PERSONS – 4TH WEEK CASES

G.R. No. L-16439 July 20, 1961

ANTONIO GELUZ, petitioner,

vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and OSCAR LAZO, respondents.

Mariano H. de Joya for petitioner.

A.P. Salvador for respondents.

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

This petition for certiorari brings up for review question whether the husband of a woman, who voluntarily procured her abortion,
could recover damages from physician who caused the same.

The litigation was commenced in the Court of First Instance of Manila by respondent Oscar Lazo, the of Nita Villanueva, against
petitioner Antonio Geluz, a physician. Convinced of the merits of the complaint upon the evidence adduced, the trial court rendered
judgment favor of plaintiff Lazo and against defendant Geluz, ordering the latter to pay P3,000.00 as damages, P700.00 attorney's fees
and the costs of the suit. On appeal, Court of Appeals, in a special division of five, sustained the award by a majority vote of three
justices as against two, who rendered a separate dissenting opinion.

The facts are set forth in the majority opinion as follows:

Nita Villanueva came to know the defendant (Antonio Geluz) for the first time in 1948 — through her aunt Paula Yambot. In
1950 she became pregnant by her present husband before they were legally married. Desiring to conceal her pregnancy from
her parent, and acting on the advice of her aunt, she had herself aborted by the defendant. After her marriage with the
plaintiff, she again became pregnant. As she was then employed in the Commission on Elections and her pregnancy proved to
be inconvenient, she had herself aborted again by the defendant in October 1953. Less than two years later, she again became
pregnant. On February 21, 1955, accompanied by her sister Purificacion and the latter's daughter Lucida, she again repaired
to the defendant's clinic on Carriedo and P. Gomez streets in Manila, where the three met the defendant and his wife. Nita
was again aborted, of a two-month old foetus, in consideration of the sum of fifty pesos, Philippine currency. The plaintiff
was at this time in the province of Cagayan, campaigning for his election to the provincial board; he did not know of, nor
gave his consent, to the abortion.

It is the third and last abortion that constitutes plaintiff's basis in filing this action and award of damages. Upon application of the
defendant Geluz we granted certiorari.

The Court of Appeals and the trial court predicated the award of damages in the sum of P3,000.06 upon the provisions of the initial
paragraph of Article 2206 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. This we believe to be error, for the said article, in fixing a minimum
award of P3,000.00 for the death of a person, does not cover the case of an unborn foetus that is not endowed with personality. Under
the system of our Civil Code, "la criatura abortiva no alcanza la categoria de persona natural y en consscuencia es un ser no nacido a
la vida del Derecho" (Casso-Cervera, "Diccionario de Derecho Privado", Vol. 1, p. 49), being incapable of having rights and
obligations.

Since an action for pecuniary damages on account of personal injury or death pertains primarily to the one injured, it is easy to see that
if no action for such damages could be instituted on behalf of the unborn child on account of the injuries it received, no such right of
action could derivatively accrue to its parents or heirs. In fact, even if a cause of action did accrue on behalf of the unborn child, the
same was extinguished by its pre-natal death, since no transmission to anyone can take place from on that lacked juridical personality
(or juridical capacity as distinguished from capacity to act). It is no answer to invoke the provisional personality of a conceived child
(conceptus pro nato habetur) under Article 40 of the Civil Code, because that same article expressly limits such provisional
personality by imposing the condition that the child should be subsequently born alive: "provided it be born later with the condition
specified in the following article". In the present case, there is no dispute that the child was dead when separated from its mother's
womb.

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The prevailing American jurisprudence is to the same effect; and it is generally held that recovery can not had for the death of an
unborn child (Stafford vs. Roadway Transit Co., 70 F. Supp. 555; Dietrich vs. Northampton, 52 Am. Rep. 242; and numerous cases
collated in the editorial note, 10 ALR, (2d) 639).

This is not to say that the parents are not entitled to collect any damages at all. But such damages must be those inflicted directly upon
them, as distinguished from the injury or violation of the rights of the deceased, his right to life and physical integrity. Because the
parents can not expect either help, support or services from an unborn child, they would normally be limited to moral damages for the
illegal arrest of the normal development of the spes hominis that was the foetus, i.e., on account of distress and anguish attendant to its
loss, and the disappointment of their parental expectations (Civ. Code Art. 2217), as well as to exemplary damages, if the
circumstances should warrant them (Art. 2230). But in the case before us, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals have not found
any basis for an award of moral damages, evidently because the appellee's indifference to the previous abortions of his wife, also
caused by the appellant herein, clearly indicates that he was unconcerned with the frustration of his parental hopes and affections. The
lower court expressly found, and the majority opinion of the Court of Appeals did not contradict it, that the appellee was aware of the
second abortion; and the probabilities are that he was likewise aware of the first. Yet despite the suspicious repetition of the event, he
appeared to have taken no steps to investigate or pinpoint the causes thereof, and secure the punishment of the responsible practitioner.
Even after learning of the third abortion, the appellee does not seem to have taken interest in the administrative and criminal cases
against the appellant. His only concern appears to have been directed at obtaining from the doctor a large money payment, since he
sued for P50,000.00 damages and P3,000.00 attorney's fees, an "indemnity" claim that, under the circumstances of record, was clearly
exaggerated.

The dissenting Justices of the Court of Appeals have aptly remarked that:

It seems to us that the normal reaction of a husband who righteously feels outraged by the abortion which his wife has
deliberately sought at the hands of a physician would be highminded rather than mercenary; and that his primary concern
would be to see to it that the medical profession was purged of an unworthy member rather than turn his wife's indiscretion to
personal profit, and with that idea in mind to press either the administrative or the criminal cases he had filed, or both, instead
of abandoning them in favor of a civil action for damages of which not only he, but also his wife, would be the beneficiaries.

It is unquestionable that the appellant's act in provoking the abortion of appellee's wife, without medical necessity to warrant it, was a
criminal and morally reprehensible act, that can not be too severely condemned; and the consent of the woman or that of her husband
does not excuse it. But the immorality or illegality of the act does not justify an award of damage that, under the circumstances on
record, have no factual or legal basis.

The decision appealed from is reversed, and the complaint ordered dismissed. Without costs.

Let a copy of this decision be furnished to the Department of Justice and the Board of Medical Examiners for their information and
such investigation and action against the appellee Antonio Geluz as the facts may warrant.

G.R. No. 182836 October 13, 2009

CONTINENTAL STEEL MANUFACTURING CORPORATION, Petitioner,

vs.
HON. ACCREDITED VOLUNTARY ARBITRATOR ALLAN S. MONTAÑO and NAGKAKAISANG MANGGAGAWA NG
CENTRO STEEL CORPORATION-SOLIDARITY OF UNIONS IN THE PHILIPPINES FOR EMPOWERMENT AND
REFORMS (NMCSC-SUPER), Respondents.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari, under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the Decision 1 dated 27 February 2008
and the Resolution2 dated 9 May 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 101697, affirming the Resolution3 dated 20
November 2007 of respondent Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator Atty. Allan S. Montaño (Montaño) granting bereavement leave and
other death benefits to Rolando P. Hortillano (Hortillano), grounded on the death of his unborn child.

The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:

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Hortillano, an employee of petitioner Continental Steel Manufacturing Corporation (Continental Steel) and a member of respondent
Nagkakaisang Manggagawa ng Centro Steel Corporation-Solidarity of Trade Unions in the Philippines for Empowerment and
Reforms (Union) filed on 9 January 2006, a claim for Paternity Leave, Bereavement Leave and Death and Accident Insurance for
dependent, pursuant to the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) concluded between Continental and the Union, which reads:

ARTICLE X: LEAVE OF ABSENCE

xxxx

Section 2. BEREAVEMENT LEAVE—The Company agrees to grant a bereavement leave with pay to any employee in case of death
of the employee’s legitimate dependent (parents, spouse, children, brothers and sisters) based on the following:

2.1 Within Metro Manila up to Marilao, Bulacan - 7 days

2.2 Provincial/Outside Metro Manila - 11 days

xxxx

ARTICLE XVIII: OTHER BENEFITS

xxxx

Section 4. DEATH AND ACCIDENT INSURANCE—The Company shall grant death and accidental insurance to the employee or his
family in the following manner:

xxxx

4.3 DEPENDENTS—Eleven Thousand Five Hundred Fifty Pesos (Php11,550.00) in case of death of the employees legitimate
dependents (parents, spouse, and children). In case the employee is single, this benefit covers the legitimate parents, brothers and
sisters only with proper legal document to be presented (e.g. death certificate). 4

The claim was based on the death of Hortillano’s unborn child. Hortillano’s wife, Marife V. Hortillano, had a premature delivery on 5
January 2006 while she was in the 38th week of pregnancy. 5 According to the Certificate of Fetal Death dated 7 January 2006, the
female fetus died during labor due to fetal Anoxia secondary to uteroplacental insufficiency. 6

Continental Steel immediately granted Hortillano’s claim for paternity leave but denied his claims for bereavement leave and other
death benefits, consisting of the death and accident insurance. 7

Seeking the reversal of the denial by Continental Steel of Hortillano’s claims for bereavement and other death benefits, the Union
resorted to the grievance machinery provided in the CBA. Despite the series of conferences held, the parties still failed to settle their
dispute,8 prompting the Union to file a Notice to Arbitrate before the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) of the
Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE), National Capital Region (NCR).9 In a Submission Agreement dated 9 October 2006,
the Union and Continental Steel submitted for voluntary arbitration the sole issue of whether Hortillano was entitled to bereavement
leave and other death benefits pursuant to Article X, Section 2

and Article XVIII, Section 4.3 of the CBA.10 The parties mutually chose Atty. Montaño, an Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator, to resolve
said issue.11

When the preliminary conferences again proved futile in amicably settling the dispute, the parties proceeded to submit their respective
Position Papers, 12 Replies,13 and Rejoinders14 to Atty. Montaño.

The Union argued that Hortillano was entitled to bereavement leave and other death benefits pursuant to the CBA. The Union
maintained that Article X, Section 2 and Article XVIII, Section 4.3 of the CBA did not specifically state that the dependent should
have first been born alive or must have acquired juridical personality so that his/her subsequent death could be covered by the CBA
death benefits. The Union cited cases wherein employees of MKK Steel Corporation (MKK Steel) and Mayer Steel Pipe Corporation

3
(Mayer Steel), sister companies of Continental Steel, in similar situations as Hortillano were able to receive death benefits under
similar provisions of their CBAs.

The Union mentioned in particular the case of Steve L. Dugan (Dugan), an employee of Mayer Steel, whose wife also prematurely
delivered a fetus, which had already died prior to the delivery. Dugan was able to receive paternity leave, bereavement leave, and
voluntary contribution under the CBA between his union and Mayer Steel.15 Dugan’s child was only 24 weeks in the womb and died
before labor, as opposed to Hortillano’s child who was already 37-38 weeks in the womb and only died during labor.

The Union called attention to the fact that MKK Steel and Mayer Steel are located in the same compound as Continental Steel; and the
representatives of MKK Steel and Mayer Steel who signed the CBA with their respective employees’ unions were the same as the
representatives of Continental Steel who signed the existing CBA with the Union.

Finally, the Union invoked Article 1702 of the Civil Code, which provides that all doubts in labor legislations and labor contracts shall
be construed in favor of the safety of and decent living for the laborer.

On the other hand, Continental Steel posited that the express provision of the CBA did not contemplate the death of an unborn child, a
fetus, without legal personality. It claimed that there are two elements for the entitlement to the benefits, namely: (1) death and (2)
status as legitimate dependent, none of which existed in Hortillano’s case. Continental Steel, relying on Articles 40, 41 and 42 16 of the
Civil Code, contended that only one with civil personality could die. Hence, the unborn child never died because it never acquired
juridical personality. Proceeding from the same line of thought, Continental Steel reasoned that a fetus that was dead from the moment
of delivery was not a person at all. Hence, the term dependent could not be applied to a fetus that never acquired juridical personality.
A fetus that was delivered dead could not be considered a dependent, since it never needed any support, nor did it ever acquire the
right to be supported.

Continental Steel maintained that the wording of the CBA was clear and unambiguous. Since neither of the parties qualified the terms
used in the CBA, the legally accepted definitions thereof were deemed automatically accepted by both parties. The failure of the
Union to have unborn child included in the definition of dependent, as used in the CBA – the death of whom would have qualified the
parent-employee for bereavement leave and other death benefits – bound the Union to the legally accepted definition of the latter term.

Continental Steel, lastly, averred that similar cases involving the employees of its sister companies, MKK Steel and Mayer Steel,
referred to by the Union, were irrelevant and incompetent evidence, given the separate and distinct personalities of the companies.
Neither could the Union sustain its claim that the grant of bereavement leave and other death benefits to the parent-employee for the
loss of an unborn child constituted "company practice."

On 20 November 2007, Atty. Montaño, the appointed Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator, issued a Resolution 17 ruling that Hortillano was
entitled to bereavement leave with pay and death benefits.

Atty. Montaño identified the elements for entitlement to said benefits, thus:

This Office declares that for the entitlement of the benefit of bereavement leave with pay by the covered employees as provided under
Article X, Section 2 of the parties’ CBA, three (3) indispensable elements must be present: (1) there is "death"; (2) such death must be
of employee’s "dependent"; and (3) such dependent must be "legitimate".

On the otherhand, for the entitlement to benefit for death and accident insurance as provided under Article XVIII, Section 4, paragraph
(4.3) of the parties’ CBA, four (4) indispensable elements must be present: (a) there is "death"; (b) such death must be of employee’s
"dependent"; (c) such dependent must be "legitimate"; and (d) proper legal document to be presented. 18

Atty. Montaño found that there was no dispute that the death of an employee’s legitimate dependent occurred. The fetus had the right
to be supported by the parents from the very moment he/she was conceived. The fetus had to rely on another for support; he/she could
not have existed or sustained himself/herself without the power or aid of someone else, specifically, his/her mother. Therefore, the
fetus was already a dependent, although he/she died during the labor or delivery. There was also no question that Hortillano and his
wife were lawfully married, making their dependent, unborn child, legitimate.

In the end, Atty. Montaño decreed:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, a resolution is hereby rendered ORDERING [herein petitioner Continental Steel] to pay
Rolando P. Hortillano the amount of Four Thousand Nine Hundred Thirty-Nine Pesos (₱4,939.00), representing his bereavement leave
4
pay and the amount of Eleven Thousand Five Hundred Fifty Pesos (₱11,550.00) representing death benefits, or a total amount of
₱16,489.00

The complaint against Manuel Sy, however, is ORDERED DISMISSED for lack of merit.

All other claims are DISMISSED for lack of merit.

Further, parties are hereby ORDERED to faithfully abide with the herein dispositions.

Aggrieved, Continental Steel filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Review on Certiorari, 19 under Section 1, Rule 43 of the
Rules of Court, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 101697.

Continental Steel claimed that Atty. Montaño erred in granting Hortillano’s claims for bereavement leave with pay and other death
benefits because no death of an employee’s dependent had occurred. The death of a fetus, at whatever stage of pregnancy, was
excluded from the coverage of the CBA since what was contemplated by the CBA was the death of a legal person, and not that of a
fetus, which did not acquire any juridical personality. Continental Steel pointed out that its contention was bolstered by the fact that
the term death was qualified by the phrase legitimate dependent. It asserted that the status of a child could only be determined upon
said child’s birth, otherwise, no such appellation can be had. Hence, the conditions sine qua non for Hortillano’s entitlement to
bereavement leave and other death benefits under the CBA were lacking.

The Court of Appeals, in its Decision dated 27 February 2008, affirmed Atty. Montaño’s Resolution dated 20 November 2007. The
appellate court interpreted death to mean as follows:

[Herein petitioner Continental Steel’s] exposition on the legal sense in which the term "death" is used in the CBA fails to impress the
Court, and the same is irrelevant for ascertaining the purpose, which the grant of bereavement leave and death benefits thereunder, is
intended to serve. While there is no arguing with [Continental Steel] that the acquisition of civil personality of a child or fetus is
conditioned on being born alive upon delivery, it does not follow that such event of premature delivery of a fetus could never be
contemplated as a "death" as to be covered by the CBA provision, undoubtedly an event causing loss and grief to the affected
employee, with whom the dead fetus stands in a legitimate relation. [Continental Steel] has proposed a narrow and technical
significance to the term "death of a legitimate dependent" as condition for granting bereavement leave and death benefits under the
CBA. Following [Continental Steel’s] theory, there can be no experience of "death" to speak of. The Court, however, does not share
this view. A dead fetus simply cannot be equated with anything less than "loss of human life", especially for the expectant parents. In
this light, bereavement leave and death benefits are meant to assuage the employee and the latter’s immediate family, extend to them
solace and support, rather than an act conferring legal status or personality upon the unborn child. [Continental Steel’s] insistence that
the certificate of fetal death is for statistical purposes only sadly misses this crucial point. 20

Accordingly, the fallo of the 27 February 2008 Decision of the Court of Appeals reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed Resolution dated
November 20, 2007 of Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator Atty. Allan S. Montaño is hereby AFFIRMED and UPHELD.

With costs against [herein petitioner Continental Steel]. 21

In a Resolution22 dated 9 May 2008, the Court of Appeals denied the Motion for Reconsideration23 of Continental Steel.

Hence, this Petition, in which Continental Steel persistently argues that the CBA is clear and unambiguous, so that the literal and legal
meaning of death should be applied. Only one with juridical personality can die and a dead fetus never acquired a juridical personality.

We are not persuaded.

As Atty. Montaño identified, the elements for bereavement leave under Article X, Section 2 of the CBA are: (1) death; (2) the death
must be of a dependent, i.e., parent, spouse, child, brother, or sister, of an employee; and (3) legitimate relations of the dependent to
the employee. The requisites for death and accident insurance under Article XVIII, Section 4(3) of the CBA are: (1) death; (2) the
death must be of a dependent, who could be a parent, spouse, or child of a married employee; or a parent, brother, or sister of a single
employee; and (4) presentation of the proper legal document to prove such death, e.g., death certificate.

5
It is worthy to note that despite the repeated assertion of Continental Steel that the provisions of the CBA are clear and unambiguous,
its fundamental argument for denying Hortillano’s claim for bereavement leave and other death benefits rests on the purportedly
proper interpretation of the terms "death" and "dependent" as used in the CBA. If the provisions of the CBA are indeed clear and
unambiguous, then there is no need to resort to the interpretation or construction of the same. Moreover, Continental Steel itself
admitted that neither management nor the Union sought to define the pertinent terms for bereavement leave and other death benefits
during the negotiation of the CBA.

The reliance of Continental Steel on Articles 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code for the legal definition of death is misplaced. Article 40
provides that a conceived child acquires personality only when it is born, and Article 41 defines when a child is considered born.
Article 42 plainly states that civil personality is extinguished by death.

First, the issue of civil personality is not relevant herein. Articles 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code on natural persons, must be applied
in relation to Article 37 of the same Code, the very first of the general provisions on civil personality, which reads:

Art. 37. Juridical capacity, which is the fitness to be the subject of legal relations, is inherent in every natural person and is lost only
through death. Capacity to act, which is the power to do acts with legal effect, is acquired and may be lost.

We need not establish civil personality of the unborn child herein since his/her juridical capacity and capacity to act as a person are not
in issue. It is not a question before us whether the unborn child acquired any rights or incurred any obligations prior to his/her death
that were passed on to or assumed by the child’s parents. The rights to bereavement leave and other death benefits in the instant case
pertain directly to the parents of the unborn child upon the latter’s death.

Second, Sections 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code do not provide at all a definition of death. Moreover, while the Civil Code expressly
provides that civil personality may be extinguished by death, it does not explicitly state that only those who have acquired juridical
personality could die.

And third, death has been defined as the cessation of life.24 Life is not synonymous with civil personality. One need not acquire civil
personality first before he/she could die. Even a child inside the womb already has life. No less than the Constitution recognizes the
life of the unborn from conception,25 that the State must protect equally with the life of the mother. If the unborn already has life, then
the cessation thereof even prior to the child being delivered, qualifies as death.

Likewise, the unborn child can be considered a dependent under the CBA. As Continental Steel itself defines, a dependent is "one who
relies on another for support; one not able to exist or sustain oneself without the power or aid of someone else." Under said general
definition,26 even an unborn child is a dependent of its parents. Hortillano’s child could not have reached 38-39 weeks of its gestational
life without depending upon its mother, Hortillano’s wife, for sustenance. Additionally, it is explicit in the CBA provisions in question
that the dependent may be the parent, spouse, or child of a married employee; or the parent, brother, or sister of a single employee.
The CBA did not provide a qualification for the child dependent, such that the child must have been born or must have acquired civil
personality, as Continental Steel avers. Without such qualification, then child shall be understood in its more general sense, which
includes the unborn fetus in the mother’s womb.

The term legitimate merely addresses the dependent child’s status in relation to his/her parents. In Angeles v. Maglaya,27 we have
expounded on who is a legitimate child, viz:

A legitimate child is a product of, and, therefore, implies a valid and lawful marriage. Remove the element of lawful union and there is
strictly no legitimate filiation between parents and child. Article 164 of the Family Code cannot be more emphatic on the matter:
"Children conceived or born during the marriage of the parents are legitimate." (Emphasis ours.)

Conversely, in Briones v. Miguel,28 we identified an illegitimate child to be as follows:

The fine distinctions among the various types of illegitimate children have been eliminated in the Family Code. Now, there are only
two classes of children -- legitimate (and those who, like the legally adopted, have the rights of legitimate children) and illegitimate.
All children conceived and born outside a valid marriage are illegitimate, unless the law itself gives them legitimate status. (Emphasis
ours.)

It is apparent that according to the Family Code and the afore-cited jurisprudence, the legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child attaches
upon his/her conception. In the present case, it was not disputed that Hortillano and his wife were validly married and that their child
was conceived during said marriage, hence, making said child legitimate upon her conception.1avvphi1

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Also incontestable is the fact that Hortillano was able to comply with the fourth element entitling him to death and accident insurance
under the CBA, i.e., presentation of the death certificate of his unborn child.

Given the existence of all the requisites for bereavement leave and other death benefits under the CBA, Hortillano’s claims for the
same should have been granted by Continental Steel.

We emphasize that bereavement leave and other death benefits are granted to an employee to give aid to, and if possible, lessen the
grief of, the said employee and his family who suffered the loss of a loved one. It cannot be said that the parents’ grief and sense of
loss arising from the death of their unborn child, who, in this case, had a gestational life of 38-39 weeks but died during delivery, is
any less than that of parents whose child was born alive but died subsequently.

Being for the benefit of the employee, CBA provisions on bereavement leave and other death benefits should be interpreted liberally
to give life to the intentions thereof. Time and again, the Labor Code is specific in enunciating that in case of doubt in the
interpretation of any law or provision affecting labor, such should be interpreted in favor of labor. 29 In the same way, the CBA and
CBA provisions should be interpreted in favor of labor. In Marcopper Mining v. National Labor Relations Commission,30 we
pronounced:

Finally, petitioner misinterprets the declaration of the Labor Arbiter in the assailed decision that "when the pendulum of judgment
swings to and fro and the forces are equal on both sides, the same must be stilled in favor of labor." While petitioner acknowledges
that all doubts in the interpretation of the Labor Code shall be resolved in favor of labor, it insists that what is involved-here is the
amended CBA which is essentially a contract between private persons. What petitioner has lost sight of is the avowed policy of the
State, enshrined in our Constitution, to accord utmost protection and justice to labor, a policy, we are, likewise, sworn to uphold.

In Philippine Telegraph & Telephone Corporation v. NLRC [183 SCRA 451 (1990)], we categorically stated that:

When conflicting interests of labor and capital are to be weighed on the scales of social justice, the heavier influence of the latter
should be counter-balanced by sympathy and compassion the law must accord the underprivileged worker.

Likewise, in Terminal Facilities and Services Corporation v. NLRC [199 SCRA 265 (1991)], we declared:

Any doubt concerning the rights of labor should be resolved in its favor pursuant to the social justice policy.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision dated 27 February 2008 and Resolution dated 9 May 2008 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 101697, affirming the Resolution dated 20 November 2007 of Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator Atty.
Allan S. Montaño, which granted to Rolando P. Hortillano bereavement leave pay and other death benefits in the amounts of Four
Thousand Nine Hundred Thirty-Nine Pesos (₱4,939.00) and Eleven Thousand Five Hundred Fifty Pesos (₱11,550.00), respectively,
grounded on the death of his unborn child, are AFFIRMED. Costs against Continental Steel Manufacturing Corporation.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 26795 July 31, 1970

CARMEN QUIMIGUING, Suing through her parents, ANTONIO QUIMIGUING and JACOBA CABILIN, plaintiffs-
appellants,
vs.
FELIX ICAO, defendant-appellee.

Torcuato L. Galon for plaintiffs-appellants.

Godardo Jacinto for defendant-appellee.

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

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Appeal on points of law from an order of the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga del Norte (Judge Onofre Sison Abalos, presiding),
in its Civil Case No. 1590, dismissing a complaint for support and damages, and another order denying amendment of the same
pleading.

The events in the court of origin can be summarized as follows:

Appellant, Carmen Quimiguing, assisted by her parents, sued Felix Icao in the court below. In her complaint it was averred that the
parties were neighbors in Dapitan City, and had close and confidential relations; that defendant Icao, although married, succeeded in
having carnal intercourse with plaintiff several times by force and intimidation, and without her consent; that as a result she became
pregnant, despite efforts and drugs supplied by defendant, and plaintiff had to stop studying. Hence, she claimed support at P120.00
per month, damages and attorney's fees.

Duly summoned, defendant Icao moved to dismiss for lack of cause of action since the complaint did not allege that the child had been
born; and after hearing arguments, the trial judge sustained defendant's motion and dismissed the complaint.

Thereafter, plaintiff moved to amend the complaint to allege that as a result of the intercourse, plaintiff had later given birth to a baby
girl; but the court, sustaining defendant's objection, ruled that no amendment was allowable, since the original complaint averred no
cause of action. Wherefore, the plaintiff appealed directly to this Court.

We find the appealed orders of the court below to be untenable. A conceived child, although as yet unborn, is given by law a
provisional personality of its own for all purposes favorable to it, as explicitly provided in Article 40 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines. The unborn child, therefore, has a right to support from its progenitors, particularly of the defendant-appellee (whose
paternity is deemed admitted for the purpose of the motion to dismiss), even if the said child is only "en ventre de sa mere;" just as a
conceived child, even if as yet unborn, may receive donations as prescribed by Article 742 of the same Code, and its being ignored by
the parent in his testament may result in preterition of a forced heir that annuls the institution of the testamentary heir, even if such
child should be born after the death of the testator Article 854, Civil Code).

ART. 742. Donations made to conceived and unborn children may be accepted by those persons who would legally
represent them if they were already born.

ART. 854. The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living
at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall annul the institution of heir; but
the devises and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious.

If the omitted compulsory heirs should die before the testator, the institution shall be effectual, without prejudice to
the right of 'representation.

