OIL AND NATURAL GAS COMMISSION v CA (G.R. No.

114323 July 23, 1998)

RECIT READY:
 The case is about the enforcement of a foreign judgment awarded in favor of petitioner; a
foreign corporation owned and controlled by the government of India against private
respondent, a corporation organized and existing under Philippine Laws. The conflict
between the petitioner and the private respondent rooted from the failure of the
respondent to deliver 43,000 metric tons of oil well cement to the petitioner even it had
already received payment and despite petitioner’s several demands. The appellate court
concurred with the RTC's ruling that the arbitrator did not have jurisdiction over the
dispute between the parties, thus, the foreign court could not validly adopt the arbitrator's
award. The issue in this case is whether or not the arbitrator had jurisdiction over the
dispute between the petitioner and the private respondent under Clause 16 of the
contract. The constitutional mandate that no decision shall be rendered by any court
without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based
does not preclude the validity of "memorandum decisions" which adopt by reference the
findings of fact and conclusions of law contained in the decisions of inferior tribunals.
Decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed.

FACTS:
 This proceeding involves the enforcement of a foreign judgment rendered by the Civil
Judge of Dehra Dun, India in favor of the petitioner, against the private respondent,
PACIFIC CEMENT COMPANY, INCORPORATED.
 The petitioner is a foreign corporation owned and controlled by the Government of India
while the private respondent is a private corporation duly organized and existing under
the laws of the Philippines.
 The conflict between the petitioner and the private respondent rooted from the failure of
the respondent to deliver 43,000 metric tons of oil well cement to the petitioner even it
had already received payment and despite petitioner’s several demands.
 The petitioner then informed the private respondent that it was referring its claim to an
arbitrator pursuant to Clause 16 of their contract, which stipulates that the venue for
arbitration shall be at Dehra dun.
 The chosen arbitrator, one Shri N.N. Malhotra, resolved the dispute in favor of the
petitioner setting forth the arbitral award.
 To enable the petitioner to execute the above award, it filed a Petition before the Court of
the Civil Judge in Dehra Dun. India praying that the decision of the arbitrator be made
"the Rule of Court" in India.
 This was objected by the respondent but foreign court refused to admit the private
respondent's objections for failure to pay the required filing fees.
 Despite notice sent to the private respondent of the foregoing order and several demands
by the petitioner for compliance therewith, the private respondent refused to pay the
amount adjudged by the foreign court as owing to the petitioner.
 The petitioner filed a complaint with Branch 30 of the Regional Trial Court (“RTC”) of
Surigao City for the enforcement of the aforementioned judgment of the foreign court.
The private respondent moved to dismiss the complaint.
  RTC dismissed the complaint for lack of a valid cause of action. The petitioner then
appealed to the respondent Court of Appeals, which affirmed the dismissal of the
complaint.
 In its decision, the appellate court concurred with the RTC's ruling that the arbitrator did
not have jurisdiction over the dispute between the parties, thus, the foreign court could
not validly adopt the arbitrator's award.
 The petitioner filed this petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE:
 Whether or not the arbitrator had jurisdiction over the dispute between the petitioner and
the private respondent under Clause 16 of the contract.

RULING:
 The constitutional mandate that no decision shall be rendered by any court without
expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based does
not preclude the validity of "memorandum decisions" which adopt by reference the
findings of fact and conclusions of law contained in the decisions of inferior tribunals.
 Furthermore, the recognition to be accorded a foreign judgment is not necessarily
affected by the fact that the procedure in the courts of the country in which such
judgment was rendered differs from that of the courts of the country in which the
judgment is relied on.
 If the procedure in the foreign court mandates that an Order of the Court becomes final
and executory upon failure to pay the necessary docket fees, then the courts in this
jurisdiction cannot invalidate the order of the foreign court simply because our rules
provide otherwise.
 WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED, and the assailed decision of the Court
of Appeals sustaining the trial court's dismissal of the OIL AND NATURAL GAS
COMMISSION's complaint before Branch 30 of the RTC of Surigao City is
REVERSED.

De Castro vs. JBC (G.R. No. 191002, April 20, 2010)

