. Whether or not the
claim is sincere is subordinate to the perception held by the stakeholders and media (Liu et al,
2011). If they believe in the claim of innocence it becomes easier for the organization to carry out
a victim-based, mortification response strategy and equally harder if the public dismisses the
victim claim (Coombs, 1995).
Finally, transgressions as a crisis type will be described. According to Fediuk et al, transgressions
are “crises that are believed to be due to intentional organizational misconduct” (2010, p. 635).
What this means is that an organization knowingly commits a wrongdoing and therefore becomes
the sole offender. Some examples of transgressions include safety breaches, withholding
compromising information and lying about faulty products. Transgression-based crises are linked
with negative perceptions held by stakeholders about an organization’s actions and behavior.
These perceptions are what eventually harm the reputation of an organization (Fediuk et al, 2010,
p. 635-638). Of the four crisis types transgression, if the evidence of the wrongdoing is true,
requires the highest level of atonement. There is no doubt that the organization is to blame and that
the stakeholders have been upset or harmed in some way by the crisis. A distanced and callous
response is therefore futile (Coombs, 1995).
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Wrongdoings
The prior paragraph distinguished between whether a crisis was intentional or unintentional,
internal or external. Benoit operates with the term “perceived wrong-doings” (1995, vii), which
covers alleged misbehaviors performed by people. He distinguishes between four types of
wrongdoing. The first type has to do with the scarce resources available in terms of e.g. time,
money or equipment, and that some individuals will always have wanted a different distribution of
the resources available (with anger as a possible outcome). The second type has to do with the
people, environment and events surrounding the accused, which can change circumstances and
sometimes prevent people from fulfilling their responsibilities. The third type occurs simply
because humans are imperfect and occasionally make mistakes. A mistake can happen for several
reasons, both physical conditions such as sleep deprivation or alcohol poisoning and psychological
conditions such as selfishness can cloud judgment and foster a mistake. The fourth and final type
regards the fact that a population is made up of individuals, and everyone has different priorities. A
clash of priorities can often cultivate a conflict (1995). These four types of misbehavior require
some kind of response from the wrongdoer, also known as an image restoration strategy (Benoit,
1997).
Benoit’s Image Restoration Strategy

William L. Benoit talks about the concept Image Restoration Strategies. According to him “human
beings engage in recurrent patterns of communicative behavior designed to reduce, redress, or
avoid damage to their reputation” (1995, vii). Being able to rectify a wrongdoing is crucial for
private persons as well as companies. The ability to repair a reputation is important not only for the
sake of ourselves, but also the people surrounding us, seeing as most people care about whether
others think positively about them and recognize a reputation as a valuable asset (Coombs, 2007).
A bad reputation can interfere with our interaction with others. Image restoration saturates our
everyday life, and it is therefore important to explore the concept (1995, vii).
After having defined the different types of offense that can start a crisis, it is now natural to talk
about response. When people feel the risk of losing face or having their image tarnished, the
trigger response is to offer some sort of response to save reputation. The response can take many
forms. Benoit recognizes several types, three of which are: accounts, apologies and excuses
(1995). An account can both admit and evade guilt according to how it is constructed. The account
in itself is merely a description of the events. Depending on how much weight is given to making
the wrongdoing look more or less severe the audience can decide how to interpret the account.
This strategy may evoke misinterpretations, and is therefore dangerous to use. The second type of
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response, the apology, is often used and may at first glance look like the most harmless strategy
given its air of benevolence. Benoit states “it is possible for those who commit wrongful acts to
attempt to repair their reputation with a sincere apology” (1995, p. 4). A number of studies applied
to e.g. the Exxon Valdez and Bhopal crises suggest evidence that this strategy has potential
(Benoit, 1997; Mitchell, 2007). However, the strategy does have drawbacks. Giving an apology is
not necessarily the same as taking responsibility. Sometimes an organization apologizes as an act
to show stakeholders sympathy but not to take the blame (Pace, Fediuk & Botero, 2010).
Determining whether the apology attributes responsibility or not is often seen in the use of active
(responsible) or passive (sympathetic) voice (2010). Some even claim that a direct expression of
taking responsibility must be visible in an apology for it not to be counted as partial (Lazare, 2004
as seen in Pace et al, 2010). Another potential drawback by admitting fault is the invitation of
lawsuits from victims, which can cause a major economical setback if the wrongdoing is connected
to a company (Benoit, 1997, p. 182). In connection with the apology, Benoit’s strategy “corrective
action” should be mentioned. This strategy is connected to apologizing, seeing as the accused in
this instance also admits the wrongdoing. The difference is that the accused through this strategy
attempts to reduce the offense by taking action to correct the wrongdoing. This can be done by e.g.
reimbursing victims financially or compensating whichever goods are in question. Another
possibility, which companies often choose, is to attempt to restore the state of affairs before the
offense occurred (Benoit, 1997, p. 181; Benoit, 1995, p. 6).
Finally, there is the response in the form of an excuse. The excuse can take form as e.g.
defeasibility, where the accused claims to have had a lack of information about or control over
important elements of the situation. Another possibility is to try and convince the audience that the
wrongdoing was a result of good intentions and not inflicted intentionally. What the excuses all
have in common is that they are an expression of evasion of responsibility. This strategy should
naturally only be employed, if in fact the excuse is truthful and the accused was not directly at fault
(Benoit, 1997, p. 180). Nevertheless, it is not a favorable strategy in general. Stephens et al call it
“the distance strategy”, which seeks to sever linkages between the accused and the crisis (2005). It
is difficult to form an excuse that follows the advice Benoit found to be effective in image
restoration discourse: “avoid making false claims; provide adequate support for claims, develop
themes throughout a campaign; avoid arguments that may backfire.” (Benoit, 1997, p. 183).
Especially the advice regarding adequate support and avoiding arguments that may backfire can
prove to be difficult to fulfill, for companies particularly, as it would require the accused to have a
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complete view of prior conflict history and be aware of every pitfall that could occur in connection
with the accusation.
In addition to these three strategies, there is the strategy of denial. This strategy has been isolated
due to the fact that, although it is a probable response, it is not an attempt at explanation or
justification. Denying a wrongdoing entirely leaves the blame to be placed elsewhere. This
strategy, if used profoundly, can eradicate the risk of the accused’s reputation being damaged.
Nevertheless, if used dishonestly, the consequences can be very grave, seeing as the accused will
then be deemed both guilty of the wrongdoing and lying about it. “Denial can be supplemented
with explanations of apparently damaging facts and scapegoating.” says Benoit, and is usually an
easy strategy to spot because of e.g. omitted actions or blame placing (1995, p. 2-3). A response
type that can be viewed as an active alternative to denial is the attack. Sometimes the accused
chooses to point towards a new target to place blame on, in other examples the attack directs itself
to the accusation in itself and attempts to undermine its validity. The attack often employs negative
commentary and adjectives in order to damage credibility and induce doubt (1995, p. 3).
There exists no one correct response to all crises. The response is entirely dependable on the earlier
mentioned crisis types and how key facets of the situation influence attributions and reputations
perceived by stakeholders. In turn, understanding the situation type can inform the post-crisis
communication. The aforementioned SCCT provides a framework for this (Coombs, 2007).
Situational Crisis Communication Theory

