Consciousness and Cognition 18 (2009) 740–753

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Consciousness and Cognition

journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/concog

Review

Self-regulation and the hypothesis of experience-based selection:

Investigating indirect conscious control
Derek C. Dorris
Department of Applied Psychology, University College Cork, Cork Enterprise Centre, North Mall, Cork, Ireland

a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c t

Article history: The assumption that the contents of our conscious visual experience directly control our
Received 20 August 2008 fine-tuned, real-time motor activity has been challenged by neurological and psychophys-
Available online 11 April 2009 ical evidence that suggest the two processes work semi-independently of each other. Clark
[Clark, A. (2001). Visual experience and motor action: Are the bonds too tight? The Philo-
sophical Review, 110, 495–519; Clark, A. (2002). Is seeing all it seems? Action, reason and
Keywords: the grand illusion. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 9, 181–202; Clark, A. (2006). Vision as
Motor-control
dance? Three challenges for sensori-motor contingency theory. PSYCHE, 12 (1). Available
Self-regulation
Consciousness
from http://www.psyche.cs.monash.edu.au] argues that such evidence implies a more
Implementation intentions indirect relationship between conscious visual experience and motor-control where the
Prospective memory function of visual consciousness is not to control action but to select what actions are to
be controlled. In this paper, I argue that this type of dynamic also exists at the wider level
of self-regulation where conscious intent appears to indirectly control the enactment of the
intended behaviour. I argue that by drawing parallels between Clark’s proposed dynamic
and self-regulation, the former is not only bolstered by a previously unrecognised source
of support but our understanding of the latter can help to further elucidate Clark’s pro-
posed mechanism of indirect conscious control.
Ó 2009 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction

According to Andy Clark (2002) there is a tendency within the psychological and philosophical literatures to assume that
‘‘our conscious seeings are usually guiding and controlling our visually based activities” (p. 195). He points out that this
assumption of experience-based control has persisted because, firstly, it seems intuitively correct and, secondly, some authors
use such a direct link between conscious perceptual experience and action to explain what the nonconceptual contents of
such experience are for. For example, Peacocke (1992) claims that the nonconceptual content of perceptual experience re-
flects a mode of processing that is directly compatible with the fluid actions of the body to the extent that it facilitates the
direct control of the body’s actions. However, Clark (2001, 2002, 2006) suggests that the assumption of experience-based
control is brought into doubt by the kind of neurological and psychophysical evidence presented by Milner and Goodale
(1995) that shows visually controlled action to be rooted in a different neural pathway than that which supports conscious
visual experience. On the basis of such evidence, Clark (2001, 2002, 2006) proposes that conscious visual experience is not
responsible for the direct control of our fine-tuned motor-action but instead it is responsible for the reasoned selection and
planning of certain actions that once selected are carried out and controlled nonconsciously. It will be argued in the present
paper that the wider literature on self-regulation can offer fresh support to these claims as an inspection of current research
and leading models reveals it to be often dependent on a conscious intentional process that chooses and plans desired behav-
iour and a nonconscious process that carries out that behaviour. In addition to representing a (previously unrecognised)

E-mail address: d.dorris@ucc.ie

1053-8100/$ - see front matter Ó 2009 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.concog.2009.03.005
 D.C. Dorris / Consciousness and Cognition 18 (2009) 740–753 741

source of support for his claims it will be further argued that the more detailed literature on self-regulation can also be used
to elucidate Clark’s (2001, 2002, 2006) proposed mechanism of indirect conscious control.

2. The hypothesis of experience-based selection

Clark (2001, 2002, 2006) argues that Milner and Goodale’s (1995) dual visual systems hypothesis and the empirical support
that it has received from various neurological and psychophysical studies pose an obstacle for the assumption of experience-
based control. Milner and Goodale (1995) and Goodale and Milner (2004) have proposed that visually controlled action and
conscious visual experience are largely dependent on two different and relatively independent processing streams. The for-
mer is dependent on the dorsal visual-processing stream while the latter has been found to be associated with the ventral
stream. They also presented evidence for a conscious–nonconscious distinction between these two processing streams
where the ventral stream is generally assumed to result in more conscious-based operations. Bridgeman, Lewis, Heit, and
Nagle (1979) had previously made a similar neurological distinction between perception and action pathways when they
proposed that perceptual processes are dealt with by a ‘‘cognitive” stream of visual processing and motor-control is con-
trolled by a ‘‘sensorimotor” stream (see also Bridgeman, 1999). Bridgeman (1999) suggests that motor-action and perception
must rely on different processing streams because the type of information that is important to perception (i.e., memory-
based knowledge) would interfere with the type of information that is important to visually based motor-control (i.e., infor-
mation relevant to the immediate context).
Some of the most intriguing neurological evidence in support of the dual visual systems hypothesis has come from the
study of D.F., a ventrally (cognitive stream) damaged patient who ‘‘is impaired at perceptual judgments of size shape and
orientation, but is relatively intact at colour perception and visuomotor tasks such as reaching and grasping” (Carey, Dijk-
erman, Murphy, Goodale, & Milner, 2006, p.1585). For example, Rice et al. (2006) showed that DF and another ventrally dam-
aged patient (S.B.) could avoid two objects when reaching for an area in between them. However, when they were asked to
make an explicit bisection judgement (judging where the mid-point between two objects is by physically pointing at it) their
performance was impaired. Thus, problems only emerged when the task required them to make an explicit judgement con-
cerning the two objects. Psychophysical studies have illustrated a similar dissociation of perception and action. Early re-
search such as that carried out by Bridgeman et al. (1979) and Wong and Mack (1981) revealed that participants could
continue to point accurately at a visually presented target even when that target had been displaced unbeknownst to them.
Later research (e.g., Dewar & Carey, 2006) demonstrated that visual illusions such as the Müller-Lyer illusion can affect con-
scious visual perception but not the fine-tuned actions involved in grasping the objects that are at the centre of the illusion.
Clark (2001, 2002, 2006) points out that such findings indicate that visually guided action (e.g., manually tracking a target or
grasping an object) is not directly dependent on conscious visual experience (e.g., perceiving the target’s location or perceiv-
ing an illusion).
In recent years, the degree to which the dual visual systems actually work independently of each other has been ques-
tioned. For example, Cohen, Cross, Tunik, Grafton, and Culham (2009) have shown evidence that suggests that although
the dorsal (sensorimotor) stream controls grasping under immediate movement conditions, under delayed movement con-
ditions (where a delay is introduced between the visual stimulus and action response) the dorsal stream is helped by the
ventral (cognitive) stream. They concluded that the interaction between the two streams occurs because under delayed con-
ditions the grasping becomes dependent on a perceptual memory representation of the stimulus. Clark (2001) accepts that
interactions occur between the two streams but only up to the point where the memory system is used to plan certain ac-
tions. According to him, this ventrally (cognitively) based planning can inform the dorsal (sensorimotor) stream but from
that point on the actual fine-tuned action-control is achieved through that latter stream. Thus, when dismissing the assump-
tion of experience-based control, Clark (2001) is not proposing that there is no relationship between visual conscious expe-
rience and fine-tuned action-control. Instead he is proposing a partial relationship between the two streams. Specifically, he
is arguing that conscious visual experience plays an indirect, guiding role in action-control where it selects and informs what
actions should be carried out ‘‘in the same sense that my love of pasta may be said to guide my selection of a menu item”
(Clark, 2001, p. 511).
Thus, Clark (2001, 2002, 2006) suggests that the function of conscious visual experience is not to fine-tune our real-time
actions in the physical world but, instead, it is to facilitate the reasoned and planned selections of appropriate motor-actions
that once selected can unfold nonconsciously according to appropriate sensorimotor routines. Clark (2001, 2002) refers to
this as the hypothesis of experience-based selection. To put it simply, conscious visual experience can help to select which ac-
tions are to be performed and what the targets of those actions will be. However, once this has been done, a nonconscious
process takes over the implementation of those planned actions so that the moment-to-moment fine-tuned actions are con-
trolled in the absence of conscious awareness. Perhaps Clark’s (2001, 2002, 2006) alternative notion of action-control can be
best illustrated by making reference to a recent study carried out by Velliste, Perel, Spalding, Whitford, and Schwartz (2008)
who implanted intracortical microelectrode arrays in the primary motor cortices of two monkeys. The microelectrodes
picked up cortical activity in the monkeys and sent signals to a mechanised arm replica, which could perform a number
of reaching and grasping movements so that the monkeys (whose actual arms were restrained) could feed themselves with
the mechanised arm. It was found that the monkeys could use their motor cortical activity to move the mechanised arm and
successfully perform the relatively complex physical movements involved in self-feeding. What is relevant to the hypothesis
742 D.C. Dorris / Consciousness and Cognition 18 (2009) 740–753

