Professional Documents
Culture Documents
The PRESIDENTIAL RECORDINGS JOHN F. KENNEDY
The PRESIDENTIAL RECORDINGS JOHN F. KENNEDY
The PRESIDENTIAL RECORDINGS JOHN F. KENNEDY
P R E SIDE NT I AL
R E CO R DING S
J OHN F . K ENNEDY
The
P RESIDEN T I A L
R ECORDI N G S
J O H N F. K E N N E DY
THE GREAT CRISES, VOLUME TWO
David Coleman
George Eliades
Francis Gavin
Jill Colley Kastner
Erin Mahan
Ernest May
Jonathan Rosenberg
David Shreve
Associate Editors, Volume Two
Patricia Dunn
Assistant Editor
B
W. W. NORTON & COMPANY • NEW YORK • LONDON
Copyright © 2001 by The Miller Center of Public Affairs
Portions of this three-volume set were previously published by Harvard University Press in The
Kennedy Tapes: Inside the White House During the Cuban Missile Crisis
by Philip D. Zelikow and Ernest R. May.
Copyright © 1997 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0
MILLER CENTER OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS
UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA
The Presidential Recordings Project
Philip Zelikow
Director of the Center
Timothy Naftali
Director of the Project
vii
viii CONTENTS
Index 615
The Presidential Recordings Project
BY PHILIP ZELIKOW AND ERNEST MAY
B
etween 1940 and 1973, presidents of the United States secretly
recorded hundreds of their meetings and conversations in the
White House. Though some recorded a lot and others just a little,
they created a unique and irreplaceable source for understanding not
only their presidencies and times but the presidency as an institution
and, indeed, the essential process of high-level decision making.
These recordings of course do not displace more traditional sources
such as official documents, private diaries and letters, memoirs, and con-
temporaneous journalism. They augment these sources much as photo-
graphs, films, and recordings augment printed records of presidents’
public appearances. But they do much more than that.
Because the recordings capture an entire meeting or conversation,
not just highlights caught by a minute-taker or recalled afterward in a
memorandum or memoir, they have or can have two distinctive qualities.
In the first place, they can catch the whole complex of considerations
that weigh on a president’s action choice. Most of those present at a
meeting with a president know chiefly the subject of that meeting. Even
key staff advisers have compartmented responsibilities. Tapes or tran-
scripts of successive meetings or conversations can reveal interlocked
concerns of which only the president was aware. They can provide hard
evidence, not just bases for inference, about presidential motivations.
Desk diaries, public and private papers of presidents, and memoirs
and oral histories by aides, family, and friends all show how varied and
difficult were the presidents’ responsibilities and how little time they had
for meeting those responsibilities. But only the tapes provide a clear pic-
ture of how these responsibilities constantly converged—how a presi-
dent could be simultaneously, not consecutively, a commander in chief
worrying about war, a policymaker conscious that his missteps in eco-
nomic policy could bring on a market collapse, a chief mediator among
interest groups, a chief administrator for a myriad of public programs, a
spokesperson for the interests and aspirations of the nation, a head of a
sprawling political party, and more.
The tapes reveal not only what presidents said but what they heard.
For everyone, there is some difference between learning by ear and by
xi
xii T H E P R E S I D E N T I A L R E C O R D I N G S P RO J E C T
useful bit of hardware. Looking for a way for two scholars to listen
simultaneously to the same DAT copies, Eliades suggested use of a mul-
tiple outlet headphone amplifier (Rane’s Mojo amplifier). Eliades and
Naftali also discovered that this hardware dramatically improved our
ability to boost the audio signal from the tapes. We are continuing to tin-
ker with the hardware, including more use of CD-ROM technology. We
welcome suggestions for further improvement.
The most fundamental improvements in transcription so far, though,
have not come from machines. They came from people. Introduction of a
team method for reviewing transcripts, an innovation developed and
managed mainly by Naftali, has helped reduce the most intractable source
of error—the cognitive expectations and limitations of an individual lis-
tener. For instance, when you expect to hear a word in an ambiguous bit
of sound, you often hear it. Even without particular expectations, differ-
ent listeners hear different things. So we have utilized a special kind of
“peer review” in this new realm of basic historical research.
The talents required from our scholars are demanding. They must be
excellent historians, knowledgeable about the events and people of the
period. They must also have a particular temperament. Anthropologists
and archaeologists used to taking infinite pains at a dig, teaspoon or
toothbrush in hand, might call this a talent for “field work.” So we are
especially grateful to the historians, listed on the title page of the vol-
umes, who have displayed the knowledge, the patience, and the discipline
this work requires, rewarded by a constant sense of discovery.
In consultation with our editorial advisory board and our scholars,
we developed a number of methodological principles for the Miller
Center’s work. Among the most important are:
First, the work is done by trained professional historians who have
done deep research on the period covered by the tapes and on some of
the central themes of the meetings and conversations. They are listed on
the title page as associate and volume editors. The historians not only
delve into documentary sources but sometimes interview living partici-
pants who can help us comprehend the taped discussions. Our voice
identifications are based on sample clips we have compiled and on our
research. On occasion our list of participants in a meeting differs from
the log of President Kennedy’s secretary, Evelyn Lincoln. We list only
the names of participants whose voices we can identify. Our research has
also turned up a few minor cataloguing errors made at the time or later.
Second, each volume uses the team method. Since few people always
speak in complete grammatical sentences, the transcriber has to infer
and create paragraphs, commas, semicolons, periods, and such. Usually
T H E P R E S I D E N T I A L R E C O R D I N G S P RO J E C T xv
now than it was to listeners at the time. Obviously, what to include and
omit, balancing coherence and comprehension against the completeness
of the record, also requires subjective judgment. The object is to give the
reader or user the truest possible sense of the actual dialogue as the par-
ticipants themselves could have understood it (had they been paying
attention).
Sixth, we go one step further by including in each volume explana-
tions and annotations intended to enable readers or users to understand
the background and circumstances of a particular conversation or meet-
ing. With rare exceptions, we do not add information that participants
would not have known. Nor do we comment often on the significance of
items of information, except as it might have been recognized by the par-
ticipants. As with other great historical sources, interpretations will
have to accumulate over future decades and centuries.
Preface to John F. Kennedy:
The Great Crises, Volumes 1–3
BY PHILIP ZELIKOW AND ERNEST MAY
T
hese three volumes in the Miller Center Presidential Recordings
series cover the three months after Kennedy first began to tape-
record meetings.
Before and after becoming president, Kennedy had made use of a
recording device called a Dictaphone, mostly for dictating letters or notes.
In the summer of 1962 he asked Secret Service Agent Robert Bouck to
conceal recording devices in the Cabinet Room, the Oval Office, and a
study/library in the Mansion. Without explaining why, Bouck obtained
Tandberg reel-to-reel tape recorders, high-quality machines for the
period, from the U.S. Army Signal Corps. He placed two of these machines
in the basement of the West Wing of the White House in a room
reserved for storing private presidential files. He placed another in the
basement of the Executive Mansion.
The West Wing machines were connected by wire to two micro-
phones in the Cabinet Room and two in the Oval Office. Those in the
Cabinet Room were on the outside wall, placed in two spots covered by
drapes where once there had been wall fixtures. They were activated by
a switch at the President’s place at the Cabinet table, easily mistaken for
a buzzer press. Of the microphones in the Oval Office, one was in the
kneehole of the President’s desk, the other concealed in a coffee table
across the room. Each could be turned on or off with a single push on an
inconspicuous button.
We do not know where the microphone in the study of the Mansion
was located. In any case, Bouck, who had chief responsibility for the sys-
tem, said in 1976, in an oral history interview, that President Kennedy
“did almost no recording in the Mansion.” Of the machine in the base-
ment of the Mansion, he said: “Except for one or two short recordings, I
don’t think it was ever used.” So far, except possibly for one short
recording included in these volumes, no tape from the Mansion machine
has turned up.
President Kennedy also had a Dictaphone hooked up to a telephone
in the Oval Office and possibly also to a telephone in his bedroom. He
xvii
xviii P R E FA C E
could activate it, and so could his private secretary, Evelyn Lincoln, who
knew of the secret microphones, often made sure that they were turned
off if the President had forgotten to do so, and took charge of finished
reels of tape when they were brought to her by Bouck or Bouck’s assis-
tant, Agent Chester Miller.
Though Kennedy’s brother, Attorney General Robert Kennedy, and
Robert Kennedy’s secretary, Angie Novello, certainly knew of the tapes and
dictabelts by some point in 1963, it is not clear that they had this knowl-
edge earlier. Anecdotes suggest that the President’s close aide and sched-
uler, Kenneth O’Donnell, might have known about the system and might
have told another aide, Dave Powers, but the anecdotes are unsupported.
Most White House insiders, including counsel Theodore Sorensen, who
had been Kennedy’s closest aide in the Senate, were astonished when they
learned later that their words had been secretly captured on tape.
After Kennedy’s assassination, Evelyn Lincoln was quickly displaced
by President Johnson’s secretaries. She arranged, however, for the Secret
Service agents to pull out all the microphones, wires, and recorders and
took the tapes and dictabelts to her newly assigned offices in the
Executive Office Building, adjacent to the White House. Though Robert
Kennedy had charge of these and all other records from the Kennedy
White House, Lincoln retained physical custody.
During Kennedy’s presidency, only a small number of conversations
were transcribed. Though Lincoln attempted to make some other tran-
scripts, she never had much time for doing so. George Dalton, a former
Navy Petty Officer and general chore man for the Kennedy family, took
on the job. “Dalton transcripts” have not been released, but everyone
who has seen them uses terms like fragmentary, terrible to unreliable, awful,
or garbage.
The tapes and dictabelts migrated with President Kennedy’s papers.
First they moved to the main National Archives building in downtown
Washington, D.C. Herman Kahn (an archivist, not the strategic analyst)
was responsible for them within the National Archives system; Robert
Kennedy was the custodian for materials belonging to the family, includ-
ing all the tapes. Robert Kennedy disclosed the existence of the tapes in
1965 to Burke Marshall, a legal scholar and former Justice Department
colleague. Lincoln and Dalton were looking after the materials, and
Dalton was attempting some transcripts. The papers and the tapes then
were moved to a federal records depository in Waltham, Massachusetts.
In the summer and fall of 1967, when Robert Kennedy drafted his
famous memoir of the Cuban missile crisis, Thirteen Days, he used what-
P R E FA C E xix
1. See Timothy Naftali, “The Origins of ‘Thirteen Days,’”Miller Center Report 15, no. 2 (sum-
mer 1999): 23–24.
2. Philip Bennett, “Mystery Surrounds Role of JFK Tapes Transcriber,” Boston Globe, 31
March 1993, p. 1; Seymour M. Hersh, The Dark Side of Camelot (Boston: Little, Brown, 1997),
pp. 454–55.
xx P R E FA C E
Kennedy Library after her death in 1995; others turned up in the hands
of a collector who had befriended her. In 1998 the Kennedy Library was
able to recover these dictabelts too, but there is no way of knowing
whether there were others and, if so, what their fate was.
Once in the jurisdiction of the Archivist of the United States, the
recordings were handled with thoroughgoing professionalism. The library
remastered the tapes on a Magnecord 1022 for preservation. The dicta-
belts were copied onto new masters. All copies of the tapes, including
those used for these books, derive from these new preservation masters.
Some minor anomalies were introduced as a result of the remastering.
Listeners will occasionally hear a tape stop and the recording start up,
replaying a sentence or two. That is an artifact of the remastering process,
not the original White House taping. The original tapes were also recorded
at relatively high density (1 78 inches per second). The remastered tapes
necessarily have different running speeds that produce subtle audio distor-
tion. The new masters, for example, seem to have people talking slightly
faster than they did at the time.
The library was initially at a loss as to how to make tapes available to
the public. Many contain material still covered by security classification.
Because of the poor sound quality of most of the tapes, it was not easy to
identify sensitive passages. The library initially attempted to prepare its
own transcripts and submit these for classification review. But the task
was hard, the library staff was small, and funds were meager. Moreover,
some archivists believed as a matter of principle that the library should
not give official standing to transcripts that might contain transcribers’
errors. In the view of the National Archives and Records Administration,
only the tapes themselves are archival records. All transcripts are works of
subjective interpretation. The effort at transcription came to an end in
1983, and almost all the tapes remained under lock and key.
In 1993 the library acquired new equipment and began putting the
recordings onto Digital Audio Tape (DAT). These could be reviewed in
Washington and digitally marked without transcripts. Changes in proce-
dures, along with determined efforts by two archivists, Stephanie
Fawcett and Mary Kennefick, accelerated the pace of declassification.
Between 1996 and 2000 about half of the recordings in the Kennedy
Library became available for public release; the rest await declassifica-
tion review.
While the Kennedy Library has been careful to make no deletions or
erasures from tapes and dictabelts in its possession, the copies publicly
released, and used for these volumes, do have carefully annotated exci-
sions of passages still security classified. These passages were excised
xxii P R E FA C E
RESEARCH SCHOLARS
David Coleman
Cuba, Nuclear Test Ban
George Eliades
Vietnam, Laos, Nuclear Test Ban
Francis Gavin
Berlin Crisis, International Monetary Policy
Max Holland
Domestic Politics
Erin Mahan
Berlin Crisis, U.S.-European Relations, Congo, Middle East,
United Nations, China
Timothy Naftali
U.S.-Soviet Relations, Cuba, General Latin America,
Intelligence Policy, Nuclear Test Ban
Paul Pitman
U.S.-European Relations
Jonathan Rosenberg
Civil Rights
David Shreve
Congressional Relations, Tax and Budgetary Policy,
International Monetary Policy
Kristin Gavin
RESEARCH ASSISTANTS
T
he following is a concise guide to individuals who participated in
taped conversations. We have supplemented these brief descrip-
tions, when possible, with the thumbnail sketches made by for-
mer presidential special consultant Richard E. Neustadt in his book
Report to JFK: the Skybolt Crisis in Perspective (Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University Press, 1999). Neustadt met the people he has written about.
We feel that his vivid brush strokes add some additional color that we, at
this distant remove, do not feel qualified to provide. We also include fig-
ures mentioned frequently in the conversations, such as foreign heads of
government, who were not present at the meetings.
xxxi
xxxii M E E T I N G PA RT I C I PA N T S
Under Secretary for Economic Affairs; his focused energy, intelligence, and
application already had won him a promotion.
Barbour, Walworth, U.S. Ambassador to Israel, 1961–1973
Barnett, Ross R., Democratic Governor of Mississippi, 1960–1964
Bell, David E., Director of the Budget, 1961–1962; Director, U.S.
Agency for International Development after December 1962
An economist, former Secretary of Harvard’s Graduate School of Public
Administration, as it then was, and before that Administrative Assistant to
President Truman, Bell was personable, thoughtful, analytic, and experienced.
Billings, LeMoyne, Personal friend of President Kennedy; a roommate of
the young JFK at Choate and, briefly, Princeton
Blough, Roger, Chairman, U.S. Steel Corporation, 1955–1969
Boeschenstein, Harold, Senior Executive, Owens-Corning Fiberglass
Corporation in 1962
Boggs, Thomas Hale, U.S. Representative, Democrat, from Louisiana,
1941–1943, 1947–1972; House Majority Whip, 1961–1971
Bohlen, Charles E., Special Adviser to the President, 1961–1962; U.S.
Ambassador to France, October 1962–1968
One of the two top Russian specialists in the State Department, recently
appointed Ambassador to France. More a thoroughly skilled operator than a
deep analyst, Bohlen was bored in Paris, feeling out of things.
Bundy, McGeorge, Special Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs, 1961–1966
Formerly Dean of Arts and Sciences at Harvard at a young age, co-author of
Henry Stimson’s memoirs, “Mac” was bright, quick, confident, determined,
striving to be the perfect staff man, juggling many balls at once.
Bundy, William P., Deputy Assistant of Defense for International
Security Affairs, 1961–1963
Carter, Marshall S., Lieutenant General, U.S. Army; Deputy Director of
Central Intelligence, 1962–1965
Castro Ruz, Fidel, Premier of Cuba, 1959–
Celebrezze, Anthony J., Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare,
1962–1965
Charyk, Joseph V., Under Secretary of the Air Force, 1960–1963
Clark, Ramsey, Assistant Attorney General of the United States,
1961–1965
Clay, Lucius D., President’s Special Representative in Berlin, 1961–1962;
Special Consultant to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1962–1963
Cleveland, J. Harlan, Assistant Secretary of State for International
Organization Affairs, 1961–1965
Clifford, Clark, Personal Attorney to the President; Member, President’s
M E E T I N G PA RT I C I PA N T S xxxiii
J OHN F . K ENNEDY
T U E S DAY, S E P T E M B E R 4, 1962 3
1. Date Diary, 4 September 1962, Richard Russell Papers, Richard B. Russell Library for
Political Research and Studies, University of Georgia, Athens.
2. Including President Kennedy, Charles Bohlen, McGeorge Bundy, Martin Hillenbrand,
Robert Kennedy, Foy Kohler, Robert McNamara, and Dean Rusk. Tape 18, John F. Kennedy
Library, President’s Office Files, Presidential Recordings Collection.
3. “U-2 Overflights of Cuba, 29 August through 14 October 1962,” 27 February 1963, in CIA
Documents on the Cuban Missile Crisis 1962, ed. Mary McAuliffe (Washington, DC: CIA, 1992),
document 45.
4. Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach, The CIA and the U-2 Program, 1954–1974
(Washington, DC: CIA, 1998), p. 197.
5. After 1958, the U.S. Air Force assumed the responsibility for U-2 reconnaissance flights
along the Soviet periphery. This particular flight was under the control of the Strategic Air
Command. Like the CIA, the U.S. Air Force was not permitted to send U-2s over Soviet terri-
tory after May 1960. Although a resumption of U-2 overflights of Soviet territory was consid-
Meeting on U-2 Incident 5
against yet another U-2 incident. But the U.S. government still needed
the intelligence that U-2s could provide. Although satellite reconnais-
sance was still in its infancy, the successful launch of the SAMOS satel-
lite in the summer of 1961 had taken some but not all of the pressure off
the U-2 for information on Soviet military developments. Evidently, the
U-2 involved in the 30 August incident had meant to fly parallel to the
Soviet borders to pick up electronic intelligence but had lost its way.
Kennedy began taping as Dean Rusk gives his assessment of the
situation.
Dean Rusk: It’s very clear indeed that the Soviets have got us right
on the hip on this one.
President Kennedy: Right.
Rusk: Therefore the [unclear] and—
President Kennedy: [Unclear] which I [unclear]. I saw your wife the
other day at the airport.
Charles Bohlen: Yes, sir.
President Kennedy: And I saw Avis’s sister, wasn’t that . . .?6 Avis’s
sister was there right at the airport to welcome me, along with a few
others.
Bohlen: Evidently.
President Kennedy: She said she was Avis’s sister and three boys,
and two boys.
Bohlen: Yeah.
President Kennedy: She must . . . she couldn’t have too much to do
up there if she went to the airport [unclear]. [A chuckle.]
Rusk: [Unclear] have you been briefed on what actually happened on
this?
President Kennedy: Yeah. I wonder how the pilot made the mistake?
Rusk: Well . . . very heavy winds blowing to the west and they just
blew him off course. It was at night. Obviously, it could not have been—
there—a reconnaissance photographic plane of the sort that the U-2
over a Soviet—
President Kennedy: Oh, it was at night.
ered by the Kennedy administration during the 1961 Berlin crisis, no intentional overflights of
Soviet territory took place in the Kennedy years (ibid., pp. 189–97, 201).
6. Charles Bohlen had two daughters, Avis and Celestine. Here the President is referring to
Celestine Bohlen, who later became a foreign correspondent for the New York Times.
6 T U E S DAY, S E P T E M B E R 4, 1962
7. Sakhalin Island was divided between Japan and Russia until 1945, when the Soviets occu-
pied the southern half of this long island.
8. Kennedy is referring to the politics surrounding the Soviet shoot-down of Gary Powers’s
U-2 in May 1960. The Eisenhower administration’s handling of the crisis became an issue in
that year’s presidential election.
Meeting on U-2 Incident 7
[Soviet] territory . . . You see it’s, leave that open. He may have, you see.
But [if he] did in fact violate, this act was entirely unintentional and due
solely to a navigational error under extremely difficult flying conditions.
That’s enough of a regret, I should think, at this point.
Martin Hillenbrand: Sir, may I bring up one point that I think—
President Kennedy: Yeah.
Hillenbrand: —is important to your credibility problem?
Thirty-four seconds excised as classified information.
Robert Kennedy: Can I make that point also that it’s almost the
direct wording of the note that was issued after the U-2 . . . that first
paragraph—
Hillenbrand: My point is that I just wouldn’t specify what they’re
collecting—I would leave it unspecified, but the nighttime will make it
clear that it’s not a photographic one.
President Kennedy: Well, the other thing, I, you’d have to maybe
even explain that . . .
Hillenbrand: I think you could say, “a routine.”
Bohlen: Well, but the cause of the violation was the weather, the
wind . . .
Unidentified: Right.
Hillenbrand: No doubt—
President Kennedy: The purpose of the flight—
Bohlen: The purpose of the flight was not going to—
Rusk: “A weather reconnaissance and air-sampling aircraft” . . . It
undoubtedly did some air sampling, didn’t it? Don’t all of our flights do
some of this?
Unidentified: I’m, you know . . .
Robert McNamara: I don’t [unclear], the U-2 did.
Unidentified: No, I don’t think so.
Rusk: An aircraft on a routine mission—
President Kennedy: Well, I don’t know . . . it’s . . . I think the . . . we
owe him . . . we don’t owe him the whole truth [unclear]—
McGeorge Bundy: Why don’t you just say an aircraft in interna-
tional waters may have been blown over?
Hillenbrand: That’s right. All I’m suggesting is we not say while on
an air-sampling mission.
Rusk: Knock out that sentence.
Hillenbrand: I think that this would clearly affect the credibility of
[unclear].
President Kennedy: Yeah.
Hillenbrand: It is very likely that he would know that it’s not.
8 T U E S DAY, S E P T E M B E R 4, 1962
Hillenbrand: All right, well, if you put in that phrase there, “operat-
ing at night.”
President Kennedy: Well, then we’re going to background, aren’t
we? And say that . . . We’re going to say that here. We don’t say it to the
Soviets [unclear].
Rusk: [reading] “The pilot of the aircraft has reported that he was
flying a directed course well outside Soviet territorial limits but encoun-
tered severe winds during the nighttime flight and may therefore have
unintentionally overflown the southern tip of Sakhalin. My government
has instructed me to state that the policy of the United States govern-
ment with reference to overflights of Soviet territory has in no way been
altered and remains as stated by the President on January 25, 1961. [If ]
the pilot of the aircraft in question did in fact violate Soviet territory,
this act was entirely unintentional and due solely to a navigational error
under extremely difficult flying conditions.”
President Kennedy: Do we want to say “every precaution will be
taken to prevent a recurrence”?
Unidentified: Sounds good.
President Kennedy: See that gets in, the regret, then after that . . .
Bohlen: This implies as though you haven’t taken [them] before.
And, of course, the course of this plane was well outside the—
Bundy: I don’t understand how this damn thing happened, I must say.
President Kennedy: I see that every—We are just restating it that
every precaution be taken to prevent a recurrence.
Rusk: “Precautions are . . .”
President Kennedy: “Every step will be taken.”
Rusk: “Precautions are . . .”
Bohlen: “The existing precautions will be . . .”
Rusk: “Precautions are . . . earlier—”
President Kennedy: “Reexamined in [unclear] terms.”
Rusk: “—directed earlier—”
Unidentified: “Reconfirmed.”
Rusk: “Precautions directed earlier by the President to avoid such
incidents remain in full effect.”
President Kennedy: But, except, we’ve had the incident. So, I think
we ought to just say, if we are going to say anything, we ought to just
say that we’re taking every step to prevent a recurrence.
Bundy: Will be reviewed. You could say it will be reviewed. That
would suggest that you—
President Kennedy: Prevent a recurrence.
Well, then . . . and then what would we release?
Meeting on U-2 Incident 11
11. Robert Kennedy’s 2:15 P.M. meeting with Soviet ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin is con-
firmed by a note in the Attorney General’s appointments diary, John F. Kennedy Library.
12. At the Geneva foreign ministers’ meeting in July, the United States had proposed an
agreement on the nondiffusion of nuclear weapons from nuclear states to nonnuclear states as
a way to assuage Soviet concerns that the United States would permit the Federal Republic of
Germany to acquire nuclear weapons. The Soviets did not find the U.S. proposal satisfactory
because it left the door open to West Germany receiving nuclear weapons as part of a multi-
lateral NATO nuclear sharing agreement.
13. Andrei Gromyko was Soviet foreign minister since 1957.
Meeting on U-2 Incident 13
Rusk: We really ought to get going on this and that we just really
can’t understand why they make such a [unclear] deal about on-site
inspections, which can’t possibly involve espionage. That this must be
something else in their minds. But if he has any idea . . . he could give
you more about what is really in their minds about this, do they really
want to continue the testing? [Unclear]—
President Kennedy: Well, yeah, that. And then the other thing is:
what he ought [to] say about Berlin, what he ought to say about Cuba?
He ought to indicate what [unclear] are not in Cuba.
Rusk: Well, we have that proposed statement coming in on Cuba.
President Kennedy: [to Robert Kennedy]You come into that meeting
on Cuba and Berlin.
Rusk: And then Berlin, I should think that, again, we hammer the
business of the necessity of avoiding incidents, that the movement of the
traffic from Friedrichstrasse to Brandenburg Gate or to the Brandenburg
Bridge is intended to avoid incidents. And we hope their people will coop-
erate on that and that this is a matter that ought not to be allowed to
[unclear] because [unclear]. But you’ve been fully briefed on that earlier
report on this.
President Kennedy: Yes. Well, why don’t we see whether we get—
McNamara: [Unclear] the Attorney General add to this note also, to
repeat again that it’s the President’s personal instruction to the
Secretary of Defense that there will be no U-2 overflights . . . wish he
could.
Hillenbrand: Right. And also about photography.
McNamara: Yes, and also about the photography.
Hillenbrand: Yeah. I think coming from him—
McNamara: I believe it is extremely important that [unclear].
President Kennedy: And before you . . . Chip will have gotten this
over to them? As soon as it’s . . .
Bohlen: Yeah, we can get—
President Kennedy: But you go right now. You won’t be at this,
involved in this Cuba thing, so you can go ahead with it.
Bohlen: Well, [unclear].
President Kennedy: Then, there, when the press goes out, Manning
ought to be told that he can reiterate to the press but—14
Bohlen: OK.
Rusk: [Unclear.]
Bohlen: Well [unclear] it will automatically get to [unclear].
Rusk: Well, that’s right. We don’t send anything over tomorrow.
Bundy: Let’s not [unclear] Pierre’s article.
Bohlen: Do you want me to call and see him?
President Kennedy: Why doesn’t Chip take—what?
Rusk: I wouldn’t go over to see him.
President Kennedy: Why not?
Rusk: Why doesn’t he come to see me?
President Kennedy: He doesn’t have to—what time?—Chip, just
talk to him on the phone briefing him [on] the message [unclear]—
Rusk: Or I could send him the thing. . . . I wouldn’t talk to him on the
phone. Just a phone call telling him to . . .
Bohlen: Well, then I think we’d better do this. We’d better give this
to him and then have it repeated in Moscow by McSweeney to the
Russian [unclear].15
President Kennedy: Fine. That’s the best way.
Rusk: Give him a copy of the statement we make here and then send
this to Moscow.
Bohlen: Yeah, well, we won’t get it . . . How do I get it to him? Send
it to him?
President Kennedy: Have Chip call him up and read to him and say,
“This is the message we’re sending to McSween[ey], I’ll send you over a
copy of it but I wanted you to have it ’cause we’re going to put out a
statement—”
Rusk: Yeah. We’re making a statement on it [unclear].
Meeting breaks up.
President Kennedy: McSween[ey] ought to be told, it seems to me,
in the note that we send to him that you . . . this is what’s been given to
Dobrynin at whatever time it was and also about the public statement
put out. So—
Rusk: Yeah. [Unclear.]
President Kennedy: As long as [unclear] have this by the time
McSween[ey] gets this. McSween[ey] ought to know [unclear] will
have it. Because, you know [unclear].
Bohlen: Yeah, we’ll put this right on the wires . . .
Rusk: That’s right. Let McSweeney know that it has been made public.
Bohlen: You have to make it public.
15. John M. McSweeney was the U.S. minister-counselor at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow.
16 T U E S DAY, S E P T E M B E R 4, 1962
White House Guard #1: Did you bring over the Italian guy
[Ambassador Sergio Fenoaltea]?
White House Guard #2: Yeah. I got him.
A few minutes later the group approaches the empty Oval Office.
16. From Marshall Carter to John McCone, 8 September 1962, in CIA Documents, McAuliffe,
pp. 55–56.
17. “U-2 Overflights of Cuba, 29 August through 14 October 1962,” 27 February 1963, ibid.,
pp. 127–37.
T U E S DAY, S E P T E M B E R 4, 1962 17
Ten minutes after the Arkansas group had entered the private secretarial
and staff office adjacent to the Oval Office to await the President, Kennedy
reentered the Oval Office. He clearly had little idea who these people were
or why they had been allowed to wait for him in an office usually closed to
public visitors. No White House staffer had informed him that Senator
William Fulbright and the Italian ambassador were waiting outside his
office. Apparently preoccupied with the two difficult foreign policy matters
of the day, Kennedy had forgotten that at his August 29 press conference
he had hailed this Arkansan choir and promised the press corps that the
choir would be visiting him at the White House within the new few days.
18. Angie Biddle Duke was the White House chief of protocol.
19. Pierre Salinger was the President’s press secretary.
18 T U E S DAY, S E P T E M B E R 4, 1962
The choir members were successfully ushered out to the Rose Garden.
The President then joined them and the choir began to sing. The per-
formance lasted nearly five minutes, after which the President spoke to
the audience. Laughter can be heard faintly in the Oval Office in reaction
Meeting on Soviet Arms Shipments to Cuba 19
President Kennedy: Let’s see, can you get somebody to take them
through the White House?
Can you [unclear] people remind everybody that whenever I have a
group, give me a little history with suggested points and [unclear]?
Unidentified Staffer: Right. I will, sir.
Staffer: [Unclear.]
Staffer: But announce that you [unclear] out on the other side. We’ve
worked that out. The sergeant’s going to take them through.
Staffer: Yes.
Staffer: The sergeant . . .
The door opens. Someone says, “Gee, are you going to perform me
that Boogie?” Someone answers, “Oh, yes, [this] afternoon.” The
group passes through the corridor. There is a little chitchat.
Unidentified: Oh, isn’t that gorgeous.
The group from Arkansas has left and a few staffers were chatting.
Telephones continued to ring, and Evelyn Lincoln’s voice can be heard in
the background. Forgotten, the machine in the Oval Office kept running.
12:35–1:00 P.M.
20. Including President Kennedy, McGeorge Bundy, Marshall Carter, Robert Kennedy, Robert
McNamara, Dean Rusk, and Theodore Sorensen. Tape 18, John F. Kennedy Library,
President’s Office Files, Presidential Recordings Collection.
20 T U E S DAY, S E P T E M B E R 4, 1962
Soviet note on the U-2 incident, the rest of them moved to the Cabinet
Room to discuss Soviet activities in Cuba. At issue was what form of pub-
lic statement was required to reassure the American people that Kennedy
had matters under control. Congressmen, especially Senator Kenneth
Keating of New York, had begun to question the White House’s handling
of the obvious buildup of Soviet weapons on the island. There were
rumors of the installation of Russian missiles, certainly conventionally
armed surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), but possibly even surface-to-surface
nuclear rockets. Indeed, photography from a secret U-2 flight flown over
the island on August 29 had just confirmed for Kennedy the existence of
eight SAM sites.
Although there was as yet no firm evidence of nuclear missiles, some
in Kennedy’s inner circle think that it is only a matter of time before
Khrushchev decides to install that kind of force in Cuba. This group, led
by Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy, viewed the impending public
statement as a golden opportunity to send a clear warning to Khrushchev
that the United States would never countenance a Soviet nuclear base in
Castro’s Cuba. In any case, the President wanted a public statement on
this new Soviet defensive missile system found in Cuba. On August 31, he
had told General Marshall Carter, who was running the CIA in John
McCone’s absence, to put the readout from the August 29 flight “in the
box and nail it shut.”21 A freeze on sharing this information with anyone
but the top foreign policymakers and analysts remained in effect.
However, it was not going to last forever with interest so high on Capitol
Hill and in the media.
President Kennedy remembered to turn the machine on as the
Secretary of State, a skeptic about the possiblility of any Soviet nuclear
adventure in Cuba, read aloud from a draft statement prepared by the
State Department.
Tape machines were now running connected to microphones in both
the empty Oval Office, where distant secretarial sounds could still be
heard, and in the Cabinet Room, where the President’s Cuba team had
assembled.
21. Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, Memorandum for the Director, “Action Generated by DCI Cables
Concerning Cuban Low-Level Photography and Offensive Weapons,” CIA Documents,
McAuliffe, document 12.
Meeting on Soviet Arms Shipments to Cuba 21
Dean Rusk: [reading from State draft press statement 22] “. . . in Latin
America. Whatever armed strength the Cuban regime may develop will be
restricted by whatever means—”
McGeorge Bundy: Agreed.
Rusk: “—may be necessary to that island. The U.S. will join with
other hemisphere countries to insure that Cuba’s increased military
strength will amount to nothing more than an increased burden on the
people of Cuba themselves.”
Robert McNamara: I think that’s excellent.
Bundy: I think that general sentiment—I wouldn’t call it “increased
military expen—increased expenditure on military gadgets.” I really think
we don’t want to get into the position of being frightened by this group.
Rusk: But this sense that Bob McNamara has about any placing by
the Soviets of a significant offensive capability in the hands of this self-
announced aggressive regime in Cuba would be a direct and major chal-
lenge to this hemisphere and would warrant immediate and appropriate
action.
McNamara: I worry about that because they already have 16 MiGs
which—23
Rusk: Do you feel that the MiGs are [a] significantly aggressive
[addition]?
McNamara: I do. And I further feel that they’ll be adding to what
could be interpreted as offensive strength in the months ahead.
President Kennedy: The missiles really are what are significant?
Bundy: Surface-to-surface missiles are the turning point.
Unidentified: SAMs.
Bundy: Unless they were to put jerry-built nuclear weapons on MiGs
which is—
McNamara: Yeah.
Bundy: —not a likely configuration.
22. The President’s copy of this draft is in the “Cuba, Security, 1962” folder, President’s Office
Files, Box 115, John F. Kennedy Library. The document bears Kennedy’s notations and under-
lining.
23. The MiGs are Soviet fighter and ground attack aircraft. By the summer of 1962, the
Soviets were to have delivered at least 41 jets and reconnaissance aircraft (MiG-19s and MiG-
15s) to the Cubans. See the 4 May 1961 report by Soviet defense minister Rodion Malinovsky
as quoted in “One Hell of a Gamble”: Khrushchev, Castro, and Kennedy, 1958–1964, by Aleksandr
Fursenko and Timothy Naftali (New York: Norton, 1997), p. 99. The U.S. government had
detected these older model aircraft. It had not yet, however, detected the ongoing delivery of
the most-advanced Soviet fighter/ground attack aircraft, the MiG-21.
22 T U E S DAY, S E P T E M B E R 4, 1962
24. The Organization of American States foreign ministers’ meeting was at Punta del Este,
Uruguay, 22 to 31 January 1962.
25. On Wednesday, 5 September 1962.
24 T U E S DAY, S E P T E M B E R 4, 1962
that. In fact, I should think that they probably wouldn’t support . . . a lot
of screams around the world.
But I think that this statement . . . this gives us a reason to put out a
statement as to what really is going to be our policy, not just on the sur-
face-to-air missiles, but what is our . . . going to be our policy as far as
Cuba in the future is concerned. I think that’s—
Rusk: The great problem, the great difficulty, of course, as we all
know [unclear] . . . I think that, looking at Cuba, I think that it would be
fairly easy to come to answers to the questions that are posed at the
present time. But the United States has such a worldwide confrontation
with the Soviet Union that when the time comes to act, the President
will have to take into account how that action relates to the worldwide
confrontation and what the situation is everywhere else at the same time
because his problems are total and comprehensive. I mean, if we were
relatively isolated in the world, which we were before World War II, we
could concentrate on Cuba and say, “If this in Cuba, then that follows.”
But we’ve got a million men overseas in confrontation with the Soviet
bloc and this is a part of that confrontation. This is the thing that makes
it so agonizingly difficult.
Robert Kennedy: Yeah. I understand that. So, therefore, I think that you
really have to reach a determination of whether putting surface-to-surface
missiles in Cuba would be where you’d really have to face up to it, and fig-
ure that you are going to have to take your chances on something like that.
Everything you do, whether you do it in Southeast Asia, or Berlin or Cuba
or wherever is going to have some effect on the Soviet Union elsewhere.
And whether there are certain things that they do that—
President Kennedy: But isn’t this what we’re saying? As I under-
stood, that statement was that when they’ve got a—
Robert Kennedy: Yeah, but [unclear] saying—
President Kennedy: —upset the general balance in—
Robert Kennedy: The point of that, the Secretary makes, Secretary
McNamara says they’ve got that at the present time.
President Kennedy: Yes.
Robert Kennedy: Under that definition of a “substantial offensive
capability,” quote unquote, that at the present time that the Cubans and
the Russians have that in Cuba and that the . . .
Bundy: Would our [unclear], air-defense posture against those MiGs
be [unclear], Bob?
Robert Kennedy: Some congressman or senator can come in and say,
“Prove that they haven’t at the present time 16 MiGs,” and, then you’d
Meeting on Soviet Arms Shipments to Cuba 27
26. The U.S. Naval Base at Guantánamo Bay. The Cuban government granted the United
States a lease for the base in 1903 and extended it in an agreement signed in 1934.
Meeting on Soviet Arms Shipments to Cuba 29
27. The Monroe Doctrine, proclaimed by President James Monroe in 1823, constituted a
warning to European powers not to intervene in the Western Hemisphere. In the twentieth
century, it provided a rationale for U.S. intervention in the Caribbean region. President
Theodore Roosevelt declared as a “corollary” to the doctrine that the United States should
maintain stable conditions and not give outside powers any cause to intervene in the region.
28. The next in the draft, with underlining as found on the President’s own copy, reads,
“Further I say to our friends in Latin America that whatever armed strength the Cuban
regime may develop will be restricted by whatever means may be necessary to that island.”
29. The previous sentence was “Any placing by the Soviets of a significant offensive capability
in the hands of this self-announced aggressive regime in Cuba would be a direct and major
challenge to all this hemisphere stands for and would warrant immediate and appropriate
(forceful) action.” In Kennedy’s copy, forceful is underscored.
30 T U E S DAY, S E P T E M B E R 4, 1962
30. The Rio Treaty of 1947 (Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance), better known
as the Rio Pact, was a collective security agreement. Under its provisions, an attack against
one American state would be considered an attack against all.
31. The draft ends with a list of six measures to be initiated by the President, lettered A
through G. Letter D reads, “I have asked the Secretary of State to take full advantage of the
forthcoming meeting of the U.N. General Assembly to arrange for informal consultations
with the Foreign Ministers of the other members of the Organization of American States on
recent developments in Cuba as they may affect the security of the hemisphere; this is in
accord with suggestions which have come from several of our Latin American friends.”
32. C reads, “I have asked the Secretary of State to consult with our friends in the Caribbean
area about ways in which they can assist in the above programs further to insure their protec-
tion against the threat of Cuban military strength.”
Meeting on Soviet Arms Shipments to Cuba 31
President Kennedy: Good. Now, this . . . what about G?33 This is say-
ing we are going to recognize the government-in-exile, is it?
Rusk: No, this does not go quite that far. It’s a move in that direction.
But our great problem there is that the refugees are in complete disorder
so far as leadership.
Bundy: I would question whether we want to—if we do this—then
the one that is formed will look like our puppet. It will be the Cuban
government-in-exile formed by the President on his instructions. There
is some disadvantage in that.
Rusk: I think we might be able to shorten this in various respects.
President Kennedy: Well, I think, that we can shorten this thing, boil
it down. The key thing you need right now are these missiles, also put
them into proportion: We are in much more danger from the Soviet
Union than we are from Cuba.
McNamara: Sure.
President Kennedy: So that this thing again, the fixation on Cuba as
opposed to someplace else, is really, if they’re to recognize that the mis-
siles have changed . . . There are dangers in them. But other than that . . .
we don’t want them to fall into that . . . we want to kind of make it clear
to the country that [unclear as Bundy begins to speak] get our information
as quickly as possible.
Bundy: In that context—It seems to me, Mr. President, I would sug-
gest that we get the information out of the White House because the
information, the question has been raised as to whether you had all the
dope, were getting the thing straight. And that needs to be got straight.
Then I, I at least would suggest at least that the major points might bet-
ter be made by the Secretary of State precisely because we are not doing
anything very enormous at the moment there.
President Kennedy: Now, the only key thing would be this, all of this . . .
Bundy: You could reinforce it at a press conference.
President Kennedy: Would be . . . whatever armed strength they
develop . . . I mean, they seem to put a lot into this thing about . . . why
they . . . so, this is going to be used against other Caribbean, so that sen-
tence is rather important.
Bundy: Very important. I agree.
33. G reads, “I feel sure as more and more Russians arrive in Cuba, more and more Cubans will be
thinking and saying: ‘Cuba sí, Russia no.’ To take full advantage of this fact I hereby invite and urge
Cuban exiles everywhere to unite within a single organization in which opportunities are left for
eventual major participation at top levels by those resisting Communist domination within Cuba.”
32 T U E S DAY, S E P T E M B E R 4, 1962
Rusk: I think that’s the kind of statement that has to be made by the
President. The declaration of a security, in effect, a security guarantee to
all—
Bundy: To the Caribbean states
Rusk: —all of Cuba’s neighbors [unclear].
President Kennedy: I think what we ought to do is . . . why don’t you
get . . . working.
Bundy: Yes, we can shorten it up.
President Kennedy: With Ted [Sorensen], to shorten it up, tighten
it up. Then let’s have a—Bobby’s going to see this fellow at 2:15—then
let’s have a meeting at, let’s get the leadership down here at five; all
we’re going to do really is to tell them about these surface—
Bundy: Bring them up—That will be essentially for briefing by
General [Marshall] Carter then?
President Kennedy: That’s right. Now, how much do we tell them
[about] how we got it?
Marshall Carter: We can give them a briefing, sir, that would give
them all without telling them exactly how we got it.
President Kennedy: I think you’ve got to say, you would say that—
when we did get it—because, you see, at the press conference I said that
we had no evidence.
Bundy: No confirmation. Fully confirmed conclusions were possible
only when, Thursday—
President Kennedy: Friday.
Bundy: —or Friday.
Robert Kennedy: Not till Saturday.
Bundy: It was Thursday night and Friday morning, wasn’t it?
Unidentified: That’s right. It was Thursday night.
President Kennedy: OK. Now you can work on this. So that part’s all
right. I don’t—there’s nothing particularly . . . I think you can just say you
got it and describe what it is to them. By then we will have this statement
in order and then I think at that time the Secretary can say we want to keep
some proportion. We’ve got Berlin and the big danger’s it would—They
don’t have offensive capability against us and they also, they don’t have an
ability to, in the final analysis, to prevent us from doing what we think
needs to be done. But the big problem is the fact of these other obligations.
So, if we lock them in, that takes care of really the big [unclear] physically.
Bundy: I think you can, do you have a judgment, is today the time to
reach that other larger question of whether we want to indicate that
some such phrase “the significant offensive capability or further develop-
ment which might create a direct hazard” or something of this sort?
Whether you want to make that [unclear]?
Drafting Meeting on the Cuba Press Statement 33
The meeting ended and Kennedy left to shake hands in the Oval Office
with a congressional candidate from Missouri. After that, he went to the
Mansion for lunch and a swim.
34. President Kennedy, McGeorge Bundy, Marshall Carter, Ray S. Cline, C. Douglas Dillon,
Carl Kaysen, Robert Kennedy, Curtis LeMay, Edwin Martin, Robert McNamara, Paul Nitze,
34 T U E S DAY, S E P T E M B E R 4, 1962
Theodore Sorensen, and Maxwell Taylor. Others attending the meeting but not identified as
having spoken include Charles Bohlen and Martin Hillenbrand. Tape 19, John F. Kennedy
Library, President’s Office Files, Presidential Recordings Collection.
35. What Robert Kennedy did not know was that indeed his suspicions were correct and
Soviet missiles were on their way to Cuba, though they had not arrived there. However,
Ambassador Dobrynin was as much in the dark about these missile deployments as the U.S.
government.
Drafting Meeting on the Cuba Press Statement 35
36. Ultimately, the White House would put out that there were approximately 3,500 Soviet
military personnel in Cuba. The Attorney General’s draft statement has not been found.
36 T U E S DAY, S E P T E M B E R 4, 1962
Ray Cline: Sir, you asked me a question this morning about our first
evidence, we traced it back to mid-1960, to at least by July 1960 there
were some military technical advisers—
President Kennedy: Right.
Cline: —sent to Cuba from the [Soviet] bloc.
Bundy: Was that more than three years ago?
Cline: No, [unclear].
Carter: We were carrying 500 up until this most recent influx, and
there were 1,700 actually in, and 1,300 more within the last four or five
days, so that it’s about 3,500 military technicians, but we’ve been carry-
ing approximately 2,000 agricultural and economic assistants, Soviet
types, since they first started coming in in mid-’60.
Rusk: So that number has increased since they . . . [Rusk keeps talking
under Kennedy—unintelligible.]
President Kennedy: OK, well we have to rewrite that section, I think.
I’d rather see, “As we have said before.”
Bundy: Yeah. Right.
Carter: We carry about 5,000, altogether: agricultural, economic, and
military at this time. [Pause.]
Bundy: What this statement in this form admits . . . This paragraph
here, that’s the one on which we were having a discussion this morning.
Rusk: The Attorney General redrafted it, as we said this morning . . .
Robert Kennedy (?): We’ll look at that.
Rusk: There is a paragraph here that I believe might . . . we might
just want to make two or three small changes. I think [unclear]. [Lot of
paper rustling. Short, unclear exchanges.]
Robert Kennedy: The Secretary thinks that you should . . .
Rusk: It’s page 4, I believe [unclear].
Unidentified: Have you seen this piece of paper?
Unidentified: [Unclear.]
Carter: [Unclear] I was more concerned about the first page with the
facts [unclear]. That one there that you [unclear].
Unidentified: Coordination.
Rusk: This last paragraph on page 4.
President Kennedy: Why don’t we just start at the top of page 4:
“Clearly the recent acceleration of Soviet military aid to Cuba is coming
dangerously close to a violation of the Monroe Doctrine.” I think that’s a
. . . it’s an ambivalent, ambiguous position. What [unclear] would be the
subject of endless conversation about what does constitute a violation
and what does not. [Bundy can be heard indistinctly in the background.]
Drafting Meeting on the Cuba Press Statement 37
37. The final statement did not contain any reference to the Monroe Doctrine. The U.S. posi-
tion was that it had a right to react to anything that posed a threat to U.S. security or to the
security of other members of the inter-American system.
38 T U E S DAY, S E P T E M B E R 4, 1962
38. “Declaration of Solidarity for the Preservation of the Political Integrity of the American
States Against International Communist Intervention,” accepted on 13 March 1954 at the
conclusion of the Tenth Inter-American Conference, held at Caracas, Venezuela. For the full
text of the declaration, see Department of State Bulletin 30, no. 769 (22 March 1954): 420. The
passage continues: “. . . and would call for a meeting of consultation to consider the adoption
of measures in accordance with existing treaties.”
39. The Attorney General is trying to rework his draft to incorporate these new ideas.
Ultimately his draft would be completely revised and cut.
40. He is presumably referring to Article 6, which reads: “If the inviolability or the integrity of
the territory or the sovereignty or political independence of any American State should be
affected by an aggression which is not an armed attack or by an extra-continental or intra-conti-
nental conflict, or by any other fact or situation that might endanger the peace of America, the
Organ of Consultation shall meet immediately in order to agree on the measures which must be
taken in case of aggression to assist the victim of the aggression or, in any case, the measures
Drafting Meeting on the Cuba Press Statement 39
which should be taken for the common defense and for the maintenance of the peace and security
of the Continent.” For the full text of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, 1947,
see Department of State Bulletin 17, no. 429 (21 September 1947): 565–67.
41. Of the Charter of the United Nations.
40 T U E S DAY, S E P T E M B E R 4, 1962
42. Presumably, Robert Kennedy’s draft only ruled out the placement of offensive weapon sys-
tems on Cuba. Here the President is making clear what he thinks would be unacceptable:
ground-to-ground missiles.
Drafting Meeting on the Cuba Press Statement 41
43. Bundy consistently doubts the Soviets would ever use Cuba as a military base from which
to threaten the United States.
44. Rusk has hit on a new formulation of the warning to the Soviets. This phrasing would
prevail.
42 T U E S DAY, S E P T E M B E R 4, 1962
General’s draft in the middle of page 4 indicating what there is not evi-
dence of . . .
Martin: [Unclear.]
President Kennedy: I think we ought to have that and then we ought
to—
Bundy: That could follow on—
Rusk: And then the statement on—that reassures our Latin
American allies at the end.
Dillon: Well, I think the way you’ve redrafted it [unclear] objection.
President Kennedy: What we are doing is, first we’re going to give
the details of what assistance they’ve sent to Cuba.
Bundy: That’s right . . . what they have not.
President Kennedy: Secondly, we have . . . And what they have not.
Then secondly we are going to give a unilateral guarantee against the
use of any of these forces against anyone in the hemisphere.
Bundy: Against anybody else.
President Kennedy: Third, we’re going to say that the [unclear] indi-
rect methods of taking steps against them [unclear] direct. Then I think
we ought to say something about, at the end, that we have to keep in mind
for those who are . . . This is a dangerous world and we have to keep in
mind . . . don’t want to use the word totality again, but all of the dangers we
live with. The fact of the matter is the major danger is the Soviet Union
with missiles and nuclear warheads, not Cuba. We don’t want to get
everybody so fixed on Cuba that they regard . . . So in some way or other
we want to suggest that at the end. This is a matter of [unclear] danger, as
is Berlin as is Southeast Asia as are a great many areas which are—
Bundy: I think there is a question, Mr. President, whether you want
to do that in this statement or whether that’s something we make clear
as we go along.
President Kennedy: Well, I know, I think we’ve got to say something
about that otherwise you don’t want everybody to blow on this, you get
everybody so mesmerized here that all these other places which are
also—
Rusk: I think, perhaps [unclear]—
President Kennedy: This is not an aggressive danger to us except
indirectly.
Bundy: As it now stands.
President Kennedy: Compared with these other places. Now some-
where we’ve got to get that in, it seems to me, right from the beginning.
Give some guidance.
Drafting Meeting on the Cuba Press Statement 43
45. This less than eloquent phrase makes its way into the final version of the statement.
46. The President is seeking more policy flexibility than would have been allowed by a stri-
dent statement. The sentence about restricting or confining Cuban power never makes it into
the final version. Instead the Cuban problem is set within the complex of concerns defining
the worldwide struggle against Communism.
46 T U E S DAY, S E P T E M B E R 4, 1962
Unidentified: “Perspective.”
President Kennedy: “The dangers which confront the world in . . .”
Unidentified: [Unclear.]
Bundy: Well, I would . . . I don’t know that I’d localize it, at all.
“Which Soviet—”
President Kennedy: “Communist.” “Communist.”
Bundy: “With which Communist aggression threatens the wor—
Communist aggressiveness,” I would say, “threatens the world.”
President Kennedy: “And the peace.”
Long pause, with the sounds of writing and page turning. Several
unclear, whispered exchanges. Someone says “statement of the general
threat.”
Robert Kennedy: [Unclear.] Read that [unclear].
Rusk: [reading] “The Cuban ques—”[unclear] “The Cuban question
must be considered as part of a worldwide challenge posed by Communist
threats to the peace and must be dealt with as a part of that larger issue in
which all free men have a prominent stake.” It gets the idea without—47
Bundy: Without [unclear] either way. It’s very clear.
Robert Kennedy: We might put that at the beginning, I think, of the
first paragraph, rather than at the end where we say [unclear] happen
[unclear]. Might be well to have this right under . . . when we get into a
discussion of this whole problem.
Unidentified: After the factual statement.
Bundy: That’s probably going to be the second paragraph.
Unidentified: After the factual statement.
Bundy: But before we . . . the defense [unclear] . . .
Unidentified: [Unclear.] All right, [unclear].
Bundy: But before we say there is no defensive [unclear] I would
think . . . Let’s put this together in detachable fragments [unclear].
[Unclear exchange. Someone says, “Time is running out.”]
President Kennedy: Five, yeah.
Robert Kennedy: Can we head up there before that? [Unclear] take it
up now?
Bundy: Well, we’ll do our best.
President Kennedy: Here’s . . I don’t know what—You’ve got
Bobby’s haven’t you?
47. Here Rusk was expressing President Kennedy’s point that Cuba must be kept in perspective,
since the real concern was the Soviet Union and the most acute dangers were in other parts of the
world. This language would also be part of the final version.
Drafting Meeting on the Cuba Press Statement 47
Bundy: Yeah.
President Kennedy: What about this business of Guantánamo?
[Unclear.]
Robert Kennedy: Here at the end.
Bundy: I swiped it out.48
Unidentified: Yeah. I think that . . .
Unidentified: [Unclear.]
President Kennedy: Yeah, we ought to have a sentence in there “as
any further . . . as further information is received and verified—”
Bundy: “It will be promptly made available.”
President Kennedy: “In accordance with the President’s statement a
week ago.”49
Robert Kennedy: That’s almost covered in that first page.
Bundy: It’s in one of the papers. I think we did get this.
Robert Kennedy: Mac, you might look at the first page.
Unidentified: [Unclear.]
Bundy: Well . . . the [Central Intelligence] agency has a brief of what
they plan to do, Mr. President, which you may want to review before the . . .
Rusk: “As further information is developed and confirmed.”50
Carter: Would you prefer to look at it or . . .
President Kennedy: What’s this on?
Carter: This is substantially what we gained in this morning, Mr.
President, except—
President Kennedy: Oh about the . . . I’d like to ask General [Curtis]
LeMay a little about what these SAM sites could mean if we were going to
carry out an attack on Cuba. What hazard would this present to you?51
Curtis LeMay: Well, it would mean you’d have to get, of course, your
force in there to knock them out so that the rest of the attacking forces
would be free to take on the other targets. That’d be the first thing we’d
do. We’d have to go in low level and get them.
52. A U-2 photographed the central and eastern portions of Cuba on September 5. The mis-
sion detected three additional SAM sites in the central portion of the island. Heavy cloud
cover prevented the U-2 from seeing much along the eastern side of the island. “U-2
Drafting Meeting on the Cuba Press Statement 49
Carter: I think that’s a safe operation. But I think also it’s safe for the
entire island now, but next week it may not be and it might not be now.
President Kennedy: He has to go over land doesn’t he, to get this
thing, these [unclear]?
Carter: Yes sir, these are verticals.53
LeMay: Well, once these things become operational they have the
capability of shooting a U-2 down, of course. We can go to the low alti-
tude 101s, but [unclear].54
President Kennedy: You can’t get much, can you?
LeMay: You can’t hide them very well.
President Kennedy: You don’t get much I suppose either, do you?
LeMay: Well, you’d get the definite targets you’re looking for. You’d
have to cover a big wide area. You need more sorties to do that. The spe-
cific areas you’re interested in, you could [unclear].
President Kennedy: So the question really is the hazards to this
flight tomorrow.
LeMay: Yes, sir.
Carter: I think the hazard would be very, very slight and we would
like to go ahead with it, sir.
President Kennedy: It’s fine with me. Do you have any?
Robert McNamara: I think we definitely should go ahead, Mr.
President.
Bundy: I would agree.
President Kennedy: Fine.
Now, that would be about—after that it would probably get more dif-
ficult. So what are we going to do then? We ought to go, at least—I
know it’d seem abrupt so let’s be thinking about what [unclear]. There’s
no way we can do this . . .
Thirty-three seconds excised as classified information.
Cline: This flight tomorrow, ought to give us complete coverage of the
island and I think we would assess that and perhaps suggest we do an open
flight or a . . . that it is safe for another major flight based on [unclear].
Carter: Of course, you’ll get noise from the 101s [if President
Dean Rusk had a barely audible conversation with someone before the
congressmen arrive. The Secretary of State then, it seems, left the room,
but Robert McNamara stayed behind to greet the congressmen.
56. The discussion has shifted to the call-up of reserves that Kennedy believes is necessary to
prepare the U.S. armed forces for any contingency in the rough patch ahead.
57. Foy D. Kohler would replace Llewellyn E. Thompson, Jr., as U.S. ambassador to the Soviet
Union on 27 September 1962.
52 T U E S DAY, S E P T E M B E R 4, 1962
Unidentified: [Unclear.]
Unidentified: All the big shots should be at the table, not the little
shots today. [Unclear exchanges.]
Unidentified: Pull up a chair.
Unidentified: You sit back there thinking that you’ll have people think-
ing that pipe as far away from everybody as possible. [Unclear exchanges.]
President Kennedy: Just wait just a minute. Alex. [Unclear.]
Unidentified: [Unclear.]
Unidentified: [Unclear] California.
Unidentified: He’s in California.
Unidentified: Oh, he’s in California?
Unidentified: Back tonight. I saw Fulbright was in town.
President Kennedy: That singing group from Arkansas here this
morning was fantastic . . . [unclear] group from the University of
Arkansas [unclear] won that prize with forty other countries at singing
medieval church music.
Charles Halleck: Is that the group that all the singing experts said
was no good? [Several voices agree. Laughter.] [Unclear.]
President Kennedy: [That] shows you you can’t believe everything
[unclear].
Unidentified: It just proves . . .
Russell: In my opinion I thought the . . .
Unidentified: Huh?
Russell: In my opinion the Italians loved it. [Unclear exchange.]
President Kennedy: I think we’re . . . I think we’re starting anyway.
This meeting is to give the leadership the latest information we have
on Cuba. Perhaps General Carter, who is executive director of the
Central Intelligence Agency, who is representing the intelligence com-
munity today in Mr. McCone’s absence, will lead off with first what we
had up till Friday, then the information we got this weekend.62
Marshall Carter: Up until Friday of last week we’ve had considerable
indications—in fact, firm indications—of Soviet shipping up to as many
as forty ships having come into Cuba since mid-July. Spasmodic reports,
many from refugees and from some defectors indicating the type of
equipment, but nothing on which we could really pin a confirmation.
New sources, highly reliable, new information that has just come in
over this last weekend now gives us clear confirmation of exactly what
62. McCone was on his honeymoon at Cap Ferrat, on the French Riviera.
Meeting with Cong ressional Leadership on Cuba 55
the Soviets have been putting in, in recent weeks. We have surface-to-air
missiles, some artillery, and some motor torpedo boats with missile
launchers.
I’d like to go into the details of exactly what this equipment is that we
have been able to confirm. They are now building, on the island of Cuba,
eight surface-to-air missile sites, one probable assembly area just south of
Havana and two additional sites, one on the far eastern side of Cuba.
I’d like to show you these on the map here. There has been very little
permanent construction at these sites, indicating that they are going in
on a crash basis and yet they could be operational, some of them, within
a week. It takes a minimum of 125 technically trained personnel to oper-
ate one of these sites and to the best of our knowledge, no Cubans have
been receiving this technical training. This excludes the security person-
nel and administrative personnel required to operate a site. The sites on
the western slope of Cuba, eight of them, cover the entire third of the
island. Just below Havana is what appears to be an assembly area from
the information we are getting, and in the far right, we have here an
indication of an additional site. Each of these sites has a central radar
and normally six launchers, each normally having a missile. They are
exactly the type of equipment that the Soviets utilize in Russia and is
known as their [NATO designation] SA-2. It has characteristics some-
what better than the Nike Ajax, not as good as the Nike Hercules. Its
horizontal range is 25 to 30 miles, its altitude capability 60[,000] to
80,000 feet with one system, 80,000 to 100,000 feet with an improved
system. We have not received information as to which of the systems
they are putting in. Low altitude capability is about 2,500 feet and the
maximum operational area for these missiles; the best capabilities are
between 10,000 and 60,000 feet. It appears that there will be additional
surface-to-air missile sites put in subsequently.
Now further defector and clandestine reports from the central
province indicate that at least two sites will be located there—I’ve put
them in in green—but we have not received any confirming information
on those. The pattern now is emerging that would indicate approxi-
mately 24 sites in total would cover the entire island of Cuba.
In addition to the surface-to-air missile sites that are being put in, we
have confirmed reports on eight Komar-type missile-launching motor
torpedo boats. These have an operational radius of about 300 miles at a
speed of 45 knots. Each of the boats has two missile launchers, but these
launchers are not reloadable, so that they must go back to shore or to a
mother ship to get new loads. They are radar-guided missiles and they
56 T U E S DAY, S E P T E M B E R 4, 1962
Dean Rusk: Well, they seem to be staying very much at arm’s length
from Guantánamo, with any significant forces, [unclear] moving some
forces.
President Kennedy: The Secretary of Defense wants to say some-
thing about Guantánamo, what we got there?
McNamara: Yes, Mr. President. We have relatively light forces there
at the present time, approximately 1,500 men including about 400 sailors
who have been trained for ground combat.
An attack on Guantánamo would have to be met with forces from the
United States, forces which are available, which are on alert, fighter air-
craft and airborne troops. [Unclear background conversation.]
Hickenlooper: Mr. President, may I ask if—is there any stepped-up
activity on the part of Soviet submarines in the Caribbean waters, the
Gulf [of Mexico], around that area, the shipping lanes?
Carter: No, sir. At least we have no indication of it, sir.
Hickenlooper: Well, I said stepped-up activity. There probably is
some activity around in there.
Carter: Very, very slight, in that area, sir. And very spasmodic.
Hickenlooper: Thank you.
Rusk: There’s been a surprisingly small amount of submarine activ-
ity in the Atlantic area by the Soviets.
Russell: Mr. Secretary, you remember how many dollars they get
each year out of Guantánamo, their employees there?
Rusk: They have 3,200 Cuban employees, of whom 1,000 live on the
base. So that means about 2,200 go back and forth every day.
McNamara: They might get something on the order of seven million
dollars a year perhaps. There are roughly 3,500 employees involved.
Russell: They’re requiring these people to turn in their dollars too,
aren’t they?
McNamara: Yes.
Rusk: So far as we know, there’s been no systematic attempt to
harass the workers on the base, nor has there been any interference with
the water supply there. They run a regular check on the water supply.
Halleck: Are the Cuban workers permitted to buy at the PX on the
base at Guantánamo and then go off base with their purchases, back into
Cuba, such as medicines, luxuries, this that and the other thing?
McNamara: I don’t believe so, but I can’t answer for certain. [Pause.]
Russell: [Unclear.]
President Kennedy: [to Rusk] Do you want to say anything?
Rusk: Mr. President, I might just comment on two points on the
political side. One, the attitude of the other American states and the effect
Meeting with Cong ressional Leadership on Cuba 59
of this on them. We do believe that this will give much further impetus to
the motion that started in the hemisphere about a year ago. We detect a
deeper concern in what’s happening in Cuba. You will recall that at the
last Punta del Este Conference in January, this hemisphere showed con-
siderable movement in rejecting Castro as a solution to the hemispheric
problems and unanimously condemned this regime in Cuba as a Marxist-
Leninist government and—with not in all of the cases unanimity—took a
number of actions that moved toward hemispheric solidarity.
Since that time, the Argentine government was in fact overthrown
over this issue, the Frondizi government, and this attitude toward Castro
is one of the key sources of present tensions in Brazil where the reaction
to Castro has been getting stronger.64
In the case of Mexico, if I can make this very much on an off-the-
record basis, we do get more help from Mexico, privately, underneath the
scenes, than they are willing to confess publicly or make any noise about.
They’ve got a political problem there.
But I think we can count on growing, rather than diminishing soli-
darity in the hemisphere, in response or in the face of this continued
buildup of arms in Cuba.
Now, on the other side of that, it seems that it’s necessary for us—we
have done this in a number of ways privately and the President has
thought about the public aspect of it—we’ve got to make it very clear to
all of our friends in the hemisphere that these Cuban armed forces aren’t
going anywhere. They’re not a threat by force of arms to the other coun-
tries of the hemisphere.
Now, you’ll be interested that we’ve—actually the special security
measures established at the Punta del Este Conference as an instrument
of the OAS . . .65 We’ve gone to extraordinary effort to try to catch the
Cubans actually smuggling arms or putting in bands in countries around
the Caribbean, and thus far we haven’t been able to turn up very much.
The principal effort that the Communists are making in Latin America
seems now to be money, and the training of young people as potential
agents, training these Cubans. But we haven’t been able to catch any of
this illicit traffic in arms that we were hoping to intercept [unclear] the
Punta del Este Conference. They seem to be playing a cautious game on
things of that sort.
Now, in the NATO framework, we have been trying to get our
64. The Argentine government under Arturo Frondizi was overthrown on 29 March 1962.
65. Organization of American States.
60 T U E S DAY, S E P T E M B E R 4, 1962
NATO allies to take a harder look at this Cuban problem than they have
thus far been willing to do. We’ve made some progress, but not nearly
enough in our estimate.
In the case of Canada, their trade with Cuba in 1961, [was] on the
order of 35 or 40 million dollars. This year it will be on the order of six
or seven million dollars. Part of that is because Canada is forbidding any
reexport of anything from the United States to Cuba. They are applying
the COCOM list to Cuba and it cuts off quite a number of things and
also, our own embargo on Cuba has deprived Cuba of dollars that they
might use to buy large quantities of foodstuffs and things of that sort
from Canada. So it’s partly action by Canada, partly because the Cubans
haven’t got any dollars.
We are very much concerned about the use of free world shipping in
the Cuba trade.66 But this is a very, very difficult problem to deal with,
because there is such a vast supply of shipping and a surplus of shipping
for normal trade these days, that the customary arrangements with the
Soviet bloc [are] bare-bones charters, without specifically identifying
them for the Cuba trade. A very small percentage of the tonnage avail-
able in fact goes into the Cuba trade, something like 1 percent, 2 percent,
in that order of magnitude. A number of the NATO countries claim that
they do not have the legal authority to move without having parliamen-
tary action similar to our Trading with the Enemy Act. But, in any
event, since their problem would be to break trading relations with the
Soviet bloc as a whole, as far as shipping is concerned . . . Countries like
Norway, U.K., Greece, that have a heavy reliance upon their shipping
services for foreign exchange for their own necessities, would find it
very difficult to do that in specific relation to Cuba. Nevertheless, we are
talking about this development with our NATO allies and hope very
much that they can find some way to put pressures on those shippers
who are in fact taking an active part in the Cuba trade. But it is a difficult
one because of the vast surpluses of shipping and the nature of the char-
ters that are normally used in the trade that get diverted or turned away
into the actual Cuban part of it.
Dirksen: What flag is predominant would you say?
Rusk: It varies: U.K., Norway, Greece.
Unidentified: Portugal.
Rusk: Portugal slightly, Italy slightly. And—
66. Referring to recent press reports that the demand for shipping between the Soviet Union
and Cuba was so high that vessels registered in NATO member countries were being used.
Meeting with Cong ressional Leadership on Cuba 61
67. Over previous weeks, Wiley had called publicly for a blockade of Cuba.
Meeting with Cong ressional Leadership on Cuba 63
more than some of the physical threats, or potential threats that might be
involved at the moment. I think it’s quite a serious psychological situation
in Latin America. Every time it’s announced that more Russian troops,
people, more Russian technicians, whether they are troops in civilian
clothes or whether they are agricultural technicians or whatnot, predomi-
nantly it comes out that the more of those that come in . . . more missiles,
more weapons, and so on, I’m afraid it gives stimulus to those dissident
groups down there which pose an increasing difficulty for us in those
countries. I may be wrong but . . .
President Kennedy: I will say that the Soviet Union exercises some
restraint in some areas. They haven’t after all talked about a peace treaty
since 1958 and they haven’t raised it.68 We did as I say put missiles in
Turkey with nuclear warheads and they didn’t take action. We have
engaged in assistance of various kinds to Iran, Pakistan, and other areas.
So that I think that we both proceed with some caution because we both
[Hickenlooper tries to interrupt] realize where the real danger to the coun-
tries lies finally, but I quite agree that Cuba is . . .
On the other hand, Senator, I’m not so sure looking at it over the last
12 months whether you’d say that what’s happened in Cuba has particu-
larly helped the Communist cause. I would say that there’s a lot of things
that helped the Communist cause but I think they are more internal in
each country and not what’s happened to Cuba. I would say that every
survey I’ve seen in the last 12 months shows the sharpest drop in the
support of Castro, which was, perhaps since ’59.
Hickenlooper: Mr. President, I have noticed in whatever meager and
perhaps inaccurate information I get, I think I have noticed a sharp drop
over the last year, year and a quarter, in Castro, the popularity of Castro,
or the respect for Castro as an individual, or as a leader. But Castroism is
a thing that I believe they separate from Castro in their thinking. That
is, the idea that you can take from the big fellow, that you can go take and
do it with immunity. That you can confiscate, that you can have this, that,
and the other thing, which they ally with Castro’s movement in Cuba.
They know Castro is a Commie, they know he’s under Communist domi-
nation, but I don’t know whether the Spanish say Castroísimo or, what is
68. President Kennedy is playing down his Khrushchev problem. Khrushchev’s 1958 threat to
sign a peace treaty with the East German government triggered the 1958 to 1962 Berlin cri-
sis. Although Khrushchev had backed down from following through on this threat in 1959, he
had not stopped talking about his readiness to sign a peace treaty. Khrushchev reiterated this
threat at the Vienna Summit of June 1961 and again, most recently, in July 1962.
Meeting with Cong ressional Leadership on Cuba 65
it? Whatever. Anyway, the Castroism in Spanish is a thing that they dif-
ferentiate as compared to Castro as the individual. I may be wrong about
that but that is the impression I get.
Rusk: Mr. President, I think there is no question that the extreme left
down there will tend to make some noise about this kind of buildup. I think
there is a compensating factor on the other side, Senator. I think that more
and more people of the responsible sort are becoming much more sober
about Cuba than a year ago. A year ago at Punta del Este, as you know, cer-
tain of these countries down there didn’t really think about Cuba; they were
thinking about their own internal problems and those at a distance from
Cuba—Argentina, Brazil, Chile—weren’t very helpful at Punta del Este.
Now, there are growing concerns about it. I think there is a more
sober approach. And I would have to report [unclear] that some of the
reactions have been not what ought to be done about Cuba, but to use
the Cuban situation as a pretext for saying to us: “Well, now that means,
of course, the opportunity presents itself to have more destroyers and
more cruisers and things of that sort.” And that’s as a matter for their
own military establishments. It is not really called for at this point
[unclear] in relation to Cuba. But, I think on balance the development
down there has been wholesome, in response to this. [Unclear.]
The President asked me to comment for just a moment on what hap-
pened in Berlin today. Over the weekend the three allies insisted to the
Soviet Union that their guard coming in from Friedrichstrasse to the
War Memorial would have to be moved to gates down near the War
Memorial to avoid incidents, traffic hazards, provocations that were
resulting from their use of the Friedrichstrasse Gate for their armored
personnel carriers, carriers that they adopted after the stoning incidents
ten days ago. We gave them until this morning to reply because they had
to turn around with Moscow.69
Hickenlooper: That’s the War Memorial at Brandenburg Gate?
69. An imposing Soviet War Memorial in Berlin had been erected just inside West Berlin, near
the Brandenburg Gate. Each day, Soviet soldiers charged with guarding the memorial would
travel down Unter den Linden, through the Brandenburg Gate, from East Berlin to West
Berlin. Disturbances and instances of harassment from West Berliners, particularly students,
had intensified with the recent one-year anniversary of the sealing of West Berlin (13 August)
and the killing of an East German, Peter Fechter, as he was trying to cross the Wall and
escape to West Berlin. This led the Soviets to transport their soldiers in Armored Personnel
Carriers (APCs), creating a difficult issue for the Western powers striving to keep to a mini-
mum the Soviet military presence in West Berlin. By changing the crossing point from the
Brandenburg Gate to the Sandkrug Bridge, the Western powers shortened the distance that
the Soviet APCs would have to travel through West Berlin.
66 T U E S DAY, S E P T E M B E R 4, 1962
Rusk: That’s correct. So we’ve just had information from Berlin that
the Soviets did accept the Sandkrug Bridge which is just beyond the
Brandenburg Gate and is very near the War Memorial. And we were
interested and pleased that they responded in that way because they
were beginning to build up a position there and we cut that back to the
original [unclear].
Russell: That’s good news.
Short unclear exchange between Rusk and President Kennedy.
Russell: That’s good, but one question, Mr. Secretary. You hear all
kind of rumors that Castro is becoming more and more of a figurehead,
that two of the old-time Communists are running Cuba and he’s more or
less a front. Is there anything to that?
Rusk: My own reading of our information on that, Senator Russell, is
that this is not the case, that it would have, it might have been true per-
haps four or five months ago but that Castro, whatever his faults, has been
more or less accepted by the Soviet Union as the person who has to be
backed even though there is friction between himself and the hard-core,
old-time Communist apparatus.70 Now, I think you do get reports about
his heavy drinking and his administrative hopelessness and things of that
sort. But we’re inclined to believe that the Soviets have agreed to tolerate
his “un-Communist” kinds of weaknesses, if you like, because they need
his hold on the Cuban people. I suspect, myself, that they’d have much
greater difficulty with the Cuban people if Castro were removed and you
had the old-line apparatus trying to take over completely.
Dirksen: General Carter, assuming that those sites you pointed out
are essentially for defensive purposes, how long would it take to convert
them to an offensive facility?
Carter: They’re not convertible, sir. You’d have an entirely new
installation. The only thing you could use would be the administrative
facilities, the buildings and roadways.
Dirksen: What else would they require?
Carter: You’d require launching pads, and an entirely new missile
delivery system and missile guidance system, if you are going into a
static operation. Now, of course, we do have mobile surface-to-surface
missiles in our own inventory and in the Soviet inventory. We have seen
no sign of those at all in Cuba.
70. In March 1962, Castro removed the powerful longtime Cuban Communist leader, Anibal
Escalante. On the shake-up in the Cuban leadership see Fursenko and Naftali, “One Hell of a
Gamble,” pp. 163–65.
Meeting with Cong ressional Leadership on Cuba 67
71. The chairman of the Armed Services Committee is asking about the possible consequences
of the SAM deployments on U-2 flights over the island.
72. Senator Russell was a member of the smaller group of congressmen who were regularly
informed about CIA operations.
73. Rusk met with the Latin American ambassadors the following afternoon, where he pro-
posed an informal meeting of foreign ministers.
68 T U E S DAY, S E P T E M B E R 4, 1962
techniques of money and training [unclear] and things of that sort. Arms,
we think they haven’t been able to buy. We’d love to catch them.
Russell: The President referred to our responsibilities there to these
other countries. Just what would we do if they had an upheaval say in
[the] Dominican Republic and the Communists took over there? A
handful of Castroites there, perhaps not many. But are we under any
more responsibility there to restore some democratic form of govern-
ment than we are in Cuba?
President Kennedy: Well, I’d say that that is our problem, quite obvi-
ously not the military problem, but Haiti is now a [unclear] and I would
think that the United States should intervene if it appeared that there
were going to be a revolt or a coup d’etat in the Dominican Republic that
would put Communists in control, then I would think the United States
would intervene at that point.
Russell: We moved up, I know, when it looked as if the fallen dicta-
tor’s family might—
President Kennedy: That’s right.
Russell: —move back in. I didn’t know whether that . . . of course
you’ve got about as much of a dictator on the other end of the island as
there was in Santo Domingo. Duvalier, I think, is [unclear].
Unidentified: [Unclear, but someone mentions Castro.]
President Kennedy: Yes, I think that obviously Duvalier . . . and we
don’t know where he’s going, but we have to . . . but I would think that if
we ever had any others that Castro is taking over, then the United States
would with as many other countries as we could, would try to intervene.
We have, in the case of [the] Dominican Republic, we had Colombia and
Venezuela with us. And I think that we ought to attempt to strengthen
our inner OAS arrangements in the Caribbean so that if there is a situa-
tion, we can intervene with the support of at least one or two other
Caribbean countries at the critical moment.
Hickenlooper: Well, Mr. President, isn’t there some evidence that
almost all of the Caribbean countries are willing to join in whatever
intervention the United States should determine—
President Kennedy: I’m sure with the exception perhaps of Haiti, I’m
sure they would.
Hickenlooper: Well, with the exception of Haiti, yes, yes, yes.
President Kennedy: And Mexico, I’m sure they would if they see—
Hickenlooper: Indeed.
President Kennedy: Whether they would join in Guatemala would
depend really on the conditions in Guatemala. But I would think if the . . .
Meeting with Cong ressional Leadership on Cuba 69
deal of our military power and I think we’ve got Berlin, we’ve got
Turkey and Iran . . . We’ve got southeast Asia, so I—
Unidentified: Formosa also.
Fulbright: Do you think?
President Kennedy: And Formosa.
Fulbright: Do you think, Mr. President, if we did decide to take some
firm action about Cuba, that this would turn the pancake over, that this
would start Russia off here, there, somewhere else?
Rusk: I think this will lead to a very very severe crisis indeed. I
couldn’t predict exactly what the Soviets would do but I would think
that they would almost certainly make a major move on Berlin of some
sort. You remember, the unfortunate combination of Hungary and Suez
in 1955 and ’6. Now, if on the other side, as the President indicated, the
Soviets made a move on Berlin, this opens up some possibilities with
Cuba with world support, that we would not have if we at the moment
took initiative against Cuba because of circumstances.
Fulbright: This is the other side of the pancake.
Rusk: See, that’s the other side of the pancake. Because this is a part
of the worldwide confrontation of the free world and the Soviet Union.
We have a million men outside the United States as part of this con-
frontation. All right, this has to be thought of in relation to the whole
because you can’t deal with these simply as little isolated [unclear]
instances but the total situation.
Russell: That’s undoubtedly true, but Senator Mansfield is right about
. . . it may cause a great deal of reaction because this Cuban thing—
President Kennedy: That’s right.
Russell: —is in the nature of an offense to the national pride, [chuck-
ling] and there’s something personal about it too. It’s so close down
there that . . . a man wouldn’t get ruffled about something that happened
in Berlin, much less Hungary or some other part of the world, but he
would get upset about Cuba.
Unidentified: [Unclear.] [Short pause.]
President Kennedy: Well, this statement will be out and it won’t
have any reference to our meeting here but it will be a statement of fact
and you’ve heard the facts as they come along, we’ll make available to
you. And I would think that if we ever get any information about
ground-to-ground missiles then the situation would then be quite
changed and we would have to [unclear].
Unidentified: Well, thank you, Mr. President.
President Kennedy: Meanwhile we will . . .
Unidentified: Thank you [unclear] Senator Russell.
Meeting on the Cong ressional Resolution about Cuba 73
5:55–6:10 P.M.
74. Including President Kennedy, Everett Dirksen, Lyman Lemnitzer, Robert McNamara,
Paul Nitze, Dean Rusk, Richard Russell, and Carl Vinson. Tape 20, John F. Kennedy Library,
President’s Office Files, Presidential Recordings Collection.
74 T U E S DAY, S E P T E M B E R 4, 1962
Robert McNamara: The authority that was granted last summer has
expired. As you know it covered authority to call up 250,000 men during
a period of 11 months and that authority expired with the 1st of July.
Since that authority was granted, we have added about 300,000 men
Meeting on the Cong ressional Resolution about Cuba 75
to the regular forces: roughly 40[,000] to 50,000 men to the Navy, about
the same number to the Air Force, and 110[,000] to 120,000 men to the
Army. All of the forces are in substantially better shape today than they
were on June 30th of last year.
The Army has been expanded in terms of combat-ready divisions by
about 45 percent. There were then 11 combat-ready divisions. There are
today 16 combat-ready divisions.
The Air Force has had a very substantial expansion in its tactical air
strength. A portion of that tactical air strength that has been added,
however, is not yet combat ready and won’t be combat ready for six to
nine months.
The Navy has been expanded by the addition of a large number of
amphibious craft as well as logistical support ships.
So, we are much stronger today than we were 13 or 14 months ago
when we asked for authority to call up Reserve and Guard personnel.
On the other hand, there are both military and political and psycho-
logical reasons why it would be desirable, we believe, to have authority
to call up between 150[,000] and 250,000 personnel during the period
that Congress is out of session, say roughly from the 1st of October to
the end of February. We’ve been considering that. I just mentioned it
briefly, a moment ago, to Chairman [Carl] Vinson and Chairman
[Richard] Russell.75 They mentioned that the House would meet on
Friday—
Unidentified: On Thursday.
McNamara: Rather Thursday. We have a draft resolution, essentially
the same as the resolution passed a year ago. I think we’re all agreed, all
of us who have considered this problem, that if there is to be any contro-
versy, any debate, any argument over whether this is a wise move or not,
it would be undesirable to submit it to—[Tape cuts off briefly.]
President Kennedy: Then [unclear] the numbers revised [by]
General [Burgess]?
McNamara: Yes, sir. We would.
President Kennedy: But it seems to me quite possible that you would
have to call up some air units before the end of the year, if not earlier.
Because I think they would be the most likely units we’d call.
We don’t have any plans to call up any [National] Guard divisions?
McNamara: No, sir. They . . . If—
President Kennedy: That’s why I think the 150 is enough. When it
75. Respectively, chairmen of the House and Senate Armed Services Committees.
76 T U E S DAY, S E P T E M B E R 4, 1962
gets beyond that, then we’re [unclear] crisis more, and after that we
draft a [unclear].
McNamara: It seems almost certain that any units that were called
up during this intervening period between now and, let’s say, the end of
February could be composed of men who had not been called up within
the last year and a half.
President Kennedy: With the exception of the air.
McNamara: Well, even in the air, Mr. President. We have located
seven squadrons of fighter aircraft and personnel who were not called to
active duty and who would therefore be the squadrons we’d call to rein-
force either the U.S. reserve or to move to Western Europe.
And similarly in the Navy we think that, except under most unusual
circumstances, we could call the 8[,000] or 10,000 naval reservists that
might possibly be needed in the event of blockade and antisubmarine war-
fare from personnel who had not served within the past year and a half.
In the case of the Army, because of the very substantial increase in
armed strength, as I mentioned, a 45 percent increase in the number of
combat ready divisions, we see no real requirement for a call-up during
this period. But with the possibility that such might be necessary, we
would like to have authority to call up a total of at least 150,000 men.
Were it necessary to call Army personnel, again personnel could be
called who had not served within the past year and a half.
Dean Rusk: Mr. President, if I might just make a very brief comment
on the one aspect of this. If the Soviets have been cautious this past year
about Berlin in key times, a lot of it was due to the speed and the calm
with which the Congress moved last autumn in response to the
President’s request for additional strength in the military field. If this
could go through with relative quiet and speed, it would be a very useful
signal in Moscow, but if it were to create a grave controversy, then that
would be—create another problem.
Everett Dirksen: Mr. Secretary, how are we going to avoid acri-
monies today in view of the gripes that obtained in the last call-up of
reserves . . . ?
President Kennedy: Sir, that’s why we’re talking to you now.
Dirksen: Yeah, [unclear].
Now, I think there is probably one way to pour some sugar on that
department and achieve that tactic, if in any kind of a statement you
were going to particularly mention . . . definitely say “in view of the
developments in Cuba” . . . people understand that . . . and a few other
things, put ’em in . . . have no doubt in their minds as to why this is
needed. You [unclear]. Now, Mr. President, I was [unclear] yesterday, I
Meeting on the Cong ressional Resolution about Cuba 77
was the guest of the Winnebago Labor Day, on Labor Day.76 The only
thing they wanted to talk about, those that talked to me, wanted to talk
about Cuba . . . in Cuba. So this is very much in the average person’s
mind and you’ll have to lay it right on the line in any statement you
make; otherwise they’ll be hell-a-poppin for one and we won’t have any
good answers for them, unless you give us the answers.
McNamara: We can say that it will not be necessary. As a matter of
fact, we can insert into the resolution, a statement that personnel who
had served within the past year and a half would not be called back
involuntarily. And we could certainly say that in view of world condi-
tions, including Cuba, we believe it necessary to request this authority to
act during the period when Congress is out of session.
Richard Russell: Excuse me, Mr. Secretary, [unclear] go back and
get the qualified personnel without meeting again with the same group?
McNamara: Yes, we can.
Russell: The only other question you had is about the recommenda-
tion to reducing the National Guard reserve force. Is this [unclear] in
any way contemplated?
McNamara: No, definitely not.
Russell: Because that ought to be explained somewhere.
McNamara: Yes, that can be—that’s very very—
Unidentified: Yeah.
Unidentified: Who would we ask? [Unclear exchange. Then indistinct
discussion among the participants.]
Unidentified: Why don’t we lead on this?
Russell: I think that we may have some controversy about this now,
Mr. Secretary—
Unidentified: [whispers in the background] We will.
Russell: —because it’s a political year and you’re on the eve of an elec-
tion. And there have been some legitimate gripes on the part of some of
these fellows who have been called up . . . [unclear] griping, there’s been a
lot of questioning, and we can get the bill through all right. But I can’t
guarantee you that if we [unclear] controversy . . . that the President’s
[unclear] I’ll do it anyhow [unclear] if he wants to do [unclear] to assume
my part of the responsibility to get that through [unclear].
Dirksen: [Unclear.]
76. Senator Everett Dirksen spoke at the Winnebago County (Illinois) Labor Day picnic
(Rockville Register Star, 4 September 1962). We are grateful for the assistance of the Everett
Dirksen Center, University of Illinois, in tracking down this reference.
78 T U E S DAY, S E P T E M B E R 4, 1962
President Kennedy: Even when pointing out that it’s deeper than
[unclear] international [unclear].
Dirksen: Deeper [unclear] so damn vulnerable [unclear].
President Kennedy: Can we do this in this manner? The Secretary of
Defense can talk to the leadership again and to Senator Russell and to
Senator . . . to Chairman Vinson in the next two or three days in more
detail about the kind of language about how no one would be called up
with the exception of [unclear] of say a thousand people because it’s pos-
sible we might want to [unclear] Cuba. If we really had an emergency,
we could call up an important [unclear]—
Russell: I bet a good many would volunteer.
President Kennedy: —go over to talk to the leadership and unless he . . .
McNamara: Yes, Mr. President, we can do that. This doesn’t—
President Kennedy: You get [unclear] think about in the next day or so.
Carl Vinson: I’m working with [unclear] this week. If it does not
have to be done this week, it might be better. [Unclear.]
The President, McNamara, and the Congressman speak simultaneously.
President Kennedy: [Unclear] through just at the end, which you
suddenly lost the . . .
McNamara: Yes, I agree [unclear], Mr President. It’s pertinent to the
subject that we discuss it more. But we will draft a resolution and dis-
cuss it further.
