[G.R. No. 133026.
February 20, 2001] Josephine confirmed her mothers testimony and even said that she had seen Gerry Galgarin
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. EDWARD ENDINO (at large)
and GERRY GALGARIN alias TOTO, accused.
GERRY GALGARIN alias TOTO, accused-appellant.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
YIELDING to mans brutish instinct for revenge, Edward Endino, with the aid of Gerry
Galgarin alias Toto, slew Dennis Aquino in the presence of a lady whose love they once shared.
On a busy street in Puerto Princesa City in the evening of 16 October 1991, an emboldened
Gerry Galgarin, uncle of accused Edward Endino, suddenly and without warning lunged at Dennis
and stabbed him repeatedly on the chest. Dennis girlfriend Clara Agagas who was with him, stunned
by the unexpected attack, pleaded to Galgarin to stop. Dennis struggled and succeeded momentarily
to free himself from his attacker. Dennis dashed towards the nearby Midtown Sales but his escape
was foiled when from out of nowhere Edward Endino appeared and fired at Dennis. As Dennis
staggered for safety, the two (2) assailants fled in the direction of the airport.
Meanwhile, Dennis, wounded and bleeding, sought refuge inside the Elohim Store where he
collapsed on the floor. He was grasping for breath and near death. Clara with the help of some
onlookers took him to the hospital but Dennis expired even before he could receive medical
attention. According to the autopsy report of Dr. Josephine Goh-Cruz, cause of death was "cardio-
respiratory arrest secondary to hypovolemic shock secondary to a stab wound which penetrated the
heart."[1]
On 18 October 1991, an Information for the murder of Dennis Aquino was filed against Edward
Endino and accused-appellant Gerry Galgarin and warrants were issued for their arrest. However, as
both accused remained at large, the trial court issued on 26 December 1991 an order putting the case
in the archives without prejudice to its reinstatement upon their apprehension.
On 19 November 1992, Gerry Galgarin was arrested through the combined efforts of the
Antipolo and Palawan police forces at a house in Sitio Sto. Nio, Antipolo, Rizal. He was immediately
taken into temporary custody by the Antipolo Police. Early in the evening of the following day, he
was fetched from the Antipolo Police Station by PO3 Gaudencio Manlavi and PO3 Edwin Magbanua
of the Palawan police force to be taken to Palawan and be tried accordingly.
On their way to the airport, they stopped at the ABS-CBN television station where accused
Galgarin was interviewed by reporters. Video footages of the interview were taken showing Galgarin
admitting his guilt while pointing to his nephew Edward Endino as the gunman. According to
Galgarin, after attacking Aquino, they left for Roxas, Palawan, where his sister Langging who is
Edward's mother, was waiting. Langging gave them money for their fare for Manila. They took the
boat for Batangas, where they stayed for a few days, and proceeded to Manila where they separated,
with him heading for Antipolo. Galgarin appealed for Edward to give himself up to the
authorities. His interview was shown over the ABS-CBN evening news program TV Patrol.
The case against accused-appellant Gerry Galgarin was established through the testimony of
Clara Agagas who said that she was with the victim Dennis Aquino standing outside the Soundlab
Recording Studio, a barhouse owned by him, when Galgarin suddenly approached them and without
any prior warning stabbed Dennis. Dennis tried to run away, but Edward, a spurned lover who
harbored ill-feelings towards her and Dennis, shot Dennis. She recognized Edward and Gerry
because the street was sufficiently lighted.[2]
The testimony of Clara Agagas was corroborated by Anita Leong, next-door neighbor of
Dennis, who testified that a little past six oclock in the evening of 16 October 1991 Gerry Galgarin
together with a companion went to her house looking for Dennis. She instructed them to proceed to
the Soundlab Recording Studio as Dennis might still be there. But a few minutes later she heard
a Instinctively, she instructed her two (2) young daughters to duck for cover while she anxiously
waited for her seven (7)-year old daughter Josephine who was out of the house for an errand for
her. Soon enough she heard Josephine knocking at their door. She was crying because she said
her Kuya Dennis had been shot and stabbed.[3]
1
stab her Kuya Dennis and she could remember Gerry very well because of the mole below his nose. [4]
For his part, accused-appellant Gerry Galgarin disclaimed having taking part in the slaying of
Dennis. Gerry asserted that on 14 October 1991 he was in Antipolo to help his common-law wife
Maria Marasigan give birth to their first born. He stayed with her until the 16th of October when she
was discharged from the Pedragoza Maternity Clinic.[5]
Clarita Florentino Pedragoza, the midwife who delivered his son, supported the alibi of
accused-appellant. However, she admitted that when she registered the childs birth on 13 December
1993 or more than two (2) years after the delivery, she informed the civil registrar that the childs
father was "unknown."[6] His story was also confirmed by Dolores Arciaga and Maria Tomenio, his
co-workers at the Kainan sa Kubo Sing Along Restaurant, who testified that accused-appellant was
fetched by a neighbor from the restaurant in the early afternoon of 14 October with the news that his
wife was having labor pains.[7]
Accused-appellant disowned the confession which he made over TV Patrol and claimed that it
was induced by the threats of the arresting police officers. He asserted that the videotaped confession
was constitutionally infirmed and inadmissible under the exclusionary rule provided in Sec.12, Art.
III, of the Constitution.[8]
The trial court however admitted the video footages on the strength of the testimony of the
police officers that no force or compulsion was exerted on accused-appellant and upon a finding that
his confession was made before a group of newsmen that could have dissipated any semblance of
hostility towards him. The court gave credence to the arresting officers assertion that it was even
accused-appellant who pleaded with them that he be allowed to air his appeal on national television
for Edward to surrender.
The alibi of Galgarin was likewise rejected since there was no convincing evidence to support
his allegation that he was not at the locus criminis on the evening of 16 October 1991. Accordingly,
accused-appellant Gerry Galgarin was convicted of murder qualified by treachery [9] and sentenced
to reclusion perpetua. Additionally, he was ordered to indemnify the heirs of Dennis
Aquino P50,000.00 as compensatory damages and P72,725.35 as actual damages. The case against
his nephew and co-accused Edward Endino remained in the archives without prejudice to its
reinstatement as soon as he could be arrested.[10]
In his Appellants Brief, Gerry Galgarin assails the trial court for rejecting his alibi and
admitting his videotaped confession as evidence against him.
The argument that accused-appellant could not be at the scene of the crime on 16 October 1991
as he was in Antipolo assisting his wife who was giving birth on the 14th of that month, is not
persuasive.Alibi is a weak defense. The testimony of Cornelio Tejero Jr.,[11] Philippine Airlines Load
Controller of the Puerto Princesa City, that the name of "Gerry Galgarin" did not appear on their
passenger manifest for the 16 October 1991 Manila-Puerto Princesa flight, could not be relied upon
inasmuch as he himself admitted that they could not be sure of their passengers real identities. The
testimonies of accused-appellants co-workers that he was in Antipolo on 14 October 1991 did not
fortify his defense either since these witnesses did not categorically state that they saw him in
Antipolo in the evening of 16 October 1991.
With accused-appellant having been positively identified by the prosecution witnesses as the
one who stabbed Dennis, his bare denial proves futile and unavailing. Josephine Leongs
identification of accused-appellant was given in a very categorical and spontaneous manner. Her
confidence as to the attackers identity was clearly shown by her vivid recollection of him having a
mole below his nose, which is correct. Moreover, it is inconceivable for Josephine and Anita to
implicate accused-appellant, a complete stranger to them, if there was no truth to their assertion. As
for Clara, her naming of accused-appellant as her boyfriends assailant was not done out of spite, but
was impelled by her desire to seek justice for Dennis.
Corroborating further accused-appellants guilt, probably with intense incriminating effect,
were his immediate flight after the slaying, and his attempt at jailbreak [12] revealing a guilty
conscience, hence, his persistent effort to evade the clutches of the law.
Apropos the court a quos admission of accused-appellants videotaped confession, we find such
admission proper. The interview was recorded on video and it showed accused-appellant
unburdening his guilt willingly, openly and publicly in the presence of newsmen. Such confession
does not form part of custodial investigation as it was not given to police officers but to media men in
an attempt to elicit sympathy and forgiveness from the public. Besides, if he had indeed been forced
into confessing, he could have easily sought succor from the newsmen who, in all likelihood, would
have been symphatetic with him. As the trial court stated in its Decision[13]-

Furthermore, accused, in his TV interview (Exh. H), freely admitted that he had stabbed Dennis
Aquino, and that Edward Endino had shot him (Aquino). There is no showing that the interview of
accused was coerced or against his will. Hence, there is basis to accept the truth of his statements
therein.

We agree. However, because of the inherent danger in the use of television as a medium for
admitting ones guilt, and the recurrence of this phenomenon in several cases, [14] it is prudent that
trial courts are reminded that extreme caution must be taken in further admitting similar
confessions. For in all probability, the police, with the connivance of unscrupulous media
practitioners, may attempt to legitimize coerced extrajudicial confessions and place them beyond the
exclusionary rule by having an accused admit an offense on television. Such a situation would be
detrimental to the guaranteed rights of the accused and thus imperil our criminal justice system.

We do not suggest that videotaped confessions given before media men by an accused with the
knowledge of and in the presence of police officers are impermissible. Indeed, the line between
proper and invalid police techniques and conduct is a difficult one to draw, particularly in cases such
as this where it is essential to make sharp judgments in determining whether a confession was given
under coercive physical or psychological atmosphere.

A word of counsel then to lower courts: we should never presume that all media confessions
described as voluntary have been freely given. This type of confession always remains suspect and
therefore should be thoroughly examined and scrutinized. Detection of coerced confessions is
admittedly a difficult and arduous task for the courts to make. It requires persistence and
determination in separating polluted confessions from untainted ones. We have a sworn duty to be
vigilant and protective of the rights guaranteed by the Constitution.

With all the evidence tightly ringed around accused-appellant, the question that next presents
itself is whether the trial court correctly denominated the crime as murder qualified by
treachery. Doubtless,the crime committed is one of murder considering that the victim was stabbed
while he was simply standing on the pavement with his girlfriend waiting for a ride, blissfully
oblivious of the accused's criminal design. The suddenness of the assault on an unsuspecting victim,
without the slightest provocation from him who had no opportunity to parry the attack, certainly
qualifies the killing to murder.[15]

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the court a quo finding accused-appellant GERRY

GALGARIN alias Toto guilty of Murder qualified by Treachery, sentencing him
to reclusion perpetua, and ordering him to indemnify the heirs of Dennis Aquino in the amount
of P50,000.00 as compensatory damages and P72,725.35 as actual damages, is AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that accused-appellant is further ordered to compensate the decedents
heirs P50,000.00 as moral damages for their emotional and mental anguish. Costs against accused-
appellant.

SO ORDERED.

2
 [G.R. No. 138403. August 22, 2001]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROLLY ABULENCIA
COYOS, defendant-appellant.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
In the multitude of cases which passed this Court, we did not flinch in sending men rapacious
of the flesh to the gallows. Lamentably, there still remains such callous men who commit
unimaginable acts and even concoct tales, no matter how absurd, just to exculpate themselves.
The case at bench is an illustration.
On August 4, 1998, a cold-blooded ravager, Rolly Abulencia y Coyos, preyed on ten-year old
Rebelyn Garcia.
In the early morning of the following day, Rebelyns lifeless, naked body was found floating at
the Colobong creek in San Manuel, Pangasinan, with marks of bruises, burns and injuries
manifesting that she was defiled and later drowned to death.
In an Information dated September 7, 1998, docketed as Criminal Case No. U-9777, Abulencia
was charged before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 46, Urdaneta City for rape with homicide. The
Information reads:
That on or about August 4, 1998, between 5:00 oclock P.M. to 8:00 0clock in the evening, at
barangay San Juan, San Manuel, Pangasinan, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloneously (sic) have carnal
knowledge of one REBELYN GARCIA y AGAPAY, a minor 10 years of age. That by reason thereof, to
conceal his criminal act, with intent to kill, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
drown said Rebelyn Garcia y Agapay in the San Juan River of said municipality. The body of the
victim was later retrieved at the Colobong Creek at Sitio Casilagan, Brgy. San Juan, San Manuel,
Pangasinan, to the damage and prejudice of her heirs.
Contrary to Art. 266-A, No. 1(d), Republic Act No. 8353, in relation to Art. 249, Revised Penal Code,
as amended by Republic Act No. 7659.[1]
When arraigned, with the assistance of counsel, Abulencia pleaded not guilty. At the trial, the
prosecution presented six (6) witnesses, namely: Dr. Asuncion Tuvera, PO3 Avelino Sandi, PO3
Randy Bergado, Dennis Mojares, Reynaldo Garcia, Jr. and Reynaldo Garcia, Sr. The defense
presented, as lone witness, Abulencia himself.
The facts are not disputed:
Rebelyn Garcia, the victim, was a 10-year old lass from Poblacion, Asingan, Pangasinan and a
[2]
fourth grader at the Narciso Ramos Elementary School. She is the daughter of Reynaldo and Alicia
Garcia.[3]
On August 4, 1998, at about 7:00 oclock in the morning, Rebelyns brother, Reynaldo Garcia,
Jr., and a jeepney driver were at the Asingan jeepney terminal waiting for passengers. [4]
After two (2) hours, accused Rolly Abulencia arrived and invited Reynaldo to a drinking spree.
Reynaldo joined Abulencia and one Reynaldo Pascua in drinking Red Horse beer at the Asingan
[5]
jeepney terminal. At about 12 oclock noon, each one had consumed about four (4) bottles of beer. [6]
Thereafter, Reynaldo and Abulencia rode a tricycle and proceed to the formers residence at
Poblacion, Asingan where they again drank beer and later slept on a bamboo bed (papag). Rebelyn
was then inside the house. At that time, her parents were not around.[7]
Reynaldo and Abulencia woke up at about 5:30 oclock in the afternoon of that day. Abulencia
then asked permission to buy dilis from a nearby store. But Reynaldo, noticing that Abulencia was
drunk, advised the latter not to leave. [8] Abulencia ignored Reynaldo and went out. Rebelyn tagged
along.[9]
Abulencia and Rebelyn never returned, although the store where they were supposed to
buy dilis is merely 40 meters away from the house.[10] Thereupon, Reynaldo and his family started
Y looking for the two as far as Rosales, Pangasinan but failed to find them. [11]
About 8:00 oclock in the evening, Abulencia surrendered to Mayor Felipe Sevilleja of San
Manuel, Pangasinan. PO3 Randy Bergado, a PNP officer assigned in San Manuel who was then in the
mayors house, was informed by Abulencia that he had a small girl companion that he accidentally
bumped at the Aburido bridge and who might have been dead because the flow of the river is so fast.
[12]
PO3 Bergado immediately turned over Abulencia to the San Manuel police station. Forthwith,
PO3 Avelino Sandi entered the incident in the police blotter. Abulencia was later detained.[13]
At about 6:00 oclock the following morning (August 5, 1998), Rebelyns lifeless, naked body
was found floating at the Colobong creek near the Aburido bridge at Sitio Casilagan, San Juan, San
Manuel, Pangasinan.[14]
Dr. Asuncion Tuvera, Municipal Health Officer, conducted an autopsy on the victims
cadaver. The doctors autopsy report states:
A. External Findings:
Head - lacerated wound about 1 cm. in length at the corner of the left eye (superficial)
- Multiple hematoma, contussion forehead;
- Lacerated wound about 1 1/4 inches in length at the frontal area;
- 2 lacerated wound about one inch + 0.5 inch. respectively, at the rt. temporal area.
- lacerated wound about 0.5 cm. In length at the rt. lower lip
Chest - hematoma at the upper portion of the sternum
Extremities - Multiple burn on both upper arms.
Genitalia - Multiple vaginal wall and hymenal laceration
NOTE:
Vaginal smear taken for the presence of spermatozoa. Result is negative.
B. Internal Findings:
Lungs - presence of H2O in the lung tissues.
CAUSE OF DEATH:
Cardio-respiratory arrest 2 drowning; shock 2 rape. [15]
Dr. Tuvera further found that the multiple lacerations on the vaginal wall and hymen of
Rebelyns genitalia indicate that a hard object, probably an erect penis, was inserted therein; [16] and
that the presence of a large amount of water in Rebelyns lungs indicates that she was submerged and
droned.[17]
Dennis Mojares, a radio commentator of DZWN Bombo Radio, testified that on August 6,
1998, when he interviewed Abulencia at the Municipal Jail of San Manuel, Pangasinan, the latter
admitted having raped Rebelyn and that she fell off the bridge. [18] The interview was tape recorded,
which tape Mojares identified and presented in court. [19]
In his defense, accused Rolly Abulencia denied the charge. In gist,[20] the following is his
story: After he left the Garcia residence at around 5:00 oclock in the afternoon of August 4, 1998 to
buy dilis in the market, he noticed Rebelyn Garcia following him. But he just ignored her. However,
upon reaching the market, he decided not to buy dilis anymore. Instead, he went home to Binalonan,
Pangasinan. He then proceeded towards San Manuel while Rebelyn continued to follow him
3
closely. Annoyed, he told her he was going to San Manuel, but she insisted on following him because
she wanted to go to his house. They then took the provincial road, but upon reaching the Aburido
bridge, he distanced himself from the girl. However, she ran towards him. While she was running, he
tried to tell her to go home, but in doing so he accidentally tripped (napatid) her off, causing her to
fall from the bridge. He got nervous and proceeded to the house of his Auntie Deciang Delfin and
asked her to accompany him to the authorities so he could surrender. They approached Mayor
Sevilleja of San Miguel, Pangasinan.
After the trial on the merits, the court a quo rendered its decision dated March 16, 1999,
convicting accused Rolly Abulencia of the crime as charged. The dispositive portion of the decision
states:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds ROLLY ABULENCIA y COYOS, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of aggravated RAPE WITH HOMICIDE (punishable under Article 266-A, No. 1(d) and Article
266-B, paragraph 4 of republic Act No. 8353, in relation to Article 249, Revised Penal Code and
republic Act No. 7659) and the Court sentences Rolly Abulencia to suffer the penalty of DEATH, to be
implemented in the manner provided for by law. Ordering the accused to indemnify the heirs of
Rebelyn Garcia, the sum of P75,000.00 damages, and another sum of P20,000.00 for exemplary
damages plus P6,425.00 as actual damages.
xxx xxx xxx"[21]
Appellant Rolly Abulencia bewails his conviction, asserting that the court a quo:
I COURT: How about Rebelyn when you left the house?
x x x GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING (HIM) OF THE CRIME CHARGED BASED
PRINCIPALLY ON THE MEDICO-LEGAL FINDINGS (EXHIBIT A) AND DESPITE THE PAUCITY
OF DIRECT EVIDENCE POINTING TO (HIM) AS THE CULPRIT IN THE X X X INCIDENT.
II
x x x ERRED IN RELYING ON THE VULNERABILITY OF DEFENSE EVIDENCE RATHER THAN
THE STRENGTH OF PROSECUTION EVIDENCE IN FINDING A VERDICT OF GUILT AGAINST
(HIM).[22]
Appellant mainly contends that there is no direct evidence linking him to the commission of
the crime and that the findings of the medico-legal officer are not sufficient to warrant his conviction
by the trial court.
This Court does not agree.
Normally, the crime of rape - whether simple, qualified or complexed with other crimes - is
committed in seclusion, thereby rendering its prosecution difficult owing to the absence of witnesses
to its commission.
The prosecution of such crime becomes even more intricate and complex if homicide is
committed since the victim herself would no longer be able to testify against the perpetrator. In most
cases, only circumstantial evidence is available to prove its commission. [23]
The absence of direct evidence, however, does not preclude the conviction of a person accused
of the complex crime of rape with homicide. Circumstantial evidence can be as potent as direct
evidence to sustain a conviction provided that there is a concurrence of all the requisites prescribed
in Section 5, Rule 133 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, thus:
Sec. 5. Circumstantial Evidence, when sufficient.- Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction
if:
(a) There is more than one circumstance;
(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond a reasonable
doubt.[24]
4
Likewise this Court has held that an accused can be convicted based on circumstantial evidence
if the circumstances proven constitute an unbroken chain which leads to a fair and reasonable
conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person. [25]
Admittedly, in the case at bar, the trial court relied solely on circumstantial evidence in finding
that the appellant is guilty as charged - and it did so correctly.
It is established from the testimony of prosecution witness Reynaldo Garcia, Jr. that he met the
appellant in the morning of that fateful day of August 4, 1998 and later, both engaged in a drinking
spree; that they slept on the papag of Garcias house in the afternoon of that day; that the victim
Rebelyn, was also in the same house at that time; that after waking up, the appellant left the house at
about 5:30 oclock in the afternoon to buy dilis in the nearby store located 40 meters away, the victim
tagging along; that the appellant and Rebelyn never returned; that in the evening of the same day,
the appellant surrendered to Mayor Sevilleja, reporting that he was with the victim when the latter
allegedly fell from the bridge after he accidentally tripped (napatid) her off; that the appellant
admitted having raped the victim in a tape interview by Dennis Mojares, another prosecution
witness; that the victim was found dead the following morning floating at the Colobong creek near
the Aburido bridge; and that the autopsy conducted on her cadaver shows that she was sexually
abused and, thereafter, brutally killed.
The appellant himself admitted that he was alone with Rebelyn in the evening of August 4,
1998. His only defense is that Rebelyn died because she accidentally fell from the bridge. We find her
tale so fantastic to be accorded any iota of credibility. This is his incredible story:
A I saw Rebelyn when I was on my way to the market, sir, she was at my back.
Q On your way, Rebelyn was following you in the market?
A Yes, sir.
ATTY. FLORENDO: When did you notice Rebelyn to be following you?
A When she was at my back, sir.
Q And when you noticed that she was following you, what did you do?
A I did not mind, sir.
COURT: You just ignored her?
A Yes, sir.
ATTY. FLORRENDO: And you were able to reach the public market?
A Yes, sir.
Q Upon reaching the public market, what happened?
A I decided to go home, sir.
COURT: But you were able to buy dilis?
A No more, sir, but I decided to go home.
Q Whereat?
A Binalonan, Pangasinan, sir.
ATTY. FLORENDO: Where was Rebelyn when you decided to go home?
A She was at my back following me, sir.
COURT: You said you decided to go home to Binalonan, Pangasinan did you take a jeep?
A No, sir, I just walked. A Yes, sir.

Q From the public market of Asingan to Binalonan you just walked? Q While walking with Rebelyn what place were you able to reach?

A I walked but I was not able to reach Binalonan, sir. A Aburido, sir.

Q You decided to go home not to buy dilis anymore? COURT: What route did you take going to San Manuel, Pangasinan?

A Yes, sir. A The provincial road, sir.

Q And you thought of going home? ATTY. FLORENDO: While you were at the Aburido bridge what were you doing with Rebelyn?

A Yes, sir. A I was running away from her, sir.

Q Were you able to go home? Q You were running away from Rebelyn why?

A No, sir. A Because I want her to be left, sir.

Q From the public market where did you go? Q And what did Rebelyn do when you tried to run away from her?

A San Juan, San Manuel, Pangasinan, sir. A She ran following me, sir.

Q From the public market where did you go? Q By the way, what is that Aburido bridge?

A I proceeded to San Manuel, Pangasinan. A A cemented bridge, sir.

Q What did you take in going to San Manuel, Pangasinan? Q So, when she ran towards you, what happened, Mr. Witness?

A I just walked, sir. A I accidentally tripped (napatid) her, sir.

Q You mean to say that you walked this distance from the public market of Asingan to San Q When you said that you accidentally tripped Rebelyn what happened to her?
Manuel, Pangasinan?
A She fell to the bridge.
A Yes, sir.
Q When Rebelyn fell to the bridge what else happened?
Q From the public market proceeding to San Manuel, where was Rebelyn?
A I went home, sir.
A She was at my back, sir.
x x x[26]
ATTY. FLORENDO: While you were walking towards San Manuel, Pangasinan, did you ever talk
to Rebelyn? We cannot accept as a valid defense such kind of tale which is highly preposterous and
obviously contrary to the common experience of mankind. Time and again, we declared the legal
A Yes, sir. truism that evidence to be believed must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness, but
must be credible in itself. Human perception can be warped by the impact of events and testimony
Q You mean to tell us that Rebelyn was already walking with you side by side? colored by the unconscious workings of the mind. No better test has yet been found to measure the
value of a witness testimony than its conformity to the knowledge and common experience of
A Yes, sir. mankind.[27]
COURT: Did you tell Rebelyn that you are proceeding to San Manuel, Pangasinan? Appellants defense is a mere denial which is intrinsically weak. To merit credence, it must be
buttressed by strong evidence of non-culpability.[28] This, the appellant failed to do.
A Yes, sir.
Even granting that Rebelyn fell from the bridge, the autopsy report of Dr. Tuvera does not
Q Despite of that she is still following you? support such incident.
A Yes, sir. As found by Dr. Tuvera, Rebelyns body bore injuries not attributed to a fall. There were
multiple cigarette burns on both her upper arms. [29] Her genitalia showed multiple lacerations on the
ATTY. FLORENDO: By the way, while you were at the public market at Asingan, Pangasinan, did
vaginal wall and hymen extending to the upper part of the urethra. [30]
Rebelyn ever talk to you?
Anent the injuries found in Rebelyns genitalia, Dr. Tuvera observed:
A Yes, sir.
COURT: What does multiple vaginal wall laceration indicate?
Q What else did she tell you?
A It indicates that in he vaginal area, a foreign object was inserted, there is contact, sir.
A She told me that she will go to our house, sir.
Q What is your conclusion?
Q She told you that she pay a visit to your house?

5
 A Probably a male genitalia or any hard object, sir. SO ORDERED.

Q What does multiple laceration on the vaginal wall to the urethra indicate?

A It indicates that there is a contact in the genitalia, it may be caused by erect penis or genitalia
of a male or maybe caused by a hard object, sir.[31]

And this fact is more revealing. Rebelyns body was found naked. If she merely fell from the
bridge, as appellant wants us to believe, it is highly improbable that the current of the river would
totally undress her.

The appellant also contends that the absence of spermatozoa in Rebelyns genitalia and the
failure of Dr. Tuvera to show that the lacerations were fresh do not prove that the victim was raped.

This argument does not persuade us. The absence of spermatozoa does not negate a finding of
rape considering that its presence is not an essential element of the crime.

The totality of all the circumstances obtaining, taken together with the condition of Rebelyns
body when found, eloquently indicate that the appellant sexually assaulted her before drowning her
to death.

It bears stressing that appellant admitted having raped Rebelyn when he was interviewed by
Dennis Mojares, a radio commentator of Bombo Radio. Mojares testimony lends support to our
conclusion.We have held that a confession to a radio reporter is admissible where it was not shown
that said reporter was acting for the police or that the interview was conducted under circumstances
where it is apparent that the suspect confessed to the killing out of fear. [32]

After considering all the evidence presented, this Court is constrained to affirm the appealed
decision of the trial court imposing the death penalty upon the appellant. We, however, modify the
same insofar as the civil aspect of the case is concerned. Although this matter has not been raised by
the parties, especially the Solicitor General, it is a settled rule that in a criminal case, an appeal to the
Supreme Court throws the whole case open for review, and it becomes the duty of the Court to
correct such errors as may be found in the appealed judgment, whether they are made the subject of
assignments of error or not.[33]

With regard to the civil indemnity, the trial court awarded only P75,000.00 Current
jurisprudence has fixed at P100,000.00 the civil indemnity in cases of rape with homicide, which is
fully justified and properly commensurate with the seriousness of that special complex crime. [34]

The trial court did not award moral damages to the victims family. Based on prevailing
jurisprudence, however, moral damages may be awarded to the heirs of the victim without need for
pleading or proof of its basis for their mental, physical and psychological sufferings are too obvious
to still require their recital at the trial. Hence, moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00 must be
awarded.[35]

In People vs. Lagarto,[36] we held that attendant circumstances may be considered to determine
civil liability. Thus, in view of the evident cruelty inflicted upon Rebelyn, as shown by the multiple
burns and contusions on her body, we grant the award of exemplary damages in the amount of
P25,000.00[37]

Four members of the Court maintain their position that Republic Act No. 7659, insofar as it
prescribes the death penalty, is unconstitutional. Nevertheless, they submit to the ruling of the
majority members that the law is constitutional and that the death penalty should be imposed.

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision convicting ROLLY ABULENCIA y COYOS of the crime
of rape with homicide and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of DEATH, is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION insofar as the civil aspect is concerned. Appellant is thus ordered to PAY the heirs
of Rebelyn Garcia P100,000.00 as civil indemnity; P50,000.00 as moral damages; P25,000.00 as
exemplary damages; and P6,425.00 as actual damages.

In accordance with Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 25 of Republic
Act No. 7659, upon finality of this decision, let the certified true copy of the record of this case be
forthwith forwarded to the Office of the President for possible exercise of the pardoning power.

6

G.R. No. 112983 March 22, 1995
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
HECTOR MAQUEDA @ PUTOL, and RENE SAGVAMAIJTE (at large), Accused, HECTOR
MAQUEDA @ PUTOL, Accused-Appellant.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
As against a bustling city life, Britisher Horace William Barker, a consultant of the World Bank, and
his Filipino wife, Teresita Mendoza, chose the peace and quiet of a country home not any near the
metropolis of Manila or its environs, but in the rugged and mountainous terrain of Tuba, Benguet.
Perhaps they thought they were in a veritable paradise, beyond the reach of worldly distractions and
trouble when in the early morning of 27 August 91, in the, sanctity of their own home, Horace was
brutally slain and Teresita badly battered with lead pipes on the occasion of a robbery. Sufficient
prima facie evidence pointed to Rene Salvamante, the victims·former houseboy, as one of the
perpetrators of the That illusion was shattered ghastly crime.
As to Rene's co-conspirator, the, prosecution initially included one Richard Malig y Severino in the
information for robbery with homicide and serious physical injuries 1 filed on 19 November 1991 with
Branch 10 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Benguet at La Trinidad, Benguet.
Only Richard Malig was arrested On 22 January 1992, prior to the arraignment of Richard Malig, the
prosecution filed a motion to amend the information 2 to implead as co-accused Hector Maqueda
alias Putol because the evaluation Of the evidence subsequently submitted established his complicity
in the crime, and at the hearing of the motion the following day, the Prosecutor further asked that
accused Richard Malig be dropped from the information because further evaluation of the evidence
disclosed no sufficient evidence against him.3
The motion to drop Malig was granted and warrants for the arrest of accused Salvamante and
Maqueda were issued. Maqueda was subsequently arrested on 4 March 1992, and on 9 April 1992, he
filed an application for bail.4He categorically stated therein that "he is willing and volunteering to be
a State witness in the above-entitled case, it appearing that he is the least guilty among the accused in
this case."
On 22 April 1992, the prosecution filed an Amended Informations 5 with only Salvamante and
Maqueda as the accused. Its accusatory portion reads as follows:
That on or about the 27th Of August, 1991, at Tagadi; Upper Tadiangan
Municipality of Tuba, Province Of Benguet, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the, above-named accused, Conspiring,
confederating and mutually aiding one another, armed with lead pipes, and with
intent of gain and against the will and consent of the owners thereof, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously enter the house of Spouses
TERESITA and WILLIAM HORACE BARKER and with violence against and
intimidation of the persons therein ransack the place and take and carry away
the following articles, to ,it:
[An enumeration and description of the articles follow]
all having a total value of TWO HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND TWO
HUNDRED FIFTY PESOS (P204.250.00), Philippine Currency, belonging to,
the said Teresita and William Horace Barker; that on the occasion and by reason
of the said robbery; both accused willfully, unlawfully and feloniously repeatedly
strike Teresita Barker and William Horace Barker with lead pipes on the
different Parts of their body, leading to the death of William Horace Barker and
inflicting various physical injuries on the former which required medical
attendance for a period of more than thirty (30) days and have likewise
incapacitated her from the performance of her, customary labor for the same
period of time.
7
Contrary to Law.
Since Rene Salvamante continues to elude arrest and has remained at large, trial proceeded entered a
plea of not guilty on 22 April 1992.6
In its decision7 Promulgated on 31 August 1993, the trial Maqueda guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of robbery with homicide and serious physical Injuries and sentenced him to Suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the victim, Teresita M, Barker in the amount of
P50,000.00 for the death of William Horace Barker, court found accused Hector P41,681,00
representing actual expenses, P100,000.00 as moral damages and to pay the costs."
The prosecution presented as its witnesses Mrs. Teresita Mendoza Barker, househelps Norie Dacara
and Julieta Villanueva, Mike Tayaban, Dr. Francisco Hernandez, Jr., Francisco Cabotaje, prosecutor
Daniel Zarate, Ray Dean Salvosa, Glen Enriquez, SPO1 Rodolfo Tabadero, and Policarpio Cambod in
its evidence in chief and Fredesminda Castrence and SP03 Armando Molleno on rebuttal. Accused
Hector Maqueda took the witness stand and presented SPO1 Aurelio Sagun, Jr. in his evidence in
chief and Myrna Maqueda Katindig as his sour-rebuttal witness.
The version of the prosecution, as culled from the trial court's detailed and meticulous summary
thereof, is as follows:
Between 10:30 and 11:00 pm. of 26 August 1991, the spouses Horace William Barker and Teresita
Mendoza Barker repaired to their bedroom after Teresita had checked, as washer wont, the main
doors of their house to see if they had been locked and bolted.
At around 6:00 a.m. of the following day, 27 August 1991, Norie Dacara, a househelp of the Barkers
who shared a room with her cousin and fellow househelp, Julieta Villanueva, got up, opened the door
to the garage, went to the lavatory to wash her face, and proceeded to the toilet. When she opened
the door of the toilet and switched. on the light, she saw Rene Salvamante. She knew Salvamante
very well because he and his sister Melanie were the former househelps of the Barkers whom she and
Julieta Villanueva had replaced and because Salvamante had acquainted her on her chores.
Salvamante suddenly strangled her. While she Was fighting back, Norie happened to turn her face
and she saw a fair-complexioned, tall man with a high-bridged nose at Salvamante's side, whom she
identified at the trial as Maqueda. After she broke free from Salvamante, Norie fled towards the
garage and shouted for help. Salvamante chased her and pulled her back inside the house.
Julieta Villanueva, who was awakened by the shouts of Norie, got out of her bed and upon opening
the door of her room, saw a man clad in maong jacket and short pants with 'his right hand
brandishing a lead pipe standing two meters in front of her. At the trial, She pointed to, accused
Maqueda as the man she saw then. (She got scared and immediately closed the door. Since the door
knob turned as if someone was forcing his way into the room, she held on to it and shouted for help.
The shouts awakened Teresita Mendoza Barker. She rose from her bed and went out of the room,
leaving behind her husband who was still asleep; She went down the Stairs and proceeded t, the
dining room. She saw Salvamante and a companion who was a complete stranger to her. Suddenly
the two rushed towards her and beat her up with lead pipes. Despite her pleas to get what they want
and not to hurt her, they continued to beat her up until she lost consciousness. At the trial, she
pointed to accused Maqueda as Salvamante's companion.
Salvamante also hit Norie with the lead pipe on her back and at the·back of her right hand. She fell to
the concrete floor, and after she had recovered, she ran to-the garage and hid under the car. After a
few seconds, ,he went near the door of the garage and because she could not open it, she called
Julieta. Julieta opened the door and they rushed to their room and closed the door. When they saw
that the door knob was being turned, they braced themselves against the door to prevent anyone
from entering. While locked in their room, they heard the moans of Mrs. Barker and the shouts of
Mr. Barker: "That's enough, that's enough, that's enough." When the noise stopped, Norie and
Julieta heard the sound of water flowing from the toilet and the barking of dogs.
At 7:00 a.m. of that same day, 27 August 1991, Mike Tabayan and Mark Pacio were resting in a
waiting shed beside the Asin road at Aguyad, Tuba·, Benguet, which is only a kilometer away from
the house of the Barkers. They saw two men approaching them from a curve. When the two men
reached the shed, he and Mark noticed that the taller of the two had an amputated left hand and a
right hand with a missing thumb and index finger. This man was carrying a black bag on his right
shoulder
Speaking in Tagalog, the taller man asked Mike and Mark whether the road they were following
would lead to Naguilian, La Union. Mike replied that it did not. Five minutes later, a passenger
jeepney bound for Baguio City and owned and driven by Ben Lusnong arrived at the waiting shed.
The two men bearded it, Mike again noticed that the taller man had the defects above mentioned
because the latter used his right hand with only three fingers to hold on to the bar of the jeepney as
he bearded it. In the Investigation conducted by the Tuba Police, he identified through a picture the
shorter man as Salvamante, and at the hearing, he pointed to Maqueda as the taller man.
At 9:00 a.m. of 27 August 1991, Norie and Julieta gathered bough courage to leave the room where
they had earlier barricaded themselves and proceed to the kitchen to get the key to the gate of the
garage. In the dining room, they saw the Barkers bathed in their own blood. Norie and Julieta rushed
out of the house and ran to the place of Janet Albon to seek help. After requesting Janet to call the
police, they returned to the Barker's house but did not enter it for fear of what they had seen earlier.
They just stayed near the road.
Soon after, security guards of the Baguio College Foundation (BCF) arrived. A team from the Baguio
City Police Station, headed by Police Officer Policarpio Cambod, and which included Dr. Perfecto
Micu of the City Health Department, also arrived. The team conducted an initial investigation only
because it found out that the scene of the crime was within the jurisdiction of the Tuba Police
Station, which, however, was difficult to get in touch with at that time. Dr. Perfecto Micu found the
body of Mr. Barker inside the Barker house and Cambod prepared a sketch (Exhibit "JJ") showing its
location.' They went around the house and found a lead pipe (Exhibit "AA") at the toilet, a black T-
shirt (Exhibit "CC"), and a green hand towel (Exhibit "DD"). He also discovered another lead pipe
(Exhibit "BB") at the back of the door of the house. He then interviewed the two househelps who
provided him with descriptions of the assailants. The team then left, leaving behind BCF Security
Officer Glen Enriquez and a security guard. Cambod prepared a report of his initial investigation
(Exhibit "KK").
Enriquez conducted his own investigation. At the master's bedroom, he saw several pieces of jewelry
scattered on the floor and an empty inner cabinet. He noticed footprints at the back of the house,
particularly at the riprap wall, and observed that the grass below it was parted as if someone had
passed through and created a trail amidst the grass down toward the Asin road of Tuba, Benguet.
Upon his request, a security guard of the BCF, Edgar Dalit, was sent to the Barker house to secure the
premises. Enriquez then left after Dalit's arrival.
At 5:00 p.m. of that same day, members of the Tuba Police Station arrived at the·Barker house to
conduct their investigation. Enriquez, who in the meantime was called by Dalit, returned to the
Barker house.
The lead pipes, black T-shirt, and the green hand towel recovered from the Barker house by the
Baguio City Police were first brought to the PNP Crime Laboratory Service at Camp Dangwa, La
Trinidad, Benguet, and then to the court.
The body of William Horace Barker was taken to the Baguio Funeral Homes at Naguilian Road,
Baguio City, where it was examined by Dr. Francisco P. Cabotaje, Municipal·Health Officer of Tuba,
Benguet. H, found in it twenty-seven injuries, which could have been caused by a blunt instrument,
determined the cause of death as hemorrhagic shock, and then issued a death certificate (Exhibits
"P," "O," and "R").
The wounded Teresita Barker was brought to the Baguio General Hospital and Medical Center where
she was treated and confined for eight days. The attending physician, Dr. Francisco L. Hernandez,
Jr., first saw her at around 11:00 a.m. of 27 August 1991. She was in a comatose state. Dr. Hernandez
found that she sustained multiple lacerations primarily an the left side of the occipital area, bleeding
in the left ear, and bruises on the arm. One of the muscles adjoining her eyes was paralyzed. She
regained consciousness only after two days. Dr. Hernandez opined that Mrs. Barker's injuries were
caused by a blunt instrument, like a lead pipe, and concluded that if her injuries had been left
unattended, she would have died by noontime of 27 August 1991 due to bleeding or hemorrhagic
shock.
On 1 September 1991, a police team from the Tuba Police Station, Benguet, came to the hospital bed
of Mrs. Barker, showed her pictures of several persons, and asked her to identify the persons who
8
had assaulted her. She pointed to a person who turned out to be Richard Malig. When informed of
the investigation, Dr. Hernandez told the members of the team that it was improper for them to
conduct it without first consulting him since Mrs. Barker had not yet fully recovered consciousness.
Moreover, her eyesight had not yet improved, her visual acuity was impaired, and she had double
vision.
On 3 September 1991, the remains of Mr. Barker were cremated. Mrs. Barker was then discharged
from the hospital and upon getting home, tried to determine the items lost during the robbery. She
requested Glen Enriquez to get back the pieces of jewelry taken by the Tuba PNP (Exhibit "U"). The
Tuba PNP gave them to Enriquez (Exhibit "V"). Mrs. Barker discovered that her Canon camera, radio
cassette recorder (Exhibit "W-3"), and some pieces of jewelry (Exhibit "W-2") were missing. The
aggregate value of the missing items was P204,250.00. She then executed an affidavit on these
missing items (Exhibit "X.).
Mrs. Barker underwent a CT Scan at the St. Luke's Hospital in Quezon City. It was revealed that she
sustained a damaged artery on her left eye which could cause blindness. she then sought treatment at
the St. Luke's Roosevelt Hospital in New York (Exhibit "L") where she underwent an unsuccessful
operation. She likewise received treatment at the New York Medical Center (Exhibit "M").
On 29 November 1991, Ray Dean Salvosa, Executive Vice President of the BCF, ordered Glen
Enriquez to go to Guinyangan, Quezon, to coordinate with the police in determining the,
whereabouts of accused Rene Salvamante. In Guinyangan, Enriquez was able to obtain information
from the barangay captain, Basilio Requeron, that he saw Salvamante together with a certain "Putol"
in September 1991; however, they already left the place.
On 21 December 1991, Enriquez, Melanie Mendoza, and three others went back to Guinyangan to
find out whether Salvamante and "Putol" had returned. Upon being informed by Barangay Captain
Requeron that the two had not, Enriquez requested Requeron to notify him immediately once
Salvamante or "Putol" returned to Guinyangan,
On 4 March 1992, Requeron's daughter called up Enriquez to inform him that Putol," who is none
other than accused Hector Maqueda, had been arrested in Guinyangan. Enriquez and Maj. Rodolfo
Anagaran, Chief of the Tuba Police Station, together with another policeman, Proceeded to
Guinyangan. The Guinyangan Police Station turned over Maqueda to Maj. Anagaran who then
brought Maqueda to the Benguet Provincial Jail.
Before Maj. Anagaran's arrival at Guinyangan, Maqueda had been taken to the. headquarters of the
235th PNP Mobile Force Company at Sta. Maria, Calauag, Quezon. Its commanding officer, Maj.
Virgilio F. Rendon, directed SP03 Armando Molleno to get Maqueda's statement. He did so and
according to him, he informed Maqueda of his rights under the Constitution. Maqueda thereafter
signed a Sinumpaang Salaysay (Exhibit "LL") wherein he narrated his participation in the crime at
the Barker house on 27 August 1991.
On 9 April 1992, while he was under detention, Maqueda filed a Motion to Grant Bail (Exhibit "GG-
6"). He stated therein that "he is willing and volunteering·to be a State witness in the above entitled
case, it appearing that he is the least guilty among the accused in this case." Prosecutor Zarate then
had a talk with Maqueda regarding such statement and asked him if he was in the company of
Salvamante on 27 August 1991 in entering the house of the Barkers. After he received an affirmative
answer, Prosecutor Zarate told Maqueda that he would oppose the motion for bail since he,
Maqueda, was the only accused on trial (Exhibit "II").
In the meantime, Ray Dean Salvosa arrived at the Office of Prosecutor Zarate and obtained
permission from the latter to talk to Maqueda. Salvosa then led Maqueda toward the balcony.
Maqueda narrated to Salvosa that Salvamante brought him to Baguio City in order to find a job as a
peanut vendor; Salvamante then brought him to the Barker house and it was only when they were at
the vicinity thereof that Salvamante revealed to him that his zeal purpose in going to Baguio City was
to rob the Barkers; he initially objected to the plan, but later on agreed to it; when they were in the
kitchen of the Barker house, one of the househelps was already there; Salvamante hit her with a lead
pipe and she screamed; then Mrs. Barker came down, forcing him, Maqueda, to attack her with the
lead pipe provided·him by Salvamante, After he felled Mrs. Barker, he helped Salvamante in beating
up Mr. Barker who had followed his wife downstairs. the Barkers were already unconscious on the'
floor, Salvamante went upstairs and a few minutes later came down bringing with him a radio
cassette and some pieces of jewelry.
Maqueda further divulged to Salvosa that they then changed clothes, went out of the house, walked
toward the road where they Saw two persons from whom they asked directions, and when a
passenger jeepney stopped and they were informed by the two Persons that it was bound for Baguio
City, he and Salvamante bearded it. They alighted somewhere along Albano Street in Baguio City and
walked until they reached the Philippine Rabbit Bus station where they boarded a bus for Manila. 8
Accused Hector Maqueda put up the defense of denial and alibi. Hi, testimony is summarized by the
trial court in this wise:
Accused Hector Maqueda denied having anything to do with the crime. He
stated that O" August 27, 1991 he was at the polvoron factory owned by Minda
Castrense located at Lot 1, Block 21 Posadas Bayview Subdivision, Sukat,
Muntinlupa, Metro Manila. He was employed as a caretaker Since July 5, 1991
and he worked continuously there up to August 27, 1991, It was his sister, Myrna
Katindig, who found him the job as caretaker. A, caretaker, it was his duty to
supervise the employees in the factory and whenever his employer was not
around, he was in charge of the sales. He and his 8 co-employees all Sleep inside
the factory.
On August 26, 1991, he reported for work although he could not recall what he
did that day. He slept inside the factory that night and on August 27, 1991, he
was teaching the new employees how to make the seasoning for the polvoron.
On December 20, 1991, he went home to Gapas, Guinyangan, Quezon Province
as it was his vacation time from his job at the polvoron factory. He was to be
back at work after New Year's Day in 1992. Upon alighting from the bus at
Guinyangan, Quezon, he saw accused Rene Salvamante. He knows accused
Salvamante as they were childhood playmates, having gone to the same
elementary school. He had no chance to talk to him that day when he saw him
and so they just waved to each other. He again saw accused Salvamante after
Christmas day on the road beside their (Salvamante) house. Salvamante invited
him to go to Calauag, Quezon Province and roam around. He agreed to go as he
also wanted to visit his brother, Jose Maqueda who resided at Sabangdos,
Calauag, Quezon. When the two accused were at Calauag, Salvamante asked
Maqueda to accompany him /Salvamante) in selling a cassette recorder which
he said came from Baguio City. Accused Maqueda knew that Salvamante worked
in Baguio as the latter's mother told him about it. They were able to sell the
cassette recorder to Salvamante's aunt. They had their meal and then went to
visit accused Maqueda's brother. After that occasion, he never saw accused
Salvamante again. After his Christmas vacation, he went back to work a the
polvoron factory until February 29, 1992. One of his co-workers Roselyn Merca,
who was a townmate of his asked him to accompany her home as she was hard
up in her work at the factory. Hence, he accompanied Rosely home to
Guinyangan, Quezon. He was supposed to report back for work on March 2,
1992 but he was not able to as he was arrested by members of the CAGFU at the
house of Roselyn Merca when he brought her home. He was then brought to the
Guinyangan municipal jail, then to the Tuba Police Station, Tuba, Benguet.
There he was told to cooperate with the police in arresting Salvamante so he
would not stay long in the Province of Benguet. He was also told that if he would
point to accused Salvamante, he would be freed and he could also become a state
witness: He told them that he could attest to the fact that he accompanied
accused Salvamante in selling the cassette recorder.
On March 5, 1992, he was brought to the Benguet Provincial Jail at La Trinidad,
Benguet where he has remained under detention up to the present. 9
The prosecution rebutted the testimony of Hector Maqueda by presenting Fredesminda Castience
and SP03 Armando Molleno. Castrence, the owner of the polvoron factory where Maqueda worked,
·testified that she started her business only on 30 August 1991 and thus it was impossible for her to
have hired Maqueda on 5 July 1991. SP03 Molleno declared that he informed Maqueda of his
constitutional rights before Maqueda was investigated and that Maqueda voluntarily and freely gave
his Sinumpaang Salaysay (Exhibit "LL"). 10
9
Although the trial court had doubts on the identification of Maqueda by prosecution witnesses
Teresita Mendoza Barker, Norie Dacara, and Julieta Villanueva and thus disregarded their
testimonies on this matter, it decreed a conviction "based on the confession and the proof of corpus
delicti" as well as on circumstantial evidence. It stated thus:
Since we have discarded the positive identification theory of the prosecution
pinpointing accused Maqueda as the culprit, can we still secure a conviction
based on the confession and the proof of corpus delicti as well as on
circumstantial evidence?
In order to establish the guilt of the accused through circumstantia1 evidence,
the following requisites must be present: 1) there must be more than One
circumstance; 2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proved; and
3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction
beyond reasonable doubt (People vs. Pajarit, G.R. No. 82770, October 19, 1992,
214 SCRA 678). There must be an unbroken chain of circamstances which leads
to one fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the defendant to the exclusion
of all Others, as the author of the crime (People vs. Abuyen, G.R. No. 77285,
September 4, 1992, 213 SCRA 569).
The circumstances shown by the prosecution which tend to show the guilt of the
accused are:
1. A physical demonstration to which the accused and his counsel did not offer
any objection shows that despite his being handicapped, accused Maqueda could
well and easily grip a lead pipe and strike a cement post with such force that it
produced a resounding vibration. It is not farfetched then to conclude that
accused Maqueda could have easily beat Mr. Barker to death.
2. His presence within the vicinity of the crime scene right after the incident in
the company of accused Salvamante was testified to by Mike Tabayan, the only
prosecution witness who noticed the defective hands of the accused. As they had
to ask for directions from the witness in the Tagalog dialect shows that they were
strangers to the place
3. Accused Maqueda knows or is familiar with accused Rene Salvamante as they
from the same town. By his own testimony, accused Maqueda has established
that he Salvamante are close friends to the point that they went out together
during the Christmas vacation in 1991 and he even accompanied Salvamante in
selling the black radio cassette recorder.
4. His Motion to Grant Bail (Exhibit "HH") contains this statement that he is
willing and volunteering to be State witness in the above-entitled case, it the
accused in appearing that he is the least guilty along This in effect, supports his
extrajudicial confession trade to the police at Although he claims that he did not
his signature would lean his as he was just told that release from detention, this
is a flimsy excuse which cannot Had he not understood what the motion meant,
he could have easily asked his sister and brother-in-law what it meant seeing
that their signatures up already affixed on the motion.
5. This time, his admission to Prosecutor Zarate that he was at the Barker house
that fateful morning and his even more damaging admission to Ray Dean
Salvosa as to what he actually did can be considered as another circumstance to
already bloster the increasing circumstances against the accused.
6. The accused's defense is alibi. As stated in a long Line of cases, alibi is at best
a weak defense and easy of fabrication (People vs. Martinado, G.R. No. 92020,
October 19, 1992, 214 SCRA 712). For alibi to be given credence, it must not only
appear that the accused interposing the same was at some other place but also
that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime at the
time of its commission (People vs. Pugal, G.R. No. 90637, October 29, 1992, 215
SCRA 247). This defense easily crumbles down as Tayaban placed accused
Maqueda at vicinity of the crime scene.
 The combination of all these circumstances plus extrajudicial confession
produce the needed proof beyond reasonable doubt that indeed accused
Maqueda is guilty of the crime. 11
The extrajudicial confession referred to is the Sinumpaang Salaysay (Exhibit: "LL") of Maqueda
taken by SP02 Molleno immediately after Maqueda was arrested.
Maqueda seasonably appealed to us his conviction. In his 14-page brief, he pleads that we acquit him
because the trial court committed this lone error:
. . . IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME CHARGED. 12
Only three pages of the brief, typed double space, are devoted to his arguments which are anchored
on his alibi that at the time the crime Was committed he was not in Benguet but in Sukat,
Muntinlupa, Metro Manila, ad the failure of the star witnesses for the Prosecution to identify him. He
alleges that Mrs. Barker, when investigated at the hospital, Pointed to Richard Malig as the
companion of Rene Salvamante, and that when initially investigated, the two housemaids gave a
description of Salvamante's companion that fitted Richard Malig.
We find no merit in this appeal. As hereinafter shown, the defense of alibi is unconvincing.
The accused's arguments which stress the incredibility of the testimonies of Mrs. Barker and the
househelps identifying Maqueda are misdirected and misplaced because the trial court had ruled that
Mrs. Teresita Mendoza Barker and the two housemaids, Norie Dacara and Julieta Villanueva, were
not able to positively identify Magueda, The trial court based his conviction on his extrajudicial
confession and the proof of corpus delicti, as well as on circumstantial evidence. He should have
focused his attention and arguments on these.
From its ratiocinations, the trial court made a distinction between an extrajudicial confession —
the Sinumpaang Salaysay — and an extrajudicial admission — the, verbal admissions to Prosecutor
Zarate and Ray Dean Salvosa. A perusal of the Sinumpaang Salaysay fails to convince us that it is an
extrajudicial confession. It is only an extrajudicial admission. There is a distinction between. the
former and the latter as clearly shown in Sections 26 and 33, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court which
read as follows:
Sec. 26. Admission of a party. — The act, declaration or omission of party as to a
relevant fact may be given in evidence against him.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 33. Confession. — The declaration of an accused acknowledging his guilt of
the offense charged, or of any offense necessarily included therein, may be given
in evidence against him.
In a confession, there is an acknowledgment of guilt. The term admission is usually applied in
criminal cases to statements of fact by the accused which do not directly involve an acknowledgment
of his guilt or of the criminal intent to commit the offense with which he is charged. 13 Wharton
distinguishes a confession from an admission as follows:
A confession is an acknowledgment in express terms, by a party in a criminal
case, of his guilt of the crime charged, while an admission is a statement by the
accused, direct or implied, of facts pertinent to the issue and tending, in
connection with proof of other facts, to prove his guilt. In other words, an
admission is something less than a confession, and is but an acknowledgment of
some fact or circumstance which in itself is insufficient to authorize a conviction
and which tends only to establish the ultimate fact of guilt. 14
And under Section 3 of Rule 133, an extrajudicial confession made by the accused is not sufficient for
conviction unless corroborated by evidence of corpus delicti.
The trial court admitted the Sinumpaang Salaysay of accused Maqueda although it was taken
without the assistance of counsel because it was of the opinion that since an information had already
benefited in court against him and he was arrested pursuant to a warrant of arrest issued by the
10
court, the Sinumpaang Salaysay was not, therefore, taken during custodial investigation. Hence,
Section 12(1), Article III of the Constitution providing as follows:
Sec. 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense
shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have
competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person
cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights
cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
is not applicable, 15 i.e., the police investigation was " no longer within the ambit of a custodial
investigation." It heavily relied on People vs. Ayson 16 where this Court elucidated on the rights of a
person under custodial investigation and the rights of an accused after a case is filed in court. The
trial court went on to state:
At the time of the confession, the accused was already facing charges in court.
He no longer had the right to remain silent and to counsel but he had the right to
refuse to be a witness and not to have any prejudice whatsoever result to him by
such refusal. And yet, despite his knowing fully well that a case had already been
filed in court, he still confessed when he did not have to do so. 17
The trial court then held that the admissibility of the Sinumpaang Salaysay should not be tested
under the aforequoted Section 12(1), Article III of the Constitution, but on the voluntariness of its
execution. Since voluntariness is presumed, Maqueda had the burden of proving otherwise, which he
failed to do and, hence, the Sinumpaang Salaysay was admissible against him.
As to the admissions made by Maqueda to Prosecutor Zarate and Ray Dean Salvosa, the trial court
admitted their testimony thereon only to prove the tenor of their conversation but not to prove the
truth of the admission because such testimony was objected to as hearsay. It said:
In any case, it is settled that when testimony is presented to establish not the
truth but the tenor of the statement or the fact that such statement was made, it
is not hearsay (People vs. Fule, G.R. No. 83027, February 28, 1992, 206 SCRA
652). 18
While we commend the efforts of the trial court to distinguish between the rights of a person under
Section 12(1), Article III of the Constitution and his rights after a criminal complaint or information
had been filed against him, we cannot agree with its sweeping view that after such filing an accused
"no longer Has] the right to remain silent End to counsel but he [has] the right to refuge to be a
witness and not to have any prejudice whatsoever result to him by such refusal." If this were so, then
there would be a hiatus in the criminal justice process where an accused is deprived of his
constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel and to be informed of such rights. Such a view
would not only give a very restrictive application to Section 12(1); it would also diminish the said
accused's rights under Section 14(2) Article III of the Constitution,
The exercise of the rights to remain silent and to counsel and to be informed thereof under Section
12(1), Article III of the Constitution are not confined to that period prior to the filing of a criminal
complaint or information but are available at that stage when a person is "under investigation for the
commission of an offense." The direct and primary source of this Section 12(1) is the second
paragraph of Section 20, Article II of the 1973 Constitution which reads:
Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the
right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right . . .
The first sentence to which it immediately follows refers to the right against self-incrimination
reading:
No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.
which is now Section 17, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. The incorporation of the second
paragraph of Section 20 in the Bill of Rights of the 1973 constitution was an acceptance of the
landmark doctrine laid down by the united States Supreme Court in Miranda vs. Arizona. 19 In that
case, the Court explicitly stated that the holding therein "is not an innovation in our jurisprudence,
but is an application of principles long recognized and applied in other settings." It went on to state
its ruling:
 Our holding will be spelled out with some specificity in the pages which follow
but briefly stated, it is this: the prosecution may not use statements, whether
exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the
defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to
secure the privilege against self-incrimination. By custodial interrogation, we
mean questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been
taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any
significant way. As for the procedural safeguards to be employed, unless other
fully effective means are devised to inform accused persons of their right of
silence and to assure a continuous opportunity to exercise it, the following
measures are required. Prior to any questioning the person must be warned that
he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as
evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney,
either retained or appointed. The defendant may waive effectuation of these
rights, provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. If,
however, he indicates in any manner and at any stage of the process that he
wishes to consult with an attorney before speaking there can be no questioning.
Likewise, if the individual is alone and indicates in any manner that he does not
wish to be interrogated, the police may not question him. The mere fact that he
may have answered some question or volunteered some statements on his own
does not deprive him of the right to refrain from answering any further inquiries
until he has consulted with an attorney and thereafter consents to a
questioned. 20
It may be pointed out though that as formulated in the second paragraph of the aforementioned
Section 20, the word custudial, which was used in Miranda with reference to the investigation, was
excluded. In view thereof, in Galman vs. Pamaran, 21 this Court aptly observed:
The fact that the framers of our Constitution did not choose to use the term
"custodial" by having it inserted between the words "under" and "investigation,"
as in fact the sentence opens with the phrase "any person" goes to prove that
they did not adopt in toto the entire fabric of the Miranda doctrine.
Clearly then, the second paragraph of Section 20 has even broadened the application of Miranda by
making it applicable to the investigation for the commission of an offense of a person and in
custody. 22 Accordingly, as so formulated, the second paragraph of Section 20 changed the rule
adopted in People vs. Jose 23 that the rights of the accused only begin upon arraignment, Applying
the second paragraph of Section 20, this Court laid down this rule in Morales vs, Enrile: 24
7. At the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting officer to
inform him of the reason for the arrest and he must be shown the warrant of
arrest, if any. He shall be informed of his constitutional rights to remain silent
and to counsel, and that any statement he might make could be used against
him. The person arrested shall have the right to communicate with his lawyer, a
relative, or anyone he chooses by the most expedient means — by telephone if
possible — or by letter or messenger. It shall be the responsibility of the
arresting officer to see to it that this is accomplished. No custodial investigation
shall be conducted unless it be in the presence of counsel engaged by the person
arrested, by any person on his behalf, or appointed by the court upon petition
either of the detainee himself or by anyone on his behalf. The right to counsel
may be waived but the waiver shall not be valid unless made with the assistance
of counsel. Any statement obtained in violation of the procedure herein laid
down, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, in whole or in part, shall be
inadmissible in evidence.
Note that the first sentence requires the arresting officer to inform the person to be arrested of the
reason for the arrest and show him "the warrant of arrest, if any." The underscored phrase simply
means that a case had been filed against him in a court of either preliminary or original jurisdiction
and that the court had issued the corresponding warrant of arrest. From the foregoing, it is clear that
the right to remain silent and to counsel and to be informed thereof under the second paragraph of
Section 20 are available to a person at any time before arraignment whenever he is investigated for
the commission of an offense. This paragraph was incorporated into Section 12(1), Article III of the
present Constitution with the following additional safeguards: (a) the counsel must be competent
11
and independent, preferably of his own choice, (b) if the party cannot afford the services of such
counsel, he must be provided with one, and (c) the rights therein cannot be waived except in writing
and in the presence of counsel.
Then, too, the right to be heard would be a farce if it did not include the right to counsel. 25 Thus,
Section 12(2), Article III of the present Constitution provides that in all criminal prosecutions the
accused shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel." In People vs. Holgado, 26 this Court
emphatically declared:
One of the great principles of justice guaranteed by our Constitution is that "no
person shall be-held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of
law", and that all accused "shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and
counsel." In criminal cases there can be no fair hearing unless the accused be
given an opportunity to be heard by counsel. The right to be heard would be of
little avail if it does not include the right to be heard by counsel. Even the most
intelligent or educated man may have no skill in the science of the law,
particularly in the rules of procedure, and, without counsel, he may be convicted
not because he is guilty but because he does not know how to establish his
innocence. And this can happen more easily to persons who are ignorant or
uneducated. It is for this reason that the right to be assisted by counsel is
deemed so important that it has become a constitutional right and it is so
implemented that under our rules of procedure it is not enough for the Court to
apprise an accused of his right to have an attorney, it is not enough to ask him
whether he desires the aid of an attorney, but it is essential that the court should
assign one de officio for him if he so desires and he is poor or grant him a
reasonable time to procure an attorney of his own.
It was, therefore, wrong for the trial court to hold that Section 12(1), Article III of the Constitution is
strictly limited to custodial investigation and that it does not apply to a person against whom a
criminal complaint or information has already been filed because after its filing he loses his right to
remain silent and to counsel. If we follow the theory of the trial court, then police authorities and
other law enforcement agencies would have a heyday in extracting confessions or admissions from
accused persons after they had been arrested but before they are arraigned because at such stage the
accused persons are supposedly not entitled to the enjoyment of the rights to remain silent and to
counsel.
Once a criminal complaint or information is filed in court and the accused is thereafter arrested by
virtue of a warrant of arrest, he must be delivered to the nearest police station or jail and the
arresting officer must make a return of the warrant to the issuing judge, 27 and since the court has
already acquired jurisdiction over his person, it would be improper for any public officer Or law
enforcement agency to investigate him in connection with the commission of the offense for which he
is charged. If, nevertheless, he is subjected to such' investigation, then Section 12(1), Article III of the
Constitution and the jurisprudence thereon must be faithfully complied with.
The Sinumpaang Salaysay of Maqueda taken by SP02 Molleno after the former's arrest was taken in
palpable violation of his rights under Section 12(1), Article III of the Constitution. As disclosed by a
reading thereof, Maqueda was not even told of any of his constitutional rights under the said section.
The statement was also taken in the absence of counsel. Such uncounselled Sinumpaang Salaysay is
wholly inadmissible pursuant to paragraph 3, Section 12, Article III of the Constitution which reads:
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof
shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.
However, the extrajudicial admissions of Maqueda to Prosecutor Zarate and to Ray Dean Salvosa
stand on a different footing. These are not governed by the exclusionary rules under the Bill of
Rights.. Maqueda voluntarily and freely made them to Prosecutor Zarate not in the course of an
investigation, but in connection with Maqueda's plea to be utilized as a state witness; and as to the
other admission, it was given to a private person. The provisions of the Bill of Rights are primarily
limitations on government, declaring the rights that exist without governmental grant, that may not
be taken away by government and that government has the duty to protect; 28 or restriction on the
power of government found "not in the particular specific types of action prohibited, but in the
general principle that keeps alive in the public mind the doctrine that governmental power is not
unlimited.29 They are the fundamental safeguards against aggressions of arbitrary power, 30 or state
tyranny and abuse of authority. In laying down the principles of the government and fundamental the unrebutted testimony of Mike Tayaban, which Maqueda does not controvert in his brief, it was
liberties of the people, the Constitution did not govern the relationships between individuals. 31 positively established that Maqueda and a companion were seen at 7:00 a.m. of 27 August 1991 at the
waiting shed in Aguyad, Tuba, Benguet, a place barely a kilometer away from the house of the
Accordingly, Maqueda's admissions to Ray Dean Salvosa, a private party, are admissible in evidence Barkers. It was not then impossible for Maqueda and his companion to have been at the Barker
against the former Under Section 26, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. In Aballe vs; People, 32 this house at the time the crime was committed. Moreover, Fredisminda Castrence categorically declared
Court held that the declaration of an accused expressly acknowledging his guilt of the offense may be that Maqueda started working in her polvoron factory in Sukat only on 7 October 1991, thereby
given in evidence against him and any person, otherwise competent to testify as a witness, who heard belying his, testimony that he started working on 5 July 1991 and continuously until 27 August 1991.
the confession, is competent to testify as to the substance of what he heard if he heard and
understood it. The said witness need not repeat verbatim the oral confession; it suffices if he gives its WHEREFORE, in of the foregoing, the instant appeal is DISMISSED and the appealed decision Of
substance. By analogy, that rule applies to oral extrajudicial admissions. Branch 10 of the Regional Trial Court Of Benguet in Criminal Case, No.91-CR-1206 is AFFIRMED in
toto.
To be added to Maqueda's extrajudicial admission is his Urgent Motion for Bail wherein he
explicitly .stated that "he is willing and volunteering to be a state witness in the above entitled case, it Costs against accused-appellant HECTOR MAQUEDA @ PUTOL.
appearing that he is the least guilty among the accused in this case."
SO ORDERED,
In the light of his admissions to Prosecutor Zarate and Ray Dean Salvosa and his willingness to be a
state witness, Maqueda's participation in the commission of the crime charged was established
beyond moral certainty. His defense of alibi was futile because by his own admission he was not only
at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission, he also admitted his participation therein.
Even if we disregard his extrajudicial admissions to Prosecutor Zarate and Salvosa, his guilt was, as
correctly ruled by the trial court, established beyond doubt by circumstantial evidence. The following
circumstances were duly proved in this case:

(1) He and a companion were seen a kilometer away from the Barker house an
hour after the crime in question was committed there;

(2) Rene Salvamante, who is still at large, was positively identified by Mrs.
Barker, Norie Dacara, and Julieta Villanueva as one of two persons who
committed the crime;

(3) He and co-accused Rene Salvamante are friends;

(4) He and Rene Salvamante were together in Guinyangan, Quezon, and both
left the place sometime in September 1991;

(5) He was arrested in Guinyangan, Quezon, on 4 March 1992; and

(6) He freely and voluntarily offered to be a state witness stating that "he is the
least guilty."

Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court provides that circumstantial evidence is sufficient for
conviction if:

(a) There is more than one circumstance;

(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are
proven; and

(c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction

beyond reasonable doubt.

Or, as jurisprudentially formulated, a judgment of conviction based on circumstantial evidence can

be upheld only if the circumstances proved constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and
reasonable conclusion which points to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person,
i.e. the circumstances proved must be consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that
the accused is guilty, and at the same time inconsistent with any other hypothesis except that of
guilty. 33 We do not hesitate to rule that all the requisites of Section 2, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court
are present in this case.

This conclusion having been reached, the defense of alibi put up by the appellant must fail. The trial
court correctly rejected such defense. The rule is settled that for the defense of alibi to prosper, the
requirements of time and place must be strictly met. It is not enough to prove that the accused was
somewhere else when the crime was committed, he must demonstrate that it was physically
impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission. 34 Through

12
G.R. No. L-37712 March 6, 1933
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ESTEBAN MONES, IRENEO MAGUNCIA, FAUSTINO ELMIDO, and IGNACIO
GAGUA, defendants-appellants.
Rupisan and Ramirez for appellants.
Attorney-General Jaranilla for appellee.
STREET, J.:
This appeal has been brought to reverse a judgment of the court of First Instance of Pangasinan,
finding the appellants, Esteban Mones, Irineo Maguncia, Faustino Elmido, and Ignacia Gagua, guilty
of robbery in band with quadruple homicide and sentencing each of them to reclusion perpetua, with
the accessories prescribed by law, and requiring them jointly and severally to indemnify each of the
heirs of the four victims in the amount of P100, as well as to the pay the costs of prosecution.
Shortly before the midnight on the rainy night of August 27, 1931, a fire consumed the house of
Manuel Mico in the barrio of Nampalcan, municipality of Umiñgan, in the Province of Pangasinan.
Four persons were the living in the house, namely, Manuel Mico and his wife, Adriana Aganon, and
the two small children, Juana Obina and Domingo Obina, and the charred trunks of all four were
found in the debris of the fire. In the houses not far removed from the fire lived two sons of the
elderly couple, and these, with others living in the same houses or nearby, were attracted by the
flames or attendant noise. They arrived on the scene, however, too late to be of any assistance in
stopping the fire.
Early in the morning the justice of the peace, the municipal president, and the district health officer
came to view the premises; and the latter testified that the dead bodies of the four human beings
were so badly burned that he could not determine whether violence had been used upon the deceased
prior to the fire, though he noticed that the intestines of one of the children protruded from an orifice
in the trunk. It was naturally assumed that the fire had been of accidental origin.
In about two weeks, however, a letter containing an illegible signature was received by the local
Constabulary authorities in which it was stated that four persons responsible for this fire and the
death of the four inmates of the house were the four accused, namely, Faustino Elmido and Irineo
Maguncia, of Santa Mariaan, of the municipalities of San Quintin, and Esteban Mones and Ignacio
Gagua, of the barrio of Nampalcan, in Umiñgan. It was later discovered that this letter had emanated
from Ulpiano Velasquez, a resident of Umiñgan, and further inquiry revealed the fact that his
informant was the one Santiago Origenes. This Origenes had a wife or querida named Pastora
Maguncia, a sister of Irineo Maguncia, and she was at this time staying in the home of Faustino
Elmido, who was married to the mother of Pastora Maguncia, and her brother, Irineo Maguncia. In
the meantime Origenes was living in San Quintin. In the afternoon of August 27, 1931, it occurred to
Santiago Origenes to visit the house of Faustino Elmido, where Pastora Maguncia was staying. After
his arrival Faustino Elmido and Irineo Maguncia, who were of course on intimate terms with
Santiago, informed him that they were going that night to the house of Ignacio Gagua, otherwise
known as Ignas, upon a mission that was expected to result in gain. They accordingly invited
Santiago to accompany them. The latter declined, on the ground that he was already tired, preferring,
no doubt, to spend the time with Pastora.
Very early the next morning, while it was yet dark, Faustino and Irineo returned, and informed
Santiago and other inmates of the house that if any investigation should later be made, they must
keep quiet, and that they should not inform anybody that Faustino and Irineo had been to Umiñgan
that night. To this Santiago gave his assent. Faustino and Irineo then went to sleep, and did not arise
until the forenoon was well advanced. When they came down the conversation relative to the doings
of Faustino and Ireneo during the previous night was resumed. In the course of this conversation
Faustino gave Santiago to understand that the haul had netted only P100, of which Ignacio Gagua
had been given the sum of P16. The net result of the talk was that Santiago inferred that the two had
been out on a robbing expedition and that Esteban Mones and Ignacio Gagua were participants in
the adventure.
As a result of the information obtained from this individual the four accused were arrested on
September 18, 1931, and taken before the justice of the peace of Umiñgan. Lieutenant J. G. Polotan of
the Philippine Constabulary, stationed at Tayug, Pangasinan, was then called in; and upon arriving
13
in Umiñgan, he found the four accused under detention. The accused were then severally brought
before the justice of the peace and subjected to examination, when Gagua admitted that he had seen
the crime committed by the other three, but he refrained from incriminating himself.
By this time it was already night, and an attorney, Pedro Aquino, who appeared as representative of
the two San Quintin culprits, suggested to Lieutenant Polotan that he should take the four prisoners
for examination to Tayug. His idea seems to have been that in Umiñgan influences might be brought
to bear that would affect the result unfavorably to his clients. Lieutenant Polotan adopted this
suggestion, and he and two of the prisoners embarked in Aquino's car for Tayug. The other two
prisoners and their custodians got into a carromata, which was supplied by the same Aquino, and
followed to Tayug, arriving at about 8:30 or 9 o'clock. Among those present was Santiago Origenes
who had been brought along from San Quintin. When all were collected in the in the barracks in
Tayug, Lieutenant Polotan went down and began questioning the accused. At first each of the four
was questioned separately. Later they were confronted. After some questioning Gagua explained to
Lieutenant Polotan some of the details of how the crime was committed, although he still insisted
that he only waited down below at the house of Mico while the other three accused accomplished the
robbery, murder, and arson.
One of the incidents of the examination was that Esteban Mones, upon hearing that he being
incriminated by Gagua, jumped towards Gagua and attempted to assault him. Lieutenant Polotan
says that seeing that Mones was threatening the old man (Gagua), he seized them both by
interposing his hands on the chest of each, and warned Mones that if he should continue to
misbehave he would be handcuffed. The examination then proceeded and in time each of the four
gave his separate confession.
It appears that the four accused speak Ilocano, a language not known to Lieutenant Polotan; and
Sergeant Villasista, who reduced the confessions to writing, acted as interpreter. These proceedings
took up a good part of the night and it was 3 o'clock or later in the morning when the reduction of the
statements of the four accused to writing was finished. At the conclusion of each of the separate
statements it was read over to the accused to whom the statement pertained, and each signified his
conformity with the contents as interpreted to him. Lieutenant Polotan did not, however, cause
either of the accused then to sign his confession, as the lieutenant preferred to have that act done in
the presence in the justice of the peace. For some reason or the other the justice of the peace of Tayug
was not available the next morning for this service and the four accused were returned to the town of
Umiñgan, where they were again taken before the justice of the peace of that municipality. Upon
being brought before this official three of the accused signed the statements prepared for them, but
Irineo Maguncia, acting upon the suggestion which had reached him from his lawyer, refused to sign
the statement prepared for him, and Esteban Mones, though he signed his statement, said that he
would not have admitted the facts contained therein if he had not been maltreated the night before.
An incident connected with the appearance before the justice of the peace was this: Gagua stated in
the written confession signed by him that he had received P16 of the money which had been taken
from Manuel Mico, and when this part of the confession was reached in the reading of the same to
him, the justice of the peace asked the declarant to point to the place where the money had been
delivered, which was on a public street only a short distance from the court. The declarant indicated
the spot with the justice of the peace in fact repaired to that place with declarant and others, and
upon reaching the place, Gagua demonstrated the act of the division of the spoil at that place.
Translated into English, the three confessions signed by three of the accused are as follows:
I, Faustino Elmido, 40 years of age, married and resident of the municipality of San
Quintin, Pangasinan, P.I., after being duly sworn in accordance with law, declare as
follows:
I remember very well without hesitation that on the morning of the 27th of August of this
year, 1931, — I cannot remember the day — Esteban Mones, of Umiñgan, came to my
house in the barrio of Casantamariaan, San Quintin, Pangasinan, at 8 o'clock, and told me
the following: "Compadre, if you wish, you come to Umiñgan for we will go and get
money." I asked him who would go with us and he gave me the names of Irineo Bagoncia
and old man Ignacio Gagua of Umiñgan. I also asked him whose money was it that we
would get and he said it was the money of his uncle, Manuel Mico, of the barrio of
Nanpalcan, Umiñgan, Pangasinan. I acceded to his proposal and so he returned to the
municipality of Umiñgan and left a word that Irineo Bagoncia and I should follow later in
the afternoon of the same day.
After taking my supper that evening, I dropped in at the house of Irineo Bagoncia and,
with him, proceeded to Umiñgan. On reaching the town of Umiñgan, we called on the old
man Ignacio Gagua in his own barrio. Then we proceeded with him to the house of Esteban
Mones where we held a conference for about less than an hour. Thereafter we again
proceeded to the house of Manuel Mico whom we killed that same night. It was about 10
o'clock when we reached that house (Mico's). The first one who went up the house was
Esteban Mones, himself the nephew of the old man Manuel, followed by Irineo Bagoncia,
myself, and Ignacio Gagua in the order named. On coming to the house of the said Manuel
Mico, we found four persons sleeping, namely, old man Manuel, his wife, and two children,
a girl and a boy. Esteban Mones approached the old woman who was sleeping and boloed
her; Irineo Bagoncia also approached the old man who was also sleeping and boloed him
to death; I, myself, boloed the girl; and the old man Ignacio Gagua also boloed the boy.
Soon after the old man Manuel Mico and his wife and two grandchildren died, Esteban
Mones went to the place where their trunk was, cut its lid with his bolo, and, after taking
the money which was our objective upon forcing the trunk open, enjoined us to go. I then
stepped down, with the old man Ignacio Gagua and Ireneo Maguncia following me.
Esteban Mones came down later, as he first set the roof of the house on fire. As he came
down, he again set the shed (patag-guab) on fire, after which we all went home. As we
parted, Esteban Mones instructed us to meet together the following morning at the town of
Umiñgan where, he said, he would give us our share of the booty (money).
On the morning of the 28th of August, of this same year, 1931, before noon, I left
San Quintin for Umiñgan in company with Irineo Bagoncia. As we reached the
town of Umiñgan, we found our companions in the poblacion and then and
there we were given our shares in the following amounts:
Amount given to Irineo Bagoncia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . P15.00,
One 10-peso bill and one 5-peso bill.
Amount given to me . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15.00,
One 10-peso bill and one 5-peso bill.
I do not know how much was given to the old man Ignacio Gagua, as he was handed a roll
of bills.
All the statements hereinabove given are true. They are given freely without threat and
inducement. And in witness whereof, I hereunto press my right thumb below, as I do not
know how to write.
I, Ignacio Gagua, of age, married, farmer, and resident of Nanpalcan, Umiñgan,
Pangasinan, P.I., after being duly sworn in accordance with law, without force and
intimidation having been exerted upon me, declare as follows:
That on the 27th of August of this year, 1931, at about 10 o'clock p.m., Irineo Maguncia and
Faustino Elmido of San Quintin called at my house and invited me to go to the house of
Esteban Mones and later to that of Manuel Mico in the barrio of Nanpalcan, Umiñgan.
Upon reaching his house, Esteban Mones gave Irineo Bagoncia a bolo, and then we all
proceeded to the house of the old man, Manuel Mico, armed with bolos. Upon arriving at
the house of the said Manuel Mico, Esteban Mones went up the house, and he was
followed Faustino Elmido, Irineo Maguncia and myself in the order named. As we entered
the house, Esteban Mones took hold of the left arm of the old woman Adriana with his
right hand and then struck her with his bolo twice. I did not notice on which parts of the
body of Adriana the blows landed as I was then in the act of striking the little boy with my
bolo on the left side below his armpit. Faustino Elmido also struck the little girl with his
bolo, but I could not notice how many blows he gave her. Irineo Maguncia also struck the
old man, Manuel Mico, with his (Maguncia) bolo twice. I did not notice on which parts of
the body of the old man the blows landed. Soon after these persons died in the house,
Esteban Mones cut the lid of their trunk and forced it open. After taking the money
contained in the trunk, he ordered us to go down. He came down later, as he first set the
roof of the house, just above the door, on fire. As he came down, he again set the shed
(patag-guab) south of the ladder of the house on fire. As the house was in flames, we all
went home with instructions from Esteban Mones to meet together the following day in
the town of Umiñgan where he would give us our share of the booty.
14
That on the morning of the 28th of the same month and year, I went to the town and found
Esteban Mones on a corner of a road South where we all met together. Then and there
Esteban Mones handed me the amount of P16: one 10-peso bill, one 5-peso bill and one 1-
peso bill. After receiving my share I went home and the others also returned home.
All the statements hereinabove given are true. They are given without anybody including
me or exerting undue influence upon me. And in witness whereof, I hereunto press my
right thumb between my name and my surname, as I do not know how to write, this 19th
day of September, 1931, in the municipality of Umiñgan, Pangasinan, P.I.
I, Esteban Mones, 35 years of age, single, born in Bacnotan, La Union, and actually
residing in the municipality of Umiñgan, Pangasinan, for the last seven years, whose
occupation is farmer, after being duly sworn in accordance with law, declare as follows:
That one day in the month of July of this year, 1931, my uncle, Manuel Mico, of the barrio
of Nanpalcan, Umiñgan, sold a hog for P30. Five days after the sale, I went to him to ask
for a loan of P5 on account of my extreme poverty. I was not favored with the loan asked of
him and so I thought of committing wrong.
That on account of ill-feeling I harbored against my uncle, Manuel Mico, for his refusal to
give me a loan, I went to my friends, Irineo Maguncia and Faustino Elmido, in the
municipality of San Quintin on the morning of August 27 of this same year, 1931, and told
them of the money that my said uncle then had. We then agreed then and then to get the
money of my uncle Manuel Mico, at any cost. We further agreed to get the money on the
night of the same day or the day when I went to the houses of the said Irineo Maguncia and
Faustino Elmido.
After our conference, I returned home in Umiñgan with the Understanding that they
(Irineo Maguncia and Faustino Elmido) would call on me at my house.
That at about 7 o'clock in the evening, Irineo Maguncia and Faustino Elmido together with
the old man Ignacio Gagua dropped home.
That a few moments after their arrival at home, we started off together, including the old
man Ignacio. We brought bolos with us. As Irineo Maguncia came home without a bolo, I
furnished him one.
On arriving at the above-named house of my uncle, Manuel Mico, I went upstairs, followed
by Irineo Maguncia, Faustino Elmido and Ignacio Gagua in the order named. I know
positively that we were in conversation as we went up, for I turned my face to them. Once
in the house, I approached my aunt, Adriana Aganon, who was then sleeping, took hold of
her left arm with my right hand struck her with my bolo on the right nipple. She was
awakened by the blow and because she shouted, saying "Ay!" I covered up her mouth with
my hand until she died.
Irineo Maguncia boloed my uncle, Manuel Mico, until the latter died. Faustino Elmido also
boloed the little girl by the name of Juanita Ovina. The old man, Ignacio Gagua also boloed
the little boy by the name of Domingo Ovina.
That soon after the death of uncle, Manuel Mico, and my aunt, Adriana Aganon, and the
two children, I approached the trunk, cut it with my bolo and, after breaking the lid, forced
it open. I then took the money that it contained in the amount of P100 in denominations of
one 20-peso and eight 10-peso bills. Thereupon, I told my companions that we could then
leave the place as I already had with me the money which was our objective. My
companions then came down while I remained upstairs as I first set the roof of the house,
just above the ladder, on fire. Then as I came down I again set the shed (patag-guab) on
fire. The house being then in flames, we left for our respective homes, giving them
instructions to meet together the following morning at the town of Umiñgan where I would
give each his share.
That on the morning of the 28th of August of this same year, we met together in the
poblacion of Umiñgan. Then and there I handed them their shares in the following
amounts:
 1. Irineo Magoncia . . . . . . . . . . . . . P15.00
2. Faustino Elmido . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15.00
3. Ignacio Gagua . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16.00
4. I, the affiant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54.00
out of which nothing was left , as I spent it in taking care of my mother and my nephews
and nieces.
The statements hereinabove given are the whole truth. They were given freely without the
use of force, intimidation and inducement. And in witness whereof, I hereunto place my
right thumb mark between my name and surname this 19th day of September, 1931, in this
municipality of Tayug, for I do not know how to write.
The statement of Erineo Maguncia was not signed by him, but it is proved that when the statement
was drawn up and read over him that night at Tayug, he clearly stated "That is true, sir". In substance
the statement thus approved by Maguncia follows in the main the lines of the declarations made by
the three whose confessions have been quoted, Elmido admitting that he slew the old man Manuel
Mico with his, bolo, while the other accused performed the parts admitted by them in their several
statements. In this statement Irineo asserted that Mones opened the chest and took therefrom P100
in money, and that Mones was the one who set the house on fire.
At the hearing in this case all of the accused stated that they were maltreated by Sergeant Villasista
during the examination of the accused in Tayug, and all united in asserting that Lieutenant Polotan
was not present when said acts of maltreatment were committed. The obvious mendacity of the latter
statement deprives their testimony on this point entirely of credit, for the evident that Lieutenant
Polotan was present during the examination of the witnesses during the whole night prior to the time
their confessions were given, and we have no doubt that the statements suggesting abuse were built
up upon the incident that Lieutenant Polotan had to intervene energetically with his arms to prevent
Mones from assaulting Gagua.
The facts above stated supply the basis of the conviction of the four accused in this case; and the
point in here made in their favor that the proof of what is called the corpus delicti is not sufficient. In
this case connection we are reminded of the rule generally prevailing in American jurisdictions that
before evidence of a confession in a homicide case is admitted there should be some proof that the
person supposed to have been slain is in fact dead. In dealing with this subject in his treatise on the
law of evidence Professor Wigmore calls attention to the fact that judicial decisions in the United
States are not harmonious, but he says that in its orthodox sense the expression corpus
delicti signifies the fact of specific loss or injury sustained; and he illustrates what he considers to be
the correct meaning of the term by saying that "in homicide that fact of the death, whether or not
feloniously caused, is the corpus delicti; in arson, the fact of burning, whether or not willful."
(Wigmore on Evidence, sec. 2072.) This view has been accepted in this court. (People vs. Bantagan,
54 Phil., 834.) It is true that cases can be cited from various courts to the effect that proof of
the corpus delicti should go beyond mere proof of specific injury or loss and comprehend not only
somebody's criminal liability as the source of the loss but even the identity of the accused as the
author of the crime. But, as observed by Professor Wigmore, if interpreted in this sense, the
expression corpus delicti would be synonymous with the whole charge, and the rule would require
corroborative evidence as to all elements of the crime independently of the confession. In conformity
with the view of this learned author, we consider the more restricted meaning to be the one properly
applicable to the expression in this jurisdiction. It is therefore unnecessary to require independent
proof of the criminal connection of the four accused with the four deaths and with the crime of arson,
apart from their several confessions.
Upon the point whether any reasonable doubt can be raised as to the innocence of the accused in the
light of those confessions and related circumstances, only one conclusion can, in the opinion of the
majority of the court, be deduced, namely, that they are guilty. As against Faustino Elmido we have
his admissions made to Santiago Origenes in the morning after the crime was committed, and the
later confession reduced to writing in Tayug and subsequently ratified before the justice of the peace
of Umiñgan. As against Ignacio Gagua we have the circumstance that, when first arrested and
questioned by Lieutenant Polotan before the justice of the peace Umiñgan in the afternoon of
September 18, he admitted that he was present and saw the murders committed, and on the same
night at Tayug he repeated this confession, with additional circumstances indicating his own guilt.
The next morning he ratified this confession with which he pointed out, as already stated, with
sufficient details the place and manner in which he was paid P16 of the booty. Against Ireneo
15
Maguncia we have his admissions to Origenes, and the subsequent confession which was reduced to
writing at Tayug; and although this confession was not confirmed the next morning by the signature
or mark of this accused, the proof leaves no room for doubt that the confession, as reduced to
writing, is true. Lastly, the guilt of Esteban Mones is shown by his confession in writing and by the
fact that he subsequently rectified it with his mark. In addition to this, we have the circumstance of
his physical assault on Gagua, based precisely on the fact, not that Gagua was speaking falsely as to
the intervention of Mones in the crime, but because Gagua at first had refused to admit his own guilt.
We conclude that the confessions of all four of the accused were voluntarily made and the
circumstances that they may have been subjected to questioning by Lieutenant Polotan with respect
to their participation in the crime does not render these confessions incompetent. In weighing the
truthfulness of these confessions, we should remember that the inference of guilt drawn against the
four is corroborated by the testimony of Santiago Origenes, a witness who had no motive to reveal
the guilt of the four accused other than a laudable desire to bring the guilty to justice. Indeed, he was
indirectly connected with two of the accused by ties of kinship, — a circumstance which tendered
rather to seal his lips than to cause him to reveal the truth.
With respect to the qualification of this offense, or offenses, we note that the four accused were
prosecuted upon an information charging robbery en cuadrilla, with quadruple homicide and arson.
Fundamentally this is a prosecution for the complex crime of robbery with homicide and of this
offense the accused were convicted. Technically this is a higher offense than simple robbery or simple
homicide, and even the murder. Moreover, the crime of robbery with homicide remains
fundamentally the same regardless of the number of persons killed in connection with the robbery.
There is only one offense. (People vs. Manuel, 44 Phil., 333.) But, in such a case, where the
accusation of robbery fails, but multiple homicide or murder is proved, the accused must be
sentenced for the several separate offenses of homicide or murder (U.S. vs. Lahoylahoy and
Mandanlog, 38 Phil., 330); and in this case, if the proof should be held insufficient as to the robbery,
the result would be, under the Revised Penal Code, that each of the accused would be sentenced for
the four murders committed by them. In view of this fact we are constrained to sustain the conviction
for robbery with homicide, upon the concurrent confessions of each of the four accused to the effect
that robbery was the purpose of the crime and that P100 in money were taken from the trunk of
Manuel Mico. As to the moral basis of this fact we entertain no doubt whatever, although there is no
independent evidence, apart from the confessions that robbery was committed. In thus sustaining
the trial court in its finding of robbery we do not wish to be understood as declaring that this
appreciation could prevail if the prosecution consisted of a charge of robbery only, or if the
conclusion reached were in fact unfavorable to be accused.
In connection with the crime is to be estimated the aggravating circumstances that the offense was
committed in the dwelling house of the injured parties, nocturnity being absorbed in
the alevosia which is constitutive of murder. The same may perhaps be said of the aggravating
circumstance of abuse of superior strength, as regards the offenses committed upon the person of the
two children. As against the aggravating circumstance we allow the mitigating circumstance of lack of
instruction. But this point is immaterial in this case as the ultimate penalty could not be imposed in
view of the lack of unanimity on the part of the court.
To the penalty of reclusion perpetua, imposed on each of the accused by the trial court, must be
added three months and eleven days for the crime of arson, under No. 1 of article 322 of the Revised
Penal Code, there being no allegations in the information with respect to the arson which would
justify the imposition of a more severe penalty. Also, the dispositive part of the appealed decision
must be amended so as to require that the indemnity imposed on the accused shall be paid to the
heirs of her four victims instead of to "each" of heirs of said victims.
It being understood, therefore, that the judgment is modified to the extent above stated, said
judgment is affirmed. So ordered, with costs against the appellants.
Avanceña, C.J., Ostrand, Villa-Real, Hull, Vickers and Imperial, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
ABAD SANTOS, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part:
In United States vs. De Leon and De Leon (27 Phil.,. 506, 511), this court, in my opinion, wisely
observed: "Courts are slow to accept extrajudicial confessions, when they are subsequently disputed,
unless they are corroborated by other testimony. Generally the question of the admissibility of
extrajudicial confessions is necessarily addressed, in the first instance, to the judge, and since such
discretion must be controlled by all the attendant circumstances, the courts have wisely foreborne to
mark with absolute precision any rules limiting the admission or exclusion of such testimony. Their
admissibility must depend largely in each case upon the facts and circumstances surrounding the
same. (Hopt vs. Utah, 110 U.S., 574; Bram vs. U.S., 168 U.S., 532; Wilson vs. U.S., 162 U.S., 613.)"
Again, in United States vs. Agatea (40 Phil., 596, 601), this court said: "Another rule of evidence is,
that a mere naked confession uncorroborated by any circumstance inspiring belief in the truth of the
confession is not sufficient to warrant the conviction of the accused for the crime of which he is
charged."

Considering the circumstances of the present case, I entertain serious doubt as to the guilt of the
defendant Ignacio Gagua. Unlike the case of the other accused, whose confession have been
corroborated by circumstances inspiring belief in the truth thereof, Gagua is being convicted solely
on his naked confession. I believe he is entitled to an acquittal.

BUTTE, J., dissenting:

The accused are illiterate, "poor and ignorant" men. They are "taos" — peaceful, typical "little men",
about whom we hear so much talk.

I am convinced that they are innocent and that their alleged confessions are spurious and false on
their face.

Moreover, the conviction is illegal because it flies in the face of the principles relating to confessions
laid down repeatedly in the decisions of this court. (U.S. vs. De la Cruz, 2 Phil., 148; U.S. vs. De Leon
and De Leon, 27 Phil., 506; People vs. Bantagan, 54 Phil., 834.)

Villamor, J., concur.

16

G.R. Nos. 115908-09 December 6, 1995
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
DANNY GODOY, * accused-appellant.
REGALADO, J.:
Often glossed over in the emotional arguments against capital punishment is the amplitude of legal
protection accorded to the offender. Ignored by the polemicist are the safeguards designed to
minimally reduce, if not altogether eliminate, the grain of human fault. Indeed, there is no critique
on the plethora of rights enjoyed by the accused regardless of how ruthlessly he committed the crime.
Any margin of judicial error is further addressed by the grace of executive clemency. But, even before
that, all convictions imposing the penalty of death are automatically reviewed by this Court. The
cases at bar, involving two death sentences, apostrophize for the condemned the role of this ultimate
judicial intervention.
Accused-appellant Danny Godoy was charged in two separate informations filed before the Regional
Trial Court, for Palawan and Puerto Princesa City, Branch 47, with rape and kidnapping with serious
illegal detention, respectively punished under Articles 335 and 267 of the Revised Penal Code, to wit:
In Criminal Case No. 11640 for Rape:
That on or about the evening of the 21st day of January, 1994, at Barangay Pulot
Center, Municipality of Brooke's Point, Province of Palawan, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused by means of
force, threat and intimidation, by using a knife and by means of deceit, did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with one
Mia Taha to her damage and prejudice.1
In Criminal Case No. 11641 for Kidnapping with Serious Illegal Detention:
That on or about the 22nd day of January, 1994, at Barangay Ipilan,
Municipality of Brooke's Point, Province of Palawan, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, a private individual, and
being a teacher of the victim, Mia Taha, and by means of deceit did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously kidnap or detained (sic) said Mia Taha,
a girl of 17 years old (sic), for a period of five (5) days thus thereby depriving said
Mia Taha of her liberty against her will and consent and without legal
justification, to the damage and prejudice of said Mia Taha. 2
During the arraignment on both indictments, appellant pleaded not guilty to said charges and, after
the pre-trial was terminated, a joint trial of the two cases was conducted by the trial court. 3
According to complainant Mia Taha, at around 7:00 P.M. of January 21, 1994, she went to the
boarding house of her cousin, Merlylyn Casantosan, at Pulot Center, Brooke's Point which is near the
Palawan National School (PNS), Pulot Branch, where she was studying. When she saw that the house
was dark, she decided to pass through the kitchen door at the back because she knew that there was
nobody inside. As soon as she opened the door, somebody suddenly grabbed her, poked a knife on
her neck, dragged her by the hand and told her not to shout. She was then forced to lie down on the
floor. Although it was dark, complainant was able to recognize her assailant, by the light coming
from the moon and through his voice, as accused-appellant Danny Godoy who was her Physics
teacher at PNS.
When she was already on the floor, appellant removed her panty with one hand while holding the
knife with the other hand, opened the zipper of his pants, and then inserted his private organ inside
her private parts against her will. She felt pain because it was her first experience and she cried.
Throughout her ordeal, she could not utter a word. She was very frightened because a knife was
continually pointed at her. She also could not fight back nor plead with appellant not to rape her
17
because he was her teacher and she was afraid of him. She was threatened not to report the incident
to anyone or else she and her family would be killed.
Thereafter, while she was putting on her panty, she noticed that her skirt was stained with blood.
Appellant walked with her to the gate of the house and she then proceeded alone to the boarding
house where she lived. She did not see where appellant went after she left him at the gate. When she
arrived at her boarding house, she saw her landlady but she did not mention anything about the
incident.
The following morning, January 22, 1994, complainant went home to her parents' house at Ipilan,
Brooke's Point. She likewise did not tell her parents about the incident for fear that appellant might
make good his threat. At around 3:00 P.M. of that same day, appellant arrived at the house of her
parents and asked permission from the latter if complainant could accompany him to solicit funds
because she was a candidate for "Miss PNS Pulot." When her parents agreed, she was constrained to
go with appellant because she did not want her parents to get into trouble.
Appellant and complainant then left the house and they walked in silence, with Mia following behind
appellant, towards the highway where appellant hailed a passenger jeep which was empty except for
the driver and the conductor. She was forced to ride the jeep because appellant threatened to kill her
if she would not board the vehicle. The jeep proceeded to the Sunset Garden at the poblacion,
Brooke's Point where they alighted.
At the Sunset Garden, appellant checked in and brought her to a room where they staye d for three
days. During the entire duration of their stay at the Sunset Garden, complainant was not allowed to
leave the room which was always kept locked. She was continuously guarded and constantly raped by
appellant. She was, however, never drunk or unconscious. Nonetheless, she was forced to have sex
with appellant because the latter was always carrying a knife with him.
In the early morning of January 25, 1994, appellant brought her to the house of his friend at
Edward's Subdivision where she was raped by him three times. She was likewise detained and locked
inside the room and tightly guarded by appellant. After two days, or on January 27, 1994, they left
the place because appellant came to know that complainant had been reported and indicated as a
missing person in the police blotter. They went to see a certain Naem ** from whom appellant sought
help. On that same day, she was released but only after her parents agreed to settle the case with
appellant.
Immediately thereafter, Mia's parents brought her to the District Hospital at Brooke's Point where
she was examined by Dr. Rogelio Divinagracia who made the following medical findings:
GENERAL: Well developed, nourished, cooperative, walking, conscious,
coherent Filipina.
BREAST: Slightly globular with brown colored areola and nipple.
EXTERNAL EXAM.: Numerous pubic hair, fairly developed labia majora and
minora, hymenal opening stellate in shape, presence of laceration superficial,
longitudinal at the fossa navicularis, approximately 1/2 cm. length.
INTERNAL EXAM.: Hymenal opening, stellate in shape, laceration noted,
hymenal opening admits 2 fingers with slight resistance, prominent vaginal
rugae, cervix closed.
CONCLUSION: Hymenal opening admits easily 2 fingers with slight resistance,
presence of laceration, longitudinal at the fossa navicularis approximately 1/2
cm. length. Hymenal opening can admit an average size penis in erection with
laceration.4
Dr. Divinagracia further testified that the hymenal opening was in stellate shape and that there was a
laceration, which shows that complainant had participated in sexual intercourse. On the basis of the
inflicted laceration which was downward at 6 o'clock position, he could not say that there was force
applied because there were no scratches or bruises, but only a week-old laceration. He also examined
the patient bodily but found no sign of bruises or injuries. The patient told him that she was raped.
During the cross-examination, complainant denied that she wrote the letters marked as Exhibits "1"
and "2"; that she never loved appellant but, on the contrary, she hated him because of what he did to
her; and that she did not notice if there were people near the boarding house of her cousin. She
narrated that when appellant started to remove her panty, she was already lying down, and that even
as appellant was doing this she could not shout because she was afraid. She could not remember with
which hand appellant held the knife. She was completely silent from the time she was made to lie
down, while her panty was being removed, and even until appellant was able to rape her.
When appellant went to their house the following day, she did not know if he was armed but there
was no threat made on her or her parents. On the contrary, appellant even courteously asked
permission from them in her behalf and so they left the house with appellant walking ahead of her.
When she was brought to the Sunset Garden, she could not refuse because she was afraid. However,
she admitted that at that time, appellant was not pointing a knife at her. She only saw the cashier of
the Sunset Garden but she did not notice if there were other people inside. She likewise did not ask
the appellant why he brought her there.
Complainant described the lock in their room as an ordinary doorknob, similar to that on the door of
the courtroom which, even if locked, could still be opened from the inside, and she added that there
was a sliding lock inside the room. According to her, they stayed at Sunset Garden for three days and
three nights but she never noticed if appellant ever slept because everytime she woke up, appellant
was always beside her. She never saw him close his eyes.
Helen Taha, the mother of complainant, testified that when the latter arrived at their house in the
morning of January 22, 1994, she noticed that Mia appeared weak and her eyes were swollen. When
she asked her daughter if there was anything wrong, the latter merely kept silent. That afternoon, she
allowed Mia to go with appellant because she knew he was her teacher. However, when Mia and
appellant failed to come home at the expected time, she and her husband, Adjeril, went to look for
them at Ipilan. When they could not find them there, she went to the house of appellant because she
was already suspecting that something was wrong, but appellant's wife told her that he did not come
home.
Early the next morning, she and her husband went to the Philippine National Police (PNP) station at
Pulot, Brooke's Point and had the incident recorded in the police blotter. The following day, they
went to the office of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) at Puerto Princess City, then to the
police station near the NBI, and finally to the radio station airing the Radyo ng Bayan program where
she made an appeal to appellant to return her daughter. When she returned home, a certain Naem
was waiting there and he informed her that Mia was at Brooke's Point. He further conveyed
appellant's willingness to become a Muslim so he could marry Mia and thus settle the case. Helen
Taha readily acceded because she wanted to see her daughter.
In the morning of January 27, 1994, she went to the house of Naem who sent somebody to fetch
complainant. She testified that when Mia arrived, she was crying as she reported that she was raped
by appellant, and that the latter threatened to kill her if she did not return within an hour. Because of
this, she immediately brought Mia to the hospital where the latter was examined and then they
proceeded to the municipal hall to file a complaint for rape and kidnapping. Both Mia and Helen
Taha executed separate sworn statements before the PNP at Brooke's Point.
Later, Fruit Godoy, the wife of appellant, went to their house and offered P50,000.00 for the
settlement of the case. On their part, her husband insisted that they just settle, hence all three of
them, Adjeril, Helen and Mia Taha, went to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor where they met
with the mother of appellant who gave them P30,000.00. Adjeril and Helen Taha subsequently
executed an affidavit of desistance in Criminal Case No. 7687 for kidnapping pending in the
prosecutor's office, which was sworn to before Prosecutor II Chito S. Meregillano. Helen Taha
testified that she agreed to the settlement because that was what her husband wanted. Mia Taha was
dropped from the school and was not allowed to graduate. Her father died two months later,
supposedly because of what happened.
The defense presented a different version of what actually transpired.
According to appellant, he first met Mia Taha sometime in August, 1993 at the Palawan National
School (PNS). Although he did not court her, he fell in love with her because she often told him "Sir, I
love you." What started as a joke later developed into a serious relationship which was kept a secret
from everybody else. It was on December 20, 1993 when they first had sexual intercourse as lovers.
Appellant was then assigned at the Narra Pilot Elementary School at the poblacion because he was
18
the coach of the Palawan delegation for chess. At around 5:00 P.M. of that day, complainant arrived
at his quarters allegedly because she missed him, and she then decided to spend the night there with
him.
Exactly a month thereafter, specifically in the evening of January 20, 1994, Erna Baradero, a teacher
at the PNS, was looking inside the school building for her husband, who was a security guard of PNS,
when she heard voices apparently coming from the Orchids Room. She went closer to listen and she
heard a girl's voice saying "Mahal na mahal kita, Sir, iwanan mo ang iyong asawa at tatakas tayo."
Upon hearing this, she immediately opened the door and was startled to see Mia Taha and Danny
Godoy holding hands. She asked them what they were doing there at such an unholy hour but the
two, who were obviously caught by surprise, could not answer. She then hurriedly closed the door
and left. According to this witness, complainant admitted to her that she was having an affair with
appellant. Desirous that such illicit relationship must be stopped, Erna Baradero informed
appellant's wife about it when the latter arrived from Manila around the first week of February, 1994.
Upon the request of appellant's wife, Erna Baradero executed an affidavit in connection with the
present case, but the same was not filed then because of the affidavit of desistance which was
executed and submitted by the parents of complainant. In her sworn statement, later marked in
evidence as Exhibit "7", Erna Baradero alleged that on January 21, 1994, she confronted Mia Taha
about the latter's indiscretion and reminded her that appellant is a married man, but complainant
retorted, "Ano ang pakialam mo," adding that she loves appellant very much.
Appellant testified that on January 21, 1994, at around 7:00 P.M., Mia Taha went to his office asking
for help with the monologue that she would be presenting for the Miss PNS contest. He agreed to
meet her at the house of her cousin, Merlylyn Casantosan. However, when he reached the place, the
house was dark and he saw Mia waiting for him outside. Accordingly, they just sat on a bench near
the road where there was a lighted electric post and they talked about the matter she had earlier
asked him about. They stayed there for fifteen minutes, after which complainant returned to her
boarding house just across the street while appellant headed for home some fifteen meters away.
It appears that while complainant was then waiting for appellant, Filomena Pielago, a former teacher
of Mia at PNS and who was then on her way to a nearby store, saw her sitting on a bench and asked
what she was doing there at such a late hour. Complainant merely replied that she was waiting for
somebody. Filomena proceeded to the store and, along the way, she saw Inday Zapanta watering the
plants outside the porch of her house. When Filomena Pielago returned, she saw complainant talking
with appellant and she noticed that they were quite intimate because they were holding hands. This
made her suspect that the two could be having a relationship. She, therefore, told appellant that his
wife had finished her aerobics class and was already waiting for him. She also advised Mia to go
home.
Prior to this incident, Filomena Pielago already used to see them seated on the same bench.
Filomena further testified that she had tried to talk appellant out of the relationship because his wife
had a heart ailment. She also warned Mia Taha, but to no avail. She had likewise told complainant's
grandmother about her activities. At the trial, she identified the handwriting of complainant
appearing on the letters marked as Exhibits "1" and "2", claiming that she is familiar with the same
because Mia was her former student. On cross-examination, Filomena clarified that when she saw
the couple on the night of January 21, 1994, the two were talking naturally, she did not see Mia
crying, nor did it appear as if appellant was pleading with her.
In the afternoon of the following day, January 22, 1994, appellant met Mia's mother on the road near
their house and she invited him to come up and eat "buko," which invitation he accepted. Thirty
minutes thereafter, complainant told him to ask permission from her mother for them to go and
solicit funds at the poblacion, and he did so. Before they left, he noticed that Mia was carrying a
plastic bag and when he asked her about it, she said that it contained her things which she was
bringing to her cousin's house. Appellant and Mia went to the poblacion where they solicited funds
until 6:30 P.M. and then had snacks at the Vic Tan Store.
Thereafter, complainant told appellant that it was already late and there was no more available
transportation, so she suggested that they just stay at Sunset Garden. Convinced that there was
nothing wrong in that because they already had intimate relations, aside from the fact that Mia had
repeatedly told him she would commit suicide should he leave her, appellant was prevailed upon to
stay at the hotel. Parenthetically, it was complainant who arranged their registration and
subsequently paid P400.00 for their bill from the funds they had solicited. That evening, however,
appellant told complainant at around 9:00 P.M. that he was going out to see a certain Bert Dalojo at
the latter's residence. In truth, he borrowed a motorcycle from Fernando Rubio and went home to
Pulot. He did not bring complainant along because she had refused to go home.
The following morning, January 23, 1994, appellant went to the house of complainant's parents and
informed them that Mia spent the night at the Sunset Garden. Mia's parents said that they would just
fetch her there, so he went back to Sunset Garden and waited for them outside the hotel until 5:00
P.M. When they did not arrive, he decided to go with one Isagani Virey, whom he saw while waiting
near the road, and they had a drinking session with Virey's friends. Thereafter, Virey accompanied
him back to Sunset Garden where they proceeded to Mia's room. Since the room was locked from the
inside, Virey had to knock on the door until it was opened by her.
Once inside, he talked to complainant and asked her what they were doing, but she merely answered
that what she was doing was of her own free will and that at that moment her father was not
supposed to know about it for, otherwise, he would kill her. What complainant did not know,
however, was that appellant had already reported the matter to her parents, although he opted not to
tell her because he did not want to add to her apprehensions. Isagani Virey further testified that
when he saw appellant and complainant on January 23 and 24, 1994, the couple looked very happy.
Appellant denied that they had sexual intercourse during their entire stay at Sunset Garden, that is,
from January 22 to 24, 1994, because he did not have any idea as to what she really wanted to prove
to him. Appellant knew that what they were doing was wrong but he allegedly could not avoid Mia
because of her threat that she would commit suicide if he left her. Thus, according to appellant, on
January 24, 1994 he asked Isagani Virey to accompany him to the house of Romy Vallan, a
policeman, to report the matter.
Additionally, Virey testified that appellant and Mia went to see him at his aunt's house to ask for
assistance in procuring transportation because, according to appellant, the relatives of Mia were
already looking for them and so they intend to go to Puerto Princesa City. Virey accompanied them to
the house of Romy Vallan, whose wife was a co-teacher of appellant's wife, but the latter refused to
help because of the complicated situation appellant was in.
Nevertheless, Vallan verified from the police station whether a complaint had been filed against
appellant and after finding out that there was none, he told appellant to just consult a certain Naem
who is an "imam." Appellant was able to talk to Naem at Vallan's house that same day and bared
everything about him and Mia. Naem suggested that appellant marry complainant in Muslim rites
but appellant refused because he was already married. It was eventually agreed that Naem would just
mediate in behalf of appellant and make arrangements for a settlement with Mia's parents. Later that
day, Naem went to see the parents of complainant at the latter's house.
The following day, January 25, 1994, allegedly because complainant could no longer afford to pay
their hotel bills, the couple were constrained to transfer to the house of appellant's friend, Fernando
Rubio, at Edward's Subdivision where they stayed for two days. They just walked along the national
highway from Sunset Garden to Edward's Subdivision which was only five hundred to seven hundred
meters away. The owner of the house, Fernando Rubio, as well as his brother Benedicto Rubio,
testified that the couple were very happy, they were intimate and sweet to each other, they always ate
together, and it was very obvious that they were having a relationship.
In fact, Fernando Rubio recalled that complainant even called appellant "Papa." While they were
there, she would buy food at the market, help in the cooking, wash clothes, and sometimes watch
television. When Fernando Rubio once asked her why she chose to go with appellant despite the fact
the he was a married man, Mia told him that she really loved appellant. She never told him, and
Fernando Rubio never had the slightest suspicion, that she was supposed to have been kidnapped as
it was later claimed. He also testified that several police officers lived within their neighborhood and
if complainant had really been kidnapped and detained, she could have easily reported that fact to
them. Mia was free to come and go as she pleased, and the room where they stayed was never locked
because the lock had been destroyed.
On cross-examination, Fernando Rubio declared that appellant was merely an acquaintance of his;
that it was Naem who went to the lodging house to arrange for Mia to go home; that complainant's
mother never went to his house; and that it was Chief of Police Eliseo Crespo who fetched appellant
from the lodging house and brought him to the municipal hall.
19
Shortly before noon of January 26, 1994, Naem again met with appellant at Edward's Subdivision
and informed him that complainant's parents were willing to talk to him at Naem's house the next
day. The following morning, or on January 27, 1994, appellant was not able to talk to complainant's
parents because they merely sent a child to fetch Mia at Edward's Subdivision and to tell her that her
mother, who was at Naem's house, wanted to see her. Appellant permitted complainant to go but he
told her that within one hour he was be going to the police station at the municipal hall so that they
could settle everything there.
After an hour, while appellant was already on his way out of Edward's Subdivision, he was met by
Chief of Police Eliseo Crespo who invited him to the police station. Appellant waited at the police
station the whole afternoon but when complainant, her parents and relatives arrived at around 5:00
P.M., he was not given the chance to talk to any one of them. That afternoon of January 27, 1994,
appellant was no longer allowed to leave and he was detained at the police station after Mia and her
parents lodged a complaint for rape and kidnapping against him.
During his detention, Mia's cousin, Lorna Casantosan, delivered to appellant on different occasions
two letters from complainant dated February 27, 1994 and March 1, 1994, respectively. As Mia's
teacher, appellant is familiar with and was, therefore, able to identify the handwriting in said letters
as that of Mia Taha. After a time, he came to know, through his mother, that an affidavit of
desistance was reportedly executed by complainants. However, he claims that he never knew and it
was never mentioned to him, not until the day he testified in court, that his mother paid P30,000.00
to Mia's father because, although he did not dissuade them, neither did he request his mother to talk
to complainants in order to settle the case.
Under cross-examination, appellant denied that he poked a knife at and raped Mia Taha on January
21, 1994. However, he admitted that he had sex with Mia at the Sunset Garden but that was already
on January 24, 1994. While they were at Edward's Subdivision, they never had sexual relations.
Appellant was told, when complainant visited him in jail, that her father would kill her if she refused
to testify against him, although by the time she testified in court, her father had already died.
Appellant further testified that complainant has had several illicit relations in the boarding house of
her cousin, Merlylyn Casantosan, which was a well-known fact in Pulot. However, he decided to have
a relationship with her because he wanted to change her and that was what they had agreed upon.
Appellant denied that, during the time when they were staying together, Mia had allegedly asked
permission to leave several times but that he refused. On the contrary, he claimed that on January
27, 1994 when she told him that her parents wanted to see her, he readily gave her permission to go.
He also identified the clothes that Mia brought with her when they left her parents' house on January
22, 1994, but which she left behind at the Rubios' lodging house after she failed to return on January
27, 1994. The bag of clothes was brought to him at the provincial jail by Benedicto Rubio.
Appellant likewise declared that he had been detained at the provincial jail since January 27, 1994
but the warrant for his arrest was issued only on January 28, 1994; and that he did not submit a
counter-affidavit because according to his former counsel, Atty. Paredes, it was no longer necessary
since the complainants had already executed an affidavit of desistance. He admits having signed a
"Waiver of Right to Preliminary Investigation" in connection with these cases.
On rebuttal, Lorna Casantosan, the cousin of Mia Taha, denied that she delivered any letter to
appellant when the latter was still detained at the provincial jail. She admitted, on cross-
examination, that she was requested by Mia Taha to testify for her, although she clarified that she
does not have any quarrel or misunderstanding with appellant.
Mia Taha was again presented on rebuttal and she denied the testimony of Erna Baradero regarding
the incident at the Orchids Room because, according to her, the truth was that she was at the
boarding house of Toto Zapanta on that date and time. She likewise negated the claim that Erna
Baradero confronted her on January 21, 1994 about her alleged relationship with appellant
contending that she did not see her former teacher on that day. Similarly, she disclaimed having seen
and talked to Filemona Pielago on the night of January 21, 1994. She vehemently disavowed that she
and appellant were lovers, much less with intimate relations, since there never was a time that they
became sweethearts.
She sought to rebut, likewise through bare denials, the following testimonies of the defense
witnesses: that she told appellant "iwanan mo ang iyong asawa at tatakas tayo;" that she answered
"wala kang pakialam" when Erna Baradero confronted her about her relationship with appellant;
that she was the one who registered them at Sunset Garden and paid for their bill; that appellant left
her at Sunset Garden to go to Ipil on January 22, 1994; that Isagani Virey came to their room and
stayed there for five minutes, because the only other person who went there was the room boy who
served their food; that they went to the house of Virey's aunt requesting help for transportation; and
that she was free to roam around or to go out of the lodging house at Edward's Subdivision.
Mia Taha also rejected as false the testimony of appellant that she went to see him at Narra, Palawan
to have sex with him and claims that the last time she went to Narra was when she was still in Grade
VI; that she ever told him "I love you, sabik no sabik ako sa iyo" when she allegedly went to Narra;
that she wrote to him, since the letters marked as Exhibits "1" and "2" are not hers; that she
threatened to commit suicide if appellant would leave her since she never brought a blade with her;
and that at Sunset Garden and at Edward's Subdivison, she was not being guarded by appellant.
However, on cross-examination, complainant identified her signature on her test paper marked as
Exhibit "4" and admitted that the signature thereon is exactly the same as that appearing on Exhibits
"1" and "2". Then, contradicting her previous disclaimers, she also admitted that the handwriting on
Exhibits "1" and "2" all belong to her.
On sur-rebuttal, Armando Pasion, a provincial guard of the Provincial Jail, Palawan who volunteered
to testify in these cases, identified Lorna Casantosan as the person who visited appellant in jail on
February 27, 1994 at around 4:00 P.M. Since he was on duty at that time, he asked her what she
wanted and she said she would just visit appellant. Pasion then called appellant and told him he had
a visitor. Lorna Casantosan and appellant talked at the visiting area which is around ten meters away
from his post, and then he saw her hand over to appellant a letter which the latter immediately read.
This witness declared that appellant never requested him to testify.
Another sur-rebuttal witness, Desmond Selga, a jeepney driver, testified that in the afternoon of
January 22, 1994, he was plying his regular route in going to Brooke's Point and, when he passed by
Ipilan, he picked up appellant and Mia Taha. At that time, there were already several passengers
inside his jeepney. The two got off at the poblacion market. He denied that he brought them to the
Sunset Garden.
On May 20, 1994, the court a quo rendered judgment5 finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crimes of rape and kidnapping with serious illegal detention, and sentencing him to the
maximum penalty of death in both cases.6 By reason of the nature of the penalty imposed, these cases
were elevated to this Court on automatic review.
The records show that, on the basis of the complaints for rape 7 and kidnapping with serious illegal
detention8 filed by Mia Taha and Helen Taha, respectively, the Municipal Trial Court of Brooke's
Point issued a resolution9 on February 4, 1994 finding the existence of a prima facie case against
appellant. On February 10, 1994, the spouses Adjeril Taha and Helen Taha executed an affidavit of
desistance withdrawing the charge of kidnapping with serious illegal detention. 10 However, pursuant
to a joint resolution11 issued on March 11, 1994 by Prosecutor II Reynaldo R. Guayco of the Office of
the Provincial Prosecutor, two separate informations for rape and for kidnapping with serious illegal
detention were nevertheless filed against appellant Danny Godoy with no bail recommended in both
charges.
Appellant is now before us seeking the reversal of the judgment of the court below, on the following
assignment of errors:
I. The trial court erred in convicting the accused-appellant (of) the crime of rape
despite the fact that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.
II. The trial court erred by failing to adhere to the doctrine/principle in
reviewing the evidence adduced in a prosecution for the crime of rape as cited in
its decision reiterating the case of People vs. Calixto (193 SCRA 303).
III. The trial court erred in concluding that the accused-appellant had
consummated the crime of rape against private complainant.
IV. The trial court erred by its failure to give any credence to Exhibits "1" and "2"
as evidence of the defense.
20
V. The trial court erred in convicting the accused-appellant of the crime of
kidnapping with serious illegal detention as the prosecution failed to prove his
guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
VI. The trial court erred in giving full faith and credence to the testimonies of
prosecution witnesses and completely ignoring the testimonies of the defense
witnesses.
VII. The trial court erred in concluding that there was implied admission of guilt
on the part of the accused-appellant in view of the offer to compromise.
VIII. The trial court erred in ordering that the complainant be indemnified in the
sum of one hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) for each of the alleged
crimes committed.
IX. The trial court gravely erred by imposing the death penalty for each of the
crimes charged on the accused-appellant despite the fact that the crimes were
allegedly committed prior to the effectivity of Republic Act No. 7659. 12
A. The Rape Case
A rape charge is a serious matter with pernicious consequences. It exposes both the accused and the
accuser to humiliation, fear and anxieties, not to mention the stigma of shame that both have to bear
for the rest of their
lives.13 By the very nature of the crime of rape, conviction or acquittal depends almost entirely on the
credibility of the complainant's testimony because of the fact that usually only the participants can
testify as to its occurrence. 14This notwithstanding, the basic rule remains that in all criminal
prosecutions without regard to the nature of the defense which the accused may raise, the burden of
proof remains at all times upon the prosecution to establish his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. If
the accused raises a sufficient doubt as to any material element, and the prosecution is then unable to
overcome this evidence, the prosecution has failed to carry its burden of proof of the guilt of the
accused beyond a reasonable doubt and the accused must be acquitted. 15
The rationale for the rule is that, confronted by the full panoply of State authority, the accused is
accorded the presumption of innocence to lighten and even reverse the heavy odds against him. Mere
accusation is not enough to convict him, and neither is the weakness of his defense. The evidence for
the prosecution must be strong per se, strong enough to establish the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt.16 In other words, the accused may be convicted on the basis of the lone
uncorroborated testimony of the offended woman, provided such testimony is clear, positive,
convincing and otherwise consistent with human nature and the normal course of things.
There are three well-known principles that guide an appellate court in reviewing the evidence
presented in a prosecution for the crime of rape. These are: (1) while rape is a most detestable crime,
and ought to be severely and impartially punished, it must be borne in mind that it is an accusation
easy to be made, hard to be proved, but harder to be defended by the party accused, though
innocent;17 (2) that in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime of rape where only two persons are
usually involved, the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with extreme caution; 18 and
(3) that the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits and cannot be allowed
to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense. 19
In the case at bar, several circumstances exist which amply demonstrate and ineluctably convince
this Court that there was no rape committed on the alleged date and place, and that the charge of
rape was the contrivance of an afterthought, rather than a truthful plaint for redress of an actual
wrong.
I. Two principal facts indispensably to be proven beyond reasonable doubt for conviction of the crime
of rape under paragraph (1), Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code are, first, that the accused had
carnal knowledge of the complainant; and, second, that the same was accomplished through force or
intimidation.
1. The prosecution has palpably failed to prove beyond peradventure of doubt that appellant had
sexual congress with complainant against her will. Complainant avers that on the night of January
21, 1994, she was sexually assaulted by appellant in the boarding house of her cousin, Merlelyn
Casantosan. Appellant, on the other hand, denied such a serious imputation and contends that on
said date and time, he merely talked with complainant outside that house. We find appellant's This is even consonant with her testimony that appellant fetched her the following day in order to
version more credible and sustained by the evidence presented and of record. solicit funds for her candidacy in that same school affair.