of experience-based selection is that these monkeys were able to use the mechanised arm to feed themselves in the same
fashion that they used their own arms even though they had no direct control over that mechanised arm. The cortical activity
determined that the arm should move but the arm’s movements were directly controlled by its programming. Although, hu-
man perceptual experience is far more sophisticated than that of monkeys’, Velliste et al.’s (2008) findings nonetheless show
us that experience can indirectly influence fine-tuned actions.
The hypothesis of experience-based selection has important implications for the control of action. For that reason it is
important to understand how action-production is generally understood to unfold. Norman and Shallice’s (1986) model
of willed and automatic action is a well-known model of action-control that postulates two control processes. The first is
an automatic or nonconscious contention scheduling system that carries out routine or simple actions. The contention
scheduling system operates on the principle of lateral activation and inhibition of related schemas. These schemas respond
(automatically) to environmental cues that are relevant to the actions they represent. However, during the performance of
novel tasks when routine actions might be inappropriate, a more conscious control process called the supervisory attentional
system emerges. By mediating attention towards these schemas, this latter system can modulate their activation and inhi-
bition levels and, in doing so, bias the operation of the contention scheduling system so that the non-routine actions can be
completed. If the supervisory attentional system becomes distracted, action slips can occur and routine actions can be acti-
vated inappropriately (e.g., turning the key when the car’s engine is already on because the distracted supervisory system did
not inhibit the schema for key-turning). Neurological evidence appears to support this notion of action-control as damage to
prefrontal structures (which are believed to be responsible for many of the supervisory attentional system’s functions) re-
sults in a tendency towards action slips (Shallice, 1988).
Botvinick and Bylsma (2005) propose a more recent account of action-control. They argue that action-slips during routine
behaviour do not necessarily occur because of a failure of a supervisory attentional system as Norman and Shallice (1986)
argue. Instead, they occur when the more automatic process of sequential action-production (such as that involved in mak-
ing a cup of coffee) is interrupted and the on-line representation of the task-context begins to degrade. According to Botvi-
nick and Bylsma (2005), this representation is at its strongest at the end of a given subtask (i.e., adding sugar) because that is
when the contextual information concerning other subtasks (i.e., ‘‘has cream been added?” or ‘‘does it still need to be ad-
ded?”) becomes most relevant. It is at its weakest in the middle of a subtask because that is when the contextual information
is least relevant. Thus, task-context should be most susceptible to interruption during the middle of a subtask. Botvinick and
Bylsma (2005) interrupted participants during a coffee-making task (by giving them a mathematical problem to solve) either
at the end of a particular subtask or in the middle of a subtask. They found that interruption in the middle of a subtask led to
more subsequent errors than interruption at the end of a subtask, thus, supporting their claim that the on-line representation
of action plays a role in action slips.
Interestingly, when these models of action-control are evaluated it can be appreciated that they imply a type of action-
control that is compatible with the hypothesis of experience-based selection. To explain, according to Norman and Shallice’s
(1986) model the conscious supervisory attentional system indirectly affects non-routine action by increasing or inhibiting
the activation values of underlying schemas, which then affects how they are activated within the contention scheduling
system. In this way, the conscious system indirectly influences or biases the control of action by promoting certain actions,
which, once promoted, are controlled by a nonconscious system. Although Botvinick and Bylsma (2005) appear to accept the
possibility of an interaction between conscious and nonconscious processes in the same way that Norman and Shallice
(1986) do, they are not as focused on that interaction. However, their research into the nonconscious process of action-pro-
duction reveals a form of on-line sequential action-control that appears to run independently of conscious attentional pro-
cesses. Thus, their notion of action-control complements Clark’s (2001, 2002, 2006) claim that fine-tuned motor-action is
controlled nonconsciously.
Clark’s (2001, 2002, 2006) concept of action-control is built around two related issues. Firstly, what the functional role
of conscious visual experience is and, secondly, what the contents of that experience amount to. On his account, conscious
visual experience facilitates the reasoned selection and planning of actions by abstracting or packaging the visual input so
that it is compatible with such conceptually driven processes. Once selected and planned, these actions are enacted non-
consciously resulting in an indirect form of conscious action-control. Other researchers share similar viewpoints on the
nature and function of perceptual consciousness. For example, Koch (2004), Jacob and Jeannerod (2003), and Matthen
(2005) also describe the content of visual experience as being such that it facilitates the conscious selection of actions
(see Clark, 2006).
However, there are other accounts that give conscious perceptual experience a different role by purporting a different
form of experiential content. For example Cussins (1990) suggests that conscious perceptual experience is constituted by
the nonconceptual micro-adjustments of the body’s actions and that such perceptual content serves to establish a direct link
between conscious perception and action. Noë (2004) offers an account of visual consciousness that also advocates a direct
link between visual consciousness and action. He claims that the contents of perceptual experience amount to having a lar-
gely nonconceptual repertoire of sensorimotor expectations concerning how movement (e.g., of the body) will affect sensory
stimulation. According to this account, experience (which emerges as these sensorimotor expectations are being used to
guide action) functions to link the individual efficiently and directly with the physical world. Accounts that postulate a form
of nonconceptual content and a resultant form of direct conscious control over action offer an opposing view to that which
the hypothesis of experience-based selection postulates. However, Clark (2001, 2002, 2006) points out that the evident neu-
rological and psychophysical dissociation between conscious visual experience and fine-tuned action-control represents an
 D.C. Dorris / Consciousness and Cognition 18 (2009) 740–753 743

obstacle to these accounts because evidence of dissociation implies a less direct and more indirect conscious control of
action.
Thus, the hypothesis of experience-based selection predicts that the function of conscious visual experience is not to di-
rectly control fine-grained motor-action but to indirectly influence it. This claim is significant in that it challenges a very
strong and intuitive feeling that we are in direct control of our own actions. The neurological and psychophysical evidence
such as that discussed above forms a large part of the basis to this claim. However, it will be argued in the present paper that
the wider literature on self-regulation represents a, heretofore unidentified, source of support for the type of indirect con-
scious control that Clark (2001, 2002, 2006) proposes. Specifically, our current knowledge of self-regulation reveals that, in
the same way that conscious visual experience might only indirectly influence motor-control, the conscious self-regulatory
processes that formulate our intentions only indirectly influence the enactment of those intentions. The primary aim of the
current paper, therefore, is to further validate Clark’s (2001, 2002, 2006) concept of indirect conscious control by pointing out
that this form of control has already been empirically demonstrated to be operating at a wider level of abstraction.
Although the evidence that was discussed above supports Clark’s (2001, 2002, 2006) concept of indirect conscious con-
trol, it actually does little to elucidate the type of mechanism that could facilitate an indirect relationship between conscious
visual experience and fine-tuned motor-control. As will be discussed later, Clark (2001, 2002) draws on Prinz’s (2000) work
on memory in order to begin the process of sketching a potential mechanism. However, it will be argued in the present paper
that by drawing parallels between self-regulation and the hypothesis of experience-based selection we can use our more
detailed and empirically based knowledge of the former to further explicate the nature of that mechanism. The secondary
aim of the current paper, therefore, is to use our knowledge of how conscious intentions can indirectly influence the non-
conscious enactment of self-regulatory behaviour to better explain how conscious visual experience might indirectly influ-
ence fine-tuned motor-control.

