3. Republic v.

CA, 172 SCRA 296 RA 3019

FACTS:

Spouses Berdon were charged for an unexplained wealth under RA 1379. Simplicio Berdon, an assistant
civil engineer of the DPWH, and wife, a pharmacist, acquired parcels of land and constructed a house.
The amount is said to be disproportionate to their income. The RTC dismissed the case and the CA
upheld the same. Hence, RP made this appeal.

ISSUE:

Whether the presumption of unexplained wealth has been rebutted.

HELD:

Yes. The presumption under Sec 2 of RA 1379 that the subject penalties were unlawfully acquired had
been successfully rebutted by the spouses through competent evidence. The purchase of parcels of land
and the construction of a house was funded from the loans and donations.

The courts are not bound by the statement of assets and liabilities in determining whether wealth is
unexplained under the language of RA 1739.

4. Morfe v. Mutuc, 22 SCRA 424

Facts: Section 7 of Republic Act No. 3019 (R.A. 3019), provides that "every public officer, ...after his assumption to
office and within the month of January of every other year thereafter, as well as upon the termination of his
position, shall prepare and file with the head of the office to which he belongs, a true detailed and sworn
statement of assets and liabilities, including a statement of the amounts and sources of his income. the amounts of
his personal and family expenses and the amount of income taxes paid for the next preceding calendar year..."

Jesus Morfe, disputing that such requirement is violative of due process as an oppressive exercise of
police power and as an unlawful invasion of the constitutional right to privacy , implicit in the ban against
unreasonable search and seizure construed together us with the prohibition against self-incrimination. filed a
petition for declaratory relief before the Court of first Instance (CFI ) of Pangasinan. After the submission of
pleading, and stipulation of facts. The CFI found for Morfe, affirming that the requirements of periodical
submission of such sworn statement od assets and liabilities exceeds the permissible limit of the police power and
is thus offensive to due process clause hence , section 7 of RA 3019 is unconstitutional

Aggrieved Executive Secretary Amelito Mutoc appealed the decision of the CFI before the supreme court.

COA: That the RA 3019 is unconstitutional

Issue: Whether or not the requirement of periodical submission of the sworn statement of assets and liabilities ,
pursuant to RA 3019, exceeds the permissible limit of the States Police Power and is thus offensive to due process
clause?

Held: no, Nothing can be clearer therefore than that the Anti-Graft Act of 1960 like the earlier statute was
precisely aimed at curtailing and minimizing the opportunities for official corruption and maintaining a standard of
honesty in the public service. It is intended to further promote morality in public administration. A public office
must indeed be a public trust. Nobody can cavil at its objective; the goal to be pursued commands the assent of all.
The conditions then prevailing called for norms of such character. The times demanded such a remedial device.

The statute was framed with that end in view. It is comprehensive in character, sufficiently detailed and explicit to
make clear to all and sundry what practices were prohibited and penalized. More than that, an effort was made, so
evident from even a cursory perusal thereof, to avoid evasions and plug loopholes. One such feature is the
challenged section. Thereby it becomes much more difficult by those disposed to take advantage of their positions
to commit acts of graft and corruption

It would be to dwell in the realm of abstractions and to ignore the harsh and compelling realities of public service
with its ever-present temptation to heed the call of greed and avarice to condemn as arbitrary and oppressive a
requirement as that imposed on public officials and employees to file such sworn statement of assets and liabilities
every two years after having done so upon assuming office. The due process clause is not susceptible to such a
reproach. There was therefore no unconstitutional exercise of police power.

5. Jaravata v. Sandiganbayan, 127 SCRA 363 GR No. L-56170

CONTENTION OF THE STATE: Hilario Jaravata was accused of violating Section 3(b) of
Republic Act No. 3019. Jaravata, being the assistant principal of Leones, Tubao, La Union
Barangay High School made demand and received payments from classroom teachers Romeo
Dacayanan, Domingo Lopez, Marcela Bautista, and Francisco Dulay in the amount of P118.00,
P100.00, P50.00, and P70.00 out of their salary differentials.

CONTENTION OF THE ACCUSED: Jaravata did not violate the said Act.

RESOLUTION: Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act provides the following:

Sec. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. — In addition to acts or omissions of public

officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices
of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:

(b) Directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any gift, present, share, percentage, or
benefit, for himself or for any other person in connection with any contract or transaction
between the Government and any other party, wherein the public officer in his official
capacity has to intervene under the law.

There is no question that Jaravata at the time material to the case was a "public officer" as
defined by Section 2 of R.A. No. 3019, i.e. "elective and appointive officials and employees,
permanent or temporary, whether in the classified or unclassified or exempt service receiving
compensation, even normal from the government." It may also be said that any amount which
Jaravata received in excess of P36.00 from each of the complainants was in the concept of a
gift or benefit. The pivotal question, however, is whether Jaravata, an assistant principal of a
high school in the boondocks of Tubao, La Union, "in his official capacity has to intervene under
the law" in the payment of the salary differentials for 1978 of the complainants. It should be
noted that the arrangement was "to facilitate its [salary differential] payment accused and
the classroom teachers agreed that accused follow-up the papers in Manila with the
obligation on the part of the classroom teachers to reimburse the accused of his
expenses.

Sec. 3(b) of R.A. No. 3019, refers to a public officer whose official intervention is required
by law in a contract or transaction.

6. Trieste v. Sandiganbayan, 145 SCRA 508

FACTS: Generoso Trieste, Sr., the Municipal Mayor of Numancia, Aklan, was charged by the Tanodbayan with
12 counts of alleged violations of Section 3 (h) of the Anti-Graft Law (3019) for having financial or pecuniary
interest in a business, contractor transaction in connection with which said accused intervened or took part
in his official capacity and in which he is prohibited by law from having any interest, to wit the purchases of
construction materials by the municipality from Trigen Agro-Industrial Development Corporation, of which
the accused is the president, incorporator, director and major stockholder.

STATE: Sandiganbayan convicted Trieste in all the 12 crim. cases.

ACCUSED: The SolGen under a “Manifestation for Acquittal”, concluded that: (1) petitioner has divested his
interest with Trigen; (2) Sales of stocks need not be reported to Sec; (3) Prosecution failed to prove charges;
(4) No evidence to prove petitioner approved payment; (5) Testimonial and documentary evidence confirms
that petitioner signed vouchers after payment; etc.

HELD: No violation. Petitioner has divested his interest with the company. Petitioner established that before
he assumed office as mayor he had already sold his shares of the company to his sister. The sale was made by
corresponding indorsements to her stock certificate which was duly recorded in the stock and transfer book
of the corporation.

In as much as Treasurer Vega signed and paid the vouchers after the materials were delivered, petitioner's
signature on the vouchers after payment is not, we submit, the kind of intervention contemplated under
Section 3(h) of the anti-graft law is the actual intervention in the transaction in which one has financial or
pecuniary interest in order that liability may attach. The official need not dispose his shares in the
corporation as long as he does not do anything for the firm in its contract with the office. For the law aims to
prevent the dominant use of influence, authority and power.

There is absolutely no evidence that petitioner had, in his capacity as Mayor, used his influence, power, and
authority in having the transactions given to Trigen.

7. Mejorada v. Sandiganbayan, 151 SCRA 399

FACTS:

Arturo Mejorada was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section3(E) of RA. 3019, aka
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Mejorada was a right-away agent whose duty was to process the
claims for compensation of damages of property owners affected by highway construction
and improvements. He required the claimants to sign blank copies of Sworn Statements and
Agreements to Demolish, where it appeared that the properties of the claimants have higher values
than the actual value being claimed by them. However, the claimants did not bother reading through
the paper because they very much interested in the compensation of damages. After processing the
claims, instead of giving to the claimants the proper amount, Mejorada gave one of them Php 5,000 and
the rest, Php 1,000 each, saying that there are many who would share in said amounts. The claimants
weren’t able to complain because they were afraid of the accused and his armed companion. The
Sandiganbayan sentenced Mejorada 56 years and8 years of imprisonment which is equivalent to the
eight (8) penalties for the eight (8) informations filed against him. Contention of the State: Section 3 of
RA 3019 states that Mejorada should be punished with “imprisonment for not less than 1 year nor more
than 10 years” as stated in Sec 9 of the same Act. In this case, there are 8 charges against him and each
charge should be served with the penalty prescribed by the law. Contention of the Accused: Mejorada
states that the penalty imposed upon him is contrary to the three-fold rule and states that the duration
should not exceed 40years. This is in accordance to Article 70 of the RPC.

ISSUE: WON the penalty imposed upon him violates the three-fold rule under Article 70 of the RPC.

RULING: The Court favors the State. Article 70 of the RPC does not state anything aboutthe “imposition
of penalty”. It only explains the “service” of sentence, “duration”of penalty and penalty “to be inflicted”.
It should be interpreted that the
accusedcannot be made to serve more than three times the most severe of thesepenalties the
maximum of which is forty (40) years. As stated in a previous case, “The courts can still impose as many
penalties as there are separate and distinct offenses committed, since for every individual crime
committed, a
correspondingpenalty is prescribed by law.” With these reasons, Mejorada cannot correctlycontend that
his penalty is excessive. There are eight charges against him and each has an equivalent penalty as
prescribed by RA 3019, thus, Sandiganbayan has imposed the correct penalty.

