Cases On Search Warrant

Political Law Review: Cases on Search Warrant
G.R. No. 111267 September 20, 1996

COLUMBIA PICTURES ENTERTAINMENT, INC., MGM ENTERTAINMENT CO., ORION PICTURES
CORPORATION, PARAMOUNT PICTURES CORP., UNIVERSAL CITY STUDIOS, INC., THE WALT
DISNEY COMPANY and WARNER BROTHERS, INC., petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, 14TH DIVISION and JOSE B. JINGCO of SHOWTIME
ENTERPRISES, INC., respondents.
ROMERO, J.:
Petitioners Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc., MGM Entertainment Co., Orion Pictures Corporation, Paramount
Pictures Corp., Universal City Studios, Inc. The Walt Disney Company and Warner Brothers, Inc. question the
decision 1 of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the Order of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Branch 168,
the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, finding that the issuance of the questioned warrants was not supported by probable cause, the
"Urgent Motion (to Lift Search Warrant [No. 23] and for the Return of Seized Articles) is hereby GRANTED.
Accordingly, the Videogram Regulatory Board (VRB) and/or any Police Agency or other representatives of the
VRB are hereby directed to return to the defendant/movant or his representative all articles/items in their
possession seized under and by virtue of Search Warrant No. 23.
SO ORDERED.
The antecedent facts leading to the disputed Order are:
Alfredo G. Ramos, intelligence officer of the Videogram Regulatory Board (VRB), received information that
private respondent Jose B. Jinco had in his possession pirated videotapes, posters, advertising materials and
other items used or intended to be used for the purpose of sale, lease, distribution, circulation or public
exhibition of the said pirated videotapes. Ramos ascertained the information to be true and filed a verified
Application for Search Warrant dated July 28, 1986 with prayer for the seizure of the properties described in
the search warrant.
On the same date, a hearing was conducted by Judge Florentino A. Flor of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig,
Branch 168, wherein Ramos and his two witnesses, Analie Jimenez and Rebecca Benitez-Cruz testified on the
need for the issuance of search warrant.
On July 28, 1986, the prayer for the issuance of the search warrant was granted and, on the same date,
Search Warrant No. 23 was issued.
On July 2, 1987, private respondent filed a Motion to Quash Search Warrant No. 23 on the grounds that the
Search Warrant did not state a specific offense and that, even assuming it stated a specific offense, it covered
more than one specific offense. The VRB opposed the Motion to Quash stating that Search Warrant No. 23
was issued for a single specific offense namely, violation of Section 56 and other related sections of
Presidential Decree No. 49 as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1988.
On September 30, 1987, the trial court denied the Motion to Quash finding that the Search Warrant was
issued for one specific offense. A Motion for Reconsideration was filed but the same was likewise denied.
Private respondent then filed an Urgent Motion To Lift the Search Warrant and For the Return of the Seized
Articles alleging that Search Warrant No. 23 is a general warrant, and that it was issued without probable
cause.
1
On May 22, 1989, the assailed order was issued by Judge Benjamin V. Pelayo, now presiding over Branch 168
of the Pasig RTC, granting the Motion to Quash and ordering the return of all seized articles to private
respondent.
Petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the said Order in toto.
Hence, this petition.
In granting the Motion to Quash, the trial court relied on the Court's ruling in 20th Century Fox Film
Corporation v. Court of Appeals, et al. 2 which involved violation of Presidential Decree No. 49, (otherwise
known as the Decree on the Protection of Intellectual Property). In said case, video outlets were raided
pursuant to search warrants issued by the Regional Trial Court of Makati. However, the search warrants were
later lifted by the same court on the ground of lack of probable cause because the master tapes of the
alleged pirated tapes were never shown to the lower court. The Court affirmed the lifting of the search
warrants holdings that the presentation of the master tapes was necessary for the validity of the search
warrants against those who have the pirated films in their possession.
When the trial court granted the Motion to Quash Search Warrant No. 23 on May 22, 1989, it used as its
justification the fact that, as the master copies were not presented to the court in its hearing of July 28, 1986,
there was no probable cause to issue the said warrant, based on the pronouncements in 20th Century Fox.
Petitioners now question the retroactive application of the 20th Century Fox decision which had not yet been
promulgated in 1986 when the search warrant was issued. Petitioners further argue that, contrary to the trial
court's finding, the search warrant was not a general warrant since the description of the items to be seized
was specific enough. It removed from the serving officer any discretions as to which items to seize inasmuch
as it described only those items which had a direct relation to the offense for which the search warrant was
issued.
The threshold issued that must first be determined is whether or not petitioners have the legal personality
and standing to file the appeal.
Private respondent asserts that the proceedings for the issuance and/or quashal of a search warrant are
criminal in nature. Thus, the parties in such a case are the "People" as offended party and the accused. A
private complainant is relegated to the role of a witness who does not have the right to appeal except where
the civil aspect is deemed instituted with the criminal case.
Petitioners, on the other hand, argue that as the offended parties in the criminal case, they have the right to
institute an appeal from the questioned order.
From the records it is clear that, as complainants, petitioners were involved in the proceedings which led to
the issuance of Search Warrant No. 23. In People v. Nano, 3 the Court declared that while the general rule is
that it is only the Solicitor General who is authorized to bring or defend actions on behalf of the People or the
Republic of the Philippines once the case is brought before this Court or the Court of Appeals, if there appears
to be grave error committed by the judge or a lack of due process the petition will be deemed filed by the
private complainants therein as if were filed by the Solicitor General. In line with this ruling, the Court gives
this petition due course and will allow petitioners to argue their case against the questioned order in lieu of
the Solicitor General.
As regards the issue of the validity of Search Warrant No. 23, there are two questions to be resolved: first,
whether the 20th Century Fox decision promulgated on August 19, 1988 is applicable to the Motion to Quash
Search Warrant No. 23 (issued on July 28, 1986).
We hold in the negative.
2
In the recent Columbia Pictures, et al., v. Court of Appeals, et al. 4 case which resolved the same issue
involving the same petitioners but with different respondents, the Court en banc held:
Mindful as we are of the ramifications of the doctrine of stare decisis and the rudiments of fair play, it its our
considered view that the 20th Century Fox ruling cannot be retroactively applied to the instant case to justify
the quashal of Search case to justify the quashal of Search Warrant No. 87-053. Herein petitioners' consistent
position that the order of the lower court of September 5, 1988 denying therein defendants' motion to lift the
order of search warrant was properly issued, there having been satisfactory compliance with the then
prevailing standards under the law for determination of probable cause, is indeed well taken. The lower court
could not possibly have expected more evidence from petitioners in their application for a search warrant
other than what the law and jurisprudence, then existing and judicially accepted, required with respect to the
finding of probable cause.
xxx xxx xxx
It is consequently clear that judicial interpretation becomes a part of the law as of the date that law was
originally passed, subject only to the qualification that when a doctrine of this Court is over-ruled and a
different view is adopted, and more so when there is a reversal thereof, the new doctrine should be applied
prospectively and should not apply to parties who relied on the old doctrine and acted in good faith. (People
v. Jabinal, L-30061, February 27, 1974, 55 SCRA 607; Unciano Paramedical College, Inc., et al. v. Court of
Appeals, et al. G.R. No. 100335, April 7, 1993, 221 SCRA 285; Tanada, et al. v. Guingona, Jr., etc., et al., G.R.
No. 113888, August 19, 1994, 235 SCRA 507). To hold otherwise would be to deprive the law of its quality of
fairness and justice then, if there if no recognition of what had transpired prior to such adjudication. (De
Agbayani v. Philippine National Bank, et al. L-23127, April 29, 1971, 38 SCRA 429).
Likewise, the Court ruled therein that presentation of the master tapes in such cases is not an absolute
requirement for as search warrant to issue:
More to the point, it is felt that the reasonableness of the added requirement in 20th Century Fox calling for
the production of the master tapes of the copyrighted films for determination of probable cause in copyright
infringement cases needs revisiting and clarification.
xxx xxx xxx
In fine, the supposed pronunciamento in said case regarding the necessity for the presentation of the master
tapes of the copy-righted films for the validity of search warrants should at most be understood to merely
serve as a guidepost in determining the existence of probable cause in copy-right infringement cases where
there is doubt as to the true nexus between the master tape and the pirated copies. An objective and careful
reading of the decision in said case could lead to no other conclusion than that said directive was hardly
intended to be a sweeping and inflexible requirement in all or similar copyright infringement cases. Judicial
dicta should always be construed within the factual matrix of their parturition, otherwise a careless
interpretation thereof could unfairly fault the writer with the vice of over statement and the reader with the
fallacy of undue generalization.
xxx xxx xxx
It is evidently incorrect to suggest, as the ruling in 20th Century Fox may appear to do, that in copyright
infringement cases, the presentation of master tapes of the copyright films is always necessary to meet the
requirement of probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant. It is true that such master tapes are
object evidence, with the merit that in this class of evidence the ascertainment of the controverted fact is
made through demonstration involving the direct use of the senses of the presiding magistrate. (City of
Manila v. Cabangis, 10 Phil. 151 [1908]; Kabase v. State, 31 Ala, App. 77, 12 So. 2nd, 758, 764). Such
auxiliary procedure, however, does not rule out the use of testimonial or documentary evidence, depositions,
admissions or other classes of evidence tending to prove the factum probandum, (See Phil. Movie Workers
3
Association v. Premiere Productions, Inc. 92 Phil. 843 [1953]) especially where the production in court of
object evidence would result in delay, inconvenience or expenses out of proportion to is evidentiary value.
(See 3 Jones on Evidence, Sec. 1400).
The instant case also differs from 20th Century Fox in that what herein private respondent put in issue was
the application of the ruling in that case, not the conduct of Judge Flor in the issuance of Search Warrant No.
23. From the records, it is clear that Judge Flor observed all the requirement necessary before the search
warrant was issued: he heard the testimonies and studied the dispositions of the witnesses for the
petitioners, namely, Ms. Rebecca Benitez-Cruz, Ms. Analie I. Jimenez and the VRB's Intelligence Officer,
Alfredo G. Ramos on the existence of probable cause before issuing the warrant.
Under Sec. 3 and 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, the requirements for the issuance of valid search warrant
are:
Sec. 3. Requisites for issuing search warrant.
A search warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be
determined by the judge or such other responsible officer authorized by law after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the thing to be seized.
Sec. 4. Examination of complainant; record. —
The judge must, before issuing the warrant, personally examine in the form of searching questions and
answers, in writing and under oath the complainant and any witnesses he may produce on facts personally
known to them and attach to the record their sworn statements together with any affidavits submitted.
Having satisfied these requirements, Judge Flor committed no grave abuse of discretion in issuing the
warrant.
Private respondent contends that Search Warrant No. 23 also violates the constitutional requirements of
particularity of the description of the warrant, being a general warrant and thus, is null and void.
In several cases, this Court had held that:
To be valid, a search warrant must be supported by probable cause to be determined by the judge or some
other authorized officer after examining the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. No less
important, there must be a specific description of the place to be searched and the things to be seized, to
prevent arbitrary and indiscriminate use of the warrant (Sec. 3, Art. IV, 1974 Constitution, now Sec. 2, Art. III
of the 1986 Constitution; Sec. 3, Rule 126 of the New Rules of Court; Stonehill v. Diokno, 20 SCRA 383, Lime
v. Ponce de Leon, 66 SCRA 299; Uy Kheytin v. Villareal, 42 Phil. 886; People v. Veloso, 48 Phil. 169; People v.
Rubio, 57 Phil. 384; Bache & Co., (Phil.) Inc. v. Ruiz, 37 SCRA 823; Roan v. Gonzalez, 145 SCRA 687) 5
(emphasis supplied)
When may a search warrant be deemed to satisfy the legal requirements of specificity?
In Bache and Co., (Phil.) Inc. v. Ruiz, we said
A search warrant may be said to particularly describe the things to be seized when the description therein is
as specific as the circumstances will ordinarily allow (People v. Rubio, 57 Phil. 384); or when the description
expresses a conclusion of fact — not of law — by which the warrant officer may be guided in making the
search and seizure (idem., dissent of Abad Santos, J.); or when the things described are limited to those
which bear direct relation to the offense for which the warrant is being issued (Sec. 2, Rule 126, Revised
Rules of Court). . . . If the articles desired to be seized have any direct relation to an offense committed, the
4
applicant must necessarily have some evidence, other than those articles, to prove the said offense; and the
articles subject of search and seizure should come in handy merely to strengthen such evidence. . . .
An examination of Search Warrant No. 23 shows that it was worded in such a manner that the enumerated
items to be seized bear a direct relation to the offense of violation of Sec. 56 of Presidential Decree No. 49, as
amended, which states:
(1) Transfer or cause to be transferred, directly or indirectly any sound recording or motion picture, or
other audio-visual work that has been recorded on a phonograph record, disc, wire, tape, film or other article
on which sounds, motion pictures, or other audio-visual works are recorded, with intent to sell, lease, publicly
exhibit or cause to be sold, leased or publicly exhibited, or to use for cause to be used for profit, such article
on which sounds, motion pictures, or other audio visual works are so transferred, WITHOUT THE WRITTEN
CONSENT OF HIS ASSIGNEE; or
(2) Sell, lease, distribute, circulate, exhibit, offer for sale, lease, distribution, circulation or public exhibit,
offer for sale, lease, distribution, or possess for the purpose of sale, lease, distribution, circulation or public
exhibition, any such article to which the sounds, motion pictures or audio-visual recordings thereon have been
so transferred, without the written consent of the owner or his assignee; or
(3) Offer or make available for a fee, rental or any other form of compensation, directly or indirectly, any
equipment, machinery, paraphernalia or any material with the knowledge that such equipment, machinery,
paraphernalia or material, will be used by another to reproduce, without the consent of the owners any
phonograph record, disc, wire, tape film or other article on which sound, motion pictures, or other audio-
visual recordings may be transferred.
In other words, it authorized only the seizure of articles used or intended to be used in the unlawful sale,
lease and other acts in violation of the said decree. The search warrant ordered the seizure of the following
properties:
(a) Pirated video tapes of the copyright motion pictures/films the titles of which are mentioned in the
attached list;
(b) Posters, advertising leaflets, brochures, invoices, journals, ledgers, and books of accounts bearing
and/or mentioning the pirated films with titles (as per attached list);
(c) Television sets, video cassettes records, rewinders, tape head cleaners, accessories, equipment and
other machines and paraphernalia or material used in the unlawful sale, lease, distribution, or possession for
purpose of sale, lease, distribution, circulation or public exhibition of the above-mentioned pirated video tapes
which he is keeping and concealing in the premises above-described.
Clearly, the above items could not be anymore specific as the circumstances will allow since they are all used
or intended to be used in the unlawful sale or lease of pirated tapes. Therefore, the pending of the appellate
court that Search Warrant No. 23 is a "general" warrant of devoid of basis.
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision and resolution of respondent Court of Appeals, and necessarily inclusive of
the order of the trial court dated May 22, 1989, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The order of the trial
court dated July 28, 1986 upholding the validity of Search Warrant No. 23 is hereby REINSTATED.
Costs against private respondent.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado, Puno and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur. 4 G.R. No. 110318, August 28, 1996.
Mendoza, J., is on leave. 5 Bachelor Express Incorporated v. Court of Appeals,
Footnotes G.R. No. 85691, 31 July 1990, 188 SCRA 216; Villa Rey Transit,
1 Rollo, p. 24. Inc. v. Court of Appeals, No. L- 25499, 18 February 1970, 31
2 162 SCRA 655 (1988). SCRA 511.
3 205 SCRA 155 (1992).
5
G.R. No. 142295 May 31, 2001
VICENTE DEL ROSARIO y NICOLAS, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
PARDO, J.:
Petitioner Vicente del Rosario y Nicolas appeals via certiorari from a decision of the Court of Appeals1
affirming with modification the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Bulacan, Branch 20, Malolos, and finding
him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of P. D. No. 1866, as amended, by Republic Act No. 8294
(illegal possession of firearms), sentencing him to four (4) years, nine (9) months and eleven (11) days of
prision correccional, as minimum, to six (6) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of prision mayor, as
maximum, and to pay a fine of P30,000.00.1âwphi1.nêt
On June 17, 1996, Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Eufracio S. Marquez of Bulacan filed with the Regional Trial
Court, Bulacan, Malolos an Information charging petitioner Vicente del Rosario y Nicolas with violation of P. D.
No. 1866, as follows:
"That on or about the 15th day of June 1996, in the municipality of Norzagaray, Province of Bulacan,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession under his custody and control, the following, to wit:
"a) One (1) pc. Pistol Cal. 45 SN:70G23792 (w/o license)
"b) One (1) pc. Revolver Cal. 22 SN:48673 (w/o license)
"c) Twenty Seven (27) rds live ammos. For cal. .45
"d) Five (5) pcs. Magazines for cal. .45
"e) Eight (8) rds live ammunitions for cal. 22
"f) Five (5) pcs. Magazines short for cal. 5.56 (M16)
"g) Twenty (20) rds live ammunitions for cal 5.56.
"without first having obtained" a proper license therefor.
"Contrary to law."2
On June 25, 1996, the trial court arraigned the petitioner. He pleaded not guilty.3 Trial ensued.
The facts, as found by the Court of Appeals, are as follows:
"Sometime in May 1996, the police received a report that accused-appellant Vicente del Rosario was in
possession of certain firearms without the necessary licenses. Acting upon the report, P/Sr. Insp. Jerito
Adique of the PNP Criminal Investigation Group at Camp Olivas, Pampanga inquired from the PNP Firearms
and Explosive Division "whether or not the report was true. On May 10, 1996, P/Sr. Insp. Edwin C. Roque of
the PNP Firearms and Explosives Division issued a certification (Exhibit L) stating that per records in his office,
the appellant is not a licensed/registered firearm holder of any kind and caliber. Armed with the said
certification, P/Sr. Insp. Adique applied for a search warrant to enable his team to search the house of
appellant.1âwphi1.nêt
"On June 13, 1996, a search warrant (Exhibit A) was issued by Judge Gil Femandez, Sr. of the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, Branch 217, authorizing the search of the residence of appellant at Barangay Tigbe,
6
Norzagaray, Bulacan.4 On June 15, 1996, at about 7:00 o'clock in the morning, a team led by P/Sr. Insp.
Adique went to Norzagaray to serve the warrant. Before proceeding to the residence of the appellant, the
police officers requested Barangay Chairman Rogelio de Silva and Barangay Councilman Aurelio Panteleon to
accompany them in the implementation of the warrant. Upon arrival at the house of appellant, the police
officers introduced themselves to the wife of appellant. When the appellant came out, P/Sr. Insp. Adique
informed him that they had a search warrant and that they were authorized to search his house. After
appellant gave his permission, the police officers conducted a search of the house. The search yielded the
following items: (a) a caliber .45 pistol with Serial No. 703792 with five magazines of caliber .45 (Exhibits B
and H) found at the master's bedroom; (b) five magazines of 5.56 M-16 rifle and two radios (Exhibits C to C-
4) found in the room of appellant's daughter; and (c) a caliber .22 revolver with Serial No. 48673 (Exhibit F)
containing 8 pieces of live ammunition (Exhibit M) found in the kitchen of the house. When asked about his
license to possess the firearms, the appellant failed to produce any. This prompted the police officers to seize
the subject firearms.
"SPO2 Marion Montezon, one of the searching officers, prepared three separate inventories of the seized
items (Exhibits H, M and N). The inventories were signed by P/Sr. Insp. Adique, the appellant and the
barangay officials who witnessed the search. Thereafter SPO2 Montezon prepared a certification of orderly
search (Exhibit I) which was signed by the appellant and the barangay officials attesting to the orderly
conduct of the search.
"For his defense, appellant contends that he had a license for the caliber .45 pistol recovered in his bedroom
and that the other items seized during the search including the caliber .22 revolver, were merely planted by
the police officers. Appellant likewise assails the manner in which the search was carried out, claiming that
the police officers just barged into his house without asking permission. Furthermore, he claimed that the
barangay officials arrived only after the police already had finished the search.
"After trial and on July 2, 1998, the trial court rendered a judgment of conviction, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds the accused VICENTE DEL ROSARIO y NICOLAS guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of violation of P. D. No. 1866 as charged under the Information dated June 17,