Recit Ready:
 This case is about the Motion for Reconsideration on the decision that directs the Judicial
and Bar Council (“JBC”) to resume its proceedings for the nomination of candidate to fill
the vacancy created by the compulsory retirement of Reynato Puno. The movants of the
cases states that the constitutional provision on midnight appointments also intended a
ban on the members of the judiciary. The issue is whether or not the Constitutional
Commission extend to the Judiciary the ban on presidential appointments during the
period stated in Sec. 15, Article VII. The Constitutional Commission did not extend to
the Judiciary the ban on presidential appointments during the period stated in Sec. 15,
Art. VII. The deliberations that the dissent of Justice Carpio Morales quoted from the
records of the Constitutional Commission did not concern either Sec. 15, Art. VII or Sec.
4(1), Art. VIII, but only Sec. 13, Art. VII, a provision on nepotism.
FACTS:
 This is a Motion for Reconsideration on the March 17, 2010 decision of the Court.
 The said decision directs the Judicial and Bar Council to resume its proceedings for the
nomination of candidates to fill the vacancy created by the compulsory retirement of
Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno by May 17, 2010, and to prepare the short list of nominees
and submit it to the incumbent President.
 Movants argue that the disputed constitutional provision, Art. VII, Sec. 15 and Art. VIII,
Sec. 4(1), clearly intended the ban on midnight appointments to cover the members of the
Judiciary, and they contended that the principle of stare decisis is controlling, and insisted
that the Court erred in disobeying or abandoning the Valenzuela ruling.

ISSUE:
 Whether or not the Constitutional Commission extend to the Judiciary the ban on
presidential appointments during the period stated in Sec. 15, Article VII?

RULING:
 The Constitutional Commission did not extend to the Judiciary the ban on presidential
appointments during the period stated in Sec. 15, Art. VII.
 The deliberations that the dissent of Justice Carpio Morales quoted from the records of
the Constitutional Commission did not concern either Sec. 15, Art. VII or Sec. 4(1), Art.
VIII, but only Sec. 13, Art. VII, a provision on nepotism.
 Election ban on appointments does not extend to the Supreme Court.
 The Court upheld its March 17, 2010 decision ruling that the prohibition under Art. VII,
Sec. 15 of the Constitution against presidential appointments immediately before the next
presidential elections and up to the end of the term of the outgoing president does not
apply to vacancies in the Supreme Court

ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR. vs. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

(G.R. No. 160261. November 10, 2003)

Recit Ready:
 A resolution was adopted in the House of Representatives that directed the Committee on
Justice to conduct an investigation in aid of legislation, on the manner of disbursements
and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development
Fund (“JDF”). The issue in this case is whether the resolution thereof is a political
question. The Supreme Court state that there are two species of political questions: (1)
truly political questions" and (2) those which "are not truly political questions. Truly
political questions are thus beyond judicial review, the reason for respect of the doctrine
of separation of powers to be maintained. On the other hand, by virtue of Section 1,
Article VIII of the Constitution, courts can review questions, which are not truly political
in nature. From the record of the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, it
is clear that judicial power is not only a power; it is also a duty, a duty which cannot be
abdicated by the mere specter of this creature called the political question doctrine.
FACTS:
 On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution, sponsored by
Representative Felix William D. Fuentebella, which directed the Committee on Justice
"to conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of disbursements and
expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development
Fund (JDF)."
 On June 2, 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment complaint
against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices of this Court for
"culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and other high
crimes."
 The complaint was endorsed by Representatives Rolex T. Suplico, Ronaldo B. Zamora
and Didagen Piang Dilangalen, and was referred to the House Committee.
 The House Committee on Justice ruled on October 13, 2003 that the first impeachment
complaint was "sufficient in form," but voted to dismiss the same on October 22, 2003
for being insufficient in substance.
 To date, the Committee Report to this effect has not yet been sent to the House in plenary
in accordance with the said Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution. Four months
and three weeks since the filing on June 2, 2003 of the first complaint or on October 23,
2003, a day after the House Committee on Justice voted to dismiss it, the second
impeachment complaint was filed with the Secretary General of the House by
Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William B. Fuentebella against Chief
Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry
initiated by above-mentioned House Resolution.
 This second impeachment complaint was accompanied by a "Resolution of
Endorsement/Impeachment" signed by at least one-third (1/3) of all the Members of the
House of Representatives.

ISSUE:
 Whether the resolution thereof is a political question – has resulted in a political crisis.

RULING:
 From the foregoing record of the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, it
is clear that judicial power is not only a power; it is also a duty, a duty which cannot be
abdicated by the mere specter of this creature called the political question doctrine.
 Chief Justice Concepcion hastened to clarify, however, that Section 1, Article VIII was
not intended to do away with "truly political questions."
 From this clarification it is gathered that there are two species of political questions: (1)
"truly political questions" and (2) those which "are not truly political questions."
 Truly political questions are thus beyond judicial review, the reason for respect of the
doctrine of separation of powers to be maintained. On the other hand, by virtue of Section
1, Article VIII of the Constitution, courts can review questions, which are not truly
political in nature.
US v. Nixon (418 US 683)

Recit Ready:
 President Nixon was issued a subpoena duces tecum by the US District Court of
Columbia to produce tape recordings and documents relating to his conversation with
aides and advisers. Nixon argued that he has absolute executive privilege. The issue here
is whether the subpoena should be quashed because it demands confidential
conversations between a President and his close advisors that it would be inconsistent
with the public interest to produce. The court stated that: “We conclude that, when the
ground for asserting privilege as to subpoenaed materials sought for use in a criminal trial
is based only on the generalized interest in confidentiality, it cannot prevail over the
fundamental demands of due process of law in the fair administration of criminal justice.
The generalized assertion of privilege must yield to the demonstrated, specific need for
evidence in a pending criminal trial.”


