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Thomas Aquinas. Aristotelianism Versus Platonism - Jan A. Aertsen PDF
Thomas Aquinas. Aristotelianism Versus Platonism - Jan A. Aertsen PDF
Thomas Aquinas. Aristotelianism Versus Platonism - Jan A. Aertsen PDF
AERTSEN
THOMAS AQUINAS:
ARISTOTELIANISM VERSUS PLATONISM?
1. INTRODUCTION
und ihre Wirkung auf Thomas von Aquin. Leiden, 1966. W.J. HANKEY, Cod in
Himself, Aquinas' Doctrine of Cod as Expounded in the Summa theologiae. Oxford,
1987.
6 A. DE LIBERA, «Albert le Grand et
Thomas d'Aquin interprètes du Liber de
causis »,in Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques, 74 (1990), pp. 347-
378. De Libera calls Thomas« le premier philologue et le premier historien».
150 I.A. AERTSEN
nominibus presents the good as the first divine name. In contrast to the
good, the most universal being is the first caused, a claim asserted by
the fourth proposition of the Liber de causis 11 .
Two points stand out in Berthold' s presentation. The first is that he
understands Platonism and Aristotelianism as opposed structures of
thought, as two competing archetypes of philosophy. Both philosophies
mean to identify that which is first and most general, but they part ways
in their approaches to this question and in their conceptions of the
nature of that which is most general. The characteristic feature of the
Aristotelian position is the transcendental way of thought, oriented to
<<Universality of predication»; the Platonic position is marked by the
«transcendence» of the first, a term conveyed by Berthold's expression
«universality of separation». The generalness of the first results from
its causality; the first itself, however, remains « separated » from what
is caused. The Good or One is beyond being. For Berthold, the Platonic
position is superior to Aristotle's first philosophy, since it deals not
only with being as being but also with principles that are above being12.
The second point to note is that the «Plata» and « Aristotle » of
whom Berthold speaks are patently medieval transformations of the
two protagonists of ancient philosophy. Berthold's «Plata» is in fact «a
persan with a double face»: it is Proclus-DionysiusI3. His « Aristotle »
11 Expositio, prop. llA (ed. PAGNONI-STURLESE, 186, 54-188, 23): «Non sic
autem accipiuntur ens et bonum apud Platonem, qui ponit utrumque etiam in sua
universalitate acceptum esse in rerum natura. Non enim dicit ea esse universalia uni-
versalitate logica seu praedicationis, ubi, quanto aliquid est universalius, tanto est
potentialius, sed ponit ea esse universalia universalitate theologica sive separationis,
ubi, quanto aliquid est universalius, tanto est actualius ita, quod universalissimum est
actualissimum. Et per consequens dicit ens et bonum distingui ab invicem re et
ratione seu intentione ita tamen, quod bonum sit prius, universalius, formalius et abso-
lutius non solum ipso ente, sed etiam respectu omnium intentionum formalium sicut
universalissima causa simpliciter omnium[ ... ]». Cf. Expos., prop. lA (ed. PAGNONI-
STURLESE, 73, 90-74, 105), where Berthold already introduces the opposition between
universalitas praedicationis and universalitas separationis, between universale log-
icum and universale theologicum. For the identity between the « good » and the
«one», see Expos., prop. 7A (ed. PAGNONI-STURLESE, 140, 37): «[ ... ]in prima et
absolutissima intentione boni sive unius, quod idem est».
12 Expos., praeambula C (ed. PAGNONI-STURLESE, 65, 454-66, 458; 66, 482-485).
13 DE LIBERA, Introduction à la mystique rhénane ... , pp. 388-389.
THOMAS AQUINAS: ARISTOTELIANISM VS. PLATONISM? 153
Platonists, the more general (communius) something is, the more sepa-
rate it is. What is more general is also prior (prius) in the order of
things. Its ontological priority entails causality: it is participated in by
what is posterior to it, and is its cause. The Platonists hold further that
«the one» and ~<the good » are the most general (communissima); the y
are even more general than « being ». From this it follows that the sepa-
rate «one» (or «good») is the highest and first principle of things.
After «the one» there is nothing so general as « being ». Hence, on the
Platonic view, separate being itself (ipsum ens separatum) is the first
among created things 16 . Thomas identifies the essential teachings of
Platonism as those of the universality of separation and the firstness of
the one or good.
