IMPROVING DISTRIBUTION NETWORK RESILIENCE
AGAINST EARTHQUAKES
A. Navarro-Espinosa*, R. Moreno*,**, T. Lagos*, F. Ordoñez*, R. Sacaan†, H. Rudnick†
*Universidad de Chile, Chile, **Imperial College of London, UK, †Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile, Chile.
Keywords: Distribution Networks, Resilience, High Impact
Low Probability Events (HILP), Earthquake impacts, Risk
Management Reduction.
Abstract
Historically, reliability analysis has ignored the occurrence of
natural hazards such as those associated with extreme weather,
flooding, earthquakes and tsunamis, which are becoming more
and more relevant due to recent events. In this context, we
present an assessment methodology to determine the resiliency
levels of a distribution system exposed to a major earthquake.
The proposed 4-stage methodology models (i) the earthquake,
(ii) the fragility of network components, (iv) the network
outages, and (v) the impacts on network operation (including
the energy not supplied) through sequential Monte Carlo
simulations. This methodology is used to study the resilience
of distribution networks under two particular strategies: one
that hardens substations infrastructure in order to reduce their
fragility levels, and the other one that uses additional network
infrastructure in the form of transfer cables to shift load among
substations in case a major event occurs. Through several case
studies based on a real distribution network in Chile, we
demonstrate that hardening substations infrastructure may be a
more resilient way to deal with earthquakes, even when
compared to an alternative, extreme case where a vast number
of transfer cables are installed to support damaged substations.
1 Introduction
Power systems, including transmission and distributions
networks, have been historically designed to satisfy certain
levels of reliability, dealing with the occurrence of the so-
called credible outages, such as the disconnection of a large
power plant, disconnection of one or more transmission lines
and/or power transformers (N-1 or N-2), etc. This reliability
framework has been critical in power system, being focus
mainly on adequacy and security [1]. Adequacy refers to the
system capability to supply the peak demand (i.e., enough
installed capacity) and security refers specifically to the system
ability to recover after a contingency (i.e., enough reserve to
overcome credible outages) [2].
That traditional reliability framework (adequacy/security)
ignores high impact and low probability (HILP) events,
common mode failures and natural hazards [3] and hence, these
types of contingency are not usually considered for planning
(e.g., sizing and redundancy levels of transmission lines and
further infrastructure) and operational purposes (e.g., sizing of
maintenance crews, tele-control manoeuvre devices for
topological configuration). In this context, Power System
Resilience, defined as the capability of a system to recover the
original state, as fast and as much as possible, after a severe
disturbance [4], emerges as a promising concept to overcome
effects of HILP events such as those originated from
earthquakes, floods, tsunamis, etc.
The resilience of key infrastructure (communication, roads,
water, and power systems) is a topic getting increasing
attention from the policy making and academic community.
Particularly on power systems, a pioneer study about the
seismic vulnerability of power transmission network was
presented in [5]. Then, the authors in [4] present a
comprehensive framework to asses resilience at generation and
transmission levels, showing specific example applications in
[6] by using a simplified version of the bulk UK system.
However, only a few studies have been reported on distribution
networks [7],[8].
The distribution network is very important since, after a large
disturbance occurs (e.g., earthquake) and after generation and
transmission networks have been fully recovered, load may
remain unserved due to failures in the distribution systems that
can last longer than those in the generation and transmission
networks. In fact, this situation happened after the 8.8 Mw
earthquake in Chile, where it took almost two weeks to re-
connect the load nearby the epicentre area, albeit generation
and national transmission network infrastructure did not
present any important failure [9].
Hence, this paper will focus on distribution network resilience
and the application of two mitigation actions to increase
resilience, namely, i) hardening the primary substation
infrastructure and ii) smart tele-control manoeuvre devices for
load transferring among substations. This modelling allows
assessing the effects of an earthquake and thus properly
quantify the energy not supplied (ENS) that can be used in
tandem with generation-transmission resilience models to
assess the whole-system effects of natural hazards.
Furthermore, we demonstrate the value of hardening
infrastructure and the utilization of smart grid technologies in
terms of minimising the expected energy not supplied (EENS)
under severe and rare events, which can be used to inform
 4
review and development of innovative security standards and x 10
network incentive frameworks.
2

The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section II 1.9

describes the proposed methodology to evaluate resilience at
1.8
distribution networks. The case study and the corresponding
sensitivities are developed in section III. Section IV presents 1.7

the simulation results for a real distribution system and finally, 1.6
the main conclusions are drawn in section IV.
1.5