Situational crisis communication theory is one of the most dominant and recognized theories
within the field of crisis management. The theory “provides an evidence-based framework for
understanding how to maximize the reputational protection afforded by post-crisis
communication” (Coombs, 2007, p. 163). It evolves around the examination of a crisis situation
and how certain factors determine the level of reputational threat existing in an organizational
crisis. There are three factors that shape the level of threat: initial crisis responsibility, crisis history
and prior relational reputation. Initial crisis responsibility is one of the central concepts within
crisis communication research. The theory posits that stakeholders attribute responsibility for the
crisis and thereby how it is framed. This idea is closely connected to crisis origin, which refers to
whether a crisis commenced from an internal organizational issue or an external source. The
different types of crisis origin affect the attribution of responsibility and, thus, the available crisis
communication strategies (Jin et al, 2011). The level of responsibility attributed to the organization
is especially important, as it will determine the role it has in a crisis. Another variable is the actor
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in the crisis. Depending on whether the central actor is human or nature, internal or external,
individual or grouped the crisis can be predicted to develop in certain ways and communication
strategies can be designed accordingly (Jin et al, 2011; Coombs et al, 2010; Cho & Gower, 2006).
Research also shows that the more responsibility an organization is attributed during a crisis, the
higher the reputational threat will be (Cho & Gower 2006; Coombs 2007).
Crisis history
A widespread belief within crisis communication is that crises are specific incidents. This is not
always the case. People sometimes overlook the continuous mistakes a company can make, their
so-called crisis history. Therefore, a “crisis can be an isolated event or part of a larger pattern of
organizational performance” (Coombs, 2010, p. 2-3). This distinction is important to make when
analyzing how a company chooses to navigate in times of crisis, as well as when assessing the
consequences of a crisis. The greater the reputational threat becomes, the more accommodative the
response strategy should become (2012, p. 158). Coombs argues that the history and prior
reputation of a company is essential when assessing the reputational threat of a crisis, and later
which image restoration strategy the company chooses to employ. This idea is known as “the
Velcro effect” (Coombs, 2004, p. 272). The idea plays on the metaphor of Velcro attracting lint; in
the same way organizations with a history of crises attract additional reputational harm. Coombs
goes on to say that the effect also exists in terms of reputation. A negative prior reputation will
increase the risk of tarnishing the present reputation. The Velcro effect therefore has a serious
impact on how crisis management is tackled (Coombs, 2004; Coombs & Holladay, 2006). Finally,
prior relational reputation can be seen as an extension of this idea. The concept covers “how well
or poorly an organization has or is perceived to have treated stakeholders in other contexts”
(Coombs, 2007, p. 67). Depending whether the organization’s prior relational reputation is viewed
as positive or negative it can have an either favorable or unfavorable effect on a crisis. The concept
can reveal how considerate an organization is towards its stakeholders both in a crisis situation and
in other areas (Coombs, 1999).
These three factors, together with the crisis type, make up the main issues to consider when
choosing a response strategy as well as designing a specific rhetorical communication effort after a
crisis.
Defining social media

The prior paragraph laid out the ground of crises and how they can be responded to. This thesis
seeks to determine if social media has had an effect on the theory and eventually how
organizations manage to navigate crises under these new circumstances. Therefore the following
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paragraph will seek to define social media and how it can be used as a tool and form of two-way
communication.
According to Wigley and Zhang, “social media are changing the way everyone, including
journalists and public relations practitioners, communicate” (2011, p. 1). In the same instance they
go on to state that the definition of social media still is under development. Despite its prevalence
in society it is still a relatively new phenomenon, which needs to be explored further. Some
scholars have offered an attempt at a definition, among these Kaplan and Haenlein, who define
social media as “a group of Internet-based applications that build on the ideological and
technological foundations of Web 2.0, and that allow the creation and exchange of user-generated
content” (2010, p. 61). Coombs claims that “one key component found in these newer media is the
capacity to facilitate bi-directional communication, or dialogue” (2010, p. 381). What can be
drawn from these quotes is that a number of technological conquests have made social media
possible, and that the various mediums have indeed facilitated communication. Once this has been
said, an obvious trait of social media ought to be mentioned, namely immediacy (Wigley & Zhang,
2011). It can be argued that traditional media such as the telephone or newspaper also facilitate
communication. What is unique about social media though is that they have enabled near
immediate communication. And this is one of the most dominant factors affecting PR (and crisis
communication in particular), along with the ability to reach large masses without the limitation of
geography (Auer, 2011). Through these two traits social media makes for one powerful game
changer. Gerald Baron, an experienced crisis communication practitioner and blogger
(Crisisblogger), even argues that social media are more than this, that they have in fact changed
everything we do and how we do them (Crisisblogger, January 16, 2012). Crisisblogger also raises
the question of whether social media still exists as a separate concept. In January he wrote a post
stating “the Internet is social media and social media is the Internet, so why do we keep calling it
social media? And continued with an argument about Facebook: “What started out as a college
campus replacement to the pre-teen MySpace is now used by most corporations as their website”
(January 16, 2012, p. 1). In other words, social media have started to overlap, and no longer serve
one sole purpose. They permeate our lives and the Internet, a factor that could point towards there
being some truth to Crisisblogger’s statement.
How is social media affecting crisis communication?