8. Estrada vs Sandiganbayan, November 21, 2001 G.R. No. 148560, November

19, 2001
Facts: Petitioner Joseph Estrada prosecuted An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder, wishes
to impress upon the Court that the assailed law is so defectively fashioned that it crosses that thin but
distinct line which divides the valid from the constitutionally infirm.
His contentions are mainly based on the effects of the said law that it suffers from the vice of
vagueness; it dispenses with the "reasonable doubt" standard in criminal prosecutions; and it abolishes
the element of mens rea in crimes already punishable under The Revised Penal Code saying that it
violates the fundamental rights of the accused. The focal point of the case is the alleged “vagueness” of
the law in the terms it uses.
Particularly, this terms are: combination, series and unwarranted. Because of this, the petitioner uses
the facial challenge on the validity of the mentioned law.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner possesses the locus standi to attack the validity of the law using
the facial challenge.

Ruling: On how the law uses the terms combination and series does not constitute vagueness. The
petitioner’s contention that it would not give a fair warning and sufficient notice of what the law seeks
to penalize cannot be plausibly argued. Void-for-vagueness doctrine is manifestly misplaced under the
petitioner’s reliance since ordinary intelligence can understand what conduct is prohibited by the
statute. It can only be invoked against that specie of legislation that is utterly vague on its face, wherein
clarification by a saving clause or construction cannot be invoked. Said doctrine may not invoked in this
case since the statute is clear and free from ambiguity. Vagueness doctrine merely requires a reasonable
degree of certainty for the statute to be upheld, not absolute precision or mathematical exactitude. On
the other hand, overbreadth doctrine decrees that governmental purpose may not be achieved by
means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms. Doctrine
of strict scrutiny holds that a facial challenge is allowed to be made to vague statute and to one which is
overbroad because of possible chilling effect upon protected speech. Furthermore, in the area of
criminal law, the law cannot take chances as in the area of free speech. A facial challenge to legislative
acts is the most difficult challenge to mount successfully since the challenger must establish that no set
of circumstances exists. Doctrines mentioned are analytical tools developed for facial challenge of a
statute in free speech cases. With respect to such statue, the established rule is that one to who
application of a statute is constitutional will not be heard to attack the statute on the ground that
impliedly it might also be taken as applying to other persons or other situations in which its application
might be unconstitutional. On its face invalidation of statues results in striking them down entirely on
the ground that they might be applied to parties not before the Court whose activities are
constitutionally protected. It is evident that the purported ambiguity of the Plunder Law is more
imagined than real. The crime of plunder as a malum in se is deemed to have been resolve in the
Congress’ decision to include it among the heinous crime punishable by reclusion perpetua to death.
Supreme Court holds the plunder law constitutional and petition is dismissed for lacking merit.
Chapter three

A. ART. 213- FRAUDS AGAINST THE PUBLIC TREASURY& SIMILAR OFFENSES

B. ART. 214- OTHER FRAUDS

C. ART. 215-PROHIBITED TRANSACTIONS

D. ART. 216- POSSESSION OF PROHIBITED INTEREST BY A PUBLIC OFFICER

Chapter four

A. ART. 217- MALVERSATION OF PUBLIC FUNDS OR PROPERTY

1. Punishable Acts

2 COMMON ELEMENTS

3. Labatagos v. Sandiganbayan, 183 SCRA 415 G.R. No. 71581 March 21, 1990

FACTS:

Carmen Labatagos was the cashier and collecting officer of Mindanao State University from 1978-1980.
During March-May of 1978, she was on leave and Francisco Rivera was designated leader of a team to
conduct examination of the cash and accounts of petitioner Labatagos. The team found out that there
was a shortage in the amounts she remitted to DBP and the amounts that she collected. The shortages
amounted to P34, 336.19 and P71, 361.75. When Labatagos failed to come up with an explanation of
the shortages, the Tanodbayan filed charges of malversation of public funds against her.

COA:

Petitioner's defense was that she signed the audit reports on the understanding that the shortage would
only amount to P2, 000. She added that she was on maternity leave for some time, and that several
disbursements were not credited in her favor by the auditors and that some of the receipts were lost.
Lastly, she avers that she did not put the missing funds to her personal use.

ISSUE:

WON petitioner's guilt has been proven beyond reasonable doubt

Held:

Yes, the amount which she allege were disbursed were not valid disbursement as
the copies are incompetent evidence. As for her maternity leave, she was still able
to have control over the money during that time as the officer in charge reported
to her in her house. Malversation of public funds consists not only in
misappropriation or converting funds to one's personal use but also by knowingly
allowing others to make use or misappropriate them. Decision of Sandiganbayan
affirmed

4. Estepa v. Sandiganbayan, 182 SCRA 269

Leonardo N. Estepa seeks to set aside the decision of the Sandiganbayan in Case No. 3658
convicting him of the crime of malversation of public funds through negligence.

Estepa is a senior paymaster of the Cash Division of the City Treasurer's Office of the City of
Manila.Mr. Marcelo testified that they distributed the cash of P7,640,000.00 to the paymasters
because on the day that they are to place the money on the cash vault, there was a power
"brownout". 850,000 pesos was entrusted to Estepa. However, ten minutes later, Estepa
reported to Mr. Marcelo that the amount of P50,000.00 was missing from his cash advance. It
turned out that the amount received by each of the paymasters, except Estepa, was correct.
The Legal Office of the City of Manila filed a complaint against Estepa charging him with the
crime of malversation through negligence.

COA: The facts alleged in the information did not constitute an offense since there can be no
crime of malversation of public funds through mere failure to count the money.

Held: It will be seen that the information charged him with having carelessly and negligently
allowed an unknown person to steal or misappropriate the amount of P50,000.00; that he had
failed to exercise his duty as a public officer accountable for public funds received by him and
that he had failed to count the money turned over to him at the General Cashier's Room.
In the crime of malversation, all that is necessary for conviction is proof that the accountable
officer had received the public funds and that he did not have them in his possession when
demand therefore was made and he could not satisfactorily explain his failure so to account. An
accountable public officer may be convicted for malversation even if there is no direct evidence
of personal misappropriation, where he has not been able to explain satisfactorily the absence
of the public funds involved.

Under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, there is prima facie evidence of malversation
where the accountable public officer fails to have duly forthcoming any public funds with which
he is chargeable upon demand by duly authorized officer. As this Court has pointed out, this
presumption juris tantum is founded upon human experience.

5. Ilogan v. Sandiganbayan, 218 SCRA 766 G.R. No. 102356 February 9, 1993
Facts:

Petitioner Calinico B. Ilogon was the acting Postmaster of the Bureau of Posts in Cagayan de Oro City
from July, 1978 to January, 1986. He likewise performed the task of accepting payments, making
collections and effecting disbursement as there was no cashier employed during the period of his
incumbency. He was adept at this work because, before his designation as Acting Postmaster he was, as
a matter of fact, a duly-appointed cashier.

On September 19, 1983, Commission on Audit Auditors Robin S. Aban and Alfonso A. Gala conducted an
examination of the cash and accounts of petitioner covering the period from September 8, 1983 to
September 13, 1988.

Ilogon was the acting Postmaster when the examination showed that the petitioner incurred a shortage
in his accounts. He was charged and convicted of malversation of public funds.

State:

We hold that the evidence was sufficient to sustain the verdict finding the petitioner guilty of the crime
charged. The judgment of the Sandiganbayan is hereby AFFIRMED and the petition is DISMISSED.

Accused:

In respect to the shortage of P8,846.00, Item 1 in the auditor's letter of demand, the amount represents
vales (cash advances) granted to postal employees of Cagayan de Oro City in payment of salaries or
wages which the accused paid out to them, even before the period for which they were supposed to be
paid.

As regards that category of shortage amounting to P48,028.58, the accused claims that this amount
represents the aggregate of the cash advances to salaries of the Regional Director, Postal Inspector, and
postal employees of Davao, Iloilo and other places who were assigned in Cagayan de Oro City.

Respecting that category of shortage amounting to P5,787.97, the accused explained that this shortage
constituted cash advances to postal employees.
Resolution:

In the crime of malversation, all that is necessary for conviction is proof that the accountable officer had
received public funds and that he did not have them in his possession when demand herefore was
made. There is even no need of direct evidence of personal misappropriation as long as there is a
shortage in his account and petitioner cannot satisfactorily explain the same.

The fact that petitioner did not personally use the missing funds is not a valid defense and will not
exculpate him from his criminal liability. And as aptly found by respondent Sandiganbayan, “the fact that
(the) immediate superiors of the accused (petitioner herein) have acquiesced to the practice of giving
out cash advances for convenience did not legalize the disbursements”.

The fact also that petitioner fully settled the amount of P118, 003.10 later is of no moment. The return
of funds malversed is not a defense. It is neither an exempting circumstance nor a ground for
extinguishing the accused’s criminal liability. At best, it is a mitigating circumstance.