3. Self-regulation

Self-regulation is the process whereby one can purposefully control one’s own thoughts, emotions, and behaviour in
accordance with one’s desires (Vohs & Baumeister, 2004). It involves the co-ordinated operation of cognitive processes such
as intention formation, planning, plan implementation or enactment, and monitoring. Although fine-grained motor-control
could be described as a form of self-regulation, research into self-regulation is typically concerned with more high-level and
amodal acts of self-control (see Vohs & Baumeister, 2004), such as the self-control of thinking (e.g., forming a rational argu-
ment in one’s own mind) or the self-control of complex behaviour (e.g., acting in a socially appropriate fashion).
Self-regulation originates with intention. Such intentions are usually concerned with reducing a perceived disparity be-
tween one’s current state and a more desired state (Carver & Scheier, 1998). The process whereby intentions are formed is
complex and involves considering the effects of an intended behaviour, the meaning of that behaviour, and the importance of
those effects and of that meaning (Ajzen, 1991). In order to satisfy an intention, one often needs to establish a plan on how to
go about implementing that decision. Such planning can involve considering when and where one should engage in the in-
tended behaviour and how that behaviour should unfold (Cohen & Gollwitzer, 2008). When it comes to explaining how the
sub-processes involved in intention formation and planning are co-ordinated, it is generally assumed that they are collated
in one’s conscious awareness where information is selectively attended to in a sequential manner (Logan, 1989). In this
sense, intention formation and planning are considered to be under direct conscious control.
Self-regulation is, thus, dependent on our capacity for voluntary or conscious control (Vohs & Baumeister, 2004). How-
ever, it appears as though such control may not be necessary to the entire process of self-regulation. As will be described
in the next section, a review of the research into implementation intentions and prospective memory reveals that the enact-
ment of intentions can often be controlled nonconsciously. The reason for this is that intention formation and intention plan-
ning are capable of leaving the underlying goal-representations accessible to subsequent nonconscious activation. Once
nonconsciously activated, these goal-representations can allow the intended and planned behaviour to unfold in the absence
of the conscious processes that formed those intentions and plans. This is a form of indirect conscious control because con-
scious processes are not directly controlling the behaviour but instead they are affecting the mental structures that will
eventually control the behaviour. What is important to the present paper is that self-regulation can, therefore, be understood
to reflect the same type of indirect relationship between conscious experience and self-regulatory behaviour that Clark
(2001, 2002, 2006) implicates between conscious visual experience and fine-tuned action-control. Thus, the literature on
self-regulation may represent a thus far unidentified source of support for the type of mechanisms that he postulates by val-
idating the potential for such a mechanism.

4. How conscious intentions are nonconsciously enacted during self-regulation

The nonconscious control of our consciously formed intentions is evident throughout our daily lives. For example, Marsh,
Hicks, and Cook (2008) point out that we often have the experience of walking into a room only to pause and wonder why we
entered that room in the first place. Marsh et al. (2008) further point out that by going back to the room where our intention
was formed, we appear to somehow trigger that intention once again. This kind of anecdotal evidence does not say much for
our ability to directly consciously initiate the intentional behaviour. Moreover, even if we do not return to the original
744 D.C. Dorris / Consciousness and Cognition 18 (2009) 740–753

context where the intention was formed, the ultimate triggering of the intention can often seem to be achieved by a quick
scan of the room that we are currently in. For example, if we walk into the kitchen to make a cup of coffee but forget the
intention on route, it is not unusual to scan the room looking for cues to trigger the memory (e.g., the coffee pot). Such
instinctive scanning for intention-related cues might imply that we strongly rely on highly automated mechanisms to ini-
tiate our intentional behaviour.
Within the literature on self-regulation there are a number empirical studies demonstrating nonconscious processes
that are capable of enacting consciously formed intentions. Perhaps the best example comes from the research into imple-
mentation intentions (see Cohen & Gollwitzer, 2008; Gollwitzer, Fujita, & Oettingen, 2004). The underlying premise con-
cerning implementation intentions is that humans who decide where, when, and how they are going to satisfy an
intention are affecting their mind in two ways. Firstly, they are forming a mental association between the intended behav-
iour and those environmental circumstances that will most likely facilitate the enacting of that behaviour (the critical sit-
uation). Secondly, they are raising the accessibility of that critical situation’s underlying mental representation. As a
consequence, when one encounters the critical situation, it automatically activates the accessible representation so that
the associated behaviour can itself be nonconsciously enacted (Cohen & Gollwitzer, 2008). For example, if one forms
the intention to start eating healthier and then decides that ordering a healthy meal the next time one is at a restaurant
can best enact that intention, the presence of the waiter taking the order should serve to activate the intention as well as
the implemental behaviour.
Gollwitzer and Brandstätter (1997) found evidence supporting the idea that plan formation can result in the automati-
sation of behaviour initiation. They found that participants, who had formed implementation intentions specifying the right
time to present a specific counter-argument to an argument made by a confederate, initiated those counter-arguments faster
than those participants who had not furnished their goal to counter-argue with an implementation plan. Although imple-
mentation intentions are suited to facilitate the execution of future plans, Gollwitzer et al. (2004) point out that they can
should also play a part in implementing immediately relevant plans particularly when the task behaviour is difficult to com-
plete. This is to be expected because if the critical situation is made accessible from the moment the plan is formed it should
be capable of nonconsciously affecting subsequent behaviour from that point on. Indeed, Gollwitzer et al. (2004) point out
that the automatic implementation of planned behaviour is more effective the stronger the original goal-intention is. As the
goal-intention should be at its strongest immediately after it has been formed, the automatic execution of any implemen-
tational plans should be most effective at this point also.
Thus, the conscious planning of intentions can result in a type of implementation that is controlled automatically. How-
ever, there is evidence that unplanned intentions are also capable of being initiated automatically. Goschke and Kuhl (1993)
reported a series of experiments where participants had learned a pair of action-scripts (each script contained five related
actions such as ‘‘distribute the cutlery for setting the table”). The participants were then told that they would have to per-
form the actions from one of these scripts (the remaining script and its actions was thus deemed irrelevant to the partici-
pants’ future intentions). In an immediately subsequent recognition task, Goschke and Kuhl (1993) found that response
latencies to nouns and verbs from the action script were shorter than response latencies to nouns and verbs from the neutral
script. They referred to this finding as the intention superiority effect.
Marsh, Hicks, and Bink (1998) found further evidence for the increased accessibility of intentional items using a lexical
decision task. In addition, they found that the accessible representations actually become inhibited once the intended actions
are completed supporting the notion that the accessibility was related to the participants’ conscious intentions and not some
other feature of the task. These effects combine to form what is generally referred to as prospective memory (see Ellis & Free-
man, 2008). Prospective memories appear to allow unplanned future intentions to be activated automatically because the
heightened accessibility of our intentional goals ensures that related environmental cues can activate those goals in the ab-
sence of any conscious processing. Thus, in the same way implementation intentions do, prospective memory appears to re-
sult in a type of self-regulatory control that is built on the conscious selection of a target behaviour and the nonconscious
activation of that behaviour.
Prospective memories are usually implicated in maintaining an intention in mind so that we can remember to pursue it at
a later point in time. However, prospective memory is built on the intention superiority effect (the hyperaccessibility of an
uncompleted intention) and investigations into prospective memory demonstrate that the intention superiority effect
emerges as soon as the intention is formed. For example, Marsh et al. (1998) demonstrated the hyperaccessibility of uncom-
pleted intentions using a lexical decision task that was presented immediately after the participants formed the intention to
carry out the target behaviour. Hyperaccessibility, therefore, appears to be an instantaneous result of intention formation
and, as such, it should be capable of affecting nonconscious behaviour from the moment the intention is formed. Like imple-
mentation intentions, therefore, prospective memory should be relatable to more immediate processes of behavioural
control.
Clark’s (2001, 2002, 2006) proposed mechanism of experience-based selection is also reflected in many important theo-
ries of self-regulation some well established and some more recent. As was discussed earlier, Norman and Shallice’s (1986)
model of willed and automatic control implies that non-routine action is controlled indirectly by a conscious system that
affects the operation of a nonconscious system responsible for the actual action-control. However, although it is concerned
with patterns of action-control that are somewhat more complex than the moment-to-moment motor-actions that Clark
(2001, 2002, 2006) focuses on, this model is still specifically focused on action-regulation. As mentioned earlier, accounts
of self-regulation are typically more concerned with the purposeful regulation of thoughts or complex social behaviour. Nor-
 D.C. Dorris / Consciousness and Cognition 18 (2009) 740–753 745