In order to put social media into a PR context, it is important to study how they can be used as a
tool i.e. how organizations monitor, communicate and experience crises through them.
Furthermore, it is crucial to understand the effect social media have had on stakeholders seeing as
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they, in the final instance, define and assess the crisis (Benoit, 1997). Studying the facilitation of
communication and hereunder two-way communication can provide a picture of how social media
are affecting crisis communication.
Social media as a tool

“A key to successfully handling crises is controlling the flow of information to the media and
one’s publics.” (Wigley & Zhang, 2011, p. 2). If this statement is true the aforementioned traits of
social media, immediacy and the dissolving of geographical boundaries, must have had a
substantial effect on crisis handling. According to Wigley and Zhang, social media have allowed
for news to break almost instantly and once it hits a conduit such as Twitter or Facebook it is only
a matter of minutes before the story is spread virally to thousands or even millions of people
(2011). This means that the old mantra of crisis communication regarding control of information
flow has become almost impossible for companies to perform (Solis & Breakenridge, 2006).
Public relations professionals no longer have time to plan before crises reach social media and the
public. Thus, crisis communicators have been given the reactive role and with that they are forced
to begin reputational damage control once the public has already discovered and evaluated the
crisis (Wigley & Zhang, 2011).
So what does this mean for the way crisis communication is designed today? Naturally, there are
both advantages and drawbacks by this development. However, there is no doubt that social media
can be used as a tool by organizations, and, if used correctly, a very beneficial one (Solis &
Breakenridge, 2009). One of the advantages could be a higher degree of transparency and
interactivity between company and consumer. Coombs posits that before social media “people
were having trouble reaching many of the organizations considered at the heart of the crisis”
(2010, p. 390). Companies now have various channels to communicate from and, more
importantly, they have access to a tool that allows for a message to be delivered without delay
(Auer, 2011). Another advantage is the reduced significance of the so-called “middle-men”, who
until now have served as a form of filter that messages passed through before reaching the public.
An example of this could be censors or editors interfering with communication. When using social
media the message instead goes directly from sender to receiver without delay or modifications,
this has speeded up communication time substantially (Auer, 2011). This development may also
include drawbacks; some argue that social media in terms of credibility fall short (Sunstein, 2006;
Auer, 2011). This is specifically due to the immediate nature, which allows a minimum of proof
reading and accuracy compared to other media tools. This factor can be important for
organizations when trying to convince stakeholders. If credibility of a message does drop when
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using social media, this means organizations must take extra care in tailoring communication when
using these conduits (Auer, 2011).
Social media as two-way communication

Another important feature of social media are their ability to enable two-way communication
between organization and stakeholder. They provide the opportunity to invite consumers to
respond to a crisis after which the organization can then deal with it in a personal manner. This
being said, these opportunities also foster greater expectations on behalf of the stakeholders. They
now expect near immediate communication that is well planned and answers to their concerns
(Coombs, 2010). These expectations could be a potential drawback, seeing as research at the
moment suggests that companies have yet to embrace social media fully, some still focus on the
threats connected with the concept rather than the potentials (Wigley & Zhang, 2011). Coombs
also talks about how “newer media allow for individual stakeholders to virtually meet, share
information, and potentially band together” (2010, p. 390). This can be a positive development,
seeing as it can give a nuanced discussion of a crisis. It can also become a negative trait if a
collective of stakeholders decide to portray a company as “the villain” and spread this perception
(2010). Ultimately, what can be said about entering such an electronic community is that it is a
place where user opinions and values are shared, a place that can “spawn commentary, sway
views, and spur action” (Auer, 2011, p. 711). In this way, social media become a vital arena for
organizations to navigate in and spread crisis communication through.
Method
In order to answer the problem statement excerpts from several media outlets will be used.
External sources will include The Guardian and The New York Post, where quotes from articles
published during the October Outage will be highlighted and commented on. Internal sources are
necessary in order to determine and analyse RIM’s online crisis strategy. A number of company
posts and updates from Facebook will be drawn upon as well as a Youtube video speech by the
CEO Mike Lazaridis, which RIM chose to link to from several of its other social media conduits.
Finally, comments from stakeholders (mainly connected to the postings by RIM) will also be
examined, although the main focus will be on organizational strategy rather than audience
response. These reactions will also be needed when describing the progression of the crisis, seeing
as the stakeholders actually broke the news of the outage rather than the organization issuing the
statement.
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Research in Motion
Introduction to RIM
Research in Motion (RIM) was founded in 1984. The company resides in Waterloo, Canada but
has several offices in Asia-Pacific, Europe and the US. RIM has become a global leader within
wireless technology and today exports smartphones, tablets and software. Its most popular product
to date, the BlackBerry, was launched in 1999 and is used by millions today (RIM – Company,
2012). The company has always benefited from being known as an innovative front-runner within
its field and in many countries its products were savored by enterprise users over competitors in
the likes of Apple and Samsung. A decline in sales has however started to show as competition
intensifies and RIM’s core capacities no longer offer a solution the majority of consumers are
interested in (Gasseé, April 2, 2012). Combined with experiencing various crises and issues, this is
a tough period in the history of the Canadian company.
The assessment of how the October Outage was handled should not be carried out without having
looked at RIM as an organization. As mentioned earlier Research in Motion is a relatively young
company, its history going back to the mid-eighties. The BlackBerry solution, which the crisis is
connected to, was not introduced until 1999. Noteworthy of RIM, is that it is a company selling
innovative, wireless solutions and therefore deals with complicated technology on a daily basis.
Furthermore, the company operates within the ever-evolving mobile industry and it can therefore
be assumed that RIM has to stay on top of the newest media trends in order to compete with other
competitors. In other words, RIM is a tech savvy brand that is no stranger to social media, as they
have to come up with new media solutions for the BlackBerry continuously. Also, judging from
activity on RIM’s own accounts, the company has incorporated social media largely into its
communication with stakeholders (the BlackBerry Youtube page e.g. features over 1400 posted
videos since its creation in 2006). Based on this characteristic alone, RIM ought to navigate a crisis
within an online platform well. Nonetheless, being tech savvy does not equal being able to handle
a crisis successfully.
The crisis history of RIM