6. Azarcon v. Sandiganbayan, 268 SCRA 747 G.R. No. 116033 February 26, 1997
FACTS:

Alfredo Azarcon owned and operated a hauling business. Occasionally, he engaged the services of sub-
contractors like Jaime Ancla whose trucks were left at the former’s premises A Warrant of Distraint of
Personal Property was issued by the Main Office of the BIR addressed to the Regional Director or his
authorized representative of Revenue Region 10,Butuan City commanding the latter to distraint the
goods, chattels or effects and other personal property of Ancla, a sub-contractor of accused Azarcon
and, a delinquent taxpayer. The Warrant of Garnishment was issued to Azarcon ordering him to
transfer, surrender, transmit and/or remit to BIR the property in his
possession owned by taxpayer Ancla. Azarcon, in signing the “Receipt for Goods, Articles, and Things
Seized Under Authority of the National Internal Revenue,” assumed the undertakings specified
in the receipt. Subsequently, however, Ancla took out the distrained truck from Azarcon’s custody. For
this reason, Azarcon was charged before the Sandiganbayan with the crime of malversation of public
funds or property under Article 217 in relation to Article 222 of the Revised Penal Code.

Can Azarcon be considered a public officer by reason of his being designated by the BIR as a depositary
of distrained property?

HELD:

Article 223 of the RPC defines a public officer as “any person who, by direct provision of the law,
popular election, or appointment by competent authority, shall take part in the performance of public
functions in the Government of the Philippine Islands, or shall perform in said Government or in any of
its branches public duties as an employee, agent, or subordinate official, of any rank or classes”. Azarcon
obviously may not be deemed authorized by popular election. Neither can his designation by the BIR as
a custodian of distrained property qualifies as appointment by direct provision of law, or by competent
authority. While it is true that Sec. 206 of the NIRC, as pointed out by the prosecution, authorizes
the BIR to effect a constructive distraint by requiring “any person” to preserve a distrained property
there is no provision in the NIRC constituting such person
apublic officer by reason of such requirement. The BIR’s power authorizing a privateindividual to act as a
depositary cannot be stretched to include the power to appoint him as a public officer. The charge
against Azarcon should forthwith be dismissed.

Further, the case of U.S. vs. Rastrollo is not applicable to the case before us simply because the facts
therein are not identical, similar or analogous to those obtaining here. While the cited case involved a
judicial deposit of the proceeds of the sale of attached property in the hands of the debtor, the case at
bench dealt with the BIR’s administrative act of effecting constructive distraint over alleged property of
taxpayer Ancla in relation to his back taxes, property which was received by Petitioner Azarcon. In the
cited case, it was clearly within the scope of that court’s jurisdiction and judicial power to constitute the
judicial deposit and give “the depositary a character equivalent to that of a public official.” However, in
the instant case, while the BIR had authority to require Petitioner Azarcon to sign a receipt for the
distrained truck, the NIRC did not grant it power to appoint Azarcon a public officer.

7. When can malversation be committed by private individuals

8. Malversation as distinguished from estafa

B. ART. 218- FAILURE OF ACCOUNTABLE OFFICER TO RENDER ACCOUNTS

C. ART. 219- FAILURE OF A RESPONSIBLE PUBLIC OFFICER TO RENDER ACOUNTS BEFORE LEAVING THE
COUNTRY

D. ART. 220- ILLEGAL USE OF PUBLIC FUNDS OR PROPERTY

1. Technical Malversation

2. Distinction of Malversation from Illegal Use

E. ART. 221-FAILURE TO MAKE DELIVERY OF PUBLIC FUNDS OR PROPERTY

F. ART. 222-OFFICERS INCLUDED IN THE PROVISIONS

Chapter five

A. ART. 223- CONNIVING WITH OR CONSENTING TO EVASION

B. ART. 224- EVASION THROUGH NEGLIGENCE

C. ART. 225-ESCAPE OF PRISONER UNDER THE CUSTODY OF A PERSON NOT A PUBLIC OFFICER

• Rodillas v. Sandiganbayan, 161 SCRA 347 G.R. No. L-58652

FACTS: Patrolman Alfredo Rodillas was directed by his superior, Corporal Victor Victoriano, to
escort Zenaida Sacris deadline Andres, a detention prisoner, before the sala of Judge Bernardo to
face trial for an alleged Violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as the policewoman officer
who was supposed to escort the said detainee was then sick. After the hearing, the husband of
Zenaida sought permission from Rodillas to have lunch with the detainee to which Rodillas
consented. During the lunch, Zenaida asked to go to the bathroom. She was accompanied by her
husband’ cousin while Rodillas was guarding outside. After 10 minuts, Rodillas became suspicious
and checked the bathroom only to find out Zenaida has already escaped.

STATE: The accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal in the crime of Evasion through
Negligence Art. 24, RPC)

ACCUSED: his conviction by the Sandiganbayan was based merely on his admissions without the
prosecution presenting evidence to prove his negligence.

RESOLUTION: The elements of the crime under Article 224 of the Revised Penal Code are: a) that
the offender is a public officer; b) that he is charged with the conveyance or custody of a prisoner,
either detention prisoner or prisoner by final judgment; and c) that such prisoner escapes through his
negligence.

There is no question that the petitioner is a public officer. Neither is there any dispute as to the fact
that he was charged with the custody of a prisoner who was being tried for a violation of the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.

It is evident from the records that the petitioner acted negligently and beyond the scope of his
authority when he permitted his charge to create the situation which led to her escape. As a police
officer who was charged with the duty to return the prisoner directly to jail, the deviation from his duty
was clearly a violation of the regulations.

It is the duty of any police officer having custody of a prisoner to take necessary precautions to
assure the absence of any means of escape. A failure to undertake these precautions will make his
act one of definite laxity or negligence amounting to deliberate non-performance of duty. His
tolerance of arrangements whereby the prisoner and her companions could plan and make good her
escape should have aroused the suspicion of a person of ordinary prudence.

Section two

A. ART. 226- REMOVAL, CONCEALMENT, OR DESTRUCTION OF DOCUMENTS

B. ART. 227- OFFICER BREAKING THE SEAL

C. ART. 228- OPENING OF CLOSED DOCUMENTS

III. SECTION THREE. -- REVEIATION OF-SECRETS

ART. 229- REVELATION OF SECRETS BY AN OFFICER

ART. 230- PUBLIC OFFICER REVEALING SECRETS OF PRIVATE INDIVIDUAL

Chapter six

A. ART. 231- OPEN DISOBEDIENCE

B. ART. 232-DISOBEDIENCE TO ORDER OF SUPERIOR OFFICER WHEN SAID ORDER WAS SUSPENDED BY
INFERIOR OFFICER

C. ART. 233-REFUSAL OF ASSISTANCE

D. ART. 234-REFUSAL TO DISCHARGE ELECTIVE OFFICE

E. ART. 235-MALTREATMENT OF PRISONERS

Section two

A. ART. 236-ANTICIPATION OF DUTIES OF PUBLIC OFFICE

B. ART. 237-PROLONGING PERFORMANCE OF DUTIES AND POWERS

C. ART. 238-ABANDONMENT OF OFFICE OR POSITION

Section three

A. ART. 239-USURPATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWERS

B. ART. 240-USURPATION OF EXECUTIVE FUNCTIONS
C. ART. 241- USURPATION OF JUDICIAL FUNCTIONS
D. ART. 242-DISOBEYING REQUEST FOR DISQUALIFICATION
E. ART. 243-ORDERS OR REQUESTS BY EXEC. OFFICERS TO ANY JUDICIAL AUTHORITY
F. ART. 244-UNLAWFUL APPOINTMENTS

SECTION FOUR. ABUSES AGAINST CHASTITY

A. ART. 245-ABUSES AGAINST CHASTITY

Title Eight CRIMES AGAINST PERSONS

Chapter one

(.SECTION ONE — PARRICIDE, MURDER, HOMICIDE

A. ART. 246-PARRICIDE

I . Cases of parricide when the penalty shall not be reclusion perpetua to death:

a. parricide through negligence (art 365)

b. parricide by mistake (art 249)

c. parricide under exceptional circumstances (art 247)

 2. People v. Jumawan, 116 SCRA 739
Rodolfo Magnaye was married on 26 January 1974 to Presentacion Jumawan. Presentacion
Jumawan Magnaye left the conjugal home and stayed with her sister Sebastiana Jumawan.
Rodolfo Magnaye, on the other hand, went and stayed with his mother. Between 5:00 and 6:00
o’ clock in the afternoon of 19 June 1976 Rodolfo Magnaye was dressing up and told her
mother that he was going to the public market because his wife asked him to fetch her
because they are going to talk about their lives. He left home at about 6:00 o’ clock. Before
reaching the slaughter house Rodolfo was killed by Jumawans. Francisco Jumawan is the father
of his co-accused, namely, Cesario Jumawan, Manuel Jumawan and Presentacion Jumawan
(Rodolfo’s wife).

Contention of the Accused:

He was not at the place if the scene of the crime as he was in the house of Sebastiana Jumawan noy in
her store.