It is thus clear that the lower court's theory that Article 291 of the Civil Code declaring that support is an obligation of parents and
illegitimate children "does not contemplate support to children as yet unborn," violates Article 40 aforesaid, besides imposing a
condition that nowhere appears in the text of Article 291. It is true that Article 40 prescribing that "the conceived child shall be
considered born for all purposes that are favorable to it" adds further "provided it be born later with the conditions specified in the
following article" (i.e., that the foetus be alive at the time it is completely delivered from the mother's womb). This proviso, however,
is not a condition precedent to the right of the conceived child; for if it were, the first part of Article 40 would become entirely useless
and ineffective. Manresa, in his Commentaries (5th Ed.) to the corresponding Article 29 of the Spanish Civil Code, clearly points this
out:

Los derechos atribuidos al nasciturus no son simples expectativas, ni aun en el sentido tecnico que la moderna
doctrina da a esta figura juridica sino que constituyen un caso de los propiamente Ilamados 'derechos en estado de
pendenci'; el nacimiento del sujeto en las condiciones previstas por el art. 30, no determina el nacimiento de
aquellos derechos (que ya existian de antemano), sino que se trata de un hecho que tiene efectos declarativos. (1
Manresa, Op. cit., page 271)

A second reason for reversing the orders appealed from is that for a married man to force a woman not his wife to yield to his lust (as
averred in the original complaint in this case) constitutes a clear violation of the rights of his victim that entitles her to claim
compensation for the damage caused. Says Article 21 of the Civil Code of the Philippines:

8
 ART. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.

The rule of Article 21 is supported by Article 2219 of the same Code:

ART 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases:

(3) Seduction, abduction, rape or other lascivious acts:

xxx xxx xxx

(10) Acts and actions referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28 ....

Thus, independently of the right to Support of the child she was carrying, plaintiff herself had a cause of action for damages under the
terms of the complaint; and the order dismissing it for failure to state a cause of action was doubly in error.

WHEREFORE, the orders under appeal are reversed and set aside. Let the case be remanded to the court of origin for further
proceedings conformable to this decision. Costs against appellee Felix Icao. So ordered.

G.R. No. L-39110 November 28, 1933

ANTONIA L. DE JESUS, ET AL., plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
CESAR SYQUIA, defendant-appellant.

Jose Sotelo for plaintiffs-appellants.

Vicente J. Francisco for defendant-appellant.

STREET, J.:

This action was instituted in the Court of First Instance of Manila by Antonia Loanco de Jesus in her own right and by her mother,
Pilar Marquez, as next friend and representative of Ismael and Pacita Loanco, infants, children of the first-named plaintiff, for the
purpose of recovering from the defendant, Cesar Syquia, the sum of thirty thousand pesos as damages resulting to the first-named
plaintiff from breach of a marriage promise, to compel the defendant to recognize Ismael and Pacita as natural children begotten by
him with Antonia, and to pay for the maintenance of the three the amount of five hundred pesos per month, together with costs. Upon
hearing the cause, after answer of the defendant, the trial court erred a decree requiring the defendant to recognize Ismael Loanco as
his natural child and to pay maintenance for him at the rate of fifty pesos per month, with costs, dismissing the action in other respects.
From this judgment both parties appealed, the plaintiffs from so much of the decision as denied part of the relief sought by them, and
the defendant from that feature of the decision which required him to recognize Ismael Loanco and to pay for his maintenance.

At the time with which we are here concerned, the defendant, Cesar Syquia was of the age of twenty-three years, and an unmarried
scion of the prominent family in Manila, being possessed of a considerable property in his own right. His brother-in-law, Vicente
Mendoza is the owner of a barber shop in Tondo, where the defendant was accustomed to go for tonsorial attention. In the month of
June Antonia Loanco, a likely unmarried girl of the age of twenty years, was taken on as cashier in this barber shop. Syquia was not
long in making her acquaintance and amorous relations resulted, as a consequence of which Antonia was gotten with child and a baby
boy was born on June 17, 1931. The defendant was a constant visitor at the home of Antonia in the early months of her pregnancy, and
in February, 1931, he wrote and placed in her hands a note directed to the padre who has expected to christen the baby. This note was
as follows:

Saturday, 1:30 p. m.
February 14, 1931

Rev. FATHER,

9
The baby due in June is mine and I should like for my name to be given to it.

CESAR SYQUIA

The occasion for writing this note was that the defendant was on the eve of his departure on a trip to China and Japan; and while he
was abroad on this visit he wrote several letters to Antonia showing a paternal interest in the situation that had developed with her, and
cautioning her to keep in good condition in order that "junior" (meaning the baby to be, "Syquia, Jr.") might be strong, and promising
to return to them soon. The baby arrived at the time expected, and all necessary anticipatory preparations were made by the defendant.
To this he employed his friend Dr. Crescenciano Talavera to attend at the birth, and made arrangements for the hospitalization of the
mother in Saint Joseph's Hospital of the City of Manila, where she was cared for during confinement.

When Antonio was able to leave the hospital, Syquia took her, with her mother and the baby, to a house at No. 551 Camarines Street,
Manila, where they lived together for about a year in regular family style, all household expenses, including gas and electric light,
being defrayed by Syquia. In course of time, however, the defendant's ardor abated and, when Antonia began to show signs of a
second pregnancy the defendant decamped, and he is now married to another woman. A point that should here be noted is that when
the time came for christening the child, the defendant, who had charge of the arrangement for this ceremony, caused the name Ismael
Loanco to be given to him, instead of Cesar Syquia, Jr., as was at first planned.

The first question that is presented in the case is whether the note to the padre, quoted above, in connection with the letters written by
the defendant to the mother during pregnancy, proves an acknowledgment of paternity, within the meaning of subsection 1 of article
135 of the Civil Code. Upon this point we have no hesitancy in holding that the acknowledgment thus shown is sufficient. It is a
universal rule of jurisprudence that a child, upon being conceived, becomes a bearer of legal rights and capable of being dealt with as
a living person. The fact that it is yet unborn is no impediment to the acquisition of rights. The problem here presented of the
recognition of unborn child is really not different from that presented in the ordinary case of the recognition of a child already born
and bearing a specific name. Only the means and resources of identification are different. Even a bequest to a living child requires oral
evidence to connect the particular individual intended with the name used.

It is contended however, in the present case that the words of description used in the writings before us are not legally sufficient to
indemnify the child now suing as Ismael Loanco. This contention is not, in our opinion, well founded. The words of recognition
contained in the note to the padre are not capable of two constructions. They refer to a baby then conceived which was expected to be
born in June and which would thereafter be presented for christening. The baby came, and though it was in the end given the name of
Ismael Loanco instead of Cesar Syquia, Jr., its identity as the child which the defendant intended to acknowledge is clear. Any doubt
that might arise on this point is removed by the letters Exhibit F, G, H, and J. In these letters the defendant makes repeated reference
to junior as the baby which Antonia, to whom the letters were addressed, was then carrying in her womb, and the writer urged Antonia
to eat with good appetite in order that junior might be vigorous. In the last letter (Exhibit J) written only a few days before the birth of
the child, the defendant urged her to take good care of herself and ofjunior also.

It seems to us that the only legal question that can here arise as to the sufficiency of acknowledgment is whether the acknowledgment
contemplated in subsection 1 of article 135 of the Civil Code must be made in a single document or may be made in more than one
document, of indubitable authenticity, written by the recognizing father. Upon this point we are of the opinion that the recognition can
be made out by putting together the admissions of more than one document, supplementing the admission made in one letter by an
admission or admissions made in another. In the case before us the admission of paternity is contained in the note to the padre and the
other letters suffice to connect that admission with the child then being carried by Antonia L. de Jesus. There is no requirement in the
law that the writing shall be addressed to one, or any particular individual. It is merely required that the writing shall be indubitable.

The second question that presents itself in this case is whether the trial court erred in holding that Ismael Loanco had been in the
uninterrupted possession of the status of a natural child, justified by the conduct of the father himself, and that as a consequence, the
defendant in this case should be compelled to acknowledge the said Ismael Loanco, under No. 2 of article 135 of the Civil Code. The
facts already stated are sufficient, in our opinion, to justify the conclusion of the trial court on this point, and we may add here that our
conclusion upon the first branch of the case that the defendant had acknowledged this child in writings above referred to must be taken
in connection with the facts found by the court upon the second point. It is undeniable that from the birth of this child the defendant
supplied a home for it and the mother, in which they lived together with the defendant. This situation continued for about a year, and
until Antonia became enciente a second time, when the idea entered the defendant's head of abandoning her. The law fixes no period
during which a child must be in the continuous possession of the status of a natural child; and the period in this case was long enough
to evince the father's resolution to concede the status. The circumstance that he abandoned the mother and child shortly before this
action was started is unimportant. The word "continuous" in subsection 2 of article 135 of the Civil Code does not mean that the
concession of status shall continue forever, but only that it shall not be of an intermittent character while it continues.

10
What has been said disposes of the principal feature of the defendant's appeal. With respect to the appeal of the plaintiffs, we are of the
opinion that the trial court was right in refusing to give damages to the plaintiff, Antonia Loanco, for supposed breach of promise to
marry. Such promise is not satisfactorily proved, and we may add that the action for breach of promise to marry has no standing in the
civil law, apart from the right to recover money or property advanced by the plaintiff upon the faith of such promise. This case exhibits
none of the features necessary to maintain such an action. Furthermore, there is no proof upon which a judgment could be based
requiring the defendant to recognize the second baby, Pacita Loanco.

Finally, we see no necessity or propriety in modifying the judgment as to the amount of the maintenance which the trial court allowed
to Ismael Loanco. And in this connection we merely point out that, as conditions change, the Court of First Instance will have
jurisdiction to modify the order as to the amount of the pension as circumstances will require.

The judgment appealed from is in all respects affirmed, without costs. So ordered.

G.R. No. L-770 April 27, 1948

ANGEL T. LIMJOCO, petitioner,

vs.
INTESTATE ESTATE OF PEDRO O. FRAGRANTE, deceased, respondent.

Angel Limjoco, Jr. and Delfin L. Gonzales for petitioner.

Bienvenido A. Tan for respondent.

HILADO, J.:

Under date of May 21, 1946, the Public Service Commission, through Deputy Commissioner Fidel Ibañez, rendered its decision in
case No. 4572 of Pedro O. Fragante, as applicant for a certificate of public convenience to install, maintain and operate an ice plant in
San Juan, Rizal, whereby said commission held that the evidence therein showed that the public interest and convenience will be
promoted in a proper and suitable manner "by authorizing the operation and maintenance of another ice plant of two and one-half (2-
½) tons in the municipality of San Juan; that the original applicant Pedro O. Fragante was a Filipino Citizen at the time of his death;
and that his intestate estate is financially capable of maintaining the proposed service". The commission, therefore, overruled the
opposition filed in the case and ordered "that under the provisions of section 15 of Commonwealth Act No. 146, as amended a
certificate of public convenience be issued to the Intestate Estate of the deceased Pedro Fragante, authorizing said Intestate Estate
through its Special or Judicial Administrator, appointed by the proper court of competent jurisdiction, to maintain and operate an ice
plant with a daily productive capacity of two and one-half (2-1/2) tons in the Municipality of San Juan and to sell the ice produced
from said plant in the said Municipality of San Juan and in the Municipality of Mandaluyong, Rizal, and in Quezon City", subject to
the conditions therein set forth in detail (petitioner's brief, pp. 33-34).

Petitioner makes four assignments of error in his brief as follows:

1. The decision of the Public Service Commission is not in accordance with law.

2. The decision of the Public Service Commission is not reasonably supported by evidence.

3. The Public Service Commission erred in not giving petitioner and the Ice and Cold Storage Industries of the Philippines,
Inc., as existing operators, a reasonable opportunity to meet the increased demand.

4. The decision of the Public Service Commission is an unwarranted departure from its announced policy with respect to the
establishment and operation of ice plant. (Pp. 1-2, petitioner's brief.)

In his argument petitioner contends that it was error on the part of the commission to allow the substitution of the legal representative
of the estate of Pedro O. Fragante for the latter as party applicant in the case then pending before the commission, and in subsequently
granting to said estate the certificate applied for, which is said to be in contravention of law.

If Pedro O. Fragante had not died, there can be no question that he would have had the right to prosecute his application before the
commission to its final conclusion. No one would have denied him that right. As declared by the commission in its decision, he had
invested in the ice plant in question P 35,000, and from what the commission said regarding his other properties and business, he
would certainly have been financially able to maintain and operate said plant had he not died. His transportation business alone was
11
netting him about P1,440 a month. He was a Filipino citizen and continued to be such till his demise. The commission declared in its
decision, in view of the evidence before it, that his estate was financially able to maintain and operate the ice plant. The aforesaid right
of Pedro O. Fragante to prosecute said application to its conclusion was one which by its nature did not lapse through his death.
Hence, it constitutes a part of the assets of his estate, for which a right was property despite the possibility that in the end the
commission might have denied application, although under the facts of the case, the commission granted the application in view of the
financial ability of the estate to maintain and operate the ice plant. Petitioner, in his memorandum of March 19, 1947, admits (page 3)
that the certificate of public convenience once granted "as a rule, should descend to his estate as an asset". Such certificate would
certainly be property, and the right to acquire such a certificate, by complying with the requisites of the law, belonged to the decedent
in his lifetime, and survived to his estate and judicial administrator after his death.

If Pedro O. Fragrante had in his lifetime secured an option to buy a piece of land and during the life of the option he died, if the option
had been given him in the ordinary course of business and not out of special consideration for his person, there would be no doubt that
said option and the right to exercise it would have survived to his estate and legal representatives. In such a case there would also be
the possibility of failure to acquire the property should he or his estate or legal representative fail to comply with the conditions of the
option. In the case at bar Pedro O. Fragrante's undoubted right to apply for and acquire the desired certificate of public convenience —
the evidence established that the public needed the ice plant — was under the law conditioned only upon the requisite citizenship and
economic ability to maintain and operate the service. Of course, such right to acquire or obtain such certificate of public convenience
was subject to failure to secure its objective through nonfulfillment of the legal conditions, but the situation here is no different from
the legal standpoint from that of the option in the illustration just given.

Rule 88, section 2, provides that the executor or administrator may bring or defend actions, among other cases, for the protection of
the property or rights of the deceased which survive, and it says that such actions may be brought or defended "in the right of the
deceased".

Rule 82, section 1, paragraph (a), mentions among the duties of the executor or administrator, the making of an inventory of all goods,
chattels, rights, credits, and estate of the deceased which shall come to his possession or knowledge, or to the possession of any other
person for him.

In his commentaries on the Rules of Court (Volume II, 2nd ed., pages 366, 367) the present chief Justice of this Court draws the
following conclusion from the decisions cited by him:

Therefore, unless otherwise expressly provided by law, any action affecting the property or rights (emphasis supplied) of a
deceased person which may be brought by or against him if he were alive, may likewise be instituted and prosecuted by or
against the administrator, unless the action is for recovery of money, debt or interest thereon, or unless, by its very nature, it
cannot survive, because death extinguishes the right . . . .

It is true that a proceeding upon the application for a certificate of public convenience before the Public Service Commission is not an
"action". But the foregoing provisions and citations go to prove that the decedent's rights which by their nature are not extinguished by
death go to make up a part and parcel of the assets of his estate which, being placed under the control and management of the executor
or administrator, can not be exercised but by him in representation of the estate for the benefit of the creditors, devisees or legatees, if
any, and the heirs of the decedent. And if the right involved happens to consist in the prosecution of an unfinished proceeding upon an
application for a certificate of public convenience of the deceased before the Public Service Commission, it is but logical that the legal
representative be empowered and entitled in behalf of the estate to make the right effective in that proceeding.

Manresa (Vol. III, 6th ed., p. 11) says that No. 10 of article 334 and article 336 of the Civil Code, respectively, consider
as immovable and movable things rights which are not material. The same eminent commentator says in the cited volume (p. 45) that
article 336 of the Civil Code has been deficiently drafted in that it is not sufficiently expressive of all incorporeal rights which are
also property for juridical purposes.

Corpus Juris (Vol. 50, p. 737) states that in the broad sense of the term, property includes, among other things, "an option", and "the
certificate of the railroad commission permitting the operation of a bus line", and on page 748 of the same volume we read:

However, these terms (real property, as estate or interest) have also been declared to include every species of title, inchoate or
complete, and embrace rights which lie in contract, whether executory or executed. (Emphasis supplied.)

Another important question raised by petitioner is whether the estate of Pedro O. Fragrante is a "person" within the meaning of the
Public Service Act.

12
Words and Phrases, First Series, (Vol. 6, p, 5325), states the following doctrine in the jurisdiction of the State of Indiana:

As the estate of the decedent is in law regarded as a person, a forgery committed after the death of the man whose name
purports to be signed to the instrument may be prosecuted as with the intent to defraud the estate. Billings vs. State, 107 Ind.,
54, 55, 6 N. E. 914, 7 N. E. 763, 57 Am. Rep. 77.

The Supreme Court of Indiana in the decision cited above had before it a case of forgery committed after the death of one Morgan for
the purpose of defrauding his estate. The objection was urged that the information did not aver that the forgery was committed with
the intent to defraud any person. The Court, per Elliott, J., disposed of this objection as follows:

. . . The reason advanced in support of this proposition is that the law does not regard the estate of a decedent as a person.
This intention (contention) cannot prevail. The estate of the decedent is a person in legal contemplation. "The word "person"
says Mr. Abbot, "in its legal signification, is a generic term, and includes artificial as well as natural persons," 2 Abb. Dict.
271; Douglas vs. Pacific, etc. Co., 4 Cal. 304; Planters', etc., Bank vs. Andrews, 8 Port. (Ala.) 404. It said in another work that
'persons are of two kinds: natural and artificial. A natural person is a human being. Artificial persons include (1) a collection
or succession of natural persons forming a corporation; (2) a collection of property to which the law attributes the capacity of
having rights and duties. The latter class of artificial persons is recognized only to a limited extent in our law. "Examples are
the estate of a bankrupt or deceased person." 2 Rapalje & L. Law Dict. 954. Our own cases inferentially recognize the
correctness of the definition given by the authors from whom we have quoted, for they declare that it is sufficient, in pleading
a claim against a decedent's estate, to designate the defendant as the estate of the deceased person, naming him. Ginn vs.
Collins, 43 Ind. 271. Unless we accept this definition as correct, there would be a failure of justice in cases where, as here,
the forgery is committed after the death of a person whose name is forged; and this is a result to be avoided if it can be done
consistent with principle. We perceive no difficulty in avoiding such a result; for, to our minds, it seems reasonable that the
estate of a decedent should be regarded as an artificial person. It is the creation of law for the purpose of enabling a
disposition of the assets to be properly made, and, although natural persons as heirs, devises, or creditors, have an interest in
the property, the artificial creature is a distinct legal entity. The interest which natural persons have in it is not complete until
there has been a due administration; and one who forges the name of the decedent to an instrument purporting to be a
promissory note must be regarded as having intended to defraud the estate of the decedent, and not the natural persons having
diverse interests in it, since ha cannot be presumed to have known who those persons were, or what was the nature of their
respective interest. The fraudulent intent is against the artificial person, — the estate — and not the natural persons who have
direct or contingent interest in it. (107 Ind. 54, 55, 6 N.E. 914-915.)

In the instant case there would also be a failure of justice unless the estate of Pedro O. Fragrante is considered a "person", for quashing
of the proceedings for no other reason than his death would entail prejudicial results to his investment amounting to P35,000.00 as
found by the commission, not counting the expenses and disbursements which the proceeding can be presumed to have occasioned
him during his lifetime, let alone those defrayed by the estate thereafter. In this jurisdiction there are ample precedents to show that the
estate of a deceased person is also considered as having legal personality independent of their heirs. Among the most recent cases may
be mentioned that of "Estate of Mota vs. Concepcion, 56 Phil., 712, 717, wherein the principal plaintiff was the estate of the deceased
Lazaro Mota, and this Court gave judgment in favor of said estate along with the other plaintiffs in these words:

. . . the judgment appealed from must be affirmed so far as it holds that defendants Concepcion and Whitaker are indebted to
he plaintiffs in the amount of P245,804.69 . . . .

Under the regime of the Civil Code and before the enactment of the Code of Civil Procedure, the heirs of a deceased person were
considered in contemplation of law as the continuation of his personality by virtue of the provision of article 661 of the first Code that
the heirs succeed to all the rights and obligations of the decedent by the mere fact of his death. It was so held by this Court in Barrios
vs. Dolor, 2 Phil., 44, 46. However, after the enactment of the Code of Civil Procedure, article 661 of the Civil Code was abrogated, as
held in Suiliong & Co. vs. Chio-Taysan, 12 Phil., 13, 22. In that case, as well as in many others decided by this Court after the
innovations introduced by the Code of Civil Procedure in the matter of estates of deceased persons, it has been the constant doctrine
that it is the estate or the mass of property, rights and assets left by the decedent, instead of the heirs directly, that becomes vested and
charged with his rights and obligations which survive after his demise.

The heirs were formerly considered as the continuation of the decedent's personality simply by legal fiction, for they might not have
been flesh and blood — the reason was one in the nature of a legal exigency derived from the principle that the heirs succeeded to the
rights and obligations of the decedent. Under the present legal system, such rights and obligations as survive after death have to be
exercised and fulfilled only by the estate of the deceased. And if the same legal fiction were not indulged, there would be no juridical
basis for the estate, represented by the executor or administrator, to exercise those rights and to fulfill those obligations of the
deceased. The reason and purpose for indulging the fiction is identical and the same in both cases. This is why according to the

13
Supreme Court of Indiana in Billings vs. State, supra, citing 2 Rapalje & L. Dictionary, 954, among the artificial persons recognized
by law figures "a collection of property to which the law attributes the capacity of having rights and duties", as for instance, the estate
of a bankrupt or deceased person.

Petitioner raises the decisive question of whether or not the estate of Pedro O. Fragrante can be considered a "citizen of the
Philippines" within the meaning of section 16 of the Public Service Act, as amended, particularly the proviso thereof expressly and
categorically limiting the power of the commission to issue certificates of public convenience or certificates of public convenience and
necessity "only to citizens of the Philippines or of the United States or to corporations, copartnerships, associations, or joint-stock
companies constituted and organized under the laws of the Philippines", and the further proviso that sixty per centum of the stock or
paid-up capital of such entities must belong entirely to citizens of the Philippines or of the United States.

Within the Philosophy of the present legal system, the underlying reason for the legal fiction by which, for certain purposes, the estate
of the deceased person is considered a "person" is the avoidance of injustice or prejudice resulting from the impossibility of exercising
such legal rights and fulfilling such legal obligations of the decedent as survived after his death unless the fiction is indulged.
Substantially the same reason is assigned to support the same rule in the jurisdiction of the State of Indiana, as announced in
Billings vs. State, supra, when the Supreme Court of said State said:

. . . It seems reasonable that the estate of a decedent should be regarded as an artificial person. it is the creation of law for the
purpose of enabling a disposition of the assets to be properly made . . . .

Within the framework and principles of the constitution itself, to cite just one example, under the bill of rights it seems clear that while
the civil rights guaranteed therein in the majority of cases relate to natural persons, the term "person" used in section 1 (1) and (2)
must be deemed to include artificial or juridical persons, for otherwise these latter would be without the constitutional guarantee
against being deprived of property without due process of law, or the immunity from unreasonable searches and seizures. We take it
that it was the intendment of the framers to include artificial or juridical, no less than natural, persons in these constitutional
immunities and in others of similar nature. Among these artificial or juridical persons figure estates of deceased persons. Hence, we
hold that within the framework of the Constitution, the estate of Pedro O. Fragrante should be considered an artificial or juridical
person for the purposes of the settlement and distribution of his estate which, of course, include the exercise during the judicial
administration thereof of those rights and the fulfillment of those obligations of his which survived after his death. One of those rights
was the one involved in his pending application before the Public Service Commission in the instant case, consisting in the
prosecution of said application to its final conclusion. As stated above, an injustice would ensue from the opposite course.

How about the point of citizenship? If by legal fiction his personality is considered extended so that any debts or obligations left by,
and surviving, him may be paid, and any surviving rights may be exercised for the benefit of his creditors and heirs, respectively, we
find no sound and cogent reason for denying the application of the same fiction to his citizenship, and for not considering it as
likewise extended for the purposes of the aforesaid unfinished proceeding before the Public Service Commission. The outcome of said
proceeding, if successful, would in the end inure to the benefit of the same creditors and the heirs. Even in that event petitioner could
not allege any prejudice in the legal sense, any more than he could have done if Fragrante had lived longer and obtained the desired
certificate. The fiction of such extension of his citizenship is grounded upon the same principle, and motivated by the same reason, as
the fiction of the extension of personality. The fiction is made necessary to avoid the injustice of subjecting his estate, creditors and
heirs, solely by reason of his death to the loss of the investment amounting to P35,000, which he has already made in the ice plant, not
counting the other expenses occasioned by the instant proceeding, from the Public Service Commission of this Court.

We can perceive no valid reason for holding that within the intent of the constitution (Article IV), its provisions on Philippine
citizenship exclude the legal principle of extension above adverted to. If for reasons already stated our law indulges the fiction of
extension of personality, if for such reasons the estate of Pedro O. Fragrante should be considered an artificial or juridical person
herein, we can find no justification for refusing to declare a like fiction as to the extension of his citizenship for the purposes of this
proceeding.

Pedro O. Fragrante was a Filipino citizen, and as such, if he had lived, in view of the evidence of record, he would have obtained from
the commission the certificate for which he was applying. The situation has suffered but one change, and that is, his death. His estate
was that of a Filipino citizen. And its economic ability to appropriately and adequately operate and maintain the service of an ice plant
was the same that it received from the decedent himself. In the absence of a contrary showing, which does not exist here, his heirs may
be assumed to be also Filipino citizens; and if they are not, there is the simple expedient of revoking the certificate or enjoining them
from inheriting it.

14
Upon the whole, we are of the opinion that for the purposes of the prosecution of said case No. 4572 of the Public Service
Commission to its final conclusion, both the personality and citizenship of Pedro O. Fragrante must be deemed extended, within the
meaning and intent of the Public Service Act, as amended, in harmony with the constitution: it is so adjudged and decreed.

Decision affirmed, without costs. So ordered.

G.R. No. L-27956 April 30, 1976

DIONISIO DUMLAO, in his own behalf and in his capacity as Administrator of the Testate Estate of the late Pedro Oria;
FAUSTA DUMLAO, AMADO DUMLAO, and BENJAMIN DUMLAO, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
QUALITY PLASTIC PRODUCTS, INC., defendant-appellee.

Castillo & Castillo for appellants.

Eugenio T. Estavillo for appellee.

AQUINO, J.:p

On February 28, 1962 the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan in Civil Case No.
T-662 rendered a judgment ordering defendants Vicente Soliven, Pedro Oria, Santiago Laurencio, Marcelino Sumalbag and Juana
Darang to pay solidarity Quality Plastic Products, Inc. the sum of P3,667.03 plus the legal rate of interest from November, 1958. The
lower court directed that in case the defendants failed to pay the said amount before its decision became final, then Quality Plastic
Products, Inc. "is hereby authorized to foreclose the bond, Exhibit A, in accordance with law, for the satisfaction of the judgment".
(Under that bond the four sureties bound themselves to answer solidarity for the obligations of the principal, Vicente Soliven and
certain real properties of the sureties were "given as security for" their undertaking).