Thomas's own position differs from the Platonic position with
respect to both the nature and the order of the communissima. That
which is most common is not transcendent, but transcendental. His
most complete account of the transcendentals in De veritate 1.1 further
clarifies (i) that being, one, true and good are convertible with each
other; and (ii) that being bas a conceptual priority to the other commu-
nissima. Since the transcendental way of thought is characteristic of
Aristotelianism according to Berthold' s parameter, the conclusion
seems to be that the structure of Thomas' s thought is essentially
Aristotelian.
This obvious conclusion fails to do justice, however, to Thomas' s
way of thought, because it rests on a premise he does not accept with-
out qualification - namely, that the opposition between the doctrine of
the transcendentals and the Platonic position is such that the former
approach excludes the latter.
Thirteenth-century authors shaped a doctrine of the transcendentals
on the basis of several Aristotelian texts, though the Philosopher is not
their only source and their reading of Aristotle is mediated by Arabie
commentators. The main text to which the medievals appeal is
Aristotle's account of the relation between being and one in the fourth
book of the Metaphysics. Having established in chapter one that the
subject matter of first philosophy is being qua being, Aristotle turns in
chapter two to a perse attribute of being, «the one». It is introduced as
follows (1003b 22-25): «Being and the one are the same and one single
nature (physis) in the sense that they follow upon each other [ ... ] but
not in the sense that they are determined by one concept (logos)».
Aristotle formulates here the two relations obtaining among transcen-
dentals: real identity and conceptual difference. The ratio proper to
«the one» is defined (in book X, ch. 1) as« indivision».
Historically, Aristotle's account in Metaphysics IV is not only the
authoritative text for the convertibility of being and one, but also the
starting point for the formation of a doctrine of the transcendentals. Its
influence can be seen in Philip the Chancellor, who in his Summa de
bono presents for the first time a system of the communissima « being »,
«one», «true» and «good». His ordering of the transcendentals fol-
lows the Aristotelian model of the relation between being and one by
extending it to truth and goodness. They must also be defined in terms
of «indivision» 17.
Thomas is aware that Aristotle' s teaching has an anti-Platonic
moment. In his commentary on the Metaphysics, he points out that
Aristotle' s exposition of being and one in book IV should be read in
connection with book III, the book of the aporiasis. The thesis of
convertibility is meant as an answer to the eleventh aporia, which
Aristotle calls «:the hardest of all inquiry » (Ill, c. 4, lOOla 4-5) and
which Thomas describes as the question on which Plato's entire view
depends. The aporia is presented in terms of two mutually exclusive
positions. Are being and one the substance (ousia) of things - a view
which Aristotle ascribes to the Pythagoreans and Plato - or is there
some other reality that is the underlying substratum for being and
one ? 19 In the second chapter of Metaph. X, Aristotle offers his solution
to the aporia by arguing that the first alternative is impossible. His
argument is that what is universal cannot be a subsisting substance.
N ow, being and one are the most common, because the y are predicated
17 PHILIP THE CHANCELLOR, Summa de bono, qq. 1-3, ed. N. WrcKI. Bern, 1985,
pp. 5-20. Cf. J.A. AERTSEN, «The Beginning of the Doctrine of the Transcendentals in
Philip the Chancellor», in Quodlibetaria (Festschrift Joseph Maria da Cruz Pontes).
Coimbra, 1996.
18 In III Metaph., lect. 12, 501.
l9 Metaph., III, 1, 996a 4-9 ; III, 4, lOOla 5-8. Cf. THOMAS, In III Metaph., lect. 3,
363 : «Exista quaestione dependet tota opinio Platonis et Pythagorae ».
156 J.A. AERTSEN
of all things. Therefore, they cannot be, as Plato asserted, the substance
of things (1053b 16-24). The commonness of the one is not compatible
with its substantiality20.
What deserves particular attention in Thomas's commentary are his
efforts to make sense of and redeem the Platonic view of the one. It
may be interpreted, Thomas notes, in the sense « that the one is com-
mon in the manner of a cause». But he immediately emphasizes that
this commonness differs from the commonness of a universal, since a
cause is not predicated of its effects 21 . When the commonness of the
one is taken in a causal sense, it is true to say that there exists a sepa-
rate One. This One, however, is not, as the Platonists held, the sub-
stance of all things that are one but the cause and principle of the unity
of things 22 •
In his discussion of Platonic philosophy, Thomas' s guiding principle
appears to be the distinction between commonness by predication and
commonness by causality. He shares this perspective with Berthold of
Moosburg, who employs the same distinction to characterize
Aristotelianism and Platonism as opposed structures of thought.