FACTS:
 This litigation presents for review the denial of a motion, filed in the District Court
(“DC”) on behalf of the President, to quash a 3rd-party subpoena duces tecum issued by
the US District Court of Columbia.
 The subpoena directed the President to produce certain tape recordings and documents
relating to his conversation with aides and advisers. The court rejected the President’s
claim of absolute executive privilege, of lack of jurisdiction, and of failure to satisfy the
requirement of Rule 17(c).
 On March 1, 1974, the grand jury of the US DC for Columbia returned an indictment
charging 7 named individuals with various offenses, including conspiracy to defraud the
US and to obstruct justice.
 The grand jury named the President, among others, as an unindicted coconspirator. Upon
motion of the Special Prosecutor, a subpoena duces tecum was issued to the President,
which required the production of certain tapes, memoranda, papers, transcripts, or other
writings relating to certain precisely identified meetings between the President and
others.
 The President publicly released edited transcripts of 43 conversations; portion f 20
conversations subject to subpoena in the present case were included.
 The President’ counsel filed a “special appearance” and a motion to quash the subpoena
accompanied by formal claim of privilege.
 Further motions to expunge the grand jury’s action naming the President as an unindicted
coconspirator and for protective order against the disclosure of that information were
filed or raised orally.
 DC denied the motions and further ordered “the President or any subordinate officer,
official, or employee with custody or control of the documents or objects subpoenaed,” to
deliver the originals, as well as an index and analysi of those items, together with tape
copies of those portions for which transcripts had been released to the public by the
President.
 DC rejected the jurisdictional challenges based on a contention that the dispute was
nonjusticiable because it was between the Special Prosecutor and the Chief Executive and
 hence “intra-executive” in character; it also rejected the contention that the Judiciary was
without authority to review an assertion of executive privilege by the President.
 DC held that the judiciary, not the President, was the final arbiter of a claim of executive
privilege. The court concluded that the presumptive privilege was overcome by the
Special Prosecutor’s prima facie “demonstration of need sufficiently compelling to
warrant judicial examination in chambers.”
 The President filed a timely notice of appeal from the DC order. Later on, the Special
Prosecutor also filed a petition for a writ of certiorari before judgment

ISSUE:
 Whether the subpoena should be quashed because it demands “confidential conversations
between a President and his close advisors that it would be inconsistent with the public
interest to produce.”

RULING:
 Since the Court has consistently exercised the power to construe and delineate claims
arising under express powers, it must follow that the Court has authority to interpret
claims with respect to powers alleged to derive from enumerated powers.
 We therefore reaffirm that it is the province and duty of this Court “to say what the law
is” with respect to the claim of privilege presented in this case.
 In support of his claim of absolute privilege, the President urges 2 grounds. The 1st
ground is the valid need for protection of communications between high Government
officials and those who advise and assist them in the performance of their manifold
duties.
 Human experience teaches that those who expect public dissemination of their remarks
may well temper candor with a concern for appearances and for their own interests to the
detriment of the decision making process.
 The 2nd ground asserted by the President in support of the claim of absolute privilege
rests on the doctrine of separation of powers. Here it is argued that the independence of
the Executive Branch within its own sphere, insulates a President from a judicial
subpoena in an ongoing criminal prosecution, and thereby protects confidential
Presidential communications.
 However, neither the doctrine of separation of powers nor the need for confidentiality of
high-level communications, without more, can sustain an absolute, unqualified
Presidential privilege of immunity from judicial process under all circumstances. When
the privilege depends solely on the broad, undifferentiated claim of public interest in the
confidentiality of such conversations, a confrontation with other values arises. Absent a
claim of need to protect military, diplomatic, or sensitive national security secrets, we
find it difficult to accept the argument that even the very important interest in
confidentiality of Presidential communications is significantly diminished by production
of such material for in camera inspection with all the protection that a DC will be obliged
to provide.
 To read the Art. II powers of the President as providing an absolute privilege as against a
subpoena essential to enforcement of criminal statutes on no more than a generalized
claim of the public interest in confidentiality of nonmilitary and nondiplomatic
 discussions would upset the constitutional balance of “a workable government” and
gravely impair the role of the courts under Art. III.
 We conclude that, when the ground for asserting privilege as to subpoenaed materials
sought for use in a criminal trial is based only on the generalized interest in
confidentiality, it cannot prevail over the fundamental demands of due process of law in
the fair administration of criminal justice. The generalized assertion of privilege must
yield to the demonstrated, specific need for evidence in a pending criminal trial.