man and Shallice’s (1986) work, therefore, appears to represent a kind of middle ground between the fine-tuned action-con-
trol and typical self-regulation.
One theory that falls more squarely within the parameters of self-regulation is Miller and Cohen’s (2001) theory of cog-
nitive or executive control (see also Miller & Wallis, 2009). This theory places the prefrontal cortex at the centre of our ability
to control our thoughts, emotions, and behaviour in accordance with our intentions. The theory can also be understood to
posit a form of indirect conscious control. Specifically, it holds that prefrontal-based controlled processing does not directly
affect behaviour in a goal-directed fashion. Instead, the direct activation of goal-representations puts in place a constellation
of biases the aggregate effect of which is to ‘‘guide the flow of neural activity along pathways that establish the proper map-
pings between inputs, internal states, and outputs needed to perform a given task” (Miller & Cohen, 2001, p. 171). Similar to
Norman and Shallice’s (1986) model of action-control, Miller and Cohen (2001) associate controlled processing with the inhi-
bition of inappropriate responses and the promoting or priming of appropriate responses during the completion of novel
tasks. There is neurological evidence in favour of their theory of prefrontal cortex function. For example, Miller and Wallis
(2009) report how patients with damage to the prefrontal cortex have difficulty inhibiting habitual behaviour in inappropri-
ate settings (e.g., drinking a nearby glass of water no matter who owns it). What is important to the present paper is that this
theory claims that controlled processing merely biases the processes responsible for behavioural enactment as opposed to
directly controlling it.
Metcalf and Mischel’s (1999) hot/cool systems model of self-regulation (see also Ayduk & Kross, 2009; Kross & Ayduk, 2008;
Kross, Ayduk, & Mischel, 2005; Mischel & Ayduk, 2004) postulates a type of behavioural control that can be understood to be
indirectly affected by conscious processing. According to this model, the way we behave towards a stimulus is dependent on
how we process and mentally represent that stimulus. By processing a stimulus in concrete or ‘‘hot” terms we increase the
likelihood of increasing the intensity of felt emotions. This leads to a form of stimulus-controlled, reflexive reaction that
manifests itself in the form of approach-and-avoid behaviour. However, by processing the stimulus in more abstract or
‘‘cool” terms we increase the likelihood of more cognitively driven, effortful, and reflective processing. This leads to a more
planned and less emotionally charged reaction to the stimulus. Kross et al. (2005) demonstrated this kind of dynamic when
they asked participants to remember an interpersonal experience when they felt overwhelming anger. They then instructed
them to focus on the memory in hot terms (by imagining it was happening to them all over again and by focusing on the
emotions that they were feeling) or in cool terms (by imagining it was happening to a distant version of themselves and
by focusing on why they were experiencing certain emotions). In line with Kross et al.’s (2005) predictions, participants
who processed the memory from a cool perspective showed less anger (and, therefore, better control) in both implicit
(word-stem completion) and explicit (self-report) tests.
Metcalf and Mischel’s (1999) hot/cool systems model of self-regulation is also built on a concept of indirect conscious con-
trol. To explain, Mischel and Ayduk (2004) tie cool processing with implementation planning where a ‘‘cool” conscious phase
of processing leaves in place a ‘‘cool” strategy that can be nonconsciously activated and enacted when the most appropriate
situation for such enactment is encountered. For example, when describing the process whereby implementation intentions
consciously create a link between an intended behaviour and a critical situation, Mischel and Ayduk (2004) claim that ‘‘after
this link has been established and rehearsed, effective self-regulatory behavior and cool system strategies can be activated
and generated. . .without conscious effort” (p. 115).
Bargh’s (1989, 1990, 1997) research into nonconscious goal-directed behaviour provides us with perhaps the most thor-
ough account of how nonconscious self-regulatory behaviour can be affected by conscious processes so as to facilitate indi-
rect conscious control (see also Bargh, 2007; Fitzsimons & Bargh, 2004). He outlines three forms of consciously selected
automatic behaviour each of which provides a self-regulatory function. Goal-dependent automaticity occurs when a well-
practiced behaviour is set in motion by the conscious intention to perform that behaviour (Bargh, 1989, 1997). However,
once the intention to perform has been formed the behaviour is enacted nonconsciously without any further conscious guid-
ance. We are all very familiar with this form of self-regulation as it is the basis to routine or skilled performance such as
driving a car. The parallels between this notion of self-regulation and the mechanism of experience-based selection are obvi-
ous. Both begin with the conscious selection of a goal but in both cases the actual goal-behaviour/action is carried out inde-
pendently of the conscious processes that led to their selection. Thus, both mechanisms produce a type of behaviour/action
that is only indirectly controlled by conscious processes. However, goal-dependent self-regulation can only occur for behav-
iour that is well learned. There are many instances of nonconscious self-regulation where the behaviour is not well learned.
However, when explaining how non-routine behaviour might manifest itself automatically, Bargh (1989, 1997) again impli-
cates a similar indirect relationship between conscious processes and behavioural control.
Like goal-dependent automaticity, postconscious automaticity is, according to Bargh (1989, 1997), the product of recent
conscious activation. However, in the case of postconscious automaticity the underlying mental structures have not been
reinforced through practice and so the nonconscious behaviour must rely on the residual accessibility that is temporarily
left in place after recent conscious activation. Temporary accessibility of an underlying mental representation ensures that
it can be nonconsciously activated by a related environmental stimulus even after the original activating conscious process
has been redirected. Gollwitzer, Heckhausen, and Stellar (1990) demonstrated how the residual postconscious influence of
recent goal-related thoughts could affect behaviour. They induced in participants either a deliberative mindset (by asking
them to consider alternative possibilities for solving a particular problem) or an implementation mindset (by asking them
to consider the specific steps involved in solving the problem). They then, in an ostensibly unrelated second experiment,
asked those participants to complete a fictional story about a king who had a problem to solve. They found that the partic-
746 D.C. Dorris / Consciousness and Cognition 18 (2009) 740–753