RIM is a fairly “young” company, therefore its history of crises is not that deep. However, being a
company within the wireless mobile industry RIM has experienced sharp competition from other
tech brands and being constantly pressured to withhold its global leader status RIM naturally has
experienced complications. Firstly, RIM has been involved in lawsuits regarding patent litigation
numerous times. For the most part, the company has filed suits against competitors who have
apparently infringed on patents. On January 22, 2010 Motorola filed a lawsuit against Blackberry
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for five infringements of patent. This caused a long conflict, which was finally settled on June 11,
2010 (Patel, 2010, January 22). RIM was involved in another crisis that occurred shortly after the
October Outage, when Vodafone users started experiencing how their prepaid balances were
getting deducted or reduced without any usage. Vodafone was deemed the culprit in this case but
unfortunately it also rubbed of on RIM (Bafna, 2011, December 9). The company has also
experienced several service failures, one of them happening in September 2011, where the
BlackBerry Messenger service went down for several hours in Canada and Latin America. Outages
have also occurred frequently, some of the most recent in dominant markets such as South Africa
and the UK (Austen, 2011, October 11). Finally, the crisis with by far the most impact was the
four-day network outage in October 2011, which this thesis will analyze. The outage was a result
of a technological error, but happened entirely under the auspices of RIM. Therefore, in the
company’s history of crises, this must be categorized as one of the more grave, if not the worst.
The October Outage

During October 2011, RIM faced one of its most challenging crises so far. Users of the very
popular Smartphone, BlackBerry, began to experience messaging and browsing delays, which
evolved into a full on network collapse apparently caused by “a core switch failure within RIM’s
infrastructure” (BlackBerry, 2011, October 11th). The outage spread through Europe, the Middle
East, Africa, India and parts of South America. Judging by user posts on Blackberry’s Facebook
page the first signal interruptions began around 10 am on October 10th and lasted until the evening
on October 13th. The first update from RIM was posted on Twitter on October 10th at 4.11 pm
followed by a notification on Facebook almost ten hours later at 01.48 am. The Youtube video
featuring a message from CEO of RIM, Mike Lazaridis, was not publicized until October 13th.
Interestingly, RIM chose not to issue a press release on the company website, however they did
create the “BlackBerry Service Update” page on which short updates from the company were
uploaded. These communicative efforts, along with a press conference carried out on October 12th,
constituted the part of RIM’s crisis response effort that will be analyzed below.
Analysis of RIM’s crisis strategy
Introduction to RIM’s social media strategy

As mentioned earlier, RIM’s Twitter account will not be analyzed due to space limitations but it
seems necessary to note that this was in fact the first medium to communicate the crisis to the
public (Research In Motion, 2011, October 10 4.11pm). Also, this was the medium where
BlackBerry users began a long stream of complaints. The first user generated post on Facebook
15
concerning the crisis was posted on October 12th by Hyacinth Sintiago and was entitled “how to
survive the blackberry meltdown!” (2011, October 12, 11.05pm). It could be assumed that other
users may have contacted RIM via the Facebook chat or message applications but otherwise, until
then, they had expressed their frustration by commenting on the posts authored by RIM. The first
of these was, as aforementioned, posted the day before and was followed by two consecutive posts
as well as several more over the following days as the crisis developed. Another substantial part of
RIM’s crisis strategy was a Youtube video, which to date has reached close to 400.000 views. The
video shows RIM’s CEO, Mike Lazaridis, addressing stakeholders with a message on behalf of the
company and him (BlackBerry, 2011, October 13). The video wasn’t released until two days after
the crisis started. It was then spread virally through Twitter, Facebook and the company website as
a hyperlink at the end of a message. Before beginning the analysis of RIM’s social media response
strategy the thesis will examine how the news media perceived and framed the company and
situation in order to make an assessment of the aforementioned concept attribution of
responsibility.
The news media response

