Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-21278 December 27, 1966

FEATI UNIVERSITY, petitioner,

vs.
HON. JOSE S. BAUTISTA, Presiding Judge of the Court of Industrial Relations and FEATI UNIVERSITY FACULTY
CLUB-PAFLU, respondents.

----------------------------------------

G.R. No. L-21462 December 27, 1966

FEATI UNIVERSITY, petitioner-appellant,

vs.
FEATI UNIVERSITY FACULTY CLUB-PAFLU, respondent-appellee.

----------------------------------------

G.R. No. L-21500 December 27, 1966

FEATI UNIVERSITY, petitioner-appellant,

vs.
FEATI UNIVERSITY FACULTY CLUB-PAFLU, respondent-appellee.

Rafael Dinglasan for petitioner.

Cipriano Cid and Associates for respondents.

ZALDIVAR, J.:

This Court, by resolution, ordered that these three cases be considered together, and the parties were allowed to file only one brief
for the three cases.

On January 14, 1963, the President of the respondent Feati University Faculty Club-PAFLU — hereinafter referred to as Faculty
Club — wrote a letter to Mrs. Victoria L. Araneta, President of petitioner Feati University — hereinafter referred to as University
— informing her of the organization of the Faculty Club into a registered labor union. The Faculty Club is composed of members
who are professors and/or instructors of the University. On January 22, 1963, the President of the Faculty Club sent another letter
containing twenty-six demands that have connection with the employment of the members of the Faculty Club by the University,
and requesting an answer within ten days from receipt thereof. The President of the University answered the two letters,
requesting that she be given at least thirty days to study thoroughly the different phases of the demands. Meanwhile counsel for
the University, to whom the demands were referred, wrote a letter to the President of the Faculty Club demanding proof of its
majority status and designation as a bargaining representative. On February 1, 1963, the President of the Faculty Club again
wrote the President of the University rejecting the latter's request for extension of time, and on the same day he filed a notice of
strike with the Bureau of Labor alleging as reason therefor the refusal of the University to bargain collectively. The parties were
called to conferences at the Conciliation Division of the Bureau of Labor but efforts to conciliate them failed. On February 18,
1963, the members of the Faculty Club declared a strike and established picket lines in the premises of the University, resulting
in the disruption of classes in the University. Despite further efforts of the officials from the Department of Labor to effect a
settlement of the differences between the management of the University and the striking faculty members no satisfactory
agreement was arrived at. On March 21, 1963, the President of the Philippines certified to the Court of Industrial Relations the
dispute between the management of the University and the Faculty Club pursuant to the provisions of Section 10 of Republic Act
No. 875.
In connection with the dispute between the University and the Faculty Club and certain incidents related to said dispute, various
cases were filed with the Court of Industrial Relations — hereinafter referred to as CIR. The three cases now before this Court
stemmed from those cases that were filed with the CIR.

CASE NO. G.R. NO. L-21278

On May 10, 1963, the University filed before this Court a "petition for certiorari and prohibition with writ of preliminary
injunction", docketed as G.R. No. L-21278, praying: (1) for the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction enjoining
respondent Judge Jose S. Bautista of the CIR to desist from proceeding in CIR Cases Nos. 41-IPA, 1183-MC, and V-30; (2) that
the proceedings in Cases Nos. 41-IPA and 1183-MC be annulled; (3) that the orders dated March 30, 1963 and April 6, 1963 in
Case No. 41-IPA, the order dated April 6, 1963 in Case No. 1183-MC, and the order dated April 29, 1963 in Case No. V-30, all
be annulled; and (4) that the respondent Judge be ordered to dismiss said cases Nos. 41-IPA, 1183-MC and V-30 of the CIR.

On May 10, 1963, this Court issued a writ of preliminary injunction, upon the University's filing a bond of P1,000.00, ordering
respondent Judge Jose S. Bautista as Presiding Judge of the CIR, until further order from this Court, "to desist and refrain from
further proceeding in the premises (Cases Nos. 41-IPA, 1183-MC and V-30 of the Court of Industrial Relations)."1 On December
4, 1963, this Court ordered the injunction bond increased to P100,000.00; but on January 23, 1964, upon a motion for
reconsideration by the University, this Court reduced the bond to P50,000.00.

A brief statement of the three cases — CIR Cases 41-IPA, 1183-MC and V-30 — involved in the Case G.R. No. L-21278, is here
necessary.

CIR Case No. 41-IPA, relates to the case in connection with the strike staged by the members of the Faculty Club. As we have
stated, the dispute between the University and the Faculty Club was certified on March 21, 1963 by the President of the
Philippines to the CIR. On the strength of the presidential certification, respondent Judge Bautista set the case for hearing on
March 23, 1963. During the hearing, the Judge endeavored to reconcile the part and it was agreed upon that the striking faculty
members would return to work and the University would readmit them under a status quo arrangement. On that very same day,
however, the University, thru counsel filed a motion to dismiss the case upon the ground that the CIR has no jurisdiction over the
case, because (1) the Industrial Peace Act is not applicable to the University, it being an educational institution, nor to the
members of the Faculty Club, they being independent contractors; and (2) the presidential certification is violative of Section 10
of the Industrial Peace Act, as the University is not an industrial establishment and there was no industrial dispute which could be
certified to the CIR. On March 30, 1963 the respondent Judge issued an order denying the motion to dismiss and declaring that
the Industrial Peace Act is applicable to both parties in the case and that the CIR had acquired jurisdiction over the case by virtue
of the presidential certification. In the same order, the respondent Judge, believing that the dispute could not be decided
promptly, ordered the strikers to return immediately to work and the University to take them back under the last terms and
conditions existing before the dispute arose, as per agreement had during the hearing on March 23, 1963; and likewise enjoined
the University, pending adjudication of the case, from dismissing any employee or laborer without previous authorization from
the CIR. The University filed on April 1, 1963 a motion for reconsideration of the order of March 30, 1963 by the CIR en banc,
and at the same time asking that the motion for reconsideration be first heard by the CIR en banc. Without the motion for
reconsideration having been acted upon by the CIR en banc, respondent Judge set the case for hearing on the merits for May 8,
1963. The University moved for the cancellation of said hearing upon the ground that the court en banc should first hear the
motion for reconsideration and resolve the issues raised therein before the case is heard on the merits. This motion for
cancellation of the hearing was denied. The respondent Judge, however, cancelled the scheduled hearing when counsel for the
University manifested that he would take up before the Supreme Court, by a petition for certiorari, the matter regarding the
actuations of the respondent Judge and the issues raised in the motion for reconsideration, specially the issue relating to the
jurisdiction of the CIR. The order of March 30, 1963 in Case 41-IPA is one of the orders sought to be annulled in the case, G.R.
No. L-21278.

Before the above-mentioned order of March 30, 1963 was issued by respondent Judge, the University had employed professors
and/or instructors to take the places of those professors and/or instructors who had struck. On April 1, 1963, the Faculty Club
filed with the CIR in Case 41-IPA a petition to declare in contempt of court certain parties, alleging that the University refused to
accept back to work the returning strikers, in violation of the return-to-work order of March 30, 1963. The University filed, on
April 5,1963, its opposition to the petition for contempt, denying the allegations of the Faculty Club and alleging by way of
special defense that there was still the motion for reconsideration of the order of March 30, 1963 which had not yet been acted
upon by the CIR en banc. On April 6, 1963, the respondent Judge issued an order stating that "said replacements are hereby
warned and cautioned, for the time being, not to disturb nor in any manner commit any act tending to disrupt the effectivity of the
order of March 30,1963, pending the final resolution of the same."2 On April 8, 1963, there placing professors and/or instructors
concerned filed, thru counsel, a motion for reconsideration by the CIR en banc of the order of respondent Judge of April 6, 1963.
This order of April 6, 1963 is one of the orders that are sought to be annulled in case G.R. No. L-21278.
CIR Case No. 1183-MC relates to a petition for certification election filed by the Faculty Club on March 8, 1963 before the CIR,
praying that it be certified as the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of all the employees of the University. The
University filed an opposition to the petition for certification election and at the same time a motion to dismiss said petition,
raising the very same issues raised in Case No. 41-IPA, claiming that the petition did not comply with the rules promulgated by
the CIR; that the Faculty Club is not a legitimate labor union; that the members of the Faculty Club cannot unionize for collective
bargaining purposes; that the terms of the individual contracts of the professors, instructors, and teachers, who are members of
the Faculty Club, would expire on March 25 or 31, 1963; and that the CIR has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the petition
because the Industrial Peace Act is not applicable to the members of the Faculty Club nor to the University. This case was
assigned to Judge Baltazar Villanueva of the CIR. Before Judge Villanueva could act on the motion to dismiss, however, the
Faculty Club filed on April 3, 1963 a motion to withdraw the petition on the ground that the labor dispute (Case No. 41-IPA) had
already been certified by the President to the CIR and the issues raised in Case No. 1183-MC were absorbed by Case No. 41-IPA.
The University opposed the withdrawal, alleging that the issues raised in Case No. 1183-MC were separate and distinct from the
issues raised in Case No. 41-IPA; that the questions of recognition and majority status in Case No. 1183-MC were not absorbed
by Case No. 41-IPA; and that the CIR could not exercise its power of compulsory arbitration unless the legal issue regarding the
existence of employer-employee relationship was first resolved. The University prayed that the motion of the Faculty Club to
withdraw the petition for certification election be denied, and that its motion to dismiss the petition be heard. Judge Baltazar
Villanueva, finding that the reasons stated by the Faculty Club in the motion to withdraw were well taken, on April 6, 1963,
issued an order granting the withdrawal. The University filed, on April 24, 1963, a motion for reconsideration of that order of
April 6, 1963 by the CIR en banc. This order of April 6, 1963 in Case No. 1183-MC is one of the orders sought to be annulled in
the case, G.R. No. L-21278, now before Us.

CIR Case No. V-30 relates to a complaint for indirect contempt of court filed against the administrative officials of the
University. The Faculty Club, through the Acting Chief Prosecutor of the CIR, filed with the CIR a complaint docketed as Case
No. V-30, charging President Victoria L. Araneta, Dean Daniel Salcedo, Executive Vice-President Rodolfo Maslog, and
Assistant to the President Jose Segovia, as officials of the University, with indirect contempt of court, reiterating the same
charges filed in Case No. 41-IPA for alleged violation of the order dated March 30, 1963. Based on the complaint thus filed by
the Acting Chief Prosecutor of the CIR, respondent Judge Bautista issued on April 29, 1963 an order commanding any officer of
the law to arrest the above named officials of the University so that they may be dealt with in accordance with law, and the same
time fixed the bond for their release at P500.00 each. This order of April 29, 1963 is also one of the orders sought to be annulled
in the case, G.R. No. L-2l278.

The principal allegation of the University in its petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction in Case G.R.
No. L-21278, now before Us, is that respondent Judge Jose S. Bautista acted without, or in excess of, jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion, in taking cognizance of, and in issuing the questioned orders in, CIR Cases Nos. 41-IPA 1183-MC and V-30.
Let it be noted that when the petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction was filed on May 10, 1963 in this
case, the questioned order in CIR Cases Nos. 41-IPA, 1183-MC and V-30 were still pending action by the CIR en banc upon
motions for reconsideration filed by the University.

On June 10, 1963, the Faculty Club filed its answer to the petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction,
admitting some allegations contained in the petition and denying others, and alleging special defenses which boil down to the
contentions that (1) the CIR had acquired jurisdiction to take cognizance of Case No. 41-IPA by virtue of the presidential
certification, so that it had jurisdiction to issue the questioned orders in said Case No. 41-IPA; (2) that the Industrial Peace Act
(Republic Act 875) is applicable to the University as an employer and to the members of the Faculty Club as employees who are
affiliated with a duly registered labor union, so that the Court of Industrial Relations had jurisdiction to take cognizance of Cases
Nos. 1183-MC and V-30 and to issue the questioned orders in those two cases; and (3) that the petition for certiorari and
prohibition with preliminary injunction was prematurely filed because the orders of the CIR sought to be annulled were still the
subjects of pending motions for reconsideration before the CIR en banc when said petition for certiorari and prohibition with
preliminary injunction was filed before this Court.

CASE G.R. NO. L-21462

This case, G.R. No. L-21462, involves also CIR Case No. 1183-MC. As already stated Case No. 1183-MC relates to a petition
for certification election filed by the Faculty Club as a labor union, praying that it be certified as the sole and exclusive
bargaining representative of all employees of the University. This petition was opposed by the University, and at the same time it
filed a motion to dismiss said petition. But before Judge Baltazar Villanueva could act on the petition for certification election
and the motion to dismiss the same, Faculty Club filed a motion to withdraw said petition upon the ground that the issue raised in
Case No. 1183-MC were absorbed by Case No. 41-IPA which was certified by the President of the Philippines. Judge Baltazar
Villanueva, by order April 6, 1963, granted the motion to withdraw. The University filed a motion for reconsideration of that
order of April 6, 1963 by the CIR en banc. That motion for reconsideration was pending action by the CIR en banc when the
petition for certiorariand prohibition with preliminary injunction in Case G.R. no. L-21278 was filed on May 10, 1963. As earlier
stated this Court, in Case G.R. No. L-21278, issued a writ of preliminary injunction on May 10, 1963, ordering respondent Judge
Bautista, until further order from this Court, to desist and refrain from further proceeding in the premises (Cases Nos. 41-IPA,
1183-MC and V-30 of the Court of Industrial Relations).

On June 5, 1963, that is, after this Court has issued the writ of preliminary injunction in Case G.R. No. L-21278, the CIR en
banc issued a resolution denying the motion for reconsideration of the order of April 6, 1963 in Case No. 1183-MC.

On July 8, 1963, the University filed before this Court a petition for certiorari, by way of an appeal from the resolution of the
CIR en banc, dated June 5, 1963, denying the motion for reconsideration of the order of April 6, 1963 in Case No. 1183-MC.
This petition was docketed as G.R. No. L-21462. In its petition for certiorari, the University alleges (1) that the resolution of the
Court of Industrial Relations of June 5, 1963 was null and void because it was issued in violation of the writ of preliminary
injunction issued in Case G.R. No. L-21278; (2) that the issues of employer-employee relationship, the alleged status as a labor
union, majority representation and designation as bargaining representative in an appropriate unit of the Faculty Club should have
been resolved first in Case No. 1183-MC prior to the determination of the issues in Case No. 41-IPA and therefore the motion to
withdraw the petition for certification election should not have been granted upon the ground that the issues in the first case have
been absorbed in the second case; and (3) the lower court acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the
petition for certification election and that the same should have been dismissed instead of having been ordered withdrawn. The
University prayed that the proceedings in Case No. 1183-MC and the order of April 6, 1963 and the resolution of June 5, 1963
issued therein be annulled, and that the CIR be ordered to dismiss Case No. 1183-MC on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.

The Faculty Club filed its answer, admitting some, and denying other, allegations in the petition for certiorari; and specially
alleging that the lower court's order granting the withdrawal of the petition for certification election was in accordance with law,
and that the resolution of the court en banc on June 5, 1963 was not a violation of the writ of preliminary injunction issued in
Case G.R. No. L-21278 because said writ of injunction was issued against Judge Jose S. Bautista and not against the Court of
Industrial Relations, much less against Judge Baltazar Villanueva who was the trial judge of Case No. 1183-MC.

CASE G.R. NO. L-21500

This case, G.R. No. L-21500, involves also CIR Case No. 41-IPA. As earlier stated, Case No. 41-IPA relates to the strike staged
by the members of the Faculty Club and the dispute was certified by the President of the Philippines to the CIR. The University
filed a motion to dismiss that case upon the ground that the CIR has no jurisdiction over the case, and on March 30, 1963 Judge
Jose S. Bautista issued an order denying the motion to dismiss and declaring that the Industrial Peace Act is applicable to both
parties in the case and that the CIR had acquired jurisdiction over the case by virtue of the presidential certification; and in that
same order Judge Bautista ordered the strikers to return to work and the University to take them back under the last terms and
conditions existing before the dispute arose; and enjoined the University from dismissing any employee or laborer without
previous authority from the court. On April 1, 1963, the University filed a motion for reconsideration of the order of March 30,
1963 by the CIR en banc. That motion for reconsideration was pending action by the CIR en banc when the petition
for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction in Case G.R. No. L-21278 was filed on May 10, 1963. As we have
already stated, this Court in said case G.R. No. L-21278, issued a writ of preliminary injunction on May 10, 1963 ordering
respondent Judge Jose S. Bautista, until further order from this Court, to desist and refrain from further proceeding in the
premises (Cases Nos. 41-IPA, 1183-MC and V-30 of the Court of Industrial Relations).

On July 2, 1963, the University received a copy of the resolution of the CIR en banc, dated May 7, 1963 but actually received
and stamped at the Office of the Clerk of the CIR on June 28, 1963, denying the motion for reconsideration of the order dated
March 30, 1963 in Case No. 41-IPA.

On July 23, 1963, the University filed before this Court a petition for certiorari, by way of an appeal from the resolution of the
Court of Industrial Relations en banc dated May 7, 1963 (but actually received by said petitioner on July 2, 1963) denying the
motion for reconsideration of the order of March 30, 1963 in Case No. 41-IPA. This petition was docketed as G.R. No. L-21500.
In its petition for certiorari the University alleges (1) that the resolution of the CIR en banc, dated May 7, 1963 but filed with the
Clerk of the CIR on June 28, 1963, in Case No. 41-IPA, is null and void because it was issued in violation of the writ of
preliminary injunction issued by this Court in G.R. No. L-21278; (2) that the CIR, through its Presiding Judge, had no
jurisdiction to take cognizance of Case No. 41-IPA and the order of March 30, 1963 and the resolution dated May 7, 1963 issued
therein are null and void; (3) that the certification made by the President of the Philippines is not authorized by Section 10 of
Republic Act 875, but is violative thereof; (4) that the Faculty Club has no right to unionize or organize as a labor union for
collective bargaining purposes and to be certified as a collective bargaining agent within the purview of the Industrial Peace Act,
and consequently it has no right to strike and picket on the ground of petitioner's alleged refusal to bargain collectively where
such duty does not exist in law and is not enforceable against an educational institution; and (5) that the return-to-work order of
March 30, 1963 is improper and illegal. The petition prayed that the proceedings in Case No. 41-IPA be annulled, that the order
dated March 30, 1963 and the resolution dated May 7, 1963 be revoked, and that the lower court be ordered to dismiss Case 41-
IPA on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.

On September 10, 1963, the Faculty Club, through counsel, filed a motion to dismiss the petition for certiorari on the ground that
the petition being filed by way of an appeal from the orders of the Court of Industrial Relations denying the motion to dismiss in
Case No. 41-IPA, the petition for certiorari is not proper because the orders appealed from are interlocutory in nature.

This Court, by resolution of September 26, 1963, ordered that these three cases (G.R. Nos. L-21278, L-21462 and L-21500) be
considered together and the motion to dismiss in Case G.R. No. L-21500 be taken up when the cases are decided on the merits
after the hearing.

Brushing aside certain technical questions raised by the parties in their pleadings, We proceed to decide these three cases on the
merits of the issues raised.

The University has raised several issues in the present cases, the pivotal one being its claim that the Court of Industrial Relations
has no jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter in CIR Cases 41-IPA, 1183-MC and V-30, brought before it, upon the
ground that Republic Act No. 875 is not applicable to the University because it is an educational institution and not an industrial
establishment and hence not an "employer" in contemplation of said Act; and neither is Republic Act No. 875 applicable to the
members of the Faculty Club because the latter are independent contractors and, therefore, not employees within the purview of
the said Act.