The meeting seems to have ended and the President has apparently left.
The recorder picks up bits of conversation.
Lincoln: Can I come in?
McNamara: [Unclear] I don’t think it’s necessary to call any of those
that were called up before. Do you?
Lyman Lemnitzer: [Unclear exchange in the background as Lemnitzer
speaks.] I wouldn’t think so and [unclear] all right.
McNamara: Yeah and get this [unclear].
Lemnitzer: I would like to have the 300 people at that point, in
January for Cuba.
McNamara: Well, those could be . . . more of those could be extended
service of people you have.
Lemnitzer: No, not exactly because we don’t have any qualified F-84
people available to do that. They would have to come from the National
Guard, if you wanted for us to move, wanted to do the job properly.
Paul Nitze: Is this a question of manpower ceiling now for you or—
McNamara: It’s really the 300 specialists on that [unclear ]—
Lemnitzer: What we did, you see, is we formed some new regular
Meeting on the Cong ressional Resolution about Cuba 79
77. Manufactured by Republic, the F-84 was a fighter-bomber introduced in 1948. The F-84
swept-wing version followed in 1951.
80 T U E S DAY, S E P T E M B E R 4, 1962
His official day at an end, the President went for his evening swim at
7:35 P.M.
The President reached the Oval Office after breakfast with the congres-
sional leadership. The international news that morning was not good.
The Soviets had decided to flex a little muscle in the air corridors linking
Berlin to the world. On Tuesday, Soviet MiGs had unexpectedly
“escorted” three commercial airplanes flying over East Germany on their
way to West Berlin. These actions stood in stark contrast to Moscow’s
apparent acceptance of a Western plan to regulate Soviet troop move-
ments to the Soviet War Memorial in West Berlin.
The news from Moscow would not get any better in the course of
the day. The Soviets would decide to reiterate their opposition to any
four-power meeting on Berlin, asserting instead that the best way to
eliminate tension in that divided city was to sign peace treaties with both
Germanies and remove all troops from West Berlin. And on this day, the
Kremlin would also dismiss the Kennedy administration’s explanation of
the U-2 accident in the Soviet Far East. “Unworthy of responsible politi-
cians,” said the authoritative newspaper, Izvestia.1
This morning Kennedy’s chief foreign policy advisers testified before
the Senate Armed Services Committee about the current crisis in U.S.-
Soviet relations. Neither Dean Rusk nor Robert McNamara mentioned
the administration’s intention to ask for standby authorization to call up
reserves. This was still closely held among the few congressional leaders
who had been briefed on Tuesday. But they did talk about Cuba, Berlin,
and the fact that the United States still had more nuclear weapons than
the Soviet Union.2
1. “Russians Scorn U-2 Note; Call the Flight Aggressive,” New York Times, 6 September 1962.
2. Executive Sessions of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Together with Joint Sessions
82 W E D N E S DAY, S E P T E M B E R 5, 1962
I get the impression with all this material [that] this is a case of
go out and see what happens. Because you know, nobody knows.
with the Senate Armed Services Committee (Historical Series), 5 September 1962, Volume 14,
87th Cong., 2d Sess., 1962 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1986).
3. Including President Kennedy, McGeorge Bundy, Leland Haworth, Carl Kaysen, Robert
McNamara, Dean Rusk, Glenn Seaborg, Theodore Sorensen, Robert Seamans, Jerome
Wiesner, Adrian Fisher, and James Webb. Tape 20, John F. Kennedy Library, President’s
Office Files, Presidential Recordings Collection.
Meeting on the DOMINIC Nuclear Test Series 83
Now, however, just as he fielded requests for more of these tests, Kennedy
had additional reasons to doubt his original grant of approval. On
September 1, the Atomic Energy Commission had admitted that the high-
altitude STARFISH test, conducted on July 8, had unexpectedly added sig-
nificant amounts of radiation to the Earth’s magnetic field, causing damage
to the fuel cells on three satellites. Of great embarrassment to the U.S. gov-
ernment was the fact that one of the damaged satellites, which lost its abil-
ity to communicate with Earth, was British.
Kennedy could not abandon high-altitude tests easily. At Geneva, the
U.S. and British governments had proposed a draft of a partial test ban
that would have outlawed all atmospheric and high-altitude testing as of
January 1, 1963. Although the initial Soviet reaction to this proposal had
been negative, Kennedy wished to have all high-altitude testing out of the
way quickly just in case a change in Soviet disarmament policy made a
treaty possible before the new year. Canceling the remaining tests, how-
ever, would be a direct challenge to what his military experts were telling
him about the new Soviet antiballistic missile program. They wanted him
to swallow a few, last-minute, high-altitude tests as part of DOMINIC, so
that the U.S. missile defense program could keep up with what the
Russians were doing. And, if these contradictory pressures were not
enough to keep in mind, Kennedy knew that NASA had another Mercury
space mission scheduled for September. Kennedy did not want the astro-
naut, Walter M. Schirra, to be endangered by a high-altitude test.4 So, if
Kennedy approved more high-altitude tests in 1962, they would have to be
scheduled with Schirra’s mission in mind. The President did not want a
high-profile postponement of that Mercury mission to draw attention to
any decision to press on with a few last high-altitude shots.
Before the nuclear test meeting began, President Kennedy and a few
of his national security advisers discussed Cuban policy. Press speculation
following the President’s September 4 statement centered on the possibil-
ity of early military action against the island. The recording picked up an
elliptical discussion of the possibilities of imposing a blockade.
Dean Rusk: I think you were starting to say something about this.
Unidentified: I think—
President Kennedy: The blockade thing is really [dead].
4. Born 12 March 1923, in Hackensack, New Jersey, Captain Walter “Wally” M. Schirra flew
on Mercury 8, Gemini 6, and Apollo 7.
84 W E D N E S DAY, S E P T E M B E R 5, 1962
Unidentified: [Unclear.]
McGeorge Bundy: A newsman?
President Kennedy: You know what I think we ought to do, would be
to get a good analysis of what the problems are of blockade—of how
long it would take to have [unclear]. [Unclear exchange.] There are a few
steps we can have ready [unclear]—
Robert McNamara: Well, things we can do now: We could even check
the [unclear]. But I am very reticent that the blockade would be very effec-
tive on that.5 [Unclear interjection.] And it would certainly lead to retalia-
tion, then, almost certainly, I would assume, by the Soviets.6
Dean Rusk: It might in broad terms be very [unclear].
President Kennedy: Let’s deal with that unless [unclear]. My atti-
tude on [unclear interjection by McGeorge Bundy] off by the weather.
Bundy: [Unclear.] What we could do, what could we do . . .
Unidentified: Building up an independent—
McNamara: In addition to the deterrent we [unclear].
Unidentified: —[a] target zone. When we put it out. [Unclear dis-
cussion.]
Bundy: Third paragraph. I have all the latest substantial [unclear].
McNamara: The problem is that there is still substantial doubt
whether the [unclear] Soviets retaliate with their forces in Berlin or else-
where . . . but put that kind of a blockade in [Cuba] and it will be effec-
tive immediately with the quantities [unclear].
President Kennedy: That’s obvious.
McNamara: And we didn’t discuss [unclear].
Rusk: [Unclear.] [Unclear exchange.]
McNamara: He said it wouldn’t take any U.S. soldiers.
Unidentified: I didn’t know you said seven.
McNamara: I didn’t tell him how many. [Unclear] U.S. soldiers.
Unidentified: Sorry.
McNamara: I think—
Rusk: They believe they can hold on.
McNamara: Substantial casualties [unclear] in Cuba.
Unidentified: In any event, we got a call from your office [unclear].
Unidentified: Well, this isn’t going to be worse in the future.
[Laughter.]
7. An airburst is the explosion of a nuclear weapon in the atmosphere, but below 100,000 feet
and at such an altitude that the expanding fireball does not touch the Earth’s surface. Test
devices detonated above 100,000 feet are known as high-altitude tests.
8. Yield is the energy released in nuclear explosions, usually expressed in terms of the equiva-
lent tonnage of TNT required to produce the same energy release.
86 W E D N E S DAY, S E P T E M B E R 5, 1962
9. The Tyuratam Missile Test Range was east of the Aral Sea in the Soviet republic of
Kazakhstan. Referred to as Baikonur in official Soviet press releases, it was the location of the
first Soviet launch of an intercontinental-range ballistic missile in August 1957.
10. Jerome B. Wiesner was the President’s special assistant for science and technology and
director of the White House Office of Science and Technology.
11. The President has in mind the controversy about the effects of high-altitude testing on the
upper atmosphere. On 11 August the Soviets had asked the United States not to conduct any
tests that endangered their cosmonaut Major Andrian Nikolayev. Here Kennedy wonders
whether the more recent Soviet high-altitude tests had added additional charged particles—
electrons—to the upper atmosphere, which could interfere with radio communications or even
pose a threat to the lives of astronauts who orbited through this space.
Meeting on the DOMINIC Nuclear Test Series 87
President Kennedy: What about our tests? How would you summa-
rize our tests, as far as . . . so, how would they? If they were talking
about our tests would they dismiss them quite as you dismiss theirs?
Seaborg: I think that they would not be able to understand the
sophistication of some of the biggest advances we have. Well, one other
point I might mention: we have electromagnetic timing measurements
on the . . . pulse measurements on a number of these high-yield shots
and so far all of them have been two-stage as far—
Unidentified: Well, we’ve missed the 25 megaton, we’ve—
Seaborg: No.
Unidentified: [Unclear.]
Seaborg: No, no. We got it but not with the airplane; we got it.15
[Unclear.]
Unidentified: That’s a two-stage one, too?
Seaborg: And that’s two-stage . . . Now this data—I think, at this
stage one must always remember one is still relatively looking . . . taking
a first look at the data.
Unidentified: I think—
Seaborg: Last year things changed several times in the process . . .
Unidentified: I think one observation that might be made here. And
I don’t want to put a lot of weight on it; but that is: this 25-megaton shot
being clean can be inter[preted] . . . I mean, it has significance in various
ways. But our most advanced ideas, namely the ripple concept, leads to
an inherently clean system and maximum efficiency.16
Unidentified: You don’t know whether it is a clean weapon or
another weapon that is—
Unidentified: Right. Or [unclear interjection] whether it’s clean to be
clean or whether it’s clean [unclear interjection].
Seaborg: I’m sorry, I believe it has lead in it. And I think that’s quite
a different process. I’ll check, and I don’t have it here, but that’s my
understanding [unclear and unclear interjection] in lead so that it’s not an
amazing development.
Webb: Well, perhaps it isn’t—
Seaborg: It wouldn’t show up in lead.
Webb: With reference to your earlier question, Mr. President, I think
15. The U.S. Air Force and the CIA cooperated in using reconnaissance planes to collect elec-
tronic signals from Soviet test ranges. The U-2 that strayed over Soviet territory in late
August was likely on one of these missions (see “Meeting on U-2 Incident,” 4 September 1962).
16. A ripple device permits the firing or releasing of two or more munitions, in this context
nuclear weapons, in close succession.
Meeting on the DOMINIC Nuclear Test Series 89
17. In reaction to the new Soviet test series, President Kennedy had indicated in August that
he would authorize an additional 11 tests in the DOMINIC series, some of which would be
high-altitude tests.
18. For details on the scope, character, and purposes of the DOMINIC test series, see Chuck
Hansen, U.S. Nuclear Weapons: The Secret History (New York: Orion Books, 1988), pp. 81–89.
90 W E D N E S DAY, S E P T E M B E R 5, 1962
explore further the problem of very high yield weapons with probably
low weights. The most important being the Ripple II and Ripple III
experiments, I believe.
President Kennedy: Where are those?
Bundy: On the right-hand side.
President Kennedy: OK.
Bundy: It may be worth just a moment to explain what that is. I
should think Lee [Haworth] or Glenn [Seaborg] . . .19 Because that is
probably the most important technical development in our own Dominic
series.
Kaysen: That’s the sort of breakthrough of the Livermore laboratory.
One minute, 29 seconds excised as classified information.
During the portion of this conversation excised for reasons of national
security, the President evidently asked Glenn Seaborg a question that led
to the following discussion of the role of underground testing in the U.S.
program of nuclear trials.
Rusk: . . . you might Glenn Seaborg, before you get to the President’s
question, looking ahead at your own program underground, do you see,
[unclear] strictly from your own point of view, a period of six months
say in which you would not yourself expect to conduct underground
tests for reasons of your own? Do you . . . Are there going to be any
recesses?
Seaborg: You mean if there were . . . If the possibility existed of car-
rying on tests in the future on a—
Rusk: Yes.
Seaborg: Optimum time schedule?
Rusk: If there were no, if you like, interference from the outside. Are
there periods of time in which you would not be doing anything any-
how—if you were just running your own . . .
Seaborg: I think our present view is that from the standpoint of the
best rate of advance by testing, that the Atomic Energy Commission
would prefer the—
Rusk: Steady course.
Seaborg: The steady course at an optimum rate, where the tests
would be [unclear]—
President Kennedy: Let’s see—how many underground tests have
we carried on now, since last September?
Seaborg: About 15.
20. The President was only off by one test. Since the Soviets broke the moratorium in
September 1961 and by the time of this meeting, the United States had tested 27 times in the
atmosphere as part of the DOMINIC series, 44 times underground as part of the NOUGAT
series, and 5 times underground or on the surface as part of Operation STORAX—a total of
76 tests. (Gallery of U.S. Nuclear Tests, Federation of American Scientists, www.fas.org).
21. These were for tactical use.
22. The first U.S. underground test (RAINIER) occurred in 1957. By 1962, most U.S. nuclear
testing was done underground at the National Testing Site in Nevada. In fact, two-thirds of
all U.S. tests since the resumption of testing in September 1961 took place underground.
92 W E D N E S DAY, S E P T E M B E R 5, 1962
that in the underground area we are, not only more experienced, but bet-
ter informed and better prepared than any other country.
Kaysen: Of course, somebody has [unclear]—but we are also learning
how to test higher and higher yields underground. This probably could
now be used to test weapons up to about 100 kilotons and possibly could
go up as high as a megaton. The point that Mr. Bundy makes about the
general effect on the laboratories and the state of readiness that it keeps
the laboratories in and the state of higher morale that it provides for the
laboratories is, of course, a point [that] we have made many times.23
Seaborg: I think it is just about happenstance perhaps; there has to
be a time at which the things that one, the advances one would hope to
make—the most significant advances that are down in the ground are
ones which require a series of experiments rather than a —you build up
to a point and have a sudden go/no-go test. The all-fusion weapon, is
one example.
Wiesner: But the all-fusion weapon, Mr. President, shouldn’t weigh
very heavily in your mind, in my opinion. [Seaborg is mumbling in the
background.] Because, the fact of the matter is today the all-fusion
weapon, as the result of some of the tests, looks more dismal than it did a
year ago. Keep in mind that people [unclear] make it. And it’s got to be
regarded as a long-term development program. I don’t think it should be
a major factor in seeing whatever your thinking is . . .
President Kennedy: Well, let’s go to work on these other matters
[unclear]—were you going to say something about that?
Seaborg: No, that’s all right but—
Wiesner: Wouldn’t you agree with the—
Seaborg: Well yeah, the high cleanliness . . . whether it’s all-fusion or
the other is the same general— [Unclear exchange.]
Wiesner: Which is the one that people hold out as a very cheap, and
therefore very attractive weapon. It’s still a gleam. And it is probably a
dimmer gleam now than it was a year ago.
Unidentified: Well, this is of course part of the go/no-go [unclear].
Wiesner: Yes.
Unidentified: It doesn’t make it, for us, in a year, either.
Unidentified: That’s right.
Unidentified: From a military standpoint, some of these small,
cleaner systems can be very useful. [Some agreement in the background.]
23. See Leland Haworth’s and Glenn Seaborg’s comments at the test ban meeting of 1 August
1962.
Meeting on the DOMINIC Nuclear Test Series 93
24. These high-altitude tests were subsequently postponed, scaled back, and renamed.
25. Astronaut Schirra was originally scheduled to blast off aboard Mercury 8 on September 23.
26. The remainder of the DOMINIC test series.
27. Butch was Adrian Fisher, deputy director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.
94 W E D N E S DAY, S E P T E M B E R 5, 1962
Webb: It could be. But we are certainly making every effort to go off
by the 25th.
Bundy: The alternative would be if, let’s say for the moment—that
we were to say that we gave NASA ten days or two weeks from the 25th
to try to get him up. If that, for various technical reasons, did not hap-
pen, it might be well to put the Mercury shot over to December, where
there’s another one scheduled. Then get the series out of the way, and go
forward.
McNamara: Could we not carry on some of the airdrop tests?28
Bundy: We could do that. The airdrop tests are really not a problem.
[McNamara is mumbling in the background.] But they are very easy any-
way, Bob. They can be done at any point.
McNamara: I agree. I am just suggesting that instead of pushing the
whole schedule forward two weeks—
Bundy: The tight part of the schedule is the high-altitude testing
part. That’s where there are uncertainties.
McNamara: I think there is some merit in starting the testing . . .
Bundy and McNamara speak at the same time.
Bundy: I agree, [unclear] with the current tests. I would only [unclear]
started, if the Soviets stop.
McNamara: However, in that case we could start airdrops.
Wiesner: Well, there is a problem though, that the ripple weapons
have to be fabricated.
Unidentified: That’s right.
Wiesner: So that you can’t drop them tomorrow. They are still in the
laboratory, in development.
Unidentified: These were actually the earliest dates at which they
could be made ready.
President Kennedy: You mean and each weapon, in other words—
Unidentified: They are being run through the laboratory right now.
President Kennedy: This is a schedule which is based on when these
weapons will be ready?
Unidentified: Yes. I’d speak [unclear] now. [Unclear.]
Bundy: [Unclear] two ranges, Mr. President. In the high-altitude test
28. Most of the tests in the DOMINIC series (25 April 1962 to 4 November 1962)—29 out
of the 36 tests— were airdrop tests. They involved dropping the nuclear device from an
aircraft, detonating it in the air, and measuring its yield. Unlike high-altitude tests, which
were designed primarily to measure weapons effects, airdrop tests were used for weapons
development.
Meeting on the DOMINIC Nuclear Test Series 95
29. The BLUEGILL test was aborted on 3 June 1962 when the Johnston Island missile track-
ing system failed. The BLUEGILL Prime [the second BLUEGILL test] was the test that
blew up the launch pad and contaminated the launch site at Johnston Island on 25 July 1962.
The Thor missile engine failed after ignition, and the missile control officer hit the destruct
button while the missile was still on the ground. BLUEGILL was a high-altitude test to eval-
uate a W-50 warhead in a Mk 4 reentry vehicle. (Hansen, U.S. Nuclear Weapons, pp. 86–87.)
30. The highest nuclear test (1,300 kilometers) ever planned by the United States, URRACA
was controversial from the moment DOD official Harold Brown announced the schedule for
high-altitude testing 29 April 1962. It was considered the most likely test to add additional
radiation to the Earth’s magnetic field, and it was subsequently canceled.
31. The KINGFISH test was a test similar to BLUEGILL in intention and design.
32. A HAYMAKER underground test, in the NOUGAT series, took place 27 June 1962.
33. BLUEGILL Double Prime was intended to be the lowest of the high-altitude tests. Like
the earlier BLUEGILLs, it too failed.
96 W E D N E S DAY, S E P T E M B E R 5, 1962
36. Rusk is raising a sore subject. Only days earlier the AEC had to admit that the STARFISH
test at 400 kilometers had unexpectedly added large amounts of radiation to the Earth’s mag-
98 W E D N E S DAY, S E P T E M B E R 5, 1962
netic field, causing damage to the fuel cells on three satellites. According to Seaborg’s later
memoir, Dean Rusk would rib him for years about AEC’s erroneous prediction about the
effects of this high-altitude test [Glenn Seaborg, with the assistance of Benjamin S. Loeb,
Kennedy, Khrushchev and the Test Ban (Berkeley; University of California Press 1981), p.156].
37. Seaborg is probably referring to the ill-fated STARFISH test. In his memoir, Seaborg
admits that the AEC had tried to hide the fact that it had been so wrong on STARFISH. In
its first assessment of the test results on 20 August, the AEC wrote that the increase in radi-
ation had been “generally anticipated.” Yes, it had been anticipated, but for the higher-alti-
tude URACCA test not for STARFISH; and the AEC believed these changes would be
insignificant for the Van Allen belt, in any case (see Seaborg, Kennedy, p. 157).
38. Effects shots are tests designed to test the effect of a nuclear blast on communications,
electromagnetic pulses, and so on, in outer space.
39. Lawrence Livermore Laboratory, initially the University of California Radiation
Laboratory.
Meeting on the DOMINIC Nuclear Test Series 99
Unidentified: Four.
Unidentified: Four. No, 4. See, 4 is a two-stage package actually—
President Kennedy: Yes.
Unidentified: It’s 165 kilotons at 50 kilometers as a backup for
BLUEGILL. And if BLUEGILL is successful, then it’s 10 kilotons at 25
kilometers.
President Kennedy: [Unclear] questions. Do you have any, Mac?
Bundy: I am sure that I would agree on throwing out THUMBE-
LINA and I think the test that you need to pay most attention to, Mr.
President, is KINGFISH number 2, in the high-altitude series.
President Kennedy: That’s right. [Four seconds excised as classified
information.] What about Nike/Hercules?40
Seventeen seconds excised as classified information.
Seaborg: I think that’s the test you’ve read, Mr. President.
Wiesner: No, no. It’s number 5.
Seaborg: Oh.
McNamara: The Nike/Hercules tests bear on KINGFISH—
Unidentified: That’s right.
McNamara: And I think today we should simply agree that we don’t
know whether KINGFISH can be carried out.41
Bundy: Right.
Five seconds excised as classified information.
McNamara: Information can be gained from the, particularly the first
Nike/Hercules, possibly from the second Nike/Hercules also, that will
bear on the potential effects of KINGFISH, and we should certainly not
carry out KINGFISH or decide to carry it out until one or both of those
Nike/Hercules tests have been carried out, Mr. President.
Unidentified: Mr. President—
Wiesner: Ah, excuse me . . . The trouble with that Bob is that the best
estimates that we have now is you drop KINGFISH much below 40 or 50
kilotons, you won’t get any of the blackout effects we are trying to study.42
McNamara: I agree fully.
40. The President is asking about tests using a Nike/Hercules missile to launch the test device
to a somewhat lower altitude, about 25 kilometers, which might accomplish the goals of some
of the high-altitude tests, like KINGFISH.
41. The Secretary of Defense is referring to the new uncertainty concerning the radiation
effects of this particular high-altitude nuclear test.
42. KINGFISH is also designed to test the effect of a very high altitude (circa 95 kilometers)
nuclear blast on command and control systems. Bringing the test lower or reducing its yield
to avoid the harmful effects on the Van Allen belt would make it less useful for this purpose.
Meeting on the DOMINIC Nuclear Test Series 101
Wiesner: [Unclear.]
McNamara: As I say, I think that the Nike/Hercules tests will how-
ever bear on whether you should carry it out at all.
Unidentified: Uh, huh. But, Mr. President, I think—
McNamara: I don’t think we can decide today, for sure—
Unidentified: No.
McNamara: —whether we should carry it out.
Carl Kaysen: I think there is a new dimension or element of the prob-
lem, which perhaps we didn’t have to worry about so much before.
Before, we looked at total yield and we looked at what’s important and
what’s not. We now have a number of 10-kt shots at different altitudes,
which hasn’t you know—Bob McNamara has just said the purpose of
finding out what we know about certain phenomena.
I think if we look at the political side of the business of putting elec-
trons up into space, it’s not only how many electrons we actually put up,
but the total number of high-altitude shots that has some . . . That is a
problem, that is something we ought to look at, so that—
President Kennedy: Well, now, let me ask you, point out these shots
which present the electron possibility.
Forty-six seconds excised as classified information.
President Kennedy: There’s not much use our going to the Russians
and telling them about the problem of electrons and then going ahead
and doing it ourselves and adding more electrons.
Unidentified: Well, I was thinking in estimating, however, if the
Russians do put one up, in the 30- or 40-megaton amount [unclear],
which is not likely . . . But if they shot a very high yield one up to the, at
the most vulnerable altitude and increased by a factor of five or ten the
radiation that’s already up there, then we’re beginning to get into the
range where [unclear] it’s becoming not, maybe not impossible but
[unclear] which is complicated and difficult. I don’t regard it as likely
that the Russians [unclear] . . . additional.
President Kennedy: [Unclear] too; but we haven’t heard unless I ask
[unclear] that we try again with [unclear] the Russian ambassador [unclear]
not much available, not much to draw on over there.
Wiesner: I think that Carl’s point is very important in that the total
number is [unclear].
President Kennedy: Well, let’s . . . on this matter of KINGFISH, it
seems to me the Defense Department ought to come forward with addi-
tional reasons for [unclear] tests [unclear] and they can propose, so that
we maybe can cut down the electrons and can give us . . . which we
regard as . . . based on this information. What happened before [unclear]
102 W E D N E S DAY, S E P T E M B E R 5, 1962
43. When the pace of diplomatic negotiation would make testing politically infeasible.
Meeting on the DOMINIC Nuclear Test Series 103
tion. This will put you in a position to design a weapon, which will
require further testing, so that—
Unidentified: No, it will put you in pretty good position.
Wiesner: Except you’ll have this one. You’ll have this one, which will
not be the 30 to 40 megaton.
Unidentified: No, that’s right.
Unidentified: It might be 15.
Unidentified: Yeah.
Wiesner: I understand that. So that I think that should be clear.
Unidentified: But it will be a big gain.
Wiesner: On the other hand, Mr. President, you want to recall the
KINGFISH-type experiment was one of the basic reasons that we felt
we had to resume testing.44 Which was to get [these] effects [unclear].
Because of the bad luck we’ve had in the Pacific we’ve not carried out
this test. Many of the others, I think, would be cut if you took seriously
the criteria we started applying initially, which the Secretary has talked
about.
McNamara: I would speak to that point, Jerry. I think Ripple III
should not be cut.
Forty-four seconds excised as classified information.
McNamara: We may have to burst higher than we previously antici-
pated to avoid anti-ballistic missile systems. Therefore I think Ripple III
is an important test as I think Ripple II is an important test. So, I would-
n’t cut out either Ripple II or Ripple III. There are others that might be
cut; but not those two.
President Kennedy: Where are we with BLUEGILL?
Well, in any case we are agreed that we will not start these tests
until after this . . . Schirra has gone ahead, we’ll give the order, then.
McNamara: Except, Mr. President, for some air-drop tests.
President Kennedy: Air-drop tests?
McNamara: Yes.
President Kennedy: If we can. If we can do that.
Bundy: How long would you like that, figure that period would be,
Mr. President? Do you want to make it indefinite?
President Kennedy: [to the NASA representatives] Well, we ought to
be able to know within two weeks if you are ever going—we hope you
are going to go within two weeks of the time you’ve said.
44. Soviet high-altitude tests in 1961 had been at higher altitudes than had been anticipated by
U.S. analysts.
104 W E D N E S DAY, S E P T E M B E R 5, 1962
President Kennedy: Well, we’re all agreed that we’ve got to go with
BLUEGILL and we have to go with KINGFISH though we’re going to
have another discussion on KINGFISH, aren’t we? [Unclear exchange.]
Unidentified: Mr. President, I’d like to make one consideration that
you should have in mind, and that’ll get to the background to the test
ban negotiations, background to the discussions of outer space generally.
And there is under consideration before you the idea of heading off this
military use of space, which is the Soviet concept to get our reconnais-
sance satellite, with our counter position, which is no weapons of mass
destruction in outer space. Now, there’s not a general resolution on that
yet; but that’s the way the thinking tends . . . is shaping up. Now
[unclear] is [unclear] to many ones in outer space, at the same time you
make your proposal. And that’s [unclear] URRACA, and . . . [unclear
interjection] which you hold your position on KINGFISH is—
President Kennedy: Well, URRACA is in trouble . . . anyway. But the
other . . . KINGFISH is the—
Unidentified: It’s our most important test.
President Kennedy: . . . most important test. Unless we have a great
October, I [unclear].
Bundy: [Unclear] is the most important test.
President Kennedy: What?
Bundy: [Unclear] ranks after BLUEGILL, STARFISH, and URRACA,
in the earlier recommendations, I think
Unidentified: That is right.
Unidentified: One part of the reason for that I believe was DOD
wasn’t ready to go ahead with it. I think they always felt it was an
important test.
Seaborg: KINGFISH was always in the forefront of these. We didn’t
think we could do it this year.
Wiesner: Mr. President, one other thing is that [unclear] responsi-
bility for the fallout [unclear] getting rid of Thumbelina [unclear]—
President Kennedy: Yeah.
Wiesner: Because that’ll [unclear].
President Kennedy: I see.
Bundy: I might mention, Mr. President, although it is not a part of
this specific presentation that there is also a possibility, that there is a
recommendation on it, there is a request for authority to make a fourth
lattice shot. And this would also create fall-out and those problems and
the Defense Department yesterday was apparently pulling very hard
[unclear] all this attention [unclear] the [boron?].
Seaborg: [Unclear] to trigger a shot to see about X rays up and
106 W E D N E S DAY, S E P T E M B E R 5, 1962
down. And you [unclear] experiment. You look like you get the data, but
we certainly are not interested in pushing that problem.
Wiesner: It’s a test that’s not unlike, it’s a test not unlike the one we
had [unclear] trouble [unclear] accidentally.
Seaborg: It’s about the same magnitude. There are in effect two
shots: There’s one at one-and-a-half or 1.7 megaton, kilotons each but
right on the surface.
McNamara: Mr. President, in view of the problem of the Russians
completing their tests on November 1st and ours which slipped, as we dis-
cussed it, and extending substantially beyond that point, I’d like to suggest
we take this schedule, and at least as far as the Nike/Hercules and the
KINGFISH shots are concerned, reschedule this to be completed by the
1st of November. I don’t know exactly how we’ll do that; but if you could
give us that objective, I think we can work it out. But I don’t think we
ought to have a schedule extending beyond November 1st.
Unidentified: This poses a problem with regard to Mercury.
McNamara: It does, well, but I am going to assume for the minute
that we will accept a delay in Mercury and reschedule in such a way as to
complete it by the 1st of November.
President Kennedy: How long do you think you’ll need? It’s possible
to give you five weeks; but it might only give you three.
McNamara: It might only give us three weeks; but we have con-
structed another pad, fortunately.
Unidentified: It doesn’t come in till the 15th—
McNamara: I know it doesn’t come in until the 15th of October; but
it is available for two weeks. And for two weeks, we will have two pads.
For the period before that, we will only have one pad.
I think we ought to simply take it as our objective to finish this off by
the 1st of November, at least on schedule.
Bundy: Mr. Secretary, I think we ought to be awfully careful about
this high-altitude test, just out of the experience we have had in trying
to cram it into a tight schedule. I would hate to see us come down to a
period in which we were missing certain things in October [unclear] for
the one that I would myself think in the light of the whole pattern of our
relations with the Soviet Union, it is essential for us to [unclear]
[McNamara begins to interject]. Pressure for [unclear].
McNamara: I don’t think it’s essential, Mac. But I think we can gain
a lot by preparing to complete it by the 1st of November. As a matter of
fact, we will begin to anticipate problems and find solutions to them.
Mac, my concern about what may happen, if we have to defer our tests
Meeting on the DOMINIC Nuclear Test Series 107
until after Mercury starts [is] Mercury may not take off until the end of
November, or the end of October. We’ve got to have some action here to
try to compress our schedule. The best way to get it is simply say,
assume you don’t start until the third . . . or three weeks after the 15th of
September and finish the 1st of November.
Rusk: But on the political side, if we were quite clear that we had
given them [unclear] their two shots go off after they had stopped, we
didn’t say that.
President Kennedy: [Unclear] finish.
Rusk: [Unclear.] Well, we wouldn’t want to do that, then the
[unclear] got to be larger [unclear].
President Kennedy: What about BLUEGILL? Now, what is
BLUEGILL doing in the way of electrons?
Wiesner: Very little. [Unclear exchange.]
President Kennedy: Can you get it at 95 [unclear]? Is that the dif-
ference?
Unidentified: Yes, the pressure goes up very greatly.
President Kennedy: You can’t [unclear] . . . dropping KINGFISH?
Unidentified: Well, the trouble is dropping KINGFISH—
President Kennedy: Now what is KINGFISH going to tell us that
BLUEGILL doesn’t?
Fifty-one seconds excised as classified information.
President Kennedy: . . . Let’s do this.
Wiesner: [Unclear] you call URRACA because we don’t know about
that very high altitude—
President Kennedy: Let’s take to . . . we’re going to be back here tomor-
row. I think overnight let’s be thinking—I think we ought to . . . I think 11
[tests] is too many given our time problem. So we’ve got to try to drop—
take it down to 8. And we just have to see where we, and then let’s see what
our—given the problem of—let’s do two schedules: One in which they go
off on time—give them two days; and the other is two weeks. When . . .
And how would we organize it in order to get it done as close to the
November 1st date as Bob McNamara has suggested in recognition that
that’s not a final decision right now?
Then let’s . . . What other matter do we have to consider in regard
[to this]? There’s nothing more we can do about KINGFISH. You got
that down about as fine as you can.
Unidentified: Have to learn more, sir. It is conceivable that we will
have to wait for the yields [unclear] times and the exact height of the
[unclear]?
108 W E D N E S DAY, S E P T E M B E R 5, 1962
47. The U.S. Army’s first antiballistic missile [ABM] system was designed in the mid-1950s,
and then redesigned as the Nike-X.
Meeting on the DOMINIC Nuclear Test Series 109
48. The Soviets were thought to be building an ABM system around Leningrad.
110 M O N DAY, S E P T E M B E R 10, 1962
The twin pots of Cuba and Berlin continued to simmer. Cuban policy
seemed to be increasingly a difficult domestic matter for Kennedy. The
administration had managed to keep the congressional resolution for the
reserve call-up under wraps until Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield
introduced it on September 7. Senate Minority Leader Everett Dirksen
had kept the secret, but just as soon as Mansfield made his statement, the
Republican leadership began a campaign in favor of much tougher action
against Cuba. At the same time, an incident half a world away was also
complicating Kennedy’s Cuba policy. On September 8 a U-2 reconnais-
sance aircraft on a joint U.S.-Taiwanese mission had disappeared over the
People’s Republic of China and was presumed shot down. Given the
administration’s existing concerns about the consequences of a U-2 inci-
dent over Cuba, the event in Asia reopened the debate over what risks
were acceptable to maintain surveillance over the island.
The most disturbing news to reach Kennedy was about Khrushchev
and Berlin. In his second meeting that year with a high-level U.S. visitor
(the first in May, with Salinger and Sorenson), Khrushchev had brought
Secretary of the Interior Stewart Udall to his Black Sea resort at
49. Diary of Glenn Seaborg, Entry, 6 September 1962, John F. Kennedy Library. In the end,
there would be nine remaining tests in the DOMINIC series. Five of the nine were airdrop tests,
of which ANDROSCOGGIN (2 October 1962) and HOUSATONIC (30 October 1962) tested
the Ripple II device, and CHAMA (18 October) the Thumbellina device. The ANDROSCOG-
GIN failed, which may be the reason why there was an extra test in this last group. The four
high-altitude tests were CHECKMATE (20 October 1962), BLUEGILL Triple Prime (26
October 1962), KINGFISH (1 November 1962), and TIGHTROPE (4 November 1962). All of
the high-altitude tests took place after Walter Schirra’s nine-hour Mercury mission on 3
October 1962.
M O N DAY, S E P T E M B E R 10, 1962 111
Pitsunda. The Soviet press was about to announce that Berlin negotia-
tions were deadlocked and there would be a pause. Khrushchev now told
Udall, who told Kennedy, just what would happen after that pause. He
said, “We will give [President Kennedy] a choice—go to war, or sign a
peace treaty [ending occupation rights in Berlin]. We will not allow your
troops to be in Berlin.” Khrushchev added, “if any lunatics in your coun-
try want war, Western Europe will hold them back.” If that were not
enough, “It’s been a long time since you could spank us like a little boy—
now we can swat your ass. So let’s not talk about force. We’re equally
strong,” Khrushchev blustered. “You want Berlin. Access to it goes through
East Germany. We have the advantage. If you want to do anything, you
have to start a war.” But Khrushchev promised a lull before he brought
the crisis to a conclusion. “Out of resepct for your President we won’t do
anything until November [after the midterm elections].” None of this
was public. What was public was bad enough. Khrushchev had also met
with visiting U.S. poet Robert Frost, who then recounted to reporters (in
a cleaned up version of what Khrushchev actually said) how Khrushchev
had told him that “we were too liberal to fight.”1
In Congress, when the talk wasn’t on Cuba, there was discussion of a
plan to allow the self-employed to build retirement accounts of their own,
what would become the Self-Employed Pension–Individual Retirement
Account (SEP-IRA), and the President’s foreign aid bill.
The President had spent the weekend at Hammersmith Farm in
Newport, Rhode Island, catching some of the excitement of the upcom-
ing America’s Cup Challenge. Ahead of him this Monday were a series of
important meetings, only half of which he would choose to tape.
A sense of history and, of course, politics apparently influenced the
President’s choice of what to tape this day. Former president Dwight D.
Eisenhower remained a special challenge for Kennedy. Enormously
respected throughout the world, Eisenhower retained the affection of
millions of Americans. Journalist and sometime Kennedy adviser Joseph
Alsop once described the difference in the hold that the younger
President and Eisenhower had on the American people. Kennedy com-
manded their minds, but only Eisenhower had been given a place in
American hearts. The former president had just returned from a lengthy
European tour, which had included a long conversation with the prickly
German chancellor Konrad Adenauer. Kennedy needed Eisenhower’s
blessing, or at least a political nonaggression pact, to keep control of the
domestic debate on measures appropriate to the current tensions in
Europe. Later in the day, Kennedy would meet with his Berlin team to
discuss the latest developments and to hammer out the responses that
the Western alliance would make if Khrushchev seized West Berlin.
Possibly just before turning to Eisenhower and these foreign mat-
ters, Kennedy called his Secretary of the Treasury to discuss whether to
veto the Self-employed Pension Bill.
Time Unknown
2. Dictabelt 3A.6, Cassette A, John F. Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, Presidential
Recordings Collection. C. Douglas Dillon, secretary of the treasury. See also transcripts for
the President’s conversations on H.R. 10 with Albert Gore on 8 October 1962, and with
George Smathers on 10 October 1962.
3. The principal sponsors of the original bill were Eugene J. Keogh, Democratic U.S. represen-
tative from New York, 1937 to 1967, and George A. Smathers, Democratic U.S. senator from
Florida, 1951 to 1969. Under its final provisions, eligible self-employed individuals could
deduct 50 percent of their contributions up to an annual maximum of $2,500 or 10 percent of
Conversation with Douglas Dillon 113
their annual income, whichever was less. In addition, the tax benefits would not be granted to
an employer if he did not offer the same partially deductible retirement contributions to all
employees. The original House version allowed for 100 percent deductibility up to the
$2,500/10 percent limits. A Senate floor amendment by Senators Russell Long (D-Louisiana)
and Eugene J. McCarthy (D-Minnesota) changed this to 50 percent.
4. The estimated revenue loss in the original House version was $365 million.
5. It passed the House unanimously and garnered only four no votes in the Senate: Paul Douglas
(D-Illinois), Albert Gore (D-Tennessee), Pat McNamara (D-Michigan), and Wayne Morse (D-
Oregon). The final version of the bill that emerged out of the Senate-House conference commit-
tee also passed unanimously in the House and received only eight no votes in the Senate.
6. “He” is unidentified.
114 M O N DAY, S E P T E M B E R 10, 1962
At 12:30 P.M. the former President arrived at the White House through a
side door. Minutes after Eisenhower’s arrival, the Reverend Billy Graham
paid a call on both Presidents in the Oval Office. Graham was just return-
ing from a visit to Latin America and had some news to bring the
President about the strength of Fidel Castro’s supporters in South
America. President Kennedy tapes the meeting through the receiver of
his telephone. He rarely used this method of taping.8
7. Everett M. Dirksen was a Republican senator from Illinois, 1951 to 1969, and Senate Minority
Leader, 1959 to 1969.
8. It is possible that the conversation on Dictabelt 3A.7, which has not been found, was the
object of President Kennedy’s effort to tape. Ending that conversation, the President might
have forgotten to switch off the dictabelt machine and thus this room conversation was picked
up by either an open receiver or the telephone speaker.
Meeting with Bill y Graham and Dwight Eisenhow er 115
12:35–12:40 P.M.
9. Including President Kennedy, Dwight Eisenhower, Billy Graham, and Evelyn Lincoln.
Dictabelt 3A.8, Cassette A, John F. Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, Presidential
Recordings Collection.
10. In January and February 1962, Graham toured Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and
Chile. Then beginning in São Paulo, Brazil, on 25 September 1962, he toured Brazil, Paraguay,
Argentina, and Uruguay. “Billy in Catholic Country: He Collides with Clergy,” Time, 23
February 1962, pp. 77–78; Current Biography Yearbook, 1973 (New York: H. W. Wilson, 1974),
pp. 151–54; Marshall Frady, Billy Graham: A Parable of American Righteousness (Boston: Little,
Brown, 1979), pp. 441–46; Billy Graham, Just As I Am: The Autobiography of Billy Graham (San
Francisco: Harper San Francisco, 1997), pp. 188–92, 199–206, 356–57, 360–68, 389–402;
Carroll Kilpatrick, “President Confers With Ike 2 Hours,” Washington Post, 11 September
1962, pp. A1, A6; New York Times, 24 January 1962, p. 3; Wallace Terry, “Billy Graham
Condemns Sterilization,” Washington Post, 11 September 1962, p. A6.
116 M O N DAY, S E P T E M B E R 10, 1962
was there.11 And they swooped down. They’ve killed over 300,000 in the
last 14 years.12 And they claim now that Castro is in control of these
guerrillas.
Unidentified: In what? In Colombia?
Graham: In Colombia.
And he says the way to the United States is through the Colombian
Andes. And hoped [unclear] get organized and give weapons to [unclear].
And so, the infiltration is tremendous. And the anti-Communist forces are
getting hysterical because they feel that we’re not defending them like we
ought to, right or wrong. And I know it’s a very delicate problem.
Dwight D. Eisenhower: But it isn’t easy. [Unclear.] But these ones, the
20[,000], the 25,000 . . . but a . . . but, the main thing . . . that they charge
. . . American policy is that [we support] an oppressive regime . . . the
supporters, that is . . . [we’re] keeping them down, and . . . And, there-
fore, America is wrong. “America ought to give us the weapons and not to
our bosses.” And [unclear] . . .
Graham: And how to get it to them—
Eisenhower: And [unclear]. . . . [Unclear] we were discussing, how-
ever, on the telephone today [unclear] pushing, pushing for them and I’d
like to take them on the ears: What do you mean by it?
President Kennedy: As matter of fact from Bogotá [unclear]. The, a,
there’s no a . . . the a . . . Colombia actually has, you know, [Alberto]
Lleras Camargo, he’s a first-class [unclear] government—13
Eisenhower: Oh, yes. Oh, yes. They [unclear]. The tape skips.
Unidentified: —The [unclear] president [unclear] the same thing.
The person was asked if he had been asked to help finance the [unclear]
to help them to get out of the [unclear].
Graham: Right. [Unclear exchange.] If you can do the same thing
somehow in Brazil.
Unidentified: We’ve diversified the problems down in there [unclear].
11. Graham refers to his visit to Cali, Colombia, during his Latin American tour earlier in
1962. In his autobiography published in 1997, Graham records the incident slightly differ-
ently, reporting that the guerillas killed “fourteen people not far from where we were staying”
in Cali (Graham, Just As I Am, pp. 364–65).
12. From 1948 to 1962, Colombia endured La Violencia, a period of intense violence between
Liberal and Conservative political factions that left over 200,000 Colombians dead.
13. Alberto Lleras Camargo, who had just stepped down after his second term as president of
Colombia (1945–46, 7 August 1958 to 7 August 1962), was a strong supporter of Kennedy’s
Alliance for Progress.
Meeting with Bill y Graham and Dwight Eisenhow er 117
14. Brigadier General Robert L. Schulz, retired, longtime aide to General Eisenhower.
118 M O N DAY, S E P T E M B E R 10, 1962
15. Tape 21, John F. Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, Presidential Recordings
Collection.
16. Edwin O. Guthman and Jeffrey Shulman, eds., Robert Kennedy in His Own Words: The
Unpublished Recollections of the Kennedy Years (New York: Bantam Books, 1988), p. 55.
17. “Conversation with Chancellor Adenauer,” 2 August 1962, Dwight Eisenhower papers,
post-presidential series, Box 27, folder: Principal file, 1962, Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential
Library.
Meeting with Dwight Eisenhow er 119
18. Norstad’s resignation was eventually postponed to 1 January 1963 because of the Cuban
missile crisis.
120 M O N DAY, S E P T E M B E R 10, 1962
19. Dr. Hans Globke was state secretary in the office of Chancellor Adenauer.
20. As set forth by NATO Policy Directive MC 26/4 in the summer of 1961.
21. The West German Ministry of Defense had requested 18.2 billion deutsche marks. The
West German Bundestag approved a defense budget of 14.97 billion deutsche marks.
Meeting with Dwight Eisenhow er 121
lion people. We know you’ve got a collective labor force about twice the
size, in skilled labor, twice the size of ours. There’s no reason why you
people can’t keep the ground forces. Now in the meantime, the United
States has got to keep the deterrent—all the big bombs and all the rest of
it. We’ve got to keep the big thing and an enormous air force. Your
expenditures in those things don’t need to be very heavy, but you’ve got
to begin to produce these conventional and land forces.”
“Well,” which they said, “Well, you want us just to be the ol’ land
man and you come in and be the . . . you know, the glamour boys.”
I said, “To the hell with that, we’re trying to find the . . . how can we
put together our assets to have the best defense.” Now I tried to sell—I
sold this idea. I mean, they said they accepted it.
But as time has gone on, and for eight years, I desperately tried
behind the scenes to get these people to admit we ought to begin to get
out; they wouldn’t do it. And I’m afraid that just through custom they
have thought of the—begin to think of the thing as their right, that this
is just their . . . And if you say, “Well, you now ought to do a little more,
that you ought to pay for this or that [or anything].” Oh, they get very
emotional.
But Mr. Adenauer started off to tell me about relations between
France and Germany. These he said were improving markedly and rap-
idly, and that both he and General de Gaulle were committed to a com-
plete rapprochement, and that his own trip through—about six or seven
days through France—had been almost a triumphal tour. He was very
pleased.22 And he said he thought that this was going on to . . . so that
very soon, they would be allowing all people to go back and forth over
their borders without even, without cards, like we demand up in . . .
cards you carry between Mexico and so on. He says it’s all just free cir-
culation.
I said, “Well, if you start the intermarrying, then you’ll have union,
and be all right.”
He is very keen on this and, really, I think, is now looking upon
French-German friendship, and a sort of an entente, as a new type of,
almost an axis of influence in that area. This was what he said was the
encouraging part about the European thing and he thought this also of
the Common Market.23
(EURATOM). The original six signatories were Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany,
France, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands.
24. General Lauris Norstad, Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR), 20 November
1956 to 1 January 1963.
25. General Lyman Lemnitzer was Norstad’s successor as SACEUR, 1 January 1963 to 1 July
1969.
26. Then Brigadier General Lemnitzer was Alexander’s U.S. deputy, his deputy chief of staff,
for the 15th Army Group during World War I.
27. Reference to General Maxwell Taylor, Lemnitzer’s successor as Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff. Taylor served as U.S. Army chief of staff under President Eisenhower from
1955 to 1959 and emerged as a leading critic of the Eisenhower administration’s policies.
28. Reference to Taylor’s The Uncertain Trumpet (New York: Harper, 1959), a landmark study of
U.S. military security needs, which indicted Eisenhower’s national security policy, generated
considerable controversy around the 1960 election, and popularized the term flexible response to
describe the need for limited military options short of nuclear war. See “Meeting about Berlin,”
6 August 1962, for a discussion of West German anxiety.
Meeting with Dwight Eisenhow er 123
not depend on atomic bombs.” And he said, “we’re going to—we should-
n’t fight and strive to fight our wars by conventional weapons.” He said,
“If we do this, and if we adopt this kind of philosophy, this means that
America is again ready to see Europe overrun. Then we will start—
starting way back to where we were in 1942—to go back and plan [to
retake a Soviet-occupied Europe] and after all of this destruction and
occupation.” And he said, “This time it won’t be as easy as it was under
Hitler.” And this should, by and large, he said, he saw this as a very
strong evidence of an enormous and revolutionary change in American
policy, defense policy in Western Europe.
And I said, “Well, now, I’m not going, I can’t quarrel about that. I
mean I can’t argue the case because I am not privy to exactly to the
inner circles of portions of what you’re saying. But I do know this.
They’ve [the Kennedy administration] said they’re spending a good
many billions to keep our deterrent in a very top shape, and the missile
work as far as I can see is not only going ahead but, from all that my G-2
friends tell me from time to time, our strength is growing up even more
rapidly than what we thought, first calculated, and to greater value.29
Therefore, I can’t see that any of our, any government—any American
government—is discounting the effect of the deterrent or its need to use
it in the face of overwhelming strength.
Now, shortly after that, that was the gist of his talk, although he
brought in all sorts of details and, you might say, auxiliary sort of rea-
sons to support this. But then I got a word. It came out from one of his
friends, one of his people, that reached me, oh, a week later. Said that
General Taylor had given some testimony that greatly reassured
him.30 Now, I didn’t read this testimony; I didn’t want to . . . But appar-
ently . . . The German said, that spoke to me said, that apparently
General Taylor no longer believes exactly what he said in his book
because he had changed his mind. So, the big, real thing, was when I
saw this in the paper and then this German came to see me and told me
this. I said, “Well, I think maybe there’s no need for telling you because
29. The abbreviation G-2 is used in the Army to refer to staff intelligence personnel.
30. On 9 August, while Eisenhower was touring Europe, the U.S. Senate by unanimous vote
confirmed Taylor’s nomination as Chairman of the JCS. The action followed a hearing by the
Senate Armed Services Committee. At one point, Taylor assured the committee that “I am not
returning, if you gentlemen confirm me, as a crusader for change but rather one to make the
present system as effective as possible” (see Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 24 August
1962, p. 1421).
124 M O N DAY, S E P T E M B E R 10, 1962
it’s probably something you’d write about a friend with and knew about
the change.”
President Kennedy: Well, I think that . . . Of course, I think they mis-
stated Taylor’s position. As you know, Taylor’s been very strong on tac-
tical atomic weapons.
Eisenhower: Yes. Oh, yes . . . Oh, yes . . .
President Kennedy: And I, so I . . . there’s in fact . . . Norstad . . . I
think it’s a great loss—Norstad. For example, last spring . . . As you
know, [General Lucius] Clay and Norstad had a rather difficult time.31
Eisenhower: Oh did they? No, I didn’t know that.
President Kennedy: Yeah. Well, there was a good deal of tension
there.
Eisenhower: Hmm.
President Kennedy: For example, last spring, General Clay wanted to
have the civilian—at the time buzzing was taking place take place in the
corridor—he wanted a fighter escort at that time.32 General Norstad dis-
agreed. And we went with General Norstad. And I think it was the right
thing, as [a] matter of fact. They, as you know, they called the buzzing off.
But there was a good deal of . . . I don’t know whether it’s wanting to go
back to other times—but there was a good deal of friction.
Eisenhower: I didn’t know that.
President Kennedy: But I think that Norstad is first class, but when
he came back last winter, he said . . . I guess he’s had what—two heart
attacks—or one?
Eisenhower: Yes, that’s right.
President Kennedy: So he said he wanted to resign at the end of this
year. So, then when General Lemnitzer’s time ended [as JCS Chairman],
I was either faced with having him reappointed again or putting him
back, so this seemed to be the best arrangement.
But it was unfortunate that General [James] Gavin left in September,
who had been identified with support for the French nuclear effort.33 And
General Norstad left. General Lemnitzer went in. And these things are
regarded, I think, as quite significant. And the chancellor is 86. But as I
say, I find—I think that the criticisms, which are traditionally leveled at
31. General Lucius D. Clay was the President’s special representative in Berlin until May
1962, thereafter special consultant to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Clay was chosen for his sym-
bolic role as the hero of the 1948 Berlin airlift while he was the U.S. military governor for
occupied Germany.
32. Reference to Soviet harassment of Western aircraft.
33. General James Gavin was the U.S. ambassador to France until mid-September 1962.
Meeting with Dwight Eisenhow er 125
the United States, when you think that the amount of ground divisions
we have there, the amount of effort we’re putting in various places.
Again the French—a division and a half in West Germany. I talked
to Ambassador [Hervé] Alphand this morning, and I said, “I don’t
understand.”34 I said, “This French-German rapprochement is wonder-
ful, but here the Germans, who have been quite critical of us this sum-
mer, as I say, have cut their defense budget in the last month even though
they’ve got a very strong economy. And the French have a division and a
half even though your minimum goal is four under NATO, and you really
should have six.”35
He said, “Well, we’ve got them for the defense of France.”
But I said, “Well, look, you can’t have two divisions here [in Western
Europe] and two others . . .” The British are—
Eisenhower: That’s right.
President Kennedy: [Unclear] on us. So I think that the press, partic-
ularly some feed this, these European criticisms of our efforts—I think
that considering the load we carry compared to the load they carry . . .
Eisenhower: That’s right.
President Kennedy: It’s incredible.
Eisenhower: I would agree, and, a matter of fact, I would . . . I tried
my best, although every time I did the diplomats always said, “Now you
do it, you’re going to lose Europe now; that’s all there is to it because
their temper and this and that and the other thing and the psychological
reaction.”
But I tried every possible way. I said, “Well, now let’s make these
smaller divisions. Let’s begin to show them that we are concerned about
this big spending.” After all, we built almost unaided that great infra-
structure that starts right at the ports and goes all the way through the
place. We’ve got airfields. We’ve got everything and, of course, de
Gaulle did not . . . De Gaulle didn’t talk to me substantively at all. He
just proved very nice, very hospitable, and all that, very kind, but we
didn’t talk about it. And he wouldn’t, you know. He’s a very very
[unclear] man.
But, on the other hand, the German gave me the understanding that
not only were they going to go right up to their target. But I said, “Of
course, your target is too small. You are a people of still only 60 million.
34. Hervé Alphand was French ambassador to the United States. President Kennedy and he
met between 11:05 and 11:34 A.M.
35. Four divisions were specified under NATO Policy Directive MC 26/4.
126 M O N DAY, S E P T E M B E R 10, 1962
You’re right there on the firing line. Our country, which is, I say, three
times the size, is doing much more than three times what you’re doing,
and you people ought to be waking up to this.” But I’m astonished that
they cut their—
President Kennedy: Yeah. Well, Bob McNamara is coming over to
give you the figures on it.36
Eisenhower: Well, I think when I write to Adenauer I’m going to tell
him that I’m astonished.
President Kennedy: That would be very helpful. I think we’ll get
Secretary McNamara to give you the figures. I think that . . . Your talk
was very helpful, too. Of course, he has great regard for you and John
Foster Dulles—37
Eisenhower: We’ve always been very friendly.
President Kennedy: Yeah. So I think the fact that you . . . That helped
reassure him very much, especially when you spoke about Lemnitzer and
Taylor.
Eisenhower: Oh yes. Oh, oh, Lemnitzer . . . to hell with it.
President Kennedy: Yeah, that’s right.
Eisenhower: And I said, “I just can’t believe that you’ll have anything
but satisfaction.” Now, he did bring out that . . . before he gave me all the
circumstantial evidence that showed that what’s his name, Norstad,
knew nothing about his immediate relief. Because he . . . Norstad, only
by happenstance had been there about five days earlier. And was talking
with him, the plans that they were going to do together, and so I said
well maybe he was under a . . .
President Kennedy: Well. . . . No . . . That’s right. We gave him . . . It
was only five days before his relief because he came back here about a
month in July. He came back in July, and we talked about this. He had ear-
lier said that he would like to resign between August and September and
the next January—he gave a four- or five- month period. Well, we picked
October—the first of November because of the Lemnitzer, Joint Chiefs . . .
So when he came back here in July, we talked about whether we ought
to go to January, and he said no. And he also said he’d like to come out
right away because otherwise it would be rumored and his influence would
36. McNamara joined Kennedy, Eisenhower, and Secretary of State Dean Rusk for lunch and
then met in the Cabinet Room with General Marshall Carter, deputy director of the CIA, and
the two presidents.
37. Dulles was secretary of state under Dwight Eisenhower until his death from cancer in
1959.
Meeting with Dwight Eisenhow er 127
38. General Alfred Gruenther was a close personal friend of Eisenhower and served as his
chief of staff while Eisenhower was SACEUR, 1951 to 1952. Gruenther was then SACEUR
himself, 11 July 1953 to 20 November 1956.
39. General Matthew Ridgway was commander of the U.N. Command in the Far East, 11
April 1951 to 30 May 1952. He was SACEUR, 30 May 1952 to 11 July 1953, and served as
U.S. Army chief of staff, 1953 to 1955.
128 M O N DAY, S E P T E M B E R 10, 1962
important. But I told him that just had to be something that was mechan-
ical . . . No one would do that deliberately. He seemed to take that—
President Kennedy: Well, Norstad wanted us to move because he
thought there would be rumors about . . . As I say, Norstad asked—told
me—that he couldn’t, that this was what his desire was when he was
over in the winter.
Then when he came in July, and he talked to me about what our tim-
ing was, he said he’d like it to come as quickly as possible. So what we did
was announce Norstad and then say that if we were asked to submit
somebody, we would submit the name of General Lemnitzer and put it
up to the North Atlantic Treaty Council.
Well, of course, the French are attempting always to justify the need
for their own atomic [force], independent of us.40 So, I think, they raised
some difficulty about it but . . . I don’t know what—where these—when
you think, as I say, what the United States has done for 17 years in
Germany, I think that—
Eisenhower: There’s one point that I do think we’ve got to remem-
ber. These people have . . . They were in an awful shape; then the
Marshall Plan of course got them back, and they recognize that. I’ll tell
you the nation that speaks more publicly and openly about the help of
America, American help, is Germany. You never hear of this brought up
in France or Britain—sometimes in Britain. But up in Germany, it’s
almost a religion. Everybody that comes to you says, “Well, now, of
course, we realize what we owe to America.”
But the effort to get these people to doing their own part—I just
don’t know beyond this very argument. If it were the six divisions
there—with the little bit that, the 12 that Germany will have, the one
that France, so on. You’re bound to be back to the Rhine before you can
collect yourself.
President Kennedy: Yeah . . . yeah . . . yeah . . .
Eisenhower: You see. Unless you go into this atomic business. And if
that’s going to be true, you’ve got to have greater strength that can be
deployed rapidly. Well, if they’re going to cut down . . . There’s just . . .
President Kennedy: Yeah . . . yeah.
Eisenhower: There’s something wrong here. I don’t know just what
it is. I hadn’t heard this. I was hopeful . . . I knew that when de Gaulle
brought back his Algerian army, he was going to put most of his
40. Since assuming power in 1958, de Gaulle had declared unequivocally and repeatedly that
France would achieve independent national nuclear capability.
Meeting with Dwight Eisenhow er 129
41. In 1958, de Gaulle returned to power to end the French-Algerian war. Peace talks began
in March 1961, but bloodshed continued until Algeria gained independence on 1 July 1962. In
September 1961, de Gaulle had begun withdrawing French forces from Algeria. Under NATO
policy directives MC 70 and 26/4, France was committed to contribute four divisions but had
produced only two and one-third divisions to that point.
42. Rural retreat of U.S. presidents in northern Maryland, 70 miles northwest of Washington,
D.C. Established in 1942 as “Shangri-La” by Franklin Roosevelt, Eisenhower renamed it for
his grandson in 1953. When Khrushchev visited the United States in September 1959, he and
Eisenhower had several discussions at Camp David.
130 M O N DAY, S E P T E M B E R 10, 1962
more troops [in West Germany]—there was somewhat at that time in the
public about more, a couple more divisions, and so . . . He [Krushchev]
says, “What are they talking about?” He says, “For every division they can
put in Germany, I can put ten, without any trouble whatsoever.”
And I said, “We know that.” And I said, “But we’re not worrying
about that.” And I said, “I’ll tell you. I don’t propose to fight a conven-
tional war. If you declare . . . if you bring out war, bring on war of global
character . . . There are going to be no conventional, nothing conven-
tional about it.” And I told him flatly.
And he said, “Well.” He said, “That’s a relief. Neither one of us can
afford it.” “Yes,” I said that, and I said, “OK, so I agree to that, too.”
[Laughing.]
President Kennedy: Right. Right.
Eisenhower: But, you see, what these people are afraid of . . . I mean
the essence of his argument was, if you try to fight this thing convention-
ally from the beginning, when do you start to go nuclear? And this will
never be until you yourselves in other words become in danger and he
said, “That means all of Europe is again gone.” And that—
President Kennedy: But, of course, we’ve got all these nuclear weapons,
as you know, stored in West Berlin. All we are . . . What they are really con-
cerned about is that the Russians will seize Hamburg, which is only a few
miles from the border, and some other towns, and then they’ll say, “We’ll
negotiate.” So then Norstad has come up with this whole strategy. I think
the only difficulty is that no one will . . . That if we did not have the prob-
lem, I say, of Berlin and maintaining access through that autobahn author-
ity, then you would say that any attempt to seize any part of West
Germany, we would go to nuclear weapons. But, of course, they never will!
But it’s this difficulty of maintaining a position 120 miles behind
their lines—
Eisenhower: Mr. President, I’ll tell you . . . Here’s something, I can’t
document everything . . . but Clay was there. Poor, poor old Smith is
gone.43 We begged our governments not to go into Berlin.
We . . . I asked that they build a cantonment capital, a cantonment cap-
ital at the junction of the British, American, and Russian zones. I said, “We
just don’t, we can’t do this. . . . ” Well, it had been a political thing that had
been done first in the Advisory Council, European Advisory Council, in
London. And later confirmed and . . . But Mr. Roosevelt said to me this
43. Eisenhower was probably referring to Joseph Smith, who as an Army brigadier general,
had been headquarters commander for the Berlin airlift of 1948–49.
Meeting with Dwight Eisenhow er 131
44. Eisenhower did travel with Franklin Roosevelt in Tunis on 21 November 1943. He also
met privately with Roosevelt at the White House on 5 and 12 January 1944. There are no
records of those conversations.
In March and April 1945 Eisenhower had refused to divert his forces to a race to capture
Berlin before the Russians, partly because he knew the postwar occupation zones had already
been decided. Later criticized for this judgment, he tended to be defensive about it [see
Stephen Ambrose, Eisenhower, vol. 1 (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1983), pp. 391–404]. In
now recalling how those zones, and Berlin’s place in them, were originally determined,
Eisenhower mixes memories of general conversations with Franklin Roosevelt about future
relations with Russia in November 1943 and January 1944, when there was probably little or
no specific discussion of Berlin, with the memory of his own subsequent early-1944 proposal
for a “cantonment capital.” Eisenhower made that proposal at a time when Roosevelt still
toyed with the idea of connecting Berlin to the edge of a sketchily imagined U.S. occupation
zone. Under pressure from the British, the Soviets, and his diplomats, Roosevelt gave way
later in 1944 to the scheme which neither he nor Eisenhower had originally supported but
which was finally adopted [see Herbert Feis, Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 1957), pp. 360-65; Dwight D. Eisenhower, Waging Peace: The
White House Years, 1956–1961 (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1965), p. 335 and note 5].
45. On 31 July 1961, Prime Minister Harold Macmillan announced Great Britain’s bid for
accession for the EEC. De Gaulle rarely disguised his reluctance to accept Britain’s entrance.
46. During the negotiations for the Treaty of Rome, which established the EEC in 1957, de
Gaulle supported Britain’s entrance. The United Kingdom, however, decided against joining
the Common Market and formed the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) with Austria,
Denmark, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland.
132 M O N DAY, S E P T E M B E R 10, 1962
47. Lieutenant General Marshall S. Carter was deputy director of the CIA.
48. Surface-to-air missiles.
Meeting with Dwight Eisenhow er 133
Secretary Rusk and Secretary McNamara . . . We’ll all meet here right
after lunch.
Unidentified: Fine.
President Kennedy: It’ll be about 2:15.49
Unidentified: Fine. [Door shuts.]
Tape recording continues for several minutes until someone enters the
room and turns off the switch. Following lunch in the Mansion, Kennedy,
Eisenhower, Rusk, and McNamara joined Marshall Carter in the Cabinet
Room. Kennedy did not tape that meeting.
On September 12, 1962, Eisenhower drafted a letter to Chancellor
Adenauer about the points discussed between the two U.S. presidents.
Eisenhower ended his letter with a passage meant to calm the aging
chancellor’s anxiety about the U.S. commitment to the defense of West
Germany: “Please do not bother to reply to this document. As a friend of
yours and your countrymen and as a loyal citizen of my own I have tried
only to act as a messenger of thoughts expressed to me personally (by
each of our two nations’ respective leaders) on subjects to which I have
adverted.”50 On September 14, Kennedy and Rusk approved this letter
before it was sent to Adenauer.
After Dwight Eisenhower left the White House, at about 3:00 P.M.,
Kennedy returned to the family quarters for a hour. He had a series of
meetings before him that afternoon, none of which he taped. For an hour
he spoke with the chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, Harry F.
Byrd of Virginia, a staunch opponent of anything that smacked of deficit
spending. Next there came a group led by the outgoing secretary of
labor, Arthur Goldberg; the secretary of the Navy, Fred Korth; the secre-
tary of commerce, Luther Hodges; the solicitor general, Archibald Cox;
and the attorney general, Robert Kennedy. Hodges stayed on after this
meeting and was joined by Senator Robert Kerr, Theodore Sorensen, and
the White House domestic team. At 6:00, Kennedy huddled with Clark
Clifford, the Washington lawyer and intelligence community wise man,
49. Kennedy is referring to the time of the intelligence briefing set up for President
Eisenhower in the Cabinet Room after lunch.
50. Personal letter, Eisenhower to Adenauer, 12 September 1962, Dwight Eisenhower papers,
post-presidential series, Box 27, folder: Principal file, 1962, Dwight D. Eisenhower
Presidential Library.
134 M O N DAY, S E P T E M B E R 10, 1962
who in early August had pushed for the establishment of a CIA unit to
help investigate press leaks.
Finally, from 6:28 to 6:45, the President met with Rusk, McGeorge
Bundy, and Robert Kennedy. Although no memorandum of conversation
exists for this meeting, its subject was almost certainly sending U-2s
over Cuba. A week earlier the Soviets had protested the straying of a U-
2 over Sakhalin Island, and just the day before a U-2 piloted by the
Nationalist Chinese under arrangement with the U.S. government had
been shot down over Communist China. Nevertheless the CIA was
requesting two extended flights over portions of the island not covered
by the flights of August 29 or September 5. Fearing another U-2 diplo-
matic incident, Secretary Rusk had concerns about flying over a country
that now had Soviet surface-to-air missile batteries. There was reason to
believe that the recently discovered SAM sites, which were in the eastern
and central portions of Cuba, might be operational. Bundy had called for
a 5:45 meeting of CIA representatives with Rusk; Lansdale; James Reber,
the head of the Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance (COMOR); and
the Attorney General in his office to discuss the Secretary’s concerns.
Rusk, Bundy, and Robert Kennedy came directly from that meeting to
see the President.
The President agreed with Rusk. The White House apparently
ordered a worldwide stand-down for all U-2 flights until September 16.
When U-2 flights resumed over Cuba, they were to be quick missions,
termed in-and-out flights, that photographed small parts of the island of
particular interest to the agency without coming near known SAM sites.
Due to unexpectedly bad weather the in-and-out flights would be further
delayed until September 26 and 29. As for the central and eastern parts
of Cuba, the areas with known SAM sites, there was, as yet, no agree-
ment to take the risk to photograph them.51
A gathering of the administration’s Berlin team followed. Kennedy
51. The story of Bundy’s 10 September meeting was reconstructed after the fact by two CIA
officers during congressional investigations in 1963 into the intelligence background to the
Cuban missile crisis [see Ernest deM. Berkaw, Jr., to the Executive Director, CIA, 28
February 1963, FRUS, 10: 1054–55 (The FRUS version indicates this memorandum was pre-
pared in 1963 but carries the date of 10 September 1962, giving the impression this document
was backdated for the CIA’s records.); Lyman Kirkpatrick, Memorandum for the Director,
“White House Meeting on 10 September 1962 on Cuban Overflights,” 1 March 1963, in CIA
Documents on the Cuban Missile Crisis 1962, Mary McAuliffe, ed. (Washington, DC: CIA, 1992),
document 21]. The results of the later Oval Office meeting can be inferred from Gregory W.
Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach, eds., The CIA and the U-2 Program, 1954–1974
(Washington, DC: CIA, 1998), pp. 199–211.
Meeting on Berlin 135
6:45–7:15 P.M.
Meeting on Berlin52
Since President Kennedy’s meetings about Berlin in August, the adminis-
tration’s contingency planning had progressed. His chief advisers now
encouraged him to approve a proposal on “Preferred Sequence of Military
Actions in the Berlin Conflict,” which largely drew on the Berlin and mar-
itime contingency (BERCON/MARCON) plans discussed in August.53
Now President Kennedy needed to approve the sequence of military actions
before the Washington Ambassadorial Group and the NATO Council con-
vened later in the month.
Earlier that day, McGeorge Bundy had sent Kennedy a draft of the
paper and a cover memorandum that explained disagreements about the
use of nuclear weapons and the wisdom of specifying in advance a
sequence of actions.54
The President began recording as his advisers outlined the differing
views among the Departments of State and Defense, the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, and the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe.
52. Including President Kennedy, McGeorge Bundy, Mike Forrestal, Martin Hillenbrand,
Lyman Lemnitzer, Robert McNamara, Paul Nitze, and Dean Rusk. Tape 22, John F. Kennedy
Library, President’s Office Files, Presidential Recordings Collection.
53. Draft not found. For the revised military subgroup proposal for the Washington
Ambassadorial Group on the preferred sequence of military actions in a Berlin conflict, see
FRUS, 15: 315–20.
54. FRUS, 15: 313–15.
136 M O N DAY, S E P T E M B E R 10, 1962
55. For the BERCON/MARCON contingency planning discussions, see “Meeting on Berlin,”
3 August 1962 and 9 August 1962.
Meeting on Berlin 137
one. And the thought was that you’d better take these mobilization
measures which are contemplated in Phase II before you go that far.
President Kennedy: This Phase II, though, we’re talking now really
about Phase II, aren’t we?
Lemnitzer: Yes.
Nitze: Yes, during Phase II, you would continue the flights as long as
you could, but if they started using these ground-to-air missiles, or put
in a—
President Kennedy: It seems to me we ought to maybe consider
rewording that sentence because I think it sounds like maybe they will
try and then they’ll knock us down and then we’ll stop and then it will
be up to NATO when we start again. Don’t you think we ought to put it
a little more . . . we will cease and mobilize and then—
Bundy: And [many] steps will be taken.
President Kennedy: Prepare to commence again rather than sort of
leaving it more questionable.
Nitze: I think that the British are going to come in with some sug-
gested amended language for that particular sentence. And I think their
government has approved the whole document except for that sentence
and I think they’re going to come in into our next meeting with a slight
change in it. I think they’ll make the same point that you have in mind,
Mr. President.
President Kennedy: Could you keep that in mind . . . the NATO deci-
sion? Couldn’t we say NATO would have to face the necessity, in light of
stated military preparedness for air action, beyond the scope of Live Oak
operations, in order to reestablish air access after suitable concentration of
forces has taken place?56 This other thing, they get it all, in the end.
Garbled exchange between Bundy and an unidentified speaker. Sound of
pages being turned.
President Kennedy: Now, when we say the three powers would, if
necessary . . . what are we . . . What do we want to call in the . . . Have
you got that? When do we call on NATO to make its forces, air forces
available?
Nitze: The concept is that as long as the effort is purely on the air
corridors along the autobahn, that this is a tripartite responsibility. The
56. Live Oak was the planning group created by SACEUR Lauris Norstad to deal with the
military aspects of the Berlin problem. Headed by a British major general, it also included U.S.
and French officers and a West German observer.
140 M O N DAY, S E P T E M B E R 10, 1962
Bundy: Well, they know what they are, Mr. President. Under the
existing NATO planning, they would total, if they all were produced,
something like 47 divisions, if I remember the figure correctly. General
Lemnitzer will have it in mind.
Lemnitzer: I am not sure of the total. We will check it.
Bundy: But it implies a NATO-wide mobilization, and they will all
know that that is what is implied under existing contingency plans on a
NATO-wide basis. This document, it is important to say, relates to an
existing NATO strategy. This is simply the Berlin strategy within exist-
ing NATO strategy.
Martin Hillenbrand: We have another paper which will be consid-
ered by the NAC [North Atlantic Council] at the same time, and that
relates to the specific question of tripartite-NATO relationship, and what
parts of these operations will be under necessarily under tripartite con-
trol, and where the obligation is for NATO as a whole.58
McNamara: Which we could declare by saying a major element of
military action will be for each of the Western European members of
NATO to mobilize and deploy. . . . Make it more specific.
Bundy: Under NATO M-day plans.
McNamara: Yes.
Bundy: Yeah.
McNamara: [whispering] We also hope each of the NATO nations
contemplate through the use of [unclear].
President Kennedy: Do the words on page 5, “the initiation of some
form of nuclear action” . . . has the word initiation got anything to do
[with] [unclear] [sounds of flipping pages] at the bottom? If our continued
impression would be observed, it would be the realization of the imminence
of nuclear war?59 Or is initiation satisfactory? [Unclear exchange.]
Nitze: The point we were trying to get across here was that the
other NAC members would have to realize that we might be faced with a
situation where we would have to initiate. If we could take out the words
58. The tripartite powers were the three Western powers with treaty rights and obligations in
West Germany—Great Britain, France, and the United States. The defense of the Western
position in Berlin would start as a tripartite responsibility and then expand to involve all of
NATO. The involvement of the entire NATO alliance would occur if the Soviet challenge
exceeded a certain threshold.
59. Kennedy is hinting at the possibility that the Western powers might have to be the first to
use nuclear weapons in a conflict with the Warsaw Pact over Berlin. They would preempt the
Soviet use of nuclear weapons because of the “realization of the imminence” of total war.
142 M O N DAY, S E P T E M B E R 10, 1962
initiation of, and it would still be implied when you say “will be some
form of nuclear action.”
Bundy: I think that’s better.
Nitze: “Resort to.”
President Kennedy: Yeah.
Nitze: We can just take out the initiation.
Bundy: I think “resort to” is pretty good.
President Kennedy: Yeah.
Nitze: “Resort to.”60
President Kennedy seems to take a phone call, not related to the discus-
sion at hand.
President Kennedy: Right, OK, . . . Huntsville [Alabama]? Yeah, which
day can you do it? Next week? Why don’t you check that out and . . . Let
me see, I’ll be in Huntsville Tuesday, this week. Because it looks like I’ll be
down there this Sunday. What about the [unclear] burning of those things
[unclear]? Yeah . . . have you announced how many FBI you’ve got; or are
they putting in helicopters. Yeah, OK, fine. Right. OK. Good. Bye.61 [Hangs
up phone.]
President Kennedy: You are going [to] change that to make it . . .
Bundy: We’re going to say “resort to,” simply—
President Kennedy: “Resort to.”
Nitze: It would be “to resort to.”
President Kennedy flips his copy of the document, searching for the
offending phrase.
President Kennedy: All right, then.
Rusk: Mr. President, it’s the very last paragraph, on page 6, [unclear]
language [unclear] because it would be too much of a row to NATO, the
North Atlantic Council. Paul, I don’t see any particular point, from our
point of view, in hanging on to it. We might as well drop it.
Nitze: Apparently, the Germans have also said they wanted to drop
it. I’m not quite sure why they want to drop it.
60. The critical sentence in this planning document thus read: “If the course chosen [by
NATO] were conventional action and this fails to make the Soviet Union back down and has
not precipitated general war, the last remaining pressure to be exerted will be to resort to
some form of nuclear action” (FRUS, 15:320).
61. On 11 September 1962, President Kennedy planned to visit defense facilities at Redstone
Laboratories in Huntsville, Alabama. He would be accompanied by British defense minister
Peter Thorneycroft, who was visiting the United States 9 to 17 September. On Sunday, 16
September, Kennedy was expected to be in Newport, Rhode Island, with Thorneycroft as his
and Mrs. Kennedy’s guest.
Meeting on Berlin 143
62. Thomas Finletter was the permanent representative to the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization.
144 M O N DAY, S E P T E M B E R 10, 1962
67. David Ormsby-Gore was the British ambassador to the United States.
146 M O N DAY, S E P T E M B E R 10, 1962
68. In October Bohlen is expected to leave for Europe to replace General James Gavin as U.S.
ambassador to France.
Meeting on Berlin 147
69. President Kennedy had asked Congress for standby authority to call up 150,000 reservists
for one year and to extend active duty tours without declaring a state of emergency. On 24
September, the House of Representatives granted him that power.
70. On 29 August, Secretary Udall arrived in the Soviet Union for an 11-day visit to see
hydroelectric projects. On 6 September, Udall met for two hours with Khrushchev. During
their conversation, Khrushchev raised the subject of Berlin and informed Udall bluntly that
the Soviets would not allow Western troops to remain in Berlin and that the United States
and its allies would not dare to go to war over this. At one point, Khrushchev told Udall that
Kennedy was not in a position to reach an agreement over Berlin because he lacked support in
Congress (see FRUS, 15: 308–10).
148 M O N DAY, S E P T E M B E R 10, 1962
71. Charles Hitch was assistant secretary of defense for budgetary affairs. McNamara admired
Hitch, the former head of the economics division at RAND, for his efficiency and innovation. Hitch
devised the Planning-Programming-Budgeting System (PPBS), which centralized planning in the
Office of the Secretary of Defense and reduced the independence of the service secretaries.
T H U R S DAY, S E P T E M B E R 13, 1962 149
The President arrived in the Oval Office at 9:40 A.M., after breakfast with
the Democratic legislative leadership. It was his first full day in the
White House since Monday, September 10. Early Tuesday Kennedy had
flown to Huntsville, Alabama, for an intensive two-day tour of the heart-
land of the U.S. space program, where he received a series of briefings on
the status of his goal to put a man on the moon. By the time of his return
on Wednesday night, he had visited the Marshall Space Flight Center in
Huntsville; Cape Canaveral in Florida; the NASA facility in Houston,
Texas; and the McDonnell Douglas plant in St. Louis, which had built the
Mercury capsules and was now working on the Gemini program.
Kennedy had a press conference scheduled for Thursday evening, and
most of the morning was spent preparing. After signing a bill extending
federal protection to the Point Reyes seashore in northern California,
Kennedy met for a few minutes alone with Secretary of State Dean Rusk
before heading into a longer meeting with Rusk and a group of key
advisers to review what might be discussed at the press conference.
While Kennedy was on tour, the Soviets had issued a strong response to
the President’s September 4 statement on Cuba and the administration’s
announced intention to call up 150,000 Reserves. The Soviet Union
raised the alert status of its forces and warned that it would protect
Cuban sovereignty. President Kennedy had every reason to expect ques-
tions about this in the evening.
Walter Heller then came into the Oval Office for about half an hour,
presumably to help with any domestic economic questions. Finally, before
going to a luncheon in honor of U Thant, the acting secretary-general of
the United Nations, the President welcomed the members of the U.S. del-
egation to the 17th U.N. General Assembly. Senator Albert Gore of
Tennessee, who had been named to the delegation, brought along his
daughter, Nancy, and his son Al, a future vice president.
After lunch, just before dropping in on a group of Jewish leaders meet-
150 T H U R S DAY, S E P T E M B E R 13, 1962
ing in the Fish Room, the President called Speaker McCormack, whom he
had seen at the leadership breakfast, to discuss the congressional resolu-
tion on standby authority for calling up the Reserves. In McCormack’s
office were Congressmen Carl Vinson of Georgia and Thomas Morgan of
Pennsylvania.
4:55 P.M.
1. Dictabelt 3B.1, Cassette A, John F. Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, Presidential
Recordings Collection.
Conversation with McCormack, Morgan, and Vinson 151
2. President Kennedy wants to be sure this resolution mentions the congressional resolution
that helped a Republican president, Dwight Eisenhower, deal with foreign crises in 1958.
152 T H U R S DAY, S E P T E M B E R 13, 1962
3. The New York Times that morning reported attempts by three Republican senators to add
inflammatory language to the administration’s reserve mobilization bill. One of them, Senator
Prescott Bush of Connecticut, proposed that it “put the Soviet Union on notice that the
Monroe Doctrine was not dead.” However, by the end of the day the Senate had passed the
resolution unanimously, without any amendments. The failed Republican amendments were
Conversation with McCormack, Morgan, and Vinson 153
Vinson: Uh-huh.
President Kennedy: —language.
Vinson: That’s right, because I’ve got to keep down some very objec-
tionable amendments—
President Kennedy: That’s correct.
Vinson: . . . in my committee and this is the only way I can do it.
President Kennedy: That’s fine, Mr. Chairman.
Vinson: Thank you, Mr. President.
President Kennedy: Thanks a lot. Right.
referred to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee for possible incorporation in another res-
olution (New York Times, 13 and 14 September 1962).
4. The President’s News Conference of 13 September 1962, in The Kennedy Presidential Press
Conferences (New York: Coleman, 1978).
5. On the Baldwin case, see Volume 1, “Meeting with PFIAB,” 1 August 1962; Introduction to
16 August 1962; and “Meeting on Intelligence Matters,” 22 August 1962.
154 T U E S DAY, S E P T E M B E R 25, 1962
President Kennedy took some time off in mid-September 1962 despite the
crush of events in the Caribbean and Central Europe and his active partici-
pation in the midterm elections. An avid sailor, Kennedy spent as much
time watching the America’s Cup Challenge off Newport, Rhode Island, as
possible. Leaving the Oval Office on Friday afternoon, September 14, the
Kennedys spent until Wednesday afternoon, September 19, in Newport.
President Kennedy invited his good friend British ambassador David
6. “Meeting of Orvil E. Dryfoos with John F. Kennedy, September 13, 1962,” 14 September
1962, Dryfoos Papers, New York Times Archives, New York, NY. Kennedy started the meeting
by saying that he was much less worried about Cuba than he was about the situation in Berlin.
He thought people exaggerated the threat posed by Cuba. He expected the situation to get
very bad in Berlin in December. The editors are grateful to the New York Times for the use of
its archives.
T U E S DAY, S E P T E M B E R 25, 1962 155
1. For the development of this policy see Volume 1, “Meeting on the Gold and Dollar Crisis,”
10 August 1962; “Meeting on the Gold and Dollar Crisis,” 16 August 1962; and “Meeting on
Gold and Dollar Policy,” 20 August 1962.
156 T U E S DAY, S E P T E M B E R 25, 1962
2. Including President Kennedy, William Bundy, Mike Forrestal, Averell Harriman, U. Alexis
Johnson, Carl Kaysen, Robert Komer, Lyman Lemnitzer, Robert McNamara, William
Sullivan, and Maxwell Taylor. President Kennedy’s daily appointment’s diary lists George
Ball and a Commander Bagley as also having attended the meeting, but they were not identi-
fied on the tape. Tape 23, John F. Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, Presidential
Recordings Collection. Initially, the Kennedy Library dated this conversation as 28 September
1962; however, internal evidence and the existence of an Asian foreign policy meeting on
Tape 25, which could not have occurred any other day but 28 September, argues for this being
the Taylor briefing meeting of 25 September 1962.
This tape begins with a few minutes of a fragmented conversation. The quality of the
recording is so poor that only a few words can be heard. Civil rights and the President’s inten-
tion to initiate a housing bill for the District of Columbia are mentioned. A “Ken,” possibly
Kenneth O’Donnell, and a “Tom” greet each other. Given that Tape 22 contained a conversa-
tion on September 10 and the next conversation on Tape 23 occurred in the late afternoon of
25 September, it is impossible to provide an exact date for this fragment.
Meeting with Maxw ell Ta ylor on His Far Easter n Trip 157
known as West New Guinea. The Dutch, who had colonized Indonesia and
controlled it until 1948, refused to turn over West New Guinea to the
Indonesians in 1949. The colony comprised 150,000 square miles of the
most primitive territory left in the world.
The United States maintained a hands-off policy until 1960, when
the Eisenhower administration proposed to create a U.N. trusteeship for
the territory. The negotiations quickly failed. The Dutch sent an aircraft
carrier and troops to the region, to which Sukarno responded by infil-
trating troops, contracting for $500 million of Soviet military aid, and
issuing belligerent statements. The Kennedy administration pursued
Eisenhower’s policy, but little progress was made until mid-1962, when
Kennedy’s negotiator, Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker, worked to bring
the two sides together. He proposed a two-year transition plan, with
West Irian remaining a U.N. trustee for the transitional period.
President Kennedy had to intervene to save the negotiations, but he
did save them and a compromise agreement was reached in early August
1962. The Dutch agreed to turn over the region to a U.N. Temporary
Executive Authority, which could begin the transfer of authority to the
Indonesians as early as May 1963.
Taylor returned on September 21. At this meeting, Taylor provided
essentially a long briefing of his trip. Kennedy did not tape the entire
meeting. He turned on the tape recorder after Taylor began speaking.
force. We don’t think they fly as well as our Chinat [Chinese Nationalist]
friends, but if you look at the inventory of aircraft that have been built up
in recent years, it ends up in [being] quite a formidable threat. So much
so that our air people in each one of the areas, say, in Korea, or in Taiwan,
or in Southeast Asia, can build a picture which is quite graphic and quite
realistic, I think, of a 1,000-plane attack say against every important tar-
get in South Korea in a very short period of time.
Now what we’ve done over the years is that we have built up in Korea
particularly and Taiwan very sizable ground forces, but we have lagged
in the air defense aspect. So that now we’re being hit almost at one time,
in a short period of time, at least, with the requirements for more-
advanced interceptors and also for a modernized air control and warn-
ing circuits. So we’re having this in South Korean, Taiwan, and also—
President Kennedy: OK. Now, do we have Hawk missiles in—
Taylor: —and in Korea.
President Kennedy: Do we have them on Formosa?
Taylor: We have them planned in Formosa.
Lyman Lemnitzer: None of them have Hawks yet but we have a
Nike-Hercules Battery there.
President Kennedy: Is that a pretty good missile?
Lemnitzer: Yes sir, it’s the best up to about 80,000 feet. It’s a very,
very accurate—
President Kennedy: As good as a SAM 2?
Taylor: It’s also a surface-to-air missile, Mr. President, something we
don’t give her credit for, a surface-to-surface missile. A credit we don’t
give to ourselves, but it has a very good accuracy up to about 90 miles.
Lemnitzer: It was moved in there at the time of the bombardment of
the offshore islands of 1958, and it’s the best missile in the world of its
kind.
