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My understanding is that Heidegger's phenomenological

approach asks us to set aside the notion of a concept as a


referent to some objective state or entity present-at-hand. In
order to approach the question of being, Heidegger must set
aside terminology which has been burdened by Western
metaphysics, which is characterized by its forgetfulness of being.

As an alternative, Heidegger employs concepts which are formal,


that is empty of objective content, and indicators, that is
directings toward acts which may only be understood
performatively.

The concepts of phenomenology cannot be severed or set apart


from the being, Dasein, seeking to understand the concept.
"Being-in-the-World," a formal indicator, can only be understood
by the reader through a self-reflective act. The concept does not
refer to an object in the scientific sense.

If I understand formal indicators correctly, they function


semantically in ways similar to "variables" in symbolic logic. That
is, aside from the specific train of thought in which a formal
indicator appears, that particular indicator indicates nothing.
However, within the specific scenario, formal indicators can be
analyzed in relation to each other. This allows the
phenomenologist to focus on ontological structure.

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