In support of the contention that being an educational institution it is beyond the scope of Republic Act No. 875, the University
cites cases decided by this Court: Boy Scouts of the Philippines vs. Juliana Araos, L-10091, Jan. 29, 1958; University of San
Agustin vs. CIR, et al., L-12222, May 28, 1958; Cebu Chinese High School vs. Philippine Land-Air-Sea Labor Union, PLASLU,
L-12015, April 22, 1959; La Consolacion College, et al. vs. CIR, et al., L-13282, April 22, 1960; University of the Philippines, et
al. vs. CIR, et al., L-15416, April 8, 1960; Far Eastern University vs. CIR, L-17620, August 31, 1962. We have reviewed these
cases, and also related cases subsequent thereto, and We find that they do not sustain the contention of the University. It is true
that this Court has ruled that certain educational institutions, like the University of Santo Tomas, University of San Agustin, La
Consolacion College, and other juridical entities, like the Boy Scouts of the Philippines and Manila Sanitarium, are beyond the
purview of Republic Act No. 875 in the sense that the Court of Industrial Relations has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of
charges of unfair labor practice filed against them, but it is nonetheless true that the principal reason of this Court in ruling in
those cases that those institutions are excluded from the operation of Republic Act 875 is that those entities are not organized,
maintained and operated for profit and do not declare dividends to stockholders. The decision in the case of University of San
Agustin vs. Court of Industrial Relations, G.R. No. L-12222, May 28, 1958, is very pertinent. We quote a portion of the decision:

It appears that the University of San Agustin, petitioner herein, is an educational institution conducted and managed by
a "religious non-stock corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines." It was organized not
for profit or gain or division of the dividends among its stockholders, but solely for religious and educational purposes.
It likewise appears that the Philippine Association of College and University Professors, respondent herein, is a non-
stock association composed of professors and teachers in different colleges and universities and that since its
organization two years ago, the university has adopted a hostile attitude to its formation and has tried to discriminate,
harass and intimidate its members for which reason the association and the members affected filed the unfair labor
practice complaint which initiated this proceeding. To the complaint of unfair labor practice, petitioner filed an answer
wherein it disputed the jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial Relations over the controversy on the following grounds:

"(a) That complainants therein being college and/or university professors were not "industrial" laborers or
employees, and the Philippine Association of College and University Professors being composed of persons
engaged in the teaching profession, is not and cannot be a legitimate labor organization within the meaning of
the laws creating the Court of Industrial Relations and defining its powers and functions;

"(b) That the University of San Agustin, respondent therein, is not an institution established for the purpose
of gain or division of profits, and consequently, it is not an "industrial" enterprise and the members of its
teaching staff are not engaged in "industrial" employment (U.S.T. Hospital Employees Association vs. Sto.
Tomas University Hospital, G.R. No. L-6988, 24 May 1954; and San Beda College vs. Court of Industrial
Relations and National Labor Union, G.R. No. L-7649, 29 October 1955; 51 O.G. (Nov. 1955) 5636-5640);

"(c) That, as a necessary consequence, alleged controversy between therein complainants and respondent is
not an "industrial" dispute, and the Court of Industrial Relations has no jurisdiction, not only on the parties
but also over the subject matter of the complaint."
 The issue now before us is: Since the University of San Agustin is not an institution established for profit or gain, nor
an industrial enterprise, but one established exclusively for educational purposes, can it be said that its relation with its
professors is one of employer and employee that comes under the jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial Relations? In
other words, do the provisions of the Magna Carta on unfair labor practice apply to the relation between petitioner and
members of respondent association?

The issue is not new. Thus, in the case of Boy Scouts of the Philippines v. Juliana V. Araos, G.R. No. L-10091,
promulgated on January 29, 1958, this Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice Montemayor, answered the query in the
negative in the following wise:

"The main issue involved in the present case is whether or not a charitable institution or one organized not for
profit but for more elevated purposes, charitable, humanitarian, etc., like the Boy Scouts of the Philippines, is
included in the definition of "employer" contained in Republic Act 875, and whether the employees of said
institution fall under the definition of "employee" also contained in the same Republic Act. If they are
included, then any act which may be considered unfair labor practice, within the meaning of said Republic
Act, would come under the jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial Relations; but if they do not fall within the
scope of said Republic Act, particularly, its definitions of employer and employee, then the Industrial Court
would have no jurisdiction at all.

xxx xxx xxx

"On the basis of the foregoing considerations, there is every reason to believe that our labor legislation from
Commonwealth Act No. 103, creating the Court of Industrial Relations, down through the Eight-Hour Labor
Law, to the Industrial Peace Act, was intended by the Legislature to apply only to industrial employment and
to govern the relations between employers engaged in industry and occupations for purposes of profit and
gain, and their industrial employees, but not to organizations and entities which are organized, operated and
maintained not for profit or gain, but for elevated and lofty purposes, such as, charity, social service,
education and instruction, hospital and medical service, the encouragement and promotion of character,
patriotism and kindred virtues in youth of the nation, etc.

"In conclusion, we find and hold that Republic Act No. 875, particularly, that portion thereof regarding labor
disputes and unfair labor practice, does not apply to the Boy Scouts of the Philippines, and consequently, the
Court of Industrial Relations had no jurisdiction to entertain and decide the action or petition filed by
respondent Araos. Wherefore, the appealed decision and resolution of the CIR are hereby set aside, with costs
against respondent."

There being a close analogy between the relation and facts involved in the two cases, we cannot but conclude that the
Court of Industrial Relations has no jurisdiction to entertain the complaint for unfair labor practice lodged by
respondent association against petitioner and, therefore, we hereby set aside the order and resolution subject to the
present petition, with costs against respondent association.

The same doctrine was confirmed in the case of University of Santo Tomas v. Hon. Baltazar Villanueva, et al., G.R. No. L-13748,
October 30, 1959, where this Court ruled that:

In the present case, the record reveals that the petitioner University of Santo Tomas is not an industry organized for
profit but an institution of learning devoted exclusively to the education of the youth. The Court of First Instance of
Manila in its decision in Civil Case No. 28870, which has long become final and consequently the settled law in the
case, found as established by the evidence adduced by the parties therein (herein petitioner and respondent labor union)
that while the University collects fees from its students, all its income is used for the improvement and enlargement of
the institution. The University declares no dividend, and the members of the corporation who founded it, as ordained in
its articles of incorporation, receive no material compensation for the time and sacrifice they render to the University
and its students. The respondent union itself in a case before the Industrial Court (Case No. 314-MC) has averred that
"the University of Santo Tomas, like the San Beda College, is an educational institution operated not for profit but for
the sole purpose of educating young men." (See Annex "B" to petitioner's motion to dismiss.). It is apparent, therefore,
that on the face of the record the University of Santo Tomas is not a corporation created for profit but an educational
institution and therefore not an industrial or business organization.

In the case of La Consolacion College, et al. vs. CIR, et al., G.R. No. L-13282, April 22, 1960, this Court repeated the same
ruling when it said:
 The main issue in this appeal by petitioner is that the industry trial court committed an error in holding that it has
jurisdiction to act in this case even if it involves unfair labor practice considering that the La Consolacion College is not
a business enterprise but an educational institution not organized for profit.

If the claim that petitioner is an educational institution not operated for profit is true, which apparently is the case,
because the very court a quo found that it has no stockholder, nor capital . . . then we are of the opinion that the same
does not come under the jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial Relations in view of the ruling in the case of Boy Scouts
of the Philippines v. Juliana V. Araos, G.R. No. L-10091, decided on January 29, 1958.

It is noteworthy that the cases of the University of San Agustin, the University of Santo Tomas, and La Consolacion College,
cited above, all involve charges of unfair labor practice under Republic Act No. 875, and the uniform rulings of this Court are
that the Court of Industrial Relations has no jurisdiction over the charges because said Act does not apply to educational
institutions that are not operated or maintained for profit and do not declare dividends. On the other hand, in the cases of Far
Eastern University v. CIR, et al., G.R. No. L-17620, August 31, 1962, this Court upheld the decision of the Court of Industrial
Relations finding the Far Eastern University, also an educational institution, guilty of unfair labor practice. Among the findings
of fact in said case was that the Far Eastern University made profits from the school year 1952-1953 to 1958-1959. In affirming
the decision of the lower court, this Court had thereby ratified the ruling of the Court of Industrial Relations which applied the
Industrial Peace Act to educational institutions that are organized, operated and maintained for profit.

It is also noteworthy that in the decisions in the cases of the Boy Scouts of the Philippines, the University of San Agustin, the
University of Sto. Tomas, and La Consolacion College, this Court was not unanimous in the view that the Industrial Peace Act
(Republic Act No. 875) is not applicable to charitable, eleemosynary or non-profit organizations — which include educational
institutions not operated for profit. There are members of this Court who hold the view that the Industrial Peace Act would apply
also to non-profit organizations or entities — the only exception being the Government, including any political subdivision or
instrumentality thereof, in so far as governmental functions are concerned. However, in the Far Eastern University case this Court
is unanimous in supporting the view that an educational institution that is operated for profit comes within the scope of the
Industrial Peace Act. We consider it a settled doctrine of this Court, therefore, that the Industrial Peace Act is applicable to any
organization or entity — whatever may be its purpose when it was created — that is operated for profit or gain.

Does the University operate as an educational institution for profit? Does it declare dividends for its stockholders? If it does not,
it must be declared beyond the purview of Republic Act No. 875; but if it does, Republic Act No. 875 must apply to it. The
University itself admits that it has declared dividends.3 The CIR in its order dated March 30, 1963 in CIR Case No. 41-IPA —
which order was issued after evidence was heard — also found that the University is not for strictly educational purposes and that
"It realizes profits and parts of such earning is distributed as dividends to private stockholders or individuals (Exh. A and also 1
to 1-F, 2-x 3-x and 4-x)"4 Under this circumstance, and in consonance with the rulings in the decisions of this Court, above cited,
it is obvious that Republic Act No. 875 is applicable to herein petitioner Feati University.

But the University claims that it is not an employer within the contemplation of Republic Act No. 875, because it is not an
industrial establishment. At most, it says, it is only a lessee of the services of its professors and/or instructors pursuant to a
contract of services entered into between them. We find no merit in this claim. Let us clarify who is an "employer" under the Act.
Section 2(c) of said Act provides:

Sec. 2. Definitions.—As used in this Act —

(c) The term employer include any person acting in the interest of an employer, directly or indirectly, but shall not
include any labor organization (otherwise than when acting as an employer) or any one acting in the capacity or agent
of such labor organization.

It will be noted that in defining the term "employer" the Act uses the word "includes", which it also used in defining "employee".
[Sec. 2 (d)], and "representative" [Sec. 2(h)]; and not the word "means" which the Act uses in defining the terms "court" [Sec.
2(a)], "labor organization" [Sec. 2(e)], "legitimate labor organization [Sec. 2(f)], "company union" [Sec. 2(g)], "unfair labor
practice" [Sec. 2(i)], "supervisor" [Sec. 2(k)], "strike" [Sec. 2(l)] and "lock-out" [Sec. 2(m)]. A methodical variation in
terminology is manifest. This variation and distinction in terminology and phraseology cannot be presumed to have been the
inconsequential product of an oversight; rather, it must have been the result of a deliberate and purposeful act, more so when we
consider that as legislative records show, Republic Act No. 875 had been meticulously and painstakingly drafted and deliberated
upon. In using the word "includes" and not "means", Congress did not intend to give a complete definition of "employer", but
rather that such definition should be complementary to what is commonly understood as employer. Congress intended the term to
be understood in a broad meaning because, firstly, the statutory definition includes not only "a principal employer but also a
person acting in the interest of the employer"; and, secondly, the Act itself specifically enumerated those who are not included in
the term "employer", namely: (1) a labor organization (otherwise than when acting as an employer), (2) anyone acting in the
capacity of officer or agent of such labor organization [Sec. 2(c)], and (3) the Government and any political subdivision or
instrumentality thereof insofar as the right to strike for the purpose of securing changes or modifications in the terms and
conditions of employment is concerned (Section 11). Among these statutory exemptions, educational institutions are not
included; hence, they can be included in the term "employer". This Court, however, has ruled that those educational institutions
that are not operated for profit are not within the purview of Republic Act No. 875. 5

As stated above, Republic Act No. 875 does not give a comprehensive but only a complementary definition of the term
"employer". The term encompasses those that are in ordinary parlance "employers." What is commonly meant by "employer"?
The term "employer" has been given several acceptations. The lexical definition is "one who employs; one who uses; one who
engages or keeps in service;" and "to employ" is "to provide work and pay for; to engage one's service; to hire." (Webster's New
Twentieth Century Dictionary, 2nd ed., 1960, p. 595). The Workmen's Compensation Act defines employer as including "every
person or association of persons, incorporated or not, public or private, and the legal representative of the deceased employer"
and "includes the owner or lessee of a factory or establishment or place of work or any other person who is virtually the owner or
manager of the business carried on in the establishment or place of work but who, for reason that there is an independent
contractor in the same, or for any other reason, is not the direct employer of laborers employed there." [Sec. 39(a) of Act No.
3428.] The Minimum Wage Law states that "employer includes any person acting directly or indirectly in the interest of the
employer in relation to an employee and shall include the Government and the government corporations". [Rep. Act No. 602,
Sec. 2(b)]. The Social Security Act defines employer as "any person, natural or juridical, domestic or foreign, who carries in the
Philippines any trade, business, industry, undertaking, or activity of any kind and uses the services of another person who is
under his orders as regards the employment, except the Government and any of its political subdivisions, branches or
instrumentalities, including corporations owned or controlled by the Government." (Rep. Act No. 1161, Sec. 8[c]).

This Court, in the cases of the The Angat River Irrigation System, et al. vs. Angat River Workers' Union (PLUM), et al., G.R.
Nos. L-10934 and L-10944, December 28, 1957, which cases involve unfair labor practices and hence within the purview of
Republic Act No. 875, defined the term employer as follows:

An employer is one who employs the services of others; one for whom employees work and who pays their wages or
salaries (Black Law Dictionary, 4th ed., p. 618).

An employer includes any person acting in the interest of an employer, directly or indirectly (Sec. 2-c, Rep. Act 875).

Under none of the above definitions may the University be excluded, especially so if it is considered that every professor,
instructor or teacher in the teaching staff of the University, as per allegation of the University itself, has a contract with the latter
for teaching services, albeit for one semester only. The University engaged the services of the professors, provided them work,
and paid them compensation or salary for their services. Even if the University may be considered as a lessee of services under a
contract between it and the members of its Faculty, still it is included in the term "employer". "Running through the word
`employ' is the thought that there has been an agreement on the part of one person to perform a certain service in return for
compensation to be paid by an employer. When you ask how a man is employed, or what is his employment, the thought that he
is under agreement to perform some service or services for another is predominant and paramount." (Ballentine Law Dictionary,
Philippine ed., p. 430, citing Pinkerton National Detective Agency v. Walker, 157 Ga. 548, 35 A. L. R. 557, 560, 122 S.E. Rep.
202).

To bolster its claim of exception from the application of Republic Act No. 875, the University contends that it is not state that the
employers included in the definition of 2 (c) of the Act. This contention can not be sustained. In the first place, Sec. 2 (c) of
Republic Act No. 875 does not state that the employers included in the definition of the term "employer" are only and exclusively
"industrial establishments"; on the contrary, as stated above, the term "employer" encompasses all employers except those
specifically excluded by the Act. In the second place, even the Act itself does not refer exclusively to industrial establishments
and does not confine its application thereto. This is patent inasmuch as several provisions of the Act are applicable to non-
industrial workers, such as Sec. 3, which deals with "employees' right to self-organization"; Sections 4 and 5 which enumerate
unfair labor practices; Section 8 which nullifies private contracts contravening employee's rights; Section 9 which relates to
injunctions in any case involving a labor dispute; Section 11 which prohibits strikes in the government; Section 12 which
provides for the exclusive collective bargaining representation for labor organizations; Section 14 which deals with the procedure
for collective bargaining; Section 17 which treats of the rights and conditions of membership in labor organizations; Sections 18,
19, 20 and 21 which provide respectively for the establishment of conciliation service, compilation of collective bargaining
contracts, advisory labor-management relations; Section 22 which empowers the Secretary of Labor to make a study of labor
relations; and Section 24 which enumerates the rights of labor organizations. (See Dissenting Opinion of Justice Concepcion in
Boy Scouts of the Philippines v. Juliana Araos, G.R. No. L-10091, January 29, 1958.)
This Court, in the case of Boy Scouts of the Philippines v. Araos, supra, had occasion to state that the Industrial Peace Act "refers
only to organizations and entities created and operated for profits, engaged in a profitable trade, occupation or industry". It cannot
be denied that running a university engages time and attention; that it is an occupation or a business from which the one engaged
in it may derive profit or gain. The University is not an industrial establishment in the sense that an industrial establishment is
one that is engaged in manufacture or trade where raw materials are changed or fashioned into finished products for use. But for
the purposes of the Industrial Peace Act the University is an industrial establishment because it is operated for profit and it
employs persons who work to earn a living. The term "industry", for the purposes of the application of our labor laws should be
given a broad meaning so as to cover all enterprises which are operated for profit and which engage the services of persons who
work to earn a living.

The word "industry" within State Labor Relations Act controlling labor relations in industry, cover labor conditions in
any field of employment where the objective is earning a livelihood on the one side and gaining of a profit on the other.
Labor Law Sec. 700 et seq. State Labor Relations Board vs. McChesney, 27 N.Y.S. 2d 866, 868." (Words and Phrases,
Permanent Edition, Vol. 21, 1960 edition p. 510).

The University urges that even if it were an employer, still there would be no employer-employee relationship between it and the
striking members of the Faculty Club because the latter are not employees within the purview of Sec. 2(d) of Republic Act No.
875 but are independent contractors. This claim is untenable.

Section 2 (d) of Republic Act No. 875 provides:

(d) The term "employee" shall include any employee and shall not be limited to the employee of a particular employer
unless the act explicitly states otherwise and shall include any individual whose work has ceased as a consequence of,
or in connection with, any current labor dispute or because of any unfair labor practice and who has not obtained any
other substantially equivalent and regular employment.

This definition is again, like the definition of the term "employer" [Sec. 2(c)], by the use of the term "include", complementary. It
embraces not only those who are usually and ordinarily considered employees, but also those who have ceased as employees as a
consequence of a labor dispute. The term "employee", furthermore, is not limited to those of a particular employer. As already
stated, this Court in the cases of The Angat River Irrigation System, et al. v. Angat River Workers' Union (PLUM), et al., supra,
has defined the term "employer" as "one who employs the services of others; one for whom employees work and who pays their
wages or salaries. "Correlatively, an employee must be one who is engaged in the service of another; who performs services for
another; who works for salary or wages. It is admitted by the University that the striking professors and/or instructors are under
contract to teach particular courses and that they are paid for their services. They are, therefore, employees of the University.

In support of its claim that the members of the Faculty Club are not employees of the University, the latter cites as authority
Francisco's Labor Laws, 2nd ed., p. 3, which states:

While the term "workers" as used in a particular statute, has been regarded as limited to those performing physical
labor, it has been held to embrace stenographers and bookkeepers. Teachers are not included, however.

It is evident from the above-quoted authority that "teachers" are not to be included among those who perform "physical labor",
but it does not mean that they are not employees. We have checked the source of the authority, which is 31 Am. Jur., Sec. 3, p.
835, and the latter cites Huntworth v. Tanner, 87 Wash 670, 152 P. 523, Ann Cas 1917 D 676. A reading of the last case confirms
Our view.