According to complainant, when she entered the kitchen of the boarding house, appellant was
already inside apparently waiting for her. If so, it is quite perplexing how appellant could have known
that she was going there on that particular day and at that time, considering that she does not even
live there, unless of course it was appellant's intention to satisfy his lustful desires on anybody who
happened to come along. But then this would be stretching the imagination too far, aside from the
fact that such a generic intent with an indeterminate victim was never established nor even intimated
by the prosecution.
Moreover, any accord of credit to the complainant's story is precluded by the implausibility that
plagues it as regards the setting of the supposed sexual assault. 20 It will be noted that the place where
the alleged crime was committed is not an ordinary residence but a boarding house where several
persons live and where people are expected to come and go. The prosecution did not even bother to
elucidate on whether it was the semestral break or that the boarding house had remained closed for
some time, in order that it could be safely assumed that nobody was expected to arrive at any given
time.
In contrast, complainant's professed reason for going to the boarding house is vague and tenuous. At
first, she asserted that she was at the boarding house talking with a friend and then, later, she said it
was her cousin. Subsequently, she again wavered and said that she was not able to talk to her cousin.
Furthermore, she initially stated that on January 21, 1994 at around 7:00 P.M., she was at the
boarding house conversing with her cousin. Then in the course of her narration, she gave another
version and said that when she reached the boarding house it was dark and there was nobody inside.
The apparent ease with which she changed or adjusted her answers in order to cover up or realign
the same with her prior inconsistent statements is readily apparent from her testimony even on this
single episode, thus:
Q Sometime on January 21, 1994, at about 7:00 o'clock in
the evening, do you remember where you were?
A Yes, sir.

Appellant, on the other hand, testified that on that fateful day, he went to the boarding house upon Q Where were you?
the invitation of complainant because the latter requested him to help her with her monologue for
the Miss PNS contest. However, they were not able to go inside the house because it was locked and A I was in the boarding house of Merlylyn Casantosan, Sir.
there was no light, so they just sat on a bench outside the house and talked. This testimony of
xxx xxx xxx
appellant was substantially corroborated by defense witness Filomena Pielago. She affirmed that in
the evening of January 21, 1994, she saw both appellant and complainant seated on a bench outside Q Why were you there?
the boarding house, and that she even advised them to go home because it was already late and
appellant's wife, who was the head teacher of witness Pielago, was waiting for him at the school A I was conversing with my friend there, Sir.
building. On rebuttal, complainant could only deny that she saw Pielago that night. Doctrinally,
where the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or more explanations one of which COURT:
is consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other consistent with his guilt, then the
evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty and is not sufficient to support a conviction. 21 Q Conversing with whom?

It was further alleged by complainant that after her alleged ravishment, she put on her panty and A With my cousin, Your Honor.
then appellant openly accompanied her all the way to the gate of the house where they eventually
parted ways. This is inconceivable. It is not the natural tendency of a man to remain for long by the Q Your cousin's name?
side of the woman he had raped,22and in public in a highly populated area at that. Given the stealth
that accompanies it and the anxiety to end further exposure at the scene, the logical post-incident A Merlylyn Casantosan, Your Honor.
impulse of the felon is to distance himself from his victim as far and as soon as practicable, to avoid
discovery and apprehension. It is to be expected that one who is guilty of a crime would want to xxx xxx xxx
dissociate himself from the person of his victim, the scene of the crime, and from all other things and
PROSECUTOR GUAYCO:
circumstances related to the offense which could possibly implicate him or give rise to even the
slightest suspicion as to his guilt. Verily, the guilty flee where no man pursueth. Q You said that this Dane or Danny Godoy raped you, will
you please relate to this Honorable Court how that rape
It is of common knowledge that facts which prove or tend to prove that the accused was at the scene
happened?
of the crime are admissible as relevant, on the theory that such presence can be appreciated as a
circumstance tending to identify the appellant.23 Consequently, it is not in accord with human A On Friday and it was 7:00 o'clock in the evening.
experience for appellant to have let himself be seen with the complainant immediately after he had
allegedly raped her.24 It thus behooves this Court to reject the notion that appellant would be so COURT:
foolhardy as to accompany complainant up to the gate of the house, considering its strategic
location vis-a-vis complainant's boarding house which is just across the street, 25 and the PNS Q Of what date?
schoolbuilding which is only around thirty meters away. 26
A January 21, 1994, Your Honor.
Complainant mentioned in her narration that right after the incident she went directly to her
boarding house where she saw her landlady. Yet, the landlady was never presented as a witness to xxx xxx xxx
corroborate the story of complainant, despite the fact that the former was the very first person she
came in contact with from the time appellant allegedly left her at the gate of the Casantosan boarding PROSECUTOR GUAYCO:
house after her alleged traumatic ordeal. Even though they supposedly did not talk, the landlady
could at least have testified on complainant's physical appearance and to attest to the theorized fact Q Then what happened?
that indeed she saw complainant on said date and hour, possibly with dishevelled hair, bloody skirt
and all. A I went to the boarding house of my cousin Merlylyn
Casantosan. I passed (through) the kitchen and then when I
We are, therefore, justifiedly inclined to believe appellant's version that it was Mia Taha who invited opened the door somebody grabbed me suddenly.
him to the boarding house to help her with the monologue she was preparing for the school contest.
xxx xxx xxx
21
 Q During that time were there other people present in that
boarding house where you said Danny Godoy raped you?
A None, Sir.
COURT:
Q So, the house was empty?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q I thought your cousin was there and you were conversing?
A When I went there she was not there, Your
Honor.27 (Corrections and emphasis supplied.)
2. Complainant testified that appellant raped her through the use of force and intimidation,
specifically by holding a knife to her neck. However, the element of force was not sufficiently
established. The physical facts adverted to by the lower court as corroborative of the prosecution's
theory on the use of force are undoubtedly the medico-legal findings of Dr. Rogelio Divinagracia.
Upon closer scrutiny, however, we find that said findings neither support nor confirm the charge that
rape was so committed through forcible means by appellant against complainant on January 21,
1994.
The reported hymenal laceration which, according to Dr. Divinagracia, was a week old and already
healed, and the conclusion therefrom that complainant had sexual intercourse with a man on the
date which she alleged, do not establish the supposed rape since the same findings and conclusion
are likewise consistent with appellant's admission that coitus took place with the consent of
complainant at Sunset Garden on January 24, 1994.28 Further, rather than substantiating the
prosecution's aforesaid theory and the supposed date of commission of rape, the finding that there
were no evident signs of extra-genital injuries tends, instead, to lend more credence to appellant's
claim of voluntary coition on a later date and the absence of a struggle or the lack of employment of
physical force.29In rape of the nature alleged in this case, we repeat, the testimony of the complainant
must be corroborated by physical evidence showing use of force. 30
Thus, on the basis of the laceration inflicted, which is superficial at 6 o'clock position, the aforesaid
medico-legal expert opined that it could not be categorically stated that there was force involved. On
further questioning, he gave a straightforward answer that force was not applied. 31 He also added
that when he examined the patient bodily, he did not see any sign of bruises. 32 The absence of any
sign of physical violence on the complainant's body is an indication of complainant's consent to the
act.33 While the absence in the medical certificate of external signs of physical injuries on the victim
does not necessarily negate the commission of rape,34 the instant case is clearly an exception to this
rule since appellant has successfully cast doubt on the veracity of that charge against him.
Even granting ex gratia argumenti that the medical report and the laceration corroborated
complainant's assertion that there was sexual intercourse, of course the same cannot be said as to the
alleged use of force. It has been held that such corroborative evidence is not considered sufficient,
since proof of facts constituting one principal element of the crime is not corroborative proof of facts
necessary to constitute another equally important element of the crime. 35
Complainant testified that she struggled a little but it was not really strong because she was afraid of
appellant. Again assuming that a sexual assault did take place as she claims, we nevertheless strongly
believe that her supposed fear is more imaginary than real. It is evident that complainant did not use
the manifest resistance expected of a woman defending her honor and chastity. 36 She failed to make
any outcry when appellant allegedly grabbed her and dragged her inside the house. There is likewise
no evidence on record that she put up a struggle when appellant forced her to lie on the floor,
removed her panty, opened the zipper of his trousers, and inserted his organ inside her genitals.
Neither did she demonstrate that appellant, in committing the heinous act, subjected her to any force
of whatever nature or form.
Complainant's explanation for her failure to shout or struggle is too conveniently general and
ruefully unconvincing to make this Court believe that she tenaciously resisted the alleged sexual
attack on her by appellant. And, if ever she did put up any struggle or objected at all to the
involuntary intercourse, such was not enough to show the kind of resistance expected of a woman
22
defending her virtue and honor.37 Her failure to do anything while allegedly being raped renders
doubtful her charge of rape,38 especially when we consider the actual mise-en-scene in the context of
her asseverations.
There is a rule that the rape victim's panty and blood-stained dress are not essential, and need not be
presented, as they are not indispensable evidence to prove rape. 39 We incline to the view, however,
that this general rule holds true only if there exist other corroborative evidence sufficiently and
convincingly proving the rape charge beyond reasonable doubt. The rule should go the other way
where, as in the present case, the testimony of complainant is inherently weak and no other physical
evidence has been presented to bolster the charge of sexual abuse except for the medical report
which, as earlier discussed, even negated the existence of one of the essential elements of the crime.
We cannot, therefore, escape the irresistible conclusion that the deliberate non-presentation of
complainant's blood-stained skirt, if it did exist, should vigorously militate against the prosecution's
cause.
II. The conduct of the outraged woman immediately following the alleged assault is of the utmost
importance as tending to establish the truth or falsity of the charge. It may well be doubted whether a
conviction for the offense of rape should even be sustained from the uncorroborated testimony of the
woman unless the court is satisfied beyond doubt that her conduct at the time when the alleged rape
was committed and immediately thereafter was such as might be reasonably expected from her
under all the circumstances of the
case. 40
Complainant said that on the day following the supposed rape, appellant went to her parents' house
and asked permission from them to allow her to go with him to solicit funds for her candidacy.
Nowhere throughout her entire testimony did she aver or imply that appellant was armed and that by
reason thereof she was forced to leave with him. In brief, she was neither threatened nor intimidated
by appellant. Her pretense that she was afraid of the supposed threat previously made by appellant
does not inspire belief since appellant was alone and unarmed on that occasion and there was no
showing of any opportunity for him to make good his threat, even assuming that he had really voiced
any. On the contrary, complainant even admitted that appellant respectfully asked permission from
her parents for her to accompany him.
Complainant's enigmatic behavior after her alleged ravishment can only be described as paradoxical:
it was so strangely normal as to be abnormal.41 It seems odd, if not incredible, that upon seeing the
person who had allegedly raped her only the day before, she did not accuse, revile or denounce him,
or show rage, revulsion, and disgust.42Instead, she meekly went with appellant despite the presence
of her parents and the proximity of neighbors which, if only for such facts, would naturally have
deterred appellant from pursuing any evil design. From her deportment, it does not appear that the
alleged threat made by appellant had instilled any fear in the mind of complainant. Such a
nonchalant, unconcerned attitude is totally at odds with the demeanor that would naturally be
expected of a person who had just suffered the ultimate invasion of her womanhood. 43
III. Rape is a very emotional word, and the natural human reactions to it are categorical: admiration
and sympathy for the courageous female publicly seeking retribution for her outrageous violation,
and condemnation of the rapist. However, being interpreters of the law and dispensers of justice,
judges must look at a rape charge without those proclivities, and deal with it with extreme caution
and circumspection. Judges must free themselves of the natural tendency to be overprotective of
every woman decrying her having been sexually abused, and demanding punishment for the abuser.
While they ought to be cognizant of the anguish and humiliation the rape victim goes through as she
demands justice, judges should equally bear in mind that their responsibility is to render justice
based on the law.44
The rule, therefore, that this Court generally desists from disturbing the conclusions of the trial court
on the credibility of witnesses45 will not apply where the evidence of record fails to support or
substantiate the lower court's findings of fact and conclusions; or where the lower court overlooked
certain facts of substance and value that, if considered, would affect the outcome of the case; or
where the disputed decision is based on a misapprehension of facts. 46
The trial court here unfortunately relied solely on the lone testimony of complainant regarding the
January 21, 1994 incident. Indeed, it is easy to allege that one was raped by a man. All that the victim
had to testify to was that appellant poked a knife at her, threatened to kill her if she shouted and
under these threats, undressed her and had sexual intercourse with her. The question then that
confronts the trial court is whether or not complainant's testimony is credible. 47 The technique in
deciphering testimony is not to solely concentrate on isolated parts of that testimony. The correct
meaning of the testimony can often be ascertained only upon a perusal of the entire testimony.
Everything stated by the witness has to be considered in relation to what else has been stated. 48
In the case at bar, the challenged decision definitely leaves much to be desired. The court below
made no serious effort to dispassionately or impartially consider the totality of the evidence for the
prosecution in spite of the teaching in various rulings that in rape cases, the testimony of the
offended party must not be accepted with precipitate credulity. 49 In finding that the crime of rape was
committed, the lower court took into account only that portion of the testimony of complainant
regarding the January 21, 1994 incident and conveniently deleted the rest. Taken singly, there would
be reason to believe that she was indeed raped. But if we are to consider the other portions of her
testimony concerning the events which transpired thereafter, which unfortunately the court a
quo wittingly or unwittingly failed or declined to appreciate, the actual truth could have been readily
exposed.
There are easily perceived or discernible defects in complainant's testimony which inveigh against its
being accorded the full credit it was given by the trial court. Considered independently of any other,
the defects might not suffice to overturn the trial court's judgment of conviction; but assessed and
weighed conjointly, as logic and fairness dictate, they exert a powerful compulsion towards reversal
of said judgment.50 Thus:
1. Complainant said that she was continuously raped by herein appellant at the Sunset Garden and
around three times at Edward's Subdivision. In her sworn statement she made the same allegations.
If this were true, it is inconceivable how the investigating prosecutor could have overlooked these
facts with their obvious legal implications and, instead, filed an information charging appellant with
only one count of rape. The incredibility of complainant's representations is further magnified by the
fact that even the trial court did not believe it, as may be inferred from its failure to consider this
aspect of her testimony, unless we were to uncharitably assume that it was similarly befuddled.
2. She claims that appellant always carried a knife, but it was never explained how she was
threatened with the same in such a manner that she was allegedly always cowed into giving in to his
innumerable sexual demands. We are not unaware that in rape cases, this claim that complainant
now advances appears to be a common testimonial expedient and face-saving subterfuge.
3. According to her, they stayed at Sunset Garden for three days and three nights and that she never
noticed if appellant slept because she never saw him close his eyes. Yet, when asked if she slept side
by side with appellant, complainant admitted that everytime she woke up, appellant was invariably
in bed beside her.51
4. She alleged that she could never go out of the room because it was always locked and it could not
be opened from the inside. But, this was refuted by complainant's own testimony, as follows:
Q And yet the door could be opened by you from the inside?
A No, Sir, it was locked.
Q Can you describe the lock of that room?
A It's like that of the door where there is a doorknob.
ATTY. EBOL:
Let it be recorded that the lock is a doorknob and may I ask
that the door be locked and opened from the inside.
COURT:
Alright (sic) you go down the witness stand and find out for
yourself if you can open that door from the inside.
CLERK OF COURT:
Witness holding the doorknob.
23
COURT:
The key is made to open if you are outside, but as you're
were (sic) inside you can open it?
A Yes, sir.
Q Is there no other lock aside from that doorknob that you
held?
A There was, Your Honor.
Q What is that?
A The one that slides, Your Honor.
Q And that is used when you are already inside?
A Yes, Your Honor.52 (Emphases ours.)
5. During their entire stay at the Sunset Garden or even at Edward's Subdivision, beyond supposedly
offering token or futile resistance to the latter's sexual advances, she made no outcry, no attempt to
flee or attract attention to her plight.53 In her own declaration, complainant mentioned that when
they checked in at Sunset Garden, she saw the cashier at the information counter where appellant
registered. She did not do anything, despite the fact that appellant at that time was admittedly not
armed. She likewise stated that a room boy usually went to their room and brought them food. If
indeed she was bent on fleeing from appellant, she could have grabbed every possible opportunity to
escape. Inexplicably, she did not. What likewise appears puzzling is the prosecution's failure to
present these two people she mentioned and whose testimonies could have bolstered or corroborated
complainant's story.
6. When appellant fetched complainant in the afternoon of January 22, 1994, they left the house
together and walked in going to the highway. In her own testimony, complainant stated that
appellant went ahead of her. It is highly improbable, if appellant really had evil motives, that he
would be that careless. It is likewise beyond comprehension that appellant was capable of instilling
such fear in complainant that she could not dare take advantage of the situation, in spite of the laxity
of appellant, and run as far away from him as possible despite all the chances therefor.
7. Helen Taha, the mother of Mia, testified that as a result of the filing of the rape case, complainant
was dropped from school and was not allowed to graduate. This is absurd. Rather than support and
commiserate with the ill-fated victim of rape, it would appear that the school authorities were
heartless people who turned their backs on her and considered her an outcast. That would be adding
insult to injury. But what is more abstruse yet significant is that Mia and her parents were never
heard to complain about this apparent injustice. Such complacency cannot but make one think and
conclude that there must necessarily have been a valid justification for the drastic action taken by the
school and the docile submission thereto by the Taha family.
On the other hand, in evaluating appellant's testimony, the trial court's decision was replete with
sweeping statements and generalizations. It chose to focus on certain portions of appellant's
testimony, declared them to be preposterous and abnormal, and then hastened to conclude that
appellant is indeed guilty. The court in effect rendered a judgment of conviction based, not on the
strength of the prosecution's evidence, but on the weakness of that of the defense, which is totally
repugnant to the elementary and time-honored rule that conviction should be made on the basis of
strong, clear and compelling evidence of the prosecution. 54
IV. The main defense proffered by appellant is that he and complainant were sweethearts. While the
"sweetheart theory" does not often gain favor with this Court, such is not always the case if the hard
fact is that the accused and the supposed victim are, in truth, intimately related except that, as is
usual in most cases, either the relationship is illicit or the victim's parents are against it. It is not
improbable that in some instances, when the relationship is uncovered, the alleged victim or her
parents for that matter would rather take the risk of instituting a criminal action in the hope that the
court would take the cudgels for them than for the woman to admit to her own acts of indiscretion.
And this, as the records reveal, is precisely what happened to appellant.
Appellant's claim that he and complainant were lovers is fortified by the highly credible testimonies
of several witnesses for the defense, viz.:
1. Filomena Pielago testified that on the night of January 21, 1994, she saw appellant and
complainant sitting on a bench in front of the house where the sexual attack allegedly took place, and
the couple were talking intimately. She had warned Mia about the latter's illicit affair with appellant.
2. Fernando Rubio, an acquaintance of appellant and owner of the house at Edward's Subdivision,
testified that he asked Mia why she decided to have an affair with appellant who is a married man.
Mia answered that she really loves him.55 He heard her call appellant "Papa".56 The couple looked
happy and were sweet to each other.57
3. Benedicto Rubio, the younger brother of Fernando, testified on redirect examination that he asked
Mia if she knew what she getting into and she answered, "Yes;" then he asked her if she really loved
Sir Godoy, and she again answered in the affirmative. When he was trying to give counsel to
appellant, complainant announced that if appellant left her, she would commit suicide. 58 He could
see that the couple were happy together.59
4. Isagani Virey, who knew appellant because the Municipal Engineering Office where he worked was
located within the premises of PNS, attested that he was able to talk to the couple and that when he
was advising appellant that what he was doing is wrong because he is married and Mia is his student,
complainant reacted by saying that no matter what happened she would not leave Godoy, and that if
she went home her father would kill her.60 He also observed that they were happy.61
5. Erna Baradero, a co-teacher of appellant, saw the couple the day before the alleged rape incident,
inside one of the classrooms and they were holding hands, and she heard Mia tell appellant, "Mahal
na mahal kita Sir, iwanan mo ang iyong asawa at tatakas tayo." 62 She tried to dissuade complainant
from continuing with her relationship with appellant. 63
The positive allegations of appellant that he was having an intimate relationship with complainant,
which were substantially corroborated by several witnesses, were never successfully confuted. The
rebuttal testimony of complainant merely consisted of bare, unexplained denials of the positive,
definite, consistent and detailed assertions of appellant. 64 Mere denials are self-serving negative
evidence. They cannot obtain evidentiary weight greater than the declarations of credible
disinterested witnesses.65
Besides, appellant recounted certain facts that only he could have supplied. They were replete with
details which could have been known only to him, thereby lending credence and reliability
thereto.66 His assertions are more logical, probable and bear the earmarks of truth. This is not to say
that the testimony of appellant should be accorded full credence. His self-interest must have colored
his account, even on the assumption that he could be trusted to stick to the literal truth. Nonetheless,
there is much in his version that does not strain the limits of credulity. More to the point, there is
enough to raise doubts that do appear to have some basis in reality. 67
Thus, the trial court's hasty pontification that appellant's testimony is improbable, ridiculous,
nonsensical and incredible is highly uncalled for. The rule of falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus is not
mandatory. It is not a positive rule of law and is not an inflexible one. 68 It does not apply where there
is sufficient corroboration on many grounds of the testimony and the supposed inconsistencies arise
merely from a desire of the witness to exculpate himself although not completely. 69
Complainant's denial that she and appellant were lovers is belied by the evidence presented by the
defense, the most telling of which are her two handwritten letters, Exhibits "1" and "2", which she
sent to the latter while he was detained at the provincial jail. For analysis and emphasis, said letters
are herein quoted in full:
27 Feb. 94
Dane,
Kumusta kana? Kong ako hito hindi na makatiis sa sakit.
Sir, sumulat ako sa inyo dahil gusto kong malaman mo ang situation ko. Sir,
kong mahal mo ako gagawa kang paraan na mailayo ako dito sa bahay. nalaman
ng nanay at tatay ko na delayed ang mens ko ng one week. pinapainom nila ako
24
ng pampalaglag pero ayaw ko. pagnalaman nila na hindi ko ininom ang gamot
sinasaktan nila ako.
Sir, kong maari ay huwag ng maabutan ng Martes. dahil naabutan nila akong
maglayas sana ako. kaya ngayon hindi ako makalabas ng bahay kong wala akong
kasama, kong gaano sila kahigpit noon doble pa ngayon. ang mga gamit ko
ngayon ay wala sa lalagyan ko. tinago nila hindi ko makita, ang narito lang ay
ang bihisan kong luma. Sir kong manghiram ka kaya ng motor na gagamitin sa
pagkuha sa akin. Sa lunes ng gabi manonood kami Ng Veta eksakto alas 9:00 ay
dapat dito ka sa lugar na may Veta. tanungin mo lang kay Lorna kong saan ang
Veta nila Navoor Lozot. Mag busina ka lang ng tatlo bilang senyas na lalabas na
ako at huwag kang tatapat ng bahay dahil nandoon ang kuya ko. kong ano ang
disisyon mo maari bang magsulat ka at ipahatid kay Lorna.
alang-alang sa bata. Baka makainon ako ng gamot dahil baka pagkain ko
hahaluan nila.
Please sir . . .
(Sgd.)
3/1/94
Dane,
I'm sorry kong problem ang ipinadala o sinulat sa iyo sa halip sa kasiyahan. oo
nag usap na tayo nagawa ko lang naman ang sumulat sa iyo dahil naiinis na ako
sa pagmumukha ng mga magulang kong suwapang. Ang paglayas ko sana ay
dahil sa narinig ko. Sir narinig ko na magreklamo si nanay kay Arquero yong
superentende sa Palawan high tapos ang sabi ay magreklamo itong si Arquero sa
DECS para matanggal ka sa pagtuturo yan ang dahilan kong bakit naisipan kong
lumayas ng wala sa oras at wala akong tensyon na masama laban so iyo. hindi ko
sinabi sa kanila na delayed ako ay sinabi sa iyo ni Eden na sa harap niya mismo
binigyan ako ng gamot samantalang noong Sabado ng gabi lang nalaman dahil
gusto kong masuka. Oo aaminin ko nagkasala ako sa iyo, pinabilanggo kita dahil
nagpanig ako sa mga magulang ko nadala nila ako sa sulsul nila. hindi ko
naipaglaban ang dapat kong ipaglaban ngunit kong iniisip mong minahal lang
kita dahil sa may kailangan lang ako sa iyo nagkakamali ka. alam ng Diyos na
hindi ganon ang hangarin ko sa iyo. higit pa sa binilanggo ang kalagayan ko
kong alam mo. kinukunsinsiya, nagtitiis na saktan at pagsasakripisyo ng
damdamin ko na gusto kang makita at yakapin ka pero ano ang magagawa ko
kong ang paglabas ko ng bahay ay hindi ako makalabas ng mag isa may guardiya
pa. tanungin mo si Lorna kong ano ginagawa nilang pagbantay sa akin para
akong puganti. hindi ito ayon sa kagustuhan ng mga magulang ko sarili kong
plano ito. Magtitiis pa ba akong hindi makakain maghapon tubig lang ang laman
ng tiyan, kong may masama akong hangarin sa iyo.
Oo, magtiis ako para maipakita kong mahal rin kita. March 2 darating ako sa
bahay na sinasabi mo. hindi ko matiyak kong anong oras dahil kukuha pa ako ng
tiyempo na wala rito ang tatay ko. Alam mo bang pati ang kapatid kong si
Rowena ay inuutusan akong lumayas dahil naawa no siya sa situation ko. siya
lang ang kakampi ko rito sa bahay malaki ang pag-asa kong makalabas ako ng
bahay sa tulong niya.
Love you
(Sgd.) M
There is absolutely nothing left to the imagination. The letters eloquently speak for themselves. It
was complainant's handwriting which spilled the beans, so to speak. Aside from appellant, two other
defense witnesses identified the handwriting on the letters as belonging to Mia Taha. They are
Filomena Pielago and Erna Baradero who were admittedly the former teachers of complainant and
highly familiar with her handwriting. The greatest blunder committed by the trial court was in
ignoring the testimonies of these qualified witnesses and refusing to give any probative value to these
two vital pieces of evidence, on the dubious and lame pretext that no handwriting expert was
presented to analyze and evaluate the same.
Well-entrenched by now is the rule that resort to questioned document examiners, more familiarly
called handwriting experts, is not mandatory. Handwriting experts, while probably useful, are not
indispensable in examining or comparing handwriting. 72 This is so since under Section 22, Rule 132
of the Rules of Court, the handwriting of a person may be proved by any witness who believes it to be
the handwriting of such person, because he has seen the person write, or has seen writing purporting
to be his upon which the witness has acted or been charged, and has thus acquired knowledge of the
handwriting of such person. The said section further provides that evidence respecting the
handwriting may also be given by a comparison, made by the witness or the court, with writings
admitted or treated as genuine by the party against whom the evidence is offered or proved to be
genuine to the satisfaction of the judge.73
The defense witnesses were able to identify complainant's handwriting on the basis of the
examination papers submitted to them by her in their respective subjects. This Court has likewise
carefully examined and compared the handwriting on the letters with the standard writing appearing
on the test papers as specimens for comparison and, contrary to the observations and conclusions of
the lower court, we are convinced beyond doubt that they were written by one and the same person.
More importantly, complainant herself categorically admitted that the handwriting on the
questioned letters belongs to her.
It is, therefore, extremely disconcerting, to say the least, why the trial court again chose to turn a deaf
ear to this conclusive portion of complainant's testimony:
ATTY. EBOL:
Q Did I get you right on rebuttal that Mrs. Erna Baradero
and Filomena Pielago were your teachers?
A Yes, sir.
Q And they have been your teachers for several months
before this incident of January 21, 1994, am I not correct?
A That is true, sir.
Q And you have (sic) during these past months that they
have been your teachers you took examinations in their
classes in their particular subject(s)?
A Yes, sir.
Q And some of those test papers are in the possession of
your teachers, am I correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q I will show you Exhibit "4" previously marked as Exhibit
"4", it appears to be your test paper and with your signature
and the alphabet appears in this exhibit appears to be that
of Mia Taha, please examine this and tell the Honorable
Court if that is your test paper?
A Yes, sir.
Q That signature Mia Taha I understand is also your
signature?
A Yes, sir.
Q I will show you Exhibit "4-A", will you please examine this
Exhibit "4-A" and tell this Honorable Court if you are
familiar with that.
25
A What subject is that?
Q I am just asking you whether you are familiar with that.
A I cannot remember if I have this kind of subject, sir.
Q How about this signature Mia Taha, are you not familiar
with that signature?
A That is min(e), sir.
Q I will show you Exhibit "4-C" which appears to be that in
Math, are you familiar with that signature?
A Yes, sir.
Q That is your signature?
A Yes, sir.
Q In fact, these letters in alphabet here are in your own
handwriting?
A Yes, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q You will deny this Exhibit "1" your signature?
xxx xxx xxx
Q You will deny that this is your handwriting?
A That is my handwriting, sir.
Q Also Exhibit "2"?
A Yes, sir.74
While rebuttal witness Lorna Casantosan insisted that she never delivered any letter of complainant
to herein appellant, the witness presented by the defense on sur-rebuttal, Armando Pasion, who was
the guard on duty at the provincial jail at that time, testified of his own accord because he knew that
what Casantosan said was a blatant lie. Appellant never talked to Amando Pasion nor requested him
to testify for the defense, as related by the witness himself. Hence, there exists no reason whatsoever
to disbelieve the testimony of witness Pasion to the effect that Lorna Casantosan actually went to
visit appellant in jail and in truth handed to him what turned out to be the letters marked as Exhibits
"1" and "2" for the defense.
V. The prosecution insists that the offer of compromise made by appellant is deemed to be an
admission of guilt. This inference does not arise in the instant case. In criminal cases, an offer of
compromise is generally admissible as evidence against the party making it. It is a legal maxim,
which assuredly constitutes one of the bases of the right to penalize, that in the matter of public
crimes which directly affect the public interest, no compromise whatever may be entered into as
regards the penal action. It has long been held, however, that in such cases the accused is permitted
to show that the offer was not made under a consciousness of guilt, but merely to avoid the
inconvenience of imprisonment or for some other reason which would justify a claim by the accused
that the offer to compromise was not in truth an admission of his guilt or an attempt to avoid the
legal consequences which would ordinarily ensue therefrom. 75
A primary consideration here is that the evidence for the defense overwhelmingly proves appellant's
innocence of the offense charged. Further, the supposed offer of marriage did not come from
appellant but was actually suggested by a certain Naem, who is an imam or Muslim leader and who
likewise informed appellant that he could be converted into a Muslim so he could marry
complainant. As a matter of fact, when said offer was first made to appellant, he declined because of
the fact that he was already married. On top of these, appellant did not know, not until the trial
proper, that his mother actually paid P30,000.00 for the settlement of these cases. Complainant's
own mother, Helen Taha, testified that present during the negotiations were herself, her husband,
Mia, and appellant's mother. Appellant himself was never present in any of said meetings. 76
It has been held that where the accused was not present at the time the offer for monetary
consideration was made, such offer of compromise would not save the day for the prosecution. 77 In
another case, this Court ruled that no implied admission can be drawn from the efforts to arrive at a
settlement outside the court, where the accused did not take part in any of the negotiations and the
effort to settle the case was in accordance with the established tribal customs, that is, Muslim
practices and traditions, in an effort to prevent further deterioration of the relations between the
parties.78
VI. Generally, an affidavit of desistance by the complainant is not looked upon with favor. It may,
however, create serious doubts as to the liability of appellant, especially if it corroborates appellant's
explanation about the filing of criminal charges.79
In the cases at bar, the letters written by complainant to appellant are very revealing. Most probably
written out of desperation and exasperation with the way she was being treated by her parents,
complainant threw all caution to the winds when she wrote: "Oo, aaminin ko nagkasala ako sa iyo,
pinabilanggo kita dahil nagpanig ako sa mga magulang ko nadala nila ako sa sulsul nila, hindi ko
naipaglaban ang dapat kong ipaglaban," obviously referring to her ineptitude and impotence in
helping appellant out of his predicament. It could, therefore, be safely presumed that the rape charge
was merely an offshoot of the discovery by her parents of the intimate relationship between her and
appellant. In order to avoid retribution from her parents, together with the moral pressure exerted
upon her by her mother, she was forced to concoct her account of the alleged rape.
The Court takes judicial cognizance of the fact that in rural areas in the Philippines, young ladies are
strictly required to act with circumspection and prudence. Great caution is observed so that their
reputations shall remain untainted. Any breath of scandal which brings dishonor to their character
humiliates their entire families.80 It could precisely be that complainant's mother wanted to save face
in the community where everybody knows everybody else, and in an effort to conceal her daughter's
indiscretion and escape the wagging tongues of their small rural community, she had to weave the
scenario of this rape drama.
Although the trial court did observe that a mother would not sacrifice her daughter to tell a story of
defloration, that is not always the case as this Court has noted a long time ago. The books disclose too
many instances of false charges of rape.81 While this Court has, in numerous cases, affirmed the
judgments of conviction rendered by trial courts in rape charges, especially where the offended
parties were very young and presumptively had no ill motives to concoct a story just to secure
indictments for a crime as grave as rape, the Court has likewise reversed judgments of conviction and
acquitted the accused when there are strong indications pointing to the possibility that the rape
charges were merely motivated by some factors except the truth as to their commission. 82 This is a
case in point. The Court, therefore, cannot abdicate its duty to declare that the prosecution has failed
to meet the exacting test of moral certainty and proof of guilt of appellant beyond reasonable doubt.
This is not to say that the Court approves of the conduct of appellant. Indisputably, he took
advantage of complainant's feelings for him and breached his vow of fidelity to his wife. As her
teacher, he should have acted as adviser and counselor to complainant and helped her develop in
manners and virtue instead of corrupting her.83Hence, even as he is freed from physical detention in
a prison as an instrument of human justice, he remains in the spiritual confinement of his conscience
as a measure of divine retribution. Additionally, these ruminations do not rule out such other legal
options against him as may be available in the arsenal of statutory law.
VII. The trial court, in holding for conviction, relied on the presumptio hominis that a young Filipina
will not charge a person with rape if it is not true. In the process, however, it totally disregarded the
more paramount constitutional presumption that an accused is deemed innocent until proven
otherwise.
It frequently happens that in a particular case two or more presumptions are involved. Sometimes
the presumptions conflict, one tending to demonstrate the guilt of the accused and the other his
innocence. In such case, it is necessary to examine the basis for each presumption and determine
what logical or social basis exists for each presumption, and then determine which should be
regarded as the more important and entitled to prevail over the other. It must, however, be
remembered that the existence of a presumption indicating guilt does not in itself destroy the
26
presumption against innocence unless the inculpating presumption, together with all of the evidence,
or the lack of any evidence or explanation, is sufficient to overcome the presumption of innocence by
proving the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Until the defendant's guilt is shown in this
manner, the presumption of innocence continues.84
The rationale for the presumption of guilt in rape cases has been explained in this wise:
In rape cases especially, much credence is accorded the testimony of the
complaining witness, on the theory that she will not choose to accuse her
attacker at all and subject herself to the stigma and indignities her accusation
will entail unless she is telling the truth. The rape victim who decides to speak up
exposes herself as a woman whose virtue has been not only violated but also
irreparably sullied. In the eyes of a narrow-minded society, she becomes a
cheapened woman, never mind that she did not submit to her humiliation and
has in fact denounced her assailant. At the trial, she will be the object of
lascivious curiosity. People will want to be titillated by the intimate details of her
violation. She will squirm through her testimony as she describes how her honor
was defiled, relating every embarrassing movement of the intrusion upon the
most private parts of her body. Most frequently, the defense will argue that she
was not forced to submit but freely conjoined in the sexual act. Her motives will
be impugned. Her chastity will be challenged and maligned. Whatever the
outcome of the case, she will remain a tainted woman, a pariah because her
purity has been lost, albeit through no fault of hers. This is why many a rape
victim chooses instead to keep quiet, suppressing her helpless indignation rather
than denouncing her attacker. This is also the reason why, if a woman decides
instead to come out openly and point to her assailant, courts
are prone to believe that she is telling the truth regardless of its consequences. . .
.85
The presumption of innocence, on the other hand, is founded upon the first principles of justice, and
is not a mere form but a substantial part of the law. It is not overcome by mere suspicion or
conjecture; a probability that the defendant committed the crime; nor by the fact that he had the
opportunity to do so.86 Its purpose is to balance the scales in what would otherwise be an uneven
contest between the lone individual pitted against the People and all the resources at their command.
Its inexorable mandate is that, for all the authority and influence of the prosecution, the accused
must be acquitted and set free if his guilt cannot be proved beyond the whisper of a doubt. 87 This is in
consonance with the rule that conflicts in evidence must be resolved upon the theory of innocence
rather than upon a theory of guilt when it is possible to do so. 88
On the basis of the foregoing doctrinal tenets and principles, and in conjunction with the
overwhelming evidence in favor of herein appellant, we do not encounter any difficulty in concluding
that the constitutional presumption on the innocence of an accused must prevail in this particular
indictment.
B. The Kidnapping/Illegal Detention Case
It is basic that for kidnapping to exist, there must be indubitable proof that the actual intent of the
malefactor was to deprive the offended party of her liberty. 89 In the present charge for that crime,
such intent has not at all been established by the prosecution. Prescinding from the fact that the Taha
spouses desisted from pursuing this charge which they themselves instituted, several grave and
irreconcilable inconsistencies bedevil the prosecution's evidence thereon and cast serious doubts on
the guilt of appellant, as hereunder explained:
To recall, complainant testified that appellant by himself went to fetch her at her parents' house the
day after the alleged rape incident. In her own words, appellant courteously asked her parents to
permit her to help him solicit contributions for her candidacy. When they left the house, appellant
walked ahead of her, obviously with her parents and their neighbors witnessing their departure. It is
difficult to comprehend how one could deduce from these normal and innocuous arrangement any
felonious intent of appellant to deprive complainant of her liberty. One will look in vain for a case
where a kidnapping was committed under such inauspicious circumstances as described by
complainant.
Appellant declared that when they left the house of the Taha family, complainant was bringing with
her a plastic bag which later turned out to contain her clothes. This bag was left behind by Mia at
Edward's Subdivision, as hereinbefore noted, and was later delivered to appellant by Benedicto
Rubio. Again, we cannot conceive of a ridiculous situation where the kidnap victim was first allowed
to prepare and pack her clothes, as if she was merely leaving for a pleasant sojourn with the criminal,
all these with the knowledge and consent of her parents who passively looked on without comment.
Complainant alleged that appellant always kept her locked inside the room which they occupied,
whether at Sunset Garden or at Edward's Subdivision, and that she could not unlock the door from
the inside. We must, however, recall that when she was asked on cross-examination about the kind of
lock that was used, she pointed to the doorknob of the courtroom. The court then ordered that the
door of the courtroom be locked and then asked complainant to open it from the inside. She was
easily able to do so and, in fact, she admitted that the two locks in the room at Sunset Garden could
also be opened from the inside in the same manner. This demonstrably undeniable fact was never
assailed by the prosecution. It also failed to rebut the testimony of Fernando Rubio that the room
which was occupied by the couple at Edward's Subdivision could not even be locked because the lock
thereof was broken.
When the couple transferred to Edward's Subdivision, they walked along the national highway in
broad daylight. Complainant, therefore, had more than ample opportunity to seek the help of other
people and free herself from appellant if it were true that she was forcibly kidnapped and abused by
the latter.90 In fact, several opportunities to do so had presented themselves from the time they left
complainant's home and during their extended stay in the hotel and in the lodging house.
According to appellant, he went to see the parents of complainant the day after they went to Sunset
Garden to inform them that Mia spent the night in said place. This was neither denied nor impugned
by Helen Taha, her husband, or any other person. On the other hand, the allegation of Helen Taha
that she made a report to the police about her missing daughter was not supported by any
corroborative evidence, such as the police blotter, nor was the police officer to whom she allegedly
reported the incident ever identified or presented in court.
We agree with appellant's contention that the prosecution failed to prove any motive on his part for
the commission of the crime charged. In one case, this Court rejected the kidnapping charge where
there was not the slightest hint of a motive for the crime. 91 It is true that, as a rule, the motive of the
accused in a criminal case is immaterial and, not being an element of a crime, it does not have to be
proved.92 Where, however, the evidence is weak, without any motive being disclosed by the evidence,
the guilt of the accused becomes open to a reasonable doubt and, hence, an acquittal is in
order.93 Nowhere in the testimony of either the complainant or her mother can any ill motive of a
criminal nature be reasonably drawn. What actually transpired was an elopement or a lovers' tryst,
immoral though it may be.
fall into error in judging the relevancy of proof where a fair and logical
connection is in fact shown. When such a mistake is made and the proof is
erroneously ruled out, the Supreme Court, upon appeal, often finds itself
embarrassed and possibly unable to correct the effects of the error without
returning the case for a new trial, a step which this court is always very loath to
take. On the other hand, the admission of proof in a court of first instance, even
if the question as to its form, materiality, or relevancy is doubtful, can never
result in much harm to either litigant, because the trial judge is supposed to
know the law and it is its duty, upon final consideration of the case, to
distinguish the relevant and material from the irrelevant and immaterial. If this
course is followed and the cause is prosecuted to the Supreme Court upon
appeal, this court then has all the materials before it necessary to make a correct
judgment.94
At any rate, despite that procedural lapse, we find in the records of these cases sufficient and
substantial evidence which warrant and demand the acquittal of appellant. Apropos thereto, we take
this opportunity to repeat this age-old observation and experience of mankind on the penological and
societal effect of capital punishment: If it is justified, it serves as a deterrent; if injudiciously
imposed, it generates resentment.
Finally, we are constrained to reiterate here that Republic Act No. 7659 which reimposed the death
penalty on certain heinous crimes took effect on December 31, 1993, that is, fifteen days after its
publication in the December 16, 1993 issues of the Manila Bulletin, Philippine Star, Malaya and
Philippine Times Journal,95 and not on January 1, 1994 as is sometimes misinterpreted.
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and accused-
appellant Danny Godoy is hereby ACQUITTED of the crimes of rape and kidnapping with serious
illegal detention charged in Criminal Cases Nos. 11640 and 11641 of the Regional Trial Court for
Palawan and Puerto Princesa City, Branch 49. It is hereby ORDERED that he be released forthwith,
unless he is otherwise detained for any other valid cause.
SO ORDERED.

As a closing note, we are bewildered by the trial court's refusal to admit in evidence the bag of clothes
belonging to complainant which was presented and duly identified by the defense, on its announced
supposition that the clothes could have easily been bought from a department store. Such
preposterous reasoning founded on a mere surmise or speculation, aside from the fact that on
rebuttal the prosecution did not even seek to elicit an explanation or clarification from complainant
about said clothes, strengthens and reinforces our impression of an apparently whimsical exercise of
discretion by the court below. Matters which could have been easily verified were thus cavalierly
dismissed and supplanted by a conjecture, and on such inferential basis a conclusion was then drawn
by said court.

We accordingly deem it necessary to reiterate an early and highly regarded disquisition of this Court
against the practice of excluding evidence in the erroneous manner adopted by the trial court:

It has been observed that justice is most effectively and expeditiously

administered where trivial objections to the admission of proof are received with
least favor. The practice of excluding evidence on doubtful objections to its
materiality or technical objections to the form of the questions should be
avoided. In a case of any intricacy it is impossible for a judge of first instance, in
the early stages of the development of the proof, to know with any certainty
whether the testimony is relevant or not; and where there is no indication of bad
faith on the part of the attorney offering the evidence, the court may as a rule
safely accept the testimony upon the statement of the attorney that the proof
offered will be connected later. Moreover, it must be remembered that in the
heat of the battle over which he presides, a judge of first instance may possibly

27

[G.R. No. 151205. June 9, 2004]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. MARLOW DE GUZMAN y DELA
CRUZ and JESUS VILLANUEVA y CALMA, appellants.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
This is an automatic review of the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Malabon Branch 72 in
Criminal Case No. 24671-MN finding the two accused, Marlow De Guzman y Dela Cruz and Jesus
Villanueva y Calma, guilty of violation of Section 15, Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended
by Republic Act No. 7659.
The accused were charged with the crime of drug pushing in an Information that states:
That on or about the 23rd day of March 2001, in the City of Malabon, Metro Manila, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating
and helping with one another, being a police officer and private person respectively and without
authority of law, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell and deliver in
consideration of the amount of Two pieces of Five Hundred Peso Bill and mixed with bundles of
boodle money to a poseur-buyer white crystalline substance contained in two (2) big resealable
plastic bags with markings RSF-1 and RSF-2 Net Weight of RSF-1 1,049.27 grams and Net Weight of
RSF -2 1,054.86 grams with a total Net Weight of 2,104.13 grams which substances when subjected
to chemistry examination gave positive results for EPHEDRINE HYDROCHLORIDE and
METHAMPHETAMINE HYDROCHLORIDE for the contents of RSF-1 and EPHEDRINE
HYDROCHLORIDE for the contents of RSF-2otherwise known as shabu which are both regulated
drugs.
The prosecution relied on the testimony of NBI Agent Charlemagne Veloso who apprehended
the accused in a buy-bust operation conducted on March 23, 2001 in Malabon, Metro
Manila. Veloso, a member of the Special Task Force Division, testified that on March 22, 2001, an
informant reported that he had set a deal with a certain Mr. Chang for the purchase of two kilos of
shabu for P1,000,000.00. The transaction was set at noontime of March 23, 2001 at Wendys
Restaurant along Edsa, Caloocan City. A team of NBI personnel consisting of Atty. Reynaldo
Esmeralda, Dominador Villanueva, Rommel Vallejo, Eric Isidoro, Rolan Fernandez, Job Gayas and
Veloso himself, planned a buy-bust operation against Mr. Chang. Veloso was designated as poseur-
buyer and the team prepared the marked money mixed with bundles of boodle money to be used in
the operation. In the morning of March 23, 2001, the team proceeded to the agreed meeting place,
bringing with them the marked money. The members of the team boarded separate vehicles going to
Wendys. Veloso and the informant used a private van while the rest of the team rode in two other
vehicles. Upon reaching the area, the team coordinated with the local police of Caloocan City. Veloso
and the informant entered the restaurant where they met a man who introduced himself as Walter
Sy. He was, however, later identified as Marlow De Guzman, a member of the Philippine National
Police (PNP), from his official ID which was seized after his apprehension. After some small talk, De
Guzman demanded to see the money. Veloso showed him the P500.00 bill mixed with boodle
money. De Guzman then instructed them to follow his vehicle, a 1978 Mitsubishi Galant with plate
number NEB 391, as somebody was waiting at Tugatog, Malabon. The other members of the team
followed them discreetly as they proceeded to Tumariz Street, Tugatog, Malabon. De Guzman was
met by Jesus Villanueva who was carrying two plastic bags. De Guzman and Villanueva boarded the
van and handed Veloso the two plastic bags. Veloso checked the bags and examined their
contents. After confirming that they contained white crystalline substance or shabu, he introduced
himself as an NBI operative and gave the pre-arranged signal to the other members of the
team. Other team members rushed to their vehicle and helped in apprehending the two
suspects. Veloso confiscated the drivers license of Jesus Villanueva. He also kept the marked money
inside the vehicle for safety. Upon arrival at the NBI office, team member Rolan Fernandez took
custody of the seized substance and delivered them to the Forensic Chemistry Division for laboratory
examination. Fernandez marked the plastic bags before turning them over to the Forensic
Chemist. After examining the substance, the NBI Chemist issued a certification that the seized items
were positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride. After the arrest of the suspects and examination
of the contents of the plastic bags, the NBI did the usual booking preparatory to the inquest
28
proceedings. Upon conclusion of the inquest, the prosecution recommended the filing of an
information against the two accused.[1]
Rolan Fernandez, Special Investigator at the NBI, stated that he was part of the buy-bust team
and he was present during the operation against the accused on March 23, 2001. After S/I Veloso
arrested De Guzman and his companion, the team immediately proceeded to their office and S/I
Veloso turned over to him two transparent plastic bags containing white crystalline substance which
appeared to be methamphetamine hydrochloride. He then turned over the plastic bags to the
Forensic Chemist for investigation.[2]
NBI Forensic Chemist Ferdinand I. Cruz confirmed that on March 23, 2001, he received from
NBI Agent Rolan Fernandez a request for laboratory examination of two plastic bags with markings
RSF 1 and RSF 2 containing white crystalline substance. He opened the bags in the presence of
Fernandez and weighed the same. He then performed a physical and chemical examination of their
contents. The chemical examination revealed that the contents of the plastic bag marked as RSF 1 are
positive for ephedrine hydrochloride and methamphetamine hydrochloride and the contents of the
plastic bag marked as RSF 2 are positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride. He said that
ephedrine hydrochloride is a regulated drug.[3]
The defense presented a different version of the story.
Victor Ermita, a resident of Tugatog, Malabon, Metro Manila, testified that on March 23, 2001,
around 12:00 noon, he was buying food at Sabels Lugawan in Tugatog, Malabon when he saw a man
running and shouting for help. Another man who heard the plea stood and said, I am a policeman!
Whats the problem? Ermita identified the latter as accused Marlow De Guzman. Some NBI
personnel approached De Guzman and held him. De Guzman struggled. The NBI personnel pushed
him and handcuffed him after he fell. In the meantime, the man being pursued by the NBI continued
to run and evaded his pursuers. The NBI personnel then boarded De Guzman and his companion,
Jessie, in a van.[4]
Accused Marlow De Guzman also took the witness stand. He admitted that he was a police
officer assigned to the mobile patrol. He stated that on March 23, 2001, around 11:00 in the morning,
he and Jesus Villanueva were at the lugawan of Aling Sabel in Acaro, Lascano Street when he saw a
man, a certain Andoy, screaming, Hinahabol ako! He stood up and approached the pursuers and
introduced himself as police officer. But the latter repelled him. De Guzman pretended to draw a gun
from his waist but the pursuers pushed him and identified themselves as NBI agents. De Guzman
was arrested, boarded on a van and brought to the NBI office. The NBI personnel kept him in a room
and interrogated him. They were insisting that the shabu came from him. De Guzman, however,
swore that he saw the alleged shabu for the first time at the NBI office and there was only one plastic
bag at that time. Then he heard Atty. Esmeralda ask why only one bag of shabu was taken when there
should have been at least three. One of the members replied that he could even produce two to three
kilos. When De Guzman went out of the room, he saw Villanueva come in. De Guzman heard sounds
from the room as if someone was being boxed and hit. Villanueva came out of the room after thirty
minutes with bruises. Villanueva told him that they hit his arm and fingers with a hammer and he
could hardly move. De Guzman also told the court that he saw the NBI personnel dividing money
among themselves, saying, Etong sa iyo, etong sa iyo. They pocketed the money which they
divided. He was an armslength away from them.[5]
The defense also presented NBI Agent Job Gayas as hostile witness. Agent Gayas, who has
been with the NBI for eight years, testified that he was part of the buy-bust operation against the two
accused, but he was not with the arresting team. He was riding in his own vehicle together with S/I
Fernandez and S/I Villa. They stayed about 100 meters away from the scene of the operation. Hence,
he did not actually see the transaction between the suspects and the poseur-buyer. They were only
advised over the radio of the on-going operations and its consummation. They moved out of the area
as soon as the operation was completed. Agent Gayas also testified on some of the standard operating
procedures observed during buy-bust operations. He said that it is a standard operating procedure
that the suspects undergo a medical check-up before they are committed to detention. The records of
the NBI showed that accused Villanueva did not have a medical certificate. He also said that during
buy-bust operations, the NBI normally coordinates with the local police when it conducts an
operation. In this case, however, the records do not show that the NBI coordinated with the local
police of Malabon, although they did with the local police of Caloocan City.[6]
 The trial court believed the version of the prosecution and found both accused guilty of the
charge. It meted accused Jesus Villanueva the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and accused Marlow De
Guzman the supreme penalty of death, considering the presence of the aggravating circumstance of
his being a police officer. The dispositive portion of the decision states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered, finding the two accused, namely,
Marlow de Guzman y dela Cruz and Jesus Villanueva y Calma guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of drug pushing penalized under Section 15, Art. III, RA 6425, as amended by RA
7659. Considering that accused de Guzman is an admitted policeman or member of the PNP (Exhibit
A and Exhibit 2), and considering, further, the fact that the commission by him of the crime of drug
pushing was characterized by the use of a motor vehicle, pursuant to Section 24 of the herein
mentioned law, accused de Guzman is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of DEATH to be
executed in the manner provided for by law and applicable regulations. The herein cited
circumstances not being applicable to accused Villanueva, the latter is hereby sentenced to suffer
imprisonment of RECLUSION PERPETUA.
The two accused are also ordered to pay a fine of P10,000,000.00 each.
The shabu/ephedrine hydrochloride contained in two plastic bags (Exhibit C-5 and C-6) already
returned to NBI Forensic Chemist Ferdinand Cruz are hereby forfeited in favor or the government to
be disposed under rules governing the same.
Costs against the two accused.
SO ORDERED.
Accused-appellants now assail the decision of the trial court on the following grounds:
1. The trial court gravely erred in convicting the accused-appellants of the crime charged
based on the uncorroborated testimony of the poseur-buyer.
2. The trial court gravely erred in convicting the accused-appellants of the crime charged
despite the inconsistent, contradictory and impossibility of the testimonies of
the witnesses for the prosecution.
3. The trial court gravely erred in convicting the accused-appellants of the crime charged
when the prosecution miserably failed to establish their guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.[7]
We affirm the decision of the trial court.
In buy-bust operations, the testimony of the police officers who apprehended the accused is
usually accorded full faith and credit because of the presumption that they have performed their
duties regularly. The presumption is overturned only if there is clear and convincing evidence that
they were not properly performing their duty or that they were inspired by improper motive. [8] The
courts, nonetheless, are advised to take caution in applying the presumption of regularity. It should
not by itself prevail over the presumption of innocence and the constitutionally-protected rights of
the individual. Thus, we discussed in People vs. Doria[9] the objective test in buy-bust operations to
determine the credibility of the testimony of the police officers involved in the operation:
We therefore stress that the objective test in buy-bust operations demands that the details of the
purported transaction must be clearly and adequately shown. This must start from the initial contact
between the poseur-buyer and the pusher, the offer to purchase, the promise or payment of the
consideration until the consummation of the sale by the delivery of the illegal drug subject of the
sale. The manner by which the initial contact was made, whether or not through an informant, the
offer to purchase the drug, the payment of the buy-bust money, and the delivery of the illegal drug,
whether to the informant alone or the police officer, must be the subject of strict scrutiny by courts to
insure that law-abiding citizens are not unlawfully induced to commit an offense. Criminals must be
caught but not at all cost. At the same time, however, examining the conduct of the police should not
disable courts into ignoring the accuseds predisposition to commit the crime. If there is
overwhelming evidence of habitual delinquency, recidivism or plain criminal proclivity, then this
must also be considered. Courts should look at all factors to determine the predisposition of an
accused to commit an offense in so far as they are relevant to determine the validity of the defense of
inducement.
29
We find the testimony of the poseur-buyer, Charlemagne Veloso, clear and credible. He
recounted in full detail how the deal was set by the informant, their initial meeting with De Guzman
at Wendys in Caloocan City, their agreement to purchase two kilos of shabu for P1,000,000.00, how
they met with Villanueva in Tugatog, Malabon, the actual exchange of the plastic bags containing the
substance and the boodle money, and the apprehension of the two accused. They also presented
before the court the substance confiscated from the appellants [10] and the boodle money used in the
operation.[11]
Moreover, the arguments raised by the appellants in their brief deserve scant consideration.
First, the failure of the arresting officers to confiscate and present in evidence the car allegedly
used by the appellants during the transaction does not affect the case of the prosecution.The
elements that must be established by the prosecution in a case for illegal sale of dangerous drugs
are: (1) that the transaction of sale took place and (2) the presentation in court of the corpus
delicti or the illicit drug as evidence. [12] These were sufficiently proved by the prosecution in the case
at bar. The failure of the NBI agents to confiscate and present in evidence the car allegedly used by
the appellants is immaterial for it is not an element of the crime and the prosecution has full
discretion to determine the pieces of evidence that they will present in court. It is sufficient that they
were able to prove the transaction between S/I Veloso and the appellants, and they were able to
present in court the substance seized from the appellants which, after chemical examination, were
found to contain methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.
Second, appellants argument that the testimonies of NBI personnel Ferdinand Cruz and Rolan
Fernandez do not support S/I Velosos testimony also lacks merit. Ferdinand Cruz was the forensic
chemist of NBI. He cannot be expected to testify on the conduct of the buy-bust operation as his only
duty was to examine the substance confiscated by the NBI operatives from the suspects to determine
its composition and whether it is indeed a prohibited drug. Cruz affirmed that the white crystalline
substance contained in the plastic bags taken from the appellants contained methamphetamine
hydrochloride and ephedrine hydrochloride. Rolan Fernandez, on the other hand, was a member of
the back-up team during the buy-bust operation. He was not with S/I Veloso while the latter was
transacting with the suspected drug dealers. He was riding a separate vehicle and stayed 100 meters
away from the site of the deal to avoid any suspicion from the drug pushers. Due to the distance and
because there was an obstruction in their line of vision, he was not able to see the exchange between
S/I Veloso and the appellants. This was also confirmed by S/I Job Gayas who was presented by the
defense as hostile witness. Be that as it may, both S/I Fernandez and S/I Gayas testified that the NBI
team conducted a buy-bust operation around noontime of March 23, 2001; that they moved from
Caloocan City to Tugatog, Malabon where the sale was consummated and where the appellants were
apprehended; and that after the operation, S/I Veloso turned over to S/I Fernandez two plastic bags
containing white crystalline substance taken from the appellants. Their testimonies do not contradict
that of S/I Veloso but in fact complement it.
The other alleged errors imputed by the appellants on the prosecution, such as the failure of
S/I Veloso to describe the pre-arranged signal, and the inability of S/I Fernandez to state the number
of vehicles used in the operation or to describe the clothing worn by S/I Veloso at the time pertain to
minor details which do not significantly affect the guilt of the appellants.Neither does the fact that
the plastic bags containing the substance were not sealed when they were turned over to the forensic
chemist. Contrary to appellants submission, such fact does not necessarily imply that the substance
was planted. It has been established that the NBI operatives inspected the contents of the plastic
bags before and after the appellants were apprehended. Hence, it is possible that they forgot to seal
the plastic bags after checking their contents. Appellants also harp on the fact that De Guzman was
carrying his PNP ID at the time of his apprehension. They claim that it is improbable that appellant
De Guzman would bring his official ID if it were true that he intended to commit a crime. It suffices
to say that such argument is highly speculative.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the appeal is DISMISSED. The decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Malabon Branch 72 in Criminal Case No. 24671-MN is AFFIRMED. [13]
In accordance with Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by section 25 of Republic
Act No. 7659, upon finality of this decision, let the records of these cases be forwarded to the Office of
the President for possible exercise of executive clemency.
SO ORDERED.
30
 [G.R. No. 117702. February 10, 1997]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. CRISPIN
YPARRAGUIRRE, accused-appellant.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
Accused-appellant Crispin Yparraguirre was charged with the crime of rape in an
Information that reads as follows:
"That on or about July 6, 1990, in the Municipality of XXX, Province of Davao,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, armed with a hunting knife, by means of force and intimidation, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of AAA, against her
will."[1]
The prosecution established that AAA was a housemaid of appellant and his wife; that on or
about 7:00 in the evening of July 6, 1990 at the spouses' room in Panabo, Davao, AAA was cooking
porridge for the spouses' two children, one aged four years old and the other nine months
old. Accused-appellant arrived from work and found the two children asleep. He approached AAA
and gave her a small white envelope said to contain medicine for her skin disease. AAA was afflicted
with rashes on her thighs and stomach which she allegedly contracted from one of the children. AAA
opened the envelope and counted fifteen (15) tablets inside. As instructed by appellant, AAA took all
the tablets. A few minutes later, she felt weak and fell down. Suddenly, she realized that appellant
was dragging her to the spouses' bed. She tried to get up but appellant pushed her down the bed and
pointed a hunting knife at her neck. He ordered AAA not to move or he would kill her. Then he
removed her clothes and went on top of her. He kissed her face, breasts, stomach and private parts
and then entered her. AAA cried out in pain but appellant continued entering her. After satisfying
his lust, appellant pulled out and punched AAA in the stomach. She lost consciousness.
A few minutes later, AAA woke up and saw blood in her private parts. She wiped the blood and
changed her clothes. Seeing her awake, appellant threatened to kill her should she report the
incident to her parents. Appellant then left the house.[2]
AAA did not say a word about the incident. She continued serving the Yparraguirres for one
month before leaving them to return to her mother's house in Barrio YYY. Her mother found AAA in
a state of shock. She could not eat nor talk, neither could she perform ordinary daily functions such
as dressing herself. In short, AAA became helpless. She was brought to the Municipal Health Officer
by her mother for examination. On August 22, 1990, the Municipal Health Officer, Dr. Imelda
T. Bendijo, interviewed the girl and found her unresponsive and unable to talk. She conducted a
physical examination and also found that:
"x x x Physical examination externally no abnormal findings;
Pelvic examination -- normal vagina with old laceration found at 2:00 [position]; hymen
not intact;
Internal examination -- admits one finger;
Advised for pregnancy test and for consultation by [sic] psychiatrist.
x x x."[3]
Upon the Municipal Health Officer's advice, AAA was confined at the Davao City Mental Hospital for
observation and treatment. After a week of treatment, AAA began to talk and revealed that she was
raped by appellant.[4]
Accused-appellant pled not guilty to the crime charged. He claimed that on the night of the
alleged rape he was selling fish at the public market. Allegedly, he was at the market at 4:00 in the
morning, and worked straight until 8:00 in the evening. He never left the fish stall until after 8:00 in
the evening because of his many customers.[5]
31
The trial court found accused-appellant guilty and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua. It
also ordered him to indemnify AAA P50,000.00 as moral damages and pay P5,000.00 as attorney's
fees, thus:
"WHEREFORE, IN LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, the court finds accused
Crispin Yparraguirre guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape punishable
under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code. Correspondingly, the court hereby sentences
the said accused to suffer and undergo the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA with all
the accessory penalties provided for by law and to pay the costs.
Accused Crispin Yparraguirre is also ordered to indemnify the victim Rosita Bacaling the
amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages, plus payment of P5,000.00 as attorney's fees.
SO ORDERED."[6]
In this appeal, accused-appellant contends that:
I
"THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY OF THE
CRIME OF RAPE;
II
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT WITNESS MARY ANN YPARRAGUIRRE
WENT TO THE MOTHER OF THE ACCUSED ON NOVEMBER 23, 1990 TO
NEGOTIATE FOR THE DROPPING OF THE CASE."[7]
The appeal has no merit. After reviewing the records, we find that the prosecution evidence,
which rests mainly on the testimony of AAA, is credible, reliable and trustworthy. AAA testified in a
straightforward, spontaneous and candid manner and never wavered even on cross-examination and
rebuttal. The inconsistencies in her testimony are minor which tend to buttress, rather than weaken,
the conclusion that her testimony was not contrived. [8]
The question of whether AAA contracted the skin disease from the children of appellant is not
important. The undisputed fact is that she was afflicted with the disease and that appellant gave her
tablets for treatment of the disease. Appellant's allegation that AAA should have fallen asleep for
hours after ingesting the tablets is speculative. There is no evidence that the tablets were sleeping
tablets. They, however, weakened AAA and prevented her from making any resistance to appellant's
lewd acts.[9] The delay in filing the complaint does not in any way affect AAA's credibility. [10] She was
afraid of appellant's threat to her life. The complaint was filed three months after AAA told her
mother of the incident, and three months is not too long a period to file a complaint for rape.
AAA was a seventeen-year old barrio lass and a high school dropout. She was also the
breadwinner of the family.[11] It is hard to believe that AAA would fabricate a story of defloration,
open herself to public trial and place her family, who depended on her, in a very humiliating and
compromising situation for no reason at all. [12] AAA suffered psychologically from the incident.
Before the rape, she had been working for the Yparraguirres for two months[13] and the spouses
actually found her to be a good worker.[14] When AAA returned to her family, however, she lost her
speech and could not perform ordinary daily functions that she had to seek psychiatric
treatment. Indeed, AAA's psychological condition could not have been the product of ill-motive and
fabrication.
Anent the second assigned error, there is evidence that after AAA revealed the rape to her
mother, appellant's wife, Mary Ann Yparraguirre, offered the victim's mother, BBB, fifteen thousand
pesos (P15,000.00) to dissuade her from filing the complaint. [15] When BBB refused, Mary Ann
increased the offer to twenty-five thousand pesos (P25,000.00). Still BBB refused to accept it.[16] As
pointed out by appellant, no criminal complaint had been filed at the time the compromise offer was
made. Nevertheless, the rape incident was already known to appellant's wife. Mary Ann herself
testified that BBB told her about it on November 3, 1990, the day when Mary Ann first offered the
money.[17] An offer to compromise does not require that a criminal complaint be first filed before the
offer can be received in evidence against the offeror.[18] What is required is that after committing the
crime, the accused or his representative makes an offer to compromise and such offer is proved.
 The positive identification of accused-appellant as the rapist prevails over his defense of alibi.
It was not physically impossible for appellant to have been at the scene of the crime. The public
[19]

market was merely a ten-minute walk from their rented room[20] and during work breaks, appellant
would sometimes go home to bring food to his children. [21]

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision dated May 10, 1994 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
4, Panabo, Davao is affirmed. Costs against appellant.

SO ORDERED.

32
G.R. No. L-8931 March 14, 1914
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JUAN MAQUI, defendant-appellant.
Alejo Mabanag for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor-General Harvey for appellee.
CARSON, J.:
The appellant in this case was convicted in the court below of the theft of the caraballa and her calf,
and sentenced to imprisonment for the period of five years, to suffer the accessory penalties
prescribed by law, and to pay his share of the costs of the proceedings.
Counsel for the accused contends that the trial court erred in giving probative value to the testimony
of one Dagsa, the principal witness for the prosecution; in accepting proof as to certain extrajudicial
admissions alleged to have been made by the accused, including an offer to compromise the case by
the payment of a sum of money; and in declining to accept as true the testimony of the accused in his
own behalf at the trial. We find nothing in the record, however, which would justify us in disturbing
the findings of the trial judge as to the degree of the credit which should be accorded the various
witnesses called at the trial.
Counsel rests his contention that the evidence as to the extrajudicial statements made by the accused
should have been excluded on the ground that, as counsel insists, there is no formal proof n the
record that they were made voluntarily, and that they were therefore inadmissible as proof in so far
as they can be construed as admission or confession of guilt. In answer to this contention it is
sufficient to say that there is no suggestion in the record in the court below that these extrajudicial
statements were not made voluntarily, and we are satisfied that if the evidence as to the
circumstances under which these incriminating statements were made be accepted as true it clearly
rebuts the possibility that they were made involuntarily, or extorted by force, threats, or promise of
reward. The record clearly discloses that these extrajudicial statements were made in the course of
offers to compromise and that they were made by the accused voluntarily, though doubtless these
offers to compromise were made in the hope that it accepted he would escape prosecution.
The question as to the admissibility of offers to compromise in criminal cases has frequently been
discussed in the courts of the United States, and the practice there does not appear to be wholly
uniform. We think, however, that the weight both of authority and of reason sustains the rule which
admits evidence of offers to compromise, but permits the accused to show that such offers were not
made under a consciousness of guilt, but merely to avoid the inconvenience of imprisonment or for
some other reason which would justify a claim by the accused that the offer to compromise was not
in truth an admission of his guilt and an attempt to avoid the legal consequences which would
ordinarily ensue therefrom.
Satisfaction to the owner of the goods stolen is admissible, as evidence against the accused, but if
made merely to avoid the inconvenience of imprisonment, and not under a consciousness of guilt, it
is not evidence. (U. S. vs.Hunter, 1 Cranch, C. C., 317.)
In a prosecution for seduction, evidence that the accused had sought an adjustment with the
prosecutrix is inadmissible, if such offer of adjustment did not contain an admission of guilt.
(Wilson vs. State, 73 Ala., 527.)
On a prosecution for assault with intent to commit rape upon a married woman, evidence is
admissible on behalf of the prosecution to show that the defendant sent a third person to the father
of the prosecutrix to ascertain if the case could be compromised. (Barr vs. People, 113 Ill., 471.)
In a larceny case, evidence is not admissible to show that defendant stated that he would pay $50 if it
could be settled, in reply to threats by the owner of the goods stolen that he would be prosecuted for
damages, and a solicitation to settle. (Frain vs. State, 40 Ga., 530.)
In a prosecution for larceny, evidence is not admissible that defendant paid a sum of money in
settlement of a civil action brought to recover the property alleged to have been stolen.
(State vs. Emerson, 48 Iowa, 172.)
33
An offer of compromise, voluntarily made by the accused, without threat or promise, and the reply
thereto, are admissible in evidence upon his trial for a crime. (State vs. Bruce, 33 La. Ann., 186.)
An offer of compromise of a crime, unaccepted by the prosecutor, may be proven by the state as an
admission of guilt, or as disclosing possession of the property which is the subject of the burglary and
larceny charged in the indictment. (State vs. Rodriguez, 45 La. Ann., 1040; 13 Southern, 802.)
It may be shown that the prisoner sent a massage to the prosecutor, proposing to take a whipping
and to be let go. (State vs. DeBerry, 92 N. C., 800.)
We are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused, but we are opinion that in
imposing the penalty the trial court should have taken into consideration as a mitigating
circumstance the manifest lack of "instruction and education" of the offender. It does not clearly
appear whether he is or not an uncivilized Igorot, although there are indications in the record which
tend to show that he is. But in any event, it is very clear that if he is not a member of an uncivilized
tribe of Igorots, he is a densely ignorant and untutored fellow, who lived in the Igorot country, and is
not much, if any, higher that are they in the scale of civilization. The beneficent provisions of article
11 of the Penal Code as amended by Act No. 2142 of the Philippine Legislature are peculiarly
applicable to offenders who are shown to be members of these uncivilized tribes, and to other
offenders who, as a result of the fact that their lives are cast with such people far away from the
centers of civilization, appear to be so lacking in "instruction and education" that they should not be
held to so high a degree of responsibility as is demanded of those citizens who have had the
advantage of living their lives in contact with the refining influences of civilization.
It is true that this court has quite uniformly held that convicts of the crimes of theft and robbery are
not entitled to the benefits of the provisions of article 11 of the Penal Code prior to its amendment by
Act No. 2142, this on the theory that under the provisions of the article prior to its amendment the
ground upon which the courts were authorized in their direction to mitigate the penalties prescribed
by the code was "the circumstance of the offender being a native, mestizo, or Chinese." As to crimes
of this nature we declined to hold that the mere fact that one is a native of the Philippine Islands, a
mestizo or a Chinese would justify a claim that upon conviction of crimes such as theft or robbery he
should be treated more leniently than the members of any other race or people, no sounds
presumption arising from the mere racial affiliation of the convict that he was less or to resist the
temptation to commit them than are they.
Under the provisions of the article as amended by Act No. 2142, the ground upon which the courts
are authorized to mitigate the prescribed penalties is not racial affiliation of the convict, but "the
degree of instruction and education of the offender;" and while mere ignorance or lack of education
will not always be sufficient to justify the mitigation of the prescribed penalties for crimes such as
theft and robbery, there can be no doubt that cases may and will arise wherein under all the
"circumstances attending" the commission of these offenses the exercise of a sound discretion will
justify a more lenient treatment of an ignorant and semicivilized offender, than that which should be
accorded one who has the advantage of such a degree of instruction and education as would justify
the court in believing that he was capable of fully and properly understanding and appreciating the
criminal character of the offense committed by him.
We conclude, therefore, that under the provisions of article 111 as amended by Act No. 2142, the
courts may and should, even in cases of theft and robbery, take into consideration where it appears
that under all the circumstances attending the commission of the offense, he should not be held to
the strict degree of responsibility prescribed in the code for the ordinary offender.
The larceny of large cattle and falls within articles 517, 518, and 520 of the Penal Code, as amended
by Act No. 2030. According to those sections, as amended, the value of the animals stolen being 650
pesetas, a penalty one degree higher than arresto mayor in its medium degree to presidio
correccional in its minimum degree should have been imposed; in other words, presidio
correccional in its medium degree to presidio mayor in its minimum degree. Giving the convict the
benefit of the provisions of article 11 of the Penal Code, as amended, this penalty should be imposed
in its minimum degree — that is to say, the penalty applicable in this case is that of presidio
correccional in its medium degree.
Modified by imposing the penalty prescribed for the offense of which the defendant and appellant
was convicted in the minimum degree — that is to say, by, imposing upon the accused the penalty of
two years four months and one day of presidio correccional, in lieu of that of five years'
imprisonment imposed by the court below — the judgment convicting and sentencing him should be
and is hereby affirmed, with the costs of this instance against the appellant.

34
 [G.R. Nos. 135522-23. October 2, 2001]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. AMORSOLO TORRES
GANIBO, accused-appellant.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Before this Court on automatic review is the joint judgment of conviction rendered by the
Regional Trial Court of Santa Cruz, Laguna, Branch 28, dated August 14, 1998, finding accused-
appellant Amorsolo Torres guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of rape and acts of
lasciviousness, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of death for the rape and the penalty of
imprisonment of six months of arresto mayor as minimum to six years of prision correccional as
maximum for the acts of lasciviousness.[1]
The Information for Rape alleged:
That on or about September 1, 1997 at Brgy. Ibabang Atingay, Municipality of Magdalena, Province
of Laguna and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being the
father of the herein complainant, with lewd design and with intent to satisfy his lust and by means of
force, violence and intimidation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal
knowledge with his daughter, GLORILYN TORRES y BUSTILLO, a fourteen-year old girl, against her
will and consent, to her damage and prejudice.[2]
The Information for violation of RA 7610 (Child Abuse) reads as follows:
That on or about July 26, 1997 at Bgy. Ibabang Atingay, Magdalena, Province of Laguna and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd design, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously commit lascivious acts with his own daughter, GLORILYN
B. TORRES, by touching her private parts, against her will. [3]
Upon separate arraignments, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to both charges, after which
both cases were tried jointly.
The evidence for the prosecution is summarized as follows:
Complainant Glorilyn Torres, then 14 years old at the time of the incidents, lived with her
father, herein accused-appellant, and her brothers and sisters, at Bgy. Ibabang Atingay, Magdalena,
Laguna. Her mother Gloria Torres, who has been separated from accused-appellant since 1994, was
living and working in Marikina.
At around 2:00 a.m. of July 26, 1997, complainant was sleeping in their house when she was
suddenly awakened by her father who was mashing and sucking her breasts. She asked him to stop
but he slapped her and told her to keep quiet because her brothers and sisters might
awake. Complainant cried and pleaded with her father to stop. Accused-appellant touched her vagina
and told her Pasensya ka na, kasalanan ito ng nanay mo, dahil wala siya. Complainant tried to
fight back but accused-appellant, who was holding both her arms, continued to suck her breasts and
at the same time was asking for forgiveness. Afterwards, accused-appellant told her to go back to
sleep and left. Complainant did not report the incident to anyone because the accused-appellant
threatened to maul and leave them.
On September 1, 1997, at around 2:00 a.m., complainant was again awakened by accused-
appellant lying beside her. Her sister Morilyn was also inside the room. At first, accused-appellant
was mashing and sucking her breasts. Then he ordered her to take off her panty and when she
refused, he forcibly took it off. She tried to struggle with the accused-appellant but then he held both
her arms, placed his knees between her thighs and succeeded in satisfying his lust on
her. Complainant felt excruciating pain in her vagina. After a while, accused-appellant stopped and
said he did not want to continue anymore because she might get pregnant. He put on her panty and
left. The following morning, complainant saw a spot of blood on her panty. As in the previous
incident, accused threatened to leave complainant and her brothers and sisters, and that he will maul
and kill her mother, brothers and sisters if she told anybody about what happened. After this
incident, complainant never talked to accused-appellant.
It was only on October 5, 1997 when complainant was able to report the two incidents to their
barangay chairwoman, Aurora Cube. It appears that on said date, Mercy Torres, a sister-in-law of
y accused-appellant, saw Roberto Montemor, a suitor of the complainant, holding complainant by the
shoulder, inside the house of accused-appellant. According to complainant, Roberto was apologizing
to her for asking her to elope with him. Mercy Torres reported the matter to Aurora Cube who went
to the house of accused-appellant to confront complainant. When Aurora told complainant that
accused-appellant might scold her, complainant got frightened and held on to the arm of Aurora. In
between tears, complainant narrated to Aurora how accused-appellant molested and raped her. The
barangay chairwoman gave complainant P200.00 and asked a granddaughter to accompany
complainant to see the latters mother in Marikina.
Thereafter, Aurora Cube proceeded to the police station in Magdalena to report the complaint
for rape. She was given permission by the police to invite accused-appellant for questioning. In the
evening of October 5, 1997, Aurora ordered her barangay tanods to invite accused-appellant to the
barangay hall on the pretext that he is scheduled to be on patrol duty. When accused-appellant
arrived, Aurora asked him what he did to his daughter, but accused-appellant denied having done
anything to complainant. That night he was detained at the barangay hall.
The following day, October 6, 1997, complainant and her mother arrived at the barangay hall.
Complainants mother, Gloria Torres, tearfully confronted accused-appellant and asked if what
complainant said was true. Accused-appellant was adamant in denying the charges against him and
said that he could not do that against his own daughter. Thereafter accused-appellant was turned
over to the Magdalena Police Station where he was detained. Complainant and her mother executed
their respective affidavit-complaints.[4]
The Medico-legal report[5] issued by the examining physician Dra. Maria Cleofe Pita, Municipal
Health Officer of Magdalena, Laguna, shows that complainant suffered a healed laceration at 7
oclock position with retraction of the edges. Dra. Pita testified that based on the lacerations, there
could have been penetration more than once, and that the insertion of an object could have caused
the retraction of the edges and laxity of the muscles.
Accused-appellants defense hinges mainly on alibi and denial. As to the charge of acts of
lasciviousness committed against complainant in the early morning of July 26, 1997, accused-
appellant testified that the night before, i.e. on July 25, 1997, he slept in the mountain where he
worked as a power saw operator and came home only at 4:00 in the afternoon of July 26, 1997. Then
he left the house at around 5:00 p.m. to attend a wedding at Bgy. Burlungan, Magdalena, Laguna and
was able to go home early the following day. With respect to the complaint for rape, accused-
appellant testified that on September 1, 1997, he arrived home from work at around 6:00 p.m., and
after eating supper, he went to sleep. Complainant, together with her brothers and sisters, was
watching television at a neighbors house and he did not know what time they came home. Accused-
appellant testified that the complaint for rape was filed against him because he did not allow
complainant to live with her grandmother and study in Manila.
The trial court rendered judgment on August 14, 1998, the dispositive portion of which reads:
W H E R E F O R E:
Under Criminal Case No. SC-6691, this Court finds the accused AMORSOLO TORRES y GANIBO
GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT AS PRINCIPAL OF CONSUMMATED RAPE defined and
punished under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659,
otherwise known as the Death Penalty Law and hereby sentences him to suffer the SUPREME
PENALTY OF DEATH and to pay the private offended party GLORILYN TORRES the following
sums:
P50,000.00 - as civil indemnity;
50,000.00 - as moral damages and
50,000.00 - as exemplary damages.
Under Criminal Case No. SC-6692, this Court finds the accused AMORSOLO TORRES Y GANIBO
GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT AS PRINCIPAL OF ACTS OF LASCIVIOUSNESS defined
and penalized under Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code and hereby sentences him to suffer the
penalty of IMPRISONMENT OF SIX (6) MONTHS of Arresto Mayor as Minimum to SIX (6) YEARS
35
of Prision Correccional as Maximum and to pay the private offended party Glorilyn Torres the
following amounts:
P5,000.00 - as civil indemnity;
5,000.00 - as moral damages and
5,000.00 - as exemplary damages.
The accused is further ordered to pay the costs of both the instant suits.
The joint decision is before us by virtue of the automatic appeal of the death penalty imposed
in the rape case. It will be noted however that no separate appeal was filed by accused-appellant from
the decision finding him guilty of acts of lasciviousness. There is thus a need to address the issue of
whether or not the automatic review of accused-appellants conviction for rape, for which the death
penalty was imposed, includes the appeal of his conviction for the less serious crime of acts of
lasciviousness, but not so punished.
The Judiciary Act of 1948 under Section 17, paragraph 1 thereof, provides that:
Sec. 17. The Supreme Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction to review, revise, reverse, modify or
affirm on appeal, as the law or rules of court may provide, final judgments and decrees of inferior
courts as herein provided, in -
(1) All criminal cases involving offenses for which the penalty imposed is death or life imprisonment;
and those involving other offenses which, although not so punished, arose out of the same
occurrence or which may have been committed by the accused on the same occasion, as that giving
rise to the more serious offense, regardless of whether the accused are charged as principals,
accomplices or accessories whether they have been tried jointly or separately x x x.
In the case of People vs. Panganiban,[6] the Court held that an automatic review of the death
penalty imposed by the trial court is deemed to include an appeal of the less serious crime, although
not so punished by death, where the less serious crime arose out of the same occurrence or was
committed by the accused on the same occasion as that which gave rise to the more serious
offense. However, the case at bar is different as the acts of lasciviousness committed by herein
accused-appellant happened on July 26, 1997 whereas the rape was committed on September 1, 1997.
What is applicable is the doctrine enunciated in the recent case of People vs. Florencio
Francisco y Alejo,[7] where we ruled that the automatic review of the death penalty in the rape case
did not include the conviction for acts of lasciviousness which should have been the subject of a
separate appeal filed before the Court of Appeals, considering that the acts of lasciviousness case did
not arise out of the same occurrence or committed by the accused on the same occasion as that of the
more serious crime of rape. Thus:
In the instant case, however, it cannot be said that the acts of lasciviousness case arose out of the
same occurrence or committed by the accused on the same occasion as that of the more serious crime
of rape.The two (2) cases involved distinct offenses committed at an interval of two (2) months in
point of time. The evidence reveals that the first crime was committed sometime in April 1997 while
the second was perpetrated on 27 June 1997. In both cases, accused-appellant was animated by a
separate criminal intent, although incidentally, both crimes were directed against the same victim.
Moreover, the evidence presented by the prosecution in the rape case was not the same evidence they
offered to prove the acts of lasciviousness case.
Inescapably, the penalty of reclusion temporal meted out to accused-appellant in Crim. Case No. Q-
97-73696 (now G.R. No. 135202) for acts of lasciviousness is within the exclusive appellate
jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals. Upon the other hand, Crim. Case No. Q-97-73695 (now G.R. No.
135201) for rape, the penalty imposed therein being death, perforce falls within the jurisdiction of
this Court on automatic review.
In dismissing the appeal from the conviction for acts of lasciviousness for lack of jurisdiction
and wrong forum, the Court in People vs. Francisco ratiocinated as follows:
While we are not unmindful of the practical advantages of a single consolidated review of these two
(2) criminal cases, we cannot array any legal justification therefor without infringing upon the
36
jurisdictional boundaries so clearly delineated by our statutes. Hence, we have no other recourse but
to recognize this as a case of split appellate jurisdiction. We cannot infuse new meaning into the
provisions of our statutes apportioning appellate jurisdictions between this Court and the Court of
Appeals because their mandates and terms are specific and unmistakable. Nor can we widen the
scope of our appellate jurisdiction on the basis of the fact that the trial court heard two (2) distinct
and separate cases simultaneously. Such procedure adopted by the trial court cannot and did not
result in the merger of the two (2) offenses. In fact, a cursory reading of the assailed decision of the
court a quo reveals with pristine clarity that each was separately determined by the trial judge, as
each should be separately reviewed on appeal. Appellate competence is circumscribed by statute, and
not flux and ferment to be settled by the exigencies of trial proceedings.
In fine, it is obvious that accused-appellants conviction for acts of lasciviousness should have been
appealed to the Court of Appeals, instead of elevating the case to this Court which has no jurisdiction
over it. Consequently, being with the wrong forum, the appeal in Crim. Case No. Q-97-73696 for acts
of lasciviousness erroneously brought to us is dismissed and the decision therein of the court a quo
stands. x x x
We therefore dismiss the appeal in Criminal Case No. SC-6692 for acts of lasciviousness for
having been filed in the wrong forum. We shall now proceed to review the conviction in the rape case,
where accused-appellant avers that the court a quo gravely erred in convicting him despite
insufficiency of the prosecutions evidence to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Accused-appellant challenges the credibility of complainants testimony. It is contended that if
it were true that complainant struggled and fought with accused-appellant, and that the latter
slapped and threatened her, it is surprising how complainants sister, Morilyn, who was sleeping
beside accused-appellant, was not awakened by all the commotion. Also, the failure of complainant
to immediately report the incident allegedly renders doubtful her testimony, specially in light of her
narration that she was compelled to disclose the matter to the barangay chairwoman only after
complainants Aunt Mercy threatened to tell accused-appellant that complainant was flirting with her
boyfriend.
It is an elementary rule that the assessment of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies
is a matter best undertaken by the trial court because of its unique opportunity to observe the
witnesses firsthand and note their demeanor, conduct and attitude under grilling examination. And
the findings of the trial court will not be disturbed on appeal unless some facts or circumstances of
weight have been overlooked, misapprehended or misinterpreted so as to materially affect the
disposition of the case.[8]
In the case at bar, complainant categorically testified that she was raped by her own father,
herein accused-appellant. Her testimony jibes on all material points with her sworn statement which
she executed before the municipal judge. She testified thus:
TRIAL PROSECUTOR:
Q: You said something happened to you on September 1, 1997?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Please tell us what happened to you on said date?
A: I was then sleeping and I was awakened and I saw my father was already beside me.
Q: Can you recall what time you were awakened?
A: About 2:00 oclock in the morning, sir.
Q: Who were sleeping with you at that time aside from your father?
A: My youngest sister Morilyn, sir.
Q: How about Alvin, where was he at that time?
A: Alvin was sleeping in the outer portion of our house near the exit, sir.
Q: How about Melvin?
A: My four brothers were sleeping together on that day, sir. Q: Tell us the exact words you stated?

Q: What happened when you were awakened on said date at about 2:00 oclock in the morning? A: I said: Tay maawa na kayo sa akin, hindi ba promise ninyo hindi ninyo ako kakayugin, bakit
po ninyo ito ginagawa sa akin?
A: My father was mashing my breast, sucking the same and he ordered me to put off my panty
which I did not like so he was the one who took it off. Q: Was there any response from your father?

Q: Was he able to remove your panty? A: Nothing, sir.

A: Yes, sir. Q: What did you do if any when your father did not respond to your plea?

Q: And what did he do? A: After a lapse of 5 minutes he removed his penis from my vagina and he said he would not
continue anymore because I might get pregnant.
A: He forcibly inserted his penis into my vagina while I was struggling, sir.
Q: Are we made to understand that the penis of your father was in your vagina for about
Q: Do you know how he was able to insert his penis into your vagina despite the fact that you 5 minutes?
were struggling?
A: Yes, sir.
A: He put both his knees on both my thighs and held both my hands upward, sir.
Q: What else happened after your father removed his penis from your vagina?
Q: How was he able to insert his penis?
A: He wiped my vagina with a cloth and put on my panty.
A: He forcibly inserted his penis into my vagina, sir.
Q: Do you know the reason why he wiped your vagina with a piece of cloth?
Q: Was he successful in inserting his penis?
A: No, sir.
A: Yes, sir.
COURT:
Q: How did you know?
Q: Did your vagina get wet?
A: I felt pain, sir.
A: Yes, Your Honor.
Q: But you did not see actually his penis being inserted into your vagina?
TRIAL PROSECUTOR:
A: No, sir, it was dark and the light was dim.
Q: Do you know the reason why your vagina got wet?
Q: How did you feel when an object was inserted inside your vagina?
A: Something whitish came out of my vagina, sir.
A: It was so painful, sir.
COURT:
Q: When you felt something inside your vagina can you still recall what your father was doing?
Q: How were you able to tell that the color of the substance is white, when you said it is dark?
A: He was still mashing my breast, sir.
A: My father turned on the light so I saw it, Your Honor.
Q: May we know if he was kissing you?
TRIAL PROSECUTOR:
A: No, sir.
Q: Do you know where did that white substance come from?
Q: Do you recall if he was making some body movement?
A: Yes, sir, from my vagina.
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What did you feel if any while the penis of your father was inside your vagina aside from pain?
Q: What kind of movement was he doing at that time?
A: I felt pain on my body and I saw some spot of blood on my panty when I woke up the following
A: He was making movement on this part (witness pointing on her right pelvis). morning.

Q: Tell us what movement was he doing at that time? Q: What did you do when you noticed spot of blood coming from your vagina?

A: His body was making this movement (witness demonstrating by using her right hand moving A: I washed my panty, sir.
it upward and downward)
Q: Did your father threaten you?
Q: What did you do if any when you felt something inserted into your vagina?
A: Yes, sir.
A: I was pleading to him but he did not listen to my plea, he still continued what he was
doing. (witness with teary eye) Q: Tell us how your father threatened you?

37
 A: He threatened that he would go away and I would lose a father and he would maul and kill my Q: Why did you not shout at the time he was holding your hands?
mother, brothers and sister.
A: Because he said he would maul me.
Q: After September 1, 1997, do you still respect your father?
Q: You also stated that while your father was pushing his body up and down he was holding your
A: A little sir. I did not show him that I hated him so much. breast, is that correct?

Q: Do you still love him after September 1, 1997? A: Yes, sir.

A: No more, sir. Q: With both his hands?

Q: Why? A: Yes, sir.

A: It is because I am wondering why he had done to me that thing when I am his daughter.
Q: Did you ask your father the reason why he raped you?
A: No, sir, I did not talk to him since then. [9]
Q: Please tell the Court how did your father hold your breast while he was pushing his body up
and down?
A; He put his elbow on this portion of my arms (witness pointing to the crook of the right elbow)
and he mashed my breast with his hands.

On cross-examination, complainant described in greater detail how she struggled with Q: You also stated that your father was covering your mouth at the same time?
accused-appellant while he forced himself on her, viz:
A: Yes, sir.
ATTY. DE RAMOS:
Q: And at the same time he was mashing your breast?
Q: What was the first thing that your father did on September 1, 1997?
A: It was when I was crying aloud, he removed his hand from mashing my breast and then he
A: He mashed my breast, sir. covered my mouth with his hand.

Q: And when he was mashing your breast what did you do? Q: You also stated that your father when he was able to insert his penis into your vagina he
placed both his knees on your thighs?
A: I was struggling (nagpupumiglas). I was covering my breast with both hands but he
removed by hands. A: Yes, sir.

Q: Were you crying while struggling? Q: And you also stated that your father was able to insert his penis into your vagina?

A: Yes, sir. A: Yes, sir.

COURT: Q: Tell the Court how he was able to insert his penis when his knees were placed on your thighs?

Q: Why? A: There were occasions when he removed his knees on my thighs and whenever my feet were
moving he again placed his knees on my thighs.
A: I was frightened, Your Honor.
Q: You said you were struggling at that time?
Q: You were afraid of what?
A: Yes, sir.
A: I was afraid that he might again do the thing which happened on July 26, Your Honor.
xxxxxxxxx
ATTY. DE RAMOS:
Q: And because you felt so much pain when he entered his penis into your vagina you did not
Q: Did you cry for help at that time? shout?
A: No, sir. A: It is because he was already threatening me that he would kill my mother and I
was afraid, sir.
Q: Why did you not cry for help or shout?
Q: You mean to tell the Court, while your father was inserting his penis into your
A: Because he was already threatening me, sir. vagina he was threatening you that he will kill your mother?
Q: Despite the fact that you do not want the things that happened on July 26 to happen again? A: Yes, sir.[10]
A: He was covering my mouth, sir. Accused-appellant was convicted for the crime of rape after the trial court found that the entire
testimony of Glorilyn Torres was candid, spontaneous and consistent which has never been shaken
Q: According to you when he inserted his penis into your vagina he was holding your hands, is
even under rigid cross-examination. A witness who testified in a categorical, straightforward,
that correct?
spontaneous and frank manner and remained consistent on cross-examination is a credible witness.
A; Yes, sir.
[11]
We find no compelling reason to doubt the veracity of and deviate from the finding of the lower
court. Hence, the same should be accorded great weight and deemed conclusive and binding on this
Court.
38
 The attempt of accused-appellant to impute ill-motive on complainant for fabricating the
charge of rape against him cannot succeed. Not a few persons accused of rape have attributed the
charges brought against them to resentment or revenge, but such alleged motives have not prevented
the Court from lending full credence to the testimony of a complainant who remained steadfast
throughout her direct and cross-examination.[12] Given the naivet of complainant who was only 14
years old at the time of the incident, we are hard put to believe that she could have concocted a tale of
pure fantasy, if only to get back at her father for not allowing her to live and study in Manila. Well-
settled is the doctrine that no young and decent lass will publicly cry rape, particularly against her
alleged father, if such were not the truth, or if justice was not her sole objective. The revelation of a
young girl that she was sexually abused cannot be easily dismissed as a mere concoction, considering
her willingness to undergo a public trial and relate the details of her defilement. Normally, no woman
would be willing to undergo the arduous stages and embarrassing consequences of a rape trial, if not
to condemn an injustice and obtain retribution. [13]
ordering him to pay P50,000.00 in moral damages is AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION that
exemplary damages is decreased to P25,000.00 and the civil indemnity of P50,000.00 is hereby
increased to P75,000.00.
Let the records of this case be forwarded to the Office of the President upon finality of this
decision for possible exercise of executive clemency in accordance with Section 25 of Republic Act
No. 7659,amending Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code.
For being in the wrong forum, the appeal to this Court in Criminal Case No. SC-6692 for acts of
lasciviousness is DISMISSED and the conviction of the accused therein by the
court a quo stands. Costs de oficio.SO ORDERED.

In this case, the information alleged that accused-appellant, through the use of force and
intimidation, had carnal knowledge of complainant. This Court has consistently held that rape is
committed when intimidation is used on the victim, which includes moral intimidation or coercion.
[14]
In this case, complainant was also threatened by accused-appellant with physical harm if she
dared to report the matter to anyone. It is not uncommon for a girl of tender age to be intimidated
into silence by the mildest threat on her life. Thus, our consistent doctrine is that delay in reporting a
rape, if sufficiently explained, does not affect the credibility of a witness. [15]

We have repeatedly adhered to the oft-repeated rule that lust is no respecter of time and place,
and that rape can be committed even inside a house where there are other occupants. [16] The presence
of people in a certain place is no guarantee that rape will not and cannot be committed. [17] Thus, the
fact that complainants sister was in the same room where the incident took place is not sufficient to
cast doubt on the truthfulness of complainants testimony, especially in light of her clear and
convincing narration of the incident.

Finally, we are not persuaded by accused-appellants defense of alibi. For this defense to
prosper, it is necessary to prove the presence of the accused at another place at the time of the
perpetration of the offense and demonstrate that it is physically impossible for him to be at the scene
of the crime.[18] Accused-appellant claims that he was working in the mountain but he failed to show
that it was physically impossible for him to be in their house on that fateful day. More importantly,
accused-appellants testimony was totally uncorroborated. His alibi cannot stand against the
overwhelming evidence of the prosecution pointing to his culpability.

With regard to the civil liability of accused-appellant, we affirm the trial courts award
of P50,000.00 for moral damages. In this jurisdiction, moral damages in rape cases may be awarded
to the victim in such amount as the court deems just, without the need for pleading or proof of the
basis thereof. However, there being only one incident of rape, the award of exemplary damages
should be decreased from P50,000.00 to P25,000.00. Moreover, in line with recent jurisprudence,
the civil indemnity should be increased from P50,000.00 to P75,000.00 since the commission of
rape was qualified by circumstances under which the death penalty is imposable in accordance with
R.A. 7659.[19]

The information alleged that accused-appellant had carnal knowledge with his daughter, then
fourteen years old. The prosecution presented the birth certificate of complainant which shows that
she was born on October 14, 1983. Complainant testified that she was 14 years old when she was
raped by accused-appellant and this was confirmed by her mother, Gloria Torres. Moreover,
accused-appellant admitted that complainant is his daughter, which was corroborated by the
complainant. The concurrence of minority of the complainant and her relationship to the offender,
having been alleged in the information and duly proved with certainty and clearness as the crime
itself during trial, constrains the Court to affirm the conviction of accused-appellant of qualified rape,
justifying the imposition of the death penalty on him. [20]

Four members of the Court maintain their position that Republic Act No. 7659, insofar as it
prescribes the death penalty, is unconstitutional. Nevertheless, they submit to the ruling of the Court,
by a majority vote, that the law is constitutional and that the death penalty should be accordingly
imposed.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Santa Cruz, Laguna, Branch 28
convicting accused-appellant Amorsolo Torres y Ganibo of RAPE and sentencing him to DEATH and

39
40

G.R. No. L-68097 January 16, 1986
EDWARD A. KELLER & CO., LTD., petitioner-appellant,
vs.
COB GROUP MARKETING, INC., JOSE E. BAX, FRANCISCO C. DE CASTRO, JOHNNY
DE LA FUENTE, SERGIO C. ORDOÑEZ, TRINIDAD C. ORDOÑEZ, MAGNO C.
ORDOÑEZ, ADORACION C. ORDOÑEZ, TOMAS C. LORENZO, JR., LUIZ M. AGUILA-
ADAO, MOISES P. ADAO, ASUNCION MANAHAN and INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE
COURT, respondents-appellees.
Sycip, Salazar, Feliciano & Hernandez Law Office for petitioner.
Vicente G. Gregorio for private respondents.
Roberto P. Vega for respondent Asuncion Manahan.
AQUINO, C.J.:
This case is about the liability of a marketing distributor under its sales agreements with the owner of
the products. The petitioner presented its evidence before Judges Castro Bartolome and Benipayo.
Respondents presented their evidence before Judge Tamayo who decided the case.
A review of the record shows that Judge Tamayo acted under a misapprehension of facts and his
findings are contradicted by the evidence. The Appellate Court adopted the findings of Judge
Tamayo. This is a case where this Court is not bound by the factual findings of the Appellate Court.
(See Director of Lands vs. Zartiga, L-46068-69, September 30, 1982, 117 SCRA 346, 355).
Edward A. Keller & Co., Ltd. appointed COB Group Marketing, Inc. as exclusive distributor of its
household products, Brite and Nuvan in Panay and Negros, as shown in the sales agreement dated
March 14, 1970 (32-33 RA). Under that agreement Keller sold on credit its products to COB Group
Marketing.
As security for COB Group Marketing's credit purchases up to the amount of P35,000, one Asuncion
Manahan mortgaged her land to Keller. Manahan assumed solidarily with COB Group Marketing the
faithful performance of all the terms and conditions of the sales agreement (Exh. D).
In July, 1970 the parties executed a second sales agreement whereby COB Group Marketing's
territory was extended to Northern and Southern Luzon. As security for the credit purchases up to
P25,000 of COB Group Marketing for that area, Tomas C. Lorenzo, Jr. and his father Tomas, Sr.
(now deceased) executed a mortgage on their land in Nueva Ecija. Like Manahan, the Lorenzos were
solidarily liable with COB Group Marketing for its obligations under the sales agreement (Exh. E).
The credit purchases of COB Group Marketing, which started on October 15, 1969, limited up to
January 22, 1971. On May 8, the board of directors of COB Group Marketing were apprised by Jose
E. Bax the firm's president and general manager, that the firm owed Keller about P179,000. Bax was
authorized to negotiate with Keller for the settlement of his firm's liability (Exh. 1, minutes of the
meeting).
On the same day, May 8, Bax and R. Oefeli of Keller signed the conditions for the settlement of COB
Group Marketing's liability, Exhibit J, reproduced as follows:
This formalizes our conditions for the settlement of C.O.B.'s account with
Edward Keller Ltd.
1. Increase of mortgaged collaterals to the full market value (estimated by Edak
at P90,000.00).
2. Turn-over of receivables (estimated outstandings P70,000.00 to
P80,000.00).
41
3. Turn-over of 4 (four) trucks for outright sale to Edak, to be credited against
C.0.B.'s account.
4. Remaining 8 (eight) trucks to be assigned to Edak, C.O.B will continue
operation with these 8 trucks. They win be returned to COB after settlement of
full account.
5. C.O.B has to put up securities totalling P200,000.00. P100,000.00 has to be
liquidated within one year. The remaining P100,000.00 has to be settled within
the second year.
6. Edak wig agree to allow C.O.B. to buy goods to the value of the difference
between P200,000.00 and their outstandings, provided C.O.B. is in a position to
put up securities amounting to P200,000.00.
Discussion held on May 8, 1971.
Twelve days later, or on May 20, COB Group Marketing, through Bax executed two second chattel
mortgages over its 12 trucks (already mortgaged to Northern Motors, Inc.) as security for its
obligation to Keller amounting to P179,185.16 as of April 30, 1971 (Exh. PP and QQ). However, the
second mortgages did not become effective because the first mortgagee, Northern Motors, did not
give its consent. But the second mortgages served the purpose of being admissions of the liability
COB Group Marketing to Keller.
The stockholders of COB Group Marketing, Moises P. Adao and Tomas C. Lorenzo, Jr., in a letter
dated July 24, 1971 to Keller's counsel, proposed to pay Keller P5,000 on November 30, 1971 and
thereafter every thirtieth day of the month for three years until COB Group Marketing's mortgage
obligation had been fully satisfied. They also proposed to substitute the Manahan mortgage with a
mortgage on Adao's lot at 72 7th Avenue, Cubao, Quezon City (Exh. L).
These pieces of documentary evidence are sufficient to prove the liability of COB Group Marketing
and to justify the foreclosure of the two mortgages executed by Manahan and Lorenzo (Exh. D and
E).
Section 22, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides that the act, declaration or omission of a party as
to a relevant fact may be given in evidence against him "as admissions of a party".
The admissions of Bax are supported by the documentary evidence. It is noteworthy that all the
invoices, with delivery receipts, were presented in evidence by Keller, Exhibits KK-1 to KK-277-a and
N to N-149-a, together with a tabulation thereof, Exhibit KK, covering the period from October 15,
1969 to January 22, 1971. Victor A. Mayo, Keller's finance manager, submitted a statement of account
showing that COB Group Marketing owed Keller P184,509.60 as of July 31, 1971 (Exh. JJ). That
amount is reflected in the customer's ledger, Exhibit M.
On the other hand, Bax although not an accountant, presented his own reconciliation statements
wherein he showed that COB Group Marketing overpaid Keller P100,596.72 (Exh. 7 and 8). He
claimed overpayment although in his answer he did not allege at all that there was an
overpayment to Keller.
The statement of the Appellate Court that COB Group Marketing alleged in its answer that it
overpaid Keller P100,596.72 is manifestly erroneous first, because COB Group Marketing did not
file any answer, having been declared in default, and second, because Bax and the other
stockholders, who filed an answer, did not allege any overpayment. As already stated, even before
they filed their answer, Bax admitted that COB Group Marketing owed Keller around P179,000 (Exh.
1).
Keller sued on September 16, 1971 COB Group Marketing, its stockholders and the mortgagors,
Manahan and Lorenzo.
COB Group Marketing, Trinidad C. Ordonez and Johnny de la Fuente were declared in default (290
Record on Appeal).
After trial, the lower court (1) dismissed the complaint; (2) ordered Keller to pay COB Group
Marketing the sum of P100,596.72 with 6% interest a year from August 1, 1971 until the amount is
fully paid: (3) ordered Keller to pay P100,000 as moral damages to be allocated among the
stockholders of COB Group Marketing in proportion to their unpaid capital subscriptions; (4)
ordered the petitioner to pay Manahan P20,000 as moral damages; (5) ordered the petitioner to pay
P20,000 as attomey's fees to be divided among the lawyers of all the answering defendants and to
pay the costs of the suit; (6) declared void the mortgages executed by Manahan and Lorenzo and the
cancellation of the annotation of said mortgages on the Torrens titles thereof, and (7) dismissed
Manahan's cross-claim for lack of merit.
If after ninety (90) days from notice of the finality of the judgment in this case the judgment against
COB Group Marketing has not been satisfied fully, then the mortgages executed by Manahan and
Lorenzo should be foreclosed and the proceeds of the sales applied to the obligation of COB Group
Marketing. Said mortgage obligations should bear six percent legal interest per annum after the
expiration of the said 90-day period. Costs against the private respondents.
SO ORDERED.

The petitioner appealed. The Appellate Court affirmed said judgment except the award of P20,000 as
moral damages which it eliminated. The petitioner appealed to this Court.

Bax and the other respondents quoted the six assignments of error made by the petitioner in the
Appellate Court, not the four assignments of error in its brief herein. Manahan did not file any
appellee's brief.

We find that the lower courts erred in nullifying the admissions of liability made in 1971 by Bax as
president and general manager of COB Group Marketing and in giving credence to the alleged
overpayment computed by Bax .

The lower courts not only allowed Bax to nullify his admissions as to the liability of COB Group
Marketing but they also erroneously rendered judgment in its favor in the amount of its supposed
overpayment in the sum of P100,596.72 (Exh. 8-A), in spite of the fact that COB Group Marketing
was declared in default and did not file any counterclaim for the supposed overpayment.

The lower courts harped on Keller's alleged failure to thresh out with representatives of COB Group
Marketing their "diverse statements of credits and payments". This contention has no factual basis.
In Exhibit J, quoted above, it is stated by Bax and Keller's Oefeli that "discussion (was) held on May
8, 1971."

That means that there was a conference on the COB Group Marketing's liability. Bax in that
discussion did not present his reconciliation statements to show overpayment. His Exhibits 7 and 8
were an afterthought. He presented them long after the case was filed. The petitioner regards them as
"fabricated" (p. 28, Appellant's Brief).

Bax admitted that Keller sent his company monthly statements of accounts (20-21 tsn, September 2,
1976) but he could not produce any formal protest against the supposed inaccuracy of the said
statements (22). He lamely explained that he would have to dig up his company's records for the
formal protest (23-24). He did not make any written demand for reconciliation of accounts (27-28).

As to the liability of the stockholders, it is settled that a stockholder is personally liable for the
financial obligations of a corporation to the extent of his unpaid subscription (Vda. de Salvatierra vs.
Garlitos 103 Phil. 757, 763; 18 CJs 1311-2).

While the evidence shows that the amount due from COB Group Marketing is P184,509.60 as of July
31, 1971 or P186,354.70 as of August 31, 1971 (Exh. JJ), the amount prayed for in Keller's complaint
is P182,994.60 as of July 31, 1971 (18-19 Record on Appeal). This latter amount should be the one
awarded to Keller because a judgment entered against a party in default cannot exceed the amount
prayed for (Sec. 5, Rule 18, Rules of Court).

WHEREFORE, the decisions of the trial court and the Appellate Court are reversed and set aside.

COB Group marketing, Inc. is ordered to pay Edward A. Keller & Co., Ltd. the sum of P182,994.60
with 12% interest per annum from August 1, 1971 up to the date of payment plus P20,000 as
attorney's fees.

Asuncion Manahan and Tomas C. Lorenzo, Jr. are ordered to pay solidarity with COB Group
Marketing the sums of P35,000 and P25,000, respectively.

The following respondents are solidarity liable with COB Group Marketing up to the amounts of their
unpaid subscription to be applied to the company's liability herein: Jose E. Bax P36,000; Francisco
C. de Castro, P36,000; Johnny de la Fuente, P12,000; Sergio C. Ordonez, P12,000; Trinidad C.
Ordonez, P3,000; Magno C. Ordonez, P3,000; Adoracion C. Ordonez P3,000; Tomas C. Lorenzo, Jr.,
P3,000 and Luz M. Aguilar-Adao, P6,000.

