Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Final Paper Good 320
Final Paper Good 320
Final Paper Good 320
Adam Throne
June 1, 2018
2
Introduction
repression and police corruption under the Ben Ali regime in Tunisia. With the assistance of
social media, this sparked peaceful protests throughout Tunisia. Soon later, other Middle East
populations with similar grievances also took to the streets in what is now referred to as the Arab
Spring. Many of these peaceful revolts are still in progress, or their outcomes are yet to be
determined. For example, civil war continues to divide Syria. Despite its longevity and failures
though, this period marked a key turning point in the understanding of authoritarianism and
Tunisia and Egypt are comparable cases, because they are two of the prominent nations
in which the coercive apparatus failed the regime. January 14, 2011 Zine El Abidine Ben Ali of
Tunisia stepped down from his 24-year presidency after it became clear that his police force
could no longer protect him. Ben Ali relied primarily on counterbalancing to prevent a military
coup during his rule. By favoring the police force and marginalizing the military, Ben Ali lost the
support of military leaders and operatives (Nassif 2015, 270). Additionally, the cross-culture
critical mass involved in the protests included family-members and close friends of the military.
Ben Ali’s top officers elected to defect by defending protestors from the police rather than
protecting the regime (Nassif 2015, 245). February 11, 2011 Hosni Mubarak of Egypt resigned
as president and transferred his power to the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces. Mubarak
focused his coup-proofing strategy on appeasing upper echelon officers in the military. His
tactics included supporting a military economy, placing officers in positions of power and wealth
after retirement, and providing officers with advanced technology (Nassif 2015, 262). This
proved successful, because Mubarak was able to maintain power for 30 years before the Arab
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Spring. However, Mubarak’s tactics failed to protect him from a critical mass, because lower-
level officers and individual soldiers did not receive the same luxuries (Nassif 2015, 266).
Recognizing that their power would be delegitimized if they ordered the army to fire on
protestors, the generals were forced to remain barracked. As a result, by the end of 2011, the
people of both Tunisia and Egypt had toppled their respective regimes and started the process of
consolidating democracy.
Nearly a decade later, it is clear that Tunisia has succeeded in consolidating democracy
and that Egypt failed in consolidating democracy. Tunisia has a ratified constitution, runs fair
elections, has experienced a transition of power across party lines, and has made progress in
human rights. The Supreme Judicial Council is a newly established independent body for
checking the power of the government (Human Rights Watch 2017). A robust investment code
attracts Foreign Direct Investment from other established democracies (US Department of State
2015). A proposed gender parity law aims to ensure greater female representation in local
politics (Human Rights Watch 2017). Only continued economic corruption and the emergency
response to terrorism threaten the success of democracy (Masmoudi 2018, 150). In 2017,
Freedom House, known as the global watchdog of democracy, gave Tunisia an aggregate
freedom score of 78/100. This is fairly close to America’s 89/100 or Brazil’s 79/100 (Freedom
House 2017).
In contrast, following a 2014 coup by Commander Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, Egypt has
returned to authoritarianism. Liberal, foreign, and Islamist activists each face criminal
restrictions (Freedom House 2017). Terrorism rates have grown substantially as Islamists have
been pressured to radicalize (IEP 2017). The government uses aggressive and abusive
intelligence tactics to combat this radicalism (Dworkin 2017). On the same aggregate freedom
4
scale, Egypt received a score of 26/100 (Freedom House 2017). Despite experiencing similar
success in critical mass protests in 2011, each of these nations diverged significantly during the
process of democratic consolidation. What political factors contributed to this outcome, and how
might this case study be applicable to future cases of consolidation in the Middle East?
I argue that cultural differences between the Ennahda Party in Tunisia and Muslim
Brotherhood Party in Egypt significantly impact relationships with other key political actors
including voting citizens, other political parties, and the military. Ultimately, when applied in
context with key structural characteristics of each nation, these differences severely impacted the
ability of each nation to consolidate democracy following transition from authoritarianism. The
outcomes of this study can be used to evaluate the culture of Islamic groups in Middle Eastern
nations currently undergoing transition and predict whether democracies will consolidate.
For any comparative study of Tunisia and Egypt, it is important to consider underlying
structural differences. Many of the following structural theories are intertwined or associated.
Any number of these explanations can be used to better understand the dynamics involved in the
developing the framework that political interactions took place in following the Arab Spring.