That teachers are "employees' has been held in a number of cases (Aebli v. Board of Education of City and County of San
Francisco, 145 P. 2d 601, 62 Col. App 2.d 706; Lowe & Campbell Sporting Goods Co. v. Tangipahoa Parish School Board, La.
App., 15 So. 2d 98, 100; Sister Odelia v. Church of St. Andrew, 263 N. W. 111, 112, 195 Minn. 357, cited in Words and Phrases,
Permanent ed., Vol. 14, pp. 806-807). This Court in the Far Eastern University case, supra, considered university instructors as
employees and declared Republic Act No. 875 applicable to them in their employment relations with their school. The professors
and/or instructors of the University neither ceased to be employees when they struck, for Section 2 of Rep. Act 875 includes
among employees any individual whose work has ceased as consequence of, or in connection with a current labor dispute.
Striking employees maintain their status as employees of the employer. (Western Cartridge Co. v. NLRB, C.C.A. 7, 139 F2d 855,
858).

The contention of the University that the professors and/or instructors are independent contractors, because the University does
not exercise control over their work, is likewise untenable. This Court takes judicial notice that a university controls the work of
the members of its faculty; that a university prescribes the courses or subjects that professors teach, and when and where to teach;
that the professors' work is characterized by regularity and continuity for a fixed duration; that professors are compensated for
their services by wages and salaries, rather than by profits; that the professors and/or instructors cannot substitute others to do
their work without the consent of the university; and that the professors can be laid off if their work is found not satisfactory. All
these indicate that the university has control over their work; and professors are, therefore, employees and not independent
contractors. There are authorities in support of this view.

The principal consideration in determining whether a workman is an employee or an independent contractor is the right
to control the manner of doing the work, and it is not the actual exercise of the right by interfering with the work, but
the right to control, which constitutes the test. (Amalgamated Roofing Co. v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 133 N.E. 259, 261,
300 Ill. 487, quoted in Words and Phrases, Permanent ed., Vol. 14, p. 576).

Where, under Employers' Liability Act, A was instructed when and where to work . . . he is an employee, and not a
contractor, though paid specified sum per square. (Heine v. Hill, Harris & Co., 2 La. App. 384, 390, in Words and
Phrases, loc, cit.) .

Employees are those who are compensated for their labor or services by wages rather than by profits. (People vs.
Distributors Division, Smoked Fish Workers Union Local No. 20377, Sup. 7 N. Y. S. 2d 185, 187 in Words and
Phrases, loc, cit.)

Services of employee or servant, as distinguished from those of a contractor, are usually characterized by regularity and
continuity of work for a fixed period or one of indefinite duration, as contrasted with employment to do a single act or a
series of isolated acts; by compensation on a fixed salary rather than one regulated by value or amount of work; . . .
(Underwood v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, C.C.A., 56 F. 2d 67, 71 in Words and Phrases, op. cit., p. 579.)

Independent contractors can employ others to work and accomplish contemplated result without consent of contractee,
while "employee" cannot substitute another in his place without consent of his employer. (Luker Sand & Gravel Co. v.
Industrial Commission, 23 P. 2d 225, 82 Utah, 188, in Words and Phrases, Vol. 14, p. 576).

Moreover, even if university professors are considered independent contractors, still they would be covered by Rep. Act No. 875.
In the case of the Boy Scouts of the Philippines v. Juliana Araos, supra, this Court observed that Republic Act No. 875 was
modelled after the Wagner Act, or the National Labor Relations Act, of the United States, and this Act did not exclude
"independent contractors" from the orbit of "employees". It was in the subsequent legislation — the Labor Management Relation
Act (Taft-Harley
Act) — that "independent contractors" together with agricultural laborers, individuals in domestic service of the home,
supervisors, and others were excluded. (See Rothenberg on Labor Relations, 1949, pp. 330-331).

It having been shown that the members of the Faculty Club are employees, it follows that they have a right to unionize in
accordance with the provisions of Section 3 of the Magna Carta of Labor (Republic Act No. 875) which provides as follows:

Sec. 3. Employees' right to self-organization.—Employees shall have the right to self-organization and to form, join or
assist labor organizations of their own choosing for the purpose of collective bargaining through representatives of their
own choosing and to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining and other mutual aid or
protection. . . .

We agree with the statement of the lower court, in its order of March 30, 1963 which is sought to be set aside in the instant case,
that the right of employees to self-organization is guaranteed by the Constitution, that said right would exist even if Republic Act
No. 875 is repealed, and that regardless of whether their employers are engaged in commerce or not. Indeed, it is Our considered
view that the members of the faculty or teaching staff of private universities, colleges, and schools in the Philippines, regardless
of whether the university, college or school is run for profit or not, are included in the term "employees" as contemplated in
Republic Act No. 875 and as such they may organize themselves pursuant to the above-quoted provision of Section 3 of said Act.
Certainly, professors, instructors or teachers of private educational institutions who teach to earn a living are entitled to the
protection of our labor laws — and one such law is Republic Act No. 875.

The contention of the University in the instant case that the members of the Faculty Club can not unionize and the Faculty Club
can not exist as a valid labor organization is, therefore, without merit. The record shows that the Faculty Club is a duly registered
labor organization and this fact is admitted by counsel for the University. 5a
The other issue raised by the University is the validity of the Presidential certification. The University contends that under
Section 10 of Republic Act No. 875 the power of the President of the Philippines to certify is subject to the following conditions,
namely: (1) that here is a labor dispute, and (2) that said labor dispute exists in an industry that is vital to the national interest.
The University maintains that those conditions do not obtain in the instant case. This contention has also no merit.

We have previously stated that the University is an establishment or enterprise that is included in the term "industry" and is
covered by the provisions of Republic Act No. 875. Now, was there a labor dispute between the University and the Faculty Club?

Republic Act No. 875 defines a labor dispute as follows:

The term "labor dispute" includes any controversy concerning terms, tenure or conditions of employment, or
concerning the association or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or seeking to
arrange terms or conditions of employment regardless of whether the disputants stand in proximate relation of
employer and employees.

The test of whether a controversy comes within the definition of "labor dispute" depends on whether the controversy involves or
concerns "terms, tenure or condition of employment" or "representation." It is admitted by the University, in the instant case, that
on January 14, 1963 the President of the Faculty Club wrote to the President of the University a letter informing the latter of the
organization of the Faculty Club as a labor union, duly registered with the Bureau of Labor Relations; that again on January 22,
1963 another letter was sent, to which was attached a list of demands consisting of 26 items, and asking the President of the
University to answer within ten days from date of receipt thereof; that the University questioned the right of the Faculty Club to
be the exclusive representative of the majority of the employees and asked proof that the Faculty Club had been designated or
selected as exclusive representative by the vote of the majority of said employees; that on February 1, 1963 the Faculty Club filed
with the Bureau of Labor Relations a notice of strike alleging as reason therefor the refusal of the University to bargain
collectively with the representative of the faculty members; that on February 18, 1963 the members of the Faculty Club went on
strike and established picket lines in the premises of the University, thereby disrupting the schedule of classes; that on March 1,
1963 the Faculty Club filed Case No. 3666-ULP for unfair labor practice against the University, but which was later dismissed
(on April 2, 1963 after Case 41-IPA was certified to the CIR); and that on March 7, 1963 a petition for certification election, Case
No. 1183-MC, was filed by the Faculty Club in the CIR.6 All these admitted facts show that the controversy between the
University and the Faculty Club involved terms and conditions of employment, and the question of representation. Hence, there
was a labor dispute between the University and the Faculty Club, as contemplated by Republic Act No. 875. It having been
shown that the University is an institution operated for profit, that is an employer, and that there is an employer-employee
relationship, between the University and the members of the Faculty Club, and it having been shown that a labor dispute existed
between the University and the Faculty Club, the contention of the University, that the certification made by the President is not
only not authorized by Section 10 of Republic Act 875 but is violative thereof, is groundless.

Section 10 of Republic Act No. 875 provides:

When in the opinion of the President of the Philippines there exists a labor dispute in an industry indispensable to the
national interest and when such labor dispute is certified by the President to the Court of Industrial Relations, said
Court may cause to be issued a restraining order forbidding the employees to strike or the employer to lockout the
employees, and if no other solution to the dispute is found, the Court may issue an order fixing the terms and conditions
of employment.

This Court had occasion to rule on the application of the above-quoted provision of Section 10 of Republic Act No. 875. In the
case of Pampanga Sugar Development Co. v. CIR, et al., G.R. No. L-13178, March 24, 1961, it was held:

It thus appears that when in the opinion of the President a labor dispute exists in an industry indispensable to national
interest and he certifies it to the Court of Industrial Relations the latter acquires jurisdiction to act thereon in the manner
provided by law. Thus the court may take either of the following courses: it may issue an order forbidding the
employees to strike or the employer to lockout its employees, or, failing in this, it may issue an order fixing the terms
and conditions of employment. It has no other alternative. It can not throw the case out in the assumption that the
certification was erroneous.

xxx xxx xxx

. . . The fact, however, is that because of the strike declared by the members of the minority union which threatens a
major industry the President deemed it wise to certify the controversy to the Court of Industrial Relations for
adjudication. This is the power that the law gives to the President the propriety of its exercise being a matter that only
 devolves upon him. The same is not the concern of the industrial court. What matters is that by virtue of the
certification made by the President the case was placed under the jurisdiction of said court. (Emphasis supplied)

To certify a labor dispute to the CIR is the prerogative of the President under the law, and this Court will not interfere in, much
less curtail, the exercise of that prerogative. The jurisdiction of the CIR in a certified case is exclusive (Rizal Cement Co., Inc. v.
Rizal Cement Workers Union (FFW), et al., G.R. No. L-12747, July 30, 1960). Once the jurisdiction is acquired pursuant to the
presidential certification, the CIR may exercise its broad powers as provided in Commonwealth Act 103. All phases of the labor
dispute and the employer-employee relationship may be threshed out before the CIR, and the CIR may issue such order or orders
as may be necessary to make effective the exercise of its jurisdiction. The parties involved in the case may appeal to the Supreme
Court from the order or orders thus issued by the CIR.

And so, in the instant case, when the President took into consideration that the University "has some 18,000 students and
employed approximately 500 faculty members", that `the continued disruption in the operation of the University will necessarily
prejudice the thousand of students", and that "the dispute affects the national interest",7and certified the dispute to the CIR, it is
not for the CIR nor this Court to pass upon the correctness of the reasons of the President in certifying the labor dispute to the
CIR.

The third issue raised by the University refers to the question of the legality of the return-to-work order (of March 30, 1963 in
Case 41-IPA) and the order implementing the same (of April 6, 1963). It alleges that the orders are illegal upon the grounds: (1)
that Republic Act No. 875, supplementing Commonwealth Act No. 103, has withdrawn from the CIR the power to issue a return-
to-work order; (2) that the only power granted by Section 10 of Republic Act No. 875 to the CIR is to issue an order forbidding
the employees to strike or forbidding the employer to lockout the employees, as the case may be, before either contingency had
become a fait accompli; (3) that the taking in by the University of replacement professors was valid, and the return-to-work order
of March 30, 1963 constituted impairment of the obligation of contracts; and (4) the CIR could not issue said order without
having previously determined the legality or illegality of the strike.

The contention of the University that Republic Act No. 875 has withdrawn the power of the Court of Industrial Relations to issue
a return-to-work order exercised by it under Commonwealth Act No. 103 can not be sustained. When a case is certified by the
President to the Court of Industrial Relations, the case thereby comes under the operation of Commonwealth Act No. 103, and
the Court may exercise the broad powers and jurisdiction granted to it by said Act. Section 10 of Republic Act No. 875 empowers
the Court of Industrial Relations to issue an order "fixing the terms of employment." This clause is broad enough to authorize the
Court to order the strikers to return to work and the employer to readmit them. This Court, in the cases of the Philippine Marine
Officers Association vs. The Court of Industrial Relations, Compania Maritima, et al.; and Compañia Martima, et al. vs.
Philippine Marine Radio Officers Association and CIR, et al., G.R. Nos. L-10095 and L-10115, October 31, 1957, declared:

We cannot subscribe to the above contention. We agree with counsel for the Philippine Radio Officers' Association that
upon certification by the President under Section 10 of Republic Act 875, the case comes under the operation of
Commonwealth Act 103, which enforces compulsory arbitration in cases of labor disputes in industries indispensable to
the national interest when the President certifies the case to the Court of Industrial Relations. The evident intention of
the law is to empower the Court of Industrial Relations to act in such cases, not only in the manner prescribed under
Commonwealth Act 103, but with the same broad powers and jurisdiction granted by that act. If the Court of Industrial
Relations is granted authority to find a solution to an industrial dispute and such solution consists in the ordering of
employees to return back to work, it cannot be contended that the Court of Industrial Relations does not have the power
or jurisdiction to carry that solution into effect. And of what use is its power of conciliation and arbitration if it does not
have the power and jurisdiction to carry into effect the solution it has adopted? Lastly, if the said court has the power to
fix the terms and conditions of employment, it certainly can order the return of the workers with or without backpay as
a term or condition of employment.

The foregoing ruling was reiterated by this Court in the case of Hind Sugar Co. v. CIR, et al., G.R. No. L-13364, July 26, 1960.

When a case is certified to the CIR by the President of the Philippines pursuant to Section 10 of Republic Act No. 875, the CIR is
granted authority to find a solution to the industrial dispute; and the solution which the CIR has found under the authority of the
presidential certification and conformable thereto cannot be questioned (Radio Operators Association of the Philippines vs.
Philippine Marine Radio Officers Association, et al., L-10112, Nov. 29, 1957, 54 O.G. 3218).

Untenable also is the claim of the University that the CIR cannot issue a return-to-work order after strike has been declared, it
being contended that under Section 10 of Republic Act No. 875 the CIR can only prevent a strike or a lockout — when either of
this situation had not yet occurred. But in the case of Bisaya Land Transportation Co., Inc. vs. Court of Industrial Relations, et al.,
No. L-10114, Nov. 26, 1957, 50 O.G. 2518, this Court declared:
 There is no reason or ground for the contention that Presidential certification of labor dispute to the CIR is limited to
the prevention of strikes and lockouts. Even after a strike has been declared where the President believes that public
interest demands arbitration and conciliation, the President may certify the ease for that purpose. The practice has been
for the Court of Industrial Relations to order the strikers to work, pending the determination of the union demands that
impelled the strike. There is nothing in the law to indicate that this practice is abolished." (Emphasis supplied)

Likewise untenable is the contention of the University that the taking in by it of replacements was valid and the return-to-work
order would be an impairment of its contract with the replacements. As stated by the CIR in its order of March 30, 1963, it was
agreed before the hearing of Case 41-IPA on March 23, 1963 that the strikers would return to work under the status
quo arrangement and the University would readmit them, and the return-to-work order was a confirmation of that agreement.
This is a declaration of fact by the CIR which we cannot disregard. The faculty members, by striking, have not abandoned their
employment but, rather, they have only ceased from their labor (Keith Theatre v. Vachon et al., 187 A. 692). The striking faculty
members have not lost their right to go back to their positions, because the declaration of a strike is not a renunciation of their
employment and their employee relationship with the University (Rex Taxicab Co. vs. CIR, et al., 40 O.G., No. 13, 138). The
employment of replacements was not authorized by the CIR. At most, that was a temporary expedient resorted to by the
University, which was subject to the power of the CIR to allow to continue or not. The employment of replacements by the
University prior to the issuance of the order of March 30, 1963 did not vest in the replacements a permanent right to the positions
they held. Neither could such temporary employment bind the University to retain permanently the replacements.

Striking employees maintained their status as employees of the employer (Western Castridge Co. v. National Labor
Relations Board, C.C.A. 139 F. 2d 855, 858) ; that employees who took the place of strikers do not displace them as
`employees." ' (National Labor Relations Board v. A. Sartorius & Co., C.C.A. 2, 140 F. 2d 203, 206, 207.)

It is clear from what has been said that the return-to-work order cannot be considered as an impairment of the contract entered
into by petitioner with the replacements. Besides, labor contracts must yield to the common good and such contracts are subject
to the special laws on labor unions, collective bargaining, strikes and similar subjects (Article 1700, Civil Code).

Likewise unsustainable is the contention of the University that the Court of Industrial Relations could not issue the return-to-
work order without having resolved previously the issue of the legality or illegality of the strike, citing as authority therefor the
case of Philippine Can Company v. Court of Industrial Relations, G.R. No. L-3021, July 13, 1950. The ruling in said case is not
applicable to the case at bar, the facts and circumstances being very different. The Philippine Can Company case, unlike the
instant case, did not involve the national interest and it was not certified by the President. In that case the company no longer
needed the services of the strikers, nor did it need substitutes for the strikers, because the company was losing, and it was
imperative that it lay off such laborers as were not necessary for its operation in order to save the company from bankruptcy. This
was the reason of this Court in ruling, in that case, that the legality or illegality of the strike should have been decided first before
the issuance of the return-to-work order. The University, in the case before Us, does not claim that it no longer needs the services
of professors and/or instructors; neither does it claim that it was imperative for it to lay off the striking professors and instructors
because of impending bankruptcy. On the contrary, it was imperative for the University to hire replacements for the strikers.
Therefore, the ruling in the Philippine Can case that the legality of the strike should be decided first before the issuance of the
return-to-work order does not apply to the case at bar. Besides, as We have adverted to, the return-to-work order of March 30,
1963, now in question, was a confirmation of an agreement between the University and the Faculty Club during a prehearing
conference on March 23, 1963.

The University also maintains that there was no more basis for the claim of the members of the Faculty Club to return to their
work, as their individual contracts for teaching had expired on March 25 or 31, 1963, as the case may be, and consequently, there
was also no basis for the return-to-work order of the CIR because the contractual relationships having ceased there were no
positions to which the members of the Faculty Club could return to. This contention is not well taken. This argument loses sight
of the fact that when the professors and instructors struck on February 18, 1963, they continued to be employees of the University
for the purposes of the labor controversy notwithstanding the subsequent termination of their teaching contracts, for Section 2(d)
of the Industrial Peace Act includes among employees "any individual whose work has ceased a consequence of, or in connection
with, any current labor dispute or of any unfair labor practice and who has not obtained any other substantially equivalent and
regular employment."

The question raised by the University was resolved in a similar case in the United States. In the case of Rapid Roller Co. v.
NLRB 126 F. 2d 452, we read:

On May 9, 1939 the striking employees, eighty-four in number, offered to the company to return to their employment.
The company believing it had not committed any unfair labor practice, refused the employees' offer and claimed the
right to employ others to take the place of the strikers, as it might see fit. This constituted discrimination in the hiring
and tenure of the striking employees. When the employees went out on a strike because of the unfair labor practice of
 the company, their status as employees for the purpose of any controversy growing out of that unfair labor practice was
fixed. Sec. 2 (3) of the Act. Phelps Dodge Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 313 U.S. 177, 61 S. Ct. 845, 85. L.
ed. 1271, 133 A.L.R. 1217.

For the purpose of such controversy they remained employees of the company. The company contended that they could
not be their employees in any event since the "contract of their employment expired by its own terms on April 23,
1939."

In this we think the company is mistaken for the reason we have just pointed out, that the status of the employees on
strike became fixed under Sec. 2 (3) of the Act because of the unfair labor practice of the company which caused the
strike.

The University, furthermore, claims that the information for indirect contempt filed against the officers of the University (Case
No. V-30) as well as the order of April 29, 1963 for their arrest were improper, irregular and illegal because (1) the officers of the
University had complied in good faith with the return-to-work order and in those cases that they did not, it was due to
circumstance beyond their control; (2) the return-to-work order and the order implementing the same were illegal; and (3) even
assuming that the order was legal, the same was not Yet final because there was a motion to reconsider it.