42

G.R. No. L-8132 March 25, 1913
THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. RAMONA R. EVANGELISTA, Defendant-
Appellant.
Thomas D. Aitken, for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor-General Harvey, for appellee.
TRENT, J. :chanrobles virtual law library
The appellant, Ramona R. Evangelista, was convicted in the Court of First Instance of Manila of the
crime of arson and was sentenced, under article 557, paragraph 4, of the Penal Code, to three years
and seven months ofpresidio correccional, and to pay the costs of the
action.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Romana R. Evangelista was the tenant of a portion of a building situated on Carriedo Street, Manila,
and used the ground floor for a store where were sold hats and various other articles, while the upper
floor was used as living quarters for herself and a number of student boarders. On June 2, 1912, at
7:01 p.m., the fire department answered an alarm of fire which proved to be in that part of the
building occupied by the appellant. At the time the firemen arrived, dense black smoke was issuing
from under the eaves of the building, and the fumes of burning coal oil were plainly discernible. The
fire originated in the second floor of the building in the appellant's living quarters. Before the fire was
finally extinguished, the building was damaged, according to the testimony of record, in the amount
of P10,562.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The acting chief of the fire department testified that the fire could not been burning more than three
or four minutes when he arrived. He declared positively that the fire could not have gained the
headway it had or caused the damage it did if coal oil had not been used, and that the whole place
appeared to have been saturated with coal oil.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
Three insurance policies taken out by the appellant were introduced by the prosecution. One for
P1,000 was simply a renewal of a former policy, the renewal dating from December 20, 1911.
Another, written by the same company, in the amount of P5,000, was dated May 22, 1912. The third,
in another company, was dated May 21, 1912, and was also for P5,000. Although the policy issued
May 22 contained a condition that policies with other companies must be declared and inserted on
its face, no mention appears of the one issued the preceding
day.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
An agent of the company which issued the insurance policy for P5,000 dated the 21st of May testified
that he went to the store and made an inspection of the contents, and at that time there was not over
P2,000 or P3,000 worth of goods, including the wardrobes; but as the appellant stated that there
were more goods coming to the store very soon, he agreed to make the policy for
P5,000.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
At the date of the fire the appellant was moving her store and personal effects to No. 329 Ronquillo.
The administrator of the Tuason estate, of which the burned building was a part, testified that the
appellant owed the estate P1,392 for rent; that he had given her notice a month or two before the fire
occurred to move about June; that no date was fixed by him but the appellant informed him that she
would leave the house about June.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Jose Bello testified that he had been employed by the appellant as a clerk in the store up to the time
of the fire. He testified that he was working in the store on the morning of June 2; that the appellant
instructed him to put a number of valuable hats in a box, as she was going to send them to a friend to
sell; that he did as he was instructed, and that the box was removed by a servant to the house at 329
Ronquillo. Witness stated that these were the only valuable hats left in the store; that the trunks of
the students who were boarding with the appellant had been removed to the new place previous to
June 2, as well as furniture and cooking utensils; and that on Sunday some more trunks and other
things were taken to the new place. He testified that no new stock of goods had been brought to the
store after the insurance policies dated May 21 and 22 had been
issued.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
43
Detective Perceival stated that on the morning after the fire he found in the living quarters upstairs
an iron bed, a wardrobe, a box, and an old bed, all practically burned up; an old leather box
containing some papers of no importance; and one or two pieces of clothing. The inside of the
wardrobe was not burned and there was nothing in it.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
law library
The defendant testified that the goods she had removed from the house were those which she sold to
Americans at the end of every month; that she kept her insurance policies at her aunt's
house.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Juan Evangelista, son of the appellant, testified that he was a resident of 325 (329) Ronquillo; that
formerly he resided at 325 Carriedo; that he moved from the latter place just previous to the fire on
June 2; that all the boarders and the servants had also moved, leaving only his father and mother at
the place on Carriedo.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The acting chief of the fire department testified that on May 31, at 6:31 a.m. an alarm was turned in
for a fire which proved to be in the rear of a piano store adjacent to that part of that building
occupied by the appellant. The fire burned a hole through a door which opened into a court or
passageway to which access could also be had through a similar door on the premises of the
appellant. The fire chief directed his assistant to look for evidences of incendiarism, and shortly after
his assistant came back saying: "Chief, here are four bottles with some coal oil in them yet." The four
bottles were placed upon a piano and the case turned over to the Secret Service Bureau. Exception
was taken to the remark made to the fire chief by his assistant as being hearsay. This exception was
overruled and counsel for the appellant assigns this as error. As the chief's assistant also testified in
this case, and stated that he found four pint bottles with a few drops of kerosene in them just back of
the door which was burned by the fire, the remark in question was unnecessary to establish the fact
that the assistant chief, acting upon the instructions received from his superior, found four pint
bottles with kerosene in them, and that he bought these bottles to the fire chief, who placed them on
a piano and turned the case over to the police department. The error in admitting the remark, if error
at all, was harmless and did not prejudice the rights of the
defendant.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Teodorico Fungo, who was the servant of the appellant at the time of this first fire, testified that early
on that morning, while boiling some milk, the appellant ordered him to go downstairs and light some
papers in a box standing in the court just between the appellant's door and the door to the piano
store. Witness refused to do so, and then saw the appellant to go downstairs with a bottle of
petroleum and saturate the papers in the box with the petroleum, after which she came back upstairs
and sent him out to purchase four centavos worth of petroleum. Upon his return she took the
petroleum from him and went downstairs. Pretty soon be heard people downstairs crying, "Fire,
fire," and then he heard the appellant saying the same thing to her son. Witness then wrapped up his
things and left the house. The testimony of this witness was objected to on the ground that at the
time of the trial he was living at the house of a member of the city secret-service force who assisted in
the investigation of the origin of the fire occuring on June 2, without paying for his accommodations.
This witness, however, testified that he was washing dishes at this house, and evidently he was acting
as a servant. In any event, this fact would not effect his competency as a witness. It was established
by indisputable evidence that a fire occurred as stated above on May 31, and that unmistakable
evidences of incendiarism were found by the fire department.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
The defense objected to the introduction of all evidence relative to the fire of May 31 as incompetent
and not the fire charged in the information. While it was not the fire charged in the information, and
does not by any means amount to direct evidence against the accused, it was competent to prove the
intent of the accused in setting the fire which was charged in the
information.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
In People vs. Shainwold (51 Ca., 468), the court said:
On a trial for arson, the prosecution may prove that the prisoner had attempted to set fire to the
house on a day previous to the burning alleged in the indictment, for the purpose of showing the
intent of the prisoner in subsequently setting fire to the house.
In Knights vs. State (58 Neb., 225; 78 N.W., 508), the court said: "Where a person is charged with
the commission of a specific crime, testimony may be received of other similar acts, committed about
the same time, for the purpose only of establishing the criminal intent of the accused." chanrobles
virtual law library
And in People vs. Lattimore (86 Cal., 403; 24 Pac., 1091), a similar ruling was made, when the court
said that "evidence tending to show that defendant started the former fire was admissible to prove
intent." This principle has been applied by the courts of many jurisdictions. (3 Cyc., 1007; 1 Wigmore
on Evidence, �� 303, 354.) There was no error in receiving the evidence as to the fire occurring on
May 31 to show intent.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The accused appeared at the scene of the fire on the morning of June 3, and Detective Perceival, who
had been detailed to make an investigation of the fire, after a few minutes conversation with her, sent
her to the police station in company with the witness Jose Bello. She remained at the police station
all day until about 8 o'clock that evening, when she confessed to having started the fire, assigning as
her reason that she was heavily in debt and the only way she could see to get out of debt was to raise
her insurance and then set fire to the place. Perceival testified that the appellant gave her confession
in detail. It is not denied that this confession was made. But counsel assigns as error on this appeal
that it should not have been admitted because it was involuntary by reason of force, intimidation,
etc., used in extorting it.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
It is admitted that the accused was detained at the police station from about 10 o'clock in the
morning until 8 o'clock at night; that from the time she arrived until after office hours at 5:30 in the
evening she was held in the waiting room, which was furnished with "hard-seated chairs;" that she
was then taken into the office of the chief of the secret service and remained there until 8 o'clock,
when she made her confession; that during the day she was not allowed to talk to any member of her
family; and that the detective told her she "had better tell the truth." The defendant herself further
testified that Perceival and Dizon (another detective) were the only persons who talked to her during
the afternoon; that they both told her to admit that she had started the fire, and said if she would do
so she would only have to pay a fine and would then be set free; that if she did not admit having
started the fire, she would have to go to jail for twenty years; that she did not have anything to eat;
and that about 8 o'clock that evening she could hardly remember anything as she was shaking and
trembling and did not know that she was doing. On cross-examination she admitted that she was
offered food at noon and the evening also, but said that she did not eat any of it. She further stated
that Perceival was sitting by her side a considerable portion of the afternoon and nudging her and
saying: "Tell the truth; tell the truth." Perceival and Dizon testified in rebuttal that the defendant did
eat while she was detained at the police station; that Perceival did not nudge her or mistreat her in
any way, and that no promises of leniency or threats of imprisonment were made to her. The trial
court, who could observe the witnesses and their demeanor and bearing on the stand, was in a much
better position to estimate the value of this contradictory testimony then are we. But another
circumstance is before us which greatly weakens the testimony of the defendant on this point.
Perceival testified that immediately upon her confession of guilt he sent for the chief of the secret
service; that while the chief was there the then attorney of the defendant also came in; that he asked
her in the presence of these two gentlemen if anything had been done to her and, if so, to tell them
about it; and finally that her attorney himself asked her this question and she replied, "no; that he
(the detective) had treated her as though he was her son." Under these circumstances, the lower
court did not credit her statements in these respects, and we cannot say that there was error in so
doing.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Counsel on this appeal, however, strongly insists that the facts that she was sitting on a "hard-seated
chair" all day and talked to her about the evidence he had against her and told her "she had better tell
the truth" should be considered as sufficient to render the confession involuntary. So far as her being
detained in the waiting room which was furnished with "hard-seated chairs" is concerned, we fail to
perceive any degree of torture or mistreatment. It is true that she was deprived of her liberty and was
held as a suspicious person, which was not at all a pleasant experience. But her treatment in this
respect was certainly not more rigorous that to which all prisoners must submit. The positive
statement is accredited to the defendant that she was well-treated by the detective. It is not denied
that she made this statement, nor that it was made in the presence of her then attorney. The latter
could certainly have testified to the truth or falsity of this statement, and as to her physical condition
at the time it was made. But he was not called as a witness. Detective Perceival testified on this point
that she knew what she was saying in making her confession, but that she appeared to be ashamed
and broken up, and that she cried and begged for mercy from her lawyer after he
arrived.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
44
Nor was the admonition of Perceival that she had better tell the truth in the nature of a threat. In
Huffman vs. State (130 Ala., 89; 30 So., 394), it was held that the facts that the accused was urged to
tell the truth and the statement was made to him that it would be better for him to do so, did not
render the confession involuntary. In State vs. Leuth (5 Ohio C.C., 94), it was held that the bare
exhortation by the police captain to the accused that he had better tell the truth did not render a
confession involuntary, since this was not an influence exerted toward an untruth. The confession of
a prisoner, charged with receiving stolen goods, to a private person was held voluntary although
made after the statement to the latter that it would be better for the accused to tell the truth.
(Lucasey vs. U.S., Fed. Cas., 8588a.) In Roszczyniala vs. State (125 Wis., 414; 1104 N.W., 113), it was
held that statements made by an officer to the accused, "Why don't you tell the truth?" and "You
better tell the truth about this matter. They have all identified you," were not enough to render
inculpatory statements involuntary. The great weight of authority is to the same effect.
(Kelly vs. State, 72 Ala., 244; Hardy vs. U.S., 3 App. D.C., 35; State vs. Konstett, 62 Kan., 221; 61 Pac.,
805; State vs.Staley, 14 Minn., 75; State vs. Anderson, 96 Mo., 241; 9 S.W., 636.) We think that under
all the circumstances, the confession was properly admitted.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
There was some attempt made to establish an alibi for the defendant. The defendant gave a detailed
statement of her whereabouts from the time she left her house at 4 o'clock on the afternoon of the
fire until the fire occurred. According to her statement she went to see a friend in Calle G. Tuason,
where she stayed about an hour; from there she went to but some cloth at a store on Calle San Pedro,
where she stayed a little more than half an hour, and was on her way home when she saw the fire
engines at work at the scene of the fire. To corroborate these statements, Dimas Lampano was called
as a witness and testified that he lived on Calle G. Tuason; that he had known the defendant for
about fourteen years; that he did not remember the Sunday her house was burned; that the
defendant called on him the second day of the month about half past 4 or 5 o'clock; that he did not
know what day of the week it was, but later he stated that it was Sunday; that he remembered this
visit because on Monday he received a letter from Vitas for some work to be done there. Felisa del
Rosario testified that she lived on Calle San Pedro; that she had known the defendant about four
years; that she did not remember the day the defendant's house was burned; that she remembered
that the defendant had visited her on a Sunday afternoon, that she could not remember how long ago
that was, but that she came to the house about 5 to 5:30 in the afternoon to buy some cloth; that it
was on the 2nd of June that defendant came to see her; that she never came there again; that she
could not say when the defendant came to her house before that; and that she remembered the
defendant came that day because her children fell down the staircase. Juan Evangelista testified that
his mother came to his house between 6 and 7 o'clock in the evening; and that about three or four
minutes after his mother left he heard the fire engines passing
by.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
It will be noted that though both Lampano and Felisa del Rosario first stated that they did not
remember the day on which the defendant visited them, they concluded by not only fixing the day
but the hour when she called on them; that the hour fixed by them when the defendant paid her
respective visits almost exactly dovetailed into the testimony of the defendant herself in these
respects; and that both of these witnesses were enabled to fix the day and the hour of the defendant's
visits to them, not by any significance attached to the visit itself but by incidents entirely
unconnected with the defendant, and apparently very insignificant in themselves. Such testimony
would be subject to great suspicion under any circumstances. In considering the testimony of Juan
Evangelista it must be remembered that he was the son of the defendant and was very much
interested in establishing the innocence of his mother. It is the only evidence in the record
counteracting the case made by the prosecution. As opposed to it we have the fomidable array of
circumstantial evidence tending strongly to show intent and motive of the defendant for setting fire
to the house; the fact that the fire originated in the living quarters of the accused; that it was, by the
testimony of the acting chief of the fire department and his assistant, of incendiary origin; and
finally, the extrajudicial confession of the accused herself that she started the fire. This
circumstantial evidence, supported by the confession of the accused, is, we think, conclusive of her
guilt.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Upon the evidence presented it does not appear that the house was inhabited at the time the fire
occurred, or that there were persons on the premises as charged in the information; for it appears
that all he persons living here had left he place for another residence although the defendant says she
was going back to the place to sleep that night. Under these circumstances the lower court found the
appellant guilty under article 557 of he Penal Code, which reads:
ART. 557. Any person who shall set fire to anything not falling within the terms of the preceding
articles shall suffer:

xxx xxx xxx

4. The penalty of presidio correccional in its medium an maximum degrees, if the damages shall
exceed 6,250 pesetas.

In commenting upon this article of the code, Viada (vol. 3, p. 607) says that this article must be
considered as supplementary to and the complement of the preceding articles, the provisions of
which are applicable to those cases of arson which are not specially included or provided for in them.
This is the only function it can have, as it specifically states that it is applicable to cases "not falling
within the terms of the preceding articles." Its provisions are general and are not designed to take the
place of specific penalties provided in the chapter of which it forms a
part.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The building in this case, although not inhabited, was standing in a populated place, and the damage
to it exceeded 6,250 pesetas. These two circumstances are exactly the requirements of article 551,
paragraph 2, and the penalty provided is presidio mayor. The aggravating circumstance of
nocturnity being present in the commission of this crime, the penalty should be imposed in its
maximum degree. The appellant in this case being a woman, however, the punishment should be
changed toprision mayor in accordance with article 95 of the Code. The penalty imposed by the trial
court is therefore set aside, and the appellant is hereby sentenced to ten years and one day of prision
mayor, together with the accessory penalties provided by law; to indemnify the owner of the building
in the sum of P10,562; and to the payment of the costs of the
cause.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Arellano, C.J., Torres and Moreland, JJ., concur.

45
46
G.R. No. L-12858 January 22, 1918
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
SANTIAGO PINEDA, defendant-appellant.
Francisco and Lualhati for appellant.
Acting Attorney-General Paredes for appellee.
MALCOLM, J.:
This appeal requires a construction and an application, for the first time, of the penal provisions of
the Pharmacy Law.
Santiago Pineda, the defendant, is a registered pharmacist of long standing and the owner of a drug
store located at Nos. 442, 444, Calle Santo Cristo, city of Manila. One Feliciano Santos, having some
sick horses, presented a copy of a prescription obtained from Dr. Richardson, and which on other
occasions Santos had given to his horses with good results, at Pineda's drug store for filling. The
prescription read — "clorato de potasa — 120 gramos — en seis papelitos de 20 gramos, para
caballo." Under the supervision of Pineda, the prescription was prepared and returned to Santos in
the form of six papers marked, "Botica Pineda — Clorato potasa — 120.00 — en seis papeles — para
caballo — Sto. Cristo 442, 444, Binondo, Manila." Santos, under the belief that he had purchased the
potassium chlorate which he had asked for, put two of the packages in water the doses to two of his
sick horses. Another package was mixed with water for another horse, but was not used. The two
horses, to which had been given the preparation, died shortly afterwards. Santos, thereupon, took the
three remaining packages to the Bureau of Science for examination. Drs. Peña and Darjuan, of the
Bureau of Science, on analysis found that the packages contained not potassium chlorate but barium
chlorate. At the instance of Santos, the two chemists also went to the drug store of the defendant and
bought potassium chlorate, which when analyzed was found to be barium chlorate. (Barium chlorate,
it should be noted, is a poison; potassium chlorate is not.) Dr. Buencamino, a veterinarian,
performed an autopsy on the horses, and found that death was the result of poisoning.
Four assignments of error are made. The first is that the lower court erred in admitting the testimony
of the chemist Pena and Darjuan as to their purchase of potassium chlorate at the drug store of the
accused, which substance proved on analysis to be barium chlorate. What the appellant is here
relying on is the maxim res inter alios acta. As a general rule, the evidence of other offenses
committed by a defendant is inadmissible. But appellant has confused this maxim and this rule with
certain exceptions thereto. The effort is not to convict the accused of a second offense. Nor is there an
attempt to draw the mind away from the point at issue and thus to prejudice defendant's case. The
purpose is to ascertain defendant's knowledge and intent, and to fix his negligence. If the defendant
has on more than one occasion performed similar acts, accident in good faith is possibly excluded,
negligence is intensified, and fraudulent intent may even be established. It has been said that there is
no better evidence of negligence than the frequency of accidents. (See 10 R. C. L., pp. 938, 940.) The
United States Supreme Court has held that:
On the trial of a criminal case the question relates to the tendency of certain testimony to
throw light upon a particular fact, or to explain the conduct of a particular person, there is
a certain discretion on the part of the trial judge which a court of errors will not interfere
with, unless it manifestly appear that the testimony has no legitimate bearing upon the
question at issue, and is calculated to prejudice the accused.
Whenever the necessity arises for a resort to circumstantial evidence, either from the
nature of the inquiry or the failure of direct proof, objections to the testimony on the
ground of irrelevancy are not favored.
Evidence is admissible in a criminal action which tends to show motive, although it tends
to prove the commission of another offense by the defendant. (Moore vs. U. S. [1893], 150
U. S., 57.)
The second assignment of error is that the lower court erred in finding that the substance sold by the
accused to Feliciano Santos on the 22d of June, 1916, was barium chlorate and not potassium
chlorate. The proof demonstrates the contrary.
47
The third and fourth assignments of error that the lower court erred in finding that the accused has
been proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of an infraction of Act No. 597, section 17, as
amended. The third assignment contains the points we should consider, including, we may remark, a
somewhat difficult question concerning which the briefs have given little assistance.
The Pharmacy Law was first enacted as Act No. 597, was later amended by Act Nos. 1921, 2236, and
2382, and is now found as Chapter 30 of the Administrative Code. The law provides for a board of
pharmaceutical examiners, and the examination and registration of pharmacists, and finally contains
sundry provisions relative to the practice of pharmacy. High qualification for applicants for the
pharmaceutical; examination are established. The program of subjects for the examination is wide.
Responsibility for the quality of drugs is fixed by section 17 of the Pharmacy Law, as amended (now
Administrative Code [1917], section 751), in the following term:
Every pharmacist shall be responsible for the quality of all drugs, chemicals, medicines,
and poisons he may sell or keep for sale; and it shall be unlawful for any
person whomsoever to manufacture, prepare, sell, or administer any prescription, drug,
chemical, medicine, or poison under any fraudulent name, direction, or pretense, or to
adulterate any drug, chemical, medicine, or poison so used, sold or offered for sale. Any
drug, chemical, medicine, or poison shall be held to be adulterated or deteriorated within
the meaning of this section if it differs from the standard of quality or purity given in the
United States Pharmacopoeia.
The same section of the Pharmacy Law also contains the following penal provision: "Any person
violating the provisions of this Act shall, upon conviction, be punished by a fine of not more than five
hundred dollar." The Administrative Code, section 2676, changes the penalty somewhat by providing
that:
Any person engaging in the practice of pharmacy in the Philippine Islands contrary to any
provision of the Pharmacy Law or violating any provisions of said law for which no specific
penalty s provided shall, for each offense, be punished by a fine not to exceed two hundred
pesos, or by imprisonment for not more than ninety days, or both, in the discretion of the
court.
These are the provisions of law, pursuant to which prosecution has been initiated and which it is now
incumbent upon us to construe.
Turning to the law, certain points therein as bearing on our present facts must be admitted. Thus,
defendant is a pharmacist. As a pharmacist, he is made responsible for the quality of all drugs and
poisons which he sells. And finally it is provided that it shall be unlawful for him to sell any drug or
poison under any "fraudulent name." It is the one word "fraudulent" which has given the court
trouble. What did the Legislature intend to convey by this restrictive adjective?
Were we to adhere to the technical definition of fraud, which the appellant vigorously insists upon, it
would be difficult, if not impossible, to convict any druggist of a violation of the law. The prosecution
would have to prove to a reasonable degree of certainty that the druggist made a material
representation; that it was false; that when he made it he knew that it was false or made it recklessly
without any knowledge of its truth and as positive assertion; that he made it with the intention that it
should be acted upon by the purchaser; that the purchaser acted in reliance upon it, and that the
purchased thereby suffered injury. Such a construction with a literal following of well-known
principles on the subject of fraud would strip the law of at least much of its force. It would leave the
innocent purchaser of drugs, who must blindly trust in the good faith and vigilance of the
pharmacist, at the mercy of any unscrupulous vendor. We should not, therefore, without good reason
so devitalize the law.
The profession of pharmacy, it has been said again and again, is one demanding care and skill. The
responsibility of the druggist to use care has been variously qualified as "ordinary care," "care of a
special high degree," "the highest degree of care known to practical men." Even under the first
conservative expression, "ordinary care" with reference to the business of a druggist, the Supreme
Court of Connecticut has said must be held to signify "the highest practicable degree of prudence,
thoughtfulness, and vigilance, and most exact and reliable safeguards consistent with the reasonable
conduct of the business, in order that human life may not be constantly be exposed to the danger
flowing from the substitution of deadly poisons for harmless medicine." (Tombari vs. Connors
[1912], 85 Conn., 235. See also Willson vs. Faxon, Williams and Faxon [1913], 208 N. Y., 108; Knoefel
vs. Atkins [1907], 81 N. E., 600.) The "skill" required of a druggist is denominated as "high" or
"ample." (Peters vs. Jackson [1902], 50 W. Va., 644; 57 L. R. A., 428.) In other words, the care
required must be commensurate with the danger involved, and the skill employed must correspond
with the superior knowledge of the business which the law demands.
Under one conception, and it should not be forgotten that the case we consider are civil in nature, the
question of negligence or ignorance is irrelevant. The druggist is responsible as an absolute
guarantor of what he sells. In a decision which stands alone, the Supreme Court of Kentucky said:
As applicable to the owners of drug stores, or persons engaged in vending drugs and
medicines by retail, the legal maxim should be reversed. Instead of caveat emptor, it
should be caveat venditor. That is to say, let him be certain that he does not sell to a
purchaser or send to a patient one drug for another, as arsenic for calomel, cantharides for
or mixed with snakeroot and Peruvian bark, or even one innocent drug, calculated to
produce a certain effect, in place of another sent for and designed to produce a different
effect. If he does these things, he cannot escape civil responsibility, upon the alleged
pretext that it was an accidental or an innocent mistake; that he had been very careful and
particular, and had used extraordinary care and diligence in preparing or compounding
the medicines as required, etc. Such excuses will not avail him. (Fleet vs. Hollenkemp
[1852], 56 Am. Dec., 563.)
Under the other conception, in which the proof of negligence is considered as material, where a
customer calls upon a druggist for a harmless remedy, delivery of a poisonous drug by mistake by the
druggist is prima facie negligence, placing the burden on him to show that the mistake was under the
circumstances consistent with the exercise of due care. (See Knoefel vs. Atkins, supra,) The druggist
cannot, for example in filling a prescription calling for potassium chlorate give instead to the
customer barium chlorate, a poison, place this poison in a package labeled "potassium chlorate," and
expect to escape responsibility on plea of mistake. His mistake, under the most favorable aspect for
himself, was negligence. So in a case where a druggist filled an order for calomel tablets with
morphine and placed the morphine in a box labeled calomel, it was said:
Bearing these general principles in mind, and remembering particularly the care and skill which are
expected of druggist, that in some jurisdictions they are liable even for their mistake and in others
have the burden placed upon them to establish that they were not negligent, it cannot be that the
Philippine Legislature intended to use the word "fraudulent" in all its strictness. A plea of accident
and mistake cannot excuse for they cannot take place unless there be wanton and criminal
carelessness and neglect. How the misfortune occurs is unimportant, if under all the circumstances
the fact of occurrence is attributed to the druggist as a legal fault. Rather considering the
responsibility for the quality of drugs which the law imposes on druggists and the position of the
word "fraudulent" in juxtaposition to "name," what is made unlawful is the giving of a false name to
the drug asked for. This view is borne out by Spanish translation, which we are permitted to consult
to explain the English text. In the Spanish "supuesto" is used, and this word is certainly not
synonymous with "fraudulent." The usual badges of fraud, falsify, deception, and injury must be
present-but not scienter.
In view of the tremendous an imminent danger to the public from the careless sale of poisons and
medicines, we do not deem it too rigid a rule to hold that the law penalizes any druggist who shall sell
one drug for another whether it be through negligence or mistake.
The judgment of the lower court, sentencing the defendant to pay a fine of P100, with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs, is affirmed with the cost of this instance
against the appellant, without prejudice to any civil action which may be instituted. So ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Johnson, Carson, Araullo, and Street, JJ., concur.

It is not suggested, nor can we apprehend that it is in any wise probable, that the act of
furnishing the wrong drug in this case was willful. If it was furnished by the clerk, it was
undoubtedly a mistake and unintentional. However, it was a mistake of the gravest kind,
and of the most disastrous effect. We cannot say that one holding himself out as competent
to handle such drugs, and who does so, having rightful access to them, and relied upon by
those dealing with him to exercise that high degree of caution and care called for by the
peculiarly dangerous nature of this business, can be heard to say that his mistakes by
which he furnishes a customer the most deadly of drugs for those comparatively harmless
is not, in and of itself, gross negligence, and that of an aggravated form. (Smith's Admrx.
vs. Middleton [1902], 56 L. R. A., 484.)

The rule of caveat emptor cannot apply to the purchase and sale of drugs. The vendor and the vendee
do not stand at arms length as in ordinary transactions. An imperative duty is on the druggist to take
precautions to prevent death or serious injury to anyone who relies on his absolute honesty and
peculiar leaning. The nature of drugs is such that examination would not avail the purchaser
anything. It would be idle mockery for the customer to make an examination of a compound of which
he can know nothing. Consequently, it must be that the druggist warrants that he will deliver the
drug called for.

In civil cases, the druggist is made liable for any injury approximately resulting from his negligence.
If B negligently sells poison under the guise of a beneficial drug to A, he is liable for the injury done
to A. In a case, which has repeatedly been termed the leading case on the subject and which has been
followed by the United States Supreme Court, it was said, "Pharmacists or apothecaries who
compound or sell medicines, if they carelessly label a poison as a harmless medicine, and sent it so
labeled into the market, are liable to all persons who, without fault on their part, are injured by using
it as such medicine, in consequence of the false label; the rule being that the liability in such a case
arises not out of any contract or direct privity between the wrong-doer and the person injured, but
out of the duty which the law imposes on him to avoid acts in their nature dangerous to the lives of
others." (Nat. Savings Bank vs. Ward [1879], 100 U. S., 195, following Thomas vs. Winchester [1852],
2 Seld. [N. Y.], 387.) In reality, for the druggist, mistake is negligence and care is no defense.
Throughout the criminal law, run the same rigorous rules. For example, apothecaries or apothecary
clerks, who are guilty of negligence in the sale of medicine when death ensues in consequence, have
been held guilty of manslaughter. (See Tessymond's Case [1828], 1 Lewin, C. C., 169.)

48

G.R. No. L-45179 March 30, 1937
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
BENJAMIN IRANG, ET AL., defendants.
BENJAMIN IRANG, appellant.
Conrado V. Sanchez for appellant.
Undersecretary of Justice Melencio for appellee.
VILLA-REAL, J.:
The accused Benjamin Irang appeals to this court from the judgment of the Court of First Instance of
Nueva Ecija finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the complex crime robbery with
homicide, the robbery having been committed in the house of Perfecto Melocotones and
Maximiniana Melocotones, and sentencing him to the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to
indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of P500, with the proportionate part of the costs of
the trial.
In support of his appeal the appellant assigns the following alleged errors as having been committed
by the court a quo in its decision in question, to wit:
1. The lower court erred in holding that the defendant Benjamin Irang had been
sufficiently identified beyond reasonable doubt, and in not giving due weight to the
testimony of the witnesses for the defense.
2. The lower court erred in not acquitting the defendant Benjamin Irang on the ground of
reasonable doubt.
The following undisputed facts have been established during the trial, to wit:
Between 7 and 8 o'clock of the night of November 9, 1935, seven individuals with white stripes upon
their faces, two of whom were armed with guns and two with bolos, went to the house of the spouses
Perfecto Melocotones and Maximiniana Vicente, where three lights were burning, one at the balcony,
another in the room and another on a table. Some of said individuals went up and others remained
on guard downstairs. Those who went up approached Perfecto Melocotones immediately and
ordered him to bring his money. Melocotones answered in the affirmative but before he could do
what was ordered him he was attacked with bolos until he fell to the floor. Later another armed with
a gun went up and approaching Maximiana Vicente, wife of Perfecto Melocotones, struck herein the
face with the butt of his gun, making her lose consciousness momentarily. When she regained
consciousness he saw her husband already dead. One of the assailants then said to her: "Bring out
the money and jewelry." Maximiniana Vicente turned over to the man who had struck her with the
butt of his gun P70 in cash and jewelry valued at P200, which she has kept in a trunk. During the
short space of time that she was turning over the money and jewelry, she looked at the man's face
and saw that he had pockmarks and a scar on his left eyelid. That same night the house of Juana de la
Cruz was assaulted by malefactors who had been firing shots before arriving at and going up the
house. All of them had white stripe upon their faces. Juana de la Cruz noticed that one of them had
pockmarks and a scar on the left eyelid and was dressed in a maong-colored suit. It was he who
opened her trunk.
After the malefactors had left Perfecto Melocotones house, the latter's son Toribio Melocotones, who
had seen the assailants arrive but without recognizing them, immediately reported the matter to the
municipal authorities and to the constabulary, who went to the scene of the crime without loss of
time. Maximiniana Vicente informed Lieutenant Roman Alejandre of the Constabulary that the
person who had struck her with the butt of his gun and taken her money and jewelry was a man of
regular statute, with a lean body and pockmarked face. With this description, said lieutenant went in
search of said individual. Having arrested a group of persons, he brought them to Maximiniana
Vicente's house so that the latter might identify among them the one who struck her with the butt of
his gun, but she did not find such man. Later another group was presented to her and in it she
identified the herein accused-appellant Benjamin Irang as the one who had struck her with the butt
of his gun and demanded delivery of her money and jewelry. He was likewise the same man arrested
by Lieutenant Alejandre at midnight on November 9, 1935, in the barrio of Tampac which is five or
49
seven kilometers from Maturanoc to which he was taken and brought to the house of the deceased.
Juana de la Cruz also recognized Benjamin Irang, through his pockmarks and scar on his left eyelid,
as one of the men who had gone up to her house that same night. Once under arrest, the accused-
appellant Benjamin Irang made an affidavit in Tagalog (Exhibit B), stating that while he was in the
barrio of Tampac, municipality of Guimba. Province of Nueva Ecija, on November 9, 1935 at about 7
o'clock in the evening, Fidel Estrella and Ignacio Sebastian arrived; that Fidel Estrella invited him to
go to the house of Ignacio Sebastian's brother-in-law named Angel Talens because Estrella had
something to tell him; that upon arriving at Angel Talens' house, Fidel Estrella invited him to go to
Maturanoc to look for business; that the appellant asked Fidel Estrella why he wanted to bring him in
the latter told him to stop asking questions otherwise he would slash him with his bolo; that Fidel
Estrella carried a bolo and Ignacio Sebastian an unlicensed firearms; that they went to the house of
Perfecto Melocotones in the barrio of Maturanoc, Guimba, Nueva Ecija, and upon arriving there
Fidel Estrella, who acted as the ringleader, assigned to each and every one of them his corresponding
place, designating those who should assault that of Ursula Cabigon; that Benjamin Irang was in the
group formed by Fidel Estrella and Ignacio Sebastian, which assaulted the house of Perfecto
Melocotones, having been assigned to stand guard on the stairs of said house; that Fidel Estrella,
once inside the house, slashed Perfecto Melocotones thrice with his bolo; that Fidel Estrella later told
him that they had succeeded in taking money and the shotgun; and that after the assault they
dispersed, each returning to his own home. This affidavit (Exhibit B) was sworn to by Benjamin
Irang before the deputy clerk of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija , in the presence of
Graciano Piñgol, the constabulary soldier who accompanied him. Before Irang affixed his
thumbmark and took his oath, the deputy clerk of court asked him if he understood Tagalog and
when he answered in the affirmative said deputy clerk read the contends of the document to him.
Asked whether he had any thing else to add thereto, the appellant answered that he had nothing
more to say.
The defense of the accused-appellant is an alibi to the effect that in the afternoon of the day of the
commission of the crime, he was in his rice field washing a fishing basket. There he met Roberto
Alcantara. Later he went to the house of Buenaventura Javier to return the fishing basket in question
and to exercise on the rings (jugar a las arogallas) with the latter's son Pedro, and two unmarried
sons of the appellant's uncle, in the presence of several persons, returning home at 8 o'clock that
night. When he was arrested the constabulary soldiers opened his box but found nothing in it. They
later took him in a jitney to the victims house in the barrio of Maturanoc and upon being brought
face to face with the widow Maximiniana Vicente, Lieutenant Alejandre told the widow: "this is the
one who slashed your husband and punctured your face." The widow answered saying: "Is it that
man, sir." As Benjamin Irang answered that he had not left his house, the lieutenant gave him a blow
which made him lose consciousness. Then the lieutenant said to the widow: "He is the same man. It
was he to whom you delivered the money and jewelry. Look at him well. Identify him well." In the
constabulary barracks in Cabanatuan the soldiers and a sergeant manhandled him from the night of
November 9, 1935, until 4 o'clock in the morning of the 11th of said month and year, for having
denied all knowledge of the crime, making him lose his breath and punching him in the stomach.
When he could no longer bear the maltreatment, he agreed to tell what they wanted him to tell. Upon
being taken for investigation, the constabulary soldiers told him to agree to all that the clerk of court
might read to him, otherwise they would again manhandle him at the barracks. He was not present
when the affidavit Exhibit B was prepared. Neither are the contents thereof true. He merely affixed
his thumbmark upon said document for fear of the soldiers.
Lieutenant Alejandre as well as Sergeant Lubrico denied that the accused had been maltreated in the
least.
The only question to be decided in the present appeal is whether or not the accused-appellant
Benjamin Irang was identified as one of those who assaulted the house of Perfecto Melocotones,
killed him and robbed his wife Maximiniana Vicente of money and jewelry.
Maximiniana Vicente, whom the accused-appellant Benjamin Irang struck in the face with the butt of
his gun and of whom he demanded delivery of her money and jewelry scrutinized the latter's face and
notice that he had pockmarks and a scar on his left eyelid. When on that same night of the assault
Lieutenant Alejandre, guided by the description given him by Maximiniana Vicente, went in search
of the person who might have maltreated the latter and robbed her of her money and jewelry and
presented a group of persons to said Maximiniana Vicente, she said that the man who had maltreated
her was not among those who composed that first group. Said lieutenant later presented another
group to her but neither did the widow find in it the man who had struck her with the butt of his gun.
In the third group presented to her, she immediately pointed at one who turned out to be the herein
accused-appellant. The man pointed at protested but when she told him that it was he who had
struck her in the face with the butt of his gun, the appellant became silent.

The testimony of Juana de la Cruz to the effect that her house, situated only about one hundred
meters from that of Perfecto Melocotones, was assaulted that same night by some malefactors with
white stripes upon their faces, and that one of them, with pockmarks on his face and a scar on his left
eyelid and dressed in a maong-colored suit, who later turned out to be the herein accused-appellant,
opened her box, indirectly corroborates Maximiniana Vicente's testimony that the man of the same
description was the open who went to her house and demanded delivery of her money and jewelry,
having recognized him later to be the herein accused-appellant. While evidence of another crime is,
as a rule, not admissible in a prosecution for robbery, it is admissible when it is otherwise relevant, as
where it tends to identify defendant as the perpetrator of the robbery charged, or tends to show his
presence at the scene or in the vicinity of the crime at the time charged, or when it is evidence of a
circumstance connected with the crime (16, C. J., 610, 611, sec. 1196).

Maximiniana Vicente's identification of the herein accused-appellant is likewise corroborated by the

latter's own admission invited to assault the house of Perfecto Melocotones which they in fact the
lower court of the appellant's admission under oath upon the assumption that it was not made
voluntarily, is erroneous, inasmuch as the only evidence that it was not voluntarily is the accused-
appellant's own testimony that he had been manhandled by the constabulary soldiers and threatened
with further maltreatment if he did not testify as they wished. This imputation of fortune was
categorically denied by Lieutenant Alejandre and Sergeant Lubrico of the Constabulary, before whom
the accused-appellant made the admission and who caused it to be put in writing. The imputation is
likewise contradicted by the deputy clerk of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija before whom
the accused-appellant swore to his admission and who testified that before he administered oath to
said accused-appellant, he asked him whether he understood Tagalog and, having been answered in
the affirmative, he read said document to him and asked him whether he had anything to add, the
appellant affixing his thumbmark upon it after answering that he had nothing more to say (U.
S. vs. Zara, 42 Phil., 308). There is no doubt that an admission made under oath under such
circumstances cannot be considered involuntary and therefore is admissible against the person
making it.

This court is of the opinion, therefore, that the accused-appellant identity as one of those who
assaulted the house of Perfecto Melocotones and robbed Maximiniana Vicente of her money and
jewelry, is established conclusively beyond reasonable doubt.

The defense of the accused is an alibi and has for its purpose to show that he could both have been at
the scene of the crime between 7 and 8 o'clock at night because he was in another place about seven
kilometers away at that time. This defense of alibi is contradicted by the above-stated testimony of
Juana de la Cruz and by the accused-appellant's own admission under oath Exhibit B.

The facts established at the trial as committed by the accused-appellant beyond reasonable doubt
constitute the complex crime of robbery with homicide defined in article 293, in connection with
article 294, paragraph 1, of the Revised Penal Code, and punished by reclusion perpetua to death.
Taking into consideration all the circumstances of the case, the penalty of reclusion
perpetua imposed by the trial judge is in accordance with the evidence and with law. It is not so,
however, with the pecuniary liability because, taking into account the gravity of the offense, the
indemnity to the heirs of the deceased should be P1,000 and that for the stolen goods not restored
P390.

Wherefore, with the sole modification that the accused-appellant Benjamin Irang is sentenced
further to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of P1,000 and to restore to Maximiniana
Vicente the sum of P70 and the stolen jewelry and gun, or to reimburse the value thereof in the
amount of P390, the judgment appealed from is affirmed in all other respects, with the costs of this
instance to the appellant. So ordered.

Avanceña, C.J., Abad Santos, Imperial and Diaz, JJ., concur.

50
 [G.R. No. 143032. October 14, 2002]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. SEGUNDINO VALENCIA y
BLANCA, JOHNNY TADENA y TORDA, and DOMINGO DEROY, JR. y
SAROCAM, accused-appellants.
DECISION
Per Curiam:
Accused-appellants Segundino Valencia y Blanca, Johnny Tadena y Torda and Domingo
Deroy, Jr. y Sarocam were charged and convicted by the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for
violation of Section 15 of Republic Act (R.A.) 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act, for
unlawfully selling or offering to sell 634.0 grams of Psuedophedrine Hydrochloride which is a
regulated drug. The trial court sentenced each of the accused to the supreme penalty of death and to
pay a fine of P500,000.00. Hence, the case is now before us on automatic review.
It appears from the prosecution evidence that on September 22, 1998, a confidential informant
of the PNP Narcotics Group confided to the group that he was able to negotiate the purchase of one
kilo of drugs from a certain Junior and Johnny. The information was passed to the operatives team
leader, Insp. Ramon Arsenal and then to their commanding officer, Supt. Arturo Castillo. Supt.
Castillo immediately formed a buy-bust operation team composed of P/Insp. Arsenal, P/Insp. Beasa,
SPO2 Estrada and SPO1 Facto. SPO1 Larry Facto was designated as the poseur buyer. He was to buy
the one kilo of drugs for the agreed price of P800,000.00. SPO1 Facto was given ten P100.00 bills
which he used in preparing the boodle money.[1]
The team proceeded to the corner of Baler and Miller Streets in San Francisco Del Monte,
Quezon City. SPO1 Facto and the informant waited at the corner of Baler and Miller Streets, while
the other members of the team stayed about ten meters away. At about 10:50 in the evening, a white
Mitsubishi Lancer with plate no. UET 384 arrived. The driver, Johnny Tadena, called the
informant. The informant, together with SPO1 Facto, approached him. SPO1 Facto was introduced by
the informant to Johnny Tadena as the buyer. SPO1 Facto asked Tadena where the stuff was. The
latter replied, Its here. He told him not to worry because their boss, a certain Dodong (Segundino
Valencia), was present. SPO1 Facto saw three persons inside the car. Valencia was seated beside the
driver while their other companion, Domingo Deroy, was at the backseat. Tadena then asked SPO1
Facto about the money and the latter showed him a plastic bag containing the money. When SPO1
Facto asked Tadena to show him the stuff, Valencia ordered Deroy to hand him the bag containing
the drugs. Deroy did as instructed.Valencia then handed the stuff to SPO1 Facto in exchange for the
money. SPO1 Facto examined the content of the bag and when he saw the white substance inside, he
scratched his head to signal his companions that the transaction had been consummated. SPO1 Facto
then introduced himself as a police officer and grabbed the car key from the ignition switch. SPO1
Facto arrested Johnny Tadena while his companions seized the other accused. The three accused
were brought to Camp Crame for investigation. [2] The substance was submitted for examination at
the PNP Crime Laboratory. It tested positive for psuedo-ephedrine, a regulated drug. [3]
The defense, on the other hand, alleged that in the evening of September 22, 1998, Johnny
Tadena went to see Segundino Valencia in Caloocan City to ask him if he knew anyone who would be
interested in buying a 1995 Mitsubishi Lancer. Valencia was allegedly engaged in the business of
buying and selling used cars. On the way home, Valencia rode with Tadena to go to Bago Bantay,
Quezon City. As they were crossing an intersection along Iligan Street, an Isuzu van suddenly blocked
their way. The passengers of the van who appeared to be police officers approached them. They took
Valencias gun which he bought from a police asset. The police brought Valencia and Tadena to Camp
Crame. Tadena was placed in a jail cell while Valencia was brought before Col. Castillo. Col. Castillo
showed Valencia a plastic bag and said that he would use it as evidence against him. Valencia claimed
that the police mauled him and extorted from him the amount of P20,000.00. They also took his
necklace worth P5,000.00 and his wallet containing P1,200.00. [4] Meanwhile, Domingo Deroy
claimed that in the evening of September 22, 1998, he was picked up by the police without any
reason at the house of Valencias parents.[5]
On September 24, 1998, Assistant City Prosecutor Danilo B. Vargas filed the following
information against the accused:
That on or about the 22nd day of September 1998 in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused,
conspiring, confederating with and mutually helping one another, not having been authorized by law
51
to sell, dispense, deliver, transport or distribute any regulated drug, did then and there wilfully and
unlawfully sell or offer for sale 634.0 grams of white crystalline substance containing
Pseudoephedrine Hydrochloride which is a regulated drug.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[6]
Giving more weight to the testimony of the police officers who conducted the buy-bust
operation, the trial court convicted the accused of the crime charged. It held that the denial and alibi
of the accused were not sufficient to overturn the prosecution evidence which established the guilt of
the accused.[7] The dispositive portion of the decision read:
WHEREFORE, finding that the prosecution was able to establish the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt, the Court hereby sentences each of them (1) to suffer the penalty of Death; (2) to
pay a fine of P500,000.00; and (3) to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.[8]
In this appeal, accused-appellants raise the following errors:
1. The court a quo gravely erred in finding that the guilt of the accused-appellants for the
crime charged has been proven beyond reasonable doubt.
2. The court a quo gravely erred in giving weight and credence to the improbable
testimonies of the witnesses for the prosecution.
3. The court a quo gravely erred in finding that there was conspiracy in the case at bar. [9]
The appeal is without merit.
Accused-appellants were caught in flagrante delicto in a buy-bust operation. A buy-bust
operation is a form of entrapment whereby ways and means are resorted to for the purpose of
trapping and capturing the lawbreakers in the execution of their criminal plan. Unless there is clear
and convincing evidence that the members of the buy-bust team were inspired by any improper
motive or were not properly performing their duty, their testimony on the operation deserves full
faith and credit. When the police officers involved in the buy-bust operation have no motive to falsely
testify against the accused, the courts shall uphold the presumption that they have performed their
duties regularly.[10] The trial court in this case correctly upheld the testimony of the prosecution
witnesses, the police officers who conducted the buy-bust operation. It did not err in applying the
presumption of regularity in the performance of duty by law enforcement agents. We laid down in
the case of People vs. Doria[11] the test in determining the credibility of the testimony of police
officers regarding the conduct of buy-bust operations.The Court said:
It is thus imperative that the presumption, juris tantum, of regularity in the performance of official
duty by law enforcement agents raised by the Solicitor General be applied with studied restraint. The
presumption should not by itself prevail over the presumption of innocence and the constitutionally-
protected rights of the individual. It is the duty of courts to preserve the purity of their own temple
from the prostitution of the criminal law through lawless enforcement. Courts should not allow
themselves to be used as an instrument of abuse and injustice lest an innocent person be made to
suffer the unusually severe penalties for drug offenses.
We therefore stress that the objective test in buy-bust operations demands that the details of the
purported transaction must be clearly and adequately shown. This must start from the initial contact
between the poseur-buyer and the pusher, the offer to purchase, the promise or payment of the
consideration until the consummation of the sale by the delivery of the illegal drug subject of the
sale. The manner by which the initial contact was made, whether or not through an informant, the
offer to purchase the drug, the payment of the buy-bust money, and the delivery of the illegal drug,
whether to the informant alone or the police officer, must be the subject of strict scrutiny by courts to
insure that law-abiding citizens are not unlawfully induced to commit an offense. Criminals must be
caught but not at all cost. At the same time, however, examining the conduct of the police should not
disable courts into ignoring the accuseds predisposition to commit the crime. If there is
overwhelming evidence of habitual delinquency, recidivism or plain criminal proclivity, then this
must also be considered. Courts should look at all factors to determine the predisposition of an
accused to commit an offense in so far as they are relevant to determine the validity of the defense of
inducement.[12]
 In the case at bar, SPO1 Facto, the poseur-buyer, gave the complete details of how the A: There was a briefing in our office, maam.
transaction was conducted from beginning to end -- the negotiation between the confidential agent
and the drug dealers, the preparation made by the buy-bust team before conducting the operation, Q: What was taken up in that briefing?
when the informant introduced him as the supposed buyer to the drug dealers, the exchange of the
stuff and the payment between the pushers and the poseur buyer, and the arrest of said drug A: In the briefing, I would pose as poseur buyer.
dealers. SPO1 Facto positively identified accused-appellants as the drug dealers. His testimony went
as follows: Q: And how much were you supposed to buy?

xxx xxx xxx A: Eight Hundred Thousand Pesos per kilo, maam.

Q: Can you recall, Mr. Witness, if you reported for duty on September 22, 1998? Q: So, what else were taken up during the briefing?

A: Yes, maam. A: Inspector Arsenal furnished me ten (10) pieces of One Hundred Peso-bill. Then I prepared the
three bundles with numbers inside and make it appear, parang tingnan mo P800,000.00,
Q: What time did you report? parang may boodle sa loob.

A: Nine oclock in the morning, maam. Q: After that ... By the way who are the members of the team?

Q: Now, while you were on duty was there any specific assignment given to you by your chief? A: P/Insp. Arsenal, P/Insp. Beasa, SPO2 Estrada, myself and others.

A: Yes, sir. Q: You mentioned of a confidential informant, was he present during that briefing?

Q: What was that assignment? A: Yes, maam.

A: To conduct surveillance against drug traffic in Quezon City. Q: And after preparing the boodle money and 10 pieces of P100-bill, what else happened?

Q: Was there any specific person whom you were supposed to conduct surveillance on December A: After I prepared the boodle on the night, we proceeded to the area.
22 ... September 22, 1998?
Q: Where is this area?
A: Yes, maam. The group of a certain Johnny alias Paniki group.
A: Corner Baler and Miller Streets, San Francisco del Monte,
Q: And who ordered you or instructed you to conduct the surveillance?
Quezon City.
A: Our team leader, Police Inspector Ramon Arsenal.
Q: Were you able to reach the area?
Q: Now, how did you know the group of Paniqui would be the subject of surveillance?
A: Yes, sir.
A: Through our confidential agent, maam.
Q: What happened next if any?
Q: Were you able to talk to this confidential agent?
A: Around 10:30 p.m., 22 September 1998, minutes later, around 10:50, pm., there was an
A: Yes, maam. automobile, Mitsubishi Lancer color white UET 384 arrived at the corner of Baler-Miller
Streets.
Q: And what is the gender of this confidential agent?
Q: Where were you at that time when that Mitsubishi Lancer arrived?
A: A male, maam.
A: I was at the corner of Baler and Miller Street.
Q: What did he tell you, if any?
Q: Who were with you at that time?
A: He told me that he was able to negotiate the one kilo drug deal to a certain Junior and Johnny,
maam. A: Our confidential agent.

Q: And upon receiving this information, what did you do? Q: How about the other members of the team where were they?

A: We informed our team leader, Police Inspector Ramon Arsenal the information of our A: They were away from us at least 3 meters ... 10 meters, away from us.
confidential agent, maam.
Q: Ten meters away from you?
Q: And what happened after giving that information to your team leader?
A: Yes, sir.
A: Our team leader Ramon Arsenal told our CO Col. Castillo about that drug transaction.
Q: When this Mitsubishi Lancer arrived, what happened next?
Q: What happened next, if any?
A: The driver called for me and our CI, together with the CI.
A: Inspector Arsenal formed a team to conduct buy bust operation.
Q: And then what happened?
Q: Was there any briefing?
52
A: The CI introduced me as buyer. A: Yes, sir.

Q: And then what happened after the CI introduced you to the occupants or to the driver, what Q: And when you told the driver, you are arrested, what else happened?
happened next?
A: I got the key.
A: After I was introduced as the buyer, I asked the driver where the stuff was. The driver said, Its
here and he also admonished me not to worry because their boss is there, a certain Q: And then, after that?
Dodong, seated in front, in the front seat beside the driver.
A: I said, Arestado kayo.
Q: How many occupants were there in that Mitsubishi Lancer?
Q: After that what happened?
A: Three persons, maam.
A: My companions alighted from the Tamaraw FX and arrested his other companions.
Q: And where was the other one?
Q: And then what happened?
A: One at the back seat, maam.
A: After that we brought them to Camp Crame, maam, for investigation.
Q: And when the driver told you that his boss was there, a certain Dodong, what happened next?
Q: If you will be able to see this driver again of that vehicle with whom you had that transaction,
A: He asked me where was the money, and I said, Its here, and while I was holding the money will you be able to identify him?
which was placed inside a plastic wrap.
A: Yes, maam.
Q: What happened next?
Q: If he is inside the courtroom will you please point him to us?
A: I told him to show me the stuff first because the money was with me.
A: That one is Johnny Tadena (the person pointed to by the witness by tapping his shoulder
Q: And what happened? when asked to identify himself gave his name as Johnny Tadena).

A: The man seated in the front seat called the man at the back and said Dalhin mo dito, bigay mo Q: How about that man who handed to you that green bag containing the white substance?
dito. The person at the back seat handed the green bag to the person seated in the front
seat. A: (Witness pointing to a man seated inside the courtroom who when asked to identify himself
gave his name as Segundino Valencia).
Q: And then what happened?
Q: How about the man seated at the back of the car who handed the green bag to Mr. Segundino
A: And then he handed it to me sabay kaliwaan. Valencia?

Q: Who handed to you the stuff? A: (Witness pointing to a man who when asked to identify himself gave his name as Domingo
Deroy)
A: The man beside the driver.
xxx xxx xxx.
Q: And when it was handed to you, what did you do?
SPO1 Factos testimony withstood the rigorous cross-examination by the defense counsel and
A: I gave the money, kaliwaan na. And then I quickly looked at the stuff and I saw that there was was corroborated by SPO2 Estrada, also a member of the buy-bust team. [13]
white substance inside so right away I made the pre-arranged signal.
Accused-appellants contend that it is incredible that the alleged vendors of the drugs would
Q: What was that pre-arranged signal? readily do business with the alleged poseur-buyer whom they met only on September 22, 1998,
considering that the transaction involved the huge amount of P800,000.00. We are not impressed. It
A: I scratched my head which means the deal was, the drug deal was positive. has been shown that the appellants have previously negotiated with the confidential agent. Prior to
September 22, they have already closed the deal for the purchase of drugs for the price of
Q: And when you scratched your head what did you do? P800,000.00. Hence, it is not as if the appellants were dealing with strangers. They knew the
informant. When they met with the poseur-buyer, the latter was accompanied by the informant who
A: I introduced myself to the suspect as a police officer. And I grabbed the key of the vehicle. introduced them to each other. Nonetheless, the Court has observed that drug pushers sell their
prohibited articles to any customer, be he a stranger or not, in private as well as in public places,
Q: Where was the key at that time?
whether daytime or nighttime. Indeed, drug pushers have become increasingly daring, dangerous
A: It was a(t) the ignition switch. and openly defiant of the law. Hence, it is immaterial whether the vendor and the vendee are familiar
with each other. It is only necessary to prove the fact of agreement and the acts constituting sale and
Q: And then what did you do? delivery of the prohibited drugs.[14] These facts have been sufficiently proved in this case.

A: I said, Arestado kayo and arrested the driver. Accused-appellants also argue that the prosecution has not shown by clear and convincing
evidence whether the sale was voluntary or whether this was a case of instigation. The argument
Q: By the way, Mr. Witness, where were you at the time, while you were talking with the driver? deserves scant consideration. A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment which in recent years has
been accepted as a valid means of arresting violators of the Dangerous Drugs Law. It is commonly
A: Beside the driver. employed by police officers as an effective way of apprehending law offenders in the act of
committing a crime. In a buy-bust operation, the idea to commit a crime originates from the
Q: There (sic) were still inside that car? offender, without anybody inducing or prodding him to commit the offense. Its opposite is
53
instigation or inducement, wherein the police or its agent lures the accused into committing the
offense in order to prosecute him. Instigation is deemed contrary to public policy and considered an
absolutory cause.[15] In this case, accused-appellants, apparently, have, for some time, been engaged
in drug dealing. They were in fact the subject of a surveillance conducted by the operatives of the
PNP Narcotics Group. The police engaged the services of a confidential informant to lead them to
transact with them. The confidential agent facilitated the meeting of accused-appellants and the
poseur buyer. Hence, it was not the police nor the confidential agent who induced accused-appellants
to commit a violation of the Dangerous Drugs Law. They were already violating the law and the
police only used the buy-bust operation to apprehend them in the act of unlawfully selling
drugs. This is certainly a legitimate entrapment operation and not instigation.

Finally, accused-appellants alleged that the prosecution failed to prove the existence of a
conspiracy among the three accused, as it did not show a common plan or design among
them. Again, we find otherwise. There is conspiracy when two or more persons come to an
agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. [16] The existence of a
conspiracy need not be proved by direct evidence because it may be inferred from the parties conduct
indicating a common understanding among themselves with respect to the commission of the
crime. Neither is it necessary to show that two or more persons met together and entered into an
explicit agreement setting out the details of an unlawful scheme or object to be carried out. It may be
deduced from the mode or manner in which the crime was perpetrated or from the acts of the
accused showing a joint or common purpose and design, concerted action and community of
interest.[17] The existence of a conspiracy among the three accused is very much apparent from the
narration of SPO1 Facto about how the transaction went. Upon the arrival of the Mitsubishi Lancer
bearing plate no. UET 384 at the corner of Baler and Miller Streets, the driver, Tadena, called the
informant and SPO1 Facto, the supposed buyer. Tadena asked SPO1 Facto about the money. When
SPO1 Facto asked for the stuff, Valencia, who was occupying the front passenger seat, ordered Deroy,
who was seated at the back of the car, to hand him the bag containing the drugs. Valencia gave the
bag to SPO1 Facto as the latter handed him the money. This demonstrates the concerted effort of the
three accused in drug dealing. Conspiracy among them is obviously present in this case.

As regards the penalty, the Court agrees with the conclusions of the trial court, thus:

Section 20, Article IV of R.A. 6425, as amended, provides that The penalties for offense under x x x
Sections 14, 14-A, 15, and 16 of Art. III of this Act shall be applied if the dangerous drugs involved is
in any of the following quantities: 8. In the case of other dangerous drugs, the quantity which is far
beyond therapeutic requirements, as determined and promulgated by the DDB, after
consultations/hearings conducted for the purpose. In Section 15, the penalty is reclusion perpetua to
death and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos. The crime is
aggravated when committed by any person or persons belonging to an organized or syndicated crime
group (Section 30, R.A. 7659; and People vs. Esparas, G.R. No. 120034, July 10, 1998). In such a
case, the death penalty shall be imposed. An organized or syndicated crime group has been defined
as a group of two or more persons collaborating, confederating or mutually helping one another for
purposes of gain in the commission of any crime. (Section 30, R.A. No. 7659; and People vs. Esparas,
G.R. No. 120034, July 10, 1998)

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City in Criminal
Case No. Q98-78878 is AFFIRMED.[18]

In accordance with Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 25 of Republic
Act No. 7659, upon finality of this decision, let the records of these cases be forwarded to the Office
of the President for possible exercise of executive clemency.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona, Carpio-

Morales, and Callejo, Sr., JJ

54
G.R. No. L-28612 August 30, 1973
AUGUSTO A. SANTOS, LOURDES A. SANTOS, CARMEN A. SANTOS, represented by
FEDERICO A. SANTOS, HORACIO A. SANTOS, ALICIA A. SANTOS, MILAGROS,
CESAR, TERESA and CECILIA, all surnamed SANTOS, minors, represented by their
judicial guardian, the PRUDENTIAL BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, Petitioners,
vs. HON. FERNANDO A. CRUZ, Judge of the COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF RIZAL,
7th Judicial District, Caloocan City, Branch XII, and the REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
Norberto J. Quisumbing for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General for respondent.
CASTRO, J.:
On July 25, 1935, the spouses Juliana Andres and Roman Santos obtained adjudication of ownership
in their favor of two parcels of land (Lot 1 and Lot 6 of plan Psu-99546-Amd.) located in Navotas,
Rizal, under Decree 609322 promulgated in Land Registration Case 1190, G.L.R.O. Record 50158.
The Register of Deeds of Rizal subsequently issued, on October 15, 1936, Original Certificate of Title
8051 in the name of "Juliana Andres married to Roman Santos."chanrobles virtual law library
After the death of the spouses, their heirs (hereinafter referred to as the petitioners), through a deed
of extra-judicial partition, divided the two parcels into seven equal but physically undivided parts.
Accordingly, on June 2, 1966, Transfer Certificate of Title 165554 (of the Registry of Deeds of Rizal)
was issued in the names of the petitioners.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
On March 4, 1967, The Republic of the Philippines (hereinafter referred to as the respondent),
through the Solicitor General, filed with the Court of First Instance of Rizal - with Honorable
Fernando A. Cruz (hereinafter referred to as the respondent judge) presiding - in the original action
(Land Registration Case 1190, G.L.R.O. Record 50158) a "Petition for the Amendment and/or
Cancellation of Title and to Declare a Portion Thereof Null and Void and Petition for Reversion." In
this petition - filed pursuant to the provisions of section 112 of Act 496 1- the respondent alleged that
Lot 6 adjudicated in favor of the petitioners' predecessors "is identical to Lot 1-D as per the plans on
file in the Office of the Bureau of Lands;" and that said Lot 6
... has always been part of the sea, as in fact the same is almost completely submerged and covered,
by the waters of the Manila Bay, and that the narrow strip of land which constitutes the northern
perimeter of said lot - and which is being washed out by the flux and influx of the tide - is actually a
foreshore which was formed by the gradual and natural deposit of silt and sediment upon the sea bed
of earth...",
and "is thus a portion of the public domain which is not legally susceptible to private appropriation
or ownership."chanrobles virtual law library
The petitioners moved to dismiss the respondent's aforestated petition, claiming that the latter
should have filed its petition and action for reversion as an ordinary civil action with the ordinary
courts rather than as an incident in the original and registration case. This motion the respondent
duly opposed.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
On September 25, 1967, the respondent judge issued an order denying the petitioners' motion to
dismiss; the petitioners' subsequent motion for reconsideration was likewise denied in an order
dated December 8, 1967.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Hence, the present petition for certiorari (filed by the petitioners with this Court on February 5,
1968) by virtue of which they seek the annulment of the orders a quo of September 25, 1967 and
December 8, 1967. Pending decision in this case, they asked for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction enjoining the respondent judge from assuming jurisdiction or taking cognizance of the
respondent's petition. On February 26, 1968, this Court issued - upon the petitioners' filing of a bond
- the corresponding writ of preliminary injunction, restraining the respondent judge from assuming
jurisdiction or taking cognizance of the respondent's aforementioned petition and from otherwise
proceeding to hear and decide the same.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
55
The question posed for resolution relates to the jurisdiction of the court a quo - sitting as a land
registration court - to hear and determine the respondent's petition below "to amend and/or to
cancel the title issued in the name of the applicants aforementioned [the spouses Juliana Andres and
Roman Santos] and/or the title issued subsequent thereto in the name of the above-mentioned
parties-in-interest [the petitioners herein] insofar as Lot No. 6 or Lot No. 1-D is concerned," to
declare the title, insofar as said portion is concerned, null and void ab initio, " and to direct the
reversion of the said portion to the Government.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library
In sum, the petitioners contend that the respondent's petition below "for the cancellation, or at least
for the amendment" of TCT 165554, so as to exclude therefrom Lot 6, involves a controversial issue
beyond the competence of the court a quo sitting as a land registration court. Section 112 2invoked by
the respondent, the petitioners state, authorizes erasures, alterations or amendments in a certificate
of title only in the "absence of serious controversy between the parties-in-interest as to the title of the
party seeking relief under said section" or in the absence of an adverse claim or serious objection on
the part of any party-in-interest. The non-attendance of either of the aforestated conditions in the
case at bar, the petitioners conclude, removes the respondent's petition from the scope of section 112,
thus precluding the respondent judge from taking cognizance
thereof.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
According to the respondent, however, proceedings under section 112 suffice to effect the
cancellation, or at least the amendment, of TCT 165554, which cancellation or amendment consists
of the exclusion of Lot 6 from the said certificate, on the ground that the said lot forms part of the
foreshore and therefore is not susceptible of registration as private property. Moreover, section 112
directs the filing and entitling of petitions and motions under the said section and under the
provisions of Act 496 after the original registration in the original case that effected the entry of the
decree of registration.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
A close reading of the allegations of the petition a quo discloses that the respondent disputes the
nature and character of Lot 6 - one of the parcels of land originally adjudicated in favor of the
spouses Juliana Andres and Roman Santos - vehemently claiming the said parcel as part of the
foreshore of the State. The petitioners, on the other hand, strongly deny this assertion of the
respondent, insisting that Lot 6 is a "private land previously owned by their predecessors-in-interest
and allowed by the Director of Lands to be registered in their names under the Torrens system."
Clearly and unmistakably the parties raise an issue that requires a determination of whether Lot 6
constitutes land of private ownership or forms part of the lands of Government ownership not
available for alienation and disposition. This constitutes an issue affecting and concerning the
ownership of Lot 6 - definitely a patently substantial and genuine issue - that must be ventilated in
an ordinary action before a court of general jurisdiction. The proceedings spelled out by Act 496 are
summary in character and are therefore inadequate for the litigation of issues properly appertaining
to the ordinary courts acting under their ordinary civil jurisdiction. 3chanrobles virtual law library
Moreover, the petitioners' vigorous objection to the cancellation or amendment of TCT 165554
makes manifest the lack of unanimity among the parties-in-interest. Indeed, section 112 affords relief
only when there is unanimity among the parties or when there is no adverse claim or serious
objection on the part of any party-in-interest. The explicit serious opposition of the petitioners to the
cancellation or amendment of TCT 165554 renders the case truly controversial and the remedy
provided for by section 112 inefficacious. 4chanrobles virtual law library
ACCORDINGLY, the orders of the court a quo dated September 25, 1967 and December 8, 1967 are
set aside, and the writ of preliminary injunction issued by this Court on February 26, 1968 is hereby
made permanent. No pronouncement as to costs.
Makalintal, Actg. C.J., Zaldivar, Teehankee, Antonio and Esguerra, JJ.,
concur.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Fernando, Barredo and Makasiar, JJ., took no part.
56
G.R. No. 93516 August 12, 1992
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILLIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
BASILIO DAMASO @ Bernardo/BERNIE MENDOZA @ KA DADO, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
MEDIALDEA, J.:
The accused-appellant, Basilio Damaso, was originally charged in an information filed before the
Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City with violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866 in furtherance
of, or incident to, or in connection with the crime of subversion, together with Luzviminda Morados y
Galang @ Ka Mel, Teresita Calosa y Macabangon @ Ka Tessie, Ricardo Calosa y Perez @ Ka Ric,
Marites Calosa y Evangelista @ Ka Tess, Eric Tanciangco y Capira @ Ka Ric and Luz Tanciangco y
Pencial @ Ka Luz (Records, p. 3). Such information was later amended to exclude all the above-
enumerated persons except the accused-appellant from the criminal charge. The amended
information reads:
That an or about the 19th day of June, 1988, in the City of Dagupan, Philippines,
and within the territorial jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, Basilio DAMASO @ Bernardo/Bernie Mendoza @ KA DADO, did then
and there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally, have in his possession, custody
and control one (1) M14 Rifle bearing Serial No. 1249935 with magazine and
Fifty-Seven (57) live ammunition, in furtherance of, or incident to, or in
connection with the crime of subversion, filed against said accused in the above-
entitled case for Violation of Republic Act 1700, as amended by Executive Order
No. 276.
Contrary to Third Paragraph of Sec. 1, P.D. 1866. (Records, p. 20)
Upon arraignment, the accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to the crime charged (Records, p. 37).
Trial on the merits ensued. The prosecution rested its case and offered its exhibits for admission. The
counsel for accused-appellant interposed his objections to the admissibility of the prosecution's
evidence on grounds of its being hearsay, immaterial or irrelevant and illegal for lack of a search
warrant. On these bases, he, thereafter, manifested that he was not presenting any evidence for the
accused (TSN, December 28, 1989, p. 139). On January 17, 1990, the trial court rendered decision,
the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused Basilio Damaso alias Bernardo/Bernie
Mendoza alias Ka Dado guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Violation of
Presidential Decree Number 1866, and considering that the Violation is in
furtherance of, or incident to, or in connection with the crime of subversion,
pursuant to Section 1, Paragraph 3 of Presidential Decree Number 1866 hereby
sentences the accused to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and to pay the
costs of the proceedings.
The M14 Rifle bearing Serial Number 1249935 and live ammunition and all the
articles and/or items seized on June 19, 1988 in connection with this case and
marked and submitted in court as evidence are ordered confiscated and forfeited
in favor of the government, the same to be turned over to the Philippine
Constabulary Command at Lingayen, Pangasinan.
SO ORDERED. (Rollo, p. 31)
Thus, this present recourse with the following assignment of errors:
A. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSED APPELLANT GUILTY
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF ILLEGAL POSSESSION
OF FIREARMS AND AMMUNITIONS IN FURTHERANCE OF, OR INCIDENT
TO, OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE CRIME OF SUBVERSION DESPITE
57
THE WOEFULLY INADEQUATE EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE
PROSECUTION.
B. THE COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED WHEN THE
QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES OF SUBVERSION WAS NOT PROVEN BY
THE PROSECUTION.
C. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONSIDERING AS EVIDENCE THE
FIREARMS DOCUMENTS AND ITEMS LISTED IN EXHIBIT E AFTER THEY
WERE DECLARED INADMISSIBLE WITH FINALITY BY ANOTHER BRANCH
OF THE SAME COURT AND THE SAID EVIDENCE ARE THE FRUITS OF AN
ILLEGAL SEARCH.
D. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE MOTIONS TO QUASH
FILED BY ACCUSED-APPELLANT BECAUSE THE SEPARATE CHARGE FOR
SUBVERSION AGAINST HIM ABSORBED THE CHARGE FOR ILLEGAL
POSSESSION OF FIREARMS IN FURTHERANCE OF OR INCIDENT TO, OR
IN CONNECTION WITH THE CRIME OF SUBVERSION. (pp. 55-66, Rollo)
The antecedent facts are set forth by the Solicitor General in his Brief, as follows:
On June 18, 1988, Lt. Candido Quijardo, a Philippine Constabulary officer
connected with the 152nd PC Company at Lingayen, Pangasinan, and some
companions were sent to verify the presence of CPP/NPA members in Barangay
Catacdang, Arellano-Bani, Dagupan City. In said place, the group apprehended
Gregorio Flameniano, Berlina Aritumba, Revelina Gamboa and Deogracias
Mayaoa. When interrogated, the persons apprehended revealed that there was
an underground safehouse at Gracia Village in Urdaneta, Pangasinan. After
coordinating with the Station Commander of Urdaneta, the group proceeded to
the house in Gracia Village. They found subversive documents, a radio, a 1 x 7
caliber .45 firearm and other items (pp. 4, 6-7, tsn, October 23, 1989).
After the raid, the group proceeded to Bonuan, Dagupan City, and put under
surveillance the rented apartment of Rosemarie Aritumba, sister of Berlina
Aritumba whom they earlier arrested. They interviewed Luzviminda Morados, a
visitor of Rosemarie Aritumba. She stated that she worked with Bernie
Mendoza, herein appellant. She guided the group to the house rented by
appellant. When they reached the house, the group found that it had already
been vacated by the occupants. Since Morados was hesitant to give the new
address of Bernie Mendoza, the group looked for the Barangay Captain of the
place and requested him to point out the new house rented by appellant. The
group again required Morados to go with them. When they reached the house,
the group saw Luz Tanciangco outside. They told her that they already knew that
she was a member of the NPA in the area. At first, she denied it, but when she
saw Morados she requested the group to go inside the house. Upon entering the
house, the group, as well as the Barangay Captain, saw radio sets, pamphlets
entitled "Ang Bayan," xerox copiers and a computer machine. They also found
persons who were companions of Luz Tanciangco (namely, Teresita Calosa,
Ricardo Calosa, Maries Calosa, Eric Tanciangco and Luzviminda Morados). The
group requested the persons in the house to allow them to look around. When
Luz Tanciangco opened one of the rooms, they saw books used for subversive
orientation, one M-14 rifle, bullets and ammunitions, Kenwood radio, artificial
beard, maps of the Philippines, Zambales, Mindoro an(d) Laguna and other
items. They confiscated the articles and brought them to their headquarters for
final inventory. They likewise brought the persons found in the house to the
headquarters for investigation. Said persons revealed that appellant was the
lessee of the house and owned the items confiscated therefrom (pp. 8-12,
tsn, ibid; pp. 2-4, 6, 8-10, 31, tsn, October 31, 1989). (p. 5, Brief of Plaintiff-
Appellee, p. 91, Rollo)
While We encourage and support law enforcement agencies in their drive against lawless elements in
our society, We must, however, stress that the latter's efforts to this end must be done within the
parameters of the law. In the case at bar, not only did We find that there are serious flaws in the
method used by the law officers in obtaining evidence against the accused-appellant but also that the
evidence as presented against him is weak to justify conviction.
We reverse.
The records of this case show that the accused-appellant was singled out as the sole violator of P.D.
No. 1866, in furtherance of, or incident to, or in connection with the crime of subversion. Yet, there is
no substantial and credible evidence to establish the fact that the appellant is allegedly the same
person as the lessee of the house where the M-14 rifle and other subversive items were found or the
owner of the said items. The prosecution presented two witnesses who attested to this fact, thus:
Lieutenant Candito Quijardo
Fiscal
Q How about this Bernie Mendoza, who was the one renting
the house?
A He was not around at that time, but according to
Luz (Tanciangco) who mentioned the name Bernie
Mendoza (as) the one who was renting the house and at the
same time claiming that it was Bernie Mendoza who owns
the said items. (TSN of October 31, 1989, p. 40)
xxx xxx xxx
Q I am showing you another picture which we request to be
marked as Exhibit "K-2," tell us if it has any connection to
the house?
A The same house, sir.
Q Now, this person who according to you allegedly occupied
the house at Bonuan Gueset, by the name of Bernie
Mendoza, in your capacity as a Military officer, did you find
out the identity?
A I am not the proper (person) to tell the real identity of
Bernie de Guzman.
Q Can you tell the Honorable Court the proper person who
could tell the true identity of Bernie Mendoza?
A The Intelligence of the Pangasinan PC Command.
Q Can you name these officers?
A Captain Roberto Rosales and his assistant, First Lt.
Federico Castro. (ibid, pp. 54-55)
M/Sqt. Artemio Gomez
Q That underground house, do you know who was the
principal occupant of that house?
xxx xxx xxx
A During our conversation with the occupants, they
revealed that a certain Ka Bernie is the one occupying the
house, Bernie Mendoza alias Basilio Damaso.
. . . (TSN, December 27, 1989, pp. 126-128)
58
Clearly, the aforequoted testimonies are hearsay because the witnesses testified on matters not on
their own personal knowledge. The Solicitor General, however, argues that while the testimonies may
be hearsay, the same are admissible because of the failure of counsel for appellant to object thereto.
It is true that the lack of objection to a hearsay testimony results in its being admitted as evidence.
But, one should not be misled into thinking that since these testimonies are admitted as evidence,
they now have probative value. Hearsay evidence, whether objected to or not, cannot be given
credence. In People vs. Valero, We emphatically declared that:
The failure of the defense counsel to object to the presentation of incompetent
evidence, like hearsay evidence or evidence that violates the rule of res inter
alios acta, or his failure to ask for the striking out of the same does not give such
evidence any probative value. The lack of objection may make any incompetent
evidence admissible. But admissibility of evidence should not be equated with
weight of evidence. Hearsay evidence whether objected to or not has no
probative value.
(L-45283-84, March 19, 1982, 112 SCRA 675, emphasis supplied)
It is unfortunate that the prosecution failed to present as witnesses the persons who knew
the appellant as the lessee and owner of the M-14 rifle. In this way, the appellant could
have exercised his constitutional right to confront the witnesses and to cross-examine
them for their truthfulness. Likewise, the records do not show any other evidence which
could have identified the appellant as the lessee of the house and the owner of the
subversive items. To give probative value to these hearsay statements and convict the
appellant on this basis alone would be to render his constitutional rights useless and
without meaning.
Even assuming for the sake of argument that the appellant is the lessee of the house, the case against
him still will not prosper, the reason being that the law enforcers failed to comply with the
requirements of a valid search and seizure proceedings.
The right against unreasonable searches and seizures is enshrined in the Constitution (Article III,
Section 2). The purpose of the law is to prevent violations of private security in person and property,
and unlawful invasions of the sanctity of the home by officers of the law acting under legislative or
judicial sanction and to give remedy against such usurpations when attempted (see Alvero v. Dizon,
76 Phil. 637, 646). However, such right is not absolute. There are instances when a warrantless
search and seizure becomes valid, namely: (1) search incidental to an arrest; (2) search of a moving
vehicle; and (3) seizure of evidence in plain view (Manipon, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, L-58889, July 31,
1986, 143 SCRA 267, 276). None of these exceptions is present in this case.
The Solicitor General argues otherwise. He claims that the group of Lt. Quijardo entered the
appellant's house upon invitation of Luz Tanciangco and Luzviminda Morados, helper of the
appellant; that when Luz Tanciangco opened one of the rooms, they saw a copier machine, computer,
M-14 rifle, bullets and ammunitions, radio set and more subversive items; that technically speaking,
there was no search as the group was voluntarily shown the articles used in subversion; that besides,
a search may be validly conducted without search warrant with the consent of the person searched in
this case, appellant's helper and Luz Tanciangco allowed them to enter and to look around the
appellant's house; and that since the evidence seized was in plain view of the authorities, the same
may be seized without a warrant.
We are not persuaded. The constitutional immunity from unreasonable searches and seizures, being
personal one, cannot be waived by anyone except the person whose rights are invaded or one who is
expressly authorized to do so in his or her behalf (De Garcia v. Locsin, 65 Phil. 689, 695). In the case
at bar, the records show that appellant was not in his house at that time Luz Tanciangco and Luz
Morados, his alleged helper, allowed the authorities to enter it (TSN, October 31, 1989, p. 10). We
Find no evidence that would establish the fact that Luz Morados was indeed the appellant's helper or
if it was true that she was his helper, that the appellant had given her authority to open his house in
his absence. The prosecution likewise failed to show if Luz Tanciangco has such an authority.
Without this evidence, the authorities' intrusion into the appellant's dwelling cannot be given any
color of legality. While the power to search and seize is necessary to the public welfare, still it must be
exercised and the law enforced without transgressing the constitutional rights of the citizens, for the
enforcement of no statute is of sufficient importance to justify indifference to the basic principles of
government (Rodriguez v. Evangelista, 65 Phil. 230, 235). As a consequence, the search conducted by
the authorities was illegal. It would have been different if the situation here demanded urgency which
could have prompted the authorities to dispense with a search warrant. But the record is silent on
this point. The fact that they came to the house of the appellant at nighttime (Exh. J, p. 7, Records),
does not grant them the license to go inside his house. In Alih v. Castro, We ruled that:
The respondents cannot even plead the urgency of the raid because it was in fact
not urgent. They knew where the petitioners were. They had every opportunity
to get a search warrant before making the raid. If they were worried that the
weapons inside the compound would be spirited away, they could have
surrounded the premises in the meantime, as a preventive measure. There was
absolutely no reason at all why they should disregard the orderly processes
required by the Constitution and instead insist on arbitrarily forcing their way
into the petitioner's premises with all the menace of a military invasion. (G.R.
No. 69401, June 23, 1987, 151 SCRA 279, 286)
Another factor which illustrates the weakness of the case against the accused-appellant is in the
identification of the gun which he was charged to have illegally possessed. In the amended
information (supra, pp. 1-2), the gun was described as an M-14 rifle with serial no. 1249935. Yet, the
gun presented at the trial bore a different serial number thus:
FISCAL
Q Will you kindly restate again the items that you found
inside the house?
Lt. Quijardo:
A When she opened the doors of the rooms that we
requested for, we immediately saw different kinds of books
of which we believed to be used for subversive orientation
and the M-14 rifle.
Q In what portion of the house did you find this M-14 rifle
which you mentioned?
A In the same room of which the subversive documents
were placed.
Q If this firearm would be shown to you would you be able
to identify the same?
A Yes, sir.
Q I am showing to you a rifle bearing a serial number
1249985 which for purposes of identification, may we
request your Honor, that this rifle be marked as Exhibit "D."
COURT:
Mark it.
FISCAL:
Q Kindly examine the said firearm and tell the Honorable
Court the relation of that firearm to the firearm which
according to you you found inside the room allegedly
occupied by one Bernie Mendoza?
A This is the same rifle which was discovered during our
raid in the same house. (TSN, October 31, 1989, pp. 36-38,
emphasis supplied).
The Solicitor General contends that the discrepancy is merely a typographical error.
59
We do not think so. This glaring error goes into the substance of the charge. Its correction or lack of
it could spell the difference between freedom and incarceration of the accused-appellant.
In crimes of illegal possession of firearm as in this case, the prosecution has the burden to prove the
existence of the firearm and that the accused who possessed or owned the firearm does not have the
corresponding license for it. Since the gun as identified at the trial differs from the gun described in
the amended information, the corpus delicti(the substance of the crime, the fact that a crime has
actually been committed) has not been fully established. This circumstance coupled with dubious
claims of appellant's connection to the house (where the gun was found) have totally emasculated the
prosecution's case.
But even as We find for the accused-appellant, We, take exception to the argument raised by the
defense that the crime of subversion absorbs the crime of illegal possession of firearm in furtherance
of or incident to or in connection with the crime of subversion. It appears that the accused-appellant
is facing a separate charge of subversion. The defense submits that the trial court should have
peremptorily dismissed this case in view of the subversion charge. In People of the Philippines v.
Asuncion, et al., We set forth in no uncertain terms the futility of such argument. We quote:
If We are to espouse the theory of the respondents that force and violence are
the very essence of subversion, then it loses its distinction from rebellion.
In People v. Liwanag (G.R. No. 27683, 1976, 73 SCRA 473, 480 [1976]), the
Court categorically distinguished subversion from rebellion, and held:
Violation of Republic Act No. 1700, or subversion, as it is
more commonly called, is a crime distinct from that of
actual rebellion. The crime of rebellion is committed
by rising publicly and taking up arms against the
Government for any of the purposes specified in Article 134
of the Revised Penal Code; while the Anti-Subversion Act
(Republic Act No. 1700) punishes affiliation or
membership in a subversive organization as defined therein.
In rebellion, there must be a public uprising and taking of
arms against the Government; whereas, in subversion, mere
membership in a subversive association is sufficient and the
taking up of arms by a member of a subversive organization
against the Government is but a circumstance which raises
the penalty to be imposed upon the offender. (Emphasis
supplied)
Furthermore, in the case of Buscayno v. Military Commission (G.R. 58284, 109
289 (1981]), this Court said that subversion, like treason, is a crime against
national security, while rebellion is a crime against public order. Rising publicly
and taking arms against the Government is the very element of the crime on
rebellion. On the other hand, R.A. 1700 was enacted to outlaw the Communist
Party of the Philippines (CPP) , other similar associations and its successors
because their existence and activities constitute a clear, present and grave
danger to national security.
The first Whereas clause of R.A. 1700 states that the CPP is an organized
conspiracy to overthrow the Government, not only by force and violence
but also by deceit, subversion, and other illegal means. This is a recognition
that subversive acts do not only constitute force and violence (contrary to the
arguments of private respondents), but may partake of other forms as well. One
may in fact be guilty of subversion by authoring subversive materials, where
force and violence is neither necessary or indispensable.
Private respondents contended that the Court in Misolas v. Panga impliedly
ruled that if an accused is simultaneously charged with violation of P.D. 1866
and subversion, the doctrine of absorption of common crimes as applied in
rebellion would have found application therein. The respondents relied on the
opinion of this Court when it said:
. . . in the present case, petitioner is being charged
specifically for the qualified offense of illegal possession of
 firearms and ammunition under PD 1866. HE IS NOT
BEING CHARGED WITH THE COMPLEX CRIME OF
SUBVERSION WITH ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF
FIREARMS. NEITHER IS HE BEING SEPARATELY
CHARGED FOR SUBVERSION AND FOR ILLEGAL
POSSESSION OF FIREARMS. Thus, the rulings of the
Court in Hernandez, Geronimo and Rodriguez find no
application in this case.

This is however a mere obiter. In the above case, the Court upheld the validity of
the charge under the third paragraph of Section 1 of P.D. 1866. The Court opined
that the dictum in the Hernandez case is not applicable in that case, considering
that the legislature deemed it fit to provide for two distinct offenses: (1) illegal
possession of firearms qualified by subversion (P.D. 1866) and (2) subversion
qualified by the taking up of arms against the Government (R.A. 1700). The
practical result of this may be harsh or it may pose grave difficulty on an accused
in instances similar to those that obtain in the present case, but the wisdom of
the legislature in the lawful exercise of its power to enact laws is something that
the Court cannot inquire into . . . (G.R. Nos. 83837-42, April 22, 1992).

Nonetheless, the evidence in hand is too weak to convict the accused-appellant of the charge of illegal
possession of firearm in furtherance of, or incident to or in connection with the crime of subversion,
We are therefore, left with no option, but to acquit the accused on reasonable doubt.

ACCORDINGLY, the decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED and the appellant is ACQUITTED
with costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.

60
G.R. No. L-48009 February 3, 1992
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MARCELINO DEVARAS, FELIX CAÑAS, FLORANTE SERRANO and BERNARDO
DEVARAS, accused. MARCELINO DEVARAS, FELIX CAÑAS and FLORANTE
SERRANO, accused-appellants.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Geminiano G. Laus for accused-appellants.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
This is an appeal to the Court of Appeals 1 interposed by the accused-appellants from the decision 2 of
the then Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Leyte in Criminal Case No. 2042,
promulgated on 22 April 1977, finding them guilty of the crime of murder and sentencing each of
them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify, jointly and severally, the heirs of
the victim in the amount of P12,000.00.
In view of the penalty imposed, 3 the trial court forwarded the records of the case to this Court which
accepted the appeal in its resolution of 12 April 1976.
During the pendency of the appeal, two (2) of the appellants, Marcelino Devaras and Felix Cañas,
died. Devaras died on 23 March 1980 and his counsel filed a notice of death with a motion to dismiss
only on 23 March
1983, 4 attaching thereto the death certificate. 5 After having verified the death certificate to be
authentic, the Solicitor General filed a Comment, stating therein that the People offers no objection
to the dismissal of the case insofar as appellant Devaras is concerned without, however, prejudice to
his civil liability arising from the commission of the offense. 6
In the resolution of 20 July 1983, this Court resolved "to DISMISS this case against accused
Marcelino Devaras insofar as his criminal liability is concerned but without prejudice, however, to
his aforesaid civil liability arising from the commission of the crime in favor of the offended
parties." 7 Appellant Felix Cañas, on the other hand, died on 24 November 1982 and his counsel
informed this Court of such fact only on 15 July 1988. The Solicitor General confirmed the fact of
death on such date in his Manifestation of 8 September 1988. This case then is likewise dismissed as
against appellant Felix Cañas without prejudice, however, to his civil liability arising from the
commission of the crime.
This decision then is limited to the appeal of Florante Serrano.
The accused-appellants, together with Bernardo Devaras, were charged with the crime of murder in
an Information filed on 7 August 1975, the accusatory portion of which reads as follows:
That on or about the 6th day of July, 1975, in the Municipality of Dulag, Province
of Leyte, Philippines and within the jurisdiction (sic) of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating and acting in concert
with one another, with intent to kill and with treachery and evident
premeditation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack,
assault, stab and wound one TEODORO BISNAR with bolos with which said
accused purposely provided themselves, thereby inflicting upon said Teodoro
Bisnar the following wounds to wit:
1. Stab wound, 3 inches long x 1 inch x 4 inches deep,
cutting second costal cartillage, penetrating the heart, at the
second intercostal space, left;
2. Stab wound, 1 1/2 inch (sic) long x 1/2 inch wide x 1/2
inch deep, proximal of arm right;
61
3. Stab wound, 1 inch long x 1/4 inch wide x 1/8 inch deep,
right Hypochonrium;
4. Stab wound, 1 inch long x 1/2 inch wide x 1/8 inch deep,
unbilical region;
5. Incised wound, 2 inches long x 1/2 inch wide x 1/2 inch
deep, wrist posterior, left;
6. Incised wound, 4 inches long x 1 inch wide x 1 inch deep,
scapular region, right;
7. Incised wound, 1 1/2 inches long x 1 inch wide x 1/2 inch
deep, supra-scapular region, right;
8. Incised wound, l 1/2 inches long x 1/2 inch wide x 1 inch
wide x 1 inch deep, lateral portion of arm, right;
9. Stab wound, 1 1/2 inches x 1/2 inch wide x 1 inch deep,
infrascapular region, right;
10. Stab wound, 2 inches long x 1 inch wide 1 1/2 deep, right
lumbar region;
11. Stab wound, 1 1/2 inches long x 1/2 inch wide x 1/2 inch
deep, midaxillary line at the level of the 7th rib right;
12. Incised wound, 2 1/2 inches long x 1/4 inch wide x 1/8
inch deep, cutting the scalp at the perietotemporal region,
right;
13. Incised wound, 2 inches long x 1/4 inch wide x 1/8 inch
deep, occipital region;
14. Incised wound, 3 inches long x 1/2 inch wide x 1/8 inch
deep, anterior aspect of thigh right;
Which caused his death.
Contrary to law. 8
Each of the accused entered a plea of not guilty upon their arraignment on 17 September
1975. 9 Shortly thereafter, upon motion of the prosecution on the ground of insufficiency of evidence,
the trial court ordered the provisional dismissal of the case as against Bernardo Devaras.
After due trial on the merits, the trial court rendered its decision, the dispositive portion of which
reads as follows:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered declaring accused
Marcelino Devaras, Felix Cañas and Florante Serrano guilty of the offense of
murder, without the attendance of any aggravating nor (sic) mitigating
circumstance, and each of them is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua, and to indemnify jointly and severally the heirs of the
deceased Teodoro Bisnar in the amount of P12,000.00.
The preventive imprisonment respectively undergone by accused in, this case
shall be deducted from the respective terms of imprisonment imposed herein the
full extent, if they signed an agreement to abide by the same rules imposed upon
convicted prisoners while on detention, or only 4/5 thereof if they have not
signed said agreement (Art. 29, Rev. Penal Code; U.S. vs. Ortencio, 38 Phil. 341;
People vs. Lingao, L-28506, Jan. 31, 1977). According to the record, the herein
accused have been under detention since (sic) July 12, 1975 (p. 11, record) until
November 17, 1975 in the case of Florante Serrano (p. 100, record) until
November 24, 1975) in the case of Felix Cañas (p. 131, record).
 Accused are finally sentenced to respectively pay 1/4 of the costs.
SO ORDERED.
Treachery was considered by the trial court as the qualifying circumstance.
The evidence for the prosecution, upon which the trial court based its decision, is summarized in the
People's Brief as follows:
In the afternoon of July 6, 1975 between 4:00 to 5:00 o'clock, Paulita Borja, wife
of Teodoro Bisnar, and their daughter, were fetching water from the pump about
2 meters away from the house of Bernardo Devaras in Barrio Ginawas, Dulag,
Leyte. While fetching water from the pump, she saw Marcelino Devaras, Felix
Cañas, Florante Serrano and Bernardo Devaras, drinking in the kitchen of the
house of Bernardo Devaras. The door of the kitchen was facing the water pump.
While she was then drawing water from the waterpump, she heard Bernardo
Devaras tell his companions: "You drink now your tuba." Afterwards, she and
her daughter went home (pp. 2-5, tsn, Oct., 7, 1975; pp. 2-8, 17, tsn, Nov. 11,
1975).
That same afternoon of July 6, 1975 at about 4:30 o'clock Joel Beringuel, then 10
years old and a Grade V pupil, residing at Bo. Vecinal, Dulag, Leyte, was at the
store of Bernardo Devaras. The store was located on the porch of the said house,
which was about two and a half meters away from its kitchen. There was no wall
between the porch and the kitchen. Joel was sent to the said store by his
grandmother Ema Devaras to buy sugar cake. While in the said store, Jose (sic)
saw Bernardo Devaras, Marcelino Devaras and two other persons whom he later
recognized and identified in court as Felix Cañas and Florante Serrano drinking
in the kitchen of the said house. He overheard Marcelino Devaras say: "Let us go
to him," and then he heard Florante Serrano reply: "This evening." After buying
the sugar cake, Joel returned to the house of his grandmother (pp. 16-20. tsn,
Jan. 16, 1976).
After Paulita Borja and her daughter arrived at their house from fetching water
that afternoon of July 6, 1975, her husband Teodoro Bisnar left to fish at the
Daguitan River, also located in the same municipality (p. 6, tsn, Oct. 7, 1975; p.
20, tsn, Nov. 11, 1975).
Thus, at about 7:00 to 7:30 o'clock in the evening of July 6, 1975, Teodoro Bisnar
was then fishing in the Daguitan River, using a net and a lighted torch. On the
same occasion, Rosita Devaras and her son, Pascual Devaras, of Barrio Sabang,
and Victoriano Gabrino, a fisherman and a resident of Barrio Rizal, both barrios
located in the same municipality of Dulag, were also fishing nearby, although at
different places in the same river. Gabrino had his child for a companion who
was then at the bank of the said river. A flashlight, which was not then lighted,
was in the possession of his child (pp. 2, 6, tsn, Oct. 7, 1975; pp. 23-24, 27, tsn,
March 3, 1976; pp. 1-4, 17-18, tsn, Dec. 5, 1975). Rosita Devaras, who was
catching shrimps and fish for bait on one side of the river, noticed that Teodoro
Bisnar was fishing with net (sic), using a lighted torch (dulgalwong) at the
opposite side of the river about 15 meters away from her (pp. 24, 27, 29, tsn,
March 3, 1976). Gabrino, on the other hand, who was fishing on one side of the
river, saw Teodoro Bisnar about 15 meters away from him, fishing with the use
of a lighted torch (dugalwong) (pp. 2-5, tsn, Dec. 5, 1975).
At about 6:30 o'clock in the evening of that same day, July 6, 1975, while Paulita
Borja was in their house, Marcelino Devaras came to ask her where her husband
Teodoro Bisnar was. She told him that her husband was at the Daguitan River
catching fish. He asked her what time her husband usually returned home, and
she replied: "Sometimes eight o'clock and sometimes 10:00 o'clock" (pp. 6-7,
tsn, Oct. 7, 1975; p. 21, tsn, Nov. 11, 1975).
In the meantime, while Rosita Devaras was fishing in the middle of the river, she
saw Marcelino Devaras, Felix Cañas and Florentino (sic) Serrano approaching
her. When they came near her, they asked her if she had seen Doring, referring
62
to Teodoro Devaras. She replied in the affirmative, and then she pointed to the
place where Teodoro Bisnar was fishing about 15 meters away from her.
Thereafter, the three above-named persons left her and proceeded to the place
pointed to by her (pp. 25-26, 29-30, tsn, March 3, 1976).
Not long thereafter, Rosita Devaras and Gabrino heard a shout for help, coming
from the place where Teodoro Bisnar was then fishing. Both recognized that the
voice shouting for help was that of Teodoro Bisnar (pp. 5-6, tsn, Dec. 5, 1975; p.
26, tsn, March 3, 1976). Both immediately turned towards the direction where
the shout for help came from, and they saw persons attacking Teodoro Bisnar.
Gabrino, in particular, saw Marcelino Devaras, Felix Cañas and Florante Serrano
in the river stabbing and hacking Teodoro Bisnar. Gabrino also saw Bernardo
Devaras on the bank of the river, flashing his flashlight towards the group
attacking Teodoro Bisnar. Seeing thus (sic), Gabrino went ashore and left for his
house because he was afraid (pp. 6-9, 22-24, tsn, Dec. 5, 1975). In her case,
Rosita Devaras saw Florante Serrano slash Doring, while Marcelino Devaras
Felix Cañas were stabbing Doring. She recognized the assailants because the
place where Doring was being attacked was bright with a lighted torch at the
bank of the river. She then saw Teodoro Bisnar fall into the river, and thus
presumed him to be dead. She approached her son and told him: "Let us go
home because there is fight there." Both mother and son thus went home
because they were afraid (pp. 26-27, 30-31, 33-34, 37-38, tsn, March 3, 1976).
In the case of Paulita Borja, when it was already 8:00 o'clock that same evening
of July 6, 1975, and her husband has (sic) not yet returned from the river, she
became apprehensive. Bringing along her son, Rogelio Devaras, they went to the
river to look for her husband. She brought along a flashlight (pp. 7-8, Oct. 7
1975). On their way to the river, Paulita Borja and her son Rogelio Devaras met
Florante Serrano, Felix Cañas and Marcelino Devaras. She recognized them
because she had flashed her flashlight at them when they came near her,
although they swerved to one side about 10 meters away from her. She noticed
that their pants were wet and they were carrying boloes. She and her son did not
talk to them. Being already apprehensive for her husband, and seeing the three
persons carrying boloes, she became afraid (pp. 8-9, tsn, Oct. 7, 1975; pp. 10-11,
14-17, 23-24, tsn, Nov. 11, 1975). When she and her son reached the river, her
husband was nowhere to be found there. Hence, mother and son returned home.
That evening she could not sleep because she became more apprehensive when
her husband still did not return home (pp. 9-10, tsn, Oct. 7, 1975).
Early in the following morning of July 7, 1975, Paulita Borja and their four
children went to Daguitan River to look for her husband. Her son Rogelio later
found his father under the water already dead. Rogelio then carried the cadaver
of his father to the bank of the river. There, Paulita Borja noticed that her
deceased (sic) husband sustained several wounds on all parts of the body, some
at the back of the head (pp. 10-11, tsn, Id.).
Thereafter, a. sister-in-law of Paulita Borja went to the police department of
Dulag to report on their grim discovery. A policeman went to the river to
investigate the matter. The cadaver of the said deceased was later brought to his
house (pp. 11-12, tsn, Id.).
At about one o'clock in the afternoon of July 7, 1975, Victoriano Gabrino went to
the house of the deceased Teodoro Bisnar, where he saw the deceased lay (sic) in
state. He then talked to Paulita Borja, the surviving widow, informing her that he
had witnessed and seen the persons kill her husband in the river, while he
(Gabrino) was also catching fish there (pp. 9-10, 19-20, tsn, Dec. 5, 1975; p. 12,
tsn, Oct. 7, 1975; pp. 8-9, tsn, Nov. 11, 1975; pp. 20-21, tsn, Dec. 5, 1975).
At about 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon of the same day, July 7, 1975, Dr. Rodolfo
Serrano, municipal health officer of Dulag, Leyte, conducted a postmortem
examination of the cadaver of the deceased Teodoro Bisnar. The cadaver was
already in complete rigor mortis. The doctor found fourteen stab and incised
wounds on the body of the said deceased (which are enumerated in the above-
 quoted information). The said wounds were caused by blunt and sharp-edged
instruments. According to the said doctor, Wound No. 1 was a fatal wound,
which the death of the victim, because it penetrated the heart. Taken
individually, the other wounds would not cause his death, but so collectively,
said other wound (sic) would cause his death due to hemorrhage (pp. 2 5, tsn,
Sept. 26, 1975; p. 12, tsn, Oct. 30, 1975). Dr. Serrano issued the corresponding
medical report, of his post mortem examination of the said deceased, the entries
of which he confirmed as true in the course of his testimony in court (pp. 3, 5,
tsn. Sept. 26, 1975; Exhibit "A").
Later, Rosita Devaras met Paulita Borja sometime on a Thursday in January,
1976, during a market day of the said municipality. She saw the widow wearing
black (sic) dress; and she asked her why she was wearing a black dress. The
latter told her that her husband was killed at the Daguitan River. She asked the
widow who killed her husband, and the latter told her husband was killed by
Florante Serrano (sic), Felix Cañas and Marcelino Devaras. Rosita Devaras then
told Paulita Borja that she had seen and witnessed the incident. The widow then
asked her to be a witness in this case (pp. 27-28, 32, 36-37, tsn, March 3, 1976).
On the other hand, Victoriano Gabrino, upon her previous request, accompanied
Paulita Borja to the PC where she then filed a criminal complaint with the PC
against the assailants of her deceased husband. Gabrino was also investigated by
the PC on the same occasion (pp. 21-22, tsn, Dec. 5, 1975). 10
In exculpation, appellant Serrano, like his co-appellants, put up the defense of alibi, which the trial
court summarized as follows:
For his part, accused Florante Serrano, and with Antonio Tonido also testifying
to corroborate him, also denied having anything to do with Teodoro Bisnar's
death because at 6:00 o'clock in the evening of July 6, 1975, according to this
accused, he was on the porch of his house in Dulag conversing with Antonio
Fernandez and Rogelio Señase when Antonio Tonido arrived and told them that
he had an engine trouble of (sic) his boat with the request that help him drag it
ashore. Shortly after this, the owner of the boat, Roque Boder and a mechanic,
arrived in his house where the engine had been brought after these two left the
house, Tonido, upon written invitation of Serrano's wife, took his supper with
said accused and family, leaving the house at 9:00 p.m. He knew of the killing of
Teodoro Bisnar only the following day when he was informed that a policeman
went to his house (he was out then) looking for him and left word that he go to
the municipal building. 11
The parties agree that all the accused had been detained since 12 July 1975; they were "invited" in
connection with this case in the evening of 11 July 1975 by the Philippine Constabulary (PC)
authorities at Camp Bumpus, Tacloban City, and were taken into custody. They signed a waiver of
detention. At the time the information was filed and the arrest warrants were issued, they were
already in detention. 12
In the Appellant's Brief, appellant Serrano insists on his innocence and contends that the trial court
erred in:
FIRST. . . . holding clear and positive the identification of the appellants (and of
Teodoro Bisnar) as the assailants (and the assaulted) in the stabbing incident
alleged to have been witnessed by Victoriano Gabrino and Rosita Devaras at
about seven or seven-thirty in the evening of July 6, 1975;
SECOND. . . . ignoring and disregarding or overlooking the substantial fact that
Teodoro Bisnar met his death on July 7, 1975 (not, July 6) and within the first
hour immediately after he was wounded, which fact if properly appreciated
would offset the results of the case;
THIRD. .. . denying the appellant's motion to dismiss filed for insufficiency of
evidence;
63
FOURTH. . . . not giving the appellant's defense of alibi commensurate
strength vis-a-vis the absence of sufficient and convincing evidence of
identification;
FIFTH. . . . holding the appellants responsible for the untimely death of Teodoro
Bisnar without the necessary proof of motive in the absence of convincing proof
of identity;
SIXTH. . . . holding that the qualifying circumstance of treachery was attendant
in the killing of Teodoro Bisnar; and
SEVENTH. . . . not considering the attendance of the mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surrender in the imposition of the proper penalty.
All of these errors, except for the seventh assigned error to which it graciously concedes and concurs,
are refuted by the People in its well-written Brief.
We have carefully and meticulously examined and studied the records of this case and the evidence
adduced by the parties and We find ourselves in full agreement with the findings of the trial court
that appellant Serrano was among those responsible for the death of Teodoro Bisnar. However, as
shall hereafter be discussed, in connection with the sixth assigned error, We are unable to agree with
the trial court's conclusion that the killing was qualified by treachery.
We shall take up the assigned errors in the order they are presented.
1. The first assigned error is without basis. Prosecution witnesses Rosita Devaras and Victoriano
Gabrino positively identified appellant Serrano and his co-accused.
Rosita Devaras, whose husband Lorenzo Devaras is a cousin of accused Marcelino Devaras, and who
had known the appellants long before 6 July 1975, testified as follows:
Q While you were catching fish for bait with your son, in
that river at about 7:30 in the evening of July 6, 1975, tell us
if you have (sic) met these accused?
A Yes, because they were approaching us.
Q What did they do or what did they say in (sic)
approaching you.
A When they approached me and my son catching (sic) fish
and shrimps, they asked me whether I saw Doring.
Q Who asked you?
A Marcelino Devaras.
Q Do you know this Doring they were asking you about?
A Teodoro Bisnar.
Q What was your answer to that?
A I said that one where there is light. That is Doring who is
catching fish by the use of a net (sic).
Q You pointed to fifteen meters (sic) distance where Doring
was?
A Yes, because it was bright and I saw clearly.
Q After pointing Teodoro Bisnar to the three accused who
approached you where did these three accused go?
A They approached Doring.
 Q Did you go with them?
A No, sir. I just showed them the place.
Q Few minutes after these three accused left going to the
place where you pointed them (sic), tell the court if there
was anything unusual which you saw or heard or which
happened?
A I heard somebody said (sic): "Help."
Q Coming from what direction?
A From Doring.
Q Were you able to recognize the voice crying for help?
A Yes, it was the voice of Doring.
Q After that what did you do, after you heard the cry for
help?
A I turned my face towards them.
Q Turning your face, what did you see, please tell the court?
A When I turned my face to them I saw Florante Serrano
slash Doring while Marcelino Devaras and Felix Cañas were
stabbing him.
Q Why did you see them when it was night?
A It was bright because there was a torch.
Q Whose torch?
A The torch of Doring Bisnar.
Q Seeing the attack made by the accused on the deceased,
what did you do and where did you go?
A I approached my son and said to my son, let us go home
because there is a fight (sic) there.
Q So you went home?
A Yes, sir. 13
The cross-examination of Rosita by counsel for the accused strengthened further her positive
identification of Serrano and elicited from her a clearer picture of what Serrano did. Thus:
Q Will you please show to the court how, according to you,
you saw Florante Serrano hack Teodoro Bisnar?
A I only saw that he slashed Teodoro Bisnar, but I did not
mind how it was delivered.
Q Did you not say that you saw Florante Serrano hack
Teodoro Bisnar?
A I saw that he hack (sic), but I did not see how he delivered
the blow, but the fact is he hacked him.
Q Just exactly tell us how Florante Serrano or what was
Florante Serrano doing when you saw him. You imitate.
64
A (witness standing and then raising her right hand making
a downward movement as if slashing down, two times)
saying, hitting him on the head and other parts of the
body. 14
The cross-examiner may not have expected this voluntary revelation from Rosita; however, he
carelessly overdid his role by pressing the witness to demonstrate what exactly the accused did, a
task which properly pertains to the prosecuting fiscal on direct examination to strengthen further the
case against the accused.
Witness Victoriano Gabrino likewise positively identified the appellant as among the three
perpetrators of the crime. Thus, on direct examination, he testified as follows:
Q. Now, while you were there fishing near one bank of the
river while Teodoro Bisnar over there (sic) at the opposite
side, will you kindly tell the Court of anything unusual that
you heard?
A There was.
Q What was it which you heard?
A I heard a shout for help.
Q From which direction did that voice come and whose
voice was that which you said you heard?
A That was Teodoro Bisnar's voice.
Q Hearing that shout for help coming from Teodoro Bisnar,
what did you do?
A I went ashore.
Q When you heard this voice shouting (sic), will you kindly
tell us why did Teodoro Bisnar shout for help?
A Yes, sir.
Q Why did he shout for help?
A There were persons near him.
Q Who were the persons near him when he shouted for
help?
A Near Teodoro were Felix Cañas, Bernardo Devaras
and Florante Serrano.
Q Do you know a person by the name of Marceliano
Devaras?
A Yes, sir.
Q Do you know where Marceliano Devaras was at the time
that Teodoro Bisnar was shouting for help?
A He was near Teodoro Bisnar.
xxx xxx xxx
Q Who were stabbing Teodoro Bisnar and/or hacking him?
A Florante Serrano and Felix Cañas.
 Q How many were they?
A They were three.
Q Will you name these three?
A Felix Cañas, Florante Cañas and Marceliano Devaras. 15
2. It is true that, as entered in the death certificate of the victim, Teodoro Bisnar, 16 the date of his
death is the 7th — not the 6th — of July 1975. However, We agree with the explanation of the People
that the date "July 7, 1975" was erroneously entered on the space for "Date of Death", to wit:
A reading of both the postmortem report, Exhibit "A", and the death certificate
in question, Exhibits "A-1" or "2", both issued on that same day, July 7, 1975, by
Dr. Rodolfo Serrano, Dulag municipal health officer, however, reveals that the
date "July 7, 1975" was erroneously entered on the space for "4. Date of Death"
in the said death certificate (Exhibit "2-A"). It was already 3:00 o'clock in the
afternoon of July 7, 1975 when the said doctor conducted his postmortem
examination on the cadaver of the said deceased (p. 11, tsn, Oct. 30 1975). The
body of the deceased was already in complete rigor mortis (p. 12, tsn, Id. ) After
examining the wounds, the cause of death he (sic) placed on the said
postmortem report was: "HEMORRHAGE, secondary to stab wound of the
heart" (Exhibit "A", p. 9, Records), and soon thereafter, on the same day, July 7,
1975, he issued the corresponding death certificate of the deceased, wherein he
placed the cause or causes of death as: "(a) HEMORRHAGE, and (b) Stab wound
of the heart" (Exhibits, "A-l" or "2", p. 10, Records). Medically, the stab wound of
the heart would cause hemorrhage which will eventually cause the death of the
victim. But, as found by the said doctor, the stab or Wound No. 1, which is "Stab
wound, 3 inches long x 1 inch x 4 inches deep, cutting second costal cartillage,
penetrating the heart, at the second intercostal space, left" (Exhibit "A"), is a
fatal one, caused by a sharp-pointed instrument (pp. 4-5, tsn, Id.). The said fatal
wound, according to the said doctor, may not cause instant death, but the victim
would only live for a few minutes, or not more than one hour (p. 10, tsn, Oct. 30,
1975). The truth of the matter is that when Dr. Serrano stated that the victim
must have been dead "for more than six hours" upon finding that the cadaver
was already in complete rigor mortis (p. 12, tsn. Id.), the point of time that the
victim must have succumbed to the assault of the appellants and eventually died
could even be long before the "six hour" limitation computing from the
time rigor mortis starts to set in and be completed. The evidence shows that Dr.
Serrano found the body of the deceased at 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon of July
7, 1975, when he conducted his postmortem examination of said cadaver,
already in complete rigor mortis, but he did not state that rigor mortis of the
deceased's body set in or was completed at 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon of July
7, 1975. Consequently, when Dr. Serrano stated that the victim must have been
dead "for more than six hours," it could have been that the victim died even the
night before. 17
Moreover, in his cross-examination of Dr. Rodolfo Serrano, counsel for the accused, instead of
casting doubt on the allegation that the death of the victim occurred in the evening of 6 July 1975, or
bolstering the appellant's contention that it occurred on 7 July 1975, elicited the response that it
could have taken place before or after 7:30 in the evening of 6 July 1975. Thus:
Q You want to say Doctor, in your opinion that the body of
the victim could have been killed at 7:30 of July 6 in the
afternoon?
A Before or after that time. 18
3. The third assigned error is absolutely without merit. Appellant's motion to dismiss was actually a
demurrer to evidence, filed after the prosecution rested its case on the ground of "insufficiency of
evidence to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt." 19 The trial court denied it
because:
65
. . . going over the evidence presented by the prosecution, the Court is of the
opinion that the prosecution has established prima facie the guilt of accused
Marcelino Devaras, Florante Serrano and Felix Cañas in this
case. 20
and set the case for the reception of the evidence for the defense. Appellant did not even ask for a
reconsideration of the Order; instead, he and his co-accused merely asked for time to prepare their
evidence 21 which, on subsequent dates, they presented. Such acts effectively estopped him from
resurrecting a motion the denial of which was, in the first place, proper and correct as borne out by
the subsequent conviction of the accused and, in the second place, final as no motion for its
reconsideration was thereafter pursued.
4. Alibi is one of the weakest defenses that can be resorted to by an accused, 22 not only because it is
inherently weak and unreliable but also because of its easy fabrication, without much opportunity at
checking or rebutting it. 23It must be proved by positive, clear, and satisfactory evidence, 24 and when
the accused were identified by the witnesses for the prosecution by clear, explicit and positive
testimony, the alibi will not be credited. 25
In numerous recent cases too many to enumerate, this Court has repeatedly reiterated the rule that
the defense of alibi cannot prevail over the positive identification of the accused by the witnesses for
the prosecution and that to establish it, an accused must show that he was at some other place for
such a period of time that it was impossible for him to have been at the place where the crime was
committed at the time of its commission. In the instant case, appellant was, as earlier stated,
positively identified by the principal witnesses for the prosecution; besides, he did not even attempt
to establish that it was impossible for him to be at the place where the crime was committed.
5. The fifth assigned error is based on the assumption that there was no convincing proof of identity.
The assumption, however, as shown in the foregoing discussion, is clearly unfounded. Settled is the
rule that motive is not essential to conviction when there is no doubt as to the identity of the
culprit. 26 Motive is not essential when there are reliable eyewitnesses who fully identified the
accused as the perpetrator of the offense. 27 And lack of motive for committing the crime does not
preclude conviction for the offense when the crime and the participation of the accused are definitely
proved. 28
6. Nevertheless, We agree with appellant Serrano that the trial court erred in holding that the
qualifying circumstance of treachery was present in the killing of Teodoro Bisnar.
There is treachery when the offender commits any crimes against persons, employing means,
methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution,
without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make. 29 It should be
appreciated only against the assailant who resorted to that mode of attack. 30 In the instant case,
there is an obvious paucity of evidence to show how the aggression was commenced or how the acts
which resulted in the death of Teodoro Bisnar began and developed. All that the prosecution had
were the testimonies of Rosita Devaras and Victoriano Gabrino who both saw the appellant only after
turning their faces towards where the victim was after hearing the latter's shout for help. At that
particular instance, they saw the appellant and his co-accused hacking and stabbing the victim. They
were not, therefore, in a position to see how the attack was begun and were not able to observe the
position of the victim relative to each of the assailants, more particularly to that of Serrano.
In U.S. vs. Perdon, 31 and U.S. vs. Pangilion, 32 this Court held that where no particulars are known as
to the manner in which the aggression was made or how the act which resulted in the death of the
victim began and developed, it can in no way be established from mere suppositions that the killing
was perpetrated by treachery. Thus, it cannot be considered where the lone witness did not see the
commencement of the assault. 33 Accordingly, Serrano could only be liable for Homicide, and not
Murder, since no qualifying circumstance attended the killing of Teodoro Bisnar.
7. Despite the People's concurrence with the seventh assigned error, We find that the trial court did
not err in failing to appreciate in favor of the appellant Serrano the mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surrender. He did not offer any evidence to prove this circumstance. At the very least, he
should have testified on direct examination that he voluntarily surrendered. While it is true that the
investigating fiscal mentioned in his resolution that at the time the records of the case were turned
over to him for purposes of the preliminary investigation, all the accused were detained at the
Provincial Jail of Leyte where they were transferred from the Detention Center of the Philippine
Constabulary in Camp Bumpus, Tacloban City, 34 there is nothing on record to show that such
detention was by virtue of a voluntary surrender, just as there is nothing to support the appellant's WHEREFORE, taking into account the above modifications, judgment is hereby rendered finding
claim that, with his co-accused, he went to the PC Headquarters to comply with an invitation for an appellant FLORANTE SERRANO guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide, as
investigation in connection with the killing of Teodoro Bisnar and voluntarily signed a waiver of defined and penalized under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, for the death of Teodoro Bisnar
detention. On the contrary, in their Waiver, they explicitly admitted that they were arrested by and, considering the absence of any mitigating or aggravating circumstance and applying in his favor
elements of the 351st PC Company. The Waiver 35 reads as follows: the Indeterminate Sentence Law, said appellant is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate
penalty ranging from Eight (8) years and One (1) day of Prision Mayor, as minimum, to Fourteen
WAIVER FOR (sic) DETENTION (14) years, Eight (8) months and One (1) day of Reclusion Temporal, as maximum, and to
indemnify, jointly and severally with the estates of Marcelino Devaras and Felix Cañas, the heirs of
That we the undersigned having been arrested by elements of the 351st PC the deceased Teodoro Bisnar in the amount of P50,000.00. He is further ordered to pay one-third
Company, Camp Bumpus, Tacloban City, we waive (sic) our rights and submit (1/3) of the costs.
our persons voluntarily under the custody of the arresting officers/agency.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, we have set our hands this 12th day of July 1974, at
Tacloban City, Leyte, Philippines. Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano, Bidin and Romero, JJ., concur.

S/T MARCELLANO (sic) DEVARAS S/T FLORANTE SERRANO

(Affiant) (Affiant)

S/T BERNARDO DEVARAS S/T FELIX CAÑAS

(Affiant) (Affiant)

Witnesses:

__________________

__________________

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before, me this 12th day of July 1975, at Tacloban City, Philippines.

S/T ENRIQUE C. ASIS

1LT JAGS (PC)

HPC, Spl Detail for Leyte

and Samar Const Command

For voluntary surrender to be appreciated, it must be spontaneous and made in such manner that it shows the interest of the accused to surrender unconditionally to the

authorities, either because he acknowledges his guilt or because he wishes to save them the trouble and expenses necessarily incurred in his search and capture. 36 The fact of

the arrest of the appellant, even if made before the issuance of a warrant of arrest, belies any claim of voluntary surrender since the element of spontaneity is necessarily absent.

What seems clear in this case is that all the accused were arrested by the PC authorities without a warrant under paragraph (b), Section 6, Rule 113 of the 1964 Rules of

Court, 37 reading as follows:

Sec. 6. Arrest without warrant — when lawful. — A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:

xxx xxx xxx

(b) when an offense has in fact been committed, and he has reasonable ground to believe that the person
to be arrested has committed it.

xxx xxx xxx

At the time of the arrest, the sworn statements of prosecution witnesses Paulita Borja (widow of Teodoro Bisnar), Joel Beringuel and Victoriano Gabrino were already taken by
the PC authorities 38 and the latter had already reasonable ground to believe that Serrano and his co-accused committed the crime.

The foregoing considered, appellant should be convicted of the crime of Homicide sans the
mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. There being no proof of any ordinary aggravating
circumstance, following the first rule prescribed by Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code, the medium
of the penalty for homicide, which is reclusion temporal under Article 249 of the same Code, shall be
imposed. Appellant is, however, entitled to the benefits of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, 39 which
mandates the imposition of an indeterminate penalty the maximum term of which shall be that
which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the rules of the
Revised Penal Code and the minimum of which shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to
that prescribed by the Code for the offense.

As regards the indemnity, following recent decisions of this Court, 40 the award of P12,000.00 should
be increased to P50,000.00, the payment of which should take into account the effect the death of
appellants Marcelino Devaras and Felix Cañas as earlier adverted to.
66
G.R. No. L-23734 April 27, 1967

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
TEODORO SABIO, defendant-appellant.

Antonio T. de Jesus for defendant and appellant.

Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff and appellee.

BENGZON, J.P. J.:

At about six p.m. of April 12, 1963, Teodoro Sabio was squatting with a friend, Irving Jurilla, in the
plaza of Central Manapla, Manapla, Negros Occidental. Romeo Bacobo and two others — Ruben
Miñosa and Leonardo Garcia — approached them. All of them were close and old friends.

Romeo Bacobo then asked Sabio where he spent the holy week. At the same time, he gave Sabio a
"footkick greeting", touching Sabio's foot with his own left foot. Sabio thereupon stood up and dealt
Romeo Bacobo a fist blow, inflicting upon him a lacerated wound, ¾ inch long, at the upper lid of the
left eye. It took from 11 to 12 days to heal and prevented Romeo Bacobo from working during said
period as employee of Victorias Milling Co., Inc.

Sabio was thereafter prosecuted for less serious physical injuries. In the municipal court he was
found guilty and sentenced to imprisonment of 5 months and 10 days plus costs. In the Court of First
Instance, however, to which he appealed, he was found guilty but with the mitigating circumstance of
provocation, so that the penalty imposed was one (1) month and five (5) days of arresto mayor plus
indemnity of P100 and costs.1äwphï1.ñët

Defendant appealed from this judgment to Us to raise as a pure question of law the sole issue of
whether, under the facts is determined below, a fist blow delivered in retaliation to a "foot-kick
greeting" is an act of self-defense and/or justifying circumstance entitling the accused to acquittal
and relief from all liabilities, civil and criminal.

A primordial requisite for self-defense is unlawful aggression (Art. 11, Rev. Penal Code). And for
unlawful, aggression to be present, there must be real danger to life or personal safety (People vs.
Beatriz Yuman, 61 Phil. 786). For this reason, a mere push or a shove, not followed by other acts, has
been held insufficient to constitute unlawful aggression (People vs. Yuman, supra). A playful kick —
the lower court rejected defendant's claim that it was a "vicious kick" — at the foot my way of
greeting between friends may be a practical joke, and may even hurt; but it is not a serious or real
attack on a person's safety. Appellant's submission that it amounts to unlawful aggression cannot
therefore be sustained. As rightly found by the Court of First Instance, such kick was only a mere
slight provocation.

Reference is made to a decision of the Supreme Court of Spain (prom. Jan. 20, 1904, 72 Jur. Crim.
123-125), considering a slap on the face an unlawful aggression. No parity lies between said case and
the present. Since the face represents a person and his dignity, slapping, it is a serious personal
attack. It is a physical assault coupled with a willful disregard, nay, a defiance, of in individual's
personality. It may therefore be frequently regarded as placing in real danger a person's dignity,
rights and safety. A friendly kick delivered on a person's foot obviously falls short of such personal
aggression.

Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed in toto. Costs against appellant. So
ordered.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez and Castro, JJ.,
concur.

67
68
G.R. No. L-45470 February 28, 1985
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
GREGORIO LAQUINON, alias "JOLLY", defendant-appellant.
CONCEPCION, JR., J.:
Accused Gregorio Laquinon was charged with the crime of murder in the Court of First Instance of
Davao del Sur for the killing of Pablo Remonde, coated as follows:
That on or about November 13, 1972, in the Municipality of Hagonoy, Province
of Davao del Sur, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above named accused, with treachery and evident premeditation,
armed with a gun and with intent to kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously shoot one Pablo Remonde with said weapon, inflicting upon the
latter wounds which caused his death.
After the trial, the lower court rendered a decision finding the accused guilty of the crime charged
and sentenced him as follows:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court finds the accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of murder, and imposes upon him the penalty
of reclusion perpetua (Art. 248, Revised Penal Code); to indemnify the heirs of
the deceased in the sum of P 12,000.00 and to pay the costs.
From the foregoing judgment, accused Gregorio Laquinon interposed the present appeal.
The People's version of the case is as follows:
On November 13, 1972, at about 11:30 o'clock in the evening, Samama Buat,
barrio captain of Clib, Hagonoy, Davao del Sur, was at his residence in barrio
Clib. In a short while he heard gunshots coming from the bank of a river some
three hundred meters to the south of his house (pp. 4-6, tsn, Dec. 8, 1975). Then,
his brother, Leocario Buat, arrived and told him that a man was shouting for
help at the bank of the river. Samama Buat told his brother to call the barrio
councilman. Thereafter, he proceeded to the place where the unidentified man
was. His brother, Leocario and the barrio councilman also arrived there.
Samama Buat found the man lying on the sand and asked who he was. The man
answered, "I am Pablo Remonde" (pp 7-10, Id.). Remonde's two hands were tied
on his back. He was lying face down (p. 10, Id).
Samama Buat then took the "ante mortem" statement of Pablo Remonde. He
asked him who he was to which he answered that he was Pablo Remonde.
Samama Buat asked "who shot you" and Remonde said that it was Gregorio
Laquinon. He asked Pablo Remonde whether from the gunshot wounds he
suffered he would survive to which the victim answered "I do not know" (pp. 11,
19, 21, Id.; see also Exh. A, Folder of Exhibits). After that, barrio captain Buat
went to the municipality of Hagonoy and reported to Vice Mayor Antonio Biran
the shooting of Pablo Remonde. Vice Mayor Biran went to the scene of the
incident and asked the victim who shot him to which the latter answered that he
was shot by Gregorio Laquinon (pp. 21 A to 23, tsn, Dec. 8, 1975). Pablo
Remonde was placed on a jeep of the Vice Mayor and brought to the hospital (p.
23, Id,). Pablo Remonde was admitted to the Canos Hospital in Digos, Davao del
Sur where he was attended to by Dr. Alfonso Llanos. Dr. Llanos performed an
operation on the victim from whose body a slug was recovered (pp. 15-16, tsn,
Jan. 26, 1976; Exh. B). Pablo Remonde died in the hospital on November 16,
1972 because of bullet wounds (pp. 17-20, tsn, Jan. 26, 1976; see also clinical
chart. Exh. C, Folder of Exhibits).
The accused Gregorio Laquinon denied having killed the deceased. The trial court summarized his
defense, as follows:
69
In his defense, the accused declared that he was a KM member; that he was
ordered by one Noli Cabardo, then their CO, to fetch Pablo Remonde; he
requested one Cristino Nerosa to go with him, and matter of factly, they brought
Remonde to the place where said CO Cabardo with ten companions, was waiting
at the riverbank; that before reaching the place, Nerosa separated from him and
he alone brought Remonde to Cabardo. There Cabardo confronted Remonde
why, having been commanded to buy some provisions in Matanao, he
(Remonde) never returned; to which Remonde answered that he spent the
money 'in drinking and gambling; when upon Cabardo got mad and as Remonde
attempted to escape, he (witness) heard a shot which must have been fired by
Cabardo as he was holding a .38 Cal. revolver; that he (witness) also had that
evening a Cal. 22 paltik; that after the shot he saw Remonde sprawled on the
ground, and then Cabardo ordered them to go to the mountain as in fact they
did; that two days later during the day, their mountain camp was raided by the
PC and Cabardo and two others were killed while he (witness) was able to escape
and went to Magpet, North Cotabato, and engaged in farming therein with his
relatives; but believing that as a KM member he 'cmmitted something,' he
surrendered to the Davao PC Barracks in May, 1975 (Exhibit '2'), where up to
now he is being confined.
The accused-appellant prays for the reversal of the appealed judgment on the ground that the lower
court erred in finding him guilty of the crime charged on the basis of the statement attributed to the
deceased Pablo Remonde which reads:
Q State your name and other personal circumstances.
A Pablo Remonde y Saballa, 24 years old, laborer and
resident of Pob. this mun.
Q Who shot you?
A Mr. Laquinon, a person who ran for councilor before the
ticket of Liberal last local election and son of Suelo
Maravllias whose name I don't know.
Q Why you were shot by said persons above?
A They are suspecting me that I'm an informer of Vice
Mayor Viran regarding KM .
Q Do you think you'll die with your wound?
A I don't know sir.
The accused-appellant argues that the foregoing statement is inadmissible in evidence as an ante-
mortem declaration because it was not executed under a consciousness of an impending death; and
that the deceased was not a competent witness.
The fact that the deceased had named the son of Suelo Maravillas who turned out as Cristino Nerosa
as one of those who shot him in his dying declaration does not make the deceased an incompetent
witness. Nor does it render said dying declaration incredible of belief. The testimony of the accused
that he and Nerosa separated and that he alone brought the deceased to Noli Cabardo is not
corroborated. It may be that Nerosa was with the accused when the latter shot the deceased, as stated
in the dying declaration, but that the accused testified that Nerosa was not with him when he brought
the deceased to Noli Cabardo in order to free Nerosa from criminal liability.
Nor does the testimony of Barrio Captain Samama Buat that the place was dark and that the victim
had told him that he was shot by members of the KM make the deceased an incompetent witness. On
the contrary, it strengthens the statement of the deceased since the accused is a member of the KM.
But the dying declaration of the deceased Pablo Remonde is not admissible as an ante-mortem
declaration since the deceased was in doubt as to whether he would die or not. The declaration fails
to show that the deceased believed himself in extremist, "at the point of death when every hope of
recovery is extinct, which is the sole basis for admitting this kind of declarations as an exception to SO ORDERED.
the hearsay rule." 1
Makasiar (Chairman), Aquino, Abad Santos, Escolin and Cuevas, JJ., concur.
It may be admitted, however, as part of the res gestae since the statement was made immediately
after the incident and the deceased Pablo Remonde had no sufficient time to concoct a charge against
the accused.