Resolution:

No. Presentacion should have been accused of parricide but as it is, since her relationship to the
deceased is not alleged in the information, she, like the others, can be convicted of murder only
qualified by abuse of superior strength. Although not alleged in the information, relationship as
an aggravating circumstance should be assigned against the appellants. True, relationship is
inherent in parricide, but Presentacion stands convicted of murder. And as to the others, the
relationships of father-in-law and brother-in-law aggravate the crime.

3. People v. Tomotorgo, 136 SCRA 238

Contention of the State: Samson and Pugay were charged with the crime of murder. Samson and Pugay,
committed the crime with the qualifying circumstance of treachery and the aggravating circumstance of evident
premeditation and superior strength.
On May 19, 1982, a town fiesta was held in the public plaza of Rosario, Cavite. Sometime after midnight,
Eduardo Gabion was sitting in the ferris wheel and reading a comic book. Later, Pugay and Samson with several
companions arrived at the scene seemingly drunk. The group saw Bayani Miranda and started making fun of him
by tickling him with a piece of wood. Pugay suddenly took a can of gasoline and poured its contents on Miranda.
Gabion asked Pugay to stop during the process of pouring the gasoline. Then Samson set Miranda on fire and it
resulted to the subsequent death of the victim.

Contention of the Accused: Pugay and Samson contended that they did not intentionally killed Miranda therefore
it should only be homicide not murder. Pugay admitted in his statement, Exhibit F, that he poured a can of gasoline
on the deceased believing that the contents thereof was water and then the accused Samson set the deceased on
fire. Samson, on the other hand, alleged in his statement that he saw Pugay pour gasoline on Miranda but did not
see the person who set him on fire.
Resolution: Pugay can only be convicted of Homicide through reckless imprudence because of his failure to
exercise all the diligence necessary to avoid every undesirable consequence arising from any act committed by his
companions. Samson, on the other hand, is guilty of Homicide although it was not his intention to kill the guy, but
he shall be credited with the mitigating circumstance of no intention to commit so grave a wrong.

(In relation with reckless imprudence) defined in Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended. In U.S. vs. Maleza, et. al. 14 Phil. 468, 470, this Court ruled as follows:

“A man must use common sense and exercise due reflection in all his acts; it is his
duty to be cautious, careful, and prudent, if not from instinct, then through fear of
incurring punishment. He is responsible for such results as anyone might foresee
and for acts which no one would have performed except through culpable abandon.
Otherwise his own person, rights and property, all those of his fellow-beings, would
ever be exposed to all manner of danger and injury.”

4. People vs. Malabago, 1996

Contention of the State:

Pedro Malabago is guilty of Parricide and is sentences to death. Guillerma Romano (Pedro’s
Mother-in-law) was tending her story and its premises were lit by a kerosene lamp and fluorescent light.
Letecia Romano Malabago (Pedro’s wife) sat on one of the benches outside the store. Allandel (Letecia’s
14 year old son) appeared and sat on the bench facing her. He listened to her mother and grandmother
conversing. Pedro arrived and interrupted the conversation and they he and Leltecia began arguing.
Gullerma turned away but still heard the altercation which was about money and jelousy. Suddenly
Guillerma heard shouting and she heard Letecia say AGAY! And she saw Letecia’s face bloodied with a
slash along her left side of the face from lips down to the neck. Letecia fell to the ground and died.

Contention of the Accused:

The case should not be parricide because the prosecution failed to prove legitimate marital
relations between Pedro and Letecia

sHELD:

Parricide is committed when: (1) a person is killed; (2) the deceased is killed by the accused; (3)
the deceased is the father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or a legitimate other
ascendants or other descendants, or the legitimate spouse of the accused. The key element in parricide is
the relationship of the offender with the victim. In the case at parricide of a spouse, the best proof of the
relationship between the accused and the deceased is the marriage certificate. In the absence of a marriage
certificate. However, oral evidence of the fact of marriage may be considered by the trial court if such
proof is not objected to. The testimony of the accused that he was married to the deceased is an admission
against his penal interest. It is a confirmation of the semper praesumitur matrimonio and the presumption
that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husbands and wife have entered into a lawful contract of
marriage
 5. People vs. Ignacio, 1997
FACTS:

Rosaria Ignacio, then 44 years of age, lived with her husband, Juan Ignacio, 67 years old, in
a small two-storey house of sawali and cogon grass. Residing with them was Rosaria's daughter,
Milagros V. Cabanilla. One night, Rosaria and Juan had a heated argument. Milagros entreated
them to stop but the couple was in no mood to heed her. The following night, at dinner, Juan and
Rosaria had another quarrel. Milagros grudgingly went upstairs and tried instead to put her child
to sleep. She could hear, after a brief moment that the fight had become somewhat
violent. Milagros peeped. She saw by the gas lamp that both were pulling a piece of lawanit and
each tried to take possession of it. Juan ultimately released the lawanit and turned to go for his
bolo when Rosaria picked up a palo-palo and hit Juan on the nape.
Rosaria left the straggling (kikisay-kisay) Juan and surrendered to the police at the
municipal building. Rolando Ignacio, Juan's son by his former wife, was fishing when he learned
of the unfortunate incident. At the municipal hall, Rosaria voluntarily disclosed before Rolando
that she hit Juan with a wooden club.
ISSUE:

Whether Rosaria was guilty of a crime Parricide?

COTA:

She contended that she be held guilty only of homicide rather than of parricide, because there
was no clear evidence of marriage" between her and the victim.

HELD:

Yes, because "Any person who shall kill his father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or
illegitimate, or any of his ascendants, or descendants, or his spouse, shall be guilty of parricide
and shall be punished by the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death."

Indeed, the phrase "whether legitimate or illegitimate" characterizes the relationship between the
accused and his victim who might be his father, mother, or child, but not the "spouse" who
obviously refers to either the legitimate husband or the lawful wife
Appellant not only declared in court that the victim was her fourth husband but she also swore
that they were married before a judge in Montalban, Rizal. The victim's son testified that his
father and appellant was husband and wife, in much the same way that appellant's daughter,
Milagros, held the victim to be her mother's husband. Appellant’s own admission that she was
married to the victim was a confirmation of the semper praesumitur matrimonio and the
presumption that a man and a woman so deporting themselves as husband and wife had verily
entered into a lawful contract of marriage.
 6. People vs. Genosa , G.R. No. 135981
FACTS: This case stemmed from the killing of Ben Genosa, by his wife Marivic Genosa. During their first
year of marriage, Marivic and Ben lived happily but apparently thereafter, Ben changed and the couple
would always quarrel and sometimes their quarrels became violent. Appellant testified that every time her
husband came home drunk, he would provoke her and sometimes beat her. Whenever beaten by her
husband, she consulted medical doctors who testified during the trial. On the night of the killing, appellant
and the victim quarreled and the victim beat the appellant. However, appellant was able to run to another
room. Appellant admitted having killed the victim with the use of a gun while he was asleep.

STATE: The information for parricide against appellant, however, alleged that the cause of death of the
victim was by beating through the use of a lead pipe.

ACCUSED: Appellant invoked self defense and defense of her unborn child. After trial, the Regional Trial
Court found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of parricide with an aggravating
circumstance of treachery and imposed the penalty of death.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not appellant herein can validly invoke the “battered woman syndrome” as constituting self
defense.

RULING:

The Court ruled in the negative as appellant failed to prove that she is afflicted with the “battered woman
syndrome”.

A battered woman has been defined as a woman “who is repeatedly subjected to any forceful physical or
psychological behavior by a man in order to coerce her to do something he wants her to do without
concern for her rights. Battered women include wives or women in any form of intimate relationship with
men. Furthermore, in order to be classified as a battered woman, the couple must go through the
battering cycle at least twice. Any woman may find herself in an abusive relationship with a man once. If it
occurs a second time, and she remains in the situation, she is defined as a battered woman.”

More graphically, the battered woman syndrome is characterized by the so-called “cycle of violence,”
which has three phases: (1) the tension-building phase; (2) the acute battering incident; and (3) the
tranquil, loving (or, at least, nonviolent) phase.

The Court, however, is not discounting the possibility of self-defense arising from the battered
woman syndrome. First, each of the phases of the cycle of violence must be proven to have
characterized at least two battering episodes between the appellant and her intimate partner.
Second, the final acute battering episode preceding the killing of the batterer must have produced
in the battered person’s mind an actual fear of an imminent harm from her batterer and an honest
belief that she needed to use force in order to save her life. Third, at the time of the killing, the
batterer must have posed probable -- not necessarily immediate and actual -- grave harm to the
accused, based on the history of violence perpetrated by the former against the latter. Taken
altogether, these circumstances could satisfy the requisites of self-defense. Under the existing
facts of the present case, however, not all of these elements were duly established.

The defense fell short of proving all three phases of the “cycle of violence” supposedly characterizing the
relationship of Ben and Marivic Genosa. No doubt there were acute battering incidents but appellant
failed to prove that in at least another battering episode in the past, she had gone through a similar
pattern. Neither did appellant proffer sufficient evidence in regard to the third phase of the cycle.