When the BlackBerry crisis broke out news media worldwide were not late to comment on it. Two
of the newspapers covering the crisis closely were English The Guardian and American The New
York Times. Both also run globally read digital newspapers online, from where the quotes
mentioned in this paragraph stem. The Guardian released the first online article about the network
outage on the 10th of October describing the situation and crisis under way. The NY Times’ article
followed on October 11th and could report about how far the crisis had spread and what RIM’s
response had been. Especially the article from The Guardian portrays RIM through a negative
angle stating, “The failure will be a huge embarrassment for the company” and pulling out the
employee quote "The attitude was, 'We're going to grow and grow but making sure our
infrastructure can support it isn't a priority.' (Arthur, 2011, October 10). In an article following up
on the restoration of services the missing rights of the stakeholders were also emphasized:
“Consumers are apparently excluded from any guarantee of service by a clause in RIM's terms and
conditions” (Arthur, 2011, October 13). What can be drawn from these quotes is that the
newspaper frames RIM as a rather irresponsible company that is more interested in growth than
delivering reliable and guaranteed service to its stakeholders. The first article also insinuates that
the company has been too slow to react to the crisis through the quote that the outage “was still
affecting users more than four hours later with no time given for when it was expected to be
resolved.” (Arthur, 2011, October 10). This suggests evidence that The Guardian attributes the
16
responsibility entirely to RIM and deems the company the villain. Less blatant is the framing in
The NY Times. One of the reasons for this could be the fact that The US was not affected by the
crisis and therefore the American media did not feel the need to lash out. The paper does however
treat the subject critically. The first article includes quotes such as “many people seemed to be
frustrated by the lack of communication from Research in Motion” and also a negative quote from
a stakeholder about RIM being “Arrogant and disrespectful to its customers.” (Austen, 2011,
October 11). These quotes, when juxtaposed against sources from the Guardian, also give an
impression of RIM being attributed responsibility. Furthermore, the perceived neglecting of
stakeholders is also visible through the article. These are some of the similarities. Nevertheless,
when examining articles written later, The NY Times frames RIM much less harshly, seemingly
exercising a form of the aforesaid concept victimage. This can be seen from the following quotes:
“Wednesday’s hit could not have come at a worse time for RIM, which is fending off a growing
crowd of agitated investors”, ” It’s a bloodbath” (Wortham, 2011, October 12). This does not
automatically prove that The NY Times was attributing blame away from RIM but it is indicative
of a more nuanced framing than The Guardian. To sum up, despite different angles both mediums
seem to have attributed more or less full responsibility to RIM.
The following paragraph will map out exactly what was communicated and how it was done i.e.
the rhetorical strategy and then juxtapose these findings with the theory as put forth in the
literature review, hopefully providing an answer to the problem statement.
Characterizing the crisis

In order to analyze RIM’s response strategy it is necessary to look at the crisis situation and
determine which type the company was dealing with. Very first it seems natural to determine
whether or not the case should in fact be treated as a crisis in order to proceed with the analysis.
The difference between crisis and issue essentially came down to the amount of damage caused
and whether or not the entire organization was affected (Coombs, 1999). Externally, a Facebook
quote posted by RIM summing up how wide spread the network outage was points towards the
situation being more than a mere issue (BlackBerry, 2011, October 11, 10.34pm). Apart from the
US, some of RIM’s largest markets were stricken. In some of the countries affected, such as South
Africa, the BlackBerry is the most dominant smart phone and the outage therefore caused a serious
communication breach qua the large amount of stakeholders (Vermeulen, 2011, November 16).
Internally, the online effort of the company indicates that the situation had indeed disrupted the
entire organization. If the problem had limited itself to e.g. one or two local areas, only regional
departments might be affected due to proximity, hence probably only using regional Facebook
17
pages and issuing messages from local managers. Instead, the international Facebook page was
chosen as a tool, and a message was delivered globally from the top leader of the organization.
Now that the situation can be categorized as a crisis with some certainty, the next step is also to
determine the crisis type through Coombs’ and Benoit’s theory. According to Coombs there were
four crisis types each further categorized by intentionality and whether the crisis figured internally
or externally. When taking these axes into account the October Outage can be viewed as an
accident, seeing as the crisis happened internally and, judging from organizational and media
quotes, was not intentional (e.g. BlackBerry, 2011, October 11, 10.34pm; Arthur, 2011, October
13). The initial problem was assigned a malfunctioned fail-over after a core switch failure in the
network system (BlackBerry, October 11th, 10.34pm), and therefore, essentially, not a human error.
However, the phrase “did not function as previously tested.” from the same post shows that
employees had been testing the system and therefore humans were involved in the process. It could
even be assumed that they might have been able to predict the failure. This leads us to Benoit’s
perceptual wrongdoings. He also distinguishes between four different kinds. Common to all of
them is that they are assigned human flaws. The fact that humans were engaged in the RIM crisis
process is the instance that justifies applying Benoit’s theory to the crisis. In the case of
BlackBerry, the malfunction was technical but the system, in which it occurred, was monitored by
humans and therefore the possibility that an employee could have predicted and intervened in the
situation cannot be excluded. The type of wrongdoing that fits the situation most evolves around
the environment surrounding the accused. Benoit claims that certain people, events etc. can
prevent the accused from fulfilling responsibility. In this case the responsibility can be equated
with the goal Lazaridis mentions in his Youtube speech and goes on to say that the goal was not
delivered on during the crisis (appendix 1). The accused could arguably be both the employees in
charge of the network system or the company as a whole. RIM avoids scapegoating internally;
therefore it can be assumed that RIM as a collective of people takes the blame. Finally, the event
disrupting daily order, and creating the perceived wrongdoing, is of course the malfunctioned fail-
over.
Before elaborating on and categorizing the response strategy it is necessary to further examine the
attribution of responsibility and provide a picture of how the crisis was perceived and portrayed
externally.
The various media quotes throughout the thesis have pointed towards both stakeholders and the
news media primarily attributing responsibility to RIM. This is important knowledge when
18
beginning to assess the company’s response strategy, one of the reasons being that a main criterion
of SCCT is the assessment of organizational responsibility. The theory posits that the degree of
attributed responsibility by stakeholders determines the appropriate response to the crisis (Coombs,
2007). Taking this statement as a point of departure, the best match of strategy for RIM would be
acceptance of responsibility for the crisis. With this knowledge, certain strategies can be deemed
more risky and difficult to carry out than others. Many organizations unfortunately manage to
mismatch a strategy to their current crisis situation despite this, causing even more damage than
anticipated (Benoit, 2007). In this case two of the strategies can be judged as hazardous for RIM.
Firstly, the denial strategy would have been difficult to use, seeing as the public had already
judged the situation and RIM would have a hard time persuading them to reconsider their
judgment. Secondly, an attack strategy would also have been a misplaced response given the
circumstances. This does however not automatically indicate that the company refrained from
using the two strategies. The following analysis will shed light on how RIM chose to handle the
response strategy.
Rhetorical analysis of RIM’s response strategy on Facebook
The preliminary strategy