ipants completed the story in line with their primed mindset (i.e., those with a deliberative mindset described how the king
considered all his possibilities whereas those with an implemental mindset described what the king did to solve the prob-
lem). Even though Gollwitzer et al. (1990) were not testing the effectiveness of implementation intentions but rather the
persistence of the mindset that leads to their formation, implementation intentions can also be classed as a form of postcon-
scious processing as Bargh (1989, 1997) defines it. So too can prospective memory effects as they are a nonconscious product
of recent conscious processing.
When discussing postconscious automaticity, Bargh (1989, 1997) describes a similar indirect relationship between con-
scious processes and self-regulatory control to that which Clark (2001, 2002, 2006) describes. For example, when referring to
the postconscious activation of goal-related thoughts (Bargh, 1997, p. 33) claims, ‘‘this is a postconscious effect of recent
experience. . .that depends on a conscious choice of the goal in order to occur”. Therefore, similar to the hypothesis of expe-
rience-based selection, when it comes to postconscious automaticity Bargh (1997) sees the role of conscious self-regulation
to be concerned with the selection of the goal, which once selected, is processed nonconsciously.
Bargh’s (1989, 1997) final class of automaticity is also the basis to his automotive model of goal-directed behaviour (Bargh,
1990; see also Fitzsimons & Bargh, 2004). The automotive model postulates a type of automatic behaviour that can lead to
the successful achievement of one’s most important goals without any help from a recent or immediate conscious process.
Preconscious processing is a type of automaticity that emerges when a chronically accessible mental representation is acti-
vated by a nonconscious cue. According to Bargh (1990), frequent and repeated conscious activation of a given goal increases
the accessibility of that goal’s mental representation. Eventually, the underlying mental representation becomes perma-
nently or chronically accessible so that it can be activated by a related environmental cue without any help from a recent
or immediate conscious process. Fitzsimons and Bargh (2003) demonstrated the preconscious self-regulation of goal-direc-
ted behaviour when they identified participants who had a chronic desire to please their mothers through academic achieve-
ment and, then, two months later, asked them to complete a verbal achievement task. It was found that participants, who
immediately prior to the verbal achievement task had completed a short questionnaire about their mothers performed bet-
ter on that achievement task than those participants, who immediately prior to the achievement task had completed a neu-
tral questionnaire. This indicated that the mother-related questionnaire acted as a contextual cue, which activated or primed
the participants’ previously identified chronic representation so that their behaviour was nonconsciously regulated
accordingly.
The literatures on self-regulation and automaticity are replete with similar goal-priming studies (see Bargh, 1989, 1997,
2006 for review) to that carried out by Fitzsimons and Bargh (2003). However, as preconscious self-regulation can operate in
the complete absence of any recent or immediate conscious process it might appear as though this form of self-regulation is
purely nonconscious. Thus, one might wonder how it could reflect Clark’s (2001, 2002, 2006) concept of indirect conscious
control. However, it is only through repeated and frequent conscious activation that a goal representation can become chron-
ically accessible to nonconscious activation (Fitzsimons & Bargh, 2004). Therefore, consciousness can still be understood to
be indirectly affecting preconscious automaticity. The control is much more indirect than that involved in goal-dependent or
postconscious processing because it has to be traced back to a series of original events that may have happened years ago.
However, it is nonetheless that series of events (and the conscious activity that accompanied it) that selected what would
later become the nonconscious behaviour and determined exactly how that nonconscious behaviour would be enacted.
The relevance of preconscious self-regulation to the hypothesis of experience-based selection, therefore, is that preconscious
self-regulation would appear to be the natural long-term result of processes such as postconscious automaticity and expe-
rience-based selection. Specifically, it is reasonable to assume that the more often a conscious process selects a particular
behaviour or action the more reinforced the underlying goal or action-representation will become. Eventually, therefore, that
goal representation will become reinforced enough so that it could be nonconsciously activated without any help from a re-
cent or immediate conscious process.
Bargh’s (1989, 1997) description of preconscious self-regulation, therefore, illustrates how certain self-regulatory pro-
cesses that seem completely independent of conscious processes can be still traced back to a short-term interaction between
conscious and nonconscious processes that is akin to that which the hypothesis of experience-based selection predicts. The
notion that nonconsciously activated behaviour can be traced back to the long-term activity of a conscious process is sup-
ported by other theories too. For example, Logan’s (1988) instance theory of automatisation also posits a system of noncon-
scious control that emerges due to the long-term operation of conscious processes that shape and affect the mental
structures of goal-representations (see also Verbruggen & Logan, 2008). According to this account, consciously attending
to a stimulus creates a memory trace of the episode that contains information about the stimulus, an interpretation of that
stimulus, the response, and the task goal. The more we encounter the stimulus the more memory traces we create so that
eventually the representation of that stimulus is strong enough to be activated automatically. That is ‘‘when the stimulus is
repeated, previous processing is retrieved, facilitating performance” (Verbruggen & Logan, 2008, p. 650). So, when it comes to
self-regulatory behaviour that is occurring in the complete absence of any immediate or recent conscious process, a more
protracted version of indirect conscious control than the kind implicated by the hypothesis of experience-based selection
is implicated.
The various self-regulation models described above all implicate an indirect relationship between consciousness and the
implementation of intentional behaviour. The self-regulatory strength model and the related research into ego-depletion (see
Schmeichel & Baumeister, 2004 for a review) offers an explanation as to why such an indirect relationship may be a neces-
sary feature of self-regulation. Ego-depletion is a state of self-regulatory ‘‘tiredness” that emerges as a result of recent con-
 D.C. Dorris / Consciousness and Cognition 18 (2009) 740–753 747