On the whole, We are satisfied with the findings of the trial court that the accused was responsible
for the killing of Pablo Remonde. We cite with approval the following observations of the trial court:

Indeed, the Court cannot believe that CO Cabardo did the killing as related by
the accused for the following reasons:

First, when the deceased was allegedly delivered to CO Cabardo, he was already
hand-tied at his back, that the place of the shooting was "covered by thick
bushes and beside the river", and that CO Cabardo was with ten men excluding
the accused; under these circumstances, it is hard to believe that the deceased,
with all those overwhelming handicap, would attempt to flee.

Second, if the deceased truly tried to flee, the logical thing he would do would
be to flee away from and not towards Cabardo; in doing the former he would
turn to his right or to his left or towards his back; if he fled to his left or right, or
towards his back, he would be exposing one side of his body, or his back, and
when fired upon in that position he would have been hit on one side of the body
or at his back. The evidence — as testified to by Dr. Llanos — however, shows
that the deceased had only one wound a gunshot wound, in the abdomen; this
shows he was fired upon frontally, the bullet going through and through the
intestines and lodged, presumably in the bony portions of his back, that is why
the slug (Exhibit "B") was recovered. The accused's version, therefore, that the
deceased tried to flee is hard to believe for being against the physical facts.

Now, if the accused is innocent, why should he relate such an incredible version?

Oh what a tangled web they weave when first day practice to deceive.t

With these observations, the Court cannot believe that the accused really
delivered the deceased to CO Cabardo and that it was Cabardo who shot him. As
testified to by him, their mountain camp was raided by the PC two days after the
incident, as a result of which raid Cabardo and two of their companions were
killed. The accused himself was able to escape, went to hide in a relative's farm
in faraway Magpet, North Cotabato, did farming there until one day in May,
1975, repentant that, as a KM member, he had "committed something", he
finally surrendered to the PC Barracks in Davao City. Cabardo, may he rest in
peace, having gone to the other world, and can no longer speak in his behalf, it is
not unlikely that the accused conceived of this outlandish defense by pointing to
CO Cabardo, to free himself from responsibility.

Most important to remember on this point is that at the time the deceased grade
his "dying" statement, Cabardo was still alive; that per the accused himself, he
had no previous differences with the deceased or with the barrio captain; and
that from the prosecution witness Bo. Capt. Buat when he took the statement of
the deceased, the deceased was feeling strong, surely, under such circumstances
it is hard to believe that the deceased would name the accused with whom he
had no quarrel and Nerosa as his killers if that was really not the truth.

Accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder qualified by treachery. The victim
was apparently shot while his two hands were tied at his back. Accused, in shooting the victim,
obviously employed means or force in the execution of the offense which tended directly and
specially to insure its execution without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended
party might make.

WHEREFORE, with the modification that the indemnity to be paid to the heirs of the deceased is
increased to P30,000.00, the judgment appealed from should be, as it is hereby, AFFIRMED. With
costs against the appellant.
70

G.R. No. 72244 May 8, 1992
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
JOSE AGRIPA, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellant.
Mario A. Encinarel and Refael R. Rañeses for accused-appellant.
CRUZ, J.:
A grisly sight awaited the authorities who had come to investigate reports of a stabbing in the house
of Jose and Adelfa Agripa at barangay Humapon in Legazpi City. On the floor awash with blood, Jose
was locked in a final embrace with his wife, who was already dead. Adelfa had sustained fifteen
wounds and had expired due to shock and massive hemorrhage. Jose himself had four wounds in his
body and was hardly alive. Because he refused to release his hold on his dead wife, the couple was
rolled in a mat and rushed to the hospital. All this occurred at about one o'clock in the morning of
April 30, 1980.
That same morning, Corporal Wilfredo Bermas, a member of the investigating team took down the
following exchange between him and Jose, 1 whom he believed to be on the verge of death:
Q What is your name please?
A Jose Agripa.
Q Who stabbed you?
A I myself.
Q Who stabbed your wife?
A I myself.
Q Why did you stab your wife?
A Because of problems in the family.
Q What do you think, will you die from your wounds?
A No.
Q Was it really your intention to kill your wife?
A Yes, I want to die with her.
The statement was not signed by Jose. On Bermas's request, it was witnessed by the barangay
captain, Salustiano Botin, who was present during the recorded conversation.
Jose survived to face prosecution for parricide two months later. He was convicted on July 18, 1985. 2
The principal evidence presented against him at the trial was the above-quoted statement, which was
offered as a dying declaration or as part of the res gestae. Also submitted as an exhibit was the 8-inch
bolo-knife used in the killing, which was turned over by Botin to the police at seven o' clock that same
morning. He had received it from a neighbor of the couple who had picked it up at the scene of the
killing. 3 The police had evidently neglected to look for it when they went to investigate.
In his defense, Jose gave a different version of the killing of his wife. He said that he had gone to
sleep early that night but was awakened when he felt a stab wound in his stomach. He could not see
his assailant because it was dark. He covered the wound with his right hand but there was a second
71
thrust that wounded him again almost in the same place. Instinctively, he curled himself into a fetal
position with his hands at the back of his neck and asked, "Why did you stab me?" He received no
answer but soon enough a third thrust sliced through his left arm and pierced the right part of his
chest. It was then that he grabbed the fist of his attacker and the two of them wrestled in the dark for
possession of the weapon. He could not recall what happened afterwards as he must have fainted. He
said he also had no recollection of the statement he supposedly made before he was brought to the
hospital. He recovered consciousness there only on May 4, 1980, and was then told that his wife had
tried to kill him. 4
His statements were corroborated by his 18-year old son, Edwin, who testified that there was no
quarrel between his parents when his father went to sleep early that night of April 29, 1980. His
mother was in her usual angry mood, however. After studying his lessons, he himself went to sleep
while his mother continued folding clothes. He was awakened later by the sound of a scuffle, and
when he turned on his flashlight he saw his mother stabbing his father. He amplified his testimony
with gestures, swinging his right arm downward in simulation of stabbing. Afraid to succor his
father, he woke up his two brothers and rushed with them to their grandfather's house to seek his
help. On their way out, they heard his father say, "Why did you stab me?" 5
Edwin identified the bolo-knife as belonging to his mother, who he said usually carried it on her
person for cutting leaves to cover herself whenever it rained. On two occasions, however, she used it
for a different purpose. The first incident was when Adelfa stabbed Jose on the right side of his body,
and the second was when she hacked Jose's upper right arm. Both incidents were reported to the
barangay captain. 6
Edwin admitted loving his father more than his mother. He recalled that when he was in Grade I, his
mother hanged him by the neck from a coconut tree with a piece of katsa cloth. 7
The violent nature of Adelfa was affirmed by another witness, Manuel Cardel, who testified that he
was in the store of one Macedonio in the afternoon of April 29, 1980, when he heard Adelfa say she
would stab Jose if he came home without any money. (As it turned out, Jose did come home without
his salary, saying he would collect it the following day. This could have been the reason why Edwin
observed his mother to be in a sullen mood that night.) Cardel also recalled one time when Adelfa ran
after her husband with a bolo in her hand. 8
The trial court correctly rejected the above-quoted interrogation as a dying declaration because it did
not comply with all the requirements of this particular exception to the hearsay rule. The statement
does not show that it was made by the declarant under the consciousness of impending death
(although it is true that Jose was near death at that time). Nevertheless, it was correctly admitted as
part of the res gestae, having been made soon after the startling occurrence of the multiple stabbing
of Jose and Adelfa.
But the mere fact that evidence is admissible does not necessarily mean that it is also credible. The
testimony of a competent witness may be admissible if relevant but it is not for this reason alone
believable. According to Rule 128, Sec. 3, "evidence is admissible if it is relevant to the issue and is
not excluded by the law or these rules." Credibility depends on the evaluation given to the evidence
by the court in accordance with the guidelines provided in Rule 133 of the Rules of Court and the
doctrines laid down by this Court. 9
As the Court sees it, Jose's statement, while admissible as part of the res gestae, is not credible
evidence of his criminal liability. It is quite obvious that he was not in full possession of his faculties
when he made that statement, which, significantly, he did not sign. We note that when the
authorities came upon the wounded couple, Jose refused to let go of his dead wife and was rolled up
with her cadaver in a mat to be brought to the hospital. That was not the conduct of a rational man.
Moreover, Jose was himself suffering from four stab wounds which could have cost him his life had
he not been treated immediately. Given the condition of his mind and body at the time the statement
was made, Jose could not be expected to think clearly and to willingly make the serious and damning
confession now imputed to him.
It is true that when the accused invokes the justifying circumstance of self-defense, he loses the
constitutional presumption of innocence and assumes the burden of proving, with clear and
convincing evidence, the justification for his act. 10 The essential elements of self-defense, according
to Article 11(1) of the Revised Penal Code, are: a) unlawful aggression: b) reasonable necessity of the
means employed to prevent or repel it; and c) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person
defending himself. We feel that all these requisites are present and have been sufficiently established
in the case at bar.

The accused-appellant was sound asleep when he was suddenly attacked by his wife, who fell upon
him with intent to kill. There was no warning at all of the deadly assault. There was no provocation
either, unless it be her frenetic anger over his failure to bring home his salary, which was not the
sufficient provocation required by the law. Jose was totally unprepared for the knife thrusts in his
stomach and chest that posed an immediate threat and danger to his life. Under this vicious attack,
he had no choice but to defend himself against his unknown assailant and by the only means
available to him. He grabbed the knife from his maddened wife and struck wildly at his would-be
killer. He stabbed blindly, thinking only to save his life even as it drained from the wounds he had
sustained. If it appeared later that he had wounded his wife no less than fifteen times, it was not
because he was a cruel and bloodthirsty killer. The only reason was that he was fighting desperately
for his very life and, animated only by his mortal fear of his unknown aggressor and moved like a
wild beast by the elemental instinct for survival, did not know when to stop.

Jose Agripa was a peaceful law-abiding person with no known police record. He pursued the humble
tenor of his life, working quietly as a lowly laborer, struggling as best he could to provide for his wife
and children. If suddenly he became a killer, it was not by inclination or design or with malice
aforethought. He was merely a hapless pawn of fortune, an unfortunate victim of tragic
circumstances, more so, indeed, than the wife he killed.

The Court sees in this case a man dominated if not terrified by a wife given to cruelty and violence. It
is not unlikely that she was paranoid. Twice before, she had hacked her husband with her bolo, and
there was also that time he ran for dear life as she chased him with her trusty weapon. The act of
hanging a small child by the neck from a coconut tree can hardly be called the manifestation of a
normal psyche. It was this woman who, heeding the urgings of her twisted mind, decided to kill her
sleeping husband in the dark even as her children slumbered peacefully nearby.

A Higher Tribunal shall judge Adelfa Agripa. But this Court need not wait a minute longer to absolve
the accused-appellant. Jose Agripa is innocent. There is no stronger instinct than the instinct for
survival, which moved him without fault to do what he did.

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is REVERSED and accused-appellant Jose Agripa is

ACQUITTED on the ground of self-defense. It is the order of this Court that he be released
immediately. No costs.

Narvasa, C.J., Griño-Aquino, Medialdea and Bellosillo, JJ., concur.

72
G.R. No. 75028 November 8, 1991
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
PIOQUINTO DE JOYA y CRUZ, defendant-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Rodolfo P. Liwanag for accused-appellant.
FELICIANO, J.:
In an Information dated 5 May 1978, appellant Pioquinto de Joya y Cruz was charged before the
Regional Trial Court, 3rd Judicial Region, Branch 14, Malolos, Bulacan with the crime of robbery
with homicide committed as follows:
That on or about the 31st day of January, 1978, in the municipality of Baliuag, province of
Bulacan, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused
Pioquinto de Joya y Cruz, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with
intent of (sic) gain and without the knowledge and consent of the owner and, by means of
violence and intimidation, take, carry and cart away two (2) rings, one (1) necklace, one (1)
piece of earring, belonging to Arnedo Valencia y Angeles and Eulalia Diamse Vda. de Salac,
to their damage and prejudice in the sum of FIVE HUNDRED FIFTY PESOS (P550.00);
and that on the occasion of the said robbery and for the purpose of enabling him to take
the said properties, the accused did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
with treachery, evident premeditation and great advantage of superior strength, with
intent to kill, attack, assault and use personal violence upon the person of Eulalia Diamse
Vda. de Salac by stabbing and hitting the latter on her neck and other parts of her body
with pointed instrument causing injuries which directly caused the death of the said
Eulalia Diamse Vda. de Salac.
That in the commission of the offense, the following aggravating circumstances were
present (1) abuse of superior strength; (2) committed in the dwelling of the offended party;
(3) disregard of age and sex; (4) abuse of confidence.
Contrary to law. 1
At arraignment, appellant De Joya pleaded not guilty. After trial, the court a quo rendered a decision dated 16 May 1986 convicting De Joya of the crime charged. The
dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with Homicide, committed with the
aggravating circumstances of: abuse of superior strength, old age, disregard of sex the victim a woman 88 years old, the crime was committed in the dwelling
of the victim. The accused being 72 years old death penalty cannot be imposed against him as provided in Article 47 of the Revised Penal Code.
The Court therefore, sentences the accused to LIFE IMPRISONMENT; to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the amount of P20,000.00 and to pay damages
in the amount of P550.00.
The bond of the accused is ordered cancelled and the accused to be confined immediately in the National Penitentiary pending review of his case by the
Supreme Court.
The Clerk of Court is ordered to immediately forward the record of this case to the Supreme Court for review.
73
SO ORDERED. 2
In this appeal, appellant raises a number of issues all of which, however, amount to one basic assertion: that the lower court erred in concluding that appellant was guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged.
The facts have been summarized in the brief of the Solicitor General in the following manner:
The spouses Arnedo Valencia and Herminia Salac-Valencia, together with their ten (10) year old son Alvin Valencia and Herminia Valencia's 88-year old
mother, Eulalia Diamse, are residents of Balagtas St., Baliuag, Bulacan. (TSN, June 11, 1981, p. 2). Both spouses are teachers by profession.
Arnedo Valencia teaches at the Tiaong Elementary School at Barrio Tiaong, Baliuag, Bulacan whereas Herminia Valencia teaches in an intermediate school at
Baliuag, Bulacan. (TSN, March 11, 1980, p. 7).
In the afternoon of January 31, 1978, Herminia Salac-Valencia left for school to teach. Her mother Eulalia Diamse was then [sitting] at their sofa watching the
television set. (TSN, October 12, 1978, p. 3).
Her Son Alvin likewise left for school at 1:00 o'clock. And at 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon, his classes were dismissed and he proceeded home. (TSN, March 11,
1980, p. 8).
At around 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon of that same day, the spouses Valencia's neighbor by the name of Gloria Capulong, together with a friend, went out of
the former's house to visit a friend. While at her yard, Gloria Capulong looked back to the direction of the Valencia's house. She noticed appellant Pioquinto de
Joya standing and holding a bicycle at the yard of the Valencia's. (TSN, June 11, 1981, pp. 2-4).
When Alvin reached home, he saw his grandmother Eulalia Diamse lying down prostrate and drenched with her own blood. He immediately threw his bag and
ran towards her. He then held her hands and asked her: "Apo, Apo, what happened?". (TSN, March 11, 1980, p. 10).
. . . [Eulalia Diamse held his hand and after which said: "Si Paqui". After saying these words, she let go of Alvin's hand and passed away. (TSN, Ibid., pp. 14
and 17).
Alvin then called for his Nana Edeng and told her to see his lola because she was drenched with her own blood. His Nana Edeng told him to immediately see
his mother Herminia Salac-Valencia to inform her of what happened. (TSN, Id).
Upon seeing her mother, Alvin told her: "Mommy, Mommy, apo is drenched in her own blood." (TSN, March 11, 1980, p. 20).
Herminia immediately ran outside the school, flagged down a tricycle and went home. Alvin followed, riding his bicycle (TSN, Id., p. 21). When she reached
their house, she found her mother lying prostrate in her own blood at their sala in front of the television. Her mother's hands were stretched open and her feet
were wide apart. Blood was oozing out of her mother's ears. She then embraced her mother and placed her on the sofa. She asked Alvin and the tricycle driver
to call Dr. Delfin Tolentino. (TSN, October 12,1978, pp. 25-26).
Dr. Tolentino arrived at around 4:00 o'clock that same afternoon and examined the body of Eulalia Diamse. Said doctor declared that said Eulalia Diamse had
a heart attack which caused her death. When asked by Herminia Valencia why her mother's ears were punctured, no reply was given by said doctor. Herminia
requested for a death certificate, but Dr. Tolentino did not issue one and instead immediately left. (TSN, Ibid., pp. 27-29).
Herminia found out that the two (2) gold rings worn by her mother were missing. The right earring of her mother was likewise missing. All of these were
valued [at] P300.00 (TSN, Id., p. 15).
That same afternoon, Herminia saw the room of the groundfloor ransacked. The contents of the wardrobe closet (aparador) were taken out. Its secret
compartment/box was missing. And the lock of the aparador was destroyed. (TSN, October 12, 1978, pp. 15-17).
When she went upstairs after putting her mother on a bed at the ground floor, she found the two (2) rooms thereat in disarray. She then caused the rooms and
things photographed by a certain Ricardo Ileto (Exhibits "A" to "A-11"; TSN, October 12, 1978, p. 17).
Later, Herminia went to Dr. Adela Cruz and pleaded [with] said doctor to issue a death certificate so that her mother could be embalmed. (TSN, Id., pp. 33-
34).
On the same night, Herminia found a beach walk step-in (Exhibit "B") by the side of the cabinet near the door of their room downstairs, more or less one
meter from where the victim was lying prostrate. (TSN, October 12,1978, pp. 24-25).
Herminia was able to recognize the said step-in because of its color and size, as the other half of the pair she bought for her husband Arnedo but which she
gave to Socorro de Joya, the wife of herein appellant, before Christmas of 1977 when she saw the old and wornout pair of slippers of the latter. (TSN, Ibid.).
Appellant Pioquinto de Joya visited the wake only once. During the second day of the four-day wake, Herminia saw herein appellant Pioquinto de Joya enter
the kitchen and peep under the cabinet of the (Valencia's) house. (TSN, Id.).
 On February 3, 1978, a post-mortem examination was conducted by Dr. Romulo Madrid, a medico-legal officer of the National Bureau of Investigation. Per The reason upon which incomplete declarations are generally excluded, or if admitted, accorded little or no weight, is that since the declarant was prevented (by death or other
examination, the cause of the death arrived by Dr. Madrid was "shock, secondary to punctured wound neck" (Exhibit "D-1") situated at the right side of the circumstance) from saying all that he wished to say, what he did say might have been qualified by the statements which he was prevented from making. That incomplete
neck, just below the right ear wherein it went out thru and thru, opposite, almost in the same location, from one side of the neck to the opposite side. (Exhibit declaration is not therefore entitled to the presumption of truthfulness which constitutes the basis upon which dying declarations are received. 5
"D-2").

In its decision, the trial court became quite clear as to the factors which led to the judgment of conviction against appellant. These factors, as set out in the decision of the trial
court, were the following:
It is clear to the Court that the dying declaration of the deceased victim here was incomplete. In other words, the deceased was cut off by death before she could convey a
complete or sensible communication to Alvin. The trial court simply assumed that by uttering the words "Si Paqui", the deceased had intended to name the person who had
In the case at bar, the prosecution relied heavily on the circumstances surrounding the death of the victim as testified to by the witnesses and proven during
thrust some sharp instrument through and through her neck just below her ears. But Eulalia herself did not say so and we cannot speculate what the rest of her communication
the trial, also the dying statement of the deceased, which are: Herminia testified that two weeks before the incident the accused and the deceased quarreled
might have been had death not interrupted her. We are unable to regard the dying statement as a dying declaration naming the appellant as the doer of the bloody deed.
over a bicycle which the former took from their house without the consent of the latter; that Exhibit "B" (step-in beach walk type) which was found near the
cabinet one meter away from the body of the victim was identified by Herminia as the step-in that she gave to the wife of the accused and which she saw
The other elements taken into account by the trial court are purely circumstantial in nature. When these circumstances are examined one by one, none of them can be said to
accused wearing on January 29, 1978 when she visited them in their house; the testimony of Gloria Capulong that she saw the accused in the afternoon of
lead clearly and necessarily to the conclusion that appellant had robbed and killed the deceased Eulalia Diamse. The quarrel over the use of the bicycle which was supposed to
January 31, 1978 at around 3:00 p.m. in the yard of Herminia standing and holding a bicycle; the accused admitted, although his wife is the sister of the
have taken place two weeks before Eulalia's death does not, in our view, constitute adequate proof of a motive capable of moving a person to slay another in such a violent and
husband of Herminia he never visited the deceased during the four days that it was lying in state without any justifiable reason and contrary to the ordinary
gory manner. Failure to prove a credible motive where no identification was shown at all, certainly weakens the case of the prosecution.
experience of man; last but most convincing is the dying statement of the deceased when her grandson Alvin asked her "Apo, Apo, what happened?" and she
answered, "Si Paki", then she expired. When Alvin was asked during his testimony who is this Paki, he identified the accused. The accused during his The testimony of Herminia Valencia about the single slipper that she found near or under the cabinet in the living room where Eulalia Diamse was slain, can scarcely be
testimony never denied that he is called Paki. regarded as conclusive evidence that such slipper was indeed one of the very same pair of slippers that she had given to appellant's wife, who was also the sister of Herminia's
husband. Rubber or beach, walk slippers are made in such quantities by multiple manufacturers that there must have been dozens if not hundreds of slippers of the same color,
The foregoing circumstances established during the trial plus the dying statement of the deceased leads only to one fair and reasonable conclusion, that the
shape and size as the pair that Herminia gave to appellant's wife. And even if conclusive identification of the slippers had been offered, and it is assumed that appellant (rather
accused is the author of the crime.
than his wife) had worn those very slippers on that fatal afternoon, still the presence of that singular slipper did not clearly and directly connect the appellant to the robbery or
the slaying. At most, under that assumption, the presence of that slipper in the house of the Valencias showed that the accused had gone to the house of the Valencias and there
Analyzing the above portion of the decision, the elements taken into account by the court in convicting appellant De Joya of robbery with homicide may be listed as follows:
mislaid that slipper. We note in this connection, that appellant himself had testified that he did enter the house of the Valencias that afternoon, but after the killing of Eulalia
Diamse had been perpetrated, and there had found many persons in the house viewing the body.
1. The dying statement made by the deceased victim to her grandson Alvin Valencia a 10-year old boy: "Si Paqui";

The testimony of Gloria Capulong that she saw the accused in the afternoon of 31 January 1978 around 3:00 p.m. in the yard of the Valencias, standing and holding a
2. The quarrel, which, according to Herminia Valencia, daughter of the deceased victim, took place two weeks before the robbery and homicide, between the
bicycle and doing nothing is, by itself, not proof of any act or circumstance that would show that appellant had perpetrated the slaying or the robbery. The behaviour of the
appellant and the deceased over the use of a bicycle which appellant allegedly took from the Valencia's house without the consent of the victim;
appellant, as testified to by Gloria Capulong, offers no basis for supposing that appellant, himself 72 years of age, had just slain an 88-year old woman by skewering her through
the neck and had ransacked both floors of the Valencia house.
3. The rubber slipper, one of a pair, ("step-in beach walk type") which according to Herminia, she found near a cabinet in their house one (1) meter away from
the body of the victim, and which Herminia identified as one of the pair that she had given to the wife of the accused the previous Christmas Season;
Appellant's failure to present himself to pay his respects to the deceased or her immediate family during the four-day wake, does not give rise to any inference that appellant
was the slayer of Eulalia Diamse. Appellant had explained that he had been busily at work, sewing and carrying on his trade as a tailor. Appellant, as already noted, had dropped
4. Accused was seen by one Gloria Capulong around 3:00 p.m. in the afternoon of 31 January 1978 in the yard of the Valencias, standing and holding a bicycle
in the Valencias' house in the afternoon Eulalia Diamse was killed and had viewed the body (before it was lying in state) along with several other persons. His reluctance or
and doing nothing;
inability to participate in the formal wake is not necessarily a sign of guilt. We are unable to agree with the trial judge that such behaviour was "contrary to the ordinary

5. The statement of appellant that he did not visit the deceased during the four-day wake. experience of man" although respect for the dead is a common cultural trait of the Filipinos.

We turn first to the dying statement made by the victim when the 10-year old Alvin Valencia asked his grandmother who was sprawled on the floor of their house drenched with
blood: "Apo, Apo, what happened?" The deceased victim said: "Si Paqui". After uttering those two words, she expired. It is not disputed that "Paqui" is the nickname of
appellant Pioquinto de Joya. It must be noted at once, however, that the words "Si Paqui" do not constitute by themselves a sensible sentence. Those two words could have been In the Solicitor-General's brief, it is casually contended that the circumstantial evidence against appellant included: "the attempt on the part of appellant Pioquinto de Joya
intended to designate either (a) the subject of a sentence or (b) the object of a verb. If they had been intended to designate the subject, we must note that no predicate was
We have examined the testimony that the Solicitor General pointed to
through his counsel to settle the case amicably." 6
uttered by the deceased. If they were designed to designate the object of a verb, we must note once more that no verb was used by the deceased. The phrase "Si Paqui" must,
in referring to a supposed attempt to settle the criminal charge amicably. That testimony, given by
moreover, be related to the question asked by Alvin: "Apo, Apo, what happened?" Alvin's question was not: "Apo, Apo, who did this to you?"
Arnedo Valencia, son-in-law of the deceased Eulalia Diamse and brother-in-law of appellant
Pioquinto de Joya, was as follows:

Q You also testified that before the release of the accused from the municipal jail, you had
It has been held that a dying declaration to be admissible must be complete in itself. To be complete in itself does not mean that the declarant must recite everything that a conversation with him, is that right?
constituted the res gestae of the subject of his statement, but that his statement of any given fact should be a full expression of all that he intended to say as conveying his

The doctrine of completeness has also been expressed in the following terms in
meaning in respect of such fact. 3 A Yes, air.
Prof. Wigmore's classic work:
Q What was this conversation about?
The application of the doctrine of completeness is here peculiar. The statement as offered
must not be merely apart of the whole as it was expressed by the declarant; it must be A He called for me and took me to his counsel Atty. Aguilar and according to him if only
complete as far it goes. But it is immaterial how much of the whole affair of the death is Atty. Aguilar can talk with me, everything will be settled.
related, provided the statement includes all that the declarant wished or intended to
Q Have you seen and talked to this Atty. Aguilar?
include in it. Thus, if an interruption (by death or by an intruder) cuts short a statement
which thus remains clearly less than that which the dying person wished to make, the A Yes, I went with him to Manila, sir.
fragmentary statement is not receivable, because the intended whole is not there, and the
whole might be of a very different effect from that of the fragment; yet if the dying person Q When was this?
finishes the statement he wishes to make, it is no objection that he has told only a portion
of what he might have been able to tell. 4 (Emphasis supplied) A The time he was fetched out of jail.

Q You are referring to the municipal jail?

74
 A Yes, sir. ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the trial court dated 16 May 1986 is hereby REVERSED and
appellant Pioquinto de Joya is hereby ACQUITTED on grounds of reasonable doubt.
Q What did you and Atty. Aguilar discuss when you finally was able to see Atty. Aguilar?
It is so ordered.
A When I went there, I was introduced to Atty. Aguilar and Atty. Aguilar asked me as to
what I liked to happen.

Q What did you say?

A I said if it will be settled, well and good.

Q Anything else that transpired?

A He even told me if I might be able to convince both my wife and her sisters.

Q Did he tell you he can settle this?

A He was very certain that he can settle this, the very reason why he told me because I
was very certain as to what happened.

Q Was the accused Pioquinto de Joya present when you were discussing this with his
lawyer?

A Yes, sir

Q He heard what his, lawyer was telling you?

A It is possible because he is only one or two meters distance away.

Q Did the accused say anything?

A None, sir. (Emphasis supplied)

We find the above testimony quite impalpable and inconclusive so far as a supposed attempt of
appellant, through his counsel, to offer a compromise on the criminal charge is concerned. We are
aware of the provision of Section 24 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court which provides that

Sec. 24. Offer to compromise not admission. An offer of compromise is not an admission
that anything is due, and is not admissible in evidence against the person making the
offer. However, in criminal cases which are not allowed by law to be compromised, an
offer of compromise by the accused may be received in evidence as an implied admission
of guilt. (Emphasis supplied)

We do not, however, feel justified in concluding from the above testimony from a member of the
(extended) family of the deceased victim that "an offer of compromise" had been made "by the
accused" nor that "an implied admission of guilt" on the part of the appellant may be reasonably
inferred in the instant case. The trial court itself made no mention of any attempt on the part of
appellant to settle the criminal case amicably through the defense counsel; we must assume that the
trial court either did not believe that appellant had tried to compromise the criminal case or
considered that appellant could not fairly be deemed to have impliedly admitted that he had indeed
robbed and killed Eulalia Diamse. A much higher level of explicitness and specific detail is necessary
to justify a conclusion that an accused had impliedly admitted his guilt of a crime as serious as
robbery with homicide.

The totality of the case made out against appellant De Joya thus consists of an incomplete, aborted,
dying declaration and a number of circumstances which, singly or collectively, do not necessarily give
rise to a compelling inference that appellant had indeed robbed and slain Eulalia Diamse. We
consider, after prolonged scrutiny, that the sum total of the evidence in the instant case is insufficient
to induce that moral certainty of guilt which characterizes proof beyond reasonable doubt. The
conscience of the Court remains uneasy and unsettled after considering the nature and speculative
character of the evidence supporting the judgment of conviction.

The Court must, accordingly, hold as it hereby holds that appellant's guilt of the crime of robbery and
homicide was not shown beyond reasonable doubt.

75
76
G.R. No. L-28655 August 6, 1928
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
EUGENIO TOLEDO and SISENANDO HOLGADO, defendants.
EUGENIO TOLEDO, appellant.
C. V. Sanchez for appellant.
Attorney-General Jaranilla for appellee.
MALCOLM, J.:
This is an appeal taken by Eugenio Toledo from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of
Mindoro, finding him guilty of the crime of homicide, and sentencing him therefor to imprisonment
for fourteen years, eight months, and one day, reclusion temporal, with the corresponding accessory
penalties, indemnity, and costs.
Sisenando Holgado and Filomeno Morales had disputes about the occupation of certain land situated
in the municipality of Pinamalayan, Province of Mindoro. On the morning of June 15, 1927, the two
men happened to meet. The argument was renewed, and they agreed to fight. They did engage in a
bolo duel with a fatal result for Filomeno Morales, who was killed almost instantly. Sisenando
Holgado was also seriously wounded but was able to proceed to a neighboring house. From there
Sisenando Holgado was taken to the municipal building where he made a sworn statement before the
municipal president, in which he declared that only he and Filomeno Morales fought. About one
month later, Sisenando Holgado died from the wounds received in the fight.
The prosecution and the defense alike agree on the facts above outlined. The disputable point is
whether the accused Eugenio Toledo intervened in the quarrel and dealt a mortal blow to Filomeno
Morales. For the prosecution, there was presented the witness Justina Villanueva, the querida of
Filomeno Morales, who testified to the presence and participation of Eugenio Toledo. Her testimony
was partially corroborated by that of the witness Justina Llave. On the other hand, the theory for the
defense was that Toledo was in another place when the fight between Morales and Holgado occurred
and that his only participation was on meeting Holgado, who was his landlord or master, in helping
him to a nearby house. To this effect is the testimony of the accused and of Conrado Holgado, the son
of Sisenando Holgado. The defense also relied upon the affidavit of Sisenando Holgado, Exhibit 1,
which was identified by the municipal president of Pinamalayan.
Counsel de oficio in this court makes the following assignment of errors:
I. The lower court erred in not admitting in evidence Exhibit 1.
II. The lower court erred in not finding that accused-appellant Eugenio Toledo did not take
part in the fight between accused Sisenando Holgado and deceased Filomeno Morales,
resulting in the death of the latter.
III. The lower court erred in not giving accused-appellant Eugenio Toledo the benefit of a
reasonable doubt." Exhibit 1 above-mentioned in assignment of error No. 1, made
originally in Tagalog, in translation reads as follows:
AFFIDAVIT
I. Sisenando Holgado, married, of legal age, and resident of this
municipality of Pinamalayan, Province of Mindoro, P. I., after being
sworn in accordance with law, state the following:
My additional homestead situated in Calingag was cleaned by me and
is at present planted with palay (rice), on which I also plant hemp, but
the hemp planted by my workers is frequently uprooted by Filomeno
Morales who claims that said land is his, whereas when I was cleaning
said land nobody objected to it, but now that it is already cleaned,
Filomeno Morales says that one-half of the land occupied by me is his;
for this reason I decided to see Filomeno Morales about this matter
and when I talked to him this morning (Wednesday) at about nine
o'clock, at the hemp plantation of Victorio Saudan situated in
77
Calingag, he told me that if I should plant there anything he would cut
my neck, and to this I answered that if he was going to cut my neck we
would fight and thereupon he stabbed me with a penknife and then I
slashed at him; after this we separated, and went to Dalmacio
Manlisic's house. When we fought, there was nobody present.
Question by president: When you went to the house of Dalmacio
Manlisic, did you not meet anybody before reaching said house?
Answer: I met one of my workers named Eugenio Toledo, who
accompanied me to the house of Dalmacio Manlisic.
Question by president: How do you know that the hemp you planted
on your land above-mentioned was frequently uprooted by Filomeno
Morales?
Answer: Because he said as to my worker named Eulogio Supleo.
Question by president: Do you have anything more to say about the
incident?
Answer: No more.
In testimony of all that I stated above, I signed this document in the
presence of two witnesses and then swore to it in the presence of the
municipal president here at Pinamalayan, Mindoro, this June
fifteenth, nineteen hundred twenty-seven. His
SISENANDO HOLGADO
In the presence of:
Mark
(Sgd.) ILLEGIBLE
HILARION NIEVA
Signed and sworn to before me, this June fifteenth, 1927.
(Sgd.) ILLEGIBLE
Municipal President
The discussion of the case in court has revealed three different points of view among the members
participating, all leading to the same result of acquittal. Under such circumstances, it is, course,
difficult for the writer of the opinion to do entire justice to those theories which do not conform to his
own. However, an effort will be made to present the various opinions, leaving it for any individual
member to enlarge upon the same, if he so desires.
I
The Chief and Mr. Justice Villamor would disregard entirely the first assignment of error and would,
therefore, refrain from all discussion relative to the admissibility of Exhibit 1. Confining themselves
exclusively to an analysis of the evidence other than Exhibit 1, they find that Eugenio Toledo has not
been proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The contradictions in the testimony for the
prosecution pointed out by the trial judge do not impress these members of the court so seriously. In
reality, there being but one witness for the prosecution who, on account of her relations with
Filomeno Morales, and the land troubles, might be expected to exaggerate, and there being on the
contrary exculpatory evidence for the defense, even without Exhibit 1, the Government has not made
out its case. Consequently, on the testimonial facts, these members vote for acquittal.
II
The second view is that for which Messrs. Justices Romualdez and Villa-Real are responsible, and is
that Exhibit 1 should have been admitted in evidence as part of the res gestae, and that giving it
effect, in relation with the other evidence, the accused has not been proved guilty. What has
heretofore been said with reference to the state of the record need not here be repeated. It only
remains to be stated that Exhibit 1 was made by Sisenando Holgado on the same morning that the
fight occurred and without the interval of sufficient time for reflection. The declaration of Sisenando
Holgado fulfilled the test of the facts talking through the party and not the party talking about the
facts. There was such a correlation between the statement and the fact of which it forms part as
strongly tends to negative the suggestion of fabrication or a suspicion of afterthought. The nature and
circumstances of the statement do not disclose intrinsic evidence of premeditation as revealed in a
long, coherent, closely connected story. The modern tendency is toward the extension of the rule
admitting spontaneous declarations to meet the needs of justice when other evidence of the same fact
cannot be procured. (22 C. J., pp. 461 et seq.; U. S. vs. David [1903], 3 Phil., 128.)
III
The third opinion in court is that held by Messrs. Justices Street, Malcolm, and Ostrand, who would
resolve the first assignment of error by holding that the court erred in not admitting Exhibit 1 as the
statement of a fact against penal interest. Had Exhibit 1 been received, it is believed that its influence
would have been felt by the trial court. Without Exhibit 1, the appellate court is bound by the
appreciation of the evidence made in the trial court, and could, with little propriety, set aside the
findings made by a learned trial judge. The case calls for an examination of the right of the courts to
receive in evidence documents of the character of Exhibit 1.
Hearsay evidence, with a few well recognized exceptions, it has been said on high authority, is
excluded by courts in the United States that adhere to the principles of the common law. One
universally recognized exception concerns the admission of dying declarations. Another exception
permits the reception, under certain circumstances, of declarations of third parties made contrary to
their own pecuniary or proprietary interest. But the general rule is stated to be that the declarations
of a person other than accused confessing or tending to show that he committed the crime are not
competent for accused on account of the hearsay doctrine.
Professor Wigmore, one of the greatest living authorities on the law of evidence, has attempted to
demonstrate the false premises on which the arbitrary limitation to the hearsay rule rests. He shows
that the limitation is inconsistent with the language originally employed in stating the principle and
is unjustified on grounds of policy. Professor Wigmore in turn has been answered by no less a body
than the Supreme Court of Mississippi in the case of Brown vs. State of Mississippi ([1910], 37 L. R.
A., New Series, 345). The editor of the Mississippi case in L. R. A., however, comes to the support of
Professor Wigmore saying the unanimity of the decisions "is as complete as the shock which they
give the general sense of justice." The question has likewise in recent years gained attention by the
Supreme Court of the United States in the case of Donnelly vs. United States ([1913], 228 U. S., 243).
There it was held that the court below properly excluded hearsay evidence relating to the confession
of a third party, then deceased, of guilt of the crime with which defendant was charged. Mr. Justice
Pitney, delivering the opinion of the court, said: "In this country there is a great and practically
unanimous weight of authority in the estate courts against admitting evidence of confessions of third
parties, made out of court, and tending to exonerate the accused." Mr. Justice Van Devanter
concurred in the result while Mr. Justice Holmes, with whom concurred Mr. Justice Lurton and Mr.
Justice Hughes, dissented. Mr. Justice Holmes said:
. . . The rues of evidence in the main are based on experience, logic, and common sense,
less hampered by history than some parts of the substantive law. There is no decision by
this court against the admissibility of such a confession; the English cases since the
separation of the two countries do not bind us; the exception to the hearsay rule in the case
of declarations against interest is well known; no other statement is so much against
interest as a confession of murder; it is far more calculated to convince than dying
declarations, which would be let in to hang a man (Mattox vs. United States, 146 U. S., 140;
36 Law. ed., 917; 13 Sup. Ct. Rep., 50); and when we surround the accused with so many
safeguards, some of which seem to me excessive; I think we ought to give him the benefit
of a fact that, if proved, commonly would have such weight. The history of the law and the
arguments against the English doctrine are so well and fully stated by Mr. Wigmore that
there is no need to set them forth at greater length. (2 Wigmore, Evidence, pars. 1476,
1477.)
In the Philippine jurisdiction, we have never felt bound to follow blindly the principles of the
common law. A reexamination of some of those principles discloses anomalies.
A dying declaration is admitted of necessity in order, as the Supreme Court of Mississippi states, "to
reach those man slayers who perpetrate their crimes when there are no other eyewitnesses." But the
person accused of a crime, under the same principle of necessity, is not permitted to free himself by
offering in evidence the admission of another under oath that this other committed the crime. Again
78
admissions are receivable against either a pecuniary or a proprietary interest, but not against a penal
interest. We fail to see why it can be believed that a man will be presumed to tell the truth in the one
instance but will not be presumed to tell the truth in the other instance. Again the exhibit would have
been admitted against its maker at his trial, if he had not died. But the document is held inadmissible
to exonerate another. Yet the truth of the exhibit is not different in the first case that in the second.
A study of the authorities discloses that even if given application they are not here controlling. Most
of them do not concern the confessions of declarants shown to be deceased. Practically all of them
give as the principal reason for denying the admission of a confession of a third person that he
committed the crime with which the accused is charged, that it was not made under oath. Here the
declarant is deceased and his statements were made under oath. They also read in such a way as to
ring with the truth. When Sisenando Holgado declared "When we fought, there was nobody present,"
it was at the end of just such a rambling statement as a wounded man would be expected to make.
When Sisenando Holgado declared "I met one of my workers named Eugenio Toledo, who
accompanied me to the house of Dalmacio Manlisic," he did so in response to a question by the
municipal president. Exhibit 1 should have been received not as conclusive evidence of innocence,
but as evidence to be taken into consideration in connection with the other proven facts.
We cannot bring this decision to a conclusion without quoting the well considered language of
Professor Wigmore on the subject, the pertinent part of a decision coming from a court which has
gained respect particularly in criminal cases, and an editorial note. Professor Wigmore has said:
PAR. 1476. History of the Exception; Statement of Fact against Penal Interest, excluded;
Confessions of Crime by a Third Person. — It is today commonly said, and has been
expressly laid down by many judges, that the interest prejudiced by the facts stated must
be either a pecuniary or a proprietary interest, and not apenal interest. What ground in
authority there is for this limitation may be found by examining the history of the
execution at large.
The exception appears to have taken its rise chiefly in two separate rivulets of rulings,
starting independently as a matter of practice, but afterwards united as parts of a general
principle. . . .
These lines of precedent proceeded independently till about the beginning of the 1800s,
when a unity of principle for some of them came gradually to be perceived and argued for.
This unity lay in the circumstance that all such statements, in that they concerned matters
prejudicial to the declarant's self-interest, were fairly trustworthy and might therefore (if
he were deceased) be treated as forming an exception to the hearsay rule.
This broad principle made its way slowly. There was some uncertainty about its scope; but
it was an uncertainty in the direction of breadth; for it was sometimes put in the broad
form that any statement by a person "having no interest to deceive" would be admissible.
This broad form never came to prevail (post, par. 1576). But acceptance was gained, after
two decades, for the principle that all declarations of facts against interest (by deceased
persons) were to be received. What is to be noted, then, is that from 1800 to about 1830
this was fully understood as the broad scope of the principle. It was thus stated without
other qualifications; and frequent passages show the development of the principle to this
point.
But in 1884, in a case in the House of Lords, not strongly argued and not considered by the judges in
the light of the precedents, a backward step was taken and an arbitrary limit put upon the rule. It was
held to exclude the statement of a fact subjecting the declarant to a criminal liability, and to confined
to statements of facts against either pecuniary or proprietary interest. Thenceforward this rule was
accepted in England; although it was plainly a novelty at the time of its inception; for in several
rulings up to that time such statement had been received.
The same attitude has been taken by most American courts, excluding confessions of a
crime, or other statements of facts against penal interest, made by third persons; although
there is not wanting authority in favor of admitting such statements.
PAR. 1477. Same: Policy of this Limitation. — It is plain enough that this limitation,
besides being a fairly modern novelty, is inconsistent with the broad language originally
employed in stating the reason and principle of the present exception (ante, pars. 1457,
 1476) as well as with the settled principle upon which confessions are received (ante, par. We would like finally to turn attention to what was said by the editor of L. R. A. in his note in volume
1475). 37 hereinbefore referred to, viz:

But, furthermore, it cannot be justified on grounds of policy. The only plausible reason of
policy that has ever been advanced for such a limitation is the possibility of procuring
fabricated testimony to such a admission if oral. This is the ancient rusty weapon that has
always been drawn to oppose any reform in the rules of evidence, viz., the argument of
danger of abuse. This would be a good argument against admitting any witnesses at all, for
it is notorious that some witnesses will lie and that it is difficult to avoid being deceived by
their lies. The truth is that any rule which hampers an honest man in exonerating himself
is a bad rule, even if it also hampers a villain in falsely passing for an innocent.
The only practical consequences of this unreasoning limitation are shocking to the sense of
justice; for, in its commonest application, it requires, in a criminal trial, the rejection of a
confession, however well authenticated, of a person deceased or insane or fled from the
jurisdiction (and therefore quite unavailable) who has avowed himself to be true culprit.
The absurdity and wrong of rejecting indiscriminately all such evidence is patent.
The rulings already in our books cannot be thought to involve a settled and universal
acceptance of this limitation. In the first place, in almost all of the rulings the declarant
was not shown to be deceased or otherwise unavailable as a witness, and therefore the
declaration would have been inadmissible in any view of the present exception (ante, par.
1456). Secondly, in some of the rulings (for example, in North Carolina) the independent
doctrine (ante, pars. 139-141) was applicable that, in order to prove the accused's non-
commission of the offense by showing commission by another person, not merely one
casual piece of evidence suffices but a "prima facie" case resting on several concurring
pieces of evidence must be made out. Finally, most of the early rulings had in view, not the
present exception to the hearsay rule, but the doctrine of admissions (ante, pars. 1076,
1079) that the admissions of one who is not a co-conspirator cannot affect others jointly
charged.
The purpose of all evidence is to get at the truth. The reason for the hearsay rule is that the
extrajudicial and unsworn statement of another is not the best method of serving this
purpose. In other words, the great possibility of the fabrication of falsehoods, and the
inability to prove their untruth, requires that the doors be closed to such evidence. So long
therefore as a declarant is available as a witness, his extrajudicial statement should not be
heard. Where, however, the declarant is dead or has disappeared, his previous statements,
out of court, if not inadmissible on other grounds, are the best evidence. But they are not
rendered inadmissible by the mere fact that the declarant is unavailable, — something else
is necessary. One fact which will satisfy this necessity is that the declaration is or was
against the declarant's interest, and this is because no sane person will be presumed to tell
a falsehood to his own detriment.
xxx xxx xxx
Again, if, seems indisputable, the desire to close the door to falsehood which cannot be
detected dictates the exclusion of such testimony, the question as to the effect to be given
to such a confession is solely one of weight and credibility. . . .
Any man outside of a court and unhampered by the pressure of technical procedure, unreasoned
rules of evidence, and cumulative authority, would say that if a man deliberately acknowledged
himself to be the perpetrator of a crime and exonerated the person charged with the crime, and there
was other evidence indicative of the truthfulness of the statement, the accused man should not be
permitted to go to prison or to the electric chair to expiate a crime he never committed. Shall Judges
trained and experienced in the law display less discerning common sense that the layman and allow
precedent to overcome truth?
JUDGMENT

It is therefore not too late to retrace our steps, and to discard this barbarous doctrine,
which would refuse to let an innocent accused vindicate himself even by producing to the
tribunal a perfectly authenticated written confession, made on the very gallows, by the rule
culprit now beyond the reach of justice. Those who watched (in 1899) with self-righteous
indignation the course of proceedings in Captain Dreyfus' trial should remember that, if
that trial had occurred in our own courts, the spectacle would have been no less shameful if
we, following our own supposed precedents, had refused to admit what the French court
never for a moment hesitated to admit, — the authenticated confession of the escaped
Major Esterhazy, avowing himself the guilty author of the treason there charged. (3
Wigmore on Evidence, 2d ed., secs. 1476, 1477.)
For three somewhat divergent reasons, we are all of the opinion that the defendant-appellant
Eugenio Toledo should be given the benefit of the reasonable doubt which prevails in our minds.
Accordingly, the judgment appealed from will be reversed and the defendant and appellant
acquitted, and as it appears that he is now confined in Bilibid Prison, an order will immediately issue
directing his release, with costs de oficio.
Avanceña, C.J., Street, Villamor, Ostrand, Romualdez and Villa-Real, JJ., concur.

In the case of Pace vs. State ([1911], Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, 135 Southwestern, 379), the
appellant offered to prove in the trial court by the witness Byron Kyle that on Saturday morning
following the killing of the deceased on the previous Sunday he had a conversation with Dick Cain,
one of the parties to the homicide, in which Dick Cain admitted the he killed the deceased. The court
ruled:

. . . Wherever the state seeks to fasten criminality upon the party on trial, the accused had a
right to meet and rebut any testimony which may be offered against him in any legitimate
way. If Cain had been upon trial, his confession to the witness Kyle would have been
admissible beyond any shadow of doubt, and would have been upon trial, his confession to
the witness Kyle would have been admissible beyond any shadow of doubt, and would have
been strong evidence to go before the jury. The estate would have been seeking to
introduce this and with great earnestness, and correctly so. If appellant could prove that
another party or others committed the homicide, it might prove his innocence, and would
be strong evidence to go before the jury in his favor. Any legitimate fact or circumstance
which would meet or tend to meet the state's case and break the force of criminative facts
introduced against the accused is always admissible. Appellant's contention was that he
did not kill the deceased, but that Cain did. The state's theory was the appellant shot the
deceased, and Cain did not shoot him. Under the rules of evidence this testimony was
clearly inadmissible.

79
80
G.R. No. L-29831 March 29, 1972
GUILLERMO VIACRUCIS, LUISA DE VIACRUCIS, CLAROS MARQUEZ, and RUSTICA
AREVALO MARQUEZ, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, ANASTACIO ORAIS and CELESTINA
MALAZARTE, respondents.
Carlos Monzon Ortega for petitioners.
Leonardo C. Dejaño for respondents.
CONCEPCION, C.J.:p
Private respondents, Anastacio Orais and his wife Celestina Malazarte brought this action, in the
Court of First Instance of Leyte, to establish their title to a land of about four (4) hectares, located in
the sitio of Candilomot, barrio of Santo Rosario, formerly Palompon, now Matag-ob Leyte, and more
particularly described in the complaint — alleging that it is part of a bigger lot sold to them, on June
8, 1936, by its registered owner, Pedro Sanchez, by virtue of a deed of sale, copy of which was
attached to said pleading, as Annex A and later marked as Exhibit B — as well as to recover, from
petitioners herein — defendants in the aforesaid court — Guillermo Viacrucis and Luisa de Viacrucis
the possession of said land and damages.
In their answer to said complaint, Mr. and Mrs. Viacrucis averred that they are the owners of said 4-
hectare land; that the deed of sale, Exhibit B, in favor of Anastacio Orais, on which private
respondents — plaintiffs in the court of first instance — rely, attests merely to a simulated
transaction; and that this action is barred by the statute of limitations. Alleging that the rights of Mr.
and Mrs. Viacrucis had been assigned to them, Claros Marquez and his wife Rustica Arevalo
subsequently intervened in the case, reiterating, in a way, the stand taken by Mr. and Mrs. Viacrucis
although with a variation to be pointed out later on.
After appropriate proceedings, the trial court rendered a decision, in favor of the plaintiffs therein —
respondent herein — and against the defendants and the intervenors — petitioners herein — rejecting
their defenses of prescription of action and simulation of contract (Exhibit B), and declaring that the
whole land conveyed thereby belongs to Mr. and Mrs. Orais, as well as ordering Mr. and Mrs.
Viacrucis to vacate said land and awarding damages to Mr. and Mrs. Orais. The dispositive part of
said decision reads:
WHEREFORE, decision is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against
the defendants and intervenors: (1) declaring the following parcel of land to wit:
"A tract of agricultural land situated in the Sitio of Barrio of
Balagtas (now Santo Rosario), Municipality of Palompon
(now Matag-ob), Province of Leyte. Bounded on the North,
by property claimed by Serapio Dicio; on the East, by
property claimed by Bartolome Asayas; on the South, by
property claimed by Pablo Sanchez; on the West by
properties claimed by Borgas Merin and Canuto Loreño,
containing an area of 14 hectares, 63 ares and 03 centares,
embraced and covered by Original Certificate of Title No.
243, Patent No. 7335, Bu. of Lands No. H-11803."
as the property of the plaintiffs and hereby ordering the defendants to
immediately vacate the premises; (2) to jointly and severally pay the plaintiffs
the sum of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) for and as moral damages, plus
Three Thousand Five Hundred Ten Pesos (P3,510.00) for and as actual damages
from 1947 up to 1960; plus the further sum of Two Hundred Seventy Pesos
(P270.00) annually from November 15, 1960 until the land in question shall
have been delivered to the plaintiffs and the further sum of One Thousand Pesos
(P1,000.00) for and as attorney's fees, with costs against the defendants and
intervenors.
81
On appeal taken by Mr. and Mrs. Viacrucis and Mr. and Mrs. Marquez, said decision, against them
and in favor of Mr. and Mrs. Orais, was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, with the following
"modifications":
...; the portion of four (4) hectares claimed in the complaint and described in
paragraph 3 thereof is declared to belong to plaintiffs-appellees; defendants and
intervenors are condemned to surrender the same unto plaintiffs; and to account
for their possession, defendants from 26 January, 1959 and intervenors from 3
September, 1962 until the property should have been finally delivered to the
plaintiffs; costs against defendants and intervenors.
Hence the present petition, for review on certiorari, of Mr. and Mrs. Viacrucis and Mr. and Mrs.
Marquez, against the Court of Appeals and Mr. and Mrs. Orais, to which petition We gave due
course. Thereafter, Mr. and Mrs. Orais moved to dismiss said petition upon the ground that the
questions raised therein "are of facts and not of law and/or too unsubstantial to require
consideration" and that "the petition is prosecuted manifestly for delay." Upon consideration of the
motion and the opposition thereto of petitioners herein, the Court resolved to defer action thereon
until the case is taken up on the merits.
It appears that the land of about four (4) hectares involved in this case is part of a bigger lot of about
14.6303 hectares, covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 243 (Exhibit A) 1 in the name of Pedro
Sanchez; that, on June 8, 1936, Sanchez executed the deed, Exhibit B, selling said lot of 14.6303
hectares to Anastacio Orais; that said Exhibit B was, on September 10, 1936, filed with the Office of
the Register of Deeds of Leyte, and recorded in the memorandum of incumbrances of Homestead
OCT No. 243; that, on July 7, 1941, Sanchez executed another deed, Exhibit 10, conveying the
disputed portion, of four (4) hectares to Balentin Ruizo who, in turn, sold it, on October 10, 1945, to
Guillermo Viacrucis (Exhibit II); that, on January 12, 1959, Anastacio Orais — who claimed to have
made oral demands — formally demanded from Viacrucis that he vacate said portion and surrender
its possession to him (Orais) that this demand was not heeded by Viacrucis who, instead, executed,
on March 19, 1959, the deed, Exhibit 9, confirming the sale of said portion, allegedly made by him, on
January 12, 1954, in favor of his brother-in-law Claros Marquez; and that the deeds of sale, Exhibits
10, 11 and 9, in favor of Ruizo, Viacrucis and Marquez, respectively, have not been registered in the
Office of the Register of Deeds of Leyte.
Petitioners herein maintained in the court of first instance and the Court of Appeals that, although
the deed of sale, Exhibit B, in favor of Orais is earlier, by over five (5) years, than that executed, in
favor of their predecessor in interest, Balentin, Ruizo, by the original owner, Pedro Sanchez, they
(petitioners) have a better right to the land in question, said Exhibit B having been executed merely
to simulate a sale, in order that Orais could "secure a loan from a bank"; but this pretense was
overruled by said courts, which, likewise, rejected petitioners' plea; of prescription of action.
In their brief before Us, petitioners do not assail the findings of fact and the conclusions reached by
the Court of Appeals in connection with the aforementioned defenses of simulation of Exhibit B and
prescription of action. They merely contend that the Court of Appeals has erred: (1) "in confusing the
doctrine of laches with estoppel" and in considering "misrepresentation as of the essence thereof";
(2) in "confusing laches with estoppel" and "rejecting the defense of laches in this case where all
essential requisites thereof are fully met and (3) in deciding this case in violation of sections 22, 23
and 25, Rule 130 of the New Rules of Court.
In support of the first assignment of error, petitioners maintain that the Court of Appeals had
disposed of their plea of laches "without the least reference to the legal requisites of laches in relation
to the uncontroverted facts of this case," whereas, under their second assignment of error, it is urged
that the essential elements of the equitable defense of laches are present in the case at bar.
Regardless of the merits of these two (2) assignments of error, well settled is the rule that laches is a
defense that must be pleaded especially, and that, otherwise, it is deemed waived, so that it can not
be set up for the first time on appeal.
The record discloses that the defenses of laches and prescription are being raised
for the first time in this appeal. They were not invoked in the proceedings before
the Hearing Officer nor later on before Associate Commissioner Sanchez and the
Workmen's Compensation Commission. As said defenses do not affect the
jurisdiction of the latter, they cannot now be entertained and must be deemed to
have been waived (Regalado vs. Visayan Shipping Company, Inc., G.R. No. L-
 42855, May 21, 1939; Victorias Milling Company, Inc. vs. Compensation
Commissioner, et al., G.R. No.
L-10533, May 31, 1957; Manila Yatch Club, Inc. vs. Workmen's Compensation
Commission, et al., G.R. No. L-19258, May 31, 1963). 2
Laches not having been invoked as a defense in the court below, the same can
not be gone into at this stage of the proceedings, ... 3
... Neither prescription of appellee's claim or bar of the action for recovery due to
laches was averred in appellant's defenses. Appellant cannot raise them now for
the first time on appeal. Verily the failure to raise the issue of prescription and
laches, amounts to a waiver of such defenses (Sec. 10, Rule 9; Maxilim v.
Tabotabo, 9 Phil. 390; Domingo v. Osorio, 7 Phil. 405). Moreover, the right of
the appellee to file an action to recover possession based on its Torrens Title is
imprescriptible and not barred under doctrine of laches (Art. 348, Civil Code;
Francisco, et al. v. Cruz, et al., 43 O.G. 5105). ... 4
Petitioners Mr. and Mrs. Viacrucis, as defendants in the court of first instance, and petitioners Mr.
and Mrs. Marquez as intervenors therein, filed their respective answer and answer in intervention
alleging no other defenses than that of prescription of action and that the deed of conveyance Exhibit
B merely simulated a sale. Laches was invoked by herein petitioners for the first time in the Court of
Appeals, which could not properly entertain it, said, defense having been deemed waived in
consequence of petitioner's failure to allege it in the trial court. The first and second assignments of
error are, therefore, clearly untenable.
With respect to the third assignment of error, petitioners maintain that the Court of Appeals had
erred in considering that the failure of Orais to bring the present action earlier was mere "laziness,"
instead of an omission that "may be given in evidence against him," as provided in section 22 of Rule
130 of the Rules of Court and as "strongly persuasive of lack of merit" of the claim of said respondent,
and that when he tried to obtain a loan from the Philippine National Bank in 1936 and offered OCT
No. 243 as collateral security, the bank did not accept said offer upon the ground that the land in
question is not his property, in reply to which Orais said nothing, which is an admission by silence,
pursuant to section 23 of the same Rule 130. Moreover, petitioners bewail that the Court of Appeals,
like the trial court, considered in favor of Orais — allegedly in violation of section 25 of said Rule 130
— the admission of Mrs. Beatriz Costelo, to the effect that, although the land in dispute was
physically in the possession of her now deceased husband, Pelagio Costelo, he and she recognized
Orais as the owner of said land.
It should be noted, however, that said testimony of Mrs. Costelo and this recognition by the now
deceased Pelagio Castelo — which were confirmed by the public document Exh. G — constitute a
declaration of Mr. and Mrs. Castelo adverse to their interest, which is admissible in evidence,
pursuant to section 32 of said Rule 130. Petitioners have no reason whatsoever to object to the
consideration in favor of Orais of said admission, the same having been made in 1936, more than five
(5) years before their (petitioners) predecessor in interest, Balentin Ruizo, had entered into the
picture, when Orais and Castelo were the only parties who had any interest in the object of said
admission. Pursuant to said legal provision, such admission "may be received in evidence," not only
against the party who made it "or his successors in interest," but, also, "against third persons." 5
As regards the alleged failure of Orais to say anything when the bank refused to accept OCT No. 243
as collateral for the loan applied for by Orais, upon the ground that the land covered by said
certificate of title was not his property, there is no competent evidence on whether or not Orais had
said anything in response to said statement. Moreover, OCT No. 243 was in the name of Pedro
Sanchez, and no matter how real the sale by the latter to Orais may be, the bank would not accept the
land in question as security for said loan, unless and until OCT No. 243 shall have been cancelled and
a transfer certificate of title issued to Orais. This, however, could not take place before the filing of
his loan application, because the owner's duplicate of said certificate of title — admittedly delivered
by Sanchez to Orais — had been lost in the possession of the latter's counsel, to whom he (Orais) had
turned it over in connection with a given criminal case.
As regards the effect or import of the failure of Orais to file the present action until November 15,
1960, this is a matter relevant to the issue whether the sale attested to by Exh. B is simulated, as
contended by petitioners herein, or a true and authentic sale, as Orais maintains. The decision of the
Court of Appeals, affirming that of the trial court and sustaining the claim of Orais, constitutes a
82
finding of fact, which is final in this proceeding for review on certiorari.6 In any event, said finding is
fully borne out by the record.
Indeed, petitioners' main argument, apart from the aforementioned inaction of Orais, is that he had
never been in possession of the land in question, and that the same had remained in the name of
Pedro Sanchez for tax purposes. It should be noted, however, that, although the disputed land was
actually held by Pelagio Costelo, from 1936 to 1941, Costelo executed, on July 30, 1936, Exh. G,
whereby he, in effect, acknowledged Orais as owner of the land an Orais granted him (Costelo) the
right to possess it until the year 1941. And this was confirmed by Mrs. Costelo on the witness stand.
As a consequence, Orais came to be in constructive possession of said land, from July 30, 1936. As a
matter of fact, petitioners eventually admitted that Orais had been in actual possession, although
they claim of another portion of the land covered by OCT No. 243.
Then, again, the following circumstances militate agains the simulation alleged by petitioners herein,
namely:
1. Exhibit B was not only notarized on the very date of its execution. It was, also, filed, soon
thereafter — or on September 10, 1936 — with the Office of the Register of Deeds of Leyte and
recorded in the memorandum of incumbrances of Homestead OCT No. 243. It is noteworthy that
according to Viacrucis' deposition,7 and the testimony of Calixta Suganub, widow of Balentin Ruizo,
as witness for petitioners herein, Pedro Sanchez delivered his owner's duplicate of said OCT No. 243
to Anastacio Orais, which is clearly indicative of the intent of Sanchez to give full force and effect to
said deed of sale.
Upon the other hand, Exhibits 9, 10 and 11, on which herein petitioners rely, have not been registered
— either under the provisions of the Land Registration Act or under those of Act No. 3344 — despite
the provision in said deeds to the effect that the same should be or would be registered, by agreement
of the parties. Likewise significant is a provision, in the deed Exhibit 10, in favor of Ruizo, that the
land thus conveyed is part of a lot covered by a (certificate of) title, the space intended for the
number of which was left blank, and that, this notwithstanding, it was stipulated in said instrument
that it would be registered pursuant to Act No. 3344, which refers to lands notregistered under the
provisions of Act No. 496. Worse still, apart from including the latter stipulation, 8 Mr. and Mrs.
Viacrucis declared in the deed, Exhibit 9, in favor of Claros Marquez, that said land is not registered
under the Land Registration Act, which is not true.
Apparently, petitioners knew they could not register Exhibits 9, 10 and 11, under the provisions of the
Land Registration Act, without their rights under said instruments becoming officially subordinated
to those of Anastacio Orais. In fact, Viacrucis stated, in his aforementioned deposition, that he had
"lost no time in going to Tacloban, Leyte, to have the Deed of Sale" — presumably Exhibit 11, in his
favor — "registered with the office of the Register of Deeds." We have every reason to believe,
therefore, that petitioners had actual knowledge of the existence of Exhibit B and of the fact that it
had been filed with the office of the register of deeds, and entered in the memorandum of
incumbrances of Homestead OCT No. 243.
2. In their "Amended Answer in Intervention," dated December 10, 1962, Mr. and Mrs.
Marquez admitted that Sanchez had really made a sale in favor of Orais, although said intervenors
alleged that the land thus acquired by him was only 6.6303 hectares; but, petitioners have not even
tried to explain why Exhibit B — the only deed executed by Pedro Sanchez in favor of Anastacio Orais
— conveys the entire lot of 14.6303 covered by OCT No. 243.
Petitioners make much of a deed — marked as Exhibit 4, 9 executed by Anastacio Orais, on May 25,
1939, whereby he sold one-half (1/2) of a lot of 6.6303 hectares, covered by OCT No. 243, to Alfredo
Parrilla, Pastor Zaragoza, Pedro Gorumba and Eugenio A. Evangelista. Said Exhibit 4 does not say,
however, that the land sold by Pedro Sanchez to Anastacio Orais was limited to said area of 6.6303
hectares. What is more, it contains an indication to the contrary, for, in describing the object of the
sale, Exhibit 4 states that it is one-half (1/2) of a lot bounded on the South by a land of Anastacio
Orais. In other words, said lot of 6.6303 was not all that he owned. This might explain why
petitioners — after producing, marking and identifying Exhibit 4 — did not introduce the same in
evidence, although copy thereof is attached to the Amended Answer in Intervention of Mr. and Mrs.
Claros Marquez as Annex 5.
It should be noted, also, that, at the time of the execution of said Exhibit 4, on May 25, 1939, a
portion of about four (4) hectares of the land of 14.6303 hectares sold by Sanchez to Orais, was still
held by Pelagio Costelo, to guarantee the payment of a debt of Sanchez, in view of which Orais
conceded — in Exhibit G — Costelo's right to possess the land from 1936 to 1941 — evidently, so that
he could apply the fruits or products thereof to the satisfaction of his credit — and Costelo
acknowledged the dominical rights of Orais.
Furthermore, it appears that on July 10, 1936, or over a month after the sale by Sanchez to Orais, a
deed, Exhibit 1, dated April 19, 1934, and bearing the signature of Sanchez, was notarized. Exhibit 1
purports to convey to one Crecente Marquez a portion, of about four (4) hectares, of the lot covered
by OCT No. 243, which portion is notinvolved in the case at bar. There is evidence to the effect that
Exhibit 1 was filed with the Office of the Register of Deeds of Leyte, on August 3, 1936, and recorded
in the Memorandum of the Incumbrances of OCT No. 243. This must have been made without
producing the owner's duplicate of said OCT No. 243, inasmuch as the same was in the possession of
Orais, according to the above-mentioned deposition of Viacrucis, since, apparently the execution of
Exhibit B, on June 8, 1936. Under the circumstances, Orais may have felt that it was neither
necessary nor advisable to make any reference, in Exhibit 4, either to said portion of four (4)
hectares, ostensibly conveyed to Crecente Marquez by virtue of Exhibit 1, or to the similar area held
by Pelagio Costelo — an aggregate of eight (8) hectares, which, deducted from the land of 14.6303
hectares covered by OCT No. 243, left approximately the 6.6303 hectares mentioned in said deed
Exhibit 1.
3. Although the entire lot of 14.6303 hectares purchased by Orais from Sanchez, pursuant to Exhibit
B, remained for tax purposes in the latter's name, Orais paid the taxes due thereon." 10
At this juncture, it may not be amiss to advert to the fact that, since Exhibit B had filed with the office
of the register of deeds and recorded therein as above stated, Ruizo Viacrucis and Marquez are
deemed to have constructive notice of the sale in favor of Orais, apart from the circumstances —
heretofore adverted to — that, since Viacrucis had gone to said office soon after the execution in his
favor, on October 10, 1945, of the deed of sale Exhibit 11 for the purpose of registering the same, said
petitioner must have had actual knowledge of the previous sale to Orais. And this explains why,
despite the fact that Viacrucis had gone to the office of the register of deeds for the aforementioned
purpose, he did not carry out the same. Viacrucis did not even try to explain why he failed to do so.
cannot invoke, therefore, the rights of a purchaser for value in good faith under the provisions of the
Land Registration Act.
Upon the other hand, Orais had purchased said land, and taken possession thereof — at first,
constructively, in consequence of the deed of sale in his favor, incorporated in the public document,
Exhibit B, and, also, of the agreement Exh. G, between Orais and Costelo, and, then, actually, upon
the expiration of Castelo's right of possession, under said Exh. G — apart from filing said Exh. B with
the office of the Register of Deeds and having it recorded therein.
As between Pedro Sanchez, Orais and petitioners herein, the title to said land — if treated as an
unregistered one — passed, therefore, to Orais either on June 8, 1936, the date of Exhibit B, or, on
July 30, 1936, the date of Exhibit G, or, at the latest, on September 10, 1936, when Exhibit B was
recorded in the office of the register of deeds. 13Accordingly, Sanchez was no longer its owner when
he sold it, on July 7, 1941, to Balentin Ruizo who, as a consequence, acquired no title to said land,
and conveyed none, on October 10, 1945, to Viacrucis, who, in turn, could not have transmitted any
to Claros Marquez. 14
Furthermore, petitioners could not possibly have acquired title to said land, as one registered under
Act No. 496, inasmuch as the deeds of conveyance Exhibits 9, 10 and 11 in their favor and in that of
their predecessor in interest, Balentin Ruizo have not been registered, and, pursuant to the
provisions of said Act, "the act of registration shall be the operative act to convey and affect the
land ...." 15 Neither could the petitioners have acquired title by prescription, for "no title to registered
land in derogation to that of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse
possession." 16 Hence, petitioners have given up the plea of prescription, on which they relied heavily
in the court of first instance and the Court of Appeals, and now merely press the defense of laches,
belatedly invoked, for the first time, in the Court of Appeals and properly rejected by the same.
In short, whether the property in question is treated as a registered land or as one not registered
under the provisions of Act No. 496, Orais has, therefore, a better right than petitioners herein, and
the third assignment of error cannot be sustained.

Petitioners herein, likewise, failed to explain why neither Ruizo nor Claros Marquez had filed with
said office the deeds of sale Exhibits 10 and 9 in their favor, respectively, despite the provision in
both documents for the registration thereof.
Indeed, the parties in Exh. 10 — Sanchez and Ruizo — had stipulated therein:
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the Court of Appeals should be, as it is hereby affirmed, with
costs against herein petitioners Mr. and Mrs. Viacrucis and Mr. and Mrs. Marquez. It is so ordered.
Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo, Villamor and
Makasiar, JJ., concur.

Que el terreno objeto de esta venta es parte del titulo No. —, del vendedor y
que es nuestro deseo sin embargo que la presente se register bajo la Ley No.
3344. 11

What is more, as witness for petitioners herein, Jose R. Pastor — the notary public who prepared
Exh. 10 and before whom it was acknowledged — testified positively that Sanchez had explicitly told
him, on that occasion, and in the presence of Ruizo, that the 4-hectare land thereby conveyed to
Ruizo is covered by a certificate of title, which was not produced then.

Likewise, the deed of sale Exh. 11, executed by Ruizo in favor of Viacrucis, provides:

That ... it is our will that this document be registered under the provisions of Act
3344.

Similarly, the deed Exh. 9, executed by Mr. and Mrs. Viacrucis in favor of Claros Marquez, states:

The the above-mentioned parcel is not registered under Act No. 496, otherwise
known as the Land Registration Act nor under the Spanish Mortgage Law; and
the parties hereto agree to register this instrument in the office of the Registry
of Deeds of the Province of Leyte in accordance with the provisions of the
Revised Administrative Code, as amended by Act No. 3344. 12

Considering that Exhibit 10 had been delivered by Ruizo to Viacrucis, who, later, turned over
Exhibits 10 and 11 to Claros Marquez, We are fully persuaded that, aware of the registered status of
the land in question, petitioners herein had advisedly chosen to treat the same as an unregistered
land. None of them claims to have relied upon OCT No. 243 in the name of Pedro Sanchez. They

83
84
G.R. No. 93030-31 August 21, 1991
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ALFREDO ALEGADO Y DELIMA, accused-appellant.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
The accused-appellant stands charged and convicted of two counts of rape by the Regional Trial
Court of San Carlos City, Branch 58 in its decision promulgated on October 26, 1989 with the
following dispositive portion:
WHEREFORE, finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape
punished under Article 335 paragraphs 1 & 3 of the Revised Penal Code, said accused is
hereby sentenced to RECLUSION PERPETUA on both counts, the sentences to be served
successively, to pay the offended party the sum of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00),
and to pay costs of suit. (RTC Decision, p. 8; Rollo, P. 32)
This appeal prays for a reversal of the trial court's judgment of conviction and submits before us the
following assignment of errors to wit.:
I would not submit to his evil desires (ibid). Thereupon, appellant threatened to kill
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF
STATUTORY RAPE AS DEFINED AND PENALIZED UNDER ART. 335,
PARAGRAPH 3 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE DESPITE THE
PROSECUTION FAILURE TO PROVE WITH CERTAINTY THE ACTUAL AGE
OF THE OFFENDED PARTY.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT ACQUIRING ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF
THE CRIMES CHARGED DESPITE THE FACT THAT HIS GUILT WAS NOT
PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT (Appellant's Brief, p. 1, Rollo p. 55)
The accused-appellant, in two criminal complaints filed by the offended party herself and docketed
as Criminal Cases Nos. RTC-437 and RTC 438, was charged with rape on two counts committed as
follows:
That on or about 7:00 p.m., April 20, 1988 at the Public Market, San Carlos City, Negros Occidental,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court the above-named accused, did, then
and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of the herein offended party,
CRISTINA DEANG y VILLAROSA, a girl below twelve (12) years of age, against her will and without
her consent. (Criminal Case No. RTC-437: Rollo, p. 14)
That on or about 6:00 p.m., April 14, 1988 at the Public Market, San Carlos City, Negros Occidental,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did, then
and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of the herein offended party,
CRISTINA DEANG y VILLAROSA, a girl below twelve (12) years of age, against her will and without
her consent. (Criminal Case No. RTC-438; Rollo, p. 16)
At the pre-trial, both the prosecution and the defense agreed on a joint trial and stipulated on only
one fact, i.e., that the accused, as watchman of the San Carlos City public market was inside the said
premises during the two occasions when the alleged rapes transpired. Both parties presented two
common issues for the trial court's consideration, namely: (1) whether the offended party was
actually below 12 years old at the time of the incidents; and (2) whether the accused had carnal
knowledge of the offended party by means of force and intimidation (Pre-trial Order dated June 2,
1988; Records, p. 16)
The antecedent facts as stated by the Solicitor General in the People's brief are as follows:
85
On April 14, 1988, at about 6:00 o'clock in the afternoon, complainant was playing at the
Freedom Square inside the public market of San Carlos City when appellant, a 170-pound,
53 year old market watchman at the time, held her by the hand and took her upstairs to the
second floor of the public market building which houses some government offices and
which at the time was expectedly deserted (tan, May 17, 1989, pp. 13, 21-22). When they
reached the upper floor of the building, appellant ordered complainant to hold his penis
and masturbate it (ibid, p. 22). Thereafter, appellant ordered complainant to lie down, and
when she refused he pushed her down on the floor (ibid). When complainant was lying
prostrate on her back, appellant placed himself on top of her while she was still wearing
her pedal pusher shorts and panty (ibid, p. 23). So, appellant forced her to take off her
pedal pushers and panty (ibid, pp. 26-27) and thereupon he lay on top of her (ibid).
Appellant then tried to insert his penis into her vagina but it did not penetrate fully before
he ejaculated (ibid, pp. 23, 27-28). Complainant bled a little (ibid, p. 52) Thereafter,
appellant gave complainant P 2.00 and left (ibid, p. 28). Complainant stood up and went
down the building but never told anybody about it because she was afraid appellant would
kill her (ibid p. 28)
On April 20, 1988, at about 7:00 o'clock in the evening complainant was sitting at the
Freedom Square when appellant approached her and told her to go with him upstairs to
the second floor of the public market (tsn, May 17, 1989, pp. 11-12). Complainant refused
but appellant shoved her towards the stairs, held her by the left arm, and brought her to
the upper floor near the civic center (ibid, pp. 12-13). There, appellant ordered
complainant to take off her shorts and panty, but she refused (ibid, p. 14). Appellant then
tried to take off her shorts and panty by himself but she resisted and told the former she
complainant if she would not take off her shorts and panty (ibid). Then appellant again
tried to remove complainant's shorts and panty and the latter out of fear allowed him to do
it (ibid). When appellant succeeded in removing complainant's shorts and panty, he forced
her to lie down and then placed himself on top of her (ibid, p. 15). Appellant was then
already without his pants on (ibid). Appellant inserted his penis into complainant's vagina
but it took sometime before his organ could penetrate the girl (ibid). When it did,
complainant felt excruciating pain and begged appellant to stop (ibid, p. 16). Appellant just
ignored her and continued on without saying anything (ibid). Complainant felt some liquid
oozing out from appellant's organ and into her being (ibid, p. 17) And after appellant had
withdrawn his sex organ, complainant discovered that her vagina was bleeding (ibid).
Appellant then stood up and told her not to tell anybody about it (ibid, pp. 17-18). Then
appellant gave her P 2.00 and left (ibid, p. 18).
As appellant was going downstairs, he was seen by Patrolwoman Evangeline Alfaro, a
member of the San Carlos City INP assigned at Precinct No. 1, a police outpost near the
main entrance of the public market (tsn, September 28, 1988, pp. 4-5). Pat. Alfaro knew
appellant well because he was the public market watchman at the time (ibid, p. 5). A
minute later, Pat. Alfaro saw complainant coming down the same stairs (tsn, September
28, 1988, p. 6; May 17, 1989, pp. 18-19). Pat. Alfaro noticed that complainant was pale,
with blood flowing to her thighs and legs, and was reeling as if feeling dizzy (tsn,
September 28, 1988, p. 6)
Pat. Alfaro approached complainant and asked what happened to her (tsn, September 28,
1988, p. 6; May 17, 1989, pp. 19-20). Complainant answered that she was taken upstairs
and raped by appellant (ibid). Immediately, Pat. Alfaro brought complainant to the city
hospital where she was examined by Dr. Oscar Jagdon in the presence of two medical
technologists (tsn, September 28, 1988, pp. 7-8; May 17, 1989, p. 20). Dr. Jagdon
confirmed the report that indeed complainant was raped (ibid). Thereafter, Pat. Alfaro
reported the incident to the Station Guard by phone then took complainant to the police
station after the medical examination (tsn, September 28, 1988, p. 8; May 7, 1989, p. 20).
When they reached the station, appellant who had already been taken into custody was
readily identified by complainant as the rapist (tsn, September 28, 1988, pp. 8-10; May 17,
1989, pp. 2021). Complainant was then investigated and she rendered her statement to the
police.
Dr. Oscar Jagdon, who examined complainant at about 8:40 o'clock in the evening of April
20, 1988, found some secretion inside complaint's vagina along the cervical wall which,
upon laboratory examination, turned out to be sperm cells and that complainant's vagina
 was lacerated, one (1) centimeter long, at 9:00 o'clock position although there was only
partial penetration of the male organ into complainant's vagina (tsn, August 10, 1988, pp.
4-9; Exhibit 'E'). (Rollo, pp. 84-89)
On the other hand, the accused-appellant's version as summarized in his brief reads:
Evidence for the Defense:
Alfredo Alegado testified that on April 14, 1988 at about 6:00 p.m., he was on duty, he
being a watchman of the public market. His tour of duty is from 6:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m. the
following day. Before 7:00 p.m. of that day, he and his co-watchman roamed around the
area checking the padlocks of the stores if they are in order. At about 8:30 p.m., they
closed all the doors of the vegetables section, meat section and the dried fish section. He
knows Cristina Deang who used to sell calamansi in the area. On April 14, 1988, he did not
meet Cristina Deang as he and his companions were then busy roving around the area. On
April 20, 1988, at about 5:00 p.m., he was having snacks at Valdevia Street, with Cpl.
Allarce and Lito Alverez. They stayed there until about 7:30 p.m. when to his surprise, he
was arrested and brought to the station by Pat. Apuhin and companions including Pfc.
Evangeline Alfaro. From 5:00 p.m., to 7:30 p.m. on April 20, 1988, he never met and/or
saw Cristina Deang. Pfc. Evangeline Alfaro has been harboring ill-feelings on him when on
a certain occasion, he turned down her request to ask the four (4) armed men whom they
saw in the market (what they wanted) (t.s.n., pp. 2-3, September 14, 1989).
In the present case, the applicability of Rule 130, Section 39 of the Revised Rules on Evidence to
prove the victim's age is beyond question. The said provision contains three requisites for its
admissibility, namely: (1) that there is controversy in respect to the pedigree of any of the members
of a family; (2) that the reputation or tradition of the pedigree of the person concerned existed
previous to the controversy; and (3) that the witness testifying to the reputation or tradition
regarding the pedigree of the person must be a member of the family of said person. All these
preconditions are obtaining in the case at bar considering that the date of birth of the rape victim is
being put in issue; that the declaration of the victim's grandfather relating to tradition (sending a
child to school upon reaching the age of seven) existed long before the rape case was filed; and that
the witness testifying to the said tradition is the maternal grandfather of the rape victim.
Thus, we quote the pertinent portions of Cornelio Villarosa's testimony:
PROSECUTOR FABROZ: (to witness)
Q Mr. Villarosa, how many children do you have?
A I have 5 children.
Q How old is the eldest?
A Thirty Nine (39) years old.

Sgt. Rolando Allarce testified that he knew accused because he is assigned at the police Q How about the youngest?
precinct in the public market. At about 5:00 p.m. on April 20, 1988, he was invited by
A May be 24 years old because I forgot the birth date.
Alfredo Alegado to have a snack at Namie's Lunch. They finished having snack at about
6:00 p.m. Thereafter, Alfredo Alegado and Lito Alverez invited him to go to Valdevia Street Q The complainant in this case is a certain Cristina Deang. Do you know her?
for a drinking spree. He accepted their invitation and went with them. He went out at
about 7:00 p.m., leaving behind Alfredo Alegado in the store. (t.s.n. pp. 25-27, Ibid) (Rollo, A Yes, sir.
pp. 59-60)
Q Why do you know her?
Whether or not any cogent reason exists to constrain us to reverse the trial court's verdict of
conviction under paragraphs 1 and 3 of Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code is the issue in this A She is my granddaughter.
appeal.
Q If she is in court, would you able to point her?
Firstly, the accused-appellant contends that the offended party's actual age at the time of the alleged
incidents of rape was not establisher with certainty, hence, it was error on the part of the trial court A Yes, sir. (At this juncture the witness is pointing to a person sitting inside the courtroom
to convict the accused-appellant of statutory rape as defined and penalized under paragraph 3, who when asked answered by the name of Cristina Deang.)
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code.
Q Who is the mother of Cristina Deang?
We are not persuaded. The testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, the offended party herself and
her maternal grandfather, Cornelio Villarosa, as to the fact that the victim was born on September 5, A Angelita.
1976 do not constitute hearsay evidence as claimed by the accused-appellant but rather fall under the
exceptions to the hearsay rule as provided under sections 39 and 40 of Rule 130 of the Revised Rules Q Angelita Villarosa?
on Evidence. Under Section 40 of the said Rule, it is provided, in part, that:
A Yes, sir.
SEC. 40. — Family reputation or tradition regading pedigree. — The reputation or
tradition existing in a family previous to the controversy, in respect to the pedigree of any Q Is she your daughter?
of its members, may be received in evidence if the witness testifying thereon be also a
A Yes, sir.
member of the family, either by consanguinity or affinity. ...
Q Is she here?
The word pedigree under Section 39 of the same Rule includes relationship, family genealogy, birth,
marriage, death, the dates when and the places where these facts occurred and the names of the A No, she is not here.
relatives.
Q Where is she now?
In the case of Lazatin v. Campos, 92 SCRA 250, 261 [1979], we stated that:
A I don't know where she work now, because she did not send a letter to me.
... [D]eclarations in regard to pedigree, although hearsay, are admitted on the principle
that they are natural expressions of persons who must know the truth (See Sec. 33, Rule Q The last time, where is her whereabouts?
130 Revised Rules of Court now Sec. 39, Rule 130 under the new Rules). Pedigree
testimony is admitted because it is the best that the nature of the case admits and because A She was in Manila, my last knowledge about her whereabouts.
greater evil might arise from the rejection of such proof than from its admission. (Wigmore
on Evidence, Sec. 1420) Q You said, Cristina Deang was the daughter of your daughter, Angelita. Do you know how
many children does Angelita have?
86
A She has five (5) children. A Grade 1.

Q With whom is this Cristina Deang living now? Q Was she able to finish Grade I?

A In our residence. A No, sir.

Q How did it happen that Cristina Deang has been living with you. (TSN, January 31, 1989, pp. 4-7)

A The mother left her to me. Moreover, the offended party herself categorically stated in open court that she was born on
September 5, 1976 (TSN, May 17, 1989, p. 8). As correctly submitted by the Solicitor General:
Q When was it that the mother left her to you.
It is long-settled, as early as in the cases of U.S. v. Bergantino (3 Phil. 118 [1903] and U.S.
A In 1983. v. Angeles (sic) and Sabacahan (36 Phil. 246, 250 [1917] citing U.S. v. Estavillo and
Perez (10 O.G. 1984), that the testimony of a person as to his age is admissible although
Q How old was Cristina Deang at the time her mother left her to you? hearsay and though a person can have no personal knowledge of the date of his birth as all
the knowledge a person has of his age is acquired from what he is told by his parents (U.S.
A The mother of Cristina Deang told me that she was born in 1976 and please let her go to vs. Evangelista, 32 Phil. 321, 326 [1951] – he may testify as to his age as he had learned it
school. from his parents and relatives and his testimony in such case is an assertion of family
tradition (Gravador v. Mamigo, 20 SCRA 742) ... (Rollo, p. 93-94)
ATTY. BRIONES:
Inasmuch as the accused-appellant failed to present contrary evidence to dispute the prosecution's
I would like to make it of record that the information gathered by the mother, Angelita, is a
claim that the victim in this case was below twelve (12) years old at the time of the rape incidents
hearsay your Honor.
under consideration, we affirm the trial court's finding that the victim in these rape cases was under
PROSECUTOR FABROZ: twelve years of age.

I would like to prove the fact about the birth of the child. Time and again we have held that the gravamen of the offense of statutory rape as provided under
Article 335, paragraph 3 of the Revised Penal Code is the carnal knowledge of a woman below twelve
COURT: years old. (People v. Edgardo Puedan y Lalongisip, G.R. No. 92586, April 26, 1991 citing People v.
Villegas, Jr., 127 SCRA 195, 200 [1984]; People v. Mangalino, 182 SCRA 329 [1990] citing People v.
Let it stay in record. San Buenaventura, 164 SCRA 150 [1988] and People v. Villegas, Jr., supra). Hence, the only
elements of statutory rape are: (1) that the offender had carnal knowledge of a woman; and (2) that
PROSECUTOR FABROZ: such woman is under twelve (12) years of age. (People v. Santos, 183 SCRA 25 [1990]). It is not
necessary to prove that the victim was intimidated or that force was used against her because in
Q By the way, do you have a talk or conversation with your daughter, Angelita, the mother statutory rape the law presumes that the victim on account of her tender age, does not and cannot
of the complainant Cristina Deang, when was Cristina Deang born? have a will of her own. (People v. Bacani, 181 SCRA 393 [1990]; People v. Lualhati, 171 SCRA 277
[1989]; People v. Derpo, 168 SCRA 447 [1988])
A We did not talk about the birth of Cristina, but she told me to let her daughter Cristina
go to school because she is already 7 years old. Considering that in the instant case there is clear and competent evidence that the victim was under
twelve (12) years old at the time of the rape incidents complained of, the second argument purported
Q Did you ask her about the birth of Cristina Deang? by the accused-appellant that the alleged rapes were not attended by any force or intimidation must
also fail. Proof of carnal knowledge of the victim in this case who was only eleven (11) years old on
ATTY. BRIONES: the two separate occasions reported (April 14 and 20, 1988) is overwhelming while unnecessary force
and intimidation also appear in the records. The offended party's testimony regarding the
I think that is misleading your Honor.
abominable and wicked acts of the accused-appellant against her chastity on the two occasions
COURT: indicated in the separate informations filed by the victim herself was given in a straightforward
manner without any indication that the same was motivated by any ill- feeling toward the pinpointed
Witness may answer. perpetrator. The fact of rape on the said occasions related by the offended party was corroborated by
the examining physician whose medical finding revealed the presence of sperm cells inside the
WITNESS: victim's sexual organ due to partial penetration of the male organ into it.

A That is what she told me, she was born on September 5, 1976. It is axiomatic in rape cases that the slightest penetration of the female's private organ is sufficient to
consummate the came.1âwphi1 (People v. Jun Aquino [John Aquino], G.R. No. 83214, May 28, 1991
PROSECUTOR FABROZ: citing People v. Cruz, 180 SCRA 765 [1989]; People v. Patonog 155 SCRA 675 [1987]; People v.
Alverez, 163 SCRA 745 [1988]; People v. Bacani, supra). A careful review of the evidence on record
Q So based from the information you get from your mother Angelita, did you in fact send readily shows that the trial court did not commit any reversible error in disregarding the defenses of
your granddaughter Cristina Deang to school? denial and alibi given by the accused-appellant and in finding that the accused-appellant was guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of two counts of statutory rape. We affirm the trial court's verdict of
A Yes, sir. conviction in consonance with our oft-repeated pronouncement that we accord great respect to the
trial court's findings of fact in the absence of a showing that certain facts of substance and value were
Q Where? erroneously overlooked that, if considered, might affect the result of the case (see People v. Eleuterio
Raptus y Jeray, G.R. Nos. 92169-70, June 19,1991 citing People v. Aboga, et. al., 147 SCRA 404
A SMAC Elementary School. [1987]; People v. Estenzo, et al., 72 SCRA 428 [1976]; see also People v. Frankie Arenas, et al., G.R.
No. 92068, June 5, 1991, citing People v. Somera, 173 SCRA 684 [1989]; People v. Baysa, 172 SCRA
Q What grade did you send her?
706 [1989]; Aguirre v. People, 155 SCRA 337 [1987])
87
Lastly, we commend the trial court's additional finding that the commission of the rapes in question
was attended by force and intimidation although for conviction under Article 335 paragraph 3 of the
Revised Penal Code such finding is no longer necessary. It bears emphasis, therefore, that the
accused-appellant not only took advantage of the offended party's tender age in giving vent to his
aberrant sexual behavior but also perpetrated the carnal acts complained of through force and
intimidation. There is no meat in the accused-appellant's contention that the trial court abused its
discretion in concluding that there was force and intimidation since the information did not contain
any allegation to that effect simply because the phrase "against her will and without her consent"
contained in both informations charging the accused-appellant of rape connotes the attendance of
force and intimidation.

The absence of external signs of physical injuries and the failure of the victim to shout for help at the
first opportunity do not negate the commission of rape contrary to the accused-appellant's
propositions. The force used in rape cases need not be absolutely overpowering or irresistible. What
is essential is simply that the force employed was sufficient to allow the offender to consummate his
lewd purpose (see People v. Cpl. Mario Ramos, G.R. Nos. 92626-29, May 27, 1991 citing People v.
Mendoza, 163 SCRA 568 [1988]; People v. Tablizo, 182 SCRA 739 [1990] citing People v. Pasco, et
al., 181 SCRA 233 [1990]; People v. Villaflores 174 SCRA 70 [1989] citing People v. Abonada, 169
SCRA 530 [1989]).

We further note with approval the trial court's observation that the accused-appellant's act of giving
the offended party the sum of P2.00 after each of the aforestated "forcible copulation" apparently as
"full atonement for his dastardly act" smacks of "insult a hundred times compounded." The accused-
appellant, despite the trial court's strong words, even had the gall to reiterate before us his claim that
the acceptance of the said measly amount of P2.00 was tantamount to a tacit consent on the part of
his victim. We deplore such a highly offensive and depraved argument for we cannot allow the
innocent and helpless victims of unsolicited and forcible defloration to be brutally insulted while yet
nursing their irreparably wounded sexual purity. Considering the age of the victim, the depravity of
the crimes, and the psychological trauma involved, we increase the indemnity to P50,000.00 in
accordance with the recent rulings in the cases of People v. Cpl. Mario Ramos, supra; People v.
Edgardo Puedan y Lalongisip, supra; and People v. Rodante Felipe, G.R. No. 90390, October 31,
1990.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION
that the amount of civil indemnity which the accused shall pay to the offended party in each of the
two rape cases is hereby increased to P50,000.00.

SO ORDERED.

88

G.R. No. L-12993 October 28, 1918
RAFAEL J. FERRER, ET AL., plaintiff-appellants,
vs.
JOAQUIN J. DE INCHAUSTI, ET AL., defendants-appellees.
Vicente Sotto for appellants.
Araneta & Zaragoza and Cohn & Fisher
TORRES, J.:
This appeal was taken through bill of exceptions by counsel for the plaintiffs from the judgment of
February 12, 1917, whereby the judge of the Court of First Instance held that Rosa Viademonte,
mother of the plaintiffs, could not have been legitimate daughter of the deceased Isabel Gonzalez,
who, on her death, left some legitimate children. The court did not deem it necessary to discuss
whether the said Rosa Viademonte could be a daughter of the said Isabel Gonzalez for reason, given
in his decision, and held that the plaintiffs should not be entitled to what they have demanded, and
that they should pay the costs.
Under date of May 12, 1916, the attorney of Rafael J. Ferrer y Viademonte and Maria Angelina Ferrer
y Viademonte with her husband Ricardo Hernandez y Aracil filed a complaint in the Court of First
Instance of the city of Manila, praying for the rendition of a final judgment declaring that Rosa
Matilde Viademonte y Gonzalez had the right to succeed to the inheritance left by Isabel Gonzalez in
the same proportion and capacity as the other four children of the latter, namely, Ramon
Viademonte, Rafael C. de Inchausti, Joaquin C. de Inchausti, and Clotilde de Inchausti de Vidal; that
the plaintiffs Rafael and Maria Angelina Ferrer are the only and legitimate heirs of the deceased Rosa
Viademonte and the only ones entitled to receive her share of the inheritance left by Isabel Gonzalez,
that is, the on-fifth part of the latter's estate; that the defendants render to the plaintiffs an account
of the fruits and administration of all the property from the moment the said community of property
from the moment the said community of property was constituted among them, and to deliver to the
plaintiffs that part which corresponds to them in their capacity as sole heirs of Rosa Viademonte y
Gonzalez, that is, the one-fifth part of the inheritance with all its accession, fruits, and interests; and ,
finally, that the defendants pay the costs. In fact, it is alleged that the plaintiffs are the legitimate
children of Rosa Matilde Viademonte , who in turn died on November 20, 1898, leaving the two
plaintiffs as surviving legitimate children that the said Isabel Gonzalez was married, first to Ramon
Martinez Viademonte, and from his marriage two children, named Roman and Rosa Matilde, and
surnamed Viademonte y Gonzalez survived; that after the death of her husband Ramon Martinez
Viademonte, Sr., the widow, Isabel Gonzalez, contracted a second marriage with Don Jose Joaquin
de Inchausti with whom she had three children named Clotilde, Rafael and Joaquin, all surnamed
Inchausti y Gonzalez, that Ramon Viademonte y Gonzalez Jr., died on January 1, 1905, without
leaving any forced heir, and by a will dated May 216, 1900, he left his property to the son or sons
which Rafael C. de Inchausti might have, and in default or such child or children, to the same Rafael
C. de Inchausti, by a will, left as his heirs and successors in interest his legitimate son Jose R. de
Inchausti, his recognized natural daughter Maria Consolacion de Inchausti de Ortigas, and his widow
Maria Consolacion Rico y Medina; that on her death, Isabel Gonzalez left a certain property in her
marriage with Jose de Joaquin de Inchausti, which would amount approximately to P1,000,000 with
its accessions, according to present valuation, as shown by the inventory of said property which
makes up Exhibit A, that on January 14, 188, Jose Joaquin Inchausti y Gonzalez and Clotilde de
Inchausti y Gonzalez de Vidal, each of whom received on-fourth of the estate left by the deceased
Isabel Gonzalez, excluding therefrom Rosa Viademonte, the mother of the plaintiffs.,
notwithstanding the fact that she had an equal rights to inherit from Isabel Gonzalez; that since
January 188 till his death, Ramon Viademonte, Jr. had been the possessor and administrator of the
fourth part of the inheritance which he received from his deceased mother Isabel Gonzalez which
portion of the property later came to the possession and control of Rafael C. de Inchausti, and on the
death of the latter, this fourth part of the inheritance came to the possession of Maria Consolacion
Rico de Inchausti, widow of said Rafael C. de Inchausti, in her capacity as guardian of her son Jose
Rafael de Inchausti, and part of it, to the possession of Maric Consolacion de Inchausti de Ortigas;
and that a great part of the property which the defendants actual possess, came from the young
89
children, who received from Isabel Gonzalez with the earnings and accessions thereof; these children
have been possessing it pro indiviso or in coownership, in their lifetime, with Rosa Viademonte while
living, and upon the death of the latter, with her heirs, but that, in spite of the demands made by the
plaintiffs for the delivery to them by the defendants of their corresponding share in the inheritance
the latter have always refused to do so.
In his answers, for Clotilde Inchausti de Vial admitted that the plaintiffs are the children of Rosa
viademonte and Benigno Ferrer; that Isabel Gonzalez was married first o Ramon Martinez de
Viademonte, and afterwards to Jose Joaquin de Inchausti; that on the death of her mother Isabel
Gonzalez, on December 13, 1886, her share in the conjugal partnership amounted to P191, 248.81,
and on January 14, 1888, Jose Joaquin de Inchausti, as executor of his wife, after paying the legacies
mentioned in the testament, paid to this defendant in cash the sum of P46,295.70 as her hereditary
portion in the liquidated property of her mother, and likewise delivered to the other three sons of
said Isabel Gonzalez similar amounts; that, after receiving her share of the inheritance from her
mother, she spent it all, and she no longer has any part of it, nor has she left any portion of it during
the last thirty years, and that neither the plaintiffs nor their deceased mother had ever possessed or
enjoyed the said sum; and denies generally all the allegations of the complaint which are not
admitted, and denies specially the allegation that the mother of the plaintiffs had ever married with
their father Benigno Ferre, that they and their mother ever had the surname of Viademonte or
Viademonte y Gonzalez and that the mother of the plaintiffs was a daughter of Isabel Gonzalez.
As a special defense, she alleged that her possession of the money derived from the inheritance of her
mother had been public, adverse, pacific, continuous and under a claim of ownership, in good faith
and with just title, since January 14, 1888; that never during the lifetime of the plaintiff's mother did
she make any claim or assert any right in the amount received by this defendant form the inheritance
of her deceased mother; that more than thirty years had elapsed since she received by this defendant
inheritance of her deceased mother; and that the action for the plaintiffs has already prescribed in
accordance with the provisions of article 1955 of the Civil Code and section 38 of the Code of Civil
Procedure they (the plaintiffs) and their mother ever had the surname of "Viademonte" or
Viademonte y Gonzalez," and that the mother of the plaintiffs was a daughter of Isabel Gonzalez.
As a special defense, she alleged that her possession of the money derived from the inheritance of her
mother had been public, adverse, pacific, continuous, and under a claim of ownership, in good faith
and with just title, since January 14, 1888; that never during the lifetime of the plaintiffs' mother did
she (plaintiff's mother) make any claim or assert any right in the amount received by this defendant
from the inheritance of her deceased mother; that more than thirty years had elapsed since she
received said amount to the date of the presentation of the complaint; and that the action of the
plaintiff has already prescribed in accordance with the provisions of article 1955 of the Civil Code and
section 38 of the Code of Civil procedure.
Counsel for Maria de la Consolacion de Inchausti, in turn, set up a special defense similar to that of
Clotilde, and alleged that Ramon Martinez Viademonte, son of Isabel Gonzalez, died in the city of
Manila on January 1, 1905, without leaving any heirs, and bequeathed by will to his brother Rafael C.
de Inchausti, father of this defendant, all of his property, with the exception of some property of little
importance which he had bequeathed to others; but denied that any part of his (Ramon Maritnez
Viademonte's) property thas ever been bequeathed to the children of said Rafael C. de Inchausti;
that, on the death of said Ramon Martinez de Viademonte, his will was allowed to probate in the
Court of First Instance of Manila, and all his remaining property delivered to Rafael C. de Inchausti
with Martinez Viademonte's property received by her father Rafael C. de Inchausti was a small piece
of land situated in Santa Ana and known by the name of Hacienda de Lamayan; that the title of
Rafael C. De Inchausti to said land was registered by virtue of a decree of the Court of Land
Registration, in accordance with the provisions of the Land Registration Ac; that said land was in
turn inherited by this defendant from her father upon the death of the latter, and that she appears in
the registry of property as owner of the same; that, upon the allowance of said will in the Court of
First Instance of this city, the plaintiffs did not present any claim to the commissioners appointed to
appraise the property, and that the period allowed for the presentation of such claims expired on
October 20, 1914, and that, therefor, the action now filed by the plaintiffs has prescribed, in
accordance with the provisions of section 695 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In similar terms,
counsel for Joaquin C. de Inchausti worded his defense in a written answer as amended under date
of September 19, 1916.1awph!l.net
Counsel for Maria de la Consolacion Rico y Medina in her personal capacity an das a widow of Rafael
Inchausti and also as guardian of her son Jose Rafael de Inchausti y Rico, in his answer to the
foregoing complaint, admits that Ramon Martinez and Isabel Gonzalez Ferrer, both now deceased,
were in their lifetime husband and wife, and were survived by a child named Ramon Martinez
Viademonte y Gonzalez, but denied that the said Rosa Matilde was a daughter of that marriage or of
any of the said spouses; he also admits that the deceased Ramon Martinez Viademonte, Jr., died in
this city on January 1, 1905, without leaving any forced heir, and by a will dated May 16, 1900, he left
to his maternal brother Rafael C. de Inchausti husband of this defendant, all his property with the
exception of some small legacies, denying at the same time that any portion of the inheritance of said
Ramon Viademonte, Jr., had been left to the children of the defendant's husband; that Isabel
Gonzalez Ferrer, the mother of her husband, who died on December 13, 1886, executed a will on
April 29 of the said year, wherein she declared that she had a son with her first husband Ramon
Martinez Viademonte, and the name of said on son was also Ramon, and that with her second
husband Jose Joaquin de Inchausti. She Counsel for Maria de la Consolacion Rico y Medina in her
personal capacity and a widow of Rafael Inchausti and also as guardian of her son Jose Rafael de
Inchausti y Rico, in his answer to the foregoing complaint, admits that Ramon Martinez and Isabel
Gonzalez Ferre, both now deceased were in their lifetime husband and wife, and were survived by a
child named Ramon Martinez Viademonte y Gonzalez but denied that the said Rosa Matilde was a
daughter of that marriage or of any of the said spouses; he also admits that the deceased Ramon
Martinez Viademonte, Jr., died in this city on January 1905, without leaving any forced heir, and by a
will dated May 165, 1900, he left to his maternal brother Rafael C. de Inchausti, husband of this
defendant, all his property with the exception of some small legacies, denying at the same time that
any portion of the inheritance of said Ramon Viademonte, Jr., had been left to the children of the
defendant's husband, who died on December 13, 1886, executed a will on April 29 of the said year,
wherein she declared that she had some with her first husband Ramon Martinez Viademonte and the
name of said son was also Ramon, and that with her second husband Jose Joaquin de Inchausti, she
had three children, and he instituted the said four children as the sole and universal heirs to the
remainder of her property in equal parts, her property being the one half of the conjugal property
had during her marriage with her second husband Inchausti who had survived her; that no portion of
the inheritance from the deceased Isabel Gonzalez y Ferrer was adjudicated to the mother of the
plaintiffs; that the deceased Rafael C. de Inchausti inherited from the said Ramon Martinez
Viademonte, Jr., a parcel of land known by the name of Hacienda de Lamayan, registered in the
name of the deceased Rafael de Inchausti, which property was, in turn, inherited by the defendant
Maria Consolacion de Inchausti de Ortigas. As a special defense, she alleged that in the said will
wherein the testatrix Isabel Gonzalez name d her sole and universal heirs, Rosa Matilde, the mother
of the plaintiffs, was not designated a heiress or legatee, but on the contrary, was omitted therefrom,
that from the death of the testratrix of this compliant neither Rosa Matilde nor the plaintiffs
presented any claim whatsoever against the omission of Rosa Matilde from the will of said Isabel
Gonzalez for the plaintiffs could have availed themselves of any right which Rosa Matilde could have
had in the property inherited by the defendant and her son Jose Rafael de Inchausti, derived by law
for contesting the will of Isabel Gonzalez on the ground of prejudicial omission therefrom of Rosa
Matilde expired long before the date on which this compliant was filed; and consequently, said action
has prescribed; that, after the death of Ramon Viademonte, Jr., in February 1905, probate
proceedings were had in the Court of First Instance of Manila, an administrator of the decedent's
estate was appointed, on July 21 of said year the commissioners to appraise the estate of the
deceased were appointed, and after the lapse of the period fixed for allowing claims against the state,
the property of the deceased was adjudicated to his heir Rafael C. de Inchausti and to the legatees,
the plaintiffs not having presented to the commissioners, any claim against the estate of said
deceased has thus prescribed by the lapse of the period for its presentation, that after the death of
Rafael C. de Inchausti, on October 5, 1913, probate proceedings were had regarding his will in the
Court of First Instance of the city, an executor was appointed, as well as the commissioners to
appraise the estate, and the period within which claims against he estate might be received has
expired, and the plaitniffs have not presented any claim whatsoever against he estate of said Rafael
C. de Inchausti, and finally, she alleged that he period fixed by law for presenting claims against he
estate of said Rafael C. de Inchausti expired long before the date of the filing of this complaint, and
consequently, the action to assert the claim has already prescribed, and that therefore the defendant
should be absolved from the complaint with the costs against the plaintiffs.
Counsel for the plaintiffs, in his written reply amending his replies of September 20 and 21, 1916,
denied generally and specifically each and all of the new facts alleged in the answers of the
defendants, and added that the will of Isabel Gonzalez, dated October 12, 1886, is null and void,
inasmuch as Rosa Viademonte Gonzalez and having equal rights as her other children; that he
defendants are estopped form denying that the surname of Rosa Matilde was a daughter of Isabel
Gonzalez with Ramon Martinez Viademonte; that the plaintiffs are legitimate children of said Rosa
Matilde with Benigno Ferre inasmuch as both their predecessors in interest as well as the present
90
defendants have previously made declarations and formal affirmations, written and oral, recognizing
that the surname of Rosa Matilde was Viademonte y Gonzalez, that the same was legitimate daughter
of Isabel Gonzalez and Ramon Martinez Viademonte and that the plaintiffs are legitimate children of
Rosa Viademonte y Gonzalez with Benigno Ferrer.
The trial having been held and the evidence of both parties adduced, the trial judge, on February 12,
1917, rendered a judgment declaring that the plaintiffs receive nothing in this action and pay the
costs. To this decision the plaintiffs excepted and moved for a new trial, which motion was denied by
order of the court on the 27th day of the same month and year. An exception was taken to the order
denying the motion for a new trial, and the corresponding bill of exception was presented, approved,
certified, and forwarded to the office of the clerk of this court.
The parties are agreed as regard the allegations that the plaintiffs Rafael J. Ferrer and Maria
Angelina Ferrer are children of the deceased Rosa Matilde Viademonte, although the defendants
deny that they (plaintiffs) were legitimate children of their mother contrary to the affirmation of the
plaintiffs to this effect. The evidence of record concerning this point is of such a character that it is
difficult to deduce therefrom a certain and definite conclusion, because, while it appears that Rosa
Matilde Viademonte has, on various occasions, stated that she was unmarried and never contracted a
marriage, she has made entirely different statements on other occassions. In the proceedings
(Exhibit 8) instituted by the said Rosa Matilde against Rafael C. de Inchausti, it was disclosed that
she had never been married and that if her children with Benigno Ferrer were baptized as legitimate
children, it was so done in order to conceal her dishonor, such statement being found in a document
drawn in 1892 and signed by her (Exhibit 8, pp. 3-4). On page 159 of the records of the said
proceedings (Exhibit 8) it appears that said Rosa Matilde stated under oath before a judge, on
January 21. 1893, that she had never married, and the same declaration was made by her on April
15th of the same year in another case. (Exhibit 7, pp. 17-26.)
In a document found on page 166 of said Exhibit 8, executed in 1890, Rosa Matilde stated that she
was a widow; but, in a document executed in 1893, found on page 257 of Exhibit 8, and in a
document (Exhibit 1, page 136 of the first document executed in 1894) she made the statement that
she was unmarried. Rosa Matilde might have made these contradictions due perhaps to her extreme
poverty, which had prompted her to tell a lie before the courts of justice, with the sole purpose of
recovering the amount claimed by her as her legacy, while, on the hand, it is undeniable that she
could not duly justify the marriage contracted by her with Benigno Ferrer.
Even if the plaintiffs be considered as legitimate children of Rosa Matilde, Viademonte in her
marriage with Benigno Ferrer, still this action filed by them will not prosper, inasmuch as the
evidence adduced at the trial to prove the origin of the cause of action referred to shows, in a manner
which leaves no room for doubt that Rosa Matilde was not a legitimate daughter of Isabel Gonzalez,
and it follows that her children as well as her privies have no right to a part of the hereditary property
of said Isabel Gonzalez.
Counsel for plaintiffs pretend to establish that Rosa Matilde Viademonte had been treated and
considered as a daughter by Isabel Gonzalez, and as a sister the children of the latter; that, on one
occasion, said Gonzalez remarked that the father of Rosa Matilde was Ramon Martinez de
Viademonte; that Joaquin Matilde in the following manner: "To my dear and unforgettable sister
Rosa." that when Rosa Matilde entered the College de la Compania de Jesus, her name as recorded in
the registry of that college was Rosa Matilde Viademonte, and her expenses were defrayed by Rafael
de Inchausti and in the same registry said Rafael de Inchausti appears as brother of Rosa; that when
Rosa entered the Colegio de Santa Isabel, she used the same name and surname; that Ramon
Martinez de Viademonte, Jr., presented Rosa Matilde also sister, saying that the father of the same
was also his father named Ramon Martinez de Viademonte, while Rosa Matilde has always been
known by the same name and surname during the time she was studying in the Colegio de Luisa Oda
de Birgi; that Clotilde de Inchausti called Rosa Matilde her sister in her letters to Rafael Ripol, and
that Joaquin de Inchausti himself in the codicil of his testament designates Rosa Matilde with the
surname of Viademonte.
From all the evidence adduced, the slightest indication cannot be inferred that Rosa Matilde was
born during the marriage of Ramon Martinez de Viademonte, Sr., with Isabel Gonzalez or within the
300 days after the dissolution of their marriage by the death of the husband, nor has the said Ramon
Martinez de Viademonte, Sr., in his lifetime recognized said Rosa Matilde as his daughter. If Rosa
Matilde is a legitimate daughter of Isabel Gonzalez, it follows that she was also a daughter of Isabel's
husband, Ramon Martinez de Viademonte, under the assumption that she was born in the marriage
of both or at a time prior or subsequent to that of the celebration of the marriage, as fixed by law.
(Arts. 119, 120, 121, and 122 of the Civil Code.)
Legitimate filiation presupposes the existence of marriage contracted by the presumed parents in
accordance with law, and therefore a person can not be declared to be a legitimate daughter of her
mother, without presuming at the same time that she was born in the marriage of this mother with
the presumed father, who, in his lifetime, and without his consent, could not have been considered as
father of a child that was not conceived by his own wife, because the mere fact of having used his
surname after his death, without his assent or consent, does not constitute a proof of filiation of
parternity.
In this decision it is to be determined whether Rosa Matilde was born in the lifetime of Ramon
Martinez de viademonte to decide on the truth of the assertion made by the plaintiffs that their
predecessor in interest was a legitimate daughter of the said spouses Viademonte and Gonzalez.
At the trial, the death certificate of Ramon Martinez de Viademonte, first husband of Isabel
Gonzalez, was not presented in evidence; but it is uncontroverted that he died on September 30,
1836; as corroborated by the accountant of the naval division of Puerto Galkera in charge of the
Leiutenant of the Spanish Navy, Jose Atienza, saying that the Lieutenant, who had the rank of
captain in the navy, Ramon Viademonte, died on September 30, 1836, as appears in the list of
officers found in the payroll under his custody, having paid till the date of the death of said
Viademonte all his salaries corresponding to him as such officer, and further saying that, by request
of the widow of the deceased, he issued the proper certificate on December 31, 1836.
So certain is the death of said Ramon Martinez de Viademonte that his widow Isabel Gonzalez on
January 31, 1837, applied to the Government for a pension sufficient to cover her widowhood
expenses, alleging that she was a widow with children of the deceased. The application was made in a
paper stamped as of the years 1836 and 1837, a fact which proves the authenticity of the document
written in a stamped paper, and the presentation of said application by the widow demonstrates the
fact that her husband really died, wherefore she asked for a pension, because she would have been
held responsible if, in truth and in fact, her husband had been living and not dead as she claimed.
The said documents, as constituting a supplementary proof of the death of the deceased Ramon
Martinez, de Viademonte, appear to be corroborated by an entry in a notebook belonging to Ramon
Viademonte, Jr. wherein it is stated that his mother was married in 1833 to Ramon Martinez de
Viademonte who died on September 30, 1836, at the age of 33 years, being then a major in the naval
division assigned at Puerto Galera, Mindoro.
Notwithstanding the fact that the death certificate of said Ramon Martinez de Viademonte, first
husband of Isabel Gonzalez was not presented in evidence, still the documentary and circumstantial
evidence of record, especially the fact of the marriage of his widow Isabel Gonzalez with Jose Joaquin
de Inchausti, some years after the death of Viademonte died before that marriage or on September
30. 1836. If this be true, let us see on what day Rosa Matilde was born,, and in this way it will be
shown that she did not have the status of a legitimate child of those spouses, even after the
dissolution of their marriage by the death of the husband.
It appears in the certificate that on September 1, 1852, a child three days old, born of unknown
parents, was baptized in the Cathedral Church of this city, and given the name of Rosa Matilde
Robles. In view of the fact that the plaintiffs have not shown that such baptismal certificate was not
that of their mother Rosa Matilde, it remains proven therefore that said certificate was presented as
exhibit by Rafael C. de Inchausti in a case concerning the delivery of a legacy instituted against Rosa
Matilde, who, instead of denying that such a baptismal certificate referred to her, admitted that such
certificate might have been hers.
On Page 9 of the day-book which Ramon Martinez de Viademonte, Jr., kept during his lifetime,
appears a memorandum which says: On September 1, 1862, seven o'clock in the evening a children
three days old named Rosa Matilde Robles, according to the baptismal certificate issued by the acting
rector Don Ramon Fernandez of the Cathedral Church of Manila, was delivered to my mother; this
child was baptized by the priest Don Remegio Rodriguez with the authority of said rector, and
according to the baptismal certificate, it was a child of unknown parents." This memorandum agrees
with the above-mentioned baptismal certificate of Rosa Matilde Robles.
Notwithstanding the argument of counsel for the appellants Joaquin de Inchausti stated that one day
he was assured by his half-brother Ramon Martinez Viademonte that Rosa Matilde was not his sister,
91
but that she was only a mere protegee and that her true name was Rosa Matilde Robles, and that on
that occasion the said brother showed him the certificate of birth of which Exhibit 6 is a copy, which
he took from the parochial church.
In view of the fact that Ramon Martinez Viademonte is now dead, the testimony of Joaquin Jose de
Inchausti referring to the said deceased is admissible, for they are members of the same family, in
accordance with the provisions of section 281 of Act No. 190, and consequently, the conclusion is that
Rosa Matilde is the same Rosa Matilde Robels which is mentioned in Exhibit 6 and because she was
born in 1852, in no manner could her be legitimate daughter of Ramon Viademonte and Isabel
Gonzalez whose marriage was dissolved in 18365 by the death of the husband. Moreover, the witness
Pilar Abarca presented by the plaintiffs testified that she had known Rosa Matilde in the Colegio de
Santa Isabel in 1863, she being then 20 years old and Rosa, 9 years. If the witness Abarca was 73
years old on the date of giving this testimony in 1916, it follows that Rosa Matilde was born in 1854,
and that therefore she could not be a daughter of Ramon Martinez de Viademonte who died in 1836.
Notwithstanding the attempt of the plaintiffs to impugn the testimony of said witness, said testimony
is admissible according to section 263 of the Code of civil Procedure which provides the when part of
an act, declaration conservation, or writing is given in evidence by one party, the whole of the same
subject may be inquired into by the other. It is true that the said witness was not presented to prove
that the date of Rosa Matildes birth but the fact is that the age of the child is 9 years old as well as
that of a youth 19 or 22 years of age can be known from the appearance of the child, and even if, in
fixing the age of Rosa Matilde, as mistake has been made, said mistake could not be such as to reduce
her true age by 10 years; but even then and even supposing still that Rosa Matilde was 20 years old in
1863, the fact remains that she must have been born in 1843, and so she could not have been a
daughter of Ramon Martinez de Viademonte, Sr. that the age of a child 9 years old as well as that of a
youth 19 or 22 years of age can be known from the appearance of the child, and even if, in fixing the
age of Rosa Matilde, a mistake has been made, said mistake could not be such as to reduce her true
age by 10 years; but even then and even supposing still that Rosa Matilde was 20 years old in 1863,
the fact remains that she must have been born in 1843, and so could not have been a daugther of
Ramon Martinez de Viademonte, Sr.
Juan Ferrer, another witness for the plaintiffs, testified that Benigno Ferrer and Rosa Matilde
married in 1872, that Rosa Matilde must have been then between 22 and 30 years of age. It is
inferred from this testimony that, if Rosa Matilde could no be over 30 years old in 1872, she could
not have been born before 1842, and much less in 1836 or 1837.
The document No. 663, page 257 of Exhibit 8, appears to have been executed by Rosa Matilde in
1893, wherein she declared to the notary public before whom the document was executed that she
was then 39 years of age. If she was 39 years old in 1893, she could not have been born in 1854 and
much less in 1836 and 1837.
In Exhibit 1, page 135, which is a certified copy of a discharge in full executed by Rosa Matilde in
1894 in favor of Joaquin Jose de Inchausti, it is said that the maker of the deed was 40 years old,
thus corroborating ina convincing manner what has been stated regarding this point in the preceding
document.
In view of the objection and arguments made by counsel for the plaintiffs against the admission of
the aforementioned documents, it becomes necessary to say in this connection that it is undeniable
that Rosa Matilde, in executing said two documents, gave as her age those appearing therein, and
that there was no reason for the belief that she told a lie and tried to conceal her true age; but, even
admitting that we had made a mistake by telling that she was older or younger than she really was,
such a mistake could not have given a difference of 10 years from her true age, inasmuch as she was
an educated person, and it is not possible to believe that, through ignorance, she gave an age
difference from her true anger; and, even if 10 years be added to the age given by Rosa Matilde in the
documents referred to, still the fact remains that in 1894 she must have been only 50 years old and
that she must have been born in 1844. It is undisputed that Roa Matilde was born 16 years after the
death of Ramon Viademonte, and therefor could not be a daughter of the latter.
Counsel for plaintiffs objected to the admission in evidence of the day-book kept by Ramon Martinez
Viademonte, Jr., during his lifetime, alleging that it has not been proven that the entries in said book
were made at the same time that those events occurred; that the witness who identified it did not see
Ramon Martinez de Viademonte, Jr., in the act of making the said entries, and that, even if it were
so, still the writing contained in the book, being a mere memorandum of an interested party, can not
be admitted at the trial.
The above objection can be met and disposed of by the provisions of section 298, No. 13 of the Code
of Civil Procedure, which provides that evidence may be given upon trial of monuments and
inscriptions in public places as evidence of common reputation; and entries in family Bibles or other
family books or charts; engravings on rings, family portraits and the like, as evidence of pedigree.
The law does not require that the entries in the said booklet be made at the same time as the
occurrence of those events; hence, the written memorandum in the same is not subject to the defect
attributed to it, The witness Joaquin Jose de Inchausti declared affirmatively that the memorandum
under consideration has been written in the handwriting of his brother Ramon Martinez de
Viademonte, whose handwriting he was familiar with, and the testimony of this witness contains
some reference to a member of the family, now dead, and concerning the family genealogy of the
same.
It remains now to be decided whether Rosa Matilde Viademonte was a natural daughter of the
deceased Isabel Gonzalez or was a mere protegee cared for and maintained in the house of said
Isabel Gonzalez, and, if in the first case, the plaintiffs have the right to succeed ab intestato to a part
of the inheritance of Isabel Gonzalez in representation of their mother Rosa Matilde Viaddemante or
Robles.
The record does not furnish satisfactory proof that Rosa Matilde was a daugther or at least a natural
daughter of Isabel Gonzalez; on the other hand, it is shown in the records of the case that she was a
protegee in the house of said Isabel, for, in a conciliation proceeding had on April 15, 1893, between
Rosa Matilde and Joaquin F. de Inchausti, it appears in the record thereof that, although in some of
the documents presented to justify the accounts, Rosa Matilde called Rafael de Inchausti her brother,
this manner of calling him was due to the intimacy in which both have been brought up from
childhood in the same house, she being a mere protegee of the latter's parents, and of because they
were really brother and sister.
This statement made by Inchausti in the presence of Rosa Matilde Viademonte did not bring about a
protest or objection on the part of Rosa Matilde herself or her attorney. In addition to this fact,
Rafael C. De Inchausti stated under oath that it is not true that Rosa MatildeViademonte was his
maternal sister.
Rosa Viademonte herself, in a document dated June 15, 1894 (Exhibit 1, page 135), made the
statement that Jose Joaquin de Inchausti, who, together with his wife, cared for her since her early
childhood, bequeathed to her, by virtue of a codicil executed before a notary public on January 12,
1889, a legacy amounting to P4,000. The contents of this document constitute a most convincing
proof that Rosa Matilde was not a daughter of Isabel Gonzalez, but only a protegee of hers and of her
husband Jose Joaquin de Inchausti.
Ramon Viademonte, Jr., while yet living, told his brother Joaquin J. de Inchausti (record, p. 85), that
Rosa Matilde was not their sister but only a protegee of their parents, whose name was Rosa Matilde
Robles. It is thus fully proven in the records of the case that Rosa Matilde, the mother of the
plaintiffs, was not a daughter of Isabel Gonzalez.
Even supposing that Rosa Matilde was in fact a natural child of the deceased Isabel Gonzalez,
because the records show that it was impossible that he was a legitimate daughter of the latter, still it
cannot be disputed that the said Rosa Matilde could not inherit from her supposed natural mother,
Isabel Gonzalez.
It is a positive fact admitted by the plaintiffs that Isabel Gonzalez died in 1886(record, p. 325) or
some years before the Civil Code became operative in these Islands, and therefore, the hereditary
rights of the successors of the said deceased should be determined in accordance with the prior laws
or the Law of Toro, which provides, among other things, that natural children have no right to
succeed to their natural mother when, on her death, the latter leaves legitimate children, as in the
present case, and for this reason it is useless to inquire as to whether Rosa Viademonte or Robles was
a natural or even an acknowledged natural child of Isabel Gonzalez.
Rule 1 of the transitory provisions of the Civil Code invoked by the appellants provides as follows;
"Rights arising under the legislation prior to this code, out of matters carried out under its rules,
shall be governed by said prior legislation, even if the code should regulate them in another manner,
92
or does not recognize the same. But if said right is declared for the first time in this code, it shall be
effective at once, even when the act which gave rise thereto may have taken place under the prior
legislation, provided it does not prejudice other acquired rights having the same origin."
When Isabel Gonzalez died on December 12, 1886, or some time before the Civil Code became
effective in these Islands, she was survived by four children, the eldest being Ramon Viademonte had
with her first husband, and the other three, had with her second husband Jose Joaquin de Inchausti,
are Clotilde, Rafael, and Joaquin. On her death, the right to succeed her was transmitted by
operation of law to her legitimate and legitimated children, and for this reason, even supposing that
Rosa Matilde was a natural child of Isabel Gonzalez, she could not claim any right to the inheritance
of her supposed natural mother, inasmuch as against her right there exist the rights acquired by the
four legitimate and legitimated children of said Isabel Gonzalez, which rights can not be injured or
prejudiced in accordance with the conclusive provision of the aforementioned Rule 1 of the transitory
provision of the Civil Code.
Besides, the records show that the action brought by the plaintiffs has already prescribed, because
section 38 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that the rights of action which have already
accrued, with the exception of the two cases mentioned in the same section, among which the present
case is not included, must be vindicated by the commencement of an action or proceeding to enforce
the same within ten years after Act No. 190 came into effect, and, as this Act became operative in
1901, it is evident that the action instituted against the estate of Isabel Gonzalez has already
prescribed.
The plaintiffs, by their complaint, do not only seek the partition of the estate of the deceased Isabel
Gonzalez, but also and principally to recover the part of the inheritance corresponding to their
mother Rosa Matilde in her succession to the said deceased, so that the discussion during the
proceedings referred mainly to the question as to whether the plaintiffs were descendants of an
heiress to the said deceased, and if so, whether they had a right derived from their mother to a part of
the estate of Isabel Gonzalez. This action must be brought within ten years. He who brings an action
for the partition or division of hereditary estates or property in common is supposed to by a coheir
and to have an undisputed right to the property claimed or to be coowner of the same property
possessed in common. He who claims a right to a part of an inheritance of a deceased person, and
who alleges that he is a relative of the latter and has a right of testate or intestate succession thereto,
has for his principal object the recognition of his right to the inheritance claimed by him and the
delivery to him of his share as fixed by law.
Before concluding this decision, it must be stated that, on page 21 of the brief signed by Vicente Sotto
as the plaintiffs attorney, and after the first five lines thereof, the following statement appears: "It is
also established that Rosa Viademonte was born of Isabel Gonzalez in the year 1852, that is, during
the widowhood of the latter."
Counsel for the defendants with reason, qualify as false, this affirmation made by the counsel for the
plaintiffs to the effect that the judge has established the fact that Rosa Viademonte was born of Isabel
Gonzalez, when such affirmation does not appear in any part of the decision rendered by the said
judge.
This court can not look with indifference on any attempt to alter or falsify, for certain purposes, the
facts or their important details in the extracts or references that have to be made in proceedings or
records brought before it. All the records in a proceeding should contain and reflect the truth in such
a way that all who intervene in it may have absolute confidence that the course and procedure of a
trial are under the vigilance and inspection of the court.
It is unprofessional and worthy of the highest form of rebuke for a lawyer to attribute to a judge a
statement which he had not made in his decision, and in view of the fact that Vicente Sotto has
already been disbarred from the exercise of his profession by resolution of this court, it is deemed
unnecessary to determine what punishment shall be adopted for said act, which in his case, should
be imposed upon him as a lawyer
For the foregoing reasons, whereby the errors assigned to the judgment appealed from are deemed to
have been refuted, the said judgment should be, as it hereby is, affirmed and the defendants absolved
from the complaint, with the costs against the appellants. So ordered.
G.R. No. L-33049 November 29, 1976
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
GUILLERMO PUTIAN, alias GUIRMO accused-appellant.
Alaric P. Acosta for appellant.
Solicitor General Felix Q. Antonio, Assistant Solicitor General Crispin V. Bautista, and Solicitor
Leonardo I. Cruz for appellee.
AQUINO, J:
Guillermo Putian appealed from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Misamis Occidental,
finding him guilty of murder, sentencing him to reclusion perpetua and ordering him to indemnify
the heirs of Teodulo Panimdim in the sum of twelve thousand pesos (Criminal Case No. 6762).
The peculiarity of this case is that no eyewitness was presented to testify on the assault which
resulted in the victim's death (See People vs. Dahino, 88 Phil. 789 as to murder proven by
circumstantial evidence).
The prosecution presented only two witnesses: (1) The doctor who treated the victim at the hospital
and who testified on the nature of his wound and the cause of his death (Exh. A) and (2) the
policeman who arrested the accused and seized from him the dagger allegedly used in the stabbing
(Exh. B) and who took down the victim's ante-mortem statement Identifying "Guirmo" Putian as his
assailant (Exh. C).
On the other hand, the accused did not testify in his own behalf. The defense presented only one
witness. He testified that appellant Putian was in the dance hall when the victim was stabbed outside
that hall.
Hence, in this appeal our task is to determine whether the prosecution's evidence establishes
appellant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt and, if so, whether the offense is murder or homicide.
Those are the two issues raised by the appellant in his eight-page brief.
Appellant Putian admits that on November 22, 1969 while Teodulo Panimdim was attending a dance
at Barrio Tabo-o, Jimenez, Misamis Occidental, he (Panimdim) was stabbed in the left groin. As a
result of that assault, Panimdim died five days later at the provincial hospital (p. 3, brief). The
question is: Did Putian stab Panimdim?
According to the prosecution, in the evening of that day, November 22, while Patrolman Arturo Yap
was passing Barrio Tabo-o, he noticed a commotion at the back of the dance hall in that barrio. He
was informed that someone had been stabbed. He looked for the culprit. He found Guillermo Putian
behind the municipal building with a dagger and scabbard in his possession (Exh. B and B-1). Yap
investigated Putian. The latter denied that he stabbed Panimdim. Yap arrested Putian and
surrendered him to Jesus Gomonit, the guard at the municipal hall.
Patrolman Yap then repaired to the clinic of Doctor Saceda where the victim, Teodulo Panimdim,
alias Doling, was brought for treatment. At the clinic, Yap wrote on a piece of paper the victim's
declaration which is reproduced below (Exh. C):
ANTI-MORTEM Nov. 22,1969
Name of Victim — Teodolo Padimdim
(should be Panimdim)
Age — 21 single
Place — Palilan, Jimenez
Who stabbed you? — Guirmo Putian
93
Where? — Outside the dancing hall of Tabo-o
Why? None
What time? — 11:30 P.M.
Do you think you can suffer your wound? — Yes
Who is your companion? — Miguel Quilo,
Victorino Padimdim
Who is the companion of Guirmo? — I don't know their names
because they are plenty
Can you sign your name in this anti-mortem? — Yes
Statement taken by Pat.
Sign in the presence of
1. Victorino Panimdim
2. Ben Ybalane
3. Miguel Quilo
Witnesses
When that statement was taken, Panimdim was in a sitting position. Patrolman Yap advised him to
go to a hospital for treatment. Panimdim stood up, flexed his muscles and said that there was
nothing to worry about because the wound was small. Without anybody's help, he put on his
undershirt, pants and shirt. He went to his house without anyone's assistance.
Yap explained that Panimdim mentioned only a person named Guirmo and that he, Yap, was the one
who added the surname Putian in the statement Exhibit C. He clarified that he wrote that surname
because he knew of no other person called Guirmo in that locality except Guirmo Putian, an alleged
gambler (22 tsn).
On November 23, one day after the stabbing, the victim was brought to the hospital. An operation
was performed on him. He died in the hospital on November 27, or five days after he was assaulted
(Exh. D). The attending physician certified that the victim had a stab wound in the left groin which
penetrated the abdomen and punctured the large intestine. Death was due to "toxemia secondary to
general peritonitis" (Exh. A). The doctor testified that the stab wound could have been caused by the
two-bladed dagger (punyal), Exhibit B.
The slender evidence for the defense consists merely of the meager testimony of Anacleto Taporco,
54, the assistant provincial board secretary and former candidate for mayor, who claimed to be a
friend of Panimdim and a close friend of Putian. Taporco declared that in the evening of November
22, 1969 he was in the barrio dance hall together with appellant Putian, Olimpio Sitoy and Ramon
Gimeno. Panimdim was also there.
Taporco said that Panimdim, 21, asked his permission to box Rogelio Opos. Taporco allegedly
advised Panimdim not to do so because boxing Opos would cause trouble in the dance hall.
Panimdim obeyed him but sometime later Panimdim again asked Taporco that he be allowed to box
Opos. Taporco dissuaded Panimdim and took him outside the dance hall.
Afterwards, Taporco was allegedly informed that there was trouble. When he tried to find out what
the trouble was, he was informed that it was already patched up. During that interval, Putian never
left the dance hall.
The trial court, in convicting Putian, regarded Panimdim's ante-mortem statement as part of the res
gestae. Obviously, it did not give to that statement the probative value of a dying declaration because
the declarant at the time he made the statement was not under a consciousness of an impending
death (See see. 31, Rule 130, Rules of Court; People vs. Saliling, L-27974, February 27, 1976, 69 SCRA
427).
The trial court did not give any credence to Putian's alibi. It noted that he did not take the witness
stand to refute Panimdim's declaration naming Putian as his assailant. The trial court surmised that
through Putian's machinations some witnesses listed in the information did not testify for the
prosecution.
Appellant Putian challenges the trial court's ruling that Panimdim's ante-mortem statement was part
of the res gestae as envisaged in Rule 130 of the Rules of Court which provides:
SEC. 36. Part of the res gestae.— Statements made by a person while a startling
occurrence is taking place or immediately prior or subsequent thereto with
respect to the circumstances thereof, may be given in evidence as a part of
the res gestae. So, also, statements accompanying an equivocal act material to
the issue, and giving it a legal significance, may be received as a part of the res
gestae.
The res gestae rule embraces (a) spontaneous exclamations and (b) verbal acts (5 Moran's
Comments on the Rules of Court, 1970 Ed., p. 362). The trial court admitted Panimdim's statement
as a spontaneous statement made after the commission of a felony (People vs. Talledo and Timbreza,
85 Phil. 533).
Appellant Putian contends that Panimdim's statement was not spontaneous because it was "made
several hours after the incident". He claims that the requisite that the declarant gave the statement
before he had time to devise or contrive was not present in this case. Appellant further contends that
because the statement is in narrative form, it is not the statement contemplated in the rule.
On the other hand, the Solicitor General points out that the statement was in question-and-answer
form and that Panimdim's answers were spontaneous, candid, straightforward, direct, brief, concise,
natural and devoid of any design or deliberation. He argues that the fact that Patrolman Yap added
the surname Putian to the name "Guirmo", which was mentioned by the victim, did not destroy the
probative value of the statement because the appellant could have shown that there were other
persons in the locality named Guirmo but he failed to do so.
The Solicitor General cites the ruling that a declaration made by a person immediately after being
wounded, pointing out or naming his assailant, may be considered as part of the res gestae and is
admissible in evidence (People vs. Alfaro, 83 Phil. 85; People vs. Ananias, 96 Phil. 979).
We hold that the trial court did not err in characterizing Panimdim's statement as a part of the res
gestae and as proving beyond reasonable doubt that Putian inflicted upon him the stab wound that
caused his death five days later in the hospital.
The res gestae rule embraces (a) spontaneous exclamations and (b) verbal acts (5 Moran's
Comments on the Rules of Court, 1970 Ed., p. 362). The trial court admitted Panimdim's statement
as a spontaneous statement made after the commission of a felony (People vs. Talledo and Timbreza,
85 Phil. 533).
Appellant Putian contends that Panimdim's statement was not spontaneous because it was "made
several hours after the incident". He claims that the requisite that the declarant gave the statement
before he had time to devise or contrive was not present in this case. Appellant further contends that
because the statement is in narrative form, it is not the statement contemplated in the rule.
On the other hand, the Solicitor General points out that the statement was in question-and-answer
form and that Panimdim's answers were spontaneous, candid, straightforward, direct, brief, concise,
natural and devoid of any design or deliberation. He argues that the fact that Patrolman Yap added
the surname Putian to the name "Guirmo", which was mentioned by the victim, did not destroy the
probative value of the statement because the appellant could have shown that there were other
persons in the locality named Guirmo but he failed to do so.
The Solicitor General cites the ruling that a declaration made by a person immediately after being
wounded, pointing out or naming his assailant, may be considered as part of the res gestae and is
admissible in evidence (People vs. Alfaro, 83 Phil. 85; People vs. Ananias, 96 Phil. 979).
94
We hold that the trial court did not err in characterizing Panimdim's statement as a part of the res
gestae and as proving beyond reasonable doubt that Putian inflicted upon him the stab wound that
caused his death five days later in the hospital.
"Although a declaration does not appear to have been made by the declarant under the expectation of
a sure and impending death, and, for the reason, is not admissible as a dying declaration, yet if such
declaration was made at the time of, or immediately after, the commission of the crime, or at a time
when the exciting influence of the startling occurrence still continued in the declarant's mind, it is
admissible as a part of the res gestae" (5 Moran's Comments on the Rules of Court, 1970 Ed. pp, 373-
4, citing People vs. Palamos, 49 Phil. 601; People vs. Portento, 48 Phil. 971; People vs. Reyes, 52 Phil.
538).
Panimdim's statement was given sometime after the stabbing while he was undergoing treatment at
a medical clinic. He had no time to concoct a falsehood or to fabricate a malicious charge against
Putian (See People vs. Ner. L-25504, July 31, 1969, 28 SCRA 1151, 1161-2). No motive has been
shown as to why he would frame up Putian.
Appellant's alternative contention that treachery was not proven and, therefore, he can be convicted
only of homicide is meritorious. The evidence for the prosecution does not show the manner in which
the wound was inflicted. Hence, the crime imputable to appellant Putian is homicide (People vs.
Ramolete, L-28108, March 27, 1974, 56 SCRA 66, 80).
As correctly observed by the Solicitor General, the trial court erred in appreciating the aggravating
circumstance of nighttime. Nocturnity is not aggravating in this case because it was not purposely
sought by the offender to facilitate the commission of the crime.
The trial court's decision is modified. Appellant Putian is convicted of homicide. As the commission
of the crime was not attended by any modifying circumstances, he is sentenced to an indeterminate
penalty of ten (10) years of prision mayor as minimum to fifteen (15) years of reclusion
temporal medium as maximum. The indemnity of P12,000 fixed by the trial court is affirmed. Costs
against the appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Fernando (Chairman), Barredo, Concepcion, Jr. and Martin, JJ., concur.
Antonio, J., took no part.
Separate Opinions
BARREDO, J., concurring:
Even it has some doubts as to whether or not Exhibit C may be considered as part of the res
gestae because of the seeming serenity and coolness of the deceased when the same was allegedly
prepared, he believes that on the whole the circumstantial evidence in the used suffices for the
conviction of the appellant.
Separate Opinions
BARREDO, J., concurring:
Even it has some doubts as to whether or not Exhibit C may be considered as part of the res
gestae because of the seeming serenity and coolness of the deceased when the same was allegedly
prepared, he believes that on the whole the circumstantial evidence in the used suffices for the
conviction of the appellant.