1996.
"Conformably with the provisions of said law, as amended by Republic Act No. 8294, and pursuant to the
provisions, of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the Court hereby sentences the accused to suffer
imprisonment of six (6) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to six (6) years of prision correctional, as
maximum, and to pay a fine of Fifteen. Thousand Pesos (P15,000.00).
On July 20, 1998, petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals, assailing the decision for being contrary to
facts and the law.6
On July 9, 1999, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision affirming with modification the decision of the
trial court as set out in the opening paragraph of this decision.7
On August 10, 1999, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a motion for reconsideration and/or new trial.8
He contended that the certification issued by the Chief, Firearms and Explosives Division, Philippine National
Police stating that the person named therein had not been issued a firearm license referred to a certain
Vicente "Vic" del Rosario of barangay Bigte, Norzagaray, Bulacan, not to him. He comes from barangay Tigbe,
Norzagaray, Bulacan, and that he has a valid firearm license.
On February 22, 2000, the Court of Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.9
Hence, this appeal.10
7
Petitioner submits that the search conducted at his residence was illegal the search warrant was issued in
violation of the Constitution11 and consequently, the evidence seized was inadmissible. He also submits that
he had a license for the .45 caliber firearm and ammunition seized in his bedroom. The other firearm, a .22
caliber revolver seized in a drawer at the kitchen of his house, a magazine for 5.56 mm. cal. Armalite rifle,
and two 2-way radios found in his daughter's bedroom, were either planted by the police or illegally seized, as
they were not mentioned in the search warrant.
We find the petition impressed with merit. We define the issues as follows:
First: whether petitioner had a license for the .45 caliber Colt pistol and ammunition seized in his bedroom;
and
Second: whether the .22 caliber revolver seized in a drawer at the kitchen of his house, a magazine for 5.56
mm. cal. Armalite rifle and two 2-way radios found in his daughter's bedroom, were planted by the police or
were illegally seized.
We shall resolve the issues in seriatim.
First: The .45 cal. Colt pistol in question was duly licensed.
Normally, we do not review the factual findings of the Court of Appeals and the trial courts.12 However, this
case comes within the exceptions.13 The "findings of fact by the Court of Appeals will not be disturbed by the
Court unless these findings are not supported by evidence."14 In this case, the findings of the lower courts
even directly contradict the evidence. Hence, we review the evidence. The trial court held that the copy of the
license presented was blurred, and that in any event, the court could rely on the certification dated May 10,
1996, of P/Sr. Inspector Edwin C. Roque, Chief, Records Branch, Firearms and Explosives Division, Philippine
National Police stating that Vicente "Vic" del Rosario of Barangay Bigte, Norzagaray, Bulacan is not a
licensed/registered firearm holder of any kind and caliber.15 As against this, petitioner submitted that he was
not the person referred to in the said certification because he is Vicente del Rosario y Nicolas from Barangay
Tigbe, Norzagaray, Bulacan. The Court takes judicial notice of the existence of both barangay Tigbe and
barangay Bigte, in Norzagaray, Bulacan.16 In fact, the trial court erred grievously in not taking judicial notice
of the barangays within its territorial jurisdiction, believing the prosecution's submission that there was only
barangay Tigbe, and that barangay Bigte in the certification was a typographical error.17 Petitioner presented
to the head of the raiding team, Police Senior Inspector Jerito A. Adique, Chief, Operations Branch, PNP
Criminal Investigation Command, a valid firearm license. The court is duty bound to examine the evidence
assiduously to determine the guilt or innocence of the accused. It is true that the court may rely on the
certification of the Chief, Firearms and Explosives Division, PNP on the absence of a firearm license.18
However, such certification referred to another individual and thus, cannot prevail over a valid firearm license
duly issued to petitioner. In this case, petitioner presented the printed computerized copy of License No. RCL
1614021915 issued to him on July 13, 1993, expiring in January 1995, by the Chief, Firearms and Explosives
Division, PNP under the signature of Reynaldo V. Velasco, Sr. Supt. (GSC) PNP, Chief, FEO.19 On the dorsal
side of the printed computerized license, there is stamped the words "Validity of computerized license is
extended until renewed license is printed" dated January 17, 1995, signed by Police Chief Inspector Franklin
S. Alfabeto, Chief, Licence Branch, FEO.20 Coupled with this indefinite extension, petitioner paid the license
fees for the extension of the license for the next two-year period.21
Consequently, we find that petitioner was the holder of a valid firearm license for the .45 caliber Colt pistol
seized in the bedroom of his house on June 15, 1996.22 As required, petitioner presented the license to the
head of the raiding team, Police Senior Inspector Jerito A. Adique of the Criminal Investigation Division Group,
PNP.23 As a senior police officer, Senior Inspector Adique could easily determine the genuineness and
authenticity of the computerized printed license presented. He must know the computerized license printed
form. The stamp is clearly visible. He could decipher the words and the signature of the authorized signing
official of the Firearms and Explosives Division, PNP. He belonged to the same national police organization.
8
Nevertheless, Senior Insp. Adique rejected the license presented because, according to him, it was expired.
However, assuming that the license presented was expired during the period January 1995 to January 1997,
still, possession of the firearm in question, a .45 caliber Colt pistol with serial No. 70G23792, during that
period was not illegal. The firearm was kept at home, not carried outside residence. On June 15, 1996, at the
time of the seizure of the firearm in question, possession of firearm with an expired license was not
considered unlawful, provided that the license had not been cancelled or revoked. Republic Act No. 8294,
providing that possession of a firearm with an expired license was unlawful took effect only on July 7,
1997.24 It could not be given retroactive effect.25
According to firearm licensing regulations, the renewal of a firearm license was automatically applied for upon
payment of the license fees for the renewal period. The expired license was not cancelled or revoked. It
served as temporary authority to possess the firearm until the renewed license was issued. Meantime, the
applicant may keep the gun at home pending renewal of the firearm license and issuance of a printed
computerized license. He was not obliged to surrender the weapon. Printed at the dorsal side of the
computerized license is a notice reading:
"IMPORTANT
1. This firearm license is valid for two (2) years. Exhibit this license whenever demanded by proper authority.
2. Surrender your firearm/s to the nearest PNP Unit upon revocation or termination of this license. Under any
of the following instances, your license shall be revoked for which reason your firearm/s is/are subject to
confiscation and its/their forfeiture in favor of the government.
a. Failure to notify the Chief of PNP in writing of your change of address, and/or qualification.
b. Failure to renew this license by paying annual license, fees, within six (6) months from your birth month.
Renewal of your license can be made within your birth month or month preceding your birth month. Late
renewal shall be penalized with 50% surcharge for the first month (from the first day to the last day of this
month) followed by an additional 25% surcharge for all of the succeeding five (5) months compounded
monthly.
c. Loss of firearm/s through negligence.
d. Carrying of firearm/s outside of residence without appropriate permit and/or carrying firearm/s in
prohibited places.
e. Conviction by competent court for a crime involving moral turpitude or for any offense where the penalty
carries an imprisonment of more than six (6) months or fine of at least Pl,000.00.
f. Dismissal for cause from, the service.
g. Failure to sign license, or sign ID picture or affix right thumb mark.
3. Unauthorized loan of firearm/s to another person is punishable by permanent disqualification and forfeiture
of the firearm in favor of the government.
4. If termination is due to death, your next of kin should surrender your firearm/s to the nearest PNP Unit.
For those within Metro, Manila, surrender should be made with FEO, Camp Crame.
5. When firearms become permanently unserviceable, they should be deposited with the nearest PNP
Unit and ownership should be relinquished in writing so that firearms may be disposed of in accordance with
law.
9
6. Application for the purchase of ammunition should be made in case of a resident of Metro Manila direct to
the Chief, FEO and for residents of a Province to secure recommendation letter to the nearest PNP Provincial
Command who will thereafter endorse same to CHIEF, FEO for issuance of the permit. License must be
presented before an authority to purchase ammo could be obtained."26
Indeed, as heretofore stated, petitioner duly paid the license fees for the automatic renewal of the firearm
license for the next two years upon expiration of the license in January, 1995, as evidenced by official receipt
No. 7615186, dated January 17, 1995.27 The license would be renewed, as it was, because petitioner still
possessed the required qualifications. Meantime, the validity of the license was extended until the renewed
computerized license was printed. In fact, a renewed license was issued on January 17, 1997, for the
succeeding two-year period.28
Aside from the clearly valid and subsisting license issued to petitioner, on January 25, 1995, the Chief,
Philippine National Police issued to him a permit to carry firearm outside residence valid until January 25,
1996, for the firearm in question.29 The Chief, Philippine National Police would not issue a permit to carry
firearm outside residence unless petitioner had a valid and subsisting firearm license. Although the permit to
carry firearm outside residence was valid for only one year, and expired on January 25, 1996, such permit is
proof that the regular firearm license was renewed and subsisting within the two-year term up to January
1997." A Permit to Carry Firearm Outside Residence presupposes that the party to whom it is issued is duly
licensed to possess the firearm in question."30 Unquestionably, on January 17, 1997, the Chief, Firearms and
Explosives Division, PNP renewed petitioner's license for the .45 cal. Colt pistol in question.31
Clearly then; petitioner had a valid firearm license during the interregnum between January 17, 1995, to the
issuance of his renewed license on January 17, 1997.
Finally, there is no rhyme or reason why the Court of Appeals and the trial court did not accept with alacrity
the certification dated June 25, 1996, of P/Sr. Inspector Edwin C. Roque,32 Chief, Records Branch, Firearms
and Explosives Division, PNP that Vicente N. del Rosario of Barangay Tigbe, Norzagaray, Bulacan is a
licensed/registered holder of Pistol, Colt caliber .45 with serial number 70G23792, covered by computerized
license issued dated June 15, 1995, with an expiry date January 1997.33 Reinforcing the aforementioned
certification, petitioner submitted another certification dated August 27, 1999, stating that Vicente N. del
Rosario of Barangay Tigbe, Norzagaray, Bulacan, was issued firearm license No. RL-C1614021915, for caliber
.45 Pistol with Serial Number 70G23792, for the years covering the period from July 13, 1993 to January
1995, and the extension appearing at the back thereof for the years 1995 to 1997.34 Had the lower courts
given full probative value to these official issuances, petitioner would have been correctly acquitted, thus
sparing this Court of valuable time and effort.
"In crimes involving illegal possession of firearm, the prosecution has the burden of proving the elements
thereof, viz.: (a) the existence of the subject firearm and (b) the fact that the accused who owned or
possessed it does not have the license or permit to possess the same.35 The essence of the crime of illegal
possession is the possession, whether actual or constructive, of the subject firearm, without which there can
be no conviction for illegal possession. After possession is established by the prosecution, it would only be a
matter of course to determine whether the accused has a license to possess the firearm."36 "Possession of
any firearm becomes unlawful only if the necessary permit or license therefor is not first obtained. The
absence of license and legal authority constitutes an essential ingredient of the offense of illegal possession of
firearm and every ingredient or essential element of an offense must be shown by the prosecution by proof
beyond reasonable doubt. Stated otherwise, the negative fact of lack or absence of license constitutes an
essential ingredient of the offense which the prosecution has the duty not only to allege but also, to prove
beyond reasonable doubt."37 "To convict an accused for illegal possession of firearms and explosives under
P. D. 1866, as amended, two (2) essential elements must be indubitably established, viz.: (a) the existence of
the subject firearm or explosive which may be proved by the presentation of the subject firearm or explosive
or by the testimony of witnesses who saw accused in possession of the same, and (b) the negative fact that
the accused had no license or permit to own or possess the firearm or explosive which fact may be
established by the testimony or certification of a representative of the PNP Firearms and Explosives Unit that
10
the accused has no license or permit to possess the subject firearm or explosive." x x x We stress that the
essence of the crime penalized under P. D. 1866 is primarily the accused's lack of license or permit to carry or
possess the firearm, ammunition or explosive as possession by itself is not prohibited by law."38 Illegal
possession of firearm is a crime punished by special law, a malum prohibitum, and no malice or intent to
commit a crime need be proved.39 To support a conviction, however, there must be possession coupled with
intent to possess (animus possidendi) the firearm.40
In upholding the prosecution and giving credence to the testimony of police officer Jerito A. Adigui, the trial
court relied on the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties by the police officers.41 This
is a flagrant error because his testimony is directly contradictory to the official records of the Firearms and
Explosives Division, PNP, which must prevail. Morever, the presumption of regularity can not prevail over the
Constitutional presumption of innocence.42 Right from the start, P/Sr. Insp. Jerito A. Adigue was aware that
petitioner possessed a valid license for the caliber .45 Colt pistol in question. Despite this fact, P/Sr. Insp.
Adigue proceeded to detain petitioner and charged him with illegal possession of firearms. We quote pertinent
portions of the testimony of petitioner:
Q: What else did Adigue tell you after showing to him the license of your cal. .45 pistol and the alleged
cal. .22 found in a drawer in your kitchen?
A: He told me that since my firearm is licensed, he will return my firearm, give him ten thousand pesos
(P10,000.00) and for me to tell who among the people in our barangay have unlicensed firearm, sir.
Q: How did he say about the ten thousand pesos?
A: He said "palit kalabaw na lang tayo" sir.
Q: And what did you answer him?
A: I told him my firearm is licensed and I do not have money, if I have, I will not give him, sir, because
he was just trying to squeeze something from me.
Q: How about the unlicensed firearms in your barangay which he asked, from you?
A: I said I do not know any unlicensed firearm in our barangay, sir.
Q: About the .22 cal. pistol, what was your answer to him?
A: I told him that it was not mine, they planted it, sir.
Q: What did he say next?
A: He said that it is your word against mine, the Court will believe me because I am a police officer, sir.
Q: What was your comment to what he said?
A: I said my firearm is licensed and we have Courts of law who do not conform with officials like you and
then he laughed and laughed, sir."43
The trial court was obviously misguided when it held that "it is a matter of judicial notice that a caliber .45
firearm can not be licensed to a private individual."44 This ruling has no basis either in law or in
jurisprudence.45
Second issue. The seizure of items not mentioned in the search warrant was illegal.
11
With respect to the .22 caliber revolver with Serial No. 48673, that the police raiding team found in a drawer
at the kitchen of petitioner's house, suffice it to say that the firearm was not mentioned in the search warrant
applied for and issued for the search of petitioner's house. "Section 2, Article III of the Constitution lays down
the general rule that a search and seizure must be carried out through or on the strength of a judicial
warrant, absent which such search and seizure becomes 'unreasonable' within the meaning of said
constitutional provision."46 "Supporting jurisprudence thus outlined the following requisites for a search
warrant's validity, the absence of even one will cause" its downright nullification: (1) it must be issued upon
probable cause; (2) the probable cause must be determined by the judge himself and not by the applicant or
any other person; (3) in the determination of probable cause, the judge must examine, under oath or
affirmation, the complainant and such witnesses as the latter may produce; and (4) the warrant issued must
particularly describe the place to be searched and persons or things to be seized."47 Seizure is limited to
those items particularly described in a valid search warrant. Searching officers are without discretion
regarding what articles they shall seize.48 Evidence seized on the occasion of such an unreasonable search
and seizure is tainted and excluded for being the proverbial "fruit of a poisonous tree." In the language of the
fundamental law, it shall be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding.49
In this case, the firearm was not found inadvertently and in plain view. It was found as a result of a
meticulous search in the kitchen of petitioner's house. This firearm, to emphasize, was not mentioned in the
search warrant. Hence, the seizure was illegal.50 The seizure without the requisite search warrant was in
plain violation of the law and the Constitution.51 True that as an exception, the police may seize without
warrant illegally possessed firearm or any contraband for that matter, inadvertently found in plain view.
However, "[t]he seizure of evidence in 'plain view' applies only where the police officer is not searching for
evidence against the accused, but inadvertently comes across an incriminating object."52 Specifically, seizure
of evidence in "plain view" is justified when there is:
(a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present in the
pursuit of their official duties;
(b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who had the right to be where they are.
(c) the evidence must be immediately apparent, and
(d) "plain view" justified mere seizure of evidence without further search.53
Hence, the petitioner rightly rejected the firearm as planted and not belonging to him. The prosecution was
not able to prove that the firearm was in the effective possession or control of the petitioner without a
license. In illegal possession of firearms, the possessor must know of the existence of the subject firearm in
his possession or control. "In People v. de Gracia,54 we clarified the meaning of possession for the purpose of
convicting a person under P. D. No.1866, thus: x x x 'In the present case, a distinction should be made
between criminal intent and intent to possess. While mere possession without criminal intent is sufficient to
convict a person for illegal possession of a firearm, it must still be shown that there was animus possidendi or
an intent to possess on the part of the accused.' x x x x Hence, the kind of possession punishable under P. D.
No. 1866 is one where the accused possessed a firearm either physically or constructively with animus
possidendi or intention to possess the same."55 That is the meaning of animus possidendi. In the absence of
animus possidendi, the possessor of a firearm incurs no criminal liability.
The same is true with respect to the 5.56 cal. magazine found in the bedroom of petitioner's daughter. The
seizure was invalid and the seized items were inadmissible in evidence. As explained in People v. Doria,56 the
"plain view" doctrine applies when the following requisites concur: (1) the law if enforcement officer is in a
position where he has a clear view of a particular area or alias prior justification for an intrusion; (2) said
officer inadvertently comes across (or sees in plain view) a piece of incriminating evidence; and (3) it is,
immediately apparent to such officer that the item he sees may be evidence of a crime or a contraband or is
otherwise subject to seizure."
12
With particular reference to the two 2-way radios that the raiding policemen also seized in the bedroom of
petitioner's daughter, there was absolutely no reason for the seizure. The if radios were not contraband per
se. The National Telecommunications Commission may license two-way radios at its discretion.57 The burden
is on the prosecution to show that the two-way radios were not licensed. The National Telecommunication
Commission is the sole agency authorized to seize unlicensed two-way radios. More importantly, admittedly,
the two-way radios were not mentioned in the search warrant. We condemn the seizure as illegal and a plain
violation of a citizen's right. Worse, the petitioner was not charged with illegal possession of the two-way
radios.1âwphi1.nêt
Consequently, the confiscation of the two 2-way radios was clearly illegal. The possession of such radios is
not even included in the charge of illegal possession of firearms (violation of P. D. No. 1866, as amended)
alleged in the Information.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby REVERSES the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. CR No. 22255,
promulgated on July 09, 1999.
The Court ACQUITS petitioner Vicente del Rosario y Nicolas of the charge of violation of P. D. No. 1866, as
amended by R. A. No. 8294 (illegal possession of firearms and ammunition), in Criminal Case No. 800-M-96,
Regional Trial Court, Bulacan, Branch 20, Malolos.
Costs de oficio.
The Chief; Firearms and Explosives Division, PNP shall return to petitioner his caliber .45 Colt pistol, with
Serial Number No. 70023792, the five (5) extra magazines and twenty seven (27) rounds of live ammunition,
and the two 2-way radios confiscated from him. The Chief, Philippine National Police, or his duly authorized
representative shall show to this Court proof of compliance herewith within fifteen (15) days from notice. The
.22 caliber revolver with Serial No. 48673, and eight (8) live ammunition and the magazine for 5.56 mm.
caliber Armalite rifle are confiscated in favor of the government.1âwphi1.nêt
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., Puno, Kapunan, Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
Footnotes: applicant and his witnesses (Prudente v. Dayrit, 180 SCRA 69