Upon defendants' failure to pay the amount of the judgment and after the decision had become final, the lower court, on motion of
Quality Plastic Products, Inc., ordered the "foreclosure" of the surety bond and the sale at public auction of the land of Pedro Oria
which he had given as security under the bond. Oria's land, which was covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 28732 and has an
area of nine and six-tenths hectares, was levied upon and sold by the sheriff at public auction on September 24, 1962. The sale was
confirmed by the lower court in its order of November 20, 1962.

It turned out that Oria died on April 23, 1959 or long before June 13, 1960 when the action was filed. Oria's death was not known to
Quality Plastic Products, Inc. Nor were the representatives of Quality Plastic Products, Inc. aware that in the same Tayug court Special
Proceeding No. T-212, Testate Estate of the deceased Pedro Oria, was pending.

The summons and copies of the complaint for the five defendants in Civil Case No.
T-662 had been personally served on June 24, 1960 by a deputy sheriff on Soliven, the principal in the bond, who acknowledged such
service by signing on the back of the original summons in his own behalf and again signing for his co-defendants.

On March 1, 1963 Dionisio, Fausta, Amado and Benjamin, all surnamed Dumlao and all testamentary heirs in Oria's duly probated
will, sued Quality Plastic Products, Inc., also in the Tayug court for the annulment of the judgment against Oria and the execution
against his land. (Dionisio Dumlao also sued in his capacity as administrator of Oria's testate estate).

The ground for annulment was lack of jurisdiction over the person of the deceased Oria (Civil Case No. T- 873). It was only when
Quality Plastic Products, Inc. received the summons in Civil Case No. T-873 that it learned that Oria was already dead at the time the
prior case, Civil Case No. T-662, was filed.

Quality Plastic Products, Inc. in its answer alleged that Oria's heirs were aware of the suit against Soliven and his sureties and that the
said heirs were estopped to question the court's jurisdiction over Oria.

After hearing the lower court held that it acquired jurisdiction over Soliven and the other defendants in Civil Case No. T-662 by reason
of their voluntary appearance. It reasoned out that Soliven acted in bad faith because he did not apprise the court that Oria was dead. It

15
specifically ruled that "it had acquired jurisdiction over the person" of Oria and that the judgment was valid as to him. From that
decision the plaintiffs appealed.

The four assignments of error of appellants Dumlao may be boiled down to the issue as to the validity of the lower court's judgment
against the deceased Pedro Oria who, being already in the other world, was never served with summons.

There is no difficulty in resolving that issue. Since no jurisdiction was acquired over Oria, the judgment against him is a patent nullity
(Ang Lam vs. Rosillosa and Santiago, 86 Phil. 447; Asuncion vs. Nieto, 4 Phil. 97; Gorostiaga vs. Sarte, 68 Phil. 4).

As far as Oria was concerned, the lower court's judgment against him in Civil Case No. T-662 is void for lack of jurisdiction over his
person. He was not, and he could not have been, validly served with summons. He had no more civil personality. His juridical
capacity, which is the fitness to be the subject of legal relations, was lost through death. (Arts. 37 and 42, Civil Code).

The lower court erred in ruling that since Soliven's counsel also appeared as counsel for Oria, there was a voluntary appearance which
enabled the court to acquire jurisdiction over Oria, as contemplated in section 23, Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of Court. Soliven's
counsel could not have validly appeared for a dead co-defendant. Estoppel has no application to this case.

But from the fact that appellants Dumlao had to sue Quality Plastic Products, Inc. in order to annul the judgment against Oria, it does
not follow that they are entitled to claim attorney's fees against that corporation. The parties herein agreed in their stipulation of facts
that Quality Plastic Products, Inc. was unaware of Oria's death. Appellants Dumlao in effect conceded that the appellee acted in good
faith in joining Oria as a co-defendant.

WHEREFORE, the lower court's decision is reversed and set aside. Its judgment in Civil Case No. T-662 against Pedro Oria is
declared void for lack of jurisdiction. The execution sale of Oria's land covered by OCT No. 28732 is also void. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 85140 May 17, 1990

TOMAS EUGENIO, SR., petitioner,

vs.
HON. ALEJANDRO M. VELEZ, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 20, Cagayan de Oro City, DEPUTY
SHERIFF JOHNSON TAN, JR., Deputy Sheriff of Branch 20, Regional Trial Court, Cagayan de Oro City, and the Private
Respondents, the petitioners in Sp. Proc. No. 88-55, for "Habeas Corpus", namely: CRISANTA VARGAS-SANCHEZ,
SANTOS and NARCISA VARGAS-BENTULAN, respondents.

G.R. No. 86470 May 17, 1990.

TOMAS EUGENIO, petitioner-appellant,

vs.
HON. ALEJANDRO M. VELEZ, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 20, Cagayan de Oro City, CRISANTA
VARGAS-SANCHEZ, FELIX VARGAS, ERNESTO VARGAS, NATIVIDAD VARGAS-CAGAPE, NENITA VARGAS-
CADENAS, LUDIVINA VARGAS-DE LOS SANTOS and NARCISA VARGAS-BENTULAN, respondents-appellees.

Maximo G. Rodriguez for petitioner.

Erasmo B. Damasing and Oliver Asis Improso for respondents.

PADILLA, J.:

On 5 October 1988, petitioner came to this Court with a petition for certiorari and prohibition with application for restraining order
and/or injunction (docketed as G.R. No. 85140) seeking to enjoin respondent Judge from proceeding with the Habeas Corpus case
(Sp. Proc. No. 88- 55, RTC, Branch 20, Cagayan de Oro City), * the respondent Sheriff from enforcing and implementing the writ and
orders of the respondent Judge dated 28, 29, and 30 September 1988, and to declare said writ and orders as null and void. In a

16
resolution issued on 11 October 1988, this Court required comment from the respondents on the petition but denied the application for
a temporary restraining order.

The records disclose the following:

Unaware of the death on 28 August 1988 of (Vitaliana Vargas Vitaliana for brevity), her full blood brothers and sisters, herein private
respondents (Vargases', for brevity) filed on 27 September 1988, a petition for habeas corpusbefore the RTC of Misamis Oriental
(Branch 20, Cagayan de Oro City) alleging that Vitaliana was forcibly taken from her residence sometime in 1987 and confined by
herein petitioner in his palacial residence in Jasaan, Misamis Oriental. Despite her desire to escape, Vitaliana was allegedly deprived
of her liberty without any legal authority. At the time the petition was filed, it was alleged that Vitaliana was 25 years of age, single,
and living with petitioner Tomas Eugenio.

The respondent court in an order dated 28 September 1988 issued the writ of habeas corpus, but the writ was returned unsatisfied.
Petitioner refused to surrender the body of Vitaliana (who had died on 28 August 1988) to the respondent sheriff, reasoning that a
corpse cannot be the subject of habeas corpus proceedings; besides, according to petitioner, he had already obtained a burial permit
from the Undersecretary of the Department of Health, authorizing the burial at the palace quadrangle of the Philippine Benevolent
Christian Missionary, Inc. (PBCM), a registered religious sect, of which he (petitioner) is the Supreme President and Founder.

Petitioner also alleged that Vitaliana died of heart failure due to toxemia of pregnancy in his residence on 28 August 1988. As her
common law husband, petitioner claimed legal custody of her body. These reasons were incorporated in an explanation filed before the
respondent court. Two (2) orders dated 29 and 30 September 1988 were then issued by respondent court, directing delivery of the
deceased's body to a funeral parlor in Cagayan de Oro City and its autopsy.

Petitioner (as respondent in the habeas corpus proceedings) filed an urgent motion to dismiss the petition therein, claiming lack of
jurisdiction of the court over the nature of the action under sec. 1(b) of Rule 16 in relation to sec. 2, Rule 72 of the Rules of Court. 1 A
special proceeding for habeas corpus, petitioner argued, is not applicable to a dead person but extends only to all cases of illegal
confinement or detention of a live person.

Before resolving the motion to dismiss, private respondents (as petitioners below) were granted leave to amend their
petition. 2 Claiming to have knowledge of the death of Vitaliana only on 28 September 1988 (or after the filing of the habeas
corpus petition), private respondents (Vargases') alleged that petitioner Tomas Eugenia who is not in any way related to Vitaliana was
wrongfully interfering with their (Vargases') duty to bury her. Invoking Arts. 305 and 308 of the Civil Code, 3 the Vargases contended
that, as the next of kin in the Philippines, they are the legal custodians of the dead body of their sister Vitaliana. An exchange of
pleadings followed. The motion to dismiss was finally submitted for resolution on 21 October 1988.

In the absence of a restraining order from this Court, proceedings continued before the respondent court; the body was placed in a
coffin, transferred to the Greenhills Memorial Homes in Cagayan de Oro City, viewed by the presiding Judge of respondent court, and
examined by a duly authorized government pathologist. 4

Denying the motion to dismiss filed by petitioner, the court a quo held in an order, 5 dated 17 November 1988, that:

It should be noted from the original petition, to the first amended petition, up to the second amended petition that the
ultimate facts show that if the person of Vitaliana Vargas turns out to be dead then this Court is being prayed to
declare the petitioners as the persons entitled to the custody, interment and/or burial of the body of said deceased.
The Court, considering the circumstance that Vitaliana Vargas was already dead on August 28, 1988 but only
revealed to the Court on September 29, 1988 by respondent's counsel, did not lose jurisdiction over the nature and
subject matter of this case because it may entertain this case thru the allegations in the body of the petition on the
determination as to who is entitled to the custody of the dead body of the late Vitaliana Vargas as well as the burial
or interment thereof, for the reason that under the provisions of Sec. 19 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, which reads as
follows:

Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. — Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:

(1) In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation;

xxx xxx xxx

17
 (5) In all actions involving the contract of marriage and marital relations;

(6) In all cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, person or body
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions:

xxx xxx xxx

it so provides that the Regional Trial Court has exclusive original jurisdiction to try this case. The authority to try the
issue of custody and burial of a dead person is within the lawful jurisdiction of this Court because of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129 and because of the allegations of the pleadings in this case, which are enumerated in Sec. 19,
pars. 1, 5 and 6 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.

Thereafter, the court a quo proceeded as in or civil cases and, in due course, rendered a decision on 17 January 1989, 6 resolving the
main issue of whether or not said court acquired jurisdiction over the case by treating it as an action for custody of a dead body,
without the petitioners having to file a separate civil action for such relief, and without the Court first dismissing the original petition
for habeas corpus.

Citing Sections 19 and 20 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1981), 7 Sections 5 and 6 of Rule 135 of
the Rules of Court8 Articles 305 and 308 in relation to Article 294 of the Civil Code and Section 1104 of the Revised Administrative
Code, 9 the decision stated:

. . . . By a mere reading of the petition the court observed that the allegations in the original petition as well as in the
two amended petitions show that Vitaliana Vargas has been restrained of her liberty and if she were dead then relief
was prayed for the custody and burial of said dead person. The amendments to the petition were but elaborations but
the ultimate facts remained the same, hence, this court strongly finds that this court has ample jurisdiction to
entertain and sit on this case as an action for custody and burial of the dead body because the body of the petition
controls and is binding and since this case was raffled to this court to the exclusion of all other courts, it is the
primary duty of this court to decide and dispose of this case. . . . . 10

Satisfied with its jurisdiction, the respondent court then proceeded to the matter of rightful custody over the dead body, (for purposes
of burial thereof). The order of preference to give support under Art. 294 was used as the basis of the award. Since there was no
surviving spouse, ascendants or descendants, the brothers and sisters were preferred over petitioner who was merely a common law
spouse, the latter being himself legally married to another woman. 11

On 23 January 1989, a new petition for review with application for a temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction was
filed with this Court (G.R. No. 86470). Raised therein were pure questions of law, basically Identical to those raised in the earlier
petition (G.R. No. 85140); hence, the consolidation of both cases. 12 On 7 February 1989, petitioner filed an urgent motion for the
issuance of an injunction to maintain status quo pending appeal, which this Court denied in a resolution dated 23 February 1989
stating that "Tomas Eugenio has so far failed to sufficiently establish a clear legal right to the custody of the dead body of Vitaliana
Vargas, which now needs a decent burial." The petitions were then submitted for decision without further pleadings.

Between the two (2) consolidated petitions, the following issues are raised:

1. propriety of a habeas corpus proceeding under Rule 102 of the Rules of Court to recover custody of the dead
body of a 25 year old female, single, whose nearest surviving claimants are full blood brothers and sisters and a
common law husband.

2. jurisdiction of the RTC over such proceedings and/or its authority to treat the action as one for
custody/possession/authority to bury the deceased/recovery of the dead.

3. interpretation of par. 1, Art. 294 of the Civil Code (Art. 199 of the new Family Code) which
states:

Art. 294. The claim for support, when proper and two or more persons are obliged to give it, shall
be made in the following order:

(1) From the spouse;

18
 xxx xxx xxx

Section 19, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 provides for the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts over civil cases.
Under Sec. 2, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, the writ of habeas corpus may be granted by a Court of First Instance (now Regional
Trial Court). It is an elementary rule of procedure that what controls is not the caption of the complaint or petition; but the allegations
therein determine the nature of the action, and even without the prayer for a specific remedy, proper relief may nevertheless be granted
by the court if the facts alleged in the complaint and the evidence introduced so warrant. 13

When the petition for habeas corpus was filed before the court a quo, it was not certain whether Vitaliana was dead or alive.
While habeas corpus is a writ of right, it will not issue as a matter of course or as a mere perfimetory operation on the filing of the
petition. Judicial discretion is exercised in its issuance, and such facts must be made to appear to the judge to whom the petition is
presented as, in his judgment, prima facie entitle the petitioner to the writ. 14 While the court may refuse to grant the writ if the petition
is insufficient in form and substance, the writ should issue if the petition complies with the legal requirements and its averments make
a prima facie case for relief. However, a judge who is asked to issue a writ of habeas corpus need not be very critical in looking into
the petition for very clear grounds for the exercise of this jurisdiction. The latter's power to make full inquiry into the cause of
commitment or detention will enable him to correct any errors or defects in the petition. 15

In Macazo and Nunez vs. Nunez, 16 the Court frowned upon the dismissal of a habeas corpus petition filed by a brother to obtain
custody of a minor sister, stating:

All these circumstances notwithstanding, we believe that the case should not have been dismissed. The court below
should not have overlooked that by dismissing the petition, it was virtually sanctioning the continuance of an
adulterous and scandalous relation between the minor and her married employer, respondent Benildo Nunez against
all principles of law and morality. It is no excuse that the minor has expressed preference for remaining with said
respondent, because the minor may not chose to continue an illicit relation that morals and law repudiate.

xxx xxx xxx

The minor's welfare being the paramount consideration, the court below should not allow the technicality, that
Teofilo Macazo was not originally made a party, to stand in the way of its giving the child full protection. Even in
a habeas corpus proceeding the court had power to award temporary custody to the petitioner herein, or some other
suitable person, after summoning and hearing all parties concerned. What matters is that the immoral situation
disclosed by the records be not allowed to continue. 17

After the fact of Vitaliana's death was made known to the petitioners in the habeas corpus proceedings, amendment of the petition
for habeas corpus, not dismissal, was proper to avoid multiplicity of suits. Amendments to pleadings are generally favored and should
be liberally allowed in furtherance of justice in order that every case may so far as possible be determined on its real facts and in order
to expedite the trial of cases or prevent circuity of action and unnecessary expense, unless there are circumstances such as inexcusable
delay or the taking of the adverse party by surprise or the like, which justify a refusal of permission to amend. 18 As correctly alleged
by respondents, the writ of habeas corpus as a remedy became moot and academic due to the death of the person allegedly restrained
of liberty, but the issue of custody remained, which the court a quo had to resolve.

Petitioner claims he is the spouse contemplated under Art. 294 of the Civil Code, the term spouse used therein not being preceded by
any qualification; hence, in the absence of such qualification, he is the rightful custodian of Vitaliana's body. Vitaliana's brothers and
sisters contend otherwise. Indeed, Philippine Law does not recognize common law marriages. A man and woman not legally married
who cohabit for many years as husband and wife, who represent themselves to the public as husband and wife, and who are reputed to
be husband and wife in the community where they live may be considered legally mauled in common law jurisdictions but not in the
Philippines. 19

While it is true that our laws do not just brush aside the fact that such relationships are present in our society, and that they produce a
community of properties and interests which is governed by law, 20 authority exists in case law to the effect that such form of co-
ownership requires that the man and woman living together must not in any way be incapacitated to contract marriage. 21 In any case,
herein petitioner has a subsisting marriage with another woman, a legal impediment which disqualified him from even legally
marrying Vitaliana. In Santero vs. CFI of Cavite, 22 ,the Court, thru Mr. Justice Paras, interpreting Art. 188 of the Civil Code (Support
of Surviving Spouse and Children During Liquidation of Inventoried Property) stated: "Be it noted however that with respect to
'spouse', the same must be the legitimate 'spouse' (not common-law spouses)."

19
There is a view that under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code, the term "spouse" embraces common law relation for purposes of
exemption from criminal liability in cases of theft, swindling and malicious mischief committed or caused mutually by spouses. The
Penal Code article, it is said, makes no distinction between a couple whose cohabitation is sanctioned by a sacrament or legal tie and
another who are husband and wife de facto.23 But this view cannot even apply to the facts of the case at bar. We hold that the
provisions of the Civil Code, unless expressly providing to the contrary as in Article 144, when referring to a "spouse" contemplate a
lawfully wedded spouse. Petitioner vis-a-vis Vitaliana was not a lawfully-wedded spouse to her; in fact, he was not legally capacitated
to marry her in her lifetime.

Custody of the dead body of Vitaliana was correctly awarded to her surviving brothers and sisters (the Vargases). Section 1103 of the
Revised Administrative Code provides:

Sec. 1103. Persons charged with duty of burial. — The immediate duty of burying the body of a deceased person,
regardless of the ultimate liability for the expense thereof, shall devolve upon the persons hereinbelow specified:

xxx xxx xxx

(b) If the deceased was an unmarried man or woman, or a child, and left any kin, the duty of burial
shall devolve upon the nearest of kin of the deceased, if they be adults and within the Philippines
and in possession of sufficient means to defray the necessary expenses.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED. Both petitions are hereby DISMISSED. No Costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-5426 May 29, 1953

RAMON JOAQUIN, petitioner,

vs.
ANTONIO C. NAVARRO, respondent.

Agrava, Peralta & Agrava for petitioner.

Leonardo Abola for respondent.

TUASON, J.:

This three proceedings was instituted in the Court of First Instance of Manila in the summary settlement of states of Joaquin Navarro,
Sr., his wife Angela Joaquin de Navarro, Joaquin Navarro, Jr., and Pilar Navarro, deceased. All of them having been heard jointly,
Judge Rafael Amparo handed down a single decision which was appealed to the Court of Appeals, whose decision, modifying that the
Court of First Instance, in turn was elevated to the Supreme Court for review.

The main question represented in the first two courts related to the sequence of the deaths of Joaquin Navarro, Sr., his wife, and their
children, all of whom were killed in the massacre of civilians by Japanese troops in Manila in February 1945. The trial court found the
deaths of this persons to have accurred in this order: 1st. The Navarro girls, named Pilar, Concepcion and Natividad; 2nd. Joaquin
Navarro, Jr.; 3rd. Angela Joaquin de Navarro, and 4th, Joaquin Navarro, Sr. The Court of Appeals concurred with the trial court except
that, with regard to Angela Joaquin de Navarro and Joaquin Navarro, Jr., the latter was declared to have survived his mother.

It is this modification of the lower court's finding which is now being contested by the petitioner. The importance of the question
whether Angela Joaquin de Navarro died before Joaquin Navarro, Jr., or vice versa, lies in the fact that it radically affects the rights of
succession of Ramon Joaquin, the present petitioner who was an acknowledged natural child of Angela Joaquin and adopted child of
the deceased spouses, and Antonio C. Navarro, respondent, son of Joaquin Navarro, Sr. by first marriage.

The facts, which is not disputed, are outlined in the statement in the decision of the Court of Appeals as follows:

"On February 6, 1945, while the battle for the liberation of Manila was raging, the spouses Joaquin Navarro, Sr. and Angela Joaquin,
together with their three daughters, Pilar, Concepcion, and Natividad, and their son Joaquin Navarro, Jr., and the latter's wife, Adela
Conde, sought refuge in the ground floor of the building known as the German Club, at the corner of San Marcelino and San Luis
Streets of this City. During their stay, the building was packed with refugees, shells were exploding around, and the Club was set on
20
fire. Simultaneously, the Japanese started shooting at the people inside the building, especially those who were trying to escape. The
three daughters were hit and fell of the ground near the entrance; and Joaquin Navarro, Sr., and his son decided to abandon the
premises to seek a safer heaven. They could not convince Angela Joaquin who refused to join them; and son Joaquin Navarro, Sr., his
son, Joaquin Navarro, Jr., and the latter's wife, Angela Conde, and a friend and former neighbor, Francisco Lopez, dashed out of the
burning edifice. As they came out, Joaquin Navarro, Jr. was shot in the head by a Japanese soldier and immediately dropped. The
others lay flat on the ground in front of the Club premises to avoid the bullets. Minutes later, the German Club, already on fire,
collapsed, trapping many people inside, presumably including Angela Joaquin.

"Joaquin Navarro, Sr., Mrs. Joaquin Navarro, Jr., and Francisco Lopez managed to reach an air raid shelter nearby, the stayed there
about three days, until February 10, 1915, when they were forced to leave the shelter be- cause the shelling tore it open. They flied
toward the St. Theresa Academy in San Marcelino Street, but unfortunately met Japanese Patrols, who fired at the refugees, killing
Joaquin Navarro, Sr., and his daughter-in-law.

"At the time of the masaccre, Joaquin Navarro, Sr. was aged 70; his wife Angela Joaquin was about 67 years old; Joaquin Navarro, Jr.,
about 30; Pilar Navarro was two or three years older than her brother; while the other sisters, Concepcion and Natividad Navarro y
Joaquin, were between 23 and 25."

The Court of Appeals' finding were all taken from the testimony of Francisco Lopez, who miraculously survived the holocaust, and
upon them the Court of Appeals opined that, "as between the mother Angela Joaquin and the son Joaquin Navarro, Jr., the evidence of
the survivorship is uncertain and insufficient" and the statutory presumption must be applied. The appellate Court's reasoning for its
conclusion is thus stated:

"It does not require argument to show that survivorship cannot be established by proof of the death of only one of the parties; but that
there must be adequate proof that one was alive when the other had already died. Now in this case before us, the testimony of the sole
witness Lopez is to the effect that Joaquin Navarro, Jr. was shot and died shortly after the living the German Club in the company of
his father and the witness, and that the burning edified entirely collapsed minutes after the shooting of the son; but there is not a
scintilla of evidence, direct or circumstantial, from which we may infer the condition of the mother, Angela Joaquin, during the
appreciable interval from the instant his son turned his back to her, to dash out to the Club, until he died. All we can glean from the
evidence is that Angela Joaquin was unhurt when her son left her to escape from the German Club; but she could have died almost
immediately after, from a variety of causes. She might have been shot by the Japanese, like her daughters, killed by falling beams
from the burning edifice, overcome by the fumes, or fatally struck by splinters from the exploding shells. We cannot say for certain.
No evidence is available on the point. All we can decide is that no one saw her alive after her son left her aside, and that there is no
proof when she died. Clearly, this circumstance alone cannot support a finding that she died latter than her son, and we are thus
compelled to fall back upon the statutory presumption. In deed, it could be said that the purpose of the presumption of survivorship
would be precisely to afford a solution to uncertainties like these. Hence the son Joaquin Navarro, Jr. aged 30, must be deemed to have
survived his mother, Angela Joaquin, who was admittedly above 60 years of age (Rule 123, sec. 69, subsec. (ii), Rules of Court).

"The total lack of evidence on how Angela Joaquin died likewise disposes of the question whether she and her deceased children
perished in the same calamity. There being no evidence to the contrary, the only guide is the occasion of the deaths, which is identical
for all of them; that battle for the liberation of Manila. A second reason is that the law, in declaring that those fallen in the same battle
are to be regarded as perishing in the same calamity, could not overlooked that a variety of cause of death can ( and usually do)
operate in the source of combats. During the same battle, some may die from wounds, other from gages, fire, or drowning. It is clear
that the law disregards episodic details, and treats the battle as an overall cause of death in applying the presumption of survivorship.

"We are thus led the conclusion that the order in which the members of the Navarro-Joaquin family met their end is as follows: first,
the three daughters Pilar, Concepcion, and Natividad; then the mother Angela Joaquin; then the son Joaquin Navarro, Jr., and days
later (of which there is no doubt), the father Joaquin Navarro, Sr."

Much space in the briefs is taken in a discussion of whether section 334(37) of Act No. 129, now section 69 (ii) of Rule 123 of the
Rules of Court, has repealed article 33 of the civil code of 1889, now article 43 of the New Civil Code. It is the contention of the
petitioner that it did not, and that on the assumption that there is total lack of evidence, as the Court of Appeals said, then Angela
Joaquin and Joaquin Navarro, Jr. should, under article 33, be held to have died at the same time.

The point is not of much if any relevancy and will be left open for the consideration when obsolute necessity there for arises. We say
irrelevant because our opinion is that neither of the two provisions is applicable for the reasons to be presently set forth.

Rule 123, section 69 (ii) of the Revised Rules of Court, reads:

21
 When two person perish in the same calamity, such as wreck, battle or conflagration, and it is not (1) shown who died first,
and there are no (2) particular circumstances from when it can be inferred, the survivorship is presumed from the
probabilities resulting from the strength and ages of the sexes, according to the following rules:

xxx xxx xxx

Article 33 of the Civil Code of 1889 of the following tenor:

Whenever a doubt arises as to which was the first to die to the two or more persons who would inherent one from the other,
the persons who alleges the prior death of either must prove the allegation; in the absence of proof the presumption shall be
that they died at the same time, and no transmission of rights from one to the other shall take place.

Most provisions, as their language plainly implies, are intended as a substitute for lacks and so are not to be available when there are
facts. With particular reference to section 69 (ii) of Rule 123, "the situation which it present is one in which the facts are not only
unknown but unknowable. By hypothesis, there is no specific evidence as to the time of death . . . ." . . . it is assumed that no evidence
can be produced. . . . Since the facts are unknown and unknowable, the law may apply the law of fairness appropriate to the different
legal situation that arises." (IX Wigmore on Evidence, 1940 ed., 483.)