Some scholars argue that historical factors establish the potential for democracy to
consolidate in a nation long before transition from a regime. In Northeast Africa, colonial
independence movements served as differing precedents for post-Arab Spring power transitions
in Tunisia and Egypt (Hamid 2014, 192). Tunisia’s relatively short-lived independence from
France served as a model of political cooperation for future leaders. In 1954, soon after Tunisian
resistance began attacking French colonial outposts, France instituted a complete withdrawal
5
policy in order to move 400,000 additional soldiers to a more violent revolution in Algeria.
Through diplomatic relationships and fair elections, Habib Bourguiba was able to defeat his
Islamist rival Ben Youssef, ensure complete independence from France, and lead a peaceful
transition to a republic (Clayton 2014, 93). He then proceeded to work tirelessly to westernize
Tunisia and its culture (Hamid 2014, 193). Today, France and Tunisia maintain significant
economic and cultural relations. Negotiation, political resolution, and incorporation proved to be
more successful than violence and political isolation experienced in other revolutions. In 2011,
political actors unsure of how to govern a new democratic system may have looked to the
decisions of their founding figures for guidance on political transition. In Tunisia, there was
On the other hand, the extended and violent revolution between Egypt and Great Britain
a violent uprising against the British occupation of Egypt and the Sudan (Botman 1991, 55).
Recognizing their dwindling position at the hands of a new liberal society developing its own
national identity, the British removed their protectorate but continued to control key elements of
society. Egypt was able to rule itself under a parliamentary monarchy, but the British maintained
strategic and commercial dominance. In 1952 though, a new movement led by Nasser used
military strength and Soviet backing to overthrow King Farouk and end British occupation
(Birmingham 2008, 8). The prominence of coups and assassinations throughout the latter half of
the 20th century shows that this standard of violence continued to influence politics. It is likely
that el-Sisi also considered his military predecessors when deciding whether or not to overthrow
President Morsi. Therefore, it is unsurprising that el-Sisi decided to initiate a coup. Critics of this
argument would claim that global politics have shifted significantly over the past 50 years and
6
that more modern political movements have greater impacts on current interactions (Houssi et al.
2016 and others). This may be the case, but this early divergence cannot be overlooked in its
entirety. At a minimum, each society looks at its patriots from decolonization as role-models for
modern leadership.
The geography of each nation also plays a significant role in determining the potential for
democracy to consolidate. Tunisia’s isolation from conflict and close proximity to European
nations promotes civil development and the spread of democratic ideals. Beyond deployment
through United Nations peacekeeping operations, the Tunisian Military has only been directly
involved in the 2011 Battle of Wazzin and ongoing counter-terror operations (United Nations
Peacekeeping). According to World Bank, the Tunisian military had only 47,800 active
personnel in 2016 (International Institute for Strategic Studies). As a result, Tunisia is able to
focus development more on domestic aspects that make it suited for harboring democracy than
Tunisia’s beaches are once again becoming popular European tourist destinations after recent
terror attacks (Monk 2017). It is common for Tunisian scholars to live or work in Europe. These
relationships encourage the circulation of non-Muslim and Western ideology. Given the urban
population distribution of Tunisia, the benefits and particularities of democracy are accordingly
In contrast, Egypt’s possession of the Suez Canal, border with Israel, and vast size in
throughout the nation. Since gaining independence, Egypt’s military has been involved in over
15 international conflicts. The nation in 2016 had 835,500 active military personnel
(International Institute for Security Studies). Due to its strategic position, the United States has
7
offered the nation’s military 1.6 billion dollars each year since 1979 to maintain order in the
Middle East (Najjar 2017). Unlike in Tunisia where much of the nation is urban, a vast amount
of Egypt is classified as rural. It is difficult for a regime or any political actor to monitor
ideologies when individuals are not confined to densely populated areas. This naturally promotes
polarization and enables radical movements. Without access to foreign ideology, many
individuals facing oppression tend to radicalize rather than democratize. This structural
polarization and elevated military status may be reasons why the fate of democracy in Egypt was
Varying education systems also impact the potential for consolidation to occur. A
prominent theory of democracy is that education is essential for consolidation, because voters
must be able to make their own self-guided decisions on candidate viewpoints. Overall, Tunisia
has a much stronger education system than Egypt does. In 2015, 74.2% of Tunisian women and
89.6% of Tunisian men over the age of 15 could read and write. In Egypt, only 65.4% of women
and 82.2% of men over the age of 15 could read and write. The school life expectancy in Tunisia
is 15 years compared to 13 years in Egypt. In 2012, Tunisia spent 6.3% of its GDP on public
education while Egypt only spent 3.8% of its GDP on public education (CIA World Factbook).