The very first message delivered on Facebook began with the following sentence “We are pleased
to report that BlackBerry email services have been restored.” and was concluded in this way “We
apologize to our customers for any inconvenience and we’ll continue to update you as new
information becomes available.” (BlackBerry, 2011, October 11, 01.48am). This initial statement
can, in accordance to Benoit, be categorized as an apologetic strategy that includes corrective
action taken by the company. According to Pace et al, the apology lets the stakeholders know that
the company feels guilty and understands the frustration over the error (2010). At first glance this
could seem to be a sufficient solution, seeing as the crisis was deemed an internal and technical
fault that RIM maybe could have predicted. The company therefore shows remorse and begins to
restore conditions. Despite this, at least two things might be problematic with this initial
restoration strategy. Firstly, RIM made the mistake of proclaiming that the crisis was nearly over,
when in fact, at the time, it had just began to gather strength. This move, paired with the previous
quote, could be recognized as arrogant and be an expression of RIM not being in keeping with the
situation. Secondly, an apology is not regarded by all as a means of taking full responsibility for an
error, some merely view it as a way of expressing regret (Pace et al, 2010). This can be
problematic if stakeholders expect RIM to voice an explicit acceptance of responsibility.
19
The next message delivered at 5.36pm goes on to inform that some users across the globe are still
experiencing network delays followed by a lengthier message at 10.34pm stating that the delays
“were caused by a core switch failure within RIM’s infrastructure. Although the system is
designed to failover to a back-up switch, the failover did not function as previously tested.”
(BlackBerry, 2011, October 11, 01.48am). These posts can be categorized as account strategies in
which RIM seeks to explain the progress of the crisis, however, they also contain a degree of
evasion of responsibility. The use of passive voice in the quote suggests evidence to this claim, as
it can be used to conceal the doer of an action (Rosenwasser & Stephen, 2012). At no point does
the subject (RIM) perform the action but is rather acted upon. This could indicate that the company
has tried to disguise what is actually an excuse, as a simple informative account. Another
noteworthy feature about the initial communication is that the first four posts have a variant of the
sentence “we apologize for the inconvenience caused” in them. This points to RIM having
assessed the apology to be an important part of the company’s image restoration.
As the crisis deepens

After the first 24 hours of the crisis RIM seems to have realized that the problem is bigger than
initially expected. This can e.g. be seen from the first message posted on Facebook on October 12th
“We're aware many BlackBerry customers are experiencing intermittent service delays. Restoring
full service is our number one priority” (BlackBerry, 2011, October 12, 4.45pm). It is probable that
this message serves as an answer to the many angry comments made by stakeholders the day
before. At the end of the message RIM provides a hyperlink to a “service update” page, which the
company has chosen to create as an extra monitoring service. The link is shared on Facebook both
on the 12th and 13th of October. Apart from this, the company’s communicative efforts begin to
shift focus in the postings on its Facebook page. Where each message earlier contained an apology,
they begin to contain a “thank you” to the stakeholders together with updated accounts of the crisis
progress. Thanking can be placed in the same category as apologizing, as both actions are
expressions of mortification. Hereby RIM humbles itself and can hope for forgiveness (Benoit,
1997). This strategy provides no active explanation or justification and in RIM’s case the
frustration of the stakeholders begins to grow as an effect. Judging from many of their comments,
they are feeling overlooked and their need for information disparaged: “Wow, 1 day fair enough, 2
days mildly annoying, 3, ridiculous, sort it out!” (Joe Thompson, 2011, October 13, 12.36am), “I
like the way you just completely ignore all your customers’ comments and just palm us off with a
half hearted attempt at an apology!” (Sean Eaton, 2011, October 13, 1.15am).
20
RIM chose not to answer any of the threads and comments made by its stakeholders, which could
point towards the company having chosen a generic and less personal strategy. This choice has
consequences as seen in the quotes above. Naturally, it is understandable that the company may
have difficulty in answering thousands of comments each day, nevertheless several sources stress
“that openness, transparency, and two-way communication are key element of successful crisis
managements” and therefore that rendering sincere, individualized communication can reduce the
wrongdoing and cultivate a sense of understanding (Wigley&Zhang, 2011, p. 5; Macnamara,
2010). Two-way communication was also emphasized as one of the beneficial possibilities earlier
when utilizing social media in crisis communication, and it can therefore seem puzzling why RIM,
in the crisis situation, did not take more advantage of this tool.
Restoring conditions
October 13th 6.46pm RIM once again announces on Facebook that full service has been restored
followed by a lengthier message thanking stakeholders for their patience. The mortification
strategy continues as a red thread in the company’s communication to the stakeholders. This time
the problem has in fact been solved and RIM can begin restoring conditions to their previous state.
The second message posted that day contains a link enabling users of the BlackBerry to confirm
that they once again are able to receive emails. This can be analyzed as an attempt at further
corrective action. Finally, RIM refers to a Twitter account for further help (BlackBerry, 2011,
October 14, 4.31pm).
The final message on Facebook solely regarding the crisis is posted on October 17th. This message
can be seen as an attempt to make amends. RIM is aware of the fact that its stakeholders are angry
and feel as if something has been wrongfully taken from them the previous week, which needs to
be compensated. “To show our appreciation, BlackBerry subscribers will receive a selection of
premium apps (worth a total value of more than US $100) free of charge from BlackBerry App
World” (BlackBerry, 2011, October 17, 10.35am). This response strategy was not touched upon in
the literary review but is mentioned in the SCCT as simply a “compensation strategy”. The
strategy serves, like the apology, as a positive, rebuilding strategy and can ideally be used by
companies in accidental crises coupled with crisis history (Coombs, 2007). Thus, theory supports
RIM’s choice to reimburse customers at the end of the crisis.
Rhetorical analysis of RIM’s response strategy on Youtube