In In re Wallace's Estate, 220 Pac. 683, which the Court of Appeals cited the applied with the respect to the deaths of the Navarro girls,
pointing out that "our rule is taken from the Fourth Division of sec. 1936 of the California Code of Civil Procedure," the Supreme
Court of California said:

When the statue speaks of "particular circumstances from which it can be inferred" that one died before the other it means
that there are circumstances from which the fact of death by one before the other may be inferred as a relation conclusion
from the facts proven. The statue does not mean circumstances which would shown, or which would tend to show, probably
that one died before the other. Grand Lodge A.O.W.W. vs. Miller, 8 Cal. App. 28, 96 Pac. 22. When by circumstantial
evidence alone, a party seeks to prove a survivorship contrary to the statutory presumption, the circumstances by which it is
sought to prove the survivorship must be such as are competent and sufficient when tested by the general rules of evidence in
civil cases. The inference of survivorship cannot rest upon mere surmise, speculation, or conjecture. As was said in Grand
Lodge vs. Miller, supra, "if the matter is left to probably, then the statue of the presumption."

It is manifest from the language of section 69 (ii) of Rule 123 and of that of the foregoing decision that the evidence of the
survivorship need not be direct; it may be indirect, circumstantial, or inferential. Where there are facts, known or knowable, from
which a rational conclusion can be made, the presumption does not step in, and the rule of preponderance of evidence controls.

Are there particular circumstances on record from which reasonable inference of survivorship between Angela Joaquin and her son
can be drawn? Is Francisco Lopez' testimony competent and sufficient for this purpose? For a better appreciation of this issue, it is
convenient and necessary to detail the testimony, which was described by the trial court as "disinterested and trustworthy" and by the
Court of Appeals as "entitled to credence."

Lopez testified:

Q. You said you were also heat at that time as you leave the German Club with Joaquin Navarro, Sr., Joaquin Navarro, Jr. and
the latter's wife?- A. Yes, sir.

Q. Did you fall? — A. I fell down.

Q. And you said you fell down close to Joaquin Navarro, Jr.? A. Yes, sir.

Q. When the German Club collapsed where were you? — A. We were out 15 meters away from the building but I could see
what was going on.

xxx xxx xxx

Q. Could there have been an interval of fifteen minutes between the two events, that is the shooting of Joaquin Navarro, Jr.
and the collapse of the German Club? — A. Yes, sir, I could not say exactly, Occasions like that, you know, you are confused.

22
 Q. Could there (have) been an interval of an hour instead of fifteen minutes? — A. Possible, but not probable.

Q. Could it have been 40 minutes? — A. Yes, sir, about 40 minutes.

xxx xxx xxx

Q. You also know that Angela Joaquin is already dead? — A. Yes, sir.

Q. Can you tell the Honorable Court when did Angela Joaquin die? — A. Well, a few minutes after we have dashed out, the
German Club, which was burning, collapsed over them, including Mrs. Joaquin Navarro, Sr.

xxx xxx xxx

Q. From your testimony it would appear that while you can give positive evidence to the fact that Pilar, Concepcion and
Natividad Navarro, and Joaquin Navarro, Jr. died, you can not give the same positive evidence to the fact that Angela Joaquin
also died? — A. Yes, sir, in the sense that I did not see her actually die, but when the building collapsed over her I saw and I
am positive and I did not see her come out of that building so I presumed she died there.

xxx xxx xxx

Q. Why did you have to dash out of the German Club, you, Mr. Joaquin Navarro, Sr. and Mr. Joaquin Navarro Jr. and the
latter's wife? — A. Because the Japanese had set fire to the Club and they were shooting people outside, so we thought of
running away rather than be roasted.

xxx xxx xxx

Q. You mean to say that before you jumped out of the German Club all the Navarro girls, Pilar, Concepcion, and Natividad,
were already wounded? — A. to my knowledge, yes.

Q. They were wounded? — A. Yes, sir.

Q. Were they lying on the ground or not? — A. On the ground near the entrance, because most of the people who were shot
by the Japanese were those who were trying to escape, and as far as I can remember they were among those killed.

xxx xxx xxx

Q. So you noticed that they were killed or shot by the Japanese a few minutes before you left the place? — A. That is what I
think, because those Japanese soldiers were shooting the people inside especially those trying to escape.

xxx xxx xxx

Q. And none of them was not except the girls, is that what you mean? A — . There were many people shot because they were
trying to escape.

xxx xxx xxx

Q. How come that these girls were shot when they were inside the building, can you explain that? — A. They were trying to
escape probably.

It is our opinion that the preceding testimony contains facts quite adequate to solve the problem of survivorship between Angela
Joaquin and Joaquin Navarro, Jr. and keep the statutory presumption out of the case. It is believed that in the light of the conditions
painted by Lopez, a fair and reasonable inference can be arrived at, namely: that Joaquin Navarro, Jr. died before his mother.

While the possibility that the mother died before the son can not be ruled out, it must be noted that this possibility is entirely
speculative and must yield to the more rational deduction from proven facts that it was the other way around. Joaquin Navarro, Jr., it

23
will be recalled, was killed, while running, in front of, and 15 meters from, the German Club. Still in the prime of life, 30, he must
have negotiated that distance in five seconds or less, and so died within that interval from the time he dashed out of the building. Now,
when Joaquin Navarro, Jr. with his father and wife started to flee from the clubhouse, the old lady was alive and unhurt, so much so
that the Navarro father and son tried hard to have her come along. She could have perished within those five or fewer seconds, as
stated, but the probabilities that she did seem very remote. True, people in the building were also killed but these, according to Lopez,
were mostly refugees who had tried to slip away from it and were shot by Japanese troops. It was not very likely that Mrs. Joaquin
Navarro, Sr. made an attempt to escape. She even made frantic efforts to dissuade her husband and son from leaving the place and
exposing themselves to gun fire.

This determination of Mrs. Angela Joaquin to stay where she was may well give an idea, at the same time, of a condition of relative
safety in the clubhouse at the moment her husband, son, and daughter-in-law left her. It strongly tends to prove that, as the situation
looked to her, the perils of death from staying were not so imminent. And it lends credence to Mr. Lopez' statement that the collapse of
the clubhouse occurred about 40 minutes after Joaquin Navarro the son was shot in the head and dropped dead, and that it was the
collapse that killed Mrs. Angela Navarro. The Court of Appeals said the interval between Joaquin Navarro's death and the breaking
down of the edifice was "minutes". Even so, it was much longer than five seconds, long enough to warrant the inference that Mrs.
Angela Joaquin was sill alive when her son expired

The Court of Appeals mentioned several causes, besides the collapse of the building, by which Mrs. Navarro could have been killed.
All these are speculative , and the probabilities, in the light of the known facts, are against them. Dreading Japanese sharpshooters
outside as evidenced by her refusal to follow the only remaining living members of her family, she could not have kept away form
protective walls. Besides, the building had been set on fire trap the refugees inside, and there was no necessity for the Japanese to was
their ammunition except upon those who tried to leave the premises. Nor was Angela Joaquin likely to have been killed by falling
beams because the building was made of concrete and its collapse, more likely than not, was sudden. As to fumes, these do not cause
instantaneous death; certainly not within the brief space of five seconds between her son's departure and his death.

It will be said that all this is indulging in inferences that are not conclusive. Section 69(ii) of Rule 123 does not require that the
inference necessary to exclude the presumption therein provided be certain. It is the "particular circumstances from which it
(survivorship) can be inferred" that are required to be certain as tested by the rules of evidence. In speaking of inference the rule can
not mean beyond doubt, for "inference is never certainty, but if may be plain enough to justify a finding of fact." (In re Bohenko's
Estate, 4 N.Y.S. 2nd. 427, citing Tortora vs. State of New York, 269 N.Y. 199 N.E. 44; Hart vs. Hudson River Bridge Co., 80 N.Y.).
622.) As the California courts have said, it is enough that "the circumstances by which it is sought to prove the survivorship must be
such as are competent and sufficient when tested by the general rules of evidence in civil cases." (In re Wallace's Estate, supra.)
"Juries must often reason," says one author, "according to probabilities, drawing an inference that the main fact in issue existed from
collateral facts not directly proving, but strongly tending to prove, its existence. The vital question in such cases is the cogency of the
proof afforded by the secondary facts. How likely, according to experience, is the existence of the primary fact if certain secondary
facts exist?" (1 Moore on Facts, Sec. 596.) The same author tells us of a case where "a jury was justified in drawing the inference that
the person who was caught firing a shot at an animal trespassing on his land was the person who fired a shot about an hour before at
the same animal also trespassing." That conclusion was not airtight, but rational. In fact, the circumstances in the illustration leave
greater room for another possibility than do the facts of the case at hand.

In conclusion the presumption that Angela Joaquin de Navarro died before her son is based purely on surmises, speculations, or
conjectures without any sure foundation in the evidence. the opposite theory — that the mother outlived her son — is deduced from
established facts which, weighed by common experience, engender the inference as a very strong probability. Gauged by the doctrine
of preponderance of evidence by, which civil cases are decided, this inference ought to prevail. It can not be defeated as in an instance,
cited by Lord Chief Justice Kenyon, "bordering on the ridiculous, where in an action on the game laws it was suggested that the gun
with which the defendant fired was not charged with shot, but that the bird might have died in consequence of the fright." (1 Moore on
Facts, 63, citing Wilkinson vs. Payne, 4 T. R. 468.)

It is said that part of the decision of the Court of Appeals which the appellant impugns, and which has been discussed, involves
findings of fact which can not be disturbed. The point is not, in our judgment, well considered. The particular circumstances from
which the parties and the Court of Appeals drew conclusions are, as above seen, undisputed, and this being the case, the correctness or
incorrectness of those conclusions raises a question of law, not of fact, which the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to look into. As was
said in 1 Moran Commentaries on the Rules of ?Court, 3rd Ed. 856, 857, "Undisputed evidence is one thing, and contradicted
evidence is another. An incredible witness does not cease to be such because he is not impeached or contradicted. But when the
evidence is purely documentary, the authenticity of which is not questioned and the only issue is the construction to be placed thereon,
or where a case is submitted upon an agreement of facts, or where all the facts are stated in the judgment and the issue is the
correctness of the conclusions drawn therefrom, the question is one of law which may be reviewed by the Supreme Court."

24
The question of whether upon given facts the operation of the statutory presumption is to be invoked is a question of law.

The prohibition against intermeddling with decisions on questions of evidence refers to decisions supported by substantial evidence.
By substantial evidence is meant real evidence or at least evidence about which reasonable men may disagree. Findings grounded
entirely on speculations, surmises, or conjectures come within the exception to the general rule.

We are constrained to reverse the decision under review, and hold that the distribution of the decedents' estates should be made in
accordance with the decision of the trial court. This result precludes the necessity of passing upon the question of "reserva troncal"
which was put forward on the hypothetical theory that Mrs. Joaquin Navarro's death preceded that of her son. Without costs.

G.R. No. 119976 September 18, 1995

IMELDA ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS, petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and CIRILO ROY MONTEJO, respondents.

KAPUNAN, J.:

A constitutional provision should be construed as to give it effective operation and suppress the mischief at which it is aimed. 1 The
1987 Constitution mandates that an aspirant for election to the House of Representatives be "a registered voter in the district in which
he shall be elected, and a resident thereof for a period of not less than one year immediately preceding the election." 2 The mischief
which this provision — reproduced verbatim from the 1973 Constitution — seeks to prevent is the possibility of a "stranger or
newcomer unacquainted with the conditions and needs of a community and not identified with the latter, from an elective office to
serve that community."3

Petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte
with the Provincial Election Supervisor on March 8, 1995, providing the following information in item no. 8: 4

RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY WHERE I SEEK TO BE ELECTED IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING

THE ELECTION: __________ Years and seven Months.

On March 23, 1995, private respondent Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent Representative of the First District of Leyte and a
candidate for the same position, filed a "Petition for Cancellation and Disqualification" 5 with the Commission on Elections alleging
that petitioner did not meet the constitutional requirement for residency. In his petition, private respondent contended that Mrs. Marcos
lacked the Constitution's one year residency requirement for candidates for the House of Representatives on the evidence of
declarations made by her in Voter Registration Record 94-No. 33497726 and in her Certificate of Candidacy. He prayed that "an order
be issued declaring (petitioner) disqualified and canceling the certificate of candidacy." 7

On March 29, 1995, petitioner filed an Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy, changing the entry "seven" months to "since
childhood" in item no. 8 of the amended certificate. 8 On the same day, the Provincial Election Supervisor of Leyte informed petitioner
that:

[T]his office cannot receive or accept the aforementioned Certificate of Candidacy on the ground that it is filed out
of time, the deadline for the filing of the same having already lapsed on March 20, 1995. The Corrected/Amended
Certificate of Candidacy should have been filed on or before the March 20, 1995 deadline. 9

Consequently, petitioner filed the Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy with the COMELEC's Head Office in Intramuros,
Manila on
March 31, 1995. Her Answer to private respondent's petition in SPA No. 95-009 was likewise filed with the head office on the same
day. In said Answer, petitioner averred that the entry of the word "seven" in her original Certificate of Candidacy was the result of an
"honest misinterpretation" 10 which she sought to rectify by adding the words "since childhood" in her Amended/Corrected Certificate
of Candidacy and that "she has always maintained Tacloban City as her domicile or residence. 11 Impugning respondent's motive in
filing the petition seeking her disqualification, she noted that:

25
 When respondent (petitioner herein) announced that she was intending to register as a voter in Tacloban City and run
for Congress in the First District of Leyte, petitioner immediately opposed her intended registration by writing a
letter stating that "she is not a resident of said city but of Barangay Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. After respondent had
registered as a voter in Tolosa following completion of her six month actual residence therein, petitioner filed a
petition with the COMELEC to transfer the town of Tolosa from the First District to the Second District and pursued
such a move up to the Supreme Court, his purpose being to remove respondent as petitioner's opponent in the
congressional election in the First District. He also filed a bill, along with other Leyte Congressmen, seeking the
creation of another legislative district to remove the town of Tolosa out of the First District, to achieve his purpose.
However, such bill did not pass the Senate. Having failed on such moves, petitioner now filed the instant petition for
the same objective, as it is obvious that he is afraid to submit along with respondent for the judgment and verdict of
the electorate of the First District of Leyte in an honest, orderly, peaceful, free and clean elections on May 8, 1995. 12

On April 24, 1995, the Second Division of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), by a vote of 2 to 1, 13 came up with a
Resolution 1) finding private respondent's Petition for Disqualification in SPA 95-009 meritorious; 2) striking off petitioner's
Corrected/Amended Certificate of Candidacy of March 31, 1995; and 3) canceling her original Certificate of Candidacy. 14 Dealing
with two primary issues, namely, the validity of amending the original Certificate of Candidacy after the lapse of the deadline for
filing certificates of candidacy, and petitioner's compliance with the one year residency requirement, the Second Division held:

Respondent raised the affirmative defense in her Answer that the printed word "Seven" (months) was a result of an
"honest misinterpretation or honest mistake" on her part and, therefore, an amendment should subsequently be
allowed. She averred that she thought that what was asked was her "actual and physical" presence in Tolosa and not
residence of origin or domicile in the First Legislative District, to which she could have responded "since
childhood." In an accompanying affidavit, she stated that her domicile is Tacloban City, a component of the First
District, to which she always intended to return whenever absent and which she has never abandoned. Furthermore,
in her memorandum, she tried to discredit petitioner's theory of disqualification by alleging that she has been a
resident of the First Legislative District of Leyte since childhood, although she only became a resident of the
Municipality of Tolosa for seven months. She asserts that she has always been a resident of Tacloban City, a
component of the First District, before coming to the Municipality of Tolosa.

Along this point, it is interesting to note that prior to her registration in Tolosa, respondent announced that she would
be registering in Tacloban City so that she can be a candidate for the District. However, this intention was rebuffed
when petitioner wrote the Election Officer of Tacloban not to allow respondent since she is a resident of Tolosa and
not Tacloban. She never disputed this claim and instead implicitly acceded to it by registering in Tolosa.

This incident belies respondent's claim of "honest misinterpretation or honest mistake." Besides, the Certificate of
Candidacy only asks for RESIDENCE. Since on the basis of her Answer, she was quite aware of "residence of
origin" which she interprets to be Tacloban City, it is curious why she did not cite Tacloban City in her Certificate of
Candidacy. Her explanation that she thought what was asked was her actual and physical presence in Tolosa is not
easy to believe because there is none in the question that insinuates about Tolosa. In fact, item no. 8 in the Certificate
of Candidacy speaks clearly of "Residency in the CONSTITUENCY where I seek to be elected immediately
preceding the election." Thus, the explanation of respondent fails to be persuasive.

From the foregoing, respondent's defense of an honest mistake or misinterpretation, therefore, is devoid of merit.

To further buttress respondent's contention that an amendment may be made, she cited the case of Alialy
v. COMELEC (2 SCRA 957). The reliance of respondent on the case of Alialy is misplaced. The case only applies to
the "inconsequential deviations which cannot affect the result of the election, or deviations from provisions intended
primarily to secure timely and orderly conduct of elections." The Supreme Court in that case considered the
amendment only as a matter of form. But in the instant case, the amendment cannot be considered as a matter of
form or an inconsequential deviation. The change in the number of years of residence in the place where respondent
seeks to be elected is a substantial matter which determines her qualification as a candidacy, specially those intended
to suppress, accurate material representation in the original certificate which adversely affects the filer. To admit the
amended certificate is to condone the evils brought by the shifting minds of manipulating candidate, of the detriment
of the integrity of the election.

Moreover, to allow respondent to change the seven (7) month period of her residency in order to prolong it by
claiming it was "since childhood" is to allow an untruthfulness to be committed before this Commission. The
arithmetical accuracy of the 7 months residency the respondent indicated in her certificate of candidacy can be

26
gleaned from her entry in her Voter's Registration Record accomplished on January 28, 1995 which reflects that she
is a resident of Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte for 6 months at the time of the said registration (Annex A, Petition). Said
accuracy is further buttressed by her letter to the election officer of San Juan, Metro Manila, dated August 24, 1994,
requesting for the cancellation of her registration in the Permanent List of Voters thereat so that she can be re-
registered or transferred to Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. The dates of these three (3) different documents show the
respondent's consistent conviction that she has transferred her residence to Olot, Tolosa, Leyte from Metro Manila
only for such limited period of time, starting in the last week of August 1994 which on March 8, 1995 will only sum
up to 7 months. The Commission, therefore, cannot be persuaded to believe in the respondent's contention that it was
an error.

xxx xxx xxx

Based on these reasons the Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy cannot be admitted by this Commission.

xxx xxx xxx

Anent the second issue, and based on the foregoing discussion, it is clear that respondent has not complied with the
one year residency requirement of the Constitution.

In election cases, the term "residence" has always been considered as synonymous with "domicile" which imports
not only the intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in-that place, coupled with conduct
indicative of such intention. Domicile denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent for business or
pleasure, or for like reasons, one intends to return. (Perfecto Faypon vs. Eliseo Quirino, 96 Phil 294; Romualdez vs.
RTC-Tacloban, 226 SCRA 408). In respondent's case, when she returned to the Philippines in 1991, the residence
she chose was not Tacloban but San Juan, Metro Manila. Thus, her animus revertendi is pointed to Metro Manila
and not Tacloban.

This Division is aware that her claim that she has been a resident of the First District since childhood is nothing
more than to give her a color of qualification where she is otherwise constitutionally disqualified. It cannot hold
ground in the face of the facts admitted by the respondent in her affidavit. Except for the time that she studied and
worked for some years after graduation in Tacloban City, she continuously lived in Manila. In 1959, after her
husband was elected Senator, she lived and resided in San Juan, Metro Manila where she was a registered voter. In
1965, she lived in San Miguel, Manila where she was again a registered voter. In 1978, she served as member of the
Batasang Pambansa as the representative of the City of Manila and later on served as the Governor of Metro Manila.
She could not have served these positions if she had not been a resident of the City of Manila. Furthermore, when
she filed her certificate of candidacy for the office of the President in 1992, she claimed to be a resident of San Juan,
Metro Manila. As a matter of fact on August 24, 1994, respondent wrote a letter with the election officer of San
Juan, Metro Manila requesting for the cancellation of her registration in the permanent list of voters that she may be
re-registered or transferred to Barangay Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. These facts manifest that she could not have been a
resident of Tacloban City since childhood up to the time she filed her certificate of candidacy because she became a
resident of many places, including Metro Manila. This debunks her claim that prior to her residence in Tolosa,
Leyte, she was a resident of the First Legislative District of Leyte since childhood.

In this case, respondent's conduct reveals her lack of intention to make Tacloban her domicile. She registered as a
voter in different places and on several occasions declared that she was a resident of Manila. Although she spent her
school days in Tacloban, she is considered to have abandoned such place when she chose to stay and reside in other
different places. In the case of Romualdez vs. RTC (226 SCRA 408) the Court explained how one acquires a new
domicile by choice. There must concur: (1) residence or bodily presence in the new locality; (2) intention to remain
there; and (3) intention to abandon the old domicile. In other words there must basically be animus
manendi with animus non revertendi. When respondent chose to stay in Ilocos and later on in Manila, coupled with
her intention to stay there by registering as a voter there and expressly declaring that she is a resident of that place,
she is deemed to have abandoned Tacloban City, where she spent her childhood and school days, as her place of
domicile.

Pure intention to reside in that place is not sufficient, there must likewise be conduct indicative of such intention.
Respondent's statements to the effect that she has always intended to return to Tacloban, without the accompanying
conduct to prove that intention, is not conclusive of her choice of residence. Respondent has not presented any

27
 evidence to show that her conduct, one year prior the election, showed intention to reside in Tacloban. Worse, what
was evident was that prior to her residence in Tolosa, she had been a resident of Manila.

It is evident from these circumstances that she was not a resident of the First District of Leyte "since childhood."

To further support the assertion that she could have not been a resident of the First District of Leyte for more than
one year, petitioner correctly pointed out that on January 28, 1995 respondent registered as a voter at precinct No.
18-A of Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. In doing so, she placed in her Voter Registration Record that she resided in the
municipality of Tolosa for a period of six months. This may be inconsequential as argued by the respondent since it
refers only to her residence in Tolosa, Leyte. But her failure to prove that she was a resident of the First District of
Leyte prior to her residence in Tolosa leaves nothing but a convincing proof that she had been a resident of the
district for six months only. 15

In a Resolution promulgated a day before the May 8, 1995 elections, the COMELEC en banc denied petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration 16 of the April 24, 1995 Resolution declaring her not qualified to run for the position of Member of the House of
Representatives for the First Legislative District of Leyte. 17 The Resolution tersely stated:

After deliberating on the Motion for Reconsideration, the Commission RESOLVED to DENY it, no new substantial
matters having been raised therein to warrant re-examination of the resolution granting the petition for
disqualification. 18

On May 11, 1995, the COMELEC issued a Resolution allowing petitioner's proclamation should the results of the canvass show that
she obtained the highest number of votes in the congressional elections in the First District of Leyte. On the same day, however, the
COMELEC reversed itself and issued a second Resolution directing that the proclamation of petitioner be suspended in the event that
she obtains the highest number of votes. 19

In a Supplemental Petition dated 25 May 1995, petitioner averred that she was the overwhelming winner of the elections for the
congressional seat in the First District of Leyte held May 8, 1995 based on the canvass completed by the Provincial Board of
Canvassers on May 14, 1995. Petitioner alleged that the canvass showed that she obtained a total of 70,471 votes compared to the
36,833 votes received by Respondent Montejo. A copy of said Certificate of Canvass was annexed to the Supplemental Petition.

On account of the Resolutions disqualifying petitioner from running for the congressional seat of the First District of Leyte and the
public respondent's Resolution suspending her proclamation, petitioner comes to this court for relief.

Petitioner raises several issues in her Original and Supplemental Petitions. The principal issues may be classified into two general
areas:

I. The issue of Petitioner's qualifications

Whether or not petitioner was a resident, for election purposes, of the First District of Leyte for a period of one year
at the time of the May 9, 1995 elections.

II. The Jurisdictional Issue

a) Prior to the elections

Whether or not the COMELEC properly exercised its jurisdiction in disqualifying petitioner outside the period
mandated by the Omnibus Election Code for disqualification cases under Article 78 of the said Code.

b) After the Elections

Whether or not the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal assumed exclusive jurisdiction over the question of
petitioner's qualifications after the May 8, 1995 elections.

I. Petitioner's qualification

28
A perusal of the Resolution of the COMELEC's Second Division reveals a startling confusion in the application of settled concepts of
"Domicile" and "Residence" in election law. While the COMELEC seems to be in agreement with the general proposition that for the
purposes of election law, residence is synonymous with domicile, the Resolution reveals a tendency to substitute or mistake the
concept of domicile for actual residence, a conception not intended for the purpose of determining a candidate's qualifications for
election to the House of Representatives as required by the 1987 Constitution. As it were, residence, for the purpose of meeting the
qualification for an elective position, has a settled meaning in our jurisdiction.

Article 50 of the Civil Code decrees that "[f]or the exercise of civil rights and the fulfillment of civil obligations, the domicile of
natural persons is their place of habitual residence." In Ong vs. Republic 20 this court took the concept of domicile to mean an
individual's "permanent home", "a place to which, whenever absent for business or for pleasure, one intends to return, and depends on
facts and circumstances in the sense that they disclose intent." 21Based on the foregoing, domicile includes the twin elements of "the
fact of residing or physical presence in a fixed place" and animus manendi, or the intention of returning there permanently.

Residence, in its ordinary conception, implies the factual relationship of an individual to a certain place. It is the physical presence of a
person in a given area, community or country. The essential distinction between residence and domicile in law is that residence
involves the intent to leave when the purpose for which the resident has taken up his abode ends. One may seek a place for purposes
such as pleasure, business, or health. If a person's intent be to remain, it becomes his domicile; if his intent is to leave as soon as his
purpose is established it is residence. 22 It is thus, quite perfectly normal for an individual to have different residences in various
places. However, a person can only have a single domicile, unless, for various reasons, he successfully abandons his domicile in favor
of another domicile of choice. In Uytengsu vs. Republic, 23 we laid this distinction quite clearly:

There is a difference between domicile and residence. "Residence" is used to indicate a place of abode, whether
permanent or temporary; "domicile" denotes a fixed permanent residence to which, when absent, one has the
intention of returning. A man may have a residence in one place and a domicile in another. Residence is not
domicile, but domicile is residence coupled with the intention to remain for an unlimited time. A man can have but
one domicile for the same purpose at any time, but he may have numerous places of residence. His place of
residence is generally his place of domicile, but it is not by any means necessarily so since no length of residence
without intention of remaining will constitute domicile.

For political purposes the concepts of residence and domicile are dictated by the peculiar criteria of political laws. As these concepts
have evolved in our election law, what has clearly and unequivocally emerged is the fact that residence for election purposes is used
synonymously with domicile.

In Nuval vs. Guray, 24 the Court held that "the term residence. . . is synonymous with domicile which imports not only intention to
reside in a fixed place, but also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention." 25 Larena
vs. Teves 26 reiterated the same doctrine in a case involving the qualifications of the respondent therein to the post of Municipal
President of Dumaguete, Negros Oriental. Faypon vs. Quirino, 27 held that the absence from residence to pursue studies or practice a
profession or registration as a voter other than in the place where one is elected does not constitute loss of residence. 28 So settled is the
concept (of domicile) in our election law that in these and other election law cases, this Court has stated that the mere absence of an
individual from his permanent residence without the intention to abandon it does not result in a loss or change of domicile.

