1 Tacder NatRes
and Luz Sandoval filed an application for a parcel of land, Lot
A. Governing Law
B. Historical
Background
C. Policy
Considerations
D. Regalian Doctrine
Sunbeam Convenience Foods, Inc. vs. CA
FACTS: Sunbeam Convenience Foods, Inc. is the recipient of a
Sales Patent issued by the Bureau of Lands over two parcels of
land in Bataan. An OCT was thereby issued. The Solicitor-General
filed an action for reversion on the ground that the lots were
forest lands and therefore inalienable.
CA ruled, upholding the Solicitor-General's contention.
ISSUE: Whether or not land is alienable
HELD: The SC affirmed.
Our adherence to the Regalian Doctrine subjects all agricultural,
timber, and mineral lands to the dominion of the State. Thus,
before any land may be declassified from the forest group and
converted into alienable or disposable land for agricultural
purposes, there must be a positive act from the Government.
Even rules on the confirmation of imperfect titles do not apply
unless and until the land classified as forest land is released in an
official proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the
disposable agricultural lands of the public domain.
The mere fact that a title was issued by the Director of Lands
does not confer any validity on such title if the property covered
by the title or patent is part of the public forest.
Republic v Sayo
FACTS: The case at bar started at 1961 whe the spouses Casiano
7454 originally party of Santiago but had since then been
transferred to Nueva Vizcaya.
The registration was opposed by Bayaua, Reyes, and the
Philippine Cacao and Farm Products.
The case went on until on 1981, 20 years after, the Heirs of
Sandoval, Heirs of Bayaua, and the Bureau of Lands and Bureau
of Forest Development entered a compromise agreement, which
effectively distributed parts of lot 7454 among the aforesaid
parties and the counsel of the Heirs of Sandoval as attorney's
fees. The compromise agreement was approved by the court and
confirmed the title and ownership of the parties in accordance
with its terms.
Having knowledge of the incident, the Solicitor General filed a
complaint before the court to annul the decision rendered by the
court a quo for being void and made in excess of jurisdiction or
with grave abuse of discretion.
The Solicitor General contended that the the Heirs of Sandoval
et. al. did not present any evidence to support their claims of
ownership or registration, nor did the government agencies
involve have a y authority to enter into the compromise
agreement, and finally, that he was not notified of the
proceedings and so had not opportunity to take part therein.
As for the Heirs of Sandoval et.al.'s contention, they asseverate
that the land is not a public land as the possessory information
title in their name and of their predecessors-in-interest, the pre-
war certification appearing in the Bureau of Archives, and the
fact that the proceeding of the registration was brought under
the Torrens act which presupposes an existing title to be
confirmed, are all evidences that the land is a private land.
ISSUE: W/N the respondent's evidences can be considered as
proof that the lot 7454 is a private land.
RULING: NO. Under the Regalian Doctrine 2 all lands not
otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are
presumed to belong to the State. Hence it is that all applicants in
land registration proceedings have the burden of overcoming the
presumption that the land thus sought to be registered forms

part of the public domain. 3 Unless the applicant succeeds in
showing by clear and convincing evidence that the property
involved was acquired by him or his ancestors either by
composition title from the Spanish Government or by possessory
information title, or any other means for the proper acquisition of
public lands, the property must be held to be part of the public
domain . 4 The applicant must present competent and
persuasive proof to substantiate his claim; he may not rely on
general statements, or mere conclusions of law other than
factual evidence of possession and title. 5
In the proceeding at bar, it appears that the principal document
relied upon and presented by the applicants for registration, to
prove the private character of the large tract of land subject of
their application, was a photocopy of a certification of the
National Library. But, as this Court has already had occasion to
rule, that Spanish document cannot be considered a title to
property, it not being one of the grants made during the Spanish
regime, and obviously not constituting primary evidence of
ownership. 6 It is an inefficacious document on which to base any
finding of the private character of the land in question.
It thus appears that the decision of the Registration Court a
quo is based solely on the compromise agreement of the parties.
But that compromise agreement included private persons who
had not adduced any competent evidence of their ownership
over the land subject of the registration proceeding. Portions of
the land in controversy were assigned to persons or entities who
had presented nothing whatever to prove their ownership of any
part of the land. The assent of the Directors of Lands and Forest
Development to the compromise agreement did not and could
not supply the absence of evidence of title required of the private
respondents.
As to the informacion posesoria invoked by the private
respondents, it should be pointed out that under the Spanish
Mortgage Law, it was considered a mode of acquiring title to
public lands, subject to two (2) conditions: first, the inscription
thereof in the Registry of Property, and second, actual, public,
adverse, and uninterrupted possession of the land for twenty (20)
years (later reduced to ten [10] years); but where, as here, proof
of fulfillment of these conditions is absent, the informacion
posesoria cannot be considered as anything more than prima
facie evidence of possession. 7
2 Tacder NatRes
Finally, it was error to disregard the Solicitor General in the
execution of the compromise agreement and its submission to
the Court for approval. It is, after all, the Solicitor General, who is
the principal counsel of the Government; this is the reason for
our holding that "Court orders and decisions sent to the fiscal,
acting as agent of the Solicitor General in land registration cases,
are not binding until they are actually received by the Solicitor
General."
Seville vs National Development Company
FACTS: On January 14, 1980, Calixtra Yap sold to LSBDA a certain
parcel of lot. LSBDA filed a Miscellaneous Sales Application with
the Bureau of Lands covering said lot together with other lots
acquired by them. After due notice and investigation, a
Miscellaneous Sales Patent was issued in the name of LSBDA, on
the basis of which, an original certificate of title was transcribed
in the registration book on their name.
LSBDA subsequently assigned all its rights over the property to
National Development Company. NDC leased the property to
Philippine Associated Smelting and Refining Corporation,
PHILPHOS and Lepanto Consolidated Mining.
On November 29, 1988, the estate of Joaquin Ortega represented
by judicial administrator Felipe Seville filed a complaint for
recovery of real property, rentals and damages against the
National Development Company. They argued that they acquired
title to the disputed property by acquisitive prescription, because
they and their predecessors in interest had been in possession of
it for more than thirty years.
ISSUE: WON petitioners’ title, allegedly acquired by them through
acquisitive prescription, is valid.
RULING No. Petitioners’ title is not valid.
Under the Regalian Doctrine, all lands of public domain belong to
the state, which the source of any is asserted right to ownership
of land. All lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within
ownership are presumed to belong to the state.
Although it may be true that Section 48, Chapter VIII of the Public
Land Act provides that those who by themselves or through their
predecessor-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive,
and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of

the public domain for at least 30 years could acquire a title
thereto, Section 4 of PD 1073 amended the same to limit its
application to alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain only.
In the case at bar, the Supreme Court reiterated that “unless
public land is shown to have been reclassified or alienated to a
private person by the state, it remains part of the inalienable
public domain. Indeed, occupation thereof in the concept of
owner, no matter how long, cannot ripen into ownership and be
registered as a title.
Absent any showing that the land has been classified as
alienable, their possession thereof, no matter how lengthy,
cannot ripen into ownership. In other words, the petitioners have
not become the owners of the disputed property.
LSBD, who acquired a Miscellaneous Sales Patent over the
subject property, which eventually caused them to have an
Original Certificate of Title for the said land has a valid claim over
the property.
Director of Lands vs Intermediate Appellate Court
FACTS:
 Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., a corp. represented by
Mr. Rodolfo Nazario, acquired from Mariano and Acer Infiel,
members of the Dumagat tribe 5 parcels of land
 possession of the Infiels over the landdates back
before the Philippines was discovered by Magellan
 land sought to be registered is a private land
pursuant to RA 3872 granting absolute ownership to
members of the non-Christian Tribes on land occupied by
them or their ancestral lands, whether with the alienable or
disposable public land or within the public domain
 Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., has introduced
more than P45M worth of improvements
 ownership and possession of the land sought to be
registered was duly recognized by the government when the
Municipal Officials of Maconacon, Isabela
 donated part of the land as the townsite of
Maconacon Isabela
 IAC affirmed CFI: in favor of
ISSUES:
1. W/N the land is already a private land - YES
3 Tacder NatRes
2. W/N the constitutional prohibition against their acquisition
by private corporations or associations applies- NO
HELD: IAC affirmed Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc
1. YES
 already acquired, by operation of law not only a
right to a grant, but a grant of the Government, for
it is not necessary that a certificate of title should
be issued in order that said grant may be
sanctioned by the courts, an application therefore is
sufficient
 it had already ceased to be of the public domain
and had become private property, at least by
presumption
 The application for confirmation is mere formality,
the lack of which does not affect the legal
sufficiency of the title as would be evidenced by the
patent and the Torrens title to be issued upon the
strength of said patent.
 The effect of the proof, wherever made, was not to
confer title, but simply to establish it, as already
conferred by the decree, if not by earlier law
2. NO
 If it is accepted-as it must be-that the land was
already private land to which the Infiels had a
legally sufficient and transferable title on October
29, 1962 when Acme acquired it from said owners, it
must also be conceded that Acme had a perfect
right to make such acquisition
 The only limitation then extant was that
corporations could not acquire, hold or lease public
agricultural lands in excess of 1,024 hectares
United Paracale vs Dela
FACTS: United Paracale Mining Company, Inc. and Coco Grove,
Inc., seek to set aside the Order of dismissal of the case they
filed with the trial court for the ejectment of their respective
defendants from the mining claims which were allegedly
privately owned by them having been located and perfected

under the provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Act No.
624.
Petitioners question the constitutionality of P.D. 1214 and unless
it is successfully assailed, the petitioners will be but mere
applicants for the lease of the mining claims involved and would
thus have no causes of action against private respondents.
ISSUE: Does the location and perfection of the mining claims
under the provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Act No. 624
grant ownership to the petitioners.
HELD: No. In the case of Santa Rosa Mining Company, Inc. vs.
Leido, Jr. 11, the court said that mere location does not mean
absolute ownership over the affected land or the mining claim. It
merely segregates the located land or area from the public
domain by barring other would-be locators from locating the
same and appropriating for themselves the minerals found
therein. To rule otherwise would imply that location is all that is
needed to acquire and maintain rights over a located mining
claim.
Moreover, the court does not agree with petitioners’ contention
that they cannot be placed in equal footing with those who forfeit
all rights by virtue of non-filing of an application within the
prescribed period under PD1214. The court said that while those
who filed their mining lease applications have better rights than
those who forfeited all their right by not filing at all, this,
however, does not amount to any vested right which could be the
basis for their cause of action against herein private respondents.
What is precisely waived is their right to the issuance of a mining
patent upon application. This in effect grants the government the
power, in the exercise of its sound discretion, to award the patent
to the applicant most qualified to explore, develop and exploit
the mineral resources of the country in line with the objectives of
P.D. 463, and not necessarily to the original locator of the mining
4 Tacder NatRes
claim. To sustain their contention that they can question the
award of mining patents to applicants other than them would put
to naught the objectives of P.D. 1214
Republic vs Register of Deeds of Quezon
Regalian Doctrine
Burden of Proof of private ownership rests on plaintiff
Doctrine of indefeasibility of Torrens title, exception
FACTS: Petitioner was awarded a 17-hectare parcel of land, by
virtue of which he was issued an OCT.
Through an investigation conducted by the Bureau of Lands, it
was found that the free patent acquired by Petitioner was
fraudulent. A case for falsification of public documents was filed
by Petitioner was acquitted of the crime.
Subsequently, the Solicitor-General filed a complaint against
Petitioner, praying for the declaration of nullity of the Free Patent
and the OCT.
Petitioner's main contention was that the land in question was no
longer within the unclassified public forest land because by the
approval of his application for Free Patent by the Bureau of
Lands, the land was already alienable and disposable public
agricultural land. He also claimed that the land was a small
portion of Lot 5139, an area which had been declared disposable
public land by the cadastral court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the land is alienable and disposable public
land
HELD: Under the Regalian Doctrine, all lands not otherwise
clearly appearing to be privately-owned are presumed to belong
to the State. Forest lands, like mineral or timber lands which are
public lands, are not subject to private ownership unless they
under the Constitution become private properties. In the absence
of such classification, the land remains unclassified public land
until released therefrom and rendered open to disposition.
The task of administering and disposing lands of the public

domain belongs to the Director of Lands, and ultimately the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. Classification of
public lands is, thus, an exclusive prerogative of the Executive
Department, through the Office of the President. Courts have no
authority to do so.
Thus, in controversies involving the disposition of public
agricultural lands, the burden of overcoming the presumption of
state ownership of lands of the public domain lies upon the
private claimant.
In the present case, Petitioner failed to present clear, positive
and absolute evidence to overcome said presumption and to
support his claim.
Moreover, the fact the Petitioner acquired a title to the land is of
no moment, notwithstanding the indefeasibility of title issued
under the Torrens System. The indefeasibility of a certificate of
title cannot be invoked by one who procured the same by means
of fraud. Fraud here means actual and extrinsic -- an intentional
omission of fact required by law.
Petitioner committed fraud by his failure to state that the land
sought to be registered still formed part of the unclassified forest
lands.
Ituralde vs Falcasantos
FACTS: In 1986, Ramon Ituralde obtained a 6k ha parcel of land in
Basilan Province. Falcasantos, meanwhile, applied with the
Bureau of Lands to grant him the same parcel of land under free
patent. In 1989 the Director of Lands allowed Ituralde to file a
public land application for the subject property. 1990 the trial
court named Ituralde the owner and possessor of the land. The
CA reversed this decision and set aside the trial court’s decision
in Ituralde’s favor as the land was found to be forest land, and
therefore, inalienable. Ituralde, in his appeal to the SC, claims
that since the Director of Lands allowed him to file a public land
application, the said land was no longer part of public domain.
ISSUE: WON the filing of the public land application in 1989 made
the land alienable. NO.
HELD: The CA is their decision found that since 1951, the subject
5 Tacder NatRes
parcel of land was classified as a Forest Reserve Area, and hence,
not capable of private appropriation and occupation. Before any
land may be declassified from the forest group and converted
into alienable or disposable land for agricultural or other
purposes, there must be a positive act from the government.
The filing of the public land application is not such positive act.
The parcel of land retained its public character and it therefore
not susceptible to private ownership. As there was no award or
grant to Ituralde of the land by free patent or other ways of
acquisition, under the concept of jura regalia, the State retains
ownership over the land.
Republic vs. Court of Appeals and dela Rosa
Facts: Jose dela Rosa filed an application for registration of a
parcel of land on his own behalf and on behalf of his children.
This application was separately opposed by Benguet
Consolidated, Inc. (Benguet) and Atok Big Wedge Corporation
(Atok).
The petitioners claimed that they have acquired the land from
their parents and that they have been in possession of the land
ever since. Benguet and Atok opposed on the ground that they
have mineral claims covering the property and had been in
actual, continuous and exclusive possession of the land in
concept of owner.
The trial court denied the application while the Court of Appeals
reversed the decision of the trial court and recognized the claims
of the applicant but subject to the rights of Benguet and Atok
respecting their mining claims. In other words, the Court of
Appeals affirmed the surface rights of the de la Rosas over the
land while at the same time reserving the sub-surface rights of
Benguet and Atok by virtue of their mining claims.
Issue: Whether or not the CA's ruling was correct.
Held: No, the CA was incorrect.
Art. 437. The owner of a parcel of land is the owner of its surface
and of everything under it, and he can construct thereon any
works or make any plantations and excavations which he may
deem proper, without detriment to servitudes and subject to