In any event, the existence of the syndrome in a relationship does not in itself establish the legal right of
the woman to kill her abusive partner. Evidence must still be considered in the context of self-defense.
Unlawful aggression is the most essential element of self-defense. In the present case, however,
according to the testimony of Marivic herself, there was a sufficient time interval between the unlawful
aggression of Ben and her fatal attack upon him. She had already been able to withdraw from his violent
behavior and escape to their children’s bedroom. During that time, he apparently ceased his attack and
went to bed. The reality or even the imminence of the danger he posed had ended altogether. He was no
longer in a position that presented an actual threat on her life or safety.

The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of appellant for parricide. However, considering the
presence of two (2) mitigating circumstances and without any aggravating circumstance, the
penalty is reduced to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum; to 14 years 8
months and 1 day of reclusion temporal as maximum. Inasmuch as appellant has been detained
for more than the minimum penalty hereby imposed upon her, the director of the Bureau of
Corrections may immediately RELEASE her from custody upon due determination that she is
eligible for parole, unless she is being held for some other lawful cause.

NOTE: After this case was decided by the Supreme Court, R.A. 9262, otherwise known as Anti-Violence
Against Women and their Children Act of 2004 was enacted. Sec. 26 of said law provides that "xxx.
Victim-survivors who are found by the courts to be suffering from battered women syndrome do not incur
any criminal and civil liability nothwithstanding the absence of any of the elements for justifying
circumstances of self-defense under the Revised Penal Code.xxx"

B. ART. 247-DEATH OR PHYSICAL INJURIES UNDER EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES

• People v. Abarca, 153 SCRA 735 GR No. 74433, Sep 14, 1987
Facts: One day in 1984, Francisco Abarca, through a peephole, caught his wife having
sexual intercourse with one Khingsley Paul Koh inside the Abarca residence. The two
also caught Abarca looking at them and so Koh grabbed his pistol and thereafter
Abarca fled. One hour later, Abarca, armed with an armalite, went to the gambling place
where Koh usually stays and then and there shot Koh multiple times. Koh died
instantaneously. However, two more persons were shot in the adjacent room. These
two other persons survive d due to timely medical intervention.
Eventually after trial, Abarca was convicted of the complex crime of murder with
frustrated double murder.

COA: He insists that he should not be convicted, because he is entitled to provision

laid down in Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code which provides:
Any legally married person who, having surprised his spouse in the act of committing
sexual intercourse with another person, shall kill any of them or both of them in the act
or immediately thereafter, or shall inflict upon them any serious physical injury, shall
suffer the penalty of destierro.

ISSUE: Whether or not the judgment of conviction is correct.

HELD: No. Abarca is entitled to the provisions of Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code.
Article 247 prescribes the following elements: (1) that a legally married person surprises
his spouse in the act of committing sexual intercourse with another person; and (2) that
he kills any of them or both of them in the act or immediately thereafter. These elements
are present in this case.
Even though one hour had already lapsed from the time Abarca caught his wife with
Koh and the time he killed Koh, the killing was still the direct by-product of Abarca’s
rage. Therefore, Abarca is not liable for the death of Koh.
However, Abarca is still liable for the injuries he caused to the two other persons he
shot in the adjacent room but his liability shall not be for frustrated murder. In the first
place, Abarca has no intent to kill the other two persons injured. He was not also
committing a crime when he was firing his gun at Koh – it being under Art. 247. Abarca
was however negligent because he did not exercise all precaution to make sure no one
else will be hurt. As such, he shall be liable for less serious physical injuries through
simple negligence for the injuries suffered by the two other persons who were in the
adjacent room when the incident happened.

C. ART. 248-MURDER

• People v. Buensuceso, 132 SCRA 143

Facts: several demands of Pat. Aguilar to Tayag to surrender he’s fan knife until they end up agreeing to settle it at
the office of the chief of police and upon vehement refusal of Tayag to surrender the fan knife they had a heated
argument. Tayag leave the office where aguilar, municipal guard, Mallari and pat. De la cruz run after Tayag. After
leaving the office Aguilar fired his gun upwards.

Hearing the shot, Tayag turned about, then retreated backwards until he reached the fence of the plaza. When
Tayag was near the wooden fence about a knee high, Pat. Aguilar aimed his gun at Tayag and fired, hitting him
above the right knee. Tayag continued to run towards his house followed by de la Cruz without a gun. Pat. Mallari
went to the waiting shed to intercept Tayag. Pat. Mallari had a gun at that time. Pat. Aguilar followed Mallari in the
shed and they took opposite sides of the road, that is, Rizal Street, in front of the Catholic Church. Then there were
several successive gun shots, more or less nine in number.

After the commotion, Tayag was seen lying prostrate near the back of a jeep parked at the corner of Rizal and San
Juan Streets, about 60 meters away from the municipal building Pat. de la Cruz took the knife from Tayag and gave
it to Pat. Jose Buensuceso, who at the precise moment had his revolver tucked in its holster.

Contention of the State:

BUENSUCESO, Rodolfo AGUILAR, Conrado IZON and Ernesto JOSON, all members of the police force of
Dinalupihan, Bataan, of Murder, and sentencing "said accused each to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA;

Contention of the defendant:

That it should only be homicide

Ruling:
upon an on-the-spot inspection by PC Sgt. Romualdo Espiritu soon after the incident, he found that the service
pistol of AGUILAR had been fired and that its cylinder contained three (3) empty shells and three (3) live
ammunitions. Similarly, he smelled the barrel of BUENSUCESO's revolver and found that it, too, had been fired and
that its cylinder had four (4) empty shells, and two live ammunitions.

there is ample evidence establishing that AGUILAR, BUENSUCESO, IZON, and JOSON had fired their guns at the
victim hitting him on different parts of his body. True, it has not been established as to which wound was inflicted
by each accused. However, as this Court has held, where the victim died as a result of wounds received from
several persons acting independently of each other, but it has not been shown which wound was inflicted by each
assailant, all of the assailants are liable for the death of the victim. 11

The crime is Murder, qualified by treachery. The victim was already retreating backwards until he reached the
fence of the town plaza when AGUILAR fired his revolver at the former hitting him above the right
knee. 12 Notwithstanding that he was already hit and wounded, and possibly immobilized, he was still subjected to
successive shots as shown by the wounds that he had received, even at his back. Certainly, the means employed by
the accused-appellants tended directly and specially to insure the execution of the crime without risk to
themselves arising from any defense which the victim might have made. 13

The killing of the victim was aggravated by abuse of superior strength as shown by the number of assailants, which
circumstance, however, is absorbed by treachery. 14 No other circumstances modify the commission of the crime.

• People v. Pugay. 167 SCRA 439

Contention of the State: Samson and Pugay were charged with the crime of murder. Samson and Pugay,
committed the crime with the qualifying circumstance of treachery and the aggravating circumstance of evident
premeditation and superior strength.
On May 19, 1982, a town fiesta was held in the public plaza of Rosario, Cavite. Sometime after midnight,
Eduardo Gabion was sitting in the ferris wheel and reading a comic book. Later, Pugay and Samson with several
companions arrived at the scene seemingly drunk. The group saw Bayani Miranda and started making fun of him
by tickling him with a piece of wood. Pugay suddenly took a can of gasoline and poured its contents on Miranda.
Gabion asked Pugay to stop during the process of pouring the gasoline. Then Samson set Miranda on fire and it
resulted to the subsequent death of the victim.

Contention of the Accused: Pugay and Samson contended that they did not intentionally killed Miranda therefore
it should only be homicide not murder. Pugay admitted in his statement, Exhibit F, that he poured a can of gasoline
on the deceased believing that the contents thereof was water and then the accused Samson set the deceased on
fire. Samson, on the other hand, alleged in his statement that he saw Pugay pour gasoline on Miranda but did not
see the person who set him on fire.

Resolution: Pugay can only be convicted of Homicide through reckless imprudence because of his failure to
exercise all the diligence necessary to avoid every undesirable consequence arising from any act committed by his
companions. Samson, on the other hand, is guilty of Homicide although it was not his intention to kill the guy, but
he shall be credited with the mitigating circumstance of no intention to commit so grave a wrong.

(In relation with reckless imprudence) defined in Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended. In U.S. vs. Maleza, et. al. 14 Phil. 468, 470, this Court ruled as follows:

“A man must use common sense and exercise due reflection in all his acts; it is his
duty to be cautious, careful, and prudent, if not from instinct, then through fear of
incurring punishment. He is responsible for such results as anyone might foresee
 and for acts which no one would have performed except through culpable abandon.
Otherwise his own person, rights and property, all those of his fellow-beings, would
ever be exposed to all manner of danger and injury.”

• PEOPLE VS BASAY G.R. No. 86941. March 3, 1993

(nothing much had been discussed about murder, pero I think related siya sa art. 248 because of the
charge of arson. Bye)

FACTS: Zosimo Toting, Sr., Beatrice Toting and Bombie Toting were stabbed and hacked before their
house was burned. Zosimo and Beatrice died immediately while Bombie lived for a few days. As a result
of this fire, Manolita Toting and Manolo Toting suffered burns which caused the death of the former;
the latter, however, survived due to timely medical attention. Bombie Toting related to Sgt. Tabanao
that on March 4, 1986 at 7:00 o'clock in the evening, appellant and Teodoro Basay killed her parents and
burned their house.