2 Methodology 1.4

To assess potential mitigation actions to reduce the impacts of 1.3

earthquake at distribution networks, it is important to properly 1.2

model the distribution system, the effect of the earthquake on 3.3 3.4 3.5 3.6 3.7 3.8 3.9 4 4.1
4
the electrical infrastructure and then, the corresponding x 10

impacts on power system operation. In fact, given the large
scale characteristic of these systems with substations and loads
located in a widespread area, the only way to assess the impact
of an earthquake is through the topological modelling of the
network infrastructure. As an example, Fig. 1 shows the
geographic information system (GIS) representation of a
portion of a distribution system.
In general terms, the core of the proposed methodology to
comprehensively assess the impacts of earthquakes and the
potential mitigation actions can be summarised in the
following steps:
1. Earthquake modelling: Given an earthquake location
and intensity, the model must be able to calculate the
distance attenuation from the epicentre for each
network element, this means the intensity at each point
(i.e., X and Y coordinates on a 2-dimentional map) in
the distribution network will be determined. This
requires the GIS representation of the distribution
network, which corresponds to the specific location
(e.g., universal transverse Mercator –UTM–
coordinates) for each distribution network element
(e.g., power substations, distribution transformers,
loads, etc.)
2. Fragility Modelling: Having the intensity of the
earthquake at each point, it is possible to determine the
intensity in each infrastructure element, and then,
through the analysis of Fragility curves [5],[6]
determine the level of damage in each of them.
3. Outage Modelling: After determine the outage status of
each element, the effect in the system operation can be
determined. Indeed, if certain infrastructures are
partially or totally outaged/damaged, and the
reconfiguration strategies are in place, the amount of
customers not served and the energy not supplied can
be determined and minimise.
Figure 1: Distribution Network Example
4. Sequential Monte Carlo Simulations: the impacts on the
distribution system operation will depend on the period
of time when the event occurs (with certain probability)
and the restoration times for the damaged infrastructure
(according to distribution probabilities). Thus, the time
series analysis is fundamental to assess the resilience
performance of distribution networks. Furthermore, the
impacts on the infrastructure are also probabilistic, in
fact, a particular magnitude can produce a problem with
a given probability. Consequently, to cope with the
time-series dimension of the problem and the
stochasticity of the model, a Sequential Monte Carlo is
implemented.
2.1 Earthquake Modelling
In order to measure the intensity of a particular earthquake on
a widespread area, such as a distribution network, the
magnitude attenuation from the epicentre is modelled. This
attenuation can be determined by using the peak ground
acceleration (PGA) equation.
PGA corresponds to the input magnitude in the Fragility
Curves (i.e., X axis) of power infrastructure due to the action
of an earthquake. The PGA attenuation used in this work was
presented in [10] based on an extensive ground motion data
base (i.e., 697 PGA values for the regression analysis) for the
subduction zone in the Pacific. Thus, the equation obtained is
representative for the Chilean distribution network used in this
work.
. )
ln = 6.36 + 1.76 − 2.73 ln( + 1.58 (1)
+ 0.00916ℎ
Where M is the moment magnitude (earthquake intensity), R is
the distance to the epicentre in km, and h is the focal depth in
km. PGA is the peak ground acceleration in gals. Hence, given
a combination of magnitude and depth is possible to calculate
the PGA magnitude in each position of the distribution system.
 6
As an example, Fig. 2 shows a realistic distribution system x 10
used in [11]. For visualization purposes, only the poles and 6.35
underground chambers are represented (black dots). The total
dimension for the system is 4,485 km2 (65 km times 68 km), 6.34

supplying approximately 1,700,000 customers with a yearly

consumption of 12,477 GWh. Here, an 8.0 Mw earthquake is 6.33

simulated with a focal depth of 23 km in the northeast of the

city, indicating the PGA for each position in the map through 6.32

[m]
colours (brown refers to higher PGA and blue refers to lower
6.31
PGA).
6.3
It is important to highlight that the earthquake model used in
this work is a good approximation to the phenomena but it is
6.29
not the full earthquake representation (i.e., consideration of the
soil mechanical structure [12]) and therefore the impacts 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.5 3.6 3.7 3.8
determined here are only referential. Nonetheless, they still [m]
x 10
5

allow the comparison among different case studies. Figure 2: PGA distribution on the distribution system.

2.2 Fragility Curves and Restoration Time Curves 1

0.9
After having the PGA values for each position in the network
0.8
(Fig. 2), the impact on the power system infrastructure can be
determined. Those effects are calculated from fragility curves, 0.7

which relate the PGA magnitude with a damage state.