President Kennedy: Can this pick up? This . . . it could be against an
ocean target. The Nike—
Unidentified: Yes, sir.
Taylor: If you could locate the target with binoculars—
President Kennedy: Radar? Do you have a firing? Do you have a
radar apparatus?
Lemnitzer: Indeed, that’s how it . . .
President Kennedy: We don’t have any Nike-Zeus on Quemoy and
Matsu, do we?
Lemnitzer: No missiles, no surface-to-air missiles on Matsu.
President Kennedy: Now, is our, [is] the number of our missiles on
Formosa inadequate?
Meeting with Maxw ell Ta ylor on His Far Easter n Trip 159
Taylor: I would say it is inadequate. That is really the point, sir, that
the air defense aspect has lagged in terms of other kinds of forces. And
unfortunately, when you look at the MAP program, as I told the senators
this morning, that’s where the money is going.3 We’re planning now to
close this gap, but most of the money in the military aid programs are
simply for the maintenance of current forces plus this additional money
for the modernization of air defense. That’s not entirely true, but it’s
generally so. So that’s one of the unfortunate things about any serious
cut in the aid program at this time is that it does hold back an area in
which we are critically weak.4
Another very interesting and I think important point militarily, Mr.
President, as you go down each country. Take Korea, which is a big
money user in that area. I looked that program over, hoping as I have in
previous years to find some way, from a military point of view, to reduce,
to recommend a reduction. This is a burden which we don’t like. It’s
been looked at year after year. But I would have to report that as long as
we keep the present assumptions in Korea, I don’t think, from a military
point of view, we’re justified in reducing our forces. In fact, we should be
putting more money, as I’ve said, into air defense.
Now, one of the reasons however, for that is that the assumption
now . . . the objective given to our forces . . . the indigenous forces in
Korea . . . is to be able, with South Korean forces, to check and hold off a
massive attack mounted not only by the North Koreans but also by the
Red Chinese. In other words, we’re setting a very high level of effort as
the goal for our, for the indigenous forces. And we’re assuming that
atomic weapons would not be used.
Now, I’ve discussed this with the Secretary and the Joint Chiefs. I
think that we should really come to you and get with a study of . . . an
analyzing of pros and cons of the use of atomic weapons in the Far East.
Those pros and cons are quite different from the situation in Europe.
Sometimes the advantages are greater; sometimes perhaps less. But I
think that if we could assume that in case of [a] massive Chinese attack
at any point in Asia, whether in Korea or in Southeast Asia, we could
certainly recast then some of our military requirements, and I would
think reorient some of our programs. So I think that’s a capital point,
and we should bring you a recommendation.
haven’t had a chance to review it. A General Cary, who’s a retired Air
Force General.
President Kennedy mumbles something, probably related to the fact that
Bill Bundy has already made the same point while McNamara was out
of the room.
McNamara: But this ought to be reviewed formally by the Chiefs and
reported to you, and I asked the Chiefs yesterday to—
President Kennedy: The point he was making, Mr. Secretary, while
you were absent, [was] that this would in a sense be a reverse of what
we were attempting to do in Europe.
McNamara: But I think the conditions are reversed. In Europe the
reason our strategy [is] as it is, [is] because we’re faced with a nuclear
force and a very strong one. In China we have no nuclear force opposing
us. And it seems to me this is enough of a difference to warrant at least
consideration of a different strategy. And I think—
President Kennedy: Whether you’d say that you would use nuclear
weapons . . . on crossing, coming into North Korea, which would not be
very overt, because they could be coming in and out of there in peacetime
conditions or whether you’d wait until they cross the cease-fire line?6
Taylor: Well the intent would be a massive invasion. If it’s not mas-
sive, it has no great military significance.
President Kennedy: I would think that if they came en masse, the
Chinese down, then of course it would be a . . . I would think the more
likely thing would be . . . is they would move there [South Korea] having
moved against Quemoy and Matsu and our having trouble in Berlin; it
would be part of a worldwide expansion rather than just a single action
there. That’s the least likely kind of military action for them to take.
Taylor: Well, I think that’s true, that there’s no great feeling that that
is a likely contingency now, but the whole situation in Red China can
change drastically. If, for example, the situation would break in Southeast
Asia, we ourselves might want to put pressure on that part of world.
McNamara: Well, we’re right in an untenable position, I think, at the
present time. We’re supplying forces which are more than enough to
support a strategy based on nuclear weapons, but less than enough to
counter a large-scale conventional onslaught. So we don’t have any—
Taylor: We’re not bound by that position.
McNamara: And this is why we started these studies, Mr. President.
in the civilian economy. But in the long run it would free substantial
forces, maybe a couple hundred thousand men. In the long run it would
greatly reduce our military assistance program because we’re supplying
air power to Korea and to Taiwan, and we will have to supply it to
Thailand if we continue the present policy, which wouldn’t be required if
we understood that we could use nuclear weapons, particularly nuclear
weapons delivered by U.S. aircraft. So I think both of those effects would
take place.
Taylor: That’s correct. The present strength of the armed forces of
South Korea [is] about 600,000 as opposed to about 380,000, I think, in
North Korea. So if you really were setting up your military structure in
South Korea simply to offset North Korea, manpower-wise, you would
certainly think [that] you could make a reduction. But it would have to
go with some arrangement that you wouldn’t fear a sudden rush from
the Chinese across the Yalu. And that would be the response by nuclear
weapons.
President Kennedy: The next place was Japan. As a result of your
wire, I sent a memorandum to the secretary of defense about our capital
expenditures in Japan, our dollar expenditures, which I seem to recall
are 350 million?
McNamara: Over 300 [million]; 330, something like that.
President Kennedy: Yeah. The limitations which are described . . .
you can’t use it, we certainly couldn’t even use Japan if you really wanted
to use it. . . . Doesn’t seem to me they’d probably let you use it, would
they?7
Taylor: I think it is a question, sir. I’m afraid [in] my cable . . . I
noticed in the State summary which I didn’t think quite did [unclear]
really to my thoughts. [It] is not that the bases aren’t useful—they’re
very useful. In fact the Navy and the Air Force would say they’re virtu-
ally indispensable, at this time, in time of peace. But if you get into time
of war, then it becomes more and more unfit. And when you look at the,
we have some 680 combat aircraft in the Far East to face the Chinese
2,800 [planes]. About two-thirds of those are on Japanese bases. Now if
we start to have war with Red China, it’s very likely, as we’ve indicated
here, it would be a nuclear war, and whether we could use those . . . the
concerns of the air forces being neutralized, so to speak, by the Japanese
limitations, I don’t know. But it’s certainly a possibility. But I wouldn’t
suggest for a moment that we should close up these bases. But they are
necessary now, but they are not so important that they should really be
the controlling factor in all our foreign policy toward Japan.
William Sullivan:8 Under the present rules, Japan is committed to
permit us the use of bases in Japan for the use of our forces against any
resumption of hostilities in Korea. This is a United Nations commitment
which the Japanese made. They have made efforts to evade that commit-
ment when they entered the United Nations, and we were going to move
our Far East command out of there, but when it was put up on the basis
that their first action would be to deny the U.N. the use of Japanese bases
as their first act upon joining the United Nations, it looked a little bit
off-key. They withdrew their proposal.
Now the principal objection, the principal handicap at the present
time is the question of nuclear weapons in Japan. Japan is emotionally,
well they’re fanatical about nuclear weapons for understandable reasons.
Forty-two seconds excised as classified information.
Taylor: One other broad question, Mr. President, is the proper mix or
the proper balance between indigenous forces and our own forces when
we consider them packages for military purposes. Years ago, when the
military aid program started in the Far East, the thought was that prima-
rily we’d be supporting ground forces. We were going to always have a
small army. We would need the training of oriental manpower to help us
hold the line in any given sensitive area. Meanwhile our Navy and our
Air Force would utilize their mobility and their striking power and their
sophisticated weapons to back up the ground forces, largely indigenous.
In the course of the years, that’s changed, rather surprisingly. At least I
was surprised at the extent now we are planning to give sophisticated
weapons, advanced interceptors, some naval craft of some sophistication
to these indigenous forces. And I think it’s very timely for us to reexam-
ine this whole question of what is the proper mix, what should be the
objective of these forces. Now really, it’s saying in Pentagon language, to
reexamine the MAP objectives which we have country by country.
In countries such as Korea and Taiwan, for example, we use such
broad language as to say these forces are to assist U.S. forces extensively
in the event of general war. Well, that is so broad it could mean almost
anything. And I personally have the feeling that we should really
sharpen our objectives so that they state more specifically what are the
8. A sample of William Sullivan’s voice was not available. This identification is based on an
analysis of the statements made by this voice in the meeting.
Meeting with Maxw ell Ta ylor on His Far Easter n Trip 165
9. A reference to Nguyen Dinh Thuan, the coordinating secretary of state for security of
South Vietnam. He met with President Kennedy that morning to discuss, among other mat-
ters, the crop destruction program.
166 T U E S DAY, S E P T E M B E R 25, 1962
cussed with us this question of using pesticides against their food, and I
told him we’d give them an answer one way or another by the end of the
week. They wanted to try some test runs up in areas which are clearly
Vietcong.
Taylor: They are very anxious to do that.
President Kennedy: [Unclear.] All the pluses and minuses about it.
What’s our judgment about it? I thought we ought to answer him one
way or the other.
Taylor: Well, this has been talked back and forth between State and
Defense for some time. And most people are unanimous in saying that
this rather modest initial effort should be tried.
President Kennedy: What about [Lieutenant General Paul D.]
Harkins? What does he think?
Taylor: He’s all for it. Also, Diem is for it.
President Kennedy: Can they tell, do you think, which are which—
Robert Komer:10 This has been the problem in our mind, Mr. President,
as to whether or not you can identify the Vietcong–held fields from the
Montagnard fields. And—
President Kennedy: They say [unclear] rice is planted in a straighter
line. Is there any other way? They say that in the areas which they are
talking about, they say they can. I don’t know whether—
Taylor: Well they know areas that are denied to the government
forces [where] you have to fight your way in. And the assumption is that
any rice in there is going to be used by the enemy, regardless of what the
political coloration of the man who actually planted the rice.
Unidentified: Yes.
McNamara: Mr. President, I don’t think any of us here can say for
sure whether they can tell. But what we can say is that the ambassador is
wholeheartedly in support of it, our military planners are wholeheart-
edly in support of it, and I believe that the risk of a trial is low. And I
would strongly urge therefore we try it.
President Kennedy: What can we do about keeping it from becoming
an American enterprise which would be surfaced with poisoning food?11
McNamara: I think we’ll be charged with that.
Taylor: We can’t avoid it.
McNamara: We can do quite a bit to avoid it.
10. A tentative voice identification. A sample of Robert Komer’s voice was not available. This
identification is based on an analysis of the statements made by this voice in the meeting.
11. The President is using surfaced to mean “revealed to be involved.”
Meeting with Maxw ell Ta ylor on His Far Easter n Trip 167
Harriman: No, I don’t know, our people think that basically the peas-
ant, whoever he is, is the one who eats the food. Two, 3 percent, or 5 per-
cent, or 6 percent or 8 percent of Vietcong get around and that food is
taken away from whoever the peasant may be. That’s the argument that
our people make very strongly. There’s no such thing as fields, that we
know of, fields that have been grown for Vietcong. They are grown for
the villagers themselves, and that’s the argument against it, and that this
would not be depriving the Vietcong of a grain of food.
President Kennedy: Well, couldn’t we have some . . . ? It seems to me
there would have to be some proposal made that food would be supplied
to these areas by the government. Then the government would be able
to distribute—
Taylor: Once they get in, sir. But at this time these are closed areas,
no one—
Komer: Part of the problem is, if you destroy the crops, the
Montagnards come out. . . . Then being prepared to take care of them
when they do come out.
Well, now this is fairly well along [unclear], as I understand it.
Unidentified: That’s right.
McNamara: This, we have a program to do.
Komer: Yes, that’s . . .
Harriman: Our people have been through it, in China and elsewhere.
The loss will far, the losses among the peasants will far outweigh such a
relatively small gain in taking away the food from the Vietcong. But
that’s the amount of judgment which our people [feel] very strong, for
[whatever it’s worth].
President Kennedy: Who’s that? Who would that be, Governor?
Harriman: Huh?
President Kennedy: Who are those people?
Harriman: Well, Rice, who has been through it in China and seen
what happened when you prejudice the peasants against you, and he
thinks the whole thing is going to be won on the basis of whether the
peasants are with you or not.12 Come in and destroy their crops. . . . Why
it builds up an antagonism which is very hard to break.
Bundy: I think that Roger Hilsman’s theory on this is somewhat sim-
ilar, for what it’s worth. It’s mainly that if you can identify the enemy
very precisely and be sure that you’re not getting possibly friendly peas-
ants hurt too, then . . . it’s good to do it if it can be done in a rather large
12. E. E. Rice was a Foreign Service officer assigned to the Policy Planning Staff.
Meeting with Maxw ell Ta ylor on His Far Easter n Trip 169
scale because then you really want to get real military advantage com-
mensurate with the political risk. There’s some worry that doing it just
in a few very small areas, we might take an awful political whacking and
not really get—
President Kennedy: The job done.
Bundy: The big military job done.
Harriman: And then it makes the local population ready to join the
Vietcong and changes the whole atmosphere. [Unclear.]
Taylor: Well this is another form of bombing. I think it’s the same
problem. We have the . . .
Harriman: It’s a very strong political argument against it from those
people who have had experience in this.
President Kennedy: Well, why don’t we . . . without putting an impos-
sible burden on them, why don’t we say that we are now leaning, or inclin-
ing towards permitting this program, and that we would like to . . .
First, is there sufficient time to make it effective? Number two, can it
be done on a wide enough scale and yet with accuracy to make it worth-
while? And three, what is the technique they’re going to use to detect
what areas they are going to do and what is the system they are going to
use to determine what is Vietcong and what isn’t? And then what proce-
dure would they make to take care adequately of the people who are not
Vietcong, but who are damaged or find themselves short of food? And
then if we get an answer back, in 48 hours or so, then we can make a final
judgment on it. Try to tell them we’ll give them a final answer when we
get back. There may be some other questions we ought to ask them.
Komer: Those are the principal ones.
Taylor: Those are the principal ones, Mr. President.
President Kennedy: Well, then, we ought to try to tell them we’ll
give them a final answer by the weekend. I’m sure they don’t want to
screw around any longer.
Taylor: One of the things, Mr. President, we need to look at with a
little more, greater attention, is the best method of reporting our
progress. In other words, how are we doing? We’re always asking our-
selves that. We have never had a very good way to answer except by feel.
I found that General Harkins has anticipated this to a certain degree,
and now puts out a questionnaire, a rather heavy questionnaire, to all the
military people in the field, so that once a month they report back indica-
tors such as ability to go in certain villages where they hadn’t been
before, and so on.
My comment to the ambassador was that I thought that this should
be a country team affair so that all the questions, the political questions,
170 T U E S DAY, S E P T E M B E R 25, 1962
[would] get injected into the same kind of questionnaire, and that once
a month we get a complete poll across the board in those areas that
we’re interested in.
Komer: As you know we suggested to the ambassador, and I think
he’s accepted this, that we send a group of Vietnamese-speaking foreign
service officers out. To station one in each of these important areas to
maintain contact with the [unclear] people to maintain contact with the
local officials and the people and try to be [the] eyes and ears of the
ambassador and the country team to help answer this question. This
would be supplementary to—
Taylor: All these things should be done. But now we have literally
hundreds of Americans all through Vietnam who are qualified observers
and they should be passing in—
Komer: That’s great. And it’s a problem of getting the information
from them really. They’re all busy people.
Unidentified: Three are being established outside of Saigon, and
they will serve as sort of vacuum cleaners to pick this stuff [out] . . .
Komer: Yes.
Taylor: Elsewhere in Southeast Asia, Mr. President, I stopped in
Cambodia and had the first insight into the [Prince Norodom] Sihanouk
personality.13 [Laughter.]. He couldn’t have been nicer, and I told him I
don’t know why you have troubles with this man. [Laughter.] In both
Thailand and Cambodia we have a real problem of emotionalism on the
question of who to support.
President Kennedy: It’s like India and Pakistan.
Taylor: Sir?
President Kennedy: It’s like India and Pakistan.
Taylor: Yes, and perhaps even more so right now. Sihanouk is a wild
man, as you know, and he really believes that both of his neighbors on
the right and the left are his enemies, mortal enemies, historical
enemies.14 These invasions are just feeling him out, that someday they’d
like to come over and stay. He believes that. I don’t think there’s any-
thing phony about it.
Then you get over and talk to [Marshal Thanarat] Sarit, and he is of
course a wise old pro and a tough old cookie, but he gives us a pretty
good beating now.15 Oh, I think he really doesn’t mean it. He smiles when
he calls us these names, but he has behind him his people worried about
Cambodia because of the very modest military aid. They are painting the
picture of attacks by Cambodia. I said I had more confidence in the Thai
armed forces than Sarit did, and he really thought that was a possibility.
President Kennedy: How much are we giving them in our aid pro-
gram? To Cambodia?
McNamara: Eleven million.
Taylor: Eleven million and change to Cambodia. Yeah.
President Kennedy: [Unclear.] And what are we giving Thailand?
A group of voices says, “Eighty million,” then, “About eighty million.”
Taylor: The real issue now is not the basic Cambodia program, but a
little increment which represented the equipment for three infantry bat-
talions and one so-called frontier battalion which Sihanouk would
undertake to put in the northeast frontier to help stop the infiltration:
Something we’re all for. It makes all the sense in the world. And now
that we’ve had to pay this price in Thai relations, I would say we ought
to go ahead and do it. It’s about 1.7 million as I recall some [unclear].
Unidentified: That’s right
U. Alexis Johnson (?): Part of this problem, Mr. President, is also a
problem of diplomacy here, if you will. The problem of the Thais reading
this in the newspapers first—of course, anything that comes out in
Phnom Penh leaks, and it leaks to the Thais through the newspapers—
instead of our being able to tell them directly. To the degree that we can
tell the Thai about these things before they read them in the newspapers,
of course we can help. But then there’s the problem of the Thai then
talking and Sihanouk reading it. [Some laughter.]
Komer: Well, the Cambodians deliberately did this once so the Thais . . .
Johnson: They deliberately did this. The Cambodians deliberately
did this to—
Unidentified: Yes.
Johnson: We couldn’t stop it.
Unidentified: We couldn’t stop it.
Lemnitzer: This has an impact on the Vietnamese situation because
the only way that that border is going to be properly policed is for these
battalions or other Cambodian battalions to get up there and prevent the
Vietcong from circulating back and forth.
Taylor: Well they’re trying to get us also to have some of the U.N.
presence that’s been talked about, or some device like that. Perhaps a
joint military commission with the Vietnamese. Because these border
incidents are going to continue by the very nature of that frontier, and
they’re going to be a source of constant disturbance in our relations.
172 T U E S DAY, S E P T E M B E R 25, 1962
16. The acronym MAAG stands for Military Assistance Advisory Group.
Meeting with Maxw ell Ta ylor on His Far Easter n Trip 173
17. Kenneth Young was U.S. ambassador to Thailand, 29 March 1961 to 19 August 1963.
18. Frederick Nolting was U.S. ambassador in South Vietnam, 10 May 1961 to 15 August 1963.
174 T U E S DAY, S E P T E M B E R 25, 1962
19. Taylor notes in his memoirs that Sukarno talked at length “on the charms of his favorite
stars of Hollywood.”
20. Lieutenant General Abdul Nasution was chief of staff of the Indonesian armed forces and
minister of defense.
21. The abbreviation LST stands for landing ship, tank.
Meeting with Maxw ell Ta ylor on His Far Easter n Trip 175
Harriman: Yes, I met Subandrio for lunch, met three hours with him.
He made it very plain that they wanted to get out from under the
Russian influence. That’s going to be a tough thing to do, until they get
this loan paid off.
Taylor: Yes, it will be a long time.
Harriman: But I think we ought to continue. . . . I told him I thought
we ought to give him preliminary assistance and then study out their
program. But they’ll have to work something out with the IMF, and
they’re not very keen to do it, and I think we ought to hold back a
longer-range program until they develop a program which the IMF
approves. But in the meantime, given that industry is down 30 percent
some of it, give them little spare parts and raw materials which should
help them off base. Indicate that we are ready to help them when they
put their house in order.
President Kennedy: The main purpose of this buildup was West
Irian, was it?
Taylor: Yes, sir.
Unidentified: Have they delivered . . . ?
Unidentified: I think.
Taylor: Most of it’s either delivered or in the pipeline. Apparently
Sukarno and Khrushchev got together and agreed they’d put all the
steam into this thing they could. And they really, really have accom-
plished it. I asked couldn’t they cancel or turn back anything, and they
said most of the high-money-value articles have been delivered or are on
the way.
President Kennedy: Are they pleased there was a peaceful settlement
of West Irian or they’d rather . . . ?
Taylor: Sir?
President Kennedy: Are they pleased that there was a peaceful settle-
ment?
Taylor: Oh, yes. Very happy about it. Very happy about our activities
in [unclear] that . . .
President Kennedy: How much did the . . . Did we ever find out how
much the Dutch put in there as far as troops? Five thousand was it or
what? I noticed this story Marquis Childs had yesterday about all this . . .22
Unidentified: They were building up to 10,000 but I don’t think they
ever got there, sir. It was around 6[,000] or 7,000. [Unclear.]
22. Childs wrote a syndicated column that the President often read.
176 T U E S DAY, S E P T E M B E R 25, 1962
President Kennedy: That’s all they put into all of West Irian?
Unidentified: I don’t think they ever got higher than that.
Unidentified: It was very low.
President Kennedy: What do the Indonesians have under arms, do
we know?
Unidentified: Maybe 350,000 now under arms, but they got about
1,200 men on the island. That’s all they have.
Taylor: They infiltrated about 2,000 into West Irian.
Unidentified: I think we’ve got it at around 1,200.
Taylor: Well, those are the principal points, Mr. President.
President Kennedy: What about . . . we were going to talk about
whether we withdraw, what we do about the withdrawal of the MAAG
from Laos.23
Michael Forrestal:24 Sir, we’re having a meeting for you on that on
Friday if that would be all right with you.25 We haven’t quite gotten that,
the program . . .
President Kennedy: Governor, do you think?
Carl Kaysen: I think we were waiting on the [Central Intelligence]
agency—
President Kennedy: SNIE?26
Kaysen: —[to] get an estimate, round up all the intelligence material
so we had the latest agreed statement on what’s happening, and that’s
due as I understand it, Thursday. We have a meeting then.
President Kennedy: I talked to the minister, I guess you may . . . on
this question of, this morning, [unclear] this question of this. We’ll just
have to wait and see what they do on that.
Kaysen: South Vietnam.
Unidentified: South Vietnam’s representation [on Laos].
Unidentified: South Vietnam’s representation, yes.
Unidentified: They seem to be drawing back slightly on that, don’t
they?
Unidentified: Yes, there’s hope. There appears to be hope in the cable.
President Kennedy: OK. All right. Is that all?
23. The Geneva Declaration on Laos required U.S. military personnel to leave the country by
7 October.
24. A tentative voice identification. A sample of Michael Forrestal’s voice was not available.
This identification is based on an analysis of the statements made by this voice in the meeting.
25. See “Meeting on Laos,” 28 September 1962.
26. Special National Intelligence Estimate.
Meeting with Maxw ell Ta ylor on His Far Easter n Trip 177
This was the last formal meeting of the day. Kennedy’s movements
afterward are not clear from the official record. At 10:15 P.M. he departed
the White House for the National Theater to meet up with the First
Lady and his mother, Rose Kennedy, to catch the second act of Mr.
President. Afterward, the presidential party attended an after-theater
supper party at the British Embassy.
Meeting on Laos1
President Kennedy had few achievements to show for his efforts to
improve U.S.-Soviet relations. The one exception was an agreement to
neutralize tiny Laos. Lying athwart the Mekong River, it bridged
Thailand and Cambodia in the east and the two Vietnams in the west.
Signed in July 1962, the Geneva Accords provided for the withdrawal of
1. George Ball, William Bundy, Ray Cline, Roswell Gilpatric, Averell Harriman, Roger Hilsman,
Lyman Lemnitzer, Robert McNamara, and Maxwell Taylor attended the meeting. Tape 25, John
F. Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, Presidential Recordings Collection.
Meeting on Laos 179
all foreign advisers and troops from this strategic real estate.2 This repre-
sented a possible improvement of the situation from the U.S. perspective.
The military position of the Royal Lao government had so deteriorated in
the spring that in early June the Kennedy administration seriously consid-
ered sending some 40,000 U.S. troops to occupy the southern portion of
the country. Before a decision had to be made in Washington, the situation
stabilized. In mid-June, the Lao elite formed a national coalition govern-
ment and the Geneva agreement was reached. With only a week to go
before the first major test of the uneasy peace, Kennedy gathered his Laos
team to discuss the progress of the Communist compliance. As of October
7, all foreign military advisers were to have left the country. In materials
distributed before the meeting, Kennedy’s advisers made clear their
assumption that the Communists would violate the Geneva agreement.
The North Vietnamese, in particular, were expected to maintain a military
presence in the country, to backstop the Communist Pathet Lao forces.
Kennedy faced the decision of whether the United States would adhere to
the letter of the agreement and pull out all U.S. military assistance teams.
2. These were the “Declaration on the Neutrality of Laos” and a 20-article protocol. They are
printed in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents (Washington, DC: Department of State,
1962), pp. 1075–83.
3. Ray Cline was deputy director for intelligence at the Central Intelligence Agency.
4. The USIB was a interagency organization, under the chairmanship of the CIA, that over-
saw the production of national intelligence estimates.
180 F R I DAY, S E P T E M B E R 28, 1962
this end they will nominally support the Souvanna-led government pro-
ceeding toward their goal mainly through political and subversive means.
“The Communists”—the next conclusion that is relevant to this is—
“The Communists will almost certainly seek to retain as many of their
North Vietnamese forces and military advisers in Laos as they can do
with safety. Souvanna [Phouma] will almost certainly be unable to pre-
vent Communist use of southern Laos as a corridor for assisting the
Vietcong effort into South Vietnam.”
I think the . . . those are the conclusions relevant to the Geneva
Accords. In addition, they reached a number of conclusions on the fragility
of the political coalition in Vientiane. Unless there are specific questions, I
[unclear] the facts . . . if you want to read them. They are available here.
We have no evidence of an intention to withdraw all of the Vietminh
troops before October the 7th. Our own working estimate is that proba-
bly about 7,500, 7,000 to 8,000, Vietminh troops and advisers are still in
Laos. And there is very solid evidence of their intention to conceal at
least a considerable part of those troops by disguising them as Pathet
Lao or Lao troops.
I think that’s the general picture. We have a great deal of data on
what is actually going on in different parts of the country.
President Kennedy: What do we think is their—Did Secretary Rusk
have any success with his conversation with Gromyko in regard to
Soviet resupply? [Cline begins to speak but Kennedy cuts him off.] Or are
they blaming him because, they say, we’re doing the Meo business, the
Soviet Union—5
Cline: Yes, sir. I would say that the conversation with Gromyko was
not very satisfactory. That he indicated it was all our fault and said that—
President Kennedy: For what reason? What have we done wrong?
Cline: He specifically spoke about the supply of the Meo. But Hanoi—
he also referred to propaganda statements which the Communists are
now making which say that we are not intending to withdraw our troops
at all, either, that we are disguising them in—
Kennedy turns off the machine. The meeting continued for another 25
minutes.
5. The Meo were anti-Communist mountain people who were U.S. allies.
S AT U R DAY, S E P T E M B E R 29, 1962 181
6. See National Security Action Memorandum No. 189, 28 September 1962, FRUS, 24: 904.
182 S AT U R DAY, S E P T E M B E R 29, 1962
1. Including President Kennedy, Charles Bohlen, Llewellyn Thompson, and later Jerome
Wiesner. President Kennedy also has a telephone conversation with Senator Henry Jackson
during the latter part of the meeting. Tape 25, John F. Kennedy Library, President’s Office
Files, Presidential Recordings Collection.
2. Timothy Naftali Interview with McGeorge Bundy, 16 November 1995.
3. Charles “Chip” E. Bohlen was U.S. ambassador to the Soviet Union from 1953 to 1957.
Thompson succeeded him and stayed until his return in August.
Meeting on the Soviet Union 183
Soviets would initiate a new, more dangerous challenge to the status quo
in West Berlin—a warning Khrushchev repeated in his letter.
Later the President’s science adviser, Jerome Wiesner, would join the
conversation. Wiesner would not be told that Khrushchev had written
directly to the President. Instead, in another demonstration of how infor-
mation could be compartmentalized even among the President’s closest
advisers, President Kennedy would ask Wiesner to suggest responses to
certain Soviet attacks on the U.S. negotiating position at the test ban
talks, never letting on where these allegations had come from.
Kennedy started taping as Bohlen was reminiscing about his experi-
ences with Khrushchev. Thompson can be heard deferring somewhat to
Bohlen, a better linguist and more-experienced, though not necessarily
better, Kremlinologist.
Charles Bohlen: [tape fades in] . . . other than that [unclear] he con-
tinues—his wife was the one that’s—but she’s crippled.
Llewellyn Thompson: Yeah.
Bohlen: And after the breakup of the Summit in Paris [in 1960], she
rushed down to the airport when Khrushchev was leaving and presented
him with a big bunch of roses.
Thompson: Yeah, that’s right.
President Kennedy: But [unclear] . . . that is assuming he wants to
talk to [unclear] but at least I would [unclear] that part of it. [Unclear.]
Thompson: And this letter, Chip says, is—
Bohlen: This letter is clearly an appeal [unclear] to a meeting, per-
haps. This letter . . . I don’t know if this . . . [unclear] is worse.
President Kennedy: Oh, it’s not worse. It’s just the transparency of it
is less [unclear] are the Russians. Well, I’d like to have him be a little less
. . . [reading aloud from the most recent letter from Soviet premier Nikita
Khrushchev] “I would like to note with satisfaction that you now seem to
agree in principle that along with the conclusion of the treaty with . . . a
moratorium.”4
Bohlen: We had never agreed to that, at all.
4. The exact line runs: “I would like to note with satisfaction that now you seem to agree in
principle that along with the conclusion of a treaty on the ban of nuclear weapons tests in the
atmosphere, in outer space and under water a moratorium with regard to underground
explosions be accepted” (Nikita S. Khrushchev to John F. Kennedy, 28 September 1962,
FRUS, 6: 152–61).
184 S AT U R DAY, S E P T E M B E R 29, 1962
Bohlen: Well, he believes—if you take it from his own military point
of view—that the local military situation [that] makes the correlation of
forces is all in their favor and he probably thinks that in view of public
opinion and [unclear] of the horrors of a nuclear war that the United
States would not . . . would back away from that point. Therefore he’s
got a situation with all the advantage on his side where he can proceed.
And there’ll be a great whooping and yelling around but that nothing
will happen. But the thing he’s interested in, which is the only thing you
worry about, is a nuclear war. And this is cockeyed, I think. Although, I
don’t know, if you read some of Joe’s articles, [unclear] old Alsop’s arti-
cles about de Gaulle’s view and all this other stuff.
President Kennedy: But de Gaulle . . . that’s why I think de Gaulle . . . I
think de Gaulle would like to start to get out of Berlin and [unclear] blame
the United States. Because, if they could only get Berlin eliminated, then
they could really have a . . . Europe which would be in pretty good shape.
Bohlen: Well, I’m not so sure. But I think that de Gaulle’s basic feel-
ing, and I’ve talked to Joe about this, and I’ve told him [that] whoever
his informant was, who I believe was [French foreign minister] Couve
de Murville.
President Kennedy: [Unclear question.] Well, he said it was [French
diplomat Jean] Laloy; he talked to Laloy.
Bohlen: Laloy?
President Kennedy: Yeah. Apparently de Gaulle asked about contin-
gency planning. Then de Gaulle said, “Why, my dear fellow, don’t
worry—the Americans aren’t going to fight anyway. [Unclear.] Don’t
worry about it.”
Bohlen: This is de Gaulle’s, sort of, method of presentation. But I
think de Gaulle’s thought runs differently. I don’t believe that he thinks
there’s going to be a real crisis over Berlin, or what Joe would call a
crunch, in other words.
President Kennedy: Hopefully.
Bohlen: And he thinks that the thing is going to—the French have
always thought that Berlin was going to die on the vine. Couve de
Murville told me that last June.
President Kennedy: Yeah.
Bohlen: He just said . . .
President Kennedy: They don’t really care, do they?
Bohlen: “[Unclear] just stay away” and that they don’t give a damn.
No. Because if they don’t . . . they want Germany divided which is essen-
tially their whole policy.
And I think that de Gaulle’s chief mistake about the Russian thing is
Meeting on the Soviet Union 187
8. Referring to Khrushchev.
188 S AT U R DAY, S E P T E M B E R 29, 1962
Bohlen: The trouble is, that this circulates, and it’s already circulating
around Western Europe and you’re getting a sense of panic [unclear]
European countries. De Gaulle doesn’t necessarily help it at all, you know.
President Kennedy: [Unclear.] Are you saying this keeps downgrad-
ing our changes?
Bohlen: Yeah. Definitely.
Thompson: I don’t know, I think—
Bohlen: There are three or four different ways in which this particu-
lar aspect of the problem can be [unclear]. One, by you being direct. I
think you’ve seen that draft of the—
President Kennedy: Yeah, I saw yours and then Bundy did another one.
Bohlen: Yeah.
President Kennedy: Bundy’s was satisfactory . . . [unclear] be yours
or [unclear].
Bohlen: [speaks over the President] Well, it seems to me that this, in a
sense . . . part of this could be tacked on, if you’re proposing to answer
this letter of his. Some of this stuff in this draft could be a [unclear].
That would be one way of doing it, the other way would be by a pub-
lic statement, which I think everybody believes would not be either con-
vincing or very desirable at this time.
The third way would be to use a diplomatic channel, possibly you to
[Anatoly] Dobrynin or Foy [Kohler] right to Khrushchev.9 My feeling
about this is negotiating a substance as serious as this, I really think that
the direct communication thing would carry more conviction, if you did
it to Dobrynin, you had no certainty how he would—
President Kennedy: Yeah. I don’t see these . . . anybody . . . these fel-
lows having any more of these conversations for a while. I’ll try to—
Bohlen: And I think that also if you sent your ambassador in
Moscow to talk to Khrushchev along these lines, we’re still working on
the same thing.
President Kennedy: Maybe we should get just a . . . get awfully bel-
ligerent to Kohler.
Bohlen: And the third way, Mr. President, is one that I must say that
I’ve always been inclining to [unclear] is in the field of action. These fel-
lows have been buzzing our planes in the corridors—running these MiGs
within 2[00] or 300 yards of a passenger-loaded Pan Am plane, which
just contains all the ingredients of an accident. Because these things go so
fast, you know, 2[00] or 300 yards is just nothing. And that if you would
consider with your allies the possibility of the next time they do this, of
putting in fighter escorts for these planes and running them until they
seem to be calling it off and then call it off and then be prepared to start
again. I have a feeling that the Russians in situations of this kind pay much
more attention to action than they do to words.
[to Thompson] So what would you think of that?
Thompson: Yeah. As I was saying earlier, I think this may . . .
buzzing may be related to their annoyance at our buzzing their ships.10
It’s the prestige factor [unclear].
Bohlen: But you have a decided difference in there, is that the
buzzing of the planes in the corridor could at any point produce a terri-
ble accident, whereas the buzzing of a ship has got very little chances to
bring about that.
President Kennedy: We . . . How much [of the] buzzing has there
been? Remember last year there was . . . [in the] spring there was a big
argument with [Lucius] Clay wanting us to put in fighters and [General
Lauris] Norstad against it. And I thought Norstad’s judgment was right.
Because fighting . . . well, it just struck me . . I would think you ought to
wait on fighters. That is one of the things we can do without [unclear]
shooting . . . put fighters in there. And I . . . It seems to me we ought to
wait until this thing gets a little higher before we do that?
Bohlen: Well—
President Kennedy: So they’re doing [unclear] we did say we’d knock
it down, then . . . at least then they’ve taken an action which is . . .
Bohlen: Yeah. But then you’ll have an accident which will create an
enormous amount of excitement in this country and you will have the
loss of life with the passengers on the plane. And I think this will force
your hand into action which will be a little beyond what should be pro-
posed to do now.
Now the other possibility of action, which perhaps might be put in this
letter as a, sort of, a warning, but one which, I think, many of us in the
Department of State have been thinking of for a long time. And that is the
question of making West Berlin a Land of the Federal Republic. This
would mean complete recognition that you were through with East Berlin.
Well, we are de facto. But you will have a hell of a time, I think, with the
French in getting any agreement and the British to include that, and it
10. In his 28 September letter, Khrushchev makes direct reference to a conversation he had
with Llewellyn Thompson where he had complained to the U.S. ambassador about the
buzzing of Soviet ships on the high seas.
190 S AT U R DAY, S E P T E M B E R 29, 1962
would require that agreement. I don’t know what the West German atti-
tude would be.
Thompson: They’d be for it.
Bohlen: They’d be for it, I think. And the West Berliners would
surely be for it. It would have the advantage of—you’d have to have a
whole series of new agreements. That is to say, you’d have the West
German government requesting the presence of the Western troops
with the agreement of the Federal Republic. The only problem would be
how this would affect your right of access through their territory.
I just have a very strong feeling that the trend is being manipulated
by Khrushchev very much to our detriment.
Thompson: You’d certainly have to study that one carefully because
on your access . . . one of our main points now is [that] we hold the
Soviets responsible. I mean . . . they haven’t recorded that . . . but once
you make . . . do it just by agreement, the Soviets say, “Well, we have
nothing to do with this agreement; why talk to us?” You get a—
President Kennedy: Yeah.
Bohlen: Well, you might even do it in a too [unclear] sort of way but
you would leave your occupation rights there completely, but that you’d
also just change the status of the . . . West Berlin as a Land of the Republic.
Thompson: Going back to the buzzing, it seems the one thing you
could do is to put in some rather vague language in the reply, just raising
this problem instead of [unclear] our planes. [Unclear] could be coming
at it rather than just doing it.
Bohlen: A great deal of the language he uses on Cuba could be
[unclear] directly to Berlin because he’s talking about disregarding the
normal conventions, [unclear]—assigning to ourselves the right to this,
that, and the other, and this is exactly what he’s trying to do in Berlin.
President Kennedy: [reading aloud from Khrushchev’s letter] “[Unclear]
this occupation is here to stay . . . [unclear] . . . put it to the U.N.”
Did you get a report on Grewe’s last conversation with me before he
left,11 about how he thinks the Hallstein Doctrine is dated and that
they’re going to [unclear]?12
11. Wilheim Grewe was West German ambassador to the United States until September 1962.
His resignation came about because the Kennedy administration lost confidence in his effec-
tiveness as a liaison after Rusk accused him of leaking to the press in April 1962 a Department
of State draft of an allied agreement on Berlin.
12. This doctrine, named for Adenauer’s foreign policy adviser, Walter Hallstein, held that
Bonn would refuse to maintain diplomatic relations with all countries, excluding the Soviet
Union, that recognized the German Democratic Republic.
Meeting on the Soviet Union 191
13. Kennedy is paraphrasing as he reads. The sentence goes: “Under present circumstances,
when there exist thermonuclear weapons, your request to the Congress for an authority to
call up 150,000 reservists is not only a step making the atmosphere red-hot, it is already a
dangerous sign that you want to pour oil in the flame, to extinguish that red-hot glow by
mobilizing new military contingents.”
14. Foy Kohler was the newly appointed U.S. ambassador to the Soviet Union.
15. FRUS, 6: 159. The full quote reads:
That is what made us to come out with the TASS statement and later at the session
of the UN General Assembly to qualify your act, to remind of the norms of interna-
tional law and to say about West Berlin.
If there were no statement by you on Cuba, we, naturally, as Ambassador
192 S AT U R DAY, S E P T E M B E R 29, 1962
Thompson and Mr. Udall were told, would not say anything on West Berlin. Your
statement forced us to do so.
We regret that this dangerous line is being continued in the United States now.
What is going on, for example, in the U.S. Congress?
16. One of Fidel Castro’s closest associates, Ernesto “Che” Guevara, visited moscow in August
to discuss the conclusion of a Soviet-Cuban defense agreement. Khrushchev, however, refused
to sign the proposed agreement.
Meeting on the Soviet Union 193
they did. And also, as Tommy mentioned, he said from the point of view
of the Communist world, it is very important for him to be out in front,
showing that he is militant, pushing for the great cause.
President Kennedy: Why do you think they refused to put him in the
Warsaw Pact?
Bohlen: Oh, because this is too much for the Russians because then
they’re not sure what the United States might do—
President Kennedy: Right.
Bohlen: —and they don’t want to be committed to go to war over
Cuba, [Kennedy mumbles assent] if there is an American attack. Oh, I think
this has been very clear all the way going back to ’60 when he first began
to rattle the rockets about Cuba, then he made a statement before anyone
would call him on that thing, he made a statement saying, “It’s just sym-
bolic.” And they haven’t gone beyond that and this latest one, which he
refers to here; the September 11th one seems to me to have been primarily
issued in order to tack on the rider about not doing anything about Berlin.
Thompson: I think, in general, he’s, he has very much in mind that
meeting you and that, I think, if he can settle Berlin, then—
Bohlen: Well this is what bothers me . . . the hell out of me. He’s
coming over here in the end of November and this letter is really pitched
to the . . . twice he refers to the resumption of the dialogue . . . and then
in the last paragraph he talks about the: “Of great importance for finding
the ways to solve both this problem . . . are personal contacts of states-
men on the highest level.” Well that means between you and him. But,
the question is: What in God’s name could be the best solution to the
Berlin thing if you did meet?
President Kennedy: [Unclear] I don’t—unless he wants to demon-
strate that he’s doing every possible—
Bohlen: Well, I mean, this still leaves the situation as it was. I think,
from your point of view, [unclear] don’t see that [there’s] anything very
much to negotiate about as long as he is insisting on the removal of cer-
tain troops.
Thompson: Well, I think, Chip [Bohlen], that if he, I think he’s, first
of all, that he is in a position where he has . . . he feels he has got to go
ahead and sign this treaty.
Bohlen: Yes, I think everybody—
Thompson: And I don’t think he wants to play Russian roulette with
that and just toss a coin and see whether there’s war or not. If he wants
to . . . he could get us to accept the East German . . . Solution C
approach, where we would accept East Germans deployed at the check-
194 S AT U R DAY, S E P T E M B E R 29, 1962
17. Solution C was a term thrown around during the Kennedy administration as it tried to
devise a negotiating position on the German and Berlin problems. Solution C was to seek
negotiations aimed toward an informal, interim agreement to preserve the status quo in Berlin
despite a G.D.R.-U.S.S.R. peace treaty. It appeared to offer the most likely chance of success
with the least fuss. It was a view favored by State’s old Berlin hands.
Meeting on the Soviet Union 195
if the United States takes the blame for any sort of a sellout, or whatever
you want to call it, in Berlin.
But on the other hand most of the fellows in the French Foreign
Office particularly feel that Khrushchev is doing this because of the
whole effect on West Germany and on the alliance. In other words, he is
seeking larger aims than just Berlin.
I must say, I don’t think that. I think that Berlin is a . . . these are the
kind of repercussions and results [on] which he would naturally capital-
ize if they happened. But I don’t think he’s playing these moves on Berlin
with this in view. I don’t know what you feel about the alliance.
Thompson: Well, I think he’s hooked personally on . . . He’s always
boasted that this was his solution that he dreamed this whole thing up.
Bohlen: Yeah.
Thompson: He got way out and he’s gotten further out since.
Bohlen: Well, what I mean is that [unclear] Berlin as a thing in itself.
That if he settled this, would he then quiet down? And consider that
Europe is all tidied up? Or would it be just a move to disrupt the
Alliance, to stop progress—?
Thompson: I think it’s mainly the former. I think he—
Bohlen: I think so, too, myself; but on the other hand you can’t sepa-
rate the fact that these might be the consequences which he would then
immediately try and exploit.
Thompson: He can exploit any of the—
Bohlen: Well, the thing that mystifies me about this thing is that he
himself nearly has a success on his terms which would be an enormous
humiliation and defeat for us, which I don’t think is going to happen, but
assuming that it does, still if he knows anything about history, this is the
way of bringing war very much sooner—
[Someone agrees indistinctly.]
Bohlen: —because you don’t inflict what would be a very humiliating
defeat upon a power like the United States when you don’t affect his
power 1 inch by . . . .Berlin wouldn’t affect our power at all.
President Kennedy: Right.
Bohlen: And almost all throughout history a Munich has sort of
been followed by—
President Kennedy: Yeah
Bohlen: —the war.
President Kennedy: Right.
Bohlen: So, I can’t see that if he is thinking straight, and in historical
terms, that he could have very much happiness out of either result of this
thing.
Meeting on the Soviet Union 197
there was going to be another, sort of, Bay of Pigs, something like this.
Which they would probably have lost.
President Kennedy: [Comments indistinctly.]
Bohlen: And went to the Russians and said, “My goodness, my good-
ness, you’ve got to help us.” Their first idea was to put them in a treaty,
and then the Russians put these arms in there; and then also the effect of
his standing in the Communist world because the Chinese have been
constantly attacking Khrushchev from the left, which is the first time in
Bolshevik history that this has ever happened. Heretofore they have
always been the extreme left—denouncing yellow Soviet so-and-so as
the opportunist and everything like it. The Chinese now come and say,
“You are scared of the thing.” Now there is one factor that underlies
[unclear] that I don’t know anything about. Tommy may have some
ideas about it.
Thompson: History [unclear] points their way [unclear] move is to
keep the Chinese from doing it—
Bohlen: This is what I mean.
Thompson: —[taking] the Chinese with it.
Bohlen: Well, the Chinese are not in much shape to give very much
help.
Thompson: [Unclear] I think it doesn’t.
Bohlen: Yeah, I think it is more in the psychological field, of his lead-
ership in there, [Thompson murmurs assent] the other factor may be in
there. But the one question that perhaps may underlie this is that we
know now that all this flap about the missile gap is just for the birds
because they didn’t put their main effort on ICBMs and our estimate
now of the correlation of military forces is heavily in our favor [someone
mumbles assent] and not in their[s]. Now, if you go back to the history of
the Sino-Soviet dispute, you will see the Chinese undoubtedly believe,
completely literally, the Soviet claims which they were making in ’57 and
’58 of having . . . the balance having shifted in their . . . point. And I just
wonder whether or not in the Soviet hierarchy how much real under-
standing there is of the actual correlation of military force or whether
they are not operating on their previous, sort of, at least, announced esti-
mate that they had sort of passed us. And their policy would be much
more intelligible if they believed that; because if they believed that they
had the nuclear, sort of, equality, or even superiority, then their lines of
action would be quite continuous, I mean, quite consistent. But it is not
consistent if it’s viewed in the light of what our estimate of the two
forces are.
President Kennedy: We are taking a look at a contingency plan for
Meeting on the Soviet Union 199
Bohlen: Some guy must have gotten a bright idea and sold it to Phil
Graham.19
President Kennedy: Yes, you’re probably [right].
Bohlen: But the . . .
Thompson: I think . . . I had the impression, that at the start of the
Cuban thing, that the Russians thought it wasn’t going to last and they
were very reluctant to get too committed, to put too much in there.
President Kennedy: Of course, if we had gone in a year ago—and it
was much easier in April after the Bay of Pigs—and you had that
become the regular United States invasion . . . I have always thought
that they would—of course you can’t tell what they would do, a year
ago. Now . . . but it always seemed to me they would just grab West
Berlin, don’t you think?
Bohlen: Well, they might have, Mr. President, and this might have
led to general war. But I think the situation is getting to the point where
there are so many places, there are many instances where if we take cer-
tain kinds of forcible actions, the Russians can retaliate. I think we tend
[unclear] to let the Berlin situation dominate our whole action [unclear].
But this is what the Russians are clearly trying to do. [Unclear.]
Thompson: I would have thought a move against Iran would have
been more likely than for Berlin.
President Kennedy: Except they could grab Berlin in two hours.
Iran, they would have to really—
Bohlen: Yeah, but any one of these things [unclear]—
Thompson: Grabbing would have meant direct fighting with U.S.
troops—
President Kennedy: What? What?
Thompson: Grabbing Berlin. And that’s, I think, much more danger-
ous than a move in Iran.
Bohlen: Their play is . . . the Russian game has always traditionally
been this way with the non-Communist power . . . is to push, pull, to feel
around and then judge, make their next move based upon their estimate
of the reaction to what people do. There is a phrase of Lenin in which he
said there are certain situations which you control with bayonets: if you
run into mush, you go forward; if you run into steel, you withdraw. And
since anything that Lenin said is enshrined in letters—
President Kennedy: That’s right.
Bohlen: —in gold and scarlet, I still think that Khrushchev’s attitude
on Berlin is in one sense to test us. Now, I don’t know; but Joe Alsop
wrote about this . . . saw him the other day and I think you saw him,
didn’t you?
President Kennedy: Yeah, I saw him.
Bohlen: Joe has a new theory about the [Berlin] Wall, did he tell you
that?
President Kennedy: This was to cover up the . . .
Bohlen: This was to . . . The Wall was not to stop the refugees but to
provide the necessary circumstances where they could make a major
buildup of East German forces. And I said, “Well, I think that these
issues are one of the consequences but not necessarily the cause”—but
you know Joe when he gets on an idea—
President Kennedy: Then he’s got the idea that the solution to the
strategy is that the United States [unclear] our contingency planning, he
knows that the allies won’t do anything and therefore—
Bohlen: Yeah.
President Kennedy: —it [unclear] the United States to indicate it’s
going ahead.
Bohlen: Well, I must say, Mr. President, it depends on how your
analysis of this whole situation is. But, I think, that if we are going to do
anything, we’re going to have to do it—
President Kennedy: Quickly.
Bohlen: —unilaterally.
President Kennedy: Yeah. I just yesterday, or the day before, sent a
memorandum over to the Pentagon to ask them how long it takes to
move in. You remember that time we sent up that battle group into West
Berlin; then it turned out it took 28 hours to reach the autobahn. Well,
so now I asked whether they’ve got. . . . They’re still a long way away
from the autobahn, so we’ve got a camp there that they can make into a
barracks. So I asked them to—
Bohlen: McNamara was very much impressed with the state of train-
ing and the morale of the forces that he saw—
President Kennedy: Yeah.
Bohlen: —in Germany [in] the last two or three days. I don’t think
the strategy is worth a damn; but at least [he chuckles] the troops are in
good shape.
President Kennedy: Yeah.
Bohlen: But . . . because you might have an awful lot of pulling and
hauling with your allies, you see. For instance, suppose Khrushchev
when he signs the treaty does the following things: that he just turns
over to the East Germans the access rights to the military on the road
202 S AT U R DAY, S E P T E M B E R 29, 1962
and the [East] Germans say, “Well, we haven’t got any agreement with
you; they can’t go through,” leaving the air alone, because the air is a
place where we have much more freedom of maneuver. Then what’ll you
do? You will have consultations with your allies. The British, undoubt-
edly, will call for a conference, [Thompson or Kennedy laughs] and the
French will just sort of stay out of it totally. [Bohlen chuckles.] You know
them. And [unclear]. So you could lose an awful lot of time on this thing.
If they’re foolish enough to announce that the air corridors are
closed, then, I think, you have a very clearly indicated action which is to
send your fighters in. [President Kennedy speaks indistinctly.] But send
them in, in force. Anything you do on a subject like that, the danger is
that you send in too few forces and that this doesn’t create the impres-
sion. You ought to send in double the number of fighters that people
think would be adequate for the purpose.
And in the air, I think, this is the place where the thing is going to come
to a real . . . the crunch will happen there. Wouldn’t you think so, Tommy?
Thompson: Generally speaking, I think, Khrushchev has felt, at least
up until recently, that things are going his way and he needn’t take any
risks, that he is playing for the big stakes and not the small. In places like
Iran and others, where he could have done a lot of things, but if he did,
he’d [unclear] make it more difficult to spread further later on. And he’s
been . . . in Laos the same way and there are other complicating factors
there, but. . . . In general, I don’t think he wants to really run a real risk
of war at this time.
Bohlen: I wouldn’t think so.
Thompson: [Unclear.]
Bohlen: But then you come back to what is their estimate of the gen-
eral correlation of military forces?
Thompson: Well, it certainly isn’t something that can be deliberately
calculated in this period. A wise thing to do . . .
Bohlen: Whatever happened to this idea that at one point was being
kicked around [unclear] of showing Khrushchev some—
President Kennedy: Pictures?
Bohlen: Pictures. It was leaked, I mean, it was deliberately let out of
NATO. And I think that [unclear] the probability is that they’ve got it.
The only question is do they realize to what extent we cover their instal-
lations and therefore we know what ICBM rockets they have and what
we have, which is growing every month here, I think?
President Kennedy: I think he thinks they’ve got enough to cause
such damage to us, that we wouldn’t want to accept that damage unless
the provocation was extreme. But, of course, those are all calculations he
Meeting on the Soviet Union 203
has to make about what we are going to do, and what the French will do
and what the British will do. And I suppose it just comes back to what
you . . . we were originally saying, that it’s just a question of how do we
convince him that the risk is there. And that raises whether we ought to
go with this letter or not. Or whether we just choose to ignore this and
just let this thing drop until he comes over here in November. So
McNamara had some statement this morning about the [unclear]—
Bohlen: Yes, I saw that. In fact, that got the headlines in all the
papers about the fact that we had nuclear weapons there and that in cer-
tain circumstances we were prepared to use them.
President Kennedy: Whether we ought to let it drop at that or
whether these words get to be, as you suggested . . . They begin to have
less and less effect. Because I don’t know whether [unclear].
Bohlen: And the one thing about this channel, Mr. President, so far,
thank God, is it [has been] kept completely confidential—
President Kennedy: Yes.
Bohlen: —thoroughly. One of the few things—
President Kennedy: Yeah.
Bohlen: —in the United States government operations which there
is not the slightest leak on. And this fact, I think, would lend a little
more weight to the words which you send back on it. The danger of not
answering this and letting him come over here would be he’d come over
with some positions which had obviously been agreed to in the hierarchy
of the Soviet government and that they may be completely based on a
miscalculation, on a misjudgment of the whole situation. And then he
comes over here and you meet, and you have just a complete confronta-
tion with no formal agreement, or anything like this, and this sets off its
own chain of events. What would you think, Tommy?
Thompson: Oh, I think, if . . . if by chance, he is, he did say these
things in order to get a positive response from us that he could use with
his colleagues, or with the East Germans . . . then it would be too bad, if
we didn’t . . .
Bohlen: Well, let’s put it this way. What would you lose by having in
the Berlin part of this letter, something along this line, which you take to
be daring?20 I can’t see that you would lose anything. The only danger
that it might involve would be that it would bring it to a head; but I
20. Bohlen seems to be referring to a draft response from President Kennedy. The actual
response, as sent from Washington on 8 October 1962 did not include any reference to the
Berlin question (see Kennedy to Khrushchev, 8 October 1962, FRUS, 6: 163–64).
204 S AT U R DAY, S E P T E M B E R 29, 1962
don’t think the way this is worded it would have very much of this, if it’s
sufficiently general. And if he doesn’t believe it, well, you’ve wasted some
time in writing a letter, but I don’t think the consequences would be any
worse than they are. I am very much afraid of his coming over here filled
with these impressions, that our silence in the face of his—there were
four occasions now, one to [Secretary of the Interior Stewart] Udall,
one to [poet Robert] Frost—did he say it to you, Tommy, too, that
we’re not fighting on the . . . ?21
Thompson: No.
Bohlen: No. And [to] the Belgian and the Finn. And he has repeated
the same damn thing to them. And he hasn’t had any reaction whatso-
ever. Now that—
President Kennedy: It’s another . . . I don’t know whether I ought to
do anything about Frost about supposedly this secret Frost [unclear],
Macmillan sent these up . . . a civilized remark. But . . . I was just won-
dering whether there’s . . . have you talked to Frost?
Thompson: No. And I haven’t been near the [State] department, so I
don’t know . . . for the last two months, so I [unclear] . . . uninformed
[unclear].
President Kennedy: I’ll call [unclear] on the phone so he can’t say he
wasn’t asked.
What about this? Would you go along with this thought about
responding to this letter and in it, including in it . . . ?
Thompson: I agree with Chip. I think, if the letter is to have a . . .
President Kennedy: Would you get that letter you [unclear]?
Unidentified: Yes.
Bohlen: I think it’s in your [unclear].
Unidentified: I think it’s [on] the chair.
Thompson: I think now . . . You cut it down a bit, Chip.
Bohlen: Yeah.
Unidentified: [Unclear.] [Rustling of paper, then silence.]
Bohlen: You’ve got to change the first [clears his throat]. [Silence
while they read.]
President Kennedy: I think when he says that people over here agree
with him, I think he may in that case be meaning just the division of
Western Germany, which everybody does agree with him on in Europe.
Not this question of our rights and troops in West Berlin, because he’s
21. The Udall and Frost discussions on 6 and 7 September are described in the editors’ intro-
duction, 10 September 1962.
Meeting on the Soviet Union 205
been told that so many times. He knows we don’t agree with that. But I
think he knows that de Gaulle and Macmillan and, possibly, I don’t really
care about the unification of Germany.
Bohlen: Yeah, well, except that in one of these things, I think it was
to the Belgian, he was more explicit than that, in which he said that
President Kennedy and Macmillan and de Gaulle really agree with my
solution to the Berlin thing, and it’s only Adenauer who just wants trou-
ble, pulling the spokes from the wheel. I don’t know which is—
President Kennedy: Of course that may be just a way to [unclear] to
Germany and . . . but . . . I wish if the Germans were ever going to do
anything about the division of Germany or recognition of East Germany
. . . what kind of [unclear], they would go ahead and do it and not try to
do it when it becomes useless as a . . . when they can’t sell that position
for anything.
Actually that last conversation that Adenauer had with Norstad and
[NATO general secretary Dirk] Stikker, I don’t . . . he didn’t even men-
tion Berlin. [Unclear] George Ball, et cetera. But he doesn’t get around
to Berlin when he talks. I don’t think he wants to see Germany reunified.
Bohlen: Hell, no.
President Kennedy: So what are we all doing?
Thompson: Khrushchev—
Bohlen: [Unclear] with the Germans [unclear] nothing in the
German ethos because one of the things that you always run into is this
deeply felt thing, blah, blah, blah [unclear] take any action [unclear], is
put off, you’ll really disrupt Germany. I must say I never totally believed
it because Germany is a [unclear] country. And I think also—
President Kennedy: We don’t want any—
Bohlen: —that the French fear of the Germans turning East,
under the present circumstances, is very illusory because Khrushchev
cannot give them Eastern Germany. He told me this and I am sure he
said it to you, but he used to use one expression to me in the last two
months: “I was there but you must understand that we are not in a
position to make any agreement with you affecting East Germany.”
What he meant by that was that they were hooked with this Soviet
invasion of East Germany, and, therefore, the only bait that he could
offer to the West Germans would be the reunification of the country
in return for their neutrality. Well if you had that possibility, my God,
we would have had that out on the table informally years ago. Don’t
you think so, Tommy?
Thompson: Uh, huh. Since we’ve got the bigger half, the bigger part,
any unification even in neutrality would eventually be [unclear]—
206 S AT U R DAY, S E P T E M B E R 29, 1962
Bohlen: Yes, I mean, that is why I think that this would have been if he
had not Sovietized, if the Russians had not Sovietized Eastern Germany,
they would have an enormous diplomatic card that they could play to
wreck NATO, wreck the German involvement in it. But since this is not
one that they could play, I don’t really see much real danger of the Germans
turning to the East, particularly as this process with France and the
Common Market is going [Kennedy can be heard indistinctly] very far now.
President Kennedy: Well, Chip, what do you think is the . . . how
pleased with . . . I suppose anything that the West Germans did about
East Germany now would be regarded as indicating that Khrushchev
was right, and we really don’t care about West Berlin. West Berlin seems
to have less and less importance once you, if you give up the idea of uni-
fication. And then . . . what are we doing then in West Berlin . . . except
for the people that are involved—
Bohlen: Well, you’ve got two and a half million people—
President Kennedy: [Unclear.]
Thompson: The symbol and [unclear].
President Kennedy: What’s the symbol got—?
Thompson: They’ll never give up the idea that eventually reunion
will be the case. It’s one thing [unclear].
Bohlen: But, of course, one of the, I think, major arguments against
doing anything formally such as recognition of East Germany is that it’s
extremely doubtful as to whether that East Germany setup is a viable
thing. I think that Khrushchev’s attitude may be primarily motivated by
a desire to do something which will increase the viability of East
Germany. He may have thought that this Wall was going to do it and
this hasn’t done it. He may think that if you could get his arrangement
on Berlin this would fix Ulbricht up. For God’s sake, all of this seems to
be very much founded on wishful thinking.
Thompson: Yeah. Perhaps on the basis that the other solution would
be to go in with a lot of money and build up East Germany to where it
would be viable and as [first deputy Soviet foreign minister Vasiliy]
Kuznetsov once told somebody, he said, “We can’t do that because that
would mean that the Germans would live better than we do and—”
Bohlen: Yes, and this is a factor, but another thing is—
Thompson: —“and that would be immoral,” he said.
Bohlen: Being a divided country, and given the temperament of the
Germans while they haven’t been unified for so damn long historically,
they nevertheless, which is a great thing for them, and I just don’t think
that even building it up would necessarily make it into a satellite coun-
try comparable to say Poland or [unclear interjection by Thompson]
Meeting on the Soviet Union 207
Czechoslovakia because it’s [unclear]. These other ones that are divided
such as North Korea and Vietnam are new countries which haven’t got
any tradition of unity.
President Kennedy: What do you think about this letter of Chip’s?
Thompson: I think that the line is sound. I think it could be . . . you
know, this would be a long thing anyway, given the testing, if this could
be maybe boiled down a little more, not quite so—
Bohlen: And you could add this part onto the thing. Of course you’ll
want to discuss this with the Secretary.
President Kennedy: Yes.
Thompson: When he is coming back?
President Kennedy: He’s coming back this Wednesday, isn’t he?
Coming back Tuesday [unclear]?
Bohlen: Mac gets back on Wednesday, doesn’t he?
President Kennedy: Yeah. So why don’t we see what, on this
[unclear] come Wednesday?
Bohlen: Yeah.
President Kennedy: But I have. . . . Why don’t we get somebody
working on a draft response to this?
Bohlen: On the Cuban [part]?
President Kennedy: To the whole thing.
Bohlen: All right, sir. Now the only question is [that] there are very
few people in the Department who know about this correspondence at
all [Kennedy is mumbling in the background], and I don’t know if, for
example, that anybody who is knowledgeable on the Cuban thing would
be . . . is in on the general knowledge of—
President Kennedy: Actually what we say on Cuba, I think, almost
anybody would know more or less the general position on Cuba as to—
Bohlen: What would you want to say on that, then?
President Kennedy: Well, I think we ought to say that this decision
of the Soviet Union to so greatly increase the military power of the . . . of
Cuba constitutes, I don’t know, an unfriendly act or whatever the diplo-
matic term is and that had increased tensions and made . . . reaching an
accord on matters of Berlin far more difficult and that because of the
many treaties of the United States in this hemisphere and the special
position, the historic position of the relationship of the United States
with countries surrounding it, this represents a very serious assault on
our position—something like that. Without sort of saying that we would
[unclear]—
Thompson:[Unclear] get in something about the two things that
concern us about the buildup in Cuba is: one, our own vital interest; and
208 S AT U R DAY, S E P T E M B E R 29, 1962
the other is the possible use of Cuba as a threat to other countries in this
hemisphere.
Bohlen: And you might point out, if you want to mark a difference
between let’s say our assistance to Iran, where we have no bases, of
course—we just concluded an arrangement—is that Cuba was a member
of the American defense establishment. It is just as though, it would be
more comparable if the United States had acted in the case of Hungary—
President Kennedy: [Unclear.]
Bohlen: —to give military support to the Hungarian government
which declared its—to the Soviet Union—its neutrality from the Warsaw
Pact. We can do that and what about—
President Kennedy: What about saying [that] a Cuba friendly to the
hemisphere is as significant to [us] . . . that we believe, inasmuch as you
had believed that a Hungary friendly to the Soviet Union is in your vital
interest? So that he doesn’t get off on Turkey and Iran.
Bohlen: Yeah.
President Kennedy: Then on the testing, we’re pretty . . . We know—
Bohlen: And our position—
President Kennedy: —We just can’t buy . . . on the other hand, it
seems to me, we just ought to say, “Well, in this case there’s just no . . .” I
mean he’s offering us five years and then if there is not an agreement by
then, that’s just unpoliced.
I think we ought to, I’ll get Jerry Wiesner. I’ll have to give Jerry
Wiesner these two pages and tell him that this is . . . and see if there is
anything he can do about them. Let me tap Wiesner. I think this ought
to be just paraphrased. And I can give this . . . these two pages to
Wiesner and ask him for comments at least and [unclear] [Sir Edward]
Bullard and [Sir William] Penney, et cetera. What it is they did say that
is significant, whether he is accurately restating it.22
Bohlen: Of course a great deal depends on what [unclear].
Jerry Wiesner enters the Oval Office.
President Kennedy: Oh, hi Jerry.
Bohlen: Hello, Jerry.
Jerry Wiesner: Hi.
Bohlen: What the value of these—
22. In his letter of 28 September, Khrushchev alleged that Sir William Penney, the chairman
of the U.K. Atomic Energy Authority, and Sir Edward Bullard had argued at the tenth
Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs, held in London 3 to 7 September 1962,
that unmanned seismic stations would suffice to verify a comprehensive test ban.
Meeting on the Soviet Union 209
President Kennedy: Could you just take this down? I’ll give you this
notation, if you have a piece of paper. “The Russian scientists have said
that according to the British scientists Bullard and Penney, at Pugwash
concerning the use of automatic seismic stations.” [Unclear.]
Wiesner: Actually I have the statement that they issued. I don’t
know whether you want to read it.
President Kennedy: What exactly did they say? Who are Bullard and
Penney? Are they very good?
Wiesner: Yeah, they are two top British scientists.
President Kennedy: What did they say?
Wiesner: Thursday’s statement . . . the group . . . this doesn’t quote
either Bullard or Penney. That’s the group that signed the document but
apparently Bullard and Penney and a number of other people worked on
it. What they’re proposing are some unmanned seismic stations in unde-
fined number, including—
Bohlen: Two or three, he said.
Wiesner: Oh, it has to be hundreds. It has to be large numbers.
President Kennedy: Would it? Have they [unclear]?
Wiesner: They don’t say that. They say “enough.” Actually I have
had a study going since I got this document to try to find out just what
the right number is without us shooting past—
Bohlen: He mentions two or three in this letter.
Wiesner: Oh, that won’t do any good.
Bohlen: Right.
President Kennedy: Other than that we ought to . . . I’ll tell you what
we ought to do: just take these points down then you could respond to
them like we’re going to write a letter to these scientists.
Wiesner: Oh. Who is this letter from?
President Kennedy: Oh, this is from one of their people that came to us.
Wiesner: Uh, huh [possibly skeptical].
President Kennedy: [reading from the secret letter from Khrushchev] “As
we understood the idea, the suggestion is that automatic seismic stations
help with their records to determine what is the cause of this or that
underground tremor—underground nuclear blasts or ordinary earth-
quakes. It would be sort of a mechanical control without men. After
thinking this suggestion over we came to the conclusion that it can be
accepted if this would make it easier to reach [an] agreement. In this
case, it could be provided in a treaty banning all nuclear weapons tests
that automatic seismic stations be set up both near the borders of the
nuclear state and two to three such stations directly on the territory of
the states possessing nuclear weapons—in the areas most frequently
210 S AT U R DAY, S E P T E M B E R 29, 1962
23. Once again President Kennedy appears to be reading from a text, although these sentences
do not appear in the 28 September letter from Khrushchev.
Meeting on the Soviet Union 211
mic stations so that some of them are always close to the events. If
they’re close, you can usually tell the difference.
Bohlen: Hmmm.
Wiesner: I don’t believe that any such system would get us out of the
necessity for some mandatory inspection of the seismic areas. It would
reduce . . . Anything of this kind that you do reduces the number. But it’s
technically—
President Kennedy: I’ll tell you what you do. Would you then pre-
pare for the . . . by Tuesday or so a response to this argument that it
needs only two or three—
Wiesner: Yeah.
President Kennedy: —agreed upon at Pugwash by first going back
to what they really said at Pugwash and the subsequent . . .
Wiesner: OK.
President Kennedy: . . . and then say what the seismic—
Wiesner: Can I get your reaction to one other idea—
President Kennedy: Fine.
Wiesner: —that I have been playing with . . . that I have actually
been trying to understand this to prepare a memo? As you know, I have
been impressed for the last year with the fact that the earthquakes—now
I think I have talked to both of you about this—[muttered assent] in the
Soviet Union occur in a very few remote places.
Unidentified: Yes.
Wiesner: And here are some maps that I’ve had made [unclear].
[Wiesner flips maps. Kennedy leaves the room?]
Wiesner: This is 1957. They’re in there. They’re in here and they’re
down here, an occasional one out there. They’re in the same place down
here. In fact, I’ve drawn an area in which I can’t find any record of seis-
mic—
Bohlen: [Unclear.]
Wiesner: Maybe one a year in here. So, I’ve been wondering whether
if we went into this direction we would be willing to do another trick; and
that is to say, we’d accept [unclear], we would accept invitational inspec-
tions in a defined a seismic area [Bohlen mumbling in the background] and
mandatory in the seismic areas and this would probably be mandatory in
a quarter—
Bohlen: The only trouble is that these areas of where they are, they
have the big complexes.
Wiesner: I know [unclear] but one. But they’re not where your mis-
sile bases are. These are [unclear] complexes [unclear].
Bohlen: Yeah but your [unclear] bases are all in here.
212 S AT U R DAY, S E P T E M B E R 29, 1962
the boss’s impression.24 But the fact is that we’ve got a political problem
here at home—
Bohlen: Yeah.
Wiesner: —but I think the Russians have got one, too, now, because . . .
What I’d like to see is whether you could invent a system in which [Door
closes. Kennedy comes back in the room?] we made a compromise, in which we
accepted invitation in the aseismic area and mandatory inspection in the
seismic area.
Bohlen: Yeah.
Wiesner: Do you think we would get in trouble politically, Mr.
President, with a—
President Kennedy: What?
Wiesner: —proposal that said that we would accept invitational
inspection in that part of the Soviet Union where there normally aren’t
earthquakes if they would accept mandatory inspection in the seismic
area? Here’s a map, a series of maps that show what’s going on. This is
year by year and you see it. Most of—
President Kennedy: [Unclear.]
Wiesner: —that great big bulk of the Soviet Union probably doesn’t
have an earthquake a year.
Thompson: [Unclear] that?
Wiesner: And [unclear] here [pointing to map] 60 percent are over
here in the Kuril Islands. So, we have been asking, you see, for the right
to—of course if they were smart, they would say, “Well, if there are no
earthquakes, you can’t go there, because there’s no record.” But they say,
“We’ll fake them.”
President Kennedy: What?
Wiesner: But they . . . when we say, “Well if there’s no earthquake, we
won’t go because we won’t have a basis for going.” They say, “Well, you
can fake the record.” So that they worry about the other side of . . . [points
out places on the map]. You see, all of their factories and missile bases, and
so on, are in this part of the country there. There is a little bit over here:
at Kamchatka the terminal guidance for their ballistic missile tests is
there. But I think—
President Kennedy: Well, I think if there was a chance that they
[unclear], we might try—
Wiesner: You see, I think they’ve got . . . Khrushchev’s got [unclear
Kennedy had opened debate within the administration over the question
by asking for a “new appraisal of our atomic policy in regard to France.”25
Broadly speaking, the Department of Defense and Joint Chiefs of Staff
favored nuclear sharing while the Department of State adamantly
opposed it.
President Kennedy entertained the idea of providing some form of
nuclear assistance because of U.S. balance of payments worries and fear
of Franco-German nuclear collaboration. By selling missile technology
and other information up to the level of fission weapons, he hoped to off-
set U.S. military outlays. He also thought it would prevent de Gaulle
from pressuring West Germany to cooperate in a nuclear program.
Throughout the spring and summer, the Department of State had
gotten the upper hand, and the administration maintained its official
unequivocal opposition to nuclear sharing with France. Behind the
scenes, however, Department of Defense officials continued to discuss
the issue with French officials. On September 5, Deputy Secretary of
Defense Roswell Gilpatric left for Europe to discuss allied contributions
to help redress U.S. balance of payments deficits arising from military
expenditures on the continent. From September 7 to 9, he met with
French defense minister Pierre Messmer and used their talks to explore
U.S.-French cooperation in research and development, procurement and
production, and logistic support.
When this meeting of September 29 occurs, the administration is seek-
ing congressional authorization for the sale to the French government of
the Skipjack nuclear submarine, which was the Nautilus rather than the
Polaris missile-firing type. The McMahon Act of 1958, of course, prohib-
ited assistance relating to nuclear weapons. Advocates of nuclear sharing
within the administration argued, however, that the McMahon Act had
been extrapolated into other technical areas such as missile technology.
During the meeting, Kennedy takes an important call from Senator Henry
“Scoop” Jackson, head of the Joint Atomic Energy Committee.
25. C. V. Clifton, “Memorandum of Conference with the President,” 7 March 1962, “Conference
with President and JCS, 10/61–11/62” folder, Chester Clifton Files, National Security Files,
Box 345, John F. Kennedy Library.
216 S AT U R DAY, S E P T E M B E R 29, 1962
26. Bohlen is being flippant because he had received stern written and oral instructions from
the Secretary of State to pursue the official administration line of opposing nuclear sharing.
27. Manlio Brosio was the Italian ambassador to France. From 17 to 19 September, Gilpatric
met with Italian defense minister Giulio Andreotti in Rome to discuss defense cooperation and
Italian contributions for offsetting U.S. military expenditures. Brosio had apparently reported to
his government that de Gaulle sought greater Franco-Italian defense collaboration.
28. The Kennedy administration had adopted what former secretary-general of NATO Paul-
Henri Spaak said was a running joke among the West Europeans: “Italy is always looking for a
compromise. Italy’s position is to say yes to France, no to the U.K., and do what the U.S. tells
her to do.”
29. He is laughing at Wiesner’s heretical suggestion to provide some form of nuclear aid to
France. There had been acrimonious debate throughout the spring and summer over the issue.
30. Reference to their perception that both France’s force de frappe and conventional forces
were for the defense of France. De Gaulle had declared that a force de frappe would not be inte-
grated with NATO’s nuclear forces.
Meeting on the Soviet Union 217
Bohlen: This nuclear submarine thing, I hope to God that this goes
through.31
President Kennedy: Where is it now?
Bohlen: Well, I don’t know. Gilpatric told me yesterday that he talked
to Scoop Jackson and he talked to [Admiral George W.] Anderson.
President Kennedy: And they bullied?
Bohlen: Thought that there would be a considerable amount of con-
cern at the Department of State. Gilpatric went over there and sort of
made a conditional offer and this has produced a great sort of feeling in
the French: “Oh, boy, here the logjam is broken and this is wonderful”
and they’ve all expressed great pleasure and delight. But the only thing
is, if there’s a hitch in the congressional thing and we have to call it off,
then . . . [Unclear exchange.]
President Kennedy: Oh no, I thought Anderson had that?
Bohlen: Did you see that letter from Jim Gavin to the Secretary [of
State]?
President Kennedy: A letter, no.32
Bohlen: On this subject?
President Kennedy: No. Maybe you can send it over to me? But I
think that, as I recall Anderson was in favor, or maybe Jackson, I think,
was in favor of our doing something with the French.
Bohlen: I don’t think so.
President Kennedy: What? You know giving them some—
Bohlen: Yeah.
President Kennedy: —nuclear assistance—some of them were . . .
Wiesner: I always thought we were making a mistake in not helping
them with things that weren’t bombs. Because this made them particu-
larly bitter. They’d say, well this is not nuclear explosives, and confront
us on . . .
President Kennedy: Well, I think it is possible that we’ll just have to
. . . The fact is the Soviet Union in all these things recognizes France as
a nuclear power, so that it wouldn’t be a question of diffusing any-
more.33
Bohlen: Now, this is one of the things in this diffusion angle that has
really bothered me.
31. Reference to its going through the Joint Atomic Energy Committee.
32. No record of this letter has been found.
33. This was a concern because of President Kennedy’s hope for a test ban treaty.
218 S AT U R DAY, S E P T E M B E R 29, 1962
Wiesner: But at the bottom of this is the faster you . . . the more you
help the French, the more incentive you give other people to get to that
stage, too, you see. So, I think you have to be very careful on the bomb.
Bohlen: As I’ve always understood, Mr. President, your thought on
the things you told Malraux,34 was that this is surely, but in particular
when Adenauer leaves, is going to produce a comparable German effort
to get one.
President Kennedy: Uh, huh.
Bohlen: And I would say that this is one of the places where I think
de Gaulle shuts his mind and is focusing on his needs, ready to bring
Germany into the European Community. He doesn’t seem to be paying
very much attention to the old talk about the WEU treaties.35
And you recall what Adenauer said to Rusk when we were there in
June; he talked about the atomic [unclear]. He said, “Well, of course
[unclear] when we signed the WEU agreement because it is based on
the doctrine of rebus sic standibus.36
President Kennedy: Yeah. Yeah.
Bohlen: —which gives the impression which was [unclear] rebus sic
standibus is a hell of a lot and that the situation is quite different than it was
then. I think the main thing on this thing is whether or not the French—
de Gaulle—really believes that this independent nuclear capability . . .
President Kennedy: [to Evelyn Lincoln] Is he calling me? Jackson’s
calling?
[to gentlemen in room] Jackson’s calling me. So [unclear].
[to Evelyn Lincoln] Can I get Senator Jackson please?
[to gentlemen] Yeah, let’s put that away for a little . . . [unclear] and
then let’s come back to it.
Unidentified: Uh, huh.
President Kennedy: [to Wiesner] Well, would you see if you can get
me a response [to Khrushchev’s test ban letter]?
Wiesner: Well, who’s this to? Can’t you . . .
President Kennedy: I just want a paper.
Wiesner: You want a paper?
34. André Malraux, French minister of state for cultural affairs, visited the United States from
10 to 16 May 1962 at President Kennedy’s personal invitation.
35. Western European Union.
36. Rebus sic standibus is the legal doctrine that treaties can be terminated on the ground of a
change in circumstances that defeats the treaty’s purpose. Bohlen is telling the President that
Adenauer admits to relying on this document as a possible escape hatch from the WEU agree-
ment that bars West Germany from acquiring nuclear weapons.
Meeting on the Soviet Union 219
37. On Wednesday, 3 October, Senator Jackson met with the President at the White House
from 11:10 to 11:30 A.M.
220 S AT U R DAY, S E P T E M B E R 29, 1962
38. Summarizing his telephone conversation with Jackson, Kennedy tells them that there is
fear of compromising U.S. nuclear reactor technology by allowing the possibility of secrets
passing to the Soviets by sharing the Skipjack submarine with the French.
39. Admiral Hyman G. Rickover.
Meeting on the Soviet Union 221
if you really have a good tight nuclear diffusion agreement; but if you don’t
. . . That’s why I was worried about sending it on to the allies to consider
and you ought to have a lot more clarity with the Russians as to whether
they’d really need—[reference to conflict between a nuclear nonproliferation or
nondiffusion agreement and any U.S. nuclear assistance to France].
President Kennedy: That’s what I thought. We don’t want to go
through one of these terrible allied [unclear]—
Bohlen: —allied performances on a hypothetical situation.
President Kennedy: Right.
Bohlen: And, Mr. President, one more thing, you know this resolu-
tion on Berlin?
President Kennedy: Yeah.
Bohlen: —that Zablocki has sponsored.40
President Kennedy: Yeah.
Bohlen: Well, I’m going up there on Monday at ten—
President Kennedy: OK.
Bohlen: —to talk to him. And you’ve seen this draft?
President Kennedy: And I asked him to take out this question of
German . . . The government . . . the conclusion, the final. Secondly—
Bohlen: And that isn’t accurate either because the agreements don’t
provide for that.
President Kennedy: That’s right.
Bohlen: I mean, the agreements are not based on until—
President Kennedy: I think that I see no particular disadvantage.
[reading text] I don’t see any advantage of it, I don’t see it’s a great dis-
advantage.
Bohlen: No, it’s just that we’ve been trying to get Zablocki to lay off
it, but he’s just hot on it. You know, he feels that since we’ve asked
[unclear] reservists, he asked that you mention Cuba and Berlin that . . .
President Kennedy: Yeah, but I think . . . I just think—
Bohlen: If you have one on Cuba, you ought to have one on Berlin.
He really wants to pick up some political capital for being the—
President Kennedy: With the Germans?
Bohlen: No, with his election cam—41
President Kennedy: What [unclear] is German?
Tape spools out.
40. Clement J. Zablocki (D-Wisconsin) was on the House Foreign Affairs Committee.
41. Zablocki was up for reelection in November 1962.
222 S AT U R DAY, S E P T E M B E R 29, 1962
The secretary of the army, Cyrus Vance; the U.S. Army chief of staff,
General Earl Wheeler; and the incoming Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, General Maxwell Taylor, entered the Oval Office next to discuss
the possible use of the Army in Mississippi. Kennedy may have wished to
tape this conversation; but he only successfully pulls the switch at the
end of the conversation, leaving the machine on to catch the strategy
session with Attorney General Robert Kennedy and Assistant Attorney
General Burke Marshall.
1:18–1:30 P.M.
42. Including President Kennedy, Robert F. Kennedy, and Burke Marshall. Tape 24, John F.
Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, Presidential Recordings Collection.
Meeting on the Crisis at the University of Mississippi 223
After some gentle pushing between McShane and Johnson, it was appar-
ent the Mississippian would not yield. After they exchanged some
words, McShane turned in retreat, and Meredith, Doar, and a retinue of
federal marshals departed the scene, prevented once more from fulfilling
their court-ordered task.
On September 27, the group again tried to register Meredith. This time
an elaborate plan had been worked out in discussions between Attorney
General Robert Kennedy and Governor Barnett and his friend Tom
Watkins, by which the U.S. marshals would draw their guns on Barnett and
Paul Johnson in a “show of force.” Once this symbolic act had been com-
pleted, the Mississippi politicians would stand aside and allow Meredith to
pass (with his escorts) and register for classes. But the plan was thwarted, as
some 2,000 people, including students, farmers, and self-styled vigilantes,
converged that day on Oxford from all over Mississippi, determined to stop
Meredith from registering at the university. A worried Barnett telephoned
the Attorney General late in the day to report that he was uncertain if he
could maintain order and claimed he had been unable to disperse the crowd.
The Attorney General, never comfortable with the planned “show of force,”
ordered Meredith’s convoy, which was heading from Memphis to Oxford, to
turn back. Less than 50 miles from Oxford, the group turned around,
recrossed the Tennessee border, and returned to Memphis.
On Friday September 28, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals found
Governor Barnett guilty of contempt. Barnett, who did not appear in
court, was found guilty in absentia and given until the following
Tuesday to clear himself by retracting his proclamation and allowing
Meredith to register. In the event he failed to do so, the Court declared
Barnett would face arrest and a fine of $10,000 a day for each day he
remained in Meredith’s path.
On September 29, President Kennedy would become more directly
involved in the crisis, having previously allowed the Attorney General to
assume primary responsibility in the affair. That morning Robert Kennedy
had been on the telephone with Ross Barnett and his chosen intermediary,
Thomas Watkins, an attorney from Jackson, Mississippi. The deal reached
the day before had fallen through. Now the Mississippians wanted an even
larger show of federal force before giving in and letting Meredith register
at Ole Miss.
The President had to decide whether the U.S. Army or a federalized
Mississippi National Guard would be needed to cope with the increas-
ingly tense situation.
226 S AT U R DAY, S E P T E M B E R 29, 1962
43. The reference is to the autumn 1957 Little Rock crisis in which the governor of Arkansas,
Orval Faubus, defied a federal court order to desegregate Little Rock’s Central High School.
Faubus used the National Guard, ostensibly to prevent violence but in reality to block nine
African American students from enrolling in the all-white high school. After scenes of hate-
filled mobs harassing the students appeared on national television, President Eisenhower
called in 1,000 federal troops and 10,000 federalized National Guardsmen in order to protect
the young African Americans.
Meeting on the Crisis at the University of Mississippi 227
Unidentified: . . . put them in the armories, just about, I’d say that’d
be [unclear] use, and I would say the first battle group of the [unclear]
the Cavalry Regiment under Colonel Martin. Now, I would suggest that
we go ahead and move General Billingslea of the Second Infantry
Division Headquarters in there and put him in command . . .44
Unidentified: Under Vance?45
Unidentified: Right, under Vance.
Unidentified: None of the others . . .
President Kennedy: To do what? To do what?
Unidentified: Well, Billingslea would be the Army officer in overall
charge. Put him into Memphis right now.
President Kennedy: Where is he now?
Unidentified: He’s down at Benning now. 46
President Kennedy: I see.
Several unclear exchanges follow.
Unidentified: No, I agree. We were going to use, first, two M.P. bat-
talions . . .
President Kennedy: How many would there be in one?
Unidentified: Well, there would be 800 men, all told. And we’d also
bring in the battle group from the Second Infantry Division at Fort
Benning to give [unclear].
President Kennedy: How about the map of the town and so on? Is
there somebody around who knows which way and can direct the guard
to go . . . ?
Unidentified: Oh, yes. [Unclear] military [unclear] set of maps
[unclear].
President Kennedy: Will you have a regular Army fellow with them
or will it be Billingslea?
Unidentified: You have regular Army. [Several speakers at once.]
President Kennedy: Has Billingslea [unclear] made an analysis of
what he would do with the various forces?
Unidentified: People have been working on . . .
Unidentified: Right. And Creighton Abrams will be down . . .47
Unidentified: Maybe he should talk to [unclear].
44. Colonel Martin is not further identified. General Billingslea is Brigadier General Charles
Billingslea.
45. Cyrus R. Vance, secretary of the Army.
46. Fort Benning, Georgia.
47. Major General W. Creighton Abrams was assistant deputy Army chief of staff for military
operations.
Meeting on the Crisis at the University of Mississippi 229
Robert Kennedy: They called [unclear] give those guys as much time
as he can. Tell him, you can’t believe the Russians would do this. You
51. Tape 24, John F. Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, Presidential Recordings
Collection.
Meeting with Robert Kennedy on the Drummond Spy Case 231
can’t, you must be . . . You know they brought out the card thing, the
Russians are diplomats . . .
Unidentified: The Russians would do that. Ughhhh!!!
Unidentified: [Unclear] that they’ve misunderstood. They . . .
Robert Kennedy: It’s all about getting those two men.
President Kennedy: What?
Robert Kennedy: [Unclear.]
President Kennedy: What were they doing?
Robert Kennedy: We got the chief petty officer [unclear] who gave
them a lot of valuable information. [Unclear] since 1958.