According to the RTC’s decision, Basay was not guilty of Multiple Murder, Frustrated Murder with Arson,
but finding Ramirez guilty of Multiple Murder, Frustrated Murder with Arson.

ACCUSED-APPELLANT: (Ramirez) The exhibit F should not have been admitted by the court because it
was executed in violation of his constitutional rights and on the basis of hearsay evidence and on the
presumption of guilt.

STATE: The appellant executed the extra-judicial confession voluntarily and without duress; in signing
such confession, he was accompanied by a certain Mr. Catacutan, a non-lawyer, inside the chambers of
Judge Calumpang -- "an environment ... other than vindictive and oppressive which the courts desired to
guard against in Miranda vs. Arizona, 384 US 436.

RESOLUTION: The appellant's guilt was not established with moral certainty. He should be acquitted.
Exhibit F is inadmissible evidence as it was acquired unlawfully.

We cannot, however, close this case without making some observations about the legal conclusions of
the trial court anent the crimes committed and the penalty imposed. The facts indisputably establish
that Zosimo Toting, Sr., Beatrice Toting and Bombie Toting were stabbed and hacked before their house
was burned. Zosimo and Beatrice died immediately while Bombie lived for a few days. As a matter of
fact, the thesis of the prosecution is that the house was burned to conceal the stabbing and hacking. As
a result of this fire, Manolita Toting and Manolo Toting suffered burns which caused the death of the
former; the latter, however, survived due to timely medical attention. Four (4) crimes were therefore
committed, viz.: three (3) separate murders under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code 50 for the
deaths of Zosimo, Beatrice and Bombie, and arson as punished under Section 5 of P.D. No. 1613 51 for
the death of Manolita and the injuries sustained by Manolo as a consequence of the burning of the
house. The aforementioned Section 5 reads:
"SECTION 5. Where Death Results from Arson. — If by reason of or on the occasion of the arson death
results, the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua to death shall be imposed."

Also, the information that was filed is clearly duplicitous and thus vulnerable to a motion to quash under
Section 3(e), Rule 117 of the Rules of Court. No such motion having been filed, appellant is deemed to
have waived the defect.

D. ART. 249-HOMICIDE

E. ART. 250-PENALTY FOR FRUSTRATED PARRICIDE, MURDER, HOMICIDE

F. ART. 251- DEATH CAUSED IN A TUMULTUOUS AFFRAY

G. ART. 252-PHYSICAL INJURIES IN A TUMULTUOUS AFFRAY

H. ART. 253-GIVING ASSISTANCE TO SUICIDE

I. SPECIAL LAWS

1. Anti-Violence against Women and their Children Act of 2004 (R.A. 9262), Punishable acts

2. Anti-Child Pornography Act of 2009 (R.A. 9775), Definition of terms, Unlawful or punishable acts

3. Anti-Hazing Law (R.A. 8049)

a. Hazing

b. Definition

c. Allowed initiation rites

d. Who are liable e. Punishable acts

4. Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act (R.A. 7610,
as amended)

a. Coverage

b. Child prostitution, punishable acts

c. Child trafficking, punishable acts

5. Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006 (R.A. 9344); also refer to Child and Youth Welfare Code
(P.D. 603, as amended)

6. Human Security Act of 2007 (R.A. 9372)

a. Punishable acts of terrorism

 b. Who are liable

section two

A. ART. 254-DISCHARGE OF FIREARM

B. ART. 255-INFANTICIDE

• When mitigating circumstances apply

C. ART. 256-INTENTIONAL ABORTION

D. ART. 257-UNINTENTIONAL ABORTION

• PEOPLE V. SALUFRANIA, 159 SCRA 401

FACTS:
Filomeno Salufrania and his wife Marciana Abuyo quarreled at about 6:00 o'clock in the
evening of 3 December 1974, in their small house at a faraway sitio in barrio Tigbinan, Labo,
Camarines Norte. During said quarrel, he boxed his pregnant wife on the stomach and, once
fallen on the floor, he strangled her to death; that blood oozed from the eyes and nose of his wife
and that she died right on the spot where she fell. Pedro Salufrania, the spouses’ son, testified as
an eyewitness to the crime. He further testified that after killing his mother, the accused-
appellant went out of the house to get a hammock; that his brother Alex and he were the only
ones who witnessed how the accused killed their mother because his sister and other brothers
were already asleep when the horrible incident happened; that his brothers Celedonio,Danilo and
sister Merly woke up after the death of their mother and kept watch at their mothers body while
their father was away; that their father arrived early the next morning with the hammock and
after placing their dead mother on the hammock, the accused carried her on his shoulder and
brought the cadaver to the house of his sister Conching, located at a populated section of
Tigbinan that fromTigbinan the corpse was transferred to Gabon, Talisay, Camarines Norte for
burial. Continuing his testimony, Pedro Salufrania stated that he is now living with his uncle
Eduardo Abuyo and had refused and still refused to live with his father-accused, because the
latter has threatened to kill him and his other brothers and sister should he reveal the true cause
of his mother's death.

COA: The accused denied the allegations and contended that his wife died due to a stomach
ailment and headache.

HELD:
There is no evidence to show that he had the intention to cause an abortion. He should not be
held guilty of the complex crime of Parricide with Intentional Abortion but of the complex crime
of Parricide with Unintentional Abortion. The elements of Unintentional Abortion are as follows:
1) That there is a pregnant woman. 2) That violence is used upon such pregnant woman without
intending an abortion. 3) That the violence is intentionally exerted. 4) That as a result of the
violence the fetus dies, either in the womb or after having been expelled therefrom. The Solicitor
General's brief makes it appear that appellant intended to cause an abortion because he boxed his
pregnant wife on the stomach which caused her to fall and then strangled her. We find that
appellant’s intent to cause an abortion has not been sufficiently established. Mere boxing on the
stomach, taken together with the immediate strangling of the victim in a fight, is not sufficient
proof to show an intent to cause an abortion. In fact, appellant must have merely intended to kill
the victim but not necessarily to cause an abortion

E. ART. 258-ABORTION PRACTICED BY THE WOMAN HERSELF OR BY HER PARENTS

F. ART. 259-ABORTION PRACTICED BY A PHYSICIAN OR MIDWIFE AND DISPENSING OF ABORTIVES

Section three

A. ART. 262-MUTILATION

B. ART. 263-SERIOUS PHYSICAL INJURIES

1. Requisites of DEFORMITY

2. QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES

C. ART. 264- ADMINISTERING INJURIOUS SUBSTANCES OR BEVERAGES

D. ART. 265-LESS SERIOUS PHYSICAL INJURIES

QUALIFIED LESS SERIOUS PHYSICAL INJURIES

E. ART. 266-SLIGHT PHYSICAL INJURIES

F. ART. 266-A - THE NEW ANTI-RAPE LAW (RA 8353)

1. Classification of Rape

a. Traditional - under Art 335

b. Sexual Assault - RA 8353

2. People v. Orita, 184 SCRA 105 G.R. No. 88724 April 3, 1990
Facts: Ceilito Orita was accused of frustrated rape by the RTC. He appealed to the Court of
Appeals for review. The accused poke a “balisong” to college freshman Cristina Abayan as soon
as she got into her boarding house early morning after arriving from a party. She knew him as a
frequent visitor of another boarder. She was dragged inside the house up the stairs while his left
arm wrapped around her neck, and his right hand poking the Batangas knife to her neck. Upon
entering her room, he pushed her in and got her head hit on the wall. He immediately undressed
while still holding the knife with one hand, and ordered her to do the same. He ordered her to lie
down on the floor and then mounted her. He asked her to hold his penis and insert it in her
vagina, while still poking the knife to her. She followed, but the appellant could not fully
penetrate her in such a position. Next, he laid down on his back and commanded her to mount
him, but he cannot fully penetrate her. When Orita’s hands were both flat on the floor,
complainant escaped naked. She ran from room to room as appellant pursued her, and finally
jumped out through a window. She went to the municipal building nearby and knocked on the
back door for there was no answer. When the door opened, the policemen inside the building saw
her crying and naked. She was given a jacket for covering by the first policeman who saw her.
The policemen dashed to her boarding house but failed to apprehend the accused. She was
brought to a hospital for physical examination. Her PE revealed that she is still a virgin, with
abrasions on the left breast, left and right knees, and multiple pinpoint marks on her back, among
others. The trial court convicted the accused of frustrated rape.

Contention of the Accused: The accused contends that there is no crime of frustrated rape. The
trial court erred in disregarding the substantial inconsistencies in the testimonies of the
witnesses; and the trial court erred in declaring that the crime of frustrated rape was committed
by the accused. He was not able to fully penetrate in her. The accused also questions also the
failure of the prosecution to present other witnesses to corroborate the allegations in the
complaint. The accused used the Article 266 of the RPC to show that he is not guilty of
frustrated rape, and Article 6 to stress the difference of consummated, frustrated, and attempted
felonies.