According to Human Development Reports, Tunisia had an education index of .621 in 2011. In
the same year, Egypt only had an index of .573 (United Nations). These structural education
differences suggest that individual voters in Tunisia are better equipped to interpret and
understand political doctrine related to elections than Egyptian voters are. Additionally, although
Tunisia also has a larger and more developed university system than Egypt does, the diversity of
religion in higher education within Egypt also contributes to polarization (Ranking Web of
Universities 2017). Western universities, including the American University in Cairo, promote
8
liberal ideology. Public Universities, many of which have roots with the Muslim Brotherhood,
promote conservative Islam. If education is polarized within a nation, then political identities
Finally, more specific to this case study, the timeline of the 2011 revolutions themselves
played a significant role in determining the potential for democratization in each nation.
Although party-leaders and NGOs in Tunisia had prepared for democratization years before the
Arab Spring began, they did have the element of surprise on their side. For decades, it had
seemed that there was an undeniable Middle East exception to the global trends in
democratization. The ideological, self-interest, and security elements of regimes had prevented
major uprisings from occurring. When the Tunisian uprising occurred, Ben Ali did not have a
well-developed exit strategy in place. He fled via plane without a destination in mind, attempted
to land in France before being turned away, and finally found asylum in Saudi Arabia (Middle
East Eye 2017). He was forced to turn power over directly to a council of citizens. Consequently,
the Mubarak regime was able to see what had happened in Tunisia and plan accordingly. The
president’s relationship with el-Sisi and the decision to pass power to SCAF rather than a
citizen’s coalition are signs of a larger grand strategy. Gadaffi was able to make calculated
moves to guarantee the continuation of power by his close friends in the military, ensure his
eventual return to Cairo, and ultimately prevent democracy from consolidating. By not being
caught off guard, Egypt was able to prepare a long-term strategy for limiting democracy and
In sum, there was a clear structural divergence between Egypt and Tunisia by the time the
Arab Spring succeeded in overthrowing regimes in 2011. Tunisia’s political structure was
and expertise on consolidating democracy. NGOs earned Nobel Peace Prizes for working
directly with populations to promote the liberal ideals of democracy among all classifications of
the nation. Strong education ensured that people were well aware of social issues and dynamics
(Stepan 2018, 43). Egypt presented a greater challenge. Socioeconomic and ideological
polarization divided the population. Rising extremism challenged the nation’s security and
political interests. An entitled military with a history of involvement in politics was assigned to
oversee the transition to democracy. Nevertheless, although these explanations differentiate the
nations, they do not provide a causal mechanism for the success or failure of democratic
consolidation. I believe that these structural differences are important but serve only as the
foundation for the interactions between governing parties and other political actors following
successful Arab Spring revolutions. Influenced by these structural factors, Islamist Parties in
Egypt and Tunisia diverged significantly despite having similar initial goals. This ultimately
caused them to take very different approaches to consolidation which proved to be successful in
Prior to studying specific Islamist political parties in Egypt and Tunisia, it is essential to
understand how these fairly radical groups have so much influence in Middle Eastern politics.
Whether American policymakers like it or not, Islamist groups are permanent actors of Middle
East politics. Limiting their development as political parties will only encourage radicalization
and isolation. The following explanation is derived from Tunisia and Egypt, but similar patterns
To start, as the ideological promises made by regimes dissolve, individuals are left
ideological subordination (Quinlivan 2000). Arab-socialism used the promise of future economic
gains to convince citizens that their lifestyles would eventually improve if they supported the
regime (Khadduri 1970). Pan-Arabism used the historic legacy of the Ottoman Empire to
convince individuals that the regime would work towards creating a great cross-national Arabic
society (Ajami 1978). Rally around the flag tactics and religious war tactics garner temporary
support and excuse poor economic output. However, in each of these strategies, promises lose
support over time if there are not significant results to credit them. In addition to hurting support
for the regime, the failure of these ideological promises caused individuals to search for a
However, in order to prevent uprisings and quell the spread of revolutionary ideas,
another key part of the Middle East regime’s strategy is counter-intelligence and policing of all
social environments. The severity of this strategy differs by nation, but for the most part
organized ideas impartial to the regime are limited. Mosques become the only places in which
open communication is allowed under authoritarian repression, because presidents are either
Muslim themselves or recognize that limiting religious freedom could prompt more direct
uprisings (Ismail 2012, 435). As a result, leaders of Muslim communities gain significant social
and political clout. The parallel development of the internet and social media allow these leaders
without the support of the regime. The Ennahda Party, Muslim Brotherhood, and more radical
groups such as the Taliban have each faced severe scrutiny and punishment in their early stages.