G.R. No. L-19069 October 29, 1968
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
AMADEO PERALTA, ET AL., defendants,
ANDRES FACTORA, LEONARDO DOSAL, ANGEL PARUMOG, AMADEO PERALTA,
FLORENCIO LUNA and GERVASIO LARITA, defendants-review.
Assistant Solicitors General Vicente A. Torres and Antonio Ibarra for plaintiff-appellee.
J. R. Nuguid for defendants-review.
PER CURIAM:
In the decision in criminal case 7705 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal,subject of the present
automatic review, Amadeo Peralta, Andres Factora, Leonardo Dosal, Angel Parumog, Gervasio
Larita and Florencio Luna (six among the twenty-two defendants1 charged therein with multiple
murder) were pronounced guilty, and all sentenced to death, to indemnify jointly and severally the
heirs of each of the victims, namely, Jose Carriego, Eugenio Barbosaand Santos Cruz, in the sum of
P6,000, and each to pay his corresponding share of the costs.
The information recites:
That on or about the 16th day of February, 1958, in the municipality of Muntinglupa,
province of Rizal, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
abovenamed accused, who are convicts confined in the New Bilibid Prisons by virtue of
final judgments, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping and aiding one another,
with evident premeditation and treachery, all armed with deadly weapons, did, then and
there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously kill Jose Carriego, Eugenio Barbosa and Santos
Cruz, also convicts confined in the same institution, by hitting, stabbing and striking them
with ice picks, clubs and other improvised weapons, pointed and/or sharpened, thereby
inflicting upon the victims multiple serious injuries which directly caused their deaths.
That the aggravating circumstance of quasi-recidivism is present in the commission of the
crime in that the crime was committed after the accused have been convicted by final
judgments and while they are serving the said judgments in the New Bilibid Prisons.
Contrary to law with the following aggravating circumstances:
1. That the crime was committed with insult to public authorities;
2. That the crime was committed by a band;
3. That the crime was committed by armed men or persons who insure or afford impunity;
4. That use of superior strength or means was employed to weaken the defense;
5. That as a means to the commission of the crime doors and windows have been broken;
6. That means was employed which add ignominy to the natural effects of the act;
7. That the crime was committed where public authorities were engaged in the discharge of
their duties.
Upon motion of the provincial fiscal before trial, the lower court dismissed the charge against one of
the accused2for lack of evidence. After the prosecution had rested its case, the charges against six of
the accused3 were dismissed for failure of the prosecution to establish a prima facie case against
them. One of the defendants died4during the pendency of the case. After trial, the court a
quo acquitted eight5 of the remaining defendants.
As early as in 1956, a great number of inmates confined in the national penitentiary at Muntinglupa
arrayed themselves into two warring gangs, the "Sigue-Sigue" and the "OXO", the former composed
predominantly of Tagalog inmates, the latter comprised mainly of prisoners from the Visayas and
Mindanao. Since then the prison compound has been rocked time and time again by bloody riots
95
resulting in the death of many of their members and suspected sympathizers. In an effort to avert
violent clashes between the contending groups, prison officials segrerated known members of the
"Sigue-Sigue" from those of the "OXO". Building 1 housed "Sigue-Sigue" members, while a majority
of the prisoners confined in Bldg. 4 belonged to the "OXO". Even in Bldg. 4, which is composed of
four brigades, namely, 4-A and 4-B (upper floor) and 4-C and 4-D (first floor), inmates from Visayas
and Mindanao, from whom the "OXO" drew most of its members, were confined in 4-A.
It was at about 7:00 a.m. on February 16, 1958, while the inmates of the penitentiary were preparing
to attend Sunday mass, that a fight between two rival members of the "Sigue-Sigue" and "OXO"
gangs occurred in the plaza where the prisoners were assembled, causing a big commotion. The fight
was, however, quelled, and those involved were led away for investigation, while the rest of the
prisoners were ordered to return to their respective quarters. Hardly had conditions returned to
normal when a riot broke out in Bldg. 1, a known lair of the "Sigue-Sigue". The inmates thereof tried
to invade Bldg. 4, where many members and sympathizers of the "OXO" gang were confined. The
timely arrival of the guards forced the invading inmates to retreat and return to Bldg. 1. Moments
later, another riot erupted in Bldg. 4, as the inmates of brigade 4-A destroyed the lock of their door
and then rampaged from one brigade to another. The invading prisoners from 4-A, mostly "OXO"
members and sympathizers, clubbed and stabbed to death Jose Carriego, an inmate of 4-B.
Afterwards, they forcibly opened the door of 4-C and killed two more inmates, namely, Eugenio
Barbosa and Santos Cruz.
The three victims sustained injuries which swiftly resulted in their death — before they could be
brought to the hospital.
Jose Carriego: (a) lacerated wound on the lower lip, 5 cm. in length and 3 cm.in depth; (b) contusion
and hematoma of the back of the neck, about 2 inches in diameter; and (c) five punctured wounds in
the chest, penetrating the lungs. Cause of death: internal hemorrhage from multiple fatal wounds in
the chest.
Eugenio Barbosa: (a) lacerated wound in the occipital region, 3 inches in length and 1 cm. in depth;
(b) two penetrating wounds in the abdomen, puncturing the intestines; (c) lacerated wounds on the
right oxilla, 3 cm. in length and 2 cm. in depth; and (d) several bruises at the right and left lower
extremities. Cause of death: shock, secondary to internal hermorrhage in the abdomen.
Santos Cruz: (a) lacerated wound on the head, 2 inches in length; (b) fractured skull; (c) wound on
the upper lip cutting the lip in two; (d) seven punctured wounds in the chest, two of which were
penetrating; (e) hematoma on the right hand; and (f) three punctured wounds on the left hand.
Cause of death: fractured skull.
Romeo Pineda, an inmate and first quarter-in-charge of brigade 4-B, testified that while he was
taking his breakfast with Jose Carriego, who was at the time the representative of the prisoners
confined in 4-B to the inmate carcel, he "suddenly heard commotion" near the door of their brigade;
that his fellow prisoners started shouting "pinapasok na tayo," as the invading inmates from brigade
4-A stampeded into 4-B; that he and Carriego took hold of their clubs and stood at the end of the
passageway; that he saw Carriego surrender his club to Andres Factora, an "OXO" member from 4-A;
that as Carriego started to walk away, Factora clubbed Carriego on the nape causing the latter to fall;
that Factora turned up the face of his fallen victim and struck him again in the face; that while
Carriego was in this prostrate position, Amadeo Peralta and Leonardo Dosal, companions of Factora,
repeatedly stabbed him.
The testimony of Pineda was corroborated in all its material points by Juanito Marayoc and Avelino
Sauza, both inmates of 4-B. These two prosecution witnesses identified Factora, Peralta and Dosal as
the assailants of Carriego.
From 4-B, the invading inmates of 4-A went down and forcibly entered 4-C. According to Oscar
Fontillas, an inmate of 4-C, he saw the prisoners from 4-A rushing toward their brigade; that among
the invading inmates who forced open the door of 4-C, with help from the inside provided by Visayan
prisoners confined in 4-C, were Factora, Dosal, Angel Parumog, Gervacio Larita, Ernesto Fernandez
and Jose Tariman; that he saw Factora, Larita and Fernandez kill Barbosa, while the rest of their
companies instructed the Visayans to leave their cell and ordered the "Manila boys" (Tagalogs) to
remain. Antonio Pabarlan, another inmate of 4-C, declared that he saw Peralta stab Barbosa, as
Dosal, Larita, Florencio Luna, Parumog and Factora clubbed the hapless victim. Another inmate of 4-
C, Jose Halili, not only corroborated the testimony of Fontillas and Pabarlan but as well added grim
details. He declared that while Barbosa was trying to hide under a cot, he was beaten and stabbed to
death by Dosal, Parumog, Factora and Fernandez, with Luna, Larita, Pedro Cogol and Eilel Tugaya
standing guard, armed with clubs and sharp instruments, in readiness to repel any intervention from
the Tagalog inmates. Carlos Espino, also confined in 4-C, declared that he saw Parumog, Peralta
Factora and Larita assault and kill Barbosa.
The same witnesses for the prosecution testifies that after killing Barbosa, the invading "OXO"
members and sympathizers proceeded to hunt for Santos Cruz, another Tagalog like Carriego and
Barbosa. Halili testified, that he saw Peralta, Larita, Cogol and Tugaya take Santos Cruz to 4-A from
4-C; that Santos Cruz knelt down and pleaded for his life, saying, "Maawa kayo sa akin. Marami
akong anak;" that Luna and Peralta were unmoved as they stabbed Santos Cruz to death. Pabarlan
declared that after the death of Barbosa, Santos Cruz was brought to 4-A by the invading inmates but
Cruz was able to slip back to his cell only to be recaptured by Factora, Dosal and Luna and brought to
near the fire escape where he was clubbed and stabbed to death by Parumog, Dosal, Factora and
Peralta. Fontillas and Espino corroborated the declarations of Halili and Pabarlan with respect to the
killing of Santos Cruz, and both mentioned Larita as one of the assailants of Cruz.
The trial judge summarized the evidence for the prosecution, thus:
"... it clearly appears that the three killings in question were an offshoot of the rivalry
between the two organizations. All those who were killed, namely, Barbosa, Carriego and
Santos Cruz, were Tagalogs and well known as members if not sympathizers of the Sigue
Sigue, while the accused so charged with their killing were mostly members if not
sympathizers of the Oxo organization. These three killings were sparked by the commotion
that happened in the plaza between 8:00 and 9:00 in the morning, while the prisoners
were preparing to go the mass ... It was evident that the clash that occurred in the plaza
produced a chain reaction among the members and followers of the two organizations. The
inmates of Building No. 1, known lair of the Sigue Sigues bolted the door of their cells and
tried to invade Building No. 4 where a big number of the Oxo members and their
sympathizers were confined, but, however, were forced to retreat by the timely arrival of
the guards who sent them back to their building. When the members of the Oxo in
Building No. 4 learned about this, they went on a rampage looking for members of the
Sigue Sigue or their sympathizers who were confined with them in the same building. As
the evidence of the prosecution shows, the accused who were confined in Brigade 4-A of
Building No. 4 led the attack. They destroyed the lock of their dormitories and with the
help of their companions succeeded in bolting the door of the different brigades, and once
they succeeded in bolting the doors of the different brigades, they went inside and tried to
segregate the Tagalogs from their group; that as soon as they discovered their enemies they
clubbed and stabbed them to death ...
Admitting that he was one among several who killed Jose Carriego, Peralta nevertheless claims self-
defense. He testified that on the morning of the riot he was attacked by Carriego and Juan Estrella
near the door of 4-A while he was returning to his brigade from the chapel with some companions;
that Carriego clubbed him on the head; that he was able to parry the second blow of Carriego and
then succeeded in squeezing Carriego's head with his hands; that forthwith he whipped out an
improvised ice pick and stabbed Carriego several times; that when he (Peralta) was already dizzy due
to the head wound he sustained from the clubbing, Carriego managed to slip away; that he then
became unconscious, and when he regained consciousness he found himself on a tarima with his
head bandaged.
Peralta's declarations do not inspire belief. The impressive array of prosecution witnesses who saw
him actively participate in the killing of the three victims pointed to him as the aggressor, not the
aggrieved. Pineda, Marayoc and Sauza positively identified him as one of the assailants of Carriego.
Contrary to the pretensions of Peralta, Carriego an alleged "Sigue-Sigue" member, would not have
attacked him, knowing fully well that Building No. 4 was an "OXO" lair where the "Sigue-Sigue"
members were outnumbered. Anent the killing of Barbosa and Santos Cruz, Peralta failed to offer
any explicit defense to rebut the inculpatory declarations of prosecution witnesses Pabarlan and
Espino who saw him participate in the killing of Barbosa and those of Halili, Fontillas and Espino
who identified him as one of the murderers of Santos Cruz.
For his part, Leonardo Dosal stated that he killed Santos Cruz, but also claims self-defense in
exculpation. He declared that Santos Cruz, Jose Carriego, Juanita Espino, Carlos Espino and Oscar
Fontillas invaded 4-A where he was confined; that a free-for-all forthwith ensued; that he then heard
Santos Cruz call Carlos Espino, and advise the latter to go away as "I will be the one to kill that
96
person (Dosal);" that with a sharp instrument, Cruz hit him on the head and then on the nose; that as
Cruz was about to hit him again, he got hold of his ice pick and stabbed Cruz repeatedly until the
latter fell.
Dosal's avowal is clearly belied by the positive testimonies of Pabarlan, Halili and Espino who saw
him participate in the killing of Santos Cruz. If it is true that Dosal killed Santos Cruz in self-defense
when the latter together with his companions supposedly invaded Dosal's brigade (4-A), why is it
that the body of Santos Cruz was found at the fire escape near the pasillo between 4-C and 4-D of the
first floor of Bldg. 1 instead of in 4-A which is located in the upper floor? Moreover, Dosal failed to
explain why he was seen in 4-C, which he does not deny, since he was an inmate of 4-A where he was
allegedly attacked. With respect to the murder of Carriego and Barbosa with which Dosal was also
charged, he did not offer any evidence in his behalf. Hence, the testimonies of Pineda, Marayoc and
Sauza identifying him as one of the killers of Carriego and those of Pabarlan, Halili and Espino
implicating him in the death of Santos Cruz, stand unrebutted.
Andres Factora declared that he clubbed Carriego and Santos Cruz under compulsion of his co-
accused who threatened to kill him if he disobeyed their order; that he did not hit Barbosa anymore
because the latter was already dead; that it was his co-accused who actually killed the three victims.
Again, the declarations of the prosecution witnesses, which were accorded full credence by the trial
court, expose the guilt of Factora beyond reasonable doubt. In fact, according to Pineda, whose
testimony was corroborated by Marayoc, it was Factora who started the mass assault by clubbing
Carriego treacherously. Fontillas, Halili, Pabarlan and Espino pointed to Factora as one of the killers
of Barbosa, while at least three prosecution witnesses, namely, Pabarlan, Fontillas and Espino, saw
Factora participate in the slaying of Santos Cruz. The active participation of Factora in the killing,
which is clear index of voluntariness, thus negates his claim of compulsion and fear allegedly
engendered by his co-accused.
Angel Parumog, Gervasio Larita and Florencio Luna take refuge in the exculpatory device of alibi.
Parumog testified that he did not participate in the killing of the three inmates because he stayed
during that entire hapless day in the office of the trustees for investigation after the fight in the plaza;
that he was implicated in the killing by the prosecution witnesses because of his refusal to accede to
their request to testify against his co-accused; that he is not a Visayan but a Tagalog from Nueva
Ecija. Larita claims that he did not know about the killing until he was informed that three inmates
had died; that on the day in question he was brought to the police trustee brigade for investigation
after the incident in the plaza; that he was escorted back to his brigade only in the afternoon. Luna
likewise disclaims any knowledge of the killing and asserts that for the entire duration of the riot he
remained in his cell (brigade 4-A).
The alibis of Parumog, Larita and Luna merit no credence when set against the positive testimonies
of prosecution witness identifying them as participants in the killing of Barbosa and Santos Cruz.
Pabarlan, Espino and Fontillas declared that Larita was one of the killers of Barbosa; Espino and
Fontillas declared that they saw Larita kill Santos Cruz; Pabarlan, Halili and Espino testified that
they saw Parumog participate in the murder of Barbosa; Espino, Fontillas and Pabarlan stated that
Parumog took part in the killing of Santos Cruz. Pabarlan and Halili declared that Luna participated
in the fatal assault on Barbosa and Santos Cruz.
The alibis of the accused are thus sufficiently overcome by strong evidence to the contrary. The
defense of alibi is generally weak since it is easy to concoct. For this reason, courts view it with no
small amount of caution, and accept it only when proved by positive, clear and satisfactory
evidence.6 In the case at bar, if Parumog and Larita were really confined in the police trustee brigade
for investigation on the day of the incident, there should have been a record of the alleged
investigation. But none was presented. The testimony of Luna that throughout the riot he stayed in
his cell is quite unnatural. He claims that he did not even help his cellmates barricade their brigade
with tarimas in order to delay if not prevent the entry of the invading inmates. According to him, he
"just waited in one corner."
The rule is settled that the defense of alibi is worthless in the face of positive identification by
prosecution witnesses pointing to the accused as particeps criminis.7 Moreover, the defense of alibi is
an issue of fact the resolution of which depends almost entirely on the credibility of witnesses who
seek to establish it. In this respect the relative weight which the trial judge accords to the testimony
of the witnesses must, unless patently inconsistent without evidence on record, be accepted. 8 In the
case at bar, the trial court, in dismissing the alibis of Parumog, Larita and Luna, said that "their mere
denial cannot prevail over the positive testimony of the witnesses who saw them participate directly
in the execution of the conspiracyto kill Barbosa, Carriego and Santos Cruz."
The killing of Carriego constitutes the offense of murder because of the presence of treachery as a
qualifying circumstance: Carriego was clubbed by Factora from behind, and as he lay prostrate and
defenseless, Peralta and Dosal stabbed him repeatedly on the chest. The blow on the nape and the
penetrating chest wounds were all fatal, according to Dr. Bartolome Miraflor. Abuse of superior
strength qualified the killing of Barbosa and Santos Cruz to the category of murder. The victims, who
were attacked individually were completely overwhelmed by their assailants' superiority in number
and weapons and had absolutely no chance at all to repel or elude the attack. All the attackers were
armed with clubs or sharp instruments while the victims were unarmed, as so found by the trial
court. In fact, Halili testified that Barbosa was clubbed and stabbed to death while he was trying to
hide under a cot, and Santos Cruz was killed while he was on his knees pleading for his life.
The essential issue that next confronts us is whether conspiracy attended the commission of the
murders. The resolution of this issue is of marked importance because upon it depends the quantity
and quality of the penalties that must be imposed upon each of the appellants.
For this purpose, it is not amiss to briefly restate the doctrine on conspiracy, with particular
emphasis on the facets relating to its nature, the quantum of proof required, the scope and extent of
the criminal liability of the conspirators, and the penalties imposable by mandate of applicable law.
Doctrine. A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it. 9 Generally, conspiracy is not a crime except when
the law specifically provides a penalty therefor as in treason, 10 rebellion11 and sedition.12 The crime of
conspiracy known to the common law is not an indictable offense in the Philippines. 13 An agreement
to commit a crime is a reprehensible act from the view-point of morality, but as long as the
conspirators do not perform overt acts in furtherance of their malevolent design, the sovereignty of
the State is not outraged and the tranquility of the public remains undisturbed. However, when in
resolute execution of a common scheme, a felony is committed by two or more malefactors, the
existence of a conspiracy assumes pivotal importance in the determination of the liability of the
perpetrators. In stressing the significance of conspiracy in criminal law, this Court in U.S. vs. Infante
and Barreto14 opined that
While it is true that the penalties cannot be imposed for the mere act of conspiring to
commit a crime unless the statute specifically prescribes a penalty therefor, nevertheless
the existence of a conspiracy to commit a crime is in many cases a fact of vital importance,
when considered together with the other evidence of record, in establishing the existence,
of the consummated crime and its commission by the conspirators.
Once an express or implied conspiracy is proved, all of the conspirators are liable as co-principals
regardless of the extent and character of their respective active participation in the commission of the
crime or crimes perpetrated in furtherance of the conspiracy because in contemplation of law the act
of one is the act of all.15 The foregoing rule is anchored on the sound principle that "when two or
more persons unite to accomplish a criminal object, whether through the physical volition of one, or
all, proceeding severally or collectively, each individual whose evil will actively contributes to the
wrong-doing is in law responsible for the whole, the same as though performed by himself
alone."16 Although it is axiomatic that no one is liable for acts other than his own, "when two or more
persons agree or conspire to commit a crime, each is responsible for all the acts of the others, done in
furtherance of the agreement or conspiracy."17 The imposition of collective liability upon the
conspirators is clearly explained in one case18 where this Court held that
... it is impossible to graduate the separate liability of each (conspirator) without taking
into consideration the close and inseparable relation of each of them with the criminal act,
for the commission of which they all acted by common agreement ... The crime must
therefore in view of the solidarity of the act and intent which existed between the ...
accused, be regarded as the act of the band or party created by them, and they are all
equally responsible ...
Verily, the moment it is established that the malefactors conspired and confederated in the
commission of the felony proved, collective liability of the accused conspirators attaches by reason of
the conspiracy, and the court shall not speculate nor even investigate as to the actual degree of
participation of each of the perpetrators present at the scene of the crime. Of course, as to any
conspirator who was remote from the situs of aggression, he could be drawn within the enveloping
97
ambit of the conspiracy if it be proved that through his moral ascendancy over the rest of the
conspirators the latter were moved or impelled to carry out the conspiracy.
In fine, the convergence of the wills of the conspirators in the scheming and execution of the crime
amply justifies the imputation to all of them the act of any one of them. It is in this light that
conspiracy is generally viewed not as a separate indictable offense, but a rule for collectivizing
criminal liability.
The ensnaring nature of conspiracy is projected in bold relief in the cases of malversation and rape
committed in furtherance of a common design.
The crime of malversation is generally committed by an accountable public officer who
misappropriates public funds or public property under his trust. 19 However, in the classic case
of People vs. Ponte20 this Court unequivocally held that a janitor and five municipal policemen, all of
whom were not accountable public officers, who conspired and aided a municipal treasurer in the
malversation of public funds under the latter's custody, were principally liable with the said
municipal treasurer for the crime of malversation. By reason of conspiracy, the felonious act of the
accountable public officer was imputable to his co-conspirators, although the latter were not
similarly situated with the former in relation to the object of the crime committed. Furthermore, in
the words of Groizard, "the private party does not act independently from the public officer; rather,
he knows that the funds of which he wishes to get possession are in the latter's charge, and instead of
trying to abstract them by circumventing the other's vigilance he resorts to corruption, and in the
officer's unfaithfulness seeks and finds the most reprehensible means of accomplishing a deed which
by having a public officer as its moral instrument assumes the character of a social crime." 21 In an
earlier case22 a non-accountable officer of the Philippine Constabulary who conspired with his
superior, a military supply officer, in the malversation of public funds was adjudged guilty as co-
principal in the crime of malversation, although it was not alleged, and in fact it clearly appeared,
that the funds misappropriated were not in his custody but were under the trust of his superior, an
accountable public officer.
In rape, a conspirator is guilty not only of the sexual assault he personally commits but also of the
separate and distinct crimes of rape perpetrated by his co-conspirators. He may have had carnal
knowledge of the offended woman only once but his liability includes that pertaining to all the rapes
committed in furtherance of the conspiracy. Thus, in People vs. Villa,23 this Court held that
... from the acts performed by the defendants front the time they arrived at Consolacion's
house to the consummation of the offense of rape on her person by each and everyone of
them, it clearly appears that they conspired together to rape their victim, and therefore
each one is responsible not only for the rape committed personally by him, but also that
committed by the others, because each sexual intercourse had, through force, by each one
of the defendants with the offended was consummated separately and independently from
that had by the others, for which each and every one is also responsible because of the
conspiracy.
The rule enunciated in People vs. Villa was reiterated in People vs. Quitain24 where the appellant
Teofilo Anchita was convicted of forcible abduction with double rape for having conspired and
cooperated in the sexual assault of the aggrieved woman, although he himself did not actually rape
the victim. This Court observed:
We have no doubt all in all that Teofilo Anchita took part in the sexual assault ... the
accused inserted his fingers in the woman's organ, and widened it. Whether he acted out of
lewdness or to help his brother-in-law consummate the act, is immaterial; it was both
maybe. Yet, surely, by his conduct, this prisoner conspired and cooperated, and is guilty.
With respect to robbery in band, the law presumes the attendance of conspiracy so much so that "any
member of a band who is present at the commission of a robbery by the band, shall be punished as
principal of any of the assaults committed by the band, unless it be shown that he attempted to
prevent the same."25 In this instance, conspiracy need not be proved, as long as the existence of a
band is clearly established. Nevertheless, the liability of a member of the band for the assaults
committed by his group is likewise anchored on the rule that the act of one is the act of all.
Proof of conspiracy. While conspiracy to commit a crime must be established by positive
evidence,26 direct proof is not essential to show conspiracy. 27 Since by it nature, conspiracy is planned
in utmost secrecy, it can seldom be proved by direct evidence. 28 Consequently, competent and
convincing circumstantial evidence will suffice to establish conspiracy. According to People vs.
Cabrera,29 conspiracies are generally proved by a number of indefinite acts, conditions, and
circumstances which vary according to the purposes to be accomplished. If it be proved that the
defendants pursued by their acts the same object, one performing one part and another another part
of the same, so as to complete it, with a view to the attainment of the same object, one will be
justified in the conclusion that they were engaged in a conspiracy to effect the object." Or as
elucidated in People vs. Carbonel30the presence of the concurrence of minds which is involved in
conspiracy may be inferred from "proofs of facts and circumstances which, taken together,
apparently indicate that they are merely parts of some complete whole. If it is proved that two or
more persons aimed by their acts towards the accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each
doing a part so that their acts, though apparently independent, were in fact connected and
cooperative, indicating a closeness of personal association and a concurrence of sentiment, a
conspiracy may be inferred though no actual meeting among to concert means is proved ..." In two
recent cases,31 this Court ruled that where the acts of the accused, collectively and individually,
clearly demonstrate the existence of a common design toward the accomplishment of the same
unlawful purpose, conspiracy is evident.
Conspiracy presupposes the existence of a preconceived plan or agreement; however, to establish
conspiracy, "it is not essential that there be proof as to previous agreement to commit a crime, it
being sufficient that the malefactors committed shall have acted in concert pursuant to the same
objective."32 Hence, conspiracy is proved if there is convincing evidence to sustain a finding that the
malefactors committed an offense in furtherance of a common objective pursued in concert.
Liability of conspirators. A time-honored rule in the corpus of our jurisprudence is that once
conspiracy is proved, all of the conspirators who acted in furtherance of the common design are
liable as co-principals.33 This rule of collective criminal liability emanates from the ensnaring nature
of conspiracy. The concerted action of the conspirators in consummating their common purpose is a
patent display of their evil partnership, and for the consequences of such criminal enterprise they
must be held solidarity liable.
However, in order to hold an accused guilty as co-principal by reason of conspiracy, it must be
established that he performed an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy, either by actively
participating in the actual commission of the crime, or by lending moral assistance to his co-
conspirators by being present at the scene of the crime, or by exerting moral ascendancy over the rest
of the conspirators as to move them to executing the conspiracy. The difference between an accused
who is a principal under any of the three categories enumerated in Art. 17 of the Revised Penal Code
and a co-conspirator who is also a principal is that while the former's criminal liability is limited to
his own acts, as a general rule, the latter's responsibility includes the acts of his fellow conspirators.
In People vs. Izon, et al.,34 this Court acquitted appellant Francisco Robles, Jr., who was convicted by
the trial court of robbery with homicide as a conspirator, on the ground that although he may have
been present when the conspiracy to rob was proposed and made, "Robles uttered not a word either
of approval or disapproval. There are authorities to the effect that mere presence at the discussion of
a conspiracy, even approval of it, without any active participation in the same, is not enough for
purposes of conviction." In a more recent case,35this Court, in exonerating one of the appellants, said:
There is ample and positive evidence on record that appellant Jose Guico was absent not
only from the second meeting but likewise from the robbery itself. To be sure, not even the
decision under appeal determined otherwise. Consequently, even if Guico's participation in
the first meeting sufficiently involved him with the conspiracy (as he was the one who
explained the location of the house to be robbed in relation to the surrounding streets and
the points thereof through which entrance and exit should be effected), such participation
and involvement, however, would be inadequate to render him criminally liable as a
conspirator. Conspiracy alone, without the execution of its purpose, is not a crime
punishable by law, except in special instances (Article 8, Revised Penal Code) which,
however, do not include robbery.
Imposition of multiple penalties where conspirators commit more than one offense. Since in
conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all, then, perforce, each of the conspirators is liable for all of
the crimes committed in furtherance of the conspiracy. Consequently, if the conspirators commit
three separate and distinct crimes of murder in effecting their common design and purpose, each of
them is guilty of three murders and shall suffer the corresponding penalty for each offense. Thus
in People vs. Masin,36 this Court held:
98
... it being alleged in the information that three crimes were committed not simultaneously
indeed but successively, inasmuch as there was, at least, solution of continuity between
each other, the accused (seven in all) should be held responsible for said crimes. This
court holds that the crimes are murder ... In view of all these circumstances and of the
frequently reiterated doctrine that once conspiracy is proven each and every one of the
conspirators must answer for the acts of the others, provided said acts are the result of the
common plan or purpose ... it would seem evident that the penalty that should be imposed
upon each of the appellants for each of their crimes should be the same, and this is the
death penalty ... (emphasis supplied).
In the aforesaid case, however, the projected imposition of three death penalties upon each of the
conspirators for the three murders committed was not carried out due to the lack of the then
requisite unanimity in the imposition of the capital penalty.
In another case,37 this Court, after finding that conspiracy attended the commission of eleven
murders, said through Mr. Justice Tuason:
Some members of this Court opine that the proper penalty is death, under the
circumstances of the case, but they fall short of the required number for the imposition of
this punishment. The sentence consequently is reclusion perpetua; but each appellant is
guilty of as many crimes of murder as there were deaths (eleven) and should be
sentenced to life imprisonment for each crime, although this may be a useless formality for
in no case can imprisonment exceed forty years. (Emphasis supplied.)
In People vs. Masani,38 the decision of the trial court imposing only one life imprisonment for each of
the accused was modified by this Court on appeal on the ground that "inasmuch as their (the
conspirators') combined attack resulted in the killing of three persons, they should be sentenced to
suffer said penalty (reclusion perpetua) for each of the three victims (crimes)." (Emphasis supplied.)
It is significant to note that in the abovementioned cases, this Court consistently stressed that once
conspiracy is ascertained, the culpability of the conspirators is not only solidary (all co-principals)
but also multiple in relation to the number of felonies committed in furtherance of the conspiracy. It
can also be said that had there been a unanimous Court in the Masin and Macaso cases, multiple
death penalties would have been imposed upon all the conspirators.
Legality and practicality of imposing multiple death penalties upon conspirators. An accused who
was charged with three distinct crimes of murder in a single information was sentenced to two death
penalties for two murders,39 and another accused to thirteen (13) separate death penalties for the 13
killings he perpetrated.40 Therefore there appears to be no legal reason why conspirators may not be
sentenced to multiple death penalties corresponding to the nature and number of crimes they
commit in furtherance of a conspiracy. Since it is the settled rule that once conspiracy is established,
the act of one conspirator is attributable to all, then each conspirator must be held liable for each of
the felonious acts committed as a result of the conspiracy, regardless of the nature and severity of the
appropriate penalties prescribed by law.
The rule on the imposition of multiple penalties where the accused is found guilty of two or more
separate and distinct crimes charged in one information, the accused not having interposed any
objection to the multiplicity of the charges, was enunciated in the leading case of U.S. vs.
Balaba,41 thus: Upon conviction of two or more offenses charged in the complaint or information, the
prescribed penalties for each and all of such offenses may be imposed, to be executed in conformity
with the provisions of article 87 of the Penal Code [now article 70 of the Revised Penal Code]. In
other words, all the penalties corresponding to the several violations of law should be imposed.
Conviction for multiple felonies demands the imposition of multiple penalties.
The two conceptual exceptions to the foregoing rule, are the complex crime under article 48 of the
Revised Penal Code and the special complex crime (like robbery with homicide). Anent an ordinary
complex crime falling under article 48, regardless of the multiplicity of offenses committed, there is
only one imposable penalty — the penalty for the most serious offense applied in its maximum
period. Similarly, in special complex crimes, there is but a single penalty prescribed by law
notwithstanding the number of separate felonies committed. For instance, in the special complex
crime of robbery with hommicide the imposible penalty is reclusion perpetua to death42 irrespective
of the number of homicides perpetrated by reason or on occasion of the robbery.
In Balaba, the information charged the accused with triple murder. The accused went to trial without
objection to the said information which charged him with more than one offense. The trial court
found the accused guilty of two murders and one homicide but it imposed only one death penalty. In
its review en consulta, this Court modified the judgment by imposing separate penalties for each of
the three offenses committed. The Court, thru Mr. Justice Carson (with Mr. Justice Malcolm
dissenting with respect to the imposition of two death penalties), held:
The trial judge was erroneously of the opinion that the prescribed penalties for the offenses
of which the accused was convicted should be imposed in accord with the provisions of
article 89 of the Penal Code. That article is only applicable to cases wherein a single act
constitutes two or more crimes, or when one offense is a necessary means for committing
the other. (U.S. vs. Ferrer, 1 Phil. Rep., 56)
It becomes our duty, therefore, to determine what penalty or penalties should have been
imposed upon the accused upon conviction of the accused of three separate felonies
charged in the information.
There can be no reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the convict of two separate crimes
of asesinato (murder) marked with the generic aggravating circumstances mentioned in
the decision of the trial judge ... It follows that the death penalty must and should be
imposed for each of these offenses ...
Unless the accused should be acquitted hereafter on appeal of one or both
the asesinatos with which he is charged in the information, it would seem to be a useless
formality to impose separate penalties for each of the offenses of which he was convicted,
in view of the nature of the principal penalty; but having in mind the possibility that the
Chief Executive may deem it proper to grant a pardon for one or more of the offenses
without taking action on the others; and having in mind also the express provisions of the
above cited article 87 of the Penal Code, we deem it proper to modify the judgment entered
in the court below by substituting for the penalty imposed by the trial judge under the
provisions of article 89 of the Code, the death penalty prescribed by law for each of the
two separate asesinatos of which he stands convicted, and the penalty of 14 years, 8
months and 1 day of reclusion temporal (for the separate crime of homicide) ... these
separate penalties to be executed in accord with the provisions of article 87 of the Penal
Code. (Emphasis supplied.)
The doctrine in Balaba was reiterated in U.S. vs. Jamad43 where a unanimous Court, speaking again
thru Mr. Justice Carson (with Mr. Justice Malcolm concurring in the result in view of
the Balaba ruling), opined:
For all the offenses of which the accused were convicted in the court below, the trial judge
imposed the death penalty, that is to say the penalty prescribed for the most serious crime
committed, in its maximum degree, and for this purpose made use of the provisions of
article 89 of the Penal Code [now article 48 of the Revised Penal Code]. But as indicated in
the case of the United States vs. Balaba, recently decided wherein the controlling facts
were substantially similar to those in the case at bar, "all of the penalties corresponding to
the several violations of law" should have been imposed under the express provisions of
article 87 [now engrafted in article 70 of the Revised Penal Code] and under the ruling in
that case, the trial court erred in applying the provision of article 89 of the code.
We conclude that the judgment entered in the court below should be reversed, ... and that
the following separate penalties should be imposed upon him [the accused Jamad], to be
executed in accordance with article 87 of the Penal Code: (1) The penalty of death for the
parricide of his wife Aring; (2) the penalty of life imprisonment for the murder of
Labonete; (3) the penalty of life imprisonment for the murder of Torres; (4) the penalty of
12 years and one day of cadena temporal for the frustrated murder of Taclind ...
The doctrine in Balaba was reechoed in People vs. Guzman,44 which applied the pertinent provisions
of the Revised Penal Code, where this Court, after finding the accused liable as co-principals because
they acted in conspiracy, proceeded to stress that where an "information charges the defendants with
the commission of several crimes of murder and frustrated murder, as they failed to object to the
multiplicity of the charges made in the information, they can be found guilty thereof and sentenced
accordingly for as many crimes the information charges them, provided that they are duly
established and proved by the evidence on record." (Emphasis supplied.)
99
The legal and statutory justification advanced by the majority in Balaba for imposing all the
penalties (two deaths and one life imprisonment) corresponding to the offense charged and proved
was article 87 of the old Penal Code which provided:
When a person is found guilty of two or more felonies or misdemeanors, all the penalties
corresponding to the several violations of law shall be imposed, the same to be
simultaneously served, if possible, according to the nature and effects of such penalties.
in relation to article 88 of the old Code which read:
When all or any of the penalties corresponding to the several violations of the law can not
be simultaneously executed, the following rules shall be observed with regard thereto:
1. In the imposition of the penalties, the order of their respective severity shall be followed
so that they may be executed successively or as nearly as may be possible, should a pardon
have been granted as to the penalty or penalties first imposed, or should they have been
served out.
The essence and language, with some alterations in form and in the words used by reason of style, of
the above-cited provisions have been preserved in article 70 of the Revised Penal Code which is the
product of the merger of articles 87 and 88 of the old Penal Code. Article 70 provides:
When the culprit has to serve two or more penalties, he shall serve them simultaneously if
the nature of the penalties will so permit; otherwise, the following rules shall be observed:
In the imposition of the penalties, the order of their respective severity shall be followed so
that they may be executed successively or as nearly as may be possible, should a pardon
have been granted as to the penalty or penalties first imposed, or should they have been
served out.
Although article 70 does not specifically command, as the former article 87 clearly did, that "all the
penalties corresponding to the several violations of law shall be imposed," it is unmistakable,
however, that article 70 presupposes that courts have the power to impose multiple penalties, which
multiple penal sanctions should be served either simultaneously or successively. This presumption of
the existence of judicial power to impose all the penalties corresponding to the number and nature of
the offenses charged and proved is manifest in the opening sentence of article 70: "When the culprit
has to serve two or more penalties, he shall serve them simultaneously if the nature of the penalties
will so permit ..." (Emphasis supplied.) Obviously, the two or more penalties which the culprit has to
serve are those legally imposed by the proper court. Another reference to the said judicial prerogative
is found in the second paragraph of article 70 which provides that "in the imposition of the penalties,
the order of their respective severity shall be followed ..." Even without the authority provided by
article 70, courts can still impose as many penalties as there are separate and distinct offenses
committed, since for every individual crime committed, a corresponding penalty is prescribed by law.
Each single crime is an outrage against the State for which the latter, thru the courts ofjustice, has
the power to impose the appropriate penal sanctions.
With respect to the imposition of multiple death penalties, there is no statutory prohibition or
jurisprudential injunction against it. On the contrary, article 70 of the Revised Penal Code presumes
that courts have the power to mete out multiple penalties without distinction as to the nature and
severity of the penalties. Moreover, our jurisprudence supports the imposition of multiple death
penalties as initially advocated in Balaba and thunderously reechoed in Salazar where the accused
was sentenced on appeal to thirteen (13) death penalties. Significantly, the Court in Balaba imposed
upon the single accused mixed multiple penalties of two deaths and one life imprisonment.
The imposition of multiple death penalties is decried by some as a useless formality, an exercise in
futility. It is contended, undeniably enough, that a death convict like all mortals, has only one life to
forfeit. And because of this physiological and biological attribute of man, it is reasoned that the
imposition of multiple death penalties is impractical and futile because after the service of one capital
penalty, the execution of the rest of the death penalties will naturally be rendered impossible. The
foregoing opposition to the multiple imposition of death penalties suffers from four basic flaws: (1) it
fails to consider the legality of imposing multiple capital penalties; (2) it fails to distinguish between
imposition of penalty and service of sentence; (3) it ignores the fact that multiple death sentences
could be served simultaneously; and (4) it overlooks the practical merits of imposing multiple death
penalties.
The imposition of a penalty and the service of sentence are two distinct, though related, concepts.
The imposition of the proper penalty or penalties is determined by the nature, gravity and number of
offenses charged and, proved, whereas service of sentence is determined by the severity and
character of the penalty or penalties imposed. In the imposition of the proper penalty or penalties,
the court does not concern itself with the possibility or practicality of the service of the sentence,
since actual service is a contingency subject to varied factors like successful escape of the convict,
grant of executive clemency or natural death of the prisoner. All that go into the imposition of the
proper penalty or penalties, to reiterate, are the nature, gravity and number of the offenses charged
and proved and the corresponding penalties prescribed by law.
Multiple death penalties are not impossible to serve because they will have to be executed
simultaneously. A cursory reading of article 70 will show that there are only two modes of serving
two or more (multiple) penalties: simultaneously or successively. The first rule is that two or more
penalties shall be served simultaneously if the nature of the penalties will so permit. In the case of
multiple capital penalties, the nature of said penal sanctions does not only permit but actually
necessitates simultaneous service.
The imposition of multiple death penalties, far from being a useless formality, has practical
importance. The sentencing of an accused to several capital penalties is an indelible badge of his
extreme criminal perversity, which may not be accurately projected by the imposition of only one
death sentence irrespective of the number of capital felonies for which he is liable. Showing thus the
reprehensible character of the convict in its real dimensions, the possibility of a grant of executive
clemency is justifiably reduced in no small measure. Hence, the imposition of multiple death
penalties could effectively serve as a deterrent to an improvident grant of pardon or commutation.
Faced with the utter delinquency of such a convict, the proper penitentiary authorities would exercise
judicious restraint in recommending clemency or leniency in his behalf.
Granting, however, that the Chief Executive, in the exercise of his constitutional power to pardon
(one of the presidential prerogatives which is almost absolute) deems it proper to commute the
multiple death penalties to multiple life imprisonments, then the practical effect is that the convict
has to serve the maximum of forty (40) years of multiple life sentences. If only one death penalty is
imposed, and then is commuted to life imprisonment, the convict will have to serve a maximum of
only thirty years corresponding to a single life sentence.
Reverting now to the case at bar, it is our considered view that the trial court correctly ruled that
conspiracy attended the commission of the murders. We quote with approval the following incisive
observations of the court a quo in this respect:
Although, there is no direct evidence of conspiracy, the Court can safely say that there are
several circumstances to show that the crime committed by the accused was planned. The
following circumstances show beyond any doubt the acts of conspiracy: First, all those who
were killed, Barbosa, Santos Cruz and Carriego, were Tagalogs. Although there were many
Tagalogs like them confined in Building 4, these three were singled out and killed thereby
showing that their killing has been planned. Second, the accused were all armed with
improvised weapons showing that they really prepared for the occasion. Third, the accused
accomplished the killing with team work precision going from one brigade to another
and attacking the same men whom they have previously marked for liquidation and
lastly, almost the same people took part in the killing of Carriego, Barbosa and Santos
Cruz.
It is also important to note that all the accused were inmates of brigade 4-A; that all were from either
the Visayas or Mindanao except Peralta who is from Masbate and Parumog who hails from Nueva
Ecija; that all were either "OXO" members or sympathizers; and that all the victims were members of
the "Sigue-Sigue" gang.
The evidence on record proves beyond peradventure that the accused acted in concert from the
moment they bolted their common brigade, up until the time they killed their last victim, Santos
Cruz. While it is true that Parumog, Larita and Luna did not participate in the actual killing of
Carriego, nonetheless, as co-conspirators they are equally guilty and collectively liable for in
conspiracy the act of one is the act of all. It is not indispensable that a co-conspirator should take a
direct part in every act and should know the part which the others have to perform. Conspiracy is the
common design to commit a felony; it is not participation in all the details of the execution of the
crime. All those who in one way or another help and cooperate in the consummation of a felony
100
previously planned are co-principals.45 Hence, all of the six accused are guilty of the slaughter of
Carriego, Barbosa and Santos Cruz — each is guilty of three separate and distinct crimes of murder.
We cannot agree, however, with the trial court that evident premeditation was also present. The facts
on record and the established jurisprudence on the matter do not support the conclusion of the
court a quo that evident premeditation "is always present and inherent in every conspiracy." Evident
premeditation is not inherent in conspiracy as the absence of the former does not necessarily negate
the existence of the latter.46 Unlike in evident premeditation where a sufficient period of time must
elapse to afford full opportunity for meditation and reflection for the perpetrator to deliberate on the
consequences of his intended deed, conspiracy arises at the very instant the plotters agree, expressly
or impliedly, to commit the felony and forthwith decide to commit it. 47 This view finds added support
in People vs. Custodia,48 wherein this Court stated:
Under normal conditions, where the act of conspiracy is directly established, with proof of
the attendant deliberation and selection of the method, time and means of executing the
crime, the existence of evident premeditation can be taken for granted. In the case before
us, however, no such evidence exists; the conspiracy is merely inferred from the acts of the
accused in the perpetration of the crime. There is no proof how and when the plan to kill
Melanio Balancio was hatched, or what time elapsed before it was carried out; we are,
therefore, unable to determine if the appellants enjoyed "sufficient time between its
inception and its fulfillment dispassionately to consider and accept the consequences."
(cf. People vs. Bangug, 52 Phil. 91.) In other words, there is no showing of the opportunity
of reflection and the persistence in the criminal intent that characterize the aggravating
circumstance of evident premeditation (People vs. Mendoza, 91 Phil. 58; People vs.
Iturriaga, 47 Off. Gaz., [Supp to No. 12] 166; People vs. Lesada 70 Phil., 525.)
Not a single extenuating circumstance could be appreciated in favor of any of the six accused, as they
did neither allege nor prove any.
In view of the attendance of the special aggravating circumstance of quasi-recidivism, as all of the six
accused at the time of the commission of the offenses were serving sentences 49 in the New Bilibid
Prison at Muntinlupa by virtue of convictions by final judgments the penalty for each offense must be
imposed in its maximum period, which is the mandate of the first paragraph of article 160 of the
Revised Penal Code. Viada observes, in apposition, that the severe penalty imposed on a quasi-
recidivist is justified because of his perversity and incorrigibility. 50
ACCORDINGLY, the judgment a quo is hereby modified as follows: Amadeo Peralta, Andres Factora,
Leonardo Dosal, Angel Parumog, Gervasio Larita and Florencio Luna are each pronounced guilty of
three separate and distinct crimes of murder, and are each sentenced to three death penalties; all of
them shall, jointly and severally, indemnify the heirs of each of the three deceased victims in the sum
of P12,000;51 each will pay one-sixth of the costs.
G.R. No. L-55960 November 24, 1988
YAO KEE, SZE SOOK WAH, SZE LAI CHO, and SY CHUN YEN, petitioners,
vs.
AIDA SY-GONZALES, MANUEL SY, TERESITA SY-BERNABE, RODOLFO SY, and
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
Montesa, Albon, & Associates for petitioners.
De Lapa, Salonga, Fulgencio & De Lunas for respondents.
CORTES, J.:
Sy Kiat, a Chinese national. died on January 17, 1977 in Caloocan City where he was then residing,
leaving behind real and personal properties here in the Philippines worth P300,000.00 more or less.
Thereafter, Aida Sy-Gonzales, Manuel Sy, Teresita Sy-Bernabe and Rodolfo Sy filed a petition for the
grant of letters of administration docketed as Special Proceedings Case No. C-699 of the then Court
of First Instance of Rizal Branch XXXIII, Caloocan City. In said petition they alleged among others
that (a) they are the children of the deceased with Asuncion Gillego; (b) to their knowledge Sy Mat
died intestate; (c) they do not recognize Sy Kiat's marriage to Yao Kee nor the filiation of her children
to him; and, (d) they nominate Aida Sy-Gonzales for appointment as administratrix of the intestate
estate of the deceased [Record on Appeal, pp. 4-9; Rollo, p. 107.]
The petition was opposed by Yao Kee, Sze Sook Wah, Sze Lai Cho and Sy Yun Chen who alleged that:
(a) Yao Kee is the lawful wife of Sy Kiat whom he married on January 19, 1931 in China; (b) the other
oppositors are the legitimate children of the deceased with Yao Kee; and, (c) Sze Sook Wah is the
eldest among them and is competent, willing and desirous to become the administratrix of the estate
of Sy Kiat [Record on Appeal, pp. 12-13; Rollo, p. 107.] After hearing, the probate court, finding
among others that:
(1) Sy Kiat was legally married to Yao Kee [CFI decision, pp. 12-27; Rollo, pp. 49-
64;]
(2) Sze Sook Wah, Sze Lai Cho and Sze Chun Yen are the legitimate children of
Yao Kee with Sy Mat [CFI decision, pp. 28-31; Rollo. pp. 65-68;] and,
(3) Aida Sy-Gonzales, Manuel Sy, Teresita Sy-Bernabe and Rodolfo Sy are the
acknowledged illegitimate offsprings of Sy Kiat with Asuncion Gillego [CFI
decision, pp. 27-28; Rollo, pp. 64- 65.]
held if favor of the oppositors (petitioners herein) and appointed Sze Sook Wah as the administratrix
of the intestate estate of the deceased [CFI decision, pp. 68-69; Rollo, pp. 105-106.]
On appeal the Court of Appeals rendered a decision modifying that of the probate court, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision of the lower Court is hereby
MODIFIED and SET ASIDE and a new judgment rendered as follows:
(1) Declaring petitioners Aida Sy-Gonzales, Manuel Sy, Teresita Sy- Bernabe and
Rodolfo Sy acknowledged natural children of the deceased Sy Kiat with
Asuncion Gillego, an unmarried woman with whom he lived as husband and
wife without benefit of marriage for many years:
(2) Declaring oppositors Sze Sook Wah, Sze Lai Chu and Sze Chun Yen, the
acknowledged natural children of the deceased Sy Kiat with his Chinese wife Yao
Kee, also known as Yui Yip, since the legality of the alleged marriage of Sy Mat to
Yao Kee in China had not been proven to be valid to the laws of the Chinese
People's Republic of China (sic);
(3) Declaring the deed of sale executed by Sy Kiat on December 7, 1976 in favor
of Tomas Sy (Exhibit "G-1", English translation of Exhibit "G") of the Avenue
Tractor and Diesel Parts Supply to be valid and accordingly, said property
should be excluded from the estate of the deceased Sy Kiat; and
(4) Affirming the appointment by the lower court of Sze Sook Wah as judicial
administratrix of the estate of the deceased. [CA decision, pp. 11-12; Rollo, pp.
36- 37.]
From said decision both parties moved for partial reconsideration, which was however denied by
respondent court. They thus interposed their respective appeals to this Court.
Private respondents filed a petition with this Court docketed as G.R. No. 56045 entitled "Aida Sy-
Gonzales, Manuel Sy, Teresita Sy-Bernabe and Rodolfo Sy v. Court of Appeals, Yao Kee, Sze Sook
Wah, Sze Lai Cho and Sy Chun Yen" questioning paragraphs (3) and (4) of the dispositive portion of
the Court of Appeals' decision. The Supreme Court however resolved to deny the petition and the
motion for reconsideration. Thus on March 8, 1982 entry of judgment was made in G.R. No.
56045. **
The instant petition, on the other hand, questions paragraphs (1) and (2) of the dispositive portion of
the decision of the Court of Appeals. This petition was initially denied by the Supreme Court on June
101
22, 1981. Upon motion of the petitioners the Court in a resolution dated September 16, 1981
reconsidered the denial and decided to give due course to this petition. Herein petitioners assign the
following as errors:
I. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN DECLARING
THE MARRIAGE OF SY KIAT TO YAO YEE AS NOT HAVE (sic) BEEN
PROVEN VALID IN ACCORDANCE WITH LAWS OF THE PEOPLE'S
REPUBLIC OF CHINA.
II. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN DECLARING
AIDA SY-GONZALES, MANUEL SY, TERESITA SY-BERNABE AND RODOLFO
SY AS NATURAL CHILDREN OF SY KIAT WITH ASUNCION GILLEGO.
[Petition, p. 2; Rollo, p. 6.]
I. Petitioners argue that the marriage of Sy Kiat to Yao Kee in accordance with Chinese law and
custom was conclusively proven. To buttress this argument they rely on the following testimonial and
documentary evidence.
First, the testimony of Yao Kee summarized by the trial court as follows:
Yao Kee testified that she was married to Sy Kiat on January 19, 1931 in Fookien,
China; that she does not have a marriage certificate because the practice during
that time was for elders to agree upon the betrothal of their children, and in her
case, her elder brother was the one who contracted or entered into [an]
agreement with the parents of her husband; that the agreement was that she and
Sy Mat would be married, the wedding date was set, and invitations were sent
out; that the said agreement was complied with; that she has five children with
Sy Kiat, but two of them died; that those who are alive are Sze Sook Wah, Sze Lai
Cho, and Sze Chun Yen, the eldest being Sze Sook Wah who is already 38 years
old; that Sze Sook Wah was born on November 7, 1939; that she and her
husband, Sy Mat, have been living in FooKien, China before he went to the
Philippines on several occasions; that the practice during the time of her
marriage was a written document [is exchanged] just between the parents of the
bride and the parents of the groom, or any elder for that matter; that in China,
the custom is that there is a go- between, a sort of marriage broker who is known
to both parties who would talk to the parents of the bride-to-be; that if the
parents of the bride-to-be agree to have the groom-to-be their son in-law, then
they agree on a date as an engagement day; that on engagement day, the parents
of the groom would bring some pieces of jewelry to the parents of the bride-to-
be, and then one month after that, a date would be set for the wedding, which in
her case, the wedding date to Sy Kiat was set on January 19, 1931; that during
the wedding the bridegroom brings with him a couch (sic) where the bride would
ride and on that same day, the parents of the bride would give the dowry for her
daughter and then the document would be signed by the parties but there is no
solemnizing officer as is known in the Philippines; that during the wedding day,
the document is signed only by the parents of the bridegroom as well as by the
parents of the bride; that the parties themselves do not sign the document; that
the bride would then be placed in a carriage where she would be brought to the
town of the bridegroom and before departure the bride would be covered with a
sort of a veil; that upon reaching the town of the bridegroom, the bridegroom
takes away the veil; that during her wedding to Sy Kiat (according to said
Chinese custom), there were many persons present; that after Sy Kiat opened
the door of the carriage, two old ladies helped her go down the carriage and
brought her inside the house of Sy Mat; that during her wedding, Sy Chick, the
eldest brother of Sy Kiat, signed the document with her mother; that as to the
whereabouts of that document, she and Sy Mat were married for 46 years
already and the document was left in China and she doubt if that document can
still be found now; that it was left in the possession of Sy Kiat's family; that
right now, she does not know the whereabouts of that document because of the
lapse of many years and because they left it in a certain place and it was
already eaten by the termites; that after her wedding with Sy Kiat, they lived
immediately together as husband and wife, and from then on, they lived
together; that Sy Kiat went to the Philippines sometime in March or April in the
 same year they were married; that she went to the Philippines in 1970, and then
came back to China; that again she went back to the Philippines and lived with
Sy Mat as husband and wife; that she begot her children with Sy Kiat during the
several trips by Sy Kiat made back to China. [CFI decision, pp. 13-15; Rollo, pp.
50-52.]
Second, the testimony of Gan Ching, a younger brother of Yao Kee who stated that he was among the
many people who attended the wedding of his sister with Sy Kiat and that no marriage certificate is
issued by the Chinese government, a document signed by the parents or elders of the parties being
sufficient [CFI decision, pp. 15-16; Rollo, pp.
52-53.]
Third, the statements made by Asuncion Gillego when she testified before the trial court to the effect
that (a) Sy Mat was married to Yao Kee according to Chinese custom; and, (b) Sy Kiat's admission to
her that he has a Chinese wife whom he married according to Chinese custom [CFI decision, p. 17;
Rollo, p. 54.]
Fourth, Sy Kiat's Master Card of Registered Alien issued in Caloocan City on October 3, 1972 where
the following entries are found: "Marital status—Married"; "If married give name of spouses—Yao
Kee"; "Address-China; "Date of marriage—1931"; and "Place of marriage—China" [Exhibit "SS-1".]
Fifth, Sy Kiat's Alien Certificate of Registration issued in Manila on January 12, 1968 where the
following entries are likewise found: "Civil status—Married"; and, 'If married, state name and
address of spouse—Yao Kee Chingkang, China" [Exhibit "4".]
And lastly, the certification issued in Manila on October 28, 1977 by the Embassy of the People's
Republic of China to the effect that "according to the information available at the Embassy Mr. Sy
Kiat a Chinese national and Mrs. Yao Kee alias Yui Yip also Chinese were married on January 19,
1931 in Fukien, the People's Republic of China" [Exhibit "5".]
These evidence may very well prove the fact of marriage between Yao Kee and Sy Kiat. However, the
same do not suffice to establish the validity of said marriage in accordance with Chinese law or
custom.
Custom is defined as "a rule of conduct formed by repetition of acts, uniformly observed (practiced)
as a social rule, legally binding and obligatory" [In the Matter of the Petition for Authority to
Continue Use of the Firm Name "Ozaeta, Romulo, de Leon, Mabanta and Reyes", July 30, 1979,
SCRA 3, 12 citing JBL Reyes & RC Puno, Outline of Phil. Civil Law, Fourth Ed., Vol. 1, p. 7.] The law
requires that "a custom must be proved as a fact, according to the rules of evidence" [Article 12, Civil
Code.] On this score the Court had occasion to state that "a local custom as a source of right can not
be considered by a court of justice unless such custom is properly established by competent evidence
like any other fact" [Patriarca v. Orate, 7 Phil. 390, 395 (1907).] The same evidence, if not one of a
higher degree, should be required of a foreign custom.
The law on foreign marriages is provided by Article 71 of the Civil Code which states that:
Art. 71. All marriages performed outside the Philippines in accordance with the
laws in force in the country where they were performed and valid there as
such, shall also be valid in this country, except bigamous, Polygamous, or
incestuous marriages, as determined by Philippine law. (Emphasis
supplied.) ***
Construing this provision of law the Court has held that to establish a valid foreign marriage two
things must be proven, namely: (1) the existence of the foreign law as a question of fact; and (2) the
alleged foreign marriage by convincing evidence [Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee, 43 Phil. 43, 49 (1922).]
In proving a foreign law the procedure is provided in the Rules of Court. With respect to
an unwritten foreign law, Rule 130 section 45 states that:
SEC. 45. Unwritten law.—The oral testimony of witnesses, skilled therein, is
admissible as evidence of the unwritten law of a foreign country, as are also
printed and published books of reports of decisions of the courts of the foreign
country, if proved to be commonly admitted in such courts.
102
Proof of a written foreign law, on the other hand, is provided for under Rule 132 section 25, thus:
SEC. 25. Proof of public or official record.—An official record or an entry
therein, when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official
publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody
of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not kept in the
Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has the custody. If the office in
which the record is kept is in a foreign country, the certificate may be made by a
secretary of embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular
agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the
foreign country in which the record is kept and authenticated by the seal of his
office.
The Court has interpreted section 25 to include competent evidence like the testimony of a witness to
prove the existence of a written foreign law [Collector of Internal Revenue v. Fisher 110 Phil. 686,
700-701 (1961) citing Willamette Iron and Steel Works v. Muzzal, 61 Phil. 471 (1935).]
In the case at bar petitioners did not present any competent evidence relative to the law and custom
of China on marriage. The testimonies of Yao and Gan Ching cannot be considered as proof of
China's law or custom on marriage not only because they are
self-serving evidence, but more importantly, there is no showing that they are competent to testify on
the subject matter. For failure to prove the foreign law or custom, and consequently, the validity of
the marriage in accordance with said law or custom, the marriage between Yao Kee and Sy Kiat
cannot be recognized in this jurisdiction.
Petitioners contend that contrary to the Court of Appeals' ruling they are not duty bound to prove the
Chinese law on marriage as judicial notice thereof had been taken by this Court in the case of Sy Joc
Lieng v. Sy Quia [16 Phil. 137 (1910).]
This contention is erroneous. Well-established in this jurisdiction is the principle that Philippine
courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. They must be alleged and proved as any other fact
[Yam Ka Lim v. Collector of Customs, 30 Phil. 46, 48 (1915); Fluemer v. Hix, 54 Phil. 610 (1930).]
Moreover a reading of said case would show that the party alleging the foreign marriage presented a
witness, one Li Ung Bieng, to prove that matrimonial letters mutually exchanged by the contracting
parties constitute the essential requisite for a marriage to be considered duly solemnized in China.
Based on his testimony, which as found by the Court is uniformly corroborated by authors on the
subject of Chinese marriage, what was left to be decided was the issue of whether or not the fact of
marriage in accordance with Chinese law was duly proven [Sy Joc Lieng v. Sy Quia, supra., at p.
160.]
Further, even assuming for the sake of argument that the Court has indeed taken judicial notice of
the law of China on marriage in the aforecited case, petitioners however have not shown any proof
that the Chinese law or custom obtaining at the time the Sy Joc Lieng marriage was celebrated in
1847 was still the law when the alleged marriage of Sy Kiat to Yao Kee took place in 1931 or eighty-
four (84) years later.
Petitioners moreover cite the case of U.S. v. Memoracion [34 Phil. 633 (1916)] as being applicable to
the instant case. They aver that the judicial pronouncement in the Memoracion case, that the
testimony of one of the contracting parties is competent evidence to show the fact of marriage, holds
true in this case.
The Memoracion case however is not applicable to the case at bar as said case did not concern a
foreign marriage and the issue posed was whether or not the oral testimony of a spouse is competent
evidence to prove the fact of marriage in a complaint for adultery.
Accordingly, in the absence of proof of the Chinese law on marriage, it should be presumed that it is
the same as ours *** [Wong Woo Yiu v. Vivo, G.R. No. L-21076, March 31, 1965, 13 SCRA 552, 555.]
Since Yao Kee admitted in her testimony that there was no solemnizing officer as is known here in
the Philippines [See Article 56, Civil Code] when her alleged marriage to Sy Mat was celebrated [CFI
decision, p. 14; Rollo, p. 51], it therefore follows that her marriage to Sy Kiat, even if true, cannot be
recognized in this jurisdiction [Wong Woo Yiu v. Vivo, supra., pp. 555-556.]
II. The second issue raised by petitioners concerns the status of private respondents.
Respondent court found the following evidence of petitioners' filiation:
(1) Sy Kiat's Master Card of Registered Alien where the following are entered:
"Children if any: give number of children—Four"; and, "Name—All living in
China" [Exhibit "SS-1";]
(2) the testimony of their mother Yao Kee who stated that she had five children
with Sy Kiat, only three of whom are alive namely, Sze Sook Wah, Sze Lai Chu
and Sze Chin Yan [TSN, December 12, 1977, pp. 9-11;] and,
(3) an affidavit executed on March 22,1961 by Sy Kiat for presentation to the
Local Civil Registrar of Manila to support Sze Sook Wah's application for a
marriage license, wherein Sy Kiat expressly stated that she is his daughter
[Exhibit "3".]
Likewise on the record is the testimony of Asuncion Gillego that Sy Kiat told her he has three
daughters with his Chinese wife, two of whom—Sook Wah and Sze Kai Cho—she knows, and one
adopted son [TSN, December 6,1977, pp. 87-88.]
However, as petitioners failed to establish the marriage of Yao Kee with Sy Mat according to the laws
of China, they cannot be accorded the status of legitimate children but only that of acknowledged
natural children. Petitioners are natural children, it appearing that at the time of their conception
Yao Kee and Sy Kiat were not disqualified by any impediment to marry one another [See Art. 269,
Civil Code.] And they are acknowledged children of the deceased because of Sy Kiat's recognition of
Sze Sook Wah [Exhibit "3"] and its extension to Sze Lai Cho and Sy Chun Yen who are her sisters of
the full blood [See Art. 271, Civil Code.]
Private respondents on the other hand are also the deceased's acknowledged natural children with
Asuncion Gillego, a Filipina with whom he lived for twenty-five (25) years without the benefit of
marriage. They have in their favor their father's acknowledgment, evidenced by a compromise
agreement entered into by and between their parents and approved by the Court of First Instance on
February 12, 1974 wherein Sy Kiat not only acknowleged them as his children by Asuncion Gillego
but likewise made provisions for their support and future inheritance, thus:
xxx xxx xxx
2. The parties also acknowledge that they are common-law husband and wife
and that out of such relationship, which they have likewise decided to definitely
and finally terminate effective immediately, they begot five children, namely:
Aida Sy, born on May 30, 1950; Manuel Sy, born on July 1, 1953; Teresita Sy,
born on January 28, 1955; Ricardo Sy now deceased, born on December 14,
1956; and Rodolfo Sy, born on May 7, 1958.
3. With respect to the AVENUE TRACTOR AND DIESEL PARTS SUPPLY ... ,
the parties mutually agree and covenant that—
(a) The stocks and merchandize and the furniture and
equipments ..., shall be divided into two equal shares
between, and distributed to, Sy Kiat who shall own
one-half of the total and the other half to Asuncion Gillego
who shall transfer the same to their children, namely, Aida
Sy, Manuel Sy, Teresita Sy, and Rodolfo Sy.
(b) the business name and premises ... shall be retained by
Sy Kiat. However, it shall be his obligation to give to
the aforenamed children an amount of One Thousand Pesos
( Pl,000.00 ) monthly out of the rental of the two doors of
the same building now occupied by Everett Construction.
xxx xxx xxx
(5) With respect to the acquisition, during the existence of the
common-law husband-and-wife relationship between the parties, of the real
estates and properties registered and/or appearing in the name of Asuncion
103
Gillego ... , the parties mutually agree and covenant that the said real estates
and properties shall be transferred in equal shares to their children, namely,
Aida Sy, Manuel Sy, Teresita Sy, and Rodolfo Sy, but to be administered by
Asuncion Gillego during her lifetime ... [Exhibit "D".] (Emphasis supplied.)
xxx xxx xxx
This compromise agreement constitutes a statement before a court of record by which a child may be
voluntarily acknowledged [See Art. 278, Civil Code.]
Petitioners further argue that the questions on the validity of Sy Mat's marriage to Yao Kee and the
paternity and filiation of the parties should have been ventilated in the Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court.
Specifically, petitioners rely on the following provision of Republic Act No. 5502, entitled "An Act
Revising Rep. Act No. 3278, otherwise known as the Charter of the City of Caloocan', with regard to
the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court:
SEC. 91-A. Creation and Jurisdiction of the Court.—
xxx xxx xxx
The provisions of the Judiciary Act to the contrary notwithstanding, the court
shall have exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide the following cases:
xxx xxx xxx
(2) Cases involving custody, guardianship, adoption, revocation of adoption,
paternity and acknowledgment;
(3) Annulment of marriages, relief from marital obligations, legal separation of
spouses, and actions for support;
(4) Proceedings brought under the provisions of title six and title seven, chapters
one to three of the civil code;
xxx xxx xxx
and the ruling in the case of Bartolome v. Bartolome [G.R. No. L-23661, 21 SCRA 1324] reiterated in
Divinagracia v. Rovira [G.R. No. L-42615, 72 SCRA 307.]
With the enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as the Judiciary Reorganization
Act of 1980, the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Courts were abolished. Their functions and
jurisdiction are now vested with the Regional Trial Courts [See Section 19 (7), B.P. Blg. 129 and
Divinagracia v. Belosillo, G.R. No. L-47407, August 12, 1986, 143 SCRA 356, 360] hence it is no
longer necessary to pass upon the issue of jurisdiction raised by petitioners.
Moreover, even without the exactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 we find in Rep. Act No. 5502 sec.
91-A last paragraph that:
xxx xxx xxx
If any question involving any of the above matters should arise as an incident in
any case pending in the ordinary court, said incident shall be determined in the
main case.
xxx xxx xxx
As held in the case of Divinagracia v. Rovira [G.R. No. L42615. August 10, 1976, 72 SCRA 307]:
xxx xxx xxx
It is true that under the aforequoted section 1 of Republic Act No.
4834 **** a case involving paternity and acknowledgment may be ventilated
as an incident in the intestate or testate proceeding (See Baluyot vs. Ines
 Luciano, L-42215, July 13, 1976). But that legal provision presupposes that such
an administration proceeding is pending or existing and has not been
terminated. [at pp. 313-314.] (Emphasis supplied.)

xxx xxx xxx

The reason for ths rule is not only "to obviate the rendition of conflicting rulings on the same issue by
the Court of First Instance and the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court" [Vda. de Baluyut v.
Luciano, G.R. No. L-42215, July 13, 1976, 72 SCRA 52, 63] but more importantly to prevent
multiplicity of suits. Accordingly, this Court finds no reversible error committed by respondent court.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

104
G.R. No. L-22793 May 16, 1967
CARMELITA TAN and RODOLFO TAN, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and FRANCISCO TAN (alias Tan Uh Bak and Tan Seng
Ka), respondents.
Amando Asis for petitioners.
Tañada, Teehankee and Carreon for respondents.
SANCHEZ, J.:
The present is a suit aimed at establishing a children-to-father, illegitimate relationship between
petitioners and the principal respondent Francisco Tan, and to compel the latter to support
petitioners.
The background facts follow:
On July 22, 1955, petitioners, thru their mother Celestina Daldo as guardian ad litem, sued
respondent Tan in the Court of First Instance of Manila for acknowledgment and support (Civil Case
26909). 1äwphï1.ñët
On March 26, 1956, Celestina Daldo — after petitioners had already presented oral and documentary
evidence and were about to rest their case — moved to dismiss the foregoing civil case upon the
ground that the parties had come to an amicable settlement, and prayed that the same be dismissed
with prejudice and without recourse of appeal.
On the same day, March 26, 1956, Celestina Daldo subscribed before the clerk of the Court of First
Instance of Manila to an affidavit categorically stating that respondent Francisco Tan, defendant in
Civil Case 26909, "is not the father of my said minor children named Carmelita and Rodolfo (herein
petitioners) but another person whose name I cannot divulge"; and that she prepared said affidavit
precisely "to record what is true and to correct what misinterpretation may arise in the future".
On March 26, 1956, the Court of First Instance of Manila issued the following order:
As prayed for by plaintiffs in their motion filed today for the dismissal of their complaint,
on the ground that the parties have already come to an amicable settlement, with the
conformity of counsel for defendant, the Court hereby orders this case dismissed with
prejudice and without pronouncement as to costs.
On November 25, 1957 — one year and eight months after Civil Case 26909 was dismissed —
petitioners, this time thru their maternal grandfather Servillano Daldo as guardian ad litem,
commenced the present action before the Juvenile & Domestic Relations Court (Civil Case 00855)
for acknowledgment and support, involving the same parties, cause of action and subject matter.
On September 10, 1960, then Judge Juan P. Enriquez (Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila
detailed to preside over the Juvenile & Domestic Relations Court in the absence of the presiding
Judge thereof who was on leave rendered judgment declaring that "the present case is res judicata by
reason of the dismissal with prejudice of Civil Case 26909 of the Court of First Instance of Manila;
and that, even on the merits, plaintiffs [the present petitioners] have not made out their case with
sufficient evidence," and dismissed the complaint, without costs.
On October 8, 1960, petitioners herein, plaintiffs below, moved to reconsider.
On January 31, 1961, then Judge Natividad Almeda Lopez reconsidered the decision of Judge
Enriquez of September 10, 1960, and rendered judgment, viz:
In view of the foregoing considerations, this Court reconsider its decision of September 10,
1960, and declares the minors Carmelita and Rodolfo Tan to be the illegitimate children of
the defendant Francisco Tan alias Tan Uh Bak and Tang Seng Ka; and hereby orders the
defendant to support said minors in the amount of P200.00 a month, said amount to be
paid within the first five (5) days of each month directly to Carmelita Tan, for herself and
for her younger brother Rodolfo; and to help them defray their matriculation expenses, to
pay semi-annually, on June and November of such year, an additional sum of P300; to
105
reimburse Servillano Daldo his expenses in supporting plaintiff minors during the
pendency of this case in the amount of P2,000, or at the rate of P50 a month from
November 25, 1957; to pay plaintiff minors' attorney's fees of P500; and to pay the costs of
this proceedings.
Respondent Francisco Tan appealed to the Court of Appeals.
On February 21, 1964, the Court of Appeals in turn reversed the last-named judgment of Judge
Natividad Almeda Lopez, and dismissed the complaint with costs against appellees in both instances.
Petitioners now come to this Court in forma pauperis on appeal by way of certiorari.
1. Threshold question is the admissibility of Exhibits H and I, testimony of petitioners' witnesses in
the former case. Petitioners balk at the ruling denying admissibility.
The controlling statute is Section 37, Rule 123 of the 1940 Rules of Court, now Section 41, Rule
130, viz:
SEC. 41. Testimony at a former trial. — The testimony of a witness deceased or out of the
Philippines, or unable to testify, given in a former case between the same parties, relating
to the same matter, the adverse party having had an opportunity to cross-examine him,
may be given in evidence.
Concededly, the witnesses at the former trial were subpoenaed by the Juvenile & Domestic Relations
Court a number of times. These witnesses did not appear to testify.
But are their testimonies in the former trial within the coverage of the rule of admissibility set forth
in Section 41, Rule 130? These witnesses are not dead. They are not outside of the Philippines. Can
they be categorized as witnesses of the class unable to testify? The Court of Appeals, construing this
term, held that "subsequent failure or refusal to appear thereat [second trial] or hostility since
testifying at the first trial does not amount to inability to testify, but such inability proceeding from a
grave cause, almost amounting to death, as when the witness is old and has lost the power of speech.
(Griffith vs. Sauls, 77 Tex 630, 14 S.W. 230, 231; section 37 of Rule 123, Rules of Court)."
Here, the witnesses in question were available. Only, they refused to testify. No other person that
prevented them from testifying, is cited. Certainly, they do not come within the legal purview of
those unable to testify.
Besides in the situation here presented, petitioners are not at all bereft of remedy. They could have
urged the court to have said witnesses arrested, punished for contempt. 1 After all, these remedies are
in the statute books to help litigants in the prosecution of their cases. Petitioners failed to avail of
these remedies, went ahead and submitted their case.
We note petitioners' argument that to follow strictly the law of admissibility of testimony in former
trials, is to permit party litigants to buy witnesses to dissuade them from testifying again. Nothing
extant in the record will as much as intimate that respondent was responsible for the non-
appearance of these witnesses. The danger of tampering with witnesses is a problem that attends
trials in many a time and in number of imaginable situations. And, petitioners argument works both
ways. Because, witnesses at the former trial can be bought not to testify at the second trial, in just the
same way that they could have been bought to give their original testimony. Solution of this problem
lies elsewhere, not in the non-enforcement of Section 41, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
2. The procedural problem out of the way, we go direct to the merits.
Petitioners tried to prove that Celestina Daldo and respondent Francisco Tan lived together as
husband and wife for more than eight years commencing from 1936 to 1944. Petitioners Carmelita
Tan and Rodolfo Tan are allegedly the fruits of such cohabitation. Respondent stoutly denies this
claim, avers that he is very much a married man with children. Celestina Daldo, by her own
admission, had been a nursemaid (yaya) in respondent's residence but for l short period of not less
than one year in 1939. Carmelita was born on May 8, 1942 and Rodolfo, on September 11, 1944. The
validity of the testimony of petitioners' witnesses in the present case was considerably downgraded
by the affidavit of Celestina Daldo, heretofore adverted to, attached to the record of the former Case
26909. In that affidavit, Celestina deposed that petitioners were not fathered by Francisco Tan, but,
in Celestina's own words, by "another person whose name I cannot divulge." Striking is the fact that
this affidavit was executed after petitioners in the former case had finished with their oral and For the reasons given, we vote to affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals under review. No costs
documentary evidence and were about to submit their case. By then, their counsel had a grasp of the in all instances. So ordered.
situation. Petitioners and their guardian ad litem could have known whether they had reasonably
made out a case against respondent. Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P. Zaldivar and Sanchez,
JJ., concur.
Correctly then did the Court of Appeals rule out the probative value of petitioners' evidence and Castro, J., took no part.
found for respondent. On this point the Court of Appeals said:

... we now come to the resolution of the second point; i.e., whether or not the plaintiffs
have sufficiently proved their case. We have gone over and examined thoroughly the
arguments and evidence of the parties, and we find that the evidence for the plaintiffs-
appellees fall short of the requirement of clear strong and convincing evidence. Such
evidence is necessary whether to prove legitimate or illigitimate paternity and filiation,
considering the seriousness of the relationship and its far-reaching consequences. As aptly
expressed in the case of Serrano v. Aragon, (22 Phil. 10),

"Public policy, indeed public necessity, demands that before an illegitimate child be
admitted into a legitimate family, every requisite of the law be completely and fully
complied with. No one should ever be permitted upon doubtful evidence to take from
legitimate children the property which they and their parents have, by industry, fidelity,
and frugality, acquired. ..."

We agree with the findings of the trial court in its original correctly appreciating the
evidence of the plaintiffs as unsatisfactory and insufficient, in view of the following
considerations;

(1) That Exhibits H and I, former testimonies of witnesses in Civil Case No. 26909, are
inadmissible. ...

(2) That the baptismal certificates, Exhs. A and C are not admissible proofs of filiation
(Malonda vs. Malonda, 45 O.G. 5468; Pareja vs. Pareja, G.R. L-3824, prom. May 31, 1954;
Capistrano vs. Gabino, 8 Phil. 135; Adriano vs. De Jesus, 23 Phil. 350; Madridejo vs. Leon,
55 Phil. 1) The birth certificate Exhibit B is likewise inadmissible against the defendant
because it failed to comply with Section 5 of Act 3753. The alleged illegitimate father did
not sign under oath the said birth certificate (Roces vs. Local Civil Registrar of Manila,
G.R. L-10598, prom. February 14, 1958; Crisolo vs. Macadaeg, G.R. L-7017 prom. April 29,
1954).

It should be noted that said baptismal certificates are also useless to prove the dates of
birth of the appellees-minors, considering that the period of cohabitation or any intimate
relations at all between their mother and the appellant has been denied and that same has
not been satisfactorily proved. Stated in another way, the date of birth as appearing in the
birth certificate would be material only if it coincides with the period of cohabitation as
admitted or sufficiently proved. To reason otherwise would be to put the cart before the
horse, so to speak.

(3) The oral evidence for the plaintiffs, consisting principally of the testimonies of the
grandfather and of the mother of the minors, are unsatisfactory, being inconsistent and
contradictory on material points, and unbelievable. The loose character of the mother of
the minors who admittedly had lived and begotten children with several men of different
nationalities, cannot also be overlooked. Weighed against each other, the evidence for the
plaintiffs do not tip the scales in their favor as against the defendant-appellant. We are not
convinced, by preponderance of evidence, that appellant is the father of the minor
appellees. ...

Section 2, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, formerly Section 2, Rule 46 of the 1940 Rules, employs the
commanding language that "[o]nly questions of law may be raised" in an appeal by certiorari from a
judgment of the Court of Appeals. That judgment, jurisprudence teaches, is conclusive as to the facts.
We are not to alter said facts — they bind us, or to review the questions of fact. 2

Having reached the conclusion that, on the merits, petitioners made no case, it is unnecessary for us
to pass upon the other questions raised on appeal.

106

G.R. No. L-27683 October 19, 1976
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
SILVESTRE LIWANAG alias LINDA BIE, defendant-appellant.
Paterno R. Canlas Law Offices for appellant.
Solicitor General Felix V. Makasiar, Assistant Solicitor General Felicismo R. Rosete and Solicitor
Teodulo R. Dino for appellee.
CONCEPCION JR., J.:
Appeal from the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Bataan, finding the accused guilty of
violating the provisions of Republic Act No. 1700, otherwise known as the Anti-Subversion Act., and
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, with the accessories of the law, and to pay
the costs.
It is not disputed that in June, 1942, the accused Silvestre Liwanag alias Linda Bie, Nene, Bets,
Apong Iro, Silver, Pet, Apong Pedro, Agustin, and Seniong, then a young man from the farms of
Concepcion, Lubao, Pampanga, fired by patriotic fervor, joined the "Hukbo ng Bayan Laban sa
Hapon", more popularly known by its acronym "Hukbalahap", an organization whose purpose, as its
name implies, was to resist the Japanese occupation forces in the Philippines. He held the position of
commander of Squadron 18-E with the station in Lubao, Pampanga until 1944, when he was
promoted to the rank of military inspector, a position he held until liberation when the organization
was disbanded. Before the national elections of 1946, the Hukbalahap was revived. The accused was
designated provincial commander for Pampanga and later as vice commander of the Central Luzon
Regional Command (CLRC).
Sometime in 1948, the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) held a conference in the mountains
of Norzagaray, Bulacan, attended, among others, by Luis Taruc, Pedro Taruc, Peregrino Taruc,
Castro Alejandrino, Jose and Jesus Lava and the herein accused Silvestre Liwanag. The accused was
nominated to the Central Committee (CC), which is the governing body of the Party. In that
conference, it was also agreed to change the name of "Hukbong Mapagpalaya ng Bayan" or HMB.
Being a member of the Hukbalahap and the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the
Philippines, the accused was designated as supervisor and adviser to Squadron 18 of Field Command
(FC) 25 of the HMB operating in the province of Bataan until early in 1956. Among his duties were to
see to it that orders and directives coming from the Regional Command (RECO) 2, comprising the
provinces of Bataan, Zambales, Pampanga, Tarlac, Pangasinan and Bulacan, are obeyed and
implemented. The accused upon orders of his superior, planned and effected the capture of Orani,
Bataan in 1949 and Camp Makabolos in Tarlac on August 26, 1950.
In the latter part of 1956, the accused was named chief of the RECO Military Department (RMD) of
RECO 2, a position he held until March, 1958. His territory included the provinces of Tarlac,
Pampanga, Zambales and Bataan. As chief of the RMD, he supervised the armed forces of RECO 2
and gave lectures to members.
In February, 1958, the appellant and his men had an encounter with Government forces in
Magalang, Pampanga. The HMB sustained three casualties, while the Government had two,
including a P.C. lieutenant. The HMB under the command of the appellant retreated to Telabastagan,
San Fernando, Pampanga, where they stayed until about the last part of March, 1958, when they
again had an encounter with the P.C. and had to retreat to Bataan.
After this encounter, the appellant asked for, and was granted, leave to rest and recuperate from his
ailment which he spent in the mountain of Bataan. Although on leave, his advice was sought after.
In the evening of June 21, 1960, a PC patrol led by then Major Wilfredo Encarnacion captured the
appellant and his wife, Rosita Manuel, in their hideout at Barrio Kalungusan, Orion, Bataan.
107
Thenceforth, the appellant was charged for violating the provisions of Republic Act No. 1700,
otherwise known as the Anti-Subversion Act, in an information filed before the Court of First
Instance of Bataan, for having unlawfully and wilfully continued and remained as officer and/or
ranking leader of the outlawed Communist Party of the Philippines and its military arm, the
Hukbong Mapagpalaya ng Bayan, until his apprehension on June 21, 1960, without having
renounced his aforementioned leadership and/or membership therein within the period prescribed
by law, and, while remaining as such leader or high-ranking member, has taken up arms against the
Government by making and conducting raids, ambuscades and armed attacks against civilians,
Philippine Constabulary, and local police forces. 1
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 5 of Republic Act No. 1700, the preliminary investigation was
conducted by the Court of First Instance of Bataan. The appellant was present during said
preliminary investigation and was represented by counsel who extensively cross-examined the
witnesses for the prosecution. Finding a prima facie case against the appellant, the Court issued the
corresponding warrant for the arrest of the appellant 2 and thereafter set the case for trial.
Upon being arraigned, the appellant, assisted by his counsel, waived the reading of the information
and entered a plea of not guilty. 4 In view of the desire of his counsel to file a motion to quash, the
court granted the appellant twenty (20) days within which to do so. 5
On April 14, 1961, the appellant filed a motion to quash the information upon the grounds that the
defendant has been previously convicted of rebellion based upon the same overt acts as in the instant
case, and that Republic Act No. 1700 is an ex post facto law (bill of attainder) in that it changes the
punishment and inflicts a greater punishment or penalty than that annexed to the crime when
committed. 6 The court denied the motion on September 11, 1961. 7
The case was subsequently set for trial, and in the course thereof, the prosecution moved that the
testimony of the witnesses presented during the preliminary investigation of this case be adopted as
part of the evidence in chief of the prosecution. The trial court granted the motion subject to the
condition that the witnesses be further cross-examined by counsel for the accused. 8
At the trial, the witnesses for the prosecution who testified at the preliminary investigation were
recalled and were again cross-examined by counsel for the appellant. To bolster their case, the
prosecution presented three (3) additional witnesses. The defense, on the other hand, presented the
appellant himself who stated that after his apprehension, he was charged with rebellion before the
Court of First Instance of Pampanga and found guilty thereof; 9 and he was also charged with murder
before the Court of First Instance of Tarlac and acquitted; 10 and that he surrendered to the PC patrol
at Calungusan, Orion, Bataan on June 21, 1960. 11 On being cross-examined by the court, however,
the appellant admitted membership in the Hukbalahap, and later in the HMB, from 1948 to 1960,
and did not take advantage of the amnesty offered in 1948. 12
On March 28, 1967, the trial court rendered the appealed decision finding the accused guilty of the
crime of subversion, as charged. For security reasons and upon previous request, the decision was
promulgated in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasig Branch, since the accused was then
confined at the Fort Bonifacio Stockade, Makati, Rizal. 13
In seeking a reversal of the decision, the appellant assigned four errors allegedly committed by the
trial court. On the fore is his claim that he was deprived of his fundamental right to confront the
witnesses against him when the trial court granted the motion of the Fiscal that the testimony of the
witnesses presented during the preliminary investigation be adopted and made part of the evidence
for the prosecution.
The Constitution guarantees an accused person the right to meet the witnesses against him fact of
face. 14 This provision "intends to secure the accused in the right to be tried, so far as facts provable
by witnesses are concerned, by only such witnesses as meet him face to face at the trial, who give
their opportunity of cross-examination. It was intended to prevent the conviction of the accused
upon depositions or ex-parte affidavits, and particularly to preserve the right of the accused to test
the recollection of the witnesses in the exercise of the right of cross-examination." 15
Here, the testimony sought to be made part of the evidence in chief are not ex-parte affidavits, but
testimony of witnesses taken down by question and answer during the preliminary investigation in
the presence of the accused and his counsel who subjected the said witnesses to a rigid and close
cross-examination. The inclusion of said testimony was made subject to the right of the defendant to
further cross-examine the witnesses whose testimony are sought to be reproduce and, pursuant to
said order, the witnesses were recalled to the stand during the trial and again examined in the
presence of the appellant. Upon the fact, there was no curtailment of the constitutional right of the
accused to meet the witnesses face to face.
The appellant also contends that the "two-witness" rule on the same over act, as provided for under
Republic Act No. 1700, has not been observed and complied with in convicting him. In support
thereof, the appellant presented a brief summary of the testimony of the witnesses for the
prosecution which would tend to show that no two witnesses testified to the same overt act.
The law adverted to, Section 7 o f Republic Act No. 1700, provides that "No person shall be convicted
of any of the offenses penalized herein with prision mayor to death unless on the testimony of at
least two witnesses to the same overt act or on confession of the accused in open court."
Finally, the appellant asserts that the decision should have been promulgated in the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch, considering that he was then detained or confined at Camp
Crame, Quezon City, and not in the Pasig Branch of said Court; and that the decision should have
been promulgated by Judge Pedro Navarro of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal and not Judge Tito V. Tizon of the Court of First Instance of Bataan.
The appellant's contention is premised upon his claim that he was then confined at Camp Crame,
Quezon City. The records show, however, that he had been confined at Fort Bonifacio (then known as
Fort William Mckinley), Makati, Rizal, since November 20, 1962 21 and continued to be detained
therein during the continuation of the trial, up to its termination. 22 Appellant's claim is, therefore,
without merit.

The offense is punishable by prision mayor to death if the offender is an officer or ranking leader of As to the fact that Judge Tito V. Tizon personally read the decision instead of Judge Pedro Navarro,
the Communist Party of the Philippines or of any subversive association a defined in Section 2 of suffice it to state that the decision was promulgated in the sala of Judge Pedro jurisdiction over the
Republic Act No. 1700; or if such member takes up arms against the Government. 16 place of confinement or detention of the accused, upon the request of the Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Bataan, pursuant to the provisions of Section 6 of Rule 120. 23 The reading of a decision is
Appellant's being an officer or ranking leader of the Communist Party of the Philippines and its a mechanical act which may be delegated by the court.
military arm, the "Hukbong Mapagpalaya ng Bayan" or HMB, is borne out by the testimony of Santos
Miguel, Melencio Guevara, Pablo Guintu, and Lazaro Esteban, former associates of the appellant in UPON THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from should be, as it is, hereby affirmed, with costs.
the Communist Party of the Philippines and the HMB. In addition, there is his sworn
statement 17 wherein the appellant admitted membership in the Central Committee of the SO ORDERED.
Communist Party of the Philippines and recounted his prismatic rise in the "Hukbalahap" and later
in the HMB, as well as the numerous armed clashed he and his men had with the Philippine Fernando, (Chairman), Barredo, Antonio, Antonio and Aquino, JJ., concur.
Constabulary and police forces. There is also the testimony of Pablo Guintu, Melencio Guevara, and
Sgt. Sales Cresencia as to the gun battle between a PC patrol and a group of HMB men led by the
appellant on June 8, 1960, in Mt. Timak, Abucay, Bataan, and on June 21, 1960, in Calungusan,
Orion, Bataan, where the appellant was captured along with his wife. Besides, where the appellant
was captured along with his wife. Besides, appellant admitted in court that he was a member of the
"Hukbalahap" and later the "Hukbong Mapagpalaya ng Bayan" or HMB and fought against the
government.

The appellant further claims that he had been charged with rebellion ad subversion based upon the
same overt act, and since he had already been convicted of rebellion, he cannot now be prosecuted
for subversion.

Violation of Republic Act No. 1700, or subversion, as it is more commonly called, is a crime distinct
from that of actual rebellion. 18 The crime of rebellion is committed by rising publicly and taking up
arms against the Government for any of the purposes specified in Article 134 of the Revised Penal
Code; while the Anti-Subversion Act (Republic Act No. 1700) punishes affiliation or membership in a
subversive organization as defined therein. In rebellion, there must be a public uprising and the
taking of arms against the Government; 19 whereas, in subversion, mere membership in a subversive
association is sufficient, and the taking up of arms by a member of a subersive organization against
the Government is but a circumstance which raises the penalty to be imposed upon the offender.

Anyway, in the rebellion case, the appellant and several others were charged and convicted of
rebellion for having risen publicly and taken up arms against the Government for the purpose of
removing the allegiance of the Republic of the Philippines or its law, the territory of the Philippines,
and in furtherance thereof, engaged in combat against the forces of the Government, destroyed
property, and committed serious violence during the period from May 28, 1946 to June 19, 1957. 20

In the instant case, however, the accused is prosecuted under Republic Act No. 1700 for having
remained a high ranking member of the Communist Party of the Philippines and its military arm, the
HMB, from January, 1946 to June 21, 1960, without having renounced his membership in said
organizations; and, being a member or officer of said subversive association, has taken up arms
against the Government.

Although the information charges the appellant with having taken up arms against the Government,
the same is not specific as to the period covered by it. But, since the appellant is prosecuted for
violation of Republic Act No. 1700 it is deducible that the period covered is that from June 20, 1957,
when the Act took effect, up to June 21, 1960, when the appellant was captured. Inasmuch as the
rebellion case covered the period up to June 19, 1957 and the period covered in the instant case is
from June 20, 1957 to June 21, 1960, the claim of having been put twice in jeopardy for the same act
cannot be sustained.
108
 On May 27, 1970, respondent Tobias wrote petitioner's counsel the following letter:

G.R. No. L-41555 July 27, 1977 Dear Sir:

INDUSTRIAL FINANCE CORPORATION, petitioner, This is in response to your letter of demand dated May 14, 1970 asking me to
vs. surrender Dodge Truck with engine no. CPC-4007 Serial No. 1589070794. I am
CASTOR TOBIAS, respondent. now voluntarily and willingly surrendering said truck due to the ff. reasons:

Santos S. Carlos for petitioner. 1. That said truck has been with Leelin Motors ever since the
later part of February when it met an accident.
Amado J. Garcia for respondent.
2. That there is too much delay in the repair of said truck
because until now the truck is not yet completely finished.

MARTIN, J: 3. That upon seeing said truck, I am not satisfied with the
repair of the finished portions.
This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals * in CA-G.R. No. 53916, entitled
"Industrial Finance Corporation vs. Castor Tobias", affirming that of the Court of First Instance of I am now giving full authority to your client Industrial Finance Corporation to
Manila with a slight modification. get said truck at Leelin Motors, Inc.

On June 16, 1968, respondent Castor Tobias bought on installment one (1) Dodge truck from Leelin I am hoping that due to the ff. good reasons my name will not be blacklisted in
Motors, Inc. To answer for his obligation he executed a promissory note in favor of the latter, for the your credit division.
sum of P29.070.28 payable in thirty-six (36) equal installments with interest at the rate of 12% per
annum payable in the amounts and dates indicated in said promissory note. 1 To secure payment of Very truly yours,
the promissory note, respondent Tobias executed in favor of Leelin Motors, Inc. a chattel mortgage
on the Dodge truck. Castor Tobias 5

On June 19, 1969, Leelin Motors, Inc. indorsed the promissory note and assigned the chattel
mortgage to petitioner Industrial Finance Corporation. As a consequence respondent Tobias paid six
(6) installments on the promissory note directly to the petitioner Industrial Finance Corporation the
last of which was made on February 19, 1970. 2
On May 14, 1970, the petitioner's counsel wrote to respondent Tobias the following letter:
xxx xxx xxx
Dear Mr. Tobias:
My client, the INDUSTRIAL FINANCE CORPORATION, has referred to me for
appropriate legal action your account with it (LCI-690) which is in arrears in the
amount of P4,254.65 and a balance of P25,249.65 as of May 16, 1970. In view of
your default in the payment of your installments due pursuant to the Promissory
Note and Chattel Mortgage you executed in favor of Leelin Motors, Inc. and
assigned to Industrial Finance Corporation, demand is- hereby made upon you
to pay the amount of P25,249.65 on or before May 24, 1970 or to surrender
within the same period the following described personality:
One (1) Unit 1969 Motor Vehicle Dodge
D-600 FFC 197 "WB"
Engine No. CPC4007
Serial No. 1589070794
otherwise, the corresponding action will be filed against you plus damages and
attorney's fees.
Please consider this a final demand.
Very truly yours,
C.R. SANCHEZ LAW OFFICE
SGD. CATALINO R. SANCHEZ. 3
At the time the foregoing letter was written, respondent Tobias was in arrear in the payment of more
than two (2) installments. 4
Upon learning that the truck met an accident, petitioner decided not to get the truck anymore from
Leelin Motors, Inc.
On February 16, 1971, petitioner filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila an action against
respondent Tobias to recover the unpaid balance of the promissory note.- The lower court dismissed
the complaint on the ground that "(I)nasmuch as the defendant voluntarily and willingly surrendered
the truck and gave the Industrial Finance Corporation full authority to get said truck from Leelin
Motors, Inc. (Exhibit 2) pursuant to the demand to surrender (Exhibit B) the defendant complied
with the demands of the plaintiff. 6
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the lower court dismissing the complaint of
petitioner Industrial Finance Corporation but modifying the same by ordering respondent Tobias to
pay the cost of repairs of the damaged truck in the amount of P5,396.78 plus interest.
The main thrust of the petitioner's argument is that the respondent Court of Appeals erred in
affirming the dismissal of the complaint of the petitioner in the lower court by not considering his
right as an unpaid vendor of the truck in question under Art. 1484 of the New Civil Code. 7 Petitioner
claims that under Art. 1484 of the New Civil Code, an unpaid vendor may choose any of the remedies
provided therein and that as an unpaid vendor, it has chosen to exact fulfillment of the obligation for
failure of the vendee to pay. Respondent Tobias, however, claims that petitioner is estopped to insist
on its claim on the balance of the promissory note when it demanded the return or surrender of the
truck in its letter of May 14, 1970, to which demand, respondent acceded in his letter dated May 27,
1970.
The claim of respondent cannot be sustained. Art. 1484 is clear that "should the vendee or purchaser
of a personal property be in default in the payment of two or more of the agreed installments, the
vendor or seller has the option to either exact fulfillment by the purchaser of -the obligation, or to
cancel the sale, or to foreclose the mortgage on the purchased personal property, if one was
constituted.8 Since the case involves the sale of personal property on installments Art. 1484 of the
Civil Code should apply. The remedies provided for in Art. 1484 are considered alternative, not
cumulative 9 such that the exercise of one would bar the exercise by the others. 10 Here, petitioner has
not cancelled the sale, nor has it exercised the remedy of foreclosure. Foreclosure, judicial or extra-
judicial, presupposes something more than a mere demand to surrender possession of the object of
the mortgage. 11 Since the petitioner has not availed itself of the remedy of cancelling the sale of the
truck in question or of foreclosing the chattel mortgage on said truck, petitioner is still free to avail of
the remedy of exacting fulfillment ' of the obligation of respondent Tobias, the vendee of the truck in
question. In Radiowealth Inc. vs. Lavin, 12 the facts of which are similar to the 'present case, the

109
issue was "whether the plaintiff is precluded to press for collection of an account secured by a chattel
mortgagee after it shall have informed the defendants of its intention to foreclose said mortgage, and
the voluntary acceptance of such step (foreclosure) by defendant mortgagor," the Supreme Court
ruled in favor of the plaintiff mortgagee. Said the Court:

The contract being a sale of machinery payable in installments, the applicable

provision of law is Article 1484 of the Civil Code, which gives the vendor the
option to exercise any one of the alternative remedies therein mentioned: exact
fulfillment of the obligation, cancel the sale, or foreclose the chattel mortgage.
But the vendor- mortgagor in the present case desisted, on its own initiative,
from consummating the auction sale, without gaining any advantage or benefit,
and without causing any disadvantage, or harm to the vendees-mortgagees. The
least that could be said is that such desistance of the plaintiff from proceeding
with auction sale was a timely disavowal that cancelled and rendered useless its
previous choice to foreclose; its acts, being extra-judicial, brought no trouble
upon any court, and were harmless to the defendants. For this reason, the
plaintiff can not be considered as having "exercised" (the Code uses the word
"exercise") the remedy of foreclosure because of its incomplete implementation,
and, therefore, the plaintiff is not barred from suing on the unpaid account.