Nevertheless, there is a significant difference. A way of thought
directed toward « predicative universality » and a way of thought
directed toward « theological universality » do represent different
20 Cf. ln VII Metaph., lect. 16, 1641 : « Dicit quod hoc ipsum quod est unum, non
potest apud multa simul inveniri. Hoc enim est contra rationem unius, si tamen
ponatur aliquod unum per se existens ut substantia. Sed illud quod est commune, est
simul apud multa. Hoc enim est ratio communis, ut de multis praedicetur, et in multis
existat. Patet igitur quod unum quod est commune, non potest esse sic unum quasi
una substantia ».
21 ln X Metaph., lect. 3, 1964: « Nisi forte diceretur commune per modum
causae. Sed alia est communitas universalis et causae. Nam causa non praedicatur de
suis effectibus, quia non est idem causa suiipsius. Sed universale est commune, quasi
aliquid praedicatum de multis ; et sic oportet quod aliquo modo sit unum in multis, et
non seorsum subsistens ab eis ».
22 ln Ill Metaph., lect. 12, 501 : « Huius autem dubitationis solutio ab Aristotele
in sequentibus traditur. Quod enim sit aliquod separatum, quod sit ipsum unum et ens,
infra in duodecimo probabit, ostendens unitatem primi principii omnino separati,
quod tamen non est substantia omnium eorum quae sunt unum, sicut Platonici puta-
bant, sed est omnibus unitatis causa et principium ».
THOMAS AQUINAS: ARISTOTELIANISM VS. PLATONISM? 157
In the study mentioned above, Klaus Kremer defends the thesis that
Thomas entertains two incompatible conceptions of commonness. The
first is the Platonic conception, according to which the more general
something is, the more real it is. The purpose of Kremer' s study is to
show that, under the influence of Neoplatonic philosophy, Thomas
identifies divine being with esse commune. Yet this identificatio n
clashes with the Aristotelian conception according to which that which
is common has no reality but is a merely logical entity, a being of rea-
son ( ens rationis ). Kremer points to Summa contra Gentiles I, 26,
where Thomas argues that God is not the esse commune. One of his
arguments is that what is common to many things does not exist as
such apart from the many, save in the order of thought al one. Thus
«animal» is not something which exists apart from Socrates and Plato
and other animais except in the intellect that abstracts the form
«animal» from all individuating and specifying characteristics. Much
less is esse commune to be regarded as something which exists apart
from all existent things, except in the intellect. If God were to be identi-
THOMAS AQUINAS: ARISTOTELIANISM VS. PLATONISM? 161
fied with the esse commune, it would follow as a consequence that God
exists solely in the intellect27. According to Kremer Thomas's thought
is locked into two philosophical camps: «viewed from the perspective
of Aristotelianism, the term esse commune is completely unusable for
signifying God's reality; from the viewpoint of Platonism-
Neoplatonism, it would really be consistent to signify God as esse
commune »28 .
Kremer regards Thomas as a thinker who endeavors to unify the
incompatible, but his thesis is both implausible and unjustified for a
number of reasons. First, as we noticed, Thomas criticizes the Platonic
conception of commonness insofar as it views communia as subsis-
tentia. This does not mean, however, that transcendentals are some-
thing purely logical or have, as Berthold suggests, no extramental real-
ity. Thomas's point is that transcendentals do not existas such in real-
ity, that is, apart from concrete beings. Being in general is the subject
of metaphysics. If it were nothing more than a being of reason, this sci-
ence would coïncide with the study of logic.
Another argument against Kremer' s thesis is that Thomas endeavors
to justify the Platonic conception of what is most general by interpret-
ing it in a causal sense. God is common by causality: «the divine
essence is not something general in being (in essendo ), since it is dis-
tinct from all other things, but only in causing» 29. Kremer himself must
acknowledge that there is not a single text in which Thomas identifies
God with being in general. On the contrary, Thomas explicitly
maintains the opposite view: «the divine being which is identical with
the divine essence is not the esse commune »30_
Our conclusion is that Thomas does indeed hold two conceptions of
commonness, that of predication and that of causality. He is very well
aware that these conceptions are characteristic for the differing struc-
tures of thought of Aristotelianism and Platonism. His purpose is not to
27 ScG, 1, 26.
2 8 K.
KREMER, Die neuplatonische Seinsphilosophie, especially pp. 356-372. Cf.
C. FABRO, « Platonism, Neo-Platonism and Thomism: Convergences and Diver-
gences », in The New Scholasticism, 44 (1970), pp. 69-100.
29 Quodl., VII, 1.1 ad I.
30 De potentia, 7 .2 ad 4.
162 I.A. AERTSEN
Thomas-Institut, Koln