This has prevented them from being accepted as valid political parties, but it has also allowed
them to grow independent of the existing political structure. When regimes fall, Islamist groups
11
already have strong organization, the pre-existing support necessary to dominate initial
campaigns, and the determination to gain retribution through politics (Hamid 2014, 11). The
of elected Islamist majorities determine how these religion-oriented parties respond once in
positions of power.
Cultural developments caused the Ennahda Party to emerge as a moderate political party
and the Muslim Brotherhood to remain a conservative protectorate of the Koran. It is important
to not essentialize either of these parties or their origins, so the following analysis focuses on
specific policies of each group and the actions of their leadership over time. There is significant
variation among individual party supporters, and this is illustrated in the recent transition by
The original beliefs of each Islamist group are essential for understanding the emergence
of their modern stances. From its start, the Ennahda party’s commitment to citizens gained it
widespread popular support. Originally known as the Movement of the Islamic Tendency, the
Ennahda Party was founded in 1981 by its current president Rached Ghannouchi (Hamid 2014,
190 – 191). It attributed its emergence to the Iranian Revolution and, more notably, to the
Muslim Brotherhood (Lewis 2011). However, it also quickly established itself as a moderate and
accepting Islamist party. Its heavy reference to moral and cultural renewal, lack of desire for an
Islamic state, and decision to ignore Sharia Law were particularly attractive to progressive
college students who were the product of Tunisia’s evolving structure. In 1989 14% of the nation
voted for the Ennahda in parliamentary elections, and in some regions up to 60% of the nation
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voted for the Party (Hamid 2014, 191 – 193). From the start, Ghannouchi’s party was successful
Although the Muslim Brotherhood also gained quick national support, its message was
one of hate and retribution. Hassan al-Banna and six other workers from the Suez Canal
Company founded the brotherhood with the goal of combatting Western influence on traditional
Islam (Mura 2012). They believed that practicing Islam in itself should ensure a splendid
lifestyle, and the intervention of the West had prevented correct teaching of the religion (Hamid
2014, 9). Over its first twenty years of existence, al-Banna’s hateful interpretation of the Koran
fit well with the existing Anti-British sentiment of the nation. This established a standard for
Due to their widespread support and active social participation, both parties were widely
punished and isolated by regimes looking to consolidate power for themselves. Each party’s
experience with marginalization significantly shaped its modern viewpoints. Following the
Ennahda Party’s success in the 1989 election, Ben Ali quickly reversed his tolerant policies
toward the Ennahda Party, disbanded its meetings, and arrested close to 15,000 supporters.
However, he also made the momentous choice to exile the party’s key leaders after imprisoning
them (Hamid 2014, 191). Over the next 40 years, these leaders, including Ghannouchi, were able
to experience Western culture firsthand and monitor the political scene of Tunisia from afar.