Again We find no merit in this claim of Petitioner. We have already ruled that the CIR had jurisdiction to issue the order of
March 30, 1963 in CIR Case 41-IPA, and the return-to-work provision of that order is valid and legal. Necessarily the order of
April 6, 1963 implementing that order of March 30, 1963 was also valid and legal.

Section 6 of Commonwealth Act No. 103 empowers the Court of Industrial Relations of any Judge thereof to punish direct and
indirect contempts as provided in Rule 64 (now Rule 71) of the Rules of Court, under the same procedure and penalties provided
therein. Section 3 of Rule 71 enumerates the acts which would constitute indirect contempt, among which is "disobedience or
resistance to lawful writ, process, order, judgment, or command of a court," and the person guilty thereof can be punished after a
written charge has been filed and the accused has been given an opportunity to be heard. The last paragraph of said section
provides:

But nothing in this section shall be so construed as to prevent the court from issuing process to bring the accused party
into court, or from holding him in custody pending such proceedings.

The provision authorizes the judge to order the arrest of an alleged contemner (Francisco, et al. v. Enriquez, L-7058, March 20,
1954, 94 Phil., 603) and this, apparently, is the provision upon which respondent Judge Bautista relied when he issued the
questioned order of arrest.

The contention of petitioner that the order of arrest is illegal is unwarranted. The return-to-work order allegedly violated was
within the court's jurisdiction to issue.

Section 14 of Commonwealth Act No. 103 provides that in cases brought before the Court of Industrial Relations under Section 4
of the Act (referring to strikes and lockouts) the appeal to the Supreme Court from any award, order or decision shall not stay the
execution of said award, order or decision sought to be reviewed unless for special reason the court shall order that execution be
stayed. Any award, order or decision that is appealed is necessarily not final. Yet under Section 14 of Commonwealth Act No.
103 that award, order or decision, even if not yet final, is executory, and the stay of execution is discretionary with the Court of
Industrial Relations. In other words, the Court of Industrial Relations, in cases involving strikes and lockouts, may compel
compliance or obedience of its award, order or decision even if the award, order or decision is not yet final because it is appealed,
and it follows that any disobedience or non-compliance of the award, order or decision would constitute contempt against the
Court of Industrial Relations which the court may punish as provided in the Rules of Court. This power of the Court of Industrial
Relations to punish for contempt an act of non-compliance or disobedience of an award, order or decision, even if not yet final, is
a special one and is exercised only in cases involving strikes and lockouts. And there is reason for this special power of the
industrial court because in the exercise of its jurisdiction over cases involving strikes and lockouts the court has to issue orders or
make decisions that are necessary to effect a prompt solution of the labor dispute that caused the strike or the lockout, or to effect
the prompt creation of a situation that would be most beneficial to the management and the employees, and also to the public —
even if the solution may be temporary, pending the final determination of the case. Otherwise, if the effectiveness of any order,
award, or decision of the industrial court in cases involving strikes and lockouts would be suspended pending appeal then it can
happen that the coercive powers of the industrial court in the settlement of the labor disputes in those cases would be rendered
useless and nugatory.
The University points to Section 6 of Commonwealth Act No. 103 which provides that "Any violation of any order, award, or
decision of the Court of Industrial Relations shall after such order, award or decision has become final, conclusive
and executory constitute contempt of court," and contends that only the disobedience of orders that are final (meaning one that is
not appealed) may be the subject of contempt proceedings. We believe that there is no inconsistency between the above-quoted
provision of Section 6 and the provision of Section 14 of Commonwealth Act No. 103. It will be noted that Section 6 speaks of
order, award or decision that is executory. By the provision of Section 14 an order, award or decision of the Court of Industrial
Relations in cases involving strikes and lockouts are immediately executory, so that a violation of that order would constitute an
indirect contempt of court.

We believe that the action of the CIR in issuing the order of arrest of April 29, 1963 is also authorized under Section 19 of
Commonwealth Act No. 103 which provides as follows:

SEC. 19. Implied condition in every contract of employment.—In every contract of employment whether verbal or
written, it is an implied condition that when any dispute between the employer and the employee or laborer has been
submitted to the Court of Industrial Relations for settlement or arbitration pursuant to the provisions of this Act . . . and
pending award, or decision by the Court of such dispute . . . the employee or laborer shall not strike or walk out of his
employment when so enjoined by the Court after hearing and when public interest so requires, and if he has already
done so, that he shall forthwith return to it, upon order of the Court, which shall be issued only after hearing when
public interest so requires or when the dispute cannot, in its opinion, be promptly decided or settled; and if the
employees or laborers fail to return to work, the Court may authorize the employer to accept other employees or
laborers. A condition shall further be implied that while such dispute . . . is pending, the employer shall refrain from
accepting other employees or laborers, unless with the express authority of the Court, and shall permit the continuation
in the service of his employees or laborers under the last terms and conditions existing before the dispute arose. . . . A
violation by the employer or by the employee or laborer of such an order or the implied contractual condition set forth
in this section shall constitute contempt of the Court of Industrial Relations and shall be punished by the Court itself in
the same manner with the same penalties as in the case of contempt of a Court of First Instance. . . .

We hold that the CIR acted within its jurisdiction when it ordered the arrest of the officers of the University upon a complaint for
indirect contempt filed by the Acting Special Prosecutor of the CIR in CIR Case V-30, and that order was valid. Besides those
ordered arrested were not yet being punished for contempt; but, having been charged, they were simply ordered arrested to be
brought before the Judge to be dealt with according to law. Whether they are guilty of the charge or not is yet to be determined in
a proper hearing.

Let it be noted that the order of arrest dated April 29, 1963 in CIR Case V-30 is being questioned in Case G.R. No. L-21278
before this Court in a special civil action for certiorari. The University did not appeal from that order. In other words, the only
question to be resolved in connection with that order in CIR Case V-30 is whether the CIR had jurisdiction, or had abused its
discretion, in issuing that order. We hold that the CIR had jurisdiction to issue that order, and neither did it abuse its discretion
when it issued that order.

In Case G.R. No. L-21462 the University appealed from the order of Judge Villanueva of the CIR in Case No. 1183-MC, dated
April 6, 1963, granting the motion of the Faculty Club to withdraw its petition for certification election, and from the resolution
of the CIR en banc, dated June 5, 1963, denying the motion to reconsider said order of April 6, 1963. The ground of the Faculty
Club in asking for the withdrawal of that petition for certification election was because the issues involved in that petition were
absorbed by the issues in Case 41-IPA. The University opposed the petition for withdrawal, but at the same time it moved for the
dismissal of the petition for certification election.

It is contended by the University before this Court, in G.R. L-21462, that the issues of employer-employee relationship between
the University and the Faculty Club, the alleged status of the Faculty Club as a labor union, its majority representation and
designation as bargaining representative in an appropriate unit of the Faculty Club should have been resolved first in Case No.
1183-MC prior to the determination of the issues in Case No. 41-IPA, and, therefore, the motion to withdraw the petition for
certification election should not have been granted upon the ground that the issues in the first case were absorbed in the second
case.

We believe that these contentions of the University in Case G.R. No. L-21462 have been sufficiently covered by the discussion in
this decision of the main issues raised in the principal case, which is Case G.R. No. L-21278. After all, the University wanted
CIR Case 1183-MC dismissed, and the withdrawal of the petition for certification election had in a way produced the situation
desired by the University. After considering the arguments adduced by the University in support of its petition for certiorari by
way of appeal in Case G.R. No. L-21278, We hold that the CIR did not commit any error when it granted the withdrawal of the
petition for certification election in Case No. 1183-MC. The principal case before the CIR is Case No. 41-IPA and all the
questions relating to the labor disputes between the University and the Faculty Club may be threshed out, and decided, in that
case.

In Case G.R. No. L-21500 the University appealed from the order of the CIR of March 30, 1963, issued by Judge Bautista, and
from the resolution of the CIR en banc promulgated on June 28, 1963, denying the motion for the reconsideration of that order of
March 30, 1963, in CIR Case No. 41-IPA. We have already ruled that the CIR has jurisdiction to issue that order of March 30,
1963, and that order is valid, and We, therefore, hold that the CIR did not err in issuing that order of March 30, 1963 and in
issuing the resolution promulgated on June 28, 1963 (although dated May 7, 1963) denying the motion to reconsider that order of
March 30, 1963.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction in Case G.R. No. L-
21278 is dismissed and the writs prayed for therein are denied. The writ of preliminary injunction issued in Case G.R. No. L-
21278 is dissolved. The orders and resolutions appealed from, in Cases Nos. L-21462 and L-21500, are affirmed, with costs in
these three cases against the petitioner-appellant Feati University. It is so ordered.

Concepcion, C.J., Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Sanchez and Castro, JJ., concur.

Reyes, J.B.L., J., concurs but reserves his vote on the teacher's right to strike.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 103560 July 6, 1995

GOLD CITY INTEGRATED PORT SERVICE, INC. (INPORT), petitioner,

vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (Fifth Division) ADELO EBUNA, EMMANUEL VALMORIDA,
RODOLFO PEREZ, ROGER ZAGADO, MARCOS GANZAN, AND REY VALLE, (WILFREDO DAHAN, ROGELIO
VILLAFUERTE, WILFREDO AMPER, RICARDO ABA, YOLITO AMBUS, FIDEL CALIO, VICENTE CAHATOL,
SOTECO CUENCA, NICOLAS DALAGUAN, BALBINO FAJARDO, ROLANDO JAMILA, RICARDO LAURETO,
RUDY LAURETO, QUIRICO LEJANIO, OSCAR LAPINIG, FELIPE LAURETE, JESUSTUDY OMISOL, ZOSIMO
OMISOL, PEDRO SUAREZ, SATURNINO SISIBAN and MANUEL YANEZ), respondents.

G.R. No. 103599 July 6, 1995

ADELO EBUNA, WILFREDO DAHAN, RICARDO LAURETO, REY VALLE, VICENTE CAHATOL, MARCOS
GANZAN, RODOLFO PEREZ, ROEL SAA, ROGELIO VILLAFUERTE, MANUEL YANEZ, WILFREDO AMPER,
QUIRECO LEJANO, EMMANUEL VALMORIA, ROLANDO JAMILLA, NICOLAS DALAGUAN, BALBINO
FAJARDO, PEDRO SUAREZ, ELPIDIO ESTROGA, RUBEN PAJO, JESUSTODY OMISOL, RICARDO ABA, FIDEL
CALIO, SATURNINO SESYBAN, RUDY LAURETO, OSCAR LAPINIG, FELIPE LAURENTE, ROGER ZAGADO,
SOTECO CUENCA, FIDEL ESLIT, ZOSIMO OMISOL, ANGEL BERNIDO, and MICHAEL YAGOTYOT, petitioners,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, FIFTH DIVISION, and GOLD CITY INTEGRATED PORT
SERVICES, INC. (INPORT), respondents.

ROMERO, J.:

Should separation pay and backwages be awarded by public respondent NLRC to participants of an illegal strike? This is the core
issue to be decided in these two petitions.
Gold City Integrated Port Service, Inc. (INPORT) filed a petition for certiorari against the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC) assailing the latter's decision in "Gold City Integrated Port Services, Inc. v. Adelo Ebuna, et al." (NLRC RAB X Case
No. 5-0405-85) with twenty-seven private respondents (G.R. No. 103599).1 This petition has been consolidated with G.R. No.
103599 where the petitioners are the private respondents in instant case and the private respondent is INPORT. For the sake of
clarity, INPORT shall be denominated in the case at bench as the petitioner and the employees as private respondents.

Instant case arose from the following facts:

Early in the morning of April 30, 1985, petitioner's employees stopped working and gathered in a mass action to express their
grievances regarding wages, thirteenth month pay and hazard pay. Said employees were all members of the Macajalar Labor
Union — Federation of Free Workers (MLU-FFW) with whom petitioner had an existing collective bargaining agreement.

Petitioner was engaged in stevedoring and arrastre services at the port of Cagayan de Oro. The strike paralyzed operations at said
port.

On the same morning, the strikers filed individual notices of strike ("Kaugalingon nga Declarasyon sa Pag-Welga") with the then
Ministry of Labor and Employment.

With the failure of conciliation conferences between petitioner and the strikers, INPORT filed a complaint before the Labor
Arbiter for Illegal Strike with prayer for a restraining order/preliminary injunction.

On May 7, 1985, the National Labor Relations Commission issued a temporary restraining order. Thereafter, majority of the
strikers returned to work, leaving herein private respondents who continued their protest. 2

Counsel for private respondents filed a manifestation that petitioner required prior screening conducted by the MLU-FFW before
the remaining strikers could be accepted back to work.

Meanwhile, counsel for the Macajalar Labor Union (MLU-FFW) filed a "Motion to Drop Most of the Party Respondents From
the Above Entitled Case." The 278 employees on whose behalf the motion was filed, claimed that they were duped or tricked into
signing the individual notices of strike. After discovering this deception and verifying that the strike was staged by a minority of
the union officers and members and without the approval of, or consultation with, majority of the union members, they
immediately withdrew their notice of strike and returned to work.

The petitioner INPORT, not having interposed any objection, the Labor Arbiter, in his decision dated July 23, 1985, granted their
prayer to be excluded as respondents in the complaint for illegal strike. Moreover, petitioner's complaint was directed against the
31 respondents who did not return to work and continued with the strike.

For not having complied with the formal requirements in Article 264 of the Labor Code, 3 the strike staged by petitioner's workers
on April 30, 1985 was found by the Labor Arbiter to be illegal. 4 The workers who participated in the illegal strike did not,
however, lose their employment, since there was no evidence that they participated in illegal acts. After noting that petitioner
accepted the other striking employees back to work, the Labor Arbiter held that the private respondents should similarly be
allowed to return to work without having to undergo the required screening to be undertaken by their union (MLU-FFW).

As regards the six private respondents who were union officers, the Labor Arbiter ruled that they could not have possibly been
"duped or tricked" into signing the strike notice for they were active participants in the conciliation meetings and were thus fully
aware of what was going on. Hence, said union officers should be accepted back to work after seeking reconsideration from
herein petitioner.5

The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, it is hereby ordered that the strike undertaken by the officers and majority union
members of Macajalar Labor Union-FFW is ILLEGAL contrary to Article 264 of the Labor Code, as amended. Our
conclusion on the employment status of the illegal strikers is subject to our discussion above. 6

Both petitioner and private respondents filed motions for reconsideration, which public respondent NLRC treated as appeals. 7
On January 14, 1991, the NLRC affirmed with modification 8 the Arbiter's decision. It held that the concerted action by the
workers was more of a "protest action" than a strike. Private respondents, including the six union officers, should also be allowed
to work unconditionally to avoid discrimination. However, in view of the strained relations between the parties, separation pay
was awarded in lieu of reinstatement. The decretal portion of the Resolution reads:

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is Affirmed with modification in accordance with the foregoing resolution.
Complainant INPORT is hereby ordered, in lieu of reinstatement, to pay respondents the equivalent of twelve (12)
months salaries each as separation pay. Complainant is further ordered to pay respondents two (2) years backwages
based on their last salaries, without qualification or deduction. The appeal of complainant INPORT is Dismissed for
lack of merit.9

Upon petitioner's motion for reconsideration, public respondent modified the above resolution on December 12, 1991. 10

The Commission ruled that since private respondents were not actually terminated from service, there was no basis for
reinstatement. However, it awarded six months' salary as separation pay or financial assistance in the nature of "equitable relief."
The award for backwages was also deleted for lack of factual and legal basis. In lieu of backwages, compensation equivalent to
P1,000.00 was given.

The dispositive portion of the assailed Resolution reads:

WHEREFORE, the resolution of January 14, 1991 is Modified reducing the award for separation pay to six (6) months
each in favor of respondents, inclusive of lawful benefits as well as those granted under the CBA, if any, based on the
latest salary of respondents, as and by way of financial assistance while the award for backwages is Deleted and Set
Aside. In lieu thereof, respondents are granted compensation for their sudden loss of employment in the sum of
P1,000.00 each. The motion of respondents to implead PPA as third-party respondent is Noted. Except for this
modification the rest of the decision sought to be reconsidered shall stand. 11

In the instant petitions for certiorari, petitioner alleges that public respondent Commission committed grave abuse of discretion
in awarding private respondents separation pay and backwages despite the declaration that the strike was illegal.

On the other hand, private respondents, in their petition, assail the reduction of separation pay and deletion of backwages by the
NLRC as constituting grave abuse of discretion.

They also allege that the Resolution of January 14, 1991 could not be reconsidered after the unreasonable length of time of eleven
months.

Before proceeding with the principal issues raised by the parties, it is necessary to clarify public respondent's statements
concerning the strike staged by INPORT's employees.

In its resolution dated January 14, 1991, the NLRC held that the facts prevailing in the case at bench require a relaxation of the
rule that the formal requisites for a declaration of a strike are mandatory. Furthermore, what the employees engaged in was more
of a spontaneous protest action than a strike. 12

Nevertheless, the Commission affirmed the Labor Arbiter's decision which declared the strike illegal.

A strike, considered as the most effective weapon of labor, 13 is defined as any temporary stoppage of work by the concerted
action of employees as a result of an industrial or labor dispute. 14 A labor dispute includes any controversy or matter concerning
terms or conditions of employment or the association or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or
arranging the terms and conditions of employment, regardless of whether or not the disputants stand in the proximate relation of
employers and employees. 15

Private respondents and their co-workers stopped working and held the mass action on April 30, 1985 to press for their wages
and other benefits. What transpired then was clearly a strike, for the cessation of work by concerted action resulted from a labor
dispute.

The complaint before the Labor Arbiter involved the legality of said strike. The Arbiter correctly ruled that the strike was illegal
for failure to comply with the requirements of Article 264 (now Article 263) paragraphs (c) and (f) of the Labor Code. 16
The individual notices of strike filed by the workers did not conform to the notice required by the law to be filed since they were
represented by a union (MLU-FFW) which even had an existing collective bargaining agreement with INPORT.

Neither did the striking workers observe the strike vote by secret ballot, cooling-off period and reporting requirements.

As we stated in the case of National Federation of Sugar Workers v. Ovejera, 17 the language of the law leaves no room for doubt
that the cooling-off period and the seven-day strike ban after the strike-vote report were intended to be mandatory. 18

Article 265 of the Labor Code reads, inter alia:

(i)t SHALL be unlawful for any labor organization . . . to declare a strike . . . without first having filed the notice
required in the preceding Article or without the necessary strike vote first having been obtained and reported to the
Ministry. (Emphasis ours)

In explaining the above provision, we said:

In requiring a strike notice and a cooling-off period, the avowed intent of the law is to provide an opportunity
for mediation and conciliation. It thus directs the MOLE to exert all efforts at mediation and conciliation to
effect a voluntary settlement' during the cooling-off period. . . .

xxx xxx xxx

The cooling-off period and the 7-day strike ban after the filing of a strike-vote report, as prescribed in Art.
264 of the Labor Code, are reasonable restrictions and their imposition is essential to attain the legitimate
policy objectives embodied in the law. We hold that they constitute a valid exercise of the police power of the
state. 19

From the foregoing, it is patent that the strike on April 30, 1985 was illegal for failure to comply with the requirements
of the law.

The effects of such illegal strikes, outlined in Article 265 (now Article 264) of the Labor Code, make a distinction
between workers and union officers who participate therein.

A union officer who knowingly participates in an illegal strike and any worker or union officer who knowingly
participates in the commission of illegal acts during a strike may be declared to have lost their employment
status. 20 An ordinary striking worker cannot be terminated for mere participation in an illegal strike. There must be
proof that he committed illegal acts during a strike. A union officer, on the other hand, may be terminated from work
when he knowingly participates in an illegal strike, and like other workers, when he commits an illegal act during a
strike.