special laws and ordinances. He cannot complain of the
reasonable requirements of aerial navigation.
Under the theory of the respondent court, the surface owner will
be planting on the land while the mining locator will be boring
tunnels underneath. The farmer cannot dig a well because he
may interfere with the operations below and the miner cannot
blast a tunnel lest he destroy the crops above. How deep can the
farmer, and how high can the miner, go without encroaching on
each other's rights? Where is the dividing line between the
surface and the sub-surface rights?
It is a well-known principle that the owner of piece of land has
rights not only to its surface but also to everything underneath
and the airspace above it up to a reasonable height.
The rights over the land are indivisible and that the land itself
cannot be half agricultural and half mineral. The classification
must be categorical; the land must be either completely mineral
or completely agricultural.
The Regalian doctrine which, as its name implies, is intended for
the benefit of the State, not of private persons. The rule simply
reserves to the State all minerals that may be found in public and
even private land devoted to "agricultural, industrial,
commercial, residential or (for) any purpose other than mining."
Thus, if a person is the owner of agricultural land in which
minerals are discovered, his ownership of such land does not give
him the right to extract or utilize the said minerals without the
permission of the State to which such minerals belong.
The flaw in the reasoning of the respondent court is in supposing
that the rights over the land could be used for both mining and
non-mining purposes simultaneously. The correct
interpretation is that once minerals are discovered in the
land, whatever the use to which it is being devoted at the
time, such use may be discontinued by the State to
enable it to extract the minerals therein in the exercise of
its sovereign prerogative. The land is thus converted to
mineral land and may not be used by any private party, including
the registered owner thereof, for any other purpose that will
impede the mining operations to be undertaken therein. The
Regalian doctrine then extends not only to land but also to “all
natural wealth that may be found in the bowels of the earth.”
6 Tacder NatRes
Heirs of Gozo v. Philippine Union Mission Corp
Facts: Petitioners claim that they are the heirs of Spouses Gozo.
The respondents claim that they own a 5,000 square-meter
portion of the property. The assertion is based on the 28 February
1937 Deed of Donation in favor of respondent Philippine Union
Mission Corporation of the Seventh Day Adventist (PUMCO-SDA).
On the date the Deed of Donation is executed in 1937, the
Spouses Gozo were not the registered owners of the property yet
although they were the lawful possessors thereof. The land in
question was part of the inalienable public domain
RULING: The Deed of Donation was executed by the Spouses
Gozo on 28 February 1937, the subject property was part of the
inalienable public domain. It was only almost after two decades
later or on 5 October 1953 that the State ceded its right over the
land in favor of the Spouses Gozo by granting their patent
application and issuing an original certificate of title in their favor.
Prior to such conferment of title, the Spouses Gozo possessed no
right to dispose of the land which, by all intents and purposes,
belongs to the State.
Under the Regalian doctrine, which is embodied in Article XII,
Section 2 of our Constitution, all lands of the public domain
belong to the State, which is the source of any asserted right to
any ownership of land. All lands not appearing to be clearly
within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State.
Accordingly, public lands not shown to have been reclassified or
released as alienable agricultural land or alienated to a private
person by the State remain part of the inalienable public domain.
The classification of public lands is an exclusive prerogative of
the executive department of the government and not the Courts.
In the absence of such classification, the land remains as an
unclassified land until it is released therefrom and rendered open
to disposition. This is in consonance with the Regalian doctrine
that all lands of the public domain belong to the State and that
the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership in land
and charged with the conservation of such patrimony.
All lands not appearing to be clearly within private ownership are
presumed to belong to the State. Accordingly, all public lands not
shown to have been reclassified or released as alienable

agricultural land or alienated to a private person by the State
remain part of the alienable public domain. As already well-
settled in jurisprudence, no public land can be acquired by
private persons without any grant, express or implied, from the
government; and it is indispensable that the person claiming title
to public land should show that his title was acquired from the
State or any other mode of acquisition recognized by law. To
prove that the land subject of an application for registration is
alienable, the applicant must establish the existence of a positive
act of the government such as a presidential proclamation or an
executive order, an administrative action, investigation reports of
Bureau of Lands investigators, and a legislative act or a statute.
The applicant may also secure a certification from the
Government that the land applied for is alienable and disposable.
It is beyond question that at the time the gratuitous transfer was
effected by the Spouses Gozo on 28 February 1937, the subject
property was part of the public domain and is outside the
commerce of man. It was only on 5 October 1953 that the
ownership of the property was vested by the State to the
Spouses Gozo by virtue of its issuance of the OCT pursuant to the
Homestead Patent granted by the President of the Philippines on
22 August 1953. Hence, the donation of the subject property
which took place before 5 October 1953 is null and void from the
very start.
As a void contract, the Deed of Donation produces no legal effect
whatsoever. Quod nullum est, nullum producit effectum. That
which is a nullity produces no effect Logically, it could not have
transferred title to the subject property from the Spouses Gozo to
PUMCO-SDA and there can be no basis for the church's demand
for the issuance of title under its name. Neither does the church
have the right to subsequently dispose the property nor invoke
acquisitive prescription to justify its occupation. A void contract is
not susceptible to ratification, and the action for the declaration
of absolute nullity of such contract is imprescriptible.
Imperium vs Dominium
Lee Hong Kok vs. David
Distinction between IMPERIUM and DOMINIUM
Only the government can question a void certificate of title
issued pursuant to a government grant.
7 Tacder NatRes
FACTS: This is regarding a piece of land which Aniano David
acquired lawful title thereto, pursuant to his miscellaneous sales
application. After approval of his application, the Director of
Lands issued an order of award and issuance of sales patent,
covering said lot by virtue of which the Undersecretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources issued a Miscellaneous Sales
Patent. The Register of Deeds then issued an original certificate
of title to David.
During all this time, Lee Hong Kok did not oppose nor file any
adverse claim.
ISSUE: Whether or not Lee Hong Kok may question the
government grant
HELD: Only the Government, represented by the Director of
Lands or the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, can
bring an action to cancel a void certificate of title issued pursuant
to a void patent. This was not done by said officers but by private
parties like the plaintiffs, who cannot claim that the patent and
title issued for the land involved are void since they are not the
registered owners thereof nor had they been declared as owners
in the cadastral proceedings after claiming it as their private
property.
The fact that the grant was made by the government is
undisputed. Whether the grant was in conformity with the law or
not is a question which the government may raise, but until it is
raised by the government and set aside, the defendant cannot
question it. The legality of the grant is a question between the
grantee and the government.
IMPERIUM vs. DOMINIUM:
The government authority possessed by the State which is
appropriately embraced int eh concept of sovereignty comes
under the heading of imperium; its capacity to own or acquire
property under dominium. The use of this term is appropriate
with reference to lands held by the State in its proprietary
character. In such capacity, it may provide for the exploitation
and use of lands and other natural resources, including their
disposition, except as limited by the Constitution.

IPRA Law
1. Ancestral Lands and
Ancestral Domains
2. Constitutionality of the
IPRA LAW
3. Native Title: Exception
to Jura Regalia
Cruz vs Secretary of DENR
FACTS: Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa filed a suit for
prohibition and mandamus as citizens and taxpayers, assailing
the constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act No.
8371, otherwise known as the Indigenous People’s Rights Act of
1997 (IPRA) and its implementing rules and regulations (IRR). The
petitioners assail certain provisions of the IPRA and its IRR on the
ground that these amount to an unlawful deprivation of the
State’s ownership over lands of the public domain as well as
minerals and other natural resources therein, in violation of the
regalian doctrine embodied in section 2, Article XII of the
Constitution.
ISSUE: Do the provisions of IPRA contravene the Constitution?
HELD: No, the provisions of IPRA do not contravene the
Constitution. Examining the IPRA, there is nothing in the law that
grants to the ICCs/IPs ownership over the natural resources
within their ancestral domain. Ownership over the natural
resources in the ancestral domains remains with the State and
the rights granted by the IPRA to the ICCs/IPs over the natural
resources in their ancestral domains merely gives them, as
owners and occupants of the land on which the resources are
found, the right to the small scale utilization of these resources,
and at the same time, a priority in their large scale development
and exploitation.
Additionally, ancestral lands and ancestral domains are not part
of the lands of the public domain. They are private lands and
belong to the ICCs/IPs by native title, which is a concept of
8 Tacder NatRes
private land title that existed irrespective of any royal grant from
the State. However, the right of ownership and possession by the
ICCs/IPs of their ancestral domains is a limited form of ownership
and does not include the right to alienate the same.
Cariño vs Insular Government
Facts: Mateo Carino(appellant) filed his petition in the Court of
Land Registration to be granted a parcel of land consisting of 40
Hectares,1are and 13 Centares in Baguio, Province of Benguet
together with a house erected thereon . It was granted , but the
Government of the Philippines and also on behalf of the United
States averred having taken possession of the property for public
and military purposes, Respondents also asserted that they had
title to all the land in the Philippines except to permit private
lands to be acquired and no prescription runs against the Spanish
crown. The US succeeded the title of Spain through Treaty of
Paris and Mateo’s land was not registered and that he had lost
all his rights and now is deemed to be a mere trespasser. Then
the Court of First Instance dismissed the application for Mateo
since he did not possessed the land since time immemorial and
the land was property of the Government. The decision was
affirmed by the Philippine Supreme Court. Thus the case was
brought to the US Supreme Court by virtue of Writ of
Error(general method of bringing cases to this court, an appeal
the exception, confined to equity in the main.
Mateo Carino in his appeal stated that he is an Igorot of the
Province of Benguet, they have owned the land for more than 50
years before the Treaty of Paris ,they all had been recognized as
owners by the Igorots and had inherited or received his land from
his father in accordance with Igorot custom. However, no
document of title had been issued from the Spanish Crown
Issue : WON Carino owns the land.
Held : Yes
The US Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Philippine
Supreme Court.
Mateo Carino should be granted what he seeks and should not
be deprived of what by the practice and belief of those among
whom he lived, was his property, through a refined interpretation
of an almost forgotten law of Spain.
The grant to the plaintiff was the result of the principle of

Prescription as mentioned in the royal cedula of 1754 states : “
Where such possessors shall not be able to produce title deeds,
it shall be sufficient if they s hall show that ancient possession,
as a valid title by prescription” . Moreover, the Decree of June 25,
1880 states that possessors for certain time shall be deemed
owners, if a cultivated land 20 years, if uncultivated 30 years.
Mateo’s father was the owner of the land by the very terms of
this decree- by Organic Act of July 1, 1902 ,all the property and
rights acquired there by the United States are to be administered
“for the benefit of the inhibitants thereof.”
Reservations of lands of the public domain are
valid assertions of Regalian Right
Acting Registrars of Land Titles and Deeds of Pasay City
vs. Regional Trial Court Branch 57 Makati
FACTS:
On November 5, 1985, Domingo Palomares, as administrator of
the heirs of Delfin Casal, commenced suit with the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 132, Makati, Metro Manila for declaratory relief,
quieting of title, cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title No.
192, and cancellation of entries upon Original Certificate of Title
No. 291.
However, during the trial the court found hard evidence on
record that: (1) the property covered by OCT No. 291 had been
conveyed to the United States of America; (2) it had been later
ceded to the Republic of the Philippines; and (3) as a
consequence, OCT No. 291 was cancelled upon final orders of
Judge Ostrand.
During the pendency of the case also, Proclamation No. 192
(“RESERVING FOR THE VETERANS CENTER SITE PURPOSES
CERTAIN PARCEL OF LAND OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN SITUATED IN
THE PROVINCE OF RIZAL, ISLAND OF LUZON”) and Proclamation
No. 423 (“RESERVING FOR MILITARY PURPOSES CERTAIN PARCELS
OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN SITUATED IN THE MUNICIPALITY OF
PASIG, TAGUIG, AND PARAÑAQUE, PROVINCE OF RIZAL, AND
PASAY CITY”) were issued by the government.
ISSUE:
9 Tacder NatRes
Whether or not, Proclamation 192 and 423 were valid in
the absence of proof of ownership of the property by the
government?
HELD:
Yes. Such proclamations have the character of official
assertions of ownership, and the presumption is that they have
been issued by right of sovereignty and in the exercise of the
State’s dominical authority. We take not only judicial notice
thereof but accept the same as a valid asseveration of regalian
right over property.
Civil Law; Ownership; Public Land; Presumption of ownership
issued by right of sovereignty.·Proclamation No. 192 (“RESERVING
FOR THE VETERANS CENTER SITE PURPOSES CERTAIN PARCEL OF
LAND OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN SITUATED IN THE PROVINCE OF
RIZAL, ISLAND OF LUZON”) and Proclamation No. 423
(“RESERVING FOR MILITARY PURPOSES CERTAIN PARCELS OF THE
PUBLIC DOMAIN SITUATED IN THE MUNICIPALITY OF PASIG,
TAGUIG, AND PARAÑAQUE, PROVINCE OF RIZAL, AND PASAY
CITY”) have the character of official assertions of ownership, and
the presumption is that they have been issued by right of
sovereignty and in the exercise of the State’s dominical authority.
We take not only judicial notice thereof but accept the same as a
valid asseveration of regalian right over property
Owners of property over which reconveyance is asserted are
indispensable parties. While there is no presumption that
property is Government property until otherwise shown, because
the law recognizes private ownership, thus: Art. 425. Property of
private ownership, besides the patrimonial property of the State,
provinces, cities, and municipalities, consists of all property
belonging to private persons, either individually or collectively.
We find hard evidence on record that: (1) the property covered
by OCT No. 291 had been conveyed to the United States of
America; (2) it had been later ceded to the Republic of the
Philippines; and (3) as a consequence, OCT No. 291 was
cancelled upon final orders of Judge Ostrand.
Classification of Lands
a) Constitution (Sec 3-5 Art XII) Constitution (Sec 3-5 Art XII)
b) Public Land Act
c) Classification of Public Lands Open to Disposition
d) Classification of Lands an Executive Privilege
e) Public Land vs Government

Palomo v. Court of Appeals
FACTS: In 1913, some 440,530 square meters of land in Albay
were reserved for provincial park purposes by virtue of EO No.
40. Of said area, 15 parcels of land were registered in the name
of Diego Palomo by the Court of First Instance.
In 1937, Diego Palomo donated these lands to his heirs Ignacio
and Carmen Palomo. Claiming that the aforesaid original
certificates of title were lost during the Japanese occupation,
Ignacio Palomo filed a petition for reconstitution with the Court of
First Instance of Albay on May 30, 1950. The Register of Deeds of
Albay issued Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 3911, 3912, 3913
and 3914 sometime in October 1953.
On July 10, 1954, President Magsaysay issued Proclamation No.
47 converting the area covered by EO 40 into the Tiwi Hot Spring
National Park. The Palomos contended that they have been in
possession of the subject lands and have introduced
improvements thereon.
ISSUE: Were the Original Certificate of Titles issued to the
petitioners valid? –NO
HELD Before the Treaty of Paris in 1899, the lands, whether
agricultural, mineral, or forest were under the exclusive
patrimony and dominion of the Spanish crown.Private ownership
of land could only be acquired through royal concessions which
were documented in various forms, such as (1) Titulo Real or
Royal Grant," (2) Concession Especial or Special Grant, (3) Titulo
de Compra or Title by Purchase and (4) Informacion Posesoria or
Possessory Information title obtained under the Spanish
Mortgage Law or under the Royal Decree of January 26, 1889.
The decision of the CFI relied upon by petitioners were not signed
by the judge but were merely certified copies of notification to
Diego Palomo bearing the signature of the Clerk of Court.
More importantly, the lands in question were not classified as
alienable lands. Since the lands were made part of a reservation
for provincial park purposes, they form part of the forest zone.
Thus, they cannot be the valid subject of alienation.
10 Tacder NatRes
Republic vs Candy Maker Inc
FACTS: On April, 29, 1999, Antonia, Eladia, and Felisa, all
surnamed Cruz, executed a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of
Candy Maker, Inc. for a parcel of land located below the
reglementary lake elevation of 12.50m, about 900 meters away
the Laguna de Bay. Candy Maker, Inc. as applicant, filed an
application with the MTC of Taytay, Rizal for registration of its
alleged title over the lot. The CENRO of Antipolo City declared the
land to fall within the alienable and disposable zone. On the other
hand, the Land Registration Authority recommended the
exclusion of lot no. 3138-B on the ground that it is a legal
easement and intended for public use, hence, inalienable and
indisposable. On July 2001, the Republic of the Philippines, the
Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) filed its opposition
which alleged that the lot subject of the application for
registration may not be alienated and disposed since it is
considered part of the Laguna Lake Bed, a public land within, its
jurisdiction.
ISSUE: Whether the property subject of the amended application
is alienable and disposable property of the State, and if so,
whether respondent adduced the requisite quantum of evidence
to prove its ownership over the property?
Held: The property subject of this application was alienable and
disposable public agricultural land. However, respondent failed to
prove that it possesses registrable title over the property. The
statute of limitations with regard to public agricultural lands does
not operate against the statute unless the occupant proves
possession and occupation of the same after a claim of
ownership for the required number of years to constitute a grant
from the State. A mere casual cultivation of portions of the land
by the claimant does not constitute sufficient basis for a claim of
ownership, such possession is not exclusive and notorious as to
give rise to presumptive grant from the state. In light of the
foregoing, the petition of the Republic of the Philippines is
granted.
Chavez vs Public Estates Authority
FACTS: President Marcos through a presidential decree
created PEA, which was tasked with the development,

improvement, and acquisition, lease, and sale of all kinds of
lands. The then president also transferred to PEA the foreshore
and offshore lands of Manila Bay under the Manila-Cavite Coastal
Road and Reclamation Project.
Thereafter, PEA was granted patent to the reclaimed areas
of land and then, years later, PEA entered into a JVA with AMARI
for the development of the Freedom Islands. These two
entered into a joint venture in the absence of any public
bidding.
Later, a privilege speech was given by Senator
President Maceda denouncing the JVA as the grandmother of all
scams. An investigation was conducted and it was concluded
that the lands that PEA was conveying to AMARI were lands of
the public domain; the certificates of title over the
Freedom Islands were void; and the JVA itself was illegal. This
prompted Ramos to form an investigatory committee on the
legality of the JVA.
Petitioner now comes and contends that the government
stands to lose billions by the conveyance or sale of the
reclaimed areas to AMARI. He also asked for the full
disclosure of the renegotiations happening between the parties.
ISSUE: W/N stipulations in the amended JVA for the transfer
to AMARI of the lands, reclaimed or to be reclaimed, violate the
Constitution.
HELD: The ownership of lands reclaimed from foreshore and
submerged areas is rooted in the Regalian doctrine, which holds
that the State owns all lands and waters of the public domain.
The 1987 Constitution recognizes the Regalian doctrine. It
declares that all natural resources are owned by the State
and except for alienable agricultural lands of the public
domain, natural resources cannot be alienated.
The Amended JVA covers a reclamation area of 750 hectares.
Only 157.84 hectares of the 750 hectare reclamation project
11 Tacder NatRes
have been reclaimed, and the rest of the area are still submerged
areas forming part of Manila Bay. Further, it is provided that
AMARI will reimburse the actual costs in reclaiming the areas
of land and it will shoulder the other reclamation costs to be
incurred.
The foreshore and submerged areas of Manila Bay are part of the
lands of the public domain, waters and other natural
resources and consequently owned by the State. As such,
foreshore and submerged areas shall not be alienable unless
they are classified as agricultural lands of the public domain.
The mere reclamation of these areas by the PEA doesn’t convert
these inalienable natural resources of the State into alienable
and disposable lands of the public domain. There must be a law
or presidential proclamation officially classifying these
reclaimed lands as alienable and disposable if the law has
reserved them for some public or quasi-public use.
Public Land Act
Classification of Public Lands Open to Disposition
Alba vs Court of Appeals
FACTS:
In 1958, Lachica filed an application for title to a 4,485 sq.m.
parcel of land which he had acquired through purchase dating
back to 1945. However, some parties filed their opposition
thereto invoking that they are owners of some parts of land
within the total area applied for. The lower court ruled in favor
of Lachica and held, among others, that Lachica had been in
actual, open and continuous possession of the subject land in the
concept of owner since 1945 and thus had acquired it through
prescription.
ISSUE:
Did Lachica acquire the subject property by prescription?
RULING:
The Court ruled on the negative.