President Kennedy: Why, was he stationed in Moscow, was he for
awhile?
Robert Kennedy: [Unclear.] And he’s been living way above his
means. [Unclear.] So they got on him.
President Kennedy: How did they catch him?
Robert Kennedy: They started following him. He spent a lot of
money and then he [unclear] couldn’t get any good stuff on the docu-
ments. So when he was short of money, they would watch him [unclear].
And they followed . . . thought he was going to go last week, so they fol-
lowed all the way out [unclear]. Sometimes he’d drive at [unclear] miles
an hour. But they had cars stationed all the way. And then they went
finally chasing him to Westchester. [Unclear] he was with the third sec-
retary of the delegation of the Soviet Union.
President Kennedy: At the U.N. or here?
Robert Kennedy: The U.N.
President Kennedy: Yeah.
Robert Kennedy: They were sitting in the car, with the documents,
with the dough.
President Kennedy: They just arrested them?
Robert Kennedy: So, they called me at once because they thought that
[unclear] speak Russian [unclear]. They asked for diplomatic immunity.
President Kennedy: Yes.
Robert Kennedy: Said [unclear] could not believe that the Soviet Union
would be involved. You would think you must be personally [unclear] the
Russians. We can’t let you go. So they took him down. [Unclear] had to
wait until someone came down.
President Kennedy: [Unclear.]
Robert Kennedy: [Unclear.] United Nations delegation about 4:30
this morning.
President Kennedy: Did what?
Robert Kennedy: [Unclear] and then they just let them go.
232 S AT U R DAY, S E P T E M B E R 29, 1962
The President turned off the machine at about 1:35. He then called Mrs.
Kennedy, perhaps to discuss the prospects of his joining her in Newport,
Rhode Island, at the end of the day.
A few minutes later, Arthur Schlesinger reached the White House. He
was just in time to witness the President’s next telephone conversation
with the Governor of Mississippi. An air of unreal humor pervaded the
Oval Office. When he was told that Ross Barnett was on the phone
Kennedy affected the manner of a ring announcer: “And now—Governor
Ross Barnett.” “Go get him, Johnny Boy,” replied the Attorney General.52
52. Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., recounted this scene in Robert Kennedy and His Times (Boston:
Houghton Mifflin, 1978), p. 344. Soon afterward the U.S. government demanded the expul-
sion of the two Russians.
On July 19, 1963, Drummond was convicted of conspiring to commit espionage for the
Soviet Union, and on August 15, 1963, he was sentenced to life imprisonment. The judge, who
spoke of Drummond’s “heinous” crime, could have imposed the death penalty, but said he
decided on a life sentence out of compassion for the ex-sailor’s wife and parents.
Conversation with Ross Barnett 233
2:00 P.M.
53. Dictabelt 4A1, Cassette A, John F. Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, Presidential
Recordings Collection.
234 S AT U R DAY, S E P T E M B E R 29, 1962
Barnett: Did he and Mr. Watkins have a talk this morning, Tom
Watkins, the lawyer from Jackson, or not?54
President Kennedy: Yes, he talked to Tom Watkins, he told me.
Barnett: Yes, sir. Well, I don’t know what . . . I haven’t had a chance
to talk with him . . .
President Kennedy: Now just wait . . . just one minute because I got
the Attorney General in the outer office, and I’ll just speak to him.
Barnett: All right. [Long pause.]
President Kennedy: Hello, Governor?
Barnett: Yes. Hold on.
President Kennedy: I just talked to the Attorney General. Now, he
said that he talked to Mr. Watkins . . .
Barnett: Yes.
President Kennedy: . . . and the problem is as to whether we can get
some help in getting this fellow in this week.
Barnett: Yes.
President Kennedy: Now, evidently we couldn’t, the Attorney General
didn’t feel that he and Mr. Watkins had reached any final agreement on that.
Barnett: Well, Mr. President, Mr. Watkins is going to fly up there
early tomorrow morning.
President Kennedy: Right.
Barnett: And could you gentlemen talk with him tomorrow? You . . .
President Kennedy: Yes, I will have the Attorney General talk to
him and then . . .
Barnett: Yes.
President Kennedy: . . . after they’ve finished talking I’ll talk to the
Attorney General . . .
Barnett: All right.
President Kennedy: . . . on the phone and then if he feels it’s useful
for me to meet with him . . .
Barnett: I thought . . .
President Kennedy: . . . I’ll do that.
Barnett: I thought they were making some progress. I didn’t know.
President Kennedy: Well, now . . .
Barnett: I couldn’t say, you know.
President Kennedy: . . . he and Mr. Watkins, they can meet tomor-
row. Now, the difficulty is, we got two or three problems. In the first
54. Thomas H. Watkins was the Mississippi lawyer and Barnett aide who served as an inter-
mediary in the crisis.
Conversation with Ross Barnett 235
place, what can we do to . . . First place is the court’s order to you, which
I guess is, you’re given until Tuesday. What is your feeling on that?
Barnett: Well, I want . . .
President Kennedy: What’s your position on that?
Barnett: . . . to think it over, Mr. President.
President Kennedy: Right.
Barnett: It’s a serious matter, now that I want to think it over a few
days. Until Tuesday, anyway.
President Kennedy: All right. Well, now let me say this . . .
Barnett: You know what I am up against, Mr. President. I took an
oath, you know, to abide by the laws of this state—
President Kennedy: That’s right.
Barnett: —and our constitution here and the Constitution of the
United States. I’m, I’m on the spot here, you know.
President Kennedy: Well, now you’ve got . . .
Barnett: I, I’ve taken an oath to do that, and you know what our laws
are with reference to . . .
President Kennedy: Yes, I understand that. Well, now we’ve got the . . .
Barnett: . . . and we have a statute that was enacted a couple of weeks
ago stating positively that no one who had been convicted of a crime or,
uh, whether the criminal action pending against them would not be eli-
gible for any of the institutions of higher learning. And that’s our law,
and it seemed like the Court of Appeal didn’t pay any attention to that.55
President Kennedy: Right. Well, of course . . .
Barnett: And . . .
President Kennedy: . . . the problem is, Governor, that I got my
responsibility, just like you have yours . . .
Barnett: Well, that’s true. I . . .
President Kennedy: . . . and my responsibility, of course, is to the . . .
Barnett: . . . I realize that, and I appreciate that so much.
President Kennedy: Well, now here’s the thing, Governor. I will, the
Attorney General can talk to Mr. Watkins tomorrow. What I want,
would like to do is to try to work this out in an amicable way. We don’t
want a lot of people down there getting hurt . . .
55. On September 20, Meredith was found guilty in absentia of false voter registration and
was fined $100 and costs and sentenced to one year in the Hinds County jail. The conviction
on this clearly specious charge occurred the same day that Mississippi Senate Bill 1501 passed
the legislature. The bill barred persons guilty of a criminal offense from attending state insti-
tutions of higher learning. In addition, on 20 September, Governor Barnett was appointed
registrar of the university. Five days later, the Board of Trustees rescinded the appointment.
236 S AT U R DAY, S E P T E M B E R 29, 1962
2:25 P.M.
56. Dictabelt 4A2, Cassette A, John F. Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, Presidential
Recordings Collection.
57. Burke Marshall was assistant attorney general for the Civil Rights Division.
238 S AT U R DAY, S E P T E M B E R 29, 1962
2:30 P.M.
I guess it’s not going too well . . . [f]or you because of the
Mississippi deal.
2:50 P.M.
60. President Kennedy and Governor Barnett were later joined by Robert Kennedy. Dictabelt
4C, Cassette A, John F. Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, Presidential Recordings
Collection.
240 S AT U R DAY, S E P T E M B E R 29, 1962
come. And he suggested at that time, some alternatives which were not
very satisfactory.
Barnett: Well . . .
Robert Kennedy: And then he mentioned the fact that he might come
up early tomorrow morning.
Barnett: Well . . .
Robert Kennedy: I called him back after I heard the President’s con-
versation with you . . .
Barnett: Yes.
Robert Kennedy: . . . and said that I thought I’d be glad to see him,
but I thought that unless we had some real basis for some understanding
and working out this very very difficult problem that really he was wast-
ing his time; and that one of the basic requirements, in my judgment,
was the maintenance of law and order, and that would require some very
strong and vocal action by you, yourself. . . .
Barnett: Well, I’m certainly going to try to maintain law and order,
Mr . . .
Robert Kennedy: Yeah.
Barnett: . . . General, just the very best way that I can.
Robert Kennedy: But in the . . .
Barnett: I, I talked with the student body the other day and told
them to really, to have control of the physical and mental faculties. But it
didn’t do much good it seemed like.
Robert Kennedy: Well . . .
Barnett: They cheered and carried on, but then they just started rav-
ing and carrying on, you know.
Robert Kennedy: Yeah. I think, Governor, that if we . . . as a very
minimum and as a start, an order by you and the state that people could
not congregate in Oxford now in groups of three or five, larger than
groups of three or five; the second, to get the school authorities to issue
instructions to the students that if they congregate in groups that they
are liable for expulsion. If that was done this afternoon, I think that
would be a big step forward. And that anybody carrying an arm or a,
arms or a club, or anything like that would be liable to punishment.
Barnett: Well . . .
Robert Kennedy: Those kind of steps by you . . .
Barnett: Yes.
Robert Kennedy: . . . would indicate an interest in maintaining law
and order.
Barnett: Well, General, I certainly, I’ll tell the chancellor to
announce to all the students to keep law and order and to keep cool
242 S AT U R DAY, S E P T E M B E R 29, 1962
heads. But the trouble is not only the students, but it’s so many thou-
sands of outsiders will be there.
Robert Kennedy: Yes, but I think, if you said, Governor, not just to . . .
Barnett: Yeah.
Robert Kennedy: . . . keep cool heads, but that they couldn’t congregate.
Barnett: How many do you figure on sending down?
Robert Kennedy: Well, that’s a . . . I think that the President had
some questions for you that he thought that maybe if we could get some
answers to them that . . .
Barnett: Yeah.
Robert Kennedy: . . . that would be what [it would] depend [on].
[speaking to President Kennedy in the room] Mr. President . . .
Barnett: Mr. General, why don’t you . . . I believe that if you and Tom
Watkins could get together it would help a lot. He’s a very reasonable
man, and, and he’s, he knows, he knows the situation down here as well
as anybody living. If you all could get together tomorrow morning, I
really think that it would pay. I think it would help.
Robert Kennedy: Well, he doesn’t have any suggestions, he just told
me, Mr. Governor.
Barnett: Yes. Well, I . . .
Robert Kennedy: So I don’t know what . . .
Barnett: . . . I thought he did have.
Robert Kennedy: Well, he didn’t. I mean he said something about
sending Meredith, sneaking him into Jackson and getting him registered
while all of you were up at . . .
Barnett: Yeah.
Robert Kennedy: . . . at Oxford. But that doesn’t make much sense,
does it?
Barnett: Well, I don’t know. Why? Why doesn’t it? That’s where
they’d ordered him to go at first, you know.
Robert Kennedy: Yeah.
Barnett: You see, there’s an order on the minutes, Mr. General, for
him to register . . .
Robert Kennedy: Well, would you . . .
Barnett: . . . [unclear].
Robert Kennedy: . . . you’d get . . . As I understand it, you’d get
everybody up at Oxford, and then we’d, and then . . .
Barnett: Oh, well, that’s exactly what Tom Watkins must have had in
mind, you know.
Robert Kennedy: Yeah.
Barnett: Let me talk with Tom and call you back in a little while.
Conversation with Ross Barnett 243
He’s not but a block from me. That’s what he had in mind, I think. And,
of course, you know how it is in Jackson. Monday they, no school’s going
on here, you know, and . . . Uh, of course nobody would be anticipating
anyone coming here, you know.
Robert Kennedy: Are you going up to Oxford on Monday? Is that
your plan?
Barnett: Well, that’s what I planned to do, yes, sir. The lieutenant gov-
ernor and I, both, I guess, we’ll have to be up there to try to keep order,
you know. And, we’re to be up there pretty early Monday morning.
Robert Kennedy: Will you?
Barnett: We’ll be up there, unless you ask us not to.
Robert Kennedy: Yeah.
Barnett: Well, like, you see, we’ll be up there and that’s where all the
people will be. Yeah. I thought you and Watkins were going to talk
about that kind of a situation, then what’d be the best thing to do under
those conditions, you know.
Robert Kennedy: Yeah, I think, Governor, that the President has
some, uh, questions that he wanted some answers to . . .
Barnett: Well . . .
Robert Kennedy: . . . make his own determination.
Barnett: . . . that’s right. He wanted to know if I would obey the
orders of the court, and I told him I, I’d have to do some . . . study that
over. That’s a serious thing. I’ve taken an oath to abide by the laws of
this state and our state constitution and the Constitution of the United
States. And, General, how can I violate my oath of office? How can I do
that and live with the people of Mississippi? You know, they’re expecting
me to keep my word. That’s what I’m up against, and I don’t understand
why the court, why the court wouldn’t understand that.
President Kennedy: Oh, Governor, this is the President speaking.
Barnett: Yes, sir, Mr. President.
President Kennedy: Now it’s, I know that . . . your feeling about the
law of Mississippi and the fact that you don’t want to carry out that
court order. What we really want to have from you, though, is some
understanding about whether the state police will maintain law and
order. We understand your feeling about the court order . . .
Barnett: Yes.
President Kennedy: . . . and your disagreement with it. But what
we’re concerned about is how much violence [there] is going to be and
what kind of action we’ll have to take to prevent it. And I’d like to get
assurances from you that the state police down there will take positive
action to maintain law and order.
244 S AT U R DAY, S E P T E M B E R 29, 1962
61. Barnett is undoubtedly referring to 27 September, when some 2,000 people, including stu-
dents, farmers, and self-styled vigilantes, converged on Oxford from all over Mississippi,
intent on stopping Meredith from registering. A worried Barnett telephoned the Attorney
Conversation with Ross Barnett 245
General that day to report that he was uncertain if he could maintain order, claiming he could
not disperse the crowd.
246 S AT U R DAY, S E P T E M B E R 29, 1962
Barnett: . . . I say I’m going to, I’m going to cooperate. I might not
know when you’re going to register him, you know.
President Kennedy: I see. Well, now, Governor, why don’t, do you
want to talk to Mr. Watkins?
Barnett: I might not know that, what your plans were, you see.
President Kennedy: Do you want to, do you want to talk to Mr.
Watkins then . . .
Barnett: I’ll be delighted to talk to him, we’ll call you back.
President Kennedy: OK, good.
Barnett: Call the General back.
President Kennedy: Yeah, call the General, and then I’ll be around.
Barnett: All right. I appreciate it so much . . .
President Kennedy: Thanks, Governor.
Barnett: . . . and I thank you for this call.
President Kennedy: Thank you, Governor.
Barnett: All right.
President Kennedy: Right.
Barnett: Bye.
62. Angie Novello to Evelyn Lincoln, 29 September 1962, with attachment, Robert F.
Kennedy, Personal Correspondence, Civil Rights, Mississippi, Box 11.
63. Due to a technical error with the recording system, this third conversation was not
recorded. An approximate time for this conversation comes from a memo written by Robert
Conversation with Torbert MacDonald 247
7:36 P.M.
Kennedy’s secretary Angela Novello in February 1963 (see Novello to Burke Marshall, 19
February 1963, Robert Kennedy, Mississippi File). At 7:12 Barnett called the Justice
Department to alert Robert Kennedy that he would be in his office for the next 10 to 15 min-
utes. Burke Marshall relayed this message to the Attorney General, who was with his brother
at the White House. Robert Kennedy responded that Barnett should be told that “he was out
of the office for a few minutes and to find out if this call was in answer to the wire sent by the
President.”
64. Dictabelt 4D2, Cassette A, John F. Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, Presidential
Recordings Collection.
248 S AT U R DAY, S E P T E M B E R 29, 1962
MacDonald: Oh.
President Kennedy: And get Sam Atkinson.
MacDonald: Well, not until the first of the week.
President Kennedy: Oh, you can’t?
MacDonald: No.
President Kennedy: You can’t get away there tomorrow?
MacDonald: No.
President Kennedy: Oh. OK.
MacDonald: How long is he going—
President Kennedy: Well, he’s got to go back to . . . work tomorrow
night, late. What do you got tomorrow?
MacDonald: Well, you know, it’s been a full week.
President Kennedy: I know. Oh, I know you’ve had . . . I agree with that.
MacDonald: And, uh—
President Kennedy: You have to speak tomorrow?
MacDonald: Yeah.
President Kennedy: Oh.
MacDonald: And . . . they’ve sent some stuff up for me that has been
postponed during the week, you know.
President Kennedy: Yeah, yeah.
MacDonald: And so . . . I’d love to . . . not until . . . What time is . . .
he going back?
President Kennedy: Well, he’d probably go back . . . I don’t know. You
know, in time to get there at class Monday morning. But I didn’t know
whether you could sort of arrange your schedule, because it seems to me
this is going to be one of those things that you wouldn’t want to miss.
MacDonald: I’d certainly . . . I’d certainly try to do it—
President Kennedy: Well, why don’t you check on it and then give
me a call in the morning?
MacDonald: All right. I will.
President Kennedy: Will you be home in the morning?
MacDonald: Yes.
President Kennedy: Well, I . . . My judgment would be . . . based on
long years of . . . Bill’s been down here today. I’ve just talked to him. And
my judgment would be that it . . . it’s worth the trip.
MacDonald: Well, it’s worth the trip if I can do the trip.
President Kennedy: Yeah, but, well, you have to make a judgment
about whether these trips are worthwhile or those speeches are worth-
while.
MacDonald: Well, it’s—
President Kennedy: [laughing] OK.
Conversation with Torbert MacDonald 249
The President went to the Mansion and had some ice cream sent up. He
was settling into his evening’s activities when his brother called with bad
news. The deal with Barnett was off. For the next two hours, he was on the
telephone with Robert Kennedy and deputy press secretary, Andrew
Hatcher. At one point the President even roused Theodore Sorensen from
his hospital bed to draft a speech he could use if he decided to call in troops.
Ultimately, the President decided to federalize the National Guard, an
eventuality already under consideration. At 11:50 P.M., he sent word to the
Secret Service that he wanted to be notified when the Justice Department
had sent over the proclamation, which he intended to sign that night. At
11:58 P.M., Kennedy sat down with Norbert Schlei, head of the Office of
Legal Counsel, in the Oval Room of the family quarters and signed
Proclamation 3497, which ordered those who were obstructing justice in
Mississippi “to cease and desist therefrom and to retire peaceably forth-
with.” He then signed an executive order placing the Mississippi National
Guard units under federal control. Kennedy inquired whether these docu-
250 S U N DAY, S E P T E M B E R 30– M O N DAY, OCTOBER 1, 1962
ments were the same as those Eisenhower had signed in 1957 in the Little
Rock case. Schlei said they were, noting the wording had been improved.
As Schlei prepared to leave, Kennedy tapped the table, pointing out that it
had belonged to General Ulysses S. Grant. Not wanting to antagonize the
South, Kennedy advised Schlei not to mention Grant’s table to the press.
The South was already agitated. As Kennedy directed the drawing up
of the proclamation, Governor Barnett attended an Ole Miss football
game at Jackson Memorial Stadium, where 46,000 fans cheered not only
for their beloved university against the Kentucky Wildcats but also for
their Governor. It was then that Barnett, responding to the chant of “We
want Ross,” strode onto the floodlit field, stepped to the microphone, and
declared, “I love Mississippi. I love her people. I love our customs.”
Just after midnight, President Kennedy went to sleep. The crisis he
had predicted that fall was starting, but it was starting in Oxford,
Mississippi, not West Berlin.
After attending mass at St. Stephen’s Church, the President hosted a lunch
for the British foreign secretary, Lord Home, at the White House. The
Anglo-American agenda was full. But Berlin, the Congo, and Cuba domi-
nated the conversation. The discussion continued for a while after lunch.
For the moment, Mississippi was the most dangerous place in the
world for the federal government. After the British delegation left,
Kennedy turned his principal attention to the problem of safely register-
ing an African American, James Meredith, at the all-white University of
Mississippi in Oxford. Governor Barnett had come up with a new plan for
ending this stalemate peacefully. He proposed that Meredith be brought to
the campus surrounded by a large group of federal agents. Barnett was
looking for a dramatic way to save face. The defenders of a white Ole Miss
would attempt to stare down Meredith but would then retreat in the face
of a much larger force. The Attorney General, to whom the Governor had
suggested the “show of force” scheme, turned it down. Robert Kennedy
then threatened Barnett with making public that the Governor had been
negotiating with the Kennedy brothers behind the backs of the segrega-
tionists. The Attorney General’s threat resulted in a new Barnett scheme.
He suggested that the federal government sneak Meredith onto the cam-
pus that afternoon. Barnett would then announce in a speech that he had
Meeting on Civil Rights 251
been tricked and Meredith was on campus. The President and Robert
Kennedy preferred this plan. At 6:00 P.M., James Meredith flew into
Oxford accompanied by some Justice Department officials. Before his
arrival, a force of 300 U.S. marshals had assembled around the Lyceum,
the main administration building on campus. The deputy attorney gen-
eral, Nicholas Katzenbach, who was in charge of operations on the cam-
pus, had expected that Meredith would be able to register that day. But
this was impossible. So, as Governor Barnett issued a press release that
Meredith was on campus, U.S. marshals remained posted around the
Lyceum, while some distance away, in the dormitory Baxter Hall,
Meredith was under federal protective guard for the night. The goal was
to keep him safe so that he could register the next morning.
At 10:00 P.M., the President spoke to the nation. He had delayed his
speech two hours to await word that Meredith was safely on campus.
From that moment on, the unexpected displaced the expected.
1. Including President Kennedy, Robert Kennedy, Burke Marshall, Lawrence O’Brien, Kenneth
O’Donnell, and Theodore Sorensen. Tapes 26 and 26A, John F. Kennedy Library, President’s
Office Files, Presidential Recordings Collection.
252 S U N DAY, S E P T E M B E R 30– M O N DAY, OCTOBER 1, 1962
the day, Kennedy called Mississippi governor Ross Barnett, who was
expected to announce ruefully that the state of Mississippi had been
“physically overpowered” and Meredith was on campus. Kennedy was
then supposed to give a conciliatory speech that stressed the victory of
the rule of law.
The rule of law was not winning where it counted this night, on the
streets of Oxford. In the interval between the Governor’s concession
speech and Kennedy’s address, all hell broke out at the university. A
crowd of 2,500 surged toward the Lyceum, the university’s central
administrative center. With 300 federalized U.S. marshals and hand-
picked border patrol officers now on campus and ringing the Lyceum,
the Governor’s representatives on campus decided to withdraw the
Mississippi highway patrol officers who had given a semblance of calm
to the campus in the tense days since the appeals court had ordered
Barnett to admit Meredith. Sensing a shift in the balance of power, the
crowd surged forward, and in self-defense the federal marshals launched
a volley of tear gas canisters. “I would like to take this occasion to
express the thanks of this nation to those southerners who have con-
tributed to the progress of our democratic development. . . . ” A cloud of
tear gas was rising from the campus and Kennedy gave this discordant
speech. Aides had tried to stop him as news of the growing riot reached
the White House. But the telecast had begun.
In the half-hour following the speech, the news from Mississippi has
gotten progressively worse. A jerry-built communications set-up relayed
information from the campus to the White House. A series of walkie-
talkies carried by the marshals and Justice Department aides in and
around the Lyceum kept Nicholas Katzenbach, Attorney General Robert
Kennedy’s field commander, informed. Using a pay telephone in the base-
ment of the building, Katzenbach or the Attorney General’s press secre-
tary, Ed Guthman, conveyed this information to Robert Kennedy or his
assistant Burke Marshall in the White House. Meanwhile down the mall
at the Justice Department another Kennedy aide, Ramsey Clark, the assis-
tant attorney general, maintained a direct line to the Justice Department’s
makeshift Oxford headquarters, which was in a post office building a few
minutes from campus. Periodically, Clark called the Attorney General at
the White House with updates.
President Kennedy started taping as the impromptu domestic crisis
team was absorbing news that the mob had turned violent. Burke Marshall
was handling the telephone in the Cabinet Room for the Attorney General,
with the President a worried observer.
Meeting on Civil Rights 253
Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] Now don’t you have to . . . Do you
have some other men? Yeah. Did you get all the marshals there now?2
President Kennedy: State police or . . .
Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] How many you’ve got? And they’re
all there? Yeah. How are the state police? Is the crowd getting bigger?
Unidentified: [talking to Robert Kennedy in the room] [Unclear] wants
you?
Robert Kennedy: That’s fine.
[on the phone] OK, well I’ll get back. I’ll let you know.
[off the phone] Well, I think that—
President Kennedy: What?
Robert Kennedy: They think they have it in pretty good shape. [Puts
down the receiver.]
President Kennedy: [Unclear.]
Robert Kennedy: Did one marshal get his arm broken?
President Kennedy: His arm broken?
Robert Kennedy: The lousy, I mean, there you are appointed, some
politician gets you appointed deputy marshal and you’re sitting in the
courtroom . . . [telephone rings] moving . . . close to the judge . . . and
suddenly . . .
Burke Marshall: [on the phone] Hello. Yes, he is.
President Kennedy: His arm broken, what, by a bottle?
Unidentified: No, but he said they’re throwing [unclear]. It’s Ed.
President Kennedy: Who?
Unidentified: Ed.
Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] Oh, Ed.3 Well, how’s it look to you?
Kenneth O’Donnell: Yeah, there might not be quite as much rush for
those bumps they’re handing out right after . . .
Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] Is it under control? Would you bring
the guard in?4
Theodore Sorensen: Yeah, but tomorrow’s going to be worse than
today.
Marshall: Yeah, I was . . . even tonight.
Unidentified: [Unclear.]
2. The civilian contingent of U.S. marshals, border police, and federalized prison guards arrived
in stages between 7:00 and 9:00 P.M. Washington time (5:00 and 7:00 P.M. Mississippi time).
3. Probably Edwin Guthman, director of public information, Department of Justice.
4. Earlier in the day President Kennedy federalized the Mississippi National Guard. There
were units in Oxford and Jackson, Mississippi, that could be deployed if necessary.
254 S U N DAY, S E P T E M B E R 30– M O N DAY, OCTOBER 1, 1962
5. The crisis has entered a new phase. It is about 10:45 P.M. in Washington, two hours earlier in
Mississippi, and the Kennedy administration is preparing to deploy the U.S. Army in Oxford.
6. Task Force Alpha is waiting for orders in Memphis. Organized in the last 24 hours, it
includes the 503rd Military Police Battalion, the 31st Light Helicopter Company, the 138th
Truck Company, a medical detachment, and two tear gas experts. The Attorney General is
pressing the introduction of these troops on his men in Oxford.
Meeting on Civil Rights 255
7. Apparently there were only 300. See Taylor Branch, Parting the Waters: America in the King
Years, 1954–63 (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1988), pp. 662–63.
8. Dean P. Markham.
9. John H. Vaught was a University of Mississippi coach.
256 S U N DAY, S E P T E M B E R 30– M O N DAY, OCTOBER 1, 1962
10. Ironically, the Governor’s son was called up with his Mississippi National Guard unit to
fight against his father’s segregationism.
Meeting on Civil Rights 257
11. In April 1961, the United States backed an invasion force composed of Cuban exiles that
sought to overthrow the Castro regime in Cuba. The invasion, marred by a series of errors in
planning and execution, failed miserably, much to the chagrin of the new administration.
12. The reference here is to the U.S. decision not to provide air cover to support the invasion
force during the Bay of Pigs landing. Some claimed the administration’s failure to do so
doomed the operation.
13. James McShane was chief of the federal marshals.
14. Outsiders was the codeword for Ku Klux Klansmen, John Birchers, and other extremists
who had been threatening to descend on Oxford from across the Deep South to keep Ole Miss
white.
258 S U N DAY, S E P T E M B E R 30– M O N DAY, OCTOBER 1, 1962
yet. I suppose you’ll always have the difficulty of people storming onto
the campus. They have a lot of gates. It’s a hell of a big campus, you
know. So you have a few marshals and a few people at each gate, and I
suppose you can stick a car in [unclear] . . .
Marshall: [on the phone]15 Hello [unclear]. Yeah. All right.
Robert Kennedy: . . . we can always storm in there at eight tomorrow
morning or ten tomorrow morning. The problem is, you see, when you
don’t have anybody there that’s really interested in maintaining law and
order, and where their primary interest is to get us to bring troops in.16
You can imagine what would have happened if we’d gone through with
what he wanted to do tomorrow morning.
Marshall: [on the phone] It’s now against them.
Sorensen: Yeah.
Robert Kennedy: Walk in there and try to get through and he’s there
with all his . . . That’s what his plan was. That he’d be there with his
state police and sheriffs, and then assistant sheriffs and then volunteers
behind him, four lanes. And then we were to push our way through.
Unidentified: His agreement was they wouldn’t fire.
Marshall: [on the phone] [Unclear] the state troopers.
Unidentified: . . . tend to resist them anyhow.
Robert Kennedy: Yeah. With nobody else knowing the plot but him
and me.
Evelyn Lincoln: Peter Lawford is on the phone.17
Marshall: [on the phone] Well, he called on the students to act as
responsible citizens.
President Kennedy: That’s slightly ironic. I wish we’d taken that part
out.
Marshall: [on the phone with Joseph Dolan] Yeah. All right, Joe.
[to the people in the room] He says that the state police are against us.
President Kennedy: Who does?
Marshall: [on the phone] Hello. Yeah.
Robert Kennedy: Of course, filled with all this poison.
Unidentified: This way we’ll now [unclear].
15. Marshall is monitoring a continuously open phone line to Justice Department officials in
Mississippi.
16. Robert Kennedy is referring to his failed negotiations with Ross Barnett. The Mississippi
Governor’s primary concern seemed to be to maneuver the Kennedy White House so that it would
overplay its hand in Oxford and make political martyrs out of the Governor and his defenders.
17. According to a White House telephone memorandum, Peter Lawford called the President
at 10:50 P.M. (Evelyn Lincoln Collection, Box 5, John F. Kennedy Library).
Meeting on Civil Rights 259
20. The Attorney General had been given inaccurate information. The first contingent of U.S.
troops would not reach the airport at Oxford for another four hours.
Meeting on Civil Rights 261
President Kennedy: That’s the best. I think that’s fine. The problem
is really the time lapse, isn’t it?
Robert Kennedy: Well, I think that it’s in the . . . They’re going to be . . .
I mean, if you can tell, from what they say, they’re going to be all right for
an hour.
Marshall: [on the phone] Well, I know, but I . . .
President Kennedy: Then what happens after that?
Robert Kennedy: Well, then you could . . . We have [a] company of . . .
President Kennedy: Oh, you’re, so they’re flying them in?
Robert Kennedy: . . . couple of hundred. No, we’ll have a couple of . . .
They’ll be a couple of hundred there within an hour.
The President is relying on the Attorney General for information about
the troop movements. The order went out to Memphis at 11 P.M. to load
the first contingent of 200 men aboard helicopters for the one-hour
flight to Oxford. The White House assumes that the military operation
is already in progress. In fact, it hasn’t even started.
President Kennedy: Oh, I see. The others . . .
Robert Kennedy: And there’ll be eight within four hours if he needs
them.
President Kennedy: Oh, I see.
Unidentified: [Unclear] said there’d be 200 within . . .
Marshall: [on the phone] Yeah.
President Kennedy: Where will they go?
Robert Kennedy: They’d all go into the armory.
President Kennedy: I see.
Robert Kennedy: And they’re all Mississippians.
Unidentified: They’re dying in there.
Robert Kennedy: And they got gas masks.
Marshall: [may be on the phone] How long are they going out to . . .
Unidentified: Yes.
Robert Kennedy: And the General’s getting in touch with Nick, and
he can use them any time he wants.21 I’ll tell Nick or you can.
President Kennedy: So there’ll be 200 there within an hour? [Unclear
exchange.]
Marshall: [on the phone] Oh, Dean? Can we get Nick?
Robert Kennedy: He did a hell of a job on the narcotics thing.
President Kennedy: Who?
Robert Kennedy: Yeah.
22. The White House Conference on Narcotics and Drug Abuse, organized by Dean
Markham, was held 27–28 September 1962.
23. This is Task Force Alpha, a 687-man team stationed at Millington Naval Air Station in
Memphis. The advance group of 170 was supposed to have left by helicopter already. The rest
was to travel by Interstate 55 to reach Oxford in the early morning. At this point, no troops
from the Task Force had yet left Millington.
24. Brigadier General Charles Billingslea was commander of the 82nd Infantry Division, Fort
Benning, Georgia.
Meeting on Civil Rights 263
25. Nikita Khrushchev, the general secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party
of the Soviet Union, also held the title of chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R.
264 S U N DAY, S E P T E M B E R 30– M O N DAY, OCTOBER 1, 1962
26. James Reston was chief Washington correspondent for the New York Times.
27. In a front-page story that appeared in the New York Times on 1 October, James Reston
wrote that Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev had sent a private invitation to Kennedy to visit
the Soviet Union. According to Reston, the message was delivered to Kennedy by Interior
Secretary Stewart Udall, who had recently returned from the Soviet Union.
28. Stewart L. Udall was secretary of the interior.
29. Aleksei I. Adzhubei was editor of Izvestia and Khrushchev’s son-in-law.
30. Anatoly Dobrynin was Soviet ambassador to the United States.
Meeting on Civil Rights 265
Kennedy when the situation was such, but of course with the difficulty
we have in Berlin and other areas, it’s been generally agreed in both
Moscow and the United States that the situation would not have been
appropriate to [unclear]. That’s our position.
Unidentified: [Unclear] outcome.
President Kennedy: I don’t think we ought to at night knock down
Reston, ought we? Do you want to call him up? Or is that just going to
make him mad?
Sorensen: Well, you can’t . . . Don’t bother calling him up.
President Kennedy: But if he knocks it down?
Sorensen: He can’t. [Unclear.]
President Kennedy: What?
Sorensen: It’s probably too late anyway.
President Kennedy: What?
Sorensen: And his story is gone. [Unclear.]
President Kennedy: [Unclear.] I just think he’d be embarrassed about
that. This one.
Unidentified: Yeah, but I don’t think . . . Why don’t you just in your
morning briefing tomorrow give a routine answer? [Unclear voices.]
The President’s attention returns to the more immediate problem in
Oxford, Mississippi.
Marshall: I think that General Abrams and General Billingslea are
working on it. 31 Do you want to send those women down there?
Robert Kennedy: I guess I better not.
Marshall: What about the others? The lawyers?
President Kennedy: What women are these?
Marshall: Secretaries.
Robert Kennedy: Secretaries.
President Kennedy: Down to where, Oxford?
Marshall: Yeah.
President Kennedy: Oh, you mean Nick’s secretaries?
Marshall: Yeah.
Robert Kennedy: Yeah. Well, why don’t I put a hold on it and I’ll talk
to him later on tonight.
Marshall: Hold on [unclear].
President Kennedy: You don’t have any men secretaries?
Marshall: [Unclear] could probably find them. I would think [unclear].
31. Major General Creighton Abrams was assistant deputy Army chief of staff for military
operations.
266 S U N DAY, S E P T E M B E R 30– M O N DAY, OCTOBER 1, 1962
32. Sorensen is reminiscing about the key moments in the 1960 campaign. “The call” probably
refers to then Senator Kennedy’s telephone call to Coretta Scott King in October 1960 when
her husband, the Reverend Martin Luther King, Jr., was in a Georgia jail.
Meeting on Civil Rights 267
on their way. [Pause.] OK. No. [Pause.] Well, you can just stay there.
What about . . . Is Nick there? Well, I’d just like to find out what he’s
heard on getting that gas in there.
Marshall: Do you want to talk to Cy [Vance]? Cy would know.
Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] Yeah. Well.
President Kennedy: Can we get, what’s his name? The Governor’s
man?33
Marshall: [starts speaking on the phone] Hello?
Robert Kennedy: He’s getting him.
Marshall: [on the phone] Hello? Oh, listen, he went off and I’m on.
Unidentified: [in the background] What about gas?
Marshall: [on the phone] Well, are they on their way, do you know?
[A telephone rings.]
President Kennedy: [faintly in the background] Should I talk with the
General directly?34
Lincoln: Jim, did you want your girl to stay?
Unidentified: If she could do me one last favor, which is to bring me
a glass of milk
Marshall: [on the phone] All right. Where were they, at the airport?
Lincoln: A glass of milk? [Unintelligible exchange.]
Robert Kennedy: [Unclear] from now?
Marshall: [on the phone] [Unclear] well that’s something to . . .
Unidentified: Evelyn’s got some beers in the refrigerator.
Marshall: [on the phone] Well, they’re coming in. Well, have they
walked out on you? They don’t have any gas masks.
It appears that Sorensen and the President have reentered the room.
Sorensen: [Unclear] matter, did we like [unclear] the troops on the
ground?
President Kennedy: It seems to me [unclear].
Sorensen: Yeah.
President Kennedy: The governor has said the troops withdrew. The
marshals were . . . with nothing to do.
Sorensen: We’ll announce that. Yeah, but . . .
Marshall: [on the phone] The gas should be in there in a few minutes.35
Robert Kennedy: Is that Nick?
Marshall: [to Robert Kennedy] This is Ed.
33. Apparently a reference to Tom Watkins, the intermediary in the Barnett-Kennedy negotiations.
34. Up to now, the White House team has relied on Secretary Vance’s descriptions of the
movements of Task Force Alpha in Memphis.
35. The federal force protecting the Lyceum ran out of tear gas. Because the Mississippi
National Guard lacked their own supply, canisters of tear gas had to be flown in from Memphis.
268 S U N DAY, S E P T E M B E R 30– M O N DAY, OCTOBER 1, 1962
Soon the White House would face the problem of arranging a convoy to bring the gas from the
airport in Oxford to the campus.
Meeting on Civil Rights 269
36. In February 1956, an African American woman, Autherine Lucy, entered the University of
Alabama under a court order. Rioting ensued, and university officials suspended Lucy for her
270 S U N DAY, S E P T E M B E R 30– M O N DAY, OCTOBER 1, 1962
Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] Well now, is the gas on the way?37
Unidentified: What did she do, withdraw?
Unidentified: Yeah, personally [unclear]. Isn’t that right?
Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] Will you? Do you want these troops
in there?38 Yeah. OK. [Pause.] He got hit by what? Yeah.
Unidentified: Who?
Robert Kennedy: Is he going to live? The state police have left?
[Unclear] put them in?
Marshall: I [unclear] talk with the Governor.
President Kennedy: What’d he say?
Marshall: He said they can’t have pulled them out.
Sorensen: What?
Marshall: Watkins.
Robert Kennedy: [having heard Marshall’s exchange with the President]
And he said, Watkins says, “They can’t have pulled out of there.” Yeah.
They have, though?
President Kennedy: What’s Watkins say otherwise?
Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] Six what?
Marshall: [to the President] He said it’s dead.
Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] [Unclear.]
Marshall: He just talked to the Governor and the Governor had just
talked to the highway patrol [and] that everything was under control.
Concern rises in the Cabinet Room as news arrives that General Edwin
Walker is in Oxford to rally extremists in defense of a segregated
University of Mississippi. The President and the Attorney General begin
to take more seriously the need to deploy the U.S. Army on campus.
Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] Oh why? There’s going to be a fight
in the infirm[ary] . . . Have the marshals done pretty well?
Marshall: The Bureau says there are people coming in from out of town.
Unidentified: There are, huh?
Marshall: Yeah.
Robert Kennedy: [to the people in the room] General Walker’s been
out downtown getting people stirred up.39
[on the phone] Can we get it arranged to get him arrested?
own protection. When she criticized the decision, she was expelled from the university, a rul-
ing upheld by a federal judge.
37. The Mississippi National Guard stationed at the Lyceum had run out of tear gas and were
waiting for a new supply. It wouldn’t reach them until much later.
38. At this point Katzenbach tells the Attorney General that he doesn’t need any troops.
39. Major General Edwin A. Walker, retired. For additional information on Walker, see
“Conversation with Archibald Cox,” 1 October 1962, note 5.
Meeting on Civil Rights 271
O’Brien: They haven’t [unclear] some of the gas in those gas masks
so they all be [sound of sniffling].
Unidentified: And the next group. [Laughter.]
Unidentified: Well do you have . . .
President Kennedy: General Walker. Imagine that son of a bitch hav-
ing been commander of a division up till last year. And the Army pro-
moting him.
Unidentified: You’re right.
Unidentified: Yes.
Sorensen: Have you read Seven Days in May? 42
President Kennedy: Yeah.
Unidentified: Damned good book.
President Kennedy: I thought that . . .
Sorensen: It’s pretty interesting.
Unidentified: Yeah.
Sorensen: I read it straight through. It’s interesting.
Unidentified: I didn’t really like it.
O’Brien: Unrealistic? [Laughter.]
Sorensen: And you thought it was too far-fetched, then?
President Kennedy: No, I thought this [had a] sort of awful amateur’s
dialogue.
Unidentified: Yeah, it was a [unclear].
Unidentified: No, it’s not great writing, but I mean—
President Kennedy: It’s not even good. . . . The only character that
came out at all was the general. The president was awfully vague. But I
thought the general was a pretty good character. [Extended pause.]
Robert Kennedy: . . . well, then General Walker starts bringing those
fellows, you know . . .
President Kennedy: What?
Robert Kennedy: If General Walker starts bringing in fellows from
[unclear] and that—
Marshall: There are rumors all over the place.
President Kennedy: He’s bringing in what?
Robert Kennedy: He’s getting them all stirred up. If he has them
march down there with guns, we could have a hell of a battle.
Unidentified: Thugs.
Sorensen: Did the FBI say Walker’s there [unclear]?
42. Popular novel of 1962, written by Fletcher Knebel, about a military plot to overthrow the
U.S. government.
Meeting on Civil Rights 273
43. Probably John Doar, on the staff of the Civil Rights Division, Department of Justice.
44. The car bringing tear gas from the airport got lost on its way from the airport.
45. Meredith was in a dorm room in Baxter Hall. Evidently the President was unfamiliar with
the geography of the campus or the plan to protect Meredith.
274 S U N DAY, S E P T E M B E R 30– M O N DAY, OCTOBER 1, 1962
47. This is apparently a reference to a local unit of the federalized Mississippi National Guard.
48. This advance contingent was still three hours away from Oxford.
276 S U N DAY, S E P T E M B E R 30– M O N DAY, OCTOBER 1, 1962
49. Robert Kennedy seems to be supporting his team’s view that once the tear gas arrives, the
marshals under Katzenbach’s command can stabilize the situation.
50. At 11:44 P.M. this news was reported to Ramsey Clark, assistant attorney general, Lands
Division, who was overseeing the war room at the Justice Department during this crisis.
51. William Geoghegan, assistant deputy attorney general, legislative program, Department of
Justice. He was manning the command center at the Justice Department with Ramsey Clark.
Meeting on Civil Rights 277
Marshall: Yeah. Well, just hang on; I’ve got to go to another phone
for a minute.
Unidentified: I’ll hold this one.
Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] All right, can we get the answer to
that?
Unidentified: Which?
Marshall: [Unclear.]
Unidentified: Or I can . . .
Evelyn Lincoln: [Unclear.]
President Kennedy: Do you have a switchboard? How do you handle
that?
Robert Kennedy: Yeah. I’m going to get direct lines in . . .
President Kennedy: From that building?
Robert Kennedy: Well, not this. We just kept an open line. But our
various installations around there, we have direct line that we put in last
week.52
[on the phone] Hello. Is Nick there? Let me speak to him, please.
[on the phone with Katzenbach] Yeah. Oh, you’re all set? Do you? I
think we should move that army up anyway, don’t you?53 Well, yeah. Up
to you? Yeah. I don’t want to make it appear that we didn’t do enough.
Let me ask Ed what he thinks, being there and talking. All right.
[to the people in the room] But he doesn’t think but, of course, the
problem is that they can’t . . . If we can get that Walker.
Marshall: That state trooper was seriously hurt.
Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] The kid’s arm?
President Kennedy: That’s too bad. What happened? Did one of
those pellets hit him?
Marshall: Yeah. But we’re flying him to Memphis to the hospital.
President Kennedy: Did he break his back? Did it break his back?
Marshall: I don’t know. But they’re putting him on a border patrol
plane and flying him up to the hospital in Memphis.
Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] Ed, did the coach come?54
[to the people in the room] Well, he said, this is completely under control.
52. This is presumably the direct line between Louis Oberdorfer at the Justice command cen-
ter in the Oxford Post Office and Ramsey Clark at the Justice Department.
53. Robert Kennedy, who has accepted the President’s suggestion, may still be operating
under the assumption that the advance contingent from Memphis had already reached the
armory in Oxford, a short distance from the campus. In fact, this group was still in Tennessee.
54. Apparently Guthman spoke to John Vaught, the Ole Miss coach, who assured him that
there was only a small group of troublemakers.
278 S U N DAY, S E P T E M B E R 30– M O N DAY, OCTOBER 1, 1962
President Kennedy: What does he say about the students, what they
want?
Robert Kennedy: Ed just said that, they say that because it’s a rela-
tively—compared to what a big campus it is, and there are so many stu-
dents—it’s a relatively . . .
President Kennedy: Small group?
Robert Kennedy: . . . small number. Because, you know . . .
President Kennedy: Too bad that fellow getting hurt.
Unidentified: [Unclear] pitchfork.
Unidentified: Just . . .
Unidentified: [Unclear.]
President Kennedy: Mrs. Lincoln?
Lincoln: Yes.
President Kennedy: Do you want us to put on the TV? Listen
[unclear]. Ask him to send it over some [unclear].
Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] Oh, yeah.
Unidentified: [Unclear.]
Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] Well, do you think that they’re going
to move in there with some guns, though, from out of town?
Unidentified: [Unclear.]
Unidentified: Uh-huh.
Unidentified: Now here’s how you get errors [unclear].
Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] How do the marshals feel? Is that
where the . . . OK? Did they do anything about that?
Unidentified: It’s still [unclear].
Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] So that’s all right?
Unidentified: [Unclear] soldiers.
Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] I mean if anything . . . Is there any-
thing you can do to send, you can’t send anybody in and arrest that
Walker, can we?55
Sorensen: She started a [unclear].
Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] Suicide.
Sorensen: I wouldn’t hesitate to [unclear].
Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] Are these kids breaking up at all?
Sorensen: [Unclear] haven’t used the [unclear] since I was a kid.
Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] Can’t arrest any of them? Well, I
don’t know whether it would break it up or what.
55. About a half hour earlier (11:32 P.M.), Clark at Justice had instructed the FBI to arrest
General Walker, if possible.
Meeting on Civil Rights 279
59. Only Robert Kennedy’s aide at Justice, Ramsey Clark, is able to communicate with the U.S.
Army or the National Guard. Katzenbach or Oberdorfer can only reach them through
Washington.
60. Referring to General Billingslea.
61. Clark was overseeing the war room at the Justice Department during this crisis.
Meeting on Civil Rights 281
Robert Kennedy: Yeah. And then, Jim McShane’s head of the mar-
shals. And, Joe Dolan . . .62
President Kennedy: What’s Joe doing there?
Marshall: He’s sort of . . .
Robert Kennedy: Lou Oberdorfer.63
Unidentified: [Unclear.]
President Kennedy: McShane enjoy this?
Robert Kennedy: No, but I think they all like him.
President Kennedy: He’s pretty tough.
Robert Kennedy: He knows what he’s doing. I don’t think anybody’s
going to push him around much. Let’s see, we’ve got some other good
ones that they have. And then we’ve got three . . . We’ve got also about
150—
Marshall: Bob, are you sure Nick’s in touch with the guard? He just
told Ramsey that he wasn’t and that he’d like to know when they’re on
their way.64
Robert Kennedy: Yeah, well, that’s what I gave . . . He said the only
way through is through the office. Of course, Cy keeps saying that
they’re talking to one another. Let’s get Cy. You want to get Cy Vance
for me?
Marshall: [in the background, on the phone] Hello, Ramsey? [Unclear.]
You’re not in touch with . . .
Unidentified: Sure is a great day.
President Kennedy: What?
Unidentified: It’s been a great day.
O’Brien: Well, in substance, they’re defending this administration build-
ing and keeping students out of that one building where these students—
Robert Kennedy: Yeah; then they have a student that’s—
O’Brien: Yeah.
Robert Kennedy: —named Meredith in another building.
O’Brien: Yeah. They don’t know where [unclear], do they?
Robert Kennedy: Yeah, I suppose they do. I don’t know if they know.
Marshall: Right.
Robert Kennedy: And they’ve got 35, 40 marshals there. Actually,
62. Joseph P. Dolan was assistant deputy attorney general in the Justice Department.
63. Louis F. Oberdorfer was assistant attorney general in the Tax Division of the Justice
Department. He is running the command center in the Oxford Post Office.
64. Nick Katzenbach told Ramsey Clark at 12:05 A.M. (10:05 P.M. Mississippi time) that the sit-
uation had reached a point where he needed reinforcements. He wondered when the local
National Guard unit would arrive.
282 S U N DAY, S E P T E M B E R 30– M O N DAY, OCTOBER 1, 1962
out of the 500 that we have, about 330 or so are border patrolmen—the
Immigration and Naturalization Service and about 150 marshals.
O’Brien: They’re a little tougher, aren’t they?
Robert Kennedy: Yeah. The border patrol . . . But they haven’t been
through this, when we sent our marshals through a long special train-
ing. They haven’t been through that, but they’re very well disciplined.
They were the best [unclear].
Unidentified: Were they?
Marshall: That’s an impossible situation. No one’s in touch with the
guard unit, as far as I can see.
President Kennedy: Is it from Cy?
Lincoln: Secretary Vance.
President Kennedy: Yeah. [Pause.]
O’Brien: Maybe it’s by design. The guard unit is in touch with no one.
O’Donnell: [Unclear] to call the Attorney General’s office to call
them back to Memphis.
Marshall: Well, they have to call the Attorney General’s office to get
the Attorney General’s office to call the Secretary of the Army. The
Secretary of the Army to call to Memphis, and then back to the
Secretary of the Army to . . .
O’Donnell: They’re not really in Memphis but they’re supposedly
there on the road now. Aren’t they?
Marshall: They’re forming at the armory.
O’Donnell: They formed this afternoon. I saw them form on televi-
sion.65
Marshall: But they’re forming . . .
Sorensen: Again.
Marshall: —again at the armory in Oxford. You see, it’s a local unit.
O’Brien: Well, where were they forming when you saw them?
Sorensen: That’s what I’m talking about, that’s . . .
Marshall: But that’s that company.66
Sorensen: That’s just the Oxford units, you mean?
Marshall: Yeah.
Unidentified: Well, who are the [unclear]?
65. There is confusion in the room between Task Force Alpha and the local Mississippi
National Guard’s units shown getting prepared on television that afternoon.
66. Again, as stated in note 65, there appears to be some confusion among the men as to
whether they are discussing the movements of Task Force Alpha from Memphis or another
local Mississippi National Guard unit in the Oxford area.
Meeting on Civil Rights 283
67. Evidently, because of the delay in getting Task Force Alpha down, the Secretary of the
Army has located some National Guard reinforcements closer to the campus.
Meeting on Civil Rights 285
68. General Lyman Lemnitzer was Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
286 S U N DAY, S E P T E M B E R 30– M O N DAY, OCTOBER 1, 1962
69. Marshal Graham E. Same of Indianapolis was shot in the neck and in critical condition.
“How a Secret Deal Prevented a Massacre at Ole Miss,” Look, 31 December 1962.
70. William Crider of the Associated Press.
Meeting on Civil Rights 287
71. Fortunately, this was only a false rumor. Throughout the riot the lightly guarded Baxter
Hall escaped any serious harassment. There were only 24 marshals guarding Meredith in his
dormitory.
72. Task Force Alpha. It is still in Memphis.
288 S U N DAY, S E P T E M B E R 30– M O N DAY, OCTOBER 1, 1962
O’Donnell: [on the phone] Were they after him, or what? Are they
after him now? [Pause.] Yeah. OK. [Replaces the receiver.]
[to Robert Kennedy] Bobby, it was the [unclear] that [unclear] firing.
Sounds of people coming into the room. An indistinct conversation is
overheard where someone says “side arms.”
Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] Hello? Hello? Well, I think they have
to protect Meredith now. Well, that’s what I mean. They better fire, I
suppose. They got to protect Meredith. What? [Pause.] [Unclear] can’t
do anything. Is Meredith all right?
Unidentified: Well, I don’t know. If they can.
Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] They better protect Meredith now.
Well, can you make sure that he’s protected, Dean? [Pause.]
12:14 A.M.
73. Dictabelts 4E and 4F, Cassette A, John F. Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files,
Presidential Recordings Collection.
Conversation with Ross Bar nett 289
battle with . . . Up in the air? Except then it might really start them. . . .
Once you start firing, they can forget this . . . Will that help? OK. OK.
[Puts down the receiver.]
President Kennedy: [on the phone] Will you hold?
[to the people in the room] Do you think they can hold for an hour?
Robert Kennedy: If they have gas.
President Kennedy: And do they?74
Robert Kennedy: I think it really depends on how much firing.
[Phone rings in the background.]
Unidentified: Pardon.
Lincoln: [answering phone] Hello? Hello?
Unidentified: How much firing?
Robert Kennedy: The guards have arrived since you . . .
Lincoln: [on the phone] This is Evelyn Lincoln. [calls out] Cy—
Robert Kennedy: Cy Vance. . . . The President can take it.
O’Brien: [on the phone] Hello. [Long pause.] Hello.
[to the people in the room] Pretty damn hard once firing takes place, to
shut it off.
Unidentified: Yeah, I know.
Operator: Hello?
O’Brien: [on the phone] Hello.
Operator: Yes, do you want a line?
O’Brien: [on the phone] Just leave it open. Hello. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah.
Well, we’ll leave this line open. All right. Right. [Puts the receiver down.]
[to the people in the room] Well, they can’t even get the injured guy to
the college dispensary. They’re trying to get a wedge to get him through.
O’Donnell: Trying to get him through the crowd? [Long pause.]
Sounds of a door opening and closing can be heard as Robert Kennedy
returns to the room, probably after a conversation with Cyrus Vance, the
secretary of the Army.
Robert Kennedy: Damn Army! They can’t even tell if [unclear] the
MPs have left [yet].75
The Attorney General now realizes that he hasn’t any federal reinforce-
ments in town. And Vance at the Pentagon cannot even tell him when
the advance contingent of Task Force Alpha will arrive at the Oxford
armory.
74. No. The embattled federal forces at the Lyceum are still without tear gas.
75. It is about 12:17 A.M., over ninety minutes since the Attorney General ordered the move-
ment of the troops from Memphis.
294 S U N DAY, S E P T E M B E R 30– M O N DAY, OCTOBER 1, 1962
seriously hurt; the others, some others got buckshot. Well, this must have
been done under the premise that something’s going to happen [unclear].
[on the phone] Hello?
Pause. An indistinct conversation can be heard in the background.
O’Brien: [puts down the receiver] If necessary, is there any way that
we could get an ambulance?
Sorensen: The police ought to be able to get an ambulance to the
[unclear].
Unidentified: The Governor said, “Make sure and take that boy out
of there, and everything will be all right.”
O’Brien: That’s the main thing.
Unidentified: I’d take him out. By tomorrow, with those 5,000 bayo-
nets.
Unidentified: Certain that there be no repercussions whether you
choose to bring troops in or not.
Unidentified: No. No. I agree.
Unidentified: [Unclear.]
O’Brien: . . . write this thing off now. Obviously, the townies [unclear].
Robert Kennedy: They had in mind. [Doors open.]
Sorensen: One that was hit by the gas?
Unidentified: Yeah. [Unclear.] [Unclear exchange.]
Robert Kennedy: Well, we can’t last that long. [Doors close.]
O’Brien: [talking on the phone] Hello. Yeah. Hmm. Don’t worry. Oh
yeah.
Robert Kennedy: The son of a bitch. He knows [unclear]. [Door opens
and closes.]
President Kennedy: What? Yeah.
Robert Kennedy: [Unclear.] It’s not about the policemen. It’s about
other people being shot. If you get Barnett to get Meredith off the
campus . . .
President Kennedy: What?
Robert Kennedy: Just to get Meredith off the campus. That’s what he
wants.
Unidentified: Well he can [unclear]. [Sound of water being poured.]
Robert Kennedy: That’s what he said.
President Kennedy: Well, he wants to be able to say that he asked me
to get him off. And that I refused.
Robert Kennedy: Now, he’s too . . .
President Kennedy: You’ve got to get law and order and then you
can discuss what to do about Meredith. But he can’t do anything. He
doesn’t even get ahold of the head of the state police.
296 S U N DAY, S E P T E M B E R 30– M O N DAY, OCTOBER 1, 1962
81. Originally Katzenbach posted 6 men to guard Meredith; as the situation deteriorated on
campus, 18 additional men were dispatched from the Lyceum front to reinforce Baxter Hall.
298 S U N DAY, S E P T E M B E R 30– M O N DAY, OCTOBER 1, 1962
The Attorney General steps out to call secretary of the Army Cyrus
Vance to inquire about the status of the long anticipated Task Force
Alpha. Hoping to reduce any further delays, the Attorney General
wants to know whether the advance contingent can be flown directly to
the campus. Robert Kennedy used his brother’s telephone and the call
was taped.
82. At approximately 12:30 A.M., Jack Rosenthal of the Justice Department called the White
House to report that a reporter for the London Daily Sketch, Paul Guihard, had been killed in
the riot. His body was found next to a women’s dormitory on campus. See Dictabelt 4F2,
Cassette A, John F. Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, Presidential Recordings
Collection.
Meeting on Civil Rights , Continued 299
83. Dictabelt 4F3, Cassette A, John F. Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, Presidential
Recordings Collection.
300 S U N DAY, S E P T E M B E R 30– M O N DAY, OCTOBER 1, 1962
Unidentified: Right.
Unidentified: It’s going to be a big story over in Europe, don’t you
think?
Unidentified: Yeah.
O’Donnell: I have a hunch that Khrushchev would get those troops
in faster. That’s what worries me about this whole thing.
Unidentified: Why?
O’Donnell: I think that . . .
O’Brien: You know, but most of them [unclear] you get them there
first [unclear].
O’Donnell: [Unclear.]
O’Brien: [Unclear.]
O’Donnell: I just don’t quite understand it. I mean, why would
[unclear].
O’Brien: [on the phone] Hello? Anything doing?
Marshall: Larry, is there any sign of the Guard?
O’Brien: [on the phone] Find any Guard there at all? Any arrivals?
Any word?
Unidentified: I wish those marshals would arrive. No state police
guarding them [unclear] troops [unclear]. The state police they can’t
find [unclear].
Marshall: That’s what the Governor said. We didn’t find the state police.
Unidentified: [Unclear.]
O’Brien: [on the phone] Yeah, I know. National Guard.
O’Donnell: The MPs are airborne? At least?
Marshall: What?
O’Donnell: Are they airborne?
Marshall: Yeah. They’re airborne. No, they are. They are in fact air-
borne.
Unidentified: Yeah.
Marshall: I mean, unless they’re lying to us.
Sorensen: Well, they were not exactly accurate when they told us
that they were.
Marshall: They were two hours off to begin with.
O’Brien: [on the phone] Not at the airport?
Marshall: [Unclear] off something like that.
Sorensen: It wasn’t two hours? [Unclear] regular Army?
Marshall: Yeah.
O’Brien: [on the phone] Yeah.
Marshall: Or at least one of them.
O’Brien: [on the phone] Yeah. Fine. Right.
Meeting on Civil Rights , Continued 301
[talking to people in the room] The current problem is how to get the
trucks off the campus back to the airport to bring the troops in.
Marshall: Are the troops . . .
O’Brien: The MPs.
Marshall: They’re going to land on the campus.
O’Brien: Well, he said that there’s a question whether they can or not.
Marshall: Why?
O’Brien: Well, I don’t know. Lights or what have you.
O’Donnell: They have a helicopter?
Marshall: Yeah.
O’Brien: So that’s what they’re checking out now. They were going to
have them land in the airport and bring them in by truck, but now . . . ?
Marshall: They can’t get the trucks off the campus?
O’Brien: Yeah.
Door opens. The President and the Attorney General enter.
Sorensen: A few hundred students and rednecks have really got the
entire U.S. Army [unclear].
Unclear chatter; someone jokes, “Take a cab from the airport.”
Unidentified: Think some of the townspeople would drive them in?
Marshall: [Unclear.]
President Kennedy: What about a baseball field with night lights or
anything like that?
O’Brien: [talking on the phone] Hello?
Robert Kennedy: Burke, should we [unclear] them?
Marshall: We cannot [unclear].
Robert Kennedy: Yeah.
O’Brien: [talking on the phone] Well, they won’t be able to land.
Unidentified: Unless they can open it. [Unclear] can get it open.
O’Brien: Yeah.
Robert Kennedy: But can Ramsey look at the map and see whether,
where else there is?84
Marshall: Well, there is a practice field right next to the large [unclear].
Robert Kennedy: Well, why don’t they [unclear].
Marshall: That’s where they [unclear].
Robert Kennedy: Well, I don’t know whether they can find it,
though. [Unclear.]
Marshall: If there’s no lighting. That’s a problem.
84. Ramsey Clark was assistant attorney general in the Lands Division of the Department of
Justice.
302 S U N DAY, S E P T E M B E R 30– M O N DAY, OCTOBER 1, 1962
85. The first confirmation for the White House that some National Guard reinforcements, a con-
tingent of some 55, had reached the campus. Ramsey Clark at Justice learned this at 12:48 A.M.
86. Captain Murry Falkner, cousin of William Faulkner.
87. William Faulkner, author.
Meeting on Civil Rights , Continued 303
we didn’t handle the situation better. Yeah, yeah. [Pause.] OK. Well, I
think we are going to have to figure out what we are going to say.
[Pause.] Do you want to? Oh yeah, well you did terrific. I think it’s just
a question of the fact that I made the decision to send [pause]. OK. You
want to hold on?
Marshall: [on the phone] Hello? This is Burke. Yeah. Yeah.
Lincoln: Bill Geoghegan calling you. 90 Want to take it?
Marshall: [on the phone] Yeah. Oh, Mrs. Lincoln? Oh, Ed? Listen, can
you hold on just a minute while I take a call from Bill? Hello? Just hold on.
Phone rings. Then there are sounds of a door opening and closing.
Operator: What number?
Lincoln: One line. [Door opens and closes.]
Marshall: [on the phone] Ed? They can’t get the trucks out to them.
We’re going to try to land some on the campus. [Pause.] We’re not.
[Pause.] Yeah, we ought to do that. It’s really a [pause]. Yeah. Let him
know if they’ve gone. . . . Oh, he was there, all right. What he was doing
I don’t know. I don’t know, Ed.
Robert Kennedy: [Unclear.]
Marshall: [on the phone] Yeah. Yeah, they did . . . Yeah. OK. They’ve all
been evacuated, I underst—[pause]. Yeah. Real war. No. God, that’s dumb.
That’s uh, that Army, you know, they’re just late. Well, they’re in the air.91
Yeah. I don’t think they do. They’ve got pistols. Well, they’re . . . Yes, they
do. I mean, they’ll all be there by the morning, Ed. Yeah, I know. Yeah.
Robert Kennedy: Is Ed there?
Marshall: What?
Robert Kennedy: Ed?
Marshall: He just said, “Hold on,” and . . .
Robert Kennedy: I’d like to speak to him, then.
Marshall: Fine. [on the phone] Hello? Who’s this? Oh Dean? Is Ed
around? Could—well, when he comes back, Bob wanted to talk to him.
[Pause.]
[to people in the room] Do they know what they’re going to do with
the MPs?
Unidentified: Not exactly.
Robert Kennedy: Well, I think they [unclear] and maintain law and
order, and then they can figure it out.
90. William A. Geoghegan was assistant deputy attorney general in the Department of
Justice. He was the number two at the crisis center in the Justice Department.
91. It was about 12:55 A.M. and the helicopters are about to take off.
Meeting on Civil Rights , Continued 305
92. The advance contingent of Task Force Alpha landed at 1:50 A.M. Not only were they about
45 minutes later than the Attorney General had assumed, but these troops had to land at
Oxford airport due to the cloud of tear gas that obscured any possible landing areas in or near
the campus. The situation on the campus was still far from being under control.
93. Tom Watkins, Governor Barnett’s intermediary.
306 S U N DAY, S E P T E M B E R 30– M O N DAY, OCTOBER 1, 1962
Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] I think the fact, then, they promised
the state police would stay and then the state police left. And he took
responsibility . . .
President Kennedy: [on the phone] All right.
Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] . . . under this arrangement for main-
tenance of law and order.
President Kennedy: [on another phone] Yeah.
Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] I’ll do that, but I just thought you’d
cover the points, and OK . . .
President Kennedy: [on another phone] All right. Just call me now
that it’s going to be important [unclear].
Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] Yeah, but I mean, just so you know
the facts and so that that we can . . . Yeah. OK.
Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] Now, how is it down there now?
Marshall: OK. I’ll call you [unclear].
Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] OK.
Unidentified: Yeah.
Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] OK. Would you hold?
Marshall: Well, we ought to get . . . Oh, have we called up other
Guard units?
Robert Kennedy: Well, they were sending them all, I guess.
Marshall: They are?
Robert Kennedy: Well, I’m not sure. [Unclear.]
Doors close and the machine is left running. It is about 1:00 A.M. and
the Cabinet Room is empty. Someone enters the room again and turns
the machine off.
1:45 A.M.
94. Dictabelt 4F4, Cassette A, John F. Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, Presidential
Recordings Collection.
Conversation with Ross Bar nett 307
Miss since the unfortunate decision to remove the state troopers over
four hours earlier. The President does not know that Governor Ross
Barnett is indeed preparing to speak to the people of Mississippi about
the crisis in Oxford. All that is known in Washington is that the FBI in
Oxford has just detected a group of 150 state troopers sitting in their
cars doing nothing but watching the unfolding tragedy.
you’ve given up.” I said, I had to say, “No, I’m not giving up, not giving
up any fight.”95
President Kennedy: Yeah, but we don’t want to . . .
Barnett: “I never give up. I, I have courage and faith, and, we’ll win
this fight.” You understand. That’s just to Mississippi people.
President Kennedy: I understand. But I don’t think anybody, either
in Mississippi or anyplace else, wants a lot of people killed.
Barnett: Oh, no. No. I . . .
President Kennedy: And that’s what, Governor, that’s the most
important thing. We want . . .
Barnett: . . . I’ll issue any statement, any time about peace and vio-
lence.
President Kennedy: Well, now here’s what we could do. Let’s get the
maximum number of your state police to get that situation so we don’t
have sporadic firing. I will then be in touch with my people and then you
and I’ll be talking again in a few minutes; see what we got there then.
Barnett: All right.
President Kennedy: Thank you, Governor.
Barnett: All right now.
President Kennedy: I’ll be back.
President Kennedy hangs up.
1:50 A.M.
95. Throughout the evening, the Governor was deluged with calls and telegrams urging him
not to “sell out” to the Kennedys. In response to such talk, Barnett went on the air shortly
before midnight (local time), and declared, “I call on Mississippians to keep the faith and
courage. We will never surrender.”
96. Dictabelt 4F5, Cassette A, John F. Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, Presidential
Recordings Collection.
Continuation of Conversation with Ross Bar nett 309
2:00 A.M.
99. Dictabelts 4F7 and 4G1, Cassettes A and B, John F. Kennedy Library, President’s Office
Files, Presidential Recordings Collection.
100. Geoghegan and Ramsey Clark at the Justice Department War Room have maintained the
only continuous contact to the U.S. Army during this crisis. The U.S. Army evidently relies on
the Justice Department War Room for information about the battle conditions in Oxford.
After this crisis, the Army would be criticized for not having done any preliminary reconnais-
sance in Oxford.
Conversation between Robert Kennedy and Creighton Abrams 311
4:20 A.M.
102. Dictabelt 4G2, Cassette B, John F. Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, Presidential
Recordings Collection.
103. Location of Memphis Naval Air Station.
Conversation with Creighton Abrams 313
The President managed to get about three hours’ sleep after the previ-
ous night’s vigil. Still in the family quarters, he called Governor Ross
Barnett to press for some local assistance in keeping order. Concerned
that a large number of outsiders would be in the area, the President
believed that local officials would be especially useful in helping to keep
the peace.
8:46 A.M.
And I think that doesn’t change your position on the issue, but
at least it helps maintain order, which is what we’ve got to do
today.
1. Dictabelt 4G3, Cassette B, John F. Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, Presidential
Recordings Collection.
2. The text of Kennedy’s 30 September 1962 radio and television speech on the situation at
the University of Mississippi can be found in the Public Papers of the Presidents: John F. Kennedy,
1962 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1963), pp. 726–28.
Conversation with Ross Bar nett 315
President Kennedy: Well, now, the thing is, Governor, I want your
help in getting these state police to continue to help during the day
because they’re their own people. And we are going to have a lot of
strange troops in there, and we are going to have paratroopers in and all
the rest. And I think the state police should be the key, and that depends
on you.
Barnett: Oh, I . . . You’ll have, you’ll have the whole force that we
have.
President Kennedy: Well, now, you tell them . . .
Barnett: The [unclear] men are not equipped like yours.
President Kennedy: I understand that. But during the daytime they
can help keep order on these roads and keep a lot of people from coming
in. And I think that doesn’t change your position on the issue, but at
least it helps maintain order, which is what we’ve got to do today.
Barnett: All right, Mr. President.
President Kennedy: Thank you, Governor.
Barnett: I’ll stay here now.
President Kennedy: Thank you very much.
Barnett: Thank you so much.
President Kennedy: And keep after your state police now.
Barnett: I will.
President Kennedy: Thanks.
Barnett: I’ll call him as soon as we hang up . . .
President Kennedy: Thanks.
Barnett: . . . n’ tell him to do all he can to keep peace.
President Kennedy: OK, thanks, Governor.
Barnett: And when’ll I hear from you again?
President Kennedy: I’ll be talking to you about noon, my time.
Barnett: OK. Thank you so much. Good-bye.
President Kennedy: OK, Governor.
President Kennedy hangs up.
Still upstairs at the White House, the President called the solicitor gen-
eral, Archibald Cox, to discuss some legal issues raised by the Oxford
riot. In particular, the President was considering seeking the arrest of
Governor Barnett and Major General Edwin Walker. The President was
due to see Cox at the Supreme Court in less than a half hour at the
swearing in of Arthur Goldberg as associate justice. He was giving the
Solicitor General some warning as to what was on his mind.
316 M O N DAY, O C T O B E R 1, 1962
9:31 A.M.
3. Dictabelt 4G4, Cassette B, John F. Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, Presidential
Recordings Collection.
4. The President was on his way to the Supreme Court to attend the swearing in of Arthur J.
Goldberg as associate justice.
5. Major General Edwin A. Walker, U.S. Army, retired, was on the scene in Oxford and was
present in the crowd on the night of the riot. On 1 October, he was arrested on four charges,
including insurrection, and was held in lieu of $100,000 bail. After his arrest, Walker asserted,
“They don’t have a thing on me.” He also issued a statement to Governor Ross Barnett, claim-
ing his (Walker’s) efforts had been undertaken on behalf of the “stand for freedom everywhere.”
While Walker apparently played more of an observer’s role in the melee, prior to the riot, he
had issued a call from his home in Dallas, urging “patriotic” Americans to join him in
Mississippi to oppose the federal government and the integration of the campus. Worth noting
is that in 1957, Walker had commanded federal troops in Little Rock, Arkansas, in a celebrated
event in the history of the civil rights movement; in 1962, he observed, he would be on the
right side. After resigning from the Army in 1961, Walker had devoted himself to public affairs;
his activities often centered on the claim that Communists had infiltrated the U.S. Government
and the country generally. On 6 October, Walker was released on $50,000 bail, and returned to
Texas the next day, where he was greeted by some 200 supporters. He was never tried.
Conversation with Cyrus Vance and Robert McNamara 317
President Kennedy: Yeah, well then I wonder if we can get more pre-
cise information on where we are legally on arresting people, including
the governor if necessary and others?6
Cox: Right.
President Kennedy: And what the penalties are because we might
want to announce that on the radio and television that anyone involved
in any demonstration or anything would be subject to this penalty, and
maybe the General could announce it.7
Cox: Right. Good-bye.
President Kennedy: All right. OK. Thank you.
Cox: Thank you.
After returning from the Supreme Court, the President met with David
Bell and Elmer Staats on the federal budget. At 11:30 A.M., the President
would be presenting the Distinguished Service Medal to General Lyman
Lemnitzer, the outgoing Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Cyrus
Vance, the secretary of the Army, was expected to be in attendance.
Before Vance came to the White House, Kennedy wanted to be sure that
the U.S. Army contingent in Mississippi was going to be large enough
for any contingency.
11:12 A.M.
6. Barnett was never arrested because the Kennedy administration believed the potential costs
outweighed any possible gains that might accrue from his arrest and prosecution. According
to a January 1963 White House memorandum [see Victor S. Navasky, Kennedy Justice (pbk.
ed.; New York: Atheneum, 1977, pp. 237–38], there was little point in arresting and trying
the governor, which would have made him a “hero.”
7. Attorney General Robert Kennedy.
8. Dictabelt H, Cassette B, John F. Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, Presidential
Recordings Collection.
318 M O N DAY, O C T O B E R 1, 1962
ing downtown, and so on, and throwing rocks, and so on, at the troops.
Now how are we doing on our schedule?
Vance: Our schedule is still proceeding as I gave it to you [seems to be
sound of hanging up a telephone], sir.
President Kennedy: Yeah, well, you don’t know . . . Has anybody
arrived this morning?
Vance: [speaking off the telephone to someone in the room] Has anybody
arrived this morning from those 1,700?
[speaking to President Kennedy] Not yet, due in earliest at, what [speak-
ing off the phone to someone in the room], ten o’clock their time is it? Let’s
see, what’s their time?
President Kennedy: Midnight. That’d be midday.
Vance: 11:20.
President Kennedy: 11:20 their time?
Vance: Yep.
President Kennedy: That’s 1:20 our time, isn’t it?
Vance: Yes.
President Kennedy: Now that is what, 1,700 more?
Vance: Yeah. That’s, let’s see, that first increment is 900. Yeah.
President Kennedy: And they’re due in at 1:20? What group is that?
Vance: 1:20. Yeah, 1:20 our time.
President Kennedy: What group is . . . ?
Vance: That is the 82nd Airborne.
President Kennedy: Right. I see. OK. Fine. All right. Are you going
to come over to this ceremony . . . ?9
Vance: No, I thought I’d better stay here, sir.
President Kennedy: I see. Well, now I talked to Secretary McNamara;
he said something about you might be able to have 20,000 troops by mid-
night. Is . . . ?
Vance: That’s right. We are taking steps to get them in. The orders
have been given. The only limiting factor may be the weather, which is
closing in. But we’re developing alternates so that we can get them in
some way or other.
President Kennedy: I see. You mean you might send them to Memphis
and then what?
Vance: If we can’t get into Memphis, we’ll try Columbus. Now this
may add a little bit of time in getting them back, so we may not be able
9. The Distinguished Service Medal was presented to General Lyman Lemnitzer in the White
House Rose Garden on 1 October 1962.
T U E S DAY, O C T O B E R 2, 1962 319
By late in the day, a force of nearly 5,000 National Guardsmen and sol-
diers were in Oxford, Mississippi. As of the next morning, 8,735 troops
would have reached the town.
After the ceremony for General Lemnitzer, the same group wit-
nessed the swearing in of Maxwell Taylor as Lemnitzer’s replacement.
The President then went for a swim and his lunch. In the afternoon, he
had an unrecorded conversation with George Ball, Ralph Dungan, and
Carl Kaysen. This brought the President’s official day to an end.
10. The acronym MATS stands for Military Air Transport Service.
320 T U E S DAY, O C T O B E R 2, 1962
once called the “Won’t Do” Congress had been somewhat transformed.
On Monday the Senate had passed a version of the Foreign Aid Bill that
restored 70 percent of the cuts made by the House. And this morning
the President was able to sign one more bill that had seemed in trouble
earlier in the summer. At a 9:30 A.M. ceremony he signed the U.N. Bond
Act, which authorized a substantial U.S. loan to the international organi-
zation. This was encouraging too, in light of Kennedy’s concerns in late
August that events in the Congo would derail its passage.
Kennedy was taping very little at this point. Following a meeting with
former U.S. ambassador to France James Gavin, the President received a
confidential briefing from military aide Major General Chester V. Clifton.
It is possible the President received the results of the September 29 in-
and-out U-2 flight over Guantánamo and the western tip of Cuba. This
mission brought evidence of new SAM sites but no surface-to-surface mis-
sile installations. Cuba was certainly the subject of a meeting at 11:12 A.M.
with George Ball and Carl Kaysen. Ball presented the President with a
series of alternatives for dealing with non–Soviet bloc ships trading with
Cuba. As a result of this meeting, the President chose “to close all United
States ports to any ship that on the same continuous voyage was used or is
being used in Bloc-Cuba trade.”1
Cuba was also the focus of a luncheon given by Kennedy for the for-
eign ministers of 19 Latin American countries. There he pressed for a
joint hemispheric approach to the increasing Soviet presence in Cuba.
The one meeting Kennedy taped was a discussion of the 1963 budget
in light of its implications for future tax policy. Current budget estimates
exceeded the political threshold of $100 billion, a first for the federal
budget, with a $6 billion deficit. Would a budget that size kill any possi-
bility of tax cuts in 1963? Already Kennedy had to consider the possible
political consequences in 1964 of this level of deficit spending.
1. Memorandum from Acting Secretary of State Ball to President Kennedy, 2 October 1962,
FRUS, 11: 3–4. Carl Kaysen noted the President’s reaction to this memorandum in National
Security Action Memorandum No. 194, 2 October 1962, ibid., pp. 4–5.
Meeting on the Budg et and Tax Cut Proposal 321
2. Including President Kennedy, Gardner Ackley, David E. Bell, C. Douglas Dillon, Walter
Heller, Charles Schultze, Theodore Sorensen, and Elmer B. Staats. Tape 27.1, John F. Kennedy
Library, President’s Office Files, Presidential Recordings Collection.
3. When Ted Sorensen wondered aloud why raising the employment “score” from 93 to 96 per-
cent, from A-minus to A, deserved such high political priority, Kennedy’s Council of Economic
Advisers (and staff economist Arthur Okun in particular) undertook to outline and document
the changes in general economic conditions that resulted from small changes in unemployment
rates. What came to be called Okun’s law suggested that 3 extra percentage points in unemploy-
ment implied a 10 percent gap between actual and potential GNP. This gap was estimated to be
approximately $51 billion at the time of Kennedy’s inauguration and had closed to approxi-
mately $30 billion at the beginning of 1962.
4. Indeed, when Lyndon Johnson finally convinced Byrd to pass the 1964 Tax Cut bill out of the
Senate Finance Committee in January 1964, a budget introduced then under $100 billion
assured the success of President Johnson’s lobbying efforts. “Harry,” Johnson announced after
322 T U E S DAY, O C T O B E R 2, 1962
tax cut from the House Ways and Means Committee with sufficient alacrity
to lift the economy before it fell too far behind its full-employment poten-
tial? Would a recession be required to force Mill’s hand, or could the
administration convince him and others that to wait for a recession would
mean failing to exploit the potential of an economy that was growing but
growing all too sluggishly?
Because the performance of the U.S. economy had most recently fallen
short of administration projections—a $555 billion GNP at midyear,
when the Council of Economic Advisors had forecast $570 billion—the
administration’s full-employment goal, established conservatively at 4
percent, was no longer a realistic target for 1963 but had to be pushed
back to the middle of the presidential election year of 1964.5 Slippage in
the employment target was a symptom of a larger problem for the
President and his economic team. Leading economic indicators were
offering only an indistinct picture of current economic trends; the signif-
icant durable goods orders category, for example, had reversed its direc-
tion every month from May to August. Kennedy needed to know where
the economy was heading to make a firm decision on tax cuts.
Somehow the White House had to reconcile a certain reluctance to
act, in the face of opposition from Congress and much of the U.S. busi-
ness community, with a growing unease at inaction, produced by an
uncertain, perhaps teetering, domestic economy. To find a good eco-
nomic policy when the best was beyond the political pale, as Kennedy
adviser Walter Heller once put it, was the task at hand as the President
convened the following meeting.
Begins in midconversation.
Elmer Staats: . . . well, we’ve thought of that, Mr. President, just to
inject . . . one note of optimism is that I think it is very likely that you
will not have a deficit on the income . . . the national income basis which,
as you know—and nobody else seems to know [unclear] the question—
presenting the official budget for fiscal year 1965, “I’ve got the damn thing under $100 billion . . .
way under. It’s only $97.9 billion. Now you can tell your friends that you forced the President of
the United States to reduce the budget before you let him have his tax cut” [quoted in Richard
Goodwin, Remembering America: A Voice From the Sixties (Boston: Little, Brown, 1988), p. 262].
5. The 1963 target was introduced in Kennedy’s first Economic Report to Congress delivered
on 22 January 1962 [see “Message to the Congress Presenting the President’s First
Economic Report. 22 January 1962,” Public Papers of the Presidents, John F. Kennedy, 1962
(Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1963), p. 45].
Meeting on the Budg et and Tax Cut Proposal 323
that the amount of the deficit will be less than the amount of the cut . . .
the net reduction in taxes.6 So that you could say that tax reduction is
really what’s causing the deficit. You need that for full-range growth
because . . .
President Kennedy: That is what sustains the argument that the
deficit is necessary to counteract [unclear], but you’d have a tough time
justifying this tax cut because they’ll say we should reduce expenditures.
As much as you have intended to reduce the taxes, we’re going to have to
make the argument that the deficit is desired.
Douglas Dillon: Yeah, well, also you have the other argument that
tax reduction is desirable to take the brakes off growth and provides
incentives and that to make reductions equivalent to that would mean
that you’d have to cut your defense budget and things like that. And,
obviously, either way it’s the—
President Kennedy: Well, I don’t, I don’t mind taking on that argu-
ment so much. I’m not as—
Dillon: Although I find the second one, that’ll pitch everything on the
economic angle, that people don’t understand, although I think it’s . . .
will have to be made politically.
Theodore Sorensen: That’s really my point also, Doug. In other
words, we can say that, at least on the income . . . national income basis,
we could give you a balanced budget if we’re not thinking a tax cut, but
we think the tax cut is needed.
David Bell: Well, you can’t, economically, sustain precisely that point . . .
if I recall the figures correctly. Because without the tax cut, the economy
would not be pushing high enough so that that would be true, you see.7
Sorensen: Because of the feedback on taxes?
Bell: Exactly—because of taxes. But, the point, I think, is—
President Kennedy: Well, the problem is . . . is ’64.
Dillon: Another thing that complicates that, Mr. President, is this idea
of what we said we’d do is to make a retroactive tax cut. And, the effect of
that really is that, for most of these assumptions, are that you won’t be able
to get any of that retroactivity in operation except by refunds which take
place in ’64. So in ’64 you have a double deduction: you have the deduction
6. The national income basis is a method of budgetary accounting, unlike the standard federal
procedure known as the administrative budget, that includes trust fund receipts and expendi-
tures (Social Security, highway grants-in-aid, unemployment compensation, etc.), omits gov-
ernment transactions in financial assets (e.g., federal loans), and records liabilities when they
are incurred (accrual basis) and not when cash changes hands.
7. To produce enough revenue to achieve balance.
324 T U E S DAY, O C T O B E R 2, 1962
on the income side, not only from tax-rate reduction but also from the
refunds for ’63, which are claimed backwards. So it’s—I’ve forgotten what
the figure is—about a 3 or 4 billion dollar deficit.
Bell: [Unclear.]
President Kennedy: Deficit?
Bell: Yeah. But . . . the assumption is made here that the figures you
see there is about 2 billion dollars. The deficit in ’60—fiscal ’64, which
represents refunds—
Charles Schultze: If—
Bell: —to people who paid—
Schultze: If you—
Bell: —their taxes in ’63.
Schultze: If you look on page 7, and look at that fiscal ’64 figure of a
13 billion dollar deficit, if the reductions were not retroactive, that figure
would be 9.6 billion.
Bell: Yes, you’re right. And—
Schultze: And even if the . . . if the corporate rates were retroactive,
but we coupled that with the Mills plan, but the personal rates were not
retroactive, it would still be 9.6—8
Bell: You’d get—
Schultze: You get below your 10 billion figure. This means that a
great deal of the . . . we put this into the picture, if we did that, went back
to where we left off and we left out the commitment, just on the personal
income tax, your 981/2 billion figure would be less than a 100 billion; it
would be a substantially less increase than in previous years; you could
probably cut your deficit below 10 billion to this 9.6; and you could cite
the fact that the tax cut is equal to about three fourths of the deficit.
That is, that the tax cut of 7 billion that this is based on is equal to three-
fourths of the deficit. Now, the argument against that is that the lack of
retroactivity would not permit your return to full employment, but
would bring it down to about 41/2 percent rather than 4 percent in ’64.
Bell: The retroactivity part of it that you really have to be asked to
make a decision on, very obviously, is a tricky one, because the time you
need the economic boost from a tax cut would probably be next spring,
8. Wilbur D. Mills, chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee, had suggested in ear-
lier meetings with the President and other administration officials that the Internal Revenue
Service could reduce withholding rates, alone or in conjunction with a tax cut, to jump-start
the economy.
Meeting on the Budg et and Tax Cut Proposal 325
and that’s not the most likely time to get the tax bill enacted. So, this is
going to be a difficult legislative problem.
President Kennedy: Unless you have to divide it, I don’t know. We
could look for that.
Dillon: Even if you do that, if, you see, if it passes very quickly, you . . .
there’s no particular feeling that, say if it even became law some time in
May, then you probably couldn’t get the refund checks out in time. On the
other hand, in ’63 . . .
President Kennedy: There’s nothing we can do about the deficit,
then, with respect to recession in the winter or spring, is there? As far as
a tax cut?
Walter Heller: But, do you really think that’s a . . . that’s an inescapable
con[clusion] . . . legislative judgment, given the fact that there had been a
couple of cases where Congress has whistled through a tax cut?
Dillon: Oh, if we could get a tax cut through in March, we could get,
oh . . . we could get, definitely, some of the refunds out in time, but not
all of them.
President Kennedy: Well, John Gerrity called, said in about thirty
minutes Kaiser Steel’s going to take the price on it and cut it. 9 Twelve
dollars a ton across the board?10
Unidentified: Fools! [A whistle.]
Unidentified: A cut!
Unidentified: A cut!
President Kennedy: Twelve dollars a ton?
Unidentified: Gee! [Unclear exchange. Laughter.]
Staats: Well, I would . . . Let’s see, It would be . . .
Unidentified: Eight percent . . .
Staats: One hundred and four dollars . . .
9. John Gerrity was the Washington bureau reporter for the New York–based Daily Bond
Buyer. See Walter Heller’s later comments in the transcript.