The deliberations of the 1987 Constitution on the residence qualification for certain elective positions have placed beyond doubt the
principle that when the Constitution speaks of "residence" in election law, it actually means only "domicile" to wit:

Mr. Nolledo: With respect to Section 5, I remember that in the 1971 Constitutional Convention, there was an attempt
to require residence in the place not less than one year immediately preceding the day of the elections. So my
question is: What is the Committee's concept of residence of a candidate for the legislature? Is it actual residence or
is it the concept of domicile or constructive residence?

Mr. Davide: Madame President, insofar as the regular members of the National Assembly are concerned, the
proposed section merely provides, among others, "and a resident thereof", that is, in the district for a period of not
less than one year preceding the day of the election. This was in effect lifted from the 1973 Constitution, the
interpretation given to it was domicile. 29

xxx xxx xxx

Mrs. Rosario Braid: The next question is on Section 7, page 2. I think Commissioner Nolledo has raised the same
point that "resident" has been interpreted at times as a matter of intention rather than actual residence.
29
 Mr. De los Reyes: Domicile.

Ms. Rosario Braid: Yes, So, would the gentleman consider at the proper time to go back to actual residence rather
than mere intention to reside?

Mr. De los Reyes: But we might encounter some difficulty especially considering that a provision in the Constitution
in the Article on Suffrage says that Filipinos living abroad may vote as enacted by law. So, we have to stick to the
original concept that it should be by domicile and not physical residence. 30

In Co vs. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives, 31 this Court concluded that the framers of the 1987 Constitution
32
obviously adhered to the definition given to the term residence in election law, regarding it as having the same meaning as domicile.

In the light of the principles just discussed, has petitioner Imelda Romualdez Marcos satisfied the residency requirement mandated by
Article VI, Sec. 6 of the 1987 Constitution? Of what significance is the questioned entry in petitioner's Certificate of Candidacy stating
her residence in the First Legislative District of Leyte as seven (7) months?

It is the fact of residence, not a statement in a certificate of candidacy which ought to be decisive in determining whether or not and
individual has satisfied the constitution's residency qualification requirement. The said statement becomes material only when there is
or appears to be a deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible. It
would be plainly ridiculous for a candidate to deliberately and knowingly make a statement in a certificate of candidacy which would
lead to his or her disqualification.

It stands to reason therefore, that petitioner merely committed an honest mistake in jotting the word "seven" in the space provided for
the residency qualification requirement. The circumstances leading to her filing the questioned entry obviously resulted in the
subsequent confusion which prompted petitioner to write down the period of her actual stay in Tolosa, Leyte instead of her period of
residence in the First district, which was "since childhood" in the space provided. These circumstances and events are amply detailed
in the COMELEC's Second Division's questioned resolution, albeit with a different interpretation. For instance, when herein petitioner
announced that she would be registering in Tacloban City to make her eligible to run in the First District, private respondent Montejo
opposed the same, claiming that petitioner was a resident of Tolosa, not Tacloban City. Petitioner then registered in her place of actual
residence in the First District, which is Tolosa, Leyte, a fact which she subsequently noted down in her Certificate of Candidacy. A
close look at said certificate would reveal the possible source of the confusion: the entry for residence (Item No. 7) is followed
immediately by the entry for residence in the constituency where a candidate seeks election thus:

7. RESIDENCE (complete Address): Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte

POST OFFICE ADDRESS FOR ELECTION PURPOSES: Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte

8. RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY WHERE I SEEK TO

BE ELECTED IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE ELECTION:_________ Years and Seven Months.

Having been forced by private respondent to register in her place of actual residence in Leyte instead of petitioner's claimed domicile,
it appears that petitioner had jotted down her period of stay in her legal residence or domicile. The juxtaposition of entries in Item 7
and Item 8 — the first requiring actual residence and the second requiring domicile — coupled with the circumstances surrounding
petitioner's registration as a voter in Tolosa obviously led to her writing down an unintended entry for which she could be disqualified.
This honest mistake should not, however, be allowed to negate the fact of residence in the First District if such fact were established
by means more convincing than a mere entry on a piece of paper.

We now proceed to the matter of petitioner's domicile.

In support of its asseveration that petitioner's domicile could not possibly be in the First District of Leyte, the Second Division of the
COMELEC, in its assailed Resolution of April 24,1995 maintains that "except for the time when (petitioner) studied and worked for
some years after graduation in Tacloban City, she continuously lived in Manila." The Resolution additionally cites certain facts as
indicative of the fact that petitioner's domicile ought to be any place where she lived in the last few decades except Tacloban, Leyte.
First, according to the Resolution, petitioner, in 1959, resided in San Juan, Metro Manila where she was also registered voter. Then, in
1965, following the election of her husband to the Philippine presidency, she lived in San Miguel, Manila where she as a voter. In
1978 and thereafter, she served as a member of the Batasang Pambansa and Governor of Metro Manila. "She could not, have served
these positions if she had not been a resident of Metro Manila," the COMELEC stressed. Here is where the confusion lies.

30
We have stated, many times in the past, that an individual does not lose his domicile even if he has lived and maintained residences in
different places. Residence, it bears repeating, implies a factual relationship to a given place for various purposes. The absence from
legal residence or domicile to pursue a profession, to study or to do other things of a temporary or semi-permanent nature does not
constitute loss of residence. Thus, the assertion by the COMELEC that "she could not have been a resident of Tacloban City since
childhood up to the time she filed her certificate of candidacy because she became a resident of many places" flies in the face of
settled jurisprudence in which this Court carefully made distinctions between (actual) residence and domicile for election law
purposes. In Larena vs. Teves, 33 supra, we stressed:

[T]his court is of the opinion and so holds that a person who has his own house wherein he lives with his family in a
municipality without having ever had the intention of abandoning it, and without having lived either alone or with
his family in another municipality, has his residence in the former municipality, notwithstanding his having
registered as an elector in the other municipality in question and having been a candidate for various insular and
provincial positions, stating every time that he is a resident of the latter municipality.

More significantly, in Faypon vs. Quirino, 34 We explained that:

A citizen may leave the place of his birth to look for "greener pastures," as the saying goes, to improve his lot, and
that, of course includes study in other places, practice of his avocation, or engaging in business. When an election is
to be held, the citizen who left his birthplace to improve his lot may desire to return to his native town to cast his
ballot but for professional or business reasons, or for any other reason, he may not absent himself from his
professional or business activities; so there he registers himself as voter as he has the qualifications to be one and is
not willing to give up or lose the opportunity to choose the officials who are to run the government especially in
national elections. Despite such registration, the animus revertendi to his home, to his domicile or residence of
origin has not forsaken him. This may be the explanation why the registration of a voter in a place other than his
residence of origin has not been deemed sufficient to constitute abandonment or loss of such residence. It finds
justification in the natural desire and longing of every person to return to his place of birth. This strong feeling of
attachment to the place of one's birth must be overcome by positive proof of abandonment for another.

From the foregoing, it can be concluded that in its above-cited statements supporting its proposition that petitioner was ineligible to
run for the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC was obviously referring to petitioner's various
places of (actual) residence, not her domicile. In doing so, it not only ignored settled jurisprudence on residence in election law and
the deliberations of the constitutional commission but also the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. 881). 35

What is undeniable, however, are the following set of facts which establish the fact of petitioner's domicile, which we lift verbatim
from the COMELEC's Second Division's assailed Resolution: 36

In or about 1938 when respondent was a little over 8 years old, she established her domicile in Tacloban, Leyte
(Tacloban City). She studied in the Holy Infant Academy in Tacloban from 1938 to 1949 when she graduated from
high school. She pursued her college studies in St. Paul's College, now Divine Word University in Tacloban, where
she earned her degree in Education. Thereafter, she taught in the Leyte Chinese School, still in Tacloban City. In
1952 she went to Manila to work with her cousin, the late speaker Daniel Z. Romualdez in his office in the House of
Representatives. In 1954, she married ex-President Ferdinand E. Marcos when he was still a congressman of Ilocos
Norte and registered there as a voter. When her husband was elected Senator of the Republic in 1959, she and her
husband lived together in San Juan, Rizal where she registered as a voter. In 1965, when her husband was elected
President of the Republic of the Philippines, she lived with him in Malacanang Palace and registered as a voter in
San Miguel, Manila.

[I]n February 1986 (she claimed that) she and her family were abducted and kidnapped to Honolulu, Hawaii. In
November 1991, she came home to Manila. In 1992, respondent ran for election as President of the Philippines and
filed her Certificate of Candidacy wherein she indicated that she is a resident and registered voter of San Juan,
Metro Manila.

Applying the principles discussed to the facts found by COMELEC, what is inescapable is that petitioner held various residences for
different purposes during the last four decades. None of these purposes unequivocally point to an intention to abandon her domicile of
origin in Tacloban, Leyte. Moreover, while petitioner was born in Manila, as a minor she naturally followed the domicile of her
parents. She grew up in Tacloban, reached her adulthood there and eventually established residence in different parts of the country for
various reasons. Even during her husband's presidency, at the height of the Marcos Regime's powers, petitioner kept her close ties to
her domicile of origin by establishing residences in Tacloban, celebrating her birthdays and other important personal milestones in her
31
home province, instituting well-publicized projects for the benefit of her province and hometown, and establishing a political power
base where her siblings and close relatives held positions of power either through the ballot or by appointment, always with either her
influence or consent. These well-publicized ties to her domicile of origin are part of the history and lore of the quarter century of
Marcos power in our country. Either they were entirely ignored in the COMELEC'S Resolutions, or the majority of the COMELEC
did not know what the rest of the country always knew: the fact of petitioner's domicile in Tacloban, Leyte.

Private respondent in his Comment, contends that Tacloban was not petitioner's domicile of origin because she did not live there until
she was eight years old. He avers that after leaving the place in 1952, she "abandoned her residency (sic) therein for many years and . .
. (could not) re-establish her domicile in said place by merely expressing her intention to live there again." We do not agree.

First, minor follows the domicile of his parents. As domicile, once acquired is retained until a new one is gained, it follows that in
spite of the fact of petitioner's being born in Manila, Tacloban, Leyte was her domicile of origin by operation of law. This domicile
was not established only when her father brought his family back to Leyte contrary to private respondent's averments.

Second, domicile of origin is not easily lost. To successfully effect a change of domicile, one must demonstrate: 37

1. An actual removal or an actual change of domicile;

2. A bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one; and

3. Acts which correspond with the purpose.

In the absence of clear and positive proof based on these criteria, the residence of origin should be deemed to continue. Only with
evidence showing concurrence of all three requirements can the presumption of continuity or residence be rebutted, for a change of
residence requires an actual and deliberate abandonment, and one cannot have two legal residences at the same time. 38 In the case at
bench, the evidence adduced by private respondent plainly lacks the degree of persuasiveness required to convince this court that an
abandonment of domicile of origin in favor of a domicile of choice indeed occurred. To effect an abandonment requires the voluntary
act of relinquishing petitioner's former domicile with an intent to supplant the former domicile with one of her own choosing
(domicilium voluntarium).

In this connection, it cannot be correctly argued that petitioner lost her domicile of origin by operation of law as a result of her
marriage to the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos in 1952. For there is a clearly established distinction between the Civil Code
concepts of "domicile" and "residence." 39 The presumption that the wife automatically gains the husband's domicile by operation of
law upon marriage cannot be inferred from the use of the term "residence" in Article 110 of the Civil Code because the Civil Code is
one area where the two concepts are well delineated. Dr. Arturo Tolentino, writing on this specific area explains:

In the Civil Code, there is an obvious difference between domicile and residence. Both terms imply relations
between a person and a place; but in residence, the relation is one of fact while in domicile it is legal or juridical,
independent of the necessity of physical presence. 40

Article 110 of the Civil Code provides:

Art. 110. — The husband shall fix the residence of the family. But the court may exempt the wife from living with
the husband if he should live abroad unless in the service of the Republic.

A survey of jurisprudence relating to Article 110 or to the concepts of domicile or residence as they affect the female spouse upon
marriage yields nothing which would suggest that the female spouse automatically loses her domicile of origin in favor of the
husband's choice of residence upon marriage.

Article 110 is a virtual restatement of Article 58 of the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 which states:

La mujer esta obligada a seguir a su marido donde quiera que fije su residencia. Los Tribunales, sin embargo, podran
con justa causa eximirla de esta obligacion cuando el marido transende su residencia a ultramar o' a pais extranjero.

Note the use of the phrase "donde quiera su fije de residencia" in the aforequoted article, which means wherever (the husband) wishes
to establish residence. This part of the article clearly contemplates only actual residence because it refers to a positive act of fixing a
family home or residence. Moreover, this interpretation is further strengthened by the phrase "cuando el marido translade su
32
residencia" in the same provision which means, "when the husband shall transfer his residence," referring to another positive act of
relocating the family to another home or place of actual residence. The article obviously cannot be understood to refer to domicile
which is a fixed,
fairly-permanent concept when it plainly connotes the possibility of transferring from one place to another not only once, but as often
as the husband may deem fit to move his family, a circumstance more consistent with the concept of actual residence.

The right of the husband to fix the actual residence is in harmony with the intention of the law to strengthen and unify the family,
recognizing the fact that the husband and the wife bring into the marriage different domiciles (of origin). This difference could, for the
sake of family unity, be reconciled only by allowing the husband to fix a single place of actual residence.

Very significantly, Article 110 of the Civil Code is found under Title V under the heading: RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS
BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE. Immediately preceding Article 110 is Article 109 which obliges the husband and wife to live
together, thus:

Art. 109. — The husband and wife are obligated to live together, observe mutual respect and fidelity and render
mutual help and support.

The duty to live together can only be fulfilled if the husband and wife are physically together. This takes into account the situations
where the couple has many residences (as in the case of the petitioner). If the husband has to stay in or transfer to any one of their
residences, the wife should necessarily be with him in order that they may "live together." Hence, it is illogical to conclude that Art.
110 refers to "domicile" and not to "residence." Otherwise, we shall be faced with a situation where the wife is left in the domicile
while the husband, for professional or other reasons, stays in one of their (various) residences. As Dr. Tolentino further explains:

Residence and Domicile — Whether the word "residence" as used with reference to particular matters is
synonymous with "domicile" is a question of some difficulty, and the ultimate decision must be made from a
consideration of the purpose and intent with which the word is used. Sometimes they are used synonymously, at
other times they are distinguished from one another.

xxx xxx xxx

Residence in the civil law is a material fact, referring to the physical presence of a person in a place. A person can
have two or more residences, such as a country residence and a city residence. Residence is acquired by living in
place; on the other hand, domicile can exist without actually living in the place. The important thing for domicile is
that, once residence has been established in one place, there be an intention to stay there permanently, even if
residence is also established in some other
place. 41

In fact, even the matter of a common residence between the husband and the wife during the marriage is not an iron-clad principle; In
cases applying the Civil Code on the question of a common matrimonial residence, our jurisprudence has recognized certain
situations 42 where the spouses could not be compelled to live with each other such that the wife is either allowed to maintain a
residence different from that of her husband or, for obviously practical reasons, revert to her original domicile (apart from being
allowed to opt for a new one). In De la Vina vs.Villareal 43 this Court held that "[a] married woman may acquire a residence or
domicile separate from that of her husband during the existence of the marriage where the husband has given cause for
divorce." 44 Note that the Court allowed the wife either to obtain new residence or to choose a new domicile in such an event. In
instances where the wife actually opts, .under the Civil Code, to live separately from her husband either by taking new residence or
reverting to her domicile of origin, the Court has held that the wife could not be compelled to live with her husband on pain of
contempt. In Arroyo vs. Vasques de Arroyo 45 the Court held that:

Upon examination of the authorities, we are convinced that it is not within the province of the courts of this country
to attempt to compel one of the spouses to cohabit with, and render conjugal rights to, the other. Of course where the
property rights of one of the pair are invaded, an action for restitution of such rights can be maintained. But we are
disinclined to sanction the doctrine that an order, enforcible (sic) by process of contempt, may be entered to compel
the restitution of the purely personal right of consortium. At best such an order can be effective for no other purpose
than to compel the spouses to live under the same roof; and he experience of those countries where the courts of
justice have assumed to compel the cohabitation of married people shows that the policy of the practice is extremely
questionable. Thus in England, formerly the Ecclesiastical Court entertained suits for the restitution of conjugal
rights at the instance of either husband or wife; and if the facts were found to warrant it, that court would make a
mandatory decree, enforceable by process of contempt in case of disobedience, requiring the delinquent party to live
33
 with the other and render conjugal rights. Yet this practice was sometimes criticized even by the judges who felt
bound to enforce such orders, and in Weldon v. Weldon (9 P.D. 52), decided in 1883, Sir James Hannen, President in
the Probate, Divorce and Admiralty Division of the High Court of Justice, expressed his regret that the English law
on the subject was not the same as that which prevailed in Scotland, where a decree of adherence, equivalent to the
decree for the restitution of conjugal rights in England, could be obtained by the injured spouse, but could not be
enforced by imprisonment. Accordingly, in obedience to the growing sentiment against the practice, the Matrimonial
Causes Act (1884) abolished the remedy of imprisonment; though a decree for the restitution of conjugal rights can
still be procured, and in case of disobedience may serve in appropriate cases as the basis of an order for the
periodical payment of a stipend in the character of alimony.

In the voluminous jurisprudence of the United States, only one court, so far as we can discover, has ever attempted
to make a preemptory order requiring one of the spouses to live with the other; and that was in a case where a wife
was ordered to follow and live with her husband, who had changed his domicile to the City of New Orleans. The
decision referred to (Bahn v. Darby, 36 La. Ann., 70) was based on a provision of the Civil Code of Louisiana
similar to article 56 of the Spanish Civil Code. It was decided many years ago, and the doctrine evidently has not
been fruitful even in the State of Louisiana. In other states of the American Union the idea of enforcing cohabitation
by process of contempt is rejected. (21 Cyc., 1148).

In a decision of January 2, 1909, the Supreme Court of Spain appears to have affirmed an order of the Audiencia
Territorial de Valladolid requiring a wife to return to the marital domicile, and in the alternative, upon her failure to
do so, to make a particular disposition of certain money and effects then in her possession and to deliver to her
husband, as administrator of the ganancial property, all income, rents, and interest which might accrue to her from
the property which she had brought to the marriage. (113 Jur. Civ., pp. 1, 11) But it does not appear that this order
for the return of the wife to the marital domicile was sanctioned by any other penalty than the consequences that
would be visited upon her in respect to the use and control of her property; and it does not appear that her
disobedience to that order would necessarily have been followed by imprisonment for contempt.

Parenthetically when Petitioner was married to then Congressman Marcos, in 1954, petitioner was obliged — by virtue of Article 110
of the Civil Code — to follow her husband's actual place of residence fixed by him. The problem here is that at that time, Mr. Marcos
had several places of residence, among which were San Juan, Rizal and Batac, Ilocos Norte. There is no showing which of these
places Mr. Marcos did fix as his family's residence. But assuming that Mr. Marcos had fixed any of these places as the conjugal
residence, what petitioner gained upon marriage was actual residence. She did not lose her domicile of origin.

On the other hand, the common law concept of "matrimonial domicile" appears to have been incorporated, as a result of our
jurisprudential experiences after the drafting of the Civil Code of 1950, into the New Family Code. To underscore the difference
between the intentions of the Civil Code and the Family Code drafters, the term residence has been supplanted by the term domicile in
an entirely new provision (Art. 69) distinctly different in meaning and spirit from that found in Article 110. The provision recognizes
revolutionary changes in the concept of women's rights in the intervening years by making the choice of domicile a product of mutual
agreement between the spouses. 46

Without as much belaboring the point, the term residence may mean one thing in civil law (or under the Civil Code) and quite another
thing in political law. What stands clear is that insofar as the Civil Code is concerned-affecting the rights and obligations of husband
and wife — the term residence should only be interpreted to mean "actual residence." The inescapable conclusion derived from this
unambiguous civil law delineation therefore, is that when petitioner married the former President in 1954, she kept her domicile of
origin and merely gained a new home, not a domicilium necessarium.

Even assuming for the sake of argument that petitioner gained a new "domicile" after her marriage and only acquired a right to choose
a new one after her husband died, petitioner's acts following her return to the country clearly indicate that she not only impliedly but
expressly chose her domicile of origin (assuming this was lost by operation of law) as her domicile. This "choice" was unequivocally
expressed in her letters to the Chairman of the PCGG when petitioner sought the PCGG's permission to "rehabilitate (our) ancestral
house in Tacloban and Farm in Olot, Leyte. . . to make them livable for the Marcos family to have a home in our
homeland." 47 Furthermore, petitioner obtained her residence certificate in 1992 in Tacloban, Leyte, while living in her brother's house,
an act which supports the domiciliary intention clearly manifested in her letters to the PCGG Chairman. She could not have gone
straight to her home in San Juan, as it was in a state of disrepair, having been previously looted by vandals. Her "homes" and
"residences" following her arrival in various parts of Metro Manila merely qualified as temporary or "actual residences," not domicile.
Moreover, and proceeding from our discussion pointing out specific situations where the female spouse either reverts to her domicile
of origin or chooses a new one during the subsistence of the marriage, it would be highly illogical for us to assume that she cannot

34
regain her original domicile upon the death of her husband absent a positive act of selecting a new one where situations exist within
the subsistence of the marriage itself where the wife gains a domicile different from her husband.

In the light of all the principles relating to residence and domicile enunciated by this court up to this point, we are persuaded that the
facts established by the parties weigh heavily in favor of a conclusion supporting petitioner's claim of legal residence or domicile in
the First District of Leyte.

II. The jurisdictional issue

Petitioner alleges that the jurisdiction of the COMELEC had already lapsed considering that the assailed resolutions were rendered on
April 24, 1995, fourteen (14) days before the election in violation of Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code. 48 Moreover, petitioner
contends that it is the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and not the COMELEC which has jurisdiction over the election of
members of the House of Representatives in accordance with Article VI Sec. 17 of the Constitution. This is untenable.

It is a settled doctrine that a statute requiring rendition of judgment within a specified time is generally construed to be merely
directory, 49 "so that non-compliance with them does not invalidate the judgment on the theory that if the statute had intended such
result it would have clearly indicated it." 50 The difference between a mandatory and a directory provision is often made on grounds of
necessity. Adopting the same view held by several American authorities, this court in Marcelino vs. Cruz held that: 51

The difference between a mandatory and directory provision is often determined on grounds of expediency, the
reason being that less injury results to the general public by disregarding than enforcing the letter of the law.

In Trapp v. Mc Cormick, a case calling for the interpretation of a statute containing a limitation of thirty (30) days
within which a decree may be entered without the consent of counsel, it was held that "the statutory provisions
which may be thus departed from with impunity, without affecting the validity of statutory proceedings, are usually
those which relate to the mode or time of doing that which is essential to effect the aim and purpose of the
Legislature or some incident of the essential act." Thus, in said case, the statute under examination was construed
merely to be directory.

The mischief in petitioner's contending that the COMELEC should have abstained from rendering a decision after the period stated in
the Omnibus Election Code because it lacked jurisdiction, lies in the fact that our courts and other quasi-judicial bodies would then
refuse to render judgments merely on the ground of having failed to reach a decision within a given or prescribed period.

In any event, with the enactment of Sections 6 and 7 of R.A. 6646 in relation to Section 78 of B.P. 881, 52 it is evident that the
respondent Commission does not lose jurisdiction to hear and decide a pending disqualification case under Section 78 of B.P. 881 even
after the elections.

As to the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal's supposed assumption of jurisdiction over the issue of petitioner's qualifications
after the May 8, 1995 elections, suffice it to say that HRET's jurisdiction as the sole judge of all contests relating to the elections,
returns and qualifications of members of Congress begins only after a candidate has become a member of the House of
Representatives. 53 Petitioner not being a member of the House of Representatives, it is obvious that the HRET at this point has no
jurisdiction over the question.

It would be an abdication of many of the ideals enshrined in the 1987 Constitution for us to either to ignore or deliberately make
distinctions in law solely on the basis of the personality of a petitioner in a case. Obviously a distinction was made on such a ground
here. Surely, many established principles of law, even of election laws were flouted for the sake perpetuating power during the pre-
EDSA regime. We renege on these sacred ideals, including the meaning and spirit of EDSA ourselves bending established principles
of principles of law to deny an individual what he or she justly deserves in law. Moreover, in doing so, we condemn ourselves to
repeat the mistakes of the past.

WHEREFORE, having determined that petitioner possesses the necessary residence qualifications to run for a seat in the House of
Representatives in the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC's questioned Resolutions dated April 24, May 7, May 11, and May 25,
1995 are hereby SET ASIDE. Respondent COMELEC is hereby directed to order the Provincial Board of Canvassers to proclaim
petitioner as the duly elected Representative of the First District of Leyte.

SO ORDERED.

35
RENALD F. VILANDO, G.R. Nos. 192147 & 192149
Petitioner,
Present:

CORONA,* C.J.,
CARPIO,
VELASCO, JR.,*
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,*
BRION,*
- versus - PERALTA,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO,
ABAD,* *
VILLARAMA, JR.,
PEREZ,
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES MENDOZA,
ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL, JOCELYN SY SERENO, and
LIMKAICHONG AND HON. SPEAKER REYES, JJ.
PROSPERO NOGRALES,
Respondents.

Promulgated:
August 23, 2011

X -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- X

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court assailing the March 24, 2010 Decision [1] of the
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) dismissing the petitions for quo warranto and declaring private respondent
Jocelyn Sy Limkaichong (Limkaichong) not disqualified as Member of the House of Representatives representing the First District of
Negros Oriental and its Resolution[2] dated May 17, 2010, denying the motion for reconsideration.

In the May 14, 2007 elections, Limkaichong filed her certificate of candidacy for the position of Representative of the First
District of Negros Oriental. She won over the other contender, Olivia Paras.

On May 25, 2007, she was proclaimed as Representative by the Provincial Board of Canvassers on the basis of Comelec
Resolution No. 8062[3] issued on May 18, 2007.

On July 23, 2007, she assumed office as Member of the House of Representatives.

Meanwhile, petitions involving either the disqualification or the proclamation of Limkaichong were filed before the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) which reached the Court.

The petitions, which questioned her citizenship, were filed against Limkaichong by her detractors: Louis Biraogo (G.R. No.
179120);[4] Olivia Paras (G.R. Nos. 179132-33);[5] and Renald F. Vilando (G.R. Nos. 179240-41). [6] These three (3) petitions were

36
consolidated with the petition for certiorari filed by Limkaichong (G.R. Nos. 178831-32) assailing the Joint Resolution issued by the
COMELEC which resolved the disqualification cases against her.

On April 1, 2009, the Court granted the aforesaid petition of Limkaichong, reversed the Joint Resolution of the Comelec,
dismissed the three (3) other petitions, and directed the petitioners to seek relief before the HRET by way of a petition for Quo
Warranto.