Based from the facts and evidences presented, it was proven that
Lachicha only had a title to a 620sq.m. portion of the total area.
Prescription cannot be had on the remaining area as the Court
held that the law applicable in this case is Sec. 48 of CA 141 (wc
deals with registration of lands of public domain) and not Sec. 19
of Act 496 (wc deals with registration of private lands) and with
which the lower courts had relied on.
The law in force at the time an action accrues is what governs
the proceeding consistent with the fundamental dictum that laws
shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is proved. In
this case, the lower courts relied on the provisions on prescription
with the assumption that the subject property is a private land.
However, the application for registration should be that of a
judicial confirmation of an imperfect title considering that the
land is presumed under the Regalian Doctrine to be part of the
public domain.
Public lands are classified into
1. alienable or disposable lands which includes agricultural
lands and
2. inalienable or non-disposable lands or those not
susceptible of private appropriation which includes Timber
lands and Mineral lands. For purposes of administration
and disposition, the lands of the public domain classified
as "disposable" or "alienable" are further sub-classified
into
a) Agricultural;
b) Residential, commercial, industrial or for similar
productive purposes;
c) Educational, charitable or other similar purposes,
and
d) Reservations for town sites and for public and
quasi-public purposes.
Possession of public agricultural land, however long the period
may have extended, never confers title thereto upon the
possessor and it is because the statute of limitations with regard
to public agricultural land does not operate against the State,
unless the occupant can prove possession and occupation of the
same under claim of ownership for the required number of years
12 Tacder NatRes
to constitute a grant from the State.
Under (b), Sec. 48, CA 141, confirmation of an imperfect title to a
public domain requires that:
1. There be an open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the
public domain;
2. It should be under a bona fide claim of ownership; and
3. possession should be for at least thirty years immediately
preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of
title except when prevented by war or force majeure
In this case, Lachica had not yet satisfied the requirement of the
30 years possession, hence, prescription cannot be granted in
favor of him.
Classification of Land an Executive Privilege
Republic vs Imperial
FACTS: On September 12, 1917, the late Elias Imperial was
issued Original Certificate of Title (OCT) 408 (500) pursuant to
Decree No. 55173 of then Court of First Instance of Albay. OCT
No. 55173 was subdivided and further subdivided resulting in the
issuance of several titles, which are now the subjects of herein
petition in the name of private respondents. Petitioner Republic
of the Philippines filed a case with the trial court to judicially
declare the Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) issued to herein
private respondents null and void on the ground that the subject
land, on which the OCT was based, has the features of a
foreshore land based on an investigation conducted by the DENR,
Region V, Legazpi City. Respondents, on the other hand contend
that Director of Lands found Jose Baritua's land covered by TCT
No.18655, which stemmed from OCT 408(500), to be "definitely
outside of the foreshore area."
Within the time for pleading, private respondents EANCRA
Corporation, Lolita Alcazar and Salvador Alcazar filed their
answer with cross-claim, while the rest, namely, Felix S. Imperial,

Feliza S. Imperial, Elias S. Imperial and Miriam S. Imperial filed a
motion to dismiss. They contended that the adjudication by the
cadastral court is binding against the whole world including the
Republic since the cadastral proceedings are in rem and the
government itself through the Director of Lands instituted the
proceedings and was a direct and active participant therein.
Petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed an
objection to the motion to dismiss. After hearing the motion to
dismiss, the trial court dismissed the complaint on the ground
that the judgment rendered by the cadastral court in G.R. Cad.
Rec. No. 88 and the Courts resolution in the petition to quiet title,
G.R. 85770, both decreed that the parcel of land covered by OCT
No. 408 (500) was not foreshore. Petitioner appealed to the Court
of Appeals. The appellate court denied petitioners motion for
reconsideration for lack of merit and for failure to file the
appellants brief within the extended period granted to petitioner.
Hence, the present petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petition should be granted.
HELD: Yes.
At the core of the controversy is whether the parcels of land in
question are foreshore lands. Foreshore land is a part of the
alienable land of the public domain and may be disposed of only
by lease and not otherwise. It was defined as "that part (of the
land) which is between high and low water and left dry by the
flux and reflux of the tides." It is also known as "a strip of land
that lies between the high and low water marks and, is
alternatively wet and dry according to the flow of the tide."
The classification of public lands is a function of the executive
branch of government, specifically the director of lands (now the
director of the Lands Management Bureau). The decision of the
director of lands when approved by the Secretary of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) as to
questions of fact is conclusive upon the court.
There is allegedly a conflict between the findings of the Director
of Lands and the DENR, Region V, in the present case.
Respondents contend that the Director of Lands found Jose
Baritua's land covered by TCT No.18655, which stemmed from
OCT 408(500), to be "definitely outside of the foreshore area."
Petitioner, on the other hand, claims that subsequent
13 Tacder NatRes
investigation of the DENR, Region V, Legazpi City, disclosed that
the land covered by OCT No. 408 (500) from whence the titles
were derived "has the features of a foreshore land." The
contradictory views of the Director of Lands and the DENR,
Region V, Legazpi City, on the true nature of the land, which
contradiction was neither discussed nor resolved by the RTC,
cannot be the premise of any conclusive classification of the land
involved.
The need, therefore, to determine once and for all whether the
lands subject of petitioner's reversion efforts are foreshore lands
constitutes good and sufficient cause for relaxing procedural
rules and granting the third and fourth motions for extension to
file appellant's brief. Petitioner's appeal presents an exceptional
circumstance impressed with public interest and must then be
given due course.
In the case at bar, the need to determine once and for all
whether the lands subject of petitioners reversion efforts are
foreshore lands constitutes good and sufficient cause for relaxing
the procedural rules and granting the third and fourth motions for
extensions to file appellants brief. Petitioner Republics appeal
presented an exceptional circumstance impressed with public
interest which in the Courts discretion must be given due course.
Director of Lands vs CA and Bisnar
Facts: In their joint application for registration of title to two (2)
parcels of land filed on July 20, 1976, the applicants Ibarra and
Amelia Bisnar claimed to be the owners in fee simple of Lots 866
and 870 of the Pilar Cadastra, containing an area of 28 hectares
(284,424 sq.m.) and 34 hectares (345,385 sq.m.) situated in
barrio Gen. Hizon, Municipality of President Roxas, Province of
Capiz (p. 14, Rollo). The applicants alleged that they inherited
those parcels of land (p. 41, Rollo) and they had been paying the
taxes thereon (p. 40, Rollo). The Director of Lands and the
Director of the Bureau of Forest Development, opposed the
application. On February 24, 1977, the applicants filed an
amended application, which was approved on March 14, 1977,
and included the following allegation: "Should the Land
Registration Act invoked be not applicable to the case, they
hereby apply for the benefits of Chapter 8, Commonwealth Act
141, as amended, as they and their predecessors-in-interest

have been in possession of the land as owners for more than fifty
(50) years." (p. 16, Rollo.) After hearing, the trial court ordered
the registration of the title of the lots in the names of the
applicants, herein private respondents. On appeal, the Appellate
Court affirmed the trial court's decision.
Issue: Whether the lots in question may be registered under
Section 48(b) of CA 141
Ruling: In the case of Bureau of Forestry vs. Court of Appeals, 153
SCRA 351, we ruled:
"As provided for under Section 6 of Commonwealth Act 141,
which was lifted from Act 2874, the classification or
reclassification of public lands into alienable or disposable,
mineral or forest lands is now a prerogative of the Executive
Department of the government and not the courts. With these
rules, there should be no more room for doubt that it is not the
court which determines the classification of lands of the public
domain into agricultural, forest or mineral but the Executive
Branch of the government, through the Office of the President.
Hence, it was grave error and/or abuse of discretion for
respondent court to ignore the uncontroverted facts that (1) the
disputed area is within a timberland block, and (2) as certified to
by the then Director of Forestry, the area is needed for forest
purposes." (pp. 21-22, Rollo.)
It bears emphasizing that a positive act of the government is
needed to declassify land which is classified as forest and to
convert it into alienable or disposable land for agricultural or
other purposes (Republic vs. Animas, 56 SCRA 499). Unless and
until the land classified as forest is released in an official
proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the
disposable agricultural lands of the public domain, the rules on
confirmation of imperfect title do not apply.
Thus, possession of forest lands, however long, cannot ripen into
private ownership.
Section 48 (b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended,
applies exclusively to public agricultural land. Forest lands or
areas covered with forests are excluded (p. 26, Rollo).
We reiterate our ruling in Amunategui that: "In confirmation of
14 Tacder NatRes
imperfect title cases, the applicant shoulders the burden of
proving that he meets the requirements of Section 48,
Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended by Republic Act 1942.
He must overcome the presumption that the land he is applying
for is part of the public domain but that he has an interest therein
sufficient to warrant registration in his name because of an
imperfect title such as those derived from old spanish grants or
that he has had continuous, open and notorious possession and
occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain under a
bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership for at least thirty (30)
years preceding the filing of his application." (Heirs of
Amunategui vs. Director of Forestry, 126 SCRA 69.)
ALIENABLE OR DISPOSABLE PUBLIC LANDS; CLASSIFICATION OR
RECLASSIFICATION THEREOF AS PREROGATIVE OF THE
EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT. "As provided for under Section 6 of
Commonwealth Act 141, which was lifted from Act 2874, the
classification or reclassification of public lands into alienable or
disposable, mineral or forest lands is now a prerogative of the
Executive Department of the government and not the courts.
With these rules, there should be no more room for doubt that it
is not the court which determines the classification of lands of
the public domain into agricultural, forest or mineral but the
Executive Branch of the government, through the Office of the
President.
POSITIVE ACT OF THE GOVERNMENT NEEDED TO DECLASSIFY
LAND INTO ALIENABLE LAND FOR AGRICULTURAL OR OTHER
PURPOSES. — It bears emphasizing that a positive act of the
government is needed to declassify land which is classified as
forest and to convert it into alienable or disposable land for
agricultural or other purposes (Republic v. Animas, 56 SCRA 499).
Unless and until the land classified as forest is released in an
official proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the
disposable agricultural lands of the public domain, the rules on
confirmation of imperfect title do not apply.
1. the classification or reclassification of public lands into
alienable or disposable agricultural land, mineral land or forest
land is a prerogative of the Executive Department of the
government and not of the courts;
2. that possession of forest lands, no matter how long, cannot
ripen into private ownership; and
3. that an applicant for registration of title has the burden of

proving that he meets the requirements of Section 48 of Com.
Act No. 141, as amended.
Public Land vs Government Land
Montano vs Insular Government
Facts: Isabelo Montano presented a petition to the Court of Land
Registration for the inscription of a piece of land in the barrio of
Libis, municipality of Caloocan, used as a fishery having a
superficial area of 10,805 square meters, and bounded as set out
in the petition; its value according to the last assessment being
$505.05, United States currency. This petition was opposed by
the Solicitor-General in behalf of the Director of Lands, and by
the entity known asObras Pias de la Sagrada Mitra, the former on
the ground that the land in question belonged to the Government
of the United States, and the latter, that it was the absolute
owner of all the dry land along the eastern boundary of the said
fishery. The Court of Land Registration in its decision of
December 1, 1906, dismissed the said oppositions without costs
and decreed, after a general entry by default, the adjudication
and registration of the property described in the petition, in favor
of Isabelo Montano y Marcial. From this decision only counsel for
the Director of Public Lands appealed to this court. and precisely
Isabelo Montano sought title thereon on the strength of 10 years'
occupation pursuant to paragraph 6, section 5 of Act 926 of the
Philippine Commission
Issue: Whether or not the land in question can be acquired by
Montano
Held: Accordingly, "government land" and "public domain" are
not synonymous items. The first includes not only the second,
but also other lands of the Government already reserved or
devoted to public use or subject to private right. In other words,
the Government owns real estate which is part of the "public
lands" and other real estate which is not part thereof.
Government property was of two kinds — first, that of public use
or service, said to be of public ownership, and second, that of
having a private character or use. (Civil Code, arts. 339 and 340.)
Lands of the first class, while they retain their public character
are inalienable. Those of the second are not. Therefore, there is
15 Tacder NatRes
much real property belonging to the Government which is not
affected by statutes for the settlement, prescription or sale of
public lands. Examples in point are properties occupied by public
buildings or devoted to municipal or other governmental uses.
It is settled that the general legislation of Congress in respect to
public lands does not extend to tide lands. It provided that the
scrip might be located on the unoccupied and unappropriated
public lands. As said in Newhall vs. Sanger (92 U.S. 761, 763.) A
marshland which is inundated by the rise of tides belong to the
State and is not susceptible to appropriation by occupation, has
no application in the present case inasmuch as in said case the
land subject matter of the litigation was not yet titled
Modes of Disposition
a) Homestead Settlement
b) Sale of Public Agricultural Land
c) Lease
d) Confirmation of Imperfect Title
e) Non-registrable Land
f) Administrative Legalization
g) Special Patents
Modes of Disposition
Lee Hong Hok vs David
DOCTRINE: Imperium distinguished from dominum. The
government authority possessed by the state which is
appropriately embraced in the concept of sovereignty comes
under the heading of imperium; and its capacity to own or
acquire property under dominium. The use of this term is
appropriate with reference to lands held by the state in its
proprietary character. In such capacity, it may provide for the
exploitation and use of lands and other natural resources,
including their disposition, except as limited by the Constitution.
FACTS: Petitioners Lee Hong Hok et al. claim that the Torrens Title
of Respondent David over the disputed land (which is part of the