In effect this ruling answers the issue of estoppel raised by respondent Tobias. Besides, to hold the
petitioner in estoppel, it must be shown that when it gave the respondent the choice of either paying
the balance of the purchase price or of surrending the truck, it had already knowledge of the accident
and the consequent damage to the truck. In the present case petitioner claims it had no knowledge of
the accident 13 when it gave the respondent the choice of either paying the balance of the promissory
note or of surrendering the truck. It is hard to believe that petitioner would make such offer to
respondent either to pay the balance on the promissory, note or to surrender the truck in question if
it knew that the truck has had an accident. The more plausible thing it would have asked the
respondent is to ask for the balance on the promissory note. Besides the allegation of petitioner that
it had no knowledge of the accident is a negative allegation and needs no evidence to support it, not
being an essential part of the statement of the right on which the cause of action is founded. 14 It is
therefore the respondent Tobias who has the burden of disproving the claim of petitioner that he has
no knowledge of the accident when it made the offer to respondent either to pay the balance on the
promissory note or to surrender the truck. Respondent failed in this.

It is claimed by respondent Tobias that he has surrendered the truck to petitioner in his letter dated
May 27, 1970. But the alleged surrender was ineffectual as far as the petitioner is concerned because
petitioner could not take possession of the truck in question as it was in the custody of Leelin Motors,
Inc., which had a mechanic's lien over it. Even respondent Tobias cannot expect petitioner to accept
the term of surrender because aside from the fact that the truck being surrendered met an accident
petitioner was not satisfied with the repair of the finished portion of the truck in question. Petitioner
therefore was justified refusing to accept such surrender and in bringing suit to recover the balance
of the purchase price.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the judgment of the respondent Court of Appeals and of the lower
court are hereby set aside and a new one rendered ordering respondent Tobias to pay petitioner the
balance of the purchase price of the truck in question in the amount of P27,210.77 plus legal rate of
interest from the time of the filing of the complaint. Costs against the respondent.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee (Chairman), Makasiar, Muñoz-Palma and Guerrero, JJ., concur.

Fernandez, J., took no part.

110
G.R. Nos. L-27680-81 February 27, 1970
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
OPENIANO PAJENADO @ PEMING, defendant-appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General Antonio P. Barredo, Assistant Solicitor General Isidro C. Borromeo
and Solicitor Octavio R. Ramirez for plaintiff-appellee.
Ramon C. Aquino as counsel de officio for defendant appellant.
DIZON, J.:
In the Court of First Instance of Samar appellant Openiano Pajenado was charged with murder
(Criminal Case No. 3492, now G.R. No. L-27680) and with illegal possession of a firearm (Criminal
Case No. 3558, now G.R. No. L-27681). Upon arraignment he pleaded not guilty in both cases, and
after a joint trial thereof he was convicted and sentenced as follows:
Wherefore, in view of the foregoing considerations, the Court finds the accused
Openiano Pajenado alias Peming, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
murder and he is hereby condemned to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua,
to indemnify the heirs of Carlos Tapong in the amount of P6,000.00 and to pay
the cost of suit.
The same accused Openiano Pajenado is likewise guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of illegal possession of firearm and is hereby sentenced to suffer
imprisonment of not less than One (1) year nor more than Five (5) years and to
pay the cost of suit.
The facts established conclusively by the evidence are the following:
At about 12:00 o'clock noon on December 31, 1965 while prosecution witness Epifanio Cabe was
walking along one of the streets of barrio Dapdap, municipality of Las Navas, North Samar, and
arrived in front of the house of one Pablo Jazmines, he saw appellant holding the now deceased
Carlos Tapong by the neck. As the two were apparently wrestling with each other, Carlito Pajenado,
appellant's cousin, intervened and the two Pajenados were able to throw Tapong to the ground.
Carlito Pajenado held Tapong by the shoulder and pinned him down to the ground, while appellant
held him by one leg. As they thus held Carlos Tapong helpless, appellant drew his gun and fired at
him. Thereupon, Carlito Pajenado stood up and ran away, while appellant remained at the scene of
the crime with his drawn gun until a policeman, another Pajenado (Ernesto), arrived and took the
firearm from him. Carlos Tapong, mortally wounded, was thereafter carried home by his father and
other relatives.
Another prosecution witness, Pelagia Tapong, testified that at noon on the day in question, while she
was at the window of the house of her elder brother, Angel, along the street where the incident took
place, she saw appellant standing on the street; that when Carlos Tapong appeared, appellant
immediately met him and held him by the neck; that thereafter Carlito Pajenado intervened and with
his help appellant was able to fell Carlos to the ground.
It is not denied that Carlos Tapong died as a result of the gun-shot wound inflicted upon him on that
occasion. Testifying on the nature thereof, Dr. Angel Tan, municipal health officer of Las Navas, said
that he conducted a post mortem examination of the cadaver on January 1, 1966 and found that the
deceased sustained three gun-shot wounds which, in his opinion, were caused by a single shot from a
.45 caliber pistol. The wounds are described by him in his autopsy report, Exhibits A, A-1 and A-2 as
follows:
Gun shot wound with entrance at the postero-medial portion of the distal third
of the thigh making an exit at its upper promixmal third in the antero-lateral
margin, making another entrance at the right hypogastric region, penetrating
the abdominal cavity. Perforating the intestines, penetrating the left dome of the
diaphragm to enter the left thoracic cavity.
111
Dr. Tan also testified that considering the presence of powder burns in the body of the deceased, he
must have been shot at a distance of less than one meter, and that the cause of his death was shock
due to external and internal hemorrhage.
The issues raised in the assignments of error made in appellant's brief call for the resolution of:
firstly, the question of whether appellant should be convicted only of homicide instead of murder,
and whether, upon the evidence of record, he should also be found guilty of the crime of illegal
possession of a firearm.
The Solicitor General agrees with appellant's view that the latter should be convicted merely of
homicide committed with one aggravating circumstance not offset by any mitigating circumstance,
because the qualifying circumstances of evident premeditation and treachery alleged in the
information have not been proved.
We disagree.
The testimony of prosecution witness Pelagia Tapong clearly shows that, for sometime before the
incident, appellant had been waiting for Carlos Tapong to appear, and that as soon as the latter
showed up and arrived in front of the house of Pablo Jazmines, appellant met him and held him by
the neck; that thereafter his cousin Carlito helped him throw their victim to the ground. This, We
believe, is sufficient evidence of premeditation.
We agree, however, that treachery was not proved. On the other hand, the aggravating circumstance
of abuse of superior strength, admitted by appellant's counsel (p. 8, appellant's brief), must be
considered in the imposition of the corresponding penalty.
Upon the question of whether or not appellant should also be convicted of the crime of illegal
possession of a firearm, We agree with both appellant's counsel and the Solicitor General that the
appealed decision should be reversed.
It is true that People vs. Lubo, 101 Phil. 179 and People vs. Ramos, 8 SCRA 758 could be invoked to
support the view that it is incumbent upon a person charged with illegal possession of a firearm, to
prove the issuance to him of a license to possess the firearm, but We are, of the considered opinion
that under the provisions of Section 2, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court which, provide that in criminal
cases the burden of proof as to the offense charged lies on the prosecution and that a negative fact
alleged by the prosecution must be proven if "it is an essential ingredient of the offense charged", the
burden of proof was with the prosecution in this case to prove that the firearm used by appellant in
committing the offense charged was not properly licensed.
It cannot be denied that the lack or absence of a license is an essential ingredient of the offense of
illegal possession of a firearm. The information filed against appellant in Criminal Case No. 3558 of
the lower court (now G.R. No. 27681) specifically alleged that he had no "license or permit to
possess" the .45 caliber pistol mentioned therein. Thus it seems clear that it was the prosecution's
duty not merely to allege that negative fact but to prove it. This view is supported by similar
adjudicated cases. In U.S. vs. Tria, 17 Phil. 303, the accused was charged with having criminally
inscribed himself as a voter knowing that he had none of the qualifications required to be a voter. It
was there held that the negative fact of lack of qualification to be a voter was an essential element of
the crime charged and should be proved by the prosecution. In another case (People vs. Quebral, 68
Phil. 564) where the accused was charged with illegal practice of medicine because he had diagnosed,
treated and prescribed for certain diseases suffered by certain patients from whom he received
monetary compensation, without having previously obtained the proper certificate of registration
from the Board of Medical Examiners, as provided in Section 770 of the Administrative Code, this
Court held that if the subject of the negative averment like, for instance, the act of voting without the
qualifications provided by law is an essential ingredient of the offense charged, the prosecution has
the burden of proving the same, although in view of the difficulty of proving a negative allegation, the
prosecution, under such circumstance, need only establish a prima facie case from the best evidence
obtainable. In the case before Us, both appellant and the Solicitor General agree that there was not
even a prima facie case upon which to hold appellant guilty of the illegal possession of a firearm.
Former Chief Justice Moran upholds this view as follows:
The mere fact that the adverse party has the control of the better means of proof
of the fact alleged, should not relieve the party making the averment of the
burden of proving it. This is so, because a party who alleges a fact must be
assumed to have acquired some knowledge thereof, otherwise he could not have
 alleged it. Familiar instance of this is the case of a person prosecuted for doing
an act or carrying on a business, such as, the sale of liquor without a license.
How could the prosecution aver the want of a license if it had acquired no
knowledge of that fact? Accordingly, although proof of the existence or non-
existence of such license can, with more facility, be adduced by the defendant, it
is, nevertheless, incumbent upon the party alleging the want of the license to
prove the allegation. Naturally, as the subject matter of the averment is one
which lies peculiarly within the control or knowledge of the accused prima
facie evidence thereof on the part of the prosecution shall suffice to cast the onus
upon him. (6 Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, 1963 edition, p. 8.)

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

(1) Appellant is found guilty of murder, with the aggravating circumstance of use of superior
strength, without any mitigating circumstance to offset the same, but for lack of the required number
of votes to impose the corresponding penalty in its maximum degree, We only affirm the penalty
of reclusion perpetua imposed upon him by the trial court. However, the indemnity appellant must
pay the heirs of Carlos Tapong is increased to P12,000.00.

(2) The appealed decision is reversed and set aside in so far as it finds appellant guilty of illegal
possession of a firearm, with the result that he is hereby acquitted of said charge.

MODIFIED AS ABOVE INDICATED, the appealed decision is affirmed in all other respects, with
costs.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo and
Villamor, JJ., concur.

112

G.R. No. 153743. March 18, 2005]
NORMA B. DOMINGO, petitioner, vs. YOLANDA ROBLES; and MICHAEL
MALABANAN ROBLES, MARICON MALABANAN ROBLES, MICHELLE
MALABANAN ROBLES, All Minors Represented by Their Mother, YOLANDA
ROBLES, respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Forgery must be proven by the party alleging it; it cannot be presumed. To prevent a forged
transfer from being registered, the Torrens Act requires, as a prerequisite to registration, the
production of the owners certificate of title and the instrument of conveyance. A registered owner
who places in the hands of another an executed document of transfer of registered land effectively
represents to a third party that the holder of such document is authorized to deal with the property. [1]
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review [2] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, challenging the May
27, 2002 Decision[3] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 53842. The decretal portion of the
assailed Decision reads:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, [there being] no reversible error in the challenged decision,
the same is hereby AFFIRMED, in toto, and the instant appeal ordered DISMISSED. Costs
against the [petitioner].[4]
On the other hand, the affirmed Decision [5] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 272 of
Marikina, disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the complaint subject of this decision is hereby DISMISSED. [6]
The Facts
The facts are narrated by the CA as follows:
The historical backdrop shows that [petitioner] and her husband, Valentino Domingo, were the
registered owners of Lot 19, Block 1, subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-15706 located at Cristina
Subdivision, Concepcion, Marikina and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 53412. On this
lot, [Petitioner] Norma B. Domingo discontinued the construction of her house allegedly for failure
of her husband to send the necessary financial support. So, she decided to dispose of the property.
A friend, Flor Bacani, volunteered to act as [petitioners] agent in selling the lot. Trusting Bacani,
[petitioner] delivered their owners copy of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 53412 to him (Bacani).
Later, the title was said to have been lost. In the petition for its reconstitution, [petitioner] gave
Bacani all her receipts of payment for real estate taxes. At the same time, Bacani asked [petitioner] to
sign what she recalled was a record of exhibits. Thereafter, [petitioner] waited patiently but Bacani
did not show up any more.
On November 1, 1994, [Petitioner] Norma Domingo visited the lot and was surprised to see the
[respondents] (Robles, for short) starting to build a house on the subject lot. A verification with the
Register of Deeds revealed that the reconstituted Transfer Certificate of Title No. 53412 had already
been cancelled with the registration of a Deed of Absolute Sale dated May 9, 1991 signed by Norma B.
Domingo and her husband Valentino Domingo, as sellers, and [Respondent] Yolanda Robles, for
herself and representing the other minor [respondents], as buyers. As a consequence, Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 201730 was issued on June 10, 1991 in the name of [Respondent] Robles.
Claiming not to have met any of the [respondents] nor having signed any sale over the property in
favor of anybody (her husband being abroad at the time), [petitioner] assumed that the Deed of
Absolute Sale dated May 9, 1991 is a forgery and, therefore, could not validly transfer ownership of
the lot to the [respondents]. Hence, the case for the nullity thereof and its reconveyance.
113
[Respondents] Robles responded alleging to be buyers in good faith and for value. They narrate that
the subject lot was offered to them by Flor Bacani, as the agent of the owners; that after some time
when they were already prepared to buy the lot, Bacani introduced to them the supposed owners and
agreed on the sale; then, on May 9, 1991, Bacani and the introduced seller presented a Deed of
Absolute Sale already signed by Valentino and Norma Domingo needing only her (Robles) signature.
Presented likewise at that meeting, where she paid full purchase price, was the original of the owners
duplicate of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 53412.
Then sometime later, [Respondents] Robles contracted to sell the lot in issue in favor of spouses
Danilo and Herminigilda Deza for P250,000.00. [Respondent] Yolanda Robles even had to secure a
guardianship authority over the persons and properties of her minor children from the Regional Trial
Court of Pasig in JDRC No. 2614. When only P20,000.00 remained unpaid of the total purchase
price under the contract to sell, payment was stopped because of the letter received by Yolanda
Robles that [petitioner] intends to sue her.
After due proceedings, the [Regional Trial Court] rendered its Decision dated May 13, 1996,
dismissing the complaint.[7]
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The CA held that respondents were purchasers in good faith and for value. According to its
findings, (a) the sale was admittedly made through petitioners agent; (b) as Domingos agent, Bacani
brought with him the original of the owners duplicate Certificate of Title of the property and some
receipts; (c) the reconstituted title presented to the buyers was free from any liens, encumbrances or
adverse interests of other persons; and (d) the land was unoccupied. Petitioner was not able to
present, against these established facts, any evidence to prove that respondents had prior knowledge
of any other persons right to or interest over the property in question.
Hence, this Petition.[8]
Issue
Petitioner submits this sole issue for our consideration:
To determine whether or not the petitioner is entitled to her claims, the issue worthy of consideration
by the Honorable Court in the instant case is WHO IS A PURCHASER IN GOOD FAITH? [9]
The Courts Ruling
The Petition has no merit.
Sole Issue:
Acquisition of Valid Title
It is a well-established principle that factual findings of the trial court, when affirmed by the
Court of Appeals, are binding on this Court. [10] Petitioner has given this Court no cogent reason to
deviate from this rule; on the contrary, the findings of the courts a quo are amply supported by the
evidence on record.
Petitioner claims that her signature and that of her husband were forged in the Deed of
Absolute Sale transferring the property from the Domingo spouses to respondent. Relying on the
general rule that a forged deed is void and conveys no title, [11] she assails the validity of the sale.
It is a well-settled rule, however, that a notarized instrument enjoys a prima facie presumption
of authenticity and due execution. [12] Clear and convincing evidence must be presented to overcome
such legal presumption. Forgery cannot be presumed; hence, it was incumbent upon petitioner to
prove it.[13] This, she failed to do. On this point, the CA observed:
x x x. What surprises the Court is that a comparison of the signature of appellant Norma Domingo in
the Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of the appellees and the signature in the verification of the
complaint manifest a striking similarity to the point that without any contrary proof, it would be safe
to conclude that said signatures were written by one and the same person. Sadly, appellant left that
matter that way without introducing counteracting evidence. x x x [14]
 Petitioner also failed to convince the trial court that the person with whom Respondent
Yolanda Robles transacted was in fact not Valentino Domingo. Except for her insistence that her
husband was out of the country, petitioner failed to present any other clear and convincing evidence
that Valentino was not present at the time of the sale. Bare allegations, unsubstantiated by evidence,
are not equivalent to proof.[15]

Petitioner now stresses the issue of good faith on the part of respondents. In the absence of a
finding of fraud and a consequent finding of authenticity and due execution of the Deed of Absolute
Sale, a discussion of whether respondents were purchasers in good faith is wholly unnecessary.
Without a clear and persuasive substantiation of bad faith, a presumption of good faith in their favor
stands.[16]

The sale was admittedly made with the aid of Bacani, petitioners agent, who had with him the
original of the owners duplicate Certificate of Title to the property, free from any liens or
encumbrances. The signatures of Spouses Domingo, the registered owners, appear on the Deed of
Absolute Sale. Petitioners husband met with Respondent Yolanda Robles and received payment for
the property. The Torrens Act requires, as a prerequisite to registration, the production of the owners
certificate of title and the instrument of conveyance. The registered owner who places in the hands of
another an executed document of transfer of registered land effectively represents to a third party
that the holder of such document is authorized to deal with the property. [17]

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, and Garcia, JJ., concur.

114
G.R. No. L-35022 December 21, 1977 Molina told me 'THAT HER HUSBAND WAS PLANNING TO KILL ME and just after we were
through what both of us did, Josephina went upstairs inside (the) house, and because I cannot
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, withstand anymore the plan of her husband to kill me that was why I went upstairs and I went direct
vs. inside their room and I saw Bernardo Molina lying down sleeping, and that was the time when I
RICARDO VERZOLA & JOSEFINA MOLINA, accused-appellants. clubbed him three times at the nape, and when he did not move anymore that was the time when we
both with Josephine Molina throw him downstairs of their house. After that I went home.
Alberto Benesa for appellants.
7. Q:-What is the weapon that you used in clubbing Berno
Office of the Solicitor General for appellee. Molina'

A:—-A wooden club which is rounded and about two palms

in length, Sir.
ANTONIO, J.:
Q:—You stated that while you were under the house of
Appeal by Ricardo Verzola and Josefina Molina from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Bernardo Molina and you pricked with bamboo twig in
Abra, finding them guilty of the crime of Murder and sentencing them, respectively, viz.: Verzola, as awakening Josephina Molina and not long afterwards she
principal, to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment, to indemnify the offended party in the amount came down and went to you hat is your relationship with
of P12,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay 3/4 of the costs; Josephina Molina the wife of Bernardo Molina?
and Molina, as an accessory after the fact, to suffer an indeterminate penalty of six (6) years
of prision correccional as maximum, and to pay 1/4 of the indemnity and costs. A:—Josephina Molina is my paramour.
At about 10:00 o'clock on the night of September 28, 1969, Bernardo Molina was clubbed to death by Q:—How long have you been in that relationship with
Ricardo Verzola in the presence of appellant Josefina Molina inside Molina's house at Barrio Lipcan, Josephina Molina?
Bangued, Abra. The body of the victim was subsequently carried by the two appellee to the ground
and left at the foot of the stairs. Appellant Verzola then went to his house, changed his clothes and A:—What I know is that it is already about 10 years, Sir.
threw his bloodstained sweater undershirt and underwear, including the piece of wood be used in Because her daughter who is already 12 years old was still
clubbing the deceased, inside their toilet. Afterwards, he went to the municipal building and reported small.
to the police authorities that Bernardo had died in an accident. The police authorities. together with
the Municipal Health Officer, the Municipal Judge and a photographer went to Lipcan to conduct the Q:—With this relationship that you have with Josephina
investigation. They found the body of the deceased Bernardo Molina sprawled at the foot of the Molina did not her husband Bernardo Molina notice, so that
bamboo ladder (Exhibit "I"). Blood had oozed from the mouth, nose and ears. There were Josephina told you that her husband was planning to kill
bloodstains on the floor of the bedroom of the house, on the mat, as well as on the beddings of the you?
deceased. The bloodstains led to the bamboo ladder where some of the stains could be found on the
steps of the ladder. When questioned by the police, Josefina revealed that the assailant of her A:—Probably he had already, Sir. Because that is what his
husband was Ricardo Verzola. Upon her request, she was brought to the Office of the Chief of Police wife told me.
of Bangued, where at about 2:00 o'clock in the morning of September 29, 1969 she gave a written
statement narrating the circumstances surrounding the incident in question and pointing to Q:—Who witnessed when you killed Bernardo Molina that
appellant Verzola as the assailant of her husband (Exhibits 'K" and "9"). In that extra-judicial you know'
statement, she stated that immediately after 10:00 o'clock in the evening of September 28. 1969,
appellant Ricardo Verzola went to their house in Barrio Lipcan, Bangued Abra. entered the room A:—It was only Josephina the wife of Bernardo Molina, Sir.
where she was sleeping with her husband, Bernardo Molina, woke her up and had carnal knowledge
Q:—What did Josephina say when you delivered club blows
of her; that when Bernardo Molina woke up and attempted to rise from the floor, that was the
at her husband?
moment when Verzola clubbed Bernards, hitting him on the head several times that afterwards, she
heard the sound of a body being dragged downstairs and the voice of Verzola saying that he was A:—'That is enough he is dead, let us bring him down', that
leaving and warning her not to say anything about the incident. She looked out of the door and saw is what she said, Sir.
her husband already lying prostrate at the foot of the stairs. This statement was sworn to by her
before Municipal Judge Francisco T. Valera. Q:—Therefore, you want to say that you and Josephina
Molina the wife of Bernardo helped each other in this
At about 4:00 o'clock that same morning, appellant Verzola was picked up by the police and brought killing?
to the municipal building, and there he also executed a written statement (Exhibit "L") admitting
that he clubbed the victim several times. Thus, in his extra-judicial confession of September 29, 1969, A—I told her when she was going up, I'LL GO AHEAD OF
the following statements appear HIM and what she answered to me, IT IS UP TO YOU', Sir.
6. Q:—You stated that you killed Bernardo Molina inside his Q:—And where was Josephina while you were clubbing
house, will (you) relate the true events or what happened Bernardo, if you remember?
when you killed him?
A:—She was there lying down, and when Bernardo did not
A:—Yes, sir. move she said that is enough.
Last night at the stated hour in Barrio Lipcan, Bangued, Abra, inside the house of Bernardo Molina I Q:—What was your clothing when you went to club
went and when I was under their house that was the time when I pricked with a bamboo twig just Bernardo Molina and also your trousers that you used?
under the place where Josephina Molina, wife of Bernardo Molina was laying down, and I noticed
that she was awake, and not long afterwards she came down and came to my place, and that was the A:—-Sweater with long sleeves colored light gray and white
time when we did everything that wanted both of us to do, but before that in the night, Josephina shorts, Sir.
115
 Q:—Where are these sweater and shorts?
A—I dropped it inside our toilet, Sir.
Q:-And where is that club that you said you used in clubbing
Bernardo Molina?
A—I also dropped it inside our toilet, Sir.
Q:—Is it not correct that you kill Bernardo Molina because
he surprised you while you were beside his wife inside their
room that night?
A:—No, Sir.
Q:—So that in this where you clubbed to death Bernardo
Molina you admit as your guilt?
A:—Yes, Sir.
Q:—Do you have something more to add to this statement of
yours?
A:—-No more, Sir. Unless there are more questions to me.
Q:—Were you forced, intimated, instructed or you were
mauled in this where you made your statement?
A:—No, Sir.
Q:-Do You want to sign this statement of yours?
A—Yes. Sir." (Exhibit "Translation")
After execution his aforesaid written statement, he was brought to the residence of Judge Francisco
T. Valera. Judge Valera sent the n out of his house, a Verzola of his constitutional rights, then read to
him the contents of his aforementioned extrajudicial confession After satisfying himself that the
statement was given voluntarily, he administered the oath to all appellant. Appellant Verzola then
guided the po authorities to his house where, in their presence, he retrieved from the toilet his
bloodstained clothes as well as the piece of wood which he used in clubbing the deceased.
Dr. Luis P. Bringas Municipal Health Officer of Bangued, Abra, who conducted the autopsy, testified
that the died not instantaneously as a result of cardio-respiratory failure caused by "cerebral
compressions and hemorrhages". The deceased sustained the following wounds:
LACERATED WOUND NO. I:—7 Cm. in length with irregular borders or edges
extremities, the deeper tissues unevenly divided with tags of tissues showing in
the wound. The edges and surrounding parts bruised and some hairs were found
in the wound. Situated 6 Cm. in level of the posterior outer upper part of left
Helix of the left ear, extending slantingly downwards below to middle portion of
Occipital region.
LACERATED WOUND NO. II:-6 Cm. in length situated 3 Cm. lateral to
Lacerated Wound No. I, placed horizontally form mid point of the Lacerated
Wound. The characteristics of the wound is the same as the above wounds.
LACERATED WOUND NO. III:-Same characteristics as of the above wounds. 5
Cm. in length situated 2 Cm. below Lacerated Wound No. II, extending slightly
to the right side.
LACERATED WOUND NO. IV:-4.5 Cm. in length same as the characteristics of
the other wounds above, but extending opposite Lacerated Wound No. I only
from the right side." (Exhibit 'A").
116
He also declared that on the basis of the tion and direction of the w the t must have been behind the
victim and said wounds were while the victim was lying in prone position, face downwards.
Both appellants admit that ft was appellant Verzola who the fatal blows on the victim. Versola,
however, after impugning the (Exhibit "L'), claims that he did so in self- defense. Thus, V veracity of
the facts contained in his extrajudicial confession testified that while he was feeding his two cows in
front of his house at about 10:00 o'clock on the night of September 28, 1969, he heard cries for help
coming from the direction of the house of Bernardo Molina- Upon recognize it to be the voice of the
wife of Bernardo, he proceeded to the couples house. Upon reaching the yard of said house he heard
the loud voice of a man. Thus that some intruder had entered the Molina's residence, he to am
himself. At the threshold of the ladder, he picked up a pan of a plow (Exhibit B) At the door of the
room, he heard the man say: 'Vulva of your mother, I will kill you." As he entered the room, he saw
his co-appellant Josefina Mo in a comer, being maltreated by Bernardo Molina. After noticed his
presence, he said: "Vulva of your mother, I will kill all of you." At that juncture, Bernardo stooped to
pick up a bolo from the floor. As Bernardo was still bending towards the Mm V struck him twice with
the piece of wood, hitting the head of the victim, causing him to fall. After he had fallen, he tried to
revive the victim by ng the head of the latter on his lap will it, saying: "Hoy, Hoy, Hoy". He explained
that this was the reason why there were bloodstains on his clothes. When Josefina asked him what
happened, he replied that Bernardo met an accident. At his suggestion, they both carried the body of
the victim down the stairs because according to him they wanted to bring the body to the hospital. As
the hospital was too far and it was too dark, they left the body on the ground. After instructing
Josefina to go and summon persons to help the victim , he went home. After changing his clothes and
throwing his bloodstained clothing inside their toilet, he went to the municipal building in Bangued,
Abra, and reported to the guard that there was a person who met an accident in Lipcan.
His co-appellant, Josefina Molina, also testified that during the first week of September, 1969 she
had a quarrel with her husband because of Bernardo's o theft men, namely, Bocarile Santos Beloy
and appellant Ricardo Verzola; that on the night in question, she and her husband had another
quarrel and in the course thereof, she was boxed and strangled by her husband, causing her. to shout
for help; that after a while, as she was crouching in a comer of the house, with her face covered, she
heard a thud As she looked up, she noticed that Verzola was already inside their room, squatting on
the floor and holding on his lap the head of her husband, that while Verzola was shaking the head of
the deceased, he was saying: "Hoy, Hoy, Hoy." She c that out of fear, she assisted Verzola in carrying
the body of Bernardo at the foot of the stairs where Verzola left her. After looking at the wounds of
her husband, she became afraid and went up the house where her children were sleeping.
Both appellants c that they were not aware of the contents of their extra- judicial confessions as they
were made to sign them by the police authorities without being able to read their contents.
There can be no question that once an accused has admitted the killing of a human being, the burden
is on him to establish the existence of any circumstance which may justify the killing or at least
attenuate the offense committed. To establish his exculpation, or the justification for the act, he must
prove such affirmative allegation by clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence. 1 He must rely on the
strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of that for the prosecution for even if that were
weak, it could not be disbelieved after the accused himself had admitted the killing. 2It is evident that
no such proof was adduced by appellant Verzola.
To begin with, the conduct of appellant Verzola lately after he committed the crime is incompatible
with the reaction of one who killed another in legitimate self-defense. Although he claims that he
brought the victim down the stairs in order to bring him to the hospital, yet when he was able to get a
jeep he did not utilize it for that purpose but instead used it in going to town. Moreover, although
appellant Verzola was present at the scene of the crime when the police authorities were investigating
the case, he kept quiet about the incident. It was only from Josefina Molina that the police learned
for the first time that Verzola was the assailant of the deceased. Even then, Josefina had to request
the police authorities to bring her to the poblacion so that she could talk more freely about the killing
For his part, Verzola attempted to conceal his participation in the crime by hiding inside his toilet his
bloodstained clothes and the weapon that he used in clubbing the deceased . These actuations of
appellant Verzola reveal a behaviour which is incompatible with the reaction of one who acted in
legitimate self-defense. 3 More significant however, are the undisputed physical facts of the case,
such as nature, character and location of the wounds sustained by the deceased and the presence of
the bloodstains on the beddings of the victim. These facts and circumstances belie the claim of the
appellant that he clubbed the victim in self- defense. On the contrary, they sufficiently indicate that
the fatal injuries were inflicted upon the victim when the latter was lying defenseless on the floor, as
he was either sleeping or was just beginning to wake up.

Although appellant Josefina Molina admitted in her extra-judicial statement (Exhibits "K", "K- 1 " to
"K-91) that she was the paramour of her co- appellant for over a year, there is no proof that she had
knowledge of the criminal design of her co-appellant. Neither has she cooperated with him by
previous or simultaneous acts, much less is there any showing that she supplied the principal with
material or moral aid. Her only participation was in assisting her co-appellant in bringing the body of
the deceased to the ground. The question, therefore, is whether or not by said overt act she could be
held criminally responsible as an accessory.

An accessory does not participate in the criminal design, nor cooperate in the commission of the
felony, but, with knows of the commission of the crime, he subsequently takes part in three (3) ways:
(a) by profiting from the effects of the crime; (b) by concealing the body, effects or instruments of the
crime in order to prevent its discovery; and (c) by assisting in the escape or concealment of the
principal of the crime, provided he acts with abuse of his public functions or the principal is guilty of
treason, parricide, murder, or an attempt to take the life of the Chief Executive or is known to be
habitually guilty of some other crime. The main difference separating accessories after the fact the
responsibility of the accessories is subsequent to the consummation of the crime and subordinate to
that of the principal.

According to the trial court, " the bringing down of the body of the victim ... was to destroy the body
of the crime, or its effect that as to make it appear that the death of the victim was caused by an
accident. We disagree. There is no iota of proof that Josefina Molina ever attempted "to destroy the
body of the crime" or to make it appear that death of the victim was accidental. It must be noted that
Josefina testified that she helped her co- appellant bring the body of the deceased down the stairs
because of fear. Even if she assisted her co-appellant without duress, simply Verzola in bringing the
body down the house to the foot of the stairs and leaving said body for anyone to see, cannot be
classified as an attempt to or destroy the body of the crime the effects or instruments thereof, must
be done to prevent the discovery of the crime. In the case at bar, the body was left at the foot of the
stairs at a place where it was easily visible to the public. Under such circumstances there could not
have been any attempt on the part of Josefina to conceal or destroy the body of the crime-

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the judgment, insofar as appellant Verzola is concerned, is
hereby AFFIRMED. The judgment against Josefina Molina is, however, reversed and said appellant
is ACQUITTED with proportionate costs de oficio.

Barredo, Aquino, Concepcion Jr. and Guerrero, JJ., concur.

Fernando (Chairman) and Santos, JJ., are on leave.

Guerrero, J., was designated to sit in the Second Division.

117
118
G.R. No. L-14524 October 24, 1960
FELIX MOLINA, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and BASILISA MANJON, respondents.
Tabora and Concon for petitioner.
Manuel S. Tiuseco for respondent.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
In Civil Case No. 2796 of the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur, plaintiff Basilisa Manjon,
claiming ownership over a parcel of land described in the complaint, sought to recover the
possession thereof from defendant Felix Molina. Defendant Felix Molina filed his answer denying the
material avernments of the compolaint, and by way of affirmative defense and "cross- complaint"
(counterclaim) alleged that the land in question was sold to him by plaintiff around the year 1938
(which was formalized before a Notary in 1943), and that he has been in continued possession
thereof since 1938. Defendant, therefore, prayed that the complaint be dismissed; that plaintiff's
supposed title be declared void; and that defendant be given such other relief as might be found to be
just and equitable under the premises. Plaintiff answering the counterclaim, denied the due
execution of the alleged sale to defendant and urged the dismissal of the counterclaim.
rule of estoppel was applied in this jurisdiction as early as 1908, in the case of Llacer vs. Muñoz de
Bustillo, et al., 12 Phil., 328, wherein this Court said:
The plaintiff in his brief undertakes to show that the defendant had not obtained title to
the land in question, by virtue of Exhibits 7 and 8, by the fact that his father had not
obtained title to a portion of the said land until 1881, or some years after the alleged deed
of Antonio Muñoz. Exhibit F and the note to Exhibit B seem to support this contention.
Granting, however, that he did not obtain a portion of the land until some years after he
had sold such land to Antonio Mu ¤ oz, this subsequent acquisition of the land would have
the effect of making his conveyance of the same to Muñoz valid.
The rule was reaffirmed in Pang Lim and Galvez vs. Lo Seng, 42 Phil., 282, 289.
Hence, the decisive issue in this litigation appears to be whether cor not the alleged sale in 1938 (or
in 1943 when the parties supposedly executed a formal deed of sale) was in fact fictitious as
petitioner insist. If genuine, the sale is undoubtedly operative in law, pursuant to the doctrines
heretofore discussed. Unfortunately, we are not in a position to decide this question of fact (that was
neither resolved by the trial court nor by the Court of Appeals), for the reason that the parties have
not discussed it in this Court nor is the evidence now before us. We are thus constrained to remand
the record to the Court of Appeals for consideration and decision of the issue whether or not (1) the
deed of sale (Exh. 1) was simulated and (2) the statement, Exhibit D, is a foregery.

At the trial, the parties submitted evidence that the trial judge summarized as follows (Decision, Rec. Wherefore, the decisions under appeal are reversed and set aside, and the case is ordered remanded
on Appeal, pp. 7-8): to said Court of Appeals for further proceedings in conformity with this opinion.

The plaintiff admitted having executed the said deed of sale, but she claimed that it was Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Barrera, Gutierrez David and Paredes,
fictitious. Recounting the circumstances leading to its execution, she testified that on JJ., concur.
November 2, 1943, the defendant, then her overseer, informed her that some guerilla
soldiers would arrest her for investigation, because one Conchita Cuba complained to them
against her for having illegally encroached on her property. Afraid to be taken to the
guerilla camp since previously her nephew was killed there, the plaintiff asked the
defendant what was best for her to do. He suggested that she execute a fictitous deed of
sale in his favor for the portion in question which was the one claimed by Conchita Cuba,
in order that he could defend her rights in his name against the claim of Conchita Cuba.
Plaintiff accepted the suggestion and asked the defendant to have the corresponding deed
of the sale prepared. Later in the day Exh. 1 was prepared and plaintiff signed it when it
was brought to her. For her protection, however, because she did not fully trust him, she
made the defendant sign a statement in which he expressly admitted that the transaction
was only a simulated sale (Exh. D).

The defendant denied the whole story and affirmed in turn that Exh. D was a foregery. He
denied having made and signed the said statement, offering samples of his geniune
signature (Exhs. 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14 and 15) for comparison with the questioned
signature in (Exh. D).

But after hearing, the court, without passing upon the question of whether or not the sale to the
defendant was merely simulated, as claimed by the plaintiff, declared the latter as the lawful owner of
the property on the ground that she could not have validly disposed of the said land in 1938, or in
1943 when the deed of sale was allegedly executed in a public document, since it still then formed
part of the public domain, a sales patent having been issued to plaintiff by the government only on
June 4, 1948.

On appeal, Molina expressly assigned, as one of the errors committed by the trial court, its failure to
pass upon the question whether the sale, as evidenced by Exhibit 1, was simulated or not.
Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision and accepted substantially the reasoning of
the trial court. Like the latter, it neither made any definite finding as to whether or not the alleged
sale to defendant was fictitious, believing it was unnecessary, because in its opinion, Manjon could
not validly sell to Molina, in 1938 or 1943, the land that she acquired in ownership only in 1948.
Against the judgment of the Court of Appeals, Felix Molina filed the instant petition for review.

We find the appeal meritorious. It is the settled rule in this jurisdiction, deprived from the common
law doctrine of estoppel by deed, that "when a person who is not the owner of a thing sells or
alienates and delivers it and later the seller or grantor acquires title thereto, such title passes by
operation of law to the buyer or grantee" (Art. 1435, Civil Code of the Philippines). This particular
119
120
G.R. No. 107951 June 30, 1994
SPOUSES EPIFANIO FIGE and MARTINA FIGE, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. MARCELINO E. BAUTISTA, Jr., in his capacity as
Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Parañaque, Metro Manila, FELICITACION
CAMARILLO, WILFREDO CAMARILLO, and IRMA CORONEL, respondents.
Edgardo Q. Galope for petitioners.
Sunico, Malabanan & Associates for private respondents.
PUNO, J.:
The case 1 originated from a simple action for unlawful detainer. Private respondents are the
registered co-owners of a 401-square meter parcel of land with some improvements thereon located
at 634 Quirino Avenue, Tambo, Parañaque, Metro Manila. 2 Their ownership is evidenced by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 36798.
One of the improvements on the land is a store built in 1972. 3 In September 1984, one of the co-
owners, Antonio Camarillo, verbally leased the store in favor of petitioners. The agreed rental was
SEVEN HUNDRED PESOS (P700.00) a month.
On February 21, 1989, private respondents wrote to petitioners terminating the verbal lease by the
end of the said month. 4 The petitioners were given fifteen (15) days to vacate the store.
In response, petitioners sent a postal money order in the amount of ONE THOUSAND FOUR
HUNDRED PESOS (P1,400.00) representing the rental for the months of January and February
1989.
On March 2, 1989, private respondents reiterated their demand of terminating the lease. Conciliation
efforts at the barangay level failed, hence a complaint for Unlawful Detainer was filed by private
respondents against petitioners before the Metropolitan Trial Court, NCJR, Parañaque, Branch 78.
Petitioners contested the complaint. In their answer, they averred that the lot of private respondents
as described in their Transfer Certificate of Title No. 36798 is different from the parcel of land
denominated as No. 634 Quirino Avenue, Tambo, Parañaque, Metro Manila upon which the store
stood. 5 They further claimed that they bought the latter lot from a certain Elsie Periquet.
After trial, the Metropolitan Trial Court dismissed the case for lack of cause of action. 6 On appeal to
the Regional Trial Court, NCJR, Parañaque, Metro Manila, the controverted decision was reversed
on February 27, 1992, viz:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered REVERSING the decision appealed
from and a new one is entered ordering:
a) defendants-appellees and all persons claiming rights under them to
immediately vacate the premises in question and peaceably surrender
possession thereof to herein plaintiffs-appellants; and
b) defendants-appellees to pay plaintiffs-appellants the following:
1) The sum of P700.00 monthly from March 15, 1989 until
they have vacated the premises in question, representing
the reasonable value for the use and occupation thereof;
2) The sum of P15,000.00 as and for attorney’s fees; and
3) The costs of suit.
SO ORDERED. 7
121
Petitioners appealed to the respondent Court of Appeals. On August 27, 1992, respondent court
affirmed the questioned decision but deleted the award of attorney’s fees. On November 20, 1992,
petitioners’ motion for reconsideration was denied for lack of merit.
Hence, this petition faulting the respondent court, as follows:
(1) In disregarding petitioners’ Exhibits "1", "2" to "2-5", "4", "5", and "6" as well as the testimony of
Geodetic Engineer Cresencio Supleo despite the weight accorded thereon by the Metropolitan Trial
Court who under the law is in a better position to assess the same;
(2) In its failure to consider that private respondents’ complaint states no cause of action; and
(3) In affirming with modification the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Parañaque.
The petition lacks merit.
The petition hinges mainly on the allegation by petitioners that the lot they are occupying is different
from the lot described in the title of private respondents. This submission, petitioners urge in their
first assigned error, is supported by their Exhibits "1", "2", "2-5", "4", "5", and "6" and the testimony
of witness Engineer Cresencio Supleo, which allegedly, were misappreciated by the respondent court.
As a rule, it is not appropriate to raise factual questions in petitions for certiorari before this tribunal
but nonetheless, we have carefully examined the evidence presented in view of the contradictory
rulings between the trial court and the appellate courts. We find no reason to reverse the respondent
court in its ruling refusing to give probative value to Exhibit "1," Location Plan of Lot 2560; Exhibit
"2," Field Notes Cover; Exhibits "2-5," Geodetic Engineer’s Certificate, Survey Notification Letter,
Technical Description of Lot 2560, Traverse Computation, and Lot Data Computation; Exhibit "4,"
Sales Application No. 13-1; and Exhibit "6," Survey Verification Report because they were not verified
and approved by the Bureau of Lands as required by paragraph 5, Section 28 of Act No. 2259,
otherwise known as the "Cadastral Act" as amended by Section 1862 of Act No. 2711. Under the said
law, it is the duty of private surveyors to send their original field notes, computations, reports,
surveys, maps, and plots of the property to the Bureau of Lands for verification and approval. Since
the authenticity of these documents was not established, they cannot be given any
consideration. 8 On the other hand, Exhibit "5," is an uncertified xerox copy of the Technical
Description of Lot 2560 Cad. 299, Parañaque Cadastre. It was not also authenticated and attested
under the seal of the Bureau of Lands. Worse, petitioners submitted an entirely different document
from what was marked as Exhibit "5" in the trial court on November 21, 1991. Needless to state, it is
inadmissible in evidence. 9
We also stress that the juridical relation between petitioners and private respondents is that of lessee
and lessor. Considering this jural relationship, petitioners cannot claim that they purchased the
questioned lot from Elsie Periquet. Well settled is the rule that a tenant cannot, in an action involving
the possession of the leased premises, controvert the title of his landlord. 10 Nor can a tenant set up
any inconsistent right to change the relation existing between himself and his landlord, without first
delivering up to the landlord the premises acquired by virtue of the agreement between themselves. 11
In an action for unlawful detainer, the question of possession is primordial while the issue of
ownership is generally unessential. The long settled rule is that the issue of ownership should be
raised by the affected party in an appropriate action 12 for a certificate of title cannot be the subject of
a collateral attack. In this light, the testimony of Engineer Supleo which has hardly any relevance to
the issue of possession is of little solace to the petitioners. 13Apropos is the ruling in Tiu vs. Court of
Appeals, 14 to wit:
The fact of lease having been admitted by the private respondent as well as the
expiration of the term thereof, there can be no question that the issue of
ownership is foreign to the action. Indeed, it matters not that private respondent
was already an occupant of the leased premises when he executed and signed the
contract of lease, because the basis of the ejectment suit is the very contract of
lease. Private respondent cannot now be heard to impugn what he had
previously admitted, which includes that petitioner is the owner of the premises.
Neither can be confuse the issue by raising the question of title to defeat the
right of petitioner to the possession of the premises and to eject him therefrom.
The second and third assignment of errors must necessarily fail. As discussed above, petitioners’
evidence that the title of private respondents does not include the lot they are occupying is far from
convincing. Their charge that private respondents committed fraud and misrepresentation about
their ownership of the lot is bereft of competent evidence. Allegations of fraud must be proved by
clear and convincing evidence. We are satisfied that private respondents proved their cause of action.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 27760 is
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

122
G.R. No. L-37284 February 27, 1976
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
NONA SALAZAR PADIERNOS, defendant-appellant.
Prospero A. Crescini for appellant.
Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, Assistant Solicitor General Alicia V. Sempio-Diy and
Solicitor Amado D. Aquino for appellee.
CONCEPCION, JR., J.:
Appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XXII, in Criminal Case No.
5084, finding the accused Nona Salazar Padiernos guilty of the crime of parricide, and sentencing
her to life imprisonment with the corresponding accessory penalties provided by law, and to
indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the amount of P20,000.00 and the costs. 1
The accused, Nona Salazar Padiernos and the deceased, Rodolfo Padiernos were husband and wife,
having been married at Cainta, Rizal, on December 24, 1960. 2 Out of their marriage, they had four
(4) children, namely: Ronald, Rommel, Racquel, and Rosemarie. At the time of the incident in
question, they were living at 188 Montoya St., San Juan, Rizal.
During his lifetime, the deceased a tall, big and robust man was an agent of the Bureau of Customs
and as such was issued a gun, which he used to keep under the mattress of their bed.
On the night of October 22, 1968, the accused waited for the deceased, but the latter came home only
at 4:00 o'clock in the morning of October 23, 1968-drunk. The accused helped him change his
clothes, after which he went to bed by himself. At about 6:30 in the morning of the same day, the
accused brought her son Ronald to the Lourdes School in Mandaluyong, Rizal, using the family car
driven by Roberto Valeriano, the family driver. Upon her return to the house half an hour later she
went directly to their bedroom. A few minutes later, she came out of the room and asked Letty Basa,
a cousin of the deceased: "Letty, nasaan ang gamit ng Kuya mo?" At that time, the deceased was
already awake and was on the bed lying on his stomach, reading a newspaper. Having been informed
that the things of the deceased were in their bedroom, the accused returned inside and closed the
door.
Shortly, thereafter, the accused and the deceased came out of the room, at which instant the former
called for help, shouting: "Vale, Vale". Vale (Roberto Valerians), the family driver, responded to the
call, and when he entered the house, he saw the accused holding with her' right hand, a blood-stained
knife, and the deceased sprawled in a bloody mess on the floor, groaning and moaning in pain. The
accused was very angry and said: "Ganyan na lang ang pagmamahal ko sa iyo, niloloko mo pa ako."
Thereupon, Roberto Valeriano together with the other members of the household, including the
accused, carried the deceased inside the car, and proceeded to the hospital (Waterous Clinic) at
Mandaluyong, Rizal. On the way, the accused was still mad at the deceased and cursed him, saying:
"Putang ina mo, iyan ang nababagay sa iyo, pag namatay ka magpapakamatay na din ako." When
they reached the hospital, the deceased was pronounced "dead on arrival". Roberto Valeriano then
suggested to the accused that she surrender to the police authorities of San Juan, Rizal, but she
refused. Instead, upon her request, Roberto Valeriano brought the accused to her uncle's house at
San Juan. He left her there, and did not see her anymore. Then he went to Fort Bonifacio, where he
fetched Romeo Padiernos brother of the deceased.
Meanwhile, the authorities of Waterous Clinic notified the San Juan Police Department.
Immediately, thereafter, Capt. Enrique Aguinaldo and Pat. Arsenio Santos arrived, and then
proceeded to the residence of the deceased at San Juan, Rizal, where they conducted an
investigation. After interviewing Letty Basa, Pat. Arsenio Santos entered the bedroom where the
stabbing took place-followed by Letty Basa-and searched the place. The room was well arranged, but
the bedspread was "spilled with blood". When the policeman lifted the mattress of the bed, Letty saw
thereunder the gun of the deceased, and gave it to the officer. The knife u by the accused in stabbing
the deceased was likewise taken by Pat. Arsenio Santos. However, they were not able to investigate
the accused as she could no longer be located. She had fled and gone into hiding.
123
In the meantime, Romeo Padiernos brother of the d who was fetched by Roberto Valeriano at Fort
Bonifacio, arrived at the Waterous Clinic. He followed the funeral car carrying the body of his
deceased brother to Funeraria Popular in Manila.
Dr. Enrique Jimenez, under the direct supervision of Dr. Ernesto Brion, both of the N.B.I.,
performed an autopsy on the cadaver of the deceased. The Necropsy Report 3 shows that the
deceased sustained one (1) lacerated wound and three (3) stab wounds, which cause his death.
The accesed admitted that she killed the deceased. However, she claims that she did it in self defense
According to her, after taking Ronald to school, she returned to their house at about 7:15 or 7:30 in
the morning and went directly to their M. Inside, she found that the deceased was already awake and
was on the bed reading a newspaper. While she and the deceased were in the room, the latter accused
her of stealing P1,000.00 from his brief case, which she allegedly gave to her brother Jose Salazar.
After a heated argument, the deceased pulled her hair and slapped her on the face. She held the
clothes of the deceased, and when the latter pushed her back, they fell on the floor together. The
deceased stood up first, and then, kicked her on the stomach, saying: "Putang ina mo, papatayin
kita." Then, he got his gun under the mattress and pointed it at her. Believing that the deceased
would kill her, she grabbed, with her left hand, the knife under the bed. Then she stood up and with
the deceased in front of her, covered her eyes with her right hand, and began swinging the knife from
left to right and from right to left. to prevent the deceased from coming near her. After awhile, she
opened her eyes and seeing that the deceased was about two (2) meters away from her, she opened
the door and ran out fast. The deceased followed her but he fell on the floor in a bloody mess.
The foregoing version of the accused was disbelieved by the trial court. The accused, now appellant,
maintains and insists in this appeal that the trial court erred in rejecting her claim of self-defense,
and,, likewise, assails the trial court in admitting and in giving 'weight to the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses.
Appellant's plea of self-defense is untenable. If she really inflicted the wounds sustained by the
deceased in the manner claimed and demonstrated by her during the trial, that is, by swinging the
knife sidewise from left to right and from right to left, then the deceased would have sustained "slash
wounds and not stab wounds". The autopsy report, 4 however, shows that the deceased sustained
three (3) stab wounds, one of which, the fatal wound, being located at the left part of the back of the
deceased. 5 Moreover, these stab wounds, specially the fatal wound at the back, could not have been
sustained by the deceased if he had been facing the appellant. The nature and location of the stab
wounds indicate that the appellant inflicted those wounds while she was behind or at the back of the
deceased. These physical facts belie and negate the appellant's claim of self-defense.
Besides, appellant's version of the indent is highly incredible and improbable. Thus, as aptly
observed by the court below, if the appellant covered her eyes with her right hand when she began to
swing the knife from left to right and from right to left, how was she able to hit her husband without
seeing him? Why did her husband remain standing in front of her, immobile like a post without
avoiding the knife and allowed himself to be killed? If it were true that the deceased was standing in
front of her with a gun pointed at her and angry enough to kill her, why didn't he shoot her?
Furthermore, after the stabbing incident, the appellant did not surrender to the authorities, but fled
and went into hiding and surrendered only after almost four (4) years from the commission of the
crime. Such conduct of the appellant is inconsistent with and casts doubt upon her claim of self
defense. On the Contrary, it tends to establish her guilt.
"It is now a well-settled rule that one who admits the infliction of injuries which caused the death of
another has the burden of proving self-defense with sufficient and convincing evidence. If such
evidence is of doubtful veracity, and is not clear and convincing, the defense must necessarily fail, for
having admitted that he was the author of the death of the deceased. it was incumbent upon
appellant, in order to avoid criminal liability, to prove the justifying circumstance claimed by him
without relying on the weakness of that of the prosecution but on the strength of his own evidence,
for even if the evidence of the prosecution were weak it could not be disbelieved after the accused
himself admitted the killing." 6 Having failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence her plea of
self-defense, the appellant must suffer the consequences of her unlawful act.
Coming now to the question of credibility, "the rule consistently adhered to by this Court is to give
due respect to the finding of the trial court on the matter, the latter tribunal having had the
opportunity to observe the demeanor and conduct of witnesses while testifying and, therefore, is in a
better position to properly gauge their credibility. Thus, appellate tribunals will not disturb the
findings of fact of the trial court unless there is proof that said court, in making the findings, had
failed to appreciate some fact or circumstance of weight and substance that would have altered the
results of the case. 7

Upon a review of the records, We find no reason to reject the findings and conclusions of the trial
court. To begin with, the appellant's contention that prosecution witness Letty Basa is biased because
she is the cousin of the deceased, is without merit. While witnesses may be said to be interested by
reason of their relationship with one of the parties, their declarations should not be disregarded or
rejected capriciously on the ground of bias alone where-as in the present case-they are reasonable,
consistent and supported by facts and circumstances. 8 Nor do We find merit in the contention that
the non-presentation of the written statement of this witness to the police which she allegedly did not
sign, gave rise to the presumption that it "contained declarations disastrous to the prosecution case".
The presumption that suppressed evidence is unfavorable does not apply where the evidence was at
the disposal of both the defense and the prosecution. 9 In the case at bar, the alleged statement of
prosecution witness Letty Basa was in the possession of the police authorities. Hence, the defense
could have requested the court below to issue a subpoena requiring the police to produce such
statement, but as the defense failed to do that, they cannot now argue that said statement if produced
would have been adverse to the prosecution.

Again, appellant would impugn the competency and credibility of prosecution witness Dr. Ernesto
Brion by arguing that it was Dr. Enrique Jimenez and not Dr. Brion, who conducted the autopsy
examination on the body of the deceased. This contention is equally devoid of merit. As correctly
pointed out in the appellee's brief, Dr. Ernesto Brion was presented as an expert witness, and his
competency as such was admitted by the appellant's counsel. Besides, he testified that the autopsy
examination of the body of the deceased was conducted under his direct supervision. Hence, he was
competent to testify on the nature, extent, and location of the wounds sustained by the deceased, and
on the basis thereof could, with some degree of certainty, deduce the possible relative positions of the
appellant and the deceased during the stabbing incident. Our own perceptive review of the records
show that his testimony is, as held by the trial court, fully supported and corroborated by the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses.

WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error, the judgment of the court a quo is hereby affirmed in
toto. With costs against the appellant.

Fernando, Barredo, Antonio and Aquino, JJ., concur.

124
G.R. No. 91129 August 25, 1992
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ANTONIO PABLO Y DOLLOSO, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Biterbo D. Tagarda for accused-appellant.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
Accused Antonio Pablo y Dolloso was charged before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cavite City on
29 January 1986 for violating Section 4, Article II of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, otherwise
known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. 1 The accusatory portion of the information reads:
That on or about January 29, 1986, in the City of Cavite, Republic of the
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, without legal authority, did, then and there, willfully, unlawful
and knowingly deliver and sell to a poseur buyer one (1) slice of marijuana cake
and one (1) aluminum foil of dried marijuana leaves.
The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 21-86.
Accused entered a plea of not guilty when arraigned on 17 March 1986. 2 At the trial, the prosecution
established its case through the testimonies of P/Sgt. Rodrigo Espiritu and T/Sgt Jacinto de la Cruz,
both members of the Narcotics Command (NARCOM) Unit stationed at Noveleta, Cavite, and
Constancia Franco-Salonga, a forensic chemist of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). The
accused through his and his friend Rodymir Calalang's testimony, set up the defense of denial.
On 4 May 1987, the trial court promulgated its judgment convicting the appellant of the crime
charged and sentencing him:
. . . to undergo imprisonment of from twelve (12) years and one (1) day
of reclusion temporal as minimum to twenty (20) years and one (1) day
of reclusion temporal as maximum, to pay a fine of P5,000.00 without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs. 3
Accused appealed from said decision through a notice of appeal which does not indicate the court to
which he is appealing. 4 Considering the penalty imposed, the Branch Clerk of Court transmitted the
records of the case to the Court of Appeals 5 which then docketed the same as C.A.-G.R. No. 05265.
In the Appellant's Brief filed with the Court of Appeals, 6 the accused makes the following assignment
of errors:
1. . . . the Trial Court erred in finding accused guilty of violation (sic) of Section
4, Article II of Republic Act No. 6425 as amended without the prosecution
presenting the "Informer" who was alleged to be the buyer of marijuana cake
from the accused.
xxx xxx xxx
. . . the Trial Court erred in finding accused guilty of the crime charged
unsupported by positive facts and contrary to law and evidence.
xxx xxx xxx
. . . the Trial Court erred in giving full credit to the testimonies of Police Sgts.
Rodrigo Espiritu and Jacinto de la Cruz who were not buyers of the marijuana
cake nor heard (sic) the conversation that took place between accused and
informer.
xxx xxx xxx
125
. . . the Trial Court erred in disregarding and discrediting the testimony of
accused and his corroborating witness and without giving exculpatory weight to
the evidence of the defense. 7
After the Appellee filed its Brief through the Office of the Solicitor General, the Court of Appeals
rendered a decision on 23 November 1989 8 affirming the appealed decision with a modification of
the penalty imposed for being incorrect. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision appealed from is modified in
the sense that the accused-appellant Antonio Pablo y Dolloso is found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of violation (sic) of Section 4, Republic Act 6425, as
amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, and is
sentenced to life imprisonment, and to pay a fine of P20,000.00, and the cost.
However, the judgment herein shall not be entered and the case shall be, as it is
hereby certified to the Supreme Court and the entire records thereof elevated
thereto for review (Section 12, of Rule 124 of the Rules of Court; People vs.
Daniel, 86 SCRA 511; People vs. Ramos, 88 SCRA 486; People vs. Centeno, 108
SCRA 710).
SO ORDERED. 9
Pursuant to the last paragraph of the dispositive portion, the Clerk of Court of the Court of Appeals
forwarded to this Court the entire records of this case, together with the transcript of the
stenographic notes and exhibits, on 8 December 1989. 10
This Court required the accused to file his Brief, which he did on 13 March 1990. He merely
reiterated the errors and arguments raised in the Brief he filed with the Court of Appeals. The
Solicitor General filed the Appellee's Brief on 21 June 1990.
The facts of the case, as summarized by the Court of Appeals, are as follows:
At the trial the prosecution has established that at about 8:00 o'clock in the
morning of January 28, 1986 an informer by the name of "Bobby" told Sgt.
Jacinto dela Cruz of the NARCOM Unit stationed at Noveleta, Cavite that a
certain "Boy Roberts" whose real name is Antonio Pablo y Dolloso (herein
accused-appellant) of Cavite City was selling marijuana. Immediately Lt. Jorge
Corpuz, Officer-in-Charge, designated Sgt. Jacinto dela Cruz and Sgt. Rodrigo
Espiritu to form a team and conduct a "buy-bust operation." At 8:30 that same
morning, the team together with Bobby proceeded to Cavite City and arrived at
around 9:00 o'clock at Dubai Street near San Sebastian College, Cavite City.
From there, they went to Ejercito St., Sta Cruz, Cavite, where Bobby pointed to
the house of the accused. After closely watching the accused's place for some
time, the team and Bobby returned to the place of the rendezvous near San
Sebastian College. Sgt. dela Cruz instructed Bobby to buy from the accused one
(1) slice of marijuana cake and one (1) foil of marijuana leaves by using four (4)
marked P5.00 bills. Sgt. dela Cruz supplied the amount of P20.00 in marked
bills. They told Bobby to give a pre-arranged signal, by lifting his shirt, after the
marijuana cake and marijuana leaves had been handed to him. Sgts. dela Cruz
and Espiritu saw Bobby stop in front of the accused's house and called for "Boy
Roberts." The latter appeared and after a short conversation, the aforenamed
officers saw Bobby hand the P20.00 marked bills to the accused who entered his
residence and after a while returned with something wrapped in a tin foil and
gave it to Bobby. Upon seeing the pre-arranged signal, the two (2) officers
swooped down on the accused and arrested him. On the spot, the officers
recovered from the accused the marked bills and from Bobby one slice of
marijuana cake and one (1) foil of marijuana leaves. The accused did not resist
arrest. Sgt. dela Cruz and Sgt. Espiritu went inside the house of the accused.
Upon further investigation the accused brought out three (3) cakes of marijuana
which he kept inside the refrigerator and five (5) foils of marijuana leaves which
he took from a yellow plastic can near the water tank outside the house. The
officers together the (sic) accused passed by the Cavite Police Station before
returning to their headquarters at Noveleta, Cavite. Thereafter, the accused
without the assistance of counsel was investigated by Sgt. Manolo.
 On the same date, January 28, 1986, Lt. Jose Jorge E. Corpuz, Officer-In-Charge
of the Narcotic Command, Cavite District Office, Noveleta, Cavite submitted to
the Director, National Bureau of Investigation, Manila a written request for
laboratory examination to determine the presence of prohibited or regulated
drugs of the following: one (1) foil of marijuana dried leaves, three (3) bricks of
brownies cake (marijuana cakes), and five (5) foils of marijuana dried leaves
(Exh. A). The aforementioned specimens were received by Research Chemist
Constancia Franco Salonga (Exh. B). After conducting the microscopic,
chemical, and chromatographic examinations on (1) one small brick of brownie
cake allegedly containing marijuana and (2) one foil containing dried leaves
suspected to be marijuana, Research Chemist Ms. Salonga found that said
specimens gave positive results of marijuana (Exh. C-2). Ms. Salonga testified on
the examinations she conducted and the findings she made on the
aforementioned specimens.
The defense of the accused-appellant, 34, consists of denials. According to him,
he does not know Bobby but knew the informer as Andoy. At about 10:00 in the
morning of January 28, 1986, while he was fixing his bed on the lawn inside the
gate of his house, Sgt. dela Cruz, Sgt. Espiritu and Andoy arrived in a motor
vehicle. Immediately after having alighted, Sgt. dela Cruz and Sgt. Espiritu
pointed their guns at him and told him to run. Andoy who was carrying a brown
paper bag went up his house. With ihis (sic) gun, Sgt. dela Cruz hit him
(accused) three times while at standing (sic) position and two times while lying
prostrate on the drive way. Sgt. Espiritu was pointing a gun at him. A little later,
Andoy came down from the house carrying an orange colored bag which was the
same bag presented to the trial court by Fiscal Fred Aguilar. Andoy told the
officers that the bag contained marijuana cake (sic). Sgt. dela Cruz then told him
to go up the house and show them the bedroom. Sgt. dela Cruz directed Andoy to
search the room, but they did not find any marijuana there. Fifteen (15) minutes
thereafter, Sgt. Espiritu came up, carrying a yellow plastic container which,
according to the officer, was found near the water tank, and contained
marijuana. Andoy also searched the bedroom of his mother, but he did not find
anything. The accused knew Andoy as a NARCOM informer. The gas stove
presented by Fiscal Aguilar was taken from their house which they utilized
whenever there is no electricity.
Accused-appellant also declared that Andoy nursed ill-feelings against him,
because he bested Andoy in their courtship of a certain Grace who was a waitress
at Violy's refreshment parlor at San Antonio.
Accused-appellant denied that Sgt. dela Cruz had taken from him four (4) P5.00
marked bills. He stated that while he was being investigated at the NARCOM
headquarters at Noveleta, Sgt. dela Cruz took out from his wallet a P20.00 bill,
which he asked to be changed into four P5.00 bills upon which Sgt. dela Cruz
placed markings.
However, on cross-examination, accused-appellant declared that he does not
know of any reason why Sgt. dela Cruz and Sgt. Espiritu would falsely accuse
him of selling prohibited drugs except what had happened between him and
Andoy, and that he would not know if the two (2) officers would connive with
Andoy to falsely accuse him of selling marijuana.
Corroborating the accused was Rodimar Calalang, 21, a friend of five (5) years
and neighbor at Ejercito St. 11
The first three (3) assigned errors raise the issue of whether or not the evidence for the prosecution
has established beyond reasonable doubt that the accused sold marijuana in violation of Section 4,
Article II of R.A. No. 6425, as amended. It is the thesis of the accused that without having presented
the informer who posed as buyer, the fact of sale could not be established.
In disposing of these assigned errors and issue, the Court of Appeals held:
We do not agree. It has been established that Sgt. dela Cruz gave Bobby, their
informer, four (4) P5.00 marked bills with which to buy marijuana cake and one
126
(1) foil of marijuana dried leaves from accused-appellant. Sgt. dela Cruz
instructed Bobby that as soon as the accused should have given or delivered the
marijuana cake and marijuana dried leaves to him, he would lift his shirt which
was the signal for them to make the arrest. Sgt. dela Cruz and Sgt. Espiritu
testified that they saw Bobby talk to the accused-appellant and thereafter hand
the P20.00 bill to him. Thereafter, accused appellant went inside his house and
immediately came back with the marijuana cake and one marijuana leaves (sic)
in a tin foil. When Bobby lifted his shirt, the two (2) officers swooped down on
accused-appellant and arrested him. The fact that the two (2) officers did not
hear what conversation transpired between Bobby and the accused-appellant is
immaterial for the purpose of establishing the sale. Considering the fact that
money was handed by Bobby to the accused-appellant and immediately
thereafter the latter delivered to the former the subject marijuana cake and
marijuana leaves, there can be no transaction established other than that of a
sale. The burden of proof that it was not a sale was shifted to the accused-
appellant. In the case at bar, the accused-appellant did not overcome that
burden. He did not present any evidence to disprove that it was a sale either by
himself or by the informer whom he knew by the name of Andoy. Consequently,
the fact of sale stood unrebutted. Indeed, Section 2 of Republic Act 6425, as
amended par. (o) defines "sale" to mean the act of giving a dangerous drug
whether for money or any other material consideration. 12
As to the fourth assigned error, the Court of Appeals ruled that the trial court properly rejected the
version of the accused. Thus:
The defense which accused-appellant set up at the trial is that the marijuana
cake and the marijuana dried leaves submitted by the prosecution to the lower
court were planted evidence. The trial court who has observed the demeanor of
the witnesses presented by both the prosecution and the defense gave credence
to the witnesses for the prosecution and concluded that the crime charged in the
information was proven beyond reasonable doubt. Aside from the settled rule
that the findings of fact of the trial court which depend upon the proper
evaluation of credibility of witnesses are given great weight on appeal and are
not usually disturbed unless there is a showing of strong and cogent reasons
therefore, 13 it is really incredible that Sgt. dela Cruz and Sgt. Espiritu who have
not been shown to have any personal motive of falsely charging the accused with
a capital offense would do so merely to satisfy the alleged humiliation of Andoy,
the informer, whom the accused-appellant had allegedly bested in the courtship
of a certain Grace assuming such courtship to be true. And to what extent of
moral influence or ascendency (sic) has Andoy over the two officers who testified
against him, the accused-appellant has not even attempted to show. It has been
repeatedly held that there is no test of the truth of human testimony except its
conformity to the knowledge and common experience of mankind. 14 To be
believed the testimony must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible
witness, but must be credible in itself. 15 Measured by this criteria, We cannot
believe that Sgt. dela Cruz and Sgt. Espiritu would have taken time and effort to
drive from their headquarters at Noveleta, Cavite to Ejercito St., Sta. Cruz,
Cavite City and planted as evidence the marijuana cake and marijuana leaves
that were submitted to the National Bureau of Investigation for examination and
which were found to be positive as to the presence of marijuana just to satisfy
the whims of a certain Andoy, who was known to the officers as Bobby, their
informer. We hold that no reasonable prudent man would believe appellant's
theory of defense, which was easy to concoct, but hard to believe. 16
After a painstaking examination of the records of this case, evaluation of the evidence adduced and
review of the decision of the Court of Appeals certified to Us, We find the latter to be fully supported
by the evidence; moreover, We rule that the modification of the sentence is correct, except that the
portion on subsidiary imprisonment should have been likewise deleted.
Notwithstanding the sufficiency of the findings and conclusions of the Court of Appeals, however, We
wish to amplify certain points.
In support of his three (3) assigned errors, accused stresses that: (a) there was no reason to withhold In the case at bar, there were other prosecution witnesses who testified and
the testimony of the poseur-buyer because the latter was known to him, hence, the danger to the positively identified appellant as the principal participant in the illegal
poseur-buyer's person sought to be avoided by not revealing his identity does not exist; the non- transaction. Both Patrolmen Luciano and Caraan actually witnessed the same
presentation then of the poseur-buyer gives rise to the presumption that his testimony would be and their testimonies were based on their actual and personal knowledge of the
adverse to the prosecution; 17 (b) it was improbable that he would commit the offense because it is events that took place leading to appellant's arrest. They may not have been
contrary to human experience for a drug pusher to sell marijuana in the open; and (c) there is no within hearing distance, specially since conversation would expectedly be carried
showing that the slice of marijuana cake and one foil of dried marijuana leaves are the same items on in hushed tones, but they were certainly near enough to observe the
allegedly taken from him. movements of the appellant and the buyer. Moreover, these prosecution
witnesses are all law enforcers and are, therefore, presumed to have regularly
We find these contentions to be bereft of merit. performed their duties in the absence of proof to the contrary. (People vs.
Agapito, G.R. No. 73786, Oct. 12, 1987).
There was no suppression of evidence when the poseur-buyer was not presented. Firstly, his
testimony would at best be corroborative because Sgt. Dela Cruz and Sgt. Espiritu were themselves As to the second point, We have held in a number of cases that drug pushing, when done on a small
eyewitnesses to the delivery of the marked P5.00 bills by Bobby, the informer, to the accused and the level, belongs to that class of crimes which may be committed at any time and at any place. The fact
subsequent delivery of the marijuana cake and marijuana leaves by the latter to the former. His non- that the parties are in a public place and in the presence of other people may not always discourage
presentation was not fatal to the prosecution's case. Secondly, having admitted that Bobby is known them from pursuing their illegal trade as these facts may even serve to camouflage the same. 27
to him, accused could have called him to the witness stand as a hostile witness. Of course, if he chose
this strategy he would be doing so at his own risk. As held by this Court in People vs. Raul As to the third point, the prosecution, via the testimony of Sgt. Espiritu, sufficiently established that
Fernandez: 18 the slice of marijuana cake and the foil of dried marijuana leaves were the items taken from the
accused. Thus, Sgt. Espiritu testified:
There is as well no merit in the claim of the accused that the non-presentation of
the poseur-buyer as a witness is a clear suppression of evidence. The testimony Q Now, in a plastic evidence bag identified as Exh. E-6 the
of the poseur-buyer, if it were given, would at best be corroborated because contents is (sic) a brick of marijuana cake as testified to by
Navarro and Feliciano sufficiently established how the crime was committed. the Forensic Chemist, what connection has that to the brick
Thus his non-presentation was not fatal to the prosecution's case. 19 Of course, it which was the subject matter of the buy-bust operation?
would be different if the police officers were unable to see the actual sale of
marijuana. In such a situation, an exception arises and the poseur-buyer should A This was the brick that he sold.
be presented as a
witness. 20 Besides, there is no showing in this case that the poseur-buyer was Q Why do you say so?
not available for examination. If the accused honestly believed that the
testimony of such poseur-buyer would be adverse to the prosecution, the former A We asked him also to sign and his signature appears here.
should have availed of the compulsory process to have such poseur-buyer
Q Where?
produced as witness, or even as a hostile witness.
A (witness pointing to a signature over the brick)
The presumption laid down in Section 3(e), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
(e) That evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced;
Q Now, what about that foil of marijuana cigarettes that was
does not apply when the testimony of the witness is merely corroborative. As early as 1912,
the result of the buy-bust operation, where is it now?
in United States vs. Gonzales, 21 this Court already held:
A (witness pointing to a foil of marijuana which was
When an act has been witnessed by several persons, the prosecution has no
previously marked as Exh. E-5)
need, nor is it obliged, to present all such witnesses, but only those it deems
necessary; it is enough that it employ such witnesses as in its opinion may be Q Why are you sure that that is the foil of marijuana that
sufficient to prove the facts alleged in the complaint. was the result of that buy-bust operation?
In United States vs. Dinola,22 this Court pointedly ruled that: A We also have him signed, (sic) sir.
The presumption that the evidence omitted by a party would, if presented, be xxx xxx xxx
adverse to him, is not applicable to merely corroborative evidence.
FISCAL AGUILAR:
Neither does it apply in cases where the witness, as in this case, is available to the accused 23 because
then, the evidence would have the same weight against one party as against the other. 24 Q I am showing to you a receipt dated January 8, 1986
certifying that the undersigned has seized and taken
In People vs. Andiza, We had the occasion to state that although Patrolman Hernandez and the
25
possession of the property herein described from Antonio
civilian informer could have been highly competent witnesses, being themselves the poseur-buyers, Pablo y Dolloso, what connection has that receipt with the
their testimonies were not, however, indispensable in view of the declarations of not only one (1), but receipt you issued?
two (2) other eyewitnesses. Their non-presentation as witnesses does not mean suppression of
testimony that is adverse to the prosecution. Besides, the matter of presenting witnesses is the A This is the receipt of the property seized and that was
prerogative of the Prosecutor. prepared by Jacinto dela Cruz.
And in the more recent case of People vs. Bati, 26 this Court held: FISCAL AGUILAR:

We request that the same be marked as Exh. G.

127
 Q Whose signature is this, reading Jacinto dela Cruz?
A To him (sic), sir.
Q Are you (sic) present when it was signed by him?
A Yes, sir.
Q Below Sgt. dela Cruz's signature is the signature of one
Antonio Pablo, whose signature is that?
A That is Antonio Pablo's signature, sir.
Q Were you also present when he signed it?
A Yes, sir.
FISCAL AGUILAR:
Accordingly, the proper penalty to be imposed should be life imprisonment and a fine of
P20,000.00, without any subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered AFFIRMING the decision appealed from finding the
accused ANTONIO PABLO y DOLLOSO guilty beyond reasonable doubt of a violation of Section 4,
Article II of R.A. No. 6425, as amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, and
sentencing him, as above modified, to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a find of
P20,000.00.
Costs against the accused.
SO ORDERED.
Gutierrez, Jr., Bidin and Romero, JJ., concur.
Feliciano, J., is on leave.

I request that these two signatures be marked as Exh. G-1.

COURT:

Mark it.

FISCAL AGUILAR:

Immediately after these items were confiscated or recovered

from the accused, where did you take it (sic)?

A It was (sic) brought to the NBI for laboratory examination, sir.

Q Who brought it there?

A CIC Roberto Genido, sir. 28

Moreover, Constancia Franco Salonga, the forensic chemist who examined the contents of the foil
and brick of brownie cake obtained from the accused, testified that after conducting miscroscopic,
chemical and chromatographic examinations thereon, she concluded that the same were positive for
marijuana. 29

Finally, We come to the penalty imposed by the trial court which is imprisonment "of from twelve
(12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as minimum to twenty (20) years and one (1) day
of reclusion temporal as maximum," and a fine of P5,000.00.

We are unable to trace the legal basis of this penalty. According to the Court of Appeals, the trial
court applied the provisions of Section 4, Article II of R.A. No. 6425 before it was amended by P.D.
No. 1675 which took effect on 17 February 1980. Before such amendment, the penalty provided for in
said section was "imprisonment ranging from twelve years and one day to twenty years and a fine
ranging from twelve thousand to twenty thousand pesos;" however, should a prohibited drug
involved in any offense under said section be the proximate cause of the death of the victim thereof,
the penalty imposable was life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from twenty thousand
(P20,000.00) to thirty thousand (P30,000.00) pesos.

Thus, even under the pre-amendment provision, the penalty imposed is still incorrect for the trial
court exceeded the maximum by one (1) day and fixed the fine at an amount very much less than the
minimum provided therein. It likewise designated the penalty as reclusion temporal; nowhere in the
law does such a designation appear. Perhaps, it thought all along that since the range is that
for reclusion temporal, it might be best to so designate the penalty as such. Furthermore,
considering that the penalty imposed is higher than prision correccional, no subsidiary
imprisonment could be imposed pursuant to paragraph 3, Article 39 of the Revised Penal Code.

As amended by P.D. No. 1675, the penalty provided for Section 4, Article II of R.A. No. 6425 is life
imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from P20,000.00 to P30,000.00. However, the death
penalty can no longer be imposed pursuant to the 1987 Constitution. 30
128
G.R. Nos. L-3087 and L-3088 July 31, 1954
In re: Testate Estate of the deceased JOSE B. SUNTAY. SILVINO SUNTAY, petitioner-
appellant,
vs.
In re: Intestate Estate of the deceased JOSE B. SUNTAY,
FEDERICO C. SUNTAY, administrator-appellee.
Claro M. Recto for appellant.
Sison and Aruego for appellee.
PADILLA, J.:
This is an appeal from a decree of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan disallowing the alleged will
and testament executed in Manila on November 1929, and the alleged last will and testament
executed in Kulangsu, Amoy, China, on 4 January 1931, by Jose B. Suntay. The value of the estate left
by the deceased is more than P50,000.
On 14 May 1934 Jose B. Suntay, a Filipino citizen and resident of the Philippines, died in the city of
Amoy, Fookien province, Republic of China, leaving real and personal properties in the Philippines
and a house in Amoy, Fookien province, China, and children by the first marriage had with the late
Manuela T. Cruz namely, Apolonio, Concepcion, Angel, Manuel, Federico, Ana, Aurora, Emiliano,
and Jose, Jr. and a child named Silvino by the second marriage had with Maria Natividad Lim Billian
who survived him. Intestate proceedings were instituted in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan
(special proceedings No. 4892) and after hearing letters of administration were issued to Apolonio
Suntay. After the latter's death Federico C. Suntay was appointed administrator of the estate. On 15
October 1934 the surviving widow filed a petition in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan for the
probate of a last will and testament claimed to have been executed and signed in the Philippines on
November 1929 by the late Jose B. Suntay. This petition was denied because of the loss of said will
after the filing of the petition and before the hearing thereof and of the insufficiency of the evidence
to establish the loss of the said will. An appeal was taken from said order denying the probate of the
will and this Court held the evidence before the probate court sufficient to prove the loss of the will
and remanded the case to the Court of First Instance of Bulacan for the further proceedings (63 Phil.,
793). In spite of the fact that a commission from the probate court was issued on 24 April 1937 for
the taking of the deposition of Go Toh, an attesting witness to the will, on 7 February 1938 the
probate court denied a motion for continuance of the hearing sent by cablegram from China by the
surviving widow and dismissed the petition. In the meantime the Pacific War supervened. After
liberation, claiming that he had found among the files, records and documents of his late father a will
and testament in Chinese characters executed and signed by the deceased on 4 January 1931 and that
the same was filed, recorded and probated in the Amoy district court, Province of Fookien, China,
Silvino Suntay filed a petition in the intestate proceedings praying for the probate of the will executed
in the Philippines on November 1929 (Exhibit B) or of the will executed in Amoy, Fookien, China, on
4 January 1931 (Exhibit N).
There is no merit in the contention that the petitioner Silvino Suntay and his mother Maria
Natividad Lim Billian are estopped from asking for the probate of the lost will or of the foreign will
because of the transfer or assignment of their share right, title and interest in the estate of the late
Jose B. Suntay to Jose G. Gutierrez and the spouses Ricardo Gutierrez and Victoria Goño and the
subsequent assignment thereof by the assignees to Francisco Pascual and by the latter to Federico C.
Suntay, for the validity and legality of such assignments cannot be threshed out in this proceedings
which is concerned only with the probate of the will and testament executed in the Philippines on
November 1929 or of the foreign will allegedly executed in Amoy on 4 January 1931 and claimed to
have been probated in the municipal district court of Amoy, Fookien province, Republic of China.
As to prescription, the dismissal of the petition for probate of the will on 7 February 1938 was no bar
to the filing of this petition on 18 June 1947, or before the expiration of ten years.
As to the lost will, section 6, Rule 77, provides:
No will shall be proved as a lost or destroyed will unless the execution and validity of the
same be established, and the will is proved to have been in existence at the time of the
death of the testator, or is shown to have been fraudulently or accidentally destroyed in the
lifetime of the testator without his knowledge, nor unless its provisions are clearly and
distinctly proved by at least two credible witnesses. When a lost will is proved, the
129
provisions thereof must be distinctly stated and certified by the judge, under the seal of the
court, and the certificate must be filed and recorded as other wills are filed and recorded.
The witnesses who testified to the provisions of the lost will are Go Toh, an attesting witness,
Anastacio Teodoro and Ana Suntay. Manuel Lopez, who was an attesting witness to the lost will, was
dead at the time of the hearing of this alternative petition. In his deposition Go Toh testifies that he
was one of the witnesses to the lost will consisting of twenty-three sheets signed by Jose B. Suntay at
the bottom of the will and each and every page thereof in the presence of Alberto Barretto, Manuel
Lopez and himself and underneath the testator's signature the attesting witnesses signed and each of
them signed the attestation clause and each and every page of the will in the presence of the testator
and of the other witnesses (answers to the 31st, 41st, 42nd, 49th, 50th, 55th and 63rd interrogatories,
Exhibit D-1), but did not take part in the drafting thereof (answer to the 11th interrogatory, Id.); that
he knew the contents of the will written in Spanish although he knew very little of that language
(answers to the 22nd and 23rd interrogatories and to X-2 cross-interrogatory, Id.) and all he knows
about the contends of the lost will was revealed to him by Jose B. Suntay at the time it was executed
(answers to the 25th interrogatory and to X-4 and X-8 cross-interrogatories, Id.); that Jose B. Suntay
told him that the contents thereof are the same as those of the draft (Exhibit B) (answers to the 33rd
interrogatory and to X-8 cross-interrogatory, Id.) which he saw in the office of Alberto Barretto in
November 1929 when the will was signed (answers to the 69th, 72nd, and 74th interrogatories, Id);
that Alberto Barretto handed the draft and said to Jose B. Suntay: "You had better see if you want
any correction" (answers to the 81st, 82nd and 83rd interrogatories, Id.); that "after checking Jose B.
Suntay put the "Exhibit B" in his pocket and had the original signed and executed" (answers to the
91st interrogatory, and to X-18 cross-interrogatory, Id.); that Mrs. Suntay had the draft of the will
(Exhibit B) translated into Chinese and he read the translation (answers to the 67th
interrogatory, Id.); that he did not read the will and did not compare it (check it up) with the draft
(Exhibit B) (answers to X-6 and X-20 cross-interrogatories, Id.).
Ana Suntay testifies that sometime in September 1934 in the house of her brother Apolonio Suntay
she learned that her father left a will "because of the arrival of my brother Manuel Suntay, who was
bringing along with him certain document and he told us or he was telling us that it was the will of
our father Jose B. Suntay which was taken from Go Toh. ..." (p. 524, t. s. n., hearing of 24 February
1948); that she saw her brother Apolonio Suntay read the document in her presence and of Manuel
and learned of the adjudication made in the will by her father of his estate, to wit: one-third to his
children, one-third to Silvino and his mother and the other third to Silvino, Apolonio, Concepcion
and Jose, Jr. (pp. 526-8, 530-1, 542, t. s. n. Id.); that "after Apolonio read that portion, then he
turned over the document to Manuel, and he went away," (p. 528, t. s. n., Id.). On cross-examination,
she testifies that she read the part of the will on adjudication to know what was the share of each heir
(pp. 530, 544, t. s. n., Id.) and on redirect she testifies that she saw the signature of her father, Go
Toh, Manuel Lopez and Alberto Barretto (p. 546, t. s. n., Id.).
Anastacio Teodoro testifies that one day in November 1934 (p. 273, t. s. n., hearing of 19 January
1948), before the last postponement of the hearing granted by the Court, Go Toh arrived at his law
office in the De los Reyes Building and left an envelope wrapped in red handkerchief [Exhibit C] (p.
32, t. s. n., hearing of 13 October 1947); that he checked up the signatures on the envelope Exhibit A
with those on the will placed in the envelope (p. 33, t. s. n., Id.); that the will was exactly the same as
the draft Exhibit B (pp. 32, 47, 50, t. s. n., Id.).
If the will was snatched after the delivery thereof by Go Toh to Anastacio Teodoro And returned by
the latter to the former because they could not agree on the amount of fees, the former coming to the
latter's office straight from the boat (p. 315, t. s. n., hearing of 19 January 1948) that brought him to
the Philippines from Amoy, and that delivery took place in November 1934 (p. 273, t. s. n., Id.), then
the testimony of Ana Suntay that she saw and heard her brother Apolonio Suntay read the will
sometime in September 1934 (p. 524, t. s. n., hearing of 24 February 1948), must not be true.
Although Ana Suntay would be a good witness because she was testifying against her own interest,
still the fact remains that she did not read the whole will but only the adjudication (pp. 526-8, 530-1,
542, t. s. n., Id.) and saw only the signature, of her father and of the witnesses Go Toh, Manuel Lopez
and Alberto Barretto (p. 546, t. s. n., Id.). But her testimony on cross-examination that she read the
part of the will on adjudication is inconsistent with her testimony in chief that after Apolonio had
read that part of the will he turned over or handed the document to Manuel who went away (p. 528,
t. s. n., Id.).
If it is true that Go Toh saw the draft Exhibit B in the office of Alberto Barretto in November 1929
when the will was signed, then the part of his testimony that Alberto Barretto handed the draft to
Jose B. Suntay to whom he said: "You had better see if you want any correction" and that "after
checking Jose B. Suntay put the "Exhibit B" in his pocket and had the original signed and executed"
cannot be true, for it was not the time for correcting the draft of the will, because it must have been
corrected before and all corrections and additions written in lead pencil must have been inserted and
copied in the final draft of the will which was signed on that occasion. The bringing in for the draft
(Exhibit B) on that occasion is just to fit it within the framework of the appellant's theory. At any
rate, all of Go Toh's testimony by deposition on the provisions of the alleged lost will is hearsay,
because he came to know or he learned to them from information given him by Jose B. Suntay and
from reading the translation of the draft (Exhibit B) into Chinese.
Much stress is laid upon the testimony of Federico C. Suntay who testifies that he read the supposed
will or the alleged will of his father and that the share of the surviving widow, according to the will, is
two-thirds of the estate (p. 229, t. s. n., hearing of 24 October 1947). But this witness testified to
oppose the appointment of a co-administrator of the estate, for the reason that he had acquired the
interest of the surviving widow not only in the estate of her deceased husband but also in the
conjugal property (pp. 148, 205, 228, 229, 231, t. s. n., Id.) Whether he read the original will or just
the copy thereof (Exhibit B) is not clear. For him the important point was that he had acquired all the
share, participation and interest of the surviving widow and of the only child by the second marriage
in the estate of his deceased father. Be that as it may, his testimony that under the will the surviving
widow would take two-thirds of the estate of the late Jose B. Suntay is at variance with Exhibit B and
the testimony of Anastacio Teodoro. According to the latter, the third for strict legitime is for the ten
children; the third for betterment is for Silvino, Apolonio, Concepcion and Jose Jr.; and the third for
free disposal is for the surviving widow and her child Silvino.
Hence, granting that there was a will duly executed by Jose B. Suntay placed in the envelope (Exhibit
A) and that it was in existence at the time of, and not revoked before, his death, still the testimony of
Anastacio Teodoro alone falls short of the legal requirement that the provisions of the lost will must
be "clearly and distinctly proved by at least two credible witnesses." Credible witnesses mean
competent witnesses and those who testify to facts from or upon hearsay are neither competent nor
credible witnesses.
On the other hand, Alberto Barretto testifies that in the early part of 1929 he prepared or drew up
two mills for Jose B. Suntay at the latter's request, the rough draft of the first will was in his own
handwriting, given to Manuel Lopez for the final draft or typing and returned to him; that after
checking up the final with the rough draft he tore it and returned the final draft to Manuel Lopez;
that this draft was in favor of all the children and the widow (pp. 392-4, 449, t. s. n., hearing of 21
February 1948); that two months later Jose B. Suntay and Manuel Lopez called on him and the
former asked him to draw up another will favoring more his wife and child Silvino; that he had the
rough draft of the second will typed (pp. 395, 449 t. s. n., Id.) and gave it to Manuel Lopez (p. 396, t.
s. n., Id.); that he did not sign as witness the second will of Jose B. Suntay copied from the
typewritten draft [Exhibit B] (p. 420, t. s. n., Id.); that the handwritten insertions or additions in lead
pencil to Exhibit B are not his (pp. 415-7 435-6, 457, t. s. n., Id.); that the final draft of the first will
made up of four or five pages (p. 400, t. s. n., Id.) was signed and executed, two or three months after
Suntay and Lopez had called on him (pp. 397-8, 403, 449, t. s. n., Id.) in his office at the Cebu
Portland Cement in the China Banking Building on Dasmariñas street by Jose B. Suntay, Manuel
Lopez and a Chinaman who had all come from Hagonoy (p. 398, t. s. n., Id.); that on that occasion
they brought an envelope (Exhibit A) where the following words were written: "Testamento de Jose
B. Suntay" (pp. 399, 404, t. s. n., Id.); that after the signing of the will it was placed inside the
envelope (Exhibit A) together with an inventory of the properties of Jose B. Suntay and the envelope
was sealed by the signatures of the testator and the attesting witnesses (pp. 398, 401, 441, 443, 461, t.
s. n., Id.); that he again saw the envelope (Exhibit A) in his house one Saturday in the later part of
August 1934, brought by Go Toh and it was then in perfect condition (pp. 405-6, 411, 440-2, t. s.
n., Id.); that on the following Monday Go Toh went to his law office bringing along with him the
envelope (Exhibit A) in the same condition; that he told Go Toh that he would charge P25,000 as fee
for probating the will (pp. 406, 440-2, Id.); that Go Toh did not leave the envelope (Exhibit A) either
in his house or in his law office (p. 407, t. s. n., Id.); that Go Toh said he wanted to keep it and on no
occasion did Go Toh leave it to him (pp. 409, 410, t. s. n., Id.).
The testimony of Go Toh taken and heard by Assistant Fiscal F. B. Albert in connection with the
complaint for estafa filed against Manuel Suntay for the alleged snatching of the envelope (Exhibit
A), corroborates the testimony of Alberto Barretto to the effect that only one will was signed by Jose
130
B. Suntay at his office in which he (Alberto Barretto), Manuel Lopez and Go Toh took part as
attesting witnesses (p. 15, t. s. n., Exhibit 6). Go Toh testified before the same assistant fiscal that he
did not leave the will in the hands of Anastacio Teodoro (p. 26, t. s. n., Exhibit 6). He said, quoting
his own words, "Because I can not give him this envelope even though the contract (on fees) was
signed. I have to bring that document to court or to anywhere else myself." (p. 27, t. s. n., Exhibit 6).
As to the will claimed to have been executed on 4 January 1931 in Amoy, China, the law on the point
in Rule 78. Section 1 of the rule provides:
Wills proved and allowed in a foreign country, according to the laws of such country, may
be allowed, filed, and recorded by the proper Court of First Instance in the Philippines.
Section 2 provides:
When a copy of such will and the allowance thereof, duly authenticated, is filed with a
petition for allowance in the Philippines, by the executor or other person interested, in the
court having jurisdiction, such court shall fix a time and place for the hearing, and cause
notice thereof to be given as in case of an original will presented for allowance.
Section 3 provides:
If it appears at the hearing that the will should be allowed in the Philippines, the court
shall so allow it, and a certificate of its allowance, signed by the Judge, and attested by the
seal of the courts, to which shall be attached a copy of the will, shall be filed and recorded
by the clerk, and the will shall have the same effect as if originally proved and allowed in
such court.
The fact that the municipal district court of Amoy, China, is a probate court must be proved. The law
of China on procedure in the probate or allowance of wills must also be proved. The legal
requirements for the execution of a valid will in China in 1931 should also be established by
competent evidence. There is no proof on these points. The unverified answers to the questions
propounded by counsel for the appellant to the Consul General of the Republic of China set forth in
Exhibits R-1 and R-2, objected to by counsel for the appellee, are inadmissible, because apart from
the fact that the office of Consul General does not qualify and make the person who holds it an expert
on the Chinese law on procedure in probate matters, if the same be admitted, the adverse party
would be deprived of his right to confront and cross-examine the witness. Consuls are appointed to
attend to trade matters. Moreover, it appears that all the proceedings had in the municipal district
court of Amoy were for the purpose of taking the testimony of two attesting witnesses to the will and
that the order of the municipal district court of Amoy does not purport to probate the will. In the
absence of proof that the municipal district court of Amoy is a probate court and on the Chinese law
of procedure in probate matters, it may be presumed that the proceedings in the matter of probating
or allowing a will in the Chinese courts are the a deposition or to a perpetuation of testimony, and
even if it were so it does not measure same as those provided for in our laws on the subject. It is a
proceedings in rem and for the validity of such proceedings personal notice or by publication or both
to all interested parties must be made. The interested parties in the case were known to reside in the
Philippines. The evidence shows that no such notice was received by the interested parties residing in
the Philippines (pp. 474, 476, 481, 503-4, t. s. n., hearing of 24 February 1948). The proceedings had
in the municipal district court of Amoy, China, may be likened toe or come up to the standard of such
proceedings in the Philippines for lack of notice to all interested parties and the proceedings were
held at the back of such interested parties.
The order of the municipal district court of Amoy, China, which reads as follows:
ORDER:
SEE BELOW
The above minutes were satisfactorily confirmed by the interrogated parties, who declare
that there are no errors, after said minutes were loudly read and announced actually in the
court.
Done and subscribed on the Nineteenth day of the English month of the 35th year of the
Republic of China in the Civil Section of the Municipal District Court of Amoy, China.
 HUANG KUANG CHENG
Clerk of Court

CHIANG TENG HWA

Judge

(Exhibit N-13, p. 89 Folder of Exhibits.).

does not purport to probate or allow the will which was the subject of the proceedings. In view
thereof, the will and the alleged probate thereof cannot be said to have been done in accordance with
the accepted basic and fundamental concepts and principles followed in the probate and allowance of
wills. Consequently, the authenticated transcript of proceedings held in the municipal district court
of Amoy, China, cannot be deemed and accepted as proceedings leading to the probate or allowance
of a will and, therefore, the will referred to therein cannot be allowed, filed and recorded by a
competent court of this country.

The decree appealed from is affirmed, without pronouncement as to costs.

Pablo, Bengzon, A. Reyes, Labrador and Concepcion, JJ., concur.

131
132
G.R. No. L-41166 August 25, 1976
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, AMELIA K. DEL ROSARIO and DIONISIO
CERBO, petitioners,
vs.
HON NUMERIANO G. ESTENZO Judge, Court of First Instance of Iloilo, and
GREGORIO OJOY respondents.
Acting Solicitor General Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr., Assistant Solicitor General Octavio R. Ramirez and
Solicitor Mariano M. Martinez for petitioner People of the Philippines.
Enojas & Associates and Deogracias K. del Rosario for petitioners Amelia K. del Rosario and
Dionisio Cerbo.
Sixto P. Demaisip for private respondent.
ANTONIO, J.:p
Certiorari and prohibition with prayer for preliminary injunction to nullify the Order of respondent
Judge, dated July 30, 1975, sustaining the procedure proposed by defense counsel that, in lieu of the
testimony of the witnesses for the accused on direct examination in open court, he was filing their
affidavits, subject to cross-examination by the prosecution. Per Resolution dated August 22, 1975,
this Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the respondent Judge from enforcing the
questioned Order.
In Criminal Case No. 2891, entitled "People of the Philippines, plaintiff, versus Gregorio Ojoy,
accused", of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo, Branch III, after the accused himself had testified in
his defense, his counsel manifested that for his subsequent witnesses he was filing only their
affidavits subject to cross-examination by the prosecution on matters stated in the affidavits and on
all other matters pertinent and material to the case. Private prosecutor Atty. Amelia K. del Rosario,
one of the petitioners here, objected to the proposed procedure but this notwithstanding, respondent
Judge gave his conformity thereto and subsequently issued the questioned Order. Contending that
respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion because the aforesaid Orders violates Sections 1 and
2 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court, which requires that the testimony of the witness should
be given orally in open court, and there is no appeal nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law, petitioners instituted the present petition.
We grant the petition.
Sections 1 and 2, Rule 132 and Section 1, Rule 133 of the Revised Rules of Court clearly require that
the testimony of a witness shall be given orally in open court. The afore-cited Sections 1 and 2
provide:
SECTION 1. Testimony to be given in open court. — The testimony of
witnesses shall be given orally in open court and under oath or affirmation.
SEC. 2. Testimony in superior courts to be reduced to writing.- In superior
courts the testimony of each witness shall be taken in shorthand or stenotype,
the name, residence, and occupation of the witness being stated, and all
questions put to the witness and his answers thereto being included. If a
question put is objected to and the objection is ruled on, the nature of the
objection and the ground on which it was sustained or overruled must be stated,
or if a witness declines to answer a question put, the fact and the proceedings
taken thereon shall be entered in the record. A transcript of the record made by
the official stenographer or stenotypist and certified as correct by him shall
be prima facie a correct statement of such testimony and proceedings.
Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court are reproductions, respectively, of Sections
77 and 78 of Rule 123, of the Old Rules of Court. Section 77 in turn was taken from Section 381 of Act
No. 190, 1 while Section 78 from Section 32 of General Order No. 58. 2
133
The main and essential purpose of requiring a witness to appear and testify orally at a trial is to
secure for the adverse party the opportunity of cross-examination. "The opponent", according to an
eminent authority, 3 demands confrontation, not for the Idle purpose of gazing upon the witness, or
of being gazed upon by him, but for the purpose of cross-examination which cannot be had except by
the direct and personal putting of questions and obtaining immediate answers." There is also the
advantage to be obtained by the personal appearance of the witness before the judge, and it is this it
enables the judge as the trier of facts "to obtain the elusive and incommunicable evidence of a
witness deportment while testifying, and a certain subjective moral effect is produced upon the
witness. 4 It is only when the witness testifies orally that the judge may have a true idea of his
countenance, manner and expression, which may confirm or detract from the weight of his
testimony. 5 Certainly, the physical condition of the witness will reveal his capacity for accurate
observation and memory, and his deportment and physiognomy will reveal clues to his character.
These can only be observed by the judge if the witness testifies orally in court. Indeed, the great
weight given the findings of fact of the trial judge in the appellate court is based upon his having had
just that opportunity and the assumption that he took advantage of it to ascertain the credibility of
the witnesses. This has been explained by Chief Justice Appleton, thus:
The witness present, the promptless and unpremeditatedness of his answers or
the reverse, their distinctness and particularity or the want of these essentials,
their incorrectness in generals or particulars, their directness or evasiveness are
soon detected. ... The appearance and manner, the voice, the gestures, the
readiness and promptness of the answers, the evasions, the reluctance the
silence, the contumacious silence, the contradictions, the explanations, the
intelligence or the want of intelligence of the witness, the passions which more
or less control-fear, love, have, envy, or revenge are all open to observation,
noted and weighed by jury. 6
Thus, Section 1 of Rule 133 of the Rule 7 requires that in determining the superior weight of evidence
on the issues involved, the court, aside from the other factors therein enumerated, may consider the
"witness manner of testifying" which can only be done if the witness gives his testimony orally in
open court". If a trial judge prepares his opinion immediately after the conclusion of the trial, with
the evidence and his impressions of the witnesses fresh in his mind, it is obvious that he is much
more likely to reach a correct result than if he simply reviews the evidence from a typewritten
transcript, without having had the opportunity to see, hear and observe the actions and utterances of
the witnesses.
There is an additional advantage to be obtained in requiring that the direct testimony of the witness
be given orally ill court. Rules governing the examination of witnesses are intended to protect the
rights of litigants and to secure orderly dispatch of the business of the courts. Under the rules, only
questions directed to the eliciting of testimony which, under the general rules of evidence, is relevant
to, and competent to prove, the issue of the case, may be propounded to the witness. A witness in
testify only on those facts which he knows of his own knowledge. Thus, on direct examination,
leading questions are not allowed, except or, preliminary matters, or when there is difficult in getting
direct and intelligible answer from the witness who is ignorant, a child of tender years, or
feebleminded, or a deaf mute.8 It is obvious that such purpose may be subverted, and the orderly
dispatch of the business of the courts thwarted if trial judges are allowed, as in the case at bar, to
adopt any procedure in the presentation of evidence other than what is specifically authorized by the
Rules of Court.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition for certiorari is hereby granted and the order of
respondent Judge, dated July 30, 1975, in Criminal Case No. 2891 is hereby set aside, and the
temporary restraining order issued on August 22, 1975 is hereby made permanent, without any
pronouncement as to costs.
Fernando, Barredo, Aquino and Concepcion, Jr., JJ., concur.
134
G.R. No. 71537 September 17, 1987
EMILIO DE LA PAZ, JR., ENRIQUE DE LA PAZ, MANUELA DE LA PAZ, NATIVIDAD
DE LA PAZ, MARGARITA DE LA PAZ and ZENAIDA DE LA PAZ, petitioners,
vs.
HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, ADELAIDA S. TRINIDAD, CONRADO P.
SANTOS, JR., CESAR P. SANTOS, FELICITAS S. DE LEON, PONCIANITO P. SANTOS,
SR., EVANGELINE S. TANSINGCO, ANTONIO P. SANTOS, and JAIME P.
SANTOS, respondents.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
The petitioners have lumped in one amended petition an original action for certiorari to set aside the
decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 71 at Antipolo, Rizal, in Civil Case No. 164-A and a
petition for review to nullify the decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court in AC-G.R. SP No.
05472.
The records show the following incidents which transpired prior to the filing of the instant petition.
On May 12, 1983, Loreto de la Paz filed a complaint against the petitioners with the Regional Trial
Court of Rizal for a judicial declaration of ownership of a 43,830 square meter parcel of land covered
by Original Certificate of Title No. 901 of the Register of Deeds, Rizal in the name of Ponciano de la
Paz with damages. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 164-A.
Loreto alleged that the subject parcel of land was among the properties adjudicated to her and her
mother as a result of a partition submitted by the heirs of Ponciano de la Paz and approved by the
court in Civil Case No. 1399 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal. The subject matter of Civil Case
No. 1399 was Ponciano's testate estate.
In their answer, the petitioners denied that the disputed lot was among the properties adjudicated to
Loreto and her mother. They claimed that the parcel of land was not accounted for in the probate
proceedings but is actually community property of the parties.
The parties, except for petitioner Enrique de la Paz, were admittedly compulsory heirs of Ponciano
de la Paz who died in 1916. Loreto was the only legitimate child of Ponciano while: 1) Emilio de la
Paz, Jr., is the son of Emilio, a recognized natural child of Ponciano; 2) Manuela de la Paz is the
recognized natural child of Ponciano; 3) Natividad de la Paz is the daughter of Emilio, recognized
natural child of Ponciano; 4) Margarita de la Paz is the daughter of Wenceslao, a recognized natural
child of Ponciano; and 5) Zenaida de la Paz, is the daughter of Augusto, another recognized natural
child of Ponciano. As regards petitioner Enrique de la Paz, Loreto denied his claim that he is one of
the heirs of Ponciano. The petitioners, however, allege that he is also a compulsory heir of Ponciano,
he being the son of Ponciano de la Paz, Jr., the eldest child of the decedent.
The parties failed to arrive at an amicable settlement during pre-trial. Hence, trial on the merits
followed.
Loreto took the witness stand. She finished her direct testimony on March 12, 19984.
On April 25, 1984, the petitioners' counsel began his cross-examination of Loreto. The cross-
examination was, however, not completed. The petitioners' counsel moved in open court for the
continuance of the cross-examination on the ground that he still had to conduct a lengthy cross-
examination. (p. 17, Court of Appeals' rollo).
On May 18, 1984, Loreto's counsel filed a motion for "correction of transcript" due to some errors in
the transcript of stenographic notes taken during the direct testimony of Loreto. The motion was
granted.
This order granting the correction prompted the petitioners'' counsel to manifest that he would not
be able to undertake the cross-examination of the witness as scheduled. He asked for the
postponement of the May 23, 1984 hearing. The trial court postponed the trial of the case to May 31,
1984 and later to July 5, and 11, 1984. (p. 16, Court of Appeals' rollo)
135
On August 13, 1984, trial resumed. The petitioners' counsel, however, asked for still another
postponement of the cross-examination to give him a chance to go over the stenographic notes. In an
order of the same date, the hearing was again postponed. (p. 17, Court of Appeals' rollo)
During the scheduled trial on September 14, 1984, neither the petitioners, nor their counsel appeared
despite due notice. Loreto's counsel, therefore, filed a motion that she be allowed to present
evidence ex parte before a commissioner. The motion was granted and Loreto presented additional
evidence ex parte in the afternoon of the same day. On this same date, she finished the presentation
of her evidence and submitted her case for decision.
Despite this development, the petitioners upon their motion were allowed to cross-examine Loreto.
On the scheduled hearing set on September 18, 1984, the petitioners' counsel failed to appear, and
the cross-examination of Loreto was deferred for the fourth (4th) time. (p. 17, Court of Appeals' rollo)
Finally, on November 7, 1984, the petitioners' counsel resumed his repeatedly postponed cross-
examination of Loreto. The cross-examination was, however, cut short and rescheduled again on
motion of the petitioners' counsel.
Unfortunately, Loreto died on December 1, 1984. An amended complaint was filed for the purpose of
substituting the respondents, herein, they being the children and heirs of Loreto.
At the resumption of the trial on January 21, 1985, the petitioners moved verbally to strike off the
record the entire testimony of Loreto. The motion was denied. A verbal motion for reconsideration
was likewise denied.
In view of the petitioners' manifestation that they will appeal the ruling the appellate court, the trial
court issued on January 24, 1985 a more detailed order denying the motion to strike off the record
Loreto's testimony. (p. 17, Court of Appeals' rollo).
On February 11, 1985, the trial court issued another order allowing, among other things, the private
respondents to present their exhibits. A controversy as to the contents of this February 11, 1985 order
will be discussed later.
On February 18, 1985, the petitioners filed a petition with the Intermediate Appellate Court to annul
the lower court's orders dated January 24, 1985 and February 11, 1985 and to prohibit the court from
further proceeding in Civil Case No. 164-A. The petition for certiorari and prohibition was docketed
as AC-G.R. SP. No. 05472.
This petition notwithstanding, the lower court continued the proceedings in Civil Case No. 164-A.
Thus, on March 29, 1985, the lower court promulgated a decision in Civil Case No. 164-A declaring
the private respondents, the children and heirs of Loreto, as the true owners of the subject parcel of
land. Damages were also awarded in favor of the private respondents. The dispositive portion of the
decision reads:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, JUDGMENT is hereby rendered
(a) Declaring plaintiffs as the true and lawful owners of the parcel of land
covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 901 of the Register of Deeds of Rizal;
(b) Ordering the defendants to surrender the owner's duplicate copy of Original
Certificate of Title No. 901;
(c) Directing the Register of Deeds of Rizal, Pasig Branch to cancel Original
Certificate of Title No. 901 and to issue a new one in the names of the plaintiffs;
(d) Ordering the defendants jointly and severally to pay to the plaintiffs Five
Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) as actual damages, Five Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) as moral damages, Five Hundred Thousand
Pesos (P500,000.00) as exemplary or corrective damages, Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P50,000.00) as attorney's fees, plus the costs; and
(e) Dismissing the defendants counterclaim. (pp. 13-14, rollo)
On June 20, 1985, the appellate court also rendered a decision in AC-G. R. SP No. 05472. The
petition was denied due course and dismissed. A motion for reconsideration was denied for lack of
merit.
Initially, the petitioners filed only a petition to review on certiorari the appellate court's decision and
resolution respectively.
Upon motion of the petitioners, we admitted the amended petition which now seeks to annul the
decision of the lower court in Civil Case No. 164-A aside from setting aside the appellate court's
decision and resolution in AC-G.R. SP No. 05472.
In another resolution dated January 20, 1986, we gave due course to the petition and considered the
respondents' comments as answer.
We first review the challenged decision and order of the appellate court. The petitioners contend that
the appellate committed grave abuse of discretion when it sanctioned the trial court's orders which
denied the striking out of the testimony of original plaintiff Loreto de la Paz from the record.
A motion to strike off testimony from the record is an interlocutory order. Well-settled is the rule
that interlocutory orders may not be subjects of a petition of certiorari unless issued in patent abuse
of discretion. (See Villalon, Jr. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 144 SCRA 443; Bautista v.
Sarmiento, 138 SCRA 587).
We see no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court when it issued the questioned order.
True, we have consistently ruled on the nature of the right of cross-examination, to wit:
The right of a party to confront and cross-examine opposing witnesses in a
judicial litigation, be it criminal or civil in nature, or in proceedings before
administrative tribunals with quasi-judicial powers, is a fundamental right
which is part of due process. (Savory Luncheonette v. Lakas ng Manggagawang
Pilipino, et al., 1975, 62 SCRA 258).
xxx xxx xxx
The right of a party to cross-examine the witness of his adversary in invaluable
as it is inviolable in civil cases, no less than the right of the accused in criminal
cases. The express recognition of such right of the accused in the Constitution
does not render the right thereto of parties in civil cases less constitutionally
based, for it is an indispensable part of the due process guaranteed by the
fundamental law. ... Until such cross-examination has been finished, the
testimony of the witness cannot be considered as complete and may not,
therefore, be allowed to form part of the evidence to be considered by the court
in deciding the case. (Bacrach Motor Co., Inc., v. Court of Industrial Relations,
86 SCRA 27 citing Savory Luncheonette v. Lakas ng Manggagawang Pilipino, et
al., supra, Ortigas, Jr. vs. Lufthansa German Airlines, 64 SCRA 610)
But we have also ruled that it is not an absolute right which a party can demand at all times. This
Court has stated that:
xxx xxx xxx
the right is a personal one which may be waived expressly or impliedly by
conduct amounting to a renunciation of the right of cross-examination. Thus,
where a party has had the opportunity to cross-examine a witness but failed to
avail himself of it, he necessarily forfeits the right to cross-examine and the
testimony given on direct examination of the witness will be received or allowed
to remain in the record.
The conduct of a party which may be construed as an implied waiver of the right
to cross-examine may take various forms. But the common basic principle
underlying the application of the rule on implied waiver is that the party was
given the opportunity to confront and cross-examine an opposing witness but
failed to take advantage of it for reasons attributable to himself alone.
136
xxx xxx xxx
The case of the herein petitioner, Savory Luncheonette, easily falls within the
confines of the jurisprudence given above. Private respondents through their
counsel, Atty. Amante, were given not only one but five opportunities to cross-
examine the witness, Atty. Morabe, but despite the warnings and admonitions of
respondent court for Atty. Amante to conduct the cross-examination or else it
will be deemed waived, and despite the readiness, willingness and insistence of
the witness that he be cross-examined, said counsel by his repeated absence
and/or unpreparedness failed to do so until death sealed the witness' lips
forever. By such repeated absence and lack of preparation on the part of the
counsel of private respondents, the latter lost their right to examine the witness,
Atty. Morabe, and they alone must suffer the consequences. The mere fact that
the witness died after giving his direct testimony is no ground in itself for
excluding his testimony from the record so long as the adverse party was
afforded an adequate opportunity for cross-examination but through fault of his
own failed to cross-examine the witness. (Savory Luncheonette v. Lakas ng
Manggagawang Pilipino, supra; at pp. 263-267)
In the case at bar, the petitioners' failure to cross-examine Loreto was through no fault of the
respondents. As can be gleaned from the record, Loreto was available for cross-examination from the
time she finished her direct testimony on March 12, 1984 to November 7, 1984, the last scheduled
hearing of the case before her death on December 1, 1984. The petitioners not only kept on
postponing the cross-examination but at times failed to appear during scheduled hearings. The
postponement of the trial on May 23, 1984 to a later date duet o the correction of the stenographic
notes of Loreto's testimony may be justified, but the same cannot be said for the subsequent
posponements requested by the petitioners. The scheduled trials before November 7, 1984, did not
push through, because of the petitioners' fault. It may also be recalled that at the scheduled hearing
on September 14, 1984 neither the petitioners nor their counsel appeared leading to the presentation
of evidence ex parte. And also during the scheduled hearing on September 18, 1984, when the
petitioners were allowed to cross-examine Loreto despite the fact that the case was already deemed
submitted for decision, the petitioners again failed to appear.
Under these circumstances, we rule that the petitioners had waived their right to cross-examine
Loreto. Through their own fault, they lost their right to cross-examine Loreto. Her testimony stands.
As regards the petition to set aside the trial court's decision, the pivotal issue hinges on the contents
of the February 11, 1985 order. The petitioners argue that Presiding Judge Benedicto "arbitrarily and
whimsically changed without notice to either party, the tenor of the order it dictated in open court,
apart from injecting facts that did not and could not have transpired on February 11, 1985, acts
apparently calculated to deprive petitioners, as in fact they were deprived petitioners, as in fact they
were deprived of their right to present evidence in their behalf." (p. 38, Rollo).
According to the petitioners, the trial court issued two conflicting versions of the February 11, 1985
order. The order dictated in open court on February 11, 1985 states:
In view of the manifestation of the counsel for the plaintiff that he is formally re-
offering in evidence all documentary exhibits and testimonial evidence
presented and it appearing that the transcript taken during the ex-parte hearing
is already available and availed of by counsel for the defendant, he is hereby
given ten (10) days from today to file his objections after which this case will be
deemed submitted for resolution. In view of the fact that he will appeal the order
of this court denying his motion to strike out from the record, the testimony of
the plaintiff, Loreto de la Paz, the presentation of the evidence of the defendants
is hereby held in abeyance. (p. 29, Court of Appeals' rollo)
while the signed order dated February 11, 1985 states, to wit:
In view of the manifestation of the counsel for the plaintiff that he is formally re-
offering in the evidence all documentary exhibits and testimonial evidence
presented and after their admission he will rest his case and it appearing that the
transcript taken during the ex-parte hearing has been long available and availed
of by counsel for the defendants, he is hereby given ten (10) days from today to
file his objections thereto after which action will be taken on the admission of
 said exhibits. The said period having lapsed without defendants' counsel filing
his comments on the admission of the exhibits A to Z and the sub-marked
exhibits are admitted in evidence for Plaintiffs, Defendants' counsel forthwith
manifested that he will appeal to the Intermediate Court of Appeals (sic) the
ruling of this Court denying his Motion to Strike off from the records the entire
testimony of Plaintiff Loreto de la Paz who was partly cross-examined already
but who died thus his cross examination could not be completed. Said counsel
then refused to present evidence in behalf of defendants on the ground that he
intended to appeal as already alluded above the Order of this court denying the
Motion in question. The court has ruled in its Order of January 21, 1983 that
inspite of the attitude of Counsel the trial shall proceed as scheduled.
Thus, at the hearing today said Counsel failed to proceed with the trial to present
his evidence. This case shall be deemed submitted for Resolution. (p. 31, Court
of Appeals' rollo)
It is to be noted that in the dictated version of the February 11, 1985 order, the petitioners were given
ten (10) days from February 11, 1985 to file their objections after which the case will be submitted for
resolution and that the presentation of evidence for the petitioners was held in abeyance.
awarded to the respondents the following: P500,000.00 as actual damages; P500,000.00 as moral
damages; P500,000.00 as exemplary damages; P50,000.00 as attorney's fees and costs.
The questioned decision, however, is silent as to how the court arrived at these damages. Nowhere in
the decision did the trial court discuss the merit of the damages prayed for by the petitioners. There
should be clear factual and legal bases for any award of considerable damages. (See Rubio v. Court of
Appeals, 141 SCRA 488).
WHEREFORE, the amended petition is partly DENIED in that the questioned decision and
resolution of the Intermediate Appellate Court, now court of Appeals in AC-G. R. SP No. 05472 are
AFFIRMED. The petition is GRANTED in part. The questioned decision of the then Court of First
Instance of Rizal in Civil Case No. 164-A is SET ASIDE as null and void. The successor Regional Trial
Court is directed to conduct further proceedings and to receive the evidence of the petitioners in Civil
Case No. 164-A.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan (Chairman), Feliciano, Bidin and Cortes, JJ., concur.

However, in the other version, the case was declared as already deemed submitted for resolution.

It is this second version of the February 11, 1985 order which the trial court used as justification for
its promulgation of the March 29, 1985 decision in Civil Case No. 164-A.

The record clearly shows that this second version of the February 11. 1985 order was issued without
the knowledge of the parties. In fact, on March 14, 1985, the respondents filed an urgent motion to
consider the case submitted for decision with the following allegations: 1) that in the hearing of
February 11, 1985, the petitioners were required to submit their comment or objection to
respondents' offer of evidence and they were given ten (10) days from the said date within which to
do so, and thereafter to present their evidence; and 2) that notwithstanding the lapse of more than
thirty (30) days, the respondents have not submitted their comment or objection to petitioners' offer
of evidence much less have they take any move to present their evidence. (pp. 32033, Court of
Appeals' rollo). the respondents would not have filed this motion if the case was already deemed
submitted for decision pursuant to the second version of the February 14, 1985 order. Furthermore,
the respondents do not rebut these allegations.

The trial court committed a grave abuse of discretion in issuing the order dated February 11, 1985,
the contents of which conflict with another order of the same date dictated in open court during the
hearing of the case on February 11, 1985.

The issuance of this second version of the February 11, 1985 order prejudiced the petitioners' cause.
They were deprived of their right to present evidence in their behalf.