On April 21, 2009 and May 27, 2009, petitioner Renald F. Vilando (Vilando), as taxpayer; and Jacinto Paras, as registered
voter of the congressional district concerned, filed separate petitions for Quo Warranto against Limkaichong before the HRET. These
petitions were consolidated by the HRET as they both challenged the eligibility of one and the same respondent. Petitioners asserted
that Limkaichong was a Chinese citizen and ineligible for the office she was elected and proclaimed. They alleged that she was born to
a father (Julio Sy), whose naturalization had not attained finality, and to a mother who acquired the Chinese citizenship of Julio Sy
from the time of her marriage to the latter. Also, they invoked the jurisdiction of the HRET for a determination of Limkaichongs
citizenship, which necessarily included an inquiry into the validity of the naturalization certificate of Julio Sy.

For her defense, Limkaichong maintained that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen. She averred that the acquisition of Philippine
citizenship by her father was regular and in order and had already attained the status of res judicata. Further, she claimed that the
validity of such citizenship could not be assailed through a collateral attack.

On March 24, 2010, the HRET dismissed both petitions and declared Limkaichong not disqualified as Member of the House of
Representatives. Pertinent portions of the HRET decision reads:
By and large, petitioners failed to satisfy the quantum of proof to sustain their theory that respondent is not a natural-born
Filipino citizen and therefore not qualified as Representative of the First District, Negros Oriental. This being so,
their petitions must fail.

WHEREFORE, the Tribunal DISMISSES the instant petition for lack of merit and declares that respondent Jocelyn
Sy Limkaichong is not disqualified as Member of the House of Representatives representing the First District,
Negros Oriental.

As soon as the Decision becomes final and executory, notice of copies thereof shall be sent to the President of
the Philippines, the House of Representatives through the Speaker, the Commission on Audit through the Chairman,
pursuant to Rule 96 of the 2004 Rules of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal. Let a copy of this
Decision be furnished the Chairman, Commission on Elections, for his information and appropriate action.

SO ORDERED.[7]

The petitioners sought reconsideration of the aforesaid decision, but it was denied by the HRET in its Resolution dated May 17, 2010.

Hence, this petition for certiorari filed by Vilando anchored on the following

GROUNDS:
THE ONE-SIDED RESOLUTION OF THE SUBJECT PETITION FOR QUO WARRANTO AND THE
UTTER FAILURE OF THE HRET TO DISQUALIFY LIMKAICHONG AS MEMBER OF THE HOUSE
OF REPRESENTATIVES DESPITE MANIFEST EVIDENCE THAT SHE IS NOT A NATURAL-BORN
FILIPINO CITIZEN IS WHIMSICAL, CAPRICIOUS AND ARBITRARY BECAUSE:
37
 1. THE PETITION FOR QUO WARRANTO DOES NOT OPERATE AS A COLLATERAL
ATTACK ON THE CITIZENSHIP OF LIMKAICHONGS FATHER FOR THE REASON
THAT HER FATHERS CERTIFICATE OF NATURALIZATION IS OF NO FORCE AND
EFFECT FROM THE VERY BEGINNING, HENCE, THERE IS ACTUALLY NOTHING
BEING ATTACKED OR ASSAILED BY THE SAME.

2. LIMKAICHONG CANNOT DERIVE PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP FROM HER MOTHER

GIVEN THAT AT THE TIME OF HER BIRTH, HER MOTHER IS NOT ALREADY A
FILIPINO CITIZEN AS A RESULT OF HER MARRIAGE TO HER FATHER AS PROVIDED
FOR UNDER SECTION 1 (7) OF COMMONWEALTH ACT NO. 63 IN RELATION TO
ARTICLE 2 (1) CHAPTER II OF THE CHINESE REVISED NATIONALITY LAW
OF FEBRUARY 5, 1959.

3. HAVING THE PLENARY, ABSOLUTE AND EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION TO

DETERMINE, AMONG OTHERS, THE QUALIFICATIONS OF MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE
OF REPRESENTATIVES, THE HRET CAN LOOK INTO THE ELIGIBILITY OF
LIMKAICHONG EVEN IF, AS AN INCIDENT THERETO, IT WOULD MEAN LOOKING
INTO THE VALIDITY OF THE CERTIFICATE OF NATURALIZATION. [8]

It should be noted that Limkaichongs term of office as Representative of the First District of Negros Oriental from June 30,
2007 to June 30, 2010 already expired. As such, the issue questioning her eligibility to hold office has been rendered moot and
academic by the expiration of her term. Whatever judgment is reached, the same can no longer have any practical legal effect or, in the
nature of things, can no longer be enforced.[9] Thus, the petition may be dismissed for being moot and academic.

Moreover, there was the conduct of the 2010 elections, a supervening event, in a sense, has also rendered this case moot and
academic. A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that a
declaration thereon would be of no practical value. As a rule, courts decline jurisdiction over such case, or dismiss it on ground of
mootness. [10]

Citizenship, being a continuing requirement for Members of the House of Representatives, however, may be questioned at anytime.
[11]
For this reason, the Court deems it appropriate to resolve the petition on the merits. This position finds support in the rule that
courts will decide a question, otherwise moot and academic, if it is capable of repetition, yet evading review. [12] The question on
Limkaichongs citizenship is likely to recur if she would run again, as she did run, for public office, hence, capable of repetition.

In any case, the Court is of the view that the HRET committed no grave abuse of discretion in finding that Limkaichong is not
disqualified to sit as Member of the House of Representatives.

Vilandos argument, that the quo warranto petition does not operate as a collateral attack on the citizenship of Limkaichongs father as
the certificate of naturalization is null and void from the beginning, is devoid of merit.

In this petition, Vilando seeks to disqualify Limkaichong on the ground that she is a Chinese citizen. To prove his point, he
makes reference to the alleged nullity of the grant of naturalization of Limkaichongs father which, however, is not allowed as it would
constitute a collateral attack on the citizenship of the father. In our jurisdiction, an attack on a person's citizenship may only be done
through a direct action for its nullity.[13]
38
 The proper proceeding to assail the citizenship of Limkaichongs father should be in accordance with Section 18 of
Commonwealth Act No. 473. As held in Limkaichong v. Comelec,[14] thus:
As early as the case of Queto v. Catolico,[15] where the Court of First Instance judge motu propio and not in
the proper denaturalization proceedings called to court various grantees of certificates of naturalization (who had
already taken their oaths of allegiance) and cancelled their certificates of naturalization due to procedural infirmities,
the Court held that:
x x x It may be true that, as alleged by said respondents, that the proceedings for
naturalization were tainted with certain infirmities, fatal or otherwise, but that is beside the point
in this case. The jurisdiction of the court to inquire into and rule upon such infirmities must be
properly invoked in accordance with the procedure laid down by law. Such procedure is the
cancellation of the naturalization certificate. [Section 1(5), Commonwealth Act No. 63], in the
manner fixed in Section 18 of Commonwealth Act No. 473, hereinbefore quoted, namely, "upon
motion made in the proper proceedings by the Solicitor General or his representatives, or by the
proper provincial fiscal." In other words, the initiative must come from these officers, presumably
after previous investigation in each particular case.
Clearly, under law and jurisprudence, it is the State, through its representatives designated by statute, that
may question the illegally or invalidly procured certificate of naturalization in the appropriate denaturalization
proceedings. It is plainly not a matter that may be raised by private persons in an election case involving the
naturalized citizens descendant.

Vilando asserts that as an incident in determining the eligibility of Limkaichong, the HRET, having the plenary, absolute and
exclusive jurisdiction to determine her qualifications, can pass upon the efficacy of the certificate of naturalization.

True, the HRET has jurisdiction over quo warranto petitions, specifically over cases challenging ineligibility on the ground of
lack of citizenship. No less than the 1987 Constitution vests the HRET the authority to be the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns and qualifications of its Members. This constitutional power is likewise echoed in the 2004 Rules of the HRET. Rule
14 thereof restates this duty, thus:

Rule 14. Jurisdiction. The Tribunal is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications
of the Members of the House of Representatives.

Time and again, this Court has acknowledged this sole and exclusive jurisdiction of the HRET. [16] The power granted to
HRET by the Constitution is intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the legislature. [17] Such
power is regarded as full, clear and complete and excludes the exercise of any authority on the part of this Court that would in any
wise restrict it or curtail it or even affect the same.[18]

Such power of the HRET, no matter how complete and exclusive, does not carry with it the authority to delve into the legality
of the judgment of naturalization in the pursuit of disqualifying Limkaichong. To rule otherwise would operate as a collateral attack on
the citizenship of the father which, as already stated, is not permissible. The HRET properly resolved the issue with the following
ratiocination:

xxx We note that Jocelyn C. Limkaichong, not the father Julio Ong Sy, is the respondent in the present case. The
Tribunal may not dwell on deliberating on the validity of naturalization of the father if only to pursue the end of
declaring the daughter as disqualified to hold office.

Unfortunately, much as the Tribunal wants to resolve said issue, it cannot do so because its jurisdiction is limited to
the qualification of the proclaimed respondent Limkaichong, being a sitting Member of the Congress.

39
 Evidently, there is no basis to oblige the Tribunal to reopen the naturalization proceedings for a
determination of the citizenship of the ascendant of respondent. A petition for quo warranto is not a means to
achieve that purpose. To rule on this issue in this quo warranto proceeding will not only be a clear grave abuse of
discretion amounting to a lack or excess of jurisdiction, but also a blatant violation of due process on the part of the
persons who will be affected or who are not parties in this case.[19]

Thus, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) wrote that a collateral attack against a judgment is generally not allowed,
unless the judgment is void upon its face or its nullity is apparent by virtue of its own recitals. [20] Under the present situation, there is
no evidence to show that the judgment is void on its face:

As to the Order of the CFI, Negros Oriental dated July 9, 1957 and September 21, 1959 that were offered in
evidence, far from proving an invalid oath of allegiance and certificate of naturalization, being public records, they
do in fact constitute legitimate source of authority for the conferment of status of the father of respondent as
naturalized Filipino. Absent any contrary declaration by a competent court, the Tribunal presumes the validity of the
CFI Orders of July 9, 1957 and September 21, 1959, and the resulting documentations of Julio Sys acquisition of
Filipino citizenship by naturalization as valid and of legal effect. The oath of allegiance and certificate of
naturalization are themselves proofs of the actual conferment of naturalization. [21]

The HRET, therefore, correctly relied on the presumption of validity of the July 9, 1957 and September 21, 1959 Orders of the Court
of First Instance (CFI) Negros Oriental, which granted the petition and declared Julio Sy a naturalized Filipino absent any evidence to
the contrary.
Records disclose that Limkaichong was born in Dumaguete City on November 9, 1959. The governing law is the citizenship
provision of the 1935 Constitution, the pertinent portion thereof, reads:

Article IV

Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:

xxx
(3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.

(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and, upon reaching the age of majority, elect Philippine
citizenship.

xxx

Indubitably, with Limkaichongs father having been conferred the status as a naturalized Filipino, it follows that she is a Filipino
citizen born to a Filipino father.

Even on the assumption that the naturalization proceedings and the subsequent issuance of certificate of naturalization were
invalid, Limkaichong can still be considered a natural-born Filipino citizen having been born to a Filipino mother and having
impliedly elected Filipino citizenship when she reached majority age. The HRET is, thus, correct in declaring that Limkaichong is a
natural-born Filipino citizen:

Respondent Limkaichong falls under the category of those persons whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines. (Section
1(3), Article IV, 1935 Constitution) It matters not whether the father acquired citizenship by birth or by
naturalization. Therefore, following the line of transmission through the father under the 1935 Constitution, the
respondent has satisfactorily complied with the requirement for candidacy and for holding office, as she is a natural-
born Filipino citizen.
40
 Likewise, the citizenship of respondent Limkaichong finds support in paragraph 4, Section 1, Article IV of
the 1935 Constitution.

Having failed to prove that Anesia Sy lost her Philippine citizenship, respondent can be considered a natural born citizen of
the Philippines, having been born to a mother who was a natural-born Filipina at the time of marriage, and because
respondent was able to elect citizenship informally when she reached majority age. Respondent participated in the
barangay elections as a young voter in 1976, accomplished voters affidavit as of 1984, and ran as a candidate and
was elected as Mayor of La Libertad, Negros Oriental in 2004.These are positive acts of election of Philippine
citizenship. The case of In re: Florencio Mallare, elucidates how election of citizenship is manifested in actions
indubitably showing a definite choice. We note that respondent had informally elected citizenship after January 17,
1973 during which time the 1973 Constitution considered as citizens of the Philippines all those who elect
citizenship in accordance with the 1935 Constitution. The 1987 Constitution provisions, i.e., Section 1(3), Article
[IV] and Section 2, Article [IV] were enacted to correct the anomalous situation where one born of a Filipino father
and an alien mother was automatically accorded the status of a natural-born citizen, while one born of a Filipino
mother and an alien father would still have to elect Philippine citizenship yet if so elected, was not conferred
natural-born status. It was the intention of the framers of the 1987 Constitution to treat equally those born before the
1973 Constitution and who elected Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority either before or after the
effectivity of the 1973 Constitution. Thus, those who would elect Philippine citizenship under par. 3, Section 1,
Article [IV] of the 1987 Constitution are now, under Section 2, Article [IV] thereof also natural-born Filipinos. The
following are the pertinent provisions of the 1987 Constitution:

Article IV

Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:

(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this
Constitution;

(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;

(3) Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect
Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; and

(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.

Section 2. Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without
having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship. Those who elect Philippine
citizenship in accordance with paragraph (3), Section 1 hereof shall be deemed natural-born citizens.
[22]

Vilandos assertion that Limkaichong cannot derive Philippine citizenship from her mother because the latter became a
Chinese citizen when she married Julio Sy, as provided for under Section 1 (7) of Commonwealth Act No. 63 in relation to Article 2
(1) Chapter II of the Chinese Revised Nationality Law of February 5, 1959, must likewise fail.

As aptly pointed out by the HRET, Vilando was not able to offer in evidence a duly certified true copy of the alleged Chinese Revised
Law of Nationality to prove that Limkaichongs mother indeed lost her Philippine citizenship. Verily, Vilando failed to establish his
case through competent and admissible evidence to warrant a reversal of the HRET ruling.

Also, an application for an alien certificate of registration (ACR) is not an indubitable proof of forfeiture of Philippine citizenship. It is
well to quote the ruling of the HRET on this matter, to wit:

41
 An alien certificate of registration is issued to an individual who declares that he is not a Filipino citizen. It is
obtained only when applied for. It is in a form prescribed by the agency and contains a declaration by the applicant
of his or her personal information, a photograph, and physical details that identify the applicant. It bears no
indication of basis for foreign citizenship, nor proof of change to foreign citizenship. It certifies that a person named
therein has applied for registration and fingerprinting and that such person was issued a certificate of registration
under the Alien Registration Act of 1950 or other special law. It is only evidence of registration.

Unlike birth certificates registered pursuant to Act 3753 (The Civil Register Law), and much less like other public
records referred to under Section 23, Rule 132, an alien certificate of registration is not a public document that
would be prima facie evidence of the truth of facts contained therein. On its face, it only certifies that the applicant
had submitted himself or herself to registration. Therefore, there is no presumption of alienage of the declarant. This
is especially so where the declarant has in fact been a natural-born Filipino all along and never lost his or her status
as such.[23]

Thus, obtaining an ACR by Limkaichongs mother was not tantamount to a repudiation of her original citizenship. Neither did
it result in an acquisition of alien citizenship.In a string of decisions, this Court has consistently held that an application for, and the
holding of, an alien certificate of registration is not an act constituting renunciation of Philippine citizenship. [24] For renunciation to
effectively result in the loss of citizenship, the same must be express. [25] Such express renunciation is lacking in this case.

Accordingly, Limkaichongs mother, being a Filipino citizen, can transmit her citizenship to her daughter.

Well-settled is the principle that the judgments of the HRET are beyond judicial interference. The only instance where this
Court may intervene in the exercise of its so-called extraordinary jurisdiction is upon a determination that the decision or resolution of
the HRET was rendered without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion or upon a clear showing of such
arbitrary and improvident use of its power to constitute a denial of due process of law, or upon a demonstration of a very clear
unmitigated error, manifestly constituting such grave abuse of discretion that there has to be a remedy for such abuse. [26] In this case,
there is no showing of any such arbitrariness or improvidence. The HRET acted well within the sphere of its power when it dismissed
the quo warranto petition.

In fine, this Court finds sufficient basis to sustain the ruling of the HRET which resolved the issue of citizenship in favor of
Limkaichong.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Accordingly, the Court affirms the March 24, 2010 Decision of the HRET declaring that
Limkaichong is not disqualified as Member of the House of Representatives representing the First District, Negros Oriental.

SO ORDERED.

THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 187567

Petitioner,
Present:

CORONA, C.J.,
- versus - Chairperson,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO, and
VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.

42
NORA FE SAGUN,
Respondent. Promulgated:

February 15, 2012

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari filed by the Solicitor General on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines, seeking the
reversal of the April 3, 2009 Decision[1] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 3, of Baguio City in Spcl. Pro. Case No. 17-R. The
RTC granted the petition[2] filed by respondent Nora Fe Sagun entitled In re: Judicial Declaration of Election of Filipino Citizenship,
Nora Fe Sagun v. The Local Civil Registrar of Baguio City.

The facts follow:

Respondent is the legitimate child of Albert S. Chan, a Chinese national, and Marta Borromeo, a Filipino citizen. She was born on
August 8, 1959 in Baguio City[3] and did not elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. In 1992, at the age of 33
and after getting married to Alex Sagun, she executed an Oath of Allegiance [4] to the Republic of the Philippines. Said document was
notarized by Atty. Cristeta Leung on December 17, 1992, but was not recorded and registered with the Local Civil Registrar of Baguio
City.

Sometime in September 2005, respondent applied for a Philippine passport. Her application was denied due to the citizenship
of her father and there being no annotation on her birth certificate that she has elected Philippine citizenship. Consequently, she sought
a judicial declaration of her election of Philippine citizenship and prayed that the Local Civil Registrar of Baguio City be ordered to
annotate the same on her birth certificate.

In her petition, respondent averred that she was raised as a Filipino, speaks Ilocano and Tagalog fluently and attended local
schools in Baguio City, including Holy Family Academy and the Saint Louis University. Respondent claimed that despite her part-
Chinese ancestry, she always thought of herself as a Filipino. She is a registered voter of Precinct No. 0419A of Barangay Manuel A.
Roxas in Baguio City and had voted in local and national elections as shown in the Voter Certification [5] issued by Atty. Maribelle
Uminga of the Commission on Elections of Baguio City.

She asserted that by virtue of her positive acts, she has effectively elected Philippine citizenship and such fact should be
annotated on her record of birth so as to entitle her to the issuance of a Philippine passport.

On August 7, 2007, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) entered its appearance as counsel for the Republic of the Philippines and
authorized the City Prosecutor of Baguio City to appear in the above mentioned case. [6] However, no comment was filed by the City
Prosecutor.

43
After conducting a hearing, the trial court rendered the assailed Decision on April 3, 2009 granting the petition and declaring
respondent a Filipino citizen. The fallo of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. Petitioner Nora Fe Sagun y Chan is hereby
DECLARED [a] FILIPINO CITIZEN, having chosen or elected Filipino citizenship.

Upon payment of the required fees, the Local Civil Registrar of Baguio City is hereby directed to annotate
[on] her birth certificate, this judicial declaration of Filipino citizenship of said petitioner.

IT IS SO ORDERED.[7]

Contending that the lower court erred in so ruling, petitioner, through the OSG, directly filed the instant recourse via a petition for
review on certiorari before us. Petitioner raises the following issues:

Whether or not an action or proceeding for judicial declaration of Philippine citizenship is procedurally and
jurisdictionally permissible; and,

II

Whether or not an election of Philippine citizenship, made twelve (12) years after reaching the age of majority, is
considered to have been made within a reasonable time as interpreted by jurisprudence. [8]

Petitioner argues that respondents petition before the RTC was improper on two counts: for one, law and jurisprudence
clearly contemplate no judicial action or proceeding for the declaration of Philippine citizenship; and for another, the pleaded
registration of the oath of allegiance with the local civil registry and its annotation on respondents birth certificate are the ministerial
duties of the registrar; hence, they require no court order. Petitioner asserts that respondents petition before the trial court seeking a
judicial declaration of her election of Philippine citizenship undeniably entails a determination and consequent declaration of her
status as a Filipino citizen which is not allowed under our legal system. Petitioner also argues that if respondents intention in filing the
petition is ultimately to have her oath of allegiance registered with the local civil registry and annotated on her birth certificate, then
she does not have to resort to court proceedings.

Petitioner further argues that even assuming that respondents action is sanctioned, the trial court erred in finding respondent
as having duly elected Philippine citizenship since her purported election was not in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law
and was not made within a reasonable time. Petitioner points out that while respondent executed an oath of allegiance before a notary
public, there was no affidavit of her election of Philippine citizenship. Additionally, her oath of allegiance which was not registered
with the nearest local civil registry was executed when she was already 33 years old or 12 years after she reached the age of
majority. Accordingly, it was made beyond the period allowed by law.

In her Comment,[9] respondent avers that notwithstanding her failure to formally elect Filipino citizenship upon reaching the
age of majority, she has in fact effectively elected Filipino citizenship by her performance of positive acts, among which is the
exercise of the right of suffrage. She claims that she had voted and participated in all local and national elections from the time she

44
was of legal age. She also insists that she is a Filipino citizen despite the fact that her election of Philippine citizenship was delayed
and unregistered.

In reply,[10] petitioner argues that the special circumstances invoked by respondent, like her continuous and uninterrupted stay
in the Philippines, her having been educated in schools in the country, her choice of staying here despite the naturalization of her
parents as American citizens, and her being a registered voter, cannot confer on her Philippine citizenship as the law specifically
provides the requirements for acquisition of Philippine citizenship by election.

Essentially, the issues for our resolution are: (1) whether respondents petition for declaration of election of Philippine
citizenship is sanctioned by the Rules of Court and jurisprudence; (2) whether respondent has effectively elected Philippine citizenship
in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law.

The petition is meritorious.

At the outset, it is necessary to stress that a direct recourse to this Court from the decisions, final resolutions and orders of the
RTC may be taken where only questions of law are raised or involved. There is a question of law when the doubt or difference arises
as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, which does not call for an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented
by the parties-litigants. On the other hand, there is a question of fact when the doubt or controversy arises as to the truth or falsity of
the alleged facts. Simply put, when there is no dispute as to fact, the question of whether the conclusion drawn therefrom is correct or
not, is a question of law.[11]

In the present case, petitioner assails the propriety of the decision of the trial court declaring respondent a Filipino citizen

after finding that respondent was able to substantiate her election of Filipino citizenship. Petitioner contends that respondents petition

for judicial declaration of election of Philippine citizenship is procedurally and jurisdictionally impermissible. Verily, petitioner has

raised questions of law as the resolution of these issues rest solely on what the law provides given the attendant circumstances.

In granting the petition, the trial court stated:

This Court believes that petitioner was able to fully substantiate her petition regarding her election of
Filipino citizenship, and the Local Civil Registrar of Baguio City should be ordered to annotate in her birth
certificate her election of Filipino citizenship. This Court adds that the petitioners election of Filipino citizenship
should be welcomed by this country and people because the petitioner has the choice to elect citizenship of powerful
countries like the United States of America and China, however, petitioner has chosen Filipino citizenship because
she grew up in this country, and has learned to love the Philippines. Her choice of electing Filipino citizenship is, in
fact, a testimony that many of our people still wish to live in the Philippines, and are very proud of our country.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. Petitioner Nora Fe Sagun y Chan is hereby
DECLARED as FILIPINO CITIZEN, having chosen or elected Filipino citizenship. [12]

For sure, this Court has consistently ruled that there is no proceeding established by law, or the Rules for the judicial declaration of the
citizenship of an individual.[13] There is no specific legislation authorizing the institution of a judicial proceeding to declare that a
45
given person is part of our citizenry. [14] This was our ruling in Yung Uan Chu v. Republic[15] citing the early case of Tan v. Republic of
the Philippines,[16] where we clearly stated:

Under our laws, there can be no action or proceeding for the judicial declaration of the citizenship of an

individual. Courts of justice exist for settlement of justiciable controversies, which imply a given right, legally

demandable and enforceable, an act or omission violative of said right, and a remedy, granted or sanctioned by law,

for said breach of right. As an incident only of the adjudication of the rights of the parties to a controversy, the court

may pass upon, and make a pronouncement relative to their status. Otherwise, such a pronouncement is beyond

judicial power. x x x

Clearly, it was erroneous for the trial court to make a specific declaration of respondents Filipino citizenship as such
pronouncement was not within the courts competence.

As to the propriety of respondents petition seeking a judicial declaration of election of Philippine citizenship, it is imperative
that we determine whether respondent is required under the law to make an election and if so, whether she has complied with the
procedural requirements in the election of Philippine citizenship.

When respondent was born on August 8, 1959, the governing charter was the 1935 Constitution, which declares as citizens of the
Philippines those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. Sec.
1, Art. IV of the 1935 Constitution reads:

Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:

xxxx

(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and, upon reaching the age of majority, elect
Philippine citizenship.

Under Article IV, Section 1(4) of the 1935 Constitution, the citizenship of a legitimate child born of a Filipino mother and an alien
father followed the citizenship of the father, unless, upon reaching the age of majority, the child elected Philippine citizenship. The
right to elect Philippine citizenship was recognized in the 1973 Constitution when it provided that [t]hose who elect Philippine
citizenship pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution of nineteen hundred and thirty-five are citizens of the Philippines.
[17]
Likewise, this recognition by the 1973 Constitution was carried over to the 1987 Constitution which states that [t]hose born before
January 17, 1973 of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority are Philippine citizens. [18] It
should be noted, however, that the 1973 and 1987 Constitutional provisions on the election of Philippine citizenship should not be
understood as having a curative effect on any irregularity in the acquisition of citizenship for those covered by the 1935

46
Constitution. If the citizenship of a person was subject to challenge under the old charter, it remains subject to challenge under the new
charter even if the judicial challenge had not been commenced before the effectivity of the new Constitution. [19]

Being a legitimate child, respondents citizenship followed that of her father who is Chinese, unless upon reaching the age of majority,
she elects Philippine citizenship. It is a settled rule that only legitimate children follow the citizenship of the father and that
illegitimate children are under the parental authority of the mother and follow her nationality. [20] An illegitimate child of Filipina need
not perform any act to confer upon him all the rights and privileges attached to citizens of the Philippines; he automatically becomes a
citizen himself.[21] But in the case of respondent, for her to be considered a Filipino citizen, she must have validly elected Philippine
citizenship upon reaching the age of majority.

Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 625,[22] enacted pursuant to Section 1(4), Article IV of the 1935 Constitution, prescribes the
procedure that should be followed in order to make a valid election of Philippine citizenship, to wit:

Section 1. The option to elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with subsection (4), [S]ection 1, Article
IV, of the Constitution shall be expressed in a statement to be signed and sworn to by the party concerned before any
officer authorized to administer oaths, and shall be filed with the nearest civil registry. The said party shall
accompany the aforesaid statement with the oath of allegiance to the Constitution and the Government of the
Philippines.