scious self-regulatory activity. It impairs further conscious self-regulatory behaviour for a short period of time while the self-
regulatory resource replenishes itself. Nonconscious self-regulatory processes are not affected because they are not depen-
dent on that resource (see Webb & Sheeran, 2003). Ego-depletion can occur after only minor conscious self-regulatory
engagements. For example, Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Muraven, and Tice (1998) demonstrated that the simple act of choosing
to engage in a particular task impaired participants’ ability to persist at an immediately subsequent task that required con-
scious self-regulation. Choice making is another term for intention formation. Thus, if the mere act of intention formation can
interfere with subsequent attempts at conscious self-regulation then conscious control over the enactment of those inten-
tions would be quite often, if not always, very difficult to achieve. When discussing nonconscious goal-behaviour, Fitzsimons
and Bargh (2004) come to a similar conclusion when they state that ‘‘because even the simplest acts of conscious self-con-
trol. . .deplete this limited resource, it would seem that most moment-to-moment self-regulation must occur nonconscious-
ly. . . if it is to be effective” (p. 152). Therefore, just as Clark (2001, 2002, 2006) argues that the moment-to-moment control of
motor-action must be achieved nonconsciously, Fitzsimons and Bargh (2004) conclude that moment-to-moment self-regu-
lation must also occur nonconsciously because of the limitations in conscious self-regulatory strength.
The above review reveals that the self-regulation literature has recurrently implicated an indirect relationship between
consciousness and the processes responsible for the implementation of the intended control. However, there are some issues
that need to be addressed before we can safely argue that that literature is reflecting the same mechanism of indirect con-
scious control that Clark (2001, 2002, 2006) describes. For example, the research on implementation intentions and prospec-
tive memory described above only demonstrates that the intended behaviour can be nonconsciously initiated. Therefore,
that research does not necessarily preclude the possibility that a conscious process might begin to directly control that
behaviour once it has been initiated. Such a possibility would be contrary to the type of indirect control that Clark (2001,
2002, 2006) describes. However, there is evidence for the continued nonconscious control of implementation strategies
and prospective intentions.
Webb and Sheeran (2003) have demonstrated that participants, who formed implementation intentions to support their
performance on a Stroop task, exhibited less ego-depletion (by persisting for longer periods of time on a subsequent unsolv-
able puzzle) than those who formed no implementation intentions. Webb and Sheeran (2003) concluded, that the imple-
mentation intentions allowed the Stroop behaviour to unfold automatically, thereby, conserving the self-regulatory
resource for the subsequent puzzle-task. What is of relevance to the current discussion is that, in this experiment, no differ-
ence in persistence levels was found between the implementation condition and the control (no depletion) condition. This
allows us to further conclude that, for participants in the implementation condition, the intended Stroop-task behaviour was
not just initiated nonconsciously but it was also controlled and concluded nonconsciously. We can draw this conclusion be-
cause if even an intermittent conscious process was required to carry out the task behaviour then the participants in that
condition would most likely have exhibited more ego-depletion effects than the control condition. Thus, it would appear that
implementation intentions allow ‘‘preselected behavior to ‘‘run off as planned” [their quotation marks] when the critical sit-
uation is encountered” (Gollwitzer et al., 2004, p. 220).
Most of the research into prospective memory has focused only on the activation of the prospective intention and not the
question as to what happens to a prospective intention after it has been nonconsciously activated. However, there is some
evidence to suggest that unplanned intentions are not just facilitating the automatic initiation of the intention itself but also
the automatic initiation of the intended action. For example, Freeman and Ellis (2003) found that when participants formed
an intention to act in a particular way, the intention superiority effect disappeared when motor processing was inhibited
using a motor interference task that made minimal demands on attention. They concluded that, in these situations, it is
not intention-related information that is being made more accessible per se but instead it is the sensorimotor information
present in the intention that specifies the intended motor response. In addition to those findings, Nowinski and Dismukes
(2005) demonstrated that prospective memory benefits from a form of implicit planning. Participants were instructed to
complete a matching task and an anagram task and to press the ‘A’ key when a fruit word appeared on screen during either
of the tasks (this was the intention). However, unbeknownst to the participants, the experimenters manipulated the exper-
imental instructions to link the intention to one of the tasks but not the other. For example, if the link was being established
with the anagram task, then the original instructions to press the key would specify the anagram task while referring to the
matching task as ‘‘any other task” (e.g., ‘‘If you see the name of a fruit as one of the words in the anagram task, or any other
task, press the A key”). Consequentially, the intention was more associated with one task than the other. Participants’ detec-
tion of the fruit words was found to be higher in tasks that had been implicitly associated with the intention than the
remaining task. This research suggests that prospective memory might function very similarly to implementation intentions
where the physical enactment of the intention is primed along with the intention itself.
While on the point of prospective memory activation, it is important to point out that there has been some debate as to
whether prospective memories are nonconsciously or consciously activated. Smith (2003) found that the cued-retrieval of a
prospective intention during a cognitive task that is unrelated to the prospective task has the effect of interfering with that
unrelated task. Smith (2003) concluded that these findings of interference imply that prospective memory retrieval occurs
consciously because separate conscious processes are known to interfere with each other when simultaneously active. How-
ever, Cohen, Jaudas, and Gollwitzer (2008) demonstrated that this interference could have been caused by cognitive load
resulting from holding two intentions in the mind concurrently (the prospective intention as well as the intention that is
relevant to the unrelated task). Cohen et al. (2008) tested the interference of cued prospective memory on an unrelated
on-going task (lexical decision task) across seven load conditions (where the holding of an intention was made more effortful
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by increasing the number of words that could cue the prospective memory). It was found that the low-load conditions
(where the prospective memory could be cued by one word and where it could be cued by two words) did not significantly
affect the on-going task but as the number of potential cue-words increased so did the interference effects on the on-going
task. These findings support the alternative interpretation of Smith’s (2003) results. That prospective memory retrieval/acti-
vation is interfering with the on-going task because added intentions can create a cognitive load on one’s memory system
slowing down regular working memory operations (see Einstein et al., 2005 for additional empirical support for the cognitive
load explanation of prospective interference). Moreover, because the low-load conditions exhibited no significant interfer-
ence when the prospective memories were cued the findings support the notion that the prospective memories were non-
consciously activated.
Although it would appear that the self-regulatory processes described above are dependent on an indirect relationship
between conscious processes and self-regulatory behaviour there are examples of pure automatic behavioural control that
do not rely on any such relationship. Bargh (2008) lists a series of automatic processes that emerge without any immediate,
recent, or past help from consciousness. For example, Duckworth, Bargh, Garcia, and Chaiken (2002) have demonstrated that
the nonconscious evaluation of positive and negative novel stimuli can generate approach-and-avoid tendencies, respec-
tively. As novel stimuli are (by definition) stimuli that one has never encountered before, the subsequent behavioural control
cannot be considered the indirect product of some past conscious processing. Also, humans are capable of imitating the ac-
tions and behaviour of others (Dijksterhuis & Bargh, 2001). Imitation is not likely to require conscious mediation either be-
cause, as Dijksterhuis and Bargh (2001) point out, it is present not just in humans but also in lower animals such as fish and
frogs (they argue, however, that humans have an additional inhibitory mechanism that allows them to avoid imitating
everything they perceive). For example, they point out that the co-ordinated and synchronised movement of shoals of fish
is dependent on one fish imitating the behaviour of a fish in front. Neuberg, Kenrick, Maner, and Schaller’s (2004) research
into evolved motives describes how self-protection and mating goals orientate our attention towards social cues that are
relevant to those goals. Neuberg et al. (2004) view this effect as the result of an attentional system that is genetically tuned
to information that is relevant to our survival, which implies that such attentional control can be carried out in the absence
of conscious mediation.
These processes each reflect a purely nonconscious influence on our behaviour. However, does their existence provide
evidence against the notion that the self-regulatory system is built on a similar mechanism of control to that which the
hypothesis of experience-based selection is predicated on? It is argued here that it does not. To explain, self-regulation is
considered to be ‘‘regulation by the self (thus, not just of the self) [their italics and parentheses]” (Vohs & Baumeister,
2004, p. 2). In other words, the processes that drive self-regulation are affected by a sense of self. Therefore, purely noncon-
scious influences on our behaviour must, by definition, be classed as something other than self-regulation (i.e., consciousness
is an essential component to self-regulation). From the literature on automatic-evaluation effects, perception-behaviour ef-
fects, and evolved motives it would appear that these purely nonconscious processes are considered hardwired behavioural
responses. For example, Duckworth et al. (2002) described the automatic-evaluative responses to novel stimuli as ‘‘adaptive
default responses” (p. 518). When discussing imitation, Dijksterhuis and Bargh (2001) suggested ‘‘somewhere along the line
of our evolutionary history, imitation likely proved to be advantageous over an absence of imitation” (p. 32). Neuberg et al.
(2004) also adopt an evolutionary perspective when discussing their work on evolved emotions. Thus, these purely noncon-
scious influences on our behaviour fall neatly into an altogether different class of cognitive behaviour to self-regulation. They
are genetically programmed skills. Thus, in the same way that we can differentiate innate physical reflexes from fine-tuned
motor-control there is good reason to differentiate automatic-evaluation effects, perception-behaviour effects, and evolved
motives from self-regulation.
In discussing whether or not purely nonconscious control processes can affect possible comparisons between self-regu-
lation and the hypothesis of experience-based selection our attention is naturally drawn towards the question of whether or
not a purely conscious self-regulatory process could affect such comparisons. However, as mentioned earlier, the self-regu-
latory resource appears to be so limited that Fitzsimons and Bargh (2004) point out that purely conscious self-regulation
may not be possible. Furthermore, when we take the research into implementation intentions and prospective memory into
account along with the different theoretical perspectives it appears that self-regulation is, for the most part, affected by con-
scious processes that select the goal-behaviour and leave its enactment to unfold nonconsciously.

5. Integrating experience-based selection with self-regulation

The primary aim of the current work is to validate Clark’s (2001, 2002, 2006) concept of indirect conscious control by
demonstrating that it has already been established to be working at the wider level of self-regulation. Having examined both
the hypothesis of experience-based selection and the self-regulation literature, the next step is to identify just how easily the
former can be integrated with the latter. Clark’s (2001, 2002, 2006) concept of indirect conscious control is built on the claim
that conscious visual experience does not directly influence the moment-to-moment or real-time control of fine-tuned mo-
tor-action but instead it selects what actions will be carried out and plans how they will be executed. This conscious selec-
tion and planning then sets in motion a nonconscious process that carries out those consciously selected and planned
actions. The above review reveals that self-regulatory behaviour is dependent on a very similar relationship between con-
scious and nonconscious processes. Specifically, the research into prospective memory reveals that during intention forma-
 D.C. Dorris / Consciousness and Cognition 18 (2009) 740–753 749