Probability [pu]
0.6

Mathematically speaking, the fragility curve describes the 0.5

cumulative probability of reaching or exceeding different
0.4
states of damage for a specific peak ground acceleration. These
0.3 Minor
fragility curves are modelled as cumulative lognormal Moderate
distributions [13]. 0.2 Extensive
Complete
0.1
Fig. 3 shows the fragility curve for primary substations 0
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 1.2 1.4
specified in [13]. Here, four possible damage states can be PGA [g]
observed, namely, minor, moderate, extensive and complete
substation damage. Hence, for example, if the PGA is 0.6 g, Figure 3: Fragility Curve for unanchored primary substations.
then the probability of being or exceeding the minor damage 0.8
state is 0.99 (i.e., almost certainly the substation is having
minor problems) and the probability of being in a complete 0.7
Minor
damage state is about 0.3. This implies that the probability of Moderate
0.6
being in a particular state is the difference between the Extensive
Complete
probabilities of exceeding the particular state and the 0.5
Probability

probability of exceeding the above damage state. Finally, the

0.4
probability of having no damage is the difference between one
and the probability of exceeding the minor damage state. 0.3

Each damage state represents a specific percentage of damage 0.2

of the corresponding infrastructure. For instance, in the case of 0.1

primary substation, according to Hazus report: Multi-hazard
Loss Estimation Methodology [13], the minor, moderate, 0
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
extensive and complete damage states imply a capacity days

substation reduction of 5%, 40%, 70% and 100%, respectively. Figure 4: Restoration times for substations

It is important to remark that a particular PGA does not produce
always the same problem, on the contrary, a specific PGA can
cause different consequence with certain probabilities, adding
a stochastic dimension to the impact assessment. In this line,
another source of stochasticity to be considered is the
restoration time for the failed infrastructure.
In fact, according to the Hazus report, the probability for these
restoration times follows a normal distribution and it is
different for different damage states. For instance, Fig. 4
indicates the probability distribution of restoration times for
minor, moderate, extensive and complete damage state. These
curves have a median and standard deviation values of 1 and
0.5, 3 and 1.5, 7 and 3.5 and 30 and 15 days, respectively.
2.3 Sequential Monte Carlo Simulations
From the previous subsection is clear that the stochasticity
added by fragility and restoration curves must be incorporated.
Given the large number of elements included in a distribution
networks and their widespread location, it is not possible to
model all the potential scenarios with their corresponding
probabilities through an analytical formulation (i.e., large
number of combinations when considering damage states,
infrastructure elements and earthquake realizations). Thus, to
avoid the full enumeration of all combinations, a Monte Carlo
simulation is used for sampling, representing adequately the
stochastic nature of this distribution network problem [14].
Moreover, since the time-series dimension is important in this
analysis due to the interdependence among the event
occurrence, the demand variation and the recovery period for
different infrastructure elements with different damage status,
a Sequential Monte Carlo Simulation (SMC) is implemented,
and therefore the chronological time dependence is fully
considered [15]. Specifically, for this work the SMC has fixed-
intervals of one hour for a total period of one month. The main
steps are described below:
1. Set the inputs:
a. Fragility and restoration time curves for each
network infrastructure and damage state.
b. Definition of the set of earthquakes to test,
indicating location, magnitude and depth (e.g., set
of most likely earthquakes in the zone, worst case
scenario: strongest one, etc.).
c. Failure rates and recovery times for the so-called
credible outages at distribution level (i.e., low
impact and high probability events).
2. Earthquake representation:
a. Select randomly one of the earthquake from the
feasible set.
b. Calculate the PGA at each network location for the
selected earthquake.
c. Select randomly the occurrence of the earthquake
between 1 and T (T refers to the last hour in the
simulation horizon).
3. Sequential steps for hour t over the horizon 1 to T.
a. If there is an earthquake in t:
i. For every network element b in B (set of
indexes of network elements): Generate a
random number, Z. Having Z and the PGA for
b determine the damage state of b and
consequently the available installed capacity.
ii. Determine the restoration time from the
probability distribution curves.
iii. Check time in failure and time left to be
recovered for b.
iv. Update b status (damaged or recovered)
b. If there is not an earthquake in t:
i. For every network element b in B: Generate a
random number, Z, and compare the failure
rate (λ) with Z.
ii. Check time in failure and time left to be
recovered for b.
iii. Update b status (damaged or recovered)
c. Update case with the status of all elements.
d. Quantify the energy not supplied for the period t
and moves to t+1.
When t reached the last hour of the simulation horizon T, one
Sequential Monte Carlo simulation has been completed. For
each Monte Carlo run, the power system case is reset to its
default values. Thus, after N Monte Carlo simulations (we run
steps 2 and 3, N times), it is possible to obtain a probability
distribution for the Energy not supplied during period 1 to T.
3 Case Study
To test the proposed methodology and to use it to improve the
resilience of distribution network against earthquakes, a
realistic distribution network is implemented (Fig. 2). In this
case study, the specific SMC characteristic are i) one
earthquake realization is simulated (8.0 Mw, 23 km of depth,
Northeast location as the one shown in Fig. 2), ii) 100,000
Monte Carlo simulations are run, iii) the time step is set in one
hour and the total horizon is 1 month (720 hours) and iv) the
network infrastructure considered corresponds to the set of
primary substations (i.e., 41 for the real network under
analysis). A base case plus two strategies to improve the
resilience of the distribution system are examined.
3.1 Base Case
The base case is given by the consideration of the fragility
curves presented in Fig. 3 and the restoration times of Fig. 4
without any capability of transferring load among substations
(i.e., this represents a counterfactual scenario where all the
substation are isolated from each other).
3.2 Improving Resilience – Case 1
This alternative represents the possibility of hardening the
substations design in order to be more resistant to the
earthquake action. To do that, a new set of fragility curves is
incorporated from [13]. These curves represent the cumulative
distribution of being or exceeding a damage state, namely,
minor, moderate, extensive and complete, for a certain PGA in
a substation with seismic considerations (Fig. 5). Hence, for a
given PGA, the probability of being in a state of complete
damage is larger in the base case than under this case 1.
To allow a fair comparison with the base case, this action does
not include load transfers among substations. It is also worth
mentioning that this structure reinforcement is feasible in
reality and the fragility curve used come also from [13].
 1
4 Results
0.9