10. Later that day, Kaiser Steel Company announced cuts on products from its Fontana,
California, mill. It changed its price for plates and structural shapes to $108 a ton from $122
a ton; for hot-rolled steel to $104 a ton from $116.50 a ton (compared to the $106 a ton
charged by eastern mills); and for cold-rolled steel to $143 a ton from $148 a ton. The price
cut on which Kennedy and his advisers are commenting here is the price cut for Kaiser’s hot-
rolled steel. Chairman Edgar Kaiser noted later that day that the cuts were made to end
regional differences, to make the West more competitive domestically, and to “materially
assist in combating foreign steel imports to the West coast.” Immediately after the Kaiser
cuts, U.S. Steel’s Geneva Steel division in Torrance, California, and Pittsburg, California,
announced comparable cuts.
326 T U E S DAY, O C T O B E R 2, 1962
11. The President is referring here to the $6 a ton across-the-board increase implemented by
Roger Blough and U.S. Steel back on 10 April 1962, followed by increases by five other steel
companies the next day, and rescinded by all when the President objected publicly, said that he
had been double-crossed, and began deploying his government contract, antitrust, and tax law
leverage to force the rescission.
Meeting on the Budg et and Tax Cut Proposal 327
12. Heller’s implication is that Kennedy’s effort to achieve a rescission of the April 1962 steel
price increases was an effort to force the steel companies to abide by, rather than thumb their
noses at, market fundamentals. Able to raise prices in the short run due to oligopoly positions
in the U.S. market and lucrative government contracts, the U.S. steel industry’s pricing power
was fast being undermined by increasing foreign competition.
13. As noted above, U.S. Steel’s Geneva division did follow suit.
328 T U E S DAY, O C T O B E R 2, 1962
could always, well, if you had any votes or if you broke even in the con-
gressional election maybe you can justify coming back and doing it if
you really thought it was necessary.14
Ackley: The economic conditions, I think, are obvious enough.
Dillon: Well, the vote answer is that’s the new Congress. They wouldn’t
start doing anything until close to the first of February.
Schultze: I would say in answer to your question, Walter, my own
judgment would be that if the economy is more or less moving along at
the present tide, no. You’ve got to have something that’s recognizable as
a recession.
Unidentified: [Unclear.]
Heller: Is there any, anything approaching a commitment from
Wilbur Mills to move fast if—?
President Kennedy: Oh, well, you know, it just depends really, on the
situation. I think—15 [Unclear exchange.]
Dillon: If you get those hearings, if they both have hearings, you
know, [unclear] but certainly Byrd would on anything like this. 16
President Kennedy: In June and July, is that the one?
Unidentified: In fact there [unclear] the hearings [unclear] month.
Bell: Well, in view of the fact, the possibility that, or the fact that we
don’t know what the most likely possibility is for the economy at this
stage, we are suggesting that the tax bills, in effect, be worked on over
the next Monday or two . . . which would be appropriate for either con-
tingency—if the outlook looks very good going on into ’63, or looks as
though a recession is going to be breathing down our neck. And that if
these questions of the timing and retroactivity and the nature of the tax
reduction and all that, on which the Treasury will be working on, be
brought back to you later this fall.
The presentation here, however, is intended to indicate that whichever
way it goes, you . . . it looks as though it’s kind of political to present a
deficit in ’64 of the size and magnitude . . . that we may want to be pre-
senting a proposition for economic reasons, which would be . . . make a
14. The President is returning to the idea of the special session of the lame duck Congress,
which he discussed with Wilbur Mills on August 6 (see Volume 1, “Meeting with Wilbur
Mills,” 6 August 1962).
15. Kennedy had arranged several recent meetings with Mills to discuss this issue (ibid).
16. Harry F. Byrd, Sr., was a U.S. senator from Virginia, 1933 to 1965; chairman of the Senate
Finance Committee, 1955 to 1965; and founder of the Joint Committee on Reduction of
Federal Expenditures.
Meeting on the Budg et and Tax Cut Proposal 329
pretty, a pretty large deficit indeed. Now, so far as the expenditures are
concerned, we do have a need for some instructions on them at this point.
If you look at the thing that says “attachment” there, there’s no reason for
you to be called. And I’ll tell you in just a minute some other political
facts. The key point is that, as indicated there on pages 1 and 2, we find
built-in changes of about 5 billion dollars, which means—17
President Kennedy: What will those be . . . the major . . . in space, I
suppose?
Bell: Yeah. Space. At the bottom you’ll see a billion and a half of it is
defense, another billion and a half for NASA.18
President Kennedy: Where’s that? Oh, I see . . . both under five bil-
lion. Now, is that the pay increase?19
Bell: No, we do not count the pay increase as built-in, Mr. President;
we count that as optional. That’s on top of this. This is simply the
increased expenditures associated with the procurement plans and the
force plans that you’ve already approved.
President Kennedy: Three billion of the five billion is defense and
space . . . ?
Bell: Right.
President Kennedy: And a half a billion, really a half, is HEW?20
Bell: Right.
President Kennedy: Now, you’ve got a billion and a half left.
Bell: You’ve got a full table on page 5.
President Kennedy: I see.
Bell: Now, beyond this, we think there is another billion seven, which
represents sensible carrying forward of your program, and, indeed, it
includes legislative proposals that are not passed this year but which
you’ve already recommended to the Congress. And that, the nature of
which . . . the amounts of those increases are also indicated in the table
on page 5. This is how we get the one being kept forward.
17. Early versions of this item may be found in the Theodore Sorensen Papers, Classified
Subject Files, Budget, 1966, Box 44, and Bureau of the Budget, Box 47.
18. National Aeronautical and Space Administration.
19. The reference is to the effects of the “Pay Bill” that Kennedy would sign nine days later on
11 October 1962 granting pay increases to all federal employees [see “Remarks Upon Signing
the Postal Service and Federal Employees Salary Act of 1962,” Public Papers of the Presidents,
pp. 756–57].
20. Department of Health, Education and Welfare (later the Departments of Education and of
Health and Human Services).
330 T U E S DAY, O C T O B E R 2, 1962
21. The F4Hs were fighter planes, later renamed F4A, and also known as “Phantoms.”
22. Polaris submarines, nuclear-powered submarines capable of submerged firing of Polaris bal-
listic missiles, began patrolling the seas in 1960. The third generation of Polaris submarines,
typified by the USS Lafayette and the USS Alexander Hamilton and capable of firing the 2,500-
mile A3 Polaris missile, were, at the time of this meeting, currently under development.
23. The abbreviation AEC stands for Atomic Energy Commission.
24. Glenn T. Seaborg was chairman of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, 1961 to 1971.
Recipient of the 1951 Nobel Prize in chemistry and discoverer of many of the known
transuranium elements, including plutonium, Seaborg also worked on the Manhattan Project
during World War II.
Meeting on the Budg et and Tax Cut Proposal 331
25. Additional federal aid to school districts in areas of prominent federal installations, justi-
fied on the basis of diminished property tax base in the affected areas, was $229 million in the
final education appropriations bill for FY 1963.
26. “Saline water” refers to pilot desalinization projects.
27. Not, perhaps, what President Kennedy expected to be forecast.
28. The abbreviation FAA stands for the Federal Aviation Administration.
332 T U E S DAY, O C T O B E R 2, 1962
33. Due to the “Pay Bill,” signed into law by President Kennedy nine days later (11 October
1962).
34. See “Cabinet Meeting on the Federal Budget for Fiscal Year 1964,” 18 October 1962, in
which Bell advises against a policy of “no new starts.”
35. Ellis H. Veatch, chief of the Military Division, Bureau of the Budget. Though this division
would be renamed on several occasions, Veatch remained its chief until 1974.
36. Willis Shapley, deputy to Ellis Veatch and budget analyst for NASA and other science-
oriented agencies and programs.
334 T U E S DAY, O C T O B E R 2, 1962
ing with both space, both military and space just thrown together. . . .
Can your report [unclear]?
President Kennedy: I’m going to look here for some of the . . .
What’s your thought, Mr. Secretary?
Dillon: Well, the basic problem, where we see it, is that it’s probably
based on the extensive experience up until tax time of this year—
February, March, and quite a little bit—but we feel that instead it would
just be impossible to go up and get a tax reduction if our spending . . .
our increase in spending next year is larger than the increase in spend-
ing that we’ve had in any year so far. And that’s what the 100.4 is.
But the increase in spending in fiscal ’62 over ’61 was 6.2 billion
[unclear], and ’61 over ’60, rather, ’62 over ’61 it was 6 billion. And the
proposed increase here is 6.7 billion . . . increase in expenditures. And . . .
which is a larger increase than we’ve had before, so we just really, we
have to somehow get that down a respectable amount below the 6.2 and
6 billion increases, which were the previous ones, if we’re going to justify
a tax reduction.
Now the exact amount below is a difficult thing to judge. We said
981/2, which would put the increase at 4.8 compared with, with the 6
and 6.2. But the bulk of the real increase is that we think it has to be
substantially below what we think [unclear]. It might be you would
hold on the debt limit thing which you came mighty close to veto,
which could be quite a . . . be very difficult. Of course, we’ll know bet-
ter, we’ll be able to measure this better after we see what happens in
November, but—
President Kennedy: Obviously, if we get . . . set back seriously in
November, we will—
Dillon: Well, on the debt limit case, we seem to have the Republican
vote.37 Increasingly, they all decide they want to vote against the increase so
that when . . . This is just not responsible, but it is just symptomatic of a—
President Kennedy: Yeah. I’m sure it’s going to—
Dillon: So, if we go ahead with the idea of a substantial tax cut, we
don’t believe in these people who say that they have to cut expenditures
equivalently.38 But we do believe that you have to put on a performance
that looks like you’re being careful with the expenditures.
37. The administration had already lobbied successfully for a prior debt limit increase in
March 1962.
38. Harry F. Byrd, for example.
Meeting on the Budg et and Tax Cut Proposal 335
39. John Kenneth Galbraith was ambassador to India and a Harvard economist. Galbraith had
argued, quite prominently, that increased expenditures were a preferred alternative to tax cuts
if the administration sought a fiscal stimulus.
40. Military buildup and added expenditures related to the ongoing Berlin crisis.
336 T U E S DAY, O C T O B E R 2, 1962
the Budget Bureau has done in their [unclear] submissions, and it wor-
ries me that some of it we’ve already cut too far to get down to the 100.4.
Bell: The third and fourth columns there.
President Kennedy: As far as 1964, the agency—
Bell: Yeah.
Unidentified: Yeah.
Ten-second pause.
Sorensen: So that while I’m sympathetic to Doug’s point, I don’t
know where the $2 billion can be cut out.
Twenty-second pause.
President Kennedy: About this goal in three years. Has that got the . . .
where do you think . . . or are we just suggesting what these expenditures
are going to be?
Heller: I like the idea.
Sorensen: I don’t think it . . . I’m trying to think of . . . you’d just,
you’d just be taking on that and many more enemies unnecessarily.
Bell: Maybe because it would show the expenditures rising.
Sorensen: Yes.
President Kennedy: Well, It doesn’t rise so much, though, except in
space. So far I’ve gotten space. They got NASA. That’s the big rise.
Bell: Well, these figures would have to be revised a lot—
President Kennedy: Yeah.
Bell: —further than they have been.
President Kennedy: That’s right.
Bell: My guess is—
President Kennedy: I don’t see any enormous—
Bell: —if you tightened them up, they would probably look like—
President Kennedy: HEW’s the biggest.
Bell: —105, 109.
President Kennedy: And HEW went from 4.2 in ’62 up to 9.3.
Dillon: Well, economic aid—
President Kennedy: Well, we’ll have to just cut that back. But, I see
nothing else except for HEW with a really big rise. Treasury interest,
but the—
Sorensen: Housing and Home Finance.
Bell: It would be comforting to a lot of people to see those NASA fig-
ures, because it would show that they’re going to taper off after another
year or more of a rapid rise.41 HEW would be the big issue, that’s right.
42. These bills, for additional aid to schools, were defeated in the 87th Congress.
43. The abbreviation NIH stands for National Institutes of Health.
44. The original budget proposal for NIH for FY 1963 was $741 million, an increase of $113
million over FY 1962.
45. Housing and Home Finance Agency.
338 T U E S DAY, O C T O B E R 2, 1962
that are here. If you want to think seriously about this, Mr. President, we
can very readily put together a memo to show you the kinds of figures
connected to programs that would be implicit in—
President Kennedy: Well, it would only be if it were not going to be
a rapid increase which would look like we’re inundating them. And the
only advantage would be if you’re going to give an impression that this
is [unclear].
Dillon: This is [unclear] increase.
Bell: Well, and if it does give that impression . . . I mean it logically
does. Whether it would look that way and be politically vulnerable, I—
Heller: Dave, I doubt that it would look that way, and I’m not sure
that we want them all saying that it’s—[Unclear exchange.]
Dillon: —things way ahead of us and not too [unclear].
Unidentified: Umm . . .
Unidentified: That’s true.
Dillon: That’s very ostentatious.
Bell: Well, it’s up in the air with 3 more billion dollars than we said
we’d [unclear].
Heller: Well, not only that, when you’ve got the economy going full
tilt, you’d probably want to hold back some programs.
Bell: That wouldn’t be so hard.
Unidentified: Yeah.
Unidentified: On the other hand, you might take some [unclear].
Dillon: I think on the expenditures thing, while 981/2 seems a good
figure, providing you freeze inflation, but, the basic essence of the thing
is that you just have to come back, so that your increase in expenditures
is something clearly less than it has been. And I would say that this
shows you’ve done the best you possibly can on expenditures at the same
time you—
Schultze: This would . . . I would say, Doug, that in the eight years I
was up there, I never heard anyone use that as a measuring stick.46
Dillon: What?
Schultze: Whether expenditures increased more this year than they
increased last year or the year before that. And, secondly . . . and my
guess is that this increase, percentage-wise, is smaller than those previ-
ous increases.
Dillon: Probably about the same.
46. From 1952 to 1959, Schultze served as a staff economist with the Council of Economic
Advisers.
Meeting on the Budg et and Tax Cut Proposal 339
President Kennedy: Well, I don’t think the . . . you know, I think it’s
just really a question of whether it’ll be a 100 billion figure and so on,
plus the fact you’re asking for a tax cut of 6 or 7 million dollars; and then
have . . . maybe you can’t do anything about it.47 If you ask for a tax cut
with a $4 billion deficit, it’s probably just as hard a political struggle if
you ask for it with 6 billion . . . probably. We don’t know how many peo-
ple who . . . all of the Republicans are going to be against us unless we
get a tax bill which is so designed to take care, in a sense disproportion-
ately, of their constituency.48
Dillon: Because one thing is, too, is that this figure is a higher figure
than anyone has contemplated anywhere. It’s gonna be a shock. But
there’s not much you can do about it. I think everyone, I think, expects a
4 or 5 billion dollar increase in expenditures, but I don’t think any of
them think it should be moved this high next year. Even Mr. Byrd hasn’t
mentioned that [unclear].
Heller: Well, the Senate bill is high.
Sorensen: We’re probably going to go this high this year.
Dillon: Huh?
Sorensen: Yes, he [unclear]—
Unidentified: Well . . .
Sorensen: —in one of his speeches.
Dillon: Hmm.
Bell: If we can . . . one of the things that you’re suggesting, implicitly,
is that if you estimate a little generously on the ’63 expenditures, which
we’re about to put out a release on, that you’re likely—
Unidentified: Yeah.
Bell: —if that were 95 billion dollars instead of 93.7 . . . The
Congress, after all, has added a number of things. They moved forward
the date of the pay increase, and added money for health research and
military perks, and so on. Then, the big jump in ’63 to ’64, would fit your
description even of these figures.
47. Speaking rapidly here, President Kennedy said “million dollars” when he meant to say “bil-
lion dollars.”
48. Convinced that aggregate demand was the linchpin to greater private investment and to
the growth of the economy, both President Kennedy and Chairman Heller of the CEA origi-
nally sought a tax cut proposal under which the lion’s share of the decreases would go to indi-
viduals and to the less well-off. Other cuts and incentives for wealthier individuals and for
corporations were gradually added in as the political obstacles became clearer and the neces-
sary amendments were considered. This was true in the area of tax reform as well, where even
more compromises had to be made to secure only a few somewhat modest changes.
340 T U E S DAY, O C T O B E R 2, 1962
49. Revenues, from lower-than-expected levels of economic growth, also trailed most forecasts
for this period.
50. Income account is national income accounts basis. See note 3.
51. Prepared on the national income accounts basis, the federal budget would not include fed-
eral repayable loan outlays or proceeds.
Meeting on the Budg et and Tax Cut Proposal 341
Bell: We’ve been working with the council.52 We had some brief dis-
cussion earlier on this. We have a staff paper that everybody is looking
at. If you take out repayable loans, it doesn’t take out very much, around
$3 billion or 3 plus, in this particular series of budget years. If you just
take it out and say the budget should be regarded as the figures exclu-
sive of this, you don’t gain enough to make much impact on the deficit
figures, and you pick up a fight for yourself without much benefit. In
consequence, and third . . . secondly, we looked at the questions of . . .
President Kennedy: Three billion dollars might be of use to us.
Bell: Well, yes . . . in the sense that it would reduce the budget deficit,
apparent deficit. We’ve assumed that we should present a set of budget
figures that represent the federal financial transactions in some kind of
total sense. And then we say, and alongside of it, here are the income and
product account figures which are a more accurate indicator of the eco-
nomic effects of the federal budget.
And, of course, the repayable loans are excluded from that so that the
income and product account deficit will presumably look that much bet-
ter than the cash figures that we use. And, accordingly, we get that bene-
fit . . . we expect we will have that benefit by using the income and
product account figures.
And our question, therefore, is what about the overall budget figure?
Do we also take it out of there? You can, of course, ask, “Should we take
more out?” We could take out repayable loans plus capital items of vari-
ous kinds. Go to a quasi-capital budget. We’ve had some preliminary dis-
cussion with Walter and his boys on this. There’s a little disagreement
among us, and I think it might be better if we brought the question to
you a little later rather than today.
Heller: I agree.
Bell: I think there’s some majority sentiment against rather than for
this point, but it isn’t a matter that’s closed up, nor . . . one on which
we’re ready to ask you to sign off.
Take the Chamber of Commerce committee. You’ve seen the prelimi-
nary draft of their report that you asked Mallon53 to set up, I mean,
Plumley.54 Mallon’s the chairman of the committee. . . .
52. The President’s Council of Economic Advisers, Walter Heller, James Tobin, Kermit
Gordon, and staff.
53. Henry Neil Mallon was chairman and director of Dresser Industries.
54. H. Ladd Plumley was chairman and president of State Mutual Life Assurance Company of
America and president of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. President Kennedy asked Plumley
342 T U E S DAY, O C T O B E R 2, 1962
President Kennedy: Have they been through much of this with you
about what the expenditures are?
Bell: We met with them, yes. There are on the committee two or
three quite able people—Frank Pace55 is a member, and Norman Ness56
is a member—who really know what they’re talking about. They’re . . .
we’ve been working with them all along. And one of them showed us a
draft of the report in an early stage, and what it was, if they carry
through as it is now drafted, it’s going to recommend, implicitly, aban-
donment of the administrative budget, but the use of the cash state-
ment—consolidated cash statement—as the main presentation of federal
receipts and expenditures.57 Now, this is not necessarily a bad idea. This
would show a total which next year would be around 116 billion dollars
of expenditures and around a hundred and—
Schultze: About three and a half lower in deficit.
Bell: Yeah. Now, that includes all the trust fund receipts. It includes
the trust funds, and since the trust funds are gonna be running some
small surplus next year, that will help the overall . . . would help the
overall appearance of the budget . . . cut the deficit. You could say this is
the overall summary of the federal receipts and expenditures. Within
this, there are the following categories—
President Kennedy: What’d be the advantage of having this?
Bell: Well . . .
President Kennedy: Why do they think it’s a good idea, this group?
Bell: Well, they have different ideas. Some of them think it’s good sim-
ply because it would produce a bigger figure than the one we’re now using.
President Kennedy: And they want to—
Bell: Make a horror story . . . say that the budget is obviously getting
out of hand. Others simply say that this is a better representation of the
transactions in the federal government, and a better figure to have in
people’s minds is how big the federal government’s financial transac-
tions actually are in relation to anything you want to measure it
against—total national income or product or what not.
and others at the U.S. Chamber of Commerce to study both government budgeting and the
administration’s tax cut proposal.
55. Frank Pace, Jr., was chairman and director of General Dynamics Corporation.
56. Norman Ness was vice president and director of the International Milling Company,
Minneapolis, and director of the Minneapolis Grain Exchange.
57. Like the national income budget, the consolidated cash basis includes trust fund receipts.
Unlike the national income budget, it records transactions on a cash, rather than accrual, basis
and includes net loans and other credit transactions. In FY 1967 the federal government
would begin reporting its official budget in this form.
Meeting on the Budg et and Tax Cut Proposal 343
60. Days later, on 26 October 1962, after receiving confidential information from Roswell
Gilpatric that Secretary McNamara would seek to cancel the Skybolt program, Dave Bell sent
a memorandum to McGeorge Bundy, intended originally from the President, that noted a
“firm recommendation by the Secretary [McNamara] that the SKYBOLT missile be can-
celled” (Neustadt, Report to JFK, p. 33).
346 T U E S DAY, O C T O B E R 2, 1962
Schultze: Well, the simplest line to take, which is a very difficult line
to take budgetwise, but the simplest line to take from the standpoint of
accuracy, is that in this year in which we’re trying to reduce taxes and get
the economy moving to this prescription, we’re going to live with our
built-in increases, the things we have to live with, and we’re not going to
authorize any new programs. This is a price we’re going to have to pay.
Now, this is the only kind of simple, political logic, I think, that you can
make, rather than a . . . than a pick and choose. And, I guess—
President Kennedy: Now, I’ll tell you what; let’s get on with it.
Unidentified: About the consulting . . .
President Kennedy: Why don’t we get the Treasury with the Bureau
of the Budget to tell us what they would take out of that, in order to save
that which—
Dillon: We could do that, but [unclear] moot point is [unclear].
President Kennedy: [Unclear] we’ll have alternatives for what we
choose or not choose.
Dillon: [Unclear.]
President Kennedy: Well, that’s one question. Now, those will have
to wait until we see what you’re suggesting we omit in order to cut this
thing down.
Sorensen: Well, that . . . even that isn’t necessary, Mr. President,
unless the Treasury feels that the list which Dave’s put together on
pages 16 to 19 is not an adequate list.
Staats: I have a slant, Mr. President . . . [Unclear exchange.]
Staats: This list here adds up . . . adds up to 2.8 billion. To get down
to Doug’s figures, it’d be only 1.9. So we have definitely put in here more
items that add up to 2.8 than you would need to get down to—
President Kennedy: Why don’t you give us a [unclear].
Dillon: Some of the things aren’t on this list. For instance—
President Kennedy: What else have we got to decide?
Bell: That’s all . . . at this point.
President Kennedy: [Unclear] do something else, so we can talk a lit-
tle more?
Bell: All right.
President Kennedy: But, in other words, we don’t see any new budg-
eting procedures that are going to make our problem easier, do we?
Bell: I do not, Mr. President, but we haven’t signed off on—
President Kennedy: Is everybody agreed that we shouldn’t try to put
up an advance sort of list? It seems to me in some of these programs
where the increase will be much marked and where there is going to be a
plateau, that it may be advantageous to indicate it.
Meeting on the Budg et and Tax Cut Proposal 347
61. General Maxwell D. Taylor, former superintendent of the U.S. Military Academy and
Army chief of staff, had been sworn in by President Kennedy as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff on 1 October 1962, the day before convening this recorded tax and budget meeting.
62. Anthony J. Celebrezze was secretary of health, education, and welfare, July 1962 to July 1965.
63. Orville L. Freeman was secretary of agriculture, January 1961 to January 1969.
348 T U E S DAY, O C T O B E R 2, 1962
64. See “Cabinet Meeting on the Federal Budget for Fiscal Year 1964,” 18 October 1962.
65. The Titan III was the largest intercontinental ballistic missile.
66. The C1 is the Lockheed C-130 Hercules transport plane.
Meeting on the Budg et and Tax Cut Proposal 349
that . . . But I don’t think there’s much there; we won’t find there’s a
great deal of duplication to cut out. I think that we will achieve—when
we bring this to you, and it’s been nailed down—some limits on the mili-
tary program which will be very helpful.
Meeting begins to break up.
Unidentified: [Unclear.] I’m going to meet Senator Douglas on the
[unclear].67
President Kennedy: I’m meeting him at 5:30. [Unclear exchange.]
Dillon: Mr. President, if you could say that I have talked about this
overview, now, you know . . . if that would counteract the New York
Times last Sunday?68
President Kennedy: Yeah, yeah. That’s right, about the business thing.
Yeah. Well, what we can . . . what we’re going to put in the economy, we
got there. What we’re going to take out as opposed to the [unclear] . . . the
heart. What can we say?
Dillon: Well, we . . . I guess they’re getting the figures together. I think
that on an expenditure basis, on a national income accounts basis, we’re
giving much more stimulation, certainly, than we were in the last . . . in the
second quarter of this year. I think that would be something that . . . you’ll
have the figures in a couple of days, that—
Bell: Yeah, [unclear] difficulty is—
Dillon: —you could talk about.
Bell: —not the difficulty. But what the point is, that on an income . . .
on a real basis . . . on an income and product accounts basis, what we are
doing now is running a deficit. That is stimulating the economy. We, of
course, have not publicly announced any figure for the deficit. And we
will not, presumably . . . will not do so until this review of the budget
comes out a few days after the election . . . except determining that we
have plans for it, as the—
President Kennedy: I mean, isn’t it possible for us to say that we’re
spending $4 billion more to [unclear] last quarter?
67. Paul H. Douglas was a Democratic senator from Illinois, 1949 to 1967, and chairman of
the Joint Economic Committee, 1959 to 1967.
68. Possibly James Reston, “Seattle: The Mood of the Country and President Kennedy,” New
York Times, 23 September 1962, p. 10E. Reston noted: “Not since the heyday of anti-
Roosevelt feeling in the Thirties has there been such personal and emotional feeling against
‘that man in the White House.’” Though this feeling may well be what Dillon hopes to coun-
teract, Reston concluded by adding that “the main strategic objective of the Democratic
party now, as always, is to have elections decided on a simple partisan basis, and the
Republicans, by making a party issue out of the steel price controversy and the stock market
crash, have clearly furthered this aim.”
350 T U E S DAY, O C T O B E R 2, 1962
Bell: [Laughter.]
President Kennedy: [Unclear.] I don’t think we—
Bell: [Unclear] statement of fact.
President Kennedy: Maybe it ought to come from the Bureau of the
Budget. I don’t think we want to have Walter do it. 69
Bell: No, I think that’s right.
Dillon: [Unclear] political thing with the Bureau of the Budget.
[Unclear exchange.]
Unidentified: I think we can—
Dillon: It might need to be done right after the Congress quits.
Bell: There’d be some logic in a preliminary flash figure right after
the Congress leaves, you know, it would be something to hang it on
there if the Congress left and our quick estimate of the effect of their
actions on the budget seems to . . . indicates that we are now—
President Kennedy: I think it ought to come out of the [Bureau of
the] Budget. So let’s try to do it as quickly as we can. We can estimate
Congress going on Saturday. Maybe we could do it in the Sunday papers
or Monday because that’s a quicker—
Bell: OK.
President Kennedy: OK.
President Kennedy turns the machine off.
69. Walter Heller was chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers. Compared to Dave Bell
at the Bureau of the Budget, and Treasury Secretary Douglas Dillon, Heller was considered
the most outspoken liberal voice in the administration on matters economic.
352 T U E S DAY, O C T O B E R 2, 1962
5:25 P.M.
[T]he first 24 hours the use of force was desirable, and now it
won’t be. So that I suppose every time you get a picture of some-
body getting knocked down, it feeds the fire around that place.
70. Tape 27, John F. Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, Presidential Recordings
Collection. The telephone call with Cyrus Vance is on Dictabelt 4J.1, Cassette B, John F.
Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, Presidential Recordings Collection. They have been
spliced together to reproduce all sides of this three-way conversation.
71. Cyrus Vance was secretary of the Army.
Conversation with Kenneth O’Donnell and Cyr us Vance 353
72. Hamilton Howze, commander of the 18th Airborne Corps, was in charge of the military at
the Oxford campus.
73. General Earle G. Wheeler.
354 T U E S DAY, O C T O B E R 2, 1962
hours the use of force was desirable, and now it won’t be. So that I sup-
pose every time you get a picture of somebody getting knocked down, it
feeds the fire around that place. So I suppose at least it ought to be
brought to his attention to see how he thinks it should be done.
Vance: Right. Well, we will do so.
President Kennedy: OK. Fine.
Vance: Sir, do you want to release anything [unclear], would you like
us to do it in terms of the public release?
President Kennedy: Let me just think about that. Now, we’ve got the
question of this release back to the state. Probably if we do it, it’s a little
bit too . . . Has he asked us to do it, Barnett? Has Barnett asked us for
them or who’s asked?
Vance: Barnett has not asked us; Barnett has not asked us to do this.
President Kennedy: Yeah. Who has asked us to do it?
Vance: Mr. President, I can’t tell you who in the state of Mississippi has.
President Kennedy: He did. You see, well, now . . . Why don’t we do it
this way? You people announce that the President has approved the troop—
Vance: All right. [Unclear] “the President has approved.” We’ll
release it over here and check the [unclear] . . .
President Kennedy: We ought to find out who’s asked us to do it,
though, so that . . .
[off the phone to Kenny O’Donnell] Well, when did he ask us to do it?
O’Donnell: The Governor asked us to.
President Kennedy: Well, when did he ask us, do you know?
O’Donnell: He asked us about 2[:00] or 2:30.
President Kennedy: [on the phone to Vance] The guess is that they,
Kenny says that the Governor asked the civil defense, and so on. Of
course, I suppose he didn’t ask for the troops because he didn’t have to
ask us for the troops.
O’Donnell: No, he asked them for a declaration of a national emer-
gency so he could get . . . [unclear].
President Kennedy: We’d given them that [unclear], that we’d give
them a declaration of national emergency?
[speaking to Vance on the phone] Well, now who have you been talking
to about this, Cy? Is it McDermott?74
Vance: McDermott. Yeah.
President Kennedy: About the 2,500? What they’re going to do with
74. Edward A. McDermott was director of the Office of Emergency Planning and a member
of the National Security Council.
W E D N E S DAY, O C T O B E R 3, 1962 355
2,500 troops, I don’t know. We agreed to help them get the thing out.75 But I
don’t know what they’re going to do with 2,500 soldiers to get it out, so . . .
Vance: The letter I have from McDermott says, “While we have no
way to judge the appropriate figure, the state director of civil defense of
Mississippi has informed the Public Health Service officials that 2,500
troops would be needed.”
O’Donnell is saying something to the President in the background.
President Kennedy: [to O’Donnell] Did they?
O’Donnell: He hasn’t [unclear] number of troops.
President Kennedy: I see. All right, well, I see. Well, then, I would
think we ought to say that at the request of the civil defense director—
Vance: State director of civil defense of Mississippi.
President Kennedy: —that yes, the President has approved the . . .
Vance: Yeah. Fine.
President Kennedy: And so we don’t get Barnett into it . . .
Vance: Right.
President Kennedy: Right. OK. Fine.
Vance: Yes, indeed, sir.
President Kennedy: Thank you, bye.
After hanging up the telephone, the President switches off both tape
machines.
9:20 A.M.
1. Dictabelt 4J.2, Cassette B, John F. Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, Presidential
Recordings Collection.
2. On October 8, the Army removed the remaining check points from the Ole Miss campus,
allowing cars to enter without being searched. Despite this, troops still patrolled the grounds,
the town of Oxford, and the surrounding countryside. More than 5,400 troops that had been
standing by at installations in Memphis and Columbus, Mississippi, were ordered to return to
their bases. According to the New York Times, on 8 October, 3,000 National Guard troops,
14,000 regular troops, and 1,500 military police remained on duty. Of the regular troops on
duty, half were at bases in Memphis and Columbus, 90 miles away.
On 10 October, the Army completed a significant withdrawal of troops from the Oxford
area, reducing the number of men from 10,000 to 5,200. The remaining troops were divided
nearly equally between regular Army and federalized Mississippi National Guard members.
At peak strength, there had been some 23,600 men in Oxford and the surrounding area.
Conversation with John McCormack 357
10:05 A.M.
3. Edwin O. Guthman and Jeffrey Shulman, eds., Robert Kennedy in His Own Words: The
Unpublished Recollections of the Kennedy Years (New York: Bantam Books, 1988), p. 168.
4. Dictabelt 4K.3, Cassette B, John F. Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, Presidential
Recordings Collection.
358 W E D N E S DAY, O C T O B E R 3, 1962
McCormack: Today?
President Kennedy: Well, I think if they are going into conference
tomorrow, either today, or whatever time you thought. Today or tomor-
row would be fine with me.
McCormack: Better today. In other words, he’d . . . he would allocate
it, as I understood it, anyway you wanted.
President Kennedy: Right. What we got to try to do is get him up to
as near 400 as we can.
McCormack: I know. I agree with you.
President Kennedy: I’ll have Larry up there, though, at 11:30.
McCormack: All right.
President Kennedy: Thanks, Mr. Speaker.
McCormack: Right. Right.
The President then called Lawrence F. O’Brien to inform him of his dis-
cussion with the Speaker.
Unidentified: Hello.
Evelyn Lincoln: The President asked for Mr. O’Brien. He’s on.
5. Dictabelt 4K.6, Cassette B, John F. Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, Presidential
Recordings Collection.
360 W E D N E S DAY, O C T O B E R 3, 1962
Unidentified: OK.
President Kennedy: Larry?
Larry O’Brien: Yes, sir, Mr. President.
President Kennedy: Tell him to call . . . . The Speaker said that he’d
call you at 11:30 and then, perhaps, he will want to arrange—once you
get him briefed on the 400—6
O’Brien: All right.
President Kennedy: —we can arrange to see Otto, if necessary, down
here.7
O’Brien: Right.
President Kennedy: Now, the second thing is that I talked to Charlie . . .8
O’Brien: Yeah.
Secretary Vance and General Wheeler entered the White House at 12:14
P.M. Kennedy did not tape this meeting. After these military advisers left,
the President had lunch with J. Edgar Hoover, the director of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation. The President then went to the Executive
Mansion for the rest of the day. He did not swim today and may have
been feeling the initial effects of the illness that would keep him in bed
all of October 4.
During the afternoon, the President presumably received reports on
the progress of Walter Schirra’s nine-hour space mission. In early
September, Schirra’s mission had influenced the scheduling of the final
phase of the DOMINIC nuclear test series because of concerns over the
radiation effects of high-altitude testing.9 At 6:17 P.M., the President
spoke with Schirra, who had returned safely and was onboard the air-
craft carrier USS Kearsage. At 6:30, the President held an unrecorded
meeting in the Oval Room of the White House with his Soviet special-
ists. It is not known when that meeting ended.
6. The Speaker of the House, from 1962 to 1971, was John W. McCormack, Democratic con-
gressman from Massachusetts, 1928 to 1971.
7. Otto Passman was a Democratic U.S. House member from Louisiana, 1947 to 1977, and
chairman of the Foreign Operations Subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee.
The most powerful and outspoken opponent of foreign aid in Congress, Passman continually
clashed with the Kennedy administration over its foreign aid requests.
8. Unidentified.
9. See “Meeting on the DOMINIC Nuclear Test Series,” 5 September 1962.
M O N DAY, O C T O B E R 8 , 1962 361
After spending all of October 4 upstairs at the White House with a cold,
the President set off on a three-day campaign swing through Ohio,
Michigan, and Minnesota. Having returned home Sunday night, the
President entered the Oval Office at 9:32 A.M.
While the President was out of Washington, the Berlin situation had
heated up again. On October 6, a British military vehicle, seeking to
come to the aid of a man who had been shot at the Wall, had been pre-
vented from entering East Berlin. Meanwhile talks on Berlin between
Soviet foreign minister Andrei Gromyko and Dean Rusk had brought no
progress. On Sunday the three Western powers were considering a for-
mal protest to the Soviets because the bar on the British military vehicle
was a violation of the Four Power agreements.1
Also during the President’s absence, another U-2 had flown a Cuba
mission. In accordance with the September 10 decision on the reconnais-
sance plan for Cuba, this U-2 hugged the Cuban coast without crossing
over any territory to avoid identified surface-to-air missile (SAM) sites.
Back from his honeymoon, the director of central intelligence, John
McCone, wanted the next U-2 flight to be more daring. Agents on the
island were reporting the existence of surface-to-surface missiles and
missile sites in one of the regions of Cuba not photographed since
August 29. McCone wanted a U-2 to cover those areas, even though this
meant risking the loss of the plane to a Soviet-made SAM.
McCone had met resistance from the West Wing of the White House
and was on the President’s schedule for October 8. On October 5,
McGeorge Bundy, the special assistant to the President for national secu-
rity affairs, had defended the reconnaissance plan in conversation with
McCone. Bundy argued that the lack of “hard information” from the cen-
ter of the island was not really cause for concern because the Soviets
“would not go so far” as to put nuclear missiles in Cuba.2 McCone would
have his chance today to make his case directly to the President.
1. See the New York Times, 6–8 October 1962; Telegram, Rusk (New York) to State
Department, 6 October 1962, FRUS, 15: 348–51.
2. McCone, “Memorandum of Discussion with the President’s Special Assistant for National
Security Affairs” (Bundy), 5 October 1962, FRUS, 11: 13–15.
362 M O N DAY, O C T O B E R 8, 1962
10:30 A.M.
3. Dictabelt 4K.7, Cassette B, John F. Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, Presidential
Recordings Collection.
4. Morse had developed a reputation for stubbornness and had shown a willingness to take
on his own party—Republican until 1952, an interlude as an independent, and Democratic
from 1955.
Conversation with Mik e Mansfield 363
5. Referring to Morse.
6. Morse was upset that the Interior Department Appropriations Bill, after passing the Senate
and having been sent to House-Senate conferees, had been stripped of planning appropriations
for the Columbia and Willamette river channel projects, funds for construction of the Yaquina
Bay and Harbor project, and funds for a reclamation project at Pendleton, all in Oregon.
7. Edith Green was a Democratic U.S. House member from Oregon, 1955 to 1974.
8. Robert S. Kerr was a U.S. senator from Oklahoma, 1948 to 1963, and chairman of the
Senate Finance Committee. The irony of Kennedy’s request to have Kerr intercede on behalf
of Morse here is that Morse had recently led a filibuster against Kennedy’s Comsat proposal, a
proposal to privatize government satellite development, ultimately steered through to passage
by none other than Senator Kerr.
9. In the conference committee.
364 M O N DAY, O C T O B E R 8, 1962
afraid of Mike because of his power on the Interior and other appropria-
tions committees over there. They thought, well, they better go along.
President Kennedy: Yeah.
Mansfield: And it’s . . . the amounts are really small. They don’t
mean anything.
President Kennedy: Yeah . . . yeah.
Mansfield: But I think that, if you will, say, you will call Kirwan,
and I’ll get Bob Kerr to talk to Kirwan. That might be the best way
out of it.
President Kennedy: Yeah . . . yeah. Well, why don’t I call Kirwan
before I see Wayne, and see whether I can do anything?
Mansfield: OK.
President Kennedy: But, I mean, Wayne . . . [chuckles] OK, Mike.
Right.
Mansfield: OK, Mr. President.
President Kennedy: Good-bye, now.
Following this bit of legislative business, Kennedy met with Wayne Morse
for twenty minutes. The rest of the morning was devoted to foreign policy,
and the President did not tape any of it. John McCone and McGeorge
Bundy came to discuss, among other topics, the secret negotiations with
Fidel Castro over the release of the Bay of Pigs prisoners. James B.
Donovan, mediator for the United States, had just arrived in Havana for
his second meeting with Castro. Having negotiated the trade of Soviet spy
William Fisher, also known as Rudolf Abel, for imprisoned U-2 pilot
Francis Gary Powers in the winter of 1962, Donovan was trusted by both
sides in the Cold War as an honest negotiator. And U-2s may have figured
in another aspect of this conversation. As mentioned in the editors’ intro-
duction for October 8, McCone was in the midst of a campaign to per-
suade the White House to permit a U-2 to fly over east central Cuba,
where agents had pinpointed a possible missile installation. Bundy had
opposed McCone’s recommendation on October 5, considering it an
unnecessary risk. McCone must have made some progress, as he was able
to press Kennedy further on the need for a U-2 overflight of Cuba again
the next day, October 9.
Following this Cuba discussion, the President met with his science
adviser, Jerome B. Wiesner. The DOMINIC test series still had a month to
go, and with the successful completion of the Schirra mission, there was
nothing holding back the last remaining high-altitude tests. Then the
President performed some more legislative business, which he did tape.
Conversation with Alber t Gore 365
12:00 P.M.
Now, it’s really your choice, and I think that if you ask Hubert
and Bob not to override, they would not and would fight it.
But, I don’t know whether you want to put that much at stake
on it or not.
10. Dictabelts 4K.8 and 48.2, Cassettes band M, John F. Kennedy Library, President’s Office
Files, Presidential Recordings Collection. Albert A. Gore was Democratic U.S. senator from
Tennessee, 1953 to 1971.
11. “The President’s Special News Conference with Business Editors and Publishers,” Public
Papers of the Presidents, John F. Kennedy, 1962 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing
Office, 1963), pp. 714–15. Under the bill, a self-employed person would be allowed to deduct
from taxable income 50 percent of contributions to a retirement fund. The annual deductions
would apply to a maximum of 10 percent of annual income with a ceiling of $2,500.
12. Along with Senator Paul Douglas of Illinois, Gore was the chief supporter of administra-
tion plans for general tax reform.
366 M O N DAY, O C T O B E R 8, 1962
eliminate special favors for the wealthy and politically well connected.
Having ten days with which to act on passed legislation while Congress
remained in session, Kennedy was fast approaching the deadline for a
decision on a veto.
18. Bobby Baker was secretary to the Senate majority leader, 1955 to 1963. As secretary to
Senate majority leaders Lyndon Johnson and Mike Mansfield, Baker established himself as a
preeminent head counter and dispenser of unofficial favors. He also became an unofficial lob-
byist through his Washington, D.C., law firm, Tucker and Baker, and earned a substantial
income even as he drew the meager salary attached to his official occupation. Though officially
attached to Senator Mansfield at this point, Baker worked much more closely with Senator
Kerr and often reflected Kerr’s views on any particular piece of legislation or government
business. In January 1967, Baker would be convicted of income tax evasion, theft, and conspir-
acy to defraud the government.
368 M O N DAY, O C T O B E R 8, 1962
On October 10, 1962, two days after this conversation and six hours
before the deadline, Kennedy signed the Self-employed Pension Bill
without comment.
Kennedy’s last appointment before lunch was an unrecorded meeting
with Walt W. Rostow, counselor of the Department of State and chair-
man of the Policy Planning Council.
The only meeting the President taped on this day was a continuation
of the previous Tuesday’s $100 billion budget discussion. This followed
an unrecorded meeting of Bell, Sorensen, O’Brien, and O’Donnell.
Meeting on the Budg et 369
4:48–5:10 P.M.
[S]ome feel that we’re going to have to break the 100 billion
dollar barrier. So we might as well break it now as in the elec-
tion year.
19. Including President Kennedy, David Bell, C. Douglas Dillon, Henry Fowler, Walter Heller,
Charles Schultze, Theodore Sorensen, and Elmer Staats. Tape 27A, John F. Kennedy Library,
President’s Office Files, Presidential Recordings Collection.
20. See “Letter to the President of the Senate and to the Speaker of the House Transmitting a
Proposed Stand-By Capital Improvements Act. 19 February 1962,” Public Papers of the
Presidents, pp. 143–44; “Remarks Upon Signing the Public Works Acceleration Act. 14
September 1962,” ibid., pp. 682–83.
370 M O N DAY, O C T O B E R 8, 1962
the previous administration. Though the first part of the meeting was
not captured on tape, the recorded portion began with Dillon counseling
the use of low-spending estimates and reminding his colleagues in the
Kennedy administration of how that device had helped the Eisenhower
administration limp toward its modestly higher spending targets.
Kennedy pressed Chairman Heller to use the White House as a “pul-
pit for public education in economics.” Nevertheless, the President
believed that there were limits on what the administration could do.
Though a tax cut would be difficult to pass, increased spending—in an
obvious and direct fashion—seemed politically out of the question.21
Consequently, with an eye toward the creation of a conservative-liberal
coalition and the postwar reconfiguration of a tax code designed largely
for World War II, Kennedy gravitated more and more toward the tax
cut proposal as the preferred economic stimulus.22 Accordingly, ques-
tions like how to spend more on targeted investments, how to avoid dra-
conian cuts elsewhere, and how to present a budget that would appear
“responsible” enough to win a tax cut, defined the discussion as Kennedy
and his advisers considered and wrestled with the administration’s
future budget proposals.
Begins in midconversation.
Douglas Dillon: . . . expenditures on the low side, because it wouldn’t
mean anything if they actually . . . if more was spent because it was . . .
how much you would spend on past commitments, whether you spent
more than estimated. It doesn’t stop you from delivering something
that’s already in the pipeline. And we deliberately made our estimates
low, thinking they might run over, and actually they very seldom, if ever,
did. Oh, it was . . . services couldn’t deliver quite as many and some hap-
pily stayed with it. But the key thing is what you request. And in a way,
what you rec[ommend] . . . put down for these two items in expendi-
tures; you really run off the preceding year’s tendency for a good esti-
21. Heller noted that when Kennedy called for a balanced budget in his 1961 State of the
Union address, “we counted seven escape hatches” [quoted in Walter W. Heller, New
Dimensions in Political Economy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1966), p. 31].
22. Kennedy may never have given up on the idea of economic prosperity through increased
government spending. Only 11 days before his assassination, with the tax cut bill as yet bot-
tled up in the Senate Finance Committee, Kennedy reminded Heller, “First we’ll get your tax
cut, and then we’ll get my expenditure programs” (quoted in Heller, New Dimensions, p. 113).
Meeting on the Budg et 371
mate rather tightly. So I think that these two figures can stand up very
well on the basis of the previous criterion.
President Kennedy: I think we can do something there. Now, the . . .
Peace Corps.
David Bell: This is also, of course, the USIA and the State Department;
there are small increases for both.
Elmer Staats: For the Peace Corps, this would hold them at about the
level of where they would be just about a year from now. About a year
from now they’ll be just about 10,000.
President Kennedy: Soybeans? Has Larry O’Brien left?23 We’re
going to know a little more after this election about agriculture.24
Dillon: Sure. Well, Dave said there have been some other reductions;
. . . price support would be real difficult.25 He said he felt soybeans was
possible and wouldn’t make any difference anyway if you can use it
right.26
Bell: The main . . . the main money in here is the rural housing loans.
That’s the main issue, Mr. President.
Dillon: Let’s see . . . it’s 50 million and 75.
Bell: The REA generating loans is also a tough one.27 [Pause.] Well,
these—
Dillon: In determining anything, it’s just . . . just not going up as fast
as you were doing. That’s the whole point . . . if that’s where you’re plan-
ning to go.
President Kennedy: I don’t think we can probably get medical care
by if we don’t cover the non–Social Security beneficiaries.28
23. Lawrence F. O’Brien was special assistant to the President for congressional relations,
1961 to 1965.
24. In the domain of agricultural policy, the Kennedy administration was attempting to move
away from price supports to a regime characterized by direct payments to producers and less-
ened market interference.
25. The reference is to reductions in agricultural price supports.
26. Soybeans, emerging as a major export crop, were not subject to acreage control limita-
tions, nor would they later be eligible for direct payments. In most years—1957, 1958, and
1961 being the exceptions—soybean market prices had remained above predetermined sup-
port levels.
27. The REA is the Rural Electrification Administration.
28. Kennedy’s proposal for medical care for the aged was not faring well, politically, and at the
end of his administration, stood as one of his more notable legislative failures. Indeed, the
Medicare proposal that finally became legislation in 1965 required quite a bit of political
maneuvering, the addition of a Medicaid program for the poor of all ages, and the force of the
Johnson landslide in the 1964 presidential election in order to prevail.
372 M O N DAY, O C T O B E R 8, 1962
29. As he predicted, Kennedy’s aid to education proposals for the 87th Congress were
defeated.
Meeting on the Budg et 373
Bell: That’s a legislative proposal and it’s not much money. Six or
eight million . . .
Sorensen: Grants to states. It’s a very small amount.
Bell: Yeah, 6 or 8 million dollars.
President Kennedy: What does it do? What do we do with them?
Bell: They would be grants to the state labor departments to pro-
mote occupational safety standards in factories.
Unidentified: It’s research.
Bell: [Unclear] would also be involved.
Dillon: And, as I said to this thing, this is illustrative—
Unidentified: Uh-huh.
Dillon: —and economic [unclear] 6 or 7 million dollars . . .
Bell: The key point here—
President Kennedy: Well, I think the only way you’re really going to
save much with these 6 and 8 million dollar grants—
Unidentified: [Unclear.]
Bell: Yes. That’s right.
President Kennedy: [Unclear] big programs are too—
Bell: Yeah.
President Kennedy: —have too . . . but, I mean, if you get these agen-
cies all thinking about these smaller ones . . .
Bell: Well, the important issue here would be the training . . . piece of
that. We got in a big fight with the Labor Department about that. We’re
already a good deal lower than they think we should be.
Twelve-second pause.
President Kennedy: GSA.30 That could—
Bell: That, of course, is, that’s work on buildings, primarily. And you
can set that about any pace you want.
President Kennedy: Reduced direct housing loans are proposed,
25,000 housing loans, 23,000 loans?
Bell: Yeah.
President Kennedy: I don’t know really why the Veterans
Administration is in the direct loans these days, anyway. How is it?
Bell: Simply for historical reasons. We got in after World War II. And
successive Budget Bureaus and presidents have been trying to get them
out. Last year, after a considerable fight with Teague, we got an agreement
under which this program goes along, but the veterans begin to lose eligi-
bility after a certain number of years.31 And a good slug of the veterans are
beginning, now, to lose their eligibility under that legislation. So this will
be phased out in a period of four or five more years . . . the bulk of it, as I
recall. By ’68, I think . . . you’re just about through with this. But that was
the best we could do in terms of the legislative agreement. And, meantime,
they do have the authority and the veterans are eligible. So you, presum-
ably, have to . . . they . . . they’re under restriction now. They’re holding
back. They could lend a lot more. The question is kind of where you draw
the line of how much heat you’re willing to take to prevent loans being
made that actually could be made under the existing law.
Unidentified: Yeah.
Bell: Twenty-five thousand is about the level this year, and it’s about
the same as the level last year. This involves some cutback.
Fourteen-second pause.
President Kennedy: But, some feel that we’re going to have to break
the 100 billion dollar barrier. So we might as well break it now as in the
election year.
Dillon: Well, I think you may well. . . . I don’t know what you’re
gonna be in, you may well break it in NOA; that’s going to be a different
figure entirely.32 We’re talking about expenditures here. How much
higher is NOA in August, here?
Sorensen: I thought we’d already broken a 100 billion dollars.
Unidentified: Oh, we’re up by 6 or 7 billion.
Dillon: Well, that was a different NOA. [Pause.]
Sorensen: You know that it’s being broken this year?
Unidentified: Yeah.
Bell: About to be five . . . under these figures which are August 30th
figures.
Dillon: So that . . . that includes—
Bell: Mostly 2 billion dollars for the IMF and a lot of things like
that, that are not actual expenditures.33 It won’t be actual expenditures.
Dillon: If we break it next year in NOA so the budgets that are going
in would be over—
Bell: No, it’s broken now!
31. Olin E. “Tiger” Teague was a U.S. representative from Texas, 1947 to 1979; chairman of
the House Committee on Veterans Affairs, 1963 to 1973; and a much-decorated World War II
veteran.
32. The abbreviation NOA stands for new obligational authority.
33. The abbreviation IMF stands for the International Monetary Fund.
Meeting on the Budg et 375
34. President Kennedy gave a series of congressional campaign speeches in Ohio, Michigan,
and Minnesota, 5 to 7 October 1962, and in New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Kentucky, and New
York, 12 to 15 October 1962. Wednesday, 10 October 1962, he spoke in Baltimore, Maryland.
Meeting on the Budg et 377
35. Reference is to the $981/2 billion administrative budget (excluding trust fund transactions).
36. After his 13 August 1962 televised address to the nation on economic policy, delivered with a
plethora of statistics and accompanying charts and graphs, President Kennedy seemed particu-
larly concerned that such presentations never be delivered again in such an uninteresting style.
378 T U E S DAY, O C T O B E R 9, 1962
The President left only one recording from this important day. An hour
before he was to sign a piece of pork barrel legislation to satisfy a diffi-
cult and powerful congressman, the President called Senate Majority
Leader Mike Mansfield for mutual congratulations on the approval of a
compromise version of the foreign aid bill providing for a $300 million
increase over the amount voted by the House.
37. Walter H. Judd was a Republican U.S. representative from Minnesota and keynote speaker
at the 1960 Republican National Convention. Judd, in what was considered a mild upset at the
time, lost in the 1962 election to Democratic state senator Donald M. Fraser.
38. This is mostly likely a reference to Elmer Lee Andersen, governor of Minnesota, then run-
ning for reelection in 1962. His reelection bid resulted in the closest election in Minnesota
history with a loss to his opponent by 91 votes.
39. Hubert H. Humphrey was a U.S. senator from Minnesota.
40. A University of Minnesota professor of economics before joining the Kennedy administra-
tion, Walter Heller was particularly interested in this Minnesota congressional race.
Conversation with Mik e Mansfield and Mik e Kirwan 379
9:54 A.M.
1. Dictabelt 49.1, Cassette M, John F. Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, Presidential
Recordings Collection. Mike Mansfield was Democratic U.S. senator from Montana, 1953 to
1977, and Senate majority leader, 1961 to 1977. Michael J. Kirwan was a Democratic U.S. rep-
resentative from Ohio, 1937 to 1970.
380 T U E S DAY, O C T O B E R 9, 1962
Mansfield: No.
President Kennedy: Right.
Mansfield: It would make Mike very happy.
President Kennedy: Oh, good. I’ll sign it this morning, then.
Mansfield: Fine [unclear] here—wait a minute. Good-bye. Here’s
Mike.
President Kennedy: Yeah.
Mike Kirwan: Hello.
President Kennedy: Hello, hello.
Kirwan: Yes.
President Kennedy: How are you doing?
Kirwan: This is Mike . . .
President Kennedy: Are you sure you don’t want to witness this—
Kirwan: No, no . . . no.
President Kennedy: —this extraordinary action as I’m bulldozed and
bludgeoned and beaten into being the greatest friend of the fish . . . ?
Kirwan: That’s . . . . Do you want me to go down, then?
President Kennedy: I’ve eaten more fish . . .
Kirwan: What? Well, do you want me to go down?
President Kennedy: Well, why don’t you come down and watch it?
Kirwan: All right. That’s what I’ll . . . when are you going to do it?
President Kennedy: Well, I’ll do it whenever you want to be down here.
Kirwan: All right. I’ll go right down now, then.
President Kennedy: OK. Right.
tral Cuba. The flight was to be over Cuba for only 12 minutes but would
come close to some identified SAM sites. The risks were high. The last
time the CIA had photographed this part of the island was August 29
and new SAM sites might have been constructed since then. The
President approved this mission.3 The U-2 would make its direct over-
flight on October 14.
3. Gilpatric “Notes on a Meeting with the President,” 9 October 1962, described in FRUS, 11: 17.
1. “Final Parley Set on Cuba Captives,” New York Times, 9 October 1962. James Donovan
returned from Cuba on October 11 empty handed.
2. Memorandum on Donovan Project, Meeting 10 October 62, John McCone, FRUS, 11: 17–19.
382 W E D N E S DAY, O C T O B E R 10, 1962
Time Unknown
3. Cited in Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., Robert Kennedy and His Times (New York: Ballantine
Books, 1978), p. 530.
4. Dictabelt 50.3, Cassette M, John F. Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, Presidential
Recordings Collection. George A. Smathers was a Democratic U.S. senator from Florida, 1951
to 1969.
Conversation with Georg e Smathers 383
Despite their differences over this bill, Kennedy and Smathers enjoyed
a warm relationship marked by frequent golf outings and White House
breakfasts. Ostensibly a courtesy call to inform Smathers of the late-
breaking news, this conversation would meander, as well, into a discus-
sion of the James Meredith–University of Mississippi crisis, the Donovan
negotiations with Castro, and the lingering showdown over the handful
of appropriations bills yet to be completed.
5. The Self-employed Pension Bill, H.R. 10, also known as the Keough-Smathers Bill.
6. Reference to a Drew Pearson column published that morning in the Washington Post, dis-
cussed in greater detail, below (see Drew Pearson, “The Washington Merry-Go-Round: Sen.
Smathers Puts Up Roadblock,” Washington Post, 10 October 1962, p. D11).
7. A reference to the Senate and to Congress in general. On the heels of the first national elec-
tions during the Kennedy administration, the President is anxious to see Congress adjourn
and head home for the last few weeks of the campaign.
8. Richard Russell, Democratic U.S. senator from Georgia, was in the middle of a fight with
House conferees over the Department of Agriculture Appropriations Act, one of a handful of
appropriations bills not yet completed. Jamie Whitten, Democratic U.S. representative from
Mississippi and chair of the House Agriculture Subcommittee of the Appropriations
Committee, had suggested that Senate amendments not previously considered by a House
384 W E D N E S DAY, O C T O B E R 10, 1962
President Kennedy: I know, but, God, can’t we tell him we’ll give it
out of the contingency or we’ll do it with something else? I mean isn’t
there something that we can do with that goddamned Jamie Whitten?9
Smathers: I know it, it’s awful. But that’s the . . . everything else is
soluble—quickly . . . except that. I—
President Kennedy: Well, if we get everything else, I just don’t want
these guys around; particularly if this Cuban thing ever works out, we
want them out of there.
Smathers: That’s right.
President Kennedy: So, we’ve got to get them out tomorrow night.
Then everybody goes home, and, shit, nobody knows what the hell’s
going on.
Smathers: Exactly . . . exactly.
President Kennedy: There’s nothing that can be done with those god
. . . Come on. You’d think those southerners . . . I thought you southern-
ers were thick as thieves?
Smathers: Well, we are! We are! But not . . . but Jamie doesn’t want
to go home. The difficulty is—
President Kennedy: He doesn’t want to go home?
Smathers: He doesn’t want to go home. He wants to stay up here.
President Kennedy: That’s a—
Smathers: And Dick Russell doesn’t want to go. He told me this after-
noon, he said . . . I said, “Dick, can’t we get this damn thing settled?” And
he said, “Well, not before next week.” I said, “Well, Jesus Christ!” And he
said, “Well, frankly, I’m not much interested in going home anyway.”
President Kennedy: God, that’s a selfish fucking attitude, isn’t it?
With a lot of guys running for reelection?
Smathers: Yes, it is . . . yes. I know it. It’s terrible. But many south-
erners don’t want to go home. This is a problem. Sam Ervin said, 10 “I’ve
lost my enthusiasm for going home, now with this Mississippi thing.”11
President Kennedy: He thinks he’s going to get a lot of—
committee or sent down from the President were to be excluded from the conference report
and final bill. Angered on the basis of principle and by the removal of a $1.6 million amend-
ment for a peanut-marketing research facility in Dawson, Georgia, Russell intended to keep
Congress working until he got his way.
9. See note 8.
10. Samuel J. Ervin, Jr., was Democratic U.S. senator from North Carolina, 1954 to 1975.
11. Reference to the crisis at the University of Mississippi following James Meredith’s
attempts to register from 25 September to 1 October.
Conversation with Georg e Smathers 385
12. Robert L. F. Sikes was a Democratic U.S. representative from Florida, 1941 to 1979, and
senior member of the House Appropriations Committee.
13. A. Sydney Herlong, Jr., was a Democratic U.S. representative from Florida, 1949 to 1969.
14. Paul G. Rogers was a Democratic U.S. representative from Florida, 1955 to 1979.
15. Ross Barnett, segregationist governor of Mississippi from 1960 to 1964, refused to register
Meredith at Ole Miss, touching off a riot and President Kennedy’s deployment of federal troops.
386 W E D N E S DAY, O C T O B E R 10, 1962
16. Reference to William “Bill” Thompson, president of the East Coast Railway, who had recently
joined President Kennedy, Smathers, and Bill Dale of the First National Bank of Orlando for a
cruise aboard the presidential yacht, Honey Fitz. All three of Kennedy’s guests were the subject of
an acerbic Drew Pearson column in the Washington Post that morning and were cited as evidence
of Kennedy’s predilection for treating his political enemies better than his political allies.
17. Pearson, “Sen. Smathers Puts Up a Roadblock.” “The interesting thing,” Pearson noted,
assaying the Kennedy-Smathers relationship, “is that the more the debonair Senator kicks him
on the legislative shins, the more his old golfing partner comes back smiling.”
18. Estes Kefauver was Democratic U.S. senator from Tennessee, 1949 to 1963, and the
Democratic vice-presidential nominee in 1956.
19. Albert A. Gore was Democratic U.S. senator from Tennessee, 1953 to 1971.
20. Wayne Morse was Republican U.S. senator from Oregon, 1945 to 1952; Independent U.S.
senator from Oregon, 1952 to 1955; and Democratic U.S. senator from Oregon, 1955 to 1969.
21. Public works projects for Oregon removed during conference committee on Interior and
Other Agencies Appropriations Act at the behest of Representative Michael Kirwan, the chair
of the House conferees.
Conversation with Georg e Smathers 387
After speaking with Smathers, the President called the House sponsor of
the pension bill.
22. Michael J. Kirwan was a Democratic U.S. representative from Ohio. See “Conversation
between President Kennedy and Mike Mansfield,” 8 October 1962, for additional detail on the
Kirwan-Morse confrontation.
23. Supplemental Appropriations Bill.
24. President Kennedy had promised to inform Senator Gore of his intentions regarding H.R. 10.
388 W E D N E S DAY, O C T O B E R 10, 1962
Time Unknown
Before the end of the day, the President had a conversation with an
unidentified official about James Meredith’s public criticisms of the racial
composition of the troops sent to maintain order in Oxford, Mississippi.
On October 9, the Army had begun withdrawing large numbers of
troops from Oxford.
25. Dictabelt 49.1, Cassette M, John F. Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, Presidential
Recordings Collection.
26. Eugene J. Keogh was Democratic U.S. representative from New York, 1937 to 1967. Keogh
retired in 1967 after 30 years in Congress, though he was only 59 years old at the time.
Conversation about James Meredith 389
Time Unknown
27. Dictabelt 50.2, Cassette M, John F. Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, Presidential
Recordings Collection.
28. “Meredith Charges Army Segregated Oxford Force,” New York Times, 10 October 1962.
390 W E D N E S DAY, O C T O B E R 10, 1962
1. On the sources for Keating’s allegations, see Max Holland, “A Luce Connection: Senator
Keating, William Pawley, and the Cuban Missile Crisis,” Journal of Cold War Studies 1 (Fall
1999), pp. 139–67. Bundy to President Kennedy, “Memorandum on Cuba for the Press
392 T U E S DAY, O C T O B E R 16, 1962
Conference,” 13 September 1962, National Security Files, Box 36, “Cuba General September
62,” John F. Kennedy Library. Bundy’s introduction comes quickly and clearly to the point:
1. The congressional head of steam on this is the most serious that we have had. It affects both
parties and takes many forms.
2. The immediate hazard is that the Administration may appear to be weak and indecisive.
3. One way to avoid this hazard is to act by naval or military force in the Cuban area.
4. The other course is to make a very clear and aggressive explanation of current policy and
its justification.
Bundy then argued for this “other course,” urging Kennedy to explain “The threat is under con-
trol [Bundy’s emphasis]. Neither Communist propaganda nor our own natural anger should
blind us to the basic fact that Cuba is not—and will not be allowed to become—a threat to the
United States.”
T U E S DAY, O C T O B E R 16, 1962 393
5. Richard Reeves, President Kennedy: Profile of Power (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1993),
p. 351.
T U E S DAY, O C T O B E R 16, 1962 395
McCone wrong. When Soviet SAMs were spotted in Cuba at the end of
August, McCone pressed harder for U-2 flights, for he interpreted these
SAMs as harbingers of offensive surface-to-surface missiles. Rusk’s resist-
ance also hardened, for the Soviet SAMs were SA-2s, which had shot down
Powers’s U-2 in 1960. The shootdown of a Taiwanese U-2 over western
China on September 8 added to Rusk’s and Kennedy’s fears. Bundy had
allied himself with Rusk. On September 10 Kennedy chose the cautious
approach. But, as worrying evidence mounted, McCone—with Robert
Kennedy’s support—won approval on October 9 for another U-2 flight
directly over Cuba.6 That flight took place on October 14.
During October 15, experts at the CIA’s National Photographic
Intelligence Center (NPIC), in a nondescript building at 5th and K Streets
in Washington, pored over photos from that October 14 U-2 flight over
Cuba. Seeing images of missiles much longer than SAMs, they leafed
through files of photos from the Soviet Union and technical data micro-
filmed by Soviet officer (and Anglo-American spy) Oleg Penkovsky. They
came up with a perfect match. These were medium-range ballistic missiles
(MRBMs) of the SS-4 family. At about 5:30 in the afternoon, Arthur
Lundahl, the head of NPIC, passed the news to CIA headquarters out in
Langley, Virginia.7
In ignorance of what was in progress at NPIC, McNamara had met
that afternoon with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and dozens of lower-level offi-
cials. Although McNamara explained that Kennedy had decided not to
take any military action against Cuba during the next three months, the
group reviewed plans for a massive air strike on Cuba and for an invasion.
That evening, Bundy and his wife gave a small dinner at their home
on Foxhall Road for Charles (Chip) and Avis Bohlen. Chip Bohlen was
going off to be U.S. ambassador to France. Called away to the telephone,
Bundy heard CIA deputy director for intelligence Ray Cline say crypti-
cally, “Those things we’ve been worrying about—it looks as though
we’ve really got something.” “It was a hell of a secret,” Bundy wrote
later. Though he considered immediately calling Kennedy, he concluded
that a few hours made no difference. The President had been in New
York State, speaking for Democratic congressional candidates, and had
6. For more background on the discovery of the missiles, see Graham Allison and Philip
Zelikow, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (2d ed.; New York: Longman,
1999), pp. 219–24, 331–37.
7. Full details are in Dino Brugioni, Eyeball to Eyeball: The Inside Story of the Cuban Missile
Crisis, ed. Robert F. McCort (New York: Random House, 1991), pp. 187–217. (Brugioni was in
NPIC at the time.)
396 T U E S DAY, O C T O B E R 16, 1962
8. McGeorge Bundy, Danger and Survival (New York: Random House, 1988), pp. 395–96.
9. Kenneth P. O’Donnell and David F. Powers, with Joe McCarthy, “Johnny, We Hardly Knew
Ye” (New York: Pocket Books, 1972), p. 369.
Meeting on the Cuban Missile Crisis 397
10. Including President Kennedy, George Ball, McGeorge Bundy, Marshall Carter, C. Douglas
Dillon, Roswell Gilpatric, Sidney Graybeal, U. Alexis Johnson, Vice President Johnson,
Robert Kennedy, Arthur Lundahl, Robert McNamara, Dean Rusk, and Maxwell Taylor. Tape
28, John F. Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, Presidential Recordings Collection.
398 T U E S DAY, O C T O B E R 16, 1962
11. An erector launcher trailer can carry a missile and then be secured in place at a designated
launch point. The missile launcher is then erected to the firing angle and the missile is fired
from it. To say the site is unrevetted means that earthworks or fortifications to protect against
attack or the blast from the missile have not been constructed.
12. In an earlier, less stringent declassification of this material, more of this sentence was left
intact, reading (once errors were corrected): “Our last look was when we had TALENT cover-
age of [three seconds excised as classified information] and we had a 350-mile [range] missile
erected just on hard earth with a kind of field exercise going on.” TALENT was a codeword
for overhead photography. The briefer was probably describing photography of the Tyuratam
missile test range in the Soviet Union.
13. May 1960 was when Soviet air defenses shot down a CIA U-2 reconaissance aircraft
piloted by Francis Gary Powers. Then-President Eisenhower suspended further U-2 flights
over the Soviet Union. Powers was captured and eventually repatriated to the United States.
Meeting on the Cuban Missile Crisis 399
14. These are references to the Naval Photographic Intelligence Center in Suitland,
Maryland, and to the National Photographic Interpretation Center, directed by Lundahl, that
was part of the CIA.
15. Lundahl was referring to the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee (JAEIC) of the
U.S. Intelligence Board.
16. In an earlier, less stringent, declassification of this material, most of the next sentence was
left intact, reading (once errors were corrected): Lundahl: “ . . . If new types of radars, or
known associated missile firing radars or associated with missile firing, are coming up on that,
that might be another indicator of readiness. We know nothing of what those tapes [of elec-
tromagnetic emissions] hold, at the moment.”
402 T U E S DAY, O C T O B E R 16, 1962
Rusk: When will those be ready? By the end of the day, do you think?
Lundahl: They’re supposed to be in, sir. I think that’s right. Isn’t it,
General Carter?
Carter: The readout from Sunday’s [U-2 flights] should be available
now. We have done some—
Rusk: Weren’t there flights yesterday as well?
Carter: Two flights yesterday.
Rusk: You don’t have the results from those yet?
Carter: No.
The room is silent for about eight seconds.
President Kennedy: Thank you.
Lundahl: Yes, sir.
President Kennedy: Well, when is . . . ? [Are] there any further
flights scheduled?
Carter: There are no more scheduled, sir.
President Kennedy: These flights yesterday, I presume, cover the . . .
Lundahl: Well, we hope so, sir—
McGeorge Bundy: [Unclear], Mr. President. Because the weather
won’t have been clear all along the island. So we can’t claim that we will
have been—certainly we surely do not have up-to-date photographic
coverage on the whole island. I should think one of our first questions is
to—
President Kennedy: Authorize more flights.
Bundy: —consider whether we should not authorize more flights on
the basis of COMOR priorities.17
There’s a specific question of whether we want a closer and sharper
look at this area. That, however, I think should be looked at in the con-
text of the question of whether we wish to give tactical warning and any
other possible activities.
McNamara: I would recommend, Mr. President, that you authorize
such flights as are considered necessary to obtain complete coverage of
the island. Now this seems to be ill defined. But I purposely define it that
way because we’re running into cloud cover on some of these flights and
I would suggest that we simply repeat the flight if we have cloud cover
and repeat it sufficiently often to obtain the coverage we require.
17. The acronym COMOR stands for the interagency Committee on Overhead Reconaissance,
a committee of the U.S. Intelligence Board. Chaired by James Reber, COMOR set guidelines
and priorities for U.S. surveillance overflights of other countries.
Meeting on the Cuban Missile Crisis 403
18. Low-level reconnaissance overflights went underneath clouds, low and fast, over their tar-
gets. These flights were carried out by air force or navy tactical reconnaissance units with air-
craft like the F-101 or F8U. In September the CIA had asked McNamara to dispatch low-level
overflights over Cuba but at that time he declined, preferring to leave the work to the U-2.
19. The Soviet SAM sites in Cuba were first identified after a U-2 overflight of Cuba on 29
August and the White House was briefed about this discovery on 31 August. The discover-
ies contributed to the first U.S. warning to the Soviets against deploying “offensive
weapons” announced on 4 September. The same U-2 mission revealed another kind of mis-
404 T U E S DAY, O C T O B E R 16, 1962
sile site, near Banes in eastern Cuba, that CIA analysts needed more time to analyze. They
finally judged (correctly) that this missile was a cruise missile (more akin to a small
unguided jet aircraft, without a ballistic trajectory) with a range of 20 to 40 nautical miles,
apparently designed for coastal defense. President Kennedy was briefed in person about this
finding on 7 September (see Brugioni, Eyeball to Eyeball, pp. 120 –27).
President Kennedy was concerned that the nature of this arguably defensive system not
be misunderstood and that news about it not leak out into the ongoing, volatile domestic
debate over his response to the Soviet buildup in Cuba. A new codeword classification,
PSALM, was thereupon created—with a tightly restricted distribution—for future reports on
Soviet deployments in Cuba. A new, even more explicit, public warning against deployment of
“offensive weapons” was announced by the White House on 13 September.
Meeting on the Cuban Missile Crisis 405
20. The Organization of American States (OAS) was created after World War II as a collective
organization of states in the Western Hemisphere for several cooperative purposes, including
the task of responding (by a two-thirds vote) to aggression from a member or nonmember
state, including economic or political sanctions. The founding documents were signed in
Mexico City (1945) and especially the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, signed
in Rio de Janeiro (1947) and usually referred to as the Rio Pact. The OAS, spurred by the
United States, had adopted sanctions against Cuba in early 1962.
406 T U E S DAY, O C T O B E R 16, 1962
21. Guantánamo was and is a U.S. naval base on the eastern end of Cuba, with U.S. rights
secured by a long-term treaty signed decades before Castro seized power.
Meeting on the Cuban Missile Crisis 407
said, missiles, airfields, and nuclear sites that we know of. At the same
time, naval blockade. At the same time, reinforce Guantánamo and evac-
uate the dependents. I’d then start this continuous reconnaissance, the
list that you have is connected, continuing over Cuba.
Then the decision can be made as we’re mobilizing, with the air strike,
as to whether we invade or not. I think that’s the hardest question militar-
ily in the whole business, and one which we should look at very closely
before we get our feet in that deep mud in Cuba.
Rusk: There are certainly one or two other things, Mr. President.
[Soviet foreign minister Andrei] Gromyko asked to see you Thursday
[October 18]. It may be of some interest to know what he says about
this, if he says anything. He may be bringing a message on this subject. I
just want to remind you that you are seeing him and that may be rele-
vant to this topic. I might say, incidentally, sir, that you can delay any-
thing else you have to do at this point.
Secondly, I don’t believe, myself, that the critical question is whether
you get a particular missile before it goes off because if they shoot those
missiles we are in general nuclear war. In other words, the Soviet Union
has got quite a different decision to make if they shoot those missiles,
want to shoot them off before they get knocked out by aircraft. So I’m
not sure that this is necessarily the precise element, Bob.
McNamara: Well, I would strongly emphasize that I think our plan-
ning should be based on the assumption it is, Dean. We don’t know what
kinds of communications the Soviets have with those sites. We don’t
know what kinds of control they have over those warheads.
If we saw a warhead on the site and we knew that that launcher was
capable of launching that warhead I would, frankly, I would strongly
urge against the air attack, to be quite frank about it, because I think the
danger to this country in relation to the gain that would accrue would be
excessive. This is why I suggest that if we’re talking about an air attack I
believe we should consider it only on the assumption that we can carry it
off before these become operational.
President Kennedy: What is the advantage? There must be some
major reason for the Russians to set this up. It must be that they’re not
satisfied with their ICBMs. What’d be the reason that they would . . . ?
Taylor: What it’d give them is, primarily, it makes a launching base
for short-range missiles against the United States to supplement their
rather defective ICBM system, for example. That’s one reason.
President Kennedy: Of course, I don’t see how we could prevent fur-
ther ones from coming in by submarine. I mean, if we let them blockade
the thing, they come in by submarine.
410 T U E S DAY, O C T O B E R 16, 1962
McNamara: Well, I think the only way to prevent them coming in,
quite frankly, is to say you’ll take them out the moment they come in.
You’ll take them out and you’ll carry on open surveillance. And you’ll
have a policy to take them out if they come in.
I think it’s really rather unrealistic to think that we could carry out
an air attack of the kind we’re talking about. We’re talking about an air
attack of several hundred sorties because we don’t know where these
[Soviet] airplanes are.22
Bundy: Are you absolutely clear on your premise that an air strike
must go to the whole air complex?
McNamara: Well, we are, Mac, because we are fearful of these MiG-
21s.23 We don’t know where they are. We don’t know what they’re capa-
ble of. If there are nuclear warheads associated with the launchers, you
must assume there will be nuclear warheads associated with aircraft.
Even if there are not nuclear warheads associated with aircraft, you must
assume that those aircraft have high-explosive potential.
We have a serious air defense problem. We’re not prepared to report
to you exactly what the Cuban air force is capable of; but I think we must
assume that the Cuban air force is definitely capable of penetrating, in
small numbers, our coastal air defense by coming in low over the water.
And I would think that we would not dare go in against the missile sites,
knock those out, leaving intact Castro’s air force, and run the risk that he
would use part or all of that air force against our coastal areas—either
with or without nuclear weapons. It would be a very heavy price to pay
in U.S. lives for the damage we did to Cuba.
Rusk: Mr. President, about why the Soviets are doing this, Mr.
McCone suggested some weeks ago that one thing Mr. Khrushchev may
have in mind is that he knows that we have a substantial nuclear superi-
ority, but he also knows that we don’t really live under fear of his nuclear
weapons to the extent that he has to live under fear of ours.
Also, we have nuclear weapons nearby, in Turkey and places like that.
President Kennedy: How many weapons do we have in Turkey?
Taylor: We have the Jupiter missiles.
Bundy: We have how many?
McNamara: About 15, I believe to be the figure.
22. A sortie is one mission by one airplane. If eight airplanes flew against a target, that would
be 8 sorties. If the planes flew two missions in one day, that would be 16 sorties in the day.
23. The MiG-21 (NATO designation “Fishbed”) was a short-range Soviet fighter-interceptor
that could, in some configurations, carry a light bomb load against nearby targets.
Meeting on the Cuban Missile Crisis 411
capability in Cuba just five days ago, four days ago, under General Carter.
That limits this to people who have an immediate, operational necessity in
intelligence terms to work on the data, and the people who have—
President Kennedy: How many would that be, about?
Bundy: Oh that will be a very large number, but that’s not generally
where leaks come from. And the more important limitation is that only
officers with a policy responsibility for advice directly to you receive
this.
President Kennedy: How many would get it over in the Defense
Department, General, with your meeting this afternoon?
Taylor: Well, I was going to mention that. We’d have to ask for
relaxation of the ground rules that Mac has just enunciated, so that I can
give it to the senior commanders who are involved in the plans.
President Kennedy: Would that be about 50?
Taylor: No, sir. I would say that, at this stage, 10 more.
McNamara: Mr. President, I think, to be realistic, we should assume
that this will become fairly widely known, if not in the newspapers, at
least by political representatives of both parties within, I would say, I’m
just picking a figure, I’d say a week. And I say that because we have
taken action already that is raising questions in people’s minds.
Normally when a U-2 comes back, we duplicate the films. The dupli-
cated copies go to a series of commands. A copy goes to SAC. A copy
goes to CINCLANT.24 A copy goes to CIA. And normally the photo
interpreters and the operational officers in these commands are looking
forward to these. We have stopped all that, and this type of information
is going on throughout the department.
And I doubt very much that we can keep this out of the hands of
members of Congress, for example, for more than a week.
Rusk: Well, Senator Keating has already, in effect, announced it on
the floor of the Senate.
Bundy: [speaking over Rusk] Senator Keating said this on the floor of
the Senate on the 10th of October: “Construction has begun on at least a
half-dozen launching sites for intermediate-range tactical missiles.”
Rusk: That’s correct. That’s exactly the point. Well, I suppose we’ll
have to count on announcing it not later than Thursday or Friday of this
week.
Carter: There is a refugee who’s a major source of intelligence on
24. Commander in Chief, U.S. Forces, Atlantic. Headquartered in Norfolk, CINCLANT at this
time was Admiral Robert Dennison.
Meeting on the Cuban Missile Crisis 415
this, of course, who has described one of these missiles in terms which
we can recognize, who is now in this country.
President Kennedy: Is he the one who’s giving Keating his stuff ?
Carter: We don’t know.
Bundy: My question, Mr. President, is whether, as a matter of tactics,
we ought not to interview Senator Keating and check out his data. It
seems to me that that ought to be done in a routine sort of way by an
open officer of the intelligence agency.
Carter: I think that’s right.
President Kennedy: You have any thoughts, Mr. Vice President?
Vice President Johnson: I agree with Mac that that ought to be done. I
think that we’re committed at any time that we feel that there’s a buildup
that in any way endangers, to take whatever action we must take to assure
our security. I would think that the Secretary’s evaluation of this thing
being around all over the lot is a pretty accurate one. I wouldn’t think it’d
take a week to do it. I think they ought to [unclear] before then.
I would like to hear what the responsible commanders have to say
this afternoon. I think the question we face is whether we take it out or
whether we talk about it. And, of course, either alternative is a very dis-
tressing one. But, of the two, I would take it out—assuming that the
commanders felt that way.
I’m fearful if we . . . I spent the weekend with the ambassadors of
the Organization of American States. I think this organization is fine.
But I don’t think, I don’t rely on them much for any strength in any-
thing like this.
And I think that we’re talking about our other allies, I take the posi-
tion that Mr. Bundy says: “Well we’ve lived all these years [with mis-
siles]. Why can’t you? Why get your blood pressure up?” But the fact is
the country’s blood pressure is up, and they are fearful, and they’re inse-
cure, and we’re getting divided, and I don’t think that . . .
I take this little State Department Bulletin that you sent out to all the
congressmen. One of the points you make: that any time the buildup
endangers or threatens our security in any way, we’re going to do what-
ever must be done immediately to protect our own security. And when
you say that, why, they give unanimous support.
People are really concerned about this, in my opinion. I think we
have to be prudent and cautious, talk to the commanders and see what
they say. I’m not much for circularizing it over the Hill or with our allies,
even though I realize it’s a breach of faith, not to confer with them.
We’re not going to get much help out of them.
Bundy: There is an intermediate position. There are perhaps two or
416 T U E S DAY, O C T O B E R 16, 1962
Robert Kennedy: Yeah. The only thing is, there’s been so much
attention on Berlin in the last . . . Would you have to move them so that
everybody would know it was Cuba?
Taylor: Well, it’s troops, plus shipping even more so, you know.
You’re going to have to assemble the ships necessary, and that will be
very very overt, and we can think of no way to cover that up.
McNamara: May I suggest, Max, that we mention this other plan we
talked about. We should be prepared for a series of eventualities after the air
strike starts. I think it’s not probable, but it’s conceivable that the air strike
would trigger a nationwide uprising. And if there was strong opposition
among the dissident groups, and if the air strike were highly successful, it’s
conceivable that some U.S. troops could be put in in less than seven days.
Taylor: That’s correct. At first our air, our airdrops, and our Marines.
Well, the airdrop at least, beginning in five days. That might do the trick
if this is really a national upheaval.
McNamara: So we should have a series of alternative plans is all I’m
suggesting, other than the seven days.
Robert Kennedy: I just think that five days, even a five-day period—
the United States is going to be under such pressure by everybody not to
do anything. And there’s going to be also pressure on the Russians to do
something against us.
If you could get it in, get it started so that there wasn’t any turning
back, they couldn’t . . .
President Kennedy: But I mean the problem is, as I understand it . . .
you’ve got two problems.
One is how much time we’ve got on these particular missiles before
they’re ready to go. Do we have two weeks? If we had two weeks, we
could lay on all this and have it all ready to go. But the question really is
whether we can wait two weeks.
Bundy: Yeah.
Taylor: I don’t think we’ll ever know, Mr. President, those opera-
tional questions, because with this type of missile, it can be launched
very quickly with a concealed expedience—
Bundy: Do we have any intelligence—
Taylor: —so that even today, this one, this area, might be opera-
tional. I concede this is highly improbable.
Bundy: One very important question is whether there are other
areas which conceivably might be even more operational that we have
not identified.
McNamara: This is why, I think, the moment we leave here, Mac, we
just have to take this new authority we have and put it—
Meeting on the Cuban Missile Crisis 419
Bundy: May I ask General Carter whether the intelligence, the col-
lateral intelligence [information from human sources], relates only to
this area, as I understood it this morning?
Carter: That’s right. That’s why we specifically covered this area on
the one [U-2 flight] Sunday [October 14] because [unclear].
McNamara: May I go back for a second, however, to the point that
was raised a moment ago? Mr. President, I don’t believe that if we had
two weeks, if we knew that at the end of two weeks we were going in, I
don’t believe we could substantially lessen the five- or seven-day period
required after the air attack, prior to the invasion, for the size force we’re
talking about. Because we start with the assumption the air attack must
take them by surprise. We would not be able to take the actions required
to shorten the five- to seven-day period and still assure you of surprise in
the air attack. And, therefore, we haven’t been able to figure out a way to
shorten that five- to seven-day period while maintaining surprise in the
air attack.
President Kennedy: What are you doing for that five days? Moving
ships, or where are the ships?
McNamara: Moving ships. And we have to move transport aircraft
by the scores around the country. We should move ships. Actually, the
ship movement would not be as extensive in the 7-day invasion as it
would be in an 11-day [invasion] after the air strike.
Taylor: [Unclear] place after the air strike.
McNamara: We have been moving already, on a very quiet basis,
munitions and POL. We will have by the 20th, which is Friday I guess
[actually Saturday], we will have stocks of munitions, stocks of POL
prepositioned in the southeast part of this country. So that kind of move-
ment is beginning.
President Kennedy: What’s POL?
McNamara: Petroleum, oil, and lubricants. So that kind of movement
has already been taking place and it’s been possible to do it quietly.
President Kennedy: What about armor, and so on? What about armor?
McNamara: The armor movement would be noticeable if it were car-
ried out in the volume we require. And hence the point I would make is
that, knowing ahead of time, two weeks ahead of time, that we would
carry out the invasion, would not significantly reduce the five- to seven-
day interval between the strike by air and the invasion time, given the
size force we’re talking about.
Taylor: I think our point of view may change somewhat with a tacti-
cal adjustment here, a decision that would take out only the known mis-
sile sites and not the airfields. There is a great danger of a quick dispersal
420 T U E S DAY, O C T O B E R 16, 1962
25. The IL-28 (NATO designation “Beagle”) was a twin-engined light/medium jet bomber of
an early postwar design (production began in 1950) with a cruising radius of about 750 miles,
able to carry 6,500 pounds of nuclear or conventional (“iron”) bombs. On 28 September a
Navy reconaissance aircraft in the Atlantic had photographed a Soviet freighter carrying ten
fuselage crates for these bombers to Cuba. The Soviet freighter arrived on 4 October. Due to
delay in the Navy’s transmission of its photos to CIA interpreters, the IL-28s were not identi-
fied until 9 October. McCone briefed President Kennedy about this discovery on 11 October.
At that time Kennedy told McCone, “We’ll have to do something drastic about Cuba” and said
he was looking forward to the JCS operational plan that was to be presented the following
week (see McCone to File, “Memorandum on Donovan Project,” 11 October 1962, in CIA
Documents, McAuliffe, p. 124; Brugioni, Eyeball to Eyeball, pp. 172–74).
Meeting on the Cuban Missile Crisis 421
26. The acronym SACEUR stands for NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander, Europe—always
a U.S. officer. The SACEUR at that time was General Lauris Norstad. The commandant was
the commandant of the U.S. Sector of Berlin, Major General Albert Watson.
422 T U E S DAY, O C T O B E R 16, 1962
I don’t think we’ve got much time on these missiles. They may be . . .
So it may be that we just have to . . . We can’t wait two weeks while
we’re getting ready to roll. Maybe we just have to just take them out,
and continue our other preparations if we decide to do that. That may be
where we end up.