Naga Cadastre) should be declared null and void. The CA found
no legal justification for nullifying the right of David over the
disputed land arising from the grant made in his favor by
appropriate public officials.
David had acquired lawful title over said land. The Director of
Lands awarded him an order for issuance of a sales patent
pursuant to his miscellaneous sales application. Subsequently, on
the basis of such order, the Undersecretary of Agricultural and
Natural Resources issued a Miscellaneous Sales Patent and an
OCT was issued by the Register of Deeds of Naga City in favor of
the respondent.
ISSUE: WON the State can dispose of lands which have not
passed into private ownership.
HELD: In this case the land in question is not private property as
the Director of Lands and the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources have always sustained the public character
thereof for having been formed by reclamation.
It is well-settled "that no public land can be acquired by private
persons without any grant, express or implied, from the
government." It is indispensable then that there be a showing of
a title from the state or any other mode of acquisition recognized
by law.
In the case at bar, a Miscellaneous Sales Patent and OCT was
issued in favor of respondent David by competent public officials.
He had acquired the grant and title legally. The notices regarding
the auction sale of the land were published, the actual sale and
award thereof to David were not clandestine but open and public
official acts of an officer of the Government. The application was
merely a renewal of his deceased wife's application, and the said
deceased occupied the land since 1938.
(The first paragraph of Section 2, Article XII says that “all lands of
the public domain x x x and other natural resources are owned
by the state,”)
A grant by the government through duly competent public
officials cannot be disregarded on the premise that land not
passing into private ownership may not be disposed of by the
state.
16 Tacder NatRes
In discussing the concept of jura regalia, the Supreme Court said:
“As there are overtones indicative of skepticism, if not of outright
rejection, of the well-known distinction in public law between the
government authority possessed by the state which is
appropriately embraced in the concept of sovereignty, and its
capacity to own or acquire property, it is not inappropriate to
pursue the matter further. The former comes under the heading
of imperium and the latter of dominium. The use of this term is
appropriate with reference to lands held by the state in its
proprietary character. In such capacity, it may provide for the
exploitation and use of lands and other natural resources,
including their disposition, except as limited by the Constitution.
Dean Pound did speak of the confusion that existed during the
medieval era between such two concepts, but did note the
existence of res publicae as a corollary to dominium. As far as
the Philippines was concerned, there was a recognition by Justice
Holmes in Cariño v. Insular Government, a case of Philippine
origin, that "Spain in its earlier decrees embodied the universal
feudal theory that all lands were held from the Crown . . ."
That was a manifestation of the concept of jura regalia, which
was adopted by the present Constitution, ownership however
being vested in the state as such rather than the head thereof.
What was stated by Holmes served to confirm a much more
extensive discussion of the matter in the leading case of
Valenton v. Murciano, decided in 1904. One of the royal decrees
cited was incorporated in the Recopilacion de Leyes de las Indias
in these words: "We having acquired in sovereignty over the
Indies, and all lands, territories, and possessions not heretofore
ceded away by our royal predecessors, or by us, or in our name,
still pertaining to the royal crown and patrimony, it is our will that
all lands which are held without proper and true deeds of grant
be restored to us according as they belong to us, in order that
after reserving before all what to us or to our viceroys,
audiencias, and governors may seem necessary for public
squares, ways, pastures, and commons in those places which are
peopled, taking into consideration not only their present
condition, but also their future and their probable increase, and
after distributing to the natives what may be necessary for tillage
and pasturage, confirming them in what they now have and
giving them more if necessary, all the rest of said lands may

remain free and unencumbered for us to dispose of as we may
wish."
It could therefore be affirmed in Montano v. Insular Government
that "as to the unappropriated public lands constituting the
public domain the sole power of legislation is vested in Congress,
. . ." They continue to possess that character until severed
therefrom by state grant. Where, as in this case, it was found by
the Court of Appeals that the disputed lot was the result of
reclamation, its being correctly categorized as public land is
undeniable. What was held in Heirs of Datu Pendatun v. Director
of Lands finds application. Thus: "There being no evidence
whatever that the property in question was ever acquired by the
applicants or their ancestors either by composition title from the
Spanish Government or by possessory information title or by any
other means for the acquisition of public lands, the property must
be held to be public domain." For it is well-settled "that no public
land can be acquired by private persons without any grant,
express or implied, from the government." It is indispensable
then that there be a showing of a title from the state or any other
mode of acquisition recognized by law. The most recent
restatement of the doctrine, found in an opinion of Justice J.B.L.
Reyes, follows: "The applicant, having failed to establish his right
or title over the northern portion of Lot No. 463 involved in the
present controversy, and there being no showing that the same
has been acquired by any private person from the Government,
either by purchase or by grant, the property is and remains part
of the public domain." To repeat, the second assignment of error
is devoid of merit.”
Director of Land vs CA and Valeriano
Facts: The land in question is situated in Obando, Bulacan. It
adjoins the Kailogan River and private respondent Valeriano have
converted it into a fishpond.
In their application in 1976, private respondents claimed that
they are the co-owners in fee simple of the land partly through
inheritance and partly by purchase and that; it is not within any
forest or military reservation.
The Republic of the Phil., represented by the Dir of the Bureau of
Forest Development, opposed the application on the principal
ground that the land applied for is WITHIN THE UNCLASSIFIED
REGION of Obando, Bulacan and that such area are denominated
as FOREST LANDS-do not form part of the disposable and
17 Tacder NatRes
alienable portion of the public domain.
The Trial Court ordered registration of the subject land in favor of
the Valerianos. This was affirmed by the CA which said in part
that “since the subject property is entirely devoted to fishpond
purposes, it cannot be categorized as part of forest lands.”
Issue: WON the courts can reclassify the subject public land.
Held: Courts cannot reclassify... it’s beyond their competence and
jurisdiction.
The classification of public lands is an exclusive prerogative of
the Executive Department of the Government (Bureau of Forest
Development) and not of the Courts. In the absence of such
classification, the land remains as unclassified land until it is
released therefrom and rendered open to disposition.
Since the subj property is still unclassified, whatever possession
Applicants (Valeriano) may have had, and, however long, cannot
ripen into private ownership. The conversion of the subj property
into a fishpond by Applicants does not automatically render the
property as alienable and disposable.
The recommendation of the District Forester for release of subj
property from unclassified region is not the ultimate word on the
matter.
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; LANDS OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN;
CLASSIFICATIONS THEREOF, A PREROGATIVE OF THE EXECUTIVE.
— The classification of public lands is an exclusive prerogative of
the Executive Department of the Government and not of the
Courts.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; UNCLASSIFIED LAND, NOT SUBJECT TO
DISPOSITION. — In the absence of such classification, the land
remains as unclassified land until it is released therefrom and
rendered open to disposition (Sec. 8, Commonwealth Act No.
141, as amended; Vide Yngson v. Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources, 123 SCRA 441 [1983]; Republic v. Court of
Appeals, 99 SCRA 742 [1980]. This should be so under time-
honored Constitutional precepts. This is also in consonance with
the Regalian doctrine that all lands of the public domain belong
to the State (Secs. 8 & 10, Article XIV, 1973 Constitution, and
that the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership in

land and charged with the conservation of such patrimony
(Republic v. Court of Appeals, 89 SCRA 648 [1979]).
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. — The recommendation of the
District Forester for release of subject property from the
unclassified region is not the ultimate word on the matter. And
the fact that BF Map LC No. 637 dated March 1, 1927 showing
subject property to be within the unclassified region was not
presented in evidence will not operate against the State
considering the stipulation between the parties and under the
well-settled rule that the State can not be estopped by the
omission, mistake or error of its officials or agents (Republic v.
Court of Appeals, 89 SCRA 648 [1979]), if omission there was, in
fact. Since the subject property is still unclassified, whatever
possession Applicants may have had, and, however long, cannot
ripen into private ownership. (Adorable v. Director of Lands, 107
Phil. 401; Director of Forestry v. Muñoz, 23 SCRA 1184-1216
[1968]; Director of Lands v. Abanzado, 65 SCRA 5 [1975];
Republic v. Court of Appeals, 89 SCRA 648, 656 [1979]).
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CADASTRAL SURVEY OF MUNICIPALITY DOES
NOT AUTOMATICALLY RELEASE ALL LANDS THEREIN AS
ALIENABLE. — While it may be that the Municipality of Obando
has been cadastrally surveyed in 1961, it does not follow that all
lands comprised therein are automatically released as alienable.
A survey made in a cadastral proceeding merely identifies each
lot preparatory to a judicial proceeding for adjudication of title to
any of the lands upon claim of interested parties. Besides, if land
is within the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Forest Development, it
would be beyond the jurisdiction of the Cadastral Court to
register it under the Torrens System.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CONVERSION OF UNCLASSIFIED LAND INTO A
FISHPOND DOES NOT MAKE LAND ALIENABLE. — The conversion
of subject property into a fishpond by Applicants, or the alleged
titling of properties around it does not automatically render the
property as alienable and disposable. Applicants’ remedy lies in
the release of the property from its present classification.
Menguito vs Republic
FACTS: A petition for review assailing the Court of Appeals Sept
18 Tacder NatRes
30, 1997 decision against the Menguito’s –the petitioners, with
promulgated resolution 10-Mos. later reversing the decision of
the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City. The RTC decision confirmed
the application for the titling of the parcel of land with aggregate
area of 2112 sqm located at Brgy Ususan, Taguig, Metro Manila,
in favor of the Menguito’s.
The application of TCT was brought by the operation of the Land
Registration of Authority as amended by the Property
Registration Decree No. 1529 proceeding to declare:
a) That its applicants –the Menguito’s, are owners, in fee
simple, these 11 parcels of land.
b) Listing the applicants lot title numbers, attendant
documents given with their respective Technical
Descriptions.
For the said application, the RTC of Pasig issued a notice of its
initial hearing against the whole world publishing the same at
Abante Tabloid on April 5, 1989.
Seven days earlier, however, March 30, 1989, the Office of
Solicitor General, filed its contention as:
1. Applicants nor its predecessor’s in interest were neither in
open, continuous, exclusive, adverse and notorious
possession or occupation of the land they applied for
since 1945.
2. Applicants don’t have competent and sufficient evidence
of bonafide acquisition –without open, uninterrupted-
continuous, exclusive, adverse or notorious occupation of
the lot in the concept of the owner and so appearing not
genuine or indicative of pretended possession.
3. Titling from fee simple with Spanish grant title were not
anymore available after Feb 16, 1976 as required by PD
892.
4. That the said parcel of land applied for is part of the public
domain and belonging to the Republic of the Philippines –
and not subject to private appropriation.
The OSG thus stated its valid opposition on the presented
documents by the applicants leaving its prayers that said
application be denied and land in question be reverted to the
ownership of the Republic of the Philippines. At the appellate

court, the RTC’s decision favoring the registrations of the land
applied were reversed and thus this petition.
ISSUE: WON the CA’s did not err in its decision to reverse the
trial court findings.
HELD: No. The petition is without merit.
The Court cited Sec. 48 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 as
amended, provide the registration the registration of the title of
lands in this wise;
“(b) Who by themselves, or their predecessors in interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious occupation of
the land in the concept of the owner.”
The Court thus observed that the petitioners have insufficient
evidence on this.”
The Court likewise pointed that;
 Applicants to avail the OCT they must overcome the
presumption that the land they applied for forms part of
the public domain and if so, it has to be shown as re-
classified or alienated to a private person by the state.
 Otherwise, the land remain inalienable public domain.
 To overcome this, an incontrovertible or clear and
convincing evidence must be presented.
 The court observed that applicants possession were
tacked only as far back as 1948 to its predecessors of
interest –the same must have shown that their
predecessors in interest were in possession of the
property by some 30-years back or 1938 before WW-2.
The court finds the petitioners failed to show it even as they
claimed that Cirilo Menguito once declared the land for tax
purposes in 1943 –yet failed to show documentary evidence to
support the claim.
The court therefore find no reason to modify the appellate court’s
decision -thus denied the petition and declared cost against
petitioner.
Note:
19 Tacder NatRes
“Unless public land is shown to have been reclassified or
alienated to a private person by the State, it remains part of the
inalienable public domain. Indeed, occupation thereof in the
concept of owner, no matter how long, cannot ripen into
ownership and be registered as a title.
Homestead Settlement
Mesina vs Sonza
FACTS: Plaintiff Mesina claimed to be the owner of a parcel of
land located in San Antonio, Nueva, Ecija. He has been in
possession of the subject land openly, publicly and peacefully
since 1914. The said lot was subject of registration proceedings.
Surprisingly, the defendant Pineda without knowledge of the
Plaintiff was able to procure a homestead patent in the same
court were the registration of property was pending of the same
land by the plaintiff, despite of the fact that defendant had not
complied with the requirements of CA 141. That the said title was
procured by defendants through frauds, deception and
misrepresentation since they knew that the lot belong to the
plaintiff. Thus, Plaintiff sought to annulled and cancelled the
patent issued to defendant and prayed that this registration case
pending in the same court be given due course.
ISSUE: WON the homestead patent given to defendant Pineda be
declared null and void
RULING: In view of the fact that plaintiff was able to proved his
open, continuous, exclusive possession of the disputed land for
more than thirty years or since 1914 and that lot is at present
subject of registration proceeding. Plaintiff is deemed to have
acquired the lot by grant of the state, it follows that the same
had ceased to part of the public and had become private
property and therefore beyond the control of the Director of
Land. The homestead patent issued to defendant therefore is null
and void and for having it issued through fraud, deceit and
misrepresentation. The case was remanded to the trial court for
further proceedings.

Susi vs Razon
Facts:
 A complaint filed by Valentin Susi against Angela Razon
and the Director of Lands, praying for judgment: (a)
Declaring plaintiff the sole and absolute owner of the
parcel of land; (b) annulling the sale made by the Director
of Lands in favor of Angela Razon, on the ground that the
land is a private property; (c) ordering the cancellation of
the certificate of title issued to said Angela Razon.
 The Director of Lands denied each and every allegation
contained therein and, as special defense, alleged that
the land in question was a property of the Government of
the United States under the administration and control of
the Philippine Islands before its sale to Angela Razon,
which was made in accordance with law.
 The Court of First Instance of Pampanga rendered
judgment declaring the plaintiff entitled to the possession
of the land, annulling the sale made by the Director of
Lands in favor of Angela Razon, and ordering the
cancellation of the certificate of title issued to her.
 The evidence shows that on December 18, 1880, Nemesio
Pinlac sold the land in question, then a fish pond, to
Apolonio Garcia and Basilio Mendoza. After having been in
possession thereof for about eight years, and the fish
pond having been destroyed, Apolonio Garcia and Basilio
Mendoza sold it to Valentin Susi.
 Before the execution of the deed of sale, Valentin Susi had
already paid its price and sown "bacawan" on said land,
availing himself of the firewood gathered thereon, with
the proceeds of the sale of which he had paid the price of
the property. The possession and occupation of the land in
question, first, by Apolonio Garcia and Basilio Mendoza,
and then by Valentin Susi has been open, continuous,
adverse and public, without any interruption, except
during the revolution, or disturbance, except when Angela
Razon commenced an action in the Court of First Instance
of Pampanga to recover the possession of said land.
 Having failed in her attempt to obtain possession of the
land in question through the court, Angela Razon applied
to the Director of Lands for the purchase thereof.
20 Tacder NatRes
 After making the proper administrative investigation, the
Director of Lands overruled the opposition of Valentin Susi
and sold the land to Angela Razon and issued the proper
certificate of title to Angela Razon.
 Angela Razon required Valentin Susi to vacate the land in
question.
Issue:
 Who is then the rightful owner of the land?
Held:
 SC in their decision favoured Valentin Susi. According to
SC there is, the presumption juris et de jure established in
paragraph (b) of section 45 of Act No. 2874, amending Act
No. 926, that all the necessary requirements for a grant
by the Government were complied with, for he has been
in actual and physical possession, personally and through
his predecessors, of an agricultural land of the public
domain openly, continuously, exclusively and publicly
since July 26, 1894, with a right to a certificate of title to
said land under the provisions of Chapter VIII of said Act.
So that when Angela Razon applied for the grant in her
favor, Valentin Susi had already acquired, by operation of
law, not only a right to a grant, but a grant of the
Government, for it is not necessary that certificate of title
should be issued in order that said grant may be
sanctioned by the courts, an application therefore is
sufficient, under the provisions of section 47 of Act No.
2874. If by a legal fiction, Valentin Susi had acquired the
land in question by a grant of the State, it had already
ceased to be the public domain and had become private
property, at least by presumption, of Valentin Susi,
beyond the control of the Director of Lands. Consequently,
in selling the land in question to Angela Razon, the
Director of Lands disposed of a land over which he had no
longer any title or control, and the sale thus made was
void and of no effect, and Angela Razon did not thereby
acquire any right.