1 In CA-G. R. CR No. 22255, promulgated on July 09,1999. [1989]; Pendon v. Court of Appeals, 191 SCRA 429 [1990];
Aquino, J., ponente, Mabutas, Jr. and Agnir, Jr., JJ., concurring. Silva v. RTC Negros Oriental, 203 SCRA 140 [1991].
Petition, Annex "A", Rollo, pp. 21-28. 12 Siguan v. Lim, 318 SCRA 725, 734 [1999]; de los Reyes v.
2 Regional Trial Court Records, pp. 2-3. Court of Appeals, 313 SCRA 632, 645 [1999]; American Express
3 Ibid., p. 21. International, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 308 SCRA 65, 69
4 Note well that petitioner is a resident of Barangay Tigbe, [1999]; Pimentel v. Court of Appeals, 307 SCRA 38, 43 [1999].
Norzagaray, Bulacan. The certification issued by P/Sr. Insp. 13 Sta. Maria v. Court of Appeals, 349 Phil. 275, 282-283
Edwin C. Roque referred to Vicente "Vic" del Rosario of [1998].
Barangay Bigte, Norzagaray, Bulacan. 14 Guerrero v. Court of Appeals, 349 Phil. 605, 614 [1998].
5 Petition, Annex "A", Rollo, pp. 22-28, at pp. 23-24; CA Rollo, 15 See Exhibit "L", Folder of Exhibits, Regional Trial Court
pp. 87-93, at pp. 88-89. Promulgated on July 13, 1998, Records, p. 6.
Regional Trial Court Records, p. 173. 16 See Petition, Annex "C", Supplement to the Motion for
6 Notice of Appeal, dated July 17, 1998, Regional Trial Court Reconsideration, Annex "B", Rollo, p. 57. We also checked
Records, p. 175. Docketed as CA-G. R. CR No. 22255. these data from the records of the Commission on Elections.
7 Rollo, pp. 22-28. 17 But the trial court and the Court of Appeals ignored the
8 CA Rollo, pp. 94-116. sworn certification dated August 16, 1999, to the effect that
9 Resolution, Rollo, pp. 60-61. Barangay Tigbe and Barangay Bigte, Norzagaray, Bulacan are
10 Petition, filed on April 24, 2000. Rollo, pp. 9-20. On June two different and distinct barangays.
14,2000, we required respondent to comment on the petition 18 People v. Lazaro, 317 SCRA 435,446 [1999].
(Rollo, p. 129). On October 26, 2000, respondent filed its 19 Exh. "1", Folder of Exhibits, Regional Trial Court Records, p.
comment (Rollo, pp. 143-156). On December 6, 2000, we gave 10; See also p. 21.
due course to the petition (Temp. Rollo, pp. 1-2). 20 See reverse side of Exhibit "1", back of p. 10 and p. 21.
11 On the ground that the judge who issued the search 21 Exh. "3-A", Folder of Exhibits, Regional Trial Court Records,
warrant did not personally ask searching questions to the p. 14; See also Exh. "1", ibid., p. 21.
13
22 The trial court, by taking judicial notice, ruled that a .45 cal. 39 People v. Lubo, 101 Phil. 179 [1957], citing U. S. v. Go
pistol can not be licensed; The trial court committed two errors Chico, 14 Phil. 128 [1909]; People v. Bayona, 61 Phil. 181
here. One, for taking judicial notice of a disputed fact without [1935]; People v. Cava, G. R. No. L-9416, August 31, 1956
hearing and receiving evidence thereon (Salamera v. [unpublished].
Sandiganbayan, 303 SCRA 217 [1999]). Second, no law 40 People v. Lubo, supra, Note 39.
prohibits the licensing of a .45 cal pistol; the power to issue 41 People v. Jubilag, 331 Phil. 897, 910 [1996].
license is vested in the discretion of the Chief of Constabulary, 42 People v. Figueroa, G. R. No.134056, July 6, 2000.
now the Chief, Philippine National Police (Rules and Regulations 43 TSN, November 26, 1996, pp. 7-9.
Implementing P. D. No. 1866, Section 2). 44 Decision, Regional Trial Court Records, pp. 147-171, at p.
23 TSN, November 26, 1996, p. 3. 168.
24 People v. Mendoza, 301 SCRA 66, 82 [1999]. 45 Supra, Note 22.
25 People v. de Vera, Sr., 308 SCRA 75, 100 [1999]. 46 People v. Montilla, 349 Phil. 640, 656 [1998].
26 Exh. "1", dorsal side, Folder of Exhibits, Regional Trial Court 47 Republic v. Sandiganbayan, 325 Phil. 762, 821-822 [1996].
Records, back of p. 21; see also Annex "5.2", CA Rollo, p. 112. 48 Uy Kheytin v. Villareal, 42 Phil. 886 [1933]. In Roan v.
27 Exh. "3-A", Folder of Exhibits, Regional Trial Court Records, Gonzales, 145 SCRA 687, there was a search warrant but it was
p. 14. declared invalid because of failure to conduct proper
28 Motion for Reconsideration and/or new trial, Annex "5.1", examination. The seizure of guns not described in the warrant
Rollo, pp. 29-51, at p. 46; See also CA Rollo, pp. 94-116, at p. was held illegal because there was no valid search warrant, and
111. the articles seized were not in plain view but deliberately
29 Exh. "3-b", Folder of Exhibits, Regional Trial Court Records, sought (taken from A Handbook on Arrest, Search and Seizure
p. 15. See also Exhibit "1-Motion", ibid., p. 21. and Custodial Investigation, by Justice Oscar M. Herrera, 1994
30 Pastrano v. Court of Appeals, 346 Phil. 277,284 [1997]. ed., p. 178).
31 Supra, Note 28. 49 People v. Valdez, G. R. No. 129296, September 25, 2000.
32 He is the same P/Sr. Insp. Edwin C. Roque who certified on 50 People v., Doria, 301 SCRA 668 [1999]. Cf. Veroy v.
May 10, 1996, that one Vicente "Vic" del Rosario of barangay Layaque, 210 SCRA 97 [1992], the seizure of a gun found
Bigte, Norzagaray, Bulacan is not a licensed/registered firearm inside an unlocked drawer was rejected because there was no
holder of any kind and caliber, basis of the issuance of a search valid search.
warrant. Supra, Note 15. 51 Ibid., at p. 716, citing Section 2, Bill of Rights, 1987
33 Exh. "2", Folder of Exhibits, Regional Trial Court Records, p. Constitution.
II. See also Exhibit "5", ibid., p. 18. 52 People v. Valdez, supra, Note 49.
34 Supplement to the motion for reconsideration and/or new 53 People v. Aruta, 351 Phil. 868, 879 [1998].
trial, Annex "C", CA Rollo, pp. 118-124, at p. 124. 54 233 SCRA 716, 725, 727 [1994].
35 People v. Castillo, 325 SCRA 613, 620 [2000]; People v. 55 People v. de la Rosa, 348 Phil. 173, 184-185 [1998], citing
Dorimon, 321 SCRA 43, 48 [1999]; People v. Cerveto, 315 People v. Soyang, 110 Phil. 565 [1960].
SCRA 611, 624 [1999]; Cadua v. Court of Appeals, 312 SCRA 56 Supra, Note 50, concurring opinion of Justice Artemio V.
703, 722 [1999]; People v. Khor, 307 SCRA 295, 311 [1999]. Panganiban, pp. 726-727, citing People v. Musa, 217 SCRA
36 People v. Bansil, 304 SCRA 384, 394 [1999]. 597, 611 [1993].
37 People v. Khor, supra, Note 35, at p. 310. 57 Rep. Act No. 3846, as amended.
38 People v. Cortez, 324 SCRA 335, 344 [2000].
14
[G.R. No. 144639. September 12, 2003]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,
vs.
BENNY GO, appellant.
DECISION
CARPIO-MORALES, J.:
On direct appeal before this Court is the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 41, in Criminal
Case No. 99-174439 finding appellant Benny Go guilty of violating Section 16, Article III in relation to Section
2 (e-2), Article I of Republic Act No. 6425,[1] as amended, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of P1,000,000.00.
The Information filed against appellant charged as follows:
That on or about June 14, 1999, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused without being authorized
by law to possess or use any regulated drug, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly have in his
possession and under his custody and control one (1) knot tied transparent plastic bag containing TWO
HUNDRED FOUR (204) grams of white crystalline substance known as Shabu containing methamphetamine
hydrochloride, a regulated drug, without the corresponding license or prescription thereof.
Contrary to law.[2]
Upon arraignment, appellant, assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty to the offense charged.[3]
Subsequently, at the pre-trial conference on August 10, 1999, the parties stipulated that (1) the subject
Search Warrant is valid; and (2) the Forensic Chemist conducted only a qualitative examination on the subject
specimen.[4]
The prosecution presented the following witnesses: (1) Police Inspector Edwin Zata, Forensic Chemical Officer
of the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory; (2) PO2 Gerardo Abulencia (PO2 Abulencia); (3)
SPO1 Edgardo G. Fernandez (SPO1 Fernandez); and (4) SPO1 Ver M. Serquea (SPO1 Ver Serquea) whose
testimonies sought to establish the following facts:
On April 28, 1999, SPO1 Fernandez, SPO1 Serquea and a confidential informant conducted a test buy
operation at the residence of appellant at 1480 General Luna Street, Ermita, Manila during which they
purchased from him P1,500.00 worth of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.[5] The police officers did
not immediately arrest him, however. Instead, they applied for a Search Warrant for appellants residence
from the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay City[6] based on their firm belief that there was a large quantity
of illegal drugs in his house.[7]
On June 14, 1999, a raiding team composed of SPO1 Fernandez and SPO1 Serquea, together with PO2
Abulencia, PO3 Noel Adtu and PO2 Gerardo Jimenez,[8] proceeded to appellants above-said residence armed
with Search Warrant No. 99-0038[9] issued by Br. 109 of the RTC of Pasay City commanding them to make
an immediate search anytime of the day or night of appellants residence and to seize and take possession of
METAMPHETAMINE HYDROCHLORIDE (Shabu), weighing scale, other drug paraphernalias and proceeds of
the above crime.
Soon after the police officers arrived at appellants residence at around 6:00 in the evening,[10] they, to
enable them to gain entry to the two-storey house, sideswept (sinagi) a little appellants Toyota Corolla GLI
car which was parked outside.[11] Jack Go, appellants son and the only one present at the house at the time,
thereupon opened the door of the house and the policemen at once introduced themselves, informed him
that they had a warrant for the search of the premises, and promptly handcuffed him to a chair. SPO1
Fernandez, SPO1 Serquea and PO2 Abulencia entered the house, while PO3 Adtu and PO2 Jimenez remained
outside. [12]
15
On instruction of SPO1 Fernandez, SPO1 Serquea left to summon barangay officials to witness the search.
SPO1 Serquea returned five minutes later with Barangay Kagawads Gaspar Lazaro (Kagawad Lazaro) and
Emmanuel Manalo (Kagawad Manalo) who were advised by SPO1 Fernandez to be witnesses to the search
and to afterwards sign the inventory receipt and affidavit of orderly search.
As instructed, the two barangay kagawads proceeded to the upper floor of appellants house with SPO1
Serquea and PO2 Abulencia.[13] While SPO1 Fernandez, who remained downstairs in the sala,[14] instructed
the handcuffed Jack Go to witness the search, the latter refused since there will be no more left in the sala of
the house anyway there is a barangay official.[15]
In the course of the search of the premises which took place from 6:00 to 11:00 in the evening,[16] Kagawad
Lazaro and PO2 Abulencia recovered one knot tied transparent plastic bag containing white crystalline
substance[17] from the drawer of a cabinet.
Also seized from the residence of appellant were the following: (a) one plastic bag containing yellowish
substance[18] found by SPO1 Serquea;[19] (b) a weighing scale discovered by SPO1 Fernandez; (c) assorted
documents; (d) passports; (e) bank books; (f) checks; (g) a typewriter; (h) a check writer; (i) several dry
seals and (j) stamp pads;[20] (k) Chinese and Philippine currency;[21] (l) and appellants Toyota Corolla
GLI[22] car (the car).
The plastic bag containing the white crystalline substance was marked by SPO1 Fernandez as EGF-A-1, while
the plastic bag with the yellowish substance was marked as EGF-A-2.[23]
With the exception of the car, all the seized items were brought to the dining table on the ground floor of
appellants house for inventory.[24]
In the meantime, appellants wife Shi Xiu Ong and his friends Samson Go and Peter Co arrived one after the
other at the house.[25] Appellant himself arrived at 9:30 in the evening when the search was almost
through.[26]
After the inventory had been taken, SPO1 Fernandez prepared a handwritten Inventory Receipt[27] and a
document captioned Affidavit of Orderly Search,[28] the contents of which he read to appellant. On
instruction of SPO1 Fernandez, Jack Go also explained the contents of the documents to appellant who then
signed them as did kagawads Manalo and Lazaro and Jack Go as witnesses.[29]
The police officers then brought appellant, his wife, son and friends, along with the seized items, to Camp
Bagong Diwa, Bicutan, Taguig, Metro Manila for verification and investigation.
Appellant was detained while the others were eventually released. [30] The arresting officers jointly prepared
an Affidavit of Arrest dated June 15, 1999[31] which, among other things, contained an enumeration of the
seized items identical to that in the handwritten Inventory Receipt. And SPO1 Fernandez prepared a Return of
Search Warrant 99-0038 dated June 18, 1999 and a referral paper 1st Indorsement[32] with the same
enumeration of seized items.
Also on June 15, 1999, SPO1 Serquea brought the plastic bag containing the white crystalline substance
(Exhibit A) and the plastic bag containing the yellowish substance (Exhibit B) to the PNP Crime Laboratory[33]
together with a request for laboratory examination.[34] Upon examination, Exhibit A was found to contain
204 grams of white crystalline substance containing methamphetamine hydrochloride, a regulated drug.[35]
Exhibit B, on the other hand, was found negative for any prohibited and/or regulated drug.[36]
Meanwhile, the seized documents, passports, dry seals and stamp pads were brought to the Bureau of
Immigration and Deportation,[37] while the bank books were forwarded to the corresponding banks for
verification.[38]
16
The prosecution presented in evidence the Yamato weighing scale,[39] claimed to have been recovered by
SPO1 Fernandez from the top of appellants refrigerator,[40] although it was not among those listed in the
handwritten Inventory Receipt, Affidavit of Arrest or Return of the Search Warrant.[41] Also presented by the
prosecution, as a hostile witness, to corroborate in part the foregoing facts was Kagawad Lazaro. He claimed,
however, that the first page of the handwritten Inventory Receipt submitted in evidence had been substituted
with another, asserting that he and the other witnesses affixed their signatures on the left-hand margin of the
first page of the handwritten Inventory Receipt which they were asked to sign whereas that submitted in
court did not bear their signatures.[42]
Kagawad Lazaro further claimed that the first entry on the first page of the Inventory Receipt, whereon he
and his co-witnesses affixed their signatures, reading Chinese Medicine had been replaced with undetermined
quantity of white crystalline granules;[43] that what was recovered from the room of Jack Go by PO2
Abulencia was Exhibit B, the plastic bag containing the yellowish powder, and not Exhibit A, the plastic bag
containing the suspected shabu; and that Exhibit A was not even among the items seized and
inventoried.[44]
The defense, which adopted the testimony of Kagawad Lazaro, presented appellant, his son Jack Go, and
Kagawad Manalo whose version of the facts of the case follows:
In November 1998, while appellant was walking along Gen. Luna Street, he was accosted by SPO1 Serquea
and another police officer who accused him of manufacturing shabu and divested him of money amounting to
more than P5,000.00. He was later released as the policemen could not charge him with anything.[45]
On July 14, 1999 at around 5:30 in the afternoon, Jack Go opened the door of their house after hearing
somebody shout that the car had been bumped. Five armed policemen then entered the house, one of whom
handcuffed him while two went up to the upper floor of the house and searched for about thirty (30) minutes.
[46]
At past 6:00 p.m., as the two kagawads entered the house which was already in disarray, SPO1 Fernandez
formed two groups to conduct the search at the second floor: (1) that of PO2 Abulencia, with Kagawad
Lazaro to serve as witness, and (2) that of SPO1 Serquea, with Kagawad Manalo to serve as witness.[47]
PO2 Abulencia, together with Kagawad Lazaro, searched the room of Jack Go. SPO1 Serquea, accompanied
by Kagawad Manalo, searched the study room where he seized documents, passports and assorted papers.
SPO1 Serquea and Kagawad Manalo then proceeded to the room of appellant followed by PO2 Abulencia and
Kagawad Lazaro. From the room of appellant, the policemen seized documents, passports, bankbooks and
money.[48]
After the search, the policemen and barangay kagawads went down with three boxes containing passports,
money and assorted Chinese medicine.[49]
When appellants wife arrived at around 7:30 p.m.,[50] SPO1 Fernandez ordered her to open the safe (kaha
de yero) inside appellants room where the police officers seized money, passports, bankbooks, Chinese
currency and pieces of jewelry.[51]
The seized items were placed on appellants table on the first floor of the house where they were inventoried
by SPO1 Fernandez[52] during which the barangay kagawads did not see either Exhibit A, the plastic bag
containing the suspected shabu, or the weighing scale.[53]
After SPO1 Fernandez prepared a two-page Inventory Receipt and Affidavit of Orderly Search, he asked Jack
Go to sign the receipt. While Jack Go initially refused, he eventually did sign both documents without having
read them completely after he was hit by the policemen. The two barangay kagawads also signed both pages
of the Inventory Receipt as witnesses.[54]
17
When appellant arrived at around 8:30 p.m., he was handcuffed and likewise made to sign the Inventory
Receipt without having been able to read its contents.[55] Jack Go was prevented from explaining its
contents to him.[56]
The first page of the handwritten Inventory Receipt presented in court, which includes an undetermined
quantity of white crystalline granules placed inside a transparent plastic envelope as among those seized from
the residence of appellant, does not bear the signatures of appellant, the kagawads and Jack Go, hence, it is
not the same first page of the handwritten Inventory Report on which they affixed their signatures.[57] In
fact the policemen did not leave a copy of this Inventory Receipt with either appellant or the barangay
kagawads.[58]
The policemen continued to search appellants residence until around 11:00 p.m. when they brought
appellant, Jack Go, Shi Xiu Ong, Samson Go and Peter Co, together with the seized items, to Bicutan.[59]
On the way to Bicutan, PO2 Abulencia, who boarded the same vehicle as appellant, told the latter that the
policemen wanted P10,000,000.00 from him or he would be charged with possession of illegal drugs. The
amount demanded was later reduced to P5,000,000.00, then to P2,000,000.00, and finally to P500,000.00.
Appellant refused, however, to heed the policemens demands since he did not commit any crime.[60]
Finding for the prosecution, the trial court rendered the appealed Decision on June 7, 2000, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby ordered rendered finding the accused Benny Go guilty of the offense
charged in the information and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and a fine of One
Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00).
The subject shabu is hereby ordered forfeited in favor of the government and the Clerk of Court is hereby
directed to deliver and/or cause the delivery of the said shabu to the Dangerous Drugs Board for proper
disposition, upon the finality of this Decision.
SO ORDERED.[61]
His Motion for Reconsideration[62] of the decision having been denied by Order of July 24, 2000,[63]
appellant lodged the present appeal. In his Brief,[64] he assigns the following errors:
FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ACCORDING THE POLICE OFFICERS THE PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY IN
THE PERFORMANCE OF DUTY IN IMPLEMENTING THE SEARCH WARRANT BASED ON THEIR TESTIMONIES,
THERE BEING CONVINCING PROOFS TO THE CONTRARY.
SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT 204 GRAMS OF SHABU WAS RECOVERED FROM THE HOUSE
OF ACCUSED-APPELLANT ON JUNE 14, 1999 BASED ON THE TESTIMONY OF PO1 GERARDO ABULENCIA AND
THE SUPPORTING INVENTORY RECEIPT, BOTH OF WHICH WERE COMPLETELY CONTRADICTED BY THE
PROSECUTION WITNESS BARANGAY KAGAWAD GASPAR LAZARO AS WELL AS BY DEFENSE WITNESSES.
THIRD ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RENDERING JUDGMENT FINDING ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY OF ILLEGAL
POSSESSION OF TWO HUNDRED FOUR (204) GRAMS OF SHABU AS CHARGED IN THE INFORMATION AND
SENTENCING HIM TO SUFFER THE (sic) PENALTY OF RECLUSION PERPETUA AND A FINE OF ONE MILLION
18
PESOS (P1,000,000.00), INSTEAD OF ACQUITTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT FOR FAILURE OF THE
PROSECUTION TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.[65] (Emphasis supplied)
During the pendency of the appeal, appellant filed a verified Motion for Return of Personal Documents,
Vehicle and Paraphernalia dated September 10, 2001[66] praying for the release of the following seized
properties:
a. several pcs. transparent plastic envelopes
b. one (1) unit Toyota Corolla GLI with PN UTT 658
c. Cash amounting to Fifty Two Thousand Seven Hundred Sixty Pesos (P52,760.00) in different denominations
d. Twenty-Five Thousand Chinese Yuan (CY25,000.00)
e. Sixty-Seven (67) pieces of Chinese passports
f. Twenty-Eight (28) pieces of assorted bankbooks
g. Two Hundred Eighty Five (285) pieces of assorted checks
h. Fifty-Three (53) pcs. rubber stamp and related paraphernalia
i. One (1) piece Underwood typewriter with SN 9861952
j. One (1) piece check writer
k. Two (2) pieces of dry seal
m. Five (5) boxes of assorted documents
n. Three (3) bags of assorted documents[67]
This Court is thus called upon to determine (1) whether appellants guilt has been proven beyond reasonable
doubt; and (2) whether the items enumerated in appellants Motion for Return of Personal Documents, Vehicle
and Paraphernalia, which items are allegedly not among those particularly described in Search Warrant No.
99-0038, should be returned to him. These issues shall be resolved in seriatim.
Illegal Possession of 204 Grams of Shabu
As appellant questions the legality of the search of his residence, the actions of the police officers, as agents
of the State, must be carefully considered in light of appellants right against unreasonable searches and
seizures guaranteed by Sections 2 and 3, Article III of the Constitution.[68]
What constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable search or seizure is a purely judicial question determinable
from a consideration of the attendant circumstances including the purpose of the search, the presence or
absence of probable cause, the manner in which the search and seizure was made, the place or thing
searched, and the character of the articles procured.[69]
Since no presumption of regularity may be invoked by an officer to justify an encroachment of rights secured
by the Constitution,[70] courts must cautiously weigh the evidence before them. As early as in the 1937 case
of People v. Veloso,[71] this Court held:
19
A search warrant must conform strictly to the requirements of the constitutional and statutory provisions
under which it is issued. Otherwise, it is void. The proceedings upon search warrants, it has rightly been held,
must be absolutely legal, for there is not a description of process known to law, the execution of which is
more distressing to the citizen. Perhaps there is none which excites such intense feeling in consequence of its
humiliating and degrading effect. The warrant will always be construed strictly without, however, going the
full length of requiring technical accuracy. No presumptions of regularity are to be invoked in aid of the
process when an officer undertakes to justify under it.[72] (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted)