Consequently, the decision of the trial court in Civil Case No. 164-A must be declared null and void,

Another issue raised by the petitioners centers on whether or not the trial court committed grave
abuse of discretion in rendering judgment in Civil Case No. 164-A despite the pendency of the
petition which sought to inhibit it from further proceeding with the case.

The appellate court did not restrain the trial court until April 22, 1985 after the petitioners presented
the certified copy of the February 11, 1985 order. (p. 35, Court of Appeals rollo). The trial court did
not abuse its discretion or commit reversible error. It is within its sound discretion to either proceed
with the case in the absence of the prayed-for restraining order to refrain from acting on the case
until the higher court decides the matter elevated. to it. the circumstances of each case dictate what
action shall be take.

The final issue raised by the petitioners is with regard to the damages awarded the respondents by
the trial court.

In their complaint, the respondents asked for the following damages: 1) at least P150,000.00 as
actual damages; 2) P200,000.00 as moral damages; and 3) P50,000.00 as attorney's fees plus
exemplary damages which may be deemed just and equitable in the premises. The trial court

137
G.R. No. L-61570 February 12, 1990. from the Court of Appeals for cross-examination or
presentation by the plaintiff of any additional evidence. But
RUPERTO FULGADO, substituted by his heirs, JULIANA, JOSE, MAXIMO, PACITA we have no further evidence in this case ... except those
and SEVERO all surnamed FULGADO, petitioners, evidence already adduced in the lower court before it was
vs. appealed in the Court of Appeals. It is up for the defense
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, RUFINO CUSTODIO, SIMPLICIA CUSTODIO, ARSENIO now to cross-examine the witnesses.
PIGUING, ISMAEL PORCIUNCULA and DOMINGA MACARULAY, respondents.
Court (To Atty. Tuangco):
Dollete, Blanco, Ejercito & Associates for petitioners.
You are through with the cross-examination?
Ramon Tuangco for private respondents.
Atty. Tuangco:

Not yet, Your Honor, we were granted by the Court of

FERNAN, C.J.: Appeals the right to cross-examine the witnesses ... . The
last time this case was called for hearing by this Honorable
On September 9,1967, Ruperto Fulgado, a man approaching the twilight of his life, undertook the Court, the Presiding Judge tried to make the parties come to
arduous task of filing an action in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasig branch against Rufino a settlement, but it seems that. they could not come to such
Custodia, Simplicia Custodia, Arsenio Piguing, Ismael Porciuncula and Dominga Macarulay for the settlement. I advised my clients to try to meet them. So now,
annulment of certain contracts of sale and partition with accounting. 1 The defendants (herein private this is the stage where they could not agree and so we will be
respondents) filed their answer to the complaint with special and affirmative defenses and a proceeding with the cross-examination of the witnesses.
counterclaim.
Atty. Dollete:
After several deferments, the pre-trial conference was finally set for February 1, 1968 at 8:30 in the
morning. Private respondents and their counsel failed to appear on time at the pre-trial and were There were only two witnesses. Two witnesses were
subsequently declared as in default. Plaintiff Fulgado was then allowed to present his evidence ex presented, one is Ruperto Fulgado and he died already.
parte before the Deputy Clerk of Court. Your Honor, the other witness was Jose Fulgado who is now
abroad for almost a year, Your Honor.
Meanwhile, upon learning of their predicament, private respondents immediately filed a motion to
lift the order of default on the same day that the order was issued. The trial court denied said motion Atty. Tuangco:
in its order of February 16, 1972. Their motion for reconsideration was also denied. Persistently,
respondents filed a petition for relief from the default order. Once more, this was denied. I understand that the other witness was here on a visit, Your
Honor. He came back.
On April 24, 1972, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of plaintiff Ruperto Fulgado. On
appeal, however, the Court of Appeals found that private respondents had been deprived of their day Court:
in court by the unjust denial of their motion to lift the order of default. 2 The Appellate Court, in no
less than explicit terms, said: So, what shall we do now?

WHEREFORE, the decision of the court a quo is hereby set aside and the case is Atty. Tuangco:
remanded to the court of origin for trial on the merits, granting to the
defendants the opportunity to present their evidence, provided, however, that So, I move to strike out the testimonies of the witnesses who
the evidence already presented before the commissioner shall stand, but with testified on the ground that we were deprived of our right to
the right of the defendants to cross-examine the witness who had already cross-examine them.
testified and with the right of the plaintiff to present additional evidence that
then he may decide. Without costs. 3 Atty. Dollete:

The Court of Appeals' decision became final and executory on June 27,1974 and the records of the We will submit, Your Honor, for resolution the motion of
case were remanded to the trial court. the defendants.

On July 3, 1975, or more than a year after the finality of the Appellate Court's decision, counsel for Court (To Atty. Tuangco):
private respondents moved that the trial court "include th(e) case in any date of the August and
So, what do you want?
September calendar of the Court, at the usual hour in the morning." 4
Atty. Tuangco:
The case was set for hearing on September 16,1975. Unfortunately, the presiding judge went on
official leave and the hearing was postponed anew to January 15 and February 15, 1976. In the That the whole testimonies of the two witnesses who were
meantime, plaintiff Ruperto Fulgado died on November 25,1975 and was substituted by his children presented ex parte be stricken off the record because we
as party plaintiffs. Fulgado's witness, Jose Fulgado, referred to in the dispositive part of the Appellate have not been granted the right of cross-examining them
Court's judgment, had earlier migrated to the United States on September 16, 1974. and they are not available at this stage, Your Honor.
When the case was heard on May 4, 1976, the following proceedings transpired: Atty. Dollete:
Atty Dollete: We will submit Your Honor. We maintain, Your Honor. Our
opposition is that it hinges on the fact that defendants
For the plaintiff, Your Honor. If your Honor please, may I
inform this Honorable Court that this is a remanded case
138
 committed laches in their failure to cross-examine the
witness. That is our opposition.
Court:
Why?
Atty. Dollete:
There were several opportunities for them to cross-examine
especially the witness Ruperto Fulgado, Your Honor. They
are with full knowledge of the age of this witness. They
could have taken steps to assert their right granted by the
Court of Appeals. Notwithstanding their knowledge about
the age, the advanced age and health condition of this
witness Ruperto Fulgado, then we maintain, Your Honor,
that defendants, in a way, have committed laches in the
assertion of their right to cross-examine.
Atty. Tuangco:
The records will show Your Honor, that it was the
defendants who moved to set this case for hearing upon the
remanding of the records from the Court of Appeals.
Court:
You make a written motion and I will grant you a period of
ten (10) days within which to file an opposition and then
another additional period of ten (10) days within which to
reply. Then this matter shall be deemed submitted for
resolution. But the fact is clear now that plaintiff has no
more additional evidence.
Atty. Dollete:
Yes, Your Honor.
Court:
So that in case the court favorably grants the motion of
defendants and orders the striking out of the testimonies of
Ruperto Fulgado and the other witness, together with the
documentary evidence, the plaintiff had no more evidence
to offer.
Atty. Dollete:
Yes, Your Honor. We stand on the evidence on Record. 5
On June 30, 1976, the trial court issued an order dismissing the case. It decreed:
For reason stated in the defendants' motion filed on May 18, 1976, which the
Court finds meritorious, the testimonies of plaintiffs witnesses Ruperto Fulgado
and Jose Fulgado, who were not presented by the plaintiff so that the defendants
could cross-examine them on May 4, 1976, are stricken off the record and, as a
consequence, in view of the manifestation of plaintiffs counsel that he had no
more witnesses to present, the above-entitled case is dismissed without
pronouncement as to costs. 6
On appeal to the Appellate Court in C.A. G.R No. 62353-R, said order was affirmed on June 30,
1982. 7 Petitioners now question said affirmance before this Court in the instant petition for review.
The principal issue in the case at bar is the propriety of the exclusion of the testimonies given by the
now deceased Ruperto Fulgado and his witness, Jose Fulgado, who has departed for the United
139
States, which resulted in the dismissal of the complaint. Private respondents maintain that such
testimonies are wholly inadmissible for being hearsay, because respondents were not able to cross-
examine the witnesses.
Petitioners, on the other hand, contend that while the right to cross-examination is an essential part
of due process, the same may however be waived as the private respondent have done when they
allowed an unreasonable length of time to lapse from the inception of the opportunity to cross-
examine before availing themselves of such right and likewise when they failed to exhaust other
remedies to secure the exercise of such right.
The appeal is well-taken.
In Savory Luncheonette vs. Lakas ng Manggagawang Pilipino, 8 and the cases cited thereunder, the
Court, speaking through Justice Muñoz Palma, has provided us with a concise overview of the right
to cross-examination as a vital element of due process. Thus:
The right of a party to confront and cross-examine opposing witnesses in a
judicial litigation, be it criminal or civil in nature, or in proceedings before
administrative tribunals with quasi-judicial powers, is a fundamental right
which is part of due process. However, the right is a personal one which may be
waived expressly or impliedly by conduct amounting to a renunciation of the
right of cross-examination. Thus, where a party has had the opportunity to
cross-examine a witness but failed to avail himself of it, he necessarily forfeits
the right to cross-examine and the testimony given on direct examination of the
witness will be received or allowed to remain in the record.
The conduct of a party which may be construed as an implied waiver of the right
to cross-examine may take various forms. But the common basic principle
underlying the application of the rule on implied waiver is that the party was
given the opportunity to confr ont and cross-examine an opposing witness but
failed to take advantage of it for reasons attributable to himself alone.
The principle requiring a testing of testimonial statements by cross-examination has always been
understood as requiring, not necessarily an actual cross-examination, but merely an opportunity to
exercise the right to cross-examine if desired. 9 Thus the resolution of the present case would hinge
on whether or not this was an opportunity for cross-examination.
There is no disputing that where there was no such opportunity (to cross examine) and the want of it
was caused by the party offering (plaintiff), the testimony should be stricken out. However, where the
failure to obtain cross-examination was imputable to the cross examiner's fault, the lack of cross-
examination is no longer a ground for exclusion according to the general principle that an
opportunity, though waived, will suffice.10
From the records presented, it is manifest that private respondents had enough opportunity to cross-
examine plaintiff Ruperto Fulgado before his death, and Jose Fulgado before his migration to the
United States. Conceding that private respondents lost their standing in court during the time they
were in default, they were no longer in that situation on June 6, 1974 when the Court of Appeals set
aside the default judgment in CA-G.R. No. 42590-R and remanded the case to the court of origin for
trial on the merits, "granting to the defendants the opportunity to present their evidence ... ." 11 This
was a positive signal for them to proceed with the cross-examination of the two Fulgados, a right
previously withheld from them when they were considered in default. But despite knowledge of
Ruperto's failing health (he was then 89 years of age) and Jose's imminent travel to the United
States, private respondents did not move swiftly and decisively. They tarried for more than one year
from the finality of the Appellate Court's decision on June 27, 1974 to ask the trial court on July 3,
1975 to set the already much delayed case for hearing "in any date of August and September ... ." 12
Such inaction on the part of private respondents cannot be easily dismissed by the argument that it is
the duty of the plaintiff to always take the initiative in keeping the proceedings "alive." At best, the
argument is fatuous.
The task of recalling a witness for cross examination is, in law, imposed on the party who wishes to
exercise said right. This is so because the right, being personal and waivable, the intention to utilize it
must be expressed. Silence or failure to assert it on time amounts to a renunciation thereof. Thus, it
should be the counsel for the opposing party who should move to cross-examine plaintiffs witnesses.
It is absurd for the plaintiff himself to ask the court to schedule the cross-examination of his own
witnesses because it is not his obligation to ensure that his deponents are cross-examined. Having
presented his witnesses, the burden shifts to his opponent who must now make the appropriate
move. Indeed, the rule of placing the burden of the case on plaintiffs shoulders can be construed to
extremes as what happened in the instant proceedings.

Having had the liberty to cross-examine and having opted not to exercise it, the case is then the same
in effect as if private respondent had actually cross-examined. We therefore hold that it was gross
error for both the trial court and the Appellate Court to dismiss the complaint in Civil Case No. 10256
on the ultimate ground that there was an alleged failure of cross-examination. The wholesale
exclusion of testimonies was too inflexible a solution to the procedural impasse because it prejudiced
the party whose only fault during the entire proceedings was to die before he could be cross-
examined. The prudent alternative should have been to admit the direct examination so far as the
loss of cross-examination could have been shown to be not in that instance a material loss. 13 And
more compellingly so in the instant case where it has become evident that the adverse party was
afforded a reasonable chance for cross-examination but through his own fault failed to cross-
examine the witness.

Where death prevents cross-examination under such circumstances that no responsibility of any sort
can be ascribed to the plaintiff or his witness, it seems a harsh measure to strike out all that has been
obtained in the direct examination. 14

As to the witness Jose Fulgado who is reportedly abroad, private respondents could have resorted to
the various modes of discovery under the Rules of Court to cross-examine Jose. D, During the
hearing of May 4, 1976, counsel for private respondents unwittingly or wittingly disclosed that they
knew that Jose was in the country "for a visit" but they did not exert any effort to have him
subpoenaed.

Altogether, the acts of private respondents constitute a waiver, and consequently, a forfeiture of their
right to cross-examination. And having failed to make use of this right, the consequences should
rightfully fall on them and not on their adversary.

WHEREFORE, the decision under review of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 62353-R dated
June 30, 1982 is SET ASIDE. The trial court is ordered to REINSTATE Civil Case No. 10256 and to
allow the direct testimonies of plaintiff Ruperto Fulgado and his witness Jose Fulgado to remain in
the record. The court is further ordered to give priority to the hearing of said case in view of the
length of time that it has remained unresolved on account of procedural differences. This judgment is
immediately executory. No costs.

Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano, Bidin and Cortes, JJ., concur.

140
 EN BANC
G.R. No. 26708 September 29, 1927
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. ALEJO
RESABAL, Defendant-Appellant.
Melquiades G. Ilaw and Vicente Sotto for appellant.
Attorney-General Jaranilla for appellee.
VILLAMOR, J.:
The evidence shows, as an indisputable fact, that in the early morning of April 25, 1926, one Primo
Ordiz died at his own home in the barrio of Bogo, municipality of Maasin, Leyte, form the effects of
an internal hemorrhage caused by a sharp wound in the left lung, as appears from the death
certificate, marked Exhibit A.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
As a consequence of this, an information was filed with the Court of First Instance of Leyte in
Maasin, reading as follows:
That on or about April 25, 1926, in the municipality of Maasin, Province of Leyte, Philippine Islands,
the said accused, willfully, unlawfully and criminally, with treachery and evident premeditation,
conspiring amongst themselves and acting in common agreement and taking advantage of
nocturnity, mutually aiding each other, opened the window and killed Primo Ordiz by means of a
shot from a 'Smith' 38 caliber revolver, inflicting a wound in the upper part of the left nipple, which
produced the instant death of said Primo Ordiz.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
Contrary to law.
The judge who tried the case, after having carefully analyzed the evidence, reached the conclusion
that the crime committed by the accused Alejo Resabal is that of murder, provided for and penalized
in article 403 of the penal Code, with the aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation,
nocturnity and dwelling, and imposed on the accused the death penalty, with the accessories of
article 53 in case of pardon, and to pay the deceased's heirs the sum of P1,000 by way of indemnity,
with he costs of the action. He also ordered that the present case be brought to this court for review,
as provided for in section 50 of General Orders No. 58.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
law library
Counsel for the defense alleges that the trial court erred in not ignoring Glicerio Orit's testimony, and
in no acquitting the accused Alejo Resabal on the ground of reasonable
doubt.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The Attorney-General in turn asks that the judgment rendered, being in accordance with the
evidence and the law, be affirmed with the costs against the
appellant.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Glicerio Orit testified that on the morning of April 25, 1926, the accused, armed with a revolver,
invited him to Primo Ordiz's house in order to kill the latter, and on arriving at said house, the
accused went into the ground, approached one of the windows of the house less than a meter and a
half in height, opened it and looked in. At that moment the witness left the place, and at a distance of
15 brazas heard an explosion. Glicerio Orit's testimony as to the explosion is corroborated by the
declaration of the boy Jose Ordiz, who slept with his uncle Primo Ordiz, to the effect that early in the
morning of that day he was awakened by the noise of an explosion and saw his uncle Primon Ordiz
vomiting blood and unable to speak.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
It is unquestionable, from the testimony of these two witnesses and the result of the autopsy, and
above all from the finding of the revolver Exhibit B, that the weapon exhibited at the trail of the case.
This revolver was hidden by the accused on the land cultivated by the witness Carmelo Ordiz, to
whom the accused revealed it, and who, through fear of the police, transferred it to the neighboring
lot, burying it at the foot of a tree called "mabago." By following the directions of this witness,
Carmelo Ordiz, the chief of police, who investigated the case, found the revolver wrapped in two
pieces of cloth Exhibits C and C-1. The revolver was loaded with two bullets and an empty shell, and
had a rusty barrel. It must be noted that Exhibit C-1 appears to be a piece of cloth from a pair of
141
drawers, and the chief of police who searched the house where the accused lived, found a piece of a
pair of drawers in a trunk that was in the kitchen. Upon examination of said Exhibits F and C-1 by
this court, it was found that these two pieces of cloth Exhibit F and C-1 made a complete pair of
drawers, all of which shows that the accused tore the piece of cloth Exhibits C-1 from an old pair of
drawers in order to wrap up the revolver before putting it in the place indicated by the witness
Carmelo Ordiz.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
This witness testified, furthermore, that on the night of April 24, 1926, the accused believing him to
be still an enemy of the deceased Primo Ordiz, and showing him the revolver Exhibit B, invited him
to accompany him to do away with Primo Ordiz. On the other hand, the witness Vicente Ambalong
corroborates Glicerio Orits testimony to the effect that early in the morning of April 25, 1926, the
accused went to the house where the latter was sleeping to awaken him, and that he then saw the
accused on the staircase, calling to said Glicerio Orit.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
law library
And what is the motive of the crime? According to the evidence presented by the prosecution, some
twenty days before the incident the accused had a disagreement with the deceased because of the
carabao that destroyed some coconut trees belonging to the deceased Primo Ordiz. The accused
requested the deceased to return the carabao that was under his care, but the deceased refused to do
so before he was paid the value of the trees destroyed. This naturally produced resentment, which,
among country people, is sufficient cause for the commission of the act charged in the
information.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The defense of alibi set up by the accused is not, in our opinion, sufficient to overthrow the evidence
of the prosecution; for taking into consideration the short distance between the deaceased's house
and that in which the accused slept on the night of the incident, the accused could easily have gone
out of his house and returned later, without having been noticed by his companions in the house,
namely, his wife, his mother-in-law, and his sister-in-law, aside from the natural interest these have
in testifying in the accused's favor.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The defense argues that Glicerio Orit is not a credible witness, because of his having been excluded
from the information to be used as a witness for the prosecution; and, because, moreover, of the
contradiction in his testimony at the preliminary investigation and during the trial. We are of the
opinion that the mere fact of having been excluded from the information to be used as a witness for
the Government, does not prevent this witness from telling the truth in this case, especially in the
absence of proof showing the interest he might possibly have in testifying against the accused.
Neither is the apparent contradiction which may be noted in his declarations before the court of the
justice of the peace, and before the court of first instance sufficient to discredit his testimony, for the
simple reason that this witness was not given ample opportunity, by a reading to him of his
declarations before the court of the justice of the peace, to explain the discrepancies noted by counsel
for the accused. The mere presentation of Exhibit 1, without said declaration having been read to the
witness while he testified in the Court of First Instance, is no ground for impeaching his testimony.
(U. S. vs. Baluyot, 40 Phil., 385, 406.)chanrobles virtual law library
The defense also impeaches Carmelo Ordiz's testimony considering the invitation which the accused
extended to him as improbable, knowing that he was a cousin of the deceased Primo Ordiz. Under
ordinary circumstances, such an attitude would appear improbable, but not so if it is considered that
the accused invited the witness in the belief that the latter was still an enemy of the deceased, on
account of certain disagreements they had over some land.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
The defense also contends that the conduct of the accused in going with his family to the deceased's
house on the morning of April 25, 1926, helping in the preparations for the burial, is incompatible
with his being a criminal. It is, indeed, an old belief that the fear of the suspected party to touch the
corpse was a sign of guilt. But experience has shown that some criminals have gone to the extreme
that the accused did, to avoid all suspicion of guilt.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
The evidence in the record shows that guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt, and he
deserves the penalty provided for in article 403 of the Penal Code. The crime committed is murder,
qualified by treachery for, in the commission of the crime, the accused employed ways, means, and
forms that tended directly and especially to assure, it, without risk to his person from any defense the
assaulted party might make.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The trial court imposed the death penalty on the accused, by reason of the aggravating circumstances
of evident premeditation, nocturnity, and dwelling, without any mitigating circumstances to offset
them. On this point the opinion of the court is divided, with the result that we cannot impose on the
accused the maximum penalty, or death, in accordance with Act No. 3104, because the vote of the
members of the court who took part in the discussion of the case, as to the justice of the imposition of
the death penalty was not unanimous. And, it being so, it is unnecessary to discuss in detail the
presence of the said aggravating circumstances.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library

In virtue whereof, we are of the opinion, and so hold, that the accused is guilty of the crime of
murder, committed with treachery, on the person of Primo Ordiz, and with the modification of the
judgment on review, the penalty of cadena perpetua is imposed on the accused, with the accessories
of Article 54 of the Penal Code, the judgment of the trial court being affirmed in all other respects,
with the costs against the appellant. So ordered.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library

Avanceña, C. J., Johnson, Street, Malcolm, Romualdez, Johns and Villa-Real, JJ., concur.

142
G.R. No. 98376 August 16, 1991
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioners,
vs.
HON. BAYANI S. RIVERA, Judge, Branch 129 , Regional Trial Court of Kalookan City,
and WILFREDO L. EMBRANO, respondent.
The Solicitor General for petitioner.
Eduardo S. Rodriguez for private respondent.
NARVASA, J.:
The special civil action of certiorari at bar instituted in this Court to annul an order rendered by the
Regional Trial Court at Kalookan City, Branch 129, in a prosecution for arson docketed in that Court
as Criminal Case No. 28820 (87).
Accused in that case of arson is Wilfredo L. Sembrano. It is the prosecution's theory that he wilfully
caused the fire in the early morning of May 21, 1987 which totally burned and destroyed the second
and third floors of the "I Love You Restaurant and Sauna Bath" owned by Juanita L. Tan, located at
No. 2 L. Bustamante St. Kalookan City.1
Among the witnesses presented by the Government to demonstrate Sembrano's culpability was
Benjamin Lee, a room boy of the restaurant and bath. Lee testified on direct examination at the
hearing of December 8, 1987. His testimony was essentially that Sembrano had run out of the VIP
room where the fire had started and refused to heed his (Lee's) call to stop. Lee took the witness
stand again on April 26, 1987 during which he was cross-examined by defense counsel, gave
additional evidence on redirect examination, was again questioned on recross-examination by the
same defense counsel, and thereafter allowed to step down. 2
The prosecution completed presentation of its evidence-in-chief in due course. But before it could
rest its case, and two (2) months or so after Benjamin Lee had completed his testimony, the
defendant's original counsel, Benjamin Formoso, withdrew his appearance and was substituted by
another attorney, Eduardo S. Rodriguez.3 The latter then filed a motion on June 8, 1988 to recall
Benjamin Lee for further examination.4 The ground relied upon by Atty. Rodriguez was simply that
after he had reviewed the record of Benjamin Lee's testimony, he came to the conclusion that " there
seems to be many points and questions that should have been asked but were not profounded (sic)
by the other defense counsel who conducted.. (the cross-examination). It was on this averment, and
counsel's reference to "the gravity of the offense charge (sic)" and the need "to afford the accused full
opportunity to defend himself," that Lee's recall for further cross examination was sought to be
justified. Over objections of the prosecution, the Court 5 granted the motion.
Efforts were thereafter exerted to cause witness Benjamin Lee to again appear before the Court for
further cross-examination.1âwphi1 These efforts met with no success; and the trial had to be
postponed several times. It appears that Lee had terminated his employment and moved elsewhere
without indicating his new address.
So, on October 1, 1990 the private prosecutor filed a "Manifestation and Motion" drawing attention
to the inability to procure the re-appearance of witness Lee for which "the prosecution could not be
held liable," and to the fact that "Lee has already been thoroughly examined by the former defense
counsel," and praying upon these premises "that the farther examination of Benjamin Lee be
dispensed with and ... the prosecution ... allowed to terminate the presentation of its evidence."
By Order dated October 2, 1990,6 the Trial Court denied the motion to dispense with the recall of
Benjamin Lee. In fact, it ordered the testimony of Benjamin Lee for the prosecution xx stricken off
the record for lack of complete cross-examination" because the witness could no longer be found,
and "the failure of counsel for the accused to further cross-examine the witness is not the fault of the
defense.7
In the same order, the Court also set the "reception of further evidence for the prosecution, if any, ...
on October 23, 1990 xx as earlier scheduled." Subsequently, it denied the private prosecutor's motion
143
for reconsideration of the order.8 Hence, the action at bar, instituted by the Office of the Solicitor
General.
The writ of certiorari prayed for will issue. The Trial Court acted with grave abuse of discretion in
authorizing the recall of witness Benjamin Lee over the objections of the prosecution, and in later
striking out said witness' testimony for want of further cross-examination.
There is no doubt that a Trial Court has discretion to grant leave for the recall of a witness. This is
clear from a reading of Section 9, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, as amended, 9 viz.:
SEC. 9. Recalling witness.— After the examination of a witness by both sides has been
concluded, the witness cannot be recalled without leave of the court. The court will grant
or withhold leave in its discretion, as the interests of justice may require.
But obviously that discretion may not be exercised in a vacuum, as it were, entirely, isolated from a
particular set of attendant circumstances. The discretion to recall a witness is not properly invoked or
exercisable by an applicant's mere general statement that there is a need to recall a witness "in the
interest of justice," or "in order to afford a party full opportunity to present his case," or that, as here,
"there seems to be many points and questions that should have been asked" in the earlier
interrogation. To regard expressed generalities such as these as sufficient ground for recall of
witnesses would make the recall of witness no longer discretionary but ministerial. Something more
than the bare assertion of the need to propound additional questions is essential before the Court's
discretion may rightfully be exercised to grant or deny recall. There must be a satisfactory showing of
some concrete, substantial ground for the recall. There must be a satisfactory showing on the
movant's part, for instance, that particularly identified material points were not covered in the cross-
examination, or that particularly described vital documents were not presented to the witness whose
recall is prayed for, or that the cross-examination was conducted in so inept a manner as to result in
a virtual absence thereof. Absent such particulars, to repeat, there would be no foundation for a trial
court to authorize the recall of any witness.
In the case at bar, the respondent Trial Court granted the defendant's motion for recall on nothing
more than said movant's general claim that certain questions — unspecified, it must be stressed —
had to be asked. In doing so, it acted without basis, exercised power whimsically or capriciously, and
gravely abused its discretion.
So, too, the respondent Court acted whimsically, capriciously, and oppressively, in other words,
gravely abused its discretion, in ordering the striking out of the entire testimony of Benjamin Lee
after it appeared that he could no longer be found and produced for further examination. In the first
place, the Court acted unilaterally, without any motion to this effect by the defense and thus without
according the prosecution a prior opportunity to show why the striking out should not be decreed.
More importantly, the striking out was directed without any showing whatever by the defense of the
indispensability of further cross-examination, what it was that would have been elicited by further
cross-examination rendering valueless all that the witness had previously stated. It should be
stressed that Lee was subjected both to cross-examination and recross-examination by former
counsel of the accused Sembrano. Obviously the latter was satisfied that there had been sufficient
cross-examination of the witness. Absence of cross-examination may not therefore be invoked as
ground to strike out Lee's testimony (as being hearsay). And there is no showing whatever in this
case that it was the prosecution that placed the witness beyond the reach of the Court, much less of
the expected nature or tenor of his additional testimony which, because not presented, would
necessarily cause the evidence earlier given by Lee to become hearsay or otherwise incompetent, and
therefore, amenable to being stricken from the record.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the respondent Court's challenged Order dated
October 2, 1990 is NULLIFIED AND SET ASIDE, with costs against private respondent.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Cruz, Gancayco, Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
144
G.R. No. 73751 September 24, 1986
ROMAN R. VILLALON, JR., ROMAN R.C. III, ROMAN F.C. IV, ROMAN A.C. V., JOSE
CLARO C. and ARSENIO ROY C., all surnamed VILLALON, petitioners,
vs.
HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT (FOURTH SPECIAL CASES DIVISION),
HON. INOCENCIO D. MALIAMAN (PRESIDING JUDGE OF REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,
BRANCH XXIX AT SAN FERNANDO, LA UNION), CATALINA NEVAL VDA. DE
EBUIZA, CHILDREN OF PATROCINIO EBUIZA (JUSTINA, MARIANO, FELICIDAD,
FRANCISCO, EUGENIA, MARIA, MARCIANA, and SIMEON, all surnamed
EBUIZA), respondents.
RESOLUTION
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
On May 16, 1979, Civil Case No. 2799 for "Annulment of Deed of Absolute Sale, Recovery of
Possession and Damages" was filed by private respondent Catalina NEVAL Vda. de Ebuiza, mother
of the other private respondents all surnamed Ebuiza, against petitioner Atty. Roman R. Villalon, Jr.
(briefly, petitioner Villalon) and his sons, before the then Court of First Instance of La Union (the
Trial Court), for the recovery of a parcel of land located at Urbiztondo, San Juan. La Union.
The property involved was also the subject of a Disbarment Case (Adm. Case No. 1488) previously
filed on July 22, 1975 with this Court by private respondent Francisco EBUIZA, charging petitioner
Villalon with falsification of a deed of absolute sale of that property in his and his sons' favor, but
which petitioner Villalon claimed to have been his contingent fee for the professional services he had
rendered to EBUIZA's parents for successfully handling Civil Case No. 1418 entitled "Paulino Ebuiza,
et all vs. Patrocinio Ebuiza, et al." before the then Court of First Instance of La Union, Branch II. The
Disbarment Case was referred by this Court to the Office of the Solicitor General for investigation,
report and recommendation where testimonial evidence was received. The case still pends thereat.
In the course of the trial of the Civil Case, petitioners introduced in evidence the testimonies of some
of the private respondents, namely, NEVAL, EBUIZA, and Justina Ebuiza San Juan (NEVAL, et als.),
in the Disbarment Case for the purpose of impeaching their testimonies in the Civil Case.
Private respondents filed a Motion to Strike from the records of the Civil Case all matters relating to
the proceedings in the Disbarment Case. Over petitioners' opposition, on September 20, 1985, the
Trial Court issued its questioned Order granting the Motion to Strike. The dispositive portion of said
Order reads:
WHEREFORE, finding the motion to be well-taken, and as prayed for in the
motion, all direct references to the proceedings in the disbarment case against
Atty. Villalon, Jr. are hereby ordered striking (sic) out from the records and
henceforth, further references to such matters are barred.
The Trial Court opined that the admission of the contested evidence would violate Section 10, Rule
139 of the Rules of Court providing that "proceedings against attorneys shall be private and
confidential". It maintained that petitioner Villalon "is not at liberty to waive the privilege of
confidentiality" of the proceedings in the Disbarment Case considering the public interest involved
"even if it would serve his interest," and that Section 10, Rule 139 provides no exception.
Their Motion for Reconsideration having been denied on October 17, 1985, petitioners, resorted to a
Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition, and mandamus before the respondent Appellate Court to nullify
the Order of September 20, 1985 and to require the Trial Court to allow -the impeaching evidence to
remain in the records of the Civil Case.
On February 3, 1986, respondent Appellate Court denied due course and dismissed the Petition
holding that "rulings of the trial court on procedural questions and admissibility of evidence during
the course of the trial are interlocutory in nature and may not be the subject of separate appeal or
review on certiorari." Moreover, it reasoned out that, assuming the Trial Court erred in rejecting
petitioners' proffered evidence, their recourse is to make a formal offer of the evidence under Rule
145
132, Section 35 of the Rules. The reconsideration of said ruling sought by petitioners was denied for
lack of merit on February 19,1986.
Petitioners now avail of this Petition for Review on certiorari praying among others, for the
annulment of respondent Appellate Court's Decision, which sustained the Trial Court Orders of
September 20, 1985 and October 17, 1985, for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion.
We find merit in the Petition.
Petitioners introduced the testimonies of private respondents' witnesses in the Disbarment Case for
purposes of impeaching their credibility in the Civil Case. 1 Petitioners claim that private
respondents' witnesses "have given conflicting testimonies on important factual matters in the
disbarment case, which are inconsistent with their present testimony and which would accordingly
cast a doubt on their credibility." 2 That is a defense tool sanctioned by Sections 15 and 16 of Rule 132
providing:
Sec. 15. Impeachment of adverse party's witness.-A witness may be impeached
by the party against whom he was called, by contradictory evidence, by evidence
that his general reputation for truth, honesty, or integrity is bad or by evidence
that he has made at other times statements inconsistent with his present
testimony, but not by evidence of particular wrongful acts, except that it may be
shown by the examination of the witnesses, or the record of the judgment, that
he has been convicted of an offense.
Sec. 16. How witness impeached by evidence of inconsistent statements. -Before
a witness can be impeached by evidence that he has made at other times
statements inconsistent with his present testimony, the statements must be
related to him, with the circumstances of the times and places and the persons
present, and he must be asked whether he made such statements, and if so;
allowed to explain them If the statements be in writing they must be shown to
the witness before any question is put to him concerning them .
By issuing its Order to strike, the Trial Court deprived petitioners of their right to impeach the
credibility of their adverse parties' witnesses by proving that on former occasions they had made
statements inconsistent with the statements made during the trial, despite the fact that such
statements are material to the issues in the Civil Case. The subject matter involved in the disbarment
proceedings i.e., the alleged falsification of the deed of absolute sale in petitioners' favor, is the same
issue raised in the Civil Case wherein the annulment of the said deed of absolute sale is sought.
Admittedly, said Order is interlocutory in character. However, since it was issued in patent abuse of
discretion, certiorari lies. certiorari may be availed of to contest an interlocutory order to correct a
patent abuse of discretion by the lower Court in issuing the same. 3 It may also be applied for when
the broader interests of justice so require or when ordinary appeal is not an adequate remedy, 4 as in
this case. The offer of evidence, suggested by respondent Appellate Court as a remedy open to
petitioners, while procedurally correct, would be inadequate and ineffective for purposes of
impeachment. The broader interests of justice would then require that petitioners be given sufficient
latitude to present and prove their impeaching evidence for judicial appreciation.
While proceedings against attorneys should, indeed, be private and confidential except for the final
order which shall be made public, 5 that confidentiality is a privileged/ right which may be waived by
the very lawyer in whom and for the protection of whose personal and professional reputation it is
vested, pursuant to the general principle that rights may be waived unless the waiver is contrary to
public policy, among others. 6 In fact, the Court also notes that even private respondents' counsel
touched on some matters testified to by NEVAL in the disbarment proceedings and which were the
subject of cross examination.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court hereby SETS ASIDE respondent Appellate Court's Decision dated
February 3, 1986, and Resolution dated February 19, 1986, and directs the Regional Trial Court of La
Union, at San Fernando, to allow the testimonies of private respondents (plaintiffs below), more
specifically those of Catalina Neval Vda. de Ebuiza, Francisco Ebuiza and Justina Ebuiza San Juan,
given in Administrative Case No. 1488 and all other references thereto to remain in the records of
Civil Case No. 2799 entitled "Catalina Neval Vda. de Ebuiza, Plaintiff, versus Roman R. Villalon, Jr.,
et al., Defendants; Children of Patrocinio Ebuiza: Justina, et al., all surnamed Ebuiza Intervenors. "
The Temporary Restraining Order heretofore issued is hereby lifted.

SO ORDERED.

146
G.R. No. 34098 September 17, 1930
ORIENT INSURANCE COMPANY, petitioner,
vs.
E. P. REVILLA, Judge of First Instance of Manila, and TEAL MOTOR CO.,
INC., respondents.
Gibbs and McDonough for petitioner.
Guevara, Francisco and Recto for respondents.
STREET, J.:
This is an original petition for writs of certiorari and mandamus filed in this court by the Orient
Insurance Company against the respondent judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila and the
Teal Motor Co., Inc. The object of the petition is to obtain an order requiring the respondent judge to
permit the attorney for the petitioner to examine a letter (Exhibits 49 and 49-Act) part of which has
been read into the record in the course of the examination of one of the witnesses testifying for the
plaintiff in the case of Teal Motor Co., Inc. vs. Orient Insurance Company, now pending in the Court
of First Instance of the City of Manila, civil case No. 35825, with which, for purposes of trial, have
been consolidated several other cases of similar character. The cause is now before us for resolution
upon the complaint and answer interposed by the two respondents.
The respondent Teal Motor Co., Inc. is plaintiff in a civil action instituted in the Court of First
Instance of Manila (civil case No. 35825) for the purpose of recovering upon two fire insurance
policies issued by the Orient Insurance Company, aggregating P60,000, upon a stock of merchandise
alleged to be of the value of P414,513.56, which, with the exception of salvage valued at about
P50,000, was destroyed by a fire on or about January 6, 1929. In one of the clauses of the policies
sued upon is a stipulation to the effect that all benefit under the policy would be forfeited if, in case of
loss, the claim should be rejected by the insurer and action or suit should not be commenced within
three months after such rejection. In the answer of the Orient Insurance Company, interposed in the
civil case mentioned, it is alleged, by way of defense, that the company rejected the claim on April 15,
1929, that notice of such rejection was given to the plaintiff by letter on the same day, and that suit
was not instituted on the policy until August 3, 1929, which was more than three months after the
rejection of the claim.
In a replication to the answer of the defendant, containing the foregoing and other defenses, the
plaintiff admitted that the adjusters of the defendant company had, on April 15, 1929, notified the
plaintiff that the Orient Insurance Company would not pay the claim, basing refusal upon alleged
incendiarism and fraud on the part of the plaintiff; and by way of avoidance, it was alleged in the
replication that, after notification of denial of liability by the insurance company, one E. E. Elser, as
representative of the company, expressly requested the plaintiff to defer judicial action until after the
following July 31, stating that three were great possibilities that an extrajudicial compromise might
be arranged in the matter; and it was further asserted, in the replication, that the plaintiff had
deferred action, relying upon this request.
It will thus be seen that the reason for the admitted delay in the institution of the action is an
important issue in the case, or case, now in course of trial.
It further appears that while case No. 35825 was in course of trial, as it still is, before the respondent
judge, in the Court of First Instance of Manila, the witness E. M. Bachrach, president of the Teal
Motor Co., Inc., while being examined in chief by the attorneys for the plaintiff, and speaking of the
circumstances surrounding the institution of the action, said that he had reported certain
conversations to plaintiff's attorneys, and he added: "I waited for about a week longer and not having
heard anything about it, in the meantime, on the 13th of July, I received a letter from our attorneys,
Guevara, Francisco & Recto, urging me to file these cases." The attorney for the defendant, Orient
Insurance Company, thereupon interposed, saying: "I ask that the witness be required to produce the
letter referred to from Mr. Guevara, or else his answer be stricken out. (To the witness) Have you got
the letter there?" The witness replied that he had the letter with him and that he had no objection to
show that part of the letter in which Guevara urged him to proceed with the cases. Upon being asked
about the other part of the letter, the witness said that the other part contained private matter,
"between the attorney and ourselves," meaning between the Teal Motor Co., Inc., and its attorneys.
Thereupon the attorney for the defendant, Orient Insurance Company, said he would like to see the
letter, inquiring as to its date. The witness replied that it bore date of July 13, 1929; and upon the
court inquiring whether the witness had any objection to the reading of the letter by the attorney for
147
the defendant, the witness replied that he wished to consult with his attorney. Upon this the attorney
for the adversary party, the Orient Insurance Company, suggested that he would like to have the
letter marked without his reading it, and it was accordingly marked as Exhibit 49. The attorney then
said: "In view of the production of the letter, I withdraw the objection to the statement of the witness
as to its contents," and he added: "I now ask the permission of the court to read the letter for my
information." The court thereupon inquired of the attorney for the Teal Motor Co., Inc., whether he
had any objection, and the attorney observed that he would have no objection to the disclosing of
that part of the letter which referred exactly to the point of the urging of the filing of the complaints,
and he added: "Unfortunately, the other part of the letter being a communication between a client
and attorney, I don't think, if your Honor please, it can be disclosed without the consent of both."
In the course of the colloquy which thereupon unsued between the attorney for the plaintiff and the
attorney for the defendant, it was stated by the attorney for the plaintiff that only a part of the letter
had anything to do with the urging of the presentation of the complaints in the cases to which the
witness had testified, and that the other part of the letter referred to the contract of fees, or retaining
of the services of plaintiff's attorneys in connection with said cases, a matter, so the attorney
suggested, entirely distinct from the urging of the presentation of the cases. The attorney for the
defendant thereupon insisted before the court that, inasmuch as all the letter refers to the case then
in court, the entire document should be exhibited, in conformity with the rule that when part of a
document is offered in evidence, the entire document must be presented.
Upon this the respondent judge ruled as follows: "Objection of the counsel for the plaintiff and the
witness, Mr. Barchrach, to the showing or reading of the whole letter in the record is sustained, and it
is ordered that only that part of the letter which has been referred to by Mr. Bachrach in his
testimony be read and transcribed into the record." To this ruling the attorney for the defendant
excepted and the respondent judge then said: "Let that part of the letter pointed out by Mr. Bachrach
be transcribed in the record;" whereupon the following part of the letter was read out in court and
incorporated in the transcript.
July 13, 1929
DEAR SIR: As you know, your attorney Mr. Basilio Francisco has turned over to us, prior
to his departure, all the papers in connection with the insurance claim of the Teal Motor
Co., Inc., on destroyed or burned merchandise, and everything is now ready for filing of
the corresponding complaints in the Court of First Instance.
When the matter above quoted had been thus read into the record, the attorney for the defendant
made the following observation: "In view of the fact that counsel for the plaintiff has just now read
into the record and presented as evidence a part of the letter of July 13, I now request that the entire
letter be produced." This request was overruled by the court, and the attorney for the defendant
excepted. After further discussion, upon the suggestion of the attorney for the defendant and by
agreement of the counsel for both parties, the second page of the letter was marked 49-A by the clerk
court.
The incident was renewed when it came at turn of the attorney for the defendant to cross-examine
the same witness E. M. Bachrach, when the attorney for the defendant, having ascertained from the
witness that he still had the letter in his possession, and that he had not answered it in writing,
formally offered the letter in evidence. The attorney for the plaintiff again objected, on the ground
that the letter was of a privileged nature and that it was the personal property of the witness.
Thereupon the court, receiving the letter in hand from the witness, observed that he had already
ruled upon it, and after further discussion, the court sustained the objection of the attorney for the
plaintiff and refused to admit in evidence so much of the letter as had not already been read into the
record. The attorney for the defendant again excepted.
At a later stage of the trial the attorney interposed a formal motion for reconsideration of the ruling
of the court in refusing to admit the letter in evidence, or the part of it not already incorporated in the
record. The court, however, adhered to its original ruling, and the attorney for the defendant
excepted. Another incident that might be noted, though not alleged as a ground of relief in the
petition before us, but set forth in the answer of the respondents, is that the attorney for the
defendant procured a subpoena duces tecum to be issued by the clerk of court requiring the attorneys
for the plaintiff to produce in court certain papers including the letter which gave rise to the present
controversy. The court, on motion of the attorneys for the plaintiff, quashed said subpoena.
The essential character of this incident, which we have perhaps narrated with unnecessary prolixity,
is readily discernible. A witness for the plaintiff made an oral statement as to the substance of part of
a letter which had been received by the plaintiff from its attorney, and when the fact was revealed
that the communication had been made by letter, the attorney for the defendant requested that the
witness be required to produce the letter in court, and if not, that his answer should be stricken out.
This in legal effect was a demand for the production of "the best evidence," it being a well-known rule
of law that a witness cannot be permitted to give oral testimony as to the contents of a paper writing
which can be produced in court. In response to this request that portion of the letter to which the
witness had supposedly referred was read into the record.
The respondent judge appears to have considered that the excerpt from the letter thus incorporated
in the record was either proof of the defendant, its production having been demanded by defendant's
counsel, or that at least the legal responsibility for the incorporation of said excerpt into the record
was attributable to the defendant. We are unable to accept this view. The incorporation of this
excerpt from the letter was a necessary support of the oral statement which the witness had made,
and if this basis for such statement had not been laid by the incorporation of the excerpt into the
record, the oral statement of the witness concerning the tenor of the letter should properly have been
stricken out. But instead of withdrawing the oral statement of the witness concerning the nature of
the written communication, the witness produced the letter and the part of it already quoted was
read into the record. The excerpt in question must therefore be considered as proof submitted by the
plaintiff; and there can be no question that, part of the letter having been introduced in behalf of the
plaintiff, the whole of the letter could properly be examined by the other party, in accordance with
the express provision of section 283 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
It was stated in the court by the attorney for the plaintiff, in opposing the introduction of other
portions of the letter in proof, that the other parts were privileged, because they related to the terms
of employment between attorney and client, or to the fee to be paid to the attorney. With respect to
this point it is difficult to see how a contract for fees could be considered privileged. Irrelevant it
might, under certain circumstances, certainly be, but not privileged. Of course contracts between
attorneys and clients are inherently personal and private matters, but they are a constant subject of
litigation, and contracts relating to fees are essentially not of privileged nature. Privilege primarily
refers to communications from client to attorney, an idea which of course includes communications
from attorney to client relative to privileged matters.
But, even supposing that the matter contained in the letter and withheld from the inspection of the
adversary was originally of a privileged nature, the privilege was waived by the introduction in
evidence of part of the letter. The provision in section 283 of the Code of Civil Procedure making the
whole of a declaration, conversation, or writing admissible when part has been given in evidence by
one party, makes no exception as to privileged matter; and the jurisprudence on the subject does not
recognize any exception. Practically every feature of the question now under consideration was
involved in the case of Western Union Tel. Co. vs. Baltimore & Ohio Tel. Co. (26 Fed., 55), which in
1885 came before Wallace, J., a distinguished jurist presiding in the Federal Circuit Court of the
Southern District of New York. The substance of the case is well stated in the note to
Kelly vs. Cummens (20 Am. & Eng. Ann. Cases, 1283, 1287), from which we quote as follows:
In Western Union Tel. Co. vs. Baltimore, etc., Tel. Co. (26 Fed., 55), it appeared that upon
a motion in the cause, which was in equity for a preliminary injunction, one of the
questions involved was whether a reissued patent upon which the suit was founded was
obtained for the legitimate purpose of correcting mistake or inadvertence in the
specification and claims of the original, or whether it was obtained merely for the purpose
of expanding the claims of the original in order to subordinate to the reissue certain
improvements or inventions made by others after the grant of the original patent and
before the application for the reissue. To fortify its theory of the true reasons for obtaining
the reissue, the complainant upon that motion embodied in affidavits extracts from
communications made by a patent expert and attorney in the office of the solicitor general
of the complainant, to the president and the vice-president of the complainant, when the
subject of applying for a reissue was under consideration by the officers of the
complainant, and while the proceedings for a reissue were pending. After the cause had
proceeded to the taking of proofs for final hearing the defendant sought to introduce in
evidence the original communications, extracts from which were used by the complainant
upon the motion for an injunction, on the ground that the parts of the communication
which were not disclosed had an important bearing upon the history of the application for
a reissue, and indicated that it was not made for any legitimate purpose. The complainant
148
resisted the efforts of the defendant to have the original communications admitted, on the
ground that they were privileged as made to its officers by its attorney, but it was held that
the defendant was entitled to introduce them in evidence, the court saying: "The question,
then, is whether the complainant can shelter itself behind its privilege to insist upon the
privacy of the communications between its attorney and its other officers as confidential
communications, when it has itself produced fragmentary part of them, and sought to use
them as a weapon against the defendant to obtain the stringent remedy of a preliminary
injunction. Assuming that the communications addressed to the president and vice-
president of the complainant by Mr. Buckingham were communications made to the
complainant by its attorney, and as such privileged at the option of the complainant, it was
competent for the complainant to waive its privilege. It would hardly be contended that the
complainant could introduce extracts from these communications as evidence in its own
behalf for the purpose of a final hearing, and yet withhold the other parts if their
production were required by the defendant. A party cannot waive such a privilege partially.
He cannot remove the seal of secrecy from so much of the privileged communications as
makes for his advantage, and insist that it shall not be removed as to so much as makes to
the advantage of his adversary, or may neutralize the effect of such as has been introduced.
Upon the principle it would seem that it cannot be material at what stage of the
proceedings in a suit a party waives his right to maintain the secrecy of privileged
communication. All the proceedings in the cause are constituent parts of the controversy,
and it is not obvious how any distinction can obtain as to the effect of waiver when made
by a party for the purpose of obtaining temporary relief and when made by him to obtain
final relief."
From the foregoing decision and other cases contained in the note referred to, we are led to the
conclusion that the attorney for the defendant in the court below was entitled to examine the whole
of the letter (Exhibit 49 and 49-A), with a view to the introduction in evidence of such parts thereof
as may be relevant to the case on trial, and the respondent judge was in error in refusing to permit
the inspection of the letter by said attorney.
It is suggested in the argument for the respondents that the question of the admissibility in evidence
of the parts of the letter not already read into the record was prematurely raised, and that the
attorney for the defendant should have waited until it became his turn to present evidence in chief,
when, as is supposed, the question could have been properly raised. We are of the opinion, however,
that if the attorney for the defendant had a right to examine the letter, it should have been produced
when he asked for it on the cross-examination of the witness who had the letter in his possession.
Besides, in the lengthy discussions between court and attorneys, occuring at different times, there
was not the slightest suggestion from the court that the parts of the letter which were held
inadmissible would be admitted at any time. Furthermore, the action of the court in quashing the
subpoena duces tecum for the production of the letter shows that the court meant to rule that the
letter could not be inspected at all by the attorney for the defendant.
Objection is also here made by the attorney for the respondents to the use of the writ
of mandamus for the purpose of correcting the error which is supposed to have been committed. The
situation presented is, however, one where the herein petitioner has no other remedy. The letter
which the petitioner seeks to examine has been ruled inadmissible, as to the parts not introduced in
evidence by the defendant in the court below, and the respondent judge had not permitted the
document to become a part of the record in such a way that the petitioner could take advantage of the
error upon appeal to this court. It is idle to discuss whether other remedy would be speedy or
adequate when there is no remedy at all. This court is loath, of course, to interfere in course of the
trial of a case in a Court of First Instance, as such interference might frequently prolong unduly the
litigation in that court. But this case has been pending before the respondent judge for a considerable
period of time, and undoubtedly the probatory period will be necessarily extended much longer.
Under these circumstances, the action of this court in entertaining the present application will either
be conductive to the speedy determination of case, or at least will not appreciably extend the
proceedings.
It goes without saying that the subject matter of the contention is of a nature which makes the use of
the writ of mandamus appropriate, since the right from the exercise of which the petitioner is
excluded is one to which it is entitled under the law and the duty to be performed is one pertaining to
the respondent judge in his official capacity.
From what has been said it follows that the writ of mandamus prayed for will be granted, and the
respondent judge is directed to permit the attorney for the defendant (petitioner here) to inspect the
letter (Exhibit 49 and 49-A) with a view to the introduction in evidence of such parts thereof as may
be relevant to the issues made by the pleadings in civil case No. 35825 and other cases which have
been consolidated with it for trial. So ordered, with costs against the respondent Teal Motor Co., Inc.
G.R. No. 76792 March 12, 1990
RESURRECCION BARTOLOME, ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT (now Court of Appeals) and HEIRS OF
SPOUSES BERNABE BARTOLOME and URSULA CID, respondents.
Rafael B. Ruiz for petitioners.
E.L. Peralta for private respondents.
FERNAN, C.J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision 1 of the then Intermediate Appellate Court
"adjudicating the whole Lot No. 11165 in favor of" Bernabe Bartolome and Ursula Cid, thereby
reversing the decision 2 of the Regional Trial Court of Ilocos Norte, Branch XII at Laoag City. The
dispositive portion of the latter decision states:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered adjudicating the eastern portion to
the heirs of the late Epitacio Batara measuring 27 meters from south to north by
32 meters from east to west, with an area of 864 square meters, bounded on the
east by the Provincial Road; on the north by the heirs of Rufo Manuel; on the
west by a portion of the same Lot No. 11165; and on the south by Lot No.11164;
the remaining portion to the heirs of Doroteo Bartolome, bounded on the east by
the portion of Lot No. 11165 adjudicated to the heirs of Epitacio Batara and heirs
of Rufo Manuel; on the north by Eugenio Andrada; on the west by Nieves Caday
or Lot No. 11166; and on the south by Lot No. 11164.
Likewise, the heirs of Epitacio Bartolome Batara are hereby ordered to reserved
(sic) the road right of way for the necessary expansion of the road adjacent to the
eastern side of said lot, subject, however, to just compensation.
Once this Decision becomes final, let the corresponding Decree be issued
accordingly.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
The record shows that a 725-square meter portion of said Lot No. 11165 located in Barrio 11, Laoag,
Ilocos Norte, was first declared as his property by Epitacio Batara under tax declaration No. 5708
dated May 23, 1906. 3 The property was described therein as bounded on the north by the property of
Pedro Manuel, on the east by the road, on the south by the property of Doroteo Bartolome and on the
west by the property of one named Esteban, and as having "una casa de tabla de dimension 5 x 4
metros" as improvement. Tax declaration No. 5708 was superseded by tax declaration No. 37576
labelled as a "revision of declaration of real property (urban)" dated April 23, 1914. 4The residential
lot described in the latter tax declaration contained an area of 772 square meters with a "casa" and a
"granero" as improvements thereon.
Epitacio Batara and his wife, Maria Gonzales, had two children: Catalina and Pedro. The latter died a
bachelor and without issue. Catalina, who married someone surnamed Bartolome, bore five children
named Isabela, Tarcila, Calixto, Resurreccion and Ruperta. In 1912, before he left Laoag to settle in
Culalabo, Gamo (Burgos), Isabela, Epitacio entrusted the lot to his cousin, Doroteo Bartolome, who
owned the lot bounding Epitacio's property on the south. 5 Maria Gonzales remained in the lot for
sometime. When she later followed Epitacio to Isabela, she allowed Doroteo Bartolome to continue
taking charge of the property. 6
149
In 1916, Epitacio Batara died in Isabela. Five years later or in 1921, Maria Gonzales and her
grandchildren, Calixto and Resurreccion Bartolome, returned to Laoag. As they found that the house
on their lot was destroyed by fire, they boarded in someone else's house. Calixto constructed a
bamboo fence around his grandfather's lot and he and Resurreccion, who was studying in Laoag,
cleaned it. Resurreccion went back to Isabela after Maria Gonzales' death in 1926. 7 It was also in that
year when Doroteo Bartolome, to whom Epitacio had entrusted his land, migrated to Davao City.
Doroteo died there two years later. 8
Thereafter, the Director of Lands instituted cadastral proceedings over the land involved herein
(Cadastral Case No. 53). On October 23, 1933, Ursula Cid, the widow of the son of Doroteo
Bartolome, Bernabe, who died in 1928, 9filed an answer in Cadastral Case No. 53, claiming
ownership over Lot No. 11165 with an area of 1660 square meters, described as bounded on the north
by the property of Rufo Manuel and Eugenia Andrada, on the east by the provincial road, on the
south by the property of Doroteo Bartolome, and on the west by the property of Nieves Caday and
Eugenia Andrada, and with a house as improvement thereon. The land was allegedly acquired by
Ursula Cid through inheritance from Doroteo Bartolome, the father of Ursula's deceased husband,
Bernabe. 10
More than three months later or on January 30, 1934, Resurreccion Bartolome also filed an answer
in the same cadastral case claiming ownership over a portion of Lot No. 11165 with an area of 864
square meters described as bounded on the north by the property of the heirs of Rufo Manuel, on the
east by Blumentritt Street, on the south by the property of Doroteo Bartolome, and on the west by the
property of Bernabe Bartolome. No improvements on the lot were indicated in the answer which also
stated that said portion of Lot No. 11165 was acquired by claimant Resurreccion Bartolome "by
inheritance from my grandfather and grandmother . . . Epitacio Batara and Maria Gonzales." 11
From then on, no further proceedings were held in the cadastral case. Meanwhile, in 1934,
Resurreccion Bartolome verbally entrusted the portion she had claimed to Maria Bartolome, whom
she later described as the daughter of Doroteo Bartolome. 12
In 1939, Ursula Cid and her children also migrated to Davao City leaving their house on Lot No.
11165 to a lessee, Severino Ramos. Ursula and her son, Dominador Bartolome, instructed Maria
Bartolome, the sister of Bernabe, to receive the rentals for the house from Severino Ramos. 13 Maria
Bartolome also paid the taxes on the property until 1948, when Dominador took over the task. 14 But
on September 22, 1950, Maria Bartolome, as "administrator of the parcel of land situated at Bo. 11,
Laoag, Ilocos Norte," leased Lot No. 11165 to the Philippine United Trading Co., Inc. 15 The rentals for
the property were paid by the lessee to Dominador Bartolome until the edifice housing the company
was burned down in 1968. 16 Resurreccion Bartolome, who had been residing in Isabela, was given by
Maria Bartolome a small amount, which could have been about P50, in consideration of the lease
contract. 17
In June, 1968, the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte sent out
notices for the "continuation of the hearing" on June 13, 1968 in Cadastral Case No. 53. 18 It should
be remembered, however, that from the time Ursula Cid and Resurreccion Bartolome filed their
answers to the petition in the cadastral case, there had been no progress in the proceedings.
A year later or in 1969, Maria J. Bartolome filed in Cadastral Case No. 53 a "motion to admit answer
in intervention," alleging that she is one of the children of Doroteo Bartolome and that she and her
co-heirs had been excluded in Ursula Cid's answer to the petition. She therefore prayed that the
answer
of Ursula Cid be amended so as to include the rightful heirs of Doroteo Bartolome. 19 At the same
time, she filed an answer claiming co-ownership over Lot No. 11165 with Clemente, Julia and Rosario
Bartolome and Ursula Cid, the widow of Bernabe. She likewise alleged therein that she and her
siblings inherited the 1660-square meter lot from Doroteo Bartolome. 20
Three months later, Ursula Cid filed a motion to amend her answer to reflect the complete "ground
or basis of acquisition" of Lot No. 11165. 21 In her amended answer, Ursula Cid stated that she was the
absolute owner of Lot No. 11165; that she had been the possessor of Lot No. 11165 for over fifty years;
that she "acquired by inheritance from Bernabe Bartolome, who together with her, purchased the . . .
lot which used to be three adjoining lots from their respective owners;" and that Lot No. 11165 had
been declared for tax purposes in the name of her late husband Bernabe Bartolome. 22
No hearing was conducted in the case until 1974. To buttress her claim that she and her husband
purchased Lot No. 11165, Ursula Cid presented at the trial three deeds of sale: [a] one dated March 1,
1917 showing that Bernabe Bartolome and Ursula Cid bought a 374-square meter lot for fifteen pesos
from the spouses Domingo Agustin and Josefa Manrique; 23 [b] another document dated February
18, 1913 executed by Ignacia Manrique in favor of Bernabe Bartolome evidencing the sale of another
lot also for fifteen pesos; 24 and [c] still another deed executed by Maria Gonzales y Paguyo on
February 9, 1917 in favor of Bernabe Bartolome and Ursula Cid ceding to the latter 772 square meters
of land for P103.75. 25 The last-mentioned piece of land is the one being claimed by Resurreccion
Bartolome.
On May 10, 1984, the Regional Trial Court of Ilocos Norte rendered a decision the dispositive portion
of which is quoted above. The court entertained only the answers of Ursula Cid and Resurreccion
Bartolome. It found that the lots described in Exhibits 2 and 3 presented by Ursula Cid "are not
within Lot 11165" and that said exhibits "are defective as the vendors are not the real owner(s)" of the
lots described therein. As to Exhibit 4, the court ruled that it has "no probative value as the same is
incomplete and unsigned." The court also held that Ursula Cid's possession of the land "after the
claimants had filed their respective answer(s) or after the declaration of a general default," did not
confer ownership on her because said possession was interrupted and merely tolerated by all the
parties during the pendency of the case. 26
Ursula Cid appealed to the then Intermediate Appellate Court. In its decision reversing the lower
court, the appellate court held that the deeds of sale presented by Ursula Cid are ancient documents
under Section 22, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court. It also ruled that Ursula Cid's continuous
possession of the lot from its acquisition and her exercise of rights of ownership over it vested her
with the legal presumption that she possessed it under a just title.
Her motion for the reconsideration of said decision having been denied, Resurreccion Bartolome
filed the instant petition for review on certiorari based on two principal issues: [a] whether the
provisions of Rule 132 on ancient documents are applicable with respect to Exhibit 4, and [b]
whether acquisitive prescription runs during the pendency of a cadastral case.
Exhibit 4 consists of three pieces of paper. The first piece is a blank sheet which apparently serves as
a cover page. The two other pages contain the handwritten document in Ilocano stating that in
consideration of the amount of P103.75, Maria Gonzales y Paguyo sold to the spouses Bernabe
Bartolome and Ursula Cid 772 square meters of land bounded on the north by the property of Pedro
Manuel, on the east by the Bacarra road, on the south by the property of Doroteo Bartolome and on
the west by the property of Bernabe Bartolome. The third sheet or page 2 thereof contains a warranty
against eviction and other disturbances with the last three lines indicating the date of the execution
of the instrument.
According to Dominador Bartolome, he first saw Exhibit 4 in the possession of his mother, Ursula
Cid, when he was just eleven years old. He noticed that the document had a fourth page containing
the signature of Maria Gonzales and that all four pages were sewn together. 27 However, when the
document was entrusted to him by his mother in 1947 as he was then representing the family in
litigation concerning the land, the document's fourth page was already missing. 28 He stated that his
mother told him that the fourth page was lost during the Japanese occupation while they were
evacuating from Davao City. 29
Dominador Bartolome also presented in court a sworn statement in Ilocano executed by Ursula Cid
on February 19, 1937. 30 In her statement, Ursula Cid declared that the sale of the lot to her and her
husband by Maria Gonzales was evidenced by a written instrument; that the land had been
transferred in the name of her husband; that she had been paying taxes therefor, and that they had
been in continuous possession of the land for more than twenty years. 31
Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 22. Evidence of execution not necessary. — Where a private writing is more
than thirty years old, is produced from a custody in which it would naturally be
found if genuine, and is unblemished by any alterations or circumstances of
suspicion, no other evidence of its execution and authenticity need be given.
We agree with the appellate court that the first two requirements ordained by Section 22 are met by
Exhibit 4. It appearing that it was executed in 1917, Exhibit 4 was more than thirty years old when it
was offered in evidence in 1983. 32 It was presented in court by the proper custodian thereof who is
an heir of the person who would naturally keep it. 33 We notice, however, that the Court of Appeals
150
failed to consider and discuss the third requirement; that no alterations or circumstances of
suspicion are present.
Admittedly, on its face, the deed of sale appears unmarred by alteration. We hold, however, that the
missing page has nonetheless affected its authenticity. Indeed, its importance cannot be
overemphasized. It allegedly bears the signature of the vendor of the portion of Lot No. 11165 in
question and therefore, it contains vital proof of the voluntary transmission of rights over the subject
of the sale. Without that signature, the document is incomplete. Verily, an incomplete document is
akin to if not worse than a document with altered contents.
Moreover, there is a circumstance which bothers the Court and makes the genuineness of the
document suspect. If it is really true that the document was executed in 1917, Ursula Cid would have
had it in her possession when she filed her answer in Cadastral Case No. 53 in 1933. Accordingly, she
could have stated therein that she acquired the portion in question by purchase from Maria
Gonzales. But as it turned out, she only claimed purchase as a mode of acquisition of Lot No. 11165
after her sister-in-law, Maria J. Bartolome and the other descendants of Doroteo Bartolome sought
intervention in the case and demanded their rightful shares over the property.
All these negate the appellate court's conclusion that Exhibit 4 is an ancient document. Necessarily,
proofs of its due execution and authenticity are vital. Under Section 21 of Rule 132, the due execution
and authenticity of a private writing must be proved either by anyone who saw the writing executed,
by evidence of the genuineness of the handwriting of the maker, or by a subscribing witness. The
testimony of Dominador Bartolome on Exhibit 4 and Ursula Cid's sworn statement in 1937 34 do not
fall within the purview of Section 21. The signature of Maria Gonzales on the missing fourth page of
Exhibit 4 would have helped authenticate the document if it is proven to be genuine. But as there can
be no such proof arising from the signature of Maria Gonzales in the deed of sale, the same must be
excluded. 35
Even if Exhibit 4 were complete and authentic, still, it would substantially be infirm. Under Article
834 of the old Civil Code, Maria Gonzales, as a surviving spouse, "shall be entitled to a portion in
usufruct equal to that corresponding by way of legitime to each of the legitimate children or
descendants who has not received any betterment." And, until it had been ascertained by means of
the liquidation of the deceased spouse's estate that a portion of the conjugal property remained after
all the partnership obligations and debts had been paid, the surviving spouse or her heirs could not
assert any claim of right or title in or to the community property which was placed in the exclusive
possession and control of the husband as administrator thereof. 36 Hence, in the absence of proof that
the estate of Epitacio Batara had been duly settled, Maria Gonzales had no right to sell not even a
portion of the property subject of Exhibit 4.
On the issue of whether acquisitive prescription runs during the pendency of a cadastral case, we
hold, as this Court held in Cano v. De Camacho, 37 that the institution of cadastral proceedings, or at
least the publication of the notice therein issued, has the effect of suspending the running of the
prescriptive period. Hence, the appellate court erred in ascribing acquisitive prescription in favor of
Ursula Cid "up to the present." 38
Neither can Ursula Cid successfully assert that prior to the institution of the cadastral proceedings,
she and her husband had gained acquisitive prescription over the property. Until Doroteo Bartolome
migrated to Davao City in 1926, he was in possession of the whole lot including the portion entrusted
to him by Epitacio Batara. Granting that the 1520-square meter lot Bernabe Bartolome had declared
as his own in 1925 39 is within Lot No. 11165, still, the period from 1925 until the filing of the cadastral
case in 1933 failed to give him an advantage. It is short of the 10-year actual, adverse and
uninterrupted period of possession mandated by Section 41 of the Code of Civil Procedure in order
that a full and complete title could be vested on the person claiming to be the owner of a piece of
land.
Furthermore, while it is true that the property had been declared for tax purposes by Bernabe
Bartolome and that, subsequent to his death, taxes thereon were paid in the name of his son,
Dominador, 40 ownership thereof had not been acquired by Ursula Cid or her heirs. Aside from the
fact that said declarations and payments were made during the pendency of the cadastral case, a tax
declaration in the name of the alleged property owner or of his predecessor-in-interest, does not
prove ownership. It is merely an indicium of a claim of ownership. 41 In the same manner, neither
does the payment of taxes conclusively prove ownership of the land paid for.
The foregoing discussion notwithstanding, the Court is unprepared to decree 824 square meters of
Lot No. 11165 in favor of Resurreccion Bartolome and her co-heirs to the estate of Epitacio Batara.
The revised declaration of real property in the name of Epitacio, which petitioners presented as
Exhibit B, reveals that Epitacio Batara owned only 772 square meters of the lot involved. Certainly,
petitioner and her co-heirs may not be entitled to an area greater than what their grandfather
claimed as his own.

Similarly, what remains of Lot No. 11165 after the portion herein adjudicated to Resurreccion
Bartolome and her co-heirs has been determined, may not be granted to the heirs of Bernabe
Bartolome and Ursula Cid exclusively. The two other deeds of sale presented as Exhibits 2 and 3
having been found worthless by the trial court as they involve parcels of land not within Lot No.
11165 and the vendors of which were not the real owners of the property, which findings of facts are
binding on this Court, the law mandates that the property, having been inherited from Doroteo
Bartolome, must be shared in equal portions by his children or their heirs.

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the then Intermediate Appellate Court is hereby reversed
and set aside.

The eastern portion of Lot No. 11165 with an area of 772 square meters is hereby adjudicated in favor
of the heirs of Epitacio Batara who are herein represented by Resurreccion Bartolome while the
remaining area of Lot No. 11165 is hereby adjudicated in favor of the heirs of Doroteo Bartolome.

Petitioners shall pay the cost of the survey and subdivision of Lot No. 11165. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano, Bidin and Cortes, JJ., concur.

151
152
G.R. Nos. 79597-98 May 20, 1991
HEIRS OF DEMETRIA LACSA, represented by: BIENVENIDO CABAIS, VIRGINIA
CABAIS, LEONOR CABAIS-PENA and DOLORES CABAIS-MAGPAYO, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, AURELIO D. SONGCO, ANGEL D. SONGCO ENCARNACION D.
SONGCO, LOURDES D. SONGCO, ANGELA S. SONGCO, LUDIVINA S. SONGCO,
JOSEPHINE S. SONGCO, ALBERT S. SONGCO, INOSENCIO S. SONGCO, JAIME S.
SONGCO, MARTIN S. SONGCO, and BERNARD S. SONGCO, Being Heirs of Inocencio
Songco, respondents.
Norbin P. Dimalanta for petitioners.
Dante S. David for private respondents.
PADILLA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision * of respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV Nos. 08397-08398 dated 16 July 1987 affirming with modification the decision of the Regional
Trial Court of Guagua, Pampanga, in favor of private respondents, and its resolution dated 14 August
1987 denying the motion for reconsideration.
This petition which originated with the Regional Trial Court of Guagua, Pampanga involves two (2)
cases, namely: Civil Case No. G-1190 and Civil Case No. G-1332. 1
Civil Case No. G-1190 is an action for recovery of possession with damages and preliminary
injunction filed by herein petitioners, the heirs of Demetria Lacsa, against Aurelio Songco and John
Doe based on the principal allegations that petitioners are heirs of deceased Demetria Lacsa who,
during her lifetime, was the owner of a certain parcel of land consisting partly of a fishpond and
partly of uncultivated open space, located in Bancal, Guagua, Pampanga, evidenced by Original
Certificate of Title No. RO-1038 (11725); that the principal respondent and his predecessor-in-
interest who are neither co-owners of the land nor tenants thereof, thru stealth, fraud and other
forms of machination, succeeded in occupying or possessing the fishpond of said parcel of land and
caused the open space therein to be cleared for expanded occupancy thereof, and refused to vacate
the same despite petitioner's demands on them to vacate. 2
Civil Case No. G-1332 is an action also by herein petitioners against private respondents before the
same lower court for cancellation of title, ownership with damages and preliminary injunction, based
on the allegations that they are the heirs of Demetria Lacsa who was the owner of the land also
involved in Civil Case No. G-1190; that the herein private respondents and their predecessors-in-
interest, thru stealth, fraud and other forms of machination, succeeded in occupying or possessing
the fishpond of the said parcel of land, and later abandoned the same but only after the case was filed
and after all the fish were transferred to the adjoining fishpond owned by the private respondents;
that on 31 October 1923 and 15 March 1924, by presenting to the Register of Deeds of Pampanga
certain forged and absolutely simulated documents, namely: "TRADUCCION AL CASTELLANO DE
LA ESCRITURA DE PARTICION EXTRAJUDICIAL" and "ESCRITURA DE VENTA ABSOLUTA",
respectively, and by means of false pretenses and misrepresentation, Inocencio Songco, the private
respondents' predecessor-in-interest, succeeded in transferring the title to said property in his name,
to the damage and prejudice of the petitioners; and that a preliminary injunction was necessary to
prevent the private respondents from disposing of said property. 3
Private respondents denied the material allegations of both complaints and alleged as special and
affirmative defenses, petitioners' lack of cause of action, for the reason that Original Certificate of
Title No. RO-1038 (11725) was merely a reconstituted copy issued in April 1983 upon petitioners'
expedient claim that the owner's duplicate copy thereof had been missing when the truth of the
matter was that OCT No. RO-1038 (11725) in the name of Demetria Lacsa, had long been cancelled
and superseded by TCT No. 794 in the name of Alberta Guevarra and Juan Limpin by virtue of the
document entitled "TRADUCCION AL CASTELLANO DE LA ESCRITURA DE PARTICION EXTRA-
JUDICIAL" entered into by the heirs of Demetria Lacsa; that the latter TCT was in turn superseded
by TCT No. 929 issued in the name of Inocencio Songco (father of private respondents) by virtue of a
153
document entitled "ESCRITURA DE VENTA ABSOLUTA" executed by spouses Juan Limpin and
Alberta Guevarra in favor of said Inocencio Songo.4
Private respondents, in their answer, pleaded a counterclaim against petitioners based on allegations
that the latter headed by Carlito Magpayo, by force and intimidation, took possession of a portion of
the fishpond in the land and occupied a hut therein, that at that time, private respondents had 3,000
bangus fingerlings left in the fishpond which upon petitioners' harvest thereof left private
respondents deprived and damaged in the amount of P50,000.00 more or less; that such illegal
occupancy caused private respondents to suffer unrealized income and profits, sleepless nights,
wounded feelings and serious anxiety which entitled them to actual, moral and exemplary damages
as well as attorney's fees and P500.00 appearance fee for every hearing. 5
On 20 January 1985, the parties assisted by their respective counsel filed in Civil Case No. G-1332 a
joint stipulation of facts, alleging:
1. That on June 9, 1982, the plaintiffs, being heirs of Demetria Lacsa, filed Civil Case No.
1190;
2. That after the defendants filed their Answer in the said Civil Case No. G-1190, and
learning the land subject of the two (2) abovementioned cases (sic), said plaintiffs filed a
Motion for Leave to Admit Amended and/or Supplemental Complaint.
3. That the said motion was denied by the Honorable Court, hence, said plaintiffs filed
Civil Case No. G-1332, the above-entitled case, with the same cause of action as that of the
proposed Amended and/or Supplemental Complaint;
4. That the evidences of both parties in Civil Case No. G-1190 and in the above-entitled
case are practically and literally the same;
5. That in view of the foregoing, and in order to avoid duplicity of action by repeatedly
presenting the same act of evidences and same set of witnesses, the parties mutually
agreed as they hereby agree and stipulate that any and all evidences presented under Civil
Case No. 1190 shall be adopted as evidences for both parties in the above-entitled case, and
upon submission for resolution of Civil Case No. G-1190, the above-entitled case shall
likewise be deemed submitted for resolution on the basis of the evidence presented in the
same Civil Case No. G-1190.6
On the basis of this joint stipulation of facts, the lower court held that:
. . . the fishpond in question was originally owned by Demetria Lacsa under Original
Certificate of Title No. 11725. After Demetria Lacsa died her two daughters Alberta
Guevarra and Ambrocia Guevarra with their respective husbands Juan Limpin and
Damaso Cabais entered into an extrajudicial partition of the properties left by Demetria
Lacsa under the document "Traduccion Al Castellano de la Escritura de Partition Extra-
judicial" dated April 7, 1923 (Exhibits "3","3-A" and "3-B") wherein the fishpond in
question was adjudicated to Alberta Guevarra and which deed was duly registered in the
Office of the Registry of Deeds of Pampanga as evidenced by the certification of the Deputy
Register of Deeds marked as Exhibit "3-C". Aside from the "Traduccion Al Castellano de la
Escritura de Particion Extrajudicial" written in the Spanish language, the spouses Alberta
Guevarra and Juan Limpin and the spouses Ambrosia Guevarra and Damaso Cabais
executed on April 7, 1923, another deed of partition in the Pampango dialect marked as
Exhibit "3-D" "wherein the fishpond in question was adjudicated to Alberta Guevarra. As a
consequence, Original Certificate of Title No. 794 (Exhibit "4") was issued to spouses
Alberta Guevarra and Juan Limpin. On January 20, 1924, the spouses Juan Limpin and
Alberta Guevarra sold the fishpond in question to Inocencio Songco under the deed
entitled "Escritura de Venta Absoluta" (Exhibits "7" and "7-A") which was duly registered
in the Office of the Registry of Deeds of Pampanga as evidenced by the certification of the
Deputy Register of Deeds marked Exhibit "7-B". As a result of the sale, Transfer Certificate
of Title No. 794 (Exhibit "4") in the name of the spouses Alberta Guevarra and Juan
Limpin was cancelled by the Office of the Registry of Deeds of Pampanga and Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 929 was issued to Inocencio
Songco."7
The lower court thus held that the fishpond in question belongs to the private respondents, having
been inherited by them from their deceased father Inocencio Songco. 8
The dispositive portion of the judgment in favor of private respondents reads:
WHEREFORE, JUDGMENT is hereby rendered
In Civil Case No. G - 1190
(A) Ordering the dismissal of the complaint in Civil Case No. G-1190;
In Civil Case No. G-1332
(B) Ordering the dismissal of the complaint in Civil Case No. G-1332;
In Both Civil Case No. G-1190 and Civil Case No. G-1332
(C) Ordering the cancellation of Original Certificate of Title No. RO-1038 (11725) in the
name of Demetria Lacsa;
(D) Ordering the plaintiffs to restore possession of the fishpond in question located in
Bancal, Guagua, Pampanga, to the defendants (sic);
(E) Ordering the plaintiffs to pay jointly and severally, the defendants the sum of Twenty
Five Thousand (P25,000.00) Pesos, Philippine Currency, as and for moral damages;
(F) Ordering the plaintiffs to pay jointly and severally, the defendants the sum of Twenty
Five Thousand (P25,000.00) Pesos, Philippine Currency, as and for exemplary damages;
(G) Ordering the plaintiffs to pay jointly and severally, the defendants the sum of Ten
Thousand (P10,000.00) Pesos, Philippine Currency, as attorney's fees;
(H) Costs against the plaintiffs.
SO ORDERED.9
Petitioners appealed the above-mentioned decision to the respondent Court of Appeals assigning the
following errors allegedly committed by the lower court:
I. IN FAILING TO APPRECIATE THE PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE IN FAVOR OF
THE PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS THAT THE TWO DOCUMENTS (EXHS. 3 & 7 AND
THEIR SUB-MARKINGS) WERE FORGED AND ABSOLUTELY SIMULATED
DOCUMENTS. HENCE, NULL AND VOID;
II. IN HOLDING THAT THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE THAT THE SIGNATURE OF JUAN
LIMPIN AND THUMBMARK OF ALBERTA GUEVARRA APPEARING ON THE
EXCRITUA DE VENTA ABSOLUTA (EXHS. 7 & 7-A) WERE FORGED;
III. IN APPRECIATING IN FAVOR OF THE APPELLEES THE DOCUMENTS
PRESENTED BY WITNESS JESUS CRUZ WHEN THEIR SOURCES COULD NOT BE
ACCOUNTED FOR AND THEIR AUTHENTICITY IS IN QUESTION;
IV. IN HOLDING THAT INOCENCIO SONGCO, THE PREDECESSOR-IN-INTEREST OF
THE APPELLEES WAS AN INNOCENT PURCHASER FOR VALUE;
V. IN HOLDING THAT TRANSFER CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NO. 929 WAS ISSUED TO
INOCENCIO SONGCO BY THE REGISTERED TRY OF DEEDS OF PAMPANGA;
VI. IN HOLDING THAT ORIGINAL CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NO. RO-1038 (11725) WAS
ISSUED BY THE COURT (CFI-III PAMPANGA) IN EXCESS OF OR WITHOUT
JURISDICTION AND THEREFORE NULL AND VOID;
VII. IN FAILING TO APPRECIATE THAT THE VOLUNTARY ABANDONMENT OF THE
FISHPOND IN QUESTION BY THE APPELLEES WAS A RECOGNITION OF
APPELLANTS' TITLE TO IT;
154
VIII. IN AWARDING DAMAGES TO THE APPELLEES.10
The Court of Appeals rendered a decision in the appealed case, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED with the modification
that appellants are not liable for moral and exemplary damages as well as attorney's fees.
SO ORDERED.11
Petitioners flied a motion for reconsideration with the Court of Appeals but the same was denied in
its resolution dated 14 August 1987.12 Hence, this petition.
Petitioners assign the following alleged errors to the Court of Appeals:
I. IN APPLYING THE "ANCIENT DOCUMENT RULE" ON THE QUESTIONED
DOCUMENT ENTITLED "ESCRITURA DE PARTICION EXTRAJUDICIAL" AND
"ESCRITURA DE VENTA ABSOLUTA; AND MARKED DURING THE TRIAL AS
EXHIBITS "3" AND "7", RESPECTIVELY, FOR THE RESPONDENT HEREIN;
II. IN DISREGARDING THE MANDATORY REQUIREMENT OF THE NOTARIAL LAW
WHICH TOOK EFFECT AS EARLY AS FEBRUARY 1, 1903;
III. IN DISREGARDING THE RULE ON PROOF OF PUBLIC OR OFFICIAL RECORD,
(SEC. 25, RULE 132, RULES OF COURT)13
Petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals wrongfully applied the "ancient document rule"
provided in Sec. 22, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court. 14 The rule states that:
Sec. 22. Evidence of execution not necessary.— Were a private writing is more than thirty
years old, is produced from a custody in which it would naturally be found if genuine, and
is unblemished by any alterations or circumstances of suspicion, no other evidence of its
execution and authenticity need be given.
It is submitted by petitioners that under this rule, for a document to be classified as an "ancient
document", it must not only be at least thirty (30) years old but it must also be found in the proper
custody and is unblemished by alterations and is otherwise free from suspicion. 15 Thus, according to
petitioners, exhibits "3" and "7", entitled "Traduccion Al Castellano de la Escritura de Particion
Extrajudicial" and "Escritura de Venta Absoluta", respectively, can not qualify under the foregoing
rule, for the reason that since the "first pages" of said documents do not bear the signatures of the
alleged parties thereto, this constitutes an indelible blemish that can beget unlimited alterations. 16
We are not persuaded by the contention. Under the "ancient document rule," for a private ancient
document to be exempt from proof of due execution and authenticity, it is not enough that it be more
than thirty (30) years old; it is also necessary that the following requirements are fulfilled; (1) that it
is produced from a custody in which it would naturally be found if genuine; and (2) that it is
unblemished by any alteration or circumstances of suspicion. 17
The first document, Exhibit "3", entitled 'Traduccion Al Castellano de la Escritura de Particion
Extrajudicial" was executed on 7 April 1923 whereas the second document, exhibit "7", entitled
"Escritura de Venta Absoluta" was executed on 20 January 1924. These documents are, therefore,
more than thirty (30) years old. Both copies of the aforementioned documents were certified as exact
copies of the original on file with the Office of the Register of Deeds of Pampanga, by the Deputy
Register of Deeds. There is a further certification with regard to the Pampango translation of the
document of extrajudicial partition which was issued by the Archives division, Bureau of Records
Management of the Department of General Services.18
Documents which affect real property, in order that they may bind third parties, must be recorded
with the appropriate Register of Deeds. The documents in question, being certified as copies of
originals on file with the Register of Deeds of Pampanga, can be said to be found in the proper
custody. Clearly, therefore, the first two (2) requirements of the "ancient document rule" were met.
As to the last requirement that the document must on its face appear to be genuine, petitioners did
not present any conclusive evidence to support their allegation of falsification of the said documents.
They merely alluded to the fact that the lack of signatures on the first two (2) pages could have easily
led to their substitution. We cannot uphold this surmise absent any proof whatsoever. As held in one
case, a contract apparently honest and lawful on its face must be treated as such and one who assails
the genuineness of such contract must present conclusive evidence of falsification. 19

Moreover, the last requirement of the "ancient document rule" that a document must be
unblemished by any alteration or circumstances of suspicion refers to the extrinsic quality of the
document itself. The lack of signatures on the first pages, therefore, absent any alterations or
circumstances of suspicion cannot be held to detract from the fact that the documents in question,
which were certified as copied of the originals on file with the Register of Deeds of Pampanga, are
genuine and free from any blemish or circumstances of suspicion.

The documents in question are "ancient documents" as envisioned in Sec. 22 of Rule 132 of the Rules
of Court.1âwphi1Further proof of their due execution and authenticity is no longer required. Having
held that the documents in question are private writings which are more than thirty (30) years old,
come from the proper repository thereof, and are unblemished by any alteration or circumstances of
suspicion, there is no further need for these documents to fulfill the requirements of the 1903
Notarial Law. Hence, the other contentions of the petitioners that the documents do not fulfill the
mandatory requirements of the Notarial Law20 and that the proper person or public official was not
presented to testify on his certification of the documents in question, 21 need not be resolved as they
would no longer serve any purpose.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The appealed decision of the Court of Appeals is
AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

155
156
G.R. No. 88383 February 19, 1992
HARRIS SY CHUA, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and STATE FINANCING CENTER, INC., respondents.
Pepino Law Offices for petitioner.
Escober Alon & Associates for private respondents.
MEDIALDEA, J.:
This a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the respondent appellate court in CA G.R.
No. CV-08546, entitled "State Financing Center, Inc. v. AsiaPhil Timber Corporation, et al.,"
promulgated on February 22, 1989 reversing the judgment of the trial court which dismissed the
complaint for sum of money against petitioner.
The antecedent facts of this case are as follows:
On September 1, 1983, respondent State Financing Center, Inc. (State Inc. for brevity) filed a
complaint for sum of money with the Regional Trial Court of Manila against AsiaPhil Timber
Corporation, Johnny Sy Ping Sing, Delfin S. Lee, Philip Escolin, Lee Chi Uan and petitioner Harris Sy
Chua based upon documents attached to the complaint. These documents are the following:
1) Term Loan Agreement, 2) Promissory note, 3) Comprehensive Surety Agreement dated January 25
and June 19, 1979, 4) Demand letters, and 5) Statement of outstanding past due account as of August
15, 1983.
On November 24, 1983, the trial court issued an order upon motion of the respondent State Inc. as
plaintiff in the case, declaring in default all the defendants including petitioner Harris Sy Chua.
On December 12, 1983, petitioner Chua filed a motion for extension of time within which to file his
responsive pleading to the complaint, which the trial court granted.
On December 21, 1983, petitioner filed his answer to the complaint with a counterclaim against
private respondent and cross-claim against his co-defendant AsiaPhil Timber Corporation.
On December 23, 1983, respondent State Inc. filed a reply to petitioner Chua's answer and an answer
to the latter's counterclaim.
On February 2, 1984, after respondent State Inc. had presented its evidence ex parte against all the
defendants including petitioner, the trial court issued an order declaring that with the admission of
the evidence adduced by respondent, the case against all the defendants is considered submitted for
decision.
On February 23, 1984, petitioner Chua filed an omnibus motion praying that the order declaring him
in default as well as the ex parte proceeding insofar as he is concerned be set aside on the ground
that the he filed his answer within the extended period of time granted by the court.
On March 23, 1984, the trial court, upon petitioner's motion issued an order reconsidering and
setting aside both its order of November 24, 1983 which declared him in default and the ex
parte proceeding against him.
On May 4, 1984, the trial court set the case for pre-trial on June 1, 1984. The pre-trial order issued by
the court on the said date reads as follows:
Upon agreement, and as there is no other matters that could be agreed upon
aside from those admitted in the pleadings and the personal circumstances, the
above-entitled case is hereby removed from the pre-trial calendar and set for
trial on the merits on July 20, 1984 at 9:00 o'clock A.M. (p. 77 Records).
On July 20, 1984, upon motion of respondent State Inc., with the petitioner's conformity, the hearing
was reset to another date.
157
On September 13, 1984, the hearing was again postponed because the witness for the plaintiff was
not available.
On November 27, 1984, respondent State Inc. filed a formal offer of exhibits in writing, attaching
thereto the documents enumerated therein. Petitioner filed a written opposition thereto alleging that
the documents offered in evidence have not been properly presented and identified by any witness
during any proceeding before the trial court and considering that the ex parte presentation of
evidence against him had already been set aside, there is no more document or testimony that could
be taken into account against him.
On March 6, 1985, for failure of petitioner Chua to appear for the presentation of his evidence, the
trial court issued an order considering petitioner as having waived his right to present evidence.
Thus, the case was deemed submitted for decision based on the evidence on record.
On June 3, 1985, the trial court rendered judgment holding four of the defendants liable to pay
respondent State Inc. but dismissing the complaint against petitioner Chua. The dispositive portion
of the trial court's decision states:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff
and against the defendants Asiaphil Timber Corporation, Johnny Sy Ping Sing,
Delfin S. Lee and Lee Chi Uan, as follows:
1. Ordering said defendants, jointly and severally, to pay plaintiff the principal
amount of P722,000.00 plus 21% interest thereon per annum and 1% penalty
per month from August 16, 1983 until fully paid;
2. Ordering said defendants, jointly and severally, to pay plaintiff, the accrued
interest and charges from June 1, 1981 to August 15, 1983 in the total amount of
P512,559.84;
3. Ordering said defendants, jointly and severally, to pay plaintiff the amount of
P4,689.72 as litigation expenses and other costs of the suit; and
4. Ordering said defendants, jointly and severally to pay plaintiff attorney's fees
in the amount of P30,000.00, which the court believes is the reasonable
amount.
All other claims and/or counterclaim is hereby dismissed for lack of merit,
including the complaint against defendants Harris Sy Chua and Philip Escolin,
against whom no evidence has been presented.
SO ORDERED. (p. 22, Rollo)
Not satisfied with the portion of the decision absolving petitioner Chua from any liability to
respondent State Inc., the latter appealed to the Court of Appeals.
On February 22, 1989, respondent appellate court rendered a decision which reversed the ruling of
the trial court, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the judgment dismissing the complaint of the plaintiff-appellant
State Financing Center, Inc. against the defendant-appellee Harris Sy Chua and
the order denying its motion for reconsideration, both appealed from, are hereby
REVERSED. Accordingly, the said defendant-appellee is hereby adjudged liable
and ordered to pay unto the plaintiff-appellant, jointly and severally with his co-
defendants Asiaphil Timber Corporation, Johnny Sy Ping Sing, Delfin S. Lee and
Lee Chi Uan, the amounts provided for in the judgment of the Regional Trial
Court of Manila Branch III, in Civil Case No. 83-19953, quoted earlier in this
decision. Costs against defendant-appellee.
SO ORDERED. (p. 32, Rollo)
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner Chua contends that the respondent appellate court erred in rendering a decision which is
not based on the issues raised in the appeal brief of respondent State Inc. He also argues that the
documentary evidence which were formally offered by private respondent in a written offer of
exhibits but which were not properly identified by any witness during the trial cannot be considered
as evidence against petitioner in order to hold the latter liable to private respondent.
We find the petitioner's contentions devoid of merit.
From the decision of the trial court dismissing the complaint against petitioner Chua, respondent
State Inc. appealed to the Court of Appeals alleging in its brief that the lower court erred in
dismissing the complaint as against petitioner Harris Sy Chua for the reason that no evidence has
been presented against him. Although the respondent's assigned error of the trial court in its
appellant's brief was couched in broad and general terms, the meaning which respondent intends to
convey by its assignment of error is quite clear, that is, the trial court should have found petitioner
Chua liable to respondent because there was evidence which was presented to prove said liability.
It is an established rule that pleadings should be construed liberally in order that the litigants may
have ample opportunity to prove their respective claims and that a possible denial of substantial
justice due to legal technicalities may be avoided (Philippine Veterans Bank v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
81957, May 23, 1989, 173 SCRA 544). Moreover, issues though not specifically raised in the pleadings
in the appellate court, may, in the interest of justice be properly considered by said court in deciding
a case, if they are questions raised in the trial court and are matters of record having some bearing on
the issue submitted which the parties failed to raise or the lower court ignored (Tambunting v. Court
of Appeals, No. L-48278, November 8, 1988, 167 SCRA 16). It is clear from the decision of the
respondent appellate court that the latter made a discussion on the respondent's assigned error
which was allegedly committed by the trial court. The appellate court made the following
explanation:
The appellee's unexplained denial of the term loan agreement . . . and
promissory notes . . . for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a
belief when as a party to them it is within his capacity to know their due
execution and authenticity or not is evasive and is insufficient to constitute an
effective denial. Hence, it is to be deemed as an admission. With that and the
appellee's admission of the existence and due execution of the comprehensive
surety agreements . . ., there is no need for the appellant to adduce evidence to
establish the due execution and authenticity of the term loan agreement,
promissory note and comprehensive surety agreement . . . sued upon. . . . (p.
31, Rollo)
Anent petitioner's second contention that respondent State Inc.'s written offer of documentary
evidence should not have been considered by the respondent appellate court in finding the former
liable, We find that the same must likewise fail.
Our rule on evidence provides the procedure on how to present documentary evidence before the
court, as follows: firstly, the document should be authenticated and proved in the manner provided
in the rules of court; secondly, the document should be identified and marked for identification; and
thirdly, it should be formally offered in evidence to the court and shown to the opposing party so that
the latter may have an opportunity to object thereon.
The authentication and proof of documents are provided in Sections 20 to 24 of Rule 132 of the Rules
of Court. Only private documents require proof of their due execution and authenticity before they
can be received in evidence. This may require the presentation and examination of witnesses to
testify on this fact. When there is no proof as to the authenticity of the writer's signature appearing in
a private document, such private document may be excluded (General Enterprises, Inc. v. Lianga Bay
Logging Co., Inc., No. L-18487, August 31, 1964, 11 SCRA 733). On the other hand, public or notarial
documents, or those instruments duly acknowledged or proved and certified as provided by law, may
be presented in evidence without further proof, the certificate of acknowledgment being prima
facie evidence of the execution of the instrument or document involved. There is also no need for
proof of execution and authenticity with respect to documents the genuineness and due execution of
which are admitted by the adverse party. These admissions may be found in the pleadings of the
parties or in the case of an actionable document which may arise from the failure of the adverse party
to specifically deny under oath the genuineness and due execution of the document in his pleading.
After the authentication and proof of the due execution of the document, whenever proper, the
marking for identification and the formal offer of such documents as evidence to the court follow.
158
With respect to offer of evidence, Section 35 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, as amended, which is
the applicable rule then, provides:
Offer of evidence — The court shall consider no evidence which has not been
formally offered. The purpose for which the evidence is offered must be
specified.
When a party offers a particular documentary instrument as evidence during trial, he must specify
the purpose for which the document or instrument is offered. He must also describe and identify the
document, and offer the same as an exhibit so that the other party may have an opportunity of
objecting to it (Ahag v. Cabiling, 18 Phil 415). The offer of evidence is necessary because it is the duty
of the judge to rest his findings of facts and his judgment only and strictly upon the evidence offered
by the parties at the trial. Such offer may be made orally or in writing sufficient to show that the
party is ready and willing to submit the evidence to the court. (Llaban y Catalan et al. v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 63226, Dec. 20, 1991; U.S. v. Solana, 33 Phil. 582; Dayrit v. Gonzales, 7 Phil. 182)
Applying the aforestated legal principles to the circumstances in the case at bar, We find that the
presentation or written offer of documentary exhibits by the respondent to the court was properly
made and could be considered as basis by the court for holding petitioner liable under the contracts,
set forth in the documents presented, for the following reasons:
When respondent State Inc. filed a complaint for sum of money against petitioner Harris Chua and
several others, the former attached thereto, five annexes, four of which consist of 1) Term Loan
Agreement executed between respondent State Inc. as one of the creditors and defendant Asia Phil
Timber Corporation as the borrower 2) Promissory Note executed by AsiaPhil Timber Corporation in
favor of respondent State Inc. 3) Comprehensive Surety Agreement executed by petitioner Harris
Chua and other defendants in favor of State Inc., "to guarantee in joint and several capacity the
punctual payment" of the indebtedness of AsiaPhil Timber Corp. and 4) Demand letters to petitioner
Chua by respondent State Inc. (pp. 8-40 Records). In his answer to the complaint, petitioner Chua
admitted the allegations in the complaint with respect to the existence and due execution of the Term
Loan Agreement and Comprehensive Surety Agreement to which he is one of the signatories, while
pleading certain affirmative defenses (pp. 57-60 Records). Because of this judicial admission, the due
execution of the Term Loan Agreement and Comprehensive Surety Agreement are already admitted
by the petitioner and there is no more need for the respondent State Inc. to present witnesses to
testify on the genuineness of the documents. Further, records show that the aforementioned
documents are all notarial instruments, the due execution of which is already presumed and need not
be proven. Records show that respondent State Inc. did not present any proof or witness to testify on
the execution of the said document but it did, however, submit a written formal offer of exhibits
before the court, wherein respondent State Inc. identified and marked each of the aforementioned
documents as its exhibits. These exhibits were similar to the documents attached to the complaint.
The respondent State Inc. also specified in its written offer the purpose for which each of the
documentary exhibits was offered in evidence (pp. 91-93, Records). Despite the fact that a copy of the
written offer of exhibits was furnished to petitioner Chua, thus giving the latter the opportunity to
object thereon and to present rebutting evidence, the latter failed to do so on the date set for the
presentation of evidence for his defense. Because of this, the trial court considered him as having
waived this right and deemed the case submitted for decision.
In view of the foregoing, We find no compelling reasons to reverse the conclusion of the respondent
appellate court finding the petitioner jointly and severally liable with his co-defendants in the trial
court, on the basis of documentary evidence presented and offered before the court.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed decision of respondent Court of
Appeals dated February 22, 1989 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 138322. October 2, 2001]
GRACE J. GARCIA, a.k.a. GRACE J. GARCIA-RECIO, petitioner, vs. REDERICK A.
RECIO, respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
A divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in our jurisdiction, provided such
decree is valid according to the national law of the foreigner. However, the divorce decree and the
governing personal law of the alien spouse who obtained the divorce must be proven. Our courts do
not take judicial notice of foreign laws and judgments; hence, like any other facts, both the divorce
decree and the national law of the alien must be alleged and proven according to our law on evidence.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to nullify the
January 7, 1999 Decision[1] and the March 24, 1999 Order[2] of the Regional Trial Court of
Cabanatuan City, Branch 28, in Civil Case No. 3026AF. The assailed Decision disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, this Court declares the marriage between Grace J. Garcia and Rederick A. Recio
solemnized on January 12, 1994 at Cabanatuan City as dissolved and both parties can now remarry
under existing and applicable laws to any and/or both parties. [3]
The assailed Order denied reconsideration of the above-quoted Decision.
The Facts
Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian citizen, in
Malabon, Rizal, on March 1, 1987.[4] They lived together as husband and wife in Australia. On May 18,
1989, a decree of divorce, purportedly dissolving the marriage, was issued by an Australian family
[5]
court.
On June 26, 1992, respondent became an Australian citizen, as shown by a Certificate of
Australian Citizenship issued by the Australian government. [6] Petitioner -- a Filipina -- and
respondent were married on January 12, 1994 in Our Lady of Perpetual Help Church in Cabanatuan
City.[7] In their application for a marriage license, respondent was declared as single and Filipino. [8]
Starting October 22, 1995, petitioner and respondent lived separately without prior judicial
dissolution of their marriage. While the two were still in Australia, their conjugal assets were divided
on May 16, 1996, in accordance with their Statutory Declarations secured in Australia. [9]
On March 3, 1998, petitioner filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage [10] in the
court a quo, on the ground of bigamy -- respondent allegedly had a prior subsisting marriage at the
time he married her on January 12, 1994. She claimed that she learned of respondents marriage to
Editha Samson only in November, 1997.
In his Answer, respondent averred that, as far back as 1993, he had revealed to petitioner his
prior marriage and its subsequent dissolution. [11] He contended that his first marriage to an
Australian citizen had been validly dissolved by a divorce decree obtained in Australia in 1989;
[12]
thus, he was legally capacitated to marry petitioner in 1994.
On July 7, 1998 -- or about five years after the couples wedding and while the suit for the
declaration of nullity was pending -- respondent was able to secure a divorce decree from a family
court in Sydney, Australia because the marriage ha[d] irretrievably broken down. [13]
Respondent prayed in his Answer that the Complaint be dismissed on the ground that it stated
no cause of action.[14] The Office of the Solicitor General agreed with respondent. [15] The court marked
and admitted the documentary evidence of both parties. [16] After they submitted their respective
memoranda, the case was submitted for resolution.[17]
Thereafter, the trial court rendered the assailed Decision and Order.
159
Ruling of the Trial Court
The trial court declared the marriage dissolved on the ground that the divorce issued in
Australia was valid and recognized in the Philippines. It deemed the marriage ended, but not on the
basis of any defect in an essential element of the marriage; that is, respondents alleged lack of legal
capacity to remarry. Rather, it based its Decision on the divorce decree obtained by respondent. The
Australian divorce had ended the marriage; thus, there was no more marital union to nullify or
annul.
Hence, this Petition.[18]
Issues
Petitioner submits the following issues for our consideration:
1
The trial court gravely erred in finding that the divorce decree obtained in Australia by the
respondent ipso facto terminated his first marriage to Editha Samson thereby capacitating him to
contract a second marriage with the petitioner.
2
The failure of the respondent, who is now a naturalized Australian, to present a certificate of legal
capacity to marry constitutes absence of a substantial requisite voiding the petitioners marriage to
the respondent
3
The trial court seriously erred in the application of Art. 26 of the Family Code in this case.
4
The trial court patently and grievously erred in disregarding Arts. 11, 13, 21, 35, 40, 52 and 53 of the
Family Code as the applicable provisions in this case.
5
The trial court gravely erred in pronouncing that the divorce decree obtained by the respondent in
Australia ipso facto capacitated the parties to remarry, without first securing a recognition of the
judgment granting the divorce decree before our courts. [19]
The Petition raises five issues, but for purposes of this Decision, we shall concentrate on two
pivotal ones: (1) whether the divorce between respondent and Editha Samson was proven, and (2)
whether respondent was proven to be legally capacitated to marry petitioner. Because of our ruling
on these two, there is no more necessity to take up the rest.
The Courts Ruling
The Petition is partly meritorious.
First Issue:
Proving the Divorce Between Respondent and Editha Samson
Petitioner assails the trial courts recognition of the divorce between respondent and Editha
Samson. Citing Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee, [20] petitioner argues that the divorce decree, like any
other foreign judgment, may be given recognition in this jurisdiction only upon proof of the existence
of (1) the foreign law allowing absolute divorce and (2) the alleged divorce decree itself. She adds that
respondent miserably failed to establish these elements.
Petitioner adds that, based on the first paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, marriages
solemnized abroad are governed by the law of the place where they were celebrated (the lex loci
celebrationis). In effect, the Code requires the presentation of the foreign law to show the conformity
of the marriage in question to the legal requirements of the place where the marriage was performed.
 At the outset, we lay the following basic legal principles as the take-off points for our
discussion. Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce; hence, our courts cannot grant it.
[21]
A marriage between two Filipinos cannot be dissolved even by a divorce obtained abroad, because
of Articles 15[22] and 17[23] of the Civil Code.[24] In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner,
Article 26[25] of the Family Code allows the former to contract a subsequent marriage in case the
divorce is validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry. [26] A
divorce obtained abroad by a couple, who are both aliens, may be recognized in the Philippines,
provided it is consistent with their respective national laws. [27]
A comparison between marriage and divorce, as far as pleading and proof are concerned, can
be made. Van Dorn v. Romillo Jr. decrees that aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be
recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. [28] Therefore,
before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our courts, the party pleading it must prove the
divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it. [29] Presentation solely
of the divorce decree is insufficient.
Divorce as a Question of Fact
Petitioner insists that before a divorce decree can be admitted in evidence, it must first comply
with the registration requirements under Articles 11, 13 and 52 of the Family Code. These articles
read as follows:
ART. 11. Where a marriage license is required, each of the contracting parties shall file separately a
sworn application for such license with the proper local civil registrar which shall specify the
following:
xxxxxxxxx
(5) If previously married, how, when and where the previous marriage was dissolved or annulled;
xxxxxxxxx
ART. 13. In case either of the contracting parties has been previously married, the applicant shall be
required to
ART. 13. In case either of the contracting parties has been previously married, the applicant shall be
required to furnish, instead of the birth or baptismal certificate required in the last preceding article,
the death certificate of the deceased spouse or the judicial decree of the absolute divorce, or the
judicial decree of annulment or declaration of nullity of his or her previous marriage. x x x.
ART. 52. The judgment of annulment or of absolute nullity of the marriage, the partition and
distribution of the properties of the spouses, and the delivery of the childrens presumptive legitimes
shall be recorded in the appropriate civil registry and registries of property; otherwise, the same shall
not affect their persons.
Respondent, on the other hand, argues that the Australian divorce decree is a public document
-- a written official act of an Australian family court. Therefore, it requires no further proof of its
authenticity and due execution.
Respondent is getting ahead of himself. Before a foreign judgment is given presumptive
evidentiary value, the document must first be presented and admitted in evidence. [30] A divorce
obtained abroad is proven by the divorce decree itself. Indeed the best evidence of a judgment is the
judgment itself.[31] The decree purports to be a written act or record of an act of an official body or
tribunal of a foreign country.[32]
Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing or document may be
proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a
copy thereof attested[33] by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept
in the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper
diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in
which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office. [34]
160
The divorce decree between respondent and Editha Samson appears to be an authentic one
issued by an Australian family court. [35] However, appearance is not sufficient; compliance with the
aforementioned rules on evidence must be demonstrated.
Fortunately for respondents cause, when the divorce decree of May 18, 1989 was submitted in
evidence, counsel for petitioner objected, not to its admissibility, but only to the fact that it had not
been registered in the Local Civil Registry of Cabanatuan City. [36] The trial court ruled that it was
admissible, subject to petitioners qualification.[37] Hence, it was admitted in evidence and accorded
weight by the judge. Indeed, petitioners failure to object properly rendered the divorce decree
admissible as a written act of the Family Court of Sydney, Australia. [38]
Compliance with the quoted articles (11, 13 and 52) of the Family Code is not necessary;
respondent was no longer bound by Philippine personal laws after he acquired Australian citizenship
in 1992.[39]Naturalization is the legal act of adopting an alien and clothing him with the political and
civil rights belonging to a citizen. [40] Naturalized citizens, freed from the protective cloak of their
former states, don the attires of their adoptive countries. By becoming an Australian, respondent
severed his allegiance to the Philippines and the vinculum juris that had tied him to Philippine
personal laws.
Burden of Proving Australian Law
Respondent contends that the burden to prove Australian divorce law falls upon petitioner,
because she is the party challenging the validity of a foreign judgment. He contends that petitioner
was satisfied with the original of the divorce decree and was cognizant of the marital laws of
Australia, because she had lived and worked in that country for quite a long time. Besides, the
Australian divorce law is allegedly known by Philippine courts; thus, judges may take judicial notice
of foreign laws in the exercise of sound discretion.
We are not persuaded. The burden of proof lies with the party who alleges the existence of a
fact or thing necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action. [41] In civil cases, plaintiffs have the
burden of proving the material allegations of the complaint when those are denied by the answer;
and defendants have the burden of proving the material allegations in their answer when they
introduce new matters.[42] Since the divorce was a defense raised by respondent, the burden of
proving the pertinent Australian law validating it falls squarely upon him.
It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws.
Like any other facts, they must be alleged and proved. Australian marital laws are not among
[43]
those matters that judges are supposed to know by reason of their judicial function. [44] The power of
judicial notice must be exercised with caution, and every reasonable doubt upon the subject should
be resolved in the negative.
Second Issue: Respondents Legal Capacity to Remarry
Petitioner contends that, in view of the insufficient proof of the divorce, respondent was legally
incapacitated to marry her in 1994. Hence, she concludes that their marriage was void ab initio.
Respondent replies that the Australian divorce decree, which was validly admitted in evidence,
adequately established his legal capacity to marry under Australian law.
Respondents contention is untenable. In its strict legal sense, divorce means the legal
dissolution of a lawful union for a cause arising after marriage. But divorces are of different
types. The two basic ones are (1) absolute divorce or a vinculo matrimonii and (2) limited divorce
or a mensa et thoro. The first kind terminates the marriage, while the second suspends it and leaves
the bond in full force.[45] There is no showing in the case at bar which type of divorce was procured by
respondent.
Respondent presented a decree nisi or an interlocutory decree -- a conditional or provisional
judgment of divorce. It is in effect the same as a separation from bed and board, although an absolute
divorce may follow after the lapse of the prescribed period during which no reconciliation is effected.
[46]
Even after the divorce becomes absolute, the court may under some foreign statutes and
practices, still restrict remarriage. Under some other jurisdictions, remarriage may be limited by
statute; thus, the guilty party in a divorce which was granted on the ground of adultery may be
prohibited from marrying again. The court may allow a remarriage only after proof of good behavior. legal capacity to marry petitioner; and failing in that, of declaring the parties marriage void on the
[47]
ground of bigamy, as above discussed. No costs.

On its face, the herein Australian divorce decree contains a restriction that reads: SO ORDERED.

1. A party to a marriage who marries again before this decree becomes absolute (unless Melo, (Chairman), Vitug, and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., concur.
the other party has died) commits the offence of bigamy. [48]

This quotation bolsters our contention that the divorce obtained by respondent may have been
restricted. It did not absolutely establish his legal capacity to remarry according to his national
law. Hence, we find no basis for the ruling of the trial court, which erroneously assumed that the
Australian divorce ipso facto restored respondents capacity to remarry despite the paucity of
evidence on this matter.

We also reject the claim of respondent that the divorce decree raises a disputable presumption
or presumptive evidence as to his civil status based on Section 48, Rule 39 [49] of the Rules of Court,
for the simple reason that no proof has been presented on the legal effects of the divorce decree
obtained under Australian laws.

Significance of the Certificate of Legal Capacity

Petitioner argues that the certificate of legal capacity required by Article 21 of the Family Code
was not submitted together with the application for a marriage license. According to her, its absence
is proof that respondent did not have legal capacity to remarry.

We clarify. To repeat, the legal capacity to contract marriage is determined by the national law
of the party concerned. The certificate mentioned in Article 21 of the Family Code would have been
sufficient to establish the legal capacity of respondent, had he duly presented it in court. A duly
authenticated and admitted certificate is prima facie evidence of legal capacity to marry on the part
of the alien applicant for a marriage license.[50]

As it is, however, there is absolutely no evidence that proves respondents legal capacity to
marry petitioner. A review of the records before this Court shows that only the following exhibits
were presented before the lower court: (1) for petitioner: (a) Exhibit A Complaint; [51] (b) Exhibit B
Certificate of Marriage Between Rederick A. Recio (Filipino-Australian) and Grace J. Garcia
(Filipino) on January 12, 1994 in Cabanatuan City, Nueva Ecija; [52] (c) Exhibit C Certificate of
Marriage Between Rederick A. Recio (Filipino) and Editha D. Samson (Australian) on March 1, 1987
in Malabon, Metro Manila;[53] (d) Exhibit D Office of the City Registrar of Cabanatuan City
Certification that no information of annulment between Rederick A. Recio and Editha D. Samson
was in its records;[54] and (e) Exhibit E Certificate of Australian Citizenship of Rederick A. Recio;
[55]
(2) for respondent: (a) Exhibit 1 -- Amended Answer; [56] (b) Exhibit 2 Family Law Act 1975 Decree
Nisi of Dissolution of Marriage in the Family Court of Australia; [57] (c) Exhibit 3 Certificate of
Australian Citizenship of Rederick A. Recio; [58] (d) Exhibit 4 Decree Nisi of Dissolution of Marriage in
the Family Court of Australia Certificate; [59] and Exhibit 5 -- Statutory Declaration of the Legal
Separation Between Rederick A. Recio and Grace J. Garcia Recio since October 22, 1995. [60]

Based on the above records, we cannot conclude that respondent, who was then a naturalized
Australian citizen, was legally capacitated to marry petitioner on January 12, 1994. We agree with
petitioners contention that the court a quo erred in finding that the divorce decree ipso facto clothed
respondent with the legal capacity to remarry without requiring him to adduce sufficient evidence to
show the Australian personal law governing his status; or at the very least, to prove his legal capacity
to contract the second marriage.

Neither can we grant petitioners prayer to declare her marriage to respondent null and void on
the ground of bigamy. After all, it may turn out that under Australian law, he was really capacitated
to marry petitioner as a direct result of the divorce decree. Hence, we believe that the most judicious
course is to remand this case to the trial court to receive evidence, if any, which show petitioners
legal capacity to marry petitioner. Failing in that, then the court a quo may declare a nullity of the
parties marriage on the ground of bigamy, there being already in evidence two existing marriage
certificates, which were both obtained in the Philippines, one in Malabon, Metro Manila dated March
1, 1987 and the other, in Cabanatuan City dated January 12, 1994.