They experienced the development of the internet, changing societal structures, and the rise of
progressive trends. It became clear to them that people still supported the essential teachings of
Islam, but younger generations were also interested in commercialism, western education, and
world travel. Citizens could think on their own, develop their own opinions, and challenge
radical claims. Building off of its roots, the party recognized that it needed to set aside its
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outdated radical agenda in favor of more accepting and dynamic policies if it hoped to achieve its
goal of encouraging Muslims to choose a Muslim lifestyle (Hamid 2014, 193). While exiled in
the United Kingdom from 1991 – 2011, Ghannouchi wrote hundreds of articles advancing
arguments against violence and the forced implementation of Sharia Law (Stepan 2018, 49). By
being adaptable to change, the Ennahda Party managed to develop in a similarly progressive
The decisions by Egyptian regimes to keep leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood in solitude
caused the Islamist group to radicalize, overlook progressive development, and misunderstand
political relationships within Egypt. The goals of the Muslim Brotherhood today are similar to
what they were when Egypt achieved independence from Great Britain. Although not to the
same extent, the torture and inhumane conditions of Egyptian prisons had similar psychological
effects as Syrian prisons did (Human Rights Watch 1991). Trapped in their own minds and
driven to psychological extremes, key leaders of the brotherhood became increasingly committed
to ensuring the future implementation of their own interpretation of the Koran on society. The
goals of this movement became less about fixing society from Western Corruption than about
gaining retribution for imprisonment (Wickham 2015). The decisions of Elder Members were
not to be questioned by less-experienced members. This is why, when young members started
ignoring the advice of their superiors to not attend anti-regime protests, the members were forced
to intervene by dominating the protests and changing their messages (Wickham 2018, 36). The
Muslim Brotherhood commitment to conservative Islam and inability to mediate with other
opinions did not align with existing social or political trends in Egypt. When the Brotherhood
The outcome of diverging cultural development paths for the Ennahda and Muslim
Brotherhood parties can be qualified by the varying decisions each party made with other major
political actors when elected into power following the Arab Spring. It is clear that the Ennahda
party was open to compromise and valued the long-term benefits of democracy over its own
political agenda. The Muslim Brotherhood was hungry for power and prioritized using its
political advantage to benefit its own interests against widespread opposition. When applied to
the geopolitical structures described above, these varying Islamist cultures allowed democracy to
Low voter turnout and misinformation in young democracies elevates the importance of
the relationship between political parties and individual voters. If unity is not cultivated among
the population, then democracy is not possible. The culture of the Ennahda Party and Muslim
Brotherhood distinguished the abilities of each party to sustain legitimate popular support in
2011. The Ennahda Party made sure to demonstrate itself as an actor of the population as a whole
rather than a protectorate of its own base. It achieved this by striving for a civil state and
ensuring fundamental rights. In contrast to a religious state, a civil state is controlled by citizens
under the protection of laws and guidance of administrators. Ghannouchi decided to not pursue
the incorporation of Sharia Law into the constitution or even make Islam the official state
religion. His reasoning for this decision is founded on the structure of society: “There is an
ongoing debate in our country between secular currents which may be described as extremist,
and Islamist ones which may be described in a like manner” (Stepan 2018, 4). Recognizing this
intrinsic religious polarization, Ghannouchi aimed to tie the nation together through the
implementation of liberal ideals including equality, freedom, and independence. These attributes
15
can be seen in the constitution ratified under the Ennahda Party’s leadership. The second chapter
of the Tunisian constitution contains 29 articles that each guarantees a personal right or freedom.
The state is mandated to pursue moderation and tolerance as well as include all races and
nationalities. Essential human rights, such as access to water, free education, freedom of belief,
and gender equality, are also protected (Ghannouchi 2018, 22). These inclusions support my
point that the culture of the Ennahda Party was largely shaped by the study of Tunisian structure
itself. By not including any religious attributes, this constitution is supportive of the entire
nation. This has allowed the formation of a shared Tunisian identity that is essential for
democracy to succeed.
Following the collapse of the Mubarak regime, the critical mass that had been successful
in Egyptian national protests failed to stay united under democracy. This was evident soon after
the military forced individuals to clear Tahrir Square following Mubarak’s resignation. If the
Muslim Brotherhood had taken the advice of Ghannouchi and recognized the religious
polarization within its society, it could have similarly worked to incorporate the viewpoints of
diverse backgrounds into its governance. At first, it seemed that regime repression in fact have
caused the Muslim Brotherhood to moderate as Hamid suggests is a traditional pattern in the
Middle East (Hamid 2014, 38). Through its organized campaign, the organization claimed that it
was committed to democracy and a civil state. This somewhat surprising perspective earned the
vote of many central voters. However, more on pace with what its cultural development in
isolation would predict, the Muslim Brotherhood turned against its moderate election promises
and forced a conservative social agenda once in power. The Muslim Brotherhood believed that it
had single-handedly been responsible for mobilizing the protestors responsible for Mubarak’s
collapse. This misunderstanding of a critical mass proved to be a severe blunder in the polarized
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structure of Egypt. Rather than creating a civil state like Tunisia had, the Muslim Brotherhood
worked to incorporate Sharia Law into its constitution. Proposed policies included incorporating
Muslim Brotherhood teachings into public education, opening government daycares, and
monitoring public spaces. Women were required to cover their heads, going out was permitted,
and casual western ideology was illegal (Kandil 2014). This caused significant protest from
liberal, secular, and center-right members of society. Despite practicing Islam, many young
individuals did not appreciate a conservative reading of the Koran due to their educations,
Western influences, and use of social media (Brown 2018, 78) Differentiations in socioeconomic
class also caused varying degrees of interest in the continuation of political reform (Lynch et al.