Sale of Public Agricultural Land
Lease
Confirmation of Imperfect Title
Alba vs CA
Facts: Applicant Jose Lachica filed this application for title to land
on April 28, 1958 with the claim that the land applied for was
purchased by him and his wife, Adela Raz from one Eulalio Raz.
The documents attached to the application are: technical
description, surveyor's certificate, certification by the chief
deputy assessor of Aklan and the blue print of Psu-161277.
The land applied for is residential and initial hearing was held on
October 31, 1958. An order of general default was issued but
those who presented their opposition, namely, Octabela Alba
Vda. De Raz, Manuel and Susana Braulio, Jose Rago, representing
Apolonia Rebeco, the Director of Lands and the Municipality of
Banga represented by the Provincial Fiscal, were given thirty (30)
days to file their written opposition.
Manuel C. Braulio and Susana P. Braulio filed their opposition on
October 31, 1958. They opposed the registration of the
southeastern portion of the 240 square meters of the land
applied for alleging that they are the owners in fee simple and
possessors of said portion and all the improvements thereon for
not less than 70 years together with their predecessor-in-interest
deriving their title by purchase from the original owners.
Jose Rago filed his opposition on November 29, 1958 as the duly
constituted attorney-in-fact of Apolonia Rebeco although no
special power of attorney was attached. He alleged that his
principal is the owner by right of succession and is in the
possession of said portion with all its improvements for more
than 80 years together with his predecessor-in-interest,
continuously, peacefully and openly under claim of ownership.
Rodolfo Alba, Lourdes Alba, represented by their attorney-in-fact,
alleged that they are the co-owners of a portion of the land
applied for with an area of 2,262 square meters bounded on the
north by Januario Masigon, Nicolas Realtor, Agustina Rebeldia
and Apolonia Rebeco, on the south by Eulalio Raz and on the
west by the public market of Banga. They claimed to have
21 Tacder NatRes
inherited the above-mentioned portion from their late father,
Eufrosino M. Alba, who purchased the same from Dionisia Regado
in 1918. Hence, they have been in possession continuously,
openly and peacefully under claim of ownership of the above-
mentioned portion for not less 70 years.
The private respondent/applicant requested the Municipal
Assessor of Banga to issue a revised tax declaration covering
4,845 square meters on the bare claim that "the area has been
decreased" to only 620 square meters.
Issue: Whether or not the private respondent/applicant is entitled
to the confirmation of his ownership in fee simple for the 4, 845
square meter parcel of land he applied for.
Held: The trial court and the Court of Appeals confirmed private
respondent/applicant's title to the land on the basis of the
findings that:
1. the private respondent/applicant purchased the land from
Faustino Martirez;
2. the subject land is covered by Tax Declaration No. 14181;
3. the private respondent/applicant has paid the realty taxes
on the land from 1945 up to the filing of his application in
1958;
4. the private respondent/applicant has been in actual, open
and continuous possession of the subject land in the
concept of owner since 1945, and
5. the private respondent/applicant has acquired the land by
prescription.
Private respondent that the acquired land in question from three
(3) sources, namely:
a) A Deed of Sale dated August 13, 1941 allegedly executed
by Faustino Martirez covering 840 square meters;
b) 300 square meters allegedly purchased from private
respondent's father-in-law Eulalio Raz, and
c) 3,725 square meters private respondent allegedly bought
in 1940 from Eugrocino Alba.
In Section 48 of Commonwealth Act 141, as amended by RA Nos.
1942 and 6236, 48 which states that:
Sec. 48. The following-described citizens of the Philippines,

occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any
such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been
perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance
of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their
claim and issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the
Land Registration Act, to wit:
1. Those who prior to the transfer of sovereignty from Spain
to the United States have applied for the purchase,
composition or other form of grant of lands of the public
domain under the laws and royal decrees then in force
and have instituted and prosecuted the proceedings in
connection therewith, but have with or without default
upon their part, or for any other cause, not received title
therefor, if such applicants or grantees and their heirs
have occupied and cultivated said lands continuously
since the filing of their applications. 49
2. Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in
interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands
of the public domain under a bona fide claim of
ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding
the filing of the application for confirmation of title except
when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be
conclusively presumed to have performed all the
conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be
entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this
chapter. 50
3. Members of the national cultural minorities who by
themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of lands of the public domain
suitable to agriculture, whether disposable or not, under a
bona fide claim of ownership for at least 30 years shall be
entitled to the rights granted in subsection (b) hereof. 51
A circumspect scrutiny of the assailed Decision readily shows
that in the affirming the ruling of the trial court, the Court of
Appeals relied on the provisions of Section 19 of Act 496 52 in
relation to the Civil Code's provision's on prescription on the
assumption that the subject land is private land. Therein lies the
flaw in the appellate court's postulate. The application for
registration of private respondent is for judicial confirmation of an
imperfect title considering that the land is presumed under the
Regalian Doctrine to be part of the public domain.
Public lands are broadly classified into 1.] Alienable or disposable
22 Tacder NatRes
lands; and, 2.] Inalienable or non-disposable public lands. Non-
disposable public lands or those not susceptible of private
appropriation include a.] Timber lands; and, b.] Mineral lands. 53
For purposes of administration and disposition, the lands of the
public domain classified as "disposable" or "alienable" are further
sub-classified into a.] Agricultural; b.] Residential, commercial,
industrial or for similar productive purposes; c.] Educational,
charitable or other similar purposes, and d.] Reservations for
town sites and for public and quasi-public purposes. 54
Rule:
The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Kalibo, Aklan, Branch 1
dated August 18, 1992 in Land Registration Case No. K-101, LRC
Record No. K-15104 is hereby MODIFIED as follows:
1. The 620 square meter portion on which private
respondent Jose N. Lachica's house is situated, clearly
delineating its metes and bounds, is hereby ORDERED
segregated from the parcel of land described in Psu-
161277 situated in the Poblacion of the Municipality of
Banga, Province of Aklan, Philippines with an area of
4,484 square meters, to be registered and confirmed in
the name of private respondent;
2. A ten (10) meter road width along the National road
mentioned in the application be segregated for future
road widening programs upon the payment of just
compensation to be annotated at the back of the title.
3. Insofar as the ownership of the remainder of the subject
land is concerned, the case is hereby REMANDED to the
court of origin for the reception of further evidence for the
petitioners to establish the other requisites for the
confirmation of title and registration in their names of the
areas they respectively claim.
Republic vs CA and Naguit
FACTS: Corazon Naguit filed a petition for registration of title
which seeks judicial confirmation of her imperfect title over a
parcel of land in Nabas, Aklan. It was alleged that Naguit and her
predecessors-in-interest have occupied the land openly and in
the concept of owner without any objection from any private
person or even the government until she filed her application for
registration. The MCTC rendered a decision confirming the title in
the name of Naguit upon failure of Rustico Angeles to appear

during trial after filing his formal opposition to the petition.
The Solicitor General, representing the Republic of the
Philippines, filed a motion for reconsideration on the grounds that
the property which is in open, continuous and exclusive
possession must first be alienable. Naguit could not have
maintained a bona fide claim of ownership since the subject land
was declared as alienable and disposable only on October 15,
1980. The alienable and disposable character of the land should
have already been established since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
ISSUE:
Whether or not it is necessary under Section 14 (1) of the
Property Registration Decree that the subject land be first
classified as alienable and disposable before the applicant’s
possession under a bona fide claim of ownership could even
start.
RULING:
Section 14 (1) merely requires that the property sought to be
registered as already alienable and disposable at the time the
application for registration of title is filed.
There are three requirements for registration of title,
1. that the subject property is alienable and disposable;
2. that the applicants and their predecessor-in-interest have
been in open, continuous, and exclusive possession and
occupation, and;
3. that the possession is under a bona fide claim of
ownership since June 12, 1945.
There must be a positive act of the government through a statute
or proclamation stating the intention of the State to abdicate its
exclusive prerogative over the property, thus, declaring the land
as alienable and disposable. However, if there has been none, it
is presumed that the government is still reserving the right to
utilize the property and the possession of the land no matter how
long would not ripen into ownership through acquisitive
prescription.
To follow the Solicitor General’s argument in the construction of
Section 14 (1) would render the paragraph 1 of the said provision
inoperative for it would mean that all lands of public domain
which were not declared as alienable and disposable before June
23 Tacder NatRes
12, 1945 would not be susceptible to original registration, no
matter the length of unchallenged possession by the occupant.
In effect, it precludes the government from enforcing the said
provision as it decides to reclassify lands as alienable and
disposable.
The land in question was found to be cocal in nature, it having
been planted with coconut trees now over fifty years old. The
inherent nature of the land but confirms its certification in 1980
as alienable, hence agricultural. There is no impediment to the
application of Section 14 (1) of the Property Registration Decree.
Naguit had the right to apply for registration owing to the
continuous possession by her and her predecessors-in-interest of
the land since 1945.
Heirs of Malabanan vs Republic
FACTS:
On 20 February 1998, Mario Malabanan filed an application for
land registration before the RTC of Cavite-Tagaytay, covering a
parcel of land situated in Silang Cavite, consisting of 71,324
square meters. Malabanan claimed that he had purchased the
property from Eduardo Velazco, and that he and his
predecessors-in-interest had been in open, notorious, and
continuous adverse and peaceful possession of the land for more
than thirty (30) years. Velazco testified that the property was
originally belonged to a twenty-two hectare property owned by
his great-grandfather, Lino Velazco. Lino had four sons–
Benedicto, Gregorio, Eduardo and Esteban–the fourth being
Aristedes’s grandfather. Upon Lino’s death, his four sons
inherited the property and divided it among themselves. But by
1966, Esteban’s wife, Magdalena, had become the administrator
of all the properties inherited by the Velazco sons from their
father, Lino. After the death of Esteban and Magdalena, their son
Virgilio succeeded them in administering the properties, including
Lot 9864-A, which originally belonged to his uncle, Eduardo
Velazco. It was this property that was sold by Eduardo Velazco to
Malabanan.
Among the evidence presented by Malabanan during trial was a
Certification dated 11 June 2001, issued by the Community

Environment & Natural Resources Office, Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (CENRO-DENR), which stated
that the subject property was “verified to be within the Alienable
or Disposable land per Land Classification Map No. 3013
established under Project No. 20-A and approved as such under
FAO 4-1656 on March 15, 1982.” On 3 December 2002, the RTC
approved the application for registration.
The Republic interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals,
arguing that Malabanan had failed to prove that the property
belonged to the alienable and disposable land of the public
domain, and that the RTC had erred in finding that he had been in
possession of the property in the manner and for the length of
time required by law for confirmation of imperfect title. On 23
February 2007, the Court of Appeals reversed the RTC ruling and
dismissed the appliocation of Malabanan.
ISSUES:
1. In order that an alienable and disposable land of the
public domain may be registered under Section 14(1) of
Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the
Property Registration Decree, should the land be classified
as alienable and disposable as of June 12, 1945 or is it
sufficient that such classification occur at any time prior
to the filing of the applicant for registration provided that
it is established that the applicant has been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the
land under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12,
1945 or earlier?
In connection with Section 14(1) of the Property Registration
Decree, Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act recognizes and
confirms that “those who by themselves or through their
predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of alienable
and disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona fide
claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945” have
acquired ownership of, and registrable title to, such lands based
on the length and quality of their possession.
a) Since Section 48(b) merely requires possession since 12
24 Tacder NatRes
June 1945 and does not require that the lands should have
been alienable and disposable during the entire period of
possession, the possessor is entitled to secure judicial
confirmation of his title thereto as soon as it is declared
alienable and disposable, subject to the timeframe
imposed by Section 47 of the Public Land Act.
b) The right to register granted under Section 48(b) of the
Public Land Act is further confirmed by Section 14(1) of
the Property Registration Decree.
2. For purposes of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration
Decree may a parcel of land classified as alienable and
disposable be deemed private land and therefore
susceptible to acquisition by prescription in accordance
with the Civil Code?
In complying with Section 14(2) of the Property Registration
Decree, consider that under the Civil Code, prescription is
recognized as a mode of acquiring ownership of patrimonial
property. However, public domain lands become only patrimonial
property not only with a declaration that these are alienable or
disposable. There must also be an express government
manifestation that the property is already patrimonial or no
longer retained for public service or the development of national
wealth, under Article 422 of the Civil Code. And only when the
property has become patrimonial can the prescriptive period for
the acquisition of property of the public dominion begin to run.
a) Patrimonial property is private property of the
government. The person acquires ownership of
patrimonial property by prescription under the Civil Code
is entitled to secure registration thereof under Section
14(2) of the Property Registration Decree.
b) There are two kinds of prescription by which patrimonial
property may be acquired, one ordinary and other
extraordinary. Under ordinary acquisitive prescription, a
person acquires ownership of a patrimonial property
through possession for at least ten (10) years, in good
faith and with just title. Under extraordinary acquisitive
prescription, a person’s uninterrupted adverse possession
of patrimonial property for at least thirty (30) years,
regardless of good faith or just title, ripens into ownership.

3. May a parcel of land established as agricultural in
character either because of its use or because its slope is
below that of forest lands be registrable under Section
14(2) of the Property Registration Decree in relation to the
provisions of the Civil Code on acquisitive prescription?
4. Are petitioners entitled to the registration of the subject
land in their names under Section 14(1) or Section 14(2)
of the Property Registration Decree or both?
It is clear that the evidence of petitioners is insufficient to
establish that Malabanan has acquired ownership over the
subject property under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act.
There is no substantive evidence to establish that Malabanan or
petitioners as his predecessors-in-interest have been in
possession of the property since 12 June 1945 or earlier. The
earliest that petitioners can date back their possession,
according to their own evidence—the Tax Declarations they
presented in particular—is to the year 1948. Thus, they cannot
avail themselves of registration under Section 14(1) of the
Property Registration Decree.
Neither can petitioners properly invoke Section 14(2) as basis for
registration. While the subject property was declared as alienable
or disposable in 1982, there is no competent evidence that is no
longer intended for public use service or for the development of
the national evidence, conformably with Article 422 of the Civil
Code. The classification of the subject property as alienable and
disposable land of the public domain does not change its status
as property of the public dominion under Article 420(2) of the
Civil Code. Thus, it is insusceptible to acquisition by prescription.
2013
Classifications of land according to ownership
Land may be classified as either of public dominion or of private
ownership.
It is of public dominion if it:
1. is intended for public use; or
2. belongs to the State, without being for public use, and is
intended for some public service or for the development
of the national wealth.
Land belonging to the State that is not of such character, or
although of such character but no longer intended for public use
or for public service forms part of the patrimonial property of the
25 Tacder NatRes
State. Land that is other than part of the patrimonial property of
the State, provinces, cities and municipalities is of private
ownership if it belongs to a private individual. Pursuant to the
Regalian Doctrine (Jura Regalia), all lands of the public domain
belong to the State. All lands not appearing to be clearly under
private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Also,
public lands remain part of the inalienable land of the public
domain unless the State is shown to have reclassified or
alienated them to private persons.
Classifications of public lands according to alienability
1935 Constitution: lands of the public domain were classified into
- agricultural, timber and mineral. Section 10, Article XIV of the
1973 Constitution: lands of the public domain were classified into
- agricultural, industrial or commercial, residential, resettlement,
mineral, timber or forest, and grazing land, with the reservation
that the law might provide other classifications. 1987
Constitution adopted the classification under the 1935
Constitution into agricultural, forest or timber, and mineral, but
added national parks. Under Section 2, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution, only agricultural lands of the public domain may be
alienated; all other natural resources may not be. Alienable and
disposable lands of the State fall into two categories:
a) patrimonial lands of the State, or those classified as lands
of private ownership under Article 425 of the Civil Code,
without limitation; and
b) lands of the public domain, or the public lands as provided
by the Constitution, but with the limitation that the lands
must only be agricultural.
Consequently, lands classified as forest or timber, mineral, or
national parks are not susceptible of alienation or disposition
unless they are reclassified as agricultural. A positive act of the
Government is necessary to enable such reclassification, and the
exclusive prerogative to classify public lands under existing laws
is vested in the Executive Department, not in the courts. If,
however, public land will be classified as neither agricultural,
forest or timber, mineral or national park, or when public land is
no longer intended for public service or for the development of
the national wealth, thereby effectively removing the land from
the ambit of public dominion, a declaration of such conversion
must be made in the form of a law duly enacted by Congress or
by a Presidential proclamation in cases where the President is
duly authorized by law to that effect.