I think we ought to, beginning right now, be preparing to present
what we’re going to do anyway. We’re certainly going to do [option]
number one. We’re going to take out these missiles.
The questions will be whether, what I would describe as number two,
which would be a general air strike. That we’re not ready to say, but we
should be in preparation for it.
The third is the general invasion. At least we’re going to do number
one. So it seems to me that we don’t have to wait very long. We ought to
be making those preparations.
Bundy: You want to be clear, Mr. President, whether we have defi-
nitely decided against a political track. I, myself, think we ought to work
out a contingency on that.
Rusk: We’ll develop both tracks.
President Kennedy: I don’t think we ought to do the OAS. I think
that’s a waste of time. I don’t think we ought to do NATO.
We ought to just decide who we talk to, and how long ahead, and how
many people, really, in the government. There’s going to be a difference
between those who know that—this will leak out in the next few days—
there are these bases. Until we say, or the Pentagon or State, won’t be hard.
We’ve already said it on the . . . So let’s say we’ve got two or three days.
Bundy: Well, let’s play it, shall we, play it still harder and simply say
that there is no evidence. I mean, we have to [unclear] be liars.
President Kennedy: We ought to stick with that until we want to do
something. Otherwise we give ourselves away, so let’s—
Bundy: May I make one other cover plan suggestion, Mr. President?
President Kennedy: Yes.
Bundy: There will be meetings in the White House. I think the best
we can do is to keep the people with a specific Latin American business
black and describe the rest as intensive budget review sessions.27 But I
haven’t been able to think of any other.
President Kennedy: Nobody, it seems to me, in the State Department.
I discussed the matter with Bohlen of the Soviet part and told him he
could talk to [Llewellyn] Thompson. So that’s those two. It seems to me
27. In this context the word black means to keep undercover, covert.
Meeting on the Cuban Missile Crisis 423
that there’s no one else in the State Department that ought to be talked to
about it in any level at all until we know a little more.
And then, as I say, in Defense we’ve got to keep it as tight as possible,
particularly what we’re going to do about it. Maybe a lot of people know
about what’s there. But what we’re going to do about it really ought to
be, you know, the tightest of all because [unclear] we bitch it up.
McNamara: Mr. President, may I suggest that we come back this
afternoon prepared to answer three questions.
First, should we surface our surveillance? I think this is a very impor-
tant question at the moment. We ought to try to decide today either yes
or no.
President Kennedy: By “surface our”?
McNamara: I mean, should we state publicly that, that you have
stated we will act to take out any offensive weapons. In order to be cer-
tain as to whether there are or are not offensive weapons, we are sched-
uling U-2 flights or other surveillance—
Bundy: [chuckling] This is covert reconnaissance.
McNamara: Well, all right, or reconnaissance flights to obtain this
information. We’ll make the information public.
President Kennedy: That’d be one. All right, why not?
McNamara: This is one question. A second question is: Should we
precede the military action with political action? If so, on what timing?
I would think the answer is almost certainly yes. And I would think
particularly of the contacts with Khrushchev. And I would think that if
these are to be done, they must be scheduled, in terms of time, very, very
carefully in relation to a potential military action. There must be a very,
very precise series of contacts with him, and indications of what we’ll do
at certain times following that.
And, thirdly, we should be prepared to answer your questions regarding
the effect of these strikes and the time required to carry them off. I think—
President Kennedy: How long it would take to get them organized.
McNamara: Exactly. We’ll be prepared—
President Kennedy: In other words, how many days from tomorrow
morning would it . . . How many mornings from tomorrow morning
would it take to get the, to take out just these missile sites, which we
need to know now. How long before we get the information about the
rest of the island, do you figure, General?
Bundy: It could take weeks, Mr. President.
President Kennedy: Weeks?
Bundy: For complete coverage of a cloud-covered island.
Unidentified: Well, depending on the weather.
424 T U E S DAY, O C T O B E R 16, 1962
28. The West Gate was on the same side of the White House as the White House Press Room
and was the usual path for observing the comings and goings of official visitors. The East
Gate was the usual entrance for the residential side of the White House, used more for social
functions and tours.
29. McCone had remarried in August. His wife’s son, Paul Pigott, had died on 14 October
426 T U E S DAY, O C T O B E R 16, 1962
from injuries suffered in an auto racing accident in California. McCone had left Washington to
accompany the body to Seattle for the funeral.
Meeting on the Cuban Missile Crisis 427
body else and sit down at the table and figure out where these planes are.
And consider what camps there are. [Mixed voices.]
Why don’t you come down with, drive back [with us]? Why don’t you
ride—pick up your car and drive over with us to the Pentagon and have
lunch with us over there? Why don’t you call from here [unclear names] and
come over, or anybody else you choose? [Unclear.] And then we can sit
down [unclear] and sort out in great detail and see what we really need.
Vice President Johnson: [concerned about improving his jet transport and
communications as he travels] I have [unclear] authority. I wonder if there’s
any good reason why you shouldn’t go to somebody and put [unclear]. If
you had immediate [unclear] or something else, I’m away from you for four
or five hours. I have a Grumman Gulfstream that I’ve leased. I want you to
lease it for MATS [Military Air Transport Service], after the election. Let
me use it for the [Lockheed] Jetstar. It’s a hell of a lot better for these small
airfields. When I think about [unclear].
Anyway, I have a lease now and what I’d like to have is the best commu-
nication that you have that you’re . . . if it can be done.
McNamara: Oh sure, sure.
Vice President Johnson: As it is now, I’m going to get 100–200 miles
from Washington on the [unclear reference to communication].
McNamara: Oh sure.
30. Including President Kennedy, George Ball, McGeorge Bundy, Marshall Carter, C. Douglas
Dillon, Roswell Gilpatric, U. Alexis Johnson, Vice President Johnson, Robert Kennedy, Edwin
Martin, Robert McNamara, Dean Rusk, Theodore Sorensen, and Maxwell Taylor. Tapes 28
and 28A, John F. Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, Presidential Recordings Collection.
428 T U E S DAY, O C T O B E R 16, 1962
tration could act promptly and effectively against the missiles without
surprising allies in the hemisphere and Europe and possibly losing their
support.
While this went on, Kennedy kept to his announced schedule. He
presided over a formal lunch for the crown prince of Libya. Adlai Stevenson
was present. After lunch, Kennedy invited Stevenson to the family quarters.
Showing Stevenson the U-2 photos, Kennedy said, “I suppose the alterna-
tives are to go in by air and wipe them out or to take other steps to render
the weapons inoperable.” Stevenson’s position was: “Let’s not go into an air
strike until we have explored the possibilities of a peaceful solution.”
During the afternoon, Stevenson took part in the meetings at the
State Department. So did Soviet experts Bohlen and Thompson and the
assistant secretary for Latin America, Edwin Martin.
At Justice, Robert Kennedy had meanwhile held in his own office a
meeting of those involved in Operation Mongoose. Describing the “gen-
eral dissatisfaction” of the President with progress thus far, the Attorney
General focused discussion on a new and more active program of sabo-
tage that had just been prepared by the CIA. Pressed by the CIA repre-
sentative (Richard Helms) to explain the ultimate objective of the
operation and what to promise the Cuban exiles, Robert Kennedy hinted
the President might be becoming less averse to overt U.S. military
action. He wondered aloud how many Cubans would defend Castro’s
regime if the country were invaded. After discussing the possibility of
having Cuban émigrés attack the missile sites, he and the rest of the
group seemed to agree this was not feasible.
At the Pentagon, the Joint Chiefs of Staff conferred with CIN-
CLANT, the commanders of SAC and the Tactical Air Command (TAC),
and the general commanding the 18th Airborne Corps. McNamara
joined later. Presuming that the Soviets would not initiate a nuclear war
against the United States, the JCS favored an attack, regardless of
whether the missiles were operational. They nevertheless approved sev-
eral prudential steps to increase U.S. readiness for nuclear war. After
McNamara left, the JCS agreed that they did not favor use of low-level
reconnaissance flights over Cuba, fearing that they would “tip our hand.”
They also agreed they would rather do nothing than limit an air strike
only to MRBMs.31 In the last 40 minutes before returning to the White
31. Based on notes taken from transcripts of JCS meetings in October–November 1962. The
notes were made in 1976 before these transcripts were apparently destroyed. They have since
been declassified and are available from the National Security Archive, in Washington, D.C.
Meeting on the Cuban Missile Crisis 429
Carter: It would appear that with this type of missile, with the solid
propellant and inertial guidance system, that they could well be opera-
tional within two weeks, as we look at the pictures now. And once opera-
tional they could fire on very little notice. They’ll have a refire rate of
from four to six hours, for each launcher.
President Kennedy: What about the vulnerability of such a missile to
bullets?
Robert McNamara: Highly vulnerable, Mr. President.
Carter: They’re vulnerable. They’re not nearly as vulnerable as the
oxygen propellant, but they are vulnerable to ordinary rifle fire.
We have no evidence whatsoever of any nuclear warhead storage near
the field launchers. However, ever since last February we have been
observing an unusual facility which now has automatic antiaircraft weapon
protection. This is at Bejucal. There are some similarities but also many
points of dissimilarity between this particular facility and the national
[nuclear] storage sites in the Soviet Union. It’s the best candidate for a
site, and we have that marked for further surveillance. However, there is
really totally inadequate evidence to say that there is a nuclear storage
capability now.
These are field-type launchers. They have mobile support, erection,
and check-out equipment. And they have a four-in-line deployment pat-
tern in launchers which is identical, complexes about five miles apart,
representative of the deployments that we note in the Soviet Union for
similar missiles.
President Kennedy: General, how long would you say we had before
these, at least to the best of your ability for the ones we now know, will
be ready to fire?
Carter: Well our people estimate that these could be fully operational
within two weeks. This would be the total complex. If they’re the oxy-
gen type, we have no . . . it would be considerably longer, since we don’t
have any indication of oxygen refueling there, nor any radars.
Alexis Johnson: This wouldn’t rule out the possibility that one of
them might be operational very much sooner.
Carter: Well, one of them could be operational much sooner. Our
people feel that this has been being put in since, probably, early
September. We have had two visits of a Soviet ship that has an eight-foot
hold capacity sideways. And this, about so far, is the only delivery vehicle
that we would have any suspicion that they came in on. And that came in
late August, and one in early September.
George Ball: Why would they have to be sideways though?
Carter: Well, it’s just easier to get them in, I guess.
Meeting on the Cuban Missile Crisis 431
Carter: No. There’s no question in our minds at all. These are all the
characteristics that we have seen with live ones.
Rusk: You’ve seen actual missiles themselves and not just the boxes,
have you?
Carter: No, we’ve seen . . . in the picture there is an actual missile.
Rusk: Yeah. Sure there is [tone is serious, not sarcastic].
Carter: Yes. There’s no question in our mind, sir. And they are gen-
uine. They are not a camouflage or covert attempt to fool us.
Bundy: How much do we know, Pat? I don’t mean to go behind your
judgment here, except that there’s one thing that would be really cata-
strophic, [which] would be to make a judgment here on a bad guess as
to whether these things are . . . We mustn’t do that.
How do we really know what these missiles are, and what their
range is?
Carter: Only that from the readout that we have now, and in the
judgment of our analysts, and of the Guided Missile and Astronautics
Committee which has been convening all afternoon, these signatures are
identical with those that we have clearly earmarked in the Soviet Union,
and have fully verified.33
Bundy: What made the verification? That’s really my question. How
do we know what a given Soviet missile will do?
Carter: We know something from the range firings that we have vet-
ted for the past two years. And we know also from comparison with the
characteristics of our own missiles as to size and length and diameter. As
to these particular missiles, we have a family of Soviet missiles for which
we have all accepted the specifications.
Bundy: I know that we have accepted them, and I know that we’ve
had these things in charts for years. But I don’t know how we know.
Carter: Well, we know from a number of sources, including our
IRONBARK sources, as well as from range firings which we have been
vetting for several years, as to the capabilities.34 But I would have to get
the analysts in here to give you the play-by-play account.
Rusk: Pat, we don’t know of any 65-foot Soviet missile that has a
range of, say, 15 miles, do we?
33. The Guided Missile and Astronautics Intelligence Committee (GMAIC) was another
interagency committee of the U.S. Intelligence Board.
34. The word IRONBARK was a codeword for information passed to the United States by
Colonel Oleg Penkovsky, an officer in Soviet military intelligence. Penkovsky had already
fallen under suspicion and was arrested six days later (on 22 October, Washington time). He
was later executed by the Soviet government.
Meeting on the Cuban Missile Crisis 433
threat that exists here, and we mean to take action about it in the next
day or so. And we’ll have to do this unless we receive word from him that
he is prepared to take action to get the Soviets out of the site. He will
have to show us that, not only by statements—privately or publicly—
but by action. That we intend to keep close surveillance by overflights of
the site to make sure, to know, what is being done. But we will have to
know that he is doing something to remove this threat, in order to with-
hold the action that we intend, we will be compelled, to take.
If Castro feels that an attempt by him to take the kind of action that
we’re suggesting to him would result in serious difficulties for him
within Cuba, we at least want him to know that, ask to convey to him
and remind him of the statement that you, Mr. President, made a year
and a half ago, to the effect that there are two points that are nonnego-
tiable. One is the Soviet tie and presence. And the second is aggression
in Latin America. This is a hint, but no more than that, that we might
have sympathy and help for him in case he ran into trouble trying to
throw the old-line Communists and the Soviets out.
Rusk: Yes.
Martin: And give him 24 hours to respond.
Rusk: The disadvantage in that is, of course, the advance notice if he
judges that . . . We would not, in this approach here, say exactly what we
would do. But it might, of course, lead him to bring up mobile antiaircraft
weapons around these missiles themselves, or take some other action that
will make the strike there more difficult. But there is that move.
There are two other problems that we are concerned about. If we strike
these missiles, we would expect, I think, maximum Communist reaction in
Latin America. In the case of about six of those governments, unless the
heads of government had some intimation requiring some preparatory
steps from the security point of view, one or another of those governments
could easily be overthrown. I’m thinking of Venezuela, for example, or
Guatemala, Bolivia, Chile, possibly even Mexico. And therefore the ques-
tion will arise as to whether we should not somehow indicate to them, in
some way, the seriousness of the situation so they can take precautionary
steps, whether we tell them exactly what we have in mind, or not.
The other is the NATO problem. We would estimate that the Soviets
would almost certainly take some kind of action somewhere. For us to
take an action of this sort without letting our closer allies know of a
matter which could subject them to very great danger is a very far
reaching decision to make. And we could find ourselves isolated, and the
alliance crumbling, very much as it did for a period during the Suez
Meeting on the Cuban Missile Crisis 435
35. The U.S. ambassador to Moscow, Foy Kohler, had met with Khrushchev earlier in the
morning of 16 October (Moscow time). His report on their long conversation had arrived in
Washington during the afternoon (Washington time), so Rusk and others would have read the
report just before this meeting. In the initial summary report of that conversation (Moscow
970, 16 October 1962), Khrushchev promised that he would not do anything to worsen rela-
tions until after the U.S. congressional elections in early November. He planned to visit New
York later in November for a meeting of the U.N. General Assembly and would then renew
the dialogue on Berlin and other matters. Khrushchev said the Americans “could be sure he
would take no action before meeting which would make situation more difficult.”
36. At this point Tape 28 ends and the recording resumes on Tape 28A.
440 T U E S DAY, O C T O B E R 16, 1962
37. Carter was referring to the Special National Intelligence Estimate, “The Military Buildup
in Cuba,” of September 19, which had concluded that the Soviet Union “could derive consider-
able military advantage” from deploying MRBMs and IRBMs in Cuba but that such a devel-
opment was incompatible with Soviet practice and policy because “it would indicate a far
greater willingness to increase the level of risk in U.S.-Soviet relations than the U.S.S.R. has
displayed thus far. . . .” in CIA Documents, McAuliffe, document 33.
Meeting on the Cuban Missile Crisis 441
38. Carter was partly in error. In fact, as indicated in the previous note, the estimators
thought the deployment would improve the Soviet military position. This was a unanimous
view in the intelligence community. Every lower-level expert, whether in State, the Office of
the Secretary of Defense, the armed forces, or the CIA, all believed (and separately wrote) that
MRBMs and IRBMs in Cuba would materially improve the Soviet position in the strategic
balance of power.
442 T U E S DAY, O C T O B E R 16, 1962
Taylor: We would have to target them with our missiles and have the
same kind of pistol pointed at the head situation as they have in the
Soviet Union at the present time.
Bundy: No question. If this thing goes on, an attack on Cuba
becomes general war. And that’s really the question: Whether . . .
President Kennedy: That’s why it shows the Bay of Pigs was really
right. If we had done it right. That was [a choice between] better and
better, and worse and worse.
Taylor: I’m impressed with this, Mr. President. We have a war plan
over there for you. [It] calls for a quarter of a million American soldiers,
marines, and airmen to take an island we launched 1,800 Cubans against,
a year and a half ago. We’ve changed our evaluations about it.
Robert Kennedy: Of course, the other problem is in South America a
year from now. And the fact that you’ve got these things in the hands of
Cubans here, and then, say, some problem arises in Venezuela. And
you’ve got Castro saying: “You move troops down into that part of
Venezuela; we’re going to fire these missiles.” [Unclear interjection by
Douglas Dillon.] I think that’s the difficulty, rather than the [unclear]. I
think it gives the [unclear] image.
President Kennedy: It makes them look like they’re coequal with us.
And that . . .
Douglas Dillon: We’re scared of the Cubans.
Robert Kennedy: We let the . . . I mean, like, we’d hate to have it in
the hands of the Chinese.
Dillon: I agree with that sort of thing very strongly.
Edwin Martin: It’s a psychological factor. It won’t reach as far as
Venezuela is concerned.
Dillon: Well, that’s—
McNamara: It’ll reach the U.S., though. This is the point.
Dillon: Yeah. That is the point.
Martin: Yeah. The psychological factor of our having taken it.
Dillon: Taken it. That’s the best [way of putting it].
Robert Kennedy: Well, and the fact that if you go there, we’re gonna
fire it.
President Kennedy: What’s that again, Ed? What are you saying?
Martin: Well, it’s a psychological factor that we have sat back and let
them do it to us. That is more important than the direct threat. It is a
threat in the Caribbean. . . .
President Kennedy: I said we weren’t going to [allow it].
Bundy: That’s something we could manage.
President Kennedy: Last month I said we weren’t going to [allow
Meeting on the Cuban Missile Crisis 443
it]. Last month I should have said that we don’t care. But when we said
we’re not going to, and then they go ahead and do it, and then we do
nothing, then I would think that our risks increase.
I agree, what difference does it make? They’ve got enough to blow us
up now anyway. I think it’s just a question of . . . After all, this is a politi-
cal struggle as much as military.
Well, so where are we now? Where is the . . . ? I don’t think the mes-
sage to Castro’s got much in it.
Let’s just try to get an answer to this question: How much . . . ? It’s
quite obviously to our advantage to surface this thing to a degree before . . .
first to inform these governments in Latin America, as the Secretary sug-
gests. Secondly, let the NATO people who have the right to some warning:
Macmillan, de Gaulle. How much does this diminish . . . ? Not [telling
them] that we’re going to do anything, but the existence of them, without
any say about what we’re gonna do.
Let’s say, 24 hours ahead of our doing something about it, we inform
Macmillan. We make a public statement that these have been found on
the island. That would be a notification, in a sense, of their existence and
everybody could draw whatever conclusion they wanted to.
Martin: I would say this, Mr. President. That I would . . . that if
you’ve made a public statement, you’ve got to move immediately, or
you’re going to have a [unclear] in this country.
President Kennedy: Oh, I understand that. We’ll be talking about . . .
Say we’re going to move on a Saturday. And we would say on a Friday
that these MRBMs, that the existence of this, presents the gravest threat
to our security and that appropriate action must be taken.
Robert Kennedy: Could you stick planes over them? And say you made
the announcement at six, Saturday morning? And at the same time, or
simultaneously, put planes over to make sure that they weren’t taking any
action or movement and that you could move in if they started moving in
the missiles in place or something. You would move in and knock . . . That
would be the trigger that you would move your planes in and knock them
out. Otherwise you’d wait until six or five that night. I don’t . . . is that . . . ?
Taylor: I don’t think anything like that [would work]. I can’t visual-
ize doing it successfully that way. I think that anything that shows our
intent to strike is going to flush the airplanes and the missiles into con-
cealment. These are really mobile missiles.
President Kennedy: They can just put them—
Taylor: They can be pulled in under trees and forest and disappear
almost at once, as I visualize it.
McNamara: And they can also be readied, perhaps, between the time
444 T U E S DAY, O C T O B E R 16, 1962
we, in effect, say we’re going to come in and the time we do come in.
This is a very very great danger to this coast. I don’t know exactly how
to appraise it, because I don’t know the readiness period, but it is possi-
ble that these are field missiles. And then in that case they can be readied
very promptly if they choose to do so.
Carter: These are field missiles, sir. They are mobile-support type
missiles.
Taylor: About a 40-minute countdown. Something like that’s been
estimated.
Roswell Gilpatric: So you would say that the strike should precede
any public discussion?
McNamara: I believe so, yes. If you’re going to strike. I think, before
you make any announcements, you should decide whether you’re going to
strike. If you are going to strike, you shouldn’t make an announcement.
Bundy: That’s right.
Dillon: What is the advantage of the announcement earlier? Because
it’s to build up sympathy, or something, for doing it. But you get the
simultaneous announcement of what was there, and why you struck,
with pictures and all—I believe would serve the same [purpose].
Ball: Well, the only advantage is it’s a kind of ultimatum in which
there is an opportunity of a response which would preclude it [the
strike]. I mean it’s more for the appearance than for the reality. Because
obviously you’re not going to get that kind of response.
But I would suppose that there is a course which is a little different,
which is a private message from the President to the prime . . . to . . .
Alexis Johnson: To Macmillan and to de Gaulle.
Ball: And that you’re going to have to do this. You’re compelled, and
you’ve got to move quickly, and you want them to know it. Maybe two
hours before the strike, something like that, even the night before.
Dillon: Well, that’s different.
Ball: But it has to be kept on that basis of total secrecy. And then the
question of what you do with these Latin American governments is
another matter. I think if you notify them in advance, it may be all over.
President Kennedy: That’s right. They could take . . .
The Congress would take; [we would have to take] the Congress
along.
Bundy: I think that’s just not right.
President Kennedy: I’m not completely . . . I don’t think we ought to
abandon just knocking out these missile bases, as opposed to . . . That’s a
much more defensible [and] explicable, politically, or satisfactory in
Meeting on the Cuban Missile Crisis 445
every way, action than the general strike which takes us into the city of
Havana, and it is plain to me, takes us into much more hazardous . . .
shot down . . .
Now, I know the Chiefs say: “Well, that means their bombers can take
off against us.” But . . .
Bundy: Their bombers take off against us. Then they have made a
general war against Cuba of it, which then becomes much more their
decision.
We move this way and the political advantages are very strong, it
seems to me, of the small strike. It corresponds to “the punishment fits the
crime” in political terms. We are doing only what we warned repeatedly
and publicly we would have to do. We are not generalizing the attack. The
things that we’ve already recognized and said that we have not found it
necessary to attack, and said we would not find it necessary to attack . . .
President Kennedy: Well, here’s . . . Let’s look, tonight. It seems to
me we ought to go on the assumption that we’re going to have the gen-
eral, number two we would call it, course number two, which would be a
general strike and that you ought to be in position to do that, then, if you
decide you’d like to do number one.
Bundy: I agree.
Robert Kennedy: Does that encompass an invasion?
President Kennedy: No. I’d say that’s the third course.
Let’s first start with, I’d just like to first find out, the air, so that I
would think that we ought to be in position to do [options] one and two,
which would be:
One would be just taking out these missiles and whatever others
we’d find in the next 24 hours.
Number two would be to take out all the airplanes.
And number three is to invade.
Dillon: Well, they’d have to take out the SAM sites also, Mr.
President.
President Kennedy: OK, but that would be in two, included in num-
ber two. Of course, that’s a terrifically difficult—
Dillon: Well, that may be [option] three and invasion [is option]
four.
Taylor: In order to get in to get the airfields, there’s a certain num-
ber we’d have to get.
Martin: Well, isn’t there a question whether any of the SAM sites are
operational?
Taylor: We’re not sure yet.
446 T U E S DAY, O C T O B E R 16, 1962
President Kennedy: OK. Well, let’s say we’ve decided we’re going the
whole way. So let’s say that number two is the SAM sites plus the air.
Bundy: It’s actually to clear the air, to win the air battle.
President Kennedy: Yeah, well, whatever.
Now, it seems to me we ought to be preparing now, in the most covert
way, to do one and two, with the freedom to make the choice about num-
ber one depending on what information we have on it. I don’t know what
kind of moves that requires, and how much is that going to . . . ?
McNamara: Mr. President, it requires no action other than what’s
been started. And you can make a decision prior to the start, Saturday or
any time thereafter.
President Kennedy: Well, where do we put all these planes?
Taylor: You recall we have this problem, Mr. President. We’re going
to get new intelligence that will be coming in from these flights and
that’s gonna have to be cranked into any strike plans we’re preparing. So
there is that factor of time. The Secretary has given you the minimum
time to make a decision now, so that we can brief the pilots and then
crank in the new intelligence. I would point out that—
McNamara: If I may, Max, to answer the question you asked: As I
understand it, we don’t have to decide now we’re going to do it. All we
have to decide is if we want Sweeney to be prepared to do it.39
Taylor: That’s correct.
McNamara: And Sweeney has said that he will take the tape that
comes in tomorrow and process it Thursday and Friday [October 18 and
19] and prepare the mission folders for strikes on Saturday [October 20]
or earlier, every day thereafter.
Taylor: Yes. The point is that we’ll have to brief pilots. We’re holding
that back. And there’ll be, I would say, 400 pilots will have to go to be
briefed in the course of this. So I’m just saying this is widening the
whole military scope of this thing very materially, if that’s what we’re
supposed to do at this time.
President Kennedy: Well, now, when do we start briefing the pilots?
Taylor: They’ll need at least 24 hours on that, when this new intelli-
gence comes in.
President Kennedy: In other words, then, until tomorrow. All I was
thinking of—at least until—
39. General Walter Sweeney, commander of USAF Tactical Air Command. Sweeney had ear-
lier been placed in charge of all tactical strike planning under the relevant operational CINC,
which was CINCLANT (Admiral Dennison).
Meeting on the Cuban Missile Crisis 447
Bundy: Can they be briefed in such a way that they’re secure? They
have no access to—
McNamara: Let’s go back just a second, now. The President does not
have to make any decision until 24 hours before the strike, except the
decision to be prepared. And the process of preparation will not, in itself,
run the risk of overt disclosure of the preparation.
Bundy: Doesn’t it imply briefing, the preparation?
Taylor: It does, but—
McNamara: It implies the preparation of mission folders.
Taylor: Say, 24 hours before they go, they start a briefing.
I’d like to say this, Mr. President, the more time you can give, the
better. Because they can then do a lot more rehearsing and checking out
of all these pilots. So, while I accept the time cycle, I—
President Kennedy: Well, now, let’s say you give a pilot . . . I mean,
how does he find his way down to a SAM site off of one of those things?
Taylor: Well, they’ll give him a target folder with all the possible
guidance, and so on, to hit the target.
President Kennedy: They know how to do that.
Taylor: Yes, sir. They’re well trained in that procedure.
McNamara: Mission folders have already been prepared on all the
known targets. The problem is that we don’t have the unknown targets,
specifically these missile launchers and the nuclear storage, and we won’t
have that until tomorrow night at the earliest. And it’ll be processed pho-
tographically on Thursday, interpreted Thursday night, turned into target
folders on Friday, and the mission could go Saturday. This is Sweeney’s
estimate of the earliest possible time for an air strike against the missiles.
Decision by the President on Friday, strike on Saturday.
As General Taylor pointed out, if we could have either another day of
preparation, which means no strike till Saturday, and/or alternatively
more than 24 hours between the time of decision and the first strike, it
will run more smoothly.
President Kennedy: Right. Well, now, what is it, in the next 24 hours,
what is it we need to do in order, if we’re going to do, let’s first say, one
and two by Saturday or Sunday? You’re doing everything that is . . .
McNamara: Mr. President, we need to do two things, it seems to me.
First, we need to develop a specific strike plan limited to the missiles
and the nuclear storage sites, which we have not done. This would be a
part of the broader plan, but I think we ought to estimate the minimum
number of sorties. Since you have indicated some interest in that possi-
bility, we ought to provide you that option. We haven’t done this.
President Kennedy: OK.
448 T U E S DAY, O C T O B E R 16, 1962
40. In late 1957, in the wake of fears arising from the Soviet Sputnik flight and concerns about
Soviet missiles targeted at Europe, the United States had publicly offered to deploy intermedi-
ate-range ballistic missiles, Jupiters, on the territory of its European allies. The Jupiters were
not actually deployed to Turkey (and Italy) until 1961–62. A similar type of missile, the Thor,
was deployed to England; those are the ones Johnson is talking about.
452 T U E S DAY, O C T O B E R 16, 1962
41. A reference to the mysterious explosion that sank the USS Maine while it was visiting
Havana harbor during a period of tension between the United States and Spain over the condi-
tions of Spanish rule in Cuba. Robert Kennedy is echoing the belief that this incident precipi-
tated the U.S. declaration of war that began the Spanish-American War in 1898.
Meeting on the Cuban Missile Crisis 453
42. Sorensen was referring to long-standing negotiations between the Kennedy administration
and Castro, carried on by intermediaries, to obtain the release of Cuban exiles imprisoned after
the failed landing at the Bay of Pigs. The most recent intermediary, lawyer James Donovan, had
persuaded Castro to accept some exchange of food and drugs rather than money, but his nego-
tiations were still in progress at the time of the crisis. The negotiations eventually succeeded,
and the released prisoners arrived in the United States at the end of 1962.
454 T U E S DAY, O C T O B E R 16, 1962
Sorensen: No. What I meant was, if we’re gonna trade them out . . .
President Kennedy: They’re on the Isle of Pines, these prisoners?
Robert Kennedy: No, some of them are. They’re split up.
Bundy: If you can get them out alive, I’d make that choice.
President Kennedy: There’s no sign of their getting out now, is
there? The exchange?
Robert Kennedy: No, but they will take a few weeks.
President Kennedy: A few weeks.
Robert Kennedy: Yeah. You know they’re having that struggle
between the young Cuban leaders and the [unclear] . . .
Bundy: We have a list of sabotage options, Mr. President. It’s not a
very loud noise to raise at a meeting of this sort, but I think it would
need your approval. I take it you are in favor of sabotage.
The one question which arises is whether we wish to do this in naval
areas, international waters, or in positions which may—mining interna-
tional waters or mining Cuban waters may hit . . . Mines are very indis-
criminate.
President Kennedy: Is that what they [the Special Group-Augmented
that dealt with covert action against Castro] are talking about? Mining?
Bundy: That’s one of the items. Most of them relate to infiltration of
raiders, and will simply be deniable, internal Cuban activities.
The question that we need guidance from you on is whether you now
wish to authorize sabotage which might have its impact on neutrals, or
even friendly ships.
President Kennedy: I don’t think we want to put mines out right
now, do we?
McNamara: Should wait for 24 hours at least before any [unclear].
Bundy: Well, let’s put the others into action then in Cuba, the inter-
nal ones, not the other ones.
President Kennedy: Mr. Vice President, do you have any thoughts?
Between [strike options] one and two?
Vice President Johnson: I don’t think I can add anything that is
essential.
President Kennedy: Let’s see, what time are we going to meet again
tomorrow? What is it we want to have by tomorrow from the . . .
We want to have from the Department [of State] tomorrow, in a lit-
tle bit more concise form, whether there is any kind of a notification we
would have to give. How much of a [unclear]?
And, number two, what do you think of these various alternatives
we’ve been talking about.
Three, whether there is any use in bringing this to Khrushchev in the
Meeting on the Cuban Missile Crisis 455
way of, for example . . . Do we want to, for example . . . Here is Dobrynin
now, he’s repeated . . .43
I’ve got to go to see Schroeder. Let’s meet at . . . why don’t we meet
at twelve? What time do I get back tomorrow night [from
Connecticut]?44
Sorensen: Reasonably early. Get back about 7:45.
President Kennedy: Can we meet here at nine?
Bundy: Mr. Secretary, some of us are in trouble with the dinner for
Schroeder tomorrow night.
President Kennedy: OK. Well, why don’t we . . . I don’t think we’ll
have anything by noon tomorrow, will we?
Bundy: Do you want to wait until Thursday morning [October 18],
Mr. President?
President Kennedy: Looks to me like we might as well. Everybody
else can meet if they want to, if they need to. Well, the Secretary of State,
the Secretary of Defense, can call [meetings]—
McNamara: I think it’d be very useful to meet, or else stay after-
wards tonight for a while.
Bundy: It would be a great improvement not to have any more
intense White House meetings. The cover will grow awfully thin. If we
could meet at the State Department tomorrow . . .
President Kennedy: All right. Then I could meet you, Mac, when I
get back tomorrow and just as well, whatever the thing is. And then we
can meet Thursday morning.
The question is whether . . . I’m going to see Gromyko on Thursday
and I think the question that I’d really like to have some sort of a judg-
ment on is whether we ought to do anything with Gromyko, whether we
ought to say anything to him, whether we ought to indirectly give him
sort of an ultimatum on this matter, or whether we just ought to go
ahead without him.45 It seems to me that he said we’d be . . . The ambas-
sador [Dobrynin] told the attorney general, as he told Bohlen the other
day, that they were not going to put these weapons there. Now either
he’s lying, or he doesn’t know.
Whether the Attorney General saw [might see] Dobrynin, not act-
ing as if we had any information about them, [and] say that: “Of course,
they must realize that if this ever does happen that this is going to cause
this . . .” Give a very clear indication of what’s going to happen.
Now I don’t know what would come out of that. Possibly nothing.
Possibly this would alert them. Possibly they would reconsider their
decision, but I don’t think we’ve had any clear evidence of that, and it
would give them . . . We’d lose a week.
Sorensen: You mean tell them that . . .
President Kennedy: Well, not tell them that we know that they’ve got
it. But merely, in the course of a conversation, Dobrynin, having said that
they would never do it . . . The Attorney General, who sees Dobrynin
once in a while, would . . .
Sorensen: How would we lose a week?
President Kennedy: What?
Sorensen: How would we lose a week?
President Kennedy: Oh, we would be . . . what Bobby would be saying
to them, in short, is: “If these ever come up, that we’re going to do . . . the
President stated that we would have to take action. And this could cause
the most far reaching consequences.” On the possibility that that might
cause them to reconsider their action.
I don’t know whether he [Dobrynin] is, they are, aware of what I
said. I can’t understand their viewpoint, if they’re aware of what we said
at the press conferences [of September 4 and 13]. As I say, I’ve never . . .
I don’t think there’s any record of the Soviets ever making this direct a
challenge ever, really, since the Berlin blockade.
Bundy: We have to be clear, Mr. President, that they made this deci-
sion, in all probability, before you made your statements. This is an
important element in the calendar.
Dillon: They didn’t change it.
Bundy: No, indeed they didn’t change it. But they . . . It’s quite a dif-
ferent thing.
Dillon: There was either a contravenance on one . . .
Bundy: My, I wouldn’t bet a cookie that Dobrynin doesn’t know a
bean about this.
President Kennedy: You think he does know.
Robert Kennedy: He didn’t know. He didn’t even know [unclear], in
my judgment.
Carter: Oh, yes. There’s evidence of sightings in late August, I think,
and early September, of some sort.
Gilpatric: It seems to me, Mr. President, in your public presentation
Meeting on the Cuban Missile Crisis 457
46. President Kennedy was referring to the most recent of several confrontations in the Taiwan
Straits, in 1958, when China shelled offshore islands under Taiwan’s control and threatened to
invade Taiwan, then linked by a mutual defense treaty with the United States. He was also refer-
ring to a Communist insurgency against a pro-Western government in Laos that became the recip-
ient of significant U.S. aid. Heading off the threat of direct U.S. intervention, a negotiated cease-fire
in Laos took effect in May 1961, followed by negotiations about neutralizing the country.
Meeting on the Cuban Missile Crisis 459
Carter: We can try it. Your problems about exfiltration and your
problems with training an individual as to what to look for are not han-
dled in 24 hours.
McNamara: A better way would be to send in a low-flying airplane,
and we have today put those on alert. But we would recommend against
using the low-flying planes until shortly before the intention to strike.
Taylor: That was considered by the commanders today, and they’re
all of the opinion that the loss of surprise there was more serious than
the information we’d get from that.
Ball: I would think it would be very valuable to have them go in
shortly before the strike, just to build the evidence. I mean, then you’ve
got pictures that really show what was there. . . .
President Kennedy: Now with these great demonologists, did Bohlen
and Thompson, did they have an explanation of why the Russians are
sticking it to us quite so . . . ?
I wonder what we’re going to say up in Connecticut. We expect the
domestic [unclear]. [Chuckles.] Don’t care for the . . .
Overlapping discussions about schedules for Wednesday, October 17, follow.
President Kennedy: We’re going to be discussing [unclear] budget
[in a Cabinet meeting on October 18].
What about Schroeder? Do I have anything we want to say to
Schroeder?47
Bundy: We haven’t a lot on that, Mr. President, which we’ll have for
you early in the morning. I don’t think it’s very complicated. The big
issue that has come up is Schroeder makes a very strong case for refus-
ing visas on the ground that he thinks that that would undermine morale
in Berlin in a very dangerous way. I think that’s the principal issue that’s
between us.
President Kennedy: I wonder if we could get somebody to give me
something about what our position should be on that.
Bundy: You want that? Yeah, very happy to. You want it tonight?
President Kennedy: No, no. Just in the morning.
The meeting is breaking up. There are more fragments of simultaneous
conversations.
President Kennedy: That’s very good, General. Thank you.
47. The principal subject at the forthcoming meeting with Schroeder was to be the contin-
gency that the Soviets or East Germans might require formal visas for entry to East
Germany or East Berlin. For the West Germans this prospect skirted too close to diplomatic
recognition of the East German regime.
460 T U E S DAY, O C T O B E R 16, 1962
48. The DGZs are Designated Ground Zeros, the precise aim points for explosives.
Meeting on the Cuban Missile Crisis 461
Bundy: They’re not really going to be realistic, even, but they give—
McNamara: —but they give us an order of magnitude to [give to]
the President, to get some idea of this. And this we can do, and this can
be done very easily.
But the most important thing we need to do is this appraisal of the
world after any one of these situations, in great detail.
Bundy: Sure, that’s right.
McNamara: And I think probably this is something State would have
to do, and I would strongly urge we put it on paper. And we, I’ll, be
happy to stay now or look at it early in the morning, or something like
that, in order that we may inject disagreement if we—
Bundy: What I would suggest is that someone be deputied to do a
piece of paper which really is: What happens?
I think the margin is between whether we [do the] take out the mis-
siles only strike, or take a lot of air bases. This is tactical, within a decision
to take military action. It doesn’t overwhelmingly, it may substantially, but
it doesn’t overwhelmingly change the world.
I think any military action does change the world. And I think not
taking action changes the world. And I think these are the two worlds
that we need to look at.
McNamara: I’m very much inclined to agree, but I think we have to
make that point: Within the military action [there is] a gradation.
Bundy: I agree, I agree. Oh, many gradations. And it can have major
effects. I don’t mean to exaggerate that now.
The question is: How to get ahead with that, and whether . . . I would
think, myself, that the appropriate place to make this preliminary analy-
sis is at the Department of State. I think the rest of us ought to spend
the evening, really, to some advantage separately, trying to have our own
views of this. And I think we should meet in order, at least, to trade
pieces of paper, before 2:00. Tomorrow morning, if that’s agreeable.
McNamara: Why don’t we meet tomorrow morning? And with
pieces of paper, from State, and—maybe you don’t feel this is reasonable,
but I would strongly urge that, tonight, State—
Bundy: Well, who is State’s de facto [person in charge for this]? Are
you all tied up tonight? Or what?
Ball: No, no. The situation is that the only one who’s tied up tonight
is the Secretary, and he is coming down at eleven from his dinner to look
at what we will have done in the meantime.
Martin: Alex [Johnson] is back waiting for him.
Ball: Oh, good. We’ll have Alex; we’ll have Tommy [Llewellyn
Thompson]. Well, we’ve kept this to our . . . this has been . . .
462 T U E S DAY, O C T O B E R 16, 1962
49. Roger Hilsman was assistant secretary of state for intelligence and research. A demonolo-
gist is a Kremlinologist, or an expert on the Soviet Union.
Meeting on the Cuban Missile Crisis 463
I would like to throw one in that I do not think the army and the
Chiefs would normally consider. And that is the possibility of genuinely
making a quite large-scale strike, followed by a drop, followed by a recov-
ery of the people dropped to get these things, and not simply to increase
the chance that we’ve hit most of them. There’s always incompleteness in
a military, in an air, operation. But if these things are what the pictures
show, you could drop a battalion of paratroopers and get them. Now what
you do with a battalion, I grant you, is a hell of a problem.
I think there’s an enormous political advantage, myself, within these
options, granted that all the Chiefs didn’t fully agree, to taking out the
thing that gives the trouble and not the thing that doesn’t give the trouble.
McNamara: This, as opposed to an air attack on them?
Bundy: This would be supplementary to an air attack. I mean, how
are you gonna know that you’ve got them? And if you haven’t got them,
what have you done?
Ball: Well this, of course, raises the question of: Having gotten this
set, what happens to the set that arrives next week?
McNamara: Oh, I think . . . Let me answer Mac’s question first. How
do we know we’ve got them? We will have photo recon, military, with
the strike. Sweeney specifically plans this and—
Bundy: Proving a negative is a hell of a job.
McNamara: Pardon me?
Bundy: Proving a negative is a hell of a job.
Carter: Yeah, but the [unclear] on the ground very well [unclear], Mac.
Bundy: It’s true.
McNamara: Terrible risk to put them [paratroopers] in there.
Bundy: I agree, I think it’s probably a bad idea, but it troubles me
[unclear].
McNamara: I think the risk troubles me. It’s too great in relation to
the risk of not knowing whether we get them.
Bundy: Well . . .
McNamara: But, in any case, this is a small variant of one of the plans.
Bundy: That’s right, it’s a minor variant of one of the plans.
McNamara: It seems to me that there are some major alternatives
here. I don’t think we discussed them fully enough today. And I’d like to
see them laid out on the paper, if State agrees.
The first is what I still call the political approach. Let me say it: a non-
military action. It doesn’t start with one and it isn’t going to end with one.
And I, for that reason, call it a political approach. And I say it isn’t going
to end with one because, once you start this political approach, I don’t
think you’re going to have any opportunity for a military operation.
464 T U E S DAY, O C T O B E R 16, 1962
Bundy: OK.
McNamara: Now, there’s not much we can do to help. I’d be happy to,
though, if you think of anything we can do. We’ll go to work tonight and
get these numbers of sorties, by target systems, laid out. [Admiral]
Riley’s up in Mac’s office and I’ll go down there now and get them started
on it.
Carter: I think Mr. McCone could be helpful to you all in the
morning.
McNamara: Well, I think he should try to stay here at 8:30.
Carter: He’s been worrying about this for a heck of a long time.
Ball: Sure.
This small informal meeting then breaks up. The recording picks up a few
fragments of conversation. Bundy and Ball talk about eating supper
together. Bundy and Ball apparently refer to the secretarial problems that
arose from informing so few people about the crisis. Then there is silence.
After a few minutes a man comes in to clean the room. Evelyn Lincoln
walks in, speaks briefly to him, and apparently she turns off the machine.
Everyone was still trying to conceal the start of the crisis by appearing
to maintain their known schedules. President Kennedy went to another
farewell dinner for Bohlen, hosted by columnist Joseph Alsop. At the din-
ner he drew Bohlen aside and they had a long, animated, private conversa-
tion. Kennedy reportedly asked Bohlen if he could stay, but Bohlen feared
that delaying his long-planned departure for Paris might arouse unwanted
notice and comment.
Meetings resumed that evening at the State Department, winding up
in Rusk’s office at about 11:00 P.M. McNamara slept at the Pentagon that
night. McCone returned to Washington.
argued that Khrushchev knew what he was doing and wanted a showdown
on Berlin. In this view, Khrushchev thought the missiles in Cuba armed
him for that confrontation. Taylor and McCone sided with Thompson.
After less than an hour, McCone and Bundy left for the White House.
Arriving at about 9:30 A.M., McCone briefed President Kennedy. The
CIA director came away with the impression that Kennedy, too, leaned
toward prompt military action. Kennedy asked McCone to go to
Gettysburg and give Eisenhower a full briefing. McCone then drove off
to Pennsylvania and reported back later that Eisenhower thought the
situation was intolerable. The former president said he would support
any decisive military action.
Meanwhile Kennedy had moved on to his 10:00 meeting.
1. Including President Kennedy, Gerhard Schroeder, and translator Kusterer. Tape 29, John F.
Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, Presidential Recordings Collection.
2. Editorial Note, FRUS, 15: 336.
470 W E D N E S DAY, O C T O B E R 17, 1962
4. See State Topol 399, 25 September 1962, in FRUS, 15: 327; letter from Kennedy to
Adenauer, in “Germany, Security, 10/62–12/62” folder, President’s Office Files, Box 117, John
F. Kennedy Library.
5. Khrushchev also discussed Cuba, protesting U.S. provocations. Moscow 981, 16 October
1962, FRUS, 15: 359–62.
472 W E D N E S DAY, O C T O B E R 17, 1962
nized that, in our electronic age, when one button is pressed, other but-
ton is pressed automatically. There is no sense in dialogue of threats.
This is silly policy. So U.S. should take position of reason.”6
Kennedy will not say a word about missiles in Cuba to the West
German foreign minister. But as the discussion slowly comes to the heart
of the matter—U.S. readiness to threaten war in taking a rigid stance on
Allied rights (as on the visa issue he knows Schroeder will emphasize7)—
the Soviet missiles in Cuba cannot be far from Kennedy’s thoughts.
Schroeder spoke English reasonably well. So while he used his trans-
lator to be sure he expressed himself clearly, the translator did not
bother to translate what Kennedy said.
President Kennedy: Mr. Minister, would you care for some coffee or
orange juice?
Gerhard Schroeder: Oh, I’d prefer tea, if [unclear].
President Kennedy: [to others] Coffee? Tea?
Unidentified: Tea.
President Kennedy: [on phone] Maybe we can get three or four teas
and three or four coffees and a cup of orange juice?
[aside, to someone else] . . . Yes, I left them on the table in my, on the
desk in my office.
[turns to Schroeder] Well, I’m glad to see you, Mr. Minister. You’ve
come in a couple of times, but . . . We have pretty strong feelings, as
you’re aware, that we’re going to have great difficulty with Berlin in the
next few months. And I wanted to, first, to see what your thought was
about what the Soviet schedule might be, and what actions they were
most likely to take. I thought you might know what our contingency
planning is to deal with those actions.
Schroeder: If you’ll allow me to speak German and get translated, it
makes a big difference.
Zunächst [unclear] für die Gelegenheit danken, das wir hier zusam-
men sind, insbesondere herzliche Grüße des Bundeskanzlers überbrin-
gen, der sich freut, Sie in ein Paar Wochen zu sehen. Und ich betrachte
diese Reise als eine sehr nützliche Vorbereitung, auch für den Besuch,
den der Bundeskanzler machen wird.
sible Soviet intentions, and also our views as to the contingency planning.
In our opinion, it is not certain that the Russians really do have the inten-
tion, by the end of November or by end the year, to increase the crisis by
any action of their own. We are more inclined to believe that the Soviets,
in spite of all attempts to bring psychological pressure to bear, have, in
spite of this, they basically continue, and will want to continue, to talk and
to try to achieve their objectives without having to resort to force.
Now, of course one cannot be quite sure about this, but I think one
should take account of several factors. First of all, the Soviets, in their
attempts up to now at getting support from other nations for a separate
peace treaty, have so far registered rather little support, and for them to
sign a separate treaty only with their own signature, and the signature of
their subcontractors [the East Germans and other bloc states], so to
speak, isn’t really something really much worthwhile, because from the
international point of view this would not provide them with any really
firm and good point of departure. So I think that the attitude which the
noncommitted states have taken so far can really be considered to be posi-
tive from our point of view.
Now the further question, of course, is what special measures the
Soviets may have in mind over Berlin, and the number of steps which
they could still take without coming to the point of confrontation is
really rather limited. And there isn’t really much more margin for them,
for any measures or steps or actions they could take, without coming
really close to that point of confrontation. And therefore, it is for us, of
course, at the same time necessary to envisage what possible action the
Soviet-occupied zone authorities [East Germans] might take, of course,
after having received approval from the Soviets. And there’s one specific
problem which I think we should study, and that is the problem of
whether they might try, by the introduction of passport and/or visa
requirements, to arrest and interfere with civilian traffic.
Schroeder: Dieser Problem ist, nach meiner Meinung, deswegen so
wichtig, weil wir verhindern müssen, daß sich in der Zugangsfrage über-
haupt irgendwelche Verschlechterungen gegenüber dem derzeitigen Stand
ergeben. Und ist das ja leider eben so, daß diese Fragen dort zum Teil aus-
gesprochene Papierfragen sind, in dem Sinne, daß wenn man jetzt durch die
Zone fahren will, man an den Grenzpunkt ankommt, man sein Personal-
ausweis abgibt, einen Stempel bekommt, und dann durch die—ein Paar
Mark bezahlt—und dann durch die Zone durchfährt. Und natürlich könnte
die andere Seite dieses Stück so spielen, daß anstatt, daß man ein—
zunächst so spielen—daß als man ein Zettel bekommt und dann [den]
Ausweis, sie sagen, “Das ist jetzt ein Visum, was Sie [unclear] bekommen.
Meeting with West German Foreign Minister Gerhard Schroeder 475
Dieses Visum kann man hier bekommen, und dieses Visum kann man auch
in Ostberlin beantragen.” In anderen Worten, das, was sich hier zunächst
einmal für das Auge ändert, ist unter Umständen nicht so furchtbar tief-
greifend. Das ändert sich aber eine Menge in der rein rechtlichen Situation,
weil nämlich die Visaerteilung eine Geschichte ist, die man ganz nach
reinem [unclear] kann, es gibt dann keinerlei Anspruch auf ein Visum. Mit
anderen worten, wenn es zu dieser Einführung käme, und [unclear] es
akzeptieren wollte, würde das praktisch bedeuten, viel stärker als bisher,
diesen Landzugang nach Berlin abhängig zu machen von der Sowjetzone,
und damit natürlich ihre rechtliche—völkerrechtliche Bedeutung, im Sinne
eine Anerkennung, einige Stufen höher gehen.
[Unclear] gibt es ein Paar Probleme. Es gibt zum Beispiel das
Problem, daß im Verhältnis zu allem anderen ausländischen Verkehr, am
Beispiel amerikanischen Zivilverkehr, solche Visa bereits erteilt worden
sind, was ein sehr dummer Punkt ist, von unserem Standpunkt aus, bei
[unclear] Geschichte. Ich will das nicht im Einzelnen darstellen. Ich
habe die Überzeugung, daß wenn man irgendwelche weiteren Versch-
lechterungen des Zivilzugangs findet, man eines Tages an der Stelle ist,
wo der militärische Zugang im—in eine ganz große Notenlage gerät
dadurch. Das braucht er vielleicht zunächst, nur weitere Papier-
erfordernisse unterworfen werden soll, und die Weltöffentlichkeit nur
sehr schwer verstehen wird, daß wir mal gerade in dem anderen Weg
durch sehr viel neue Stempel Papiere hingenommen haben, man für den
militärischen Verkehr nicht bereit sein würdest zu tun.
Translator: The question is so important in my mind because we will
have to avoid any further deterioration of access as compared to what the
present situation is. Unfortunately, most of these questions can easily be
paper questions, if I may say so, because if now, you want to go through,
to transit the Soviet-occupied zone, you drive up to the checkpoint, you
give them your identity card—in the civilian field—you give them your
identity card, you get it stamped, you pay a few marks’ toll, and then you
proceed on your way. Now, of course, this could, at least in the begin-
ning, be played by the other side in this way: that instead of giving the
passengers a little paper, they will say, “Now what you receive now is a
visa. This visa can be obtained here at the checkpoint; it can also be
applied for in East Berlin.” In other words, the visible change isn’t really
very great, and doesn’t visibly reach really far, but it changes, of course,
a lot in the legal situation, because a visa is, of course, something which
you’re at complete liberty to issue or to deny. And in other words, if the
visa was introduced and accepted, this would really mean that demand
access, much more than up to now, would be dependent on the discretion
476 W E D N E S DAY, O C T O B E R 17, 1962
Da gibt’s es hier aber zweitens daraus, daß man vom politisch-, diplo-
matisch-, und psychologischen Standpunkt aus, alles tun muß, um den
Sowjets rechtzeitig klar zu machen, daß man nicht die Absicht hat, zum
Beispiel die Einführung von Visa hinzunehmen, und daß man darauf mit
energischen Mitteln reagieren wird. Das sind die beiden Dinge, die in
diesen Zusammenhang von . . . erforderlich sind. Und ich glaube tatsäch-
lich, es gibt eine Art Interdependenz, um den Ausdruck [Tea is delivered,
Schroeder interrupts himself to say “Danke schön.”] zu gebrauchen, zwis-
chen dem zivilen Verkehr und dem militärischen Verkehr, und ich meine,
es wird notwendig sein, daß man das bei den ganzen Planung[en] real-
istisch in Rechnung stellt.
Translator: Now, there are of course some conclusions to be drawn
from this situation, and the first conclusion I see is that the contingency
planning of course must really realistically consider and take into account
any possible deterioration in the field of also civilian access. There are
certain numbers of variations that can be imagined, but I don’t think it is
necessary to go into that detail now.
The second conclusion would be that in the political, diplomatic, and
psychological fields, one really must do everything to make it quite clear,
to drive it home to the Soviet Union, that we have no intention whatso-
ever of, for example, accepting the introduction of a visa requirement, but
that on the contrary the West would react very strongly to any such
move. I think that is necessary, and I further think that there is, to use
that term, a clear interdependence between civilian and military traffic,
and I think that should be taken into account realistically in our planning.
President Kennedy: Let me say, Mr. Minister, that I agree that there
is a clear interdependence between the military and the civilian. There is
a substantial difference between them, however, with regards to access.
We could always supply ourselves militarily by air if we can’t supply the
city by ground. Now, in addition, at the present time, as I understand it,
the civilian traffic is treated differently than military traffic. The docu-
mentation presented by civilian traffic is different from the documenta-
tion presented by military traffic. The degree of authority which the
East German regime exercises on civilian traffic is different from the
authority that they exercise on military traffic. Is this at all true?
Schroeder: Ja, das ist sicherlich, das ist sicherlich so. Aber es kommt
eine Stelle, wo die Sache ganz gefährlich wird, wo nämlich weitere
Verschlechterung[en] des Zivilverkehrs eine Situation hervorrufen, das
macht zunächst geringfügige Verschlechterung, zu optisch geringfügige
Verschlechterung des militärischen Verkehrs schwer hinnehmen, schwer-
er und schwerer ablehnen kann. Und die Frage ist natürlich ob man,
Meeting with West German Foreign Minister Gerhard Schroeder 479
Berlin als ihre Hauptsorge an, aber die Auseinandersetzung geht in dem
Grunde über Berlin hinaus, in dieser Sache, so daß es nicht—die Interessen
hier—nicht ganz identisch sind. Und man muß versuchen, diese Interessen
auf einem Punkt zu bringen, damit sie ungefähr harmonisiert [sind].
Translator: Well, that’s certainly true. But the point comes where it
would be very dangerous to have accepted already a further deteriora-
tion in the civilian traffic, because this would place us in a situation
where optically minor changes in the field of military traffic would be
very difficult to reject. And the question of whether we say, if there’s any
further deterioration of civilian traffic, the question now is, whether we
say, “Okay, we will acquiesce in it,” or whether we say we are not going
to accept that in any way.
If we say we are not going to accept that in any way, we of course
have to ask ourselves what are we going to do? There is a theoretical
answer, the theoretical answer being that surface transport to Berlin
would come to an end. Now, there may be a possibility of ensuring more
or less the transportation of personnel from and to Berlin by air, but
even there we have our doubts insofar as bad seasons, any serious elec-
tronic interference is concerned, leaving completely aside the question
of goods transportation, which we do not think it will be possible to
carry out by air. And then, of course, we’ve reached a point where via-
bility is really seriously affected. We even think that the simple intro-
duction of visa, the very fact that a visa requirement would be introduced,
would mean that per day 20,000 visas would have to be issued for people
traveling to and from Berlin. And this fact in itself would already slow
down and reduce the Berlin access. So really, [unclear] there’s one
essential, that is, viability, which really is at stake if anything of the kind
happened.
If we move, lift the traffic up into the air, and if the economic coun-
termeasures we take do not have the effect which we are thinking of,
then we might well find ourselves at the point where, at the price of high
concessions and high loss of prestige, we would have to come back from
that stand which we have taken. So the question, of course, of how we
react to these requirements is, I think, extremely important.
The line which has been followed in planning up to now is that the
vital surface transport would continue and that one would, for that pur-
pose, accept the visa, at the same time appealing to the population not to
do any unnecessary surface travel, and at the same time, of course, intro-
ducing economic countermeasures. Now, this is an intermediate solution.
The question as to whether it will have the result which we are expecting
it to have is, of course, an open one. But I think that, at any rate, whether
Meeting with West German Foreign Minister Gerhard Schroeder 481
one will in the final analysis come to a more restricted or a very strict
reaction in the planning stage, it is necessary to rethink very hard the
whole planning and to come to agreement as to how we will really act.
We also, especially, have to come some agreement on that point with
the Berliners, because there is some difference in the perspective between,
and some difference of interests between, the Berliners and the Federal
Republic as such. The problem of—
Schroeder: [interrupting translator] Or the Western position as such.
Translator: Or the Western position as such, thank you. The problem
of recognition and the problem of all-German policy is not felt by the
Berliners as their really direct concern and really immediate concern.
The Berliners think that their immediate and direct concern, of course, is
the unrestricted access, but the problem itself, of course, and all the impli-
cations reach far beyond Berlin alone, so there is not quite the same inter-
est with the western Berliners and with the West, and therefore it is
necessary for us to try to bring these interests to a certain point.
President Kennedy: Mr. Minister, if you . . . if they insist on these
visas, and then West Germans going in, or traffic, say that they won’t
submit to them, and that traffic stops, then where are we?
Schroeder: Das bedeutet—im Grunde, bedeutet das Ganze die Frage,
ob man ins Auge fassen will, oder ins Auge fassen kann, und ich stelle das
nur als eine Frage, den Landzugang nach Berlin vom ersten Augenblick,
an dem ernsthaft blockiert wird, wirklich mit Gewalt offenzuhalten, oder
ob man, die ganze Gedankenführung so ordenlich, daß man sagt, “Lassen
wir das Land, nehmen wir die Luft, und warten wir ab die Wirt-
schaftsmaßnahmen und der Gleichen wirken.”
Ich glaube, und das sage ich aus meiner persönlichen Meinung, daß es
eine sehr gefährliche Vorstellung wäre, mich darauf einzulassen, daß man
das Problem durch Ausweichen in die Luft [unclear] zu lösen [unclear].
Translator: Basically the question of course is—and I am only rais-
ing the question without trying to give an answer now to it—but basi-
cally the question is whether we will and whether we can, in case the
land access is harassed, whether we will and whether we can, from the
first moment of such blockage onward, keep that access open by force, or
whether we will say, “Well, let’s drop the land traffic, the surface traffic,
and let’s lift it up into the air and wait for the effect of the economic
countermeasures.”
Now, I personally believe that it would be really dangerous to think that
the problem could be solved by simply lifting up the traffic into the air.
President Kennedy: Well, I think that we discussed what action we
would take if there was a forcible blockage of traffic on the ground. The
482 W E D N E S DAY, O C T O B E R 17, 1962
only question would be whether the blockage took place because of the,
of a paper barrier rather than one of arms or force. Whether we, in that
case, would be warranted, if the blockage is by paper, warranted taking
the force if we didn’t like the kind of visa or the kind of papers which
were being requested of the civilian traffic.
Schroeder: Aber wir sind—das Problem ist gerade, wenn man das
hier nicht tut, obwohl die “viability” von Berlin im Grunde daran hängt,
welche Chance hat man, sich bei, dann denn für den militärischen
Verkehr, nur in Anführungszeichen das Erfordernis, von etwas mehr
Papier gestellt wird, zu sagen, “Dies aber ist eine gewaltsame Stelle.”
Translator: Well, Mr. President, the question of course arises, if one
doesn’t do it at that stage, at that point, although viability is involved,
what are our chances of doing it when, in the military field only, some
paper requirement, new paper requirement is introduced? What chance
do we then stand to reply, to react by force?
President Kennedy: Well, I would think it does raise the question of
whether any sort of paper documentation which we would accept in the
civilian traffic. I say, military traffic you can always move by air, so that
you don’t have quite the same problem. But the civilian traffic you can’t
move by air, so civilian traffic as a practical matter is basically a different
problem. If you’re going to say that you’re not going to have any civilian
traffic submit to these visas, and you can’t carry the civilian traffic by air,
then you’re going to have, in a sense, a blockade of Berlin imposed by us.
And with all the difficulties that would come upon the city, with the city
not wholly sympathetic to that position, vis-à-vis arguing that this is an
unreasonably legalistic position that we’ve taken, it seems to me that that
may end up in a somewhat more . . . slightly ambiguous position than we
would if we said, “Well, we don’t accept this authority, but if it’s a matter
of moving civilian traffic in and out, we would agree.” [Unclear.]
Schroeder: Ich meine es liegt auf der Hand, das wird eine sehr
schwierige Frage ist, aber die hängt im—einfach eben damit zusammen,
und das gilt nach meiner Meinung eben vor Allendingen auch für den
militärischen Verkehr, ob man sich gegenüber dem militärischen Verkehr
vorstellen, “Nun, wir können die Luft ausweichen.” Oder man sagt, “Dies
ist ein lebenswichtiges Problem, oder ein militärisch-lebenswichtiges
Problem, den Landverkehr aufrecht zu erhalten.”
Ich sage ihnen ganz offen, ich würde der Auffassung sein, daß es ein
militärisch-lebenswichtiges Problem ist, den Landverkehr offen zu halten,
um mich nicht damit mit zu vergnügen, daß man in die Luft gehen kann.
Ich bin mir ganz darüber klar, daß das schwere Entscheidungen beinhal-
Meeting with West German Foreign Minister Gerhard Schroeder 483
tet, aber unter Umständen ist man ganz anderen Entwicklung entgegen,
wenn mal den militärischen Verkehr durch die Luft nimmt, um dann zu
sehen, wieviel weiter man kommen wird. Das hat man ’48–’49 getan. Und
zwar diese Luftbrücke hat es gegeben. Die ist dann schließlich aus einer
anderen Situation mehr oder weniger ohne Entscheidung, ohne jedenfalls
wirklich wirksame Verbesserung zu schaffen, aufgegeben worden, weil
die Interessenlage auf der sowjetischen Seite geändert hat, aber ich würde
nicht glauben, daß man heute mit dieser Art von militärischer Aktion
wirklich die Auseinandersetzung mit den Sowjets positiv bestehen kann,
sondern auf dieser Weise geht man möglicherweise einer schweren poli-
tisch-diplomatischen Niederlage entgegen.
Ich habe das Problem eigentlich nur in dieser Schärfe aufgeworfen,
damit man [unclear] sieht, in welche Lagen man geraten kann, und man
muß die möglichen Lagen vorher, glaube ich, absolut realistisch und gener-
alstabsmäßig durchgedacht haben, um nicht eines Tages an einer Stelle zu
stehen, wo man, wo das Publikum den Eindruck gewinnt, “ihr habt doch
nicht ganz entschlossen gehandelt,” weil man versucht [unclear] auszuwe-
ichen. Die Lösung, die wir jetzt für derzeit [unclear], für das Problem des
Zivilzugangs, sieht so aus, um es noch einmal zu sagen, daß man sagt,
“Nun, der lebenswichtige Verkehr muß weiter gehen. Nimmt die Visa, dafür
[unclear] unten Potenz [unclear]. Macht keine unnötigen Reisen. Wer
sonst reisen muß, geht durch die Luft. Wir werden das bezahlen, wir wer-
den das organisieren, und wir werden das finanzieren. Und wir werden
dann wirtschaftliche Maßnahmen eintreten lassen.” Und Verhinderungen
des Interzonenhandels oder Kündigung des Interzonenhandels, entsprech-
ende Handlung der drei Westallierten, möglichst entsprechende Handlung
alle NATO-Partner gerichtet gegen die Sowjetzone.
Aber wenn das nicht den gewünschten Effekt dabei führt, dann bleibt
man in der Situation, entweder nur ein[en] begrenzten Berlinverkehr zu
haben, oder das Visaerfordernis ganz zu nehmen, und man befindet sich,
in der Tat, auf einer gleitenden Skala, die leider nach unten gleitet, und
nicht auf einer aufsteigenden [unclear] zur Besserung.
Translator: I’m certainly fully aware that this is an extremely diffi-
cult problem, and it is connected also especially with the question [of]
whether in the military field, military traffic, one will want to take a
decision then in case of any such introduction, also in the military field,
to lift it up into the air, or whether it is considered vital—also militarily
vital—to keep land access open. I frankly believe that it is also militarily
vital to keep the land access open and not simply try and lift everything
up into the air.
484 W E D N E S DAY, O C T O B E R 17, 1962
I am, of course, aware that this implies a very heavy and very difficult
decision, but it is possible that if one goes into the air and says, “Well,
let’s see how we can get along,” we might be placed before different
developments, which might place us rather in a spot. Now there was, of
course, the airlift in 1948–49, and under a different situation it more or
less came back on the surface without any effective improvement. And it
came back because the interests for the Soviet side had changed. But I do
not think that now, with any such military action as taken in ’48–’49, it
will be possible for us to really meet the Soviet challenge. But [instead]
we may be well in for a major diplomatic and political defeat.
Having raised the question . . . and I only want to see that every pos-
sible development, every possible situation is really thought about in a
war-gaming manner, if I may say, so as not one day to find oneself in a
position where the public would gain the impression that after all they
[the Western allies] are not so very firm, firmly resolved and they are
trying to evade the problems. The solution which up to now has been, to
repeat that, which up to now has been envisaged for any such deteriora-
tion of civilian traffic was that the vital traffic would continue, that
under protest one would accept the visa, that one would appeal to the
population not to do any unnecessary travel, that the necessary travel
would have to be financed and lifted up into the air, and that economic
countermeasures would be taken by us insofar as the interzonal trade is
concerned, either diminishing or completely renunciating it, and corre-
sponding action, economic counteraction, by the three Western powers
and possibly by all NATO members.
But if all these measures remained without effect, then of course we
would be in a situation where we would either have reduced access to
Berlin or we would have to accept all the visa requirements for all the
traffic, and we would find ourselves suddenly on a declining gliding scale.
President Kennedy: I don’t know, Mr. Minister, if the question of the
visas is the . . . if we should make this the great issue, whether we can
win that fight [unclear]. That’s the problem. We don’t want to have a
diplomatic defeat. We don’t want to have Berlin isolated either, because
of the forcible blockade of their own or because of a decision of ours not
to move. And the question really is as to whether a visa is the issue upon
which to hang our use of force, your use of economic countermeasures
and your use of force with us. Can we justify—we’re talking about opin-
ion in the world—fighting our way up the autobahn because they won’t
give a visa? When [unclear]—when, after all, civilian traffic has been
submitting itself to being stamped? That’s a pretty sophisticated—
Schroeder: Das ist in der [unclear], aber die ganze Schwierigkeit der
Meeting with West German Foreign Minister Gerhard Schroeder 485
I don’t think it’s enough, really, for the Soviets only to know that under
certain circumstances we will fight. They do know that. They even believe
that we’re going to wage a nuclear war over Berlin, although from their
point of view this looks a rather crazy decision to take. But they still
believe that we will wage a nuclear war over Berlin if necessary. But their
own intentions, or their further moves, of course depend on how we deal
with the precedent, or how we have dealt with the precedent move. Now
the question is really so vitally important, now, whether this is the visa or
whether it is something else. But it is not merely a paper requirement. It
really goes much further than that.
President Kennedy: Well, I understand the difficulty, but you have to
make some decisions in the next three or four weeks about the matter.
I know this argument about salami, and what point we draw the line.
I agree that that’s important. I just think we ought to make sure that in
our desire to demonstrate some firmness, that we don’t draw the line at
the wrong place. The civilian traffic at the present time accepts East
German control. That traffic submits its documents to the East German
authorities. They stamp the documents—that’s a kind of acquiescence in
their authority. The degree of difference between that kind of acquies-
cence and acquiescence in the acceptance of a different paper doesn’t
seem to me to be dramatic enough to hang all of our future on that issue.
The West German government has made it clear it’s not going to
recognize [East Germany]. All the rest of us [in the Alliance] have.
Whether we therefore want to set in train all the reactions on this ques-
tion of a difference in the paper, I think, is a matter that we ought to
make up our mind about very shortly. If we make it the important issue
and then acquiesce, then it’s going to be a major defeat. [Schroeder inter-
jects: “No.”] If we say that we would accept East Germans on the check-
points, and that this . . . we’ll sign these papers which we don’t have any
regard for, and which have no standing, then it will become less impor-
tant. So we’ve got to decide in advance whether we want to make it
important or whether we want to attempt to downgrade it and regard
the actual movement in and out as the key issue.9
Schroeder: Ich möchte nur einen Satz noch zu diesen Problemen sagen.
Es ist eben doch ein ganz großer Unterschied, ob ich an einen Grenzpunkt
heranfahre und dort eine Sache abgestempelt wird, und ich durchfahre,
oder aber, ob man das tun kann, was die Leute ohne weiteres tun können,
sagen “Alle Visa gibt es überhaupt nur noch in Ostberlin. Oder wir sind
bereit auf Eurem Boden Visabureaus zu eröffnen, zum Beispiel in West
Berlin.” In anderen Worten, die Zone kommt durch das anerkannte
Visaerfördernis in eine ganz andere Lage, darauf zu sagen, “Wir geben im
Monat überhaupt nur 50,000 Visen.” Und was machen wir dann? Mit
anderen Worten, sie könnten sowohl die Zahl der Visen als den Ort der
Visaerteilung feststellen. Von daran eine Menge Förderung knüpfen, die
angeblich entgegenkommen sein sollen, in Westdeutschland oder in West
Berlin Visastellen zu eröffnen. Das ist die [unclear] Gefahr, die hinter
dieser Sache liegt.
Translator: I just wanted to add one point, Mr. President, on this
issue. There is, of course, a big difference of whether you drive up to a
checkpoint and you get your stamp and then you proceed, or whether
they can do—the Soviet-occupied Zone people [East Germans] can do
what they certainly could do to say that visas can only be issued in East
Berlin. Or they say, “We’ll be very generous; we’ll make it easy for you.
We’ll open visa-issuing agencies in West Berlin,” for instance.
Schroeder: Or in West Germany.
Translator: Or in West Germany. In other words, the zone really
comes into a completely different situation. They might as well say,
“We’ll only issue 50,000 visas per month.” And they can fix the number,
fix the place and connect it up with other demands that are worse. Under
the label of being very generous, saying, “We’ll open up these visa-issu-
ing agencies—”
President Kennedy: [interrupting] But I would assume that under
those conditions the economic countermeasures that we would take
would be sufficiently oppressive to them that this kind of action, which is
rather superficial, would not be useful to them.
Schroeder: Das ist die Frage, wie weit wirtschaftliche Maßnahmen
dabei wirksam sind. Ehrlich gesagt, bin ich von der Wirksamkeit der
wirtschaftlichen Maßnahmen dann nicht überzeugt, wenn die andere
Seite bereit ist, das Risiko zu laufen. Dann wenn sie—die andere Seite
bereit ist, das Risiko zu laufen, dann kann sie die wirtschaftlichen
Maßnahmen dann sich hinnehmen. Ich würde jedenfalls davor warnen,
zu glauben, daß wirtschaftlicher Druck genügte, um die gewünschten
Veränderungen hervorzurufen.
Translator: Berlin, of course, is at risk as to how far the economic
countermeasures will be effective. Quite honestly, I’m not convinced that
Meeting with West German Foreign Minister Gerhard Schroeder 489
they are effective if the other side is prepared to really run the risk. Then
they can certainly put up with everything we can do in the field of eco-
nomic countermeasures. So I would rather warn to the belief that eco-
nomic countermeasures alone, and in themselves, will be sufficiently
effective.
President Kennedy: Let me say, there’s a couple of other matters
which . . . I appreciate the Minister’s discussion.
Schroeder: Well, I’m sorry they’re just a little bit long on this.
[Kennedy interjects: “No, no, but I—”] I think it’s very important we both
get to make a start with it—
President Kennedy: I want . . .
Unidentified: Go on.
President Kennedy: The other question is on this matter of the nego-
tiations with . . . these discussions which have been carried on with
[Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei] Gromyko, which so far have been
unsuccessful. Since last spring [spring of 1962], the Communist insis-
tence on the withdrawal of Western troops from Berlin, of course, has
meant that nothing has proceeded.
Now, it may be they won’t always stay on that, that they’ll withdraw
that condition and come back again to access and boundaries and atomic
weapons and all these other matters which were discussed some months
ago before they got on this other matter. Do you have any thoughts
about . . . particularly . . . I don’t see why Mr. Khrushchev would want to
come over here and talk about Berlin if all he’s going to talk about is
what we’ve been very clear is not a matter that is subject to negotiation.
Schroeder: Nach meiner Meinung ist erstens noch nicht ganz sicher,
ob Khrushchev wirklich kommen wird, und kommen will. Khrushchev
hat diese Besuchsankündigung, nach meiner Meinung hervorragend
benutzt, um den Westen mit Spekulation zu beschäftigen. Aber, deswe-
gen weiß ich nicht ob er es wirklich tun wird. Ich will nur einmal
annehmen, daß er es tatsächlich vor hat.
Dann würde ich es als ein Zeichnen dafür ansehen, daß er nicht
geneigt ist, den sagen Sie mal härtesten Kurs zu steuern. Er müßte, also,
schon kommen, in der Erwartung, daß man irgendwelche Dinge arrang-
ieren kann. Khrushchev—wir haben das in Genf gesehen im März, und
wir haben das in Juli gesehen mit Gromyko—man wird das—Sie werden
das vielleicht morgen Nachmittag wieder sehen—haben in der Tat den
scheidenden Punkt daraus gemacht, westliche Anwesenheit in Berlin.
Wir haben [unclear]—die Sowjets haben sich ein Bißchen zu optimistisch
ausgedrückt, darüber, daß man sich über Grenzen, Demarkationslinien,
490 W E D N E S DAY, O C T O B E R 17, 1962
But just for the sake of argument, let’s assume he will come. And if he
does, I would consider that as some indication that he is perhaps not really
coming along with the intention of going the toughest course. So he
would probably come expecting that something could be arranged. Now,
we have seen this in Geneva in March, and also in July with Gromyko—
you’ll probably have the same experience tomorrow, Mr. President, [in
your meeting] with him [Gromyko]—that Khrushchev and the Soviets
have always made the crucial point, or the only point really for them, was
the Western presence in Berlin.10 And in my opinion the Soviet Union has
been a little too optimistic in its utterings about boundaries, demarcation
lines, nonaggression pacts, nuclear weapons, acting as though all this was
practically and virtually settled and agreed, while in my opinion there is
certainly not yet any agreement on these questions. But in their view in
the diplomatic, through diplomatic channels, the Soviets present it as
though these matters had already been agreed.
Now, putting myself in the Soviets’ place for a moment, if all this . . .
and taking it as they do, that all this is practically arranged and agreed,
then I would rather think that the Soviets would continue to try via the, or
[unclear] concerning, the Western presence in Berlin, to come to an
understanding on a sort of gliding scale. In my opinion, this has been quite
clear in Geneva, where they raised the question, “How long do you want
to stay in Berlin? Do you want to stay in Berlin forever?” And then they
suggested that the forces in Berlin should be reduced by one-half, and for
the next four years we would add some Poles, Czechs, Danes, and Dutch
[troops], and we would reduce it by 25 percent each year, and after a
period of four years, that’s the end of it. Now I’m convinced that the
Soviets, from their point of view, really thought that this was a compro-
mise offer. And I even think that the November ’58 proposal of
Khrushchev’s to turn Berlin into a free and demilitarized city was, in their
eyes, a compromise offer intended to serve as a face-saver for both sides.
Now they’ve seen that this offer has not been accepted, and therefore
10. Schroeder is referring to the major talks on Berlin between Rusk and Gromyko, in
Geneva, in March and July 1962. On both occasions the Soviets had pressed the issue of the
Western troop presence in Berlin very hard, reinforced by secret letters sent to Kennedy from
Khrushchev. It was after the July 1962 round of meetings that Khrushchev began telling U.S.
diplomats and visitors that it was "clear our dialogue was coming to [an] end." He would
have to proceed to settle the Berlin matter without being intimidated any longer by U.S.
threats. See, for example, Ambassador Llewellyn Thompson’s conversation with Khrushchev
recounted in Moscow 228, 26 July 1962, in FRUS, 15: 253.
492 W E D N E S DAY, O C T O B E R 17, 1962
11. Kennedy is referring to the Washington Ambassadorial Group, a working group of repre-
sentatives from the United States, Britain, France and West Germany that regularly met to
discuss Berlin and German issues.
Meeting with West German Foreign Minister Gerhard Schroeder 493
hat, dann liegt die Gefahr sehr nah, daß der Plan ein Bißchen auseinan-
der läuft, und ich glaube, wir sind jetzt in einem Stadium, in dem man
sich das alles noch einmal neu ansehen muß, und das ganz realistisch
und klar auf die [unclear] und Annahmen bringen muß, um zu sehen,
was der Kern der ganzen Geschichte ist. Ich habe gestern mit dem
Secretary of Defense gesprochen, und er war offenbar sehr klar der
Meinung, daß man diese ganze Planung jetzt einmal, sozusagen auf dem
neuesten Stand überholen, und daß mal Stromlinien—der Ausdruck ist
von mir—etwas Stromlinien [unclear] sein muß.
Translator: If you’ll permit me to say this, Mr. President, if one has
been going on planning and replanning for one or two years, of course,
there is the danger that the harmonization is not 100 percent between the
various stages of the plans. And therefore I think that we have reached a
point where the whole thing should be reexamined and brought up to
date under the most realistic and sober consideration, and to really try to
find what is the crux of the matter. Yesterday I had a really interesting
talk with Mr. McNamara, and he rather was of the opinion, it seemed to
me, that really this planning should be brought up to date, and—that’s
not a term he used, but I would use it—should be streamlined.
Schroeder: Darf ich nur einen Satz dazu [unclear]. Ich [unclear] die
Meinung, man muß diese ganzen Möglichkeiten noch einmal wieder
richtig wie Kriegsspiele hin und her spielen, und da wird es gut sein, die
klügsten Leute die wir haben, die Sowjets spielen zu lassen.
Translator: May I add just one sentence? I am of the opinion that all
of these various contingencies should be played through in a sort of war
game, and then it would be quite good to have the most intelligent [peo-
ple we have] play the Soviet part.
President Kennedy: Well, I’m not as generous as you about the
Russians. [All laugh.]
Schroeder: [laughing] Nein, also, ich möchte nicht falsch verstanden
werden. Nur um ganz sicher zu gewinnen, sollten wir möglichst, die
klügsten für die [unclear] auf die anderen Seite setzt. Ich würde die
Russen sonst auch nicht zu [unclear].
Translator: Now, don’t misunderstand me, Mr. President, it’s just to
be quite sure that we don’t miss any point, but that is why we should
have the most intelligent play the Soviet part. But I certainly wouldn’t
think that the Soviets are more intelligent as well.
President Kennedy: Yeah, they’ve got a great geography as their
asset.
I read this morning Mr. [West German defense minister Franz
Josef] Strauss’s interview in the New York Times which made two points.
494 W E D N E S DAY, O C T O B E R 17, 1962
One is the completeness of the comradeship between the French and the
Germans in military matters. And the other is the question of at what
point . . . his opposition to the use of German forces, if this matter came
to a crunch, until [unclear] secondary stage [of a Berlin crisis]. If this
matter comes to a military [unclear], it seems to me that the law is going
to rest with the side which has the larger force and that therefore there
isn’t much use once the military action begins in questioning whether
the use of German troops would throw a shadow on our judicial—juridi-
cal rights to be in West Berlin.
Schroeder: I’m not sure whether you said “completeness” of Franco-
German understanding or “not completeness.”
President Kennedy: “Completeness of comradeship,” I think, is the
phrase Mr. Strauss used.
Schroeder: Did he really say completeness of comradeship? That’s—
[Resumes speaking German.]
Ich will mal die deutsch-französischen Sachen herauslassen. Ich
denke, über die französischen Möglichkeiten in dieser Sache, so realis-
tisch, wie ich annehme daß Sie, Herr President, darüber denken.
Aber der andere Punkt ist wichtiger, denn [unclear] die Frage, wie
stark ist das deutsche Engagement in dieser Sache. Und daran darf es über-
haupt keiner Zweifel geben, das das deutsche Engagement in dieser Sache
genau so stark ist, wie das amerikanische, aus, in welchen Sachen, aus
Gefühlsgründen und aus patriotischen Gründen daraus, eher betonter als
das amerikanische, es überhaupt sein kann. Das dürfte eigentlich zwischen
uns keine Frage sein. Und das was ich—dieses Interview habe ich nur
flüchtig gelesen, es ist mit der Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung gewesen—das
was dort drinnen gesagt ist, wenn man es objektiv ließt, ist genau der
Stand der Planung zwischen Live Oak und NATO. Es gibt hier eine Live
Oak Planung, die dann übergeht in einer NATO Sache, und da unsere
ganzen Truppen der NATO unterstellt sind, gehören wir in dem NATO-
Abschnitt dieser Sache. Das [unclear] die [unclear] auf dem Papier und
nach der derzeitigen Planung. Aber ich habe überhaupt keinen Zweifel
daran, daß wenn es jetzt zur größeren militärischen Auseinandersetzung
kommt, wir einfach deswegen von vornherein drinnen sind, weil wir halt
vorne stehen. Das ist auch eine große Selbstverständlichkeit, in meiner
Meinung.
Translator: I may leave perhaps the German-French thing aside—
just one sentence on that. I have about as realistic a view of these things
as you, I suppose, Mr. President.
But the second point, I think, is more important, and that is to what
degree is Germany committed in this matter, and there can be no doubt
Meeting with West German Foreign Minister Gerhard Schroeder 495
about the fact that our commitment is exactly the same as that of the
United States, and perhaps even a little more so, out of feeling and out of
patriotism, than it ever could be for the United States, so there should
really be no question whatsoever between us. Now I haven’t read this
interview, which was given to the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung by Herr
Strauss. I haven’t read it in every detail; I just had a short look at it. But
when you look at what it says, really, it means that it is—it corresponds
exactly to what the stage of planning is between Live Oak and the
NATO planning.12 And as all our forces are assigned to NATO, we are
automatically a part of the NATO plan in that context. But that is, of
course, the situation on paper. I have no doubt that the real situation, if
there were any major military confrontation or conflict, would be that
we are in it right from the very first moment, simply because we are
right up in front, so this is a matter of course.
President Kennedy: And the . . . this doesn’t really have so much to
do with what we’re talking about, but the other day in talking to the
French foreign minister about the disposition of French forces, of actu-
ally France maintaining its forces in France rather than in eastern
Western Germany and forward strategy, because this indicates a rather
sharp division between us all on this question of exactly what our mili-
tary strategy is, and where our forces ought to be, where the division
between those forces and the use of nuclear weapons ought to be.13
These are matters which seem to be somewhat unresolved, and West
Germany has an important role to play in helping resolve them. We’ve
been unable to persuade the French to move [unclear] their forces into
West Germany and up into the forward line. And if we don’t have the
French forces up there then really, we’ve got inadequate forces.
Schroeder: Wir haben an sich vorgesehen—ich weiß nicht ob es
schon geschehen ist—de Gaulle diesen Punkt noch mal sehr klar zu
machen, daß wir das in der Zeit den Zustand als ganz unbefriedigend
ansehen. Wenn ich richtig unterrichtet bin, sozusagen von französischer
Seite [unclear] sind, seien die Unterhaltungen, die sie damals gehabt
haben, von der französischen Seite der Standpunkt entwickelt worden,
ihre Schwierigkeiten legen im Augenblick darin, daß sie dabei sein, ihre
Truppen von Algerien nach Frankreich zurückzunehmen und sie mehr
12. Live Oak was the planning group for NATO, created by General Lauris Norstad to deal
with military contingencies surrounding Berlin. Its headquarters were outside of Paris. It was
headed by a British general assisted by U.S. and French officers, and a German observer.
13. The French foreign minister was Maurice Couve de Murville.
496 W E D N E S DAY, O C T O B E R 17, 1962
aus Gründen des Innerenaufbaus, und der Disziplin, und so weiter, lieber
auf französischen Boden zu haben. Angeblich ist dieses Argument
vorgebracht worden. Ich halte das Argument nicht für so sehr überzeu-
gend, denn die Franzosen würden, nach meiner Meinung, in der Lage
sein, unter Umständen mit amerikanischer Unterstützung, so weit es
nicht um die Ausstattung der Truppen und Divisionen handelt, diese
Division weiter vorne zu postieren.
Ein Bißchen liegt, nach meiner Überzeugung, in der französischen
Strategie, die Auffassung, das es eine Art von—daß es zwei Schlachten
daß es im Grunde zwei Schlachten gebe: eine Schlacht um Deutschland,
die verloren wird, und eine Schlacht um Frankreich, die gewonnen wird.
Die letzen französischen Manöver haben in der Tat einen Stand gehabt, in
dem—in der Zusammenfassung, am Schluß, oder in dem Ausgangslage,
glaube ich sogar, [unclear] Franzosen ist gesagt würde, “Die Schlacht in
Deutschland ist verloren gegangen, und nun stellt sich hier für uns die
soundso Situation.” Ich bin kein Stratege und kein Berufssoldat, aber ich
finde, daß diese Annahmen, die die Franzosen ihren Übung zugrunde
legen, nicht ganz im unseren Jahrhundert gehören. Aber vielleicht täusche
ich mich, und vielleicht sind die große militärischer Genies die Franzosen.
Ich möchte darüber keine [unclear].
Translator: Now we have the intention—I don’t know if this has
already been done—but we intend to make it very clear to de Gaulle that
we feel that the present situation is very unsatisfactory. If I am well
informed, in that discussion with you, you were referring to just now, the
French have said that that sort of difficulty now about these French
forces was that they were moving them back from Algeria to France and
for reasons of discipline and morale and so on it was better to have them
on French soil. Now, I don’t really think that this is an extremely con-
vincing argument, because in my opinion the French would be quite
able, with some American aid, to equip their forces in such a way that
they can be sent to the forward line.