In the case at bench, INPORT accepted the majority of the striking workers, including union officers, back to work.
Private respondents were left to continue with the strike after they refused to submit to the "screening" required by the
company. 21

The question to be resolved now is what these remaining strikers, considering the circumstances of the case, are entitled
to receive under the law, if any.

Are they entitled, as they claim, to reinstatement or separation pay and backwages?

In his decision, the Labor Arbiter ordered INPORT to reinstate/accept the remaining workers as well as to accept the
remaining union officers after the latter sought reconsideration from INPORT. 22

The NLRC on January 14, 1991, modified the above decision by ordering INPORT to pay private respondents the
equivalent of twelve months in salary as separation pay in lieu of reinstatement and two years' backwages. 23
On reconsideration, public respondent modified its original award and reduced the separation pay to six months,
deleted the award for backwages and instead awarded P1,000.00 as compensation for their sudden loss of
employment. 24

25
Under the law, an employee is entitled to reinstatement and to his full backwages when he is unjustly dismissed.

Reinstatement means restoration to a state or condition from which one had been removed or separated. Reinstatement
and backwages are separate and distinct reliefs given to an illegally dismissed employee. 26

Separation pay is awarded when reinstatement is not possible, due, for instance, to strained relations between employer
and employee.

It is also given as a form of financial assistance when a worker is dismissed in cases such as the installation of labor
saving devices, redundancy, retrenchment to prevent losses, closing or cessation of operation of the establishment, or in
case the employee was found to have been suffering from a disease such that his continued employment is prohibited
by law. 27

Separation pay is a statutory right defined as the amount that an employee receives at the time of his severance from the
service and is designed to provide the employee with the wherewithal during the period that he is looking for another
employment. 28 It is oriented towards the immediate future, the transitional period the dismissed employee must
undergo before locating a replacement job. 29

Hence, an employee dismissed for causes other than those cited above is not entitled to separation pay. 30Well-settled is
it that separation pay shall be allowed only in those instances where the employee is validly dismissed
for causes other than serious misconduct or those reflecting on his moral character. 31

Backwages, on the other hand, is a form of relief that restores the income that was lost by reason of unlawful
dismissal. 32

It is clear from the foregoing summary of legal provisions and jurisprudence that there must generally be unjust or
illegal dismissal from work, before reinstatement and backwages may be granted. And in cases where reinstatement is
not possible or when dismissal is due to valid causes, separation pay may be granted.

Private respondents contend that they were terminated for failure to submit to the controversial "screening"
requirement.

Public respondent Commission took the opposite view and held:

As the evidence on record will show, respondents were not actually terminated from the service. They were
merely made to submit to a screening committee as a prerequisite for readmission to work. While this
condition was found not wholly justified, the fact remains that respondents who are resistant to such
procedure are partly responsible for the delay in their readmission back to work. Thus, We find justifiable
basis in further modifying our resolution of January 14, 1991 in accordance with the equities of the case.

We shall therefore recall the award for backwages for lack of factual and legal basis. The award for
separation pay shall likewise (be) reasonably reduced. Normally, severance benefit is granted as an
alternative remedy to reinstatement. And since there is no dismissal to speak of, there is no basis for awarding
reinstatement as a legal remedy. In lieu thereof, We shall grant herein respondents separation pay as and by
way of financial assistance in the nature of an "equitable relief". 33

We find that private respondents were indeed dismissed when INPORT refused to accept them back to work after the
former refused to submit to the "screening" process.

Applying the law (Article 264 of the Labor Code) which makes a distinction, we differentiate between the union
members and the union officers among private respondents in granting the reliefs prayed for.
Under Article 264 of the Labor Code, a worker merely participating in an illegal strike may not be terminated from his
employment. It is only when he commits illegal acts during a strike that he may be declared to have lost his
employment status. Since there appears no proof that these union members committed illegal acts during the strike,
they cannot be dismissed. The striking union members among private respondents are thus entitled to reinstatement,
there being no just cause for their dismissal.

However, considering that a decade has already lapsed from the time the disputed strike occurred, we find that to award
separation pay in lieu of reinstatement would be more practical and appropriate.

No backwages will be awarded to private respondent-union members as a penalty for their participation in the illegal
strike. Their continued participation in said strike, even after most of their co-workers had returned to work, can hardly
be rewarded by such an award.

The fate of private respondent-union officers is different. Their insistence on unconditional reinstatement or separation
pay and backwages is unwarranted and unjustified. For knowingly participating in an illegal strike, the law mandates
that a union officer may be terminated from employment. 34

Notwithstanding the fact that INPORT previously accepted other union officers and that the screening required by it
was uncalled for, still it cannot be gainsaid that it possessed the right and prerogative to terminate the union officers
from service. The law, in using the word may, grants the employer the option of declaring a union officer who
participated in an illegal strike as having lost his employment. 35

Moreover, an illegal strike which, more often than not, brings about unnecessary economic disruption and chaos in the
workplace should not be countenanced by a relaxation of the sanctions prescribed by law.

The union officers are, therefore, not entitled to any relief.

However, the above disquisition is now considered moot and academic and cannot be effected in view of a
manifestation filed by INPORT dated May 15, 1987. 36 In said Manifestation, it attached a Certification by the
President of the Macajalar Labor Union (MLU-FFW) to the effect that the private respondents/remaining strikers have
ceased to be members of said union. The MLU-FFW had an existing collective bargaining agreement with INPORT
containing a union security clause. Article 1, Section 2(b) of the CBA provides:

The corporation shall discharge, dismiss or terminate any employee who may be a member of the Union but
loses his good standing with the Union and or corporation, upon proper notice of such fact made by the latter;
provided, however, . . . after they shall have received the regular appointment as a condition for his continued
employment with the corporation. . . . 37

Since private respondents (union members) are no longer members of the MLU, they cannot be reinstated. In lieu of
reinstatement, which was a proper remedy before May 1987 when they were dismissed from the union, we award them
separation pay. We find that to award one month salary for every year of service until 1985, after April of which year
they no longer formed part of INPORT's productive work force partly through their own fault, is a fair settlement.

Finally, there is no merit in INPORT's statement that a Resolution of the NLRC cannot be modified upon
reconsideration after the lapse of an unreasonable period of time. Under the present circumstances, a period of eleven
months is not an unreasonable length of time. The Resolution of the public respondent dated January 14, 1991 did not
acquire finality in view of the timely filing of a motion for reconsideration. Hence, the Commission's modified
Resolution issued on December 12, 1991 is valid and in accordance with law.

In sum, reinstatement and backwages or, if no longer feasible, separation pay, can only be granted if sufficient bases
exist under the law, particularly after a showing of illegal dismissal. However, while the union members may thus be
entitled under the law to be reinstated or to receive separation pay, their expulsion from the union in accordance with
the collective bargaining agreement renders the same impossible.

The NLRC's award of separation pay as "equitable relief" and P1,000.00 as compensation should be deleted, these
being incompatible with our findings detailed above.
 WHEREFORE, from the foregoing premises, the petition in G.R. No. 103560 ("Gold City Integrated Port Service Inc.
v. National Labor Relations Commission, et al.") is GRANTED. One month salary for each year of service until 1985
is awarded to private respondents who were not union officers as separation pay. The petition in G.R. No. 103599
("Adelo Ebuna, et al. v. National Labor Relations Commission, et al.") is DISMISSED for lack of merit. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Feliciano, Melo, Vitug and Francisco, JJ., concur.

As we start the year 2012, perhaps the most hotly debated protected speech issue concerns the rights of employees to post
perceived disparaging comments about their employers on social media websites such as Facebook and Twitter. As this is still a
developing area of labor law, as of the time of the writing of this article the National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”) has not
yet handed down any precedential decisions on this issue.
As with all other areas concerning protected speech issues, the threshold question in social media postings is whether the
employee is engaged in concerted activity. If not, the postings will not be found to be a form of protected speech by the NLRB.
The test for concerted activity under the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”) is whether an employee acts “with or on the
authority of other employees, and not solely by and on behalf of the employee himself.” Meyers Industries (Meyers I) (1984)
268 NLRB 493; Meyers Industries (Meyers II) (1986) 281 NLRB 882. If concerted activity is found, then the question of
whether the speech is protected is determined by the 3 factors announced by the U.S. Supreme Court in NLRB v. Local Union
No. 1229, IBEW (Jefferson Standard Broadcasting) (1953) 346 U.S. 464: (1) does the speech occur in the context of an
ongoing labor dispute; (2) is it related to that dispute; and (3) is it determined to not be egregiously disloyal, reckless or
maliciously untrue.
HISPANICS UNITED OF BUFFALO DECISION
In September 2011, in the case of Hispanics United of Buffalo, Inc., Case No. 3-CA-27872, an NLRB Administrative Law
Judge issued the first decision concerning the protected nature of social media postings under the NLRA. As this is only an ALJ
decision that has not yet been reviewed by the full Board, it is not considered precedent, but the findings and analysis are useful
in helping to predict how the Board may ultimately decide these cases.
In Hispanics United, 5 employees of a private non-profit social services agency engaged in an exchange on Facebook concerning
criticisms made of them by another non-management employee. Management then fired all 5 employees on the grounds that
their postings constituted bullying and harassment of the subject employee. The ALJ found that the employees’ postings were
protected speech and therefore they had not engaged in any misconduct.
On the issue of protected speech, the ALJ found the employees were engaged in concerted activity: “Individual action is
concerted as long as it is engaged in with the object of inducing group action. The object of inducing group action need not be
express.” Further, the ALJ found that the employees’ Facebook communications with each other in reaction to the co-worker’s
criticisms were protected and that it was “irrelevant . . . that the (workers) were not trying to change their working conditions and
that they did not communicate their concerns to (the employer).”
The ALJ then found that the employees had not engaged in any misconduct. In doing so, the ALJ relied on the decision
from Atlantic Steel Co. (1979) 245 NLRB 814 that sets forth the factors used to determine if an employee engaged in misconduct
during the course of otherwise protected activity. Those factors are: (1) the place of the discussion; (2) the subject matter of the
discussion; (3) the nature of the employee’s outburst; and (4) whether the outburst was, in any way, provoked by an employer’s
unfair labor practice.
In applying these factors in Hispanics United, the ALJ determined that the employees actions were protected on the basis that:
(1) the “discussion”: the Facebook posts were not made at work and not made during working hours; (2) the “subject matter”: the
Facebook posts were related to a coworker’s criticisms of employee job performance, a matter the employees had a protected
 right to discuss; (3) there were no “outbursts”: none of the employees criticized the employer; and (4) “provocation”: while the
Facebook comments were not provoked by the employer, this factor was found irrelevant to the instant case.
As a result of his decision, the ALJ ordered that the fired employees should be reinstated to their positions. This decision has
been appealed to the full Board which currently has it under review. The Board’s decision will most likely be issued sometime in
late 2012.
WHERE SOCIAL MEDIA POSTINGS MAY BE FOUND UNPROTECTED
As of January 2012, the NLRB General Counsel’s office has reviewed a number of cases that have been filed by employees
contesting their terminations from employment as a result of posting complaints about their workplaces on social media
sites. The General Counsel has tended to find that social media postings are not protected where the content reflects a single
individual’s griping or complaints not related to any concerted group activity. Examples of findings of such unprotected activity
include:

 Personal attacks on managers

 No evidence that person making the post had previously discussed concerns with co-workers
 Co-workers not responding to postings thus showing absence of concerted activity
 Posting does not relate to terms and conditions of employment
 Postings commenting solely on the clients or customers of employer without reference to any practices of the employer

EMPLOYER SOCIAL MEDIA POLICIES

As a direct result of concerns stemming from employees’ use of social media websites, a large number of employers are adopting
policies affecting, restricting or regulating in some form employees’ use of social media and blogging. The NLRB has reviewed
many of these policies using standards the Board created in earlier decisions concerning the legality of work rules promulgated
by employers.
The test for lawfulness of employer social media policies is primarily based on these decisions :
Lafayette Park Hotel (1988) 326 NLRB 824: In this case, the NLRB held that an employer violates Section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA
through the maintenance of a work rule if that rule would “reasonably tend to chill employees in the exercise of their Section 7
rights.”
Lutheran Heritage Village–Livonia (2004) 343 NLRB 646: In this case, the NLRB found that a two-step inquiry should be used
to determine if a work rule would have a chilling effect. First, a rule is unlawful if it explicitly restricts protected employee
activities per Section 7 of the NLRA. Second, if the rule does not explicitly restrict protected activities, it is unlawful only upon a
showing that: (1) employees would reasonably construe the language to prohibit Section 7 activity; (2) the rule was promulgated
in response to union activity; or (3) the rule has been applied to restrict the exercise of Section 7 rights.
Based on these cases, the General Counsel has determined the following social media policies to be unlawful:

 Employees prohibited from posting pictures of themselves in any media, including the internet, which depict the company in any
way, including a company uniform or corporate logo.

 Employees prohibited from making disparaging comments when discussing the company or the employee’s superiors,
coworkers, and/or competitors.

 Policy stating that employees are subject to discipline for engaging in “inappropriate discussions” about the company,
management, and/or coworkers where policy did not define what was encompassed by the broad term “inappropriate
discussions” by specific examples or limit it in any way that would exclude Section 7 activity.
 Prohibiting employees from using any social media that may violate, compromise, or disregard the rights and reasonable
expectations as to privacy or confidentiality of any person or entity; prohibiting any communication or post that constitutes
embarrassment, harassment or defamation of the employer or any co-employee; prohibiting statements that lack truthfulness or
that might damage the reputation or goodwill of the employer or its employees. Policy found overbroad and ill-defined.

 Policy which stated that it was designed to protect the employer’s reputation and that it governed employee communications
during both work and personal time: policy precluded employees from pressuring their coworkers to connect or communicate
with them via social media; precluded employees from revealing, including through the use of photographs, personal information
regarding coworkers, company clients, partners, or customers without their consent; precluded the use of the employer’s logos
and photographs of the employer’s store, brand, or product, without written authorization.

PRECAUTIONS TO TAKE

 Before publishing or engaging in any speech or communication concerning your workplace or conditions of employment, seek
advice from your union or another trusted source such as a labor law attorney on whether it appears to be protected.

 If you are publishing written remarks, review them carefully to make sure they comply with the laws on protected speech.

 If you have made verbal comments, make an accurate contemporaneous record of what you have said.

 If you believe your speech or communication may lead to a problem, inform your union immediately so that precautionary steps
can be taken as soon as possible.

 If you are questioned on speech issues by management, do not make any statements or agreed to be interviewed without asking
your union for assistance. If you are in a non-union workplace, consult with an attorney before speaking with management.

 Be cautious about posting any comments about the employer and work issues on social media sites. If you do so, make sure it is
in a context of protected concerted activity and on topics concerning terms and issues of employment that you have been
discussing with co-employees.

[G.R. No. 158158. January 17, 2005]

BUKLURAN NG MANGGAGAWA SA CLOTHMAN KNITTING CORPORATION SOLIDARITY OF UNIONS IN

THE PHILIPPINES FOR EMPOWERMENT AND REFORMS (BMC-SUPER) AND RAYMOND
TOMAROY, ROEL SARDONIDOS, JOSEPH SEDERIO, MARITCHU JAVELLANA, ENRIQUE OMADTO,
EFREN MOGAR, FRANCISCO BERTULFO, JUDY ROQUERO, PATERNO SILVESTRE, CAYETANO
PALMON, TEODORO OCOP AND JOSEPH ESTIFANO, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS (Former
Fifteenth Division), NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (Second Division), and CLOTHMAN
KNITTING CORPORATION, respondents.

DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:

This is a petition for review of the Resolutions[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 73353 filed by the
Bukluran ng Manggagawa sa Clothman Knitting Corporation Solidarity of Unions in the Philippines for Empowerment and
Reforms (the petitioner union) and Raymond Tomaroy, Roel Sardonidos, Joseph Sederio, Maritchu Javellana, Enrique Omadto,
Efren Mogar, Francisco Bertulfo, Judy Roquero, Paterno Silvestre, Cayetano Palmon, Teodoro Ocop and Joseph Estifano.
 Respondent Clothman Knitting Corporation (CKC) is a domestic corporation engaged in knitting/textiles. [2] It has
approximately one hundred forty-four (144) rank-and-file employees. The petitioner union is a legitimate labor organization of
rank-and-file employees therein. The petitioners were rank-and-file employees of the respondent and were also members and
officers of the petitioner union.
In the year 2001, the rank-and-file employees at the CKC banded together and formed the petitioner union. It was
registered with the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) on February 23, 2001. In reaction thereto, the respondent,
headed by its President, Paul U. Lee, gathered the employees and advised them not to listen to outsiders. [3]
Meanwhile, another group of rank-and-file employees banded together and formed the Nagkakaisang Lakas ng
Manggagawa sa Clothman Corporation Katipunan (NLM-Katipunan). The NLM-Katipunan was issued a certificate of
registration on April 23, 2001 by the DOLE.[4] A petition for certification election was later filed by the petitioner union with the
Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR).
Pending the resolution of the petition for certification election, the respondent issued a Memorandum [5] dated March 2,
2001, informing the employees of the change in the schedule brought about by the decrease in the orders from the customers.
On March 10, 2001, another Memorandum[6] was issued by the respondent informing its employees at the Dyeing and
Finishing Division that a temporary shutdown of the operations therein would be effected for one week, from March 12 to 17,
2001. The employees were advised to go on vacation leave, and were asked to verify any changes in the schedule from the
Human Resources Division on March 17, 2001.
Unable to solve its financial problems, the respondent decided to temporarily shutdown its operations at the Dyeing and
Finishing Division effective the next day, scheduled to resume until further notice. It notified the DOLE of the said shutdown on
May 26, 2001.[7] The operations of the other divisions of the CKC remained normal.
For its reduced dyeing and finishing needs, the respondent brought the textiles to Crayons, Inc., a sister company. On June
11, 2001, while the respondents service truck with plate number TBK-158 was to deliver fabrics in Bulacan, the group of
petitioner Raymond Tomaroy and some companions approached the truck as it made its way towards Don Pedro Street and
blocked its way. As a result, the driver of the service truck decided to return to the respondents compound. Later that day,
petitioner Tomaroy, with sixteen (16) members of the petitioner union, staged a picket in front of the respondents compound,
carrying placards with slogans that read:
1. Itigil ang sabwatan ng KATIPUNAN (FABIAN GROUP) at management BMC-SUPER.
2. Mr. Paul Lee Huwag mong ipitin ang mid-year, 13th month pay ng mga manggagawa sa CKC. BMC-SUPER.
3. Ibalik ang pasok sa Finishing Department.
4. Mr. Paul Lee Magagara ang sasakyan mo, Montero, BMW, Pajero pero kaunting benepisyo ng manggagawa ay di
mo maibigay. BMC-SUPER.
5. Kilalanin ang karapatan ng manggagawa na magtatag ng unyon. BMC-SUPER.[8]
On June 14, 2001, twenty-three (23) members of the petitioner union gathered in front of the respondents compound
carrying the same placards. Later that day, petitioner Tomaroy agreed to talk to the management with the following priority
demands: (a) resumption of work; and (b) 13th month pay.[9] The next day, members of the petitioner union and their supporters
gathered in front of the respondents compound.[10] From June 16, 2001 up to June 18, 2001, the members, as well as supporters of
the union, gathered again in front of the companys compound.[11]
On June 25, 2001, the respondent filed a petition to declare the strike illegal before the arbitration branch of the National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), docketed as NLRC-NCR 06-03332-2001.[12] The respondent alleged that the picket of the
members of the union from June 11, 2001 to June 18, 2001 in front of the companys compound constituted an illegal strike. It
cited the following reasons:

a) The strikers/picketers did not conduct a strike vote and no cooling-off period was observed;

b) The strikers/picketers did not file a notice of strike;

c) The reasons for the strike/picket involve a non-strikeable issue;

d) The work slowdown/picket caused damages to the petitioner in the sum of FIVE MILLION PESOS
(P5,000,000.00);
 e) The illegal acts of respondents constrained petitioner to seek the services of undersigned counsel for an attorneys
fee of P50,000.00 and P2,000.00 per appearance.[13]

In a Decision dated October 18, 2001, the Labor Arbiter granted the petition, declared the strike illegal and the employment
status of the union officers who participated therein as terminated:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition filed by the petitioner is hereby GRANTED.