Resolution: Clearly, in the crime of rape, from the moment the offender has carnal knowledge of
his victim he actually attains his purpose and, from that moment also all the essential elements of
the offense have been accomplished. Nothing more is left to be done by the offender, because he
has performed the last act necessary to produce the crime. Thus, the felony is consummated.
[Art. 266 and Art. 6]We have set the uniform rule that for the consummation of rape, perfect
penetration is not essential. Any penetration of the female organ by the male organ is sufficient.
Entry of the labia or lips of the female organ, without rupture of the hymen or laceration of the
vagina is sufficient to warrant conviction

3. People v. Mangalino, 182 SCRA 329

FACTS:

Victim, 6year old was playing at the 2 story apartment of the accused and his wife. At the time of the
incident, there were 2 people playing chess at the sala, and another witness who testified against the
accused. Mangalino gave 2 pesos to the girl and told her not to tell anybody. He fingered her and
inserted his organ, but in vain

COA:
The accused claims it was impossible for him to have raped the victim in the presence of other people,
more so, in a place without privacy.

HELD:

Court held that rape can be committed even in places where people congregate: in parks, along the road
side, within school premises, and even inside a house where there are other occupants. 27 The
apartment of the accused was no exception. Lust is no respecter of time or place. For rape to be
committed, full penetration is not required.

In fine, we hold that the trial court did not commit any reversible error in finding the accused-appellant
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of statutory rape.

4. People v. Balbuena, 129 SCRA 10

5. PEOPLE VS CASTRO 196 SCRA 679 G.R. No. 9149, May 6, 1991

FACTS:

On the witness stand, six (6) year old Diana Rose Castro narrated how, while playing
with a neighbor sometime on 4 October 1986, she was pulled by the accused inside a
bathroom, prevented from going out, and made to stand on the toilet bowl. Accused is a first
cousin of Diana Rose's mother. Kuya Delfin, as Diana Rose referred to the accused, then put up
her clothes, took off her panty, made her lean on the wall and, despite her efforts to pull away
he inserted his private part into her causing pain. Then she was told by the accused to go home.
At home, she refused to have her private part washed by her Auntie Alice because it was
hurting and painful.

CONTENTION OF THE ACCUSED:

That there was no rape because —(a) the hymen of the victim was not lacerated (b) the
victim was allegedly standing while the crime was being committed (c) the victim is still a virgin.

RESOLUTION:

The accused is guilty of rape. The victim being of tender age, the penetration of the male
organ could go only as deep as the labia. In any case, for rape to be committed, full penetration
is not required. It is enough that there is proof of entrance of the male organ within the labia or
pudendum of the female organ. Even the slightest penetration is sufficient to consummate the
crime of rape.
 Perfect penetration, rupture of the hymen or laceration of the vagina are not essential for
the offense of consummated rape. Entry, to the least extent, of the labia or lips of the female
organ is sufficient. Diana's remaining a virgin does not negate rape.

6. People v. Atento, 196 SCRA 357

Facts:

Asked how she felt while she was being raped, the complainant replied: "Masarap."(first line of the full
text, note niyo nalang ba tanungin ni sir gani)

Glenda Aringo, 16-year old mental retardate was repeatedly raped by her neighbor Cesar Atento, and
she later on gave birth to their child. She described the sexual experience as pleasurable.

Contention of the Accused:

Glenda was a girl of loose morals, he says he had twice seen her in sexual congress with a man and that
she had once offered her body to his thirteen year old son for a fee of P5.00.

Resolution:

Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code provides:

Art. 335. When and how rape committed. –– Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a
woman under any of the following circumstances:

1. By using force or intimidation;

2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious and

3. When the woman is under twelve years of age, even though neither of the circumstances
mentioned in the two next preceding paragraphs shall be present.

It has not been clearly established that Atento employed force or threat against Glenda to make her
submit to his lust. Nevertheless, there is no question that Atento is guilty of rape upon Glenda under
paragraph 2, because the girl was deprived of reason. Alternatively, he is liable under paragraph 3,
because his victim had the mentality of a girl less than twelve years old at the time she was raped.

7. People v. Campuhan, 329 SCRA 270 Campuhan GR No. 129433

FACTS:
• April 25, 1996 4 pm: Ma. Corazon P. Pamintuan, mother of 4-year old Crysthel Pamintuan,
went to the ground floor of their house to prepare Milo chocolate drinks for her 2
children. There she met Primo Campuhan, helper of Conrado Plata Jr., brother of Corazon, who
was then busy filling small plastic bags with water to be frozen into ice in the freezer located at
the second floor.
• Then she heard Crysthel cry, "Ayo'ko, ayo'ko!" so she went upstairs and saw Primo
Campuhan inside her children's room kneeling before Crysthel whose pajamas or "jogging pants"
and panty were already removed, while his short pants were down to his knees and his hands
holding his penis with his right hand
• Horrified, she cursed "P - t - ng ina mo, anak ko iyan!" and boxed him several times. He
evaded her blows and pulled up his pants. He pushed Corazon aside who she tried to block his
path. Corazon then ran out and shouted for help thus prompting Vicente, her brother, a cousin
and an uncle who were living within their compound, to chase the Campuhan who was
apprehended. They called the barangay officials who detained.
• Physical examination yielded negative results as Crysthel ‘s hymen was intact

CONTENTION OF THE ACCUSED:

Crysthel was in a playing mood and wanted to ride on his back when she suddenly pulled
him down causing both of them to fall down on the floor.

CONTENTION OF THE STATE:

Guilty of statutory rape, sentenced him to the extreme penalty of death.

ISSUE: W/N it was a consummated statutory rape

HELD:

NO. MODIFIED. guilty of ATTEMPTED RAPE and sentenced to an indeterminate prison term
of eight (8) years four (4) months and ten (10) days of prision mayor medium as minimum, to
fourteen (14) years ten (10) months and twenty (20) days of reclusion temporal medium as
maximum. Costs de oficio. For rape to be consummated, a slight brush or scrape of the penis on
the external layer of the vagina (man’s pubis) will not suffice. There must be sufficient and
convincing proof that the penis indeed touched the labia’s or slid into the female organ, and NOT
merely stroked the external surface thereof. AT LEAST THE LABIA MAJORA MUST BE
ENTERED FOR RAPE TO BE CONSUMMATED.

8. People v. Gallo, 315 SCRA 462

Facts: The appellant, Romeo Gallo, was found guilty and penalized with death penalty for the crime of
qualified rape which he committed against his daughter, Marites Gallo. The said decision of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 68, of Binangonan, Rizal was affirmed by the Supreme Court in its decision
promulgated on 22 January 1998. However, on August 24, 1999, accused- appellant filed a “Motion to Re-
open Case (with Leave of Court)” seeking a modification of the death sentence to reclusion perpetua.
Contention of the Accused: Accused-appellant proffers that the reduction sought by him would be in line
with the new Court rulings which annunciate that the seven attendant circumstances introduced in Section
11 of Republic Act No. 7659 partake of the nature of qualifying circumstances that must be pleaded in the
indictment in order to warrant the imposition of the penalty.
Contention of the State: The Court in the case of People vs. Garcia, speaking through then, Justice Florenz
D. Regalado, ratiocinated that the additional attendant circumstances introduced by R.A. 7659 should be
considered as special qualifying circumstances distinctly applicable to the crime of rape and, if not pleaded
as such, could only be appreciated as generic aggravating circumstances.
COA:
The Court must apply retroactively the Garcia doctrine to the conviction of accused-appellant?
Resolution:
The Office of the Solicitor General, when requested to comment on the aforesaid 24 th August 1999 motion
of accused-appellant, had this to state: Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the law or the Constitution
shall form part of the legal system of the land (Article 8, Civil Code of the Philippines). Medina, which has
the force and effect of law, forms part of our penal statutes and assumes retroactive effect, being as it is,
favorable to an accused who is not a habitual criminal, and notwithstanding that final sentence has already
been pronounced against him (Article 22, Revised Penal Code). Indeed, by operation of law, appellant is
rightfully entitled to the beneficial application of Medina. Accordingly, the Office of the Solicitor General
hereby joins appellant’s prayer for reduction of his sentence from death to reclusion perpetua. The Court
agrees with the Office of the Solicitor General in its above observations and sees merit in its stand to join
accused-appellant in praying for a modification of the sentence from death to reclusion perpetua.