2017). By attempting to conform a highly divided population to its radical ideology, the Muslim
Brotherhood lost support of its allies. Without a cooperative society, the military remained the
Similar relationship trends can be seen in the organized politics of Tunisia and Egypt.
Differences in cultural development caused the Ennahda Party to incorporate minority parties
into its governance and pushed the the Muslim Brotherhood, running as the Freedom and Justice
Party, to isolate itself from political rivals. Ghannouchi’s cultured leadership, learned from years
in exile, emphasized unity through proportional representation. Beginning in 2003, the Ennahda
Party and two Tunisian secular left parties started holding annual meetings in France to discuss
the potential for cooperation (Stepan 2018, 50). October 18, 2005 the Ennahda party was a
participant in the World Summit on the Information Society that later developed into the October
18 Committee. This committee incorporated the viewpoints of political parties, activists, and
journalists with the goal of envisioning a post-Ben Ali democratic Tunisia (Ghannouchi 2018,
16). These preemptive meetings show that the party was genuinely invested in sharing its power
17
with other representatives. When elected into the majority position of Tunisia’s first constituent
assembly, the Ennahda chose to incorporate rather than target its recognized political opposition.
This constituent assembly was responsible for drafting the constitution that would be used to
guide future governance. With 51.97% voter turnout, the Ennahda Party won 89 seats compared
to 29 from the CPR and 26 from the Aridha. Although this is a dominant advantage, the low
turnout is fairly concerning for such an important election. Rather than abusing his advantage as
an Islamist Majority power, Ghannouchi established a consensus democracy and placed on his
cabinet members from leading opposition parties (Gobe and Salaymeh 2016). A democracy is
only a complete democracy if all members of society are equally represented. Through an early
commitment to gender equality in politics, the Ennahda Party set the stage for nearly one third of
Tunisia’s 2017 Parliament to be represented by women (Eltahawy 2018). In 2014, the Ennahda
Party lost control of its advantage in parliament and intentionally withdrew from the presidential
election (Ghannouchi 2018, 19). The coinciding decision to peacefully pass power to the next
leader is a final illustration of the Islamist party’s commitment to democratic ideology. A culture
of respect and greater interest in the societal benefits of democracy created strong relations
between the Ennahda Party and its opposition. When applied to the progressive structure of
Tunisia that encouraged the balance of ideas, this allowed democracy to consolidate in its natural
form.
An underlying interest in promoting its personal religious goals through politics caused
the Muslim Brotherhood to isolate itself from political enemies when elected to power. Unlike
the Ennahda Party in Tunisia, the Muslim Brotherhood did not run away with the election in
2011. Led by Morsi, the party only earned 37.5% of the national popular vote. As a result, Morsi
felt immense pressure from all sides. The secular left, composed of nearly 10% of the population,
18
directly targeted the sovereignty of the Muslim Brotherhood on a religious basis (CIA World
Factbook). After all, the underlying purpose of the Muslim Brotherhood was to protect
interpretation of the Koran from Westerners and Christians. On the right, other rising Islamist
groups including Jihadis and Saladis looked to recruit from the Muslim Brotherhood’s
supporting base. The Muslim Brotherhood’s moderate election promises and involvement in
peaceful protests were not radical enough for hardline Muslims. Having risen to power in a
culture of isolation and self-endowment, the Muslim Brotherhood chose to follow a strategy of
political domination rather than choose an ally. Despite only possessing a little over one third of
the popular vote, Morsi constructed a majoritarian government in which other political opinions
had no significance. The Muslim Brotherhood consistently presented a rude and commandeering
attitude to the secular left (Kandil 2014). The polite and mannerly interactions typical of Western
democracies were nowhere to be found. This exemplifies both the desire for retribution
developed by Muslim Brotherhood leadership in prison and the long-term development of the
Brotherhood in political isolation. As the Muslim Brotherhood started to turn on its election
promises and institute radical policy changes on Egyptian society, the secular left felt threatened
and turned to the military for assistance. By failing to pursue a democratic strategy of cross-party
collaboration in a nation whose politics were structurally divided, the Muslim Brotherhood
became a target of political aversion. Without the support of individual voters or political allies,
the hopes for democracy to consolidate under the Muslim Brotherhood’s conservative policies
were bleak.