The strike conducted by the respondents is hereby declared as illegal.

Consequently, due to their illegal activities, the respondents namely: RAYMOND TOMAROY, President, ROEL
SARDONIDOS, Vice-President, JOSEPH SEDERIO, Secretary, MARITCHU JAVELLANA, Treasurer, ENRIQUE OMADTO,
Auditor, EFREN MOGAR, P.R.O., and FRANCISCO BERTULFO, P.R.O. and Board of Directors: JUDY ROQUERO,
PATERNO SILVESTRE, CAYETANO PALMON, TEODORO OCOP and JOSEPH ESTIFANO are hereby declared to have
lost their employment status with the petitioner.[14]

The Labor Arbiter found that the continued decline in job prompted the respondent to implement a reduced working day
from the original six (6) days to three (3) days per week because of the continued decrease of job orders, which further led to its
decision to temporarily stop the operation in its Dyeing and Finishing Division for one (1) week March 12 to 17, 2001. The
affected employees were then requested to utilize their vacation leaves and were, thereafter, admitted back to work. However,
Tomaroy and members of the union staged a strike, and the labor unrest resulted in the cancellation of job orders amounting
to P6,380,817.50. The aforestated losses prompted the petitioner to close and stop the business operations of its Dyeing and
Finishing Division.
It is worthy to note that the whole company did not cease to operate and that it was only the workers in the Dyeing and
Finishing Division who were affected by the temporary lay-off. Thus, when the respondents conducted a picket in front of the
companys premises, the whole business operations of the respondent was affected. As borne out by the records, the Labor Arbiter
found that the petitioners therein failed to comply with the requirements for a valid strike, to wit:
1. It was not based on a valid factual ground, either based on Collective Bargaining Deadlock and/or Unfair Labor
Practice;
2. No notice of strike was filed with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board of the DOLE;
3. There was no strike-vote taken by the majority members of the union;
4. There was no strike-vote report submitted to the DOLE at least seven (7) days before the intended date of the
strike;
5. The cooling-off period prescribed by law was not observed; and
6. The 7-day visiting period after submission of the strike vote report was not fully observed. [15]
Thus, the Labor Arbiter ruled that the strike staged by the petitioner union was illegal; hence, the union officers who
knowingly participated in an illegal strike, already lost their employment status. [16]
Aggrieved, the petitioner union interposed an appeal before the NLRC, docketed as NLRC-CA-030216-01. In a Resolution
promulgated on May 10, 2002, the NLRC dismissed the appeal and affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, and finding no cogent reason to disturb the finding of the Labor Arbiter a quo, the
assailed decision is hereby AFFIRMED.[17]

The NLRC reasoned that it found no instances and/or situation befitting grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Labor
Arbiter.
Dissatisfied, the petitioner union filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied in a Resolution [18] dated July 24,
2002.
The petitioner union filed a petition for certiorari before the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 73353, raising the following
error:

I. PUBLIC RESPONDENTS, THE HONORABLE LABOR ARBITER AND THE COMMISSIONERS OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION COMMITTED PATENT GRAVE ABUSED (SIC) OF
 DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN THEY FAILED TO
APPRECIATE FACTS AND EVIDENCES, APPLICABLE LAWS AND EXISTING JURISPRUDENCE
AND, IF NOT CORRECTED, WOULD CAUSE IRREPARABLE DAMAGE TO HEREIN
RESPONDENTS.[19]

In a Resolution[20] dated October 25, 2002, the CA dismissed the petition. The CA found that, contrary to Section 3, Rule
46 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the petition for certiorari filed by the petitioner union did not contain the full names and
actual addresses of all the petitioners and the respondents, as the petition merely mentioned BMC-SUPER, et al. as the
petitioners. Further, the petition and the certification on non-forum shopping were signed by Raymond P. Tomaroy, who claimed
to be the union president/authorized representative of petitioners without, however, any such authorization from the labor union
and the other petitioners covered by the abbreviation et al. Moreover, the petition was not verified as required by Section 1, Rule
65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure; hence, did not produce legal effect as provided for in Section 4, Rule 7 of the Rules of
Court.
In addition, the petition was signed by petitioner Raymond P. Tomaroy in his capacity as union president/authorized
representative, assisted by Enrique T. Belarmino, Legal Head of Solidarity of Unions in the Philippines for Empowerment and
Reforms, neither of whom was a duly authorized member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. Hence, according to the
appellate court, neither of them had authority to conduct litigation before the CA. [21] A motion for reconsideration was filed by
the petitioner union which was similarly denied in a Resolution[22] dated April 21, 2003. The CA reasoned that, contrary to the
petitioners insistence that the verification was signed by Raymond P. Tomaroy, page 16 of the petition filed before it did not bear
such signature. Moreover, the special power of attorney attached to the motion for reconsideration was subscribed and sworn to
by the signatories therein before Notary Public Orlando C. Dy only on November 20, 2002, i.e., more than one (1) month after
the filing of the petition on October 15, 2002. Consequently, the special power of attorney did not cure the defect in the
certification against forum shopping signed by Raymond Tomaroy, which was, likewise, not accompanied by proof that he was
authorized to file the petition on behalf of the petitioner union.
The CA clarified that the authority of non-lawyers to represent the labor organization or members thereof applies only to
proceedings before the NLRC or Labor Arbiters, as provided for in Article 222 of the Labor Code. On the other hand, a non-
lawyer may appear before it only if he is a party-litigant. However, Raymond P. Tomaroy did not appear to be a party in the case
before the CA as his name was not mentioned in the caption nor in the body of the petition. [23]
Aggrieved, the petitioners filed the instant petition contending that:

PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT DISMISSED THE PETITIONERS APPEAL
ON GROUNDS OF TECHNICALITIES.

II

PUBLIC RESPONDENT NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION ERRED [WHEN] IT AFFIRMED

THE FINDINGS OF THE HONORABLE LABOR ARBITER THAT PETITIONERS COMMITTED ILLEGAL
STRIKE.[24]

On the first ground, the petitioners allege that they complied with Section 3, Rule 46 and Section 7, Rule 3 of the Rules of
Court. They contend that the petition filed before the CA by the petitioner unions president was sanctioned by Article 242 of the
Labor Code, and the cases of Liberty Manufacturing Workers Union v. CFI of Bulacan,[25] Davao Free Workers Front v.
CIR,[26] and La Carlota Sugar Central v. CIR.[27] The petitioner union insists that it would be illogical for the union, as an entity,
to require all its members to sign the said petition and the certificate of non-forum shopping. It avers that a labor union is a
judicial entity which functions thru its officers. Thus, the president, as an officer of the union, needed no special power of
attorney to sign for the union. It stresses that it did not violate Section 34, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.
The petitioner union further invokes the policy that the rules of technicality must yield to the broader interest of substantial
justice; when the rules strictly applied resulting in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote justice, this Court is
empowered to support the rules.
The petitioners argue that they did not stage a strike, much more an illegal strike. They explain that a strike means work
stoppage. Considering that the Dyeing and Finishing Division of the respondent was shutdown, it could not have caused a work
stoppage. The union members merely picketed in front of the respondents factory to urge the respondent to open and order the
resumption of the operations in its Dyeing and Finishing Division. There was, thus, no need to comply with the requirements laid
down by Article 263 of the Labor Code and its implementing rules.
 For its part, the respondent prayed that the petition be dismissed on the ground that the petition filed before the CA failed to
comply with Section 1 of Rule 65, Section 3 of Rule 46, and Section 7 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, and that the requirement
as to the signatories in the petition failed to comply with Section 3, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court. The respondent reiterates that
the petitioners staged an illegal strike, and that as officers of the union who participated therein, the petitioners are deemed to
have lost their employment status.
The contention of the petitioners is erroneous. They are of the erroneous impression that the only respondent in the NLRC
was the petitioner union and that it was sued in its representative capacity. The fact of the matter is that the respondent sued not
only the petitioner union as respondent, but also its officers and members of its Board of Directors as principal respondents, and
sought the termination of the employment of the said officers. The Labor Arbiter rendered judgment against all the respondents
therein and declared the officers to have lost their employment status. The NLRC affirmed the decision on appeal. It was not only
the union that assailed the decision of the NLRC in the CA, but also the dismissed officers. The petitioners (respondents therein)
prayed for the reversal thereof and that another judgment be rendered as prayed for by them in their position paper in the NLRC,
thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed to this Honorable Labor Arbiter that, after submission of this
Position Paper, the above entitled case be considered submitted for resolution, and the decision be rendered in favor of the
respondents employees:

1. Declaring Petitioners guilty of illegal reduction of working days, shutdown and UNFAIR LABOR
PRACTICES against individual respondents;
2. Ordering petitioners be, jointly and severally, liable to pay respondents actual damages, payment of MORAL
and EXEMPLARY DAMAGES in the amount of not less than P50,000.00 each individual employees and 10%
of the total monetary award for the Office of BMC-SUPER plus P10,000.00 litigation expenses;
3. Ordering that Petitioner Paul Lee be in contempt of court and be fined to pay individual respondents in the
amount of P50,000.00 each or imprisonment of Two (2) to Four (4) Years or both.

Other relief and remedies equitable in the premises are, likewise, prayed for.[28]

Under Section 3 of Rule 46 in relation to Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, the petition for certiorari shall contain
the full names and actual addresses of all the petitioners and the respondents, and that the failure of the petitioners to comply with
the said requirement shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal of their petition:

Sec. 3. Contents and filing of petition; effect of non-compliance with requirements. The petition shall contain the full names and
actual addresses of all the petitioners and respondents, a concise statement of the matters involved, the factual background of the
case and the grounds relied upon for the relief prayed for.

It shall be filed in seven (7) clearly legible copies together with proof of service thereof on the respondent with the original copy
intended for the court indicated as such by the petitioner, and shall be accompanied by a clearly legible duplicate original or
certified true copy of the judgment, order, resolution, or ruling subject thereof, such material portions of the record as are referred
to therein and other documents relevant or pertinent thereto. The certification shall be accomplished by the proper clerk of court
or by his duly authorized representative, or by the proper officer of the court, tribunal, agency or office involved or by his duly
authorized representative. The other requisite number of copies of the petition shall be accompanied by clearly legible plain
copies of all documents attached to the original.

The petitioner shall also submit together with the petition a sworn certification that he has not theretofore commenced any other
action involving the same issues in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or different divisions thereof, or any other tribunal
or agency; if there is such other action or proceeding, he must state the status of the same; and if he should, thereafter, learn that a
similar action or proceeding has been filed or is pending before the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or different divisions
thereof, or any other tribunal or agency, he undertakes to promptly inform the aforesaid courts and other tribunal or agency
thereof within five (5) days therefrom.

The petitioner shall pay the corresponding docket and other lawful fees to the clerk of court and deposit the amount of P500.00
for costs at the time of the filing of the petition.

The failure of the petitioner to comply with any of the foregoing requirements shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal of the
petition.
 Moreover, under Section 1, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court, the title of the action indicates the names of the parties who shall
be named in the original petition:

Section 1. Caption. The caption sets forth the name of the court, the title of the action, and the docket number, if assigned.

The title of the action indicates the names of the parties. They shall all be named in the original complaint or petition; but in
subsequent pleadings, it shall be sufficient if the name of the first party on each side be stated with an appropriate indication
when there are other parties.

Their respective participation in the case shall be indicated.

In this case, the title of the petition for certiorari filed in the CA does not contain the names of the petitioners officers of the
petitioner BMC-SUPER and of the members of the Board of Directors; even the petition itself does not contain the full names
and addresses of the said officers and members of the Board of Directors of the petitioner union. We quote the title of the petition
and the averments thereof having reference to the parties-petitioners:
BUKLURAN NG MANGGAGAWA SA CLOTHMAN KNITTING CORPORATION SOLIDARITY OF
UNIONS IN THE PHILIPPINES FOR EMPOWERMENT AND REFORMS (BMC-SUPER), ET AL.,
Petitioner,

-vs-

CLOTHMAN KNITTING CORPORATION,

Respondents.[29]

Petitioners, BUKLURAN NG MANGGAGAWA SA CLOTHMAN SOLIDARITY OF UNIONS FOR EMPOWERMENT AND

REFORMS (BMC-SUPER), et al., is a legitimate labor organization with Charter Certificate No. S-102, can be served with
summons and other processes at 4th Floor Perlas Building, 646 Quezon Avenue, Quezon City.

Private Respondent, CLOTHMAN KNITTING CORPORATION, is a domestic corporation organized and existing under and by
virtue of Philippine Laws engaged in textile industry with principal place of business at No. 57 Don Pedro Street, Don Pedro
Village, Marulas, Valenzuela City.

Public Respondents, National Labor Relations Commission, Second Division, herein impleaded as the tribunal exercising judicial
functions who issued the assailed decision in NLRC Case No. 05-03332-2001.[30]

The petitioners reliance on the ruling of this Court in Davao Free Workers Front v. CIR[31] is misplaced. In the said case,
the Court held that the failure to specify the details regarding the number and names of the striking members of a labor union in
the decision or in the complaint was of no consequence. This is due to the fact that it was established that all the union members
went on strike as a result of the unfair labor practice of the employer, in consonance with the rule that it is precisely the function
of a labor union to carry the representation of its members, particularly against the employers unfair labor practices against it and
its members, and to file an action for their benefit and behalf without joining each and every member as a separate party.
Significantly, the full names and addresses of the officers and members of the Board of Directors of the petitioner union are
set forth in their petition at bench; proof that, indeed, there is a need for the full names and addresses of all the petitioners to be
stated in the title of the petition and in the petition itself. We quote the title of the petition and the allegation therein having
reference to the parties-petitioners:
BUKLURAN NG MANGGAGAWA SA CLOTHMAN KNITTING CORPORATION SOLIDARITY OF
UNIONS IN THE PHILIPPINES FOR EMPOWERMENT AND REFORMS (BMC-SUPER), AND
RAYMOND TOMAROY, ROEL SARDONIDOS, JOSEPH SEDERIO, MARITCHU JAVELLANA,
ENRIQUE OMADTO, EFREN MOGAR, FRANCISCO BERTULFO, JUDY ROQUERO, PATERNO
SILVESTRE, CAYETANO PALMON, TEODORO OCOP AND JOSEPH ESTIFANO,
Petitioners.[32]

1. Petitioners, BUKLURAN NG MANGGAGAWA SA CLOTHMAN SOLIDARITY OF UNIONS FOR EMPOWERMENT

AND REFORMS (BMC-SUPER), ROEL SARDONIDOS, JOSEPH SEDERIO, MARITCHU JAVELLANA, ENRIQUE
OMADTO, EFREN MOGAR, FRANCISCO BERTULFO, JUDY ROQUERO, PATERNO SILVESTRE, CAYETANO
PALMON, TEODORO OCOP AND JOSEPH ESTIFANO, the former is a legitimate labor organization with Charter Certificate
No. S-102, and the latter are members of the former; they can be served with summons and other processes of this Honorable
Court at c/o H.O. VICTORIA AND ASSOCIATES LAW OFFICES, Unit 305 Web-Jet Building, 64 Quezon Avenue cor. BMA
Avenue, Quezon City.[33]

On the other hand, Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court reads:

Sec. 5. Certification against forum shopping. The plaintiff or principal party shall certify under oath in the complaint or other
initiatory pleading asserting a claim for relief, or in a sworn certification annexed thereto and simultaneously filed therewith: (a)
that he has not, therefore, commenced any action or filed any claim involving the same issues in any court, tribunal or quasi-
judicial agency and, to the best of his knowledge, no such other action or claim is pending therein; (b) if there is such other
pending action or claim, a complete statement of the present status thereof; and (c) if he should, thereafter, learn that the same or
similar action or claim has been filed or is pending, he shall report that fact within five (5) days therefrom to the court wherein
his aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading has been filed.

Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be curable by mere amendment of the complaint or other initiatory
pleading but shall be cause for the dismissal of the case without prejudice, unless otherwise provided, upon motion and after
hearing. The submission of a false certification or non-compliance with any of the undertakings therein shall constitute indirect
contempt of court, without prejudice to the corresponding administrative and criminal actions. If the acts of the party or his
counsel clearly constitute willful and deliberate forum shopping, the same shall be ground for summary dismissal with prejudice
and shall constitute direct contempt, as well as a cause for administrative sanctions.

As gleaned from the petition for certiorari in the CA, only the petitioner Raymond P. Tomaroy signed the certification of
non-forum shopping in his capacity as the president of the petitioner union. The officers and members of the Board of Directors,
who were, likewise, principal petitioners, did not execute any certification of non-forum shopping as mandated by the said Rule.
The rule is that the certification of non-forum shopping must be signed by all the petitioners and that the signing by only one of
them is insufficient.[34] Although petitioner Tomaroy was authorized by virtue of his position as president of the petitioner union
to execute the certification for and in its behalf, he had no authority to do so for and in behalf of its petitioners-officers, as well as
the members of the Board of Directors thereof. The execution by the individual petitioners of a special power of attorney
subsequent to the dismissal of the petition by the CA authorizing petitioner Tomaroy to execute the requisite certification does
not cure the fatal defect in their petition.[35]
The respondent alleges that the petition for certiorari filed before the CA was correctly dismissed as it was not signed by
counsel. The respondent noted that petitioner Tomaroy was not a lawyer and that petitioner Enrique Belarmino did not manifest
in the petition that he was the lawyer. The respondent, thus, contends that Tomaroy and Belarmino engaged in the illegal practice
of law, in violation of Section 34, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.
We do not agree.
Section 3, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court provides that every pleading must be signed by the party or counsel representing
him.[36] Considering that the union is one of the petitioners, Tomaroy, as its president, may sign the pleading. For this reason
alone, the CA cannot dismiss the petition.
Even if we glossed over the procedural lapses of the petitioners and resolved the petition on its merits, we find that the
petitioner union, along with its supporters, staged a strike without complying with the requirements laid down in Article 263 of
the Labor Code and its Implementing Rules.
The petitioner union alleges that it could not have staged a strike because the operations at the Dyeing and Finishing
Division were temporarily stopped. It insists that it merely protested the unjustified closing of the respondents Dyeing and
Finishing Division by forming a picket in front of the respondents compound to urge the re-opening thereof.
We do not agree.
A strike is any temporary stoppage of work by the concerted action of employees as a result of an industrial or labor
dispute.[37] A labor dispute includes any controversy or matter concerning terms or conditions of employment or the association
or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or arranging the terms and conditions of employment,
regardless of whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer and employee. [38]
The members and the supporters of the petitioner union, headed by petitioner Tomaroy, thru concerted action, caused a
temporary stoppage of work as a result of an industrial dispute. This is evidenced in the June 13, 2001 spot report of the Atlantic
Security & Investigation Agency:

On or about 1445H of June 11, 2001, Mr. Jojo Flores and Mr. Rene Fabian were about to deliver fabrics in Bulacan with service
truck TBK-158. Upon reaching the corner of Don Pedro St. and McArthur Highway, they gave way to a big truck turning to Don
Pedro St. and at the same time the group of Mr. Raymond Tomaroy, the leader of BUKLURAN NG MANGGAGAWA SA
CLOTHMAN SOLIDARITY OF UNIONS IN THE PHILIPPINES FOR EMPOWERMENT AND REFORMS BMC SUPER
were on their way to CKC compound. Seeing the group, Mr. Fabian greeted them by giving a quick forward motion of his head.
But instead, according to Mr. Fabian, Mr. Tomaroy with finger pointing on to Mr. Fabian accusing him as the one responsible for
the delay of their 13th month pay. Mr. Fabian just told the group BMC-SUPER to read the Memorandum of the HRD dated June
8, 2001. Mr. Flores and Mr. Fabian returned to CKC, Don Pedro St., Marulas, Valenzuela, to report the matter.