In my conviction, the French strategy really is based on the rather
well-known French opinion that there are actually [going to be] two
battles, one [a] battle of Germany, which will be lost, and one [a] battle
of France, which will be won. In fact, the last French maneuvers had that
assumption—that the battle of Germany was lost—as their point of
departure, and from there they proceeded in their maneuvers. Now, I am
not a strategist nor a professional soldier, but I would think that these
assumptions, and working assumptions, do not fully belong to our cen-
tury [laughter]. I may be wrong; the French may be more ingenious in
Meeting with West German Foreign Minister Gerhard Schroeder 497
Prince. He was back at the White House for only about 20 minutes before
taking off for his previously scheduled political trip to Connecticut. He
would return to Washington that night.
1. Including President Kennedy, David Bell, Anthony Celebrezze, J. Edward Day, C. Douglas
Dillon, Najeeb Halaby, Walter Heller, Luther Hodges, Theodore Sorensen, Aubrey Wagner,
James Webb, and Jerome Wiesner. Tape 30, John F. Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files,
Presidential Recordings Collection.
500 T H U R S DAY, O C T O B E R 18, 1962
programs and stimulate the economy with greater federal spending, the
President nonetheless wants to present budgets that run only modest
deficits and appear to be tightly managed products of surpassing frugal-
ity, budgets that can favorably be compared to those produced by his
Republican predecessor.
This meeting offers a brief and unvarnished portrait of the budgetary
politics that would come to dominate the Kennedy and Johnson adminis-
trations. Embracing a “New Economics” that sought to boost the econ-
omy with some deficit spending and employ more presidential activism,
President Kennedy at the same time feels drawn toward the older verities
of political economy. Budgets and economic policies characterized by lais-
sez-faire, fiscal austerity, and the smallest possible federal workforce
remained popular with the public and the U.S. Congress alike. President
Kennedy seems to know this, and perhaps even shares the sentiment.
David Bell: When you consider the portions of the budget that are
essentially unmalleable . . . interest on the debt, payments to veterans
under the compensation laws [and] other unchangeable commitments,
then you will see that we have some substantial review work to do dur-
ing this fall budget season.
You want me to continue, sir, while the photographers are here?2
President Kennedy: Yeah, sure . . . yeah, you can go ahead. [Unclear.]
Bell: Now there are two principal points to bear in mind. First of all,
the President recognizes that the planning figures that we all reached
last summer represent a sensible program for carrying forward the com-
mitments the administration has made—
President Kennedy: You might as well wait, Dave.
There is some mostly inaudible, quiet conversation, as some machine
noise disturbs the discussion. To the listener it sounds like a workman’s
drill is being used on some construction in the West Wing of the White
House. The following exchange can be heard.
President Kennedy: This [unclear], I have learned, was designed by
Mr. Jones for the . . . possibly the death of [unclear].
Unidentified: I thought the Vice President might want to give you
this but since he’s not here, here is the Sam Rayburn stamp.3
[Unclear exchange.]
2. Photographers are taking pictures at the beginning of the meeting; they leave as it begins.
3. Sam Rayburn of Texas, then the Speaker of the House, died of cancer in November 1961.
Cabinet Meeting on the Federal Budget for Fiscal Year 1964 501
4. Jim Farley was Franklin Roosevelt’s postmaster general from 1933 to 1940 and chairman of
the Democratic National Committee from 1932 to 1940.
502 T H U R S DAY, O C T O B E R 18, 1962
a series of issues. And we may very well end up by cutting back on some
of the things that the administration has stood for.
Secondly, even when we have done this there will still be a substan-
tial increase, necessarily, in the ’64 budget on the expenditure side. The
problem that the President spoke of, in presenting an expenditure
increase, and a deficit, and a tax reduction proposal—all at once—will
remain. And we’re not going to be able to get him off that hook. But,
obviously, under those circumstances, the budget should be rock solid.
I have a suggestion about procedure. It seems to me it would be unwise,
at this point, to stop and ask all of you to reconsider the budgets you are
submitting. Many of the budgets have already reached the bureau. Others
are in the final stages. I suggest they come right on in. We will consider
them and will be suggesting areas for considering possible reductions. And
I suggest that you all—from this meeting on—direct your staffs to do the
same thing. And we will then be, simultaneously the bureau and your own
organizations—working on the question of what reductions can be made
below the final figures we had previously agreed on.
With respect to policy, we have a few suggestions. It is clear that in
nearly . . . well, I should probably say in every agency, it will be neces-
sary to go below the planning figures. This is going to mean different
things in different agencies. I suspect that, on the civilian side, the two
agencies where we are going to have the most difficulty is Agriculture
and Health, Education and Welfare. Those are the largest civilian budg-
ets. They both have very volatile elements within them. They both have
large legislative programs, to this point. Therefore, we will need to be
spending a good deal of time.
And for the benefit of those two secretaries, may I illustrate the prob-
lem by saying, in preparing the planning figures, we had already agreed
that the difference in view between us and the departments—in the case of
Agriculture, of some 400 million dollars; in the case of HEW of some 200
million dollars. It now appears to me, that to meet the President’s target it
is likely to be necessary to cut below our figures, in the case of Agriculture
by another 1[00] or 200 million dollars, and in the case of Health,
Education and Welfare by as much as 2[00] to 400 million dollars.
Anthony Celebrezze: More?
Bell: Yes, sir.
Celebrezze: You mean 600 million all together?
Bell: Yes, sir. This simply illustrates the extent of the range of dis-
cussion that we’re going to be engaged in during this next few weeks.
We do not think that it would be wise or appropriate to set arbitrary
Cabinet Meeting on the Federal Budget for Fiscal Year 1964 503
5. This refers to a hypothetical policy under which no new initiatives or programs would be
entertained in planning the following year’s budget.
6. Adopted in 1939 and discontinued in 1943, the federal Food Stamp Program was adopted
anew in 1961 as a pilot program in selected counties and municipalities. Changed fundamen-
tally at this point from a program designed to distribute farm surpluses to one that focused
more on improved nutrition, it grew markedly as it expanded to cover more people and a
greater variety of foodstuffs.
504 T H U R S DAY, O C T O B E R 18, 1962
7. The total number of federal employees in 1962, including postal workers, was approxi-
mately 1.6 million.
Cabinet Meeting on the Federal Budget for Fiscal Year 1964 505
8. The presidential daily diary lists both Stewart Udall, secretary of the interior, and John A.
Carver, Jr., assistant secretary of the interior, as being in attendance at this meeting. It is likely
that one or the other is making this statement.
9. See “People of the Week: Byrd vs. Dillon, Differing Views on a Tax Cut,” U.S. News and
World Report, 22 October 1962, p. 21. The opening line of this brief article reads, “Should the
U.S. Government cut taxes without a cut in federal spending?” Harry F. Byrd, Sr., chairman of
the Senate Finance Committee, answered by saying that to do so would be evidence of “unmit-
igated fiscal irresponsibility.” Dillon argued instead that the nation’s growing infrastructure,
training, and research requirements made the tax cut, without offsetting spending cuts, an
absolute necessity.
10. Day was referring to H.R. 7927, signed by President Kennedy on 11 October 1962. This
legislation mandated salary increases (of approximately 11 percent) for approximately 590,000
postal employees and (of approximately 10 percent) for approximately 1 million nonpostal fed-
eral employees. It also provided for a 5 percent increase in retirement benefits for all federal
employees and included a postal rate increase, increasing first class postage from 4 cents to 5
cents. Its estimated costs were $504 million in FY 1963 and $1.049 billion in FY 1964.
Cabinet Meeting on the Federal Budget for Fiscal Year 1964 507
they are being sent over to the Budget Bureau or to my office so that we
will have them in plenty of time to think them through and to consider
them for inclusion in the President’s program.
Secondly, there is a great deal of the President’s program which went
to the 87th Congress which they simply didn’t have time to consider.
There are a few which they had time to consider, and which they didn’t
pass. I think that you ought to examine each of those proposals to see
whether you want to make some change in the President resubmitting
them next year, or whether they should be resubmitted at all. In any
case, if the Congress altered them in committee or sent them for testi-
mony or further experience, some change would be required. [Dillon
whispering in background.] I hope you’ll be making those changes and be
ready to discuss them with my office and the Budget Bureau. I just
wanted to make sure everyone was on notice that they would be having
that work completed in a month or so.
President Kennedy: Anybody got anything else? Otherwise, Ted do
you—
Unidentified: The Secretary of State will not be here, so there won’t
be—
President Kennedy: Right. I think we probably all got hung up in the . . .
I think it’s tough on this budget. But I will say, just before we leave,
that Ambassador Galbraith says that we’ll never get a tax cut through
anyway, and what the economy needs is expenditures.11 And that, there-
fore, you shouldn’t cut your programs, because that’s the only way you’re
ever going to get the kind of spending which this economy needs to
maintain a reasonable rate of growth.
But I figured you’d be doing that anyway. [Boisterous laughter.]
Webb: Mr. President, it looks like we’re going to get the range of
orbit 12–37.12 If we can, it’ll—
Unidentified: I think we [unclear]. Good job.
At this point the formal meeting comes to a close as some participants
11. John Kenneth Galbraith, Harvard professor of economics, had been appointed ambassador
to India by President Kennedy in 1961. Though he understood the primary political virtues of
the tax cut proposal—the speed with which it could be implemented and its potential to
attract support from the business community and from conservative politicians—Galbraith
consistently pressed for increased public expenditures as a more appropriate alternative.
12. With Wally Schirra’s recent Mercury orbit (3 October 1962), and two “secret” satellite
launchings from Vandenberg Air Force Base also taking place in the month of October 1962 (9
October and 26 October), “range of orbit” speculations were, perhaps, a frequent part of Kennedy
White House conversation, and in this case, it appears, an integral part of an inside joke.
Cabinet Meeting on the Federal Budget for Fiscal Year 1964 509
begin filing out of the room. Some remain and engage in less formal
conversation for about another 20 minutes. With the exception of the
following excerpts, most of these conversations are not distinct and are,
therefore, difficult to comprehend. Douglas Dillon, Dave Bell, and
chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers Walter Heller, who
apparently came in late, are among the last to leave and can be heard
more clearly over the last few minutes of the recording. Few of the frag-
ments are meaningful until the following exchange.
Walter Heller: I take it your fellows are getting together something
on the growth side for next Monday, because that meeting a week from
Thursday, the 26th . . .
Dillon: I’ve got that trip to Mexico [for an Inter-American Confer-
ence] and everything else, the EPC meeting. [Unclear.]
Another unclear set of exchanges in overlapping conversations. There
are several audible fragments, clearly referring to estimates of economic
growth.
Heller: Well, you know, what strikes me that we need to do, really . . .
We’re trying to get the administration to put out a statement on growth,
and you know, in that statement, it could say that [unclear]. [Background
conversation ensues.]
Unidentified: [Unclear] could be growth in your office.
Unidentified: No, no . . . I’m not talking about my personal office.
Heller: [continuing] Now then, if there is some easing, maybe the first
step in growth policy should be to maintain the expansion, to sharpen
expansion, to keep up, to try to get to the limits of potential. Something
like that might be, you know, if we could get that in there, clearly, in the
policy section, we have the statement you want.
[aside, to Dave Bell] Dave, before you get away, I wonder . . . we’re
going to have a problem in connection with the midyear review, aren’t
we, of how clean we come? Well, there are two problems.
Bell: Yes, we sure are.
Heller: There are two problems. One is: What are our internal fig-
ures going to be for GNP and so forth? And the second is: What is our
stance? Last year, after all, we came awfully damn clean and said what
our . . . I think we went on and said what our GNP estimates were for
the first and second quarters of the ensuing year, because, in connection
with the I & P. 13
13. Reference to income and product accounts and related National Income and Product
Accounts budget. The latter refers to the method of budgetary accounting (unlike the standard
510 T H U R S DAY, O C T O B E R 18, 1962
Bell: Well, all we’ve said so far is that there will be a release on this
after the election. Now, your question is what’s going to be in that release?
Heller: Yeah. That’s right.
Bell: And—
Unidentified: We have [unclear] every day that we would need to put
out the projections of GNP.
Dillon: If you want to put any out, the most I’d go is a projection—
Heller: For the fourth quarter for the year.
Bell: Well, presumably . . . we could presumably say our revenue esti-
mates for the year will be such and such. How much you break down the
revenue estimates remains a detail to be discussed—the extent to which
you back it up with a GNP estimate. I had assumed we would have to put
out the equivalent of a GNP estimate for calendar year ’62.
Dillon: That’s right.
Heller: Now, however, last year we, after all, went more heavily on to
the I & P Accounts budget. That implied an estimate. . . . I don’t know
whether we . . . I think we specified . . . I may be wrong. Either in your
press conference on it—
Bell: Yeah . . . now, remember, we’re not going to publish a pamphlet
this year. We’re not going to do the whole thing in a press release.
Dillon: This could be a very brief [statement].
Bell: We’ll get together as much—
Heller: At the midyear there’s going to be no [unclear] budget review
at all?
Bell: Nevertheless, I had assumed we would have some reference to
the income and product figures.
Heller: Yes. Well, now, if you do—
Bell: Without going into any detail.
Heller: All right. But suppose they say, “Well now, your income and
product figures for the year are so and so.”
Bell: Yeah.
Heller: “Clearly, Mr. Bell, you must have some GNP figures underly-
ing that for the first and second quarters of next year.” What? You’ve
got to be prepared for that.
Bell: Yeah.
federal procedure known as the administrative budget) which includes trust fund receipts and
expenditures (Social Security, highway grants-in-aid, unemployment compensation, and so on),
omits government transactions in financial assets (federal loans, for example), and records lia-
bilities when they are incurred (accrual basis) and not only when cash changes hands.
Cabinet Meeting on the Federal Budget for Fiscal Year 1964 511
Heller: And . . . but that’s the externals. And internally, we have a big
unresolved difference for the first and second quarters of next year.
Bell: Well, internally, [unclear].
Dillon: Our basic thing on that was—
Heller: We’ll have to resolve it towards the high side in order to
make this [deficit?] thing seem—
Dillon: [apparently in a separate conversation] Also, our basic thing on
that was that we wouldn’t have said what the balance is if we didn’t want
to face this now. We could face it a lot better when we have to which is
early December.
Bell: Early November, this is after the election.
Dillon: No, no . . . I mean for the next year . . . January 1st.
Bell: Oh yes, but the next . . . we will need some choice of figures.
Heller: Yes.
Dillon: Oh yes, [unclear] choice of figures for this thing. But the pub-
lic, the basic thing, will feel much “solider” about it. And I don’t think in
our next choice of figures we necessarily have to resolve our thing about
the first . . .
Unidentified: Well what have we got to do?
Bell: We’ll have to . . . I don’t know that we need to resolve the pres-
ent figures, but we have to come down—
Unidentified: A single revenue figure.
Dillon: That can be just by ad hoc sort of thing. [A few people
chuckle.]
Bell: Yeah, that’s right. We don’t need to resolve the substantive
issue—
Dillon: Yeah.
Unidentified: The first and second quarter issue, well sure we’ll get
some tough questions. Well then we’ll just have to, just have to . . .
Bell: Dance.
Unidentified: Well, I think this could be [unclear]. I’d rather do the
dance than get my [unclear, laughs].
Unidentified: Oh, there, sure, sure.
At this point, voices begin to fade as the remaining meeting participants
leave the room. Minutes later, Evelyn Lincoln speaks to an unidentified
male just before recorder is turned off.
Lincoln: Are we coming here? Is the eleven [o’clock] meeting . . . is
it in here?
Unidentified: Oh yes it is. I think it’s a fine time to go back and . . .
512 T H U R S DAY, O C T O B E R 18, 1962
14. Including President Kennedy, George Ball, McGeorge Bundy, Douglas Dillon, Roswell
Gilpatric, U. Alexis Johnson, Robert Kennedy, Arthur Lundahl, Edwin Martin, John McCone,
Robert McNamara, Dean Rusk, Theodore Sorensen, Maxwell Taylor, and Llewellyn
Thompson. Tapes 30 and 30A, John F. Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, Presidential
Recordings Collection.
15. Stevenson letter to President Kennedy, 17 October 1962; reprinted in The Cuban Missile
Crisis, 1962: A National Security Archive Documents Reader, eds. Laurence Chang and Peter
Kornbluh (New York: New Press, 1992), pp. 119–20.
16. The sortie numbers were derived by examining a target and determining how many indi-
vidual aim points should be hit in order to destroy it. Then planners used training experi-
ence to judge how many bombs would need to be dropped on an aim point to be fairly sure
that one would hit it. From that, after incorporating attrition from enemy action or mechani-
Meeting on the Cuban Missile Crisis 513
The Chiefs still opposed any strike limited only to the missile sites.
They continued also to view any blockade as merely a complement to,
not an alternative for, an air strike. They assumed, in addition, that a
blockade would require a formal declaration of war.
About 15 senior officials had met again for several hours the after-
noon of October 17.17 Almost all leaned toward taking some political
action before launching an air strike. They reviewed a large number of pos-
sible courses of action and speculated about imaginable Soviet responses.
McNamara and Taylor worried that any diplomatic efforts would alert
the Soviets and thwart an effective strike. McNamara and Gilpatric belit-
tled the significance of the Soviet MRBM deployments for the overall
strategic balance. McCone and Taylor argued that the MRBMs did,
indeed, change the balance. But this difference of opinion did not prevent
general agreement that the United States could not allow the Soviet
deployment to stand.
It was in this context that Kennedy’s advisers, for the first time, dis-
cussed in detail the pros and cons of a blockade. Bohlen and Thompson
continued to insist that Khrushchev’s aim was to achieve something with
regard to Berlin and that the U.S. government ought not to be diverted
from that by concentrating its attention exclusively on Cuba.
Kennedy had invited former Secretary of State Dean Acheson to join
his circle of advisers. Formidably self-assured and gifted not only with
cutting wit as well as great ability in advocacy, Acheson participated in
cal problems, planners could come up with sortie numbers. These numbers first grew
because new targets were identified. They later grew because the staff began incorporating
additional requirements for escort, air defense suppression, and poststrike reconnaissance. A
few days later, exasperated by the latest revision, Taylor exclaimed to his JCS colleagues:
“What! These figures were reported to the White House. You are defeating yourselves with
your own cleverness, gentlemen.” Notes taken from Transcripts of Meetings of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, p. 6.
17. These meetings were attended (though not everyone was there all of the time) by Robert
Kennedy, Rusk, McNamara, Taylor, Bundy, McCone, Ball, Gilpatric, Alexis Johnson, Charles
Bohlen, Thompson, Theodore Sorensen, Martin, possibly Paul Nitze, and (late in the day for a
shorter time) Dean Acheson.
514 T H U R S DAY, O C T O B E R 18, 1962
Sorensen’s earlier note for Kennedy had a similar list. Various forms
of political action and messages to Khrushchev were considered, as well
as various kinds of strikes. Many questions were identified for further
analysis, especially about likely Soviet responses.
During the night of October 17–18, a few officials wrote brief papers
for the President summarizing their personal beliefs. Douglas Dillon
submitted a memo stating opposition to negotiations of any kind with
Khrushchev. He recommended a blockade coupled with intensive surveil-
lance of Cuba and a demand that Cuba begin removal of the weapons
forthwith. If the Cubans refused or the military pronounced the blockade
infeasible, Dillon favored an immediate air strike. He said that the Soviet
Union had “initiated a test of our intentions that can determine the
Meeting on the Cuban Missile Crisis 515
18. C. Douglas Dillon, “Memorandum for the President,” 17 October 1962; reprinted in The
Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962, Chang and Kornbluh, pp. 116–18.
19. “Position of George W. Ball,” 17 October 1962, ibid., pp. 121–22.
20. In their conversation at dinner on Tuesday night, October 16, Kennedy had asked Bohlen
to postpone his highly publicized departure for Paris and help with the crisis. Bohlen worried
about the notice his change of plans would cause but said he would try to come up with a
cover story. The next day Bohlen discussed the matter with Rusk, who thought that Bohlen
should proceed with his plans and that Thompson could provide the needed advice on the
Soviet Union. Rusk called President Kennedy, and Kennedy called Bohlen and told him to go
ahead with his departure.
On the morning of 18 October, Kennedy changed his mind, possibly after reading Sorensen’s
note highlighting Bohlen’s advocacy. Just before the 11:00 meeting transcribed here, Bohlen was
summoned (from the airport) to come to the White House. On the phone, Bohlen convinced the
President to let him go ahead with his travel, since he was now expected at a public event that day
in New York. Robert Kennedy later voiced bewilderment and anger about Bohlen’s decision.
21. Sorensen to Kennedy, 18 October 1962, “Cuba—General: 10/15/62–10/23/62” folder,
National Security Files, John F. Kennedy Library. Dillon’s approach—an ultimatum and block-
516 T H U R S DAY, O C T O B E R 18, 1962
Meanwhile, intelligence analysts had pored over photos from the ear-
lier U-2 flights. They found something new—evidence of fixed IRBM
sites in addition to the MRBM sites that had already been identified.
With twice the range of MRBMs (2,200 miles instead of 1,100) and war-
heads of roughly twice as much yield (up to 5 megatons), these missiles
could menace all parts of the continental United States except the Pacific
Northwest.
As officials received this new information on the morning of October
18, their attitudes hardened. McNamara called McCone to say that he now
thought prompt and decisive action necessary. Taylor told the Joint Chiefs
that the news tipped him toward supporting the maximum option—full
invasion of Cuba. This then became the unanimous position of the JCS.
These early-morning discussions of the new intelligence set the mood as
officials filed into the Cabinet Room.
ade, then a strike—was thus close to Bohlen’s. Ball’s suggestion—a blockade followed by
political pressure—was different.
Meeting on the Cuban Missile Crisis 517
seen by us, some 21 miles to the southwest of Havana, which we have at the
moment labeled a probable MRBM/IRBM launch complex. The name of
the town nearest is this [Guanajay]. It is there.
The two sites, sir, numbers one and two—are 21/2 miles apart. And
enlarging this one, we look at it, and we see for the first time a pattern of
medium/IRBM sites that looks like the things we have been seeing in
the Soviet Union. There are two [launch] pads, here—and here. They
are separated by 750 feet. There’s a control bunker with cable scars
[marks on the ground showing cable emplacements] going up into
small buildings inboard of each of the pads. There’s no equipment on the
pads yet. They’re under construction. The security fence has been super-
imposed around the place and on 29 August, the last time we went over
this area, the ground had just scarcely started to be scratched.
At the same time, 21/2 miles south of there is site number two. On 29
August, there were no scratchings on the ground at all and since that
time, these scratchings have taken a form slightly different. There’s this
pattern 2-1-2-1-2, [which] is called the offset inline. They’re slightly
more inline in here. There looks like there’s going to be a fourth one
[pad] up in here, but the spacing is the same.
The orientation of the axis of the pads, 315 [degrees], which will
bring you into the central massif of the United States. We call it
M/IRBM, sir. We have never identified, irrevocably, the signature of the
Soviet intermediate range ballistic missile which is estimatedly a 2,000-
mile missile. But the elongation of the pads and the location of the con-
trol bunkers, between each pair of pads, has been the thing that has
suggested to our hearts, if not our minds, the kind of thing that might
accompany an IRBM.
So we have at the moment labeled it as such and let the guided mis-
siles intelligence analysts come up, finally, with a true analysis of what
the range of these missiles might be that are eventually accommodated
on this set of pads.
If I may switch to the next one, sir.
President Kennedy: Let’s take a look?
Lundahl: Yes, sir. For comparison purposes, Mr. President, I showed
the other day, when I was here [Tuesday, October 16], the sites that we
had described to you the other day, the three that we showed you were
these down near San Cristobal. The one with erectors and missiles. The
one here, just with the missiles and no erectors. And this one here at an
early stage of construction, with tenting and encamping materials, but
neither missiles nor erectors. The date of that photography was 14
October, and the impression of this third site is contained in this illusion
518 T H U R S DAY, O C T O B E R 18, 1962
here, wherein I think you can see the equipment, the buildings and the
housing, and so forth.
On the next day, and admittedly in better photographic cover, we see
this same area that is shown in here with, now, missile erectors, probably
off in here, vehicles, more vehicles, buildings, missile transporters, and a
variety of equipment and additional things under construction. The
impression one would gather is that there is some sense of speed with
which they are proceeding in the construction of this particular base.
May I pass that one over to you, sir? Thank you.
Also, earlier, Mr. President, we reported to you a number of what we
call cruise missile sites, short-range coastal defense-type missiles start-
ing out with the Banes site, with another one located at Santa Cruz del
Norte, up here in the Havana area.22 At the time of that reporting, there
were two launchers at this position, here and here.
Since the coverage of that day, two more launching positions have
been added outboard of those two positions. The launchers here—the
[unclear] is uncovered. You can actually see the launcher itself and,
down in this small revetment here, appears to be the winged kind of air-
breathing missile which will go on it. It’s a short stubby-winged fellow
which conforms with the cruise type of missile that we have seen before.
So our opinion of this thing remains the same. We now just would
report two additional launching positions at that complex.
Finally, Mr. President, at the very westernmost tip of Cuba, the
island, we have San Julian airfield, 7,000 feet by 150 feet, which has hith-
erto been barricaded. Rows of stones and other kinds of materials pre-
venting this [from being able] to be used by anybody. Now we see the
barricades being removed from the two runways. And in this hardstand
at the edge of the tarmac, enlarged up in here, we find 22 of those crates,
some 60 feet long, which we have interpreted from the deckside photog-
raphy that the Navy had taken, to be, possibly, the crates that would
accommodate the IL-28, or Beagle, type of aircraft. This field is long
enough to accommodate those craft. I think they need something around
6,000 feet to take off. We have 7,000 feet. We definitely had not yet seen
the Beagle IL-28. One fuselage has been taken from one of the boxes. It’s
up at this location. It’s 58 feet long, which is about the length of the
Beagle fuselage, and you can see the wing roots, but the actual wing tips
have not yet been installed. We’ve just caught them, apparently, at the
start of the assembly operation. And it would appear that San Julian, this
hitherto unused airfield, may be the locus for IL-28 activity.
That’s all I have at the moment, Mr. President.
President Kennedy: What percentage of the island have we got cov-
ered here?
Lundahl: In these separate missions, the one of Sunday, October the
14th, and two on Monday, October the 15th, [the coverage] represents a
considerable percentage from north to south and from east to west. But
the business of plotting the [areas obscured by] clouds has not been
completely done, so I can’t give you a good figure.
President Kennedy: But, in other words, from the information we
have prior to the development of these new films, you would say there
are how many different missile sites? As well as how many different
launch pads on each site?
Lundahl: Well, sir, we had not found anything like the MRBM sites
in any of the photography up to this 15 October bit. We had found, and
added to it last night, one more surface-to-air missile site, so that made
a total of 23, as of this location. However, one of them has been pulled
up and moved away, at Santa Lucia. We don’t know where they pull
these things up and move them to, but we have seen 23 surface-to-air
missile sites. We’ve seen three of these surface-to-surface cruise type of
missile sites at Banes and up here over at del Norte, and then down on
the Isle of Pines.
We have one other type of missile site up here north of Havana
which we haven’t been able to identify yet, as being either cruise or some
other type of site, but which we’re carrying [as] unknown.
And now we’ve added to this. In the briefings of the last couple of
days we’ve added the field type of installation, this 650- or 1,100-mile
missile as it probably is, near San Cristóbal with these three sites located
here which we briefed on the other day [October 16]. And in the pho-
tography of Monday of this week, we’ve now added what looks like a
more fixed type of site, conforming to a signature which we have seen—
President Kennedy: In other words, you have got five different mis-
sile sites?
Lundahl: Yes, sir.
President Kennedy: And how many pads on each site?
Lundahl: Well sir, at this location here we don’t have pads, we have
these erectors, these 60-foot long objects that lay on the ground. There
were four erectors there. We have found three erectors not yet in posi-
tion but lying around to be disposed here. And we had more erectors but
520 T H U R S DAY, O C T O B E R 18, 1962
they’re under the trees and we can’t tell. But it would seem as though
there are going to be four erectors at each of those locations, and it
would appear that there are going to be four launch pads at each of those
too. But these [new sites] will be firmer type of launchings. And these
will be the portable field type of launching equipment.
McCone: The GMAIC committee made an estimate that between 16
and 32 missiles would be operational within a week, or slightly more.23
This was an estimate that appeared yesterday.
Maxwell Taylor: Have any electronic emissions from the SAMs been
picked up? I had a report they were showing life.
McCone: No. If they are, there are some SIGINT [signals intelli-
gence] responses on Monday [October 15] that did not state conclu-
sively that the radars were operational. However, we do estimate that
some of these SAM sites will be operational within a week’s time.
President Kennedy: If an unsophisticated observer . . . If we wanted
to ever release these pictures to demonstrate that there were missiles
there, it would not be possible to demonstrate this to the satisfaction of
an untrained observer, would it?
Lundahl: I think it would be difficult, sir. By some eight years of
experience in looking at the evolution in the Soviet Union, the signature
emerges very clearly to us. I think the uninitiated would like to see the
missile and the tube that it fits in.
President Kennedy: May I—
McGeorge Bundy: The implication is, if we go in by air [with a
strike], we would have simultaneous low-level photography for this pur-
pose.
McCone: That’s right.
Robert McNamara: And there is a picture that is not here of what I
call site number 1, of which I believe the uninitiated could be persuaded
there were missiles.
Lundahl: I would concur on that, sir. The canvas coverings of all
those missiles lying on trailers in there at lower level, particularly as Mr.
Bundy says, could, I think, very clearly impact on people.
President Kennedy: Thank you.
Lundahl: Yes, sir.
President Kennedy: But when will we get the data, really, on the
entire island, to the extent that we can?
23. The abbreviation GMAIC stands for the Guided Missile and Astronautics Intelligence
Committee, an interagency committee of the interagency U.S. Intelligence Board.
Meeting on the Cuban Missile Crisis 521
Lundahl: Sir, there are five missions coming in today, as Mr. McCone
said, some 28,000 feet [of film], the first two of which are in slightly after
noon. We would seek to read them out during the night. And then as the
others come in, in the next two to three days, we will be going all out to
read it on a 24-hour basis. But it is quite a volume of film to look at. We’re
trying to be accurate, as accurate as we possibly can. I would hope that,
comes the weekend, we might have a fair grasp on all five [McCone had
mentioned six missions], plus whatever number of additional ones Mr.
McNamara will run between yesterday and the end of the week.
President Kennedy: Thanks.
Lundahl: Yes, sir. [He collects his briefing materials.]
Rusk: Mr. President, I think this changes my thinking on the matter
if you have to [unclear] from the point of view of U.S. [unclear]. The
first question we ought to answer is: Is it necessary to take action? And I
suppose that there is compelling reason to take action here. For if no
action is taken, it looks now as though Cuba is not going to be just an
incidental base for a few of these things, but, basically an [unclear] with
MRBMs, and IRBMs, and that sort of thing. Cuba could become a formi-
dable military problem in any contest we would have with the Soviet
Union over a threat in any other part of the world. I think our colleagues
in Defense will want to comment on that very carefully because that’s a
very important point. But I do think that when the full scope of this
becomes known, that no action would undermine our alliances all over
the world very promptly.
On September 4th you said, “There is no evidence of any organized
combat force in Cuba from any Soviet bloc country, or of military bases
provided by Russia, in violation of the ’34 treaty relating to Guantánamo,
or of the presence of offensive ground-to-ground missiles; or other signifi-
cant offensive capability either in Cuban hands or under Soviet direction
and guidance. Were it to be otherwise the gravest issues would arise.”
Now that statement was not made lightly at that time. These ele-
ments that were mentioned were pointing our fingers to things that
were very fundamental to us. And it was intended as a clear warning to
the Soviet Union that these are matters that we will take with the
utmost seriousness. When you talk about the gravest issues, in the gen-
eral language of international exchange, that means something very
serious.
I think also we have to think of the effect on the Soviets if we were to
do nothing. I would suppose that they would consider this a major back-
down and that this would free their hands for almost any kind of adven-
ture they might want to try out in other parts of the world. If we are
522 T H U R S DAY, O C T O B E R 18, 1962
unable to face up to a situation like Cuba against this kind of threat, then
I think they would be greatly encouraged to go adventuring and would
feel that they’ve had it made as far as intimidation of the United States is
concerned.
I think also that we have an almost unmanageable problem in this
country getting any support for the foreign policy that we would need to
pursue, if we are going to sustain the cause of independence of states and
freedom in all parts of the world. We’ve got a million men in uniform
outside the United States. We’ve got foreign aid programs. We’ve got a
major effort we’re making in every continent. And it seems to me that
inaction in this situation would undermine and undercut the enormous
support that we need for the kind of foreign policy that will eventually
ensure our survival.
Now action involves very high risks indeed, and I think that this
additional information, if anything, increases the risk because the chal-
lenge is much more serious and the counteraction, I would suppose,
would have to be heavier than we have, in fact, been talking about. But
we can expect you would have to have in the back of your own mind,
with whatever decision you take, the possibility—if not the likelihood—
of a Soviet reaction somewhere else running all the way from Berlin
right around to Korea, and the possibility of a reaction against the
United States itself. I don’t think that you can make your decision under
any assumption that this is a free ride, or easier, or anything of that sort.
I would suppose that with those first missiles that we were talking
about, that a quick strike with quick success in the matter of a couple
hours’ time—with 50 to 60 sorties, that sort of thing, where it’s obvious
then that the matter is over and finished and that was the purpose of our
engagement—that that would have a much more reduced risk of a mili-
tary response on the other side. But getting these other installations and
getting involved in various parts of the island, I think would increase the
risk of a military response down there.
The action also has to be thought of in connection with alliance soli-
darity. There we’re faced with conflicting elements. Unless we’re in a sit-
uation where it is clear that the alliance is with us and understands the
problem, then an unannounced, or unconsulted, quick action on our part
could well lead to a kind of allied disunity that the Soviets could capital-
ize upon very strongly.
It’s one thing for Britain and France to get themselves isolated
within the alliance over Suez. But it’s quite another thing for the alliance
if the United States should get itself in the same position because we are
Meeting on the Cuban Missile Crisis 523
the central bone structure of the alliance. I think this is a different kind
of problem that we have to think very hard about.
Now, I think that, as far as I’m concerned, I would have to say to you
that if we enter upon this path of challenging the Soviets, the Soviets
who themselves have embarked upon this fantastically dangerous course,
that no one can surely foresee the outcome.
I was prepared to say when I came over here, before when I got this
information, that even the 50-sortie strike would very probably move by
specific steps into much more general action, at least as far as Cuba is
concerned, and possibly in other situations.
Now, there is another fact, Mr. President, that bothers me consider-
ably. I think the American people will willingly undertake great danger
and, if necessary, great suffering, if they have a deep feeling that we’ve
done everything that was reasonably possible to determine whether this
trip was necessary. Also that they have a clear conscience and a good
theory of the case.
The first point, whether this trip is necessary. We all, of course, remem-
ber the guns of August where certain events brought about a general situa-
tion in which at the time none of the governments involved really wanted.24
And this precedent, I think, is something that is pretty important.
We had a clear conscience in World War II, the Pearl Harbor attack
up against the background of Hitler’s conduct resolved that problem. In
the case of Korea, we had an organized large-scale aggression from
North Korea, and we were doing it as part of a general United Nations
commitment. Even with that start, the Korean aspect of it—the Korean
war—got out of control as far as the general support of the American
people were concerned, before it was over.
Now, these considerations that I’ve just mentioned would militate in
favor of a consultation with Khrushchev and an implication that we will
act because, in the first instance, there is the possibility, only a possibil-
ity, that Mr. Khrushchev might realize that he’s got to back down on
this. We can’t be . . . I have no reason to expect that. This looks like a
very serious and major commitment on his part. But at least it will take
that point out of the way for the historical record, and just might have in
it the seeds of prevention of a great conflict.
24. Rusk was referring to events that preceded and immediately followed the outbreak of
World War I in 1914, using the title of a well-known book recently published about this
episode, The Guns of August, by Barbara Tuchman.
524 T H U R S DAY, O C T O B E R 18, 1962
The Rio Pact is, I think clearly, our strongest legal basis for whatever
action we need to take. The other possibility is a straight, is a straight
declaration of war, which carries with it many legal privileges as a bel-
ligerent that would be extremely useful for us to have. But there is
plenty of room in the Rio Pact for meeting this kind of threat, and I
would suppose—Mr. Martin will have to comment on this—I would
suppose there would be no real difficulty in getting a two-thirds vote in
favor of necessary action.
But if we made the effort and failed to get the two-thirds vote at the
time, which I would doubt would be the result, then at least we will have
tried. And as far as the American people are concerned, we’d have done
our very best on that.
Now, it seems to me, that the further information we have about the
bases, other bases in other parts of the island, the buildup generally
throughout Cuba, does raise the question as to whether a declaration of
a national emergency and, if necessary, a declaration of war on Cuba may
not be the necessary step here rather than spotty single strikes here and
there around about the island. Because this could become a cops and rob-
bers game, each strike becoming not only more difficult from a military
point of view, but more difficult from your, from a political point of view,
and it looks as though we have a larger problem to solve. And we may
have to solve it in a larger way.
Now the principal alternative to that is, of course, to put in the short
strikes, the brief strikes, and try our hand at getting it over with
promptly as far as these particular installations are concerned. But these
other bases, I think, create larger problems. Casualties go up a great deal
and the challenge goes up a great deal. I think that the question is
whether—I’d like to hear my colleagues comment on this—whether the
action we would take, would have to take even in the most limited sense,
would have to be large enough to involve the greatest risks in any event.
Therefore we might as well solve the problem.
I would like to . . . Mr. Bohlen left a note last night after our meeting,
wrote it out at about midnight or early this morning, just before he left.
And I would like to read you certain paragraphs of this. He said:
That best course would be, he says, a carefully worded and serious
letter to Khrushchev, before we take the action, the steps, and then fol-
lowed by a declaration of war. We were talking about this last night. I
think it is in this range of problems that we need to concentrate our
attention, Mr. President. Otherwise we just . . . how we see the nature of
the threat. I think our Defense colleagues ought to talk a moment about
the actual military aspect of the threat itself.
McNamara: Mr. President, here is listed . . . there are a series of
alternative plans ranging from Roman numeral I was about 50 sorties,
directed solely against the known MRBMs, known as of last night, to
Roman numeral V, which covers the alternative invasion plan.
All of these plans are based on one very important assumption: That
we would attack, with conventional weapons, against an enemy who is
not equipped with operational nuclear weapons. If there’s any possibility
526 T H U R S DAY, O C T O B E R 18, 1962
that the enemy is equipped with operational nuclear weapons, I’m certain
the plans would have to be changed.
Last evening we were discussing the relative merits of these forms of
military action, assuming that at some point military action was required.
It has been the view of the Chiefs, based on discussions within the last
two days, and it was certainly my view, that either Roman numeral I or
Roman numeral II, very limited air strikes against very limited targets,
would be quite inconclusive, very risky, and almost certainly lead to fur-
ther military action prior to which we would have paid an unnecessary
price for the gains we achieved.
And therefore the Chiefs and I would certainly have recommended
last night, and I would recommend more strongly today, that we not
consider undertaking either Roman numeral I, or Roman numeral II. In
other words, we consider nothing short of a full invasion as applicable
military action. And this only on the assumption that we’re operating
against a force that does not possess operational nuclear weapons.
President Kennedy: Why do you change . . . why has this informa-
tion changed the recommendation?
McNamara: Last evening, it was my personal belief that there were
more targets than we knew of, and it was probable there would be more
targets than we could know of at the start of any one of these strikes.
The information of this morning, I think, simply demonstrates the valid-
ity of that conclusion of last evening.
Secondly, when we’re talking of Roman numeral I, it’s a very limited
strike against MRBMs only, and it leaves in existence IL-28s with nuclear
weapon-carrying capability, and a number of other aircraft with
nuclear weapon-carrying capability, and aircraft with strike capability
that could be exercised during our attack, or immediately following our
attack on the MRBMs, with great possible risk of loss to either
Guantánamo and/or the eastern coast of the U.S.
I say great loss, I’m not thinking in terms of tens of thousands, but
I’m thinking in terms of sporadic attacks against our civilian population,
which would lead to losses, I think, we would find it hard to justify in
relation to the alternative courses open to us, and in relation to the very
limited accomplishment of our limited number of strikes.
Robert Kennedy: Bob, what about alternative number II, on the basis
that you’re going against offensive weapons? You’re going to go against
the missiles, and you’re going to go against their planes. What are the
arguments against that? I mean that would prevent them knocking our
population.
McNamara: It is much to be preferred over number I, in my opinion.
Meeting on the Cuban Missile Crisis 527
McNamara: Yes. You would assume, by the end of the day, their air
force could be nearly destroyed. I say nearly because there might be a
few sporadic weapons around.
Taylor: Yes, I would stress the point, Mr. President, that we’ll never
be guaranteeing 100 percent.
McNamara: That’s right. That’s right.
President Kennedy: But at least as far as their . . . except with
nuclear. I would think you would have to go on the assumption that they
are not going to permit nuclear weapons to be used against the United
States from Cuba unless they’re going to be using them from everyplace.
McNamara: Well, they could . . . I’m not sure they can stop it. This is
why I emphasized the point I did. I don’t believe the Soviets would
authorize their use against the U.S., but they might nonetheless be used.
And, therefore, I underline this assumption, that all of these cases are
premised on the assumption there are no operational nuclear weapons
there. If there’s any possibility of that I would strongly recommend that
these plans be modified substantially.
Now I would go back just one second. I evaded the question Secretary
Rusk asked me, and I evaded it because I wanted this information dis-
cussed first. The question he asked me was: How does—in effect—how
does the introduction of these weapons to Cuba change the military
equation, the military position of the U.S. versus the U.S.S.R.?
And, speaking strictly in military terms, really in terms of weapons,
it doesn’t change it at all, in my personal opinion. My personal views are
not shared by the Chiefs. They are not shared by many others in the
department. However, I feel very strongly on this point and I think I
could argue a case, a strong case, in defense of my position.
This doesn’t really have any bearing on the issue, in my opinion,
because it is not a military problem that we’re facing. It’s a political
problem. It’s a problem of holding the alliance together. It’s a problem of
properly conditioning Khrushchev for our future moves. And the prob-
lem of holding the alliance together, the problem of conditioning
Khrushchev for our future moves, the problem of dealing with our domes-
tic public, all requires action that, in my opinion, the shift in military bal-
ance does not require.
President Kennedy: On holding the alliance. Which is going to
strain the alliance more: This attack by us on Cuba, which most allies
regard as a fixation of the United States and not a serious military
threat? I mean, you’d have to . . . an awful lot of conditioning would have
to go in before they would accept, support our action against Cuba,
because they think that we’re slightly demented on this subject.
Meeting on the Cuban Missile Crisis 529
So there isn’t any doubt that whatever actions we take against Cuba,
no matter how good our films are, are going to cause [problems] in
Latin America. A lot of, a lot of people would regard this as a mad act by
the United States, which is due to a loss of nerve because they will argue
that, taken at its worst, the presence of these missiles really doesn’t
change the . . . If you think that, they’re going to, certainly. With all the
incentives to think the other way, viewing this as you do as an American,
what’s everybody else going to think who isn’t under this gun?
McNamara: Aren’t the others going to think exactly as I do?
Taylor: May I comment, Mr. President?
With regard to what we’ve just seen in intelligence, it seems to me
three things stand out. The first is the very rapid . . . the energy with
which they are developing the mobile missiles. In the course of 24 hours
since Sunday [October 14, the day of the U-2 flight that first pho-
tographed the MRBM sites]. They are moving very fast to make those
weapons operational.
Whether they’re operational today? I would agree with the Secretary
that probably not, but I don’t think anyone can assure you. At any time at
least one or more of these missiles will become operational.
Now, number two, the IL-28s. We’ve been expecting this. But now
they’ve turned up in a very plausible location, I would say, and they’re
lying there inviting attack—an ideal time to take them out.
Now third, the IRBMs really put a new factor in, as I look at it.
Yesterday, when we looked at this we had only a few of the mobile type
[MRBMs]. I was far from convinced that the big showdown would be
required. Today we’re getting new pictures, and the vision of an island
that’s going to be a forward base, can become a forward base, of major
importance to the Soviets.
Also, the targets that we’re seeing, however, the kind of air attack
we’re talking about means nothing. We can’t take this threat out by
actions from the air. So that we have argued more and more that if,
indeed, you’re going to prevent that kind of thing, invasion is going to
be required.
Bundy: But you don’t mean that you can’t prevent it in the sense of
stopping it from happening the next day. You mean that for the long pull
you’re going to have to take the island.
Taylor: Yes, you can’t destroy a hole in the ground. We can’t prevent
this construction going ahead by any air actions. Conceivably diplomatic
action might stop it, but only diplomatic action, or occupation as far as I
can see, can prevent this kind of threat from building up.
Now, if those statements are roughly correct, then what does it mean
530 T H U R S DAY, O C T O B E R 18, 1962
in terms of time? Well, it means that, insofar as getting the mobile mis-
siles out, time is of the essence. But the faster the better, if it’s not
already too late. And I would say that, again, we’re not sure that it is not
too late, with respect to one or more of the missiles.
With the IL-28s, our air people think it would be two to three weeks
before they’re ready to fly. So that would give us considerably more lati-
tude in terms of time.
The MRBMs give us a rather complete time because, the experience
in the Soviet Union is an average of about six months to get these ready.
And these started about the first of September.
President Kennedy: You say MRBM. That’s—
McNamara: It’s the fixed site, yes [that had been identified as a prob-
able IRBM, not MRBM].
President Kennedy: That [missile] gives an extra 800 miles [of
range], gives them an extra—
McNamara: It makes it 2,000 miles [range]. An extra 1,000 miles
[over the MRBMs].
Taylor: So that there is no pressure of time from that point of view
even though it’s the more egregious danger in the long run. So that’s
about the thoughts that arise in my mind, and I think the Chiefs will join
me in that.
There is one factor we talked about at length yesterday. It’s the polit-
ical actions which Mr. Bohlen recommends, and many others think must
be done. Certainly militarily that is undesirable, if we really have in mind
the urgency of taking out by surprise the missiles, and the IL-28s.
On the other hand, if we consider it politically necessary, it’s quite
true that an offsetting [unclear] if we could be making military moves of
readiness to reinforce the political action, and actions that can shorten
the time of our reaction.
President Kennedy: Let me ask you: If we gave, say, this 24-hour
notice, getting in touch with Khrushchev, or taking the other actions
with our allies, I would assume that they would move these mobile mis-
siles into the woods, wouldn’t they?
Taylor: There’s is a danger, Mr. President. If you’re talking in terms
of 24 hours I would doubt it. But the more you add on—
President Kennedy: [Unclear] carry them away?
McNamara: Mr. President, I don’t believe they’re equipped to do
that. I say that because if they are equipped to do that, they would have
been equipped to erect them more quickly. I think that it’s unlikely they
would move them in 24 hours. If they were to move them in 24 hours, I
think we could keep enough reconnaissance over the island during that
Meeting on the Cuban Missile Crisis 531
period to have some idea of where they moved. I have every reason to
believe we’d know where they were.
McCone: It would take a little longer though.
McNamara: What?
McCone: It would take a little longer and take very careful recon-
naissance to know where they are.
Bundy: Why are you so confident that they couldn’t hide them or get
them in immediate readiness in 24 hours?
McNamara: Well, I’m not confident. I didn’t say they couldn’t get
them in immediate readiness in 24 hours, Mac. I don’t believe that we
would lose them with a 24-hour discussion with Khrushchev.
President Kennedy: How quick is our communications with Moscow?
I mean, say we sent somebody to see him, I mean he was there at the
beginning of the 24-hour period, to see Mr. Khrushchev, how long would
it be before Khrushchev’s answer could get back to us, just by communi-
cation?
Llewellyn Thompson: I think it would have to go in code. Probably . . .
what, five to six hours, I guess.
President Kennedy: Well, you can—
Thompson: You could telephone, of course.
Robert Kennedy: It wouldn’t really have to go in code, would it?
Thompson: Well, you would shorten the time a lot by not putting it
into a highly confidential code [unclear].
President Kennedy: That would be a couple of hours?
Thompson: Yes.
Rusk: I think the quickest way might be, actually, not to run into any
delays on their end, would be to give it to Dobrynin here in an actual
text, and let him transmit it, because that would get to Khrushchev
straight away, whereas somebody else might have the problem of setting
up an appointment.
McCone: I think more importantly—
President Kennedy: What?
McCone: I think the one point on this that ought to be . . . bear in
mind—this was brought up in the [U.S.] Intelligence Board meeting
this morning rather forcefully, that, so far as we know, there is no stated
relationship that makes these Soviet missiles or Soviet bases. The
attempts that Castro made to ally himself with the Warsaw Pact, or to
join the Warsaw Pact, or even to engage in a bilateral [defense treaty]
with Moscow, apparently either were deferred or failed. He sent Raul
[Castro] and Che Guevara to Moscow a few months ago, apparently for
that purpose, that and his other purposes.
532 T H U R S DAY, O C T O B E R 18, 1962
Hence, if we were to take action with this present status, the Soviets
would have some latitude as to how they might want to respond if they
did at all.
On the other hand, if as a result of a warning, or of a communication
with them, they declare these their bases, then we would have a different
kind of problem because it would be the problem of committing an
action against a stated base of theirs. And this might mean a war of dif-
ferent proportions.
President Kennedy: The question is really whether the Soviet reac-
tion, and who knows this, would be measurably different if they were
presented with an accomplished fact days after, I mean one day, not the
invasion [unclear] just the accomplished fact. [The question is] whether
their reaction would be different than it would be if they were given a
chance to pull them out.
If we said to Khrushchev that: “We have to take action against it. But
if you begin to pull them out, we’ll take ours out of Turkey.” Whether he
would then send back: “If you take these out, we’re going to take Berlin”
or “We’re going to do something else.” And then we’d be . . .
Thompson: An important factor there is, if you do this first strike,
you’d have killed a lot of Russians and that doesn’t . . . inevitable reac-
tion. On the other hand, if you do give him notice, the thing I would fear
the most is a threat to Turkey and Italy to take action, which would
cause us considerable difficulty [unclear].
President Kennedy: You mean if . . .
Bundy: What is your preference, Tommy?
Thompson: My preference is this blockade plan. I think this declaration
of war and these steps leading up to it. I think it’s very highly doubtful that
the Russians would resist a blockade against military weapons, particularly
offensive ones, if that’s the way we pitched it before the world.
President Kennedy: What do we do with the weapons already there?
Thompson: Demand they’re dismantled, and say that we’re going to
maintain constant surveillance, and if they are armed, we would then
take them out. And then maybe do it.
I think we should be under no illusions; this would probably in the
end lead to the same thing. But we do it in an entirely different posture
and background and much less danger of getting up into the big war.
The Russians have a curious faculty of wanting a legal basis despite
all of the outrageous things they’ve done. They attach a lot of impor-
tance to this. The fact that you have a declaration of war. They would be
running a military blockade legally established. I think it would greatly
deter them.
Meeting on the Cuban Missile Crisis 533
25. In fact it is not at all easy to hide even the MRBMs in the woods and of course not the
fixed IRBM sites. But Thompson is relying on the assumption that was then prevalent, if
unexamined.
534 T H U R S DAY, O C T O B E R 18, 1962
government out. And he felt if this was done, probably the thing would be
in disarray, so it could be done with a minimum loss of life and time.
Now he said that without the benefit of specific knowledge of troop
deployments, and equipment deployments, and so forth of the Soviets, or
of the Cubans, but I thought this would be of interest to you.
Rusk: Mr. President, one thing that would have to be considered:
There would be a number of steps that you would have to take on which
you would need the authority of a national emergency or a declaration of
war, some of the defense steps and some of these kind of steps would
bring in additional manpower and there are other powers that the attor-
ney general would know about that could be important here.
Thompson: One other point that maybe . . . seems to me might be
missed, that is since Castro’s gone this far in conniving, I suppose—
assuming that he didn’t protest at putting these things in there—it
seems to me that in the end it does lead to the fact that Castro has to go.
But if we did this blockade, and any of these steps, and Castro attacked
Guantánamo and so on, you’ve got a much better position in which then to
go ahead and take him out than if it’s started by some surprise attack by
us. I gather it’s fairly likely that Castro would do something there to—
Taylor: Certainly, if we take any of these military actions, I think we
have to assume a reaction against Guantánamo.
Douglas Dillon: Mr. President, what is the whole idea, I’m not quite
clear, of talking to Khrushchev ahead of time? What could he do that
would remove this danger that we have from these MRBMs that are
present and already there? What could he do that would satisfy us? It
seems to me very difficult to see any action you can take that he might
say: “Sure, I’ll take them out sometime,” and then do the opposite their
old way.
I can’t quite understand how we achieve anything. We may achieve
something in sort of . . . for history in showing we’ve done something.
But that’s a different argument than the argument of really trying to
achieve anything. I don’t see how we really achieve anything with them.
Rusk: Yes, sir. There are the two alternatives. In general, he might
reduce his involvement. He might step it up in his reply.
Dillon: But you can’t believe his reply, whatever it is.
Rusk: But you can check his reply.
Thompson: I think the most he’d do in the way of concession would
be to say that he will not take any further action while these talks go on.
Meantime, we’ve said that we were going to keep an eye on him, and the
problem is that if they become operational, they might be turned to the
Cubans. [Unclear.] But I don’t think he’d ever just back down.
Meeting on the Cuban Missile Crisis 537
26. At this point Tape 30 ends and Tape 30A begins, in the John F. Kennedy Library catalogu-
ing system.
27. The Board of National Estimates at the CIA was then preparing a Special National
Intelligence Estimate, distributed the next day, on “Soviet Reactions to Certain U.S. Courses
of Action on Cuba.”
538 T H U R S DAY, O C T O B E R 18, 1962
28. The Kennedy administration had considered abandoning the delayed deployment of
Jupiter missiles to Turkey and had discussed the possibility with Turkish officials in the
spring of 1961. The Turks wanted the missiles. Before top administration officials resolved
the problem, the confrontation in Vienna between Kennedy and Khrushchev over Berlin inter-
vened. After Khrushchev’s intimidating rhetoric in Vienna, the administration agreed that the
Turkish deployment had to proceed, since canceling the deployment might then be mistaken
as a sign of U.S. fear or weakness.
29. The principal idea then being considered for the replacement of Turkish and other obso-
lescent land-based ballistic missiles deployed in Europe was to offer some sea-based substitute
for them, possibly linked to the Polaris nuclear missile submarines then entering service.
Meeting on the Cuban Missile Crisis 539
Dillon: Well, the only advantage I see to it is the one you say, George,
and that is that if you decide to do this, and you want to put yourself in
the right position with the world, you [do this] as part of a [military]
program that never stops. You have 24-hour notice. But you’re under no
illusion that anything he says is going to stop you.
You go ahead and do it [the strike]. You’re not doing it for the pur-
pose of getting him to come up and do something. What you’re doing is
to set the stage. That makes some sense.
Alexis Johnson: If you go the blockade route, you could take more
time in these steps; on the other hand, you hold the danger of his outma-
neuvering you.
President Kennedy: If he grabs Berlin, of course. Then everybody
would feel we lost Berlin, because of these missiles, which as I say, do not
bother them.
Thompson: My guess is that he would not immediately attack Berlin,
but he would precipitate the real crisis at first, in order to try to sap our
morale and—
Dillon: The difference is that in Cuba we’ve shown that we will take
action, at a point which nobody knows. That’s the great danger, now, to
us; they think we will never take action. So I think our position has
[unclear] possibility [unclear].
Bundy: I think he [Thompson] and I agree. I think the precipitation
of a Berlin crisis is just as bad, if we’ve let this happen to us, against all
our promises to ourselves.
Dillon: Worse.
President Kennedy: You mean, in other words, in late November
when he [Khrushchev] grabs Berlin?
Robert Kennedy: What do we do when he moves into Berlin?
Bundy: If we could trade off Berlin, and not have it our fault.
[Chuckles.]
Dillon: Well, that’s the danger. To have already acted in Cuba and—
McNamara: Well, when we’re talking about taking Berlin, what do
we mean exactly? Does he take it with Soviet troops?
President Kennedy: That’s what it would seem to me.
McNamara: Then we have . . . I think there’s a real possibility. We
have U.S. troops there. What do they do?
Taylor: They fight.
McNamara: They fight. I think that’s perfectly clear.
President Kennedy: And they get overrun.
McNamara: Yes, they get overrun, exactly.
Unidentified: Well, you have a direct confrontation.
Meeting on the Cuban Missile Crisis 541
Rusk: No, I don’t think it would. Ed, how quickly could they—?
Martin: I think two or three days it could be done. But I don’t think . . .
Unidentified: I doubt it that quickly. I don’t think you would do it so
fast.
Robert Kennedy: How many votes [in the OAS] would you have
against it [a blockade]?
Martin: Probably four for sure.
President Kennedy: Mexico. Brazil. Chile.
Martin: Cuba and Bolivia.
President Kennedy: Yeah. Probably Ecuador.
Martin: No, Cuba’s not in it. Ecuador I think we might get.
Rusk: Bolivia might not come.
Martin: Bolivia might well not attend. So you would have three sure.
Rusk: Because they’re temporarily out of the OAS.
President Kennedy: Now, obviously, knowing the Soviets and the
way Khrushchev reacts always, I don’t think that we could assume that
he’s going to stop working.
I’m not sure exactly what we get out of this particular course of action,
except that it doesn’t go quite—it doesn’t raise it [the escalation] imme-
diately as high as it would be under ordinary, other conditions.
Ball: Mr. President, I would like to suggest that if you have a block-
ade, without some kind of ultimatum, that work must stop on the missile
sites or you take them out. That you’ll have an impossible position with
the country, because they will not sit still while work goes on making
these things operational. And I think this is one of the real problems of
the blockade, is that it’s a rather a slow agony and you build up all kinds
of fears and doubts in the minds of people here.
Now on the question of the blockade, I think that it is Tommy’s view
that even the Soviet Union would be influenced by the question as to
whether there was a declaration of war or not.
Thompson: Yes, I think so. You might be able to frame it in such a
way that if your world postures were going to prevent this threat to us
from these offensive weapons, and therefore, you were surveilling prop-
erly, if they . . . if work goes on, then we will stop any further supplies
coming in. And for that reason, and to that extent, we are in a state of
war with Cuba. It’s a little different from saying we’re going to war to
destroy them. That’s really the thing to make you . . . At least your
world posture isn’t [unclear].
Bundy: It seems to me that’s your whole posture. Even if you go in
with a strike, your posture is simply that this man has got entangled in
the notion of doing unacceptable things, from the point of view of the
544 T H U R S DAY, O C T O B E R 18, 1962
President Kennedy: Let’s say the situation was reversed, and he had
made the statement about these missiles similar to the ones I made about
[Cuba]. Similar to the ones about our putting missiles in Turkey. And he
had made the statement saying that serious action could result if we put
them in, and then we went ahead and put them in. Then he took them out
[attacked them] some day.
To me, there’s some advantages of that if it’s all over. Hungary.30 It’s
over so quick, supposedly, then really . . . almost the next move is up to
him. Now, he may take these moves, but . . .
Dillon: I think that’s entirely right.
Thompson: I gather, it’s the military view that this would lead, in the
end, to an invasion. It wouldn’t be over quickly. We’d bomb and the
whole deal. And you’d have to have air cover over these people and block
the planes as they come out.
McNamara: I would think so.
Taylor: I think we’ll get into this air gambit regardless, Mr.
President.
President Kennedy: The invasion?
McNamara: Invasion.
Taylor: Because [of] actions against Guantánamo, for example. And
our surveillance requirements will get us into dogfights over the island.
We’ll be threatened by—
President Kennedy: No, but we’ll be taking out their planes—
Taylor: —I think sooner or later, we’ll be—
President Kennedy: Well, that’s what I meant. We go ahead. Let’s
just say this is a prospective course of action.
And tomorrow afternoon [Friday, October 19] I’d announce these
[unclear] and the existence of these missiles, and say that we’re calling
Congress back, and when we consider this Saturday morning, so every-
body knows about it. It isn’t Pearl Harbor in that sense. We’ve told
everybody.
Then we go ahead Saturday [October 20] and we take them out, and
announce that they’ve been taken out. And if any more are put in, we’re
going to take those out.
Bundy: And the air force.
30. President Kennedy was referring to the rapid Soviet suppression of the revolt in Hungary
during November 1956 and the perceived Western inability to organize an effective response,
especially because of the simultaneous distraction of the Anglo-French-Israeli military action
against Egypt arising from the Suez crisis.
546 T H U R S DAY, O C T O B E R 18, 1962
President Kennedy: And the air force. And that we don’t want any
war, and so on and so forth, but we’re not going to permit this, in view of
the fact that—
Taylor: We would take the air force out tomorrow, too? I mean, that’s
a little too fast for us—
President Kennedy: On Saturday.
Taylor: On the 21st [Sunday] we could get this [attack] out.
President Kennedy: Sunday has historic disadvantages [referring to
memories of Pearl Harbor]. [Bundy laughs.]
Taylor: Any additional time at all is good.
President Kennedy: What?
Taylor: Any additional time at all is good.
President Kennedy: The race is against these missiles, but obviously
Sunday or Monday. To announce, the day before, the existence of these.
We won’t announce what we’re going to do. But we are going to call the
Congress back. Then we go ahead and do it the next morning.
Robert Kennedy: Even if you announce pretty much, you can almost
hint that you’re going to have to take some action.
President Kennedy: Well, we don’t . . . We can decide exactly how far
we’d go.
Taylor: Of course, a public announcement, militarily, is more disad-
vantageous than just talking to Khrushchev.
President Kennedy: Well there’s no doubt they’d move the planes
and so on . . . Wouldn’t they?
Taylor: They would make every effort to, yes.
Sorensen: Mr. President, what is the advantage of your public
announcement?
Rusk: He can simply announce what is there.
Sorensen: What is the advantage of that?
President Kennedy: The advantage of calling Congress back is only
that we don’t launch . . . as I can see the only advantage, is that every-
body gets the information that they are there before we attack. Whatever
solidarity that that may induce. And it wouldn’t put us quite in the posi-
tion of almost acting in such a bad way. But I—
Taylor: Would a few hours do rather than 24 hours, Mr. President?
President Kennedy: Well that’s what I—
Bundy: U.S. solidarity is the least of our problems.
President Kennedy: What did you say?
Bundy: U.S. solidarity—
President Kennedy: Oh, I meant the solidarity—
Robert Kennedy: I think George Ball—
Meeting on the Cuban Missile Crisis 547
31. Thompson was referring to the planned Paris summit between Eisenhower and
Khrushchev in May 1960. After the shoot-down of a U.S. U-2 over Soviet airspace and after
Eisenhower took personal responsibility for authorizing such flights, Khrushchev canceled the
summit shortly before it was to take place. At the time Thompson was the U.S. ambassador in
Moscow.
Meeting on the Cuban Missile Crisis 549
nied with the blockade on any further supplies of this sort, this is a
strong action.
President Kennedy: No, I feel that there’s a difference in our action,
and therefore in their response, between our knocking out these missiles
and planes, and invading Cuba.
Thompson: I think there is.
President Kennedy: Obviously, if he knocked out our missiles . . . If he
had said that he that was going to knock out our missile sites, and went and
did it one afternoon in Turkey, it would be different than if the Russian army
started to invade Turkey. Face it: there’s a ten-day period of shootings.
And nobody knows what kind of success we’re going to have with
this invasion. Invasions are tough, hazardous. They’ve got a lot of equip-
ment. A lot of—thousands of—Americans get killed in Cuba, and I think
you’re in much more of a mess than you are if you take out these . . .
I mean, this is all presumption, but I would think that if he invades
Iran, it takes ten days and there’s a lot of fighting in Iran. We’re in a
much more difficult position [with an invasion] than if he takes out
those bases out there. It may be that his response would be the same,
nobody can guess that, but by stretching it out you increase the . . .
Robert Kennedy: I don’t think you have to make up your mind if
you’re going to invade. Even in the first 24 hours, 48 hours—
Taylor: We can’t invade that fast, Mr. President. It will take at least
seven days, unless we have some advance preparations that we can’t
make now.
President Kennedy: Why is that? Why? You mean, getting these
people into there?
Taylor: Getting in position. We’re now not making any moves that
could give away our intentions.
Robert Kennedy: So I think you can always hold that out.
President Kennedy: The only question is Guantánamo. I would think
Castro’s reprisal would be against Guantánamo, wouldn’t it?
Taylor: That’s right. And we can immediately jump in there and
defend Guantánamo.
Rusk: Is this quite clear, would it not be well to bring the dependents
out?
Taylor: We have that—that could be done very quickly [four seconds
excised as classified information]—will be there, all during this period.
We’ll keep shipping there.
Rusk: I just think if we reinforced Guantánamo and simply explained
at the moment, do this as quick as possible, that we are pulling the
dependents out only to make room for the reinforcements.
Meeting on the Cuban Missile Crisis 551
32.The bracketed clause was transcribed from the sound segment that is missing from our
current copy of this tape.
Meeting on the Cuban Missile Crisis 553
Bundy: Yeah.
Rusk: Because unless you send someone that has no visibility . . .
Robert Kennedy: Well, I think you can get somebody on a plane.
President Kennedy: It might take you a couple of days to get an
appointment with Khrushchev and so on.
Rusk: I just think a written message through Dobrynin is probably . . .
Dillon: A written message to which he has to reply in writing is . . .
Thompson: Otherwise you get a fuzzy conversation in which it’s
very hard to . . .
Robert Kennedy: How do you handle the letter?
Thompson: He’s pretty adept at these matters.
Rusk: Adlai Stevenson thinks a special emissary might be very advis-
able.
President Kennedy: Let’s say we ask Mr. Robert Lovett to go over
there, with a letter. You’d have to put him on a plane; you’d have to send
him to Moscow; you’d have to make an appointment with Khrushchev;
all that would take . . .
Rusk: You’d have to wrap up the Soviet pilots, get a special plane.
Thompson: You’d have to fill him in pretty completely on the back-
ground. I don’t know how he would handle the conversation.
Bundy: You’re going to have to do that with Foy. He doesn’t know
much.
Thompson: I wouldn’t suggest he necessarily needs to deliver it per-
sonally. You can just send it around. I would think just getting it to
Khrushchev is . . .
President Kennedy: What does that do for us though, Tommy? I mean,
do you think that there’s a chance that he might—do what with the . . .
Thompson: What Khrushchev will do?
Bundy: Khrushchev will call for a summit.
Thompson: I think that’s almost certain.
I think it’s quite possible that he would say that: “I’m prepared to
take no further action in Cuba pending these talks.” And in the meantime
if we made this announcement there, would then make the announce-
ment: That we will knock these things off; if there were any further
work done on them. And stop any others from coming in.
In the meantime, the military makes their moves in preparation for
an invasion. So I don’t think [unclear]. The Russians would know this,
and this is a strong warning to them. In some ways . . .
President Kennedy: Well, if we ever get to a summit, then he’s going
to be talking about Berlin.
Dillon: Well the only point in talking to them is the point originally
554 T H U R S DAY, O C T O B E R 18, 1962
that George made, [which] is that it gives us a better position with our
allies. Not perhaps with Khrushchev but with the world.
Ball: I think the history too would give us a better position.
Dillon: That’s it. For history, or to the world, we’ve done it. But
that’s what we’re doing it for. We’re not doing it to the . . . and if he does
have other [unclear].
McCone: [Unclear] a demand on him right away. For instance, there
are quite a number of ships, in transit. You demand that they would be
turned around.
Thompson: If he does have trouble at this point—
McCone: And demand that this work stop at once.
Bundy: How much better are you off before history if you ask him 24
hours ahead of time, if he says: “I want a summit,” and you say, “Nuts.”
Rusk: [Unclear.] It’s what has to happen in Cuba. Before there can be
a summit.
Sorensen: And before we would call off—
Bundy: You can have that in the first message. It’s very likely he
would propose that we meet. But we can’t meet unless we can have
agreement on these things.
Taylor: Doesn’t the Gromyko call this afternoon have some advan-
tages from the possibility that we can get him to lie that he doesn’t have
them—
Rusk: Well I was going to suggest that the President consider
expressing to Gromyko our deep disturbance about all this provocation
in Cuba. Read to him from this paragraph of this statement of September
4th and see what Gromyko says. See if he will lie about it, because
Ambassador Dobrynin said there are no offensive weapons there and so
forth, but Dobrynin might not know.
Robert Kennedy: Well, what if he says there are? Then what do you do?
Rusk: I don’t think the President ought to disclose to Gromyko what
we have in mind, until we get an actual message to him [Khrushchev].
Robert Kennedy: What if he says to you: “We’ve just got the same
kind of weapons you’ve got in Turkey. Because they’re no more offensive
than your weapons in Turkey”? Then what do you do? What do you do?
Rusk: He’s talking about [a Turkish and NATO deployment decision
made] five years ago and that’s not relevant. Well, first the Rio Treaty.
Second, that we have here in this postwar era a rough status quo.
When they took strong action against Hungary, on the ground that this
was on their side of that status quo. Now they’re penetrating into this
hemisphere which violates not only modern obligations but historic
well-known policies of the United States toward this hemisphere.
Meeting on the Cuban Missile Crisis 555
33. The United States had stockpiled nuclear bombs in Turkey, under U.S. control, for possible
use by Turkish (or U.S.) F-100 aircraft.
556 T H U R S DAY, O C T O B E R 18, 1962
being made by Senator Keating and others is that there are missiles
down there.”
Ball: I wouldn’t think the President would disclose it this afternoon,
though [with Gromyko].
Bundy: The President ought to get him down and [unclear].
Sorensen: No, just talk about what appears in the press, which is stir-
ring up these elections.
Rusk: There would be some significance that Khrushchev in his talk
with [U.S. ambassador to Moscow Foy] Kohler did not deny there were
missiles there.34
President Kennedy: He didn’t?
Rusk: No.
Bundy: He wasn’t charged with it, but he didn’t put it that way.
Rusk: I think . . . referring to refugee reports [unclear] that they
know now that we know. They must know now that we know. That’s
why they’re working around the clock down there.
Robert Kennedy: Well, then maybe if they [the Soviets] said that, I
suppose you wouldn’t have to send a message to Khrushchev. Then you
could do it all.
Bundy: At this point.
Taylor: One point we haven’t mentioned, Mr. President, is the fact
we still haven’t all the intelligence. I’m impressed with how our minds
have changed on this in 24 hours based upon this last intelligence. I
think before we really commit ourselves we ought to get the full picture
of this island.
Bundy: I agree.
Gilpatric: That’s why Monday [October 22], I think, is better than
Saturday [October 20].
Taylor: I think so, very much so.
President Kennedy: Monday?
Taylor: As long as you think you can hold it.
McCone: I think, tomorrow morning at this time we could have a
quite a good deal more information, from the photography we ran yes-
terday.
I’m worried about this getting out. I think it’s remarkable that it’s
been held this week. For that reason I feel that we mustn’t delay too long.
President Kennedy: We haven’t much time.
heading into, what we are heading into here. The President hopes to
unify or not, by going on this trip this weekend? Unify the country?
President Kennedy: I don’t need to unify the country. That’s not the
purpose of the trip. [Laughter.]
The only problem is, calling it off, obviously that’d be a major story
as to why we called it off. So unless we were about to proceed Saturday
or Sunday, I’d better not call it off.
We are going over to Monday unless we get our sequences into a
position where we can surface this thing by Friday afternoon. The
minute I call off [this trip], this thing is going to break. Because then
every newspaperman will be around to everybody and then they’re
going to get it. So I don’t think I can call this thing off tomorrow with-
out having this thing—unless we are ready to have it surface tomorrow.
Dillon: I don’t think there’s any problem about unifying the country
because once you . . . This action will unify it just like that. No problem
at all. [Mixed voices, general agreement.]
Bundy: I wouldn’t [unclear] this weekend.
President Kennedy: Well, I’m not going to.
McCone: [Unclear] unanimously support that.
Rusk: Now there may be some inquiries about this meeting this
morning.
Bundy: I still believe that our best cover is intensive review of the
defense budget. Now we haven’t had to use it yet. [Laughter.]
President Kennedy: Yeah, that’s all right because we had this
[10:00] Cabinet meeting.
Dillon: It’s credible after the Cabinet meeting. More credible than it
was.
Thompson: And, of course, I’d be seeing you in preparation for
Gromyko’s visit.
Bundy: Martin isn’t here and I think it’s really very important.35
Martin: No, I’ll disappear.
Rusk: Now, Mr. President, I have invited Gromyko to dinner after
our talk, but I’m inclined to call him and say that talks may go on for a
while and that we better cancel this dinner. I think this . . .
Bundy: I think it’s worth thinking about the channel of yourself to
Gromyko, though. And if we decide on a warning, having [someone
35. Martin was there. Bundy meant that people should not reveal that Martin was there, since
that would reveal that the meeting concerned Latin America and their cover story would
unravel.
562 T H U R S DAY, O C T O B E R 18, 1962
Rusk: Well, I think that we ought to draw the group together except
for those who are going to be needed on military assignments.
McNamara: I don’t believe the military problem, the military plans,
need much elaboration. That isn’t really what I was thinking about.
What I was really thinking about is this give-and-take here.
Bundy: That’s very true.
McNamara: Which we haven’t gone through. I think the price of any
one of these actions is going to be very very high. I can visualize a whole
series of actions that the Russians are going to take. And it seems to me
we ought to lay those down. And then we ought to consider, how can we
reduce that price?
And I would suggest, therefore, that under the guidance of State,
because this is primarily an international political problem, we develop
two groups here. And that we have Defense and State people in those two
groups, and we take two or three hours this afternoon to let those
two groups take these two basic alternatives. They can derive any
number of variations they wish to.
But one is a minimum military action, a blockade approach, with a
slow buildup to subsequent action. And the other is a very forceful mili-
tary action with a series of variants as to how you enter it. And consider
how the Soviets are going to respond. This is what we haven’t done.
Dillon: Well, not only the Soviet response but what the response to
the response will be.
McNamara: [Mixed voices.] I think that’s it, exactly. So then, how we
respond to these responses.
Rusk: They’re beginning to work on them already.
Ball: We’ve done a good deal of work on this.
Rusk: Yes, we could pull those together.
McNamara: Well, I think it would be useful to pull it together.
President Kennedy: Well, now, let’s see. Mr. Secretary [Rusk], I
ought to meet with you at 4:30 with Tommy before the Gromyko [meet-
ing] to see where we are on this conversation. Then, at the end of the
Gromyko conversation, we may want to have . . . I don’t think we’ll go
three or four hours but let’s say we finish in two hours. I don’t know what
he wants to see us about. And then, whether we ought to, some time this
evening, have another meeting based on what Gromyko said and see
where we are with planning.
Bundy: I hate to be worried about security all the time but I think
evening meetings are very dangerous. I think they create a feeling
around the town and almost inevitably people have to leave dinners. I
think it’s a very—
564 T H U R S DAY, O C T O B E R 18, 1962
President Kennedy: Well, I’m going to leave right now so why don’t
you, Mr. Secretary and Mr. McNamara, decide how we are going to pro-
ceed for this afternoon. In any case, I will meet you [Rusk] at 4:30 and
we will meet . . .
Mr. Lovett is coming down here. He’ll be here at a quarter of five or
at five. We can . . .
[speaking to Bundy] Are you going to be in with me with Gromyko?
Bundy: Whatever you want.
President Kennedy: There’s no need to be. Why don’t you—
Bundy: I’ll talk to him.
President Kennedy: —discuss with Mr. Lovett and see whether he’s
got any thoughts about it. And we will then be in touch tonight. At least,
Bundy will communicate anything that Gromyko may have said to see
whether that affects any of our . . . [Bundy whispers something, perhaps
about Lovett.] I’ll talk to him.
President Kennedy then leaves the meeting, and it begins to break up. A
few participants stay behind and continue to talk in mixed conversations.
The following are the more audible fragments of these conversations on
the recording.
Dillon: As long as this has been all briefed to the Congress, I quite
agree [unclear].
Bundy: He’s coming into the White House, I gather, at five to five.
Do you want to [unclear] briefing [unclear] here or go over it yourself ?
Gilpatric: Actually, Mr. Secretary, I think this blockade paper might
interest you [unclear].
Bundy: Well, the question of reactions is what Bob has in mind [for
the analytical work to be done].
McNamara: That’s right.
Bundy: That’s . . .
Alexis Johnson: Soviet reactions and our counterreactions.
Bundy: Yeah.
Alexis Johnson: We’ve catalogued Soviet reactions, but . . .
Rusk: [aside to someone else] Why don’t you come to my office at
around, say, 2:00 or 2:30. 2:30.
Taylor: Bob, one of the things that has not been laid out in front of
the President is mobilization requirements. At this point I—
McNamara: Yes, certainly, and [unclear].
Rusk: [Unclear] Bob is that . . . well, we can put some words on a
piece of paper. But you can’t really say much about the Soviet reaction.
You can say what they may be.
Taylor: For that reason, though, I think we have to recognize that
Meeting on the Cuban Missile Crisis 565
announcement that you’re going to overfly it, and that you were going to
strike if this thing went on.
Taylor: If there were any further work done.
Thompson: And all these other measures to . . .
Dillon: Well that would mean overflying low altitude [reconnaissance].
Alexis Johnson: That’s right. At low altitude.
Thompson: Yes. I would do all those things.
Taylor: And air engagement over the island.
Bundy: The great advantage of that, of course, is you don’t kill any
Russians.
McNamara: This is the main theory.
Alexis Johnson: Or Cubans.
Bundy: Or Cubans.
Gilpatric: It’s not a direct conflict.
Dillon: Well what happens when they start shooting down your
planes?
Taylor: Well, yeah. That’s the point. You hit them [unclear] chance
again.
Rusk: Then they’ve escalated. Then they’ve escalated.
Taylor: Now the only military advantage is the fact you can be doing
these things which you would like to do before we execute an invasion.
Alexis Johnson: Now, the blockade approach we contemplated here
though has a considerable number of steps leading up to it.
McNamara: That’s right.
Alexis Johnson: This is not an immediate, we didn’t contemplate—
Martin: Both in terms of political negotiations and military pre-
paredness.
Alexis Johnson: Military preparedness and political negotiations.
Gilpatric: If you announce a blockade, how long before it is actually
imposed?
Rusk: Well immediately.
McNamara: Well it becomes effective over a period of hours, 48 hours.
Alexis Johnson: You see if you are going to do it within the frame-
work, you have the two choices. You do it—well, three choices really. You
do it unilaterally without declaration of war. This is about the worst of all.
Unidentified: This would get you in real trouble.
Bundy: You must declare. I think the President did not fully grasp that.
Alexis Johnson: Then you’ve got the OAS track that the Secretary
[Rusk] was talking about here. Some way of getting it sanctioned under
the OAS support.
Meeting on the Cuban Missile Crisis 567
And then you have getting it sanctioned under OAS plus declaration
of war on our part are the three—
Martin: May I also point out that I think you can start the political
discussions, and the military preparations, and have a blockade as part of
these initial actions, without having decided whether your final action
will stop with the blockade or will include military—
Bundy: Do your blockade before OAS consent?
Dillon: The purpose of a war is to destroy your enemy and that’s
the only purpose of it. And so, if you do declare war, how do you . . . I
mean, you only justify the blockade on the basis of that is what it’s
going to do. And that you’re going to carry it through completely and
totally, so there’s not much difference between that and straight
action.
Rusk: Of course, there’s another advantage to the blockade action
too. Put on a blockade and then the Soviets hit the Turkish missile sites.
Then your hands are probably free to [unclear].
McNamara: I think you have to look to the end of the other course to
really see the potential of a blockade. The end to the other course, the
end to the other course is the missiles out of Cuba and some kind of a
price. Now the minimum price are missiles out of Turkey and Italy, it
seems to me.
Martin: With Castro still there?
McNamara: Pardon me?
Martin: Castro’s still there.
Bundy: No, Castro goes out on either of these roads in my judgment,
at the end of the road.
McNamara: He may or may not. This is something to think about.
But, in any case, the minimum price you pay under the military
course of action is missiles out of Turkey and Italy. And they may be out
by physical means. Because of the Russians moving against them. And
you have a serious potential division in the alliance. Now it seems to me
that’s the best possible situation you could be in as a result of the military
course. I can visualize many worse situations.
Under the blockade, [tapes changing, material repeated] the best possi-
ble situation—
Bundy: The other thing you can do with a blockade is consult. That’s
clear. You can consult with everybody.
McNamara: The best possible conclusion of a blockade, it seems to
me, is that the alliance is not divided. You have agreed to take your mis-
siles out of Turkey and Italy, and the Soviets have agreed either to take
568 T H U R S DAY, O C T O B E R 18, 1962
Then the room fell silent. The tape recorder continued running for more
than 20 minutes until it ran out of tape or was turned off.
President Kennedy went to his scheduled meeting with the Japanese
minister for trade and industry, Eisaku Sato, and then had lunch in the
Mansion.
Near Midnight
36. Tape 31.1, John F. Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, Presidential Recordings
Collection.
Kennedy Summarizes a Late-Night Meeting 573
The meeting with Gromyko lasted until about 7:15. Gromyko empha-
sized the need to settle the Berlin issue. Though he repeated the promise
that the Soviets would do nothing before the November elections in the
United States, he warned that later in that month the Soviet government
would bring the Berlin problem to conclusion. If there was no understand-
ing, Gromyko said that “the Soviet government would be compelled, and
Mr. Gromyko wished to emphasize the word compelled,” to take steps to
end the Western presence in Berlin. Gromyko described the Western mili-
tary presence in Berlin as a “rotten tooth which must be pulled out.”
Gromyko also complained about U.S. threats against Cuba. The
Soviet Union was only training Cubans in the use of defensive weapons.
President Kennedy said that “there was no intention to invade Cuba” and
that he would have been glad to give Khrushchev assurances to that
effect, if asked. Yet Soviet shipments of arms to Cuba were an extremely
serious matter, as a result of which the two countries faced “the most
dangerous situation since the end of the war [World War II]. ”
Returning to Cuban fears, Gromyko referred to the Bay of Pigs inva-
sion attempt of 1961. Kennedy cut in to say that he’d already admitted
that this had been a mistake. He repeated that he “would have given
assurances that there would be no further invasion, either by refugees or
by U.S. forces.” But since the Soviet shipments of arms had begun in July,
the situation had changed.
Kennedy then read from his September 4 and 13 public statements,
looking for a reaction. None was evident. The two leaders also discussed
the ongoing negotiations to restrict nuclear testing and Kennedy agreed
to see Khrushchev when the Soviet leader came to the United States for
the U.N. meeting in November.37
After Gromyko left, Rusk and Thompson stayed and President
Kennedy asked Lovett and Bundy to join them. Two years later Lovett
recalled their discussion as follows:38
37. Quotations are from the full State Department Memorandum of Conversation for the
meeting (A. Akalovsky was the notetaker), in National Security Archive, Cuban Missile Crisis
Files, 1992 Releases Box.
38. From an interview by Dorothy Fosdick for the John F. Kennedy Library Oral History
Project, 19 November 1964. The interview was only two years after the event, and Lovett had
kept substantial notes of the session that he had reexamined in preparing for this interview. So
574 T H U R S DAY, O C T O B E R 18, 1962
Lincoln’s office to avoid the press which seemed to have taken over
that section of the office building [the north side of the West Wing
of the White House]. I learned that the reason for this was that
Gromyko had just left.
When I went into the President’s office [the Oval Office], he was
sitting in his rocking chair, with Rusk and Thompson on his left and
the sofa, on his right, vacant. He motioned Bundy and me to it. He
asked me if I had gotten the briefing and all the facts available, and I
said that I had. He grinned and said, “I ought to finish the story by
telling you about Gromyko who, in this very room not over 10 min-
utes ago, told more bare-faced lies than I have ever heard in so short
a time. All during his denial that the Russians had any missiles or
weapons, or anything else, in Cuba, I had the low-level pictures in the
center drawer of my desk and it was an enormous temptation to
show them to him.”39
The President then asked me what I thought of the situation
and I outlined briefly the philosophy which I felt would be appro-
priate here for the President to take, as well as the military steps
which seemed to be called for. I urged the quarantine route [Lovett
is using the term that later passed into common usage; it was then
still called the blockade] as the first step . . . and the matter was
discussed in some detail with Rusk and Thompson joining in.40
At about this stage of the discussion the door onto the Rose
Garden opened and the Attorney General came in and joined the dis-
cussion. The President asked me to repeat what I had previously
said, and I did so. Robert Kennedy asked two or three very searching
questions about the application of any blockade and indicated that he
felt as I did about the necessity for taking a less violent step at the
outset because, as he said, we could always blow the place up if neces-
sary but that might be unnecessary and then we would then be in the
position of having used too much force. He did not support one of the
we find the account an unusually detailed record of a key moment in the shaping of Kennedy’s
conclusions about how to proceed.
39. In fact they were not low-level pictures. Low-level reconnaissance of Cuba had not begun.
40. Lovett explained in the same oral history interview that he thought a tight blockade
should precede air strikes and a possible invasion. The blockade allowed a demonstration of
national will to persuade the Russians to withdraw their missiles without great bloodshed,
without appearing trigger-happy. His doubt, according to his notes of the time, “lay in the area
of the willingness of the Administration to follow through on a course of action undertaken by
it.” This meant a full blockade, not letting up until the objective was accomplished, and being
ready to escalate if necessary.
Kennedy Summarizes a Late-Night Meeting 575
the West Wing of the White House for fear that reporters would notice
and wonder. So the meeting was held in the Oval Room on the second
floor of the Executive Mansion. Therefore the session could not be tape-
recorded.
At this meeting there was continued agreement that the United
States must act, though Bundy voiced a dissenting view. The group gen-
erally agreed that U.S. action should probably start with a blockade
rather than an immediate attack. Kennedy discussed the timing of a pos-
sible announcement of the blockade and directed that detailed planning
begin. The meeting broke up sometime near midnight.
After the others left, President Kennedy went to the Oval Office, pos-
sibly accompanied by his brother. Aware that he had been unable to
record the meeting, President Kennedy turned on the recording machine
there in the Oval Office and began to dictate.
41. These were apparently the participants in the White House meeting that had just ended.
Dean Rusk and Llewellyn Thompson had stayed at the State Department attending the dinner
for Gromyko, which dragged on until after midnight.
Kennedy Summarizes a Late-Night Meeting 577
would divide our alliance and that we would bear that responsibility. He
felt we would be better off to merely take note of the existence of these
missiles, and to wait until the crunch comes in Berlin, and not play what
he thought might be the Soviet game.
Everyone else felt that for us to fail to respond would throw into
question our willingness to respond over Berlin, [and] would divide our
allies and our country. [They felt] that we would be faced with a crunch
over Berlin in two or three months and that by that time the Soviets
would have a large missile arsenal in the Western Hemisphere which
would weaken our whole position in this hemisphere and cause us, and
face us with the same problems we’re going to have in Berlin anyway.