Based on the foregoing, the statutory formalities of electing Philippine citizenship are: (1) a statement of election under oath;
(2) an oath of allegiance to the Constitution and Government of the Philippines; and (3) registration of the statement of election and of
the oath with the nearest civil registry.[23]

Furthermore, no election of Philippine citizenship shall be accepted for registration under C.A. No. 625 unless the party exercising the
right of election has complied with the requirements of the Alien Registration Act of 1950. In other words, he should first be required
to register as an alien.[24] Pertinently, the person electing Philippine citizenship is required to file a petition with the Commission of
Immigration and Deportation (now Bureau of Immigration) for the cancellation of his alien certificate of registration based on his
aforesaid election of Philippine citizenship and said Office will initially decide, based on the evidence presented the validity or
invalidity of said election.[25] Afterwards, the same is elevated to the Ministry (now Department) of Justice for final determination and
review.[26]

It should be stressed that there is no specific statutory or procedural rule which authorizes the direct filing of a petition for
declaration of election of Philippine citizenship before the courts. The special proceeding provided under Section 2, Rule 108 of
the Rules of Court on Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry, merely allows any interested party to file an action
for cancellation or correction of entry in the civil registry, i.e., election, loss and recovery of citizenship, which is not the relief prayed
for by the respondent.

Be that as it may, even if we set aside this procedural infirmity, still the trial courts conclusion that respondent duly elected
Philippine citizenship is erroneous since the records undisputably show that respondent failed to comply with the legal requirements
for a valid election. Specifically, respondent had not executed a sworn statement of her election of Philippine citizenship. The only

47
documentary evidence submitted by respondent in support of her claim of alleged election was her oath of allegiance, executed 12
years after she reached the age of majority, which was unregistered. As aptly pointed out by the petitioner, even
assuming arguendo that respondents oath of allegiance suffices, its execution was not within a reasonable time after respondent
attained the age of majority and was not registered with the nearest civil registry as required under Section 1 of C.A. No. 625. The
phrase reasonable time has been interpreted to mean that the election should be made generally within three (3) years from reaching
the age of majority.[27]Moreover, there was no satisfactory explanation proffered by respondent for the delay and the failure to register
with the nearest local civil registry.

Based on the foregoing circumstances, respondent clearly failed to comply with the procedural requirements for a valid and
effective election of Philippine citizenship. Respondent cannot assert that the exercise of suffrage and the participation in election
exercises constitutes a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship since the law specifically lays down the requirements for
acquisition of citizenship by election. The mere exercise of suffrage, continuous and uninterrupted stay in the Philippines, and other
similar acts showing exercise of Philippine citizenship cannot take the place of election of Philippine citizenship. Hence, respondent
cannot now be allowed to seek the intervention of the court to confer upon her Philippine citizenship when clearly she has failed to
validly elect Philippine citizenship. As we held in Ching,[28] the prescribed procedure in electing Philippine citizenship is certainly not
a tedious and painstaking process. All that is required of the elector is to execute an affidavit of election of Philippine citizenship and,
thereafter, file the same with the nearest civil registry. Having failed to comply with the foregoing requirements, respondents petition
before the trial court must be denied.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated April 3, 2009 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 3 of

Baguio City in Spcl. Pro. Case No. 17-R is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The petition for judicial declaration of election of

Philippine citizenship filed by respondent Nora Fe Sagun is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 191970 April 24, 2012

ROMMEL APOLINARIO JALOSJOS, Petitioner,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and DAN ERASMO, SR.,
DECISION
ABAD, J.:

This case is about the proof required to establish the domicile of a reinstated Filipino citizen who seeks election as governor of a
province.

The Facts and the Case

48
Petitioner Rommel Jalosjos was born in Quezon City on October 26, 1973. He migrated to Australia in 1981 when he was eight years
old and there acquired Australian citizenship. On November 22, 2008, at age 35, he decided to return to the Philippines and lived with
his brother, Romeo, Jr., in Barangay Veteran’s Village, Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay. Four days upon his return, he took an oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, resulting in his being issued a Certificate of Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship by
the Bureau of Immigration.1 On September 1, 2009 he renounced his Australian citizenship, executing a sworn renunciation of the
same2 in compliance with Republic Act (R.A.) 9225.3

From the time of his return, Jalosjos acquired a residential property in the same village where he lived and a fishpond in San Isidro,
Naga, Zamboanga Sibugay. He applied for registration as a voter in the Municipality of Ipil but respondent Dan Erasmo, Sr., the
Barangay Captain of Barangay Veteran’s Village, opposed the same. Acting on the application, the Election Registration Board
approved it and included Jalosjos’ name in the Commission on Elections’ (COMELEC’s) voters list for Precinct 0051F of Barangay
Veterans Village, Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay.4

Undaunted, Erasmo filed before the 1st Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Ipil-Tungawan-R.T. Lim in Ipil a petition for the
exclusion of Jalosjos’ name from the official voters list. After hearing, the MCTC rendered a decision, denying the petition. 5 On
appeal,6 the Regional Trial Court (RTC) affirmed the MCTC decision. The RTC decision became final and executory.

On November 28, 2009 Jalosjos filed his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for Governor of Zamboanga Sibugay Province for the May
10, 2010 elections. Erasmo promptly filed a petition to deny due course or to cancel Jalosjos’ COC7 on the ground that the latter made
material misrepresentation in the same since he failed to comply with (1) the requirements of R.A. 9225 and (2) the one-year
residency requirement of the Local Government Code.

After hearing, the Second Division of the COMELEC ruled that, while Jalosjos had regained Philippine citizenship by complying with
the requirements of R.A. 9225, he failed to prove the residency requirement for a gubernatorial candidate. He failed to present ample
proof of a bona fide intention to establish his domicile in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay. On motion for reconsideration, the COMELEC En
Banc affirmed the Second Division’s decision, ruling that Jalosjos had been a mere guest or transient visitor in his brother’s house and,
for this reason, he cannot claim Ipil as his domicile.

Acting on Jalosjos’ prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order, the Court resolved on May 7, 2010 to issue a status quo
ante order, enjoining the COMELEC from enforcing its February 11, 2010 decision pending further orders. Meanwhile, Jolosjos won
the election and was proclaimed winner of the 2010 gubernatorial race in the Province of Zamboanga Sibugay. 8

The Issue Presented

The sole issue presented in this case is whether or not the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in ruling that Jalosjos failed to present ample proof of a bona fide intention to establish his domicile in Ipil,
Zamboanga Sibugay.

The Court’s Ruling

The Local Government Code requires a candidate seeking the position of provincial governor to be a resident of the province for at
least one year before the election.9 For purposes of the election laws, the requirement of residence is synonymous with
domicile,10 meaning that a person must not only intend to reside in a particular place but must also have personal presence in such
place coupled with conduct indicative of such intention.11

There is no hard and fast rule to determine a candidate’s compliance with residency requirement since the question of residence is a
question of intention.12 Still, jurisprudence has laid down the following guidelines: (a) every person has a domicile or residence
somewhere; (b) where once established, that domicile remains until he acquires a new one; and (c) a person can have but one domicile
at a time.13

It is inevitable under these guidelines and the precedents applying them that Jalosjos has met the residency requirement for provincial
governor of Zamboanga Sibugay.

One. The COMELEC appears hasty in concluding that Jalosjos failed to prove that he successfully changed his domicile to
Zamboanga Sibugay. The COMELEC points out that, since he was unable to discharge the burden of proving Zamboanga Sibugay to
be his rightful domicile, it must be assumed that his domicile is either Quezon City or Australia.

49
But it is clear from the facts that Quezon City was Jalosjos’ domicile of origin, the place of his birth. It may be taken for granted that
he effectively changed his domicile from Quezon City to Australia when he migrated there at the age of eight, acquired Australian
citizenship, and lived in that country for 26 years. Australia became his domicile by operation of law and by choice. 14

On the other hand, when he came to the Philippines in November 2008 to live with his brother in Zamboanga Sibugay, it is evident
that Jalosjos did so with intent to change his domicile for good. He left Australia, gave up his Australian citizenship, and renounced his
allegiance to that country. In addition, he reacquired his old citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines, resulting in his being issued a Certificate of Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship by the Bureau of Immigration. By his
acts, Jalosjos forfeited his legal right to live in Australia, clearly proving that he gave up his domicile there. And he has since lived
nowhere else except in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay.

To hold that Jalosjos has not establish a new domicile in Zamboanga Sibugay despite the loss of his domicile of origin (Quezon City)
and his domicile of choice and by operation of law (Australia) would violate the settled maxim that a man must have a domicile or
residence somewhere.

Two. The COMELEC concluded that Jalosjos has not come to settle his domicile in Ipil since he has merely been staying at his
brother’s house. But this circumstance alone cannot support such conclusion. Indeed, the Court has repeatedly held that a candidate is
not required to have a house in a community to establish his residence or domicile in a particular place. It is sufficient that he should
live there even if it be in a rented house or in the house of a friend or relative. 15 To insist that the candidate own the house where he
lives would make property a qualification for public office. What matters is that Jalosjos has proved two things: actual physical
presence in Ipil and an intention of making it his domicile.

Jalosjos presented the affidavits of next-door neighbors, attesting to his physical presence at his residence in Ipil. These adjoining
neighbors are no doubt more credible since they have a better chance of noting his presence or absence than his other neighbors,
whose affidavits Erasmo presented, who just sporadically passed by the subject residence. Further, it is not disputed that Jalosjos
bought a residential lot in the same village where he lived and a fish pond in San Isidro, Naga, Zamboanga Sibugay. He showed
correspondences with political leaders, including local and national party-mates, from where he lived. Moreover, Jalosjos is a
registered voter of Ipil by final judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga Sibugay.1âwphi1

Three. While the Court ordinarily respects the factual findings of administrative bodies like the COMELEC, this does not prevent it
from exercising its review powers to correct palpable misappreciation of evidence or wrong or irrelevant considerations. 16 The
evidence Jalosjos presented is sufficient to establish Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay, as his domicile. The COMELEC gravely abused its
discretion in holding otherwise.

Four. Jalosjos won and was proclaimed winner in the 2010 gubernatorial race for Zamboanga Sibugay. The Court will respect the
decision of the people of that province and resolve all doubts regarding his qualification in his favor to breathe life to their manifest
will.

WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition and SETS ASIDE the Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division dated February
11, 2010 and the Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc dated May 4, 2010 that disqualified petitioner Rommel Jalosjos from seeking
election as Governor of Zamboanga Sibugay.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 193261 April 24, 2012

MEYNARDO SABILI, Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and FLORENCIO LIBREA, Respondents.

DECISION

SERENO, J.:

Before us is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, seeking to annul the Resolutions in
SPA No. 09-047 (DC) dated 26 January 2010 and 17 August 2010 of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), which denied due

50
course to and canceled the Certificate of Candidacy (COC) of petitioner Meynardo Sabili (petitioner) for the position of Mayor of Lipa
City for the May 2010 elections. At the

heart of the controversy is whether petitioner Sabili had complied with the one-year residency requirement for local elective officials.

When petitioner filed his COC1 for mayor of Lipa City for the 2010 elections, he stated therein that he had been a resident of the city
for two (2) years and eight (8) months. Prior to the 2010 elections, he had been twice elected (in 1995 and in 1998) as Provincial
Board Member representing the 4th District of Batangas. During the 2007 elections, petitioner ran for the position of Representative of
the 4th District of Batangas, but lost. The 4th District of Batangas includes Lipa City. 2 However, it is undisputed that when petitioner
filed his COC during the 2007 elections, he and his family were then staying at his ancestral home in Barangay (Brgy.) Sico, San Juan,
Batangas.

Private respondent Florencio Librea (private respondent) filed a "Petition to Deny Due Course and to Cancel Certificate of Candidacy
and to Disqualify a Candidate for Possessing Some Grounds for Disqualification" 3 against him before the COMELEC, docketed as
SPA No. 09-047 (DC). Citing Section 78 in relation to Section 74 of the Omnibus Election Code,4 private respondent alleged that
petitioner made material misrepresentations of fact in the latter’s COC and likewise failed to comply with the one-year residency
requirement under Section 39 of the Local Government Code. 5 Allegedly, petitioner falsely declared under oath in his COC that he
had already been a resident of Lipa City for two years and eight months prior to the scheduled 10 May 2010 local elections.

In support of his allegation, private respondent presented the following:

1. Petitioner’s COC for the 2010 elections filed on 1 December 20096

2. 2009 Tax Declarations for a house and lot (TCT Nos. 173355, 173356 and buildings thereon) in Pinagtong-ulan, Lipa City
registered under the name of Bernadette Palomares, petitioner’s common-law wife 7

3. Lipa City Assessor Certification of Property Holdings of properties under the name of Bernadette Palomares 8

4. Affidavit executed by private respondent Florencio Librea 9

5. Sinumpaang Salaysay executed by Eladio de Torres10

6. Voter Certification on petitioner issued by COMELEC Election Officer Juan D. Aguila, Jr. 11

7. 1997 Voter Registration Record of petitioner12

8. National Statistics Office (NSO) Advisory on Marriages regarding petitioner 13

9. Lipa City Assessor Certificate of No Improvement on Block 2, Lot 3, Brgy. Lood, Lipa City registered in the name of
petitioner14

10. NSO Certificate of No Marriage of Bernadette Palomares15

11. Lipa City Assessor Certificate of No Improvement on Block 2, Lot 5, Brgy. Lood, Lipa City registered in the name of
petitioner16

12. Lipa City Permits and Licensing Office Certification that petitioner has no business therein 17

13. Apparent printout of a Facebook webpage of petitioner’s daughter, Mey Bernadette Sabili18

14. Department of Education (DepEd) Lipa City Division Certification that the names Bernadette Palomares, Mey Bernadette
Sabili and Francis Meynard Sabili (petitioner’s son) do not appear on its list of graduates 19

15. Certification from the Office of the Election Officer of Lipa City that Bernadette Palomares, Mey Bernadette Sabili and
Francis Meynard Sabili do not appear in its list of voters20

51
 16. Affidavit executed by Violeta Fernandez21

17. Affidavit executed by Rodrigo Macasaet22

18. Affidavit Executed by Pablo Lorzano23

19. Petitioner’s 2007 COC for Member of House of Representative24

For ease of later discussion, private respondent’s evidence shall be grouped as follows: (1) Certificates regarding ownership of real
property; (2) petitioner’s Voter Registration and Certification (common exhibits of the parties); (3) petitioner’s COCs in previous
elections; (3) Certifications regarding petitioner’s family members; and (4) Affidavits of Lipa City residents.

On the other hand, petitioner presented the following evidence to establish the fact of his residence in Lipa City:

1. Affidavit executed by Bernadette Palomares25

2. Birth Certificate of Francis Meynard Sabili26

3. Affidavit of Leonila Suarez (Suarez)27

4. Certification of Residency issued by Pinagtong-ulan Barangay Captain, Dominador Honrade 28

5. Affidavit executed by Rosalinda Macasaet29

6. Certificate of Appreciation issued to petitioner by the parish of Sto. Nino of Pinagtong-ulan 30

7. Designation of petitioner in the Advisory Body (AB) of Pinagtong-ulan, San Jose/Lipa City Chapter of Guardians
Brotherhood, Inc.31

8. COMELEC Voter Certification on petitioner issued by Election Officer Juan Aguila, Jr.32

9. COMELEC Application for Transfer/Transfer with Reactivation dated 6 June 2009 signed by Election Officer Juan Aguila,
Jr.33

10. Petitioner’s Income Tax Return for 200734

11. Official Receipt for petitioner’s income tax payment for 200735

12. Petitioner’s Income Tax Return for 200836

13. Official Receipt for petitioner’s income tax payment for 200837

14. Birth Certificate of Mey Bernadette Sabili38

15. Affidavit executed by Jacinto Cornejo, Sr.39

16. Joint Affidavit of twenty-one (21) Pinagtong-ulan residents, including past and incumbent Pinagtong-ulan officials. 40

For ease of later discussion, petitioner’s evidence shall be grouped as follows: (1) his Income Tax Returns and corresponding Official
Receipts for the years 2007 and 2008; (2) Certification from the barangay captain of Pinagtong-ulan; (3) Affidavit of his common-law
wife, Bernadette Palomares; and (4) Affidavits from a previous property owner, neighbors, Certificate of Appreciation from the
barangay parish and Memorandum from the local chapter of Guardians Brotherhood, Inc.

The COMELEC Ruling

52
In its Resolution dated 26 January 2010,41 the COMELEC Second Division granted the Petition of private respondent, declared
petitioner as disqualified from seeking the mayoralty post in Lipa City, and canceled his Certificate of Candidacy for his not being a
resident of Lipa City and for his failure to meet the statutory one-year residency requirement under the law.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the 26 January 2010 Resolution of the COMELEC, during the pendency of which the 10 May
2010 local elections were held. The next day, he was proclaimed the duly elected mayor of Lipa City after garnering the highest
number of votes cast for the said position. He accordingly filed a Manifestation 42 with the COMELEC en banc to reflect this fact.

In its Resolution dated 17 August 2010,43 the COMELEC en banc denied the Motion for Reconsideration of petitioner. Although he
was able to receive his copy of the Resolution, no prior notice setting the date of promulgation of the said Resolution was received by
him. Meanwhile, Section 6 of COMELEC Resolution No. 8696 (Rules on Disqualification Cases Filed in Connection with the May
10, 2012 Automated National and Local Elections) requires the parties to be notified in advance of the date of the promulgation of the
Resolution.

SEC. 6. Promulgation. – The promulgation of a Decision or Resolution of the Commission or a Division shall be made on a date
previously fixed, notice of which shall be served in advance upon the parties or their attorneys personally, or by registered mail,
telegram, fax, or thru the fastest means of communication.

Hence, petitioner filed with this Court a Petition (Petition for Certiorari with Extremely Urgent Application for the Issuance of a Status
Quo Order and for the Conduct of a Special Raffle of this Case) under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, seeking the
annulment of the 26 January 2010 and 17 August 2010 Resolutions of the COMELEC. Petitioner attached to his Petition a Certificate
of Canvass of Votes and proclamation of Winning Candidates for Lipa City Mayor and Vice-Mayor issued by the City/Municipal
Board of Canvassers,44 as well as a copy of his Oath of Office.45 He also attached to his Petition another Certification of
Residency46 issued by Pinagtong-ulan Barangay Captain Dominador Honrade and sworn to before a notary public.

On 7 September 2010, this Court issued a Status Quo Ante Order 47 requiring the parties to observe the status quo prevailing before the
issuance of the assailed COMELEC Resolutions. Thereafter, the parties filed their responsive pleadings.

Issues

The following are the issues for resolution:

1. Whether the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion when it failed to promulgate its Resolution dated 17 August
2010 in accordance with its own Rules of Procedure; and

2. Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that Sabili failed to prove compliance with the
one-year residency requirement for local elective officials.

The Court’s Ruling

1. On whether the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion when it failed to promulgate its Resolution dated 17 August 2010
in accordance with its own Rules of Procedure

Petitioner argues that the assailed 17 August 2010 COMELEC Resolution, which denied petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration, is
null and void. The Resolution was allegedly not promulgated in accordance with the COMELEC’s own Rules of Procedure and,
hence, violated petitioner’s right to due process of law.

The rules governing the Petition for Cancellation of COC in this case is COMELEC Resolution No. 8696 (Rules on Disqualification
of Cases Filed in Connection with the May 10, 2010 Automated National and Local Elections), which was promulgated on 11
November 2009. Sections 6 and 7 thereof provide as follows:

SEC. 6. Promulgation. - The promulgation of a Decision or Resolution of the Commission or a Division shall be made on a date
previously fixed, notice of which shall be served in advance upon the parties or their attorneys personally, or by registered mail,
telegram, fax or thru the fastest means of communication.

53
SEC. 7. Motion for Reconsideration. - A motion to reconsider a Decision, Resolution, Order or Ruling of a Division shall be filed
within three (3) days from the promulgation thereof. Such motion, if not pro-forma, suspends the execution for implementation of the
Decision, Resolution, Order or Ruling.

Within twenty-four (24) hours from the filing thereof, the Clerk of the Commission shall notify the Presiding Commissioner. The latter
shall within two (2) days thereafter certify the case to the Commission en banc.

The Clerk of the Commission shall calendar the Motion for Reconsideration for the resolution of the Commission en banc within three
(3) days from the certification thereof.

However, the COMELEC Order dated 4 May 201048 suspended Section 6 of COMELEC Resolution No. 8696 by ordering that "all
resolutions be delivered to the Clerk of the Commission for immediate promulgation" in view of "the proximity of the Automated
National and Local Elections and lack of material time." The Order states:

ORDER

Considering the proximity of the Automated National and Local Elections and lack of material time, the Commission hereby suspends
Sec. 6 of Resolution No. 8696 promulgated on November 11, 2009, which reads:

Sec. 6. Promulgation. – The promulgation of a Decision or Resolution of the Commission or a Division shall be made on a date
previously fixed, notice of which shall be served upon the parties or their attorneys personally, or by registered mail, telegram, fax or
thru the fastest means of communication."

Let all resolutions be delivered to the Clerk of the Commission for immediate promulgation.

SO ORDERED.

Petitioner claims that he did not receive notice of the said suspension of Section 6 of COMELEC Resolution No. 8696. Thus, his right
to due process was still violated. On the other hand, the COMELEC claims that it has the power to suspend its own rules of procedure
and invokes Section 6, Article IX-A of the Constitution, which gives it the power "to promulgate its own rules concerning pleadings
and practice before it or before any of its offices."

We agree with the COMELEC on this issue.

In Lindo v. Commission on Elections,49 petitioner claimed that there was no valid promulgation of a Decision in an election protest
case when a copy thereof was merely furnished the parties, instead of first notifying the parties of a set date for the promulgation
thereof, in accordance with Section 20 of Rule 35 of the COMELEC’s own Rules of Procedure, as follows:

Sec. 20. Promulgation and Finality of Decision. — The decision of the court shall be promulgated on a date set by it of which due
notice must be given the parties. It shall become final five (5) days after promulgation. No motion for reconsideration shall be
entertained.

Rejecting petitioner’s argument, we held therein that the additional rule requiring notice to the parties prior to promulgation of a
decision is not part of the process of promulgation. Since lack of such notice does not prejudice the rights of the parties,
noncompliance with this rule is a procedural lapse that does not vitiate the validity of the decision. Thus:

This contention is untenable. Promulgation is the process by which a decision is published, officially announced, made known to the
public or delivered to the clerk of court for filing, coupled with notice to the parties or their counsel (Neria v. Commissioner of
Immigration, L-24800, May 27, 1968, 23 SCRA 812). It is the delivery of a court decision to the clerk of court for filing and
publication (Araneta v. Dinglasan, 84 Phil. 433). It is the filing of the signed decision with the clerk of court (Sumbing v. Davide, G.R.
Nos. 86850-51, July 20, 1989, En Banc Minute Resolution). The additional requirement imposed by the COMELEC rules of notice in
advance of promulgation is not part of the process of promulgation. Hence, We do not agree with petitioner’s contention that there was
no promulgation of the trial court's decision. The trial court did not deny that it had officially made the decision public. From the
recital of facts of both parties, copies of the decision were sent to petitioner's counsel of record and petitioner’s (sic) himself. Another
copy was sent to private respondent.

54
What was wanting and what the petitioner apparently objected to was not the promulgation of the decision but the failure of the trial
court to serve notice in advance of the promulgation of its decision as required by the COMELEC rules. The failure to serve such
notice in advance of the promulgation may be considered a procedural lapse on the part of the trial court which did not prejudice the
rights of the parties and did not vitiate the validity of the decision of the trial court nor (sic) of the promulgation of said decision.

Moreover, quoting Pimping v. COMELEC,50 citing Macabingkil v. Yatco,51 we further held in the same case that failure to receive
advance notice of the promulgation of a decision is not sufficient to set aside the COMELEC’s judgment, as long as the parties have
been afforded an opportunity to be heard before judgment is rendered, viz:

The fact that petitioners were not served notice in advance of the promulgation of the decision in the election protest cases, in Our
view, does not constitute reversible error or a reason sufficient enough to compel and warrant the setting aside of the judgment
rendered by the Comelec. Petitioners anchor their argument on an alleged denial to them (sic) due process to the deviation by the
Comelec from its own made rules. However, the essence of due process is that, the parties in the case were afforded an opportunity to
be heard.

In the present case, we read from the COMELEC Order that the exigencies attendant to the holding of the country’s first automated
national elections had necessitated that the COMELEC suspend the rule on notice prior to promulgation, and that it instead direct the
delivery of all resolutions to the Clerk of the Commission for immediate promulgation. Notably, we see no prejudice to the parties
caused thereby. The COMELEC’s Order did not affect the right of the parties to due process. They were still furnished a copy of the
COMELEC Decision and were able to reckon the period for perfecting an appeal. In fact, petitioner was able to timely lodge a Petition
with this Court.

Clearly, the COMELEC validly exercised its constitutionally granted power to make its own rules of procedure when it issued the 4
May 2010 Order suspending Section 6 of COMELEC Resolution No. 8696. Consequently, the second assailed Resolution of the
COMELEC cannot be set aside on the ground of COMELEC’s failure to issue to petitioner a notice setting the date of the
promulgation thereof.

2. On whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that Sabili failed to prove compliance with the one-year
residency requirement for local elective officials

As a general rule, the Court does not ordinarily review the COMELEC’s appreciation and evaluation of evidence. However,
exceptions thereto have been established, including when the COMELEC's appreciation and evaluation of evidence become so grossly
unreasonable as to turn into an error of jurisdiction. In these instances, the Court is compelled by its bounden constitutional duty to
intervene and correct the COMELEC's error.52

In Mitra v. Commission on Elections, (G.R. No. 191938, 2 July 2010), we explained that the COMELEC’s use of wrong or irrelevant
considerations in deciding an issue is sufficient to taint its action with grave abuse of discretion -

As a concept, "grave abuse of discretion" defies exact definition; generally, it refers to "capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment
as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction;" the abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty
or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an
arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility. Mere abuse of discretion is not enough; it must be grave. We have
held, too, that the use of wrong or irrelevant considerations in deciding an issue is sufficient to taint a decision-maker's action with
grave abuse of discretion.

Closely related with the limited focus of the present petition is the condition, under Section 5, Rule 64 of the Rules of Court, that
findings of fact of the COMELEC, supported by substantial evidence, shall be final and non-reviewable. Substantial evidence is that
degree of evidence that a reasonable mind might accept to support a conclusion.

In light of our limited authority to review findings of fact, we do not ordinarily review in a certiorari case the COMELEC's
appreciation and evaluation of evidence. Any misstep by the COMELEC in this regard generally involves an error of judgment, not of
jurisdiction.

In exceptional cases, however, when the COMELEC's action on the appreciation and evaluation of evidence oversteps the limits of its
discretion to the point of being grossly unreasonable, the Court is not only obliged, but has the constitutional duty to intervene. When
grave abuse of discretion is present, resulting errors arising from the grave abuse mutate from error of judgment to one of jurisdiction.