As mentioned in the introduction to RIM’s social media strategy the company also chose to
publish a video on Youtube showing CEO Mike Lazaridis presenting a speech directed at the
21
stakeholders affected during the crisis. Before delving into the content of the speech, it seems
necessary firstly to analyze what significance including this medium and message altogether did
have for the response strategy.
A study put forth by Wright and Hinson examined the actual importance attributed various social
media in PR together with the importance they ought to be attributed. The study showed that both
Youtube and Facebook generally were less recognized conduits than they ought to be (as seen in
Macnamara, 2010). This claim could indicate that RIM made a wise choice when employing these
media, although the actual outcome of course rests on the content of the strategy also. In terms of
combining Facebook and Youtube, there can be obvious complementing benefits by being able to
utilize both a medium allowing immediate, two-way written communication and one allowing
video and audio content. RIM must have considered this yet somehow did not provide the
communicative content stakeholders expected. This claim will be elaborated on in the following
paragraph.
In the speech Lazaridis begins by quoting RIM’s main goal throughout the years of delivering
“reliable real-time communications around the world” with emphasis on the word “reliable”. He
follows up by admitting that they “did not deliver on that goal this week. Not even close.”
(Appendix 1). This is the first time RIM actively admits to having failed to deliver what
stakeholders expected. Although this is not an explicit expression of taking responsibility for the
crisis, it does show that RIM feels responsible for failing to deliver its service as promised. The
initial statement is followed by a personal apology from Lazaridis: “I apologise for the service
outages this week. We’ve let many of you down.” (Appendix 1). This leads back to the
mortification strategy initially identified in the Facebook messages. RIM continues to humble itself
towards the stakeholders. The next few sentences provide an account of what RIM is doing to fix
the problem. Again, this is a strategy that the company also employed on Facebook, although the
account is longer and more descriptive in the Youtube video. The next noteworthy sentence
addresses the problem regarding lack of communication: “We know that you want to hear more
from us, and we’re working to update you more frequently through our websites and social media
channels”. Hereby RIM answers to the news media and stakeholders, who have accused the
company of slow and insufficient communication to the public. Unfortunately, this message was
not delivered until the final day of the network outage, which was probably too late to redeem any
sort of goodwill. The idea of addressing the demands of the stakeholders is a reasonable one given
e.g Benoit’s rationale for restoring a reputation, stating, “perceptions are more important than
reality” (1997, p. 178). In other words that RIM should strive to satisfy stakeholders regardless of
22
what the company makes of its own strategy. If they point to a problem, RIM should address it, as
they did in the sentence described above. The drawback in this case being that the message should
have been delivered when it was essentially still relevant, rather than on the day the crisis was
pronounced resolved.
The final part of the speech is a plea to the stakeholders to restore their trust in the company and
have confidence in the fact that RIM are doing whatever possible to restore previous conditions.
Lazaridis finishes with a “thank you” (appendix 1). This section also bears resemblance to some of
the messages posted on Facebook by the company. The fact that the Youtube message to such a
high degree echoes what has already been communicated on Facebook can both be seen as an
advantage and a drawback. The advantage lies in consistency. Showing consistency in crisis
communication can be an important way to build credibility. Inconsistency exhibits the
organization’s incompetency with crisis management (Coombs, 2010). However, as mentioned
earlier, failing to meet expectations can also cause increased damage to a company’s reputation.
The drawback being that stakeholders presumably were expecting something more than what had
already been communicated on Facebook, when RIM decided to use an entirely new medium
featuring the CEO.
When evaluating the speech as a whole it is relevant to study what has been included and what has
been omitted. As in the Facebook messages there once again is given an apology and once again
there is an account of what the company is now reactively doing. One thing that has been omitted
is the account of how the crisis happened, i.e. what went wrong. And still there is no mention of
responsibility. RIM comes closer in the video by using active sentences instead of passive, and
having either Lazaridis or the company as the main actor in the message, but an explicit expression
of fault is never given. In this video RIM focuses entirely on the repercussions and resolving of the
crisis. The message can be categorized as an extension of what was already being posted on
Facebook but with a more personal angle qua having Lazaridis be the spokesperson and drawing
advantage of non-linguistic tools such as facial expressions and tone of voice. The same
reputational rebuild strategies were used in both mediums in the form of apology, thanking and
accounts.
Discussion
The primary purpose of this thesis was to examine how companies navigate crises in an online
world, taking departure in the RIM crisis. Consistent with prior research within the field of social
media and crisis communication, the results of the case study indicate that immediacy and
23
elimination of geographical barriers have had an effect on how crises are handled. Stakeholders
expect immediate response and a higher degree of coverage from a company involved in a crisis
being communicated online. In keeping with the SCCT framework, the stakeholder assessment of
responsibility is still vital for companies when designing a crisis response. Now more than ever it
seems important to communicate responsibility. The findings illustrate that RIM was too late in
responding and when the company finally did, the response was marked with vagueness in terms
of who was to blame and when the crisis would actually be solved.
Pace et al suggested that issuing an apology not necessarily lead to the perception that an
organization was taking blame for a crisis. Instead, explicitly voicing acceptance of responsibility
could lead to greater reputational protection (2010). RIM chose not to do the latter and suffered
reputational damage among stakeholders and the news media as an effect. A reason for acting as
they did could be the fact that accepting responsibility is more costly than apologizing, with
possible lawsuits in the offing. Perhaps RIM had hoped that offering a simple apology would have
sufficed, as it does in some cases. Unfortunately for them, many stakeholders were not convinced
by this approach. A recommendation for the company might be in the future to continuously use a
response where accommodative and compensating strategies are still used but instead utilize the
apology more carefully, hopefully framing it more sincerely. Also, focus could be on constructing
messages with active sentences rather than passive, of course depending on the degree of
responsibility assigned to RIM in future crises. Nevertheless, research points to the active voice
being more transparent and credible than the passive, indicating that this would be the wise choice
when attempting to conduct honest crisis communication (Rosenwasser & Stephen, 2012). When
comparing this factor with the aforementioned critique of messages on social media lacking
credibility, active rhetoric also seems to be a valid approach. An entirely different response
strategy that RIM could have chosen to use is the excuse. The company’s strategy for the October
outage did have elements from this response strategy but it could have been carried out more
consistently. RIM might then have denied the intent to do harm and claimed incapacity to control
the events that triggered the crisis. If stakeholders where lead to believe this claim, it would
minimize the organizational responsibility (Coombs, 2007).
An essential constituent of crisis communication theory was the history of crises, the so-called
Velcro effect. In RIM a history of network outages was determined, having caused crisis-like
situations previously and with probability eroding the stakeholders’ confidence in the brand. Also,
a number of other issues in the history of the company were described. It seems probable that this
crisis history has affected how the October outage was perceived. In coherence with theory this
24
crisis posed a large threat to the reputation of RIM and judging from the framing in the news
media and response from stakeholders it was a matter of time before the network incidents
developed into a full-blown crisis. This continuous string of problems could also be one of the
explanations for the anger and frustration visible in customer comments. Since this was not an
isolated crisis people had expected more from the company in terms of ready information about the
situation and perhaps that RIM had been better prepared for the outage. In future crises the
company should make sure to take its crisis history into account when designing a response
strategy.
Conclusion
Currently, more and more research is showing the potential social media have to become a vital
tool in crisis communication. Interestingly, this has still not motivated many companies to avail
them of these new conduits. And many of those that have, fail to use them in a way that ends up
contributing to a successful crisis strategy. Naturally, a lot more scholarly research needs to be
conducted on the field, before the mechanics of social media are fully understood (this might not
even be possible), however, studies for a company such as RIM to gain knowledge about how they
should be communicating online do exist.
The findings of this thesis show that there is still some way to be covered before RIM grasps the
consequences of utilizing social media. Theory shows that it can be a powerful instrument but only
when used efficiently. For RIM the challenge, among other things, lies in combining ideas from
the SCCT framework, crisis communication theory and response strategies with the advantageous
traits of social media. Especially the factor of immediacy needs to be taken more seriously. It is no
longer sufficient for a company to follow up on a crisis several hours after the outbreak. Online
communication should be monitored closely and when a problem occurs stakeholders ought to be
provided with a message instantly. This does not mean that weight not longer should be put on
content of crisis communication, merely that the progress of the communication effort could be
designed differently.
Future research should continue to examine the traits of social media and how they might be
beneficial in a crisis communication context. The tools provided with this new technology are still
relatively unexplored. With a better understanding of the technology crisis strategies could be
tailored to be more efficient and precise. It could also be relevant to explore further how
companies draw more advantage of two-way communication. Whether communication could be
made more proficient and individually directed. Also, research should study further the
25
accommodative reputational response strategies and investigate whether expressions of