Disposition of alienable public lands
Section 11 of the Public Land Act (CA No. 141) provides the
manner by which alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain, i.e., agricultural lands, can be disposed of:
1. For homestead settlement;
2. By sale;
3. By lease; and
4. By confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles;
a) By judicial legalization; or
b) By administrative legalization (free patent).
The core of the controversy herein lies in the proper
interpretation of Section 11(4), in relation to Section 48(b) of the
Public Land Act, which expressly requires possession by a Filipino
citizen of the land since June 12, 1945, or earlier. Bearing in mind
such limitations under the Public Land Act, the applicant must
satisfy the following requirements in order for his application to
come under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, to
wit:
1. The applicant, by himself or through his predecessor-in-
interest, has been in possession and occupation of the
property subject of the application;
2. The possession and occupation must be open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious;
3. The possession and occupation must be under a bona fide
claim of acquisition of ownership;
4. The possession and occupation must have taken place
since June 12, 1945, or earlier; and
5. The property subject of the application must be an
agricultural land of the public domain.
In sum, these are the rules relative to the disposition of public
land or lands of the public domain, namely:
1. As a general rule and pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine,
all lands of the public domain belong to the State and are
inalienable. Lands that are not clearly under private
ownership are also presumed to belong to the State and,
therefore, may not be alienated or disposed;
2. Exceptions:
a) Agricultural lands of the public domain are
rendered alienable and disposable through any of
the exclusive modes enumerated under Section 11
of the Public Land Act. If the mode is judicial
confirmation of imperfect title under Section 48(b)
26 Tacder NatRes
of the Public Land Act, the agricultural land subject
of the application needs only to be classified as
alienable and disposable as of the time of the
application, provided the applicant’s possession
and occupation of the land dated back to June 12,
1945, or earlier. Thereby, a conclusive presumption
that the applicant has performed all the conditions
essential to a government grant arises, and the
applicant becomes the owner of the land by virtue
of an imperfect or incomplete title. By legal fiction,
the land has already ceased to be part of the
public domain and has become private property.
b) Lands of the public domain subsequently classified
or declared as no longer intended for public use or
for the development of national wealth are
removed from the sphere of public dominion and
are considered converted into patrimonial lands or
lands of private ownership that 3 may be alienated
or disposed through any of the modes of acquiring
ownership under the Civil Code.
If the mode of acquisition is prescription, whether ordinary or
extraordinary, proof that the land has been already converted to
private ownership prior to the requisite acquisitive prescriptive
period is a condition sine qua non in observance of the law
(Article 1113, Civil Code) that property of the State not
patrimonial in character shall not be the object of prescription. In
the case at bar, the petitioners failed to present sufficient
evidence to establish that they and their predecessors-in-interest
had been in possession of the land since June 12, 1945. Without
satisfying the requisite character and period of possession -
possession and occupation that is open, continuous, exclusive,
and notorious since June 12, 1945, or earlier - the land cannot be
considered ipso jure converted to private property even upon the
subsequent declaration of it as alienable and disposable.
Prescription never began to run against the State, such that the
land has remained ineligible for registration under Section 14(1)
of the Property Registration Decree. Likewise, the land continues
to be ineligible for land registration under Section 14(2) of the
Property Registration Decree unless Congress enacts a law or the
President issues a proclamation declaring the land as no longer
intended for public service or for the development of the national
wealth.

Palomo vs CA
DOCTRINE: 1) Law governing natural resources that forest land
cannot be owned by private persons. It is not registrable and
possession thereof, no matter how lengthy, cannot convert it into
private property, less such lands are reclassified and considered
disposable and alienable. 2) Neither do the tax receipts which
were presented in evidence prove ownership of the parcels of
land inasmuch as the weight of authority is that tax declarations
are not conclusive proof of ownership in land registration cases.
FACTS:
 Diego Palomo is the owner of 15 parcels of land covered
by Executive Order No. 40. On 1916, he ordered the
registration of these lands and donated the same to his
heirs, Ignacio and Carmen Palomo two months before his
death in April 1937.
 Averment that the aforesaid OCT were lost during the
Japanese occupation, Ignacio Palomo filed a petition for
reconstitution with the Court of First Instance of Albay on
May 1970. The Register of Deeds of Albay issued Transfer
Certificates of Title Nos. 3911, 3912, 3913 and 3914
sometime in October 1953.
 July 1954 President Ramon Magsaysay issued
Proclamation No. 47 converting the area embraced by
Executive Order No. 40 into the "Tiwi Hot Spring National
Park," under the control, management, protection and
administration of the defunct Commission of Parks and
Wildlife, now a division of the Bureau of Forest
Development.
 Land was never released as alienable and disposable
portion of the public domain and, therefore, is neither
susceptible to disposition under the provisions of the
Public Land Law nor registerable under the Land
Registration Act. The Palomos, however, continued in
possession of the property, paid real estate taxes thereon
and introduced improvements by planting rice, bananas,
pandan and coconuts.
 April 8, 1971, petitioner Carmen de Buenaventura and
spouses Ignacio Palomo and Trinidad Pascual mortgaged
the parcels of land to guarantee a loan of P200,000 from
the Bank of the Philippine Islands.
ISSUES:
 Whether or not forest land which is a public domain may
be owned by private persons
27 Tacder NatRes
 Whether or not tax receipt can be use as a proof of
ownership over the claiming lands.
RULING:
 There is no question that the lots here forming part of the
forest zone were not alienable lands of the public domain.
The adverse possession which may be the basis of a grant
of title in confirmation of imperfect title cases applies only
to alienable lands of the public domain. It is in the law
governing natural resources that forest land cannot be
owned by private persons. It is not registerable and
possession thereof, no matter how lengthy, cannot
convert it into private property, unless such lands are
reclassified and considered disposable and alienable.
 Tax receipts which were presented in evidence prove
ownership of the parcels of land inasmuch as the weight
of authority is that tax declarations are not conclusive
proof of ownership in land registration cases. As to the
forfeiture of improvements introduced by petitioners, the
fact that the government failed to oppose the registration
of the lots in question is no justification for petitioners to
plead good faith in introducing improvements on the lots.
Bracewell vs CA
Facts: The controversy involves a total of nine thousand six
hundred fifty-seven (9,657) square meters of land located in Las
Piñas, Metro Manila. In 1908, Maria Cailles, married to James
Bracewell, Sr., who acquired the said parcels of land from the
Dalandan and Jimenez families of Las Piñas; after which
corresponding Tax Declarations were issued in the name of Maria
Cailles.
On January 16, 1961, Maria Cailles sold the said parcels of land to
her son, the petitioner, by virtue of a Deed of Sale which was
duly annotated and registered with the Registry of Deeds of
Pasig, Rizal. Tax Declarations were thereafter issued in the name
of petitioner, canceling the previous Tax Declarations issued to
Maria Cailles. On September 19, 1963, petitioner filed before the
then Court of First Instance of Pasig, Rizal an action for
confirmation of imperfect title under Section 48 of

Commonwealth Act No. 141.
The Director of Lands, represented by the Solicitor General,
opposed petitioner's application on the grounds that neither he
nor his predecessors-in-interest possessed sufficient title to the
subject land nor have they been in open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious possession and occupation of the same for at least
thirty (30) years prior to the application, and that the subject
land is part of the public domain.
On May 3, 1989, the lower court issued an Order granting the
application of petitioner. The Solicitor General promptly appealed
to respondent Court which, on June 29, 1992, reversed and set
aside the lower court's Order. It also denied petitioner's Motion
for Reconsideration in its Resolution of September 30, 1992.
Issues:
a) Whether the failure of the petitioner to prosecute his
action for an unreasonable length of time?
b) Whether the tax declarations attached to the complaint
do not constitute acquisition of the lands applied for?
Held:
The controversy is simple. On one hand, petitioner asserts his
right of title to the subject land under Section 48 (b) of
Commonwealth Act No. 141, having by himself and through his
predecessors-in-interest been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of the subject parcels of
land, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, since
1908. On the other hand, it is the respondents' position that
since the subject parcels of land were only classified as alienable
or disposable on March 27, 1972, petitioner did not have any title
to confirm when he filed his application in 1963. Neither was the
requisite thirty years possession met.
A similar situation in the case of Reyes v. Court of Appeals, where
a homestead patent issued to the petitioners' predecessor-in-
interest was cancelled on the ground that at the time it was
issued, the subject land was still part of the public domain.
In the said case, this Court ruled as follows —
Under the Regalian doctrine, all lands of the public domain
belong to the State, and that the State is the source of any
28 Tacder NatRes
asserted right to ownership in land and charged with the
conservation of such patrimony. This same doctrine also states
that all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private
ownership are presumed to belong to the State (Director of Lands
vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 219 SCRA 340).
Hence, the burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of
State ownership of lands of the public domain is on the person
applying for registration. The applicant must show that the land
subject of the application is alienable or disposable. These
petitioners failed to do.
The homestead patent was issued to petitioners' predecessor-in-
interest, the subject land belong to the inalienable and
undisposable portion of the public domain. Thus, any title issued
in their name by mistake or oversight is void ab initio because at
the time the homestead patent was issued to petitioners, as
successors-in-interest of the original patent applicant, the
Director of Lands was not then authorized to dispose of the same
because the area was not yet classified as disposable public land.
Consequently, the title issued to herein petitioners by the Bureau
of Lands is void ab initio.
Neither has petitioner shown proof that the subject Forestry
Administrative Order recognizes private or vested rights under
which his case may fall. We only find on record the Indorsement
of the Bureau of Forest Development from which no indication of
such exemption may be gleaned.
Having found petitioner to have no cause of action for his
application for confirmation of imperfect title, we see no need to
discuss the other errors raised in this petition.
Republic vs CA and Bernabe
FACTS:
Lot No. 622 of the Mariveles Cadastre was declared public land in
a decision rendered before the last war in Cadastral Case No. 19,
LRC Cadastral Record No. 1097. On July 6, 1965 such lot was
segregated from the forest zone and released and certified by
the Bureau of Forestry (BOF) as an agricultural Land for
disposition under the Public Land Act. On April 26, 1967,
Respondents filed in the CFI of Bataan a petition to reopen
Cadastral Case No. 19 to perfect their rights and register their
titles to said lots. They alleged that they acquired ownership and
possession of said parcels of land by purchase from the original
owners thereof, whose possession of the same including that of

the herein respondents, has always been continuous, open,
active, exclusive, public, adverse and in the concept of owners
for more than 30 years. The Director of Forestry filed an
opposition to the above petition but later withdrew the same
upon verification of findings that this portion of the timberland
had already been released from the mass of the public forests.
Subsequently, the Acting Prov. Fiscal of Bataan, for and in behalf
of the Director of Lands filed his opposition alleging that the land
is still a Public Land and as such cannot be the subject of a land
registration proceeding under Act 496. The lower court
adjudicated in favor or respondent Bernabes, finding that the
latter have complied with all the terms and conditions entitling
them to a grant. This decision having become final, the
Commissioner of Land Registration issued the corresponding
decrees of registration. On the other hand, petitioner DL through
the Solicitor Gen. filed a petition for review of the decrees.
Afterwards, he filed an Amended Petition for Review, adding: that
respondents executed simulated deeds of sale conveying
portions of the subject parcels to third parties for fictitious
considerations in order to remove the same from the coverage of
Sec. 38 of Act 496, but in truth, buyers are mere dummies of
petitioners; hence, not purchasers for value. The Court of First
Instance denied this petition and on appeal, the CA affirmed the
questioned decision. Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration
having been denied for lack of merit; hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
WON the lots claimed by respondents could be legally be the
subject of a juridical confirmation of Title under Section 48 (b) of
Commonwealth Act 141 as amended by Republic Act 1942.
HELD:
No. The Supreme Court ruled that Sec. 48 (b) of CA 141, as
amended, applies exclusively to public lands. Forest lands or
areas covered with forests are excluded. Thus, possession of
forest lands, however long cannot ripen into private ownership.
A parcel of forest land is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Bureau of Forestry and beyond the power and jurisdiction of the
cadastral court to register under the Torrens System. Thus, even
if the reopening of the cadastral proceedings was at all possible,
private respondents have not qualified for a grant under Section
48 (b) of CA 141. They can only be credited with 1 year, 9 mos.
29 Tacder NatRes
and 20 days of possession and occupation of the lots involved,
counted from July 6, 1965 when the lots involved had been
segregated from the forest zone and released by the BOF as an
agricultural land for disposition under the Public Land Act. As
such, respondents and their predecessors in interest could not
have possessed the lots for the required period of 30 years as
disposable agricultural land.
Republic vs Bautista
FACTS:
Apolonio Bautista Jr. acquired lot 17078 through succession,
when his father Apolonio Sr. died in 1987. He applied judicial
confirmation of imperfect title before MTC with testimonial
evidence that his father was in possession of the said lot since
1969 and acquired it from Jardin and Villanueva, through
notarized Deed of Absolute Sale dated February 15, 1971 and
May 25, 1973 respectively. The MTC granted the application and
declared him as the owner in fee simple of the said land.
The Government of the Philippines appealed before CA,
contending that the testimony of Apolonio Jr. is an hearsay which
should not be given probative value. The application of judicial
confirmation of imperfect title must comply with Sec. 48(b) of CA
141. The CA affirmed the ruling of MTC, it pointed out that the
Government of the Phil. did not timely object to the evidence
presented.
ISSUE: W/N the grant of judicial confirmation of imperfect title to
Apolonio Jr proper?
RULING: The Supreme Court reversed the ruling of MTC and CA.
It held that the requisite period of possession must conform with
Sec 48(b) of Public Land Act as amended by RA 1942 which
provides that any person who applies for judicial confirmation, he
or his predecessor in interest must have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation
of alienable and disposable land of public domain under the
bonafide claim of ownership at least 30 years since June 12, 1945
or earlier.
In the present case, the lower court relied only on the testimony
of Bautista Jr. that his father acquired the land and in possession
since 1969. He failed to prove that the transferor had in open,

continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of said land for at
least 30 years since June 12, 1945 or earlier. Bautista Jr. has no
personal knowledge of these facts. Lack of this evidence does not
give the court the right to grant a judicial confirmation of
imperfect title in favor of Bautista Jr.
Non-registrable Land
MIAA vs CA
Facts: Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA) is the
operator of the Ninoy International Airport located at Paranaque
City. The Officers of Paranaque City sent notices to MIAA due to
real estate tax delinquency. MIAA then settled some of the
amount. When MIAA failed to settle the entire amount, the
officers of Paranaque city threatened to levy and subject to
auction the land and buildings of MIAA, which they did. MIAA
sought for a Temporary Restraining Order from the CA but failed
to do so within the 60 days reglementary period, so the petition
was dismissed. MIAA then sought for the TRO with the Supreme
Court a day before the public auction, MIAA was granted with the
TRO but unfortunately the TRO was received by the Paranaque
City officers 3 hours after the public auction.
MIAA claims that although the charter provides that the title of
30 Tacder NatRes
the land and building are with MIAA still the ownership is with the
Republic of the Philippines. MIAA also contends that it is an
instrumentality of the government and as such exempted from
real estate tax. That the land and buildings of MIAA are of public
dominion therefore cannot be subjected to levy and auction sale.
On the other hand, the officers of Paranaque City claim that MIAA
is a government owned and controlled corporation therefore not
exempted to real estate tax.
Issues:
 Whether or not MIAA is an instrumentality of the
government and not a government owned and controlled
corporation and as such exempted from tax.
 Whether or not the land and buildings of MIAA are part of
the public dominion and thus cannot be the subject of
levy and auction sale.
Ruling:
Under the Local government code, government owned and
controlled corporations are not exempted from real estate tax.
MIAA is not a government owned and controlled corporation, for
to become one MIAA should either be a stock or non stock
corporation. MIAA is not a stock corporation for its capital is not
divided into shares. It is not a non stock corporation since it has
no members. MIAA is an instrumentality of the government
vested with corporate powers and government functions.
Under the civil code, property may either be under public
dominion or private ownership. Those under public dominion are
owned by the State and are utilized for public use, public service
and for the development of national wealth. The ports included in
the public dominion pertain either to seaports or airports. When
properties under public dominion cease to be for public use and
service, they form part of the patrimonial property of the State.
The court held that the land and buildings of MIAA are part of the
public dominion. Since the airport is devoted for public use, for
the domestic and international travel and transportation. Even if
MIAA charge fees, this is for support of its operation and for
regulation and does not change the character of the land and
buildings of MIAA as part of the public dominion. As part of the
public dominion the land and buildings of MIAA are outside the
commerce of man. To subject them to levy and public auction is