Indeed, a strict interpretation of the constitutional, statutory and procedural rules authorizing search and
seizure is required, and strict compliance therewith is demanded because:
x x x Of all the rights of a citizen, few are of greater importance or more essential to his peace and happiness
than the right of personal security, and that involves the exemption of his private affairs, books, and papers
from the inspection and scrutiny of others. While the power to search and seize is necessary to the public
welfare, still it must be exercised and the law enforced without transgressing the constitutional rights of
citizens, for the enforcement of no statute is of sufficient importance to justify indifference to the basic
principles of government.[73]
In arriving at the appealed decision, the trial court placed greater weight on the testimony of the police
officers to whom it accorded the presumption of regularity in the performance of duty, viz:
Coming to the first issue raised, the Court gives credence to the testimonies of the police officers and accords
them the presumption of regularity in the performance of their duty. The Court has observed the demeanor of
the witnesses and finds the prosecution witnesses more credible than the defense witnesses. x x x
On the other hand, there is no showing that the police officers had ill motive when they applied for and
secured the Search Warrant, raided the house of the accused and arrested him. Accused is a Chinese national
who appeared to have no quarrel with the arresting police officers and thus the police officers had no reason
to fabricate or trump up charges against him. Hence, there appears to be no reason the police officers should
not be accorded the presumption of regularity in the performance of their duty. As held by the Supreme
Court, (L)aw enforcers are presumed to have regularly performed their official duty, in the absence of the
evidence to the contrary. x x x We see no valid obstacle to the application of the ruling in People vs.
Capulong, (160 SCRA 533 {1988}) that credence is accorded to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses
who are law enforcers for it is presumed that they have regularly performed their duty in the absence of
convincing proof to the contrary. The appellant has not shown that the prosecution witnesses were motivated
by any improper motive other than that of accomplishing their mission. (People of the Philippines, Plaintiff-
appellee, vs. Said Sariol Y Muhamading, accused-appellant, 174 SCRA 238).[74] (Emphasis supplied)
At the same time, the trial court based its finding that the search of appellants residence was proper and valid
on the so-called Affidavit of Orderly Search.
On the second issue raised, the validity of the Search Warrant is clearly shown by the Affidavit of Orderly
Search signed by the accused and his son Jack Go and his witnesses Salvador Manalo and Gaspar Lazaro.
Such Affidavit of Orderly Search coupled with the testimonies of the police officers have clearly established
the propriety and validity of the search.[75] (Emphasis supplied)
The rule that a trial courts findings are accorded the highest degree of respect, it being in a position to
observe the demeanor and manner of testifying of the witnesses,[76] is not absolute and does not apply
when a careful review of the records and a meticulous evaluation of the evidence reveal vital facts and
circumstances which the trial court overlooked or misapprehended and which if taken into account would alter
the result of the case.[77]
In the case at bar, an examination of the testimonies of the police officers brings to light several irregularities
in the manner by which the search of appellants residence was conducted.
20
By PO2 Abulencias own account, in order to enter the premises to be searched, the police officers deliberately
side-swiped appellants car which was parked alongside the road, instead of following the regular knock and
announce procedure as outlined in Section 7 (formerly Section 6), Rule 126 of the Rules of Court.[78]
Q Mr. Witness, how did you enter the house of Benny Go?
A Its really heard (sic) to enter the house. Before the door, there was a still (sic) supporting the door and
they will not allow us to enter because they dont know us. Then, in order that we could enter the house, we
side swept (sinagi) a little the vehicle that was parked in front of their house. And their neighbor knocked at
the house of the subject and thats the time that we were able to enter.[79] (Emphasis supplied)
Since the police officers had not yet notified the occupant of the residence of their intention and authority to
conduct a search and absent a showing that they had any reasonable cause to believe that prior notice of
service of the warrant would endanger its successful implementation, the deliberate sideswiping of appellants
car was unreasonable and unjustified.
Also by PO2 Abulencias own account, upon entry to appellants residence, he immediately handcuffed Jack Go
to a chair. Justifying his action, PO2 Abulencia explained that not only was he unfamiliar with Jack Go and
unsure of how the latter would react, but it was a standard operating procedure:
Pros. Rebagay:
Now, what happened on June 14, 1999 at 6:00 p.m. when you were armed with the Search Warrant issued
by Judge Lilia Lopez?
A We entered inside the house of the subject and we were able to see (nadatnan naming) Jack Go, the son of
Benny Go, sir.
xxx
Q And what was the reaction of Jack Go, if any?
A We introduced ourselves as police officers and we have a Search Warrant to conduct a search to the above
subject place and also we handcuffed Jack Go to the chair, sir.
Q Why did you do that, Mr. witness?
A Hindi naming kakilala iyong mga tao, sir kaya ganoon ang ginawa namin para hindi kami maano, eh hindi
naming kabisado iyong ugali, sir.
Pros. Rebagay:
And is that an (sic) standard operating procedure Mr. witness, when you are serving a search warrant?
A Yes, sir.[80] (Emphasis supplied)
There is no showing, however, of any action or provocation by Jack Go when the policemen entered
appellants residence. Considering the degree of intimidation, alarm and fear produced in one suddenly
confronted under similar circumstances, the forcible restraint of Jack Go all the more was unjustified as was
his continued restraint even after Barangay Kagawads Lazaro and Manalo had arrived to justify his forcible
restraint.
While Search Warrant No. 99-99-0038 authorized the immediate search of appellants residence to seize
METAMPHETAMINE HYDROCHLORIDE (Shabu), weighing scale, other drug paraphernalias and proceeds of
21
the above crime, the policemen, by SPO1 Fernandezs admission, seized numerous other items, which are
clearly unrelated to illegal drugs or illegal drug paraphernalia:
Q In the presence of the barangay officials, what are those items which you seized or your raiding team
seized, if any?
A With the permission of the Honorable Court, Your Honor, can I take a look at my notes.
Court
Proceed.
Witness
Thank you very much.
A Seized or confiscated form the said residence are: (1) undetermined quantity of white crystalline granules
placed inside the transparent plastic envelope, (2) undetermined quantity of yellowish powder placed inside
the transparent plastic envelope; (3) several pieces of transparent plastic envelopes; (4) one unit Toyota
Corolla GLI with Plate No. UPT-658; (5) P52,760.00 in different denominations; (6) 25,000.00 Chinese Yuan;
(7) 67 pieces of Chinese passports; (8) 28 pieces of assorted bank book; (9) 285 pieces of assorted checks;
(10) 53 pieces rubber stamps and related paraphernalia; (11) one piece Underwood typewriter with Serial No.
9861952; (12) one piece checkwriter; (13) two pieces dry seals; (14) 5 boxes of assorted documents; (15) 3
bags of assorted documents; and I will add another one Your Honor, a weighing scale.[81]
While an inventory of the seized items was prepared, also by SPO1 Fernandezs admission, it did not contain a
detailed list of all the items seized, particularly the voluminous documents:
Q Why is it that you did not make a detailed inventory or receipt of the passports? Why did you not give any
detailed receipt or inventory on the passports.
A There were lots of documents during the time on the table, voluminous documents that I was not able to
make a listing of the said passports.
Q And it was only this October 8, 1999 or four months after that you made a detailed receipt of those seized
items, am I right?
A Yes, sir.
xxx
Q Is it your standard operating procedure that when there are voluminous seized items you will not (sic)
longer made (sic) an inventory report, am I right?
A Its not an SOP.
Q Why did you not make a detailed inventory or receipt?
A As Ive said earlier, its voluminous. [82] (Emphasis supplied)
In Asian Surety And Insurance Co., Inc. v. Herrera,[83] this Court stressed the necessity for a detailed receipt
of the items seized in order to adequately safeguard the constitutional rights of the person searched:
22
Moreover, as contended by petitioner, respondents in like manner transgressed Section 10 of Rule 126 of the
Rules for failure to give a detailed receipt of the things seized. Going over the receipts (Annexes B B-1, B-2,
B-3 and B-4 of the Petition) issued, We found the following: one bordereau of reinsurance, 8 fire registers, 1
marine register, four annual statements, folders described only as Bundle gm-1 red folders; bundle 17-22 big
carton folders; folders of various sizes, etc., without stating therein the nature and kind of documents
contained in the folders of which there were about a thousand of them that were seized. In the seizure of two
carloads of documents and other papers, the possibility that the respondents took away private papers of the
petitioner, in violation of his constitutional rights, is not remote, for the NBI agents virtually had a field day
with the broad and unlimited search warrant issued by respondent Judge as their passport.[84] (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied)
After the inventory had been prepared, PO2 Abulencia presented it to appellant for his signature[85] without
any showing that appellant was informed of his right not to sign such receipt and to the assistance of counsel.
Neither was he warned that the same could be used as evidence against him. Faced with similar
circumstances, this Court in People v. Gesmundo[86] stated:
It is true that the police were able to get an admission from the accused-appellant that marijuana was found
in her possession but said admission embodied in a document entitled PAGPATUNAY previously prepared by
the police, is inadmissible in evidence against the accused-appellant for having been obtained in violation of
her rights as a person under custodial investigation for the commission of an offense. The records show that
the accused-appellant was not informed of her right not to sign the document; neither was she informed of
her right to the assistance of counsel and the fact that the document may be used as evidence against
her.[87] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied, citations omitted)
In People v. Policarpio,[88] this Court held that such practice of inducing suspects to sign receipts for
property allegedly confiscated from their possession is unusual and violative of the constitutional right to
remain silent, viz:
What the records show is that appellant was informed of his constitutional right to be silent and that he may
refuse to give a statement which may be used against him, that is why he refused to give a written statement
unless it is made in the presence of his lawyer as shown by the paper he signed to this effect. However, he
was made to acknowledge that the six (6) small plastic bags of dried marijuana leaves were confiscated from
him by signing a receipt and to sign a receipt for the P20.00 bill as purchase price of the dried marijuana
leaves he sold to Pat. Mangila.
Obviously the appellant was the victim of a clever ruse to make him sign these alleged receipts which in effect
are extra-judicial confessions of the commission of the offense. Indeed it is unusual for appellant to be made
to sign receipts for what were taken from him. It is the police officers who confiscated the same who should
have signed such receipts. No doubt this is a violation of the constitutional right of appellant to remain silent
whereby he was made to admit the commission of the offense without informing him of his right. Such a
confession obtained in violation of the Constitution is inadmissible in evidence.[89] (Emphasis supplied)
The Inventory Receipt signed by appellant is thus not only inadmissible for being violative of appellants
custodial right to remain silent; it is also an indicium of the irregularity in the manner by which the raiding
team conducted the search of appellants residence.
At the same time, it is unclear whether appellant was furnished a copy of the Inventory Receipt as mandated
by Sec. 11, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court.[90]
Q Now, while you were making an inventory of that, am I right, that you did not give a copy to Benny Go, am
I right?
A I gave them a xerox copy. I remember I gave them a xerox copy.
23
Q Is there any proof that they received an inventory report?
A Nothing, sir.[91]
Moreover, an examination of Exhibit Z, the Return of Search Warrant No. 99-0038 submitted by SPO1
Fernandez to Br. 109 of the RTC of Pasay City was not verified under oath,[92] as required by Section 12 (a)
(formerly Section 12), Rule 126 of the Rules of Court.[93]
The delivery of the items seized to the court which issued the warrant together with a true and accurate
inventory thereof, duly verified under oath, is mandatory in order to preclude the substitution of said items by
interested parties.[94] Under Section 12 of Rule 126,[95] the judge which issued the search warrant is
mandated to ensure compliance with the requirements for (1) the issuance of a detailed receipt for the
property received, (2) delivery of the seized property to the court, together with (3) a verified true inventory
of the items seized. Any violation of the foregoing constitutes contempt of court.
Given the foregoing deviations from the normal and prescribed manner of conducting a search, as disclosed
by the members of the raiding team themselves, the reliance by the trial court on the disputable presumption
that the police officers regularly performed their official duty was evidently misplaced.
The Affidavit of Orderly Search is not of any help in indicating the regularity of the search. Not having been
executed under oath, it is not actually an affidavit, but a pre-prepared form which the raiding team brought
with them. It was filled up after the search by team leader SPO1 Fernandez who then instructed appellant to
sign it as he did instruct Jack Go, Kagawad Manalo and Kagawad Lazaro to sign as witnesses.
More importantly, since the Affidavit of Orderly Search purports to have been executed by appellant, the
same cannot establish the propriety and validity of the search of his residence for he was admittedly not
present when the search took place, he having arrived only when it was almost through.
Q And while your officers and the barangay kagawad were searching the house Mr. Benny Go is not yet
present in that house, am I right?
A Yes, sir.
Q And you made to sign Benny Go in the inventory receipt when the search was already over, am I right?
A He was already present when I was making the inventory. He arrived at around 9:30.
Q Yes, and the search was already finished, am I right?
A Almost through.[96]
In fine, since appellant did not witness the search of his residence, his alleged Affidavit of Orderly Search,
prepared without the aid of counsel and by the very police officers who searched his residence and eventually
arrested him, provides no proof of the regularity and propriety of the search in question.
On the contrary, from the account of the police officers, their search of appellants residence failed to comply
with the mandatory provisions of Section 8 (formerly Section 7), Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, viz:
SEC. 8. Search of house, room, or premises, to be made in presence of two witnesses. No search of a house,
room, or any other premise shall be made except in the presence of the lawful occupant thereof or any
member of his family or in the absence of the latter, two witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing in
the same locality. (Underscoring supplied)
24
As pointed out earlier, the members of the raiding team categorically admitted that the search of the upper
floor, which allegedly resulted in the recovery of the plastic bag containing the shabu, did not take place in
the presence of either the lawful occupant of the premises, i.e. appellant (who was out), or his son Jack Go
(who was handcuffed to a chair on the ground floor). Such a procedure, whereby the witnesses prescribed by
law are prevented from actually observing and monitoring the search of the premises, violates both the spirit
and letter of the law:
Furthermore, the claim of the accused-appellant that the marijuana was planted is strengthened by the
manner in which the search was conducted by the police authorities. The accused-appellant was seated at the
sala together with Sgt. Yte when they heard someone in the kitchen uttered ito na. Apparently, the search of
the accused-appellants house was conducted in violation of Section 7, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court which
specifically provides that no search of a house, room or any other premise shall be made except in the
presence of the lawful occupant thereof or any member of his family or in the absence of the latter, in the
presence of two (2) witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing in the same locality. This requirement
is mandatory to ensure regularity in the execution of the search warrant. Violation of said rule is in fact
punishable under Article 130 of the Revised Penal Code.
As we have ruled in Eduardo Quintero vs. The National Bureau of Investigation, et al. a procedure, wherein
members of a raiding party can roam around the raided premises unaccompanied by any witness, as the only
witnesses available as prescribed by law are made to witness a search conducted by the other members of
the raiding party in another part of the house, is violative of both the spirit and letter of the law.[97]
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
That the raiding party summoned two barangay kagawads to witness the search at the second floor is of no
moment. The Rules of Court clearly and explicitly establishes a hierarchy among the witnesses in whose
presence the search of the premises must be conducted. Thus, Section 8, Rule 126 provides that the search
should be witnessed by two witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing in the same locality only in the
absence of either the lawful occupant of the premises or any member of his family. Thus, the search of
appellants residence clearly should have been witnessed by his son Jack Go who was present at the time. The
police officers were without discretion to substitute their choice of witnesses for those prescribed by the law.
The claim of SPO1 Fernandez and PO2 Abulencia that Jack Go voluntarily waived his right to witness the
search, allegedly because there would be no one left in the sala and anyway barangay officials were present,
cannot be accepted. To be valid, a waiver must be made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently.[98]
Furthermore, the presumption is always against the waiver of a constitutionally protected right.[99]
While Jack Go was present from the time the raiding team entered the premises until after the search was
completed, he was, however, handcuffed to a chair in the sala. [100] All alone and confronted by five police
officers who had deprived him of his liberty, he cannot thus be considered to have voluntarily, knowingly and
intelligently waived his right to witness the search of the house. Consent given under such intimidating,
coercive circumstances is no consent within the purview of the constitutional guaranty.[101]
The search conducted by the police officers of appellants residence is essentially no different from that in
People v. Del Rosario[102] where this Court observed:
We thus entertain serious doubts that the shabu contained in a small canister was actually seized or
confiscated at the residence of accused-appellant. In consequence, the manner the police officers conducted
the subsequent and much-delayed search is highly irregular. Upon barging into the residence of accused-
appellant, the police officers found him lying down and they immediately arrested and detained him in the
living room while they searched the other parts of the house. Although they fetched two persons to witness
the search, the witnesses were called in only after the policemen had already entered accused-appellants
residence (pp. 22-23, tsn, December 11, 1991), and, therefore, the policemen had more than ample time to
plant the shabu. Corollary to the Constitutional precept that, in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be
presumed innocent until the contrary is proved (Sec. 14 (2), Article III, Constitution of the Republic of the
25
Philippines) is the rule that in order to convict an accused the circumstances of the case must exclude all and
each and every hypothesis consistent with his innocence (People vs. Tanchoco, 76 Phil. 463 [1946]; People
vs. Constante, 12 SCRA 653 [1964]; People vs. Jara, 144 SCRA 516 [1986]). The facts of the case do not rule
out the hypothesis that accused-appellant is innocent.[103] (Emphasis supplied)
The raiding teams departure from the procedure mandated by Section 8, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court,
taken together with the numerous other irregularities attending the search of appellants residence, tainted
the search with the vice of unreasonableness, thus compelling this Court to apply the exclusionary rule and
declare the seized articles inadmissible in evidence. This must necessarily be so since it is this Courts solemn
duty to be ever watchful for the constitutional rights of the people, and against any stealthy encroachments
thereon.[104] In the oft-quoted language of Judge Learned Hand:
As we understand it, the reason for the exclusion of evidence competent as such, which has been unlawfully
acquired, is that exclusion is the only practical way of enforcing the constitutional privilege. In earlier times
the action of trespass against the offending official may have been protection enough; but that is true no
longer. Only in case the prosecution which itself controls the seizing officials, knows that it cannot profit by
their wrong, will that wrong be repressed.[105] (Emphasis supplied)
In all prosecutions for violation of The Dangerous Drugs Act, the existence of the dangerous drug is a
condition sine qua non for conviction since the dangerous drug is the very corpus delicti of the crime.[106]
With the exclusion of Exhibit A, the plastic bag containing the shabu allegedly recovered from appellants
residence by the raiding team, the decision of the trial court must necessarily be reversed and appellant
acquitted.
What is more, a thorough evaluation of the testimonies and evidence given before the trial court fails to
provide the moral certainty necessary to sustain the conviction of appellant.
In particular, Barangay Kagawads Lazaro and Manalo, the two witnesses to the search chosen by the police
officers in substitution of Jack Go, both categorically testified under oath that no shabu was recovered from
appellants residence by the police. Thus, Kagawad Lazaro testified that the plastic bag containing white