0.8 The proposed methodology indicated in section 2.3 with the

0.7
specifications defined in section 3 is applied over the three
cases under analysis: i) Base Case, ii) Case 1: Hardening
Probability [pu]

0.6
Infrastructure and iii) Case 2: Load Transfer Capability,
0.5 obtaining the histograms for the energy not supplied (ENS)
0.4 presented in Fig. 7, 8 and 9, respectively. There, it is possible
0.3
to observe that both mitigation actions increase the resilience
Minor
Moderate
of the distribution network. Moreover, hardening the
0.2
Extensive infrastructure seems to have a better performance in the
0.1 Complete
reduction of the ENS. With the purpose of having a better
0
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 1.2 1.4
comparison, several statistical metrics are determined for the
PGA [g] three cases and summarised in Table 1. Here, it can be seen that
Figure 5: Fragility Curve for Seismic Substations, Case 1. for all the metrics, both mitigation actions have less energy not
supplied than the base case and also for all the metrics, the Case
3.3 Improving Resilience – Case 2 1 has a better performance.
4
x 10
3.5
This alternative adds to the base case, the possibility of
transferring load among substations (i.e., unanchored 3

substations) when there are connections and power capacity

2.5
available. This availability condition is particularly important
for the earthquake modelling because in a city, neighbours

Frequency
2

substations are close enough to face similar PGA values, and

1.5
therefore having similar chances to be in a similar state of
damage. Hence, the transfer of load will be possible if only if 1

the substations expected to provide backup have enough

0.5
capacity to do so (i.e., the damage state still allow the transfer
of a de-rated amount of power). 0
0 100 200 300 400 500 600
ENS GWh

In order to model a system in which every substation is backed Figure 7: ENS Histogram for Base Case.
up for at least three substations, the Delaunay triangulation is x 10
4

3.5
determined among all the primary substations in the
distribution network under analysis and this is shown in Fig. 6. 3
By using this triangulation (green lines in Fig. 6), all the
2.5
interconnections are made only among neighbours substations.
These neighbouring areas corresponds to Voronoi Diagrams
Frequency

whose centres are the substation location [16]. As observed, the

1.5
support network formed from transfer cables in Fig. 6 is very
interconnected and this provides an extreme case against which 1

case 1 can be compared.

0.5

6
x 10 0
0 100 200 300 400 500 600
6.35 ENS GWh

Figure 8: ENS Histogram for Case 1.

6.34 4
x 10
3.5

6.33
3

6.32 2.5
[m]

Frequency

2
6.31
1.5

6.3
1

6.29 0.5

3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.5 3.6 3.7 3.8 0

0 100 200 300 400 500 600
[m] 5
x 10 ENS GWh

Figure 6: Delaunay Triangulation among Substations, Case 2. Figure 9: ENS Histogram for Case 2.
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4 Conclusions
This work developed a 4-stage methodology and the
corresponding models to assess the impacts of earthquakes on
power distribution networks. These stages are: (i) earthquake
modelling, (ii) the fragility of network components, (iv) the
network outages, and (v) the impacts on network operation
(including the energy not supplied) through sequential Monte
Carlo simulations. This methodology was used for studying the
resilience of distribution networks under two mitigation
actions: hardening infrastructure and increasing transfer
capabilities among primary substations. These studies were
carried out in a real distribution network in Chile,
demonstrating that hardening substations infrastructure may be
a more resilient way to deal with earthquakes.
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