55
Before us, petitioner has alleged and shown the COMELEC’s use of wrong or irrelevant considerations in deciding the issue of
whether petitioner made a material misrepresentation of his residency qualification in his COC as to order its cancellation. Among
others, petitioner pointed to the COMELEC’s inordinate emphasis on the issue of property ownership of petitioner’s declared
residence in Lipa City, its inconsistent stance regarding Palomares’s relationship to the Pinagtong-ulan property, and its failure to
consider in the first instance the certification of residence issued by the barangay captain of Pinagtong-ulan. Petitioner bewails that the
COMELEC required "more" evidence to show the change in his residence, notwithstanding the various pieces of evidence he
presented and the fact that under the law, the quantum of evidence required in these cases is merely substantial evidence and not clear
and convincing evidence. Petitioner further ascribes grave abuse of discretion in the COMELEC’s brushing aside of the fact that he
has been filing his ITR in Lipa City (where he indicates that he is a resident of Pinagtong-ulan) on the mere expedient that the law
allows the filing of the ITR not only in the place of legal residence but, alternately, in his place of business. Petitioner notes that
private respondent’s own evidence shows that petitioner has no business in Lipa City, leaving only his residence therein as basis for
filing his ITR therein.

Hence, in resolving the issue of whether the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in ruling that petitioner had not sufficiently
shown that he had resided in Lipa City for at least one year prior to the May 2010 elections, we examine the evidence adduced by the
parties and the COMELEC’s appreciation thereof.

In the present case, the parties are in agreement that the domicile of origin of Sabili was Brgy. Sico, San Juan, Batangas. He claims
that he abandoned his domicile of origin and established his domicile of choice in Brgy. Pinagtong-ulan, Lipa City, thereby making
him qualified to run for Lipa City mayor. On the other hand, respondent COMELEC held that no such change in domicile or residence
took place and, hence, the entry in his Certificate of Candidacy showing that he was a resident of Brgy. Pinagtong-ulan, Lipa City
constituted a misrepresentation that disqualified him from running for Lipa City mayor.

To establish a new domicile of choice, personal presence in the place must be coupled with conduct indicative of the intention to make
it one's fixed and permanent place of abode.53 As in all administrative cases, the quantum of proof necessary in election cases is
substantial evidence, or such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind will accept as adequate to support a conclusion. 54

The ruling on private respondent’s evidence

We begin with an evaluation of the COMELEC’s appreciation of private respondent’s evidence.

a) Petitioner’s Voter Certification, Registration and COCs in previous elections

Petitioner’s Voter Certification is a common exhibit of the parties. It states, among others, that petitioner is a resident of Pinagtong-
ulan, Lipa City, Batangas; that he had been a resident of Lipa City for two (2) years and three (3) months; and that he was so registered
on 31 October 2009. The information therein was "certified correct" by COMELEC Election Officer Juan B. Aguila, Jr.

Private respondent presented this document as proof that petitioner misrepresented that he is a resident of Lipa City. On the other
hand, the latter presented this document as proof of his residency.

The COMELEC correctly ruled that the Voter Certification issued by the COMELEC Election Officer, Atty. Juan B. Aguila, Jr., was
not conclusive proof that petitioner had been a resident of Lipa City since April 2007. It noted that Aguila is not the competent public
officer to certify the veracity of this claim, particularly because petitioner’s COMELEC registration was approved only in October
2009.

The Voter Registration Record of petitioner accomplished on 21 June 1997 showing that he was a resident of Sico, San Juan,
Batangas, as well as his various COCs dated 21 June 1997 and March 2007 indicating the same thing, were no longer discussed by the
COMELEC – and rightly so. These pieces of evidence showing that he was a resident of Sico, San Juan, Batangas on the said dates
are irrelevant as, prior to April 2007, petitioner was admittedly a resident of Sico, San Juan Batangas. Rather, the relevant time period
for consideration is that from April 2007 onwards, after petitioner’s alleged change of domicile.

b) Certificates regarding ownership of real property

The various certificates and tax declarations adduced by private respondent showed that the Lipa property was solely registered in the
name of petitioner’s common-law wife, Bernadette Palomares. In discussing the import of this document, the COMELEC reasoned
that, being a "seasoned politician," he should have registered the Lipa property (which he claimed to have purchased with his personal
funds) in his own name. Such action "would have offered positive proof of intent to change actual residence" from San Juan, Batangas

56
to Lipa City, considering that he had previously declared his ancestral home in San Juan, Batangas as his domicile. Since Palomares
and petitioner are common-law spouses not capacitated to marry each other, the property relation between them is governed by Article
148 of the Family Code,55 where only the parties’ actual contributions are recognized. Hence, petitioner cannot prove ownership of a
property and residence in Lipa City through the registered ownership of the common-law wife of the property in Lipa City.

On the other hand, petitioner bewails the inordinate emphasis that the COMELEC bestowed upon the question of whether the Lipa
property could be considered as his residence, for the reason that it was not registered in his name. He stresses that the issue should be
residence, not property ownership.

It is true that property ownership is not among the qualifications required of candidates for local election. 56 Rather, it is a candidate’s
residence in a locality through actual residence in whatever capacity. Indeed, we sustained the COMELEC when it considered as
evidence tending to establish a candidate’s domicile of choice the mere lease (rather than ownership) of an apartment by a candidate in
the same province where he ran for the position of governor.57 In the more recent case of Mitra v. Commission on Elections,58 we
reversed the COMELEC ruling that a candidate’s sparsely furnished, leased room on the mezzanine of a feedmill could not be
considered as his residence for the purpose of complying with the residency requirement of Section 78 of the Omnibus Election
Code.59

The Dissent claims that the registration of the property in Palomares’s name does not prove petitioner’s residence as it merely showed
"donative intent" without the necessary formalities or payment of taxes.

However, whatever the nature of the transaction might be, this point is immaterial for the purpose of ascertaining petitioner’s
residence. We have long held that it is not required that a candidate should have his own house in order to establish his residence or
domicile in a place. It is enough that he should live in the locality, even in a rented house or that of a friend or relative. 60 What is of
central concern then is that petitioner identified and established a place in Lipa City where he intended to live in and return to for an
indefinite period of time.

Hence, while the COMELEC correctly ruled that, of itself, Palomares’ ownership of the Lipa property does not prove that she or – and
in view of their common-law relations, petitioner – resides in Lipa City, nevertheless, the existence of a house and lot apparently
owned by petitioner’s common-law wife, with whom he has been living for over two decades, makes plausible petitioner’s allegation
of bodily presence and intent to reside in the area.

c) Certifications regarding the family members of petitioner

Private respondent presented a Certification from the DepEd, Lipa City Division, indicating that the names Bernadette Palomares,
Mey Bernadette Sabili (petitioner’s daughter) and Francis Meynard Sabili (petitioner’s son) do not appear on the list of graduates of
Lipa City. Private respondent also presented a Certification from the Office of the Election Officer of Lipa City that the names of these
family members of petitioner do not appear in its list of voters.

As the issue at hand is petitioner’s residence, and not the educational or voting record of his family, the COMELEC properly did not
consider these pieces of evidence in arriving at its Resolution.

The Dissent nevertheless asserts that because his children do not attend educational institutions in Lipa and are not registered voters
therein, and because petitioner does not maintain a business therein nor has property

in his name, petitioner is unable to show the existence of real and substantial reason for his stay in Lipa City.

As to the Dissent’s first assertion, it must be stressed that the children, like the wife, do not dictate the family domicile. Even in the
context of marriage, the family domicile is jointly decided by both husband and wife.61 In addition, we note that the transfer to Lipa
City occurred in 2007, when petitioner’s children were already well into college and could very well have chosen to study elsewhere
than in Lipa City.

Also, it is petitioner’s domicile which is at issue, and not that of his children. But even assuming that it was petitioner himself (rather
than his children) who attended educational institutions or who registered as a voter in a place other than Lipa City, we have held that
"absence from residence to pursue studies or practice a profession or registration as a voter other than in the place where one is
elected, does not constitute loss of residence." 62 In fact, Section 117 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that transfer of residence
to any other place by reason of one's "occupation; profession; employment in private and public service; educational activities; work

57
in military or naval reservations; service in the army, navy or air force, the constabulary or national police force; or confinement or
detention in government institutions in accordance with law" is not deemed as loss of residence.

As to the Dissent’s second assertion, petitioner apparently does not maintain a business in Lipa City. However, apart from the
Pinagtong-ulan property which both Suarez (the previous property owner) and Palomares swear was purchased with petitioner’s own
funds, the records also indicate that there are two other lots in Lipa City, particularly in Barangay Lodlod, Lipa City 63 which are
registered jointly in the name of petitioner and Palomares. In fact, it was private respondent who presented the Lipa City Assessor’s
Certificate to this effect. Even assuming that this Court were to disregard the two Lodlod lots, it is well-established that property
ownership (and similarly, business interest) in the locality where one intends to run for local elective post is not requirement of the
Constitution.64

More importantly, we have gone so far as to rule that there is nothing "wrong in an individual changing residences so he could run for
an elective post, for as long as he is able to prove with reasonable certainty that he has

effected a change of residence for election law purposes for the period required by law." 65

d) Affidavits of Lipa City residents

Private respondent also presented the affidavits of Violeta Fernandez66 and Rodrigo Macasaet,67 who were also residents of Pinagtong-
ulan. Both stated that petitioner did not reside in Pinagtong-ulan, as they had "rarely seen" him in the area. Meanwhile, Pablo
Lorzano,68 in his Affidavit, attested that although the Lipa property was sometimes used for gatherings, he did "not recall having seen"
petitioner in their barangay. On the other hand, private respondent69 and Eladio de Torres,70 both residents of Brgy. Calamias, reasoned
that petitioner was not a resident of Lipa City because he has no work or family there.

The COMELEC did not discuss these Affidavits in its assailed Resolution. It was correct in doing so, particularly considering that
these Affidavits were duly controverted by those presented by petitioner.

Moreover, even assuming the truth of the allegation in the Affidavits that petitioner was "rarely seen" in the area, this does not
preclude the possibility of his residence therein. In Fernandez v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, 71 we held that the
averments of certain barangay health workers – that they failed to see a particular candidate whenever they made rounds of the locality
of which he was supposed to be a resident – is of no moment. It is possible that the candidate was out of the house to attend to his own
business at the time. The law does not require a person to be in his home twenty-four (24) hours a day, seven (7) days a week, to fulfill
the residency requirement.

The ruling on petitioner’s evidence

We now evaluate how the COMELEC appreciated petitioner’s evidence:

a) Petitioner’s Income Tax Returns for 2007 and 2008

The Income Tax Returns of petitioner presented below showed that petitioner had been paying his Income Tax (2007 and 2008) to the
Revenue District Office of Lipa City. In waving aside his Income Tax Returns, the COMELEC held that these were not indications of
residence since Section 51(B) of the National Internal Revenue Code does not only state that it shall be filed in a person’s legal
residence, but that it may alternatively be filed in a person’s principal place of business.

In particular, Section 51(B) of the National Internal Revenue Code72 provides that the Income Tax Return shall be filed either in the
place where a person resides or where his principal place of business is located. However, private respondent’s own evidence – a
Certification from the City Permits and Licensing Office of Lipa City– showed that there was no business registered in the City under
petitioner’s name.

Thus, COMELEC failed to appreciate that precisely because an individual income tax return may only be filed either in the legal
residence OR the principal place of business, as prescribed under the law, the fact that Sabili was filing his Income Tax Returns in
Lipa City notwithstanding that he had no business therein showed that he had actively elected to establish his residence in that city.

The Dissent claims that since the jurisdiction of RDO Lipa City includes both San Juan and Lipa City, petitioner’s filing of his ITR
therein can also support an intent to remain in San Juan, Batangas - petitioner’s domicile of origin.

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However, a simple perusal of the Income Tax Returns and Revenue Official Receipts for 2007 and 2008 shows that petitioner
invariably declares his residence to be Pinagtong-ulan, Lipa City, rather than San Juan, Batangas. 73Hence, while petitioner may be
submitting his income tax return in the same RDO, the declaration therein is unmistakable. Petitioner considers Lipa City to be his
domicile.

b) Certification from the Barangay Captain of Pinagtong-ulan

The COMELEC did not consider in the first instance the Certification issued by Pinagtong-ulan Barangay Captain Dominador
Honrade74 (Honrade) that petitioner had been residing in Brgy Pinagtong-ulan since 2007. When this oversight was raised as an issue
in petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration, the COMELEC brushed it aside on the ground that the said Certification was not sworn to
before a notary public and, hence, "cannot be relied on." Subsequently, petitioner presented another, substantially identical,
Certification from the said Pinagtong-ulan Barangay Captain, save for the fact that it had now been sworn to before a notary public.

We disagree with the COMELEC’s treatment of the Barangay Captain’s Certification and find the same tainted with grave abuse of
discretion.

Even without being sworn to before a notary public, Honrade’s Certification would not only be admissible in evidence, but would also
be entitled to due consideration.

Rule 130, Section 44 of the Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 44. Entries in official records.—Entries in official records made in the performance of his duty by a public officer of the
Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated.

In Country Bankers Insurance Corporation v. Lianga Bay and Community Multi-purpose Cooperative, Inc., 75 we explained that the
following three (3) requisites must concur for entries in official records to be admissible in evidence:

(a) The entry was made by a public officer, or by another person specially enjoined by law to do so;

(b) It was made by the public officer in the performance of his duties, or by such other person in the performance of a duty
specially enjoined by law; and

(c) The public officer or other person had sufficient knowledge of the facts stated by him, which facts must have been
acquired by him personally or through official information.

As to the first requisite, the Barangay Secretary is required by the Local Government Code to "keep an updated record of all
inhabitants of the barangay."76 Regarding the second requisite, we have explicitly recognized in Mitra v. Commission on
Elections,77 that "it is the business of a punong barangay to know who the residents are in his own barangay." Anent the third requisite,
the Barangay Captain’s exercise of powers and duties78 concomitant to his position requires him to be privy to these records kept by
the Barangay Secretary.

Accordingly, there is basis in faulting the COMELEC for its failure to consider Honrade’s Certification on the sole ground that it was
initially not notarized.

Meanwhile, the Dissent opines that the sworn affidavit of the barangay chair of Pinagtong-ulan that petitioner is a resident of Lipa
City does not help petitioner’s case because it was not shown that the term "resident" as used therein carries the same meaning as
domicile, that is, not merely bodily presence but also, animus manendi or intent to return. This Court has ruled otherwise.

In Mitra v. Commission on Elections,79 the declaration of Aborlan’s punong barangay that petitioner resides in his barangay was taken
to have the same meaning as domicile, inasmuch as the said declaration was made in the face of the Court’s recognition that Mitra
"might not have stayed in Aborlan nor in Palawan for most of 2008 and 2009 because his office and activities as a Representative were
in Manila."

Assuming that the barangay captain’s certification only pertains to petitioner’s bodily presence in Pinagtong-ulan, still, the
COMELEC cannot deny the strength of this evidence in establishing petitioner’s bodily presence in Pinagtong-ulan since 2007.

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c) Affidavit of petitioner’s common law wife

To substantiate his claim of change of domicile, petitioner also presented the affidavit of Palomares, wherein the latter swore that she
and petitioner began residing in Lipa City in 2007, and that the funds used to purchase the Lipa property were petitioner’s personal
funds. The COMELEC ruled that the Affidavit was self-serving for having been executed by petitioner’s common-law wife. Also,
despite the presentation by petitioner of other Affidavits stating that he and Palomares had lived in Brgy. Pinagtong-ulan since 2007,
the latter’s Affidavit was rejected by the COMELEC for having no independent collaboration.

Petitioner faults the COMELEC’s stand, which it claims to be inconsistent. He argues that since the property regime between him and
Palomares is governed by Article 148 of the Family Code (based on the parties’ actual contribution) as the COMELEC stressed, then
Palomares’s Affidavit expressly stating that petitioner’s money alone had been used to purchase the Lipa property (notwithstanding
that it was registered in her name) was not self-serving, but was in fact, a declaration against interest.

Petitioner’s argument that Palomares’s affidavit was a "declaration against interest" is, strictly speaking, inaccurate and irrelevant. A
declaration against interest, under the Rules of Civil Procedure, refers to a "declaration made by a person deceased, or unable to testify
against the interest of a declarant, if the fact asserted in the declaration was at the time it was made so far contrary to declarant’s own
interest, that a reasonable man in his position would not have made the declaration unless he believed it to be true." 80 A declaration
against interest is an exception to the hearsay rule.81 As such, it pertains only to the admissibility of, not the weight accorded to,
testimonial evidence.82

Nevertheless, we see the logic in petitioner’s claim that the COMELEC had committed grave abuse of discretion in being inconsistent
in its stand regarding Palomares, particularly regarding her assertion that the Lipa property had been purchased solely with petitioner’s
money. If the COMELEC accepts the registration of the Lipa property in her name to be accurate, her affidavit disavowing ownership
thereof in favor of petitioner was far from self-serving as it ran counter to her (and her children’s) property interest.

The Dissent states that it was not unreasonable for the COMELEC to believe that Palomares may have committed misrepresentations
in her affidavit considering that she had perjured herself as an informant on the birth certificates of her children with respect to the
supposed date and place of her marriage to petitioner. However, this was not the reason propounded by the COMELEC when it
rejected Palomares’ affidavit.

Moreover, it is notable that Palomares’ assertion in her affidavit that she and petitioner have been living in the Pinagtong-ulan property
since April 2007 is corroborated by other evidence, including the affidavits of Pinagtong-ulan barangay officials and neighbors.

d) Affidavits from a previous property owner, neighbors, certificate from parish and designation from socio-civic organization

The Affidavit issued by Leonila Suarez83 (erstwhile owner of the Lipa house and lot) states that in April 2007, after she received the
down payment for the Lipa property and signed an agreement that petitioner would settle her bank obligations in connection with the
said transaction, he and Palomares actually started residing at Pinagtong-ulan. The COMELEC brushed this Affidavit aside as one that
"merely narrates the circumstances surrounding the sale of the property and mentions in passing that Sabili and Palomares lived in
Pinagtong-ulan since April 2007 up to the present."84

We disagree with the COMELEC’s appreciation of the Suarez Affidavit. Since she was its owner, transactions for the purchase of the
Lipa property was within her personal knowledge. Ordinarily, this includes the arrangement regarding who shall pay for the property
and when, if ever, it shall be occupied by the buyers. We thus consider that her statements impact positively on petitioner’s claim of
residence.

The Dissent on the other hand argues that the claim that petitioner started living in the Lipa house and lot in April 2007 is made
dubious by the fact that (1) there might not be enough time to effect an actual and physical change in residence a month before the
May 2007 elections when petitioner ran for representative of the 4th District of Batangas; and (2) the Deed of Absolute Sale was
notarized, and the subsequent transfer of ownership in the tax declaration was made, only in August 2008.

Before further discussing this, it is pertinent to point out that these were not the reasons adduced by the COMELEC in the assailed
Resolutions. Assuming that the above reasons were the unuttered considerations of the COMELEC in coming up with its conclusions,
such reasoning still exhibits grave abuse of discretion.

As to the Dissent’s first argument, it must be remembered that a transfer of domicile/residence need not be completed in one single
instance. Thus, in Mitra v. Commission on Elections,85 where the evidence showed that in 2008, petitioner Mitra had leased a small

60
room at Maligaya Feedmills located in Aborlan and, in 2009 purchased in the same locality a lot where he began constructing his
house, we recognized that petitioner "transferred by incremental process to Aborlan beginning 2008 and concluded his transfer in early
2009" and thus, he transferred his residence from Puerto Princesa City to Aborlan within the period required by law. We cannot treat
the transfer to the Pinagtong-ulan house any less than we did Mitra’s transfer to the Maligaya Feedmills room.1âwphi1

Moreover, the Joint Affidavit of twenty-one (21) Pinagtong-ulan residents, including former and incumbent barangay officials, attests
that petitioner had begun living in the Pinagtong-ulan house and lot before the May 2007 elections such that it was where his
coordinators for the May 2007 elections went to meet him.86 Jacinto Cornejo Sr., the contractor who renovated the Pinagtong-ulan
house when it was bought by petitioner, also swore that petitioner and his family began living therein even while it was being
renovated.87 Another Affidavit petitioner adduced was that of Rosalinda Macasaet, a resident of Brgy. Pinagtong-ulan, 88 who stated that
she also sold a lot she owned in favor of petitioner and Palomares. The latter bought her lot since it was adjacent to the Lipa house and
lot they had earlier acquired. Macasaet also swore that the couple had actually resided in the house located in Pinagtong-ulan since
April 2007, and that she knew this because her own house was very near the couple’s own. Macasaet’s Affidavit is a positive assertion
of petitioner’s actual physical presence in Brgy. Pinagtong-ulan, Lipa City.

While private respondent had adduced affidavits of two Pinagtong-ulan residents (that of Violeta Fernandez 89 and Rodrigo
Macasaet)90 attesting that petitioner could not be a resident of Pinagtong-ulan as he was "rarely seen" in the area, these affidavits were
controverted by the Joint affidavit of twenty-one (21) Pinagtong-ulan residents who plainly accused the two of lying. Meanwhile, the
affidavits of private respondent91 and Eladio de Torres92 stating that petitioner is not a resident of Lipa City because he has no work or
family there is hardly worthy of credence since both are residents of Barangay Calamias, which is, and private respondent does not
contest this, about 15 kilometers from Pinagtong-ulan.

As to the Dissent’s second argument, the fact that the notarization of the deed of absolute sale of the property was made months after
April 2007 does not negate petitioner’s claim that he started residing therein in April 2007. It is clear from the Affidavit of the
property’s seller, Leonila Suarez, that it was not yet fully paid in April 2007, so it was understandable that a deed of absolute sale was
not executed at the time. Thus:

That initially, the contract to sell was entered into by and between Mr. & Mrs. Meynardo Asa Sabili and Bernadette Palomares and
myself, but eventually the spouses changed their mind, and after the couple settled all my loan obligations to the bank, they requested
me to put the name of Ms. Bernadette P. Palomares instead of Mr. & Mrs. Meynardo Asa Sabili and Bernadette Palomares in the
absolute deed of sale;

That it was Mr. Meynardo Asa Sabili who came to my former residence at Barangay Pinagtong-ulan sometime in the month of April
2007. At that time, Mr. Meynardo Asa Sabili was still running for Representative (Congressman) in the 4th District of Batangas;

That after payment of the down payment and signing of an agreement that Mr. Meynardo Asa Sabili will be the one to settle my bank
obligations, Mr. & Mrs. Meynardo A. Sabili and Bernadette Palomares had an actual transfer of their residence at Barangay
Pinagtong-ulan, Lipa City;

That they started living and residing in Pinagtong-ulan in the month of April, 2007 up to this point in time; xxx 93

As to the rest of the documents presented by petitioner, the COMELEC held that the Memorandum issued by the Guardians
Brotherhood Inc. San Jose/Lipa City Chapter merely declares the designation of petitioner in the organization, without any showing
that residence in the locality was a requirement for that designation. Meanwhile, the Certificate of Appreciation was nothing more than
an acknowledgment of petitioner’s material and financial support, and not an indication of residence.

We agree that considered separately, the Guardians Brotherhood Memorandum and the Pinagtong-ulan Parish Certificate of
Appreciation do not establish petitioner’s residence in Pinagtong-ulan, Lipa City. Nevertheless, coupled with the fact that petitioner
had twice been elected as Provincial Board Member representing the Fourth District of Batangas, which encompasses Lipa City,
petitioner’s involvement in the religious life of the community, as attested to by the certificate of appreciation issued to him by the
Pinagtong-ulan parish for his "material and financial support" as President of the Barangay Fiesta Committee in 2009, as well as his
assumption of a leadership role in the socio-civic sphere of the locality as a member of the advisory body of the Pinagtong-ulan, San
Jose/Lipa City Chapter of the Guardians Brotherhood Inc. , manifests a significant level of knowledge of and sensitivity to the needs
of the said community. Such, after all, is the rationale for the residency requirement in our elections laws, to wit:

The Constitution and the law requires residence as a qualification for seeking and holding elective public office, in order to give
candidates the opportunity to be familiar with the needs, difficulties, aspirations, potentials for growth and all matters vital to the

61
welfare of their constituencies; likewise, it enables the electorate to evaluate the office seekers’ qualifications and fitness for the job
they aspire for xxx. 94

Considering all of the foregoing discussion, it is clear that while separately, each evidence presented by petitioner might fail to
convincingly show the fact of his residence at Pinagtong-ulan since 2007, collectively, these pieces of evidence tend to sufficiently
establish the said fact.

Petitioner’s actual physical presence in Lipa City is established not only by the presence of a place (Pinagtong-ulan house and lot) he
can actually live in, but also the affidavits of various persons in Pinagtong-ulan, and the Certification of its barangay captain.
Petitioner’s substantial and real interest in establishing his domicile of choice in Lipa City is also sufficiently shown not only by the
acquisition of additional property in the area and the transfer of his voter registration, but also his participation in the community’s
socio-civic and religious life, as well as his declaration in his ITR that he is a resident thereof.

We therefore rule that petitioner has been able to adduce substantial evidence to demonstrate compliance with the one-year residency
requirement for local elective officials under the law.

In view of this Court’s finding that petitioner has not misrepresented his residence at Pinagtong-ulan and the duration thereof, there is
no need to further discuss whether there was material and deliberate misrepresentation of the residency qualification in his
COC.1âwphi1

As a final note, we do not lose sight of the fact that Lipa City voters manifested their own judgment regarding the qualifications of
petitioner when they voted for him, notwithstanding that the issue of his residency qualification had been raised prior to the elections.
Petitioner has garnered the highest number of votes (55,268 votes as opposed to the 48,825 votes in favor of his opponent, Oscar
Gozos)95 legally cast for the position of Mayor of Lipa City and has consequently been proclaimed duly elected municipal Mayor of
Lipa City during the last May 2010 elections96

In this regard, we reiterate our ruling in Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections97 that "(t)o successfully challenge a winning candidate's
qualifications, the petitioner must clearly demonstrate that the ineligibility is so patently antagonistic to constitutional and legal
principles that overriding such ineligibility and thereby giving effect to the apparent will of the people, would ultimately create greater
prejudice to the very democratic institutions and juristic traditions that our Constitution and laws so zealously protect and promote."

Similarly, in Japzon v. Commission on Elections,98 we concluded that "when the evidence of the alleged lack of residence qualification
of a candidate for an elective position is weak or inconclusive and it clearly appears that the purpose of the law would not be thwarted
by upholding the victor's right to the office, the will of the electorate should be respected. For the purpose of election laws is to give
effect to, rather than frustrate, the will of the voters."

In sum, we grant the Petition not only because petitioner sufficiently established his compliance with the one-year residency
requirement for local elective officials under the law. We also recognize that "(a)bove and beyond all, the determination of the true
will of the electorate should be paramount. It is their voice, not ours or of anyone else, that must prevail. This, in essence, is the
democracy we continue to hold sacred."99

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is GRANTED. The assailed COMELEC Resolutions dated 26 January 2010 and 17
August 2010 in Florencio Librea v. Meynardo A. Sabili [SPA No. 09-047(DC)] are ANNULLED. Private respondent’s Petition to
cancel the Certificate of Candidacy of Meynardo A. Sabili is DENIED. The Status Quo Ante Order issued by this Court on 7
September 2010 is MADE PERMANENT.

SO ORDERED.

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