crystalline granules, later found positive for shabu, was not recovered from the room of Jack Go:
Atty. Reyes:
You were shown a while ago by the prosecution of (sic) an Inventory Receipt allegedly prepared by Officer
Fernandez which includes the list of the items seized from the premises of Benny Go, now, you said that
theres no white crystalline granules included in that list which you signed during the inventory?
A Yes, sir.
Q Can you recall what was the first item included in that list which you signed in the first page?
A Chinese medicine, sir.
Q Now, you also testified that you were with Officer Abulencia when you conducted the search inside the
room of Jack Go, now, did you recover anything from the room of Jack Go?
A PO2 Abulencia recovered one small plastic in the drawer of Jack Go and Naphthalene balls, sir.
xxx
Atty. Reyes:
If that small plastic will be shown to you, will you be able to identify it?
26
A Yes, sir.
Atty. Reyes:
I have here a plastic which contained yellowish powder. Could you go over this and tell us if this was the one
recovered from the room of Jack Go?
A This is the one, sir.
Q I have here another plastic containing white crystalline substance marked by the prosecution as Exh. A. Will
you tell us if this is also recovered from the room of Jack Go?
A No, this was not recovered from the room of Jack Go, sir.
Q During the preparation of the inventory of the seized items, was this also included?
A I did not see that, sir.[107] (Emphasis supplied)
Similarly, Kagawad Manalo testified that neither the plastic bag of shabu nor the weighing scale was among
the seized items inventoried by the raiding team:
Q You said that you were present during the time when SPO1 Fernandez was preparing the inventory of all
the items taken from the premises of Benny Go, can you recall what are these items?
A Yes sir, assorted Chinese medicines, assorted documents, papers, passports, stamp pad, bankbooks and
checks and it was placed in five (5) boxes and three (3) ladies bag.
Q What about a weighing scale? Is there a weighing scale, Mr. Witness?
A I did not see any weighing scale, sir.
Q How about drugs or shabu contained in a plastic pack?
A I did not see any also.[108] (Emphasis supplied)
On rebuttal, SPO1 Fernandez alleged that the two barangay kagawads were lying when they claimed that no
shabu was recovered from appellants residence, and implied that they had been asked to falsify their
testimonies in court:
Pros. Rebagay:
Mr. witness, when Salvador Manalo testified before this Honorable Court when he was confronted with Exh. B
which is the inventory receipt the said witness denied that the first page of Exh. B" was genuine on the fact
that his signature and likewise [that of] his co-colleague did not appear on the first page of the said inventory
receipt, what can you say to that statement made by Salvador Manalo?
A Well, it has not been our practice to let the witness sign on the first page of the 2-page inventory receipt
and with regards to the said inventory receipt that he signed on June 4, it is the same inventory receipt that I
prepared, sir.
xxx
27
Q Likewise, Mr. witness, the said witness Salvador Manalo also denied that the shabu which is the subject of
this case has never been recovered by them, what can you say to that?
A Well, its a lie, sir.
Q Why do you say that?
A Because when the illegal drug was found by PO2 Abulencia, he was accompanied by Gaspar Lazaro at that
time. Then he called my attention and he also called the attention of SPO2 Serquea as well as the attention of
Mr. Salvador Manalo. When I went upstairs, they were already inside the said room so the five of us saw the
illegal drugs, sir.
xxx
Pros. Rebagay:
Mr. witness, when Salvador Manalo testified here on cross-examination, he mentioned that after the search of
the house of Benny Go, a certain investigator, a policeman pretended that he is making a follow-up with
respect to the search made by you and your team, will you please tell us if immediately after the incident or
after the investigation conducted by the City Prosecutors Office when you had an occasion to meet Salvador
Manalo after that?
A Yes, sir.
Q And what happened to that meeting with Salvador Manalo after the preliminary investigation?
Witness:
Because during the preliminary investigation, we were surprised why our witness has taken side, it is on the
side of the accused Benny Go so I decided to pay him a visit that day after that confrontation on June 23 and
I asked him what happened, tinanong ko siya kung ano ang nangyari bakit mukhang nakampi na siya roon sa
kabila. Ang sagot niya sa akin ang sabi sa amin ni Atty. Galing kakausapin ka rin niya. That is the exact
words.
Atty. Reyes:
We will object to that for being hearsay. May we move that the latter portion be stricken off the record.
Court:
Let it remain
Pros. Rebagay:
And will you please tell us exactly when this incident occur (sic), Mr. witness?
A That was after June 23, sir.
Q Where?
A At his store in A. Linao Street, Paco, sir.
Q And what was your response after you heard that answer from Salvador Manalo, if any, Mr. witness?
28
Witness:
Siyempre nagtaka ako, bakit ganoon ibig sabihin implied baka nagka-aregluhan na, iyan ang iniisip ko,
sir.[109] (Emphasis supplied)
Regrettably, no further evidence, aside from the foregoing allegations and suspicions of SPO1 Fernandez, was
ever presented to substantiate the claim that the two kagawads had deliberately falsified their testimonies.
On the contrary, it appears that the police officers did not actively pursue their complaint for obstruction of
justice against the two kagawads with the Department of Justice. Moreover, to completely discount the
testimonies of kagawads Lazaro and Manalo would be tantamount to having no witnesses to the search of
appellants residence at all except the police officers themselves, a situation clearly contrary to the tenor and
spirit of Section 8 of Rule 126.
The prosecutions attempt to introduce the weighing scale, supposedly seized during the search, only casts
more doubt on its case. Said weighing scale was conspicuously absent from the enumeration of seized items
in the handwritten Inventory Receipt, the Return of the Search Warrant and the Affidavit of Arrest prepared
by the police officers. SPO1 Fernandezs claim that the omission was an honest mistake, to wit:
Pros. Rebagay
Q Mr. Witness, a while ago you added another item which was not included in the inventory list and this was
the weighing scale. Please tell us, why is it only now that you are adding it to the list of those items that you
seized?
A Well, with all honesty Your Honor, I cannot offer any alibi except to say that I committed an honest mistake
when I did not include that weighing scale in the inventory receipts.[110]
does not inspire credence. Neither does SPO1 Serqueas explanation:
Q What was the search warrant all about? It commands you to search and seize what items?
A Regarding drugs, drug paraphernalias and proceeds of the crime, sir.
Atty. Reyes:
What else?
A Weighing scale, sir.
Q Weighing scale is included in the search warrant. So the warrant specifically commands you to seize drugs,
drug paraphernalias and weighing scale?
A Yes, sir.
Q And you read this Affidavit of Arrest before you signed this. Did you notice that the weighing scale is not
included here?
A Yes, sir. Now I noticed.
Q No, during the time that you signed this?
A No, sir.
Q You did not notice that?
29
A No, sir.
Q As well as the time when Officer Fernandez was preparing this Inventory, you did not call his attention that
there are some items missing in that Inventory?
A I did not call his attention. Honestly speaking (unfinished)
xxx
A Honestly speaking, we confiscated so many evidence including papers, boxes, voluminous quantity of
evidence recovered and only one officer is conducting the Inventory. We cannot conduct Inventory two at a
time or three at a time, only one. Because maybe, you see, hes only one. Maybe he did not list it because of
that so many evidence confiscated.
Atty. Reyes:
But the weighing scale is not a small item, is that correct? Its a big item?
A Yes, sir.
Q Do you want to tell us that you missed that item?
A I was not the one who missed it, sir.
Q How about your Affidavit of Arrest?
A Officer Fernandez prepared that Affidavit, sir.
Q So you are not the one who prepared this? You merely signed it?
A I signed it in their presence, sir.[111]
The foregoing explanations are improbable and far from persuasive. Considering that a weighing scale was
among the items particularly described in Search Warrant No. 99-0038, it would be expected that the police
officers would be actively searching for it and, if found, they would take care to include it in the inventory and
the return of the search warrant. But while numerous seals, stamps, checks and documents not described in
the search warrant were seized and carefully inventoried by the raiding team, none of the five police officers
bothered to point out that the weighing scale had not been included in the inventory.
The implausibility of the story put forward by the police officers leads to no other conclusion than that the
weighing scale was introduced as an afterthought in order to bolster the case against appellant.
With the persistence of nagging doubts surrounding the alleged discovery and seizure of the shabu, it is
evident that the prosecution has failed to discharge its burden of proof and overcome the constitutional
presumption of innocence. It is thus not only the accuseds right to be freed; it is, even more, this Courts
constitutional duty to acquit him. [112] Apropos is the ruling in People v. Aminnudin,[113] viz:
The Court strongly supports the campaign of the government against drug addiction and commends the
efforts of our law enforcement officers against those who would inflict this malediction upon our people,
especially the susceptible youth. But as demanding as this campaign may be, it cannot be more so than the
compulsions of the Bill of Rights for the protection of liberty of every individual in the realm, including the
basest of criminals. The Constitution covers with the mantle of its protection the innocent and the guilty alike
against any manner of high-handedness from the authorities, however praiseworthy their intentions.
30
Those who are supposed to enforce the law are not justified in disregarding the right of the individual in the
name of order. Order is too high a price for the loss of liberty. As Justice Holmes, again, said I think it is less
evil that some criminals should escape than that the government should play an ignoble part. It is simply not
allowed in the free society to violate a law to enforce another, especially if the law violated is the Constitution
itself. [114]
Return of Seized Property Not Described in the Search Warrant
Turning now to the Motion for Return of Personal Documents, Vehicle and Paraphernalia, the general rule is
that only the personal properties particularly described in the search warrant may be seized by the
authorities. Thus, in Tambasen v. People,[115] this Court held:
Moreover, by their seizure of articles not described in the search warrant, the police acted beyond the
parameters of their authority under the search warrant. Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution requires
that a search warrant should particularly describe the things to be seized. The evident purpose and intent of
the requirement is to limit the things to be seized to those, and only those, particularly described in the
search warrant to leave the officers of the law with no discretion regarding what articles they should seize, to
the end that unreasonable searches and seizures may not be made and that abuses may not be committed
(Corro v. Lising, 137 SCRA 541, 547 [1985]; Bache & Co. [Phil.], Inc. v. Ruiz, 37 SCRA 823 [1971]; Uy
Kheytin v. Villareal, 42 Phil. 886 [1920]).[116] (Emphasis supplied)
There are, however, several well-recognized exceptions to the foregoing rule. Thus, evidence obtained
through a warrantless search and seizure may be admissible under the following circumstances: (1) search
incident to a lawful arrest; (2) search of a moving motor vehicle; (3) search in violation of customs laws; (4)
seizure of evidence in plain view; and (5) when the accused himself waives his right against unreasonable
searches and seizures.[117]
To be valid, therefore, the seizure of the items enumerated in appellants Motion for Return of Personal
Documents, Vehicle and Paraphernalia must fall within the ambit of Search Warrant No. 99-0038 or under any
of the foregoing recognized exceptions to the search warrant requirement.
In this regard, the raiding team sought to justify the seizure of the car, the Fifty Two Thousand Seven
Hundred Sixty Pesos (P52,760.00) in different denominations, and the Twenty Five Thousand Chinese Yuan
(CY25,000.00) as either proceeds of the offense or means of committing an offense within the purview of the
warrant. Thus PO2 Abulencia testified:
Q And how about the money, Mr. witness? Why did you confiscate the money?
A Its considered as proceed of the crime, sir.
Q How about the vehicle, Mr. witness? Why did you took (sic) custody of the vehicle when it was not listed in
the search warrant?
A This is part and parcel of the evidence, sir. Because its being used in transporting drugs, sir.[118]
Similarly, with respect to the car, SPO1 Fernandez stated:
Q This vehicle, Toyota Corolla GLI with Plate No. PNU-TT-658, where was it during the time that you. . .
(unfinished)
A It was parked in front of the house of Benny Go.
Q And you seized it?
31
A Yes, sir.
Q Why?
A Because during the surveillance operation we saw some known pusher riding in that car?
Q Who are these drug pushers?
A One of those guys is Mr. Peter Co, also a subject of our investigation.
Q Which (sic) you released after the arrest, after he was invited for investigation in your office on June 14,
1999?
A Yes, sir.[119]
The foregoing rationalizations are unacceptable. Admittedly, neither the money nor the car was particularly
described in the search warrant. In seizing the said items then, the police officers were exercising their own
discretion and determining for themselves which items in appellants residence they believed were proceeds of
the crime or means of committing the offense. This is absolutely impermissible. It bears reiterating that the
purpose of the constitutional requirement that the articles to be seized be particularly described in the
warrant is to limit the things to be seized to those, and only those, particularly described in the search
warrant to leave the officers of the law with no discretion regarding what articles they should seize. A search
warrant is not a sweeping authority empowering a raiding party to undertake a fishing expedition to seize and
confiscate any and all kinds of evidence or articles relating to a crime. [120]
At the same time, the raiding team characterized the seizure of the assorted documents, passports,
bankbooks, checks, check writer, typewriter, dry seals and stamp pads as seizure of evidence in plain view.
[121]
Under the plain view doctrine, objects falling in the plain view of an officer who has a right to be in the
position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence.[122] This Court had the
opportunity to summarize the rules governing plain view searches in the recent case of People v. Doria,
supra, to wit:
The plain view doctrine applies when the following requisites concur: (a) the law enforcement officer in
search of the evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in a position from which he can view a
particular area; (b) the discovery of the evidence in plain view is inadvertent; (c) it is immediately apparent to
the officer that the item he observes may be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure.
The law enforcement officer must lawfully make an initial intrusion or properly be in a position from which he
can particularly view the area. In the course of such lawful intrusion, he came inadvertently across a piece of
evidence incriminating the accused. The object must be open to eye and hand and its discovery inadvertent.
(Underscoring supplied; citations omitted)[123]
Measured against the foregoing standards, it is readily apparent that the seizure of the passports, bankbooks,
checks, typewriter, check writer, dry seals and stamp pads and other assorted documents does not fall within
the plain view exception. The assertions of the police officers that said objects were inadvertently seized
within their plain view are mere legal conclusions which are not supported by any clear narration of the
factual circumstances leading to their discovery. PO2 Abulencia could not even accurately describe how the
raiding team came across these items:
Q This Box A marked as Exhibit G, in what part of the room did you recover this?
32
A We recovered all the evidence within our plain view, sir. The evidence were scattered in his house. I cannot
remember whether Box A or Box B, but all the evidence were within our plain view thats why we confiscated
them, sir.
Q What do you mean by plain view?
A Nakikita namin, sir. Yung kitang-kita namin.
Q Where in the premises of Benny Go did you see all these documents?
A Ground floor and upstairs but mostly in the ground floor, on the table and on the floor, sir.
Atty. Reyes:
This Box A marked as Exh. G contains what documents again?
A Can I see my notes, sir?
Atty. Reyes:
Go ahead.
A Box A contains different bundle of pieces of document, NBI and BI clearances, Application of Chinese
National, different papers, sir.
Q Can you remember where in particular did you recover these documents?
A I cannot remember, sir.
Q All of these documents were recovered primarily on the ground floor and on the second floor?
A Yes, sir.
Q Where in particular at the second floor, there are three to four rooms there?
A Sir, nandoon sa mesa lahat iyan eh don sa taas rin may mesa din doon at saka doon naming nakuha ang
ibang mga dokumento.
Q Is (sic) that room belongs (sic) to Jack Go?
A I dont know, sir, but all these (sic) evidence were recovered from the house of Benny Go.[124]
SPO1 Fernandezs account of how he came across the dry seals, rubber stamps and papers is just as opaque:
Q For how long have you been inside the house of Benny Go when you noticed these dry seals?
A I think more than an hour, I dont exactly remember the time.
Q But during the time you have not yet noticed the documents which you brought to this Court, what call
(sic) your attention was these dry seals first?
A Well, actually the dry seals and the rubber stamps were all placed atop the table and as well as the
documents because the box where the documents were placed are half opened. They are opened actually
thats why I saw them.
33
Q So, you first saw the rubber stamps and the dry seals, is that correct? Because they are atop the table?
A Yes, sir.
Q And then later on you also saw the documents?
A Yes, sir its beside the table.
Q Contained in a box half opened?
A Yes, sir.
Q Which did you touch first, the rubber stamps, the dry seals or the documents?
A I did not touch anything, I only inventoried that when the searching team were through with what they are
doing. Now, all the evidence were placed atop the dining table, located also at the sala of the house or at the
dining area. Then, thats when I asked some of my co-members to place all those document and the other
confiscated items atop the table also.[125]
The foregoing testimonies are clearly evasive and do not establish how the police officers became aware of
the seized items which were allegedly within their plain view.
Finally, it appears from the testimony of SPO1 Fernandez that the supposed illegal character of the items
claimed to have been seized within the plain view of the policemen was not readily and immediately apparent.
Rather, the suspicions of the policemen appear to have been aroused by the presence of the numerous
passports and immigration documents which they discovered in the course of their search. After they
confirmed that appellant was not operating a travel agency, they concluded that his possession of said
documents and passports was illegal even though they could not identify the alleged law supposedly
violated.[126]
To be sure, the policemen also filed a complaint against appellant for alleged possession of instruments or
implements intended for the commission of falsification under paragraph 2 of Article 176 of the Revised Penal
Code on the basis of dry seals and rubber stamps also found in appellants residence.[127]
However, the illegal character of said dry seals and stamp pads cannot be said to have been immediately
apparent. For SPO1 Fernandez had to first make an impression of the dry seal on paper before he could
determine that it purported to be the seal of the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation. [128] The
counterfeit nature of the seals and stamps was in fact not established until after they had been turned over to
the Chinese embassy and Bureau of Immigration and Deportation for verification. It is, therefore, incredible
that SPO1 Fernandez could make such determination from a plain view of the items from his vantage point in
the sala.
In sum, the circumstances attendant to the case at bar do not warrant the application of the plain view
doctrine to justify the seizure and retention of the questioned seized items. The things belonging to appellant
not specifically mentioned in the warrants, like those not particularly described, must thus be ordered
returned to him.[129]
Be that as it may, considering that the two (2) dry seals and eight (8) of the rubber stamps have been
certified to be counterfeit by the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation,[130] they may not be returned and
are hereby declared confiscated in favor of the State to be disposed of according to law.[131] Moreover, the
various bankbooks and passports not belonging to appellant may not be ordered returned in the instant
proceedings. The legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party whose rights have been impaired
34
thereby, and the objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely personal and cannot be availed of by
third parties.[132]
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 41, convicting appellant Benny Go of
violation of Section 16, Article III in relation to Section 2 (e-2) Article I of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended,
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Appellant Benny Go is ACQUITTED of the crime charged and is hereby ordered immediately RELEASED from
confinement, unless he is lawfully held in custody for another cause.
The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is ORDERED to forthwith IMPLEMENT this Decision and to INFORM
this Court, within ten (10) days from receipt hereof, of the date appellant was actually released from
confinement.
Appellants Motion For Return of Personal Documents, Vehicle and Paraphernalia is GRANTED IN PART, and
the trial court is hereby ordered to return to him those items seized from the subject premises which belong
to him as listed in said Motion.
The subject shabu is ORDERED forfeited in favor of the State and the trial court is hereby directed to deliver
and/or cause its delivery to the Dangerous Drugs Board for proper disposition.
The two (2) dry seals and eight (8) of the rubber stamps certified to be counterfeit by the Bureau of
Immigration and Deportation are likewise ORDERED forfeited in favor of the State for proper disposition.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, (Acting Chairman), Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Corona, JJ., concur.