contrary to public policy. Unless the President issues a
proclamation withdrawing the airport land and buildings from
public use, these properties remain to be of public dominion and
are inalienable. As long as the land and buildings are for public
use the ownership is with the Republic of the Philippines.
Roman Catholic vs Municipality of Buruanga
FACTS: Petitioner Roman Catholic Bishop of Kalibo was allegedly
the lawful owner and possessor of a parcel of residential and
commercial land, designated as Lot 138. The Roman Catholic
Church was built in 1984 in the middle portion of the said lot and
has been in existence since then up to the present. That
sometime in 1978, the Municipality of Buruanga constructed its
municipal building on the northeastern portion of the Lot 138
after it obtained the permission of the then parish priest of
Buruanga on the condition that the municipality remove all the
improvements it constructed thereon if and when the petitioner
needed the said lot.
When the municipal building was razed by fire in 1989,
petitioner, through its counsel requested the officials of the
municipality to refrain from constructing its new building on the
same site because it is the property of the church and it needed
the lot for its social projects. However, the construction of the
new municipal building on the same site proceeded.
Consequently, petitioner filed a complaint and prayed that it be
declared the lawful owner and possessor of Lot 138. Petitioner
contends that it does not allegedly lose its possession or
ownership over the property if the possession or use by another
of the same is by mere tolerance.
In its answer, the municipality alleged that said lot was surveyed
as property of the municipality and that the said municipality
alone had possessed the said land under the claim of title
exclusively for over fifty (50) years, exclusive of all other rights
and adverse to all other claimants.
After due trial, the trial court declared petitioner as the lawful
owner and possessor of Lot 138-B and the Municipality of
Buruanga as the lawful owner and possessor of Lots 138-A and
138-C, the said lots being public plaza for public use. On appeal,
the CA affirmed the ownership of petitioner over Lot 138-B but
declared Lots 138-A and 138-C as property of public dominion.
31 Tacder NatRes
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner’s open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious possession and occupation of Lot 138 since 1894
and for many decades thereafter vests ipso jure or by operation
of law upon it a government grant, a vested title, to the subject
property.
HELD: No. There was no question that petitioner has been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of Lot 138-B since 1894 as evidenced by the church
structure built thereon but there was no evidence to show that
such possession and occupation extended to Lots 138-A and 138-
C beginning the same period. No single instance of the exercise
by the petitioner of proprietary acts or acts of dominion over
these lots was established. Its unsubstantiated claim that the
construction of the municipal building as well as the subsequent
improvements thereon was by its tolerance does not constitute
proof of possession and occupation on the petitioner’s part.
Absent the important requisite of open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation thereon since 1894, no
government grant or title to Lots 138-A and 138-C had vested
upon the petitioner ipso jure or by operation of law.
Possession is open when it is patent, visible, apparent, notorious
and not clandestine. It is continuous when uninterrupted,
unbroken and not intermittent or occasional; exclusive when the
adverse possessor can show exclusive dominion over the land
and an appropriation of it to his own use and benefit; and
notorious when it is so conspicuous that it is generally known and
talked of by the public or the people in the neighborhood. Use of
land is adverse when it is open and notorious.
Amunategui vs Director of Forestry
Facts: There were two petitions for review on certiorari
questioning the decision of the Court of Appeals which declared
the disputed property as forest land, not subject to titling in favor
of private persons, Borre and Amunategui.
The Director of Forestry, through the Provincial Fiscal of Capiz,
also filed an opposition to the application for registration of title
claiming that the land was mangrove swamp which was still
classified as forest land and part of the public domain.
Another oppositor, Emeterio Bereber filed his opposition insofar
as a portion of Lot No. 885 containing 117,956 square meters
was concerned and prayed that title to said portion be confirmed

and registered in his name.
Issue: WON the lot in question can be subject of registration and
confirmation of title in the name of the private person.
Held: The opposition of the Director of Forestry was
strengthened by the appellate court's finding that timber licenses
had to be issued to certain licensees and even Jose Amunategui
himself took the trouble to ask for a license to cut timber within
the area. It was only sometime in 1950 that the property was
converted into fishpond but only after a previous warning from
the District Forester that the same could not be done because it
was classified as "public forest”.
A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain
does not lose such classification simply because loggers or
settlers may have stripped it of its forest cover. "Forest lands" do
not have to be on mountains or in out of the way places. Swampy
areas covered by mangrove trees, nipa palms, and other trees
growing in brackish or sea water may also be classified as forest
land. The possession of forest lands, no matter how long, cannot
ripen into private ownership. Therefore, the lot in question never
ceased to be classified as forest land of public domain.
1. CIVIL LAW; PUBLIC LAND ACT; FOREST LAND; CLASSIFICATION
NOT LOST EVEN IF IT HAS BEEN STRIPPED OF FOREST COVER;
UNLESS RELEASED IN AN OFFICIAL PROCLAMATION AS
DISPOSABLE LANDS, RULES ON CONFIRMATION OF IMPERFECT
TITLE DO NOT APPLY. — A forested area classified as forest land
of the public domain does not lose such classification simply
because loggers or settlers may have stripped it of its forest
cover. Parcels of land classified as forest land may actually be
covered with grass or planted to crops by kaingin cultivators or
other farmers. "Forest lands" do not have to be on mountains or
in out of the way places. Swampy areas covered by mangrove
trees, nipa palms, and other tress growing in brackish or sea
water may also be classified as forest land. The classification is
descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not have to be
descriptive of what the land actually looks like. Unless and until
the land classified as "forest" is released in an official
proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the
disposable agricultural lands of the public domain, the rules on
confirmation of imperfect title do not apply.
2. ID.; ID.; FOREST LANDS; ACQUISITIVE OWNERSHIP NOT
32 Tacder NatRes
ACQUIRED. — This Court ruled in the leading case of Director of
Forestry v. Muñoz (23 SCRA 1184) that possession of forest lands,
no matter how long, cannot ripen into private ownership. And in
Republic v. Animas (56 SCRA 499), we granted the petition on the
ground that the ares covered by the patent and title was not
disposable public land, it being a part of the forest zone and any
patent and title to said area is void ab initio. It bears emphasizing
that a positive act of Government is needed to declassify land
which is classified as forest and to convert it into alienable or
disposable land for agricultural or other purposes.
3. ID.; ID.; CONFIRMATION, OF IMPERFECT TITLE CASES; BURDEN
OF PROVING THAT THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE LAW HAVE BEEN
MET, RESTS ON THE APPLICANT. — In confirmation of imperfect
title cases, the applicant shoulders the burden of proving that he
meets the requirements of Section 48, Commonwealth Act No.
141, as amended by Republic Act No. 1942. He must overcome
the presumption that the land he is applying for is part of the
public domain but that he has an interest therein sufficient to
warrant registration in his name because of an imperfect title
such as those derived from old Spanish grants or that he has had
continuous, open, and notorious possession and occupation of
agricultural lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of
acquisition of ownership for at least thirty (30) years preceding
the filing of his application.
Ankron vs Government of the Philippines
FACTS: This case was commenced for the purpose of registering
a land under the Torrens system, which bounded, particularly
situated in the plan description attached to the complaint and
made part thereof. The respondent, Oppositor, The Government
of the Philippine islands alleged that the said land was the
property of the Government of the United States of America and
under the control of the Government of the Philippines. No proof
was presented by the oppositor regarding its allegations. The
Judge render its decision favouring Akron, and ordered that the
said land be registered to the latter, however that the right of the
government to open a road in a manner that the opening should
fifteen meters meters wide and should follow approximately the
line of the road. Hence the Director of the lands appealed to this
court. That all of said land, with the exception of a small part at
the north, the exact description and extension of which does not

appear, has been cultivated and planted for more than forty-four
years prior to the date of this decision;
That said land was formerly occupied, cultivated and planted by
Moros, Mansacas and others, under a claim of ownership, and
that they lived thereon and had their houses thereon, and that
portion of the land which was not planted or cultivated was used
as pasture land whereon they pastured their carabaos, cattle,
and horses;
That all of said Moros and Mansacas sold, transferred and
conveyed all their right, title and interest in said land to the
applicant, J. H. Ankron, some eleven years past, at which time all
of the said former owners moved o n to adjoining lands where
they now reside;
That the possession under claim of ownership of the applicant
and his predecessors in interest was shown to have been open,
notorious, actual, public and continuous for more than forty-four
years past, and that their claim was exclusive of any other right
adverse to all other claims;
That the applicant now has some one hundred fifty (150) hills of
hemp, some eight thousand (8,000) cocoanut trees, a dwelling
house, various laborers' quarters, store-building, large camarin
(storehouse of wood, a galvanized iron and other buildings and
improvements on said land.
Issue: WON the land in question cannot be registered?
Ruling: The mere fact that a tract of land has trees upon it or has
mineral within it is not of itself sufficient to declare that one is
forestry land and the other, mineral land. There must be some
proof of the extent and present or future value of the forestry and
of the minerals. While, as we have just said, many definitions
have been given for "agriculture," "forestry," and "mineral" lands,
and that in each case it is a question of fact, we think it is safe to
say that in order to be forestry or mineral land the proof must
show that it is more valuable for the forestry or the mineral which
it contains than it is for agricultural purposes. (Sec. 7, Act No.
1148.) It is not sufficient to show that there exists some trees
upon the land or that it bears some mineral. Land may be
classified as forestry or mineral today, and, by reason of the
exhaustion of the timber or mineral, be classified as agricultural
land tomorrow. And vice-versa, by reason of the rapid growth of
33 Tacder NatRes
timber or the discovery of valuable minerals, lands classified as
agricultural today may be differently classified tomorrow. Each
case must be decided upon the proof in that particular case,
having regard for its present or future value for one or the other
purposes. We believe, however, considering the fact that it is a
matter of public knowledge that a majority of the lands in the
Philippine Islands are agricultural lands, that the courts have a
right to presume, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that
in each case the lands are agricultural lands until the contrary is
shown. Whatever the land involved in a particular land
registration case is forestry or mineral land must, therefore, be a
matter of proof. Its superior value for one purpose or the other is
a question of fact to be settled by the proof in each particular
case. The fact that the land is a manglar [mangrove swamp] is
not sufficient for the courts to decide whether it is agricultural,
forestry, or mineral land. It may perchance belong to one or the
other of said classes of land. The Government, in the first
instance, under the provisions of Act No. 1148, may, by
reservation, decide for itself what portions of public land shall be
considered forestry land, unless private interests have intervened
before such reservation is made. In the latter case, whether the
land is agricultural, forestry, or mineral, is a question of proof.
Until private interests have intervened, the Government, by
virtue of the terms of said Act (No. 1148), may decide for itself
what portions of the "public domain" shall be set aside and
reserved as forestry or mineral land.
Issue: Whether or not the said land is owned by the government
of the Philippines.
Ruling: Yes, The court held that the applicant proved and validly
supplied the requisites for the registration of the said land into an
agricultural land as per stated by paragraph 6 of section 54 of
Act No. 926. The important prerequisites for registration of land
imposed by said section 54, paragraph 6, are
a) that the land shall be agricultural public land as defined
by the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902;
b) that the petitioner, by himself or his predecessors in
interest, shall have been in the open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the
same under a bona fide claim of ownership for a period of
ten years next preceding the taking effect of said Act. The
government failed to disrupt the said facts presented by
the applicant.

Hence, the court rendered its judgement in favor of the applicant
Sta Rosa Dev’t vs CA
FACTS: The case is a petition regarding Department of Agrarian
Reform Adjudication Board’s (DARAB) order of compulsory
acquisition of petitioner’s property under the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program (CARP).
Petitioner Sta. Rosa Development Corporation (SRRDC), was the
registered owner of two parcel of land situated at Brgy. Casile,
Cabuyao, Laguna. According to them, these lands are watersheds
which provide clean and potable (drinkable) water to the
Canlubang community and that 90 light industries are located in
that area.
They were alleging respondents usurped its rights over their
property thereby destroying the ecosystem. Since the said land
provides water to the residents, respondents sought an
easement of a right of a way to and from Barangay Castile, to
which, by counterclaim, Sta. Rosa sought ejectment against
respondents.
Respondents went to the DAR and filed a case for compulsory
acquisition of the Sta. Rosa Property under the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program.
Compulsory acquisition is the power of the government to
acquire private rights in land without the willing consent of its
owner or occupant in order to benefit the society.
The said land was inspected by the Municipal and Agrarian
Reform Officer, and upon consensus of the authorities concerned,
they decided that the said land must be placed under
compulsory acquisition.
Petitioners filed an objection on the ground that:
 The area is not appropriate for agricultural purposes.
 The area was rugged in terrain with slopes 18% and
above. (which falls under the exception in compulsory
acquisition of CARP)
 The occupants of the land were illegal settlers or
(squatters) who by no means are entitled to the land as
34 Tacder NatRes
beneficiaries.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the property in question is covered by
CARP despite the fact that the entire property formed part
of a watershed area prior to the enactment of R.A No.
6657
2. Whether the petition of land conversion of the parcels of
land may be granted?
HELD:
Watershed is one of those enumerated by CARP to be exempt
from its coverage.
 Art. 67 of PD 1067 provides that Any watershed or any
area of land adjacent to any surface water or overlying
any ground water may be declared by the Department of
Natural resources as a protected area.
 Watersheds may be defined as an area drained by a river
and its tributaries and enclosed by a boundary or divide
which separates it from adjacent watersheds.
We cannot ignore the fact that the disputed parcels of land form
a vital part of an area that need to be protected for watershed
purposes. The protection of watersheds ensures an adequate
supply of water for future generations and the control of
flashfloods that not only damage property but cause loss of lives.
Protection of watersheds is an intergenerational responsibility
that needs to be answered now.
Although evidence of petitioners is strong, the Supreme Court
opines that the area must be maintained for watershed purposes
for ecological and environmental considerations despite the 88
families who are beneficiaries of the CARP. It is important that a
larger view of the situation be taken because of the thousands of
residents downstream if the watershed will not be protected and
maintained for its natural purpose.
Despite Supreme Court’s strong opinion of protection of
watersheds as an intergenerational responsibility, they, however
ordered to DARAB to conduct a re-evaluation of the case since
the said land falls under exception.

Collado vs CA
FACTS: Petitioner Edna T. Collado filed with the land registration
court an application for registration of a parcel of land (“Lot”),
situated in Antipolo Rizal. Attached to the application was a
technical description, stating “this survey is inside IN-12
Mariquina Watershed.” The Solicitor General filed oppositions to
the application. Petitioners (Edna Collado and her co-applicants)
allege that they have occupied the Lot since time immemorial.
Their possession has been open, public, notorious and in the
concept of owners. They paid all real estate taxes and submitted
evidence to prove that there have been 9 transfers of rights
among them and their predecessors-in-interest. RTC ruled in
favor of the petitioners for having presented sufficient evidence
to establish registrable title over the property.
ISSUE:
 WON petitioners have registrable title over the Lot. NO.
Petitioners concede that the Lot is inside the literal description of
Marikina Watershed Reservation (MWR). Their main claim over
the Lot is that “all Presidential proclamations like the
proclamation setting aside the MWR are subject to private
rights.” EO 33 (which established the MWR) has a saving clause
that the reservations are “subject to existing private rights, if any
there be.”
Under the Regalian Doctrine, all lands not otherwise appearing to
be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to
the State. The Spaniards first introduced the doctrine to the
Philippines through the Laws of the Indies and the Royal Cedulas,
specifically, Law 14, Title 12, Book 4 of the Novisima Recopilacion
de Leyes de las Indias which laid the foundation that "all lands
that were not acquired from the Government, either by purchase
or by grant, belong to the public domain." Upon the Spanish
conquest of the Philippines, ownership of all "lands, territories
and possessions" in the Philippines passed to the Spanish Crown.
The Laws of the Indies were followed by the Ley Hipotecaria or
the Mortgage Law of 1893. The Spanish Mortgage Law provided
for the systematic registration of titles and deeds as well as
possessory claims. The Royal Decree of 1894 or the "Maura Law"
35 Tacder NatRes
partly amended the Mortgage Law as well as the Law of the
Indies. The Maura Law was the last Spanish land law promulgated
in the Philippines. It required the "adjustment" or registration of
all agricultural lands, otherwise the lands would revert to the
state.
Four years later, Spain ceded to the government of the United
States all rights, interests and claims over the national territory
of the Philippine Islands through the Treaty of Paris of December
10, 1898. In 1903, the United States colonial government,
through the Philippine Commission, passed Act No. 926, the first
Public Land Act, which was described as follows:
"Act No. 926, the first Public Land Act, was passed in pursuance
of the provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902. The law governed
the disposition of lands of the public domain. It prescribed rules
and regulations for the homesteading, selling and leasing of
portions of the public domain of the Philippine Islands, and
prescribed the terms and conditions to enable persons to perfect
their titles to public lands in the Islands. It also provided for the
"issuance of patents to certain native settlers upon public lands,"
for the establishment of town sites and sale of lots therein, for
the completion of imperfect titles, and for the cancellation or
confirmation of Spanish concessions and grants in the Islands." In
short, the Public Land Act operated on the assumption that title
to public lands in the Name: I. Concept of Jura Regalia Natural
Resources First Set_ Philippine Islands remained in the
government; and that the government’s title to public land
sprung from the Treaty of Paris and other subsequent treaties
between Spain and the United States. The term "public land"
referred to all lands of the public domain whose title still
remained in the government and are thrown open to private
appropriation and settlement, and excluded the patrimonial
property of the government and the friar lands."
Thus, it is plain error for petitioners to argue that under the
Philippine Bill of 1902 and Public Land Act No. 926, mere
possession by private individuals of lands creates the legal
presumption that the lands are alienable and disposable.
Both the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions prohibited the alienation
of all natural resources except agricultural lands of the public
domain. The 1987 Constitution readopted this policy. Indeed, all
lands of the public domain as well as all natural resources