tion any behaviour that we select to engage in is left in a heightened state of accessibility so that it is susceptible to subse-
quent nonconscious activation. The research into implementation intentions reveals that as we consciously plan how to exe-
cute previously selected behaviour we create a mental link between that behaviour and the environmental circumstances,
under which, that behaviour should be most likely enacted. Therefore, when that situation is encountered, the behaviour is
nonconsciously enacted without any direct help from a conscious process. Furthermore, several other theoretical frame-
works concerned with self-regulation are built on similar concepts of indirect conscious control. Thus, the self-regulation
literature reveals a similar system of control to that which the hypothesis of experience-based selection predicts.
Clark’s (2001, 2002, 2006) concept of indirect conscious control can be integrated with self-regulation research on more
technical levels also. For example, Clark (2001, 2002) uses Prinz’s (2000) work on consciousness to begin sketching a possible
mechanism through which conscious visual experience can affect fine-tuned action-control. Prinz (2000) suggests that con-
sciousness affects action through the use of the memory system. In particular, he argues that the episodic and working mem-
ory systems allow perceptual information to be retained and manipulated beyond those environmental circumstances that
gave rise to it so that they become critically linked to the systems for planning. Summarising this work, Clark (2001) suggests
that by providing a mechanistic base to reasoning and planning, the memory system acts as a ‘‘wedge between sensing and
acting, rendering the relation at times indirect” (p. 511). Of course, memory is also a key factor in the way in which conscious
processing indirectly affects the enactment of intended behaviour during self-regulation. For example, from the research into
prospective memory and implementation intentions we can appreciate that conscious intention formation and planning di-
rectly manipulate and alter existing memory representations by affecting the accessibility of those representations and link-
ing them with other representations. In doing so, that direct conscious activity is preparing those representations so that
they can act as a blueprint for successful self-regulation, which can be directly activated by nonconscious cues. Although
the conscious activity is not directly affecting the nonconscious enactment, it is directly affecting the memory representa-
tions, which are the basis for that enactment. Therefore, the memory representations facilitate indirect conscious control
by mediating between consciousness and nonconscious enactment. Thus, within the self-regulation literature too, the mem-
ory system can be understood to be acting as a wedge between considering the behaviour and carrying out the behaviour, a
wedge that renders the influence of the former on the latter indirect.
Another way that Clark’s (2001, 2002, 2006) concept of indirect conscious control can be integrated with our general
understanding of self-regulation is to do with the implications that it has for the contents of our conscious visual experience.
Certain components of conscious visual experience are intuited to be so rich in representative detail that this detail exceeds
our ability to conceptually describe them (Bermudez, 1998). As mentioned earlier, the assumption of experience-based con-
trol (that our conscious visual experience is directly involved in the moment-to-moment control of motor-action) can,
according to Clark (2001), be used to reinforce this intuitive belief in nonconceptual content. This is because nonconceptual
content could potentially facilitate a direct link between conscious visual experience and fine-tuned motor-control. In claim-
ing that there is no direct link between conscious visual experience and motor-control, Clark (2001) suggests that, perhaps,
our intuitions concerning potential nonconceptual contents of that experience should also be re-evaluated.
Clark (2001) suggests that the hypothesis of experience-based selection has two alternative implications for the issue of
nonconceptual content. Firstly, it would imply that nonconceptual content could be rejected altogether. Specifically, if the
function of conscious visual experience is to select and plan what actions to engage in and how to carry out those actions
then the contents of that experience ‘‘should be intrinsically poised to figure in processes of offline reflection, recall, and cas-
cading abstraction” and ‘‘as such it is a closer cognitive neighbour to full-blown conceptual content than to online, daily,
activity-guiding know-how” (Clark, 2001, p. 513). According to this view, the contents of conscious visual experience are ‘‘al-
ready formatted, packaged, and poised for use in conceptual thought and reason” (Clark, 2001, p. 514) rather than being non-
conceptual in nature and poised for use in sensorimotor action-control. The alternative implication is that nonconceptual
contents of conscious visual experience do occur alongside concept-ready content but instead of representing the full and
rich detail of our perceptual experience they represent our implicit knowledge of what finely-tuned motor-actions we are
capable of performing in service of our conceptually based intentions (Clark’s (2001, 2002).
Therefore, the notion of conscious visual experience that is implied by the hypothesis of experience-based selection is one
that is constrained by the presence of a goal and other abstract, concept-ready components. As the self-regulation of thinking
and complex behaviour is typically concerned with the implementation of a relatively broad (in comparison to action-pro-
duction) class of related behaviours, it can be appreciated that the components of conscious self-regulatory experience
should also be generally abstract and concept-ready in nature. For example, Miller and Wallis (2009) suggest that prefron-
tal-based controlled processing affects behaviour in the form of abstract, high-level rules. Thus, by removing intuitive no-
tions of nonconceptual experience from our understanding of visual consciousness, the hypothesis of experience-based
selection can be understood to be establishing tighter links between visual consciousness and conscious self-regulation. This
allows Clark’s (2001, 2002, 2006) concept of indirect conscious control to be further integrated with the literature on self-
regulation.
By stressing the importance of concept-ready content to conscious visual experience, Clark (2001) is also giving intention
a more central role in the moment-to-moment control of fine-tuned action. For example, when describing the processes that
occur when one selects an action and, in particular, the target of that action Clark (2001, p. 510) states that ‘‘the act of grasp-
ing a fork. . .requires not simply the provision of an accurate precision grip, but a grip appropriate to the intended [my italics]
use of the fork”. Therefore, action-selection and planning are shaped by the underlying intention (i.e., ‘‘what I want to use the
fork for”) not simply a nonconceptual-based command to do something (i.e., ‘‘grip the fork thusly”). Thus, it would appear
750 D.C. Dorris / Consciousness and Cognition 18 (2009) 740–753

that Clark (2001) sees intention as the component of conscious visual experience that somehow allows such experience to
indirectly affect the control of action. The research into self-regulation also implies that it is intention that somehow allows
conscious experience to indirectly affect behavioural control. Specifically, it is intention that determines whether or not a
representation will be accessible to activation once that conscious process has been redirected. For example, with regard
to prospective memory, Marsh et al. (1998) showed that the hyperaccessibility of a selected action would be replaced by
inhibition after the intention had been completed. Marsh, Hicks, and Bryan (1999) discovered a similar inhibition effect
when the intentions were cancelled before completion was possible. Thus, within Clark’s (2001, 2002, 2006) concept of indi-
rect conscious control and within the self-regulation literature it is intention that links conceptual experience with noncon-
scious control.
As mentioned above, the importance of concept-ready content to the hypothesis of experience-based selection allows us
to infer closer ties between Clark’s (2001) notion of conscious visual experience and conscious self-regulation. There are
other places where his writing frames conscious visual experience as something similar to conscious self-regulation. For
example, when accounting for the evidence against completely separate visual streams he points out that Decety and Grezes
(1999) found that the presence of a clear and explicit goal does ensure that the two systems work separately. As conscious
self-regulation is defined by the presence of a clear goal, here too Clark (2001) is helping to establish closer links between the
conscious phase of self-regulation and conscious visual experience. It may seem slightly redundant to point out that con-
scious self-regulation and fine-tuned motor control both involve the presence of a clear and explicit goal. However, it serves
to remind us that although the two can be separated on the basis of whether they result in the control of complex behaviour
or fine-grained action they are still closely related in the sense that they both result in the purposeful control of our own
behaviour. As such, it should not be particularly surprising that Clark’s (2001) work serves to bring these two fields closer
together. Nor is it unreasonable to go a step further and suggest that the mechanisms involved in self-regulation might
be the same that are involved in the close control of motor-action.
The hypothesis of experience-based selection and the self-regulation literature can, therefore, be integrated on several
levels. They both describe an indirect relationship between conscious experience and behavioural control. They both tie
the selection and planning of behaviour to conscious experience. They both place the memory system at the heart of the indi-
rect interaction between conscious experience and behavioural control. They both hold concept-ready content in general and
intention in particular to be the most important components of that conscious experience. The more parallels that can be
drawn between Clark’s (2001, 2002) hypothesis and self-regulation the more reasonable it is to assume that the empirical
demonstrations of nonconscious self-regulation (such as those described above) reflect the same mechanism of indirect con-
scious control that he describes. The only apparent difference here is the level of abstraction that the process of indirect con-
scious control is operating at.

6. Implications for the hypothesis of experience-based selection

Common-sense approaches to action-control would suggest that conscious visual experience directly controls our mo-
ment-to-moment fine-tuned motor-action. However, Clark (2001, 2002, 2006) points to neurological evidence that suggests
these two systems work independently of each other. Instead, he hypothesises a form of indirect conscious control that is
mediated by the memory system and shaped by a largely conceptually based and intention-driven conscious visual experi-
ence, the primary responsibility of which is to facilitate the selection and planning of motor-actions that will be carried out
nonconsciously. The idea of indirect conscious control is just as counter-intuitive when it comes to the broader process of
self-regulation. Crucially, however, the literature on self-regulation appears to largely complement the mechanism of indi-
rect conscious control that Clark (2001, 2002, 2006) proposes. Specifically, the research into implementation intentions and
prospective memory together with many different theoretical perspectives on self-regulation appear to also point towards a
mechanism of indirect conscious control. Moreover, like Clark’s (2001, 2002, 2006) notion, this mechanism appears to, firstly,
be rooted in the memory system and, secondly, depend on a conceptually based and intention-driven conscious process that
is responsible for the selection and planning of desirable behaviour.
Thus, by identifying empirical examples of Clark’s (2001, 2002, 2006) proposed dynamic at other levels of abstraction, the
argument that the dynamic can exist at the more specific level of real-time motor-control is strengthened all the more. So, in
addition to the neurological and psychophysical evidence discussed by Clark (2001, 2002, 2006), it is argued that the liter-
ature on self-regulation can act as an additional source of validation for his hypothesis. Importantly, the self-regulation lit-
erature has not previously been implicated as a source of support for the hypothesis of experience-based selection. Thus, this
is the first attempt to frame it as such. However, the literature on self-regulation is broad enough to do more than just con-
firm the potential for such a mechanism. It may even be possible to use that literature to expand on our current understand-
ing of the relationship between visual consciousness and motor-control.
Clark (2001, 2002, 2006) provides a sketch of a mechanism that could be capable of facilitating indirect conscious con-
trol over fluent object-engaged behaviour. As Clark (2006) points out himself, his claims are not yet sufficiently articu-
lated. However, by drawing parallels between the self-regulation literature and the hypothesis of experience-based
selection we can not only present extra support for his concept of indirect conscious control but we can also use our more
detailed knowledge of self-regulation to further elucidate that concept. For example, as described earlier Clark (2001,
2002) argues that the memory system acts as a wedge between conscious visual experience and fine-tuned action-control.
 D.C. Dorris / Consciousness and Cognition 18 (2009) 740–753 751