Puno, (Chairman), J., on leave.
[68] SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing in the same
persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable locality, leave a receipt in the place in which he found the
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose seized property.
shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest
shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined [93] SEC. 12. Delivery of property and inventory thereof to
personally by the judge after examination under oath or court; return and proceedings thereon. (a) The officer must
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may forthwith deliver the property seized to the judge who issued
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched the warrant, together with a true inventory thereof duly verified
and the persons or things to be seized. under oath.
SEC. 3. (1) The privacy of communication and correspondence xxx

shall be inviolable except upon lawful order of the court, or
when the public safety or order requires otherwise as [94] People v. Gesmundo, supra, at 752.
prescribed by law.
[95] SEC. 12. Delivery of property and inventory thereof to
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding court; return and proceedings thereon. x x x
section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
(b) Ten (10) days after issuance of the search warrant, the
[78] SEC. 7. Right to break door or window to effect search. issuing judge shall ascertain if the return has been made, and if
The officer, if refused admittance to the place of directed none, shall summon the person to whom the warrant was
search after giving notice of his purpose and authority, may issued and require him to explain why no return was made. If
break open any outer or inner door or window of a house or the return has been made, the judge shall require that the
any part of a house or anything therein to execute the warrant property seized be delivered to him. The judge shall see to it
or liberate himself or any person lawfully aiding him when that subsection (a) hereof has been complied with.
unlawfully detained therein. (Emphasis supplied)
(c) The return on the search warrant shall be filed and kept by
the custodian of the log book on search warrants who shall
[90] SEC. 11. Receipt for the property seized. The officer enter therein the date of the return, the result, and other
seizing property under the warrant must give a detailed receipt actions of the judge.
for the same to the lawful occupant of the premises in whose
presence the search and seizure were made, or in the absence A violation of this section shall constitute contempt of court.
of such occupant, must, in the presence of at least two
35
G.R. No. 133254-55 April 19, 2001
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ROBERTO SALANGUIT y KO, accused-appellant.
MENDOZA, J.:
This is an appeal from the decision,1 dated January 27, 1998, of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 96, Quezon
City, finding accused-appellant Roberto Salanguit y Ko guilty of violation of §16 of Republic Act No. 6425, as
amended, and sentencing him accordingly to suffer imprisonment ranging from six (6) months of arresto
mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as maximum, and of §8 of
the same law and sentencing him for such violation to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a
fine of P700, 000.00.
Charges against accused-appellant for violations of R.A. No. 6425 were filed on December 28, 1995. In
Criminal Case No. Q-95-64357, the information alleged:
That on or about the 26th day of December 1995, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly possess and/or use 11.14 grams of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride
(Shabu) a regulated drug, without the necessary license and/or prescription therefor, in violation of said law.
CONTRARY TO LAW .2
In Criminal Case No. Q-95-64358, the information charged:
That on or about the 26th day of December 1995, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused not being
authorized by law to possess or use any prohibited drug, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and
knowingly have in his possession and under his custody and control 1,254 grams of Marijuana, a prohibited
drug.
CONTRARY TO LAW ,3
When arraigned on May 21, 1996, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty4 whereupon he was tried.
Three witnesses were presented by the prosecution: P/Insp. Sonia S. Ludovico, forensic chemist and chief of
the Physical Science Branch of the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory, Senior Inspector Rodolfo
Aguilar of the Narcotics Command, Camp Crame, Quezon City, and PO3 Rolando Duazo of Station 10,
Kamuning, Quezon City, a field operative. The prosecution evidence established the following:
On December 26, 1995, Sr. Insp. Aguilar applied for a warrant5 in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 90,
Dasmariñias, Cavite, to search the residence of accused-appellant Robert Salanguit y Ko on Binhagan St.,
Novaliches, Quezon City. He presented as his witness SPO1 Edmund Badua, who testified that as a poseur-
buyer, he was able to purchase 2.12 grams of shabu from accused-appellant. The sale took place in accused-
appellant's room, and Badua saw that the shabu was taken by accused-appellant from a cabinet inside his
room. The application was granted, and a search warrant was later issued by Presiding Judge Dolores L.
Español.
At about 10:30 p.m. of December 26, 1995, a group of about 10 policemen, along with one civilian informer,
went to the residence of accused-appellant to serve the warrant.6
The police operatives knocked on accused-appellant’s door, but nobody opened it. They heard people inside
the house, apparently panicking. The police operatives then forced the door open and entered the house.7
36
After showing the search warrant to the occupants of the house, Lt. Cortes and his group started searching
the house.8 They found 12 small heat-sealed transparent plastic bags containing a white crystalline
substance, a paper clip box also containing a white crystalline substance, and two bricks of dried leaves which
appeared to be marijuana wrapped in newsprint9 having a total weight of approximately 1,255 grams.10 A
receipt of the items seized was prepared, but the accused-appellant refused to sign it. 11
After the search, the police operatives took accused-appellant with them to Station 10, EDSA, Kamuning,
Quezon City, along with the items they had seized.12
PO3 Duazo requested a laboratory examination of the confiscated evidence.13 The white crystalline substance
with a total weight of 2.77 grams and those contained in a small box with a total weight of 8.37 grams were
found to be positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride. On the other hand, the two bricks of dried leaves,
one weighing 425 grams and the other 850 grams, were found to be marijuana.14
For the defense, accused-appellant testified in his own behalf. His testimony was corroborated by his mother-
in-law, Soledad Arcano.
Accused-appellant testified that on the night of December 26, 1995, as they were about to leave their house,
they heard a commotion at the gate and on the roof of their house. Suddenly, about 20 men in civilian attire,
brandishing long firearms, climbed over the gate and descended through an opening in the roof.15
When accused-appellant demanded to be shown a search warrant, a piece of paper inside a folder was waved
in front of him. As accused-appellant fumbled for his glasses, however, the paper was withdrawn and he had
no chance to read it.16
Accused-appellant claimed that he was ordered to stay in one place of the house while the policemen
conducted a search, forcibly opening cabinets and taking his bag containing money, a licensed .45 caliber
firearm, jewelry , and canned goods.17
The policemen left at around 12:30 a.m. of December 27, 1995, and, after putting handcuffs on accused-
appellant, took him with them to the NARCOM on EDSA, Quezon City, where accused-appellant was
detained.18
Accused-appellant's mother-in law, Soledad Arcano, corroborated his testimony. Arcano testified that the
policemen ransacked their house, ate their food, and took away canned goods and other valuables. 19
After hearing, the trial court rendered its decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. In Criminal Case No. Q-95-64357, for violation of Sec. 16, Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, finding the
accused ROBERTO SALANGUIT y KO guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged and he is hereby
accordingly sentenced to suffer an indeterminate sentence with a minimum of six (6) months of arresto
mayor and a maximum of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional; and,
2. In Criminal Case No. Q-95-64358, for violation of Sec. 8, Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, finding the
accused ROBERTO SALANGUIT y KO guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged and he is hereby
accordingly sentenced to suffer reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of P700,000.00.
The accused shall further pay the costs of suit.
The 11.14 grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride and the 1,254 grams of marijuana bricks are hereby
confiscated and condemned for disposition according to law. The evidence custodian of this Court is hereby
directed to turn such substances over to the National Bureau of Investigation pursuant to law.
37
SO ORDERED.20
Hence this appeal. Accused-appellant contends that -
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN DECLARING THE SEARCH WARRANT VALID
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT FOR ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF

METHAMPHETAMINE HYDRO-CHLORIDE(SHABU)
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSSED-APPELLANT FOR VIOLATION §8, R.A. No.
6425
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN ADMITTING IN EVIDENCE THE TWO (2) BRICKS OF MARIJUANA
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE POLICEMEN USED EXCESSIVE FORCE IN ENFORCING
THE SEARCH WARRANT.
Accused-appellant is contesting his conviction on three grounds. First, the admissibility of the shabu allegedly
recovered from his residence as evidence against him on the ground that the warrant used in obtaining it was
invalid. Second, the admissibility in evidence of the marijuana allegedly seized from accused-appellant
pursuant to the "plain view" doctrine. Third, the employment of unnecessary force by the police in the
execution of the warrant.
First. Rule 126, §4 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure21 provides that a search warrant shall not
issue except upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined personally by the
judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized which may be anywhere in the
Philippines.
In issuing a search warrant, judges must comply strictly with the requirements of the Constitution and the
Rules of Criminal Procedure. No presumption of regularity can be invoked in aid of the process when an
officer undertakes to justify its issuance.22 Nothing can justify the issuance of the search warrant unless all
the legal requisites are fulfilled.
In this case, the search warrant issued against accused-appellant reads:
SEARCH WARRANT
NO.160 For: Violation of RA 6425
SEARCH WARRANT
TO ANY PEACE OFFICER:
G R E E T I N G S:
It appearing to the satisfaction of the undersigned after examining under oath SR. INSP. RODOLFO V.
AGUILAR, PNP and his witness SPO1 EDMUND M. BADUA, PNP that there is probable cause to believe that
ROBERT SALANGUIT has in his possession and control in his premises Binhagan St., San Jose, Quezon City as
shown in Annex "A", the properties to wit:
UNDETERMINED QUANTITY OF SHABU AND DRUG PARAPHERNALIA
which should be seized and brought to the undersigned.
38
You are hereby commanded to make an immediate search anytime of the day/night of the premises above-
described and forthwith seize and take possession of the above-stated properties and bring said properties to
the undersigned to be dealt with as the law directs.
GIVEN UNDER MY HAND this 26th day of December 1995 at Imus, Cavite, Philippines.
(SGD.) DOLORES L. ESPAÑOL
Judge
Accused-appellant assails the validity of the warrant on three grounds: (1) that there was no probable cause
to search for drug paraphernalia; (2) that the search warrant was issued for more than one specific offense;
and (3) that the place to be searched was not described with sufficient particularity.
Existence of Probable Cause
The warrant authorized the seizure of "undetermined quantity of shabu and drug paraphernalia." Evidence
was presented showing probable cause of the existence of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.
Accused-appellant contends, however, that the search warrant issued is void because no evidence was
presented showing the existence of drug paraphernalia and the same should not have been ordered to be
seized by the trial court.23
The contention has no merit. To be sure, SPO1 Edmund Badua, the intelligence officer who acted as a
poseur-buyer, did not testify in the proceedings for the issuance of a search warrant on anything about drug
paraphernalia. He stated:
Q -Being a member of the Intelligence and Operation Section, NMDU, NARCOM, do you remember if you
were assigned into a monitoring or surveillance work?
A -Yes, sir.
Q – Of what particular assignment or area were you assigned for monitoring or surveillance?
A – Its within the Quezon City area particularly a house without a number located at Binhagan St., San Jose
Quezon City, Sir.
Q – Do You know the person who occupies the specific place?
A – Yes, sir, he is ROBERT SALANGUIT @ Robert.
Q – Are you familiar with that place?
A – Yes, sir, as part of my surveillance, I was able to penetrate inside the area and established contract with
ROBERT SALANGUIT alias Robert through my friend who introduced me to the former.
Q – In what particular occasion did you meet ROBERT SALANGUIT alias Robert?
A – When I was introduced by my friend as a good buyer and drug pusher of shabu, sir .
Q – Were you able to buy at that time?
A – Yes, sir.
Q – How much if you can still remember the amount involved?
39
A – I was able to buy two point twelve (2.12) grams of shabu in the amount of Two Thousand Seven
Hundred Fifty (P2,750.00) pesos, sir .
Q – Having established contact with ROBERT SALANGUIT @ Robert, do you know where the stuff (shabu)
were being kept?
A – Yes, sir, inside a cabinet inside his room.
Q – How were you able to know the place where he kept the stuff?
A – When I first bought the 2.12 grams of shabu from him, it was done inside his room and I saw that the
shabu was taken by him inside his cabinet.
Q – Do you know who is in control of the premises?
A – Yes, sir, it was ROBERT SALANGUIT @ Robert.
Q – How sure are you, that the shabu that you bought from ROBERT SALANGUIT @ Robert is genuine shabu?
A – After I left the house of ROBERT SALANGUIT @ Robert, I proceeded back to our office and reported the
progress of my mission to our Chief and presented to him the 2.12, grams of shabu I bought from the
subject. Then afterwards, our Chief formally requested the Chief PNP Central Crime Laboratory Services,
NPDC, for Technical Analysis which yielded positive result for shabu, a regulated drug as shown in the
attached certification of PNP CLS result No. D-414-95 dated 19 December 95.
Q – Do you have anything more to add or retract from your statement?
A – Yes, sir, I was offered by him (ROBERT SALANGUIT @ Robert) that anything I wish to buy bigger
quantity of shabu, he is willing to transact to me on cash basis at his price of One Thousand Seven Hundred
Fifty (P1,750.00) pesos per gram.
Q – Are you willing to sign your statement freely and voluntarily?
A – Yes, sir.24
However, the fact that there was no probable cause to support the application for the seizure of drug
paraphernalia does not warrant the conclusion that the search warrant is void. This fact would be material
only if drug paraphernalia was in fact seized by the police. The fact is that none was taken by virtue of the
search warrant issued. If at all, therefore, the search warrant is void only insofar as it authorized the seizure
of drug paraphernalia, but it is valid as to the seizure of methamphetamine hydrochloride as to which
evidence was presented showing probable cause as to its existence. Thus, in Aday v. Superior Court,25 the
warrant properly described two obscene books but improperly described other articles. It was held:
Although the warrant was defective in the respects noted, it does not follow that it was invalid as a whole.
Such a conclusion would mean that the seizure of certain articles, even though proper if viewed separately,
must be condemned merely because the warrant was defective with respect to other articles. The invalid
portions of the warrant are severable from the authorization relating to the named books, which formed the
principal basis of the charge of obscenity. The search for and seizure of these books, if otherwise valid, were
not rendered illegal by the defects concerning other articles. ...In so holding we do not mean to suggest that
invalid portions "of a warrant will be treated as severable under all circumstances. We recognize the danger
that warrants might be obtained which are essentially general in character but as to minor items meet the
requirement of particularity, and that wholesale seizures might be made under them, in the expectation that
40
the seizure would in any event be upheld as to the property specified. Such an abuse of the warrant
procedure, of course, could not be tolerated.
It would be a drastic remedy indeed if a warrant, which was issued on probable cause and particularly
describing the items to be seized on the basis thereof, is to be invalidated in toto because the judge erred in
authorizing a search for other items not supported by the evidence.26 Accordingly, we hold that the first part
of the search warrant, authorizing the search of accused-appellant's house for an undetermined quantity of
shabu, is valid, even though the second part, with respect to the search for drug paraphernalia, is not.
Specificity of the Offense Charged
Accused-appellant contends that the warrant was issued for more than one specific offense because
possession or use of methamphetamine hydrochloride and possession of drug paraphernalia are punished
under two different provisions of R.A. No. 6425.27 It will suffice to quote what this Court said in a similar case
to dispose of this contention:
While it is true that the caption of the search warrant states that it is in connection with "Violation of R.A.
6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972," it is clearly recited in the text thereof that
"There is probable cause to believe that Adolfo Olaes alias 'Debie' and alias 'Baby' of No.628 Comia St.,
Filtration, Sta. Rita, Olongapo City, has in their session and control and custody of marijuana dried
stalks/leaves/ seeds/cigarettes and other regulated/prohibited and exempt narcotics preparations which is the
subject of the offense stated above." Although the specific section of the Dangerous Drugs Act is not
pinpointed, there is no question at all of the specific offense alleged to have been committed as a basis for
the finding of probable cause. The search warrant also satisfies the requirement in the Bill of Rights of the
particularity of the description to be made of the "place to be searched and the persons or things to be
seized." 28
Indeed, in People v. Dichoso29 the search warrant was also for "Violation of R.A. 6425," without specifying
what provisions of the law were violated, and it authorized the search and seizure of "dried marijuana leaves
and methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu) and sets of paraphernalias (sic)." This Court, however, upheld
the validity of the warrant:
Appellant's contention that the search warrant in question was issued for more than (1) offense, hence, in
violation of Section 3, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, is unpersuasive. He engages in semantic juggling by
suggesting that since illegal possession of shabu, illegal possession of marijuana and illegal possession of
paraphernalia are covered by different articles and sections of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, the search
warrant is clearly for more than one (1) specific offense. In short, following this theory, there should have
been three (3) separate search warrants, one for illegal possession of shabu, the second for illegal possession
of marijuana and the third for illegal possession of paraphernalia. This argument is pedantic. The Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972 is a special law that deals specifically with dangerous drugs which are subsumed into
"prohibited" and "regulated" drugs and defines and penalizes categories of offenses which are closely related
or which belong to the same class or species. Accordingly, one (1) search warrant may thus be validly issued
for the said violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act. 30
Similarly, in another case,31 the search warrant was captioned: "For Violation of P .D. No.1866 (Illegal
Possession of Firearms, etc.)." The validity of the warrant was questioned on the ground that it was issued
without reference to any particular provision in P.D. No.1866, which punished several offenses. We held,
however, that while illegal possession of firearms is penalized under §1 of P.D. No.1866 and illegal possession
of explosives is penalized under §3 thereof, the decree is a codification of the various laws on illegal
possession of firearms, ammunitions, and explosives which offenses are so related as to be subsumed within
the category of illegal possession of firearms, etc. under P.D. No.1866. Thus, only one warrant was necessary
to cover the violations under the various provisions of the said law.
Particularly of the Place
41
Accused-appellant contends that the search warrant failed to indicate the place to be searched with sufficient
particularity.
This contention is without merit. As the Solicitor General states:
.....While the address stated in the warrant is merely "Binhagan St., San Jose, Quezon City," the trial court
took note of the fact that the records of Search Warrant Case No.160 contained several documents which
identified the premises to be searched, to wit: 1) the application for search warrant which stated that the
premises to be searched was located in between No.7 and 11 at Binhagan Street, San Jose, Quezon City; 2)
the deposition of witness which described the premises as "a house without a number located at Binhagan
St., San Jose, Quezon City; and 3) the pencil sketch of the location of the premises to be searched. In fact,
the police officers who raided appellant's house under the leadership of Police Senior Inspector Rodolfo
Aguilar could not have been mistaken as Inspector Aguilar resides in the same neighborhood in Binhagan
where appellant lives and in fact Aguilar's place is at the end of appellant's place in Binhagan. Moreover, the
house raided by Aguilar's team is undeniably appellant'.s house and it was really appellant who was the
target. The raiding team even first ascertained through their informant that appellant was inside his residence
before they actually started their operation.32
The rule is that a description of the place to be searched is sufficient if the officer with the warrant can, with
reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place intended to be searched.33 For example, a search warrant
authorized a search of Apartment Number 3 of a building at 83 Pleasant Street, Malborough, Massachusetts.
As it turned out, there were five apartments in the basement and six apartments on both the ground and top
floors and that there was an Apartment Number 3 on each floor. However, the description was made
determinate by a reference to the affidavit supporting the warrant that the apartment was occupied by the
accused "Morris Ferrante of 83 Pleasant Street, Malboro Mass."34 In this case, the location of accused-
appellant's house being indicated by the evidence on record, there can be no doubt that the warrant
described the place to be searched with sufficient particularity.1âwphi1.nêt
In sum, we hold that with respect to the seizure of shabu from accused-appellant's residence, Search Warrant
No.160 was properly issued, such warrant being founded on probable cause personally determined by the
judge under oath or affirmation of the deposing witness and particularly describing the place to be searched
and the things to be seized.
Second. The search warrant authorized the seizure of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu but not
marijuana. However, seizure of the latter drug is being justified on the ground that the drug was seized within
the "plain view" of the searching party. This is contested by accused-appellant.
Under the "plain view doctrine," unlawful objects within the "plain view" of an officer who has the right to be
in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be presented in evidence.35 For this doctrine
to apply, there must be: (a) prior justification; (b ) inadvertent discovery of the evidence; and (c) immediate
apparent illegality of the evidence before the police.36 The question is whether these requisites were
complied with by the authorities in seizing the marijuana in this case.
Prior Justification and Discovery by Inadvertence
Because the location of the shabu was indicated in the warrant and thus known to the police operatives, it is
reasonable to assume that the police found the packets of the shabu first. Once the valid portion of the
search warrant has been executed, the "plain view doctrine" can no longer provide any basis -for admitting
the other items subsequently found. As has been explained:
What the 'plain view' cases have in common is that the police officer in each of them had a prior justification
for an intrusion in the course of which he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the
accused. The doctrine serves to supplement the prior justification -whether it be a warrant for another object,
42
hot pursuit, search incident to lawful arrest, or some other legitimate reason for being present unconnected
with a search directed against the accused -and permits the warrantless seizure. Of course, the extension of
the original justification is legitimate only where it is immediately apparent to the police that they have
evidence before them; the 'plain view' doctrine may not be used to extend a general exploratory search from
one object to another until something incriminating at last emerges.37
The only other possible justification for an intrusion by the police is the conduct of a search pursuant to
"accused-appellant's lawful arrest for possession of shabu. However, a search incident to a lawful arrest is
limited to the person of the one arrested and the premises within his immediate control.18 The rationale for
permitting such a search is to prevent the person arrested from obtaining a weapon to commit violence, or to
reach for incriminatory evidence and destroy it.
The police failed to allege in this case the time when the marijuana was found, i.e., whether prior to, or
contemporaneous with, the shabu subject of the warrant, or whether it was recovered on accused-appellant's
person or in an area within his immediate control. Its recovery, therefore, presumably during the search
conducted after the shabu had been recovered from the cabinet, as attested to by SPO1 Badua in his
depostion, was invalid.
Apparent Illegality of the Evidence
The marijuana bricks were wrapped in newsprint. There was no apparent illegality to justify their seizure. This
case is similar to People. v. Musa39 in which we declared inadmissible the marijuana recovered by NARCOM
agents because the said drugs were contained in plastic bag which gave no indication of its contents. We
explained:
Moreover, when the NARCOM agents saw the plastic bag hanging in one corner of the kitchen, they had no
clue as to its contents. They had to ask the appellant what the bag contained. When the appellant refused to
respond, they opened it and found the marijuana. Unlike Ker v. California, where the marijuana was visible to
the police officer's eyes, the NARCOM agents in this case could not have discovered the inculpatory nature of
the contents of the bag had they not forcibly opened it; Even assuming then, that the NARCOM agents
inadvertently came across the plastic bag because it was within their "plain view," what may be said to be the
object in their "plain view" was just the plastic bag and not the marijuana. The incriminating nature of the
contents of the plastic bag was not immediately apparent from the "plain view" of said object. It cannot be
claimed that the plastic bag clearly betrayed its contents, whether by its distinctive configuration, is
transparency, or otherwise, that its contents are obvious to an observer .40
No presumption of regularity may be invoked by an officer in aid of the process when he undertakes to justify
an encroachment of rights secured by the Constitution.41 In this case, the marijuana allegedly found in the
possession of accused-appellant was in the form of two bricks wrapped in newsprint. Not being in a
transparent container, the contents wrapped in newsprint could not have been readily discernible as
marijuana. Nor was there mention of the time or manner these items were discovered. Accordingly, for failure
of the prosecution to prove that the seizure of the marijuana without a warrant was conducted in accordance
with the "plain view doctrine," we hold that the marijuana is inadmissible in evidence against accused-
appellant. However, the confiscation of the drug must be upheld.
Third. Accused-appellant claims that undue and unnecessary force was employed by the searching party in
effecting the raid.
Rule 126, §7 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure42 provides:
Right to break door or window to effect search. - The officer, if refused admittance to the place of directed
search after giving notice of his purpose and authority, may break open any outer or inner door or window of
a house or any part of a house or anything therein to execute the warrant or liberate himself or any person
lawfully aiding him when unlawfully detained therein.
43
Accused-appellant's claim that the policemen had clambered up the roof of his house to gain entry and had
broken doors and windows in the process is unsupported by reliable and competent proof. No affidavit or
sworn statement of disinterested persons, like the barangay officials or neighbors, has been presented by
accused-appellant to attest to the truth of his claim.
In contrast, Aguilar and Duano's claim that they had to use some force in order to gain entry cannot be
doubted. The occupants of the house, especially accused-appellant, refused to open the door despite the fact
that the searching party knocked on the door several times. Furthermore, the agents saw the suspicious
movements of the people inside the house. These circumstances justified the searching party's forcible entry
into the house, founded as it is on the apprehension that the execution of their mission would be frustrated
unless they do so.
WHEREFORE, in Criminal Case No. Q-95-64357, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 96, Quezon
City, finding accused-appellant Roberto Salanguit y Ko guilty of possession of illegal drugs under §16 of R.A.
No.6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act, as amended, and sentencing him to suffer a prison
term ranging from six (6) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, and four (4) years and two (2) months of
prision correccional, as maximum, and ordering the confiscation of 11.14 grams of methamphetamine
hydrochloride is AFFIRMED .
In Criminal Case No. Q-95-64358, the decision of the same court finding accused-appellant Roberto Salanguit
y Ko guilty of possession of prohibited drugs under §8 of R.A. No. 6425, as amended, and sentencing him to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of Pl00,000.00 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE
and accused- appellant is ACQUITTED of the crime charged. However, the confiscation of the 1,254 grams of
marijuana, as well as the 11.14 grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride, and its disposition as ordered by
the trial court is AFFIRMED .
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Quisumbing, Buena, De Leon, Jr. JJ: concur.
27 SEC. 8, Possession or Use of Prohibited Drugs. -The penalty SEC. 16. Possession or Use of Regulated Drugs. -The penalty of
of reclusion peryetua to death and a fine ranging from five reclusion peryetua to death and fine ranging from five hundred
hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall be imposed thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall be imposed upon any
upon any person who, unless authorized by law, shall possess person who shall possess or use any regulated drug without
or use any prohibited drug subject to the provisions of Section the corresponding license or prescription, subject to the
20 hereof. provisions of section 20 hereof. (As amended by Sec. 16, RA
No. 7659).
44