At about 1517H of same date, Mr. Tomaroy with 16 members of BMC SUPER staged a rally and/or gathered in front of
Clothman Knitting Corporation gate carrying placards with slogan read as follows:

1. Itigil ang sabwatan ng KATIPUNAN (FABIAN GROUP) at management BMC-SUPER;

2. Mr. Paul Lee Huwag mong ipitin ang mid-year, 13th month pay ng mga manggagawa sa CKC. BMC-SUPER;
3. Ibalik ang pasok sa Finishing Department;
4. Mr. Paul Lee Magagara ang sasakyan mo, Montero, BMW, Pajero pero kaunting benepisyo ng manggagawa ay di
mo maibigay BMC-SUPER;
5. Kilalanin ang karapatan ng manggagawa na magtatag ng unyon BMC-SUPER.

On or about 1640H at the same date, a PNP-Valenzuela Mobil car had SPO1 Palma, PO2 Manresa and PO1 Isip on board. The
police with the BMC-SUPER.

The Valenzuela Police left at about 1727H.

At about 1810H of the same date, the group of BMC-SUPER abandoned the area.[39]

The subsequent Reports dated June 14, 15, 16 and 18, 2001 of the same agency further stated that members of the petitioner
union, along with other employees particularly from the knitting department, joined in the picket. [40] It is, thus, apparent that the
concerted effort of the members of the petitioner union and its supporters caused a temporary work stoppage. The allegation that
there can be no work stoppage because the operation in the Dyeing and Finishing Division had been shutdown is of no
consequence. It bears stressing that the other divisions were fully operational. There is nothing on record showing that the union
members and the supporters who formed a picket line in front of the respondents compound were assigned to the finishing
department. As can be clearly inferred from the spot reports, employees from the knitting department also joined in picket. The
blockade of the delivery of trucks and the attendance of employees from the other departments of the respondent meant work
stoppage. The placards that the picketers caused to be displayed arose from matters concerning terms or conditions of
employment as well as the association or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or arranging the
terms and conditions of employment.
Clearly, the petitioner union, its officers, members and supporters staged a strike. In order for a strike to be valid, the
following requirements laid down in paragraphs (c) and (f) of Article 263 of the Labor Code must be complied with: (a) a notice
of strike must be filed; (b) a strike-vote must be taken; and (c) the results of the strike-vote must be reported to the DOLE.[41] It
bears stressing that these requirements are mandatory, meaning, non-compliance therewith makes the strike illegal. The evident
intention of the law in requiring the strike notice and strike-vote report is to reasonably regulate the right to strike, which is
essential to the attainment of legitimate policy objectives embodied in the law. [42]
Considering that the petitioner union failed to comply with the aforesaid requirements, the strike staged on June 11 to 18,
2001 is illegal. Consequently, the officers of the union who participated therein are deemed to have lost their employment
status.[43]
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED. The Resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 73353 are AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Tinga and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
 SECOND DIVISION

G.R. Nos. 95494-97 September 7, 1995

LAPANDAY WORKERS UNION, ARQUILAO BACOLOD, JOSE ERAD, FERNANDO HERNANDO, EDDIE
ESTRELLA, CIRILO DAYAG, EDUARDO POQUITA, CARLITO PEPITO, RENE ARAO, JUANITO GAHUM,
EMILIANO MAGNO, PERLITO LISONDRA, GREGORIO ALBARAN, ABRAHAM BAYLON, DIONESIO TRUCIO,
TOMAS BASCO AND ROSARIO SINDAY, pertitioners,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION & DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondents.

G.R. Nos. 95494-97 September 7, 1995

LAPANDAY WORKERS UNION, ARQUILAO BACOLOD, ET AL., petitioners,

vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION AND CADECO ARGO DEVELOPMENT PHILS.,
INC. respondents.

G.R. Nos. 95494-97 September 7, 1995

LAPANDAY WORKERS UNION, ARQUILAO BACOLOD, ET AL., petitioners,

vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION AND LAPANDAY AGRICULTURAL & DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, respondents.

G.R. Nos. 95494-97 September 7, 1995

LAPANDAY WORKERS UNION, TOMAS N. BASCO, ET AL., petitioners,

vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION AND LAPANDAY AGRICULTURAL & DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, respondents.

PUNO, J.:

Petitioner Lapanday Agricultural Workers' Union (Union for brevity) and petitioners-workers of Lapanday Agricultural and
Development Corporation and CADECO Agro Development Philippines, Inc., seek to reverse the consolidated Decision dated
August 29, 1990, 1rendered by public respondent National Labor Relations Commision, declaring their strike illegal and ordering
the dismissal of their leaders.

The background of the case:

Private respondents are sister companies engaged in the production of bananas. Their agricultural establishments are located in
Davao City.

On the other hand, petitioner Lapanday Workers' Union (Union) is the duly certified bargaining agent of the rank and file
employees of private respondents. The Union is affiliated with the KMU-ANGLO. The other petitioners are all members of the
Union.

The records show that petitioner Union has a collective bargaining agreement with private respondents, covering the period from
December 5, 1985 to November 30, 1988. A few months before the expiration of their CBA, private respondents initiated certain
management policies which disrupted the relationship of the parties.
First, on August 1, 1988, private respondents contracted Philippine Eagle Protectors and Security Agency, Inc., to provide
security services for their business premises located in Lapanday, Bandug, Callawa, Davao City, and Guising, Davao Del Sur.
Their contract also called for the protection of the lives and limbs of private respondents' officers, employees and guests within
company premises. The Union branded the security guards posted within the company premises as private respondents' "goons"
and "special forces." It also accused the guards of intimidating and harassing their members.

Second, private respondents conducted seminars on Human Development and Industrial Relations (HDIR) for their managerial
and supervisory employees and, later, the rank-and-filers, to promote their social education and economic growth. Among the
topics discussed in the seminar were the mission statement of the company, corporate values, and the Philippine political
spectrum. The Union claimed that the module on the Philippine political spectrum lumped the ANGLO (Alliance of Nationalist
and Genuine Labor Organization), with other outlawed labor organizations such as the National Democratic Front or other leftist
groups.

These issues were discussed during a labor-management meeting held on August 2, 1988. The labor group was represented by
the Union, through its President, petitioner Arquilao Bacolod, and its legal counsel. After private respondents explained the
issues, the Union agreed to allow its members to attend the HDIR seminar for the rank-and-filers. Nevertheless, on August 19
and 20, the Union directed its members not to attend the seminars scheduled on said dates. Earlier on, or on August 6, 1988, the
Union, led by petitioners Arquilao Bacolod and Rene Arao, picketed the premises of the Philippine Eagle Protectors to show their
displeasure on the hiring of the guards.

Worse still, the Union filed on August 25, 1988, a Notice of Strike with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB).
It accused the company of unfair labor practices consisting of coercion of employees, intimidation of union members and union-
busting.2 These were the same issues raised by the Union during the August 2, 1988 labor-management meeting.

On August 29, 1988, the NCMB called a conciliation conference. The conference yielded the following agreement:

(1) Union officers, including the officials of KMU-ANGLO, and the Executive Director of the NCMB would attend the HDIR
seminar on September 5, 1988; and

(2) A committee shall convene on September 10, 1989, to establish guidelines governing the guards.

The Union officials did attend the September 5, 1988 seminar. While they no longer objected to the continuation of the seminar,
they reiterated their demand for the deletion of the discussion pertaining to the KMU-ANGLO.

With the apparent settlement of their differences, private respondents notified the NCMB that there were no more bases for the
notice of strike.

An unfortunate event brake the peace of the parties. On September 8, 1988, Danilo Martinez, a member of the Board of Directors
of the Union, was gunned down in his house in the presence of his wife and children. The gunman was later identified as Eledio
Samson, an alleged member of the new security forces of private respondents.

On September 9, 1988, the day after the killing, most of the members of the Union refused to report for work. They returned to
work the following day but they did not comply with the "quota system" adopted by the management to bolster production
output. Allegedly, the Union instructed the workers to reduce their production to thirty per cent (30%). Private respondents
charged the Union with economic sabotage through slowdown.

On September 14, 1988, Private respondents filed separate charges against the Union and its members for illegal strike, unfair
labor practice and damages, with prayer for injunction. These cases were docketed as Case Nos. RAB-11-09-00612-888 and
RAB No. 11-09-00613-88 before Labor Arbiter Antonio Villanueva.

On September 17, 1988, petitioners skipped work to pay their last respect to the slain Danilo Martinez who was laid to rest.
Again, on September 23, 1988, petitioners did not report for work. Instead, they proceeded to private respondents' office at
Lanang, carrying placards and posters which called for the removal of the security guards, the ouster of certain management
officials, and the approval of their mass leave application. Their mass action did not succeed.

In a last ditch effort to settle the deteriorating dispute between the parties, City Mayor Rodrigo Duterte intervened. Dialogues
were held on September 27 and 29, 1988 at the City Mayor's Office. Again, the dialogues proved fruitless as private respondents
refused to withdraw the cases they earlier filed with public respondent.
On October 3, 1988, a strike vote was canducted among the members of the Union and those in favor of the strike won
overwhelming support from the workers. The result of the strike vote was then submitted to the NCMB on October 10, 1988.
Two days later, or on Ootober 12, 1988, the Union struck.

On the bases of the foregoing facts, Labor Arbiter Antonio Villanueva ruled that the Onion staged an illegal strike. The
dispositlve portion of the Decision, dated December 12, 1988, states:

COMFORMABLY WITH ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered:

a) Declaring the strike staged by respondents (petitioners) to be illegal;

b) Declaring the employees listed as respondents in the complaint and those mentioned in page 21 to have
lost their employment status with complainants Lapanday Agricultural and Development Corporation and
Cadeco Agro Development Philippines, Inc.; and

c) Ordering respondents (petitioners in this case) to desist from further committing an illegal strike.

Petitioners appealed the Villanueva decision to public respondent NLRC.

It also appears that on December 6, 1988, or before the promulgation of the decision of Arbiter Villanueva, the Union, together
with Tomas Basco and 25 other workers, filed a complaint for unfair labor practice and illegal suspension against LADECO. The
case was docketed as Case No. RAB-11-12-00780-88. On even date, another complaint for unfair labor practice and illegal
dismissal was filed by the Union, together with Arquilao Bacolod and 58 other complainants. This was docketed as Case No.
RAB-11-12-00779-88. These two (2) cases were heard by Labor Arbiter Newton Sancho.

Before the NLRC could resolve the appeal taken on the Villanueva decision in Case Nos. RAB-11-09-00612-88 and RAB-11-09-
00613-88, Labor Arbiter Sancho rendered a decision in the two (2) cases filed by the Union against private
respondents LADECO and CADECO (Case Nos. RAB-11-12-00779-88 and RAB-11-12-00780-88). The Sancho decision, dated
October 18, 1989, declared LADECO and CADECO guilty of unfair labor practices and illegal dismissal and ordered the
reinstatement of the dismissed employees of private reapondents, with backwages and other benefits. Significantly, the Sancho
decision considered the refusal of the workers to report for work on September 9, 1988, justified by the circumstance then
prevailing, the killing of Danilo Martinez on September 8,1988.

Private respondents appealed the Sancho decision, claiming, among others, that labor arbiter Sancho erred in passing upon the
legality of the strike staged by petitioners since said issue had already been passed upon by the Regional Arbitration Branch and
was still on appeal before the NLRC.

Considering that the four (4) cases before it arose from the same set of facts and involved substantially the same issues, the
NLRC rendered a consolidated decision, promulgated August 29, 1990, upholding the Villanueva decision in Case Nos. RAB-11-
09-00612-88 and RAB-11-09-00613-88. The dispositive portion of the assailed NLRC decision states:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, a new judgment is entered in the four consolidated and above-
captioned cases as follows:

1. The strike staged by the Lapanday Agricultural Workers Union is hereby declared to be (sic) illegal;

2. As a consequence thereof, the following employees-union officers are declared to have lost their
employment status with Lapanday Agricultural Development Corporation and CADECO Agro Development
Philippines, to wit: Arguilao Bacolod, Jose Erad, Fernando Hernando, Eldie Estrella, Cerelo Dayag, Lucino
Magadan, Rene Arao, Eduardo Poquita, Juanito Gahum, Emilio Magno, Perlito Lisondra, Gregorio Albaron,
Abraham Baylon, Dionosio Trocio, Tomas Basco and Rosario Sinday;

3. However, the individual respondents (union members), being merely rank-and-file employees and who
merely joined the strike declared as illegal, are ordered reinstated but without backwages, the period they
were out of work is deemed the penalty for the illegal strike they staged;
 4. Ordering Lapanday Workers' Union, its leaders and members, to desist from further committing an illegal
strike; and

5. Dismissing the complaint for unfair labor practice, illegal suspension and illegal dismissal filed by the
Lapanday Workers Union (LWU)-ANGLO and its members, for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Petitioners fileds motion for reconsideration. It did not prosper. Hence, the petition.

Petitioners now claim that public respondent NLRC gravely abused its discretion in: a) declaring that their activities, from
September 9, 1988 to October 12, 1988, were strike activities; and b) declaring that the strike staged on October 12, 1988 was
illegal.

The critical issue is the legality of the strike held on October 12, 1988. The applicable laws are Articles 263 and 264 of the Labor
Code, as amended by E.O. No. 111, dated December 24, 1986. 3

Paragraphs (c) and (f) of Article 263 of the Labor Code, as amended by E.O. 111, provides:

(c) In cases of bargaining deadlocks, the duly certified or recognized bargaining agent may file a notice of
strike or the employer may file, notice of lockout with the Ministry at least 30 days before the intended date
thereof. In cases of unfair labor practice, the notice shall be 15 days and in the absence of a duly certified or
recognized bargaining agent, the notice of strike may be filed by any legitimate labor organization in behalf
of its members. However, in case of dismissal from employment of union officers duly elected in accordance
with the union constitution and by-laws, which may constitute union busting where the existence of the union
is threatened, the 15-daycooling-off period shall not apply and the union may take action immediately.

xxx xxx xxx

(f) A decision to declare a strike must be approved by a majority of the total union membership in the
bargaining unit concerned, obtained by secret ballot in meetings or referenda called for that purpose. A
decision to declare a lockout must be approved by a majority of the board of directors of the corporation or
association or of the partners in a partnership, obtained by secret ballot in a meeting called for that purpose.
The decision shall be valid for the duration of the dispute based on substantially the same grounds considered
when the strike or lockout vote was taken. The Ministry may, at its own initiative or upon the request of any
affected party, supervise the conduct of secret balloting. In every case, the union or the
employer shall furnish the Ministry the results of the voting at least seven (7) days before the intended strike
or lockout subject to the cooling-off period herein provided.

Article 264 of the same Code reads:

Art. 264. Prohibited activities. — (a) No labor organization or employer shall declare a strike or lockout
without first having bargained collectively in accordance with Title VII of this Book or without first having
filed the notice required in the preceding Article or without the necessary strike or lockout vote first having
been obtained and reported to the Ministry.

xxx xxx xxx

. . . . Any union officer who knowingly participates in an illegal strike and any worker or union officer who
knowingly participates in the commission of illegal acts during a strike may be declared to have lost his
employment status: Provided that mere participation of a worker in a lawful strike shall not constitute
sufficient ground for termination of his employment, even if a replacement had been hired by the employer
during such lawful strike. (emphasis ours).

A strike is "any temporary stoppage of work by the concerted action of employees as a result of an industrial or labor dispute."4 It
is the most preeminent of the economic weapons of workers which they unsheathe to force management to agree to an equitable
sharing of the joint product of labor and capital. Undeniably, strikes exert some disquieting effects not only on the relationship
between labor and management but also on the general peace and progress of society. Our laws thus regulate their exercise within
reasons by balancing the interests of labor and management together with the overarching public interest.

Some of the limitations on the exercise of the right of strike are provided for in paragraphs (c) and (f) of Article 263 of the Labor
Code, as amended, supra. They Provide for the procedural steps to be followed before staging a strike — filing of notice of
strike, taking of strike vote, and reporting of the strike vote result to the Department of Labor and Employment. In National
Federation of Sugar Workers (NFSW) vs. Overseas, et al., 5 we ruled that these steps are mandatory in character, thus:

If only the filing of the strike notice and the strike-vote report would be deemed mandatory, but not the
waiting periods so specifically and emphatically prescribed by law, the purposes (hereafter discussed) far
which the filing of the strike notice and strike-vote report is required cannot be achieved. . . .

xxx xxx xxx

So too, the 7-day strike-vote report is not without a purpose. As pointed out by the Solicitor General —

. . . The submission of the report gives assurance that a strike vote has been taken and that, if the report
concerning it is false, the majority of the members can take appropriate remedy before it is too late.

The seven (7) day waiting period is intended to give the Department of Labor and Employment an opportunity to verify
whether the projected strike really carries the imprimatur of the majority of the union members. The need for assurance
that majority of the union members support the strike cannot be gainsaid. Strike is usually the last weapon of labor to
compel capital to concede to its bargaining demands or to defend itself against unfair labor practices of management. It
is a weapon that can either breathe life to or destroy the union and its members in their struggle with management for a
more equitable due of their labors. The decision to wield the weapon of strike must, therefore, rest on a rational basis,
free from emotionalism, unswayed by the tempers and tantrums of a few hotheads, and firmly focused on the legitimate
interest of the union which should not, however, be antithetical to the public welfare. Thus, our laws require the
decision to strike to be the consensus of the majority for while the majority is not infallible, still, it is the best hedge
against haste and error. In addition, a majority vote assures the union it will go to war against management with the
strength derived from unity and hence, with better chance to succeed. In Batangas Laguna Tayabas Bus Company vs.
NLRC,6 we held:

xxx xxx xxx

The right to strike is one of the rights recognized and guaranteed by the Constitution as an instrument of labor
for its protection against exploitation by management. By virtue of this right, the workers are able to press
their demands for better terms of employment with more energy and persuasiveness, poising the threat to
strike as their reaction to employer's intransigence. The strike is indeed a powerful weapon of the working
class. But precisely because of this, it must be handled carefully, like a sensitive explosive, lest it blow up in
the workers' own hands. Thus, it must be declared only after the most thoughtful consultation among them,
conducted in the only way allowed, that is, peacefully, and in every case conformably to reasonable
regulation. Any violation of the legal requirements and strictures, . . . will render the strike illegal, to the
detriment of the very workers it is supposed to protect.

Every war must be lawfully waged. A labor dispute demands no less observance of the rules, for the benefit
of all concerned.

Applying the law to the case at bar, we rule that strike conducted by the union on October 12, 1988 is plainly illegal as it was
held within th seven (7) day waiting period provided for by paragraph (f), Article 263 of the Labor Code, as amended. The haste
in holding the strike prevented the Department of Labor and Employment from verifying whether it carried the approval of the
majority of the union members. It set to naught an important policy consideration of our law on strike. Considering this finding,
we need not exhaustively rule on the legality of the work stoppage conducted by the union and some of their members on
September 9 and 23, 1988. Suffice to state, that the ruling of the public respondent on the matter is supported by substantial
evidence.