The consensus was that we should go ahead with the blockade begin-
ning on Sunday night. Originally we should begin by blockading Soviets
against the shipment of additional offensive capacity, [and] that we
could tighten the blockade as the situation requires. I was most anxious
that we not have to announce a state of war existing, because it would
obviously be bad to have the word go out that we were having a war
rather than that it was a limited blockade for a limited purpose.
It was determined that I should go ahead with my speeches so that we
don’t take the cover off this, and come back Saturday night [October 20].
To the press and public, this was a day on which the President was sched-
uled to fly to Cleveland, Ohio, and then on to Illinois for speeches and
activities in Springfield and Chicago. But before leaving town, Kennedy
wanted to confer secretly and directly with his military leaders.
9:45–10:30 A.M.
Meeting with the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the Cuban Missile Crisis1
Continuing their analysis of earlier U-2 photography, National Photo-
graphic Interpretation Center analysts confirmed that the two MRBM
sites near San Cristobal each had a regiment with eight SS-4s on launch-
ers and eight more at hand for a second salvo. They pronounced both
sites already operational. They had found another regiment of SS-4s east
of Havana near Sagua La Grande. They expected these eight missiles to
be operational within a week.
Although they had still spotted no IRBMs, the suppositions of the
day before were hardening into a certainty that the two sites near
Guanajay were intended for 2,200-mile-range SS-5s. The photos showed
permanent construction, for SS-5s were too big and heavy to be fired
from mobile launchers. And it was the construction pattern that was the
giveaway, for they had not only seen it in photographs of the Soviet
Union; they had technical data supplied by the spy Oleg Penkovsky.
Seeing evidence of a nuclear warhead storage site in the area, the ana-
1. Including President Kennedy, George Anderson, Curtis LeMay, Robert McNamara, David
Shoup, Maxwell Taylor, and Earle Wheeler. Tape 31.2, John F. Kennedy Library, President’s
Office Files, Presidential Recordings Collection.
Meeting with the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the Cuban Missile Crisis 579
2. The estimates briefed on 19 October were written down in a joint estimate of GMAIC,
JAEIC, and NPIC, “Joint Evaluation of Soviet Missile Threat in Cuba,” 19 October 1962.
580 F R I DAY, O C T O B E R 19, 1 962
3. Very late on 18 October Gilpatric, acting for McNamara, asked that the Chiefs work on how
to help Latin American countries with their internal security, which of these countries could
help the United States blockade Cuba, which offensive weapons should be included in a block-
ade, the possibility of blockading aircraft as well as ships, and related questions.
Meeting with the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the Cuban Missile Crisis 581
President Kennedy: Let me just say a little, first, about what the
problem is, from my point of view.
First, I think we ought to think of why the Russians did this. Well,
actually, it was a rather dangerous but rather useful play of theirs. If we
do nothing, they have a missile base there with all the pressure that
brings to bear on the United States and damage to our prestige.
If we attack Cuba, the missiles, or Cuba, in any way then it gives
them a clear line to take Berlin, as they were able to do in Hungary
under the Anglo war in Egypt. We will have been regarded as—they
think we’ve got this fixation about Cuba anyway—we would be regarded
as the trigger-happy Americans who lost Berlin. We would have no sup-
port among our allies. We would affect the West Germans’ attitude
towards us. And [people would believe] that we let Berlin go because we
didn’t have the guts to endure a situation in Cuba. After all, Cuba is
5[,000] or 6,000 miles from them. They don’t give a damn about Cuba.
And they do care about Berlin and about their own security. So they
would say that we endangered their interests and security and reunifica-
tion [of Germany] and all the rest, because of the preemptive action
that we took in Cuba. So I think they’ve got . . . I must say I think it’s a
very satisfactory position from their point of view. If you take the view
that what really . . .
And thirdly, if we do nothing then they’ll have these missiles and
they’ll be able to say that any time we ever try to do anything about
Cuba, that they’ll fire these missiles. So that I think it’s dangerous, but
rather satisfactory, from their point of view.
If you take the view, really, that what’s basic to them is Berlin and
there isn’t any doubt [about that]. In every conversation we’ve had with
the Russians, that’s what . . . Even last night we [Soviet foreign minister
Andrei Gromyko and I] talked about Cuba for a while, but Berlin—
that’s what Khrushchev’s committed himself to personally. So, actually,
it’s a quite desirable situation from their point of view.
Now, that’s what makes our problem so difficult. If we go in and take
them out on a quick air strike, we neutralize the chance of danger to the
United States of these missiles being used, and we prevent a situation
from arising, at least within Cuba, where the Cubans themselves have
the means of exercising some degree of authority in this hemisphere.
On the other hand, we increase the chance greatly, as I think they—
there’s bound to be a reprisal from the Soviet Union, there always is—of
their just going in and taking Berlin by force at some point. Which leaves
me only one alternative, which is to fire nuclear weapons—which is a hell
of an alternative—and begin a nuclear exchange, with all this happening.
582 F R I DAY, O C T O B E R 19, 1 962
On the other hand, if we begin the blockade that we’re talking about,
the chances are they will begin a blockade and say that we started it.
And there’ll be some question about the attitude of the Europeans. So
that, once again, they will say that there will be this feeling in Europe
that the Berlin blockade has been commenced by our blockade.
So I don’t think we’ve got any satisfactory alternatives. When we
balance off that our problem is not merely Cuba but it is also Berlin and
when we recognize the importance of Berlin to Europe, and recognize
the importance of our allies to us, that’s what has made this thing be a
dilemma for three days. Otherwise, our answer would be quite easy.
Curtis LeMay: Mr. President—
President Kennedy: On the other hand, we’ve got to do something.
Because if we do nothing, we’re going to have the problem of Berlin any-
way. That was very clear last night [in the meeting with Gromyko]. We’re
going to have this thing stuck right in our guts, in about two months
[when the IRBMs are operational]. And so we’ve got to do something.
Now the question really is, what are we . . . let’s see. [Apparently read-
ing passages from a document.] Three . . . [unclear]. It’s safe to say that
two of these missiles [sites] are operational now; [missiles] can be
launched within 18 hours after the decision to fire has been reached.
We’ve seen [unclear] already alerted. These missiles could be launched
within 18 hours after the decision to fire. We have now located 12 fixed
launch pads near Havana. They’d [the IRBMs] be ready in December of
’62. It says [unclear] additional missiles may be [unclear] . . . nuclear
storage [unclear] . . . yields in the low megaton range. Communication,
targeting, and an integrated air defense system is now nearing opera-
tional status. What does that mean, integrated?
Taylor: That means that we’re hearing electronic emissions now,
suggesting that they have sectors for the air defense of Cuba. I believe
this is the latest intelligence here.
President Kennedy: I just wanted to say that these were some of the
problems that we have been considering. Now I’d be glad to hear from . . .
Taylor: Well, I would just say one thing and then turn it over to
General LeMay. We recognize all these things, Mr. President. But I
think we’d all be unanimous in saying that really our strength in Berlin,
our strength anyplace in the world, is the credibility of our response
under certain conditions. And if we don’t respond here in Cuba, we think
the credibility of our response in Berlin is endangered.
President Kennedy: That’s right. That’s right. So that’s why we’ve
got to respond. Now the question is: What kind of response?
LeMay: Well, I certainly agree with everything General Taylor has
Meeting with the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the Cuban Missile Crisis 583
said. I’d emphasize, a little strongly perhaps, that we don’t have any
choice except direct military action. If we do this blockade that’s pro-
posed and political action, the first thing that’s going to happen is your
missiles are going to disappear into the woods, particularly your mobile
ones.4 Now, we can’t find them then, regardless of what we do, and then
we’re going to take some damage if we try to do anything later on.
President Kennedy: Well, can’t there be some of these undercover
now, in the sense of not having been delivered?
LeMay: There is a possibility of that. But the way they’ve lined these
others up—I would have say that it’s a small possibility. If they were
going to hide any of them, then I would think they would have hid them
all. I don’t think there are any hid. So the only danger we have if we
haven’t picked up some that are setting there in plain sight. This is pos-
sible. If we do low-altitude photography over them, this is going to be a
tip-off too.
Now, as for the Berlin situation, I don’t share your view that if we
knock off Cuba, they’re going to knock off Berlin. We’ve got the Berlin
problem staring us in the face anyway. If we don’t do anything to Cuba,
then they’re going to push on Berlin and push real hard because they’ve
got us on the run. If we take military action against Cuba, then I think
that the . . .
President Kennedy: What do you think their reprisal would be?
LeMay: I don’t think they’re going to make any reprisal if we tell
them that the Berlin situation is just like it’s always been. If they make a
move we’re going to fight. Now I don’t think this changes the Berlin sit-
uation at all, except you’ve got to make one more statement on it.
So I see no other solution. This blockade and political action, I see
leading into war. I don’t see any other solution for it. It will lead right
into war. This is almost as bad as the appeasement at Munich.
[Pause.]
Because if this [unclear] blockade comes along, their MiGs are going
to fly. The IL-28s are going to fly against us. And we’re just going to
gradually drift into a war under conditions that are at great disadvan-
tage to us, with missiles staring us in the face, that can knock out our
airfields in the southeastern portion [of the United States]. And if they
4. In fact the SS-4 MRBMs, the only type which were mobile, were far too large to move into
dense woods, especially with all their associated equipment. But it took a few more days before
U.S. officials comprehended this limitation. The SS-5 IRBMs were to be deployed at fixed con-
crete sites.
584 F R I DAY, O C T O B E R 19, 1 962
use nuclear weapons, it’s the population down there. We just drift into a
war under conditions that we don’t like. I just don’t see any other solu-
tion except direct military intervention right now.
George Anderson: Well, Mr. President, I feel that the course of
action recommended to you by the Chiefs from the military point of view
is the right one. I think it’s the best one from the political point of view.
I’ll address myself to the alternative of the blockade. If we institute a
blockade, from a military point of view we can carry it out. It is easier
for us and requires less forces if we institute a complete blockade rather
than a partial blockade, because instituting a partial blockade involves
visit and search of all of these neutral ships, and taking them in, perhaps,
to ports, will certainly cause a great deal more concern on the part of the
neutrals, than if we go ahead and institute a complete blockade.
If we institute a complete blockade, we are immediately having a con-
frontation with the Soviet Union because it’s the Soviet-bloc ships which
are taking the material to Cuba.
The blockade will not affect the equipment that is already in Cuba, and
will provide the Russians in Cuba time to assemble all of these missiles, to
assemble the IL-28s, to get the MiGs and their command and control sys-
tem ready to go. And I feel that, as this goes on, I agree with General
LeMay that this will escalate and then we will be required to take other
military action at greater disadvantage to the United States, to our mili-
tary forces, and probably would suffer far greater casualties within the
United States if these fanatics do indeed intend to fire any missiles.
We certainly cannot guarantee under those circumstances that we
could prevent damage and loss of life in the United States itself. I think
we have a good chance of greatly minimizing any loss of life within the
United States under the present conditions, if we act fairly soon,
although we do recognize they’re moving very fast. I do not see that, as
long as the Soviet Union is supporting Cuba, that there is any solution
to the Cuban problem except a military solution.
On the other hand, we recognize fully the relationship to the Berlin
situation. The Communists have got in this case a master situation, from
their point of view, where every course of action posed to us is character-
ized by unpleasantries and disadvantages. It’s the same thing as Korea
all over again, only on a grander scale.
We recognize the great difficulty of a military solution in Berlin. I
think, on balance, the taking [of] positive, prompt affirmative action in
Berlin demonstrating the confidence, the ability, the resolution of the
United States on balance, I would judge it, would be to deter the Russians
Meeting with the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the Cuban Missile Crisis 585
from more aggressive acts in Berlin and, if we didn’t take anything, they’d
feel that we were weak. So I subscribe fully to the concept recommended
by the Joint Chiefs.
President Kennedy: It seems to me that we have to assume that just
when our two military . . . When we grabbed their two U.N. people [as
spies] and they threw two of ours out [of the Moscow embassy], we’ve
got to assume there’s going to be—
Anderson: Tit for tat.
President Kennedy: —that they would strike this . . . I mean they can’t
do it [accept our attack] any more than we can let these go on without
doing something. They can’t let us just take out, after all their statements,
take out their missiles, kill a lot of Russians and not do anything.
It’s quite obvious that what they . . . I would think they would do, is
try to get Berlin. But that may be a risk we have to take, but it would
seem to me . . .
LeMay: Well, history has been, I think, the other way, Mr. President.
Where we have taken a strong stand they have backed off. In Lebanon,
for instance.5
Taylor: I would agree, Mr. President. I think from the point of view
of face they’ll do something. But I think it will be considerably less,
depending on the posture we show here. I can’t really see them putting
the screws in. The dangers of hitting Berlin are just as great or greater
after our action down here, because we have our—
President Kennedy: Right. But I think they’re going to wait for three
months until they get these things [the IRBMs as well as the MRBMs]
all ready, and then squeeze us in Berlin. The only thing, at that point, for
what it is worth [and] it may not be worth much, but at least we’d have
the support of Europe this way.
Taylor: That is true.
President Kennedy: We have to figure that Europe will regard this
action . . . no matter what pictures we show afterwards of [missiles] as
having been . . .
Taylor: I think that’s right.
Earle Wheeler: Mr. President, in my judgment, from a military point
of view, the lowest-risk course of action if we’re thinking of protecting
5. A landing of thousands of U.S. Marines in Lebanon in 1958 was unopposed, and the blood-
less action was believed to have prevented a takeover of Lebanon by anti-Western dissidents
supported by the United Arab Republic and the Soviet Union.
586 F R I DAY, O C T O B E R 19, 1 962
a good many months the world has known, and we’ve known, that we have
tremendously greater potential already aimed in on us from Russia and it
has been for many months. And we didn’t attack Russia. I think that’s a
hard thing to reconcile, at least it is in my mind, and I would think it
would be in the American public and other nations of the world. If it’s a
matter of distance, that it’s closer now, well, missiles land pretty . . . If they
have nuclear warheads down there, we know they have them in Russia. So
if they want to inflict damage, it’s a question of whether Khrushchev
wants to have them do it, and him keep out of it.
So if there is a requirement to eliminate this threat of damage, then
it’s going to take some sizable forces to do it. And as we wait and wait
and wait, then it will take greater forces to do it.
And as long as it isn’t done, then those forces . . . increasingly
requirements for greater forces will be absolutely tied to that function.
They’re going to have to stand by to take care of that function. And you
will then have a considerable force of troops, ships, aircraft tied to this
requirement that some day may happen.
I can’t conceive that they [the Cubans] would attack us just for the
fun of it. They might do it at the direction of Khrushchev. But I cannot
see why they would attack us because they couldn’t invade and take us.
So there’s a question in my mind, in the political area and as I say the
public and the people, what does this mean?
Does it mean they’re [Cuba] getting ready to attack us, that little
pipsqueak of a place? If so, Russia has a hell of a lot better way to attack
us than to attack us from Cuba.
Then, in my mind, this all devolves upon the fact that they [the
Soviets] do have it. They can damage us increasingly every day. And
each day that they increase, we have to have a more sizable force tied to
this problem and then they’re not available in case something happens
someplace else. And each time you then have to take some action in
Berlin, South Vietnam, Korea, you would be degrading. You’d have to
degrade your capability against this ever-increasing force in Cuba.
So that, in my opinion, if we want to eliminate this threat that is now
closer, but it’s not nearly the threat that we’ve experienced all these
months and months, if we want to eliminate it, then we’re going to have
to go in there and do it in a full-time job to eliminate the threat against
us. Then if you want to take over the place and really put in a new gov-
ernment that is non-Communist, then you’ll have to invade the place.
And if that decision is made, we must go in with plenty of insurance of a
decisive success and as quick as possible.
President Kennedy: Well, it is a fact that the number of missiles
588 F R I DAY, O C T O B E R 19, 1 962
there, let’s say . . . no matter what they put in there, we could live today
under. If they don’t have enough ICBMs today, they’re going to have
them in a year. They obviously are putting in a lot of—
LeMay: This increases their accuracy against the 50 targets that we
know that they could hit now.
But the big thing is, if we leave them there, is the blackmail threat
against not only us but the other South American countries that they
may decide to operate against.
There’s one other factor that I didn’t mention that’s not quite in our
field, [which] is the political factor. But you invited us to comment on this
at one time. And that is that we have had a talk about Cuba and the SAM
sites down there. And you have made some pretty strong statements about
their being defensive and that we would take action against offensive
weapons. I think that a blockade and political talk would be considered by
a lot of our friends and neutrals as being a pretty weak response to this.
And I’m sure a lot of our own citizens would feel that way, too.
In other words, you’re in a pretty bad fix at the present time.
President Kennedy: What did you say?
LeMay: You’re in a pretty bad fix.
President Kennedy: You’re in there with me. [Slight laughter, a bit
forced.] Personally.
Taylor: With regard to the blockade plan, Mr. President, I say we’re
studying it now to see all the implications. We’re not . . . we really
haven’t gone into it deeply. There are two things that strike us from the
outset. One is the difficulty of maintaining surveillance. We just don’t
see how they can do that without taking losses and getting into some
form of air warfare over this island.
Second, there is the problem of Guantánamo, which is a curious
obstacle to us to some degree. I might ask Admiral Anderson to com-
ment on how we can protect our position in Guantánamo during a state
of blockade.
Anderson: Well, our position in Guantánamo becomes increasingly vul-
nerable because certainly the imposition of the blockade is going to infuri-
ate the Cubans and they have got a mass of militia and they can come on
around Guantánamo. And I don’t know whether they would actually attack
Guantánamo or not. But we would certainly have to provide increased
forces around there to defend Guantánamo, which we’re in the process of
reinforcing right now. Also, they have these short-range cruise missiles.
They have three groups of those primarily for coast defense. Their MiGs,
their aircraft, all pose a threat to Guantánamo. So the threat is greatly
increased and intensified during the course of a blockade.
Meeting with the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the Cuban Missile Crisis 589
year they’re going to have enough. . . . when we’ve talked about the num-
ber of ICBMs they have. They may not be quite as accurate. [But]
they’ve got enough, they put them on the cities and you know how soon
these casualty figures [mount up]—80 million, whether it’s 80 or 100—
you’re talking about the destruction of a country. So that it . . . just
regardless if you begin to duplicate your . . .
Taylor: And we lose our—
President Kennedy: You’ll lose it all on cities.
Taylor: And we can never talk about invading again, after they get
these missiles, because they’ve got these pointed at our head.
President Kennedy: Well, the logical argument is that we don’t really
have to invade Cuba. That’s not really . . . That’s just one of the difficulties
that we live with in life, like we live with the Soviet Union and China.
That problem, however, is after . . . for us not to do anything, then wait
until he brings up Berlin. And then we can’t do anything about Cuba.
But I do think we ought to be aware of the fact that the existence of
these missiles does add to the danger but doesn’t create it. The danger is
right there now. They’ve got enough to give us, between submarines and
ICBMs, or whatever planes they do have, I mean now they can kill, espe-
cially if they concentrate on the cities, I mean they’ve pretty well got us
there anyway.
Taylor: And by logic we ought to be able to say we can deter these
missiles as well as the Soviet missiles, the ones from the Soviet Union. I
think the thing that worries us, however, is that these [being] in poten-
tially under the control of Castro. Castro would be quite a different fel-
low to own missiles than Khrushchev. I don’t think that’s the case now,
and perhaps Khrushchev would never willingly do so. But there’s always
the risk of their falling into Cuban hands.
Shoup: Mr. President, one other item about the Guantánamo thing.
Any initiative on our part immediately gives them the—I don’t know the
authority—but the right probably to let fly at Guantánamo. And thus,
the weapons that they have, including now another SAM site or two at
work on the place, plus surface-to-surface missiles . . . They have a con-
siderable number of gun emplacements within range of Guantánamo. So
unless something is done to also at the same time neutralize this ability
to take on Guantánamo, well Guantánamo is in one hell of a fix.
President Kennedy: The only thing is, General, it’s going to take us . . .
before we could . . . what can we do about Guantánamo if we do this air
strike and they retaliate on Guantánamo?
Anderson: Mr. President, our thinking on Guantánamo is this. We’re
Meeting with the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the Cuban Missile Crisis 591
6. Taylor is suggesting an analogy between the potential Cuban harassment of Guantánamo and
China’s continuing shelling beginning in 1958 of the offshore islands of Quemoy and Matsu,
held by Taiwan, accompanied by China’s threats to invade both these islands and Taiwan itself.
592 F R I DAY, O C T O B E R 19, 1 962
that they have two ready. This says . . . it’s best to assume they do, but
the best information we have indicates it’s still highly [doubtful].
President Kennedy: Why is it Tuesday instead of Sunday, General?
What’s the argument for that?
LeMay: Well—
President Kennedy: We can’t hold this much longer.
Taylor: We were told to get ready as fast as possible. We aren’t rec-
ommending Sunday. We’d prefer Tuesday.
President Kennedy: Well, the only problem I see is that it starts to
break out in the papers.
LeMay: Well, we would prefer Tuesday. Here’s the only reason. We’ve
had this plan for some time.
Some outside noise begins to interfere with general sound quality. For
several minutes, only fragments of conversations are audible.
McNamara: For the U-2 photography we’ll have complete coverage
of the island, interpreted I would guess by late today.
President Kennedy: So then just—
Taylor: This morning I asked the question, Bob, and the estimate
was later than that to see everything [unclear].
President Kennedy: Well, let’s say it’s this evening then. But you say
that would be Monday. It’s just really a question of how long this thing
can hold without getting out.
Taylor: Mr. President, I’ve never been impressed with the argument
of some of your advisers on that point. It seems to me we’ve had so many
reports out of Cuba we can shrug them all off as rumors that [unclear].
President Kennedy: Well, when is that you begin to tell so many of
the military that there’s going to be this strike, that there’s a chance of it
getting out? The pilots and so on and their families.
Taylor: I don’t think . . . The danger is minimal. The danger is mini-
mal. The last time we spoke to these pilots—and we are briefing pilots
today—it’s not a very large number of pilots—it’s only a briefing on
these particular subjects. The other srikes are all [unclear].
President Kennedy: How effective is an air strike of this kind gener-
ally against a missile base?
LeMay: Well, I think we can guarantee hitting them.
President Kennedy: If it doesn’t take care of the mobile, what does it
do to them? [Unclear.]
Le May: The mobile missiles aren’t the problem. It’s the other ones,
where there isn’t much there [unclear] are now [unclear].
Anderson: But these are [unclear].
Taylor: [Unclear] the island.
Meeting with the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the Cuban Missile Crisis 593
initial action so that . . . We’ve got to have some degree of control. Those
people [the Soviets] last night were so away from reality that there’s no
telling what the response would be.
Taylor: Did he [Gromyko] give any clue, Mr. President?
President Kennedy: Well, he talked tough about Berlin. On Cuba he
really just talked about their defensive aspirations. He said, “We’re only
sending defensive weapons in.” Of course, that’s how they define these
weapons, as defensive.
Taylor: Well, Mr. President—
President Kennedy: General Shoup, your point is not to argue against
action by saying that we’ve been living with this sort of thing for years.
Shoup: A lot of people advance that. That is a real question for a rec-
onciliation, for our people, and you and everybody else when . . . We’ve
had a hell of a lot more than this aimed at us, and we didn’t attack it. But
they’re closer, their distance is closer, and as General LeMay pointed
out, there are certain areas in which he will certainly get in, if, as I pre-
sume, we’re going to take him on.
President Kennedy: Well, I think . . . I don’t think that it adds partic-
ularly to our danger. I think our danger is the use of nuclear weapons
[unclear] anyway. Particularly on urban sites. With submarines and
planes. They’ve got enough now; they sure will have in a year’s [time]. I
don’t think that’s probably the major argument. The major argument is
the political effect on United States [unclear] Cuba. The certainty is the
invasion is key for us.
On the other hand, there are going to be a lot of people that are just
going to move away from us, figuring that our . . . I mean, we haven’t
prepared [unclear] existence. There isn’t any doubt if we announce evi-
dence of the missile sites, most people, including the Soviets would take
a provocative act. Instead, the first announcement may be, under the
plan suggested, an act that we took. So that we’ve got a real problem in
maintaining the alliance.
Wheeler: Today . . . am I clear that you are addressing yourself as to
whether anything at all should be done?
President Kennedy: That’s right.
Wheeler: But that if military action is to be taken, you agree with us.
President Kennedy: Yeah.
Shoup: I question how to reconcile . . . the last thing you really want
is [unclear] less threat than you’ve had for a long time.
Taylor: Mr. President, may I mention one thing before you go on
because time is running out: the question of the low-level [reconnais-
Meeting with the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the Cuban Missile Crisis 595
sance] flights to get evidence. We discussed [them] last night and we’re
prepared to do them tomorrow. I’m a little concerned about doing that if
there’s any likelihood of our following a military course.
President Kennedy: Exactly. Oh, I agree. That’s why we’ve got—
McNamara: No question that we should not undertake those until a
decision has been made as to which course of action would—presumably
you’re ready?
LeMay: Yes, sir. We are.
McNamara: Good.
LeMay: [Unclear.]
Taylor: Thank you very much, Mr. President. We appreciate the
chance to talk with you.
Anderson: Sir, did you make a decision on the [unclear], I mean the
[unclear].
President Kennedy: I told [unclear] to go ahead [unclear].
Anderson: All right then.
President Kennedy: The Attorney General told me all the reports
that he got was that your reaction [unclear].
Anderson: I think everything is pretty well under control.
President Kennedy: Yeah, that’s right.
President Kennedy and McNamara begin talking privately to one side.
Taylor: I know the press is out here talking about [unclear]. [Unclear
exchanges.]
McNamara: [Unclear.] Max, may I suggest this? That for [unclear]
the Chiefs organize themselves following two alternative courses. One,
the blockade in great detail. What are the instructions you ought to do?
What ships can you do? And how would you do it without endangering
the ships? In other words you—
Taylor: Pull them out.
McNamara: Pull them out. Exactly. Now, I realize that this [unclear]
the ocean and that [unclear] greater naval force and so on. That would
be the assumption you would try to start on. At the same time, let some
other Chief or Chiefs work in great detail on the air strike. Because—I
say this because as far as the President is concerned, we’ve just talked in
very general terms about the air strike.
Taylor: Yeah.
McNamara: And with every passing day the number of airplanes that
we would have in the air, the firepower, is increasing.
Taylor: The civilian targets are increasing too.
McNamara: Oh, I’m not suggesting that. I’m just saying that, if the
596 F R I DAY, O C T O B E R 19, 1 962
too much. I don’t think we have anything to say on that. In fact I don’t
think you need to say anything when we’re coming in in this staggered
way [unclear].
Shoup: Is the coast clear out there? [Perhaps referring to President
Kennedy’s having taken off from the South Lawn in the presidential helicopter.]
Mixed voices murmuring, a few fragments are intelligible. The remain-
ing generals seem to be discussing various topics, including targets and
their transportation back to the Pentagon.
Wheeler: The way to do that is the Joint Reconnaissance Group
[JRG] getting the requirements from DIA, the input on the public rela-
tions from us. They already have wide profiles. They will have to be
adjusted in the light of the [unclear].
Taylor: And you do [unclear] surrogate possibilities.
Wheeler: Yes, sir. Actually, we have authorized the Joint Reconnais-
sance Group to deal directly with the flight leader.
McNamara: I think it would be helpful if some one of the Chiefs would
talk with DIA about it and get this formalized before [unclear, unclear
exchange]. And have [DIA director General Joseph] Carroll work with the
other groups here. There’s this National Reconnaissance Office that’s
involved in this thing. There’s a, in a sense, a third agency, that’s responsi-
ble for the U-2, the drones, anything relating to special reconnaissance for
CIA and DIA. We need to keep him involved. Carroll knows how to do this.
Wheeler: I think the JRG has all these strengths. That’s a real fine
outfit. Real fine outfit. They deal with DIA and some of these people on a
daily basis, so I’m sure we can pull it together really quickly.
After a brief, inaudible exchange McNamara and Taylor leave. Appar-
ently only three or four people remain in the room.
Shoup: Well what do you guys [unclear]. You, you pulled the rug
right out from under him.
LeMay: Jesus Christ. What the hell do you mean?
Shoup: I just agree with that answer, General. I just agree with you.
I just agree with you a hundred percent. I just agree with you a hundred
percent. That’s the only goddamn . . .
He [President Kennedy] finally got around to the word escalation.
[Unclear] I heard him say escalation. That’s the only goddamn thing
that’s in the whole trick. It’s been there in Laos; it’s been in every god-
damn one [of these crises]. When he says escalation, that’s it. [Pause.]
If somebody could keep them from doing the goddamn thing piece-
meal. That’s our problem. You go in there and friggin’ around with the
missiles. You’re screwed. You go in and frig around with anything else,
you’re screwed.
598 F R I DAY, O C T O B E R 19, 1 962
President Kennedy was now less sure that the blockade was the right
answer. This might have been because of the weight of arguments he had
heard from the Joint Chiefs. He had also talked again to Bundy, probably
at the start of his day, before the meeting with the Joint Chiefs. Bundy
had changed his mind during the night and had switched from support-
ing no action (because of concerns about Berlin) to supporting a surprise
air strike. Though we can see from the meeting with the Chiefs that
President Kennedy continued to favor a blockade, it is possible that
Bundy’s change of heart gave the President added cause for reflection.
S AT U R DAY, O C T O B E R 2 0, 1962 599
After the crisis Bundy privately recorded that Kennedy, just before he
left Washington on October 19 (in the few minutes after his meeting
with the Joint Chiefs), asked Bundy to keep the air strike option open
until he returned. In another brief exchange as he prepared to depart on
his campaign trip to Ohio and Illinois, President Kennedy asked his
brother, with Sorensen standing by, to “pull the group together.”8
The President wanted to act soon and said Bobby should call if and and
when he should cut short his trip and return to Washington. At 10:35 the
presidential helicopter lifted off from the South Lawn of the White House.
On Friday, October 19, the meetings at the State Department ran all day
and into the night. The day started with advisers divided into two camps,
one favoring a blockade and the other favoring an air strike. Bundy said
that, in the course of a sleepless night, he had decided that an air strike
was needed. Decisive action would confront the world with a fait accom-
pli. He said he had spoken with President Kennedy and passed along this
advice. Acheson, Dillon, McCone, and Taylor agreed with Bundy.
McNamara disagreed. Ball said he was wavering. Robert Kennedy
then said, with a grin, that he too had spoken with the President and that a
surprise attack like Pearl Harbor was “not in our traditions.” He “favored
action” but wanted action that gave the Soviets a chance to pull back.1
Rusk then suggested that the group divide into working groups to
refine the blockade and air strike scenarios. It became plain to all, after
8. Bundy’s recollection is drawn from notes excerpted from his private papers by Francis
Bator. Bator shared this information in an April 1998 letter to Ernest May and Philip
Zelikow. Deputy Under Secretary of State Alexis Johnson, who attended almost all of the
meetings during the crisis, remembered that the apparent consensus that had formed in
favor of the blockade on October 18 “came unstuck” on Friday, 19 October. Alexis Johnson
thought this was because of Dean Acheson’s argument for an air strike. U. Alexis Johnson
with Jef Olivarius McAllister, The Right Hand of Power (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall,
1984), p. 383. In fact Kennedy had already heard Acheson’s case on the afternoon of the 18th,
before the consensus formed that night, and had not talked again to Acheson. On the “pull the
group together” exchange, see Theodore C. Sorensen, Kennedy (New York: Harper & Row,
1965), p. 692.
1. This account draws on several sources, but these and other quotations from the 19 October
meetings are from minutes drafted by State Department deputy legal adviser Ralph Meeker,
in FRUS, 11: 116–22 (Robert Kennedy’s emphasis on action is in Meeker’s notes).
600 S AT U R DAY, O C T O B E R 20, 1962
2. The timing of the call is based on Sorensen’s account. Much later, however, Lundahl told Dino
Brugioni that Robert Kennedy, worried about the tone of the 19 October discussions, called his
brother on Friday, 19 October, failed to reach him, then called him again on Saturday, got him,
and urged him to return [Dino Brugioni, Eyeball to Eyeball: The Inside Story of the Cuban Missile
Crisis, ed. Robert F. McCort (New York: Random House, 1991), pp. 303–4].
3. The notetaker of the NSC meeting was Bromley Smith. This was the first meeting during the
missile crisis which Smith was allowed to attend, because it was the first such meeting styled as
a formal meeting of the NSC, of which Smith was the executive secretary. Smith attended and
took notes at every subsequent major meeting during the crisis, because the next two meetings
were also deemed NSC meetings and then, after that, this crisis management body was formally
constituted as the Executive Committee of the National Security Council (or Excom for short).
Smith’s notes of this 20 October meeting were more detailed than his notes of subsequent NSC
and Excom meetings during the crisis, perhaps because this growing accumulation of work left
Smith less and less time to type up more detailed summaries. Fortunately Kennedy was able to
tape the subsequent NSC and Excom meetings during the crisis, from 22 October on.
602 S AT U R DAY, O C T O B E R 20, 1962
4. The briefing notes, with Cline’s handwritten annotations, are reproduced in CIA Documents on
the Cuban Missile Crisis 1962, ed. Mary McAuliffe, (Washington, DC: CIA, 1992), pp. 221–26.
National Security Council Meeting on the Cuban Missile Crisis 603
adding that we might wish, looking back, that we had done earlier what
we are now preparing to do.
Secretary Rusk said that a blockade would serious affect the Cuban
missile capability in that the Soviets would be unable to deploy to Cuba
any missiles in addition to those now there.
Under Secretary [George] Ball said that if an effective blockade was
established, it was possible that our photographic intelligence would
reveal that there were no nuclear warheads in Cuba; hence, none of the
missiles now there would be made operational.
General Taylor indicated his doubt that it would be possible to pre-
vent the Russians from deploying warheads to Cuba by means of a block-
ade because of the great difficulty of setting up an effective air blockade.
Secretary McNamara stated that if we knew that a plane was flying
nuclear warheads to Cuba, we should immediately shoot it down.
Parenthetically, he pointed out that there are now 6,000 to 8,000 Soviet
personnel in Cuba.
The President asked whether the institution of a blockade would
appear to the free world as a strong response to the Soviet action. He is
particularly concerned about whether the Latin American countries
would think that the blockade was an appropriate response to the Soviet
challenge.
The Attorney General [Robert Kennedy] returned to the point
made by General Taylor, i.e., that now is the last chance we will have to
destroy Castro and the Soviet missiles deployed in Cuba.
Mr. [Theodore] Sorensen said he did not agree with the Attorney
General or with General Taylor that this was our last chance. He said a
missile buildup would end if, as everyone seemed to agree, the Russians
would not use force to penetrate the United States blockade.
Air Strike Route
Mr. [McGeorge] Bundy handed to the President the “air strike
alternative,” which the President read. It was also referred to as the
Bundy plan.
The Attorney General told the President that this plan was supported
by Mr. Bundy, General Taylor, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and with minor
variations, by Secretary [Douglas] Dillon and Director [John] McCone.
General Taylor emphasized the opportunity available now to take
out not only all the missiles, but all the Soviet medium bombers (IL-28)
which were neatly lined up in the open on airbases in Cuba.
Mr. McNamara cautioned that an air strike would not destroy all the
missiles and launchers in Cuba, and, at best, we could knock out two-thirds
National Security Council Meeting on the Cuban Missile Crisis 607
of these missiles. Those missiles not destroyed could be fired from mobile
launchers not destroyed. General Taylor said he was unable to explain why
the IL-28 bombers had been left completely exposed on two airfields. The
only way to explain this, he concluded, was on the ground that the Cubans
and the Russians did not anticipate [a] United States air strike.
Secretary Rusk said he hesitated to ask the question but he wondered
whether these planes were decoys. He also wondered whether the Russians
were trying to entice us into a trap. Secretary McNamara stated his
strong doubt that these planes were decoys. Director McCone added
that the Russians would not have sent one hundred shiploads of equip-
ment to Cuba solely to play a “trick.” General Taylor returned to the
point he had made earlier, namely, that if we do not destroy the missiles
and the bombers, we will have to change our entire military way of deal-
ing with external threats.
The President raised the question of advance warning prior to mili-
tary action—whether we should give a minimum of two hours notice of
an air strike to permit Soviet personnel to leave the area to be attacked.
General Taylor said that the military would be prepared to live with
a 24-hour advance notice or grace period if such advance notice was
worthwhile politically. The President expressed his doubt that any
notice beyond seven hours had any political value.
There was a brief discussion of the usefulness of sending a draft mes-
sage to Castro, and a copy of such a message was circulated.11
The President stated flatly that the Soviet planes in Cuba did not
concern him particularly. He said we must be prepared to live with the
Soviet threat as represented by Soviet bombers. However, the existence
of strategic missiles in Cuba had an entirely different impact throughout
Latin America. In his view the existence of 50 planes in Cuba did not
affect the balance of power, but the missiles already in Cuba were an
entirely different matter.
The Attorney General said that in his opinion a combination of the
blockade route and the air strike route was very attractive to him. He felt
that we should first institute the blockade. In the event that the Soviets
continued to build up the missile capability in Cuba, then we should inform
the Russians that we would destroy the missiles, the launchers, and the mis-
sile sites. He said he favored a short wait during which time the Russians
could react to the blockade. If the Russians did not halt the development of
the missile capability, then we would proceed to make an air strike. The
advantage of proceeding in this way, he added, was that we would get away
from the Pearl Harbor surprise attack aspect of the air strike route.
Mr. Bundy pointed out that there was a risk that we would act in such as
way as to get Khrushchev to commit himself fully to the support of Castro.
Secretary Rusk doubted that a delay of 24 hours in initiating an air
strike was of any value. He said he now favored proceeding on the block-
ade track.
Secretary Dillon mentioned 72 hours as the time between instituting
the blockade and initiating an air strike in the event we receive no
response to our initial action.
Director McCone stated his opposition to an air strike, but admitted
that in his view a blockade was not enough. He argued that we should
institute the blockade and tell the Russians that if the missiles were not
dismantled within 72 hours, the United States would destroy the missiles
by air attack. He called attention to the risk involved in a long drawn-out
period during which the Cubans could, at will, launch the missiles against
the United States. Secretary Dillon said the existence of strategic missiles
in Cuba was, in his opinion, not negotiable. He believed that any effort to
negotiate the removal of the missiles would involve a price so high that
the United States could not accept it. If the missiles are not removed or
eliminated, he continued, the United States will lose all of its friends in
Latin America, who will become convinced that our fear is such that we
cannot act. He admitted that the limited use of force involved in a block-
ade would make the military task much harder and would involve the
great danger of the launching of these missiles by the Cubans.
Sorensen recalled later that these presentations by McCone and Dillon,
taking direct issue with McNamara’s proposal for negotiations, resulted
in “a brief awkward silence,” which was then broken by Gilpatric, “nor-
mally a man of few words in meetings with the President when the
Defense Secretary was present.” 12
Bromley Smith’s minutes continue.
Deputy Secretary [Roswell] Gilpatric saw the choice as involving
the use of limited force or of unlimited force. He was prepared to face the
prospect of an air strike against Cuba later, but he opposed the initial use
of all-out military force such as a surprise air attack. He defined a block-
ade as being the application of the limited use of force and doubted that
such limited use could be combined with an air strike.
General Taylor argued that a blockade would not solve our problem
or end the Cuban missile threat. He said that eventually we would have
to use military force and, if we waited, the use of military force would be
much more costly.
Secretary McNamara noted that the air strike planned by the Joint
Chiefs involved 800 sorties. Such a strike would result in several thou-
sand Russians being killed, chaos in Cuba, and efforts to overthrow the
Castro government. In his view the probability was high that an air
strike would lead inevitably to an invasion. He doubted that the Soviets
would take an air strike on Cuba without resorting to a very major
response. In such an event, the United States would lose control of the
situation which could escalate to general war.
The President agreed that a United States air strike would lead to a
major Soviet response, such as blockading Berlin. He agreed that at an
appropriate time we would have to acknowledge that we were willing to
take strategic missiles out of Turkey and Italy if this issue was raised by
the Russians. He felt that implementation of a blockade would also result
in Soviet reprisals, possibly the blockade of Berlin. If we instituted a block-
ade on Sunday, then by Monday or Tuesday we would know whether the
missile development had ceased or whether it was continuing. Thus, we
would be in a better position to know what move to make next.
Secretary Dillon called attention to the fact that even if the Russians
agreed to dismantle the missiles now in Cuba, continuing inspection
would be required to ensure that the missiles were not again made ready.
The President said that if it was decided to go the Bundy route, he
would favor an air strike which would destroy only missiles. He repeated
this view that we would have to live with this threat arising out of the
stationing in Cuba of Soviet bombers.
Secretary Rusk referred to an air strike as chapter two. He did not
think we should initiate such a strike because of the risk of escalating
actions leading to general war. He doubted that we should act without
consultation of our allies. He said a sudden air strike had no support in
law or morality, and, therefore, must be ruled out. Reading from notes,
he urged that we start the blockade and only go on to an air attack when
we knew the reaction of the Russians and of our allies.
At this point Director McCone acknowledged that we did not know
positively that nuclear warheads for the missiles deployed had actually
arrived in Cuba. Although we had evidence of the construction of stor-
age places for nuclear weapons, such weapons may not yet have been
sent to Cuba.
The President asked what we would say to those whose reaction to
610 S AT U R DAY, O C T O B E R 20, 1962
our instituting a blockade now would be to ask why we had not block-
aded last July.
Both Mr. Sorensen and Mr. Ball made the point that we did not insti-
tute a blockade in July because we did not then know of the existence of
strategic missiles in Cuba.
Secretary Rusk suggested that our objective was an immediate freeze
of the strategic missile capability in Cuba to be inspected by United
Nations observation teams stationed at the missile sites. He referred to
our bases in Turkey, Spain and Greece as being involved in any negotia-
tion covering foreign bases. He said a United Nations group might be
sent to Cuba to reassure those who might fear that the United States
was planning an invasion.
Ambassador Stevenson stated his flat opposition to a surprise air
strike, which he felt would ultimately lead to a United States invasion
of Cuba. He supported the institution of the blockade and predicted
that such action would reduce the chance of Soviet retaliation of a
nature which would inevitably escalate. In his view our aim is to end
the existing missile threat in Cuba without casualties and without
escalation. He urged that we offer the Russians a settlement involving
the withdrawal of our missiles from Turkey and our evacuation of
Guantánamo base.
The President sharply rejected the thought of surrendering our base
at Guantánamo in the present situation. He felt that such action would
convey to the world that we had been frightened into abandoning our
position. He was not opposed to discussing withdrawal of our missiles
from Turkey and Greece [sic], but he was firm in saying we should only
make such a proposal in the future.
The Attorney General thought we should convey our firm intentions
to the Russians clearly and suggested that we might tell the Russians
that we were turning over nuclear weapons and missiles to the West
Germans.13
13. To reassure the German allies but also to discourage any thoughts on their part of an inde-
pendent nuclear deterrent, the United States in the late 1950s had begun to equip Luftwaffe air-
craft with “tactical” nuclear bombs and missiles. The nuclear devices remained under U.S.
control. The proposed multilateral nuclear force [MLF] was supposed to include Germans
among the multinational crews whose ships would carry nuclear-armed missiles, but authority
for the release of the weapons remained exclusively with the U.S. President. Champions of the
MLF in the United States, mostly in the State Department and sometimes referred to as the
“cabal,” hoped that it would not only dampen any German interest in nuclear weapons but
would lead the French and perhaps the British to abandon their own independent nuclear forces
[see McGeorge Bundy, Danger and Survival: Choices About the Bomb in the First Fifty Years (New
National Security Council Meeting on the Cuban Missile Crisis 611
York: Random House, 1988), pp. 487–90]. Some Western officials interpreted Khrushchev’s
position regarding Berlin as traceable chiefly to Soviet concern lest Germany acquire nuclear
weapons [see Marc Trachtenberg, History and Strategy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press, 1991), pp. 169–234]. Robert Kennedy’s suggestion here must have been startling to the
State Department contingent, especially to Ball, who was active in the cabal.
612 S AT U R DAY, O C T O B E R 20, 1962
14. Like Eisenhower before him, Kennedy had never been an all-out opponent of France’s hav-
ing independent nuclear forces. He had gone along, however, with the MLF scheme and had
approved public statements by McNamara that described such forces as “dangerous, expen-
sive, prone to obsolescence, and lacking in credibility as a deterrent.” He had also drawn upon
National Security Council Meeting on the Cuban Missile Crisis 613
During the 2 hours and 40 minutes of this meeting, lines had been
clearly drawn between the groups that would later be labeled doves and
hawks.15 It is a pity that Kennedy held the meeting outside the reach of
himself strong French criticism because of a loosely worded press conference remark which
seemed to single out French nuclear forces, not British, as “inimical to the community interest
of the Atlantic alliance.” (see Bundy, Danger and Survival, pp. 484–86).
15. The terminology may have been Kennedy’s own. It achieved popularity through a post-
mortem on the crisis: Stewart Alsop and Charles Bartlett, “In Time of Crisis,” Saturday
Evening Post, 8 December 1962, for which Kennedy was a source [see Michael Beschloss, The
Crisis Years: Kennedy and Khrushchev 1960 –1963 (New York: HarperCollins, 1991), p. 569].
614 S AT U R DAY, O C T O B E R 20, 1962
his microphones, for not even the anodyne vocabulary of an official note-
taker conceals the intensity of the exchanges. McNamara seems even
more emphatic than usual in describing the possible consequences of not
following a blockade and negotiate strategy. Stevenson pleads for such
a strategy even after the President has “sharply rejected” negotiations
about Guantánamo and has declared that the United States will not initi-
ate talks about trading away the IRBMs in Turkey and Italy. Nitze has
“flatly opposed” Stevenson. Dillon has come down hard in saying that
the missiles in Cuba are “not negotiable.” Taylor has intervened time and
again to argue for an air strike and against a blockade, while Rusk has
said categorically that “a sudden air strike had no support in the law or
morality, and, therefore, must be ruled out.”
President Kennedy has emerged from the meeting midway between
the hawks and the doves. He has rejected making any offer to negotiate,
at least for the time being. He has come down in favor of a blockade, now
to be labeled a quarantine. The blockade is to be coupled with a demand
that Khrushchev remove the missiles, with at least an air strike (a nar-
row one, President Kennedy hopes) readied if Khrushchev does not com-
ply. This was the option pressed by Thompson, Dillon, and McCone,
vitally backed by Robert Kennedy. After the meeting McCone followed
up with Robert Kennedy to nail down this outcome. Later in the evening
President Kennedy called to reassure McCone that “he had made up his
mind to pursue the course which I had recommended and he agreed with
the views I expressed in the afternoon meeting.”16
When Taylor returned to the Pentagon, he told the Chiefs, “This was
not one of our better days.” He added that President Kennedy had said,
“I know you and your colleagues are unhappy with the decision, but I
trust that you will support me in this decision.” Taylor said he had
assured the President they would. General Wheeler remarked, “I never
thought I’d live to see the day when I would want to go to war.”17
Associated Press (AP), 286 Berlin, 26, 110–12, 118–19, 134–49, 154n, 156,
Atkinson, Sam, 248–49 355, 469–98
Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), 215 Bohlen on, 185–90, 193–98, 200–206, 219,
and JFK’s budget and tax cuts proposal, 330, 221, 513
343 and briefing of congressional leadership on
on nuclear weapons testing, 82–83, 85, 90, Cuba, 32, 52, 62–63, 72
97–98 call for withdrawal of Western troops from,
Attwood, William, 390 489–91, 573
Ausland, John C., xxxi and call-up of reserve and guard units, 24, 53,
Austria, 131n 73–74, 76, 146–47
Ayub Khan, Mohammed, 155, 177 Cuba press statement and, 42
economy of, 483–84, 488–89
Baker, Bobby, 362, 367 Eisenhower on, 119, 129–31
balanced-budget policy, 340, 370n German unification and, 205–6, 394
Baldwin, Hanson, 153–54 Gromyko and, 361, 471, 489, 491–92, 497,
Ball, George W., xxxi–xxxii, 153n, 155, 205, 573, 581–82, 594
319, 380 JFK and, xxiv, 13, 22, 110–12, 119, 127, 129,
Cuban missile crisis and, 397n, 425–26, 427n, 135, 137–46, 161–62, 183, 185–86,
430, 444, 448, 450–52, 457–61, 463–68, 191–97, 200–207, 219, 221, 265, 335,
512n–13n, 515, 516n, 533–34, 537, 380, 391, 394, 469–98, 532–33, 538–40,
539–40, 542–44, 546–47, 554–56, 560, 581–83, 585, 589–90, 592–93, 598, 609
563, 576, 599, 606, 610, 612 Khrushchev on, 64n, 110–12, 129–30, 147,
on Laos, 178n, 179 183, 185–87, 190, 193–98, 201–6, 219,
on naval blockade of Cuba, 465–66, 515, 265, 394, 411, 439n, 449, 451, 469–72,
542–43, 606, 610, 612 485–86, 489–92, 497, 513, 535, 538n,
on non-Soviet bloc trade with Cuba, 320 539–40, 544, 548, 553, 581, 590, 598,
Barbour, Walworth, xxxii 611n
Barnett, Ross R., Jr., 256 meetings on, 135–49, 459, 469, 472–98
Barnett, Ross R., Sr., xxxii military contingency planning for, 135–41,
and crisis at University of Mississippi, 181, 380, 393n, 469, 471, 476, 486–87
223–27, 229, 232–37, 239–47, 249–52, Norstad and, 127, 135–36, 139n, 143–45,
255–56, 258–59, 266–67, 269–70, 284, 189, 495n
288–91, 295, 300, 303, 305–9, 314–16, political, diplomatic, and psychological impli-
351, 354, 385 cations of, 478, 485–87
JFK’s conversations with, 232–36, 239–47, public opinion on, 477, 483–86
252, 288–90, 306–9, 314–15, 351 Schroeder and, 459, 469, 472–98
JFK-Sorensen conversation and, 237 Soviet harassment of commercial aircraft en
popularity of, 250 route to, 81, 188–89
proposed arrest of, 315–17 Soviet restriction of access to, 62, 470–71,
Batista, Fulgencio, 406 472n, 473–88, 493–94, 497, 535, 541,
Bator, Francis, 599n 544, 582, 593, 609
Bay of Pigs invasion, 178, 198, 200, 251, 257, Soviet War Memorial in, 65–66, 81
274, 442, 573 strategic linkage of Cuba and, xxiv, 22, 84,
prisoners taken in, 364, 381, 383, 453–54 190–93, 197–98, 207, 396, 405, 411–12,
Belgium, 122n 418, 433, 441, 449, 451, 467, 469–70,
Berlin and, 204–5 512–13, 522, 525, 532–35, 539–41, 544,
NATO and, 137–38 548, 552–53, 576–77, 581–85, 587,
Bell, David E., xxxii, 317 589–90, 593–94, 598–99, 609
and JFK’s budget and tax cut proposal, 321n, Taylor’s Far Eastern trip and, 161–62
323–33, 335–51, 368, 369n, 371–77, U-2 reconnaissance flights and, 4, 5n, 6,
499n, 500–507, 509–11 12–13
Bennett, Philip, xx Berlin airlift, 124n, 130n
BERCON/MARCON plans, 135–36, 140 Berlin blockade, 456, 458
Index 617
Bundy, William P. (continued) and Soviet arms shipments to Cuba, 19n, 20,
on nuclear weapons, 160 25–27, 29, 54–56
on South Vietnam, 168–69 on Soviet military personnel in Cuba, 35–36,
Taylor’s Far Eastern trip and, 156n, 160–61, 55–56, 70
167–69 on Soviet submarines, 58
Bunker, Ellsworth, 157 Carver, John A., Jr., 506n
Bureau of Engraving and Printing, 501 Cary, John B., 160–61
Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), 506 Castro, Raul, 531
Bureau of the Budget, 333n, 336, 343–44, Castro Ruz, Fidel, xxxii, 391
346–47, 350–51, 373, 507–8 Bay of Pigs invasion and, 178, 257n,
Burgess, General, 75 364, 381, 383, 453
Burke, Richard, xix and briefing of congressional leadership on
Burma, 172 Cuba, 59, 62–66, 68–69, 71
Bush, Prescott, 152n and call-up of reserve and guard units, 80
Byrd, Harry F., Sr., 133 covert actions against, xx, 391, 428, 454
on JFK’s budget and tax cuts proposal, 321, Cuban missile crisis and, 405, 410, 433–34,
328, 334n, 339, 345, 506n 436, 438, 442–43, 449, 451–52, 467,
512, 515, 531, 536, 544, 548–51, 565,
C1 transport planes, 348 567–69, 590, 598, 606–9, 612
Cambodia, 170–73 Graham on, 114, 116
Laotian relations with, 178 and naval blockade of Cuba, 62, 515, 536,
Taylor’s visit to, 156, 170–72 544, 565, 568
U.S. military aid to, 171 popularity of, 64, 66
Cameron, Ben, 224 and Soviet arms shipments to Cuba, 3, 20
Canada: Soviet support for, 63, 66, 69, 192–93
Cuban missile crisis and, 405 Thompson on, 192–93
Cuban trade with, 60–61 CEA, see Council of Economic Advisers
NATO and, 138 Celebrezze, Anthony J., xxxii, 347
Capehart, Homer, 392 on JFK’s budget and tax cuts proposal, 499n,
Cardona, Miro, 406 502
Caribbean: Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 50, 67n,
and briefing of congressional leadership on 126n, 132, 154–55, 179n, 537n
Cuba, 59, 68 and briefing of congressional leadership on
Cuban aggression in, 22–23, 31 Cuba, 54
Cuban missile crisis and, 442, 538 Cuban missile crisis and, 397, 401n, 414,
Cuba press statement and, 30n, 31–32 420n, 425, 441n, 462, 469, 537n, 560,
Monroe Doctrine and, 29n 597, 602
and Soviet arms shipments to Cuba, 153 Cuba press statement and, 47
Soviet submarines in, 58 journalists and officials investigated by, xxiv,
see also Latin America 134, 154
Carroll, Joseph, 431, 597 on Laos, 176
Carter, Marshall S., xxxii, 126n, 132–33 and leaks of classified information, 154
and briefing of congressional leadership on NPIC of, 395, 397, 401n, 516, 578, 579n,
Cuba, 32, 50, 52n, 54–58, 61, 66–67, 70 603n,
Cuban missile crisis and, 397–98, 401–3, nuclear weapons testing and, 88n
414–15, 419, 424–26, 427n, 429–33, Operation Mongoose and, 428
439–41, 444, 451–52, 456–60, 463, and Soviet arms shipments to Cuba, 3, 20,
465–68 393
on Cuban missile sites, 55, 57, 61, 66–67, 132 U-2 reconnaissance flights and, 3–4, 5n, 14,
Cuba press statement and, 34n, 35–36, 40, 47, 16, 134, 380–81, 394–95, 397, 398n,
50 401n, 403n–4n, 414, 441n, 462, 516, 578,
on naval blockade of Cuba, 466 579n, 597, 603n
on reconnaissance flights over Cuba, 48–50 Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), 555
Index 619
Council of Economic Advisers (CEA), 509 565–66, 568–69, 572, 575–76, 579–81,
and JFK’s budget and tax cuts proposal, 586, 588–93, 595–602, 604–14
321n, 322, 338n–39n, 341, 350, 369 proposed declaration of war against, 514,
Couve de Murville, Maurice, 186, 380, 470, 498 524–25, 532, 534, 536, 541–43, 552,
Cox, Archibald, xxxiii, 133 557, 567, 600
and crisis at University of Mississippi, proposed invasion of, 25–26, 47–48, 62,
315–17 70–72, 391, 395, 408, 413, 416–19, 422,
Crider, William, 286n 424–25, 427–28, 435–39, 442, 445, 449,
crop destruction programs, 165n, 166–69 453, 463, 513–14, 525–27, 529, 532, 535,
Cuba, 154n, 380–84 542, 544–45, 550–53, 557, 566, 573,
Bay of Pigs invasion of, see Bay of Pigs inva- 575, 579, 586, 589–90, 593–94, 609–11
sion refugees from, 31, 54, 414–15, 556, 560
and call-up of reserve and guard units, 24, Soviet arms shipments to, xxiii–xxiv, 3–4, 16,
51–53, 73–81, 110, 150–53, 199, 221 19–52, 54–56, 59, 62–65, 67–68, 70–72,
congressional leadership briefed on, 32–33, 74, 80–81, 83, 149, 153, 156, 207, 320,
50–73 361, 381–82, 391–96, 400–401, 411,
government-in-exile of, 31 415–16, 420n, 440–41, 455, 457, 462,
Guantánamo Bay Naval Base and, see 464, 513, 528, 530, 536, 543–54, 573,
Guantánamo Bay Naval Base 588, 602–3, 606–7, 609, 612
JFK-Smathers conversation on, 382–84 Soviet military personnel in, 35–36, 55–56,
Khrushchev on, 190–92, 197–98, 207–8, 394, 64–66, 69–70, 80, 549, 552, 569, 606–7,
469 609
Latin American and Caribbean aggression of, Spanish rule in, 452n
22–23, 31 strategic linkage of Berlin and, xxiv, 22, 84,
missile sites in, xxiii–xxiv, 3–4, 16, 19–34, 190–93, 197–98, 207, 396, 405, 411–12,
39–40, 42–43, 47–49, 51, 55–57, 61–62, 418, 433, 441, 449, 451, 467, 469–70,
64, 66–67, 69–72, 74, 80, 132, 134, 153, 512–13, 522, 525, 532–35, 539–41, 544,
320, 361–62, 364, 381, 391–95, 548, 552–53, 576–77, 581–85, 587,
397–416, 418–20, 422–23, 428–38, 589–90, 593–94, 598–99, 609
443–52, 455, 460–62, 466–69, 471–72, trade relations of, 60–62, 320
512–20, 524–34, 536–37, 539, 541, 543, Cuban missile crisis, xiii, 120n, 134n, 397–472,
545–50, 552, 555–56, 558–59, 565, 499
568–69, 576–95, 598, 600–606, 608–14 JFK-Schroeder meeting on, 472
naval blockade of, 22, 25, 27, 45, 52, 62, 76, JFK’s meetings with JCS on, 578–99
83–84, 199, 406, 408–10, 416, 437, 450, JFK’s secret recordings and, xviii–xix,
454, 464–66, 513–15, 525, 532–36, xxii–xxiv
540–44, 550, 557, 563–69, 574–77, JFK’s summary of late-night meeting on,
579–80, 582–86, 588, 593, 595–96, 572, 576–77
598–602, 604–14 meetings of advisers on, 397–469, 512–614
photoreconnaissance of, 3, 6, 13, 16, 20, military contingency planning in, 199, 393,
48–50, 67n, 110, 134, 320, 361–62, 364, 395, 406–10, 412–13, 416–25, 427–28,
380–81, 394–95, 397–405, 408–9, 414, 435–38, 442–50, 452–54, 459–64,
419, 420n, 421, 423–24, 427–31, 434, 466–69, 512–16, 520, 522–29, 532–36,
436–37, 443, 446–47, 453, 463–65, 538–41, 544–52, 557–60, 562–69,
516–21, 527, 529–32, 535, 537, 545, 574–76, 579–80, 583–602, 604–14
556, 558–59, 566, 571, 574–75, 578–79, NSC meeting on, 601–14
583, 588, 592, 594–97, 602–3, 606, 611 potential casualties in, 416, 524, 526, 532,
press statement on, 3, 24–52, 71–72, 83, 149 536, 538–39, 547, 550, 566, 569,
proposed air strike against, 395, 407–10, 413, 584–85, 590, 609
416–23, 425, 427–28, 435–39, 442, proposed declaration of national emergency
445–49, 460–61, 463, 466–68, 512–14, in, 524, 536
516, 520, 523–27, 529–30, 532–33, proposed political courses of action in, 405,
535–36, 538, 545–50, 552, 557–59, 412, 415, 422–23, 434, 436–38, 443–45,
Index 621
451–52, 463–64, 466, 512–15, 521–25, French-West German relations and, 121, 218
529–30, 533–39, 542–43, 549, 553–55, NATO and, 119
566–68, 580, 583–84, 586–87, 589, 591, on nuclear weapons, 128n, 215
593–94, 598, 600, 602, 604, 607–8, Democratic Congressional Campaign
610–14 Committee, 379
public opinion and, 412–13, 417, 523–24, Democratic National Committee, 501n
528–29, 539, 548, 555, 558, 561, Democrats, Democratic party, 266, 387
586–87, 611 on Interior Appropriations Bill, 362–63
secrecy concerns in, 413–14, 422–23, 453, and JFK’s budget and tax cuts proposal, 349n
560–61, 571, 576–77, 592 midterm election campaigning of, 321,
Czechoslovakia, 207, 490–91 395–96
Self-employed Pension Bill and, 365–67
Daily Bond Buyer, 325n, 326 and Soviet arms shipments to Cuba, 24
Dale, Bill, 386n Denmark, 131n, 490–91
Dalton, George, xviii–xx Dennison, Robert S., xxxiii, 414n, 446n
Day, J. Edward, xxxiii Department of State Bulletin, 38n–39n
on JFK’s budget and tax cuts proposal, 499n, desalinization projects, 331n
505–6 DIA (Defense Intelligence Agency), 431n, 597
Dean, Arthur H., xxxiii Diem, Ngo Dinh, 166, 172
debt limit, 334 Dillon, C. Douglas, xxxiii
Declaration on Solidarity for the Preservation at budget and tax cut meetings, 321n,
of the Political Integrity of the 323–25, 327–28, 334–40, 344–51,
American States Against International 369–78, 499n, 506, 508–11
Communist Intervention, 37–38 Cuban missile crisis and, 397n, 412–13, 421,
Defense Department, U.S. (DOD), 197, 579 427n, 440, 442, 444–45, 456–57, 512n,
on Berlin, 135, 201 514–15, 536, 538–41, 544–45, 553–54,
and briefing of congressional leadership on 558, 560–67, 599–602, 606, 608–9,
Cuba, 57 613–14
on call-up of reserve and guard units, 74 Cuba press statement and, 34, 37, 39–44
and crisis at University of Mississippi, 293 on naval blockade of Cuba, 514, 565, 567,
Cuban missile crisis and, 414, 422–23, 600–602, 608
427–28, 441n, 450, 521, 525, 528, on Self-employed Pension Bill, 112–14
560–61, 563, 599–600 Dirksen, Everett M., xxxiii, 114n
on foreign aid, 147–48 briefing on Cuba for, 52n, 53, 60, 66
and JFK’s budget and tax cuts proposal, 323, on call-up of reserve and guard units, 53, 73n,
329–30, 332–34, 339, 343–45, 347–49, 76–78, 110
505 on Cuban missile sites, 66
and leaks of classified information, 154 on Cuban trade, 60
and military contingency planning on Cuba, Doar, John, 224–25, 273n
393 Dobrynin, Anatoly, xxxiii
on nuclear weapons for France, 215 Cuban missile crisis and, 455–57, 531,
nuclear weapons testing and, 82, 95n, 98, 553–54
101–2, 105, 109 nuclear weapons negotiations and, 182, 184n,
Taylor’s Far Eastern trip and, 165–66 188, 193, 214
on U-2 reconnaissance flights over Soviet proposed JFK-Khrushchev summit and, 264
Union, 4, 13 RFK’s meeting with, 12, 33–34
Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), 431n, 597 and Soviet arms shipments to Cuba, 34n,
deficit spending, 369, 500 392
de Gaulle, Charles, xxxiii, 216n, 497 on U-2 reconnaissance flights over Soviet
Berlin and, 186–88, 195–96, 205 Union, 11–12, 15
Common Market and, 131n DOD, see Defense Department, U.S.
Cuban missile crisis and, 421, 443–44 Dolan, Joseph P., 258, 281
Eisenhower on, 119, 125, 128–29 Dominican Republic, 68
622 INDEX
DOMINIC nuclear test series, 82–83, 85–110, Little Rock crisis and, 226n, 237, 250
360, 364 midterm election campaigning of, 369
Donovan, James B., 178, 364, 381, 383, 453n on nuclear weapons, 123, 128, 130, 613n
Douglas, Paul H., 53, 113n, 349, 351, 355, 365n on relief of Norstad, 122, 124, 126–27
Douglass, Frederick, 82 secret recordings by, xii–xiii
Dowling, Walter C., xxxiii, 470n on Soviet arms shipments to Cuba, 396
Dresser Industries, 341n on Taylor, 122–24, 126
Drummond, Nelson Cornelius, 230–32 U-2 reconnaissance flights and, 4, 6n, 398n,
Dryfoos, Orvil, 153–54 548n
Duke, Angie Biddle, 17 on West German defense budget, 120–21,
Dulles, Allen, 274 125–26
Dulles, John Foster, 126 West German trip of, 112, 118–26, 131
Duncan, John P., xxxiii employment, and JFK’s budget and tax cuts
Dungan, Ralph A., 319, 380 proposal, 321–22, 504–5
Duvalier, François, xxxiii, 68 Erhard, Ludwig, 120
Ervin, Samuel J., Jr., 384
East Coast Railway, 386n Escalante, Anibal, 66n
Eastland, James O., xxxiii Europe:
economy, economics: conventional ground force buildup in, 119,
of Berlin, 483–84, 488–89 121, 125, 145
Interior Appropriations Bill and, 362–64, Taylor’s Far East trip and, 160–62
379, 386–87 European Advisory Council, 130
international gold reserves and, xxiv, 155 European Atomic Energy Commission
and JFK’s budget and tax cuts proposal, 317, (EURATOM), 121n–22n
321–51, 355–56, 365–66, 368–78, European Economic Community, see Common
499–511 Market
Self-employed Pension Bill and, 111–14, European Free Trade Association (EFTA),
365–68, 382–83, 387–88 131n
Ecuador, 115n, 543 Evers, Medgar, 223
education, 331, 337, 372, 375–76 Executive Committee (Excom), 601n
EFTA (European Free Trade Association), Exner, Judith, xix
131n Experiment in International Living program,
Egypt, 43, 545n, 581, 589 82
Eighth Army, U.S., 162
Eisenhower, Dwight D., xxxiii, 151n, 332n F4H fighters, 330
Adenauer’s meeting with, 112, 118–19, F8U reconnaissance planes, 403n
121–26, 131–32, 143–44 F-84 fighter-bombers, 78–79
on Berlin, 119, 129–31 F-101 reconnaissance planes, 49–50, 403n
on budget, 369–70, 504 Fair Deal, 362
on conventional ground forces in Europe, Falkner, Murry, 302, 310
121 Far East, Taylor’s trip to, 155–76
Cuban missile crisis and, 406, 426, 460, 469, Farley, Jim, 501
514, 535–36 Faubus, Orval, 226n
on Cuban missile sites, 132 Faulkner, William, 302
on de Gaulle, 119, 125, 128–29 Fawcett, Stephanie, xxi
and Dutch-Indonesian dispute over West Fechter, Peter, 65n
Irian, 157 Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), 331
on French-West German relations, 121, 125, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), 142, 266,
131 360
JFK’s meeting with, 111–12, 114–16, and crisis at University of Mississippi,
118–33, 143–44 270–73, 276, 278n, 307
JFK-Sorensen conversation and, 237 Drummond spy case and, 230
on Latin America, 116 Feldman, Myer, xxxiii
Index 623
Cuban missile crisis and, 411, 525, 532, 539, on nuclear weapons for France, 215
567–68, 600, 604, 609, 612–13 on Soviet arms shipments to Cuba, 382
Izvestia, 81, 264n Taylor’s appointment to chairmanship of,
119, 122, 123n, 156
Jackson, Henry “Scoop,” 182n Taylor’s Far Eastern trip and, 159–61, 165
on nuclear weapons for France, 215, 217–20 Joint Committee on Armed Services and
Jackson State University, 223 Foreign Relations, 151
JAEIC (Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Joint Committee on Reduction of Federal
Committee), 217n, 401, 579n Expenditures, 328n
Japan: Joint Economic Committee, 349n, 351
Cuban missile crisis and, 411 Joint Reconnaissance Group (JRG), 597
Pearl Harbor attack and, 515, 523, 539, Jordan report, 22
545–46, 607 Joseph P. Kennedy, Jr., USS, 155
Taylor’s visit to, 156, 163–64 Judd, Walter H., 378
and U-2 reconnaissance flights over Soviet Justice Department, U.S., xviii
Union, 9 and crisis at University of Mississippi,
Javits, Jacob, 381 223–24, 246, 247n, 249, 251–52, 253n,
JCS, see Joint Chiefs of Staff 258n, 273n, 276n–77n, 280n–81n, 298n,
John F. Kennedy Presidential Library, xix–xxii 299, 301n–4n, 310n, 313
Johnson, Lyndon B., xxxiv, 367n, 371n Cuba press statement and, 41
and briefing of congressional leadership on and JFK’s budget and tax cuts proposal, 331
Cuba, 52 Tax Division of, 281n
Cuban missile crisis and, 397n, 415–16, 427,
454 Kahn, Herman, xviii
economic policy of, 321n–22n Kaiser, Edgar, 325n
JFK’s assassination and, xviii Kaiser Steel Company, 325–27
and JFK’s budget and tax cuts proposal, 500 Kamchatka, nuclear weapons negotiations and,
secret recordings by, xii–xiii 212–13
on Soviet arms shipments to Cuba, 415–16 Katzenbach, Nicholas deB., xxxv
Johnson, Paul, 224–25, 243, 246 and crisis at University of Mississippi,
Johnson, U. Alexis, xxxiv–xxxv 251–52, 261–63, 265, 267–69, 276n,
on Berlin, 534–35 277, 279–81, 286–87, 291–93, 297–98,
Cuban missile crisis and, 397n, 413, 427n, 390
430, 444, 449, 451, 457, 461, 512n–13n, on racial composition of troops at University
533–35, 538–40, 542, 544, 547–48, 551, of Mississippi, 390
558, 564–67, 570, 576, 599n Kaysen, Carl, xxxv, xxxviii, 155, 319
on naval blockade of Cuba, 534–35, 540, 542, Cuba press statement and, 34n, 40
544, 565–66, 599n on Laos, 176
on South Vietnam and Cambodia, 171–73 on non-Soviet bloc trade with Cuba, 320
Taylor’s Far Eastern trip and, 156n, 171–74 on nuclear weapons testing, 82n, 89–90, 92,
Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee 96, 99, 101
(JAEIC), 217n, 401, 579n on South Vietnam, 176
Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), 126, 143, 319, 460 Taylor’s Far Eastern trip and, 156n
on Berlin, 135 Kearsage, USS, 360
Cuban missile crisis and, 407, 420n, 425, 428, Keating, Kenneth:
435–37, 440, 445, 448–49, 463, 512–13, Cuban missile crisis and, 414–15, 421, 556,
516, 526, 528, 530, 578–99, 605–6, 608, 560
614 on Soviet arms shipments to Cuba, 3, 20,
JFK’s meetings with, 578–99 391–92, 396
in military contingency planning on Cuba, Keeny, Spurgeon, xxxv
393n, 395 Kefauver, Estes, 386
on naval blockade of Cuba, 513, 579, 585, Kennedy, Caroline, 397
588, 593, 595, 598 Kennedy, Edward M., xix–xx
Index 627
Kennedy, Jacqueline, xix, 142n, 155, 177, 232, on German unification, 205
263–65 Gore’s conversation with, 365–68
Kennedy, John F.: Graham’s meeting with, 114–18
on ABM system, 108–9 Gromyko’s meeting with, 572–73, 576, 594
Abrams’s conversation with, 312–13 on Guantánamo Bay Naval Base, 47, 50,
assassination of, xviii, xxii 57–58, 80
Barnett’s conversations with, 232–36, on Hallstein Doctrine, 190
239–47, 252, 288–90, 306–9, 314–15, illnesses of, 360
351 Indonesia and, 157, 174–76
Berlin and, xxiv, 13, 22, 110–12, 119, 127, on Interior Appropriations Bill, 362–63,
129, 135, 137–46, 161–62, 183, 185–86, 386–87
191–97, 200–207, 219, 221, 265, 335, invited to summit by Khrushchev, 263–65
380, 391, 394, 469–98, 532–33, 538–40, on Japan, 163–64
581–83, 585, 589–90, 592–93, 598, 609 JCS meetings of, 578–99
Billings’s conversation with, 238–39 Keogh’s conversation with, 388
and briefing of congressional leadership on Kirwan’s conversation with, 379–80
Cuba, 32–33, 50, 52n, 53–54, 56–57, 59, on Laos, 176, 178–81
61–64, 67–72 late-night meeting summarized by, 572,
on budget and tax cuts, 317, 321–51, 355–56, 576–77
365–66, 368–78, 499–511 on Latin America, 116
on buildup of conventional forces in Europe, on leaks of classified information, 153–54
145 McCormack’s conversations with, 150–52,
on call-up of reserve and guard units, 51–52, 357–59
73–76, 78, 80–81, 146–47, 150–53, 199 MacDonald’s conversation with, 247–49
on Cambodia, 171–72 Mansfield’s conversations with, 362–64,
on China, 160–61, 163 378–80
on Common Market, 132 midterm election campaigning of, 155, 178,
Congress’s relations with, 319–20 182–83, 321, 361–62, 369, 376n, 383n,
Cox’s conversation with, 316–17 390, 395–96, 499, 560–62, 577–78, 599
and crisis at University of Mississippi, xxiv, on military aid, 163–64, 171, 343
222–23, 225–30, 232–47, 249–58, on missiles in Far East, 158
260–82, 284–88, 290–93, 295, 297–98, on missiles in Turkey, 63–64
301–2, 305–10, 312–19, 351–57, Morgan’s conversation with, 150–52
383–85, 388–90, 579 on NATO, 118–19, 125, 129, 137–40, 144
and Cuban aggression in Latin America, 23, on naval blockade of Cuba, 22, 45, 62, 83–84,
31 533–34, 541–43, 557, 574–77, 579,
Cuban missile crisis and, xxiii–xxiv, 582–83, 593, 598, 601, 605–6, 609–12,
397–400, 402–4, 406–10, 412–27, 614
429–31, 433–36, 438–61, 469–72, on Norstad, 124, 126–28, 130
512–15, 517–21, 523, 525–43, 545–53, on nuclear weapons, 12–13, 82–83, 85–109,
555–64, 571–614 119, 124, 128–30, 135, 140–42, 144,
on Cuban missile sites, 3, 47–48, 61–62, 67, 160–62, 182–85, 188, 198, 207–11,
69, 71–72, 134 213–21, 218–19, 364, 485, 487, 489, 492,
on Cuban trade, 61–62, 320 495, 497, 573, 612, 613n
Cuba press statement and, 24–26, 28–48, O’Brien’s conversation with, 357, 359–60
50–52, 71–72, 83, 149 O’Donnell’s conversation with, 351–52,
on Drummond spy case, 231–32 354–55
Eisenhower’s meeting with, 111–12, 114–16, on proposed invasion of Cuba, 47–48, 62,
118–33, 143–44 70–72, 391
on foreign aid, 111, 147–48, 159n, 320, on racial composition of troops at University
356–60, 364, 378 of Mississippi, 388–90
on French-West German relations, 125, 129, and reconnaissance flights over Cuba, 16,
494–97 48–50, 134, 364, 380–81, 395
628 INDEX
JFK’s conversation with, 357, 359–60 380–81, 394–95, 397–405, 408–9, 414,
occupational safety legislation, 372–73 419, 420n, 421, 423–24, 427–31, 434,
O’Donnell, Kenneth, xxxvii, 153n 436–37, 443, 446–47, 453, 463–65,
and briefing of congressional leadership on 516–21, 527, 529–32, 535, 537, 545,
Cuba, 52n 556, 558–59, 566, 571, 574–75, 578–79,
at budget and tax cut meetings, 368 583, 588, 592, 594–97, 602–3, 606, 611
and crisis at University of Mississippi, 251n, see also U-2 reconnaissance flights
253–54, 257, 268, 282–85, 287–88, 291, Pigott, Paul, 425n–26n, 426
293–94, 299–300, 302–3, 351–52, Pittman, Steuart, xxxvii
354–55 Plumley, H. Ladd, 341
Drummond spy case and, 232 Point Reyes seashore, 149
JFK’s conversation with, 351–52, 354–55 Poland, 206–7
JFK’s secret recordings and, xviii Berlin and, 490–91
on Soviet arms shipments to Cuba, 396 Policy Planning Council, 368
Office of Emergency Planning, 354n Poltava, 603
Office of Legal Counsel, 249 Portugal, 60, 82
Okinawa, 411 Post Office, U.S., 505–6
Okun, Arthur, xxxvii, 321n Powers, Dave, xviii–xix
Okun’s law, 321n Powers, Francis Gary, 4, 6n, 364, 395, 398n
Old Age Survivors Insurance, 505 Prado y Ugarteche, Manuel, xxxvii
Operation Mongoose, 391, 428 “Preferred Sequence of Military Actions in the
Operation STORAX, 91n Berlin Conflict,” 135
Organization of American States (OAS), 23n, President’s Committee to Appraise
63, 65 Employment and Unemployment
and briefing of congressional leadership on Statistics, 178
Cuba, 59, 67–68 President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory
Cuban missile crisis and, 405, 412, 415, 422, Board (PFIAB), 153
542–43, 566–67, 600 press, 125
Cuba press statement and, 30n and Bay of Pigs prisoners, 381
and naval blockade of Cuba, 542–43, 600 Berlin and, 111, 394, 469
Ormsby-Gore, Sir David, xxxvii, 145, 155 and call-up of reserve and guard units, 74,
80–81, 152n
Pace, Frank, Jr., 342 CIA investigation of, xxiv, 134, 154
Pakistan, 64, 170, 177n, 535 and crisis at University of Mississippi,
Panofsky, Wolfgang, 97 250–51, 286, 298–99, 303, 305, 352, 354
Paraguay, 115n on Cuba, 394, 396, 411, 414, 424, 438–39,
Paris Summit, 183, 548 441, 456–58, 547, 556, 558, 561, 571,
Passman, Otto, 357–60 576, 592, 611
Pathet Lao, 179 on French-West German relations, 494
“Pay Bill,” 329, 333, 339, 344, 506–7 and JFK’s budget and tax cuts proposal,
Peace Corps, 371 349–51, 506, 510
Pearl Harbor attack, 515, 523, 539, 545–46, 607 and leaks of classified information, 153–54
Pearson, Drew, 383, 386 on proposed JFK-Khrushchev summit,
Penkovsky, Oleg, 395, 432n, 578 263–65
Penney, Sir William, 208–9 on racial composition of troops at University
Pentagon, see Defense Department, U.S. of Mississippi, 389n
Pérez Godoy, Ricardo Pío, xxxvii on Self-employed Pension Bill, 383
Peru, 115n and Soviet arms shipments to Cuba, 3, 20,
PFIAB (President’s Foreign Intelligence 24–52, 71–72, 83, 149, 391
Advisory Board), 153 on U.S.-West German relations, 470
photoreconnaissance of Cuba, 3, 6, 13, 16, 20, on U-2 reconnaissance flights over Soviet
48–50, 67n, 110, 134, 320, 361–62, 364, Union, 11, 13–15, 81
636 INDEX
Hungary invaded by, 72, 208, 411, 545, 549, Cuban missile crisis and, 407, 417, 422,
554, 581, 589 427–28, 441n, 450, 454, 461–63, 468,
Indonesian relations with, 157, 174–75 514, 533, 563, 572, 575, 599–600, 611n
JFK-Schroeder meeting on, 472–93, 498 Cuba press statement and, 3
JFK’s meeting with Soviet experts on, and JFK’s budget and tax cuts proposal, 371,
182–221 503, 505, 508
Laos and, 178, 180, 202, 458 in military contingency planning on Cuba,
leaks of classified information on, 154 393
military presence of, in Cuba, 35–36, 55–56, on naval blockade of Cuba, 599–600
64–66, 69–70, 80, 549, 552, 569, 606–7, on nuclear weapons for France, 215, 217
609 and Soviet arms shipments to Cuba, 20–21,
and naval blockade of Cuba, 22, 62, 84, 450, 396
532, 534–35, 540, 543–44, 564–65, 567, on Soviet military personnel in Cuba, 70
575, 577, 584, 602, 606–10 Taylor’s Far Eastern trip and, 165–66
nuclear weapons negotiations and, 12–13, 83, on U-2 reconnaissance flights over Soviet
182–85, 188, 193, 198, 207–14, 492, 497 Union, 3–4, 9, 13n, 14
nuclear weapons testing of, 82, 85–89, 91n, State Department Bulletin, 415
93–94, 101–2, 103n, 104, 106–7, 398n State Mutual Life Assurance Company of
public opinion in, 197 America, 341n
and reconnaissance flights over Cuba, 395 steel industry, 325–27, 349n
space program of, 86n, 108, 451n Stennis, John, 229
Taylor on, 157 Stevenson, Adlai E., xxxi–xxxii, xxxix, 82
and U.S. nuclear aid for France, 217, 220–21 Cuban missile crisis and, 428, 512, 553, 604n,
U-2 reconnaissance flights over, 3–16, 19–20, 610, 613
81, 88n, 134, 364, 395, 398–99, 548 on naval blockade of Cuba, 610
see also U.S.-Soviet relations on Soviet arms shipments to Cuba, 392
soybeans, 371 Stikker, Dirk, 205
Spaak, Paul-Henri, 216n Stimson, Henry, xxxii
space, space program, 508n stock market, 326–27, 349n, 350
JFK and, 83, 86–87, 93, 96, 103–5, 149, STORAX, Operation, 91n
329–30, 333–34, 336, 343, 347–49, 505 Strategic Air Command (SAC), 129, 394, 579
military use of, 105 Cuban missile crisis and, 401, 414, 428, 438
moon landing in, 149 and U-2 reconnaissance flights over Soviet
nuclear weapons testing and, 83, 86–87, Union, 5n
93–96, 102–8, 110, 360 Strauss, Franz Josef, 120, 493–95, 497
Spain, 452n, 610 Strong, Robert C., xxxix
Spanish-American War, 452n Subandrio, 174–75
Sparkman, John, 52n submarines, 590
Special Group, 16 and briefing of congressional leadership on
Special Group-Augmented, 454 Cuba, 58
Special National Intelligence Estimates Cuban missile crisis and, 409, 450, 534, 538,
(SNIEs), 393, 440n, 441, 537n, 604 594
Sproul, Alan, xxxviii Polaris missile-firing, 215, 330, 538, 613
Sputnik, 451n Skipjack nuclear, 215–17, 220n
Staats, Elmer B., xxxviii, 317 Suez crisis, 72, 411, 434–35, 522, 545n, 581
at budget and tax cut meetings, 321n, Sukarno, Achmed, 156–57, 174
322–23, 325–27, 330, 332–33, 337, 346, Sullivan, William H., xxxix
369n, 371, 376–77 on Indonesia, 174
Stalin, Joseph, 131, 187, 555 Taylor’s Far Eastern trip and, 156n, 164
STARFISH test, 83, 97, 98n, 105 supersonic jet transports, 331–32
State Department, U.S., 144n, 368, 460–63, Supplemental Appropriations Bill, 387
576n Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
on Berlin, 135, 189, 190n, 194n, 204 (SACEUR), 119–20, 122n, 127n
640 INDEX
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe on naval blockade of Cuba, 534, 544, 565–66,
(SACEUR) (continued) 579–80, 588, 600, 606, 608
on Berlin, 135–36, 139n Teague, Olin E. “Tiger,” 373–74
Cuban missile crisis and, 421 Texas Christian University (TCU), 255–56
Supreme Court, U.S., 224 Thailand:
Goldberg’s swearing in at, 315, 316n, 317 Cambodian relations with, 170n, 171–72
Sweden, 131n Laotian relations with, 178, 181
Sweeney, Walter C., xxxix military aid to, 163, 171
Cuban missile crisis and, 446–47, 463, 558 Taylor’s visit to, 156, 170–74
Switzerland, 131n Thant, U, xxxix, 149, 172, 411
Syria, 43 Thirteen Days (R. Kennedy), xviii–xix
Thompson, Llewellyn E., Jr., xxxix, 51n,
Taber, John, xxxix 191–94, 207–8, 576n
Tactical Air Command (TAC), 428, 446n on Berlin, 187–90, 193–98, 200, 202–4, 206,
Taiwan (Nationalist China), 72, 458n 219, 491n, 513, 535, 540, 544, 548, 552
China’s threats to invade, 591n Cuban missile crisis and, 422, 428, 459,
military aid to, 163 461–62, 468–69, 512n, 513–14, 515n,
Taylor on, 158–59, 164 531–38, 540, 543–45, 547–50, 552–54,
and U-2 reconnaissance flights over China, 561, 563, 565–66, 568–70, 572–75,
16, 110, 134, 395 600–602, 610, 614
Talbot, Phillips, xxxix on German unification, 205–6
Tarawa, battle of, 579 Khrushchev and, 182–83, 187, 189n, 191n,
Task Force Alpha, 254n, 262n, 267n, 279n, 282n, 193–94, 196–97, 203–5, 207, 513, 553
284n, 287n, 293, 296n, 298, 305n, 310, on naval blockade of Cuba, 514, 532–36, 550,
312 565, 568, 574, 600–602, 610
TASS statement, 191n on nuclear weapons for France, 216
Cuban missile crisis and, 411, 439, 441, nuclear weapons negotiations and, 182–83,
457–58, 547 185, 193, 213–14
Tax Cut bill, 321n on Soviet Union, 198, 531–35, 540, 543, 548,
taxes: 552–53, 575
JFK’s proposal on, 317, 321–51, 355–56, on U-2 reconnaissance flights over Soviet
365–66, 368–78, 499–511 Union, 11
meetings on, 321–51, 369–78 Thompson, William “Bill,” 386
Self-employed Pension Bill and, 112–13, Thorneycroft, Peter, 142n, 145–46
365–66 Thuan, Nguyen Dinh, 155, 165n
Taylor, Maxwell D., xxxix, 181, 380 THUMBELINA nuclear device test, 96,
Cuban missile crisis and, 397n, 400, 407–10, 99–100, 105, 109, 110n
413–14, 417–20, 424, 426–27, 429, 433, TIGHTROPE test, 110n
435–37, 439–50, 452–53, 458–59, 469, Tobin, James, xxxix, 341n
512n, 513–14, 516, 520, 527–30, 533–34, Tolstoy, Leo, 394
536–37, 540–41, 544–47, 550–52, trade:
554–56, 558–60, 564–66, 568–71, 576, Berlin and, 483–84
578n, 579–80, 582–83, 585, 588–97, of Cuba, 60–62, 320
599–601, 605–8, 610, 612–14 Trade Bill, 390
Cuba press statement and, 34n Trading with the Enemy Act, 60
Eisenhower on, 122–24, 126 Treasury Department, U.S.:
Far Eastern trip of, 155–76 and JFK’s budget and tax cuts proposal, 328,
JCS chairmanship appointment of, 119, 122, 336, 344, 346, 350, 369
123n, 156 on Self-employed Pension Bill, 113, 365
JCS chairmanship swearing in of, 319 Tretick, Stanley, xxxix
JFK and, 119, 124, 155–76, 347 Troutman, Robert, xxxix
on Laos, 178n, 179 Truman, Harry S., xxxii, 120, 127–28
Index 641