9. PEOPLE vs. RAUL BERANA y GUEVARRA [G.R. No. 123544. July 29, 1999]

Facts:
In June 2, 1994, 14-year old Maria Elena Jarcia was sleeping in the house when she was
awakened by her brother-in-law, Raul Berana. Berana pointed a "buntot page" at her neck and
warned her not to make any noise or otherwise she would be killed.
Elena was made to lie down while Barena removed her clothes, after which he raped her.
The hapless girl was again threatened not to make any noise otherwise he would kill her. Barena
sat down and warned her not to talk to anyone about the incident. He then raped her for the
second time and left after warning her that only the two of them must know about the
incident. During the entire time Barena was raping her, he repeated his threats to kill her should
she make any noise.
After Barena left, Elena put on her clothes and went to the adjacent room to report the
incident to her sister, Ma. Ana. When Ana heard the grim story, she went to Camaligan,
Camarines Sur where their parents had stayed overnight. On the same day, their mother fetched
Elena and accompanied her to the Provincial Hospital for medical examination. After having
been examined, Elena and her mother proceeded to the Sabang Police station in Naga City to
report the incident. Thereafter, Barena was apprehended by the police.
Contention of the State:
Contention of the Defendant:
Barena alleges that the sexual intercourse was consensual. He asserts that while the hymenal
laceration and the presence of spermatozoa prove the fact of sexual intercourse, they do not ipso
facto prove that such act was committed by means of force
Ruling:
Barena's contention is misplaced. The trial court's finding of rape in the case at bar, was not
based solely on the medical findings showing hymenal laceration and the presence of
spermatozoa in the victim's organ. While the excerpt quoted by Barena from the questioned
decision gives the impression that the trial court considered the hymenal laceration and the
presence of spermatozoa in the victim's organ as proof of forcible sexual intercourse, the
decision read in its entirety shows otherwise. The trial court merely considered the medical
findings as corroborative evidence for the complainant's testimony that accused-appellant had
sexual intercourse with her.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Naga City, Branch 25, finding
accused-appellant Raul Berana y Guevarra guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape is
AFFIRMED with the modification that accused-appellant is sentenced to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua. Accused-appellant is ordered to pay complainant Ma. Elena M. Jarcia the
sum of P50,000 by way of civil indemnity and P50,000 as moral damages. Costs against
accused-appellant.

10. People vs. Sabredo, 2000

FACTS:
imposing the penalty of death on accused-appellant, Jimmy Sabredo y Garbo, for the complex
crime of abduction with rape of complainant Judeliza Sabredo.

Appellant is the uncle of complainant. In 1993, Jimmy arrived from Masbate to reside with
Judeliza's family in Cagtagong, Caguyong, Borbon, Cebu, where he stayed with them for more than a
year.
On June 27, 1994, Judeliza went to the well near their house, to take a bath. There, Jimmy
grabbed and forcibly dragged her at knife's point, to the highway where he made her board a truck for
Bogo, Cebu. Impelled by fear, she complied, since Jimmy continuously poked a knife under cover of his
jacket at her. From Bogo, he took her by passenger motorboat to Placer, Masbate.

On July 4, 1994, at around midnight, Jimmy, armed with a blade, sexually assaulted Judeliza. He
covered her mouth to prevent her from shouting. After satisfying his lust, Jimmy inserted three fingers
into her vaginal orifice and cruelly pinched it. Judeliza screamed and cried for help.
Contention of accused: Jimmy admitted having sexual relations with Judeliza, but insisted that it was
consensual, he claimed that they were lovers.

HELD:
It may appear at first blush that forcible abduction, as defined and penalized by Article 342 of
the Revised Penal Code was also committed, we are not totally disposed to convict appellant for the
complex crime of forcible abduction with rape. It is note that while the information sufficiently alleges
the forcible taking of complainant from Cebu to Masbate, the same fails to allege "lewd designs." When
a complex crime under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code is charged, such as forcible abduction with
rape, it is axiomatic that the prosecution must allege and prove the presence of all the elements of
forcible abduction, as well as all the elements of the crime of rape. When appellant, using a blade,
forcibly took away complainant for the purpose of sexually assaulting her, as in fact he did rape her, the
rape may then absorb forcible abduction. Hence, the crime committed by appellant is simple rape only.

11. People vs. Arillas, G.R. No. 130593. June 19, 2000
Facts:

Two cases were consolidated. In the morning of December 23, 1995, Amor Arillas was sweeping their backyard,
then her father called to prepare for breakfast. At that time, her brothers were grazing their carabaos in the
mountains, her sisters were washing clothes in the creek about 300-400 meters away from their house and her
mother was selling soft drinks and bread in the rice fields. While Amor was doing her chores, her father
embraced her and forcibly kissing her. Amor resisted but her father kicked her on the right buttocks and successfully
had carnal knowledge with her. It was Amor’s first time. The appellant then threatened not to tell anyone or
something bad will happen. She was afraid of her father and did not want her family be broken so she did not tell
anyone and hope that the bestial act will not happen.

On February 10, 1996, while preparing for lunch her father again forcibly raped her despite the resistance of
Amor. After the 2nd incident, the father again threatened her not to tell anyone. On April 1, 1996, she finally found the
courage to report the incident. Amor then underwent medical examination and it was learned from Dr. Mylene
Chavez Milla that she has 5 old lacerations. She even testified that Amor’s hymen admits two fingers with ease which
indicates that penetration was made more than once. Romeo Decena, Assistant Civil Registrar, testified that Amor is
under 18 years old. In defense, Romeo Arillas said that on December 23, 1995 he was in the farm and that on
February 10, 1996, he was repairing an irrigation pump in San Jose, Minalabac, Camarines Sur. He also reason that it
was due to ill-motive of his in-laws because he left his brother-in-law drunk during a fiesta in Bula. The Trial Court
found Romeo Arillas guilty. On appeal, Romeo contends that even if his defense is merely denial and alibi, reasonable
doubt exist as to his guilt.

Issue: Is he guilty of rape?

Held: Yes, Romeo Arillas was not able to prove that it was physically impossible for him to be at the commission of
the crime as he was just in the rice field. The positive assertions of his daughter that he raped her are given a greater
weight.
Rationale: The contention of Romeo that the case filed against him were out of ill feeling will not stand. Aside from
the fact that he failed to prove this, it is highly unbelievable for Amor to falsely accused his father just to advance the
ill-feeling of her uncle. The Trial Court is correct in convicting him but they were wrong on sentencing him to death.
TC imposed the penalty of death because Amor was under 18 yrs old at the time of the commission of the crime.
However, in people v Garcia ,it was held that for age as a special qualifying circumstances it must be alleged in the
information and if it is not alleged but proven it will be considered as an aggravating circumstances since the latter
may be proven even if not alleged . It is the fundamental rule that every element of an offense must be alleged in the
complaint. The purpose of the rule is ti enable the accused to prepare his defense. The penalty should be reclusion
perpetua. The TC was also wrong on awarding P 100 000 as actual damage and moral damages because the
prosecution failed to present any evidence regarding actual damages. However Amor is entitled to P50K moral
damages as it requires no proof of mental and physical suffering , P25k as exemplary damages for each raped and
P50k as civil indemnity for each count of rape.

12. People vs. Mahinay G.R. No. 122485. February 1, 1999

Facts:

Appellant was charged with rape with homicide for the sexual assault and death of Maria
Victoria Chan, 12 years old. Evidence disclosed that Maria, on that fateful afternoon, went
to the second floor of the house where appellant was staying. Appellant pulled her hand
and her head hit the table causing her to become unconscious. At this stage, appellant, who
was then drunk, had sexual intercourse with her. He then dumped the still unconscious
victim inside the septic tank and thereafter took flight. The body of the victim was
retrieved the following day wearing only a blouse without underwear. Recovered in the
unfinished house where accused slept on the night of the incident was the victim’s pair of
shorts, brown belt and yellow hair ribbon.

Contention of the state: appellant was charged with rape with homicide in Information
which reads:[2]

"That on or about the 26th day of June 1995 in Valenzuela, Metro Manila and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court the above-named accused, by means of force and
intimidation employed upon the person of MARIA VICTORIA CHAN y CABALLERO, age 12
years old, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously lie with and have sexual
intercourse with said MARIA VICTORIA CHAN y CABALLERO against her will and without
her consent; that on the occasion of said sexual assault, the above-named accused, choke
and strangle said MARIA VICTORIA CHAN y CABALLERO as a result of which, said victim
died.

Contention of the accused: appellant insists that the circumstantial evidence

presented by the prosecution against him is insufficient to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. The police officers allegedly brought him to a big house somewhere in
Manila. There, appellant heard the police officers plan to salvage him if he would not admit
that he was the one who raped and killed the victim. Scared, he executed an extra-judicial
confession. He claimed that he was assisted by Atty. Restituto Viernes only when he was
forced to sign the extra-judicial confession.

Ruling:

Though it is not enough to only have testimonies from credible witnesses to produce
conviction beyond reasonable doubt, the Court gave credence to several circumstantial
evidence, which upon thorough review, were more than enough to prove the guilt of the
appellant beyond reasonable doubt.

At the time of the commission of this heinous act, rape was still considered a crime against
chastity, although under the Anti-Rape Law of 1997 (R.A. No. 8353), rape has since been re-
classified as a crime against persons under Articles 266-A and 266-B, and thus, may be
prosecuted even without a complaint filed by the offended party.

The gravamen of the offense of rape, prior to R.A. 8353, is sexual congress with a woman by
force and without consent. (Under the new law, rape may be committed even by a woman
and the victim may even be a man.) If the woman is under 12 years of age, proof of force
and consent becomes immaterial not only because force is not an element of statutory rape,
but the absence of a free consent is presumed when the woman is below such age.
Conviction will therefore lie, provided sexual intercourse is being proven. But if the woman
is 12 years of age or over at the time she was violated, as in this case, not only the first
element of sexual intercourse must be proven but also the other element that the
perpetrators evil acts with the offended party was done through force, violence,
intimidation or threat needs to be established. Both elements are present in this case.