subordination of the former military by the majority party. In Tunisia, the Ennahda Party
recognized the limited role of the military and made few changes to the existing security
19
structure. Both Tunisia and the Ennahda Party have limited histories of violence. The military in
Tunisia follows a tradition of Patriotic Excellence. Commanding officers believe that it is their
duty to protect the interests of the nation rather than the interests of the government (Nassif
2015, 270). This is the same attitude shared by militaries in other democratic nations including
the United States and England. This un-political agenda is in fact more conducive to democracy
than to authoritarianism, because in a democracy the goals of the state coincide with the goals of
the people. The Ennahda Party continued to utilize the police force to counteract terrorism and
marginalize the military as a peacekeeping force. The constitution, new system of law, and
political freedom ensured individual rights and government security; the military’s focus was to
protect the border and ensure peace. The rise in terrorism, the continuation of police corruption,
and an ongoing state of emergency challenge the party’s decision to not initiate widespread
security reform (Masmoudi 2018). However, regarding the consolidating democracy, the
Ennahda Party’s decision to focus its attention on political relations with other actors besides the
In Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood’s failure to appreciate the power of the military
ultimately triggered the failure of consolidation. As the popularly elected party, the Muslim
Brotherhood could have used its position to unify the nation against the military. Quick security-
sector reform could have eliminated key regime figures. Unable to oppose the entire nation, the
military would have been forced to comply and rescale its role to efficiently counter rapidly
increasing terrorism rates. However, due to its own entitlement, the Muslim Brotherhood instead
turned to the military for support against the Secular left (Kandil 2014). Its core religious beliefs
and culture of isolation caused the Muslim Brotherhood to believe it had far more power than it
actually did following 2011. It thought that by continuing to allow military corruption, it would
20
garner the same support from the military that Mubarak had upheld (Wickham 2018, 34). With
the support of the military, the radical Islamist group could assumedly oppress the religious
opposition and successfully institute its widespread political agenda. This move backfired
severely though when the secular left also requested the military’s support.
As he resigned, Mubarak’s last act was to hand national power to the military with the
intention of ensuring a smooth transition. Already, structural factors contributed to the propensity
for the military to intervene in Egyptian political affairs. Additionally, the military disliked the
radical ideology and interventionist approaches of the Muslim Brotherhood. They found the
military economy to be unstable under its new leadership. The thought of Muslim Brothers
fighting alongside well-established officers was disturbing (Nassif 2018, 138). Only the
knowledge that a cross-party coalition had taken down Mubarak kept el-Sisi and other generals
in compliance. With both sides of the political spectrum asking for assistance, the blessing of
Mubarak, and radical jihadists attacking civilians across the country, the military felt as though it
needed to intervene in order to protect the safety of its civilians and preserve personal interests.
This resulted in the failure of democracy when el-Sisi removed President Morsi from power and
Conclusion
In conclusion, both the structure of Tunisia and Egypt and culture of the Ennahda
Movement and Muslim Brotherhood diverged significantly over the course of Authoritarian rule.
When these elements intersected following successful peaceful protests against respective
regimes during the Arab Spring, the potential for democracy to consolidate was very different in
each nation. The Ennahda Party leadership was able to recognize the progressive trends of
21
society from exile and use its understanding of structural dynamics to unite the nation. Its
associated decisions to construct a civil society and draft a non-religious constitution allowed
democracy to flourish even after the Ennahda Party handed over power three years later.
Through imprisonment, the Muslim Brotherhood leadership became obsessed with promoting its
own conservative interpretation of Islam and used its position of authority to push its radical
objectives onto a society ripe with polarization. The outcome was the division of voters, the
empowerment of the military, and a coup d’etat. It is clear that the Islamist majority in Middle
Eastern nations must be capable of adapting to societal trends, particularly among young
generations, in order to consolidate democracy. Knowledge of this pattern can be used to predict
the outcome of consolidation in existing authoritarian regimes in the Middle East and regimes
currently undergoing transitions from authoritarianism. It can also be used to strategize potential
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