responsibility could and ought to be utilized more and whether it would have an effect on the
success of a strategy. Finally, theory on how organizations navigate online ought still to be
extended. Possibly exploring the ideas of Crisisblogger further and providing a scholarly
discussion of social media as an ever evolving concept, and if it can even be boxed and categorized
as till now.
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Appendix 1
Transcription of speech performed by Mike Lazaridis as seen on Youtube
Hi, I’m Mike Lazaridis, since launching BlackBerry in 1999, it’s been my goal to provide reliable
real-time communications around the world. We did not deliver on that goal this week. Not even
close. I apologise for the service outages this week. We’ve let many of you down. But let me
assure you that we’re working round the clock to fix this. You expect better from us, and I expect
better from us. It’s too soon to say this issue is fully resolved. But let me give you more detail
about what’s happening. We’re now approaching normal BlackBerry service levels in Europe, the
Middle East, India and Africa. We continue to monitor the system very closely. We’re working
very hard to continue to stabilize the system, and we’re seeing steady improvements. We expect to
see continued progress, and possibly some instability, as the system comes back to normal service
levels everywhere. We know that you want to hear more from us, and we’re working to update you
more frequently through our websites and social media channels as we gather more information.
I’d like to give you an estimated time of full recovery around the world – but I cannot do this with
certainty at this time. For those of you affected, I know this is very frustrating. We’re doing
30
everything in our power to restore regular service levels, and we’re working tirelessly to restore
your trust in us. We’ll update you again soon. Thank you.
31

The Effects of Social Media On Crisis Communication: A Case Study of The Response Strategy Performed by Research in Motion

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The effects of social media on crisis

communication: A case study of the response

Supervisor: Tomasz Fediuk

Submission: 3rd of May 2012

Characters excluding blanks: 55.010

What defines a crisis?

jeopardy. A reputation is an evaluation of an organization formed by its stakeholders, who in turn

Benoit’s Image Restoration Strategy

Situational Crisis Communication Theory

Defining social media

How is social media affecting crisis communication?

Social media as a tool

Social media as two-way communication

The crisis history of RIM

The October Outage

Analysis of RIM’s crisis strategy

Introduction to RIM’s social media strategy

The news media response

Characterizing the crisis

Rhetorical analysis of RIM’s response strategy on Facebook

The preliminary strategy

As the crisis deepens

Rhetorical analysis of RIM’s response strategy on Youtube

accommodative reputational response strategies and investigate whether expressions of

Coombs, T. W. (1999), “Ongoing crisis communication: planning, managing, and responding”,

Coombs, T. W. & Holladay, S. J. (2010), “The handbook of crisis communication”, Wiley-

Coombs, T. W. & Holladay, S. J. (2009), “Further explorations of post-crisis communication:

Egelhoff, W. G. & Sen, F. (1992), “An information-processing model of crisis management”,

Sunstein, C. R. (2006). Infotopia, New York: Oxford University Press.

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