This makes memory-based self-regulatory processes such as implementation intentions and prospective memory all the
more relevant to his work. Thus, it makes sense to use our knowledge of these latter processes to expand on his work.
For example, such knowledge would allow us to surmise that the memory system might act as a wedge between percep-
tion and action because the accessibility of memory representations related to the intentional actions have been left in a
heightened state of accessibility. Moreover, as mentioned earlier, prospective memories become inhibited with completion
or cancellation. Therefore, it might be further speculated that the completion or cancellation of intended actions might
inhibit the underlying representations while the incompletion of those actions might leave them in a prolonged state
of hyperaccessibility.
Our understanding of implementation intentions might also allow us to make more complex predictions as to what is
happening during the selection and planning stage of conscious visual experience. For example, if experience-based selec-
tion is comparable to implementation planning then it might be the case that the selection and planning of our specific
actions involve the flagging of a potential critical situation that would signal the moment when a specific action should
be produced or when it should be altered. In this way, therefore, our understanding of implementation intentions may
allow us to better understand how fine-tuned action-control can unfold effectively without any direct help from a con-
scious process. Sure, the sensorimotor system is likely to have a set of intuitive contingencies that allow the action to
react completely nonconsciously to the environment. But perhaps the presence of a critical situation could inform that
action in such a way as to make it more effective. Indeed, the critical situation may be the perfect vehicle to transform
or translate experience-based intentions into a format that is more compatible with the nonconscious sensorimotor rou-
tine. In other words, as a representation of an environmental event or cue, the critical situation should be both compat-
ible with the coding of a sensorimotor program yet inherently indicative of our intentions. In this sense, the critical
situation might reflect the type of ‘‘high-level information” that Clark (2001, p. 510) speaks of when he states ‘‘the pro-
cess of selection of objects to be acted upon may, it is speculated, involve mechanisms of attention that ‘‘flag” [his quo-
tation marks] the goal-object and initiate the retrieval of whatever high-level information needs to be factored into the
visuomotor routine”.
This last point is important because Clark (2001) makes a specific attempt to evaluate possible interaction-points be-
tween the vision-for-perception and vision-for-action streams of processing. He suggests that the interaction occurs at the
high-level of action-selection and planning, which is facilitated by the memory system, where the intentions that are
formed go on to guide the way the corresponding actions unfold. However, this notion of indirect conscious control does
not fully explicate how action-selection and planning can impact the fine-tuned control of action. In light of the potential
relevance that the self-regulation literature has for his concept of control, it is possible that we could (cautiously) push
this reasoning a little further. Specifically, we could suggest that the flagging of critical situations may provide the kind
of bridge between vision-for-perception and vision-for-action that Clark (2001, 2002, 2006) is searching for. That is, flag-
ging the environment with critical situations allows the fine-tuned motor processes to naturally encounter and be shaped
by the relevant components of our conceptual consciousness without being directly controlled by them. This is an issue
that obviously requires more consideration than it can be given here but it is an important example of an issue that di-
rectly concerns Clark’s (2001, 2002, 2006) concept of control but stems directly from comparisons between that concept
and self-regulation.
The research into prospective memory might explain how our conscious visual experience can facilitate the planning of
actions even if there is a distinct absence of an overt sense of planning (as there often seem to be during fine-tuned action-
control). As mentioned earlier, Nowinski and Dismukes’s (2005) findings suggest that even if one does not get around to
forming implementation intentions the formation of a prospective memory might give rise to a type of implicit planning
whereby a kind of potential critical situation is identified. If the nonconscious enactment of our intended behaviour benefits
from such implicit planning then it is perhaps, on the basis of the above review, necessary to consider that our fine-tuned
control of motor-behaviour might do so too. Thus, we could surmise that when one selects an action to perform in the ab-
sence of explicit planning, one might still set in motion a series of related but implicit activations. Implicit activations that
leave not just the mental representations of the action accessible but also a variety of mental representations that represent a
kind of critical situation where that action should occur.
Research into ego-depletion might also have implications for Clark’s (2001, 2002, 2006) concept of indirect conscious con-
trol. Implementation intentions and prospective memory are considered to function so as to make nonconscious intentional
self-regulation possible. However, research into ego-depletion implies that they do this because the conscious self-regula-
tory resource is often not strong enough to form an intention and then complete the intention all by itself. Ego-depletion
might help us to explain why experience-based selection might be more likely than experience-based control. Specifically,
conscious visual experience could be predicted to hand over control of fine-grained motor-action to nonconscious processes
because it does not have the resources to maintain such control itself. To explain, the hypothesis of experience-based selec-
tion predicts that the function of conscious visual experience is to select, reason about, and to plan motor-actions. These are
all aspects of conscious self-regulation that should require the support of the self-regulatory resource (Schmeichel & Baumei-
ster, 2004) and so deplete the resource before one ever gets around to controlling those actions. The idea that conscious vi-
sual experience does not directly control fine-grained motor-action because it does not have the strength to do so would
seem perfectly reasonable when we take certain types of action into account. For example, most of us would agree that
the kind of fine-tuned action that occurs during sports performance is usually too voluminous and too fast to be handled
by our conscious visual experience.
752 D.C. Dorris / Consciousness and Cognition 18 (2009) 740–753

7. Conclusions

The hypothesis of experience-based selection proposes that conscious visual experience does not directly control our mo-
ment-to-moment motor engagements with the real world. Instead, it merely facilitates the selection and planning of those
moment-to-moment motor engagements leaving the actual control to be executed nonconsciously. As was discussed earlier,
there are opposing viewpoints that claim fine-tuned action is directly dependent on visual consciousness. However, Clark
(2001, 2002, 2006) points out that the neurological and psychophysical evidence appear to support his notion of indirect
conscious control. Moreover, in the present paper, it is explained that a similar mechanism of indirect conscious control
is operating during the broader process of self-regulation. Therefore, the self-regulation literature can be interpreted as a
source of further validation for Clark’s (2001, 2002, 2006) concept of experience-based selection, a source of validation that
has not previously been recognised as such.
In addition to reinforcing Clark’s (2001, 2002, 2006) concept of indirect conscious control over real-time motor-action, it
is argued here that we might be able to use self-regulation frameworks to more precisely explain how the mechanism that
he described could facilitate such control. For example, the research into prospective memory could offer us a clearer idea as
to how our memory structures might mediate conscious visual experience and fine-tuned motor-control by drawing atten-
tion to the accessibility of those structures. Our understanding of implementation intentions suggests the possibility that the
planning involved in conscious visual experience could result in the identification of critical situations. These critical situa-
tions could act as signposts to the fine-tuned action-control so that they may even constitute a form of bridge between con-
scious visual experience and the sensorimotor routines that allow the intended behaviour to unfold nonconsciously.
Research demonstrating implicit planning (implicitly linking the intended behaviour with a critical situation) allows us to
predict that conscious visual experience might also benefit from a certain degree of implicit planning under circumstances
where there is no overt sense of explicit planning. Also, our understanding of ego-depletion might offer a new explanation as
to why a mechanism for experience-based selection might exist in the first place. Specifically, it may be that the system gov-
erning conscious visual experience does not have enough resources to directly control the behaviour in addition to its normal
responsibilities for action-selection and planning.
Thus, the purpose of the present paper was to explain why the literature on self-regulation could be used to validate
Clark’s (2001, 2002, 2006) concept of indirect conscious control and to use that literature to further elucidate his proposed
mechanism of indirect conscious control. In attempting to do this, the current paper brought two related but distinct liter-
atures on visually based fine-grained motor-control and self-regulation together under a framework of indirect conscious
control. This should represent a positive step for both literatures because it suggests that in the future it may be possible
to develop a unified approach to the issue of control as it pertains to psychology in general.

Acknowledgment

I thank Aidan Moran and Marek McGann for their comments on this paper.

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