We affirm the decision of the public respondent limiting the penalty of dismissal only to the leaders of the illegal strike.
especially the officers of the union who served as its major players. They cannot claim good faith to exculpate themselves. They
admitted knowledge of the law on strike, including its procedure. They cannot violate the law which ironically was cast to
promote their interest.

We, likewise, agree with the public respondent that the union members who were merely instigated to participate in the illegal
strike should be treated differently from their leaders. Part of our benign consideration for labor is the policy of reinstating rank-
and-file workers who were merely misled in supporting illegal strikes. Nonetheless, these reinstated workers shall not be entitled
to backwages as they should not be compensated for services skipped during the illegal strike.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is dismissed for failure to show grave abuse of discretion on the part of the public respondent.
Costs against the petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 101858 August 21, 1992

BATANGAS LAGUNA TAYABAS BUS COMPANY, petitioner,

vs

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (THIRD DIVISION), TINIG AT LAKAS NG MANGGAGAWA SA

BLTBCO-NAFLU and its reinstated one hundred ninety (190) members, namely, BIENVENIDO PAGKATUTUHAN,
GIL A. ALANO, ANGELITO CALISIHAN, CARLOS CORTEZ, RUSTICO PANTOJA, RICO M. SERDAN, NESTOR
GARCIA, DANILO SAN AGUSTIN, MARLON TIZON, MANUEL LUBUGUIN, EDGARDO AVENIDA, LEONARDO
ROLDAN, HILARION QUINTAIN, BASILIO BITUIN, LEONARDO PINEDA, GREGORIO CABRERA, ALFREDO
ARROYO, NOLITO BESAS, CRISOSTOMO DE LUNAS, MARTINIO ORTEGA, ENRIQUITO CIPRIANO, PEDRO
BUGAY, NOLASCO MARQUEZ, ANTONIO GAA, VIRGILIO AVENANTE, DANTE AURE, FELIPE ANDALEON,
REYNALDO CANETE, GREGORIO DELOS REYES, ZOSIMO P. ROZEL, RUBEN ROZEL, TOMAS ESTEVA,
JACINTO LANDICHO, OSCAR DELOS REYES, ROBERTO PESCASIO, MANUEL PEREJA, FELIX P. SALIBA,
LEOGARIO SALAZAR, EDUARDO DELA CUESTA, REYNALDO CATANGAY, CELSO PENANA, ROGELIO
SAVIDO, EDGARDO DIMAYUGA, RODRIGO LORENZANA, LORETO UMALI, LEONIDES MENDOZA, JOSE
ALINA, MANOLITO F. CAPIANGAO, RAMON ALCANTARA, GREGORIO M. BREGONIA, ENRICO P.
DIASANTA, FORTUNATO GAITE, NESTOR R. HOMOROK, JR., NESTOR LIM, SONIA MARALIT, NATALIA M.
MARAMOT, FERNANDO A. MARAHAN, AURORA S. MARIANO, CEFIRINO M. ROYO, DANILO M. SAMBOJON,
DIONISIO APURADO, AUGELIO PASUMBA, DEMOCRITO SISPEREZ, CARLITO R. ZUGUIRE, MARIANO
UMALI, NEMESIO T. RUMOLO, PEDRO MONTERO, JAIME MALLA, ROMEO C. EBORA, LEOPOLDO
REGALO, MARIO C. GRINDALO, BASILIO ADAJAR, GREGORIO P. CESAR, PEDRO DYPIANGCO, ARTURO B.
DE LUNA, YOLANDA MONTICER, ARMANDO P. CODERA, CARLITO C. LUBUGUIN, ILUMINADO A. MEDINA,
RAMON V. EM, JR., JAIME N. BENEDICTO P. BLASTIQUE, CESARE VILLANUEVA, EDWIN CARASCO,
CRISANTO T. VALENTE, LUIS S. DELEMA, CARLOS D. DELGADO, PEDRO B. PERENA, JR., AMANCIO C.
CLARETE, ALFREDO E. AREJA, RUFINO G. ALINSUNURIN, TELESFORO URI, ARNEL ASOY, RODRIGO A.
AVARADO, PABLITO BELLERAS, ROMEO M. HUTALIA, JOSE M. MAGPANTAY, ERNESTO C. MASCULINO,
DANILO O. PARDILLA, ROMEO C. QUINDARA, ROMEO R. RAZA, RODOLFO S. SANTILLAN, DANILO C.
VISITACION, ROGELIO B. YAMBAO, AIDEN P. MANUPIL, BUENAVENTURA ARGENTE, ROGELIO M.
DELICA, NARCISO M. RAMIREZ, ROGELIO A. TAN, CARLOS T. CHUA, NONILON A. GUTIERREZ, PEDRO E.
LOBO, WILFREDO G. LEGUA, FELICIANO G. GONZALES, ORLANDO H. VERGARA, CARLOS A. BORDON,
HOSPICIO D. BRIONES, MARTIN DALISAY, ISIDRO C. MACATANGAY, FLORENCIO E. MALAPIT, MIGUEL
SANCHEZ, RENATO A. VILLENA, CARLIE M. DELICIA, REYNALDO B. ABANADOR, CELESTINO A. DALISAY,
REYNALDO E. ACAB, RONELO U. ALINEA, REYNALDO T. ALVISO, JESUS V. CATAPIA, NOLETO R. DE
CHAVEZ, INOCENCIO S. EGAMINO, DOMINADOR ILAO, CRISOSTOMO E. MAGADIA, RODOLFO B.
MARALIT, ISIDRO PACIA, EFRENIO R. PALMA, PROSPERO B. PENA, ARMANDO V. PON, NICOLAS M.
RECEDE, DOMINGO SECRETARIO, CRISANTO V. ULAC, REYNALDO V. FERMIN, MARCELINO N. NOSES,
MARIO C. SUAREZ, ROGELIO W. BURON, MARIO D. ZOMBILLA, JACINTO B. ORANTE, SANECITO Q. DE
LUNA, JACINTO S. GRIMALDO, DANTE LADERA, FELIX S. LADINES, NOEL S. MARQUEZ, JUANCHO S.
ALMORAS, DANILO S. RICO, TIMOTEO J. QUINCENA, MELECIO F. LLAMELO, NICOLAS C. ASEJA,
DOMINGO J. EVANGELISTA, ROLANDO P. REYES, RENATO ABILLA, DONATO ALCANTARA, ELADIO Q.
MANALO, OLYMPIO C. PERENA, ARMANDO C. SAAVEDRA, JOSELITO TROZADA, LAURO M. ZUBRANO,
JULIO A. ANTENOR, MANOLO A. ATIENZA, CELESTINO D. ENRIQUEZ, RODANTE C. VICTORIA, EDUARDO,
E. ALCANTARA, SANTIAGO ARENDA, LEOPOLDO V. DEL MUNDO, LEOPOLDO REGALO, JAIME MALLA,
ELMAR CHUA, RENE A. ANEMIAS, MANUEL MILLAR, JESUS M. FAVIS, SALLY ALMARIO, ARCANGEL F.
FAURA, FLORENCIO BUHAY, JUANELIO ALMORES, JAIME FAJELAN, CRISTOBAL M. LUCI, JUANITO
CRIMALDO, RAUL I. CONSIGNADO, ISAGANI R. SUNGA, EFREN LINA, and PEPITO ABRATIQUE, respondents.

Tanjuatco, Oreta, Tanjuatco, Berenguer & Corpus for petitioner.

Villy Cadiz for private respondent Tinig at Lakas ng Manggagawa sa BLTBCO-NAFLU.

Samuel D. Entuna, Napoleon Banzuela, Jr., Noli J. Delos Santos, Alvin M. Exconde, Angel Al. Caluntad, Ildefonso B. Malueda
for private respondents.

CRUZ, J.:

This case arose when on May 23, 1988, private respondent Tinig at Lakas ng Manggagawa sa BLTB Co. NAFLU (TLM-BLTB-
NAFLU), an affiliate of the National Federation of Labor Unions. (NAFLU), filed a Notice of Strike against the Batangas Laguna
Tayabas Bus Company on the grounds of unfair labor practice and violation of the CBA.

The reaction of BLTBCO was to ask the Secretary of Labor to assume jurisdiction over the dispute or to certify it to the National
Labor Relations Commission for compulsory arbitration. The petitioner also moved to dismiss the notice of strike on August 3,
1988.

Efforts at amicable settlement having failed, Acting Labor Secretary C. Castro certified the dispute to the NLRC on August 29,
1988. 1

A copy of the certification order was served upon the NAFLU on August 29, 1988, and on the TLM-BLTBCo-NAFLU on
August 30, 1988. However, it was noted in the notice of order that union secretary Jerry Soriano refused to receive it.

On August 31, 1988, the officers and members of TLM-BLTBCo-NAFLU went on strike and maintained picket lines blocking
the premises of BLTBCo's terminals.

On September 6, 1988, the NLRC issued an en banc resolution ordering the striking employees to lift their picket and to remove
all obstructions and barricades. All striking employees on payroll as of May 23, 1988, were required to return to work. BLTBCo
was directed to accept them back to work within 5 days under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike. 2

On September 15, 1988, the BLTBCo caused the publication of the resolution and called on all striking workers to return to work
not later than September 18, 1988. It later extended the deadline to September 19, 1988.

Of the some 1,730 BLTBCo employees who went on strike, only 1,116 reported back for work. Seventeen others were later re-
admitted. Subsequently, about 614 employees, including those who were allegedly dismissed for causes other than the strike,
filed individual complaints for illegal dismissal. Their common ground was that they were refused admission when they reported
back for work.

Among those who failed to comply with the return-to-work order were the respondent individual union members.

On July 19, 1991, the NLRC issued a resolution deciding the dispute thus:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

 1. Dismissing the charge of unfair labor practice and union busting filed by the union against BLTBCo for
lack of merit;

2. Ordering BLTBCo to fully implement the provisions of the CBA in the matter of uniform and safety shoes;

3. Declaring valid the dismissal of Jose M. Calubayan, Tirso Vinas, Ronelito Torres, Floro T. Isla and
Rosauro Aguilar, being grounded on lawful causes:

4. Declaring the strike illegal;

5. Declaring the following officers and members of the union, namely: . . . to have lost their employment
status;

6. Ordering the reinstatement of the following union members, namely; . . . to their former position without
loss of seniority rights but without backwages.

7. The case of Ladislao Violanda is considered withdrawn.

8. Directing likewise the reinstatement of all striking employees of BLTBCo who have not committed illegal
acts.

9. Declaring regular the employment of casual employees who have already rendered service of at least one
year whether continuous or broken.

On September 16, 1991, the NLRC issued the other challenged resolution, viz.:

WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration of Respondent BLTBCo and Complainant Pepito Abratique
are denied for lack of merit. As a consequence, respondent's prayer for temporary restraining order is likewise
denied.

As prayed for, respondent is directed to reinstate the union members specifically named in the questioned
resolution and all those striking employees who have not committed illegal acts.

This order of reinstatement is immediately executory. No further motions for reconsideration shall be
allowed.

BLTB then filed this special civil action for certiorari, claiming that the respondent NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion
in:

1. ordering the reinstatement of the aforenamed 190 individual respondent union members notwithstanding
the fact that they knowingly participated in a strike which was illegal from its inception as it was done in
complete defiance and/or disobedience to the Assumption Order of August 29, 1988 and the Return-To-Work
Order of September 6, 1988;

2. failing to consider that aforenamed individual union members have already abandoned their employment
when they defied the Return-To-Work Order of September 6, 1988;

3. limiting the declaration of forfeiture of employment status to mere thirty-six (36) union officers and
members of the striking union when BLTBCo was able to initially identify at least (a) one hundred (100)
employees who committed illegal/violent acts during and after the strike; and (b) twenty (20)employees who
reported back for work and later on abandoned it and resumed their strike activities;

4. not including the recognized union officers — Jerry Soriano, Serafin Soriano and Desiderio Comel —
among the union officers whose employment status have been declared forfeited; and
 5. incorporating in its subject Resolution a blanket order reinstating BLTBCo's striking employees who have
not committed illegal acts.

On motion of the petitioner and upon its posting of a cash bond in the amount of P500,000.00, the Court issued a temporary
restraining order on November 6, 1991, against the enforcement of the above-quoted resolutions. 3

Separate comments on the petition were filed by two of the private respondents, Celso Peñana and Pepito Abratique, and by the
Solicitor General on behalf of the public respondent. A consolidated reply to these comments was later submitted by the
petitioner.

The Court has deliberated on the arguments of the parties and finds that the challenged resolutions must be sustained.

BLTBCo contends that the 190 union members who participated in the illegal strike should not have been reinstated because they
defied the return-to-work order of September 6, 1988. It invokes against the NLRC its own words in its resolution of July 19,
1991, where it said:

A strike that is undertaken despite the issuance by the Secretary of Labor of an assumption or certification
order becomes a prohibited activity and thus illegal, pursuant to the second paragraph of Art. 264 of the
Labor Code as amended (Zamboanga Wood Products, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. 82088, October 13, 1989: 178
SCRA 482). The Union officers and members, as a result, are deemed to have lost their employment status
for having knowingly participated in an illegal act. (Union of Filipino Employees (UFE), et al. vs. Nestle
Philippines, Inc., et al., G.R. No. 88710-13, December 19, 1991)

That is only half the picture, however. As the NLRC further explained, it was "not inclined to declare a wholesale forfeiture of
employment status of all those who participated in the strike" because, first of all, there was inadequate service of the
certification order on the union as of the date the strike was declared and there was no showing that the striking members had
been apprised of such order by the NAFLU.

Secondly, and more importantly, the resolution declared as follows:

Applying the principle of vicarious liability, only the officers of the union deserved to be penalized with the
loss of their employment status. The leaders of the union are the moving force in the declaration of the strike
and the Rank-in-file employees merely followed. Likewise, viewed in the light of Article 264, paragraph (e),
those who participated in the commission of illegal acts who stood charged criminally thereof in court must
be penalized. BLTBCo will have to agree with Us that while the general membership of TLM-NAFLU may
have joined the strike at its inception, We are convinced that they returned to work on September 19, 1988 or,
immediately thereafter. And, We are not swayed that these employees have abandoned their job just because
they reported late or, beyond the period required by the Commission and by BLTBCo. The circumstances of
time and place of employment and the residences of the employees as well as the lack of individual notice to
them are reasons enough to justify their failure to beat the deadline.

True it is, that management of BLTBCo caused the publication of the Resolution of the Commission of
September 5, 1988 in the Manila Bulletin, We cannot reasonably expect the complainants, who are ordinary
workers, to be regular readers of such newspaper. Moreover, the publication of the said resolution was only
made once.

We accept these factual conclusions as they do not appear to have been reached arbitrarily. The mere fact that the majority of the
strikers were able to return to work does not necessarily mean that the rest deliberately defied the return-to-work order or that
they had been sufficiently notified thereof. As the Solicitor General correctly adds, some of them may have left Metro Manila and
did not have enough time to return during the period given by the petitioner, which was only five days.

The contention of the petitioner that the private respondents abandoned their position is also not acceptable. An employee who
forthwith takes steps to protest his lay-off cannot by any logic be said to have abandoned his work.

For abandonment to constitute a valid cause for termination of employment, there must be a deliberate, unjustified refusal of the
employee to resume his employment. 4 This refusal must be clearly established. As we stressed in a recent case, 5 mere absence is
not sufficient; it must be accompanied by overt acts unerringly pointing to the fact that the employee simply does not want to
work anymore. In the case at bar, the affidavit of Eduardo Azucena, BLTBCo operations manager, 6 besides being hearsay, lacks
credibility in light of the subsequent acts of the private respondents in complaining about their separation.

A worker who joins a strike does so precisely to assert or improve the terms and conditions of his employment. If his purpose is
to abandon his work, he would not go to the trouble of joining a strike.

The petitioner also alleges that the NLRC erred in limiting the forfeiture of employment status to the 36 union officers and
members although there were at least 100 employees who committed violent acts and 20 employees who reported back for work
and later abandoned it to resume their strike activities.

These issues are also factual. The findings thereon of the NLRC are conclusive on us and will not be disturbed as it clearly
appears that they are not tainted with grave abuse of discretion.

We agree with the Solicitor General that the mere filing of charges against an employee for alleged illegal acts during a strike
does not by itself justify his dismissal. The charges must be proved at an investigation duly called where the employee shall be
given an opportunity to defend himself. This is true even if the alleged ground constitutes a criminal offense, as we held
in Almira v. B.F. Goodrich Phil., Inc. 7 In that case, we ordered the reinstatement of employees against whom criminal
complaints had been filed but not yet proved.

The next contention of the petitioner is that Serafin Soriano, Jerry Soriano and Desiderio Comel should also be dismissed with
the other union officers and members who participated in the illegal strike. We note, however, that these three have not been
impleaded in this petition (unlike the others who have been individually named) and so have not been given an opportunity to
defend themselves against the charges of BLTBCo. Absent such an opportunity, we are precluded from making any
pronouncement regarding their alleged role in the strike for which their dismissal is sought.

The petitioner's last point is that the NLRC should not have issued the blanket directive for the "reinstatement of all striking
employees of BLTBCo who have not committed illegal acts."

The key clause here is "who have not committed illegal acts." The directive was not really "blanket," as the petitioner would call
it, but indeed selective. The NLRC made this clear in the resolution dated September 16, 1991, thus:

The loss of employment status of striking union members is limited to those "who knowingly participates in
the commission of illegal acts." (Article 264, Labor Code) Evidence must be presented to substantiate the
commission thereof and not merely an unsubstantiated allegation. He who asserts the commission of illegal
acts, must prove the same, and it is on the basis of substantiated evidence that this Commission declares the
loss of employment status of specific union members who have committed illegal acts.

This Commission's order directing the reinstatement of all striking employees against whom no complaint of
illegal acts having been committed during the strikes, and who were barred from returning to work and is
similarly situated with those who have been directed to be reinstated, should, as a consequence and on the
basis of the reasons discussed in the questioned resolution be reinstated. There is no denial of due process in
this direction, for respondent has been given the chance to defend its position.

Elaborating on the same issue, the Solicitor General astutely observes:

The assailed Resolution does not prevent petitioner from continuing with its investigation and come up with
evidence against these workers. But they have to be admitted back to their work first. This is clearly a
situation where the social justice provisions of our laws and jurisprudence come in aid of labor. Since such
investigations might be extended, intentionally or otherwise, the workers are in danger of losing their
livelihood. As compared to the management that is in a position to wage an extended legal struggle against
labor, the latter cannot do so. This is where the State intervenes to equalize matters between labor and
management.

The right to strike is one of the rights recognized and guaranteed by the Constitution as an instrument of labor for its protection
against exploitation by management. By virtue of this right, the workers are able to press their demands for better terms of
employment with more energy and persuasiveness, poising the threat to strike as their reaction to the employer's intransigence.
The strike is indeed a powerful weapon of the working class. But precisely because of this, it must be handled carefully, like a
sensitive explosive, lest it blow up in the workers' own hands. Thus, it must be declared only after the most thoughtful
consultation among them, conducted in the only way allowed, that is, peacefully, and in every case conformably to reasonable
regulation. Any violation of the legal requirements and strictures, such as a defiance of a return-to-work order in industries
affected with public interest, will render the strike illegal, to the detriment of the very workers it is supposed to protect.

Even war must be lawfully waged. A labor dispute demands no less observance of the rules, for the benefit of all concerned.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The resolutions dated July 19, 1991, and September 16, 1991, are AFFIRMED. The
temporary restraining order dated November 6, 1991, is LIFTED. Costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Griño-Aquino and Bellosillo, JJ., concur.

Medialdea, J., took no part.