WHEREFORE, in the interest of orderly procedure and substantial justice, we REMAND the
case to the court a quo for the purpose of receiving evidence which conclusively show respondents
161
162
 [G.R. No. 119602. October 6, 2000]
WILDVALLEY SHIPPING CO., LTD. petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and
PHILIPPINE PRESIDENT LINES INC., respondents.
DECISION
BUENA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to set aside the decision of the Court of
Appeals which reversed the decision of the lower court in CA-G.R. CV No. 36821, entitled "Wildvalley
Shipping Co., Ltd., plaintiff-appellant, versus Philippine President Lines, Inc., defendant-appellant."
The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:
Sometime in February 1988, the Philippine Roxas, a vessel owned by Philippine President
Lines, Inc., private respondent herein, arrived in Puerto Ordaz, Venezuela, to load iron ore.Upon the
completion of the loading and when the vessel was ready to leave port, Mr. Ezzar del Valle Solarzano
Vasquez, an official pilot of Venezuela, was designated by the harbour authorities in Puerto Ordaz to
navigate the Philippine Roxas through the Orinoco River. [1] He was asked to pilot the said vessel on
February 11, 1988[2] boarding it that night at 11:00 p.m.[3]
The master (captain) of the Philippine Roxas, Captain Nicandro Colon, was at the bridge
together with the pilot (Vasquez), the vessel's third mate (then the officer on watch), and a helmsman
when the vessel left the port [4] at 1:40 a.m. on February 12, 1988. [5] Captain Colon left the bridge
when the vessel was under way.[6]
The Philippine Roxas experienced some vibrations when it entered the San Roque Channel at
mile 172.[7] The vessel proceeded on its way, with the pilot assuring the watch officer that the
vibration was a result of the shallowness of the channel. [8]
Between mile 158 and 157, the vessel again experienced some vibrations. [9] These occurred at
4:12 a.m.[10] It was then that the watch officer called the master to the bridge. [11]
The master (captain) checked the position of the vessel[12] and verified that it was in the centre
of the channel.[13] He then went to confirm, or set down, the position of the vessel on the chart. [14] He
ordered Simplicio A. Monis, Chief Officer of the President Roxas, to check all the double bottom
tanks.[15]
At around 4:35 a.m., the Philippine Roxas ran aground in the Orinoco River, [16] thus
obstructing the ingress and egress of vessels.
As a result of the blockage, the Malandrinon, a vessel owned by herein petitioner Wildvalley
Shipping Company, Ltd., was unable to sail out of Puerto Ordaz on that day.
Subsequently, Wildvalley Shipping Company, Ltd. filed a suit with the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch III against Philippine President Lines, Inc. and Pioneer Insurance Company (the
underwriter/insurer of Philippine Roxas) for damages in the form of unearned profits, and interest
thereon amounting to US $400,000.00 plus attorney's fees, costs, and expenses of litigation. The
complaint against Pioneer Insurance Company was dismissed in an Order dated November 7, 1988.
[17]
At the pre-trial conference, the parties agreed on the following facts:
"1. The jurisdictional facts, as specified in their respective pleadings;
"2. That defendant PPL was the owner of the vessel Philippine Roxas at the time of the incident;
"3. That defendant Pioneer Insurance was the insurance underwriter for defendant PPL;
"4. That plaintiff Wildvalley Shipping Co., Inc. is the owner of the vessel Malandrinon, whose passage
was obstructed by the vessel Philippine Roxas at Puerto Ordaz, Venezuela, as specified in par. 4, page
2 of the complaint;
163
"5. That on February 12, 1988, while the Philippine Roxas was navigating the channel at Puerto
Ordaz, the said vessel grounded and as a result, obstructed navigation at the channel;
"6. That the Orinoco River in Puerto Ordaz is a compulsory pilotage channel;
"7. That at the time of the incident, the vessel, Philippine Roxas, was under the command of the pilot
Ezzar Solarzano, assigned by the government thereat, but plaintiff claims that it is under the
command of the master;
"8. The plaintiff filed a case in Middleburg, Holland which is related to the present case;
"9. The plaintiff caused the arrest of the Philippine Collier, a vessel owned by the defendant PPL;
"10. The Orinoco River is 150 miles long and it takes approximately 12 hours to navigate out of the
said river;
"11. That no security for the plaintiff's claim was given until after the Philippine Collier was arrested;
and
"12. That a letter of guarantee, dated 12-May-88 was issued by the Steamship Mutual Underwriters
Ltd."[18]
The trial court rendered its decision on October 16, 1991 in favor of the petitioner, Wildvalley
Shipping Co., Ltd. The dispositive portion thereof reads as follows:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered for the plaintiff, ordering defendant Philippine President
Lines, Inc. to pay to the plaintiff the sum of U.S. $259,243.43, as actual and compensatory damages,
and U.S. $162,031.53, as expenses incurred abroad for its foreign lawyers, plus additional sum of
U.S. $22,000.00, as and for attorney's fees of plaintiff's local lawyer, and to pay the cost of this suit.
"Defendant's counterclaim is dismissed for lack of merit.
"SO ORDERED."[19]
Both parties appealed: the petitioner appealing the non-award of interest with the private
respondent questioning the decision on the merits of the case.
After the requisite pleadings had been filed, the Court of Appeals came out with its questioned
decision dated June 14, 1994,[20] the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
"WHEREFORE, finding defendant-appellant's appeal to be meritorious, judgment is hereby
rendered reversing the Decision of the lower court. Plaintiff-appellant's Complaint is dismissed and
it is ordered to pay defendant-appellant the amount of Three Hundred Twenty-three Thousand,
Forty-two Pesos and Fifty-three Centavos (P323,042.53) as and for attorney's fees plus cost of
suit. Plaintiff-appellant's appeal is DISMISSED.
"SO ORDERED."[21]
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration [22] but the same was denied for lack of merit in the
resolution dated March 29, 1995.[23]
Hence, this petition.
The petitioner assigns the following errors to the court a quo:
1. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN FINDING THAT
UNDER PHILIPPINE LAW NO FAULT OR NEGLIGENCE CAN BE ATTRIBUTED
TO THE MASTER NOR THE OWNER OF THE "PHILIPPINE ROXAS" FOR THE
GROUNDING OF SAID VESSEL RESULTING IN THE BLOCKAGE OF THE RIO
ORINOCO;
2. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN REVERSING THE
FINDINGS OF FACTS OF THE TRIAL COURT CONTRARY TO EVIDENCE;
 3. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE
"PHILIPPINE ROXAS" IS SEAWORTHY;
4. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN DISREGARDING
VENEZUELAN LAW DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE SAME HAS BEEN
SUBSTANTIALLY PROVED IN THE TRIAL COURT WITHOUT ANY OBJECTION
FROM PRIVATE RESPONDENT, AND WHOSE OBJECTION WAS INTERPOSED
BELATEDLY ON APPEAL;
5. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN AWARDING
ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS TO PRIVATE RESPONDENT WITHOUT ANY
FAIR OR REASONABLE BASIS WHATSOEVER;
6. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT
PETITIONER'S CAUSE IS MERITORIOUS HENCE, PETITIONER SHOULD BE
ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY'S FEES, COSTS AND INTEREST.
The petition is without merit.
The primary issue to be determined is whether or not Venezuelan law is applicable to the case
at bar.
It is well-settled that foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts
are not authorized to take judicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and
proved.[24]
A distinction is to be made as to the manner of proving a written and an unwritten law. The
former falls under Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, as amended, the entire provision of
which is quoted hereunder. Where the foreign law sought to be proved is "unwritten," the oral
testimony of expert witnesses is admissible, as are printed and published books of reports of
decisions of the courts of the country concerned if proved to be commonly admitted in such courts. [25]
Section 24 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, as amended, provides:
"Sec. 24. Proof of official record. -- The record of public documents referred to in paragraph (a) of
Section 19, when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or
by a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and
accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has
the custody. If the office in which the record is kept is in a foreign country, the certificate may be
made by a secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent
or by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the
record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office." (Underscoring supplied)
The court has interpreted Section 25 (now Section 24) to include competent evidence like the
testimony of a witness to prove the existence of a written foreign law. [26]
In the noted case of Willamette Iron & Steel Works vs. Muzzal,[27] it was held that:
" Mr. Arthur W. Bolton, an attorney-at-law of San Francisco, California, since the year 1918 under
oath, quoted verbatim section 322 of the California Civil Code and stated that said section was in
force at the time the obligations of defendant to the plaintiff were incurred, i.e. on November 5, 1928
and December 22, 1928. This evidence sufficiently established the fact that the section in question
was the law of the State of California on the above dates. A reading of sections 300 and 301 of our
Code of Civil Procedure will convince one that these sections do not exclude the presentation of other
competent evidence to prove the existence of a foreign law.
"`The foreign law is a matter of fact You ask the witness what the law is; he may, from his
recollection, or on producing and referring to books, say what it is.' (Lord Campbell concurring in an
opinion of Lord Chief Justice Denman in a well-known English case where a witness was called upon
to prove the Roman laws of marriage and was permitted to testify, though he referred to a book
containing the decrees of the Council of Trent as controlling, Jones on Evidence, Second Edition,
Volume 4, pages 3148-3152.) x x x.
164
We do not dispute the competency of Capt. Oscar Leon Monzon, the Assistant Harbor Master
and Chief of Pilots at Puerto Ordaz, Venezuela, [28] to testify on the existence of the Reglamento
General de la Ley de Pilotaje (pilotage law of Venezuela)[29] and the Reglamento Para la Zona de
Pilotaje No 1 del Orinoco (rules governing the navigation of the Orinoco River). Captain Monzon has
held the aforementioned posts for eight years. [30] As such he is in charge of designating the pilots for
maneuvering and navigating the Orinoco River. He is also in charge of the documents that come into
the office of the harbour masters.[31]
Nevertheless, we take note that these written laws were not proven in the manner provided by
Section 24 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.
The Reglamento General de la Ley de Pilotaje was published in the Gaceta Oficial[32]of the
Republic of Venezuela. A photocopy of the Gaceta Oficial was presented in evidence as an official
publication of the Republic of Venezuela.
The Reglamento Para la Zona de Pilotaje N o 1 del Orinoco is published in a book issued by
the Ministerio de Comunicaciones of Venezuela.[33] Only a photocopy of the said rules was likewise
presented as evidence.
Both of these documents are considered in Philippine jurisprudence to be public documents
for they are the written official acts, or records of the official acts of the sovereign authority, official
bodies and tribunals, and public officers of Venezuela. [34]
For a copy of a foreign public document to be admissible, the following requisites are
mandatory: (1) It must be attested by the officer having legal custody of the records or by his deputy;
and (2) It must be accompanied by a certificate by a secretary of the embassy or legation, consul
general, consul, vice consular or consular agent or foreign service officer, and with the seal of his
office.[35] The latter requirement is not a mere technicality but is intended to justify the giving of full
faith and credit to the genuineness of a document in a foreign country. [36]
It is not enough that the Gaceta Oficial, or a book published by the Ministerio de
Comunicaciones of Venezuela, was presented as evidence with Captain Monzon attesting it. It is also
required by Section 24 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court that a certificate that Captain Monzon, who
attested the documents, is the officer who had legal custody of those records made by a secretary of
the embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul or consular agent or by any officer in the
foreign service of the Philippines stationed in Venezuela, and authenticated by the seal of his office
accompanying the copy of the public document. No such certificate could be found in the records of
the case.
With respect to proof of written laws, parol proof is objectionable, for the written law itself is
the best evidence. According to the weight of authority, when a foreign statute is involved, the best
evidence rule requires that it be proved by a duly authenticated copy of the statute. [37]
At this juncture, we have to point out that the Venezuelan law was not pleaded before the lower
court.
A foreign law is considered to be pleaded if there is an allegation in the pleading about the
existence of the foreign law, its import and legal consequence on the event or transaction in issue. [38]
A review of the Complaint [39] revealed that it was never alleged or invoked despite the fact that
the grounding of the M/V Philippine Roxas occurred within the territorial jurisdiction of Venezuela.
We reiterate that under the rules of private international law, a foreign law must be properly
pleaded and proved as a fact. In the absence of pleading and proof, the laws of a foreign country, or
state, will be presumed to be the same as our own local or domestic law and this is known as
processual presumption.[40]
Having cleared this point, we now proceed to a thorough study of the errors assigned by the
petitioner.
Petitioner alleges that there was negligence on the part of the private respondent that would
warrant the award of damages.
 There being no contractual obligation, the private respondent is obliged to give only the
diligence required of a good father of a family in accordance with the provisions of Article 1173 of the
New Civil Code, thus:
Art. 1173. The fault or negligence of the obligor consists in the omission of that diligence which is
required by the nature of the obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of the persons, of
the time and of the place. When negligence shows bad faith, the provisions of articles 1171 and 2201,
paragraph 2, shall apply.
If the law or contract does not state the diligence which is to be observed in the performance, that
which is expected of a good father of a family shall be required.
The diligence of a good father of a family requires only that diligence which an ordinary
prudent man would exercise with regard to his own property. This we have found private respondent
to have exercised when the vessel sailed only after the "main engine, machineries, and other
auxiliaries" were checked and found to be in good running condition; [41] when the master left a
competent officer, the officer on watch on the bridge with a pilot who is experienced in navigating the
Orinoco River; when the master ordered the inspection of the vessel's double bottom tanks when the
vibrations occurred anew.[42]
The Philippine rules on pilotage, embodied in Philippine Ports Authority Administrative Order
No. 03-85, otherwise known as the Rules and Regulations Governing Pilotage Services, the Conduct
of Pilots and Pilotage Fees in Philippine Ports enunciate the duties and responsibilities of a master of
a vessel and its pilot, among other things.
The pertinent provisions of the said administrative order governing these persons are quoted
hereunder:
Sec. 11. Control of Vessels and Liability for Damage. -- On compulsory pilotage grounds, the Harbor
Pilot providing the service to a vessel shall be responsible for the damage caused to a vessel or to life
and property at ports due to his negligence or fault. He can be absolved from liability if the accident
is caused by force majeure or natural calamities provided he has exercised prudence and extra
diligence to prevent or minimize the damage.
The Master shall retain overall command of the vessel even on pilotage grounds whereby he can
countermand or overrule the order or command of the Harbor Pilot on board. In such event, any
damage caused to a vessel or to life and property at ports by reason of the fault or negligence of the
Master shall be the responsibility and liability of the registered owner of the vessel concerned
without prejudice to recourse against said Master.
Such liability of the owner or Master of the vessel or its pilots shall be determined by competent
authority in appropriate proceedings in the light of the facts and circumstances of each particular
case.
xxx
Sec. 32. Duties and Responsibilities of the Pilots or Pilots Association. -- The duties and
responsibilities of the Harbor Pilot shall be as follows:
xxx
f) A pilot shall be held responsible for the direction of a vessel from the time he assumes his work as a
pilot thereof until he leaves it anchored or berthed safely; Provided, however, that his responsibility
shall cease at the moment the Master neglects or refuses to carry out his order."
The Code of Commerce likewise provides for the obligations expected of a captain of a vessel,
to wit:
Art. 612. The following obligations shall be inherent in the office of captain:
xxx
"7. To be on deck on reaching land and to take command on entering and leaving ports, canals,
roadsteads, and rivers, unless there is a pilot on board discharging his duties. x x x.
165
The law is very explicit. The master remains the overall commander of the vessel even when
there is a pilot on board. He remains in control of the ship as he can still perform the duties
conferred upon him by law[43] despite the presence of a pilot who is temporarily in charge of the
vessel. It is not required of him to be on the bridge while the vessel is being navigated by a pilot.
However, Section 8 of PPA Administrative Order No. 03-85, provides:
Sec. 8. Compulsory Pilotage Service - For entering a harbor and anchoring thereat, or passing
through rivers or straits within a pilotage district, as well as docking and undocking at any
pier/wharf, or shifting from one berth or another, every vessel engaged in coastwise and foreign
trade shall be under compulsory pilotage.
xxx.
The Orinoco River being a compulsory pilotage channel necessitated the engaging of a pilot
who was presumed to be knowledgeable of every shoal, bank, deep and shallow ends of the river. In
his deposition, pilot Ezzar Solarzano Vasquez testified that he is an official pilot in the Harbour at
Port Ordaz, Venezuela,[44] and that he had been a pilot for twelve (12) years. [45] He also had
experience in navigating the waters of the Orinoco River. [46]
The law does provide that the master can countermand or overrule the order or command of
the harbor pilot on board. The master of the Philippine Roxas deemed it best not to order him (the
pilot) to stop the vessel, [47] mayhap, because the latter had assured him that they were navigating
normally before the grounding of the vessel.[48] Moreover, the pilot had admitted that on account of
his experience he was very familiar with the configuration of the river as well as the course headings,
and that he does not even refer to river charts when navigating the Orinoco River. [49]
Based on these declarations, it comes as no surprise to us that the master chose not to regain
control of the ship. Admitting his limited knowledge of the Orinoco River, Captain Colon relied on
the knowledge and experience of pilot Vasquez to guide the vessel safely.
Licensed pilots, enjoying the emoluments of compulsory pilotage, are in a different class from
ordinary employees, for they assume to have a skill and a knowledge of navigation in the particular
waters over which their licenses extend superior to that of the master; pilots are bound to use due
diligence and reasonable care and skill. A pilot's ordinary skill is in proportion to the pilot's
responsibilities, and implies a knowledge and observance of the usual rules of navigation,
acquaintance with the waters piloted in their ordinary condition, and nautical skill in avoiding all
known obstructions. The character of the skill and knowledge required of a pilot in charge of a vessel
on the rivers of a country is very different from that which enables a navigator to carry a vessel safely
in the ocean. On the ocean, a knowledge of the rules of navigation, with charts that disclose the
places of hidden rocks, dangerous shores, or other dangers of the way, are the main elements of a
pilot's knowledge and skill. But the pilot of a river vessel, like the harbor pilot, is selected for the
individual's personal knowledge of the topography through which the vessel is steered." [50]
We find that the grounding of the vessel is attributable to the pilot. When the vibrations were
first felt the watch officer asked him what was going on, and pilot Vasquez replied that "(they) were
in the middle of the channel and that the vibration was as (sic) a result of the shallowness of the
channel."[51]
Pilot Ezzar Solarzano Vasquez was assigned to pilot the vessel Philippine Roxas as well as other
vessels on the Orinoco River due to his knowledge of the same. In his experience as a pilot, he should
have been aware of the portions which are shallow and which are not. His failure to determine the
depth of the said river and his decision to plod on his set course, in all probability, caused damage to
the vessel. Thus, we hold him as negligent and liable for its grounding.
In the case of Homer Ramsdell Transportation Company vs. La Compagnie
Generale Transatlantique, 182 U.S. 406, it was held that:
x x x The master of a ship, and the owner also, is liable for any injury done by the negligence of the
crew employed in the ship. The same doctrine will apply to the case of a pilot employed by the master
or owner, by whose negligence any injury happens to a third person or his property: as, for example,
by a collision with another ship, occasioned by his negligence. And it will make no difference in the
case that the pilot, if any is employed, is required to be a licensed pilot; provided the master is at
liberty to take a pilot, or not, at his pleasure, for in such a case the master acts voluntarily, although
he is necessarily required to select from a particular class. On the other hand, if it is compulsive "WITNESS
upon the master to take a pilot, and, a fortiori, if he is bound to do so under penalty,
then, and in such case, neither he nor the owner will be liable for injuries occasioned "A Plus 100A1 means that the vessel was built according to Lloyd's rules and she is capable of
by the negligence of the pilot; for in such a case the pilot cannot be deemed properly the servant carrying ore bulk cargoes, but she is particularly capable of carrying Ore Cargoes with No.
of the master or the owner, but is forced upon them, and the maxim Qui facit per alium facit per 2 and No. 8 holds empty.
se does not apply." (Underscoring supplied)
xxx
Anent the river passage plan, we find that, while there was none, [52] the voyage has been
sufficiently planned and monitored as shown by the following actions undertaken by the pilot, Ezzar "COURT
Solarzano Vasquez, to wit: contacting the radio marina via VHF for information regarding the
channel, river traffic,[53] soundings of the river, depth of the river, bulletin on the buoys. [54] The officer The vessel is classed, meaning?
on watch also monitored the voyage.[55]
"A Meaning she is fit to travel, your Honor, or seaworthy."[58]
We, therefore, do not find the absence of a river passage plan to be the cause for the grounding
It is not required that the vessel must be perfect. To be seaworthy, a ship must be reasonably fit
of the vessel.
to perform the services, and to encounter the ordinary perils of the voyage, contemplated by the
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur does not apply to the case at bar because the circumstances parties to the policy.[59]
surrounding the injury do not clearly indicate negligence on the part of the private respondent. For
As further evidence that the vessel was seaworthy, we quote the deposition of pilot Vasquez:
the said doctrine to apply, the following conditions must be met: (1) the accident was of such
character as to warrant an inference that it would not have happened except for defendant's "Q Was there any instance when your orders or directions were not complied with because of the
negligence; (2) the accident must have been caused by an agency or instrumentality within the inability of the vessel to do so?
exclusive management or control of the person charged with the negligence complained of; and (3)
the accident must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the person "A No.
injured.[56]
"Q. Was the vessel able to respond to all your commands and orders?
As has already been held above, there was a temporary shift of control over the ship from the
master of the vessel to the pilot on a compulsory pilotage channel. Thus, two of the requisites "A. The vessel was navigating normally.[60]
necessary for the doctrine to apply, i.e., negligence and control, to render the respondent liable, are
absent. Eduardo P. Mata, Second Engineer of the Philippine Roxas submitted an accident report
wherein he stated that on February 11, 1988, he checked and prepared the main engine, machineries
As to the claim that the ship was unseaworthy, we hold that it is not. and all other auxiliaries and found them all to be in good running condition and ready for
maneuvering. That same day the main engine, bridge and engine telegraph and steering gear motor
The Lloyds Register of Shipping confirmed the vessels seaworthiness in a Confirmation of were also tested.[61] Engineer Mata also prepared the fuel for consumption for maneuvering and
Class issued on February 16, 1988 by finding that "the above named ship (Philippine Roxas) checked the engine generators.[62]
maintained the class "+100A1 Strengthened for Ore Cargoes, Nos. 2 and 8 Holds may be empty (CC)
and +LMC" from 31/12/87 up until the time of casualty on or about 12/2/88." [57] The same would not Finally, we find the award of attorneys fee justified.
have been issued had not the vessel been built according to the standards set by Lloyd's.
Article 2208 of the New Civil Code provides that:
Samuel Lim, a marine surveyor, at Lloyd's Register of Shipping testified thus:
"Art. 2208. In the absence of stipulation, attorney's fees and expenses of litigation, other than
"Q Now, in your opinion, as a surveyor, did top side tank have any bearing at all to the judicial costs, cannot be recovered, except:
seaworthiness of the vessel?
xxx
"A Well, judging on this particular vessel, and also basing on the class record of the vessel,
wherein recommendations were made on the top side tank, and it was given sufficient time "(11) In any other case where the court deems it just and equitable that attorney's fees and expenses
to be repaired, it means that the vessel is fit to travel even with those defects on the ship. of litigation should be recovered.

"COURT xxx

What do you mean by that? You explain. The vessel is fit to travel even with defects? Is that what Due to the unfounded filing of this case, the private respondent was unjustifiably forced to
you mean? Explain. litigate, thus the award of attorneys fees was proper.

"WITNESS WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED and the decision of
the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CV No. 36821 is AFFIRMED.
"A Yes, your Honor. Because the class society which register (sic) is the third party looking into
the condition of the vessel and as far as their record states, the vessel was class or SO ORDERED.
maintained, and she is fit to travel during that voyage."
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, Quisumbing, and De leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
xxx

"ATTY. MISA

Before we proceed to other matter, will you kindly tell us what is (sic) the 'class +100A1
Strengthened for Ore Cargoes', mean?

166
G.R. No. 76595 May 6, 1988
PACIFIC ASIA OVERSEAS SHIPPING CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and TEODORO RANCES, respondents.
Acaban, Corvera, Valdez & Del Castillo Law Office for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for public respondent.
Valentin A Zozobrado for private respondent.
FELICIANO, J.:
The petitioner, Pacific Asia Overseas Shipping Corporation (Pascor, in short), seeks the annulment
and setting aside of the Resolutions of the public respondent National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC) dated 14 August 1986 and 19 November 1986, denying Pascor's appeal for having been filed
out of time and denying its Motion for Reconsideration, respectively.
Sometime in March 1984, private respondent Teodoro Rances was engaged by petitioner Pascor as
Radio Operator of a vessel belonging to Pascor's foreign principal, the Gulf-East Ship Management
Limited. Four (4) months later, and after having been transferred from one vessel to another four
times for misbehaviour and inability to get along with officers and crew members of each of the
vessels, the foreign principal terminated the services of private respondent Rances citing the latter's
poor and incorrigible work attitude and incitement of others to insubordination. 1
Petitioner Pascor filed a complaint against private respondent with the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration tion (POEA) for acts unbecoming a marine officer and for, character
assassination," which case was docketed as POEA Case No: M-84-09-848. Private respondent denied
the charges set out in the complaint and by way of counterclaim demanded an amount of US$
1,500.00 which a court in Dubai had, he contended, awarded in his favor against petitioner's foreign
principal. In due course, on 4 September 1985, the POEA found private respondent liable for inciting
another officer or seaman to insubordination and challenging a superior officer to a fist fight and
imposed six (6) months suspension for each offense or a total of twelve (12) months suspension, with
a warning that commission of the same or similar offense in the future would be met with a stiffer
disciplinary sanction. The POEA decision passed over sub silentio the counterclaim of private
respondent. 2
On 10 October 1985, private respondent filed a complaint against petitioner, docketed as POEA Case
No: M-85-10-0814 and entitled "Teodoro Rances v. Pacific Asia Overseas Shipping Corporation." In
this complaint, he sought to carry out and enforce the same award obtained by him in Dubai
allegedly against Pascor's foreign principal which he had pleaded as a counterclaim in POEA Case
No: M-84-09-848. Private respondent claimed that be had filed an action in the Dubai court for US$
9,364.89, which claim was compromised by the parties for US$ 5,500.00 plus "a return ticket to
(private respondent's) country," with the proviso that "the opponent" would pay "to the claimant"
US$ 1,500.00 'in case the wife of the claimant Rantes doesn't agree with the amount sent to [her]
Private respondent further claimed that since his wife did not "agree with" the amount given to her
as 'an allotment for the 3-month period (of April, May and June 1984), he was entitled to recover the
additional US$ 1,500.00 "as mandated under the Compromise Agreement which was the basis of the
decision of the Dubai Civil Court. 3 As evidence of this foreign award, private respondent submitted
what purports to be an "original copy (sic) of the decision" of the Dubai court written in Arabic script
and language, With a copy of an English translation by an unidentified translator and a copy of a
transmittal letter dated 23 September 1984 signed by one Mohd Bin Saleh "Honorary Consul for
Philippines." The full texts of the purported English translation of the Dubai award and of the
transmittal letter are set out in the margin. 4
In its answer filed on 11 December 1985, petitioner Pascor made four principal arguments: that the
copy of the Dubai decision relied upon by private respondent could not be considered as evidence,
not having been properly authenticated; that Pascor was not a party to the Dubai court proceedings;
that the POEA had no jurisdiction over cases for the enforcement of foreign judgments; and that the
claim had already been resolved in POEA Case No: M-84-09-848, having been there dismissed as a
counterclaim.
167
In a decision dated 14 April 1986, the POEA held petitioner Pascor liable to pay private respondent
Rances the amount of US$ 1,500.00 "at the prevailing rate of exchange at the time of payment." This
decision was served on petitioner's counsel on 18 April 1986, which counsel filed a 'Memorandum on
Appeal and/or Motion for Reconsideration" on 29 April 1986.
Private respondent moved the next day for dismissal of the appeal and for issuance of a writ of
execution, upon the ground that petitioner's appeal had been filed one (1) day beyond the
reglementary period and that, consequently, the POEA decision had become final and executory.
Petitioner opposed dismissal of its appeal and issuance of a writ of execution, arguing that the one (1)
day delay in filing its Memorandum on Appeal had been occasioned by an excusable mistake.
On 20 May 1986, the POEA issued an order denying petitioner's appeal for having been filed out of
time. Petitioner moved for reconsideration, paid the docket fee and posted the required supercedes
bond in connection with its appeal.
On 29 May 1986, the POEA denied private respondent's Motion for a Writ of Execution and elevated
the case to the NLRC.
On 14 August 1986, public respondent NLRC denied petitioner's appeal as flied out of time.
Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration was similarly denied.
In the present Petition for certiorari and mandamus with prayer for Preliminary Injunction and
Temporary Restraint ' 9 Order, Pascor urges that public respondent NLRC acted with grave abuse of
discretion or in excess of its jurisdiction in denying its appeal and motion for reconsideration.
We think petitioner's contention has merit. The record shows, not an intent to delay the proceedings
but rather a genuine and substantial effort on the part of petitioner Pascor to file, in a timely manner,
its Memorandum on Appeal which, in the circumstances of this case, should not have been
disregarded by respondent NLRC. The circumstances surrounding the one (1) day delay in the filing
of petitioner's Memorandum on Appeal are summed up by petitioner in the following terms:
30.1. Mr. Ruben de la Cruz, who was newly hired as messenger in the law firm
representing the petitioner was tasked with the delivery of the memorandum on
appeal in the afternoon of April 28, 1986 (the last day for filing the same).
30.2. When Mr. de la Cruz read the caption of the memorandum, he noted that
the same is addressed to the respondent NLRC and he erroneously concluded
that it should be filed with the offices of the NLRC in Intramuros, Manila.
30.3. Wen Mr. de la Cruz presented petitioner's Appeal at the docket section of
respondent NLRC, he was advised that the same should be filed with the offices
of the POEA in Ortigas, San Juan, Metro Manila.
30.4. Mr. de la Cruz upon being apprised of his error immediately proceeded to
the offices of the POEA in order to have petitioner's (PASCOR's) appeal received
but unfortunately, by the time he arrived thereat, the POEA office had already
closed for the day. Thus, the appeal was filed the following day.
To Support the above explanation, in addition to an affidavit executed by Mr. Ruben de la Cruz,
petitioner submitted a certification dated 2 May 1986 executed by Evelyn G. Sauza, receive . receiving
clerk of respondent NLRC stating that she had read to receive the Memorandum on Appeal on or
about 4:15 P.M., 28 April 1986, because the Memorandum was supposed to be filed with the POEA
office in Ortigas and not with the NLRC in Intramuros.
The brevity of the delay in filing an appeal is not, of course, by itself a sufficient basis for giving due
course to the appeal. In the present case, however, the factual circumstances combine with the legal
merits of the case urged by the petitioner to move us to the conviction that respondent NLRC should
have recognized and heeded the requirements of orderly procedure and substantial justice which are
at stake in the present case by allowing the appeal. In Siguenza v. Court of appeals, 5 the Court
stressed that the right to appeal should not be lightly disregarded by a stringent application of rules
of procedure especially where the appeal is on its face meritorious and the interests of substantial
justice would be served by permitting the appeal:
 In the case of Castro v. Court of Appeals (132 SCRA 782), we stressed the
importance and real purpose of the remedy of appeal and ruled:
An appeal is an essential part of our judicial system. We
have advised the courts to proceed with caution so as not to
deprive a party of the right to appeal (National
Waterworks and Sewerage Authority v. Municipality of
Libmanan, 97 SCRA 138) and instructed that every party-
litigant should be afforded the amplest opportunity for the
proper and just disposition of his cause, freed from the
constraints of technicalities (A. One Feeds, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals, 100 SCRA 590).<äre||anº•1àw>
The rules of procedure are not to be applied in a very rigid
and technical sense. The rules of procedure are used only to
help secure not override substantial justice. (Gregorio v.
Court of Appeals [72 SCRA 1201). Therefore, we ruled
in Republic v. Court of Appeals (83 SCRA 453) that a six-
day delay in the perfection of the appeal does not warrant
its dismissal. And again in Ramos v. Bagasao, 96 SCRA
396, this Court held that the delay in four (4) days in filing
a notice of appeal and a notion for extension of time to file
a record on appeal can be excused on the basis of equity.
We should emphasize, however, that we have allowed the of an appeal in some
cases where a sent application of the rules would have denied it only when to do
so would serve the demands of substantial justice and in the exercise of our
equity junction.
In the case at bar, the petitioner's delay in their record on appeal should not be
strictly construed as to deprive them of the right to appeal especially since on
its face the appeal appears to be impressed appeal especially with merit. 6
We turn to the merits of the Petition. An examination of the complaint and of the Manifestation and
Motion filed by respondent Rances in POEA Case No: M-85-08-14, shows that the cause of action
pleaded by respondent Rances was enforcement of the decision rendered by c. Dubai Court which
purported to award him, among other things, an additional amount of US$ 1,500.00 under certain
circumstances. In the complaint dated 23 October 1985, respondent Rances stated:
Details of cause of action (Why are you complaining?) (To include place and date
of occurrence of case of action and amount of claim, if any) P 2,295 US$ salary
for three (3) months stated in the compromise of 1,500 TJS$ total of 2,795.50
US$ [as] per decision from Civil Court of Dubai U.A.E. 7
The Motion/Manifestation dated 3 December 1985 filed by respondent Rances may be quoted in
extension
1. Originally, complainant's claim was US$ 9,364.89 which he filed with the
Dubai Court for adjudication.
xxx xxx xxx
2. The US$ 9,364.89 claim was compromised by the court in a decision dated
September 12, 1984. Xerox copy of the decision is hereto attached as Annex "B"
and the authentication as Annex "B-l' and made an integral part thereof.
3. Pertinent portion of the decision referred to above reads as follows:
Both parties came to a decision that the opponent would
pay to the claimant the amount of Five Thousand & Five
Hundred dollars for the withdrawal of the claimant and
providing him return ticket to his country. The opponent
declared that he would pay One Thousand & Five Hundred
168
Dollars to the opponent in case the wife of the claimant
doesn't agree with the amount sent to.
4. During the hearing leading to the Compromise, I emphasized that the
allotment I was giving my wife was US$ 765.00 per month and at the time the
case was filed the allotment was already 3 months in arrears which already
amounted to US$ 2,295.00.
5. The amount sent my wife which is only P 13,393.45 through PASCOR and
confirmed by a Certification of the Philippine National Bank, Dagupan City
Branch, hereto attached as Annex 'C' is definitely very meager compared to the
exchange value of US$ 2,295.00;
6. My wife certainly did not agree and cannot agree or admit that only P
13,393.45 will be given her as an allotment for the 3-month period; hence, urder
the Compromise Agreement, we are entitled to recover the additional US$
1,500.00;
7. The agreement insofar as the additional remittance to my wife of
US$1,500.00 is reasonable in that adding the same to the P13,393.45 my wife
received would sum up to US$2,295.00 corresponding to the accumulated 3
month allotment due my wife.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed of this Honorable
Office to —
Cause or require respondent to remit and/or pay the undersigned or his wife of
the amount of US$ 1,500.00 as mandated under the Compromise Agreement
which was the basis of the decision of the Dubai Civil Court. 8
It should be noted that respondent Rances submitted to the POEA only the Dubai Court decision; he
did not submit any copy of the 'Compromise Agreement' (assuming that to have been reduced to
writing) which he presumably believed to have been absorbed and superseded by the Dubai decision.
That the cause of action set out in respondent Rances' complaint was enforcement of the Dubai
decision is further, indicated in the decision dated 14 April 1986 rendered by the POEA. This decision
provided in part as follows:
Complainant alleged that his original claim of US$ 9,364.89 for unpaid salaries,
termination pay and travel expenses was filed in Dubai. In a decision rendered
by the Dubai Court, his claim was compromised in the amount of US$ 5,500.00
plus return plane ticket. The amount of US$ 1,500.00 will be paid to his wife if
she does not agree with the amount sent to her. The three (3) months
unremitted allotments refers to the months of April, May and June 1984. As
evidenced by the Allotment Shp, respondent approved the authority given by
complainant stating that the amount of US$ 765.00 be remitted to his wife
belong with the month of April 1984. The amount remitted to his wife for
allotment cover the three (3) month period was only P 13,393.45. The basis of
complainant's claim is the reservation in the decision of the Dubai Court which
states that in case the wife of the claimant does not agree with the amount sent
to her, the opponent shall pay US$ l,500.00. 9
Clearly, therefore, respondent Rances' action was for enforcement of the Dubai decision to the extent
that such decision provided for payment of an additional amount of US$1,500.00 and that
respondent relied upon such decision.
Petitioner argues vigorously that the POEA had no authority and jurisdiction to enforce the judgment
of a foreign court. Under Section 1, Rule 1, Book VI of the POEA Rules and Regulations, it will be
seen that the POEA has jurisdiction to decide all cases 'involving employer employee relations arising
out of or by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino workers for overseas employment,
including seamen." Respondent Rances, however, relied not upon the employer - employee
relationship between himself and petitioner corporation and the latter's foreign principal, but rather
upon the judgment obtained by him from the Dubai Court which had apparently already been
partially satisfied by payment to respondent Rances of US$ 5,500.00. The POEA has no jurisdiction
to hear and decide a claim for enforcement of a foreign judgment. Such a claim must be brought
before the regular courts. The POEA is not a court; it is an administrative agency exercising, inter
alia, adjudicatory or quasi-judicial functions. Neither the rules of procedure nor the rules of evidence
which are mandatorily applicable in proceedings before courts, are observed in proceedings before
the POEA. 10
Even assuming (arguendo, merely) that the POEA has jurisdiction to recognize and enforce a foreign
judgment, still respondent Rances cannot rely upon the Dubai decision. The Dubai decision was not
properly proved before the POEA. The Dubai decision purports to be the written act or record of an
act of an official body or tribunal of a foreign country, and therefore a public writing under Section
20 (a) of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court. Sections 25 and 26 of Rules 132 prescribe the
manner of proving a public of official record of a foreign country in the following terms:
Sec. 25. Proof of public or official record. — An official record or an entry
therein, when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official
publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody
of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied. if the record is not kept in the
Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has the custody. If the office in
which the record is kept is in a foreign country, the certificate maybe be
made by a secretary of embassy or litigation, consul general, consul, vice consul,
or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines
stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept, and authenticated
by the seal of his office.
Sec. 26. What attestation of copy must state. — Whenever a copy of a writing is
attend for the purpose of evidence, the attestation must state, in substance,
that the copy is a correct copy of the original, or a specific part thereof, as the
case may be. The attestation must be under the official seal of the attesting
officer, if there be any, or if he be the clerk of a court having a seal, under the
seal of such court. (Emphasis supplied)
In the instant case, respondent Rances failed to submit any attestation issued by the proper Dubai
official having legal custody of the original of the decision of the Dubai Court that the copy presented
by said respondent is a faithful copy of the original decision, which attestation must furthermore be
authenticated by a Philippine Consular Officer having jurisdiction in Dubai. The transmittal letter,
dated 23 September 1984, signed by Mohd Bin Saleh, Honorary Consul for Philippines' does not
comply with the requirements of either the attestation under Section 26 nor the authentication
envisaged by Section 25. 11
There is another problem in respect of the admissibility in evidence of the Dubai decision. The Dubai
decision is accompanied by a document which purports to be an English translation of that decision.,
but that translation is legally defective. Section 34 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court requires
that documents written in a non-official language hke Arabic) shall not be admitted as evidence
unless accompanied by a translation into English or Spanish or Filipino. 12 In Ahag v. Cabiling, 13 Mr.
Justice Moreland elaborated on the need for a translation of a document written in a language other
than an official language:
... Moreover, when there is presented in evidence an exhibit written in any
language other than Spanish, if there is an appeal, that exhibit should be
translated into Spanish by the official interpreter of the court, or a translation
should be agreed upon by the parties, and both original and translation sent to
this court. In the case before us, there is an untranslated exhibit written in the
Visayan language. 14
In Teng Giok Yan v. Hon. Court of Appeals, et al., 15 the Court, speaking through Mr. Justice
Montemayor, had occasion to stress the importance of having a translation made by the court
interpreter who must, of course, be of recognized competence both in the language in which the
document involved is written and in English. The Court said:
[t]he trial court was certainly not bound by the translation given by the Chinese
Embassy, specially in the absence of a delete assurance that said translation was
correct and that it was made by the Embassy Adviser himself. On the other
hand, the translation made by the court interpreter is official and reliable not
only because of the recognized ability of said interpreter to translate Chinese
169
characters into English, but also because said interpreter was under the direct
supervision and control of the court. .... 16
In the instant case, there is no showing of who effected the English translation of the Dubai decision
which respondent Rances submitted to the POEA. The English translation does not purport to have
been made by an official court interpreter of the Philippine Government nor of the Dubai
Government. Neither the Identity of the translator nor his competence in both the Arabic and
English languages has been shown. The English translation submitted by the respondent is not
sworn to as an accurate translation of the original decision in Arabic. Neither has that translation
been agreed upon by the parties as a true and faithful one.
The foregoing does not exhaust the difficulties presented by reliance upon the Dubai decision.
The Dubai Court decision, even on the basis of the English translation submitted by respondent
Rances, does not purport on its face to have been rendered against petitioner Pascor nor against
the foreign principal of petitioner. Respondent Rances simply assumed that the decision was
rendered against petitioner's foreign principal. The Dubai decision does not Identify the parties to
the litigation that was resolved by said decision. Accordingly, the Dubai decision can scarcely be
enforced against petitioner Pascor. Further, even if the Dubai decision had on its face purported to be
rendered against petitioner Pascor, we must note that petitioner Pascor has expressly denied that
jurisdiction had ever been acquired by the Dubai court over the person of Pascor in accordance with
the Rules of Procedure applicable before the Dubai Court. 17 Respondent Rances has not proved the
contents of the Dubai Rules of Procedure governing acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of a
non-resident defendant.
Finally, if it be assumed (arguendo, once more) that the Dubai Court had indeed acquired
jurisdiction over the person of Pascor's foreign principal — Gulf East Ship Management Ltd. — it still
would not follow that Pascor would automatically be bound by the Dubai decision. The statutory
agency (or suretyship) of Pascor is limited in its reach to the contracts of employment Pascor entered
into on behalf of its principal with persons like respondent Rances. 18 Such statutory inability does
not extend to liability for judgments secured against Gulf East Ship Management Ltd., in suits
brought against Gulf East outside Philippine territorial jurisdiction, even though such a suit may
involve a contract of employment with a Filipino seaman.
We conclude that the POEA acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in rendering its Decision dated
14 April 1986 and its Order dated 20 May 1986, and that public respondent NLRC similarly acted
without or in excess of jurisdiction in rendering its Orders dated 14 August 1986 and 19 November
1986 denying petitioner's appeal and Motion for Reconsideration. This, however, is without
prejudice to the right of respondent Rances to initiate another proceeding before the POEA against
petitioner Pascor, this time on the basis alone of the contract of employment which existed between
said respondent and petitioner or petitioner's foreign principal; there, respondent Rances may seek
to show that he is still entitled to the allotments which he claims were not remitted by his employer
to his wife.
ACCORDINGLY, the Petition for certiorari is GRANTED and the Resolutions of public respondent
NLRC dated 14 August 1986 and 19 November 1986 are hereby NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE. The
Temporary Restraining Order issued by this Court on 8 December 1986 is hereby made PERCENT.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan (Chairman), Gutierrez, Jr., Bidin and Cortes JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 104235 November 18, 1993
SPOUSES CESAR & SUTHIRA ZALAMEA and LIANA ZALAMEA, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and TRANSWORLD AIRLINES, INC., respondents.
Sycip, Salazar, Hernandez, Gatmaitan for petitioners.
Quisumbing, Torres & Evangelista for private-respondent.
NOCON, J.:
Disgruntled over TransWorld Airlines, Inc.'s refusal to accommodate them in TWA Flight 007
departing from New York to Los Angeles on June 6, 1984 despite possession of confirmed tickets,
petitioners filed an action for damages before the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila,
Branch 145. Advocating petitioner's position, the trial court categorically ruled that respondent
TransWorld Airlines (TWA) breached its contract of carriage with petitioners and that said breach
was "characterized by bad faith." On appeal, however, the appellate court found that while there was
a breach of contract on respondent TWA's part, there was neither fraud nor bad faith because under
the Code of Federal Regulations by the Civil Aeronautics Board of the United States of America it is
allowed to overbook flights.
The factual backdrop of the case is as follows:
Petitioners-spouses Cesar C. Zalamea and Suthira Zalamea, and their daughter, Liana Zalamea,
purchased three (3) airline tickets from the Manila agent of respondent TransWorld Airlines, Inc. for
a flight to New York to Los Angeles on June 6, 1984. The tickets of petitioners-spouses were
purchased at a discount of 75% while that of their daughter was a full fare ticket. All three tickets
represented confirmed reservations.
While in New York, on June 4, 1984, petitioners received notice of the reconfirmation of their
reservations for said flight. On the appointed date, however, petitioners checked in at 10:00 a.m., an
hour earlier than the scheduled flight at 11:00 a.m. but were placed on the wait-list because the
number of passengers who had checked in before them had already taken all the seats available on
the flight. Liana Zalamea appeared as the No. 13 on the wait-list while the two other Zalameas were
listed as "No. 34, showing a party of two." Out of the 42 names on the wait list, the first 22 names
were eventually allowed to board the flight to Los Angeles, including petitioner Cesar Zalamea. The
two others, on the other hand, at No. 34, being ranked lower than 22, were not able to fly. As it were,
those holding full-fare tickets were given first priority among the wait-listed passengers. Mr.
Zalamea, who was holding the full-fare ticket of his daughter, was allowed to board the plane; while
his wife and daughter, who presented the discounted tickets were denied boarding. According to Mr.
Zalamea, it was only later when he discovered the he was holding his daughter's full-fare ticket.
Even in the next TWA flight to Los Angeles Mrs. Zalamea and her daughter, could not be
accommodated because it was also fully booked. Thus, they were constrained to book in another
flight and purchased two tickets from American Airlines at a cost of Nine Hundred Eighteen
($918.00) Dollars.
Upon their arrival in the Philippines, petitioners filed an action for damages based on breach of
contract of air carriage before the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila, Branch 145. As
aforesaid, the lower court ruled in favor of petitioners in its decision 1 dated January 9, 1989 the
dispositive portion of which states as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the defendant to pay
plaintiffs the following amounts:
(1) US $918.00, or its peso equivalent at the time of payment representing the
price of the tickets bought by Suthira and Liana Zalamea from American
Airlines, to enable them to fly to Los Angeles from New York City;
(2) US $159.49, or its peso equivalent at the time of payment, representing the
price of Suthira Zalamea's ticket for TWA Flight 007;
(3) Eight Thousand Nine Hundred Thirty-Four Pesos and Fifty Centavos
(P8,934.50, Philippine Currency, representing the price of Liana Zalamea's
ticket for TWA Flight 007,
(4) Two Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (P250,000.00), Philippine Currency, as
moral damages for all the plaintiffs'
170
(5) One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00), Philippine Currency, as and
for attorney's fees; and
(6) The costs of suit.
SO ORDERED. 2
On appeal, the respondent Court of Appeals held that moral damages are recoverable in a damage
suit predicated upon a breach of contract of carriage only where there is fraud or bad faith. Since it is
a matter of record that overbooking of flights is a common and accepted practice of airlines in the
United States and is specifically allowed under the Code of Federal Regulations by the Civil
Aeronautics Board, no fraud nor bad faith could be imputed on respondent TransWorld Airlines.
Moreover, while respondent TWA was remiss in not informing petitioners that the flight was
overbooked and that even a person with a confirmed reservation may be denied accommodation on
an overbooked flight, nevertheless it ruled that such omission or negligence cannot under the
circumstances be considered to be so gross as to amount to bad faith.
Finally, it also held that there was no bad faith in placing petitioners in the wait-list along with forty-
eight (48) other passengers where full-fare first class tickets were given priority over discounted
tickets.
The dispositive portion of the decision of respondent Court of Appeals 3 dated October 25, 1991 states
as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the decision under review is hereby
MODIFIED in that the award of moral and exemplary damages to the plaintiffs
is eliminated, and the defendant-appellant is hereby ordered to pay the plaintiff
the following amounts:
(1) US$159.49, or its peso equivalent at the time of the payment, representing
the price of Suthira Zalamea's ticket for TWA Flight 007;
(2) US$159.49, or its peso equivalent at the time of the payment, representing
the price of Cesar Zalamea's ticket for TWA Flight 007;
(3) P50,000.00 as and for attorney's fees.
(4) The costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.4
Not satisfied with the decision, petitioners raised the case on petition for review on certiorari and
alleged the following errors committed by the respondent Court of Appeals, to wit:
I.
. . . IN HOLDING THAT THERE WAS NO FRAUD OR BAD FAITH ON THE
PART OF RESPONDENT TWA BECAUSE IT HAS A RIGHT TO OVERBOOK
FLIGHTS.
II.
. . . IN ELIMINATING THE AWARD OF EXEMPLARY DAMAGES.
III.
. . . IN NOT ORDERING THE REFUND OF LIANA ZALAMEA'S TWA TICKET
AND PAYMENT FOR THE AMERICAN AIRLINES
TICKETS.5
That there was fraud or bad faith on the part of respondent airline when it did not allow petitioners
to board their flight for Los Angeles in spite of confirmed tickets cannot be disputed. The U.S. law or
regulation allegedly authorizing overbooking has never been proved. Foreign laws do not prove
themselves nor can the courts take judicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged
and proved.6 Written law may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by
the officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied with a certificate
that such officer has custody. The certificate may be made by a secretary of an embassy or legation,
consul general, consul, vice-consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the
Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal
of his office.7
Respondent TWA relied solely on the statement of Ms. Gwendolyn Lather, its customer service agent,
in her deposition dated January 27, 1986 that the Code of Federal Regulations of the Civil
Aeronautics Board allows overbooking. Aside from said statement, no official publication of said
code was presented as evidence. Thus, respondent court's finding that overbooking is specifically
allowed by the US Code of Federal Regulations has no basis in fact.
Even if the claimed U.S. Code of Federal Regulations does exist, the same is not applicable to the case
at bar in accordance with the principle of lex loci contractus which require that the law of the place
where the airline ticket was issued should be applied by the court where the passengers are residents
and nationals of the forum and the ticket is issued in such State by the defendant airline. 8 Since the
tickets were sold and issued in the Philippines, the applicable law in this case would be Philippine
law.
Existing jurisprudence explicitly states that overbooking amounts to bad faith, entitling the
passengers concerned to an award of moral damages. In Alitalia Airways v. Court of
Appeals,9 where passengers with confirmed bookings were refused carriage on the last minute, this
Court held that when an airline issues a ticket to a passenger confirmed on a particular flight, on a
certain date, a contract of carriage arises, and the passenger has every right to expect that he would
fly on that flight and on that date. If he does not, then the carrier opens itself to a suit for breach of
contract of carriage. Where an airline had deliberately overbooked, it took the risk of having to
deprive some passengers of their seats in case all of them would show up for the check in. For the
indignity and inconvenience of being refused a confirmed seat on the last minute, said passenger is
entitled to an award of moral damages.
Similarly, in Korean Airlines Co., Ltd. v. Court of Appeals, 10 where private respondent was not
allowed to board the plane because her seat had already been given to another passenger even before
the allowable period for passengers to check in had lapsed despite the fact that she had a confirmed
ticket and she had arrived on time, this Court held that petitioner airline acted in bad faith in
violating private respondent's rights under their contract of carriage and is therefore liable for the
injuries she has sustained as a result.
In fact, existing jurisprudence abounds with rulings where the breach of contract of carriage amounts
to bad faith. In Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 11 where a
would-be passenger had the necessary ticket, baggage claim and clearance from immigration all
clearly and unmistakably showing that she was, in fact, included in the passenger manifest of said
flight, and yet was denied accommodation in said flight, this Court did not hesitate to affirm the
lower court's finding awarding her damages.
A contract to transport passengers is quite different in kind and degree from any other contractual
relation. So ruled this Court in Zulueta v. Pan American World Airways, Inc. 12 This is so, for a
contract of carriage generates a relation attended with public duty — a duty to provide public service
and convenience to its passengers which must be paramount to self-interest or enrichment. Thus, it
was also held that the switch of planes from Lockheed 1011 to a smaller Boeing 707 because there
were only 138 confirmed economy class passengers who could very well be accommodated in the
smaller planes, thereby sacrificing the comfort of its first class passengers for the sake of economy,
amounts to bad faith. Such inattention and lack of care for the interest of its passengers who are
entitled to its utmost consideration entitles the passenger to an award of moral damages. 13
Even on the assumption that overbooking is allowed, respondent TWA is still guilty of bad faith in
not informing its passengers beforehand that it could breach the contract of carriage even if they
have confirmed tickets if there was overbooking. Respondent TWA should have incorporated
stipulations on overbooking on the tickets issued or to properly inform its passengers about these
policies so that the latter would be prepared for such eventuality or would have the choice to ride
with another airline.
Respondent TWA contends that Exhibit I, the detached flight coupon upon which were written the
name of the passenger and the points of origin and destination, contained such a notice. An
171
examination of Exhibit I does not bear this out. At any rate, said exhibit was not offered for the
purpose of showing the existence of a notice of overbooking but to show that Exhibit I was used for
flight 007 in first class of June 11, 1984 from New York to Los Angeles.
Moreover, respondent TWA was also guilty of not informing its passengers of its alleged policy of
giving less priority to discounted tickets. While the petitioners had checked in at the same time, and
held confirmed tickets, yet, only one of them was allowed to board the plane ten minutes before
departure time because the full-fare ticket he was holding was given priority over discounted tickets.
The other two petitioners were left behind.
It is respondent TWA's position that the practice of overbooking and the airline system of boarding
priorities are reasonable policies, which when implemented do not amount to bad faith. But the issue
raised in this case is not the reasonableness of said policies but whether or not said policies were
incorporated or deemed written on petitioners' contracts of carriage. Respondent TWA failed to show
that there are provisions to that effect. Neither did it present any argument of substance to show that
petitioners were duly apprised of the overbooked condition of the flight or that there is a hierarchy of
boarding priorities in booking passengers. It is evident that petitioners had the right to rely upon the
assurance of respondent TWA, thru its agent in Manila, then in New York, that their tickets
represented confirmed seats without any qualification. The failure of respondent TWA to so inform
them when it could easily have done so thereby enabling respondent to hold on to them as
passengers up to the last minute amounts to bad faith. Evidently, respondent TWA placed its self-
interest over the rights of petitioners under their contracts of carriage. Such conscious disregard of
petitioners' rights makes respondent TWA liable for moral damages. To deter breach of contracts by
respondent TWA in similar fashion in the future, we adjudge respondent TWA liable for exemplary
damages, as well.
Petitioners also assail the respondent court's decision not to require the refund of Liana Zalamea's
ticket because the ticket was used by her father. On this score, we uphold the respondent court.
Petitioners had not shown with certainty that the act of respondent TWA in allowing Mr. Zalamea to
use the ticket of her daughter was due to inadvertence or deliberate act. Petitioners had also failed to
establish that they did not accede to said agreement. The logical conclusion, therefore, is that both
petitioners and respondent TWA agreed, albeit impliedly, to the course of action taken.
The respondent court erred, however, in not ordering the refund of the American Airlines tickets
purchased and used by petitioners Suthira and Liana. The evidence shows that petitioners Suthira
and Liana were constrained to take the American Airlines flight to Los Angeles not because they
"opted not to use their TWA tickets on another TWA flight" but because respondent TWA could not
accommodate them either on the next TWA flight which was also fully booked. 14 The purchase of the
American Airlines tickets by petitioners Suthira and Liana was the consequence of respondent TWA's
unjustifiable breach of its contracts of carriage with petitioners. In accordance with Article 2201,
New Civil Code, respondent TWA should, therefore, be responsible for all damages which may be
reasonably attributed to the non-performance of its obligation. In the previously cited case of Alitalia
Airways v. Court of Appeals, 15 this Court explicitly held that a passenger is entitled to be reimbursed
for the cost of the tickets he had to buy for a flight to another airline. Thus, instead of simply being
refunded for the cost of the unused TWA tickets, petitioners should be awarded the actual cost of
their flight from New York to Los Angeles. On this score, we differ from the trial court's ruling which
ordered not only the reimbursement of the American Airlines tickets but also the refund of the
unused TWA tickets. To require both prestations would have enabled petitioners to fly from New
York to Los Angeles without any fare being paid.
The award to petitioners of attorney's fees is also justified under Article 2208(2) of the Civil Code
which allows recovery when the defendant's act or omission has compelled plaintiff to litigate or to
incur expenses to protect his interest. However, the award for moral damages and exemplary
damages by the trial court is excessive in the light of the fact that only Suthira and Liana Zalamea
were actually "bumped off." An award of P50,000.00 moral damages and another P50,000.00
exemplary damages would suffice under the circumstances obtaining in the instant case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED and the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals
is hereby MODIFIED to the extent of adjudging respondent TransWorld Airlines to pay damages to
petitioners in the following amounts, to wit:
(1) US$918.00 or its peso equivalent at the time of payment representing the price of the tickets
bought by Suthira and Liana Zalamea from American Airlines, to enable them to fly to Los Angeles
from New York City;

(2) P50,000.00 as moral damages;

(3) P50,000.00 as exemplary damages;

(4) P50,000.00 as attorney's fees; and

(5) Costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.

172

G.R. No. L-39013 February 29,1988
FRANCISCO BUNAG, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, ESTRUDES BAUTISTA Vda. de BITUIN and BRUNO
BAUTISTA, respondents.
CORTES, J.:
The core of the controversy in this case is a thumb-marked. non-notarized and non-witnessed deed
of sale of a parcel of unregistered land, which on its face cannot but cause a prudent man to doubt its
due execution and authenticity.
The facts are briefly summarized in the decision of the Court of Appeals:
The evidence of the plaintiff consisting of the sole testimony of said plaintiff is to
the effect that the property in question was originally owned by his father
Apolonio Bunag Aguas as shown by Tax Declaration Nos. 546 for 1941 and 320
for 1960 (Exhs. B & E), located at San Nicolas, Betis, Pampanga; that he had
been living in their house thereon with his father until 1920 when they
transferred their residence to Tarlac; that in 1925 their house thereon was
demolished as it was old; that they planted bamboos on the land; that Jose
Bautista Santiago, a nephew-in-law, erected a house on said lot and lived therein
for sometime until he became a widower when he transferred to another house;
that said Jose Bautista Santiago one day accompanied his sister Estrudes
Bautista to stay in that house; and that Santiago was allowed by his father to
build a house on said lot on condition that he would pay for the land taxes as
compensation for the use of the land. He admitted, however, that be only
learned about this agreement from his father. On September 15,1962, and
September 24,1962 he sent written demands to defendant Bruno Bautista, thru
his lawyer, to vacate the lot and remove the houses thereon, (Exhs. A & B). The
testimony of the other witness Juan Bunag was stricken from the records as he
failed to return to court for cross-examination.
On the other hand, the evidence for the defendant consist of the testimony of
defendant Bruno Bautista who testified that he is the owner of the land in
question by virtue of a deed of sale, of January 3, 1941, signed by Apolonio
Bunag with his thumbmark; that Bunag first offered it for sale to his brother
Jose Bautista, but as the latter had no money, he referred the matter to his
father; that after he was contacted in Baguio by his father, he sent the P100.00
as consideration of the sale and so the sale was consummated between his father
and Bunag; that he came down from Baguio and had the house repaired and he
stayed there with his family until liberation when they left the house and allowed
his sister Estrudes Bautista to live therein; that he planted bananas, chicos,
trees, calamansi, eggplants, thereon; that he had been paying the land taxes
thereon (Exhs. 5 to 5-M); that the property is declared in his name (Exh. 6); and
he denies that her sister Estrudes requested Apolonio Bunag to allow her to stay
on the property as her sister had a house of her own then.
Brigida Bautista testified that her brother bought the said property from
Apolonio Bunag and that she was present when Bunag affixed Ms thumbmark
on the document (Exh. 1); that aside from this deed, there were other documents
supporting the sale as the note (Exh. 2) containing the consideration and the
parties. Assessor's Field Sheet of the property (Exh. 3) and the letter of the
assessor to Bunag in 1941 informing him of the revision of the assessment.
(Rollo, pp. 15-18).
The trial court decided in favor of petitioner, the dispositive portion of the decision reading as
follows:
173
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, judgment is rendered in favor of the plaintiff.
The defendants, Bruno Bautista and Estrudes Bautista vda. de Bituin, are hereby
ordered to vacate the property herein described and to deliver possession
thereof to the plaintiff, Francisco Bunag; ordering the said defendants, jointly
and severally, to pay the land taxes of the property up to and including the year
1968; and to pay the plaintiff the sum of P15.00 per month as reasonable rentals
thereof from the date of this judgment until the property is delivered to the
plaintiff; to pay the plaintiff the sum of P200.00 as expenses of litigation and
costs. For lack of merit, the counterclaim of the defendants are dismiss (Rollo,
pp. 14-15)
The Court of Appeals, finding the deed of sale (Exhibit 1) to have been validly executed and, thus,
concluding that "the preponderance of evidence leans heavily in favor of the claim of the ownership
of defendant Bruno Bautista" [Rollo p. 18], set aside the decision of the trial court and dismissed the
complaint. The motion for reconsideration was subsequently denied by the Court of Appeals in a
minute resolution for lack of merit.
Consequently, resolution of the instant petition primarily revolves around the issue of the due
execution authenticity of the deed of sale (Exhibit 1). The petitioner assigned the following errors:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE DEED OF SALE (EXHIBIT "1") WAS
DULY EXECUTED AND AUTHENTICATED.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN MAKING CONCLUSION (SIC) NOT IN ACCORDANCE
WITH THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD.
At the outset, it must be emphasized that the deed of sale (Exhibit 1) was not acknowledged before a
notary public and neither are there any signatures in the blank spaces for the signatures of attesting
witnesses. The document is typewritten in English and over the similarly typewritten words
"APOLONIO BUNIAG" is a thumbprint.
The deed of sale (Exhibit 1) is not notarized and is, therefore, a private writing (U.S. v. Orera, 11 Phil.
596 (1908)], whose due execution and authenticity must be proved before it can be received in
evidence (Nolan v. Sales, 7 Phil. 1 (1906); U.S. v. Evangelists, 29 Phil. 215 (1915); Antillon v.
Barcelon, 37 Phil. 148 (1917)].
Proof of the due execution and authenticity of private writings is required under Section 21, Rule 132
of the Revised Rules of Court, to wit:
Sec. 21. Private writing, its execution and authenticity, how proved. — Before
any private writing may be received in evidence, its due execution and
authenticity must be proved either:
(a) By anyone who saw the writing executed;
(b) By evidence of the genuineness of the handwriting of the maker; or
(c) By a subscribing witness.
To support its conclusion as to the due execution and authenticity of the deed of sale (Exhibit 1), the
Court of Appeals relied on the testimony of Brigida Bautista, a sister of private respondents. She
testified as follows:
Q. Who is the owner of the property?
A My brother Bruno Bautista.
Q. Do you know how your brother, Bruno Bautista, came to
own the same property?
A. Yes, sir. He bought it from Apolonio Bunag.
 Q. Do you know if there is any document evidencing the
purchase of the said property from Apolonio Bunag.?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Showing to you this document already marked as Exhibit
1, do you recognize this?
A. Yes, sir, this is the document showing the purchase and
sale of the lot in litigation.
Q. At the bottom portion thereof, appears a thumbmark
above the typewritten name Apolonio Bunag, do you know
whose thumbmark this is?
A. That is the thumbmark of Apolonio Bunag, sir, and I
know that is his because I saw him affixed (sic) his
thumbmark. TSN, March 25,1967, pp. 1-2).
However, the trial court found proof of the due execution and authenticity of the deed of sale (Exhibit
1) wanting, reasoning that:
The testimony of this witness (Brigida Bautista) has to be received with caution,
coming as it does from a sister of the defendants. The circumstances other
alleged presence during the "execution" of the deed of sale was not related.
Neither does she give any light as to whether Apolonio Bunag understood the
document. It should be noted that (Exhibit "1") was written in English. Since it
appears that said document was merely thumb-marked, it could reasonably be
inferred that Apolonio Bunag, the supposed vendor, was illiterate. Under the
stances, the minimum proof necessary to establish due authenticity should, in
the least, include evidence that the document (Exhibit "1") was duly read,
explained and translated to Apolonio Bunag. Unfortunately, no such evidence
was presented. Another fact which compels this Court to proceed with caution is
the fact that there are no instrumental witnesses in the document. The mischief
that lurks behind accepting at face value a document that is merely thumb-
marked. without any witnesses to it, and not acknowledged before a notary
public could be one of the reasons behind the requirement of the rules on
evidence that a private writing must be shown to be duly executed and
authenticated. The probative value of the testimony of Brigida Bautista, who did
not furnish us with any details surrounding the execution of Exhibit "l," coming
as it does from a person whose partisanship can not, and should not, be overlook
(sic), fags short from (sic) the minimum requirements of credibility. Indeed it
has been said that the testimony of an eye-witness as to the execution of a
private document must be positive. He must state that the document was
actually executed by the person whose name is subscribed thereto. It is not
sufficient if he states in a general manner that such person made the writing
(Nolan vs. Salas, Bail. More so if the document was merely thumb-marked.
Regretably, this Court can not accept, for failure of proof as to its due execution
and authenticity, the probative value of Exhibit "1". (Record on Appeal, pp.38-
39).
The Court sustains and adopts the trial court's findings and its conclusion that private respondents
have failed to prove the due execution and authenticity of the deed of sale (Exhibit 1).
The due execution and authenticity of the deed of sale, (Exhibit 1) not having been satisfactorily
proven, such private document should be excluded [Paz v. Santiago, 47 Phil. 334 (1925); Alejandrino
v. Reyes, 53 Phil. 973 (1929); Chapman v. Garcia, 64 Phil. 618 (1937); General Enterprises v. Lianga
Bay Logging Co., G.R. No. L-18487, August 31, 1964, 11 SCRA 733].
2. Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred in arriving at a conclusion not supported by
the record, when it said:
174
The pretension of the plaintiff that the defendant bound himself to pay the taxes
for the use of the land is belied by the fact that the defendant paid the taxes in
his own name and not in the name of Bunag, and the defendant kept the receipts
of payment and did not deliver even one of those receipts to Bunag. (Rollo, p.
19.)
Petitioner argues that this finding is grossly erroneous, considering that in the stipulation of facts
submitted by both parties before the trial court, it is expressly provided:
3. That the parties hereto hereby stipulate and agree that the defendant, Bruno
Bautista, has been paying the land taxes due on the aforesaid property,
personally or thru his wife, Consolacion Capati, for the period from 1940 to
1964, as shown by the corresponding official land tax receipts duly issued by the
Municipal Treasurer of Guagua, Pampanga; however, under the column NAME
OF DECLARED OWNER thereof, the name Bunag Aguas Apolonio is written.
As this fact was stipulated by the parties, it need not be proven, it cannot be contradicted by evidence
to the contrary, and it is conclusive upon the parties, unless it is shown that the admission was made
through a palpable mistake [Irlanda v. Pitargue, 22 Phil. 383 (1912); Board of Administrators,
Philippine Veterans Administration v. Agcaoili, G.R. No. L-38129, July 23,1974, 58 SCRA 72].
There being no allegation of a palpable mistake that would relieve private respondents from the
stipulation of facts, the stipulated fact above-quoted is conclusive upon the parties.
The Court of Appeals cannot arbitrarily disregard the statement of facts agreed upon by the parties
[Siping v. Cacob, 10 Phil. 717 (1908)]. It is duty bound to render judgment strictly in accordance with
the stipulation of facts [Cabrera v. Lacson, 71 Phil. 182 (1940)].
It may also be added that, indeed, in the Real Estate Tax Receipts (Exhibits 5-5-M) covering the years
1947 to 1964 presented by private respondents as their evidence, under the column entitled "NAME
OF DECLARED OWNER" the name "Bunag Aguas Apolonio" is written. This assumes greater
significance considering that the payors in these receipts were either private respondent Bruno
Bautista, his wife Consolacion Capati or Ambrosio Bautista.
Thus, this Court finds merit in petitioner's contention that the Court of Appeals's conclusion is not
supported by the record, for said conclusion is contrary to the stipulated fact and the evidence
offered by private respondents, which support petitioner's contention that his father did not sen the
disputed property to private respondents' father, but merely allowed their brother to build a house
on the land on the condition that the latter would pay for the realty taxes due.
With the exclusion of the deed of sale (Exhibit 1), the conclusiveness of the stipulation regarding the
payment of realty taxes and the declaration of Apolonio Bunag Aguas as the owner in the Real Estate
Tax Receipts (Exhibits 5-5-M) it becomes apparent that petitioner's father never ceased to own the
disputed property.
At this juncture, it would be opportune to address private respondent's submission that the questions
raised in petitioner's petition for review are questions of fact and not of law and, therefore, this Court
should not disturb the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals. While the Court agrees with private
respondents that, ordinarily, the Supreme Court should not review questions of fact in appeals of this
nature, the Court finds, however, that an exception obtains in the instant case, for clearly evident is a
misapprehension of facts [De la Cruz v. Sosing, 94 Phil. 26 (1953); Castillo v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. 1,48290, September 29, 1983, 124 SCRA 808]. As summarized by the Court in a recent decision:
The jurisdiction of this Court in cases brought to us from the Court of Appeals
(now Intermediate Appellate Court) is limited to the review of errors of law, said
appellate court's findings of fact being conclusive upon us except (1) when the
conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or
conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly absurd, mistaken or
impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of
facts; (4) when the judgment is premised on a misapprehension of facts; (5)
when the findings of fact are conflicting; and (6) when the Court of Appeals, in
making its findings went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary
to the admissions of both appellant and appellee ... [Rizal Cement Co., Inc. v.
Villareal, G.R. No. L-30272, February 28, 1985, 135 SCRA 151].
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED, the decision of the Court of Appeals is set aside and
the decision of the trial court is affirmed in toto. This Decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-36282 December 10, 1976
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
COSME MONLEON, accused-appellant.
Prospero A. Crescini, for appellant.
Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, Assistant Solicitor General Conrado T. Limcaoco and
Solicitor Pio C. Guerrero for appellee.
AQUINO, J.:
Cosme Monleon appealed from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, finding him guilty
of parricide, sentencing him to reclusion perpetua, and ordering him to pay the heirs of his deceased
wife, Concordia Bongo, an indemnity of twelve thousand pesos plus moral damages in the sum of two
thousand pesos (Criminal Case No. BO-121).
After that judgment was read to him in open court on January 11, 1973, he asked that the penalty be
reduced (156 tsn). The court advised him to appeal if he was not satisfied with the penalty.
The Solicitor General submits that the judgment of conviction should be affirmed but recommends
executive clemency because the penalty of reclusion perpetua appears to be excessive, considering
the degree of malice exhibited by Monleon (Art. 5, Revised Penal Code; Sec. 14, Art. IX, 1973
Constitution).
The judgment was based on the following facts:
Appellant Monleon and his wife, Concordia Bongo, who had been married for twenty-six years (Exh.
A), were residents of Barrio Lunas, Borbon, Cebu. On June 1, 1970 Monleon, a forty-five year old
illiterate farmer, worked in the palihug (a sort of bayanihan) at the farm of Tomas Rosello, his
brother-in-law. There, he imbibed copious amounts of tuba, the coconut wine that is a causative
factor in the rampancy of criminality or lawlessness in rural areas.
At about seven o'clock in the evening of that day, June 1, Cosme Monleon arrived at his house. He
was drunk. He inquired from Concordia whether their carabao had been fed by their ten-year old
son, Marciano. She assured him that the carabao had been fed. He repaired to the place where the
carabao was tethered to check the veracity of her statement. He discovered that the carabao had not
been adequately fed. He became furious.
When he was about to whip Marciano, Concordia intervened. A violent quarrel ensued between
them. He placed himself astride his wife's chest, squezzed her neck, pressed her head against a post,
and kicked her in the abdomen.
He shouted: "What do I care if there would be someone who would be buried tomorrow. You let your
brothers and sisters stand up and I will also include them." Felicisimo, one of the couple's six
children, pulled away his father and stopped his assault on Concordia.
The following morning Concordia vomitted blood. She died at eleven o'clock on that morning of June
2. Death was due to "acute abdomen" (Exh. B), a pathologic condition within the belly, requiring
surgical intervention (Blakiston's New Gould Medical Dictionary, 2nd Edition, page 2).
Sixteen days after Concordia Bongo's death, or on June 18, Monleon thumbmarked a confession,
written in the Cebuano dialect and sworn to before the town mayor (Exh. C). He admitted in that
confession that he assaulted his wife and that he had repented for the wrong which he had done to
her. He orally admitted to Perfecto Bongo, a lieutenant in the Cebu City police department and a
175
relative of Concordia, that he (Monleon) assaulted his wife because he was drunk and she was a
nagger (133-134 tsn November 24, 1972).
On July 31, 1970 or about two months after Concordia's death, a medico-legal officer of the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI) exhumed her body. He found bluish-black discolorations on the
sphenoid temporal bones of her skull, on the atlas or cervical vertebra below the skull or at the base
of the neck, and on the first ribs. The discolorations were due to internal hemorrhage "caused by
trauma or external violence" (Exh. D-1; 21-24 tsn). The doctor ventured the opinion that the "acute
abdomen" could have been caused "by external violence" (37 tsn).
Appellant Monleon, by means of his testimony and the testimonies of his nineteen-year old daughter,
Felicisima, and his twelve-year old son, Marciano (a third-grade pupil), denied that he used violence
against his wife. He testified that he and his wife had merely a verbal quarrel and that Clemencia
Bongo-Monleon, the sister of Concordia and the wife of his elder brother, testified against him
because Clemencia and Monleon had a boundary dispute regarding the lands inherited by Clemencia
and Concordia from their father, Victor Bongo.
Monleon said that Lieutenant Bongo asked him to sign a "recibo" that he would take care of his
children (113 tsn). He also said that some persons threatened to kill him if he did not affix his
thumbmark to his confession (116 tsn).
As already stated, the trial court convicted Monleon of parricide. In this appeal, his counsel de oficio
the trial court erred in giving credence to Monleon's confession, the affidavit of his son, Marciano
(Exh. E), and the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, Clemencia Bongo-Monleon, Epifania
Bongo, Perfecto Bongo, and the NBI medico-legal officer, Doctor Ceferino Cunanan; in treating the
alleged declarations of Concordia Bongo to Clemencia's husband as part of the res gestae and in
rejecting the testimonies of Monleon and his two children, Marciano and Felicisima.
The crucial fact in this case is that Monleon feloniously assaulted his wife in the evening of June 1,
1970 by choking her, bashing her head against a post and kicking her in the abdomen. He did not use
any weapon but the acts of physical violence which he inflicted on her produced internal
complications which caused her to vomit blood the next day and eventually snuffed out her life.
The corpus delicti or the fact of the commission of the crime of which Concordia Bongo was the
victim was established by the prosecution witnesses, Clemencia Bongo-Monleon and Epifania Bongo.
Hence, Monleon's extrajudicial confession (Exh. C) was corroborated by evidence of the corpus
delicti (Sec. 3, Rule 133 and sec. 29, Rule 130, Rules of Court).
The trial court said that it took pains to observe the demeanor on the witness stand of the mayor
Epifania, and Clemencia, who all testified for the prosecution, and appellant Monleon himself. It was
convinced that the confession "was voluntarily executed by the accused."
Appellant's counsel de oficio contends that there are discrepancies between Monleon's confession
and the version given by the prosecution witnesses, Epifania and Clemencia. Those two witnesses
testified that Concordia died at eleven o'clock in the morning while Monleon in his confession
declared that his wife died at one o'clock in the afternoon. Another discrepancy is that according to
prosecution witnesses Monleon was not present when his wife died but according to the confession,
he was with her when she breathed her last. Counsel de oficio also points out that the confession was
supposed to have been thumbmarked on June 16, 1970 and then sworn to before the mayor two days
later or on June 18 but, according to Lieutenant Bongo, he investigated Monleon in the early
morning of June 18 and his confession was executed at that time.
We are of the opinion that those discrepancies do not destroy the probative value of the confession
nor negate Monleon's admission therein that he assaulted his wife. A court may reject portions of the
confession by reason of the improbability of the facts or statements therein or because of their falsity
or untrustworthiness (People vs. Layos, 60 Phil. 760; People vs. Piring, 63 Phil. 546; People vs.
Villanueva, 115 Phil. 858; 22 C.J.S. 1479).
The mayor and Lieutenant Bongo testified that Monleon was not forced to affix his thumbmark to
the confession. There is no evidence that he was tortured or maltreated. Monleon could have
complained to the fiscal during the preliminary investigation that he was forced to execute his
confession. He did not do so.
Attorney Prospero A. Crescini, appellant's counsel de oficio, examined meticulously the evidence,
conscientiously studied Page 268 the case and submitted a good brief. He points out that Clemencia
and Epifania did not mention that they saw each other when they allegedly witnessed the assault
made by Monleon on his wife; that they did not report immediately to the authorities the alleged
incident; that it was strange that Epifania did not ask her husband, Gervasio Bongo, the brother of
the victim, to stop the assault, and that Clemencia failed to summon her husband, an elder brother of
Monleon, to pacify the latter.
negligent son. He could have easily killed his wife had he really intended to take her life. He did not
kill her outright.
The trial court did not appreciate any mitigating circumstances in favor of Monleon. The Solicitor
General is correct in finding that the extenuating circumstances of lack of intent to commit so grave a
wrong and intoxication, which was not habitual, are present in this case. Hence, the penalty
imposable on Monleon is reclusion perpetua (Arts. 63[3] and 246, Revised Penal Code).

Those acts and omission of Clemencia and Epifania do not render their testimonies worthless The
two prosecution witnesses are uneducated. The fiscal in his direct examination and the defense
counsel did not ask them whether they saw each other in the yard of Monleon's house when they
allegedly saw Monleon mauling his wife. Most likely, they assumed that Monleon was merely
chastising his wife, as he had repeatedly done in the past, and that he did not intend to kill her. They
were not cognizant at first of the grave consequences resulting from Monleon's violent acts. Hence,
they did not see the necessity of the intervention of other persons or of the barrio captain and the
police.
Appellant's counsel argues that the trial court erred in admitting Marciano Monleon's affidavit which
was written in the Cebuano dialect (Exh. E) and which was not accompanied with the corresponding
translation. That confession is well-taken.
The trial court erred in admitting that affidavit over the objection of appellant's counsel because
section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides that documents written in an unofficial language
shall not be admitted as evidence, unless accompanied with a translation into English, Spanish or the
national language "To avoid interruption of proceedings, parties or their attorneys are directed to
have such translation prepared before trial" (See. 34).
Also meritorious is appellant's contention that the trial court erred in ruling that the alleged
declarations of Concordia Bongo to the husband of Clemencia Bongo Monleon, as to the violent acts
inflicted upon her (Concordia) by appellant Monleon, are part of the res gestae. That ruling was
made in connection with Clemencia's testimony (not on direct examination but in answer to the
questions of the trial judge) that at eight o'clock in the evening of June 1, 1970, or about an hour after
Concordia was assaulted by Monleon, she (Concordia) left her house and went to Clemencia's house
three hundred meters away and recounted to Clemencia's husband (appellant Monleon's brother)
how she was beaten by Monleon (22 tsn).
But considering that Monleon had no intent to kill his wife and that her death might have been
hastened by lack of appropriate medical attendance or her weak constitution, the penalty
of reclusion perpetua appears to be excessive. A strict enforcement of the provisions of the Penal
Code means the imposition of a draconian penalty on Monleon.
This case is similar to People vs. Rabao, 67 Phil. 255 where the husband quarrelled with his wife
because he wanted to restrain her from giving a bath to their child, who had a cold. In the course of
the quarrel, he punched her in the abdomen. As a result she suffered an attack and died. He was
convicted of parricide and sentenced to reclusion perpetua. The commutation of the penalty was
recommended to the Chief Executive (See People vs. Formigones, 87 Phil. 658; U.S. vs. Guevara, 10
Phil. 37; People vs. Castañeda, 60 Phil. 604, 609; People vs. Gungab, 64 Phil. 779).
Therefore, there is sufficient justification for the Solicitor General's recommendation that Monleon's
case be brought to the attention of the Chief Executive so that the penalty of reclusion perpetua may
be reduced.
WHEREFORE, the trial court's judgment is affirmed. Pursuant to article 5 of the Revised Penal Code,
a certified copy of this decision should be furnished the Chief Executive through the Secretary of
Justice (See sec. 3[1], Art. XVII, 1973 Constitution). Costs against the appellant.
SO ORDERED.

Appellants counsel observed that it was incredible that Concordia, after being severely maltreated by
Monleon (according to the prosecution's version), would still have the strength to go to Clemencia's
house which was located on a hill.

Clemencia's testimony reveals that she must have been confused in making that assertion, assuming
that it was accurately translated and reported. A careful scrutiny of her entire testimony reveals that
what she really meant was that Concordia on the following day, June 2, recounted to her, as
Concordia recounted also to Epifania, how she was maltreated by Monleon. In all probability what
happened was that Clemencia, on arriving at her house at around eight o'clock in the evening of June
1, apprised her husband that she witnessed the assault made by Monleon on her sister, Concordia.

The trial court's error in regarding as part of the res gestae the statement supposedly made by
Concordia to Clemencia's husband immediately after the incident and its error in admitting
Monleon's affidavit are not sufficient to exculpate Monleon or engender any reasonable doubt as to
his guilt.

The testimonies of Epifania and Clemencia, the confession of Monleon, as supported by the
testimonies of the mayor and Lieutenant Bongo, and the expert opinion of the NBI medico-legal
officer are sufficient to establish the guilt of appellant Monleon.

The instant case is covered by article 4 of the Revised Penal Code which provides that criminal
liability is incurred by any person committing a felony although the wrongful act done be different
from that which he intended. The maltreatment inflicted by Monleon on his wife was the proximate
cause of her death.

Monleon in his inebriated state had no intent to kill her. He was infuriated because his son did not
feed his carabao. He was provoked to castigate his wife because she prevented him from whipping his

176

[G.R. No. 118607. March 4, 1997]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JULITO FRANCO
TIANSON, accused-appellant.
DECISION
FRANCISCO, J.:
Appellant JULITO FRANCO y TIANSON was charged with and convicted of the crime of
[1] [2]
robbery with homicide.[3] He was sentenced to reclusion perpetua and directed to indemnify Dunkin'
Donut and the heirs of Aurelio Cuya, in the amounts of P12,000.00 and P30,000.00, respectively.
Contending "that the trial court erred in convicting x x x him x x x [based] on evidence illegally
obtained,"[4] appellant now interposes this appeal. For its part, the Solicitor General recommended
appellant's acquittal on the ground that "his guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt." [5]
The appeal is impressed with merit.
Quoted hereunder is the narration of the factual antecedents of this case, as summarized by the
Solicitor General in its Manifestation,[6] and duly supported by the evidence on record:
On August 9, 1991 at around 6:45 a.m., Angelo Tongko, then an employee of Dunkin Donut located at
Quintin Paredes [Street], Binondo, Manila, discovered the lifeless body of Aurelio Cuya, a security
guard of the said establishment (tsn, Nov. 19, 1991, pp. 2-3). Upon discovery of the lifeless body,
Tongko informed his co-workers, (ibid, p. 3) who then reported the matter to the police (ibid. p, 3).
Upon investigation by the police, the branch supervisor of Dunkin Donut informed the police that
the total sales of the establishment on August 8, 1991 in the amount of P10,000.00 and which was
allegedly kept in the safety locker in the same place where the dead body was found, was missing
(ibid, p., 7, Exh. K). The supervisor of the security agency where the victim was employed also
informed the police that he suspected the appellant as the culprit (ibid, p. 15, Exh. K). Acting on this
allegation by the supervisor, the police proceeded to the place of appellant and were able to interview
Maribel Diong ("Diong") and Hilda Dolera ("Dolera") (ibid, p. 15; Exh. L). The police then tried to
convince Diong and Dolera, who allegedly told the police that appellant allegedly confessed to them
that he killed somebody in the evening of August 8, 1991 (ibid). Diong and Dolera were not presented
in court to substantiate their affidavits.
Based on the alleged statements of Diong and Dolera, the police formed a team to apprehend the
appellant who allegedly had an agreement to meet Dolera (Exh. L). On August 10, 1991, appellant
was apprehended by the police in front of Jollibee Restaurant in Caloocan City (ibid, pp. 9, 16).
Allegedly recovered from the appellant were the amount of P2,415.00 and one handgun which was in
his cousin's residence (ibid, p. 16).
Thereafter, appellant was brought to the police headquarters where his confession (Exh. N) was
taken on August 12, 1991 allegedly on his freewill and with the assistance of a lawyer (ibid, pp. 13-14).
A booking and arrest report was also prepared by Pat. Nestor Napao-it on August 12, 1991 (Exh. J). [7]
The trial court convicted the appellant on the basis principally of his alleged extra-judicial
confession.[8] This is evident from the assailed decision which even quoted the pertinent portions of
the aforementioned extra-judicial confession.[9] But gospel truth as it may seem, we cannot stamp
with approval the trial court's undue consideration and reliance on this extra-judicial confession for,
as the records reveal, the same was not offered in evidence by the prosecution. [10] Neither were its
contents recited by the appellant in his testimony. [11] It was a grave error for the trial court, therefore,
to have considered the same, let alone be the basis of appellant's conviction.
We thus reiterate the rule hat the court shall consider no evidence which has not been
formally offered.[12] So fundamental is this injunction that litigants alike are corollarily enjoined to
formally offer any evidence which they desire the court to consider. [13] Mr. Chief Justice Moran
explained the rationale behind the rule in this wise:
x x x "the offer is necessary because it is the duty of a judge to rest his findings of facts and his
judgment only and strictly upon the evidence offered by the parties to the suit." [14]
It cannot be argued either that since the extra-judicial confession has been identified and
marked as Exhibit "N" by the prosecution in the course of the cross-examination of the appellant,
[15]
then it may now be validly considered by the trial court. Indeed, there is a significant distinction
between identification of documentary evidence and its formal offer. [16] The former is done in the
y course of the trial and is accompanied by the marking of the evidence as an exhibit, while the latter is
done only when the party rests its case. Our settled rule incidentally is that the mere fact that a
particular document is identified and marked as an exhibit does not mean that it has thereby already
been offered as part of the evidence of a party.[17]
From the records, it appears that not a single person witnessed the incident. In fact, aside from
the testimony of police investigator Pat. Nestor Napao-it, none of the other three prosecution
witnesses, to wit: (1) Angelo Tongko a Dunkin' Donut employee who testified to have found the body
of Aurelio Cuya inside the supervisor's room of the establishment in the early morning of August 9,
1991,[18] (2) Dr. Marcial Cenido the physician who autopsied the body of Aurelio Cuya, and who
testified on the cause of the latter's death; [19] and (3) Teresita Cuya the wife of Aurelio Cuya who
testified on the civil aspect of the case, [20] ever imputed, directly or indirectly, to the appellant the
commission of the crime. With respect to the testimony of Pat. Nestor Napao-it, [21] there is no dispute
that his testimony on the conduct of the investigation is admissible in evidence because he has
personal knowledge of the same.[22] However, his testimony on appellant's alleged separate
confession/admission to Hilda Dolera and Maribel Diong, which the trial court invariably considered
in its decision as establishing the truth of the facts asserted therein, is hearsay. In the terse language
of Woodroffes, said testimony is "the evidence not of what the witness knows himself but of what he
has heard from others"[23]And whether objected to or not, as in this case, said testimony has no
probative value[24]. To repeat, the failure of the defense to object to the presentation of incompetent
evidence, like hearsay, does not give such evidence any probative value.
Anent the issue of admissibility of Exhibits "F"[25] and "G"[26] original and additional sworn
statements of Maribel Diong, and Exhibits "H"[27] and "I"[28] original and additional sworn
statements of Hilda Dolera, it assumes significance to note that their admission in evidence has been
seasonably objected to by the appellant on the ground that they are hearsay. [29] The trial court
nonetheless admitted them "as part of the testimony of Pat. Nestor Napao-it". [30] While we agree that
these exhibits are admissible in evidence, their admission should be for the purpose merely of
establishing that they were in fact executed [31] They do not establish the truth of the facts asserted
therein.[32] In this case, our reading of the assailed decision, however, reveals that the foregoing
exhibits were undoubtedly considered by the trial court as establishing the truth of the facts asserted
therein. And herein lies another fatal error committed by the trial court because, without Maribel
Diong and Hilda Dolera being called to the witness stand to affirm the contents of their sworn
statements, the allegations therein are necessarily hearsay [33] and therefore inadmissible. A contrary
rule would render nugatory appellant's constitutional right of confrontation which guarantees him
the right to cross-examine the witnesses for the prosecution.
Truly, it is our policy to accord proper deference to the factual findings of the court below
especially when the issue pertains to credibility of witnesses. But no such issue is involved here.
Instead, the principal issue raised herein is whether or not the evidence adduced by the prosecution
are sufficient to overcome appellant's constitutional right to be presumed innocent. We believe in the
negative, hence, we acquit.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 33, convicting the
appellant of the crime of robbery with homicide is REVERSED. Appellant JULITO FRANCO y
TIANSON is hereby ACQUITTED and his immediate release from prison is ordered unless he is
being held on other legal grounds. No costs.
It is SO ORDERED.
177
178
G.R. No. 104611 November 10, 1993
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FELIMON JAVA Y MERCADO, accused-appellant
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Aida D. Dizon for accused-appellant.
NOCON, J.:
Convicted of the crime of robbery with homicide in Criminal Case No. 88-372 before the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch CIII, accused Felimon Java y Mercado interposed this present
appeal. Enumerating eight (8) errors which the trial court allegedly committed, he dutifully
discussed each of them and insisted on his innocence. Sequentially, we will analyze the merit of each
of the said errors, to wit:
I several times and turned left at Katipunan Road. However, the holduppers followed them and
. . . . IN HOLDING THAT SALVADOR CAMBAYA POSITIVELY IDENTIFIED
ACCUSED-APPELLANT AS A PRINCIPAL ACTOR IN THE COMMISSION OF
THE CRIME AT BAR.
II
. . . . IN HOLDING THAT ACCUSED-APPELLANT COMMITTED ROBBERY
AGAINST THE PERSONS OF MICHAEL VALDEZ AND VIRGINIA VALDEZ.
III
. . . . IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF PASTOR VALDEZ IN
SPITE THE FACT THAT HIS TESTIMONY WAS NOT FORMALLY OFFERED
BY THE PROSECUTION.
IV
. . . . IN HOLDING THAT VIRGINIA VALDEZ POSITIVELY IDENTIFIED
ACCUSED-APPELLANT AS A PRINCIPAL ACTOR IN THE COMMISSION OF
THE CRIME AT BAR.
V an information was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City charging him with the crime of
. . . . IN FINDING ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY OF THE CRIME OF
ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE
VI
. . . . IN FINDING ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY OF THE CRIME OF
ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE BASED ON EVIDENCE NOT ON RECORD.
VII
. . . . IN NOT GIVING CREDENCE TO TESTIMONY OF COL. RODOLFO
GARCIA AND OTHER DEFENSE WITNESSES.
VIII
. . . . IN NOT GIVING CREDENCE TO THE DEFENSE OF ALIBI OF ACCUSED-
APPELLANT. 1
The facts upon which the trial court based its decision convicting the accused are as follows:
179
At about 3:00 p.m. on March 19, 1988, at the V. Valdez Trading, a gravel and sand establishment
located at P. Tuazon Street, Cubao, Quezon City, two men appearing to be customers, arrived. One of
them proceeded to the office building while the other approached Salvador Cambaya a truck helper,
while the latter was weighing cement in front of the establishment. This man poked a gun at
Cambaya, announced a hold-up, divested him of his P20.00 and ordered him to enter the office
building where he and other employees and a customer were gathered in front of the counter by the
man identified later as accused Felimon Java. The other man ransacked the drawers and found some
money which he took. Then he proceeded to the room where Michael Valdez, the son of the owner of
the establishment was. Michael was heard as saying "Wala sa. akin ang susi" and "walang pera
diyan". The employees gathered in front of the counter also heard something being destroyed and
after a while, saw the man rush out holding a brown envelope. The two men hurriedly left.
Meanwhile, Virginia Cabate Valdez, the mother of Michael Valdez, was at the beauty parlor in front
of their establishment. She was informed by the owner of the parlor that a commotion was going on
at their place. She rushed out and was informed by her son, Michael, that they had just been robbed
of P50,000.00. Since Michael decided to run after the holduppers and he could not be stopped from
doing so, she boarded the car of Michael, a 'Toyota, and went with him. They drove along 20th
Avenue and turned left, at Boni Serrano where Michael saw and pointed to the get-away vehicle of
the holduppers, which was a maroon-colored passenger jeepney. Michael bumped the jeepney
bumped their car several times at the rear and sides. Somewhere further along the Katipunan Road,
one of the holduppers fired a gun hitting the rear glass of Michael's car. While the jeepney was side
by side with their car, he fired more shots at them hitting Michael on the torso and on the left side of
his body. As a result, Michael died. The holduppers sped away towards Quirino Labor Hospital.
Salvador Cambaya described to the Quezon City cartographer the physical characteristics of the man
who accosted him as follows: "5'5" and taas, mga 28-30 an edad, maitim, mabilog ang katawan, kulot
na medyo maikli ang buhok, pabilog din ang mukha," 2
On the other hand, Mrs. Valdez described the man who killed her son as:
Bilog ang mukha, maitim, bilog ang katawan, mga 35-40, kulot ang buhok. 3
On August 25, 1988 at around 11:00 a.m., Pat. Zaragosa, a police operative, went to see Mrs. Valdez
and asked her whether she would be able to recognize the man who killed her son if she saw him
again. Answering in the affirmative, she was brought to Quezon City Hall and advised to be
observant. When they were on a street near the office, of the Metro Manila Commission, she saw a
man inside the building which was 20 to 25 meters away. She could see him from the neck up as the
latter was facing the window. She positively declared that he was the gunman and could not be wrong
because she could not forget the face, especially the eyes of the man who shot her son.
As a result of such identification, accused was arrested on August 26, 1988 and on August 29, 1988,
Robbery with Homicide, which read as follows:
That on or about the 19th day of March, 1988, in Quezon City, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Court, the said accused, conspiring together,
confederating with and mutually helping one another, with intent of gain, with
violence and/or intimidation of person, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously (sic) VIRGINIA VALDEZ y CABOTE and MICHAEL VALDEZ y
CABOTE, mother and son respectively, by then and there, pointing their
respective firearms at them and thereafter take, rob and divested the victims'
collection for the day amounting to P50,000.00, Philippine Currency, to the
damage and prejudice of the said owner thereof in the total sum; that on the
occasion of the said robbery, the said accused, conspiring together,
confederating with and mutually helping one another, with intent to kill attack,
assault and employ personal violence against Michael Valdez y Cabote, by then
and there shooting him with a .38 cal. revolver marked Smith and Wesson,
hitting him on his left breast, thereby inflicting him serious and mortal wounds
which were the directed and immediate cause of his death, to the damage and
prejudice of the heirs of the said Michael Valdez in such amount as may be
awarded under the provisions of the Civil Code.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 4
At the trial of the case, Salvador Cambaya and Mrs. Valdez recounted the aforesaid facts. Mrs. Valdez
testified that her family spent P13,833.20 for the Manila Memorial Park lot, P55,000, for the funeral
services and P20,000.00 for the wake or a total of P48,833.20.
Pastor Valdez, Michael's father testified that his establishment lost P50,000.00 to the robbers. He
explained that Michael had collected P40,000.00 from a customer in Taguig, Rizal and the P10,000
came from the proceeds of the sale of construction materials that day. He handed the P10,000.00 to
Michael to be placed together with the P40,000.00 in the cabinet.
The defense evidence consisted, among others, of the testimony of accused Felimon Java and his
witnesses, namely Col. Rodolfo Garcia, Patrolman Jose Malasa and Pfc. Mario Almariego. All their
testimonies evinced the theory that accused could not have committed the crime charged as he was at
the office of Colonel Rodolfo Garcia, who was then the Station Commander of the Quezon City Police
Force at the precise time and date as that of the commission of the offense.
Felimon Java testified that he was a former Quezon City policeman; that he was dismissed from the
service on April 24, 1987 in view of an administrative case against him for violation of domicile; that
when he was separated from the service, he bought a tricycle to earn a living; that in the month of
July, 1988, he was a member of the Quezon City People's Patrol serving as security guard for Sonny
Pumarada; and that from August 1, 1988 up to the time of his arrest, he was working as civilian agent
of Western Sector Command, Malacañang Park, Metro Manila. On August 26, 1988, he was at
Quezon City Hall particularly at the Metro Manila Commission Compound, together with one Sgt.
Caingles, conducting a surveillance, when he was apprehended by Patrolman Zaragosa and brought
to the office of one Major Rosales at Kamuning, EDSA. He claimed that Major Rosales, being the
Supreme of the Guardians Chapter and Pat. Zaragosa, a member thereof, had both an ax to grind
against him because on January 13, 1987, he, shot dead two marines who were members of the
Guardians who attacked their headquarters at Kamuning, Quezon City during, the coup attempt. He
was then a sentinel at the said police headquarters.
On March 19, 1988, from 2:30 to 4:00 p.m., he was at the office of Col. Rodolfo M. Garcia asking for
a letter of recommendation to Col Guillermo Domondon for his reinstatement to the service. He
presented to the court said letter of recommendation dated March 19, 1993 quoted herein as follows:
Col. Guillermo Domondon
C, C1 Division
Camp Crame, Q.C.
Dear Sir:
Please help bearer, Pat Felimon Java in this reinstatement
Regards, who accosted him, there is no mistaking that accused-appellant is one of the perpetrators of the
Rudy
He brought the letter of recommendation to Col. Domondon but was informed by one Rodriguez that
the latter was out of town and that anyway, he already had a recommendation from Colonel Jaro, an
aide of then Gen. Fidel Ramos. He didn't know about that Jaro recommendation but remembered
that he had previously sought Col. Jaro to accompany him to see Col. Domondon when he was with
the People's Patrol.
Pfc. Mario Almariego and Patrolman Jose Malasa corroborated his claim that he was at the office of
Col. Garcia between 2:00 to 4:00 o'clock p.m. of March 19, 1988 for the purpose of securing a
recommendation and that he lingered for some more time after getting the same.
Col. Rodolfo M. Garcia likewise confirmed the visit of the accused but also admitted that his office is
swarmed with visitors everyday and he cannot memorize the names of people who see him.
He also said that the accused visited him again after he gave that note of recommendation asking for
assistance to get employed. He, remembered recommending him to a certain Sonny Pumarada who
works at the Quezon City Hall.
After trial, accused was convicted of the offense charged, the dispositive portion of which read as
follows:
180
ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered finding FELIMON JAVA Y
MERCADO GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt. as principal for the crime of
Robbery with Homicide. Said Felimon Java is hereby sentenced to suffer a jail
term of RECLUSION PERPETUA
On the civil aspect said accused Felimon Java is hereby ordered to pay the
spouses Pastor and Virginia Valdez the sum of P150,000.00 in relation to the
robbery at bar, the sum of P50,000.00 as actual damages for the death of their
son Michael Valdez, the sum of P100,000.00 as moral damages and another
P100,000.00 as exemplary damages. No costs.
SO ORDERED. 6
Going through the eight assignments of errors allegedly committed by the trial court we note that the
thrust of the defense particularly in the first assignment of error is centered on the want of positive
identification of the perpetrator of the crime. The accused-appellant harped on the disparity in the
cartographs of the supposed suspects, Exhibits "E" and "C", based on the descriptions given by the
prosecution witnesses Salvador Cambaya and Virginia Valdez, respectively.
While conceding that the cartographs do not portray the same person, a comparison, however, of 'the
descriptions given by said prosecution witnesses in their respective sworn statements previously
quoted herein shows that except for the age range of the accused-appellant, all the details agree and
point to one and the same person. Both descriptions speak of a person with a circular face, stocky
physique and curly hair. Thus, it is not the witnesses' fault if the cartographs came up with slightly
different drawings of the accused-appellant. The cartographer could have perceived declarations
along different lines. Nevertheless, the important factor is that both witnesses identified the accused-
appellant in court when they came face to face with him and pinpointed to him respectively as one of
the robbers and the gunman.
While the evidence as to the identity of the accused-appellant as the person who committed the crime
should be carefully analyzed, the Court has consistently held that where conditions of visibility are:
favorable and the witness does not appear to be biased against the man on the dock, his or her
assertions as to the identity of the malefactor should be normally accepted. 7
The witnesses in this case, particularly Mrs. Valdez, had a clear recollection of the identity of the
assailant of her son. She categorically declared that she had a good look at him and could not forget
his face, particularly his eyes. She was not the kind of person that would perjure herself just to get a
man into trouble. She had no motive for filing the case against the accused-appellant other than to
seek redress not so much for the loss of the earnings of their establishment but more so for the death
of her son. In the face of her clear and positive testimony regarding the accused-appellant's role as
the gunman of her son, as well as Cambaya's positive identification of the same person as the man
crime.
Accused-appellant next claims in his second and third assignments of errors, that the prosecution
failed to establish the fact of robbery because only two witnesses testified to the same, namely:
Cambaya, who declared that accused-appellant got his P20.00, and Pastor Valdez, whose testimony
was not offered by the prosecution at the time he testified in court on November 14, 1989 and hence
cannot be considered pursuant to Sections 34 and 35 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Indeed, Section 34, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court requires that for evidence to be
considered, it should be formally offered and the purpose specified. This is necessary because judge
has to rest his findings of fact and his judgment only upon the evidence offered by the parties at the
trial. 8
Under, the new procedure as spelled out in Section 35 of the said rule which became effective on July
1, 1989, the offer of the testimony of a witness must be made at the time the witness is called to
testify. The previous practice was to offer the testimonial evidence at the end of the trial after all the
witnesses had testified. With the innovation, the court is put on notice whether the witness to be
presented is a material witness and should be heard, or a witness who would be testifying on
irrelevant matter or on facts already testified to by other witnesses and should therefore, be stopped
from testifying further.
In the case at bar, we note that Pastor Valdez was not one of the witnesses originally intended to be
presented by the prosecution. He was merely called to the witness stand at the latter part of the
presentation of the prosecution's evidence. There was no mention why his testimony was being
presented. However, notwithstanding that his testimony was not formally offered, its presentation
was not objected to either. Section 36 of the aforementioned Rule requires that an objection in the
course of the oral examination of a witness should be made as soon as the grounds therefor shall
become reasonably apparent.. Since no objection to the admissibility of evidence was made in the
court below, an objection raised for the first time on appeal will not be considered. 9
Besides, even if the testimony of Pastor Valdez were not admitted, the robbery was established by the
testimony of Cambaya who not only stated that his P20.00 was taken at the point of a gun but that
accused-appellant's companion ransacked their office, found and fled away with some money. He
was not sure only of the exact amount taken. At any rate, the amount stolen came to be known when
Mrs. Valdez who rushed to their office, after being informed of a commotion therein, testified to
being informed by her son, Michael, that they have been robbed of P50,000.00. This statement is
admissible as part of the res gestae, having been made immediately after a startling occurrence and
before the declarant had time to concoct matters so that his utterance at that time was merely a reflex
product of his immediate sensual impression. Said statements is admissible in evidence as one of the
exceptions to the hearsay rule on the ground of trustworthiness and necessity.
Zeroing in on Mrs. Valdez' identification of her son's assailant, subject of the fourth assignment of
error, accused-appellant pointed out that at the time of the car chase, Mrs. Valdez was so tense,
nervous and excited, continually hugging her son until the time that he was shot, so that her
attention must have been focused on her son and not on the assailant. On top of that, Mrs. Valdez
who was wearing eyeglasses admitted that she was crying at that time, so much so that the accused-
appellant surmised that her glasses must have misted and blocked her vision.
Accused-appellant's conjectures have no basis in fact and collide with Mrs. Valdez' testimony that she
had a good look at the assailant in the passenger jeep. Indeed some circumstances do not always
produce the same effects as accused-appellant would want us to believe. Considering the relative
positions of the passenger jeepney where the accused-appellant was riding in and the Toyota car
driven by the victim with his mother as passenger, which were running side by side at high speed
when the shooting occurred, we find it impossible for the assailant not to be seen and identified by
Mrs. Valdez. A witness usually strive to remember the uncovered face of the assailant. 10 This, Mrs.
Valdez must have done.
Accused-appellant's fifth and sixth assigned errors center on the alleged failure of the prosecution to
prove that those who committed the robbery and those who killed the victim are one and the same
persons as to establish the crime of robbery with homicide.
Not only are these arguments fallacious but have no leg to stand on. Prosecution witness Salvador
Cambaya positively identified the accused-appellant as one of those who held him up as well as the
establishment where he works. While Mrs. Valdez identified the same accused-appellant as the jeep
passenger who shot and killed his son. Hence, the connection between the robbery and the homicide
was sufficiently established.
True, the robbers in the case at bar had already fled with their loot when the shooting of the victim
took place during his hot pursuit of the culprits. It is settled that where the deceased attacked and
stopped the robbers when they had already come out of the store where the robbery was committed
and got killed in the process, it cannot be denied that the act of killing was done in order to repel an
aggression which, had it been effective, would have endangered the whole success of the robbery
committed. it was done, in the final analysis, in order to defend the possession of the stolen property.
It was therefore an act which tended to insure the successful termination of the robbery and secure to
the robbers the possession and enjoyment of the goods taken. 11
It has also been held that where the deceased followed the robbers after he had been robbed and by
reason thereof, he was fired upon by one of the robbers, the crime is robbery with homicide. 12
The same is true even if the murder was perpetrated at a place different from that of the robbery and
after an appreciable interval of time.13
As to accused-appellant's defense of alibi, subject of the seventh and eighth assignment of errors,
accused-appellant contends that the same is supported by the testimony of no less than Colonel
Rodolfo M. Garcia, Station Commander, QCPS, now Central Police District, who would not have
181
sacrificed his name and integrity by testifying in his favor if it not true that he was in the colonel's
office at the time of the commission of the offense. While it may be true that accused-appellant
indeed sought Col. Garcia's recommendation for reinstatement to the service on the date in question
as borne out by the letter of recommendation itself, which is dated March 19, 1988, such fact does
not conclusively prove that accused-appellant was at the colonel's office on said date and time as that
of the commission of the crime charged. There was no logbook which recorded his visit, nor the date
and time thereof; nor was the letter of recommendation recorded as having been issued by the
colonel's office on said date. Hence, there is no independent proof showing that Col. Garcia issued
said letter on March 19, 1988. The good Col. Garcia even admitted that he could not remember the
other people who visited him on said day or any day for that matter. Likewise, the trial judge noted
that accused-appellant presented this defense only long after the case has gone to trial and more
importantly, he noticed that the testimony of accused-appellant himself provided the clue that
indicated that his defense predicated on alibi has been merely contrived. Said the Judge in his
decision:
1. The centerpiece of the defense theory is the note of recommendation of Col.
Rodolfo Garcia for Felimon Java dated March 19, 1988. On the date the accused
by his own testimony, was still a tricycle driver as he joined the Quezon City
People's Patrol only on July 1988 upon the recommendation of Col. Garcia.
The testimony of Col. Garcia is that he recommended the accused to Mr.
Pumarada of the Quezon City People's Patrol after that March 19, 1988 visit
made by Java to him. But according to Java, when he went to the office of Col.
Domondon to present the note of recommendation issued by Col. Garcia, a
sergeant Rodriguez there told him that the Garcia note is unnecessary already
because he already has the Jaro Letter attached to Java's record. Consequently,
the Col. Jaro note must have preceded the Col. Garcia note-which is what the
defense wanted to convey. Yet, in the latter part of Java's narration in court he
stated that he was already with the People's Patrol when Col. Jaro accompanied
him to Col. Domondon. Inasmuch as (the) Col. Jaro note came ahead of (the)
Col. Garcia note and by the time the Col. Jaro note was given the accused was
already in the Quezon City People's Patrol, then the Col. Garcia note could not
have been issued on March 19, 1988 when Java was still a tricycle driver. 14
Thus, notwithstanding the stature of accused-appellant's witnesses, their testimonies may be
disregarded in the light of the other defense evidence at hand. Testimony to be believed must not
only proceed from a credible witness but must be credible in itself and be able to stand the test of
scrutiny along with the other testimonies. Thus, the accused-appellant's invocation of alibi is
unavailing not only by reason of its inherent weakness but also because of the circumstances pointing
to its contrived nature and his positive identification by the prosecution witnesses as one of the
persons who participated in the robbery and shot the victim.
In recapitulation, not even one of the eight arguments of accused-appellant in support of his appeal
proved its worth as an error. Not a tinge of doubt was created on the guilt of the accused-appellant.
On the other hand, the prosecution evidence showed that the positive identification made by of him
by no less than two prosecution witnesses was direct, clear and positive.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED in toto being in accordance with
law and the established facts of the case.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado and Puno, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 105813 September 12, 1994
CONCEPCION M. CATUIRA, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Arnold V. Guerrero & Associates for petitioner.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
Is the testimony of a witness inadmissible in evidence if not formally offered at the time the witness
is called to testify, as required in Sec. 35, in relation to Sec. 34, Rule 132, of the Revised Rules on
Evidence? 1
On 8 June 1990, two (2) Informations for estafa were filed against petitioner Concepcion M. Catuira
with the Regional Trial Court of Calamba, Laguna, for having issued two (2) checks in payment of her
obligation to private complainant Maxima Ocampo when petitioner had no sufficient funds to cover
the same, which checks upon presentment for payment were dishonored by the drawee bank. 2
After the prosecution had presented its evidence, petitioner Concepcion M. Catuira filed a Motion to
Dismiss (by way of Demurrer to Evidence) under Sec. 15, Rule 119, of the 1985 Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure. 3 Petitioner contended that the testimony of private respondent Ocampo was
inadmissible in evidence since it was not properly introduced when she was called to testify as
mandated in Sec. 35, Rule 132, of the Revised Rules on Evidence. Petitioner also argued that even if
the testimony of private respondent was considered, the evidence of the prosecution still failed to
prove that the checks were issued in payment of an obligation.
On 26 July 1991, the trial court denied the motion to dismiss for lack of merit. On 18 October 1991, it
likewise denied the motion to reconsider its denial of the motion to dismiss.
On 4 November 1991 petitioner elevated her case to the Court of Appeals through a petition
for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus. In a similar move, the appellate court rejected her
petition and sustained the trial court in its denial of the motion to dismiss. Hence, this recourse
seeking to annul the decision of the Court of Appeals rendered on 27 February 1992 as well as its
resolution of 1 June 1992. 4
Petitioner claims that the Court of Appeals erred when it accepted the testimony of private
respondent despite the undisputed fact that it was not offered at the time she was called to testify;
her testimony should have been stricken off the record pursuant to Sec. 34, Rule 132, which prohibits
the court from considering evidence which has not been formally offered; and, it was error for
respondent appellate court to declare that petitioner's objection was not done at the proper time
since under Sec. 36, Rule 132, 5 objection to evidence offered orally must be made immediately after
the offer is made. Evidently, petitioner could not have waived her right to object to the admissibility
of the testimony of private respondent since the rule requires that it must be done only at the time
such testimony is presented and the records plainly show that the opportunity for petitioner to object
only came when the prosecution attempted, albeit belatedly, to offer the testimony after it has rested
its case. 6
moment private respondent was called to testify without any prior offer having been made by the
proponent. Most apt is the observation of the appellate court:
While it is true that the prosecution failed to offer in evidence the testimony of
the complaining witness upon calling her to testify and that it was only after her
testimony and after the petitioner moved that it be stricken that the offer was
made, the respondent Court did not gravely err in not dismissing the case
against the petitioner on the ground invoked. For, she should have objected to
the testimony of the complaining witness when it was not first offered upon
calling her and should not have waited in ambush after she had already finished
testifying. By so doing she did not save the time of the Court in hearing the
testimony of the witness that after all according to her was inadmissible. And for
her failure to make known her objection at the proper time, the procedural error
or defect was
waived. 9
Indeed, the rationale behind Sec. 34, Rule 132, is manifest in the minutes of the Revision of Rules
Committee. 10Thus —
The new rule would require the testimony of a witness to offer it at the time the
witness is called to testify. This is the best time to offer the testimony so that the
court's time will not be wasted. Since it can right away rule on whether the
testimony is not necessary because it is irrelevant or immaterial.
If petitioner was genuinely concerned with the ends of justice being served, her actuations should
have been otherwise. Instead, she attempted to capitalize on a mere technicality to have the estafa
case against her dismissed. 11 But even assuming that petitioner's objection was timely, it was at best
pointless and superfluous. For there is no debating the fact that the testimony of complaining witness
is relevant and material in the criminal prosecution of petitioner for estafa. It is inconceivable that a
situation could exist wherein an offended party's testimony is immaterial in a criminal proceeding.
Consequently, even if the offer was belatedly made by the prosecution, there is no reason for the
testimony to be expunged from the record. On the contrary, the unoffered oral evidence must be
admitted if only to satisfy the court's sense of justice and fairness and to stress that substantial justice
may not be denied merely on the ground of technicality. 12
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals sustaining the order of the Regional Trial Court
of Calamba, Laguna, Br. 35, denying petitioner's motion to dismiss (by way of demurrer to evidence)
is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., Quiason and Kapunan, JJ., concur.
Cruz, J., is on leave.

The petition is devoid of merit. The reason for requiring that evidence be formally introduced is to
enable the court to rule intelligently upon the objection to the questions which have been asked. 7 As
a general rule, the proponent must show its relevancy, materiality and competency. Where the
proponent offers evidence deemed by counsel of the adverse party to be inadmissible for any reason,
the latter has the right to object. But such right is a mere privilege which can be waived. Necessarily,
the objection must be made at the earliest opportunity, lest silence when there is opportunity to
speak may operate as a waiver of objections. 8

Thus, while it is true that the prosecution failed to offer the questioned testimony when private
respondent was called to the witness stand, petitioner waived this procedural error by failing to
object at the appropriate time, i.e., when the ground for objection became reasonably apparent the

182
183
G.R. No. 86062 June 6, 1990
INTERPACIFIC TRANSIT, INC., petitioner,
vs.
RUFO AVILES and JOSEPHINE AVILES, respondents.
Balane, Barican, Cruz, Alampay Law Office for petitioner.
Francisco G. Mendoza private respondents.
CRUZ, J.:
This case hinges on the proper interpretation and application of the rules on the admissibility of
documentary evidence and the viability. of a civil action for damages arising from the same acts
imputed to the defendant in a criminal action where he has been acquitted.
In the information filed against Rufo and Josephine Aviles, the private respondents herein, it was
alleged that being then sub-agents of Interpacific Transit, Inc. and as such enjoying its trust and
confidence, they collected from its various clients payments for airway bills in the amount of
P204,030.66 which, instead of remitting it to their principal, they unlawfully converted to their own
personal use and benefit. 1
At the trial, the prosecution introduced photocopies of the airway bills supposedly received by the
accused for which they had not rendered proper accounting. This was done in, the course of the
direct examination of one of the prosecution witnesses. 2 The defense objected to their presentation,
invoking the best evidence rule. The prosecution said it would submit the original airway bills in due
time. Upon such undertaking, the trial court allowed the marking of the said documents a s Exhibits
"B" to "OO." The e prosecution n did submit the original airway bills nor did it prove their loss to
justify their substitution with secondary evidence. Nevertheless, when the certified photocopies of
the said bills formally were offered, 3 in evidence, the defense interposed no objection.
In acquitting the accused, Judge Herminio I. Benito of the Regional Trial Court of Makati rejected
the agency theory of the prosecution and held that the relationship between the petitioner and Rufo
Aviles was that of creditor and debtor only. "Under such relationship,' it declared, "the outstanding
account, if any, of the accused in favor of ITI would be in the nature of an indebtedness, the non-
payment of which does not Constitute estafa." 4
The court' also held that the certified photocopies of the airway by were not admissible under the rule
that "there can be no evidence of a writing the content of which is the subject of inquiry other' than
the writing itself." Loss of the originals had not been proved to justify the exception to the rule as one
of the prosecution witness had testified that they were still in the ITI bodega. Neither had it been
shown that the originals had been "recorded in an existing record a certified copy of which is made
evidence by law."
In its order denying the motion for reconsideration, the trial court declared that it "had resolved the
issue of whether the accused has civil obligation to ITI on the basis of the admissibility in evidence of
the xerox copies of the airway bills." 5
Right or wrong, the acquittal on the merits of the accused can no longer be the subject of an appeal
under the double jeopardy rule. However, the petitioner seeks to press the civil liability of the private
respondents, on the ground that the dismissal of the criminal action did not abate the civil claim for
the recovery of the amount. More to the point, ITI argues that the evidence of the airways bills should
not have been rejected and that it had sufficiently established the indebtedness of the private
respondents to it.
The Court of Appeals 6 affirmed, the decision of the trial court in toto, adding that the existing record
spoken of in Section 2 (e) and (d) of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court must be in the custody, of a public
officer only. It also declared that:
Since no evidence of civil liability was presented, no necessity existed on the part
of the private respondents to present evidence of payment of an obligation which
was not shown to exist.
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The petitioner now asks this Court to annul that judgment as contrary to law and the facts
established at the As in the courts below, it is insisting on the admissibility of its evidence to prove
the civil liability of the private respondents.
We agree with the petitioner. The certified photocopies of the airway bills should have been
considered.
In assessing this evidence, the lower courts confined themselves to the best evidence rule and the
nature of the documents being presented, which they held did not come under any of the exceptions
to the rule. There is no question that the photocopies were secondary evidence and as such were not
admissible unless there was ample proof of the loss of the originals; and neither were the other
exceptions allowed by the Rules applicable. The trouble is that in rejecting these copies under Rule
130, Section 2, the respondent court disregarded an equally important principle long observed in our
trial courts and amply supported by jurisprudence.
This is the rule that objection to documentary evidence must be made at the time it is formally
offered. as an exhibit and not before. Objection prior to that time is premature.
It is instructive at this paint to make a distinction between Identification of documentary evidence
and its formal offer as an exhibit. The first is done in the course of the trial and is accompanied by the
marking of the evidence an an exhibit. The second is done only when the party rests its case and not
before. The mere fact that a particular document is Identified and marked as an exhibit does not
mean it will be or has been offered as part of the evidence of the party. The party may decide to
formally offer it if it believes this will advance its cause, and then again it may decide not to do so at
all. In the latter event, the trial court is, under Rule 132, Section 35, not authorized to consider it.
Objection to the documentary evidence must be made at the time it is formally offered, not earlier.
The Identification of the document before it is marked as an exhibit does not constitute the formal
offer of the document as evidence for the party presenting it. Objection to the Identification and
marking of the document is not equivalent to objection to the document when it is formally offered in
evidence. What really matters is the objection to the document at the time it is formally offered as an
exhibit.
In the case at bar, the photocopies of the airway bills were objected to by the private respondents as
secondary evidence only when they, were being Identified for marking by the prosecution. They were
nevertheless marked as exhibits upon the promise that the original airway bills would be submitted
later. it is true that the originals were never produced. Yet, notwithstanding this omission, the
defense did not object when the exhibits as previously marked were formally offered in evidence. And
these were subsequently admitted by the trial court. 7
In People v. Teodoro, 8 a document being Identified by a prosecution witness was objected to as
merely secondary, whereupon the trial judge ordered the testimony stricken out. This Court, in
holding the objection to be premature, said:
It must be noted that the Fiscal was only Identifying the official records of
service of the defendant preparatory to introducing them as evidence. ... The
time for the presentation of the records had not yet come; presentation was to be
made after their Identification. For what purpose and to what end the Fiscal
would introduce them as evidence was not yet stated or disclosed. ... The
objection of counsel for the defendant was, therefore, premature, especially as
the Fiscal had not yet stated for what purpose he would introduce the said
records. ...
The time for objecting the evidence is when the same is offered. (Emphasis
supplied).
The objection of the defense to the photocopies of the airway bins while they were being Identified
and marked as exhibits did not constitute the objection it should have made when the exhibits were
formally offered in evidence by the prosecution. No valid and timely objection was made at that time.
And it is no argument to say that the earlier objection should be considered a continuing objection
under Sec. 37 of Rule 132, for that provision obviously refers to a single objection to a class of
evidence (testimonial or documentary) which when first offered is considered to encompass the rest
of the evidence. The presumption is, of course, that there was an offer and a seasonable objection
thereto. But, to repeat, no objection was really made in the case before us because it was not made at entire records and of applicable statutes and precedents. To require a separate
the proper time. civil action simply because the accused was I acquitted would mean needless
clogging of court dockets and unnecessary duplication of litigation with all its
It would have been so simple for the defense to reiterate its former objection, this time seasonably, attendant loss of time, effort, and money on the part of all concerned.
when the formal offer of exhibits was made. It is curious that it did not, especially so since the
objections to the formal offer of exhibits was made in writing. In fact, the defense filed no objection By the same token, we find that remand of this case to, the trial court for further hearings would be a
at all not only to the photocopies but to all the other exhibits of the prosecution. needless waste of time and effort to the prejudice of the speedy administration of justice. Applying
the above ruling, we hereby declare therefore, on the basis of the evidence submitted at the trial as
The effect of such omission is obvious. The rule is that evidence not objected to is deemed admitted reflected in the records before us, that the private respondents are liable to the petitioner in the sum
and may be validly considered by the court in arriving at its judgment. 9 This is true even if by its of P204,030.66, representing the cost of the airway bills.
nature the evidence is inadmissible and would have surely been rejected if it had been challenged at
the proper time. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The challenged decision of the Court of Appeals is SET
ASIDE and a new one is rendered ORDERING the private respondents to. pay to the petitioner the
The records certainly would have been the, beet proof of such former conviction. sum of P204,030.66, with 6% interest from November 16, 1981, plus the costs of this suit.
The certificate was not the best proof. There seems to be no justification for the
presentation of proof of a character. ... Under an objection upon the ground that SO ORDERED.
the said certificate was not the best proof, it should have been rejected. Once
admitted, however, without objection, even though not admissible under an
objection, we are not inclined now to reject it. If the defendant had opportunely
presented an objection to the admissibility of said certificate, no doubt the
prosecution would have presented the best proof upon the questions to which
said certificate relates. 10

(It) is universally accepted that when secondary or incompetent evidence is

presented and accepted without any objection on the part of the other party, the
latter is bound thereby and the court is obliged to grant it the probatory value it
deserves. 11

We hold therefore that it was erroneous for the lower courts to reject the photocopies of the airway
bills to prove the liability of the private respondents to the petitioner. While we may agree that there
was really no criminal liability that could attach to them because they had no fiduciary relationship
with ITI, the rejected evidence sufficiently established their indebtedness to the petitioner. Hence, we
must reverse the ruling below that "on account of the inadmissibility of the prosecution's Exhibits 'B'
and 'OO', coupled with the denial made by the accused, there appears to be no concrete proof of such
accountability."

Accoording to Rule 120, Section 2, of the Rules of Court:

In case of acquittal, unless there is a clear showing that the act from which the
civil liability might arise did not exist, the judgment shall make a finding on the
civil liability of the accused in favor of the offended party.

With the admission of such exhibits pursuant to the ruling above made, we find that there is concrete
proof of the defendant's accountability. More than this, we also disbelieve the evidence of the private
respondents that the said airway bills had been paid for. The evidence consists only of check stubs
corresponding to payments allegedly made by the accused to the ITI, and we find this insufficient.

As it is Aviles who has alleged payment, it is for him to prove that allegation. He did not produce any
receipt of such payment. He said that the cancelled payment checks had been lost and relied merely
on the check stubs, which are self-serving. The prosecution correctly stressed in its motion for
reconsideration that the accused could have easily secured a certification from the bank that the
checks allegedly issued to ITI had been honored. No such certification was presented. In short, the
private respondents failed to establish their allegation that payment for the airway bills delivered to
them had been duly remitted to ITI.

In Padilla v. Court of Appeals, 12 we held:

There appear to be no sound reasons to require a separate civil action to still be

filed considering that the facts to be proved in the civil case have already been
established in the criminal proceedings where the accused was acquitted. He
was, in fact, exonerated of the charge. The constitutional presumption of
innocence called for more vigilant efforts on the part of prosecuting attorneys
and defense counsel, a keener awareness by all witnesses of the serious
implications of perjury, and a more studied consideration by the judge of the
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