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Political Law Review: Cases on Search Warrant

G.R. No. 111267 September 20, 1996

The antecedent facts leading to the disputed Order are:

Hence, this petition.

We hold in the negative.

xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 3. Requisites for issuing search warrant.

Sec. 4. Examination of complainant; record. —

In several cases, this Court had held that:

In Bache and Co., (Phil.) Inc. v. Ruiz, we said

"a) One (1) pc. Pistol Cal. 45 SN:70G23792 (w/o license)

"b) One (1) pc. Revolver Cal. 22 SN:48673 (w/o license)

"d) Five (5) pcs. Magazines for cal. .45

"e) Eight (8) rds live ammunitions for cal. 22

"g) Twenty (20) rds live ammunitions for cal 5.56.

"without first having obtained" a proper license therefor.

The facts, as found by the Court of Appeals, are as follows:

Hence, this appeal.10

We shall resolve the issues in seriatim.

c. Loss of firearm/s through negligence.

f. Dismissal for cause from, the service.

g. Failure to sign license, or sign ID picture or affix right thumb mark.

Q: How did he say about the ten thousand pesos?

A: He said "palit kalabaw na lang tayo" sir.

Q: And what did you answer him?

A: I said I do not know any unlicensed firearm in our barangay, sir.

Q: What did he say next?

Q: What was your comment to what he said?

(c) the evidence must be immediately apparent, and

Davide, Jr., Puno, Kapunan, Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.

Footnotes: applicant and his witnesses (Prudente v. Dayrit, 180 SCRA 69

The Information filed against appellant charged as follows:

FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

THIRD ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

a. several pcs. transparent plastic envelopes

b. one (1) unit Toyota Corolla GLI with PN UTT 658

d. Twenty-Five Thousand Chinese Yuan (CY25,000.00)

e. Sixty-Seven (67) pieces of Chinese passports

f. Twenty-Eight (28) pieces of assorted bankbooks

g. Two Hundred Eighty Five (285) pieces of assorted checks

h. Fifty-Three (53) pcs. rubber stamp and related paraphernalia

i. One (1) piece Underwood typewriter with SN 9861952

j. One (1) piece check writer

k. Two (2) pieces of dry seal

m. Five (5) boxes of assorted documents

n. Three (3) bags of assorted documents[67]

Illegal Possession of 204 Grams of Shabu

Q And what was the reaction of Jack Go, if any?

Q Why did you do that, Mr. witness?

A Yes, sir.[80] (Emphasis supplied)

Thank you very much.

A Its not an SOP.

Q Why did you not make a detailed inventory or receipt?

A As Ive said earlier, its voluminous. [82] (Emphasis supplied)