enumerated in the Philippine Constitution belong to the State.
Watershed Reservation is a Natural Resource: The term "natural
resource" includes "not only timber, gas, oil coal, minerals, lakes,
and submerged lands, but also, features which supply a human
need and contribute to the health, welfare, and benefit of a
community, and are essential to the well-being thereof and
proper enjoyment of property devoted to park and recreational
purposes."
 Did petitioners acquire private rights over the parcel of
land prior to the issuance of EO 33? NO.
An applicant must overcome the presumption that the land he is
applying for is part of the public domain and that he has an
interest to warrant registration in his name arising from an
imperfect title (may have been derived from old Spanish grants
or titles). In the case at bar, petitioners were unable to acquire a
valid and enforceable right or title because of the failure to
complete the required period of possession (at least 30 years).
Assuming that the Lot was alienable and disposable land prior to
the issuance of EO 33 in 1904, EO 33 reserved the Lot as a
watershed. Since then, the Lot became non-disposable and
inalienable public land. At the time petitioners filed their
application on April 25, 1985, the Lot has been reserved as a
watershed under EO 33 for 81 years prior to the filing of
petitioners’ application.
NOTES: 2. Republic vs Dela Rosa (160 SCRA 228, G.R. No. L-
43938, April 15, 1988) FACTS: The case is about a parcel of land
whose ownership is disputed by four parties: the dela Rosas,
Benguet Consolidated Inc (BCI), Atok Corp, and the Bureau of
Forestry Development (BFD). In 1965, Jose de la Rosa on his and
on his three children’s behalf, applied to register a parcel of land
divided into 9 lots in Benguet. According to the children, they
acquired the land by virtue of prescription. As evidence they
produced tax declarations and realty tax receipts.
Director of Forestry vs Villareal
FACTS: The said land consists of 178,113 square meters of
36 Tacder NatRes
mangrove swamps located in the municipality of Sapian, Capiz.
Ruperto Villareal applied for its registration on January 25, 1949,
alleging that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in
possession of the land for more than forty years. He was opposed
by several persons, including the petitioner on behalf of the
Republic of the Philippines. After trial, the application was
approved by the Court of First Instance of Capiz. The decision
was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The Director of Forestry
then came to this Court in a petition for review on certiorari
claiming that the land in dispute was forestal in nature and not
subject to private appropriation. He asks that the registration be
reversed. It is undisputed by the parties that the land in dispute
is a mangrove land HOWEVER the legal nature of mangrove
swamps or manglares are still in contention. Director of Forestry
claims that it is forestall and is not disposable. On the other
hand, Private respondents insists that it is alienable as
agricultural land.
ISSUES: Are mangrove swamps classified as public forest lands?
RULING: YES. Part of our public forest lands, they are not
alienable under the Constitution or are they considered public
agricultural lands; they may be acquired under private
ownership.
Mangrove swamps or manglares should be understood as
comprised within the public forests of the Philippines as defined
in the aforecited Section 1820 of the Administrative Code of
1917. The legislature having so determined, we have no
authority to ignore or modify its decision, and in effect veto it, in
the exercise of our own discretion. The statutory definition
remains unchanged to date and, no less noteworthy, is accepted
and invoked by the executive department. More importantly, the
said provision has not been challenged as arbitrary or unrealistic
or unconstitutional assuming the requisite conditions, to justify
our judicial intervention and scrutiny. The law is thus presumed
valid and so must be respected. We repeat our statement in
the Amunategui case that the classification of mangrove swamps
as forest lands is descriptive of its legal nature or status and does
not have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks like.
That determination having been made and no cogent argument
having been raised to annul it, we have no duty as judges but to
apply it.

It follows from all this that the land under contention being
admittedly a part of the mangrove swamps of Sapian, and for
which a minor forest license had in fact been issued by the
Bureau of Forestry from 1920 to 1950, it must be considered
forest land. It could therefore not be the subject of the adverse
possession and consequent ownership claimed by the private
respondent in support of his application for registration. To be so,
it had first to be released as forest land and reclassified as
agricultural land pursuant to the certification the Director of
Forestry may issue under Section 1827 of the Revised
Administrative Code.
The Respondent even showed, a survey of the land and its tax
declaration to support its claim, however the court held that the
same is insufficient especially now that the land is a forest land.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is SET ASIDE
and the application for registration of title of private respondent
is DISMISSED, with cost against him. This decision is immediately
executory.
Atok-Big Wedge Mining Corp vs CA
FACTS: Fredia Mineral claim of about nine (9) hectares situated in
Tuding, Itogon, Benguet, was located sometime between
December 25, 1930 and December 31, 1930, a period of six (6)
days, by A.I. Reynolds in accordance with the provisions of the
Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, better known as the Philippine
Bill of 1902, in a so-called Declaration of Location.
The said Declaration of Location of mineral claim was duly
recorded in the Office of the Mining Recorder sometime on
January 2, 1931. Fredia mineral claim, together with other
mineral claims, was sold by A.I. Reynolds to Big Wedge Mining
Company, the earlier corporate name of Atok Big Wedge Mining
Company, Inc. (Atok for short; herein petitioner) in a Deed of Sale
executed on November 2, 1931. Since then petitioner Atok has
been in continuous and exclusive ownership and possession of
said claim up to the present.
Atok has paid the realty taxes and occupation fees for the Fredia
mineral claim. The Fredia mineral claim together with other
37 Tacder NatRes
mineral claims owned by Atok has been declared under Tax
Declaration No. 9535 and that in view of Presidential Decree No.
1214 an application for lease was filed by Atok covering the
Fredia mineral claim.
On the other hand, private respondent Liwan Consi has a lot
below the land of a certain Mr. Acay at Tuding Slide, Itogon,
Benguet. He constructed a house thereon sometime in 1964. The
lot is covered by Tax Declaration No. 9462. When he first
constructed his house below the lot of Mr. Acay he was told that
it was not necessary for him to obtain a building permit as it was
only a nipa hut. And no one prohibited him from entering the land
so he was constructing a house thereon. It was only in January
1984 when private respondent Consi repaired the said house that
people came to take pictures and told him that the lot belongs to
Atok. Private respondent Consi has been paying taxes on said
land which his father before him had occupied .
On January 1984, the security guards of Atok informed Feliciano
Reyes, Security Officer of Atok, that a construction was being
undertaken at the area of the Fredia mineral claim by private
respondent Liwan Consi. Feliciano Reyes instructed the cashier to
go and take pictures of the construction. Feliciano Reyes himself
and other security guards went to the place of the construction
to verify and then to the police to report the matter.
On March 1, 1984, Atok filed a complaint for forcible entry and
detainer against Liwan Consi , which was dismissed after due
hearing by the MTC of Itogon in favor of Liwan Consi. Petitioner
ATOK appealed to the RTC of Baguio, which reversed the decision
of the MTC, ordering defendant Liwan Consi to vacate the
premises of the Fredia Mineral claim, restoring possession thereof
to the plaintiff Atok Big Wedge Mining Company. Defendant Liwan
Cosi was further ordered to remove and demolish the house he
constructed in the premises of the land of Fredia Mineral claim.
In a petition for review filed by Liwan Consi with the CA, the CA
rendered its decision dismissing the subject forcible entry action,
and further rule in part that: Liwan Consi had a possessory right
over the property which may mature into ownership on the basis
of long-term possession under the Public Land Law. Thus, it held
that both Consi and ATOK are of equal footing with regards to the
subject lot, holding possessory titles to the land. The petitioner

through its long term occupancy while respondent mining firm
being the claim locator and applicant for lease on the mineral
claim.
ATOK filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied by the
CA. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not an individual's long term occupation of land of
the public domain vests him with such rights over the same as to
defeat the rights of the owner of that claim.
HELD: It is of no importance whether Benguet and Atok had
secured a patent for as held in the Gold Creek Mining Corporation
case, for all physical purposes of ownership, the owner is not
required to secure a patent as long as he complies with the
provisions of the mining laws; his possessory right, for all
practical purposes of ownership, is as good as though secured by
patent (Republic v. Court of Appeals, 160 SCRA 228 [1988]).
In the case at bar, the evidence on record pointed that the
petitioner Atok has faithfully complied with all the requirements
of the law regarding the maintenance of the said Fredia Mineral
Claim.
The perfection of the mining claim converted the property to
mineral land and under the laws then in force removed it from
the public domain. By such act, the locators acquired exclusive
rights over the land, against even the government, without need
of any further act such as the purchase of the land or obtaining
of a patent over it. As the land had become the private property
of the locators, they had the right to transfer the same, as they
did, to Benguet and Atok .
As in the instant petition, the record shows that the lot in
question was acquired through a Deed of Sale executed between
Atok and Fredia Mineral Claim.
It is, therefore, evident that Benguet and Atok have exclusive
rights to the property in question by virtue of their respective
mining claims which they validly acquired before the Constitution
38 Tacder NatRes
of 1935 prohibited the alienation of all lands of the public domain
except agricultural lands, subject to vested rights existing at the
time of its adoption. The land was not and could not have been
transferred to the private respondents by virtue of acquisitive
prescription, nor could its use be shared simultaneously by them
and the mining companies for agricultural and mineral purposes
(Ibid).
On the matter of possession, private respondent contends that
his predecessor-in-interest has been in possession of said lot
even before the war and has in fact cultivated the same. Since
the subject lot is mineral land, private respondent's possession of
the subject lot no matter how long did not confer upon him
possessory rights over the same.
Furthermore, Article 538 of the New Civil Code provides:
Art. 538. Possession as a fact cannot be recognized at the
same time in two different personalities except in the cases of
co-possession. Should a question arise regarding the fact of
possession, the present possessor shall be preferred; if there are
two possessors, the one longer in possession; if the dates of the
possession are the same, the one who presents a title; and if all
these conditions are equal, the thing shall be placed in judicial
deposit pending determination of its possession or ownership
through proper proceedings.
Since 1931 up to the present, petitioner ATOK has been in
continuous and exclusive possession of the Fredia mineral claim
while private respondent's possession started only sometime in
1964 when he constructed a house thereon. Clearly, ATOK has
superior possessory rights than private respondent, Liwan Consi,
the former being "the one longer in possession."
It is therefore clear that from the legal viewpoint it was really
petitioner who was in actual physical possession of the property.
Having been deprived of this possession by the private
respondent, petitioner has every right to sue for ejectment.
With this ruling enunciated by the Court, it can further be
declared and held that petitioner Atok has the exclusive right to
the property in question.

Republic vs Southside Homeowners
FACTS: The subject matter of these proceedings for declaration
of nullity of title are parcels of land with a total area of 39.99
hectares, more or less, known as the JUSMAG housing area in
Fort Bonifacio where, military officers, both in the active and
retired services, and their respective families, have been
occupying housing units and facilities originally constructed by
the AFP.
Private respondent SHAI is a non-stock corporation organized
mostly by wives of AFP military officers. Records show that SHAI
was able to secure from the Registry of Deeds of the Province of
Rizal a title – Transfer Certificate of Title in its name to the bulk
of, if not the entire, JUSMAG area.
The Rizal Registry issued TCT No. 15084 on October 30, 1991on
the basis of a notarized Deed of Sale purportedly executed on the
same date by then Director Abelardo G. Palad, Jr. of the Lands
Management Bureau (LMB) in favor of SHAI.The total purchase
price as written in the conveying deed was P11,997,660.00 or
P30.00 per square meter
It appears that in the process of the investigation conducted by
the Department of Justice on reported land scams at the FBMR, a
copy of the aforesaid October 30, 1991deed of sale surfaced and
eventually referred to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)
for examination. The results of the examination undertaken by
NBI Document Examiner Eliodoro Constantino reveals that the
puported signatures in the document are forgeries.
On October 16, 1993, then President Fidel V.Ramos issued
Memorandum Order No. 173 directing the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) to institute action towards the cancellation of TCT
No. 15084 and the title acquired by the Navy Officer’s Village
Association (NOVA) over a bigger parcel within the reservation. A
month later, the OSG, in behalf of the petitioner Republic, filed
with the RTC of Pasig City the corresponding nullification and
cancellation of title suit against the private respondent SHAI,
purported signature thereon of Palad is a forgery; b) there are no
records with the LMB of (i) the application to purchase and (ii) the
alleged payment of the purchase price; and c) the property in
question is inalienable, being part of a military reservation
established under Proclamation No. 423.
39 Tacder NatRes
On pre-trial the Republic, as plaintiff therein, marked (and later
offered in evidence)the Deed of Sale dated October 30, 1991 as
its Exhibit "A,"and TCT No. 15084 as Exhibit "B."Respondent,
then defendant SHAI adopted Exhibits "A" and “B” as its Exhibits
"1" and “2,” respectively.
During the trial, the Republic presented as expert witness NBI
Document Examiner Eliodoro Constantino who testified on NBI
QDR No. 815-1093 and asserted that the signature of Palad in
Exhibit “A” is a forgery. For his part, Palad dismissed as forged
his signature appearing in the same document and denied ever
signing the same, let alone in front of a notary public holding
office outside of the LMB premises. Pressing the point, Palad
stated that he could not have had signed the conveying deed
involving as it did a reservation area which, apart from its being
outside of the LMB’s jurisdiction, is inalienable in the first place.
For its part, then defendant SHAI presented an opposing expert
witness in the person of Police Inspector Redencion Caimbon who
testified that Palad’s signature in Exhibit “A” is genuine. Mrs.
Virginia Santos, then SHAI president, likewise testified, saying
that applications to purchase were signed and then filed with the
LMB by one Engr. Eugenia Balis, followed by the payment in full
of the contract price.
Eventually, in a decision dated October 7, 1997, the trial court
rendered judgment dismissing the Republic’s complaint as it
considered the parcels covered by the deed in question as no
longer part of the FBMR. Therefrom, the Republic went on appeal
to the CA which affirmed in toto that of the trial court.
Hence, this petition of the Republic.
ISSUE: Was the JUSMAG area, during the period material,
alienable or inalienable, as the case may be, and, therefore, can
or cannot be subject of a lawful private conveyance?
RULING: Petitioner Republic, correctly asserts the inalienable
character of the JUSMAG area, the same having not effectively
been separated from the military reservation and declared as
alienable and disposable.
The President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of
Environment and Natural Resources, may designate by

proclamation any tract or tracts of land of the public domain as
reservations for the use of the Republic or any of its branches, or
for quasi-public uses or purposes. Such tract or tracts of land
thus reserved shall be non-alienable and shall not be subject to
sale or other disposition until again declared alienable.
Consistent with the foregoing postulates, jurisprudence teaches
that a military reservation, like the FBMR, or a part thereof is not
open to private appropriation or disposition and, therefore, not
registrable, unless it is in the meantime reclassified and declared
as disposable and alienable public land. And until a given parcel
of land is released from its classification as part of the military
reservation zone and reclassified by law or by presidential
proclamation as disposable and alienable, its status as part of a
military reservation remains, even if incidentally it is devoted for
a purpose other than as a military camp or for defense. The same
is true in this case.
There is no doubt that the JUSMAG area subject of the questioned
October 30, 1991sale formed part of the FBMR as originally
established under Proclamation No. 423. And while private
respondent SHAI would categorically say that the petitioner
Republic had not presented evidence that “subject land is within
military reservation,” and even dared to state that the JUSMAG
area is the private property of the government and
therefore removed from the concept of public domain per se its
own evidence themselves belie its posture as their evidence both
the TCT and the Deed of Sale technically described the property
as situated in Jusmag area located at Fort Bonifacio which is now
renamed Fort Mckinley a declared a military reservation.
The Republic has, since the filing of its underlying complaint,
invoked Proclamation No. 423. In the process, it has invariably
invited attention to the proclamation’s specific area coverage to
prove the nullity of TCT No. 15084, inasmuch as the title
embraced a reserved area considered inalienable, and hence,
beyond the commerce of man.
The October 30, 1991 Deed of Sale purportedly executed by
Palad, assuming its authenticity, could not plausibly be the
requisite classifying medium converting the JUSMAG area into a
disposable parcel. And private respondent SHAI’s unyielding
stance that would have the Republic in estoppel to question the
transfer to it by the LMB Director of the JUSMAG area is
unavailing. It should have realized that the Republic is not usually
40 Tacder NatRes
estopped by the mistake or error on the part of its officials or
agents.
Since the parcels of land in question allegedly sold to the private
respondent are, or at least at the time of the supposed
transaction were, still part of the FBMR, the purported sale is
necessarily void ab initio.
Moreover, Article XII, Section 3 [of the 1987 Constitution forbids
private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of
the public domain, except through lease for a limited period.
The interplay of compelling circumstances and inferences
deducible from the case, also cast doubt on the authenticity of
such deed, if not support a conclusion that the deed is spurious.
1. Palad categorically declared that his said signature on the
deed is a forgery. The NBI signature expert corroborated
Palad’s allegation on forgery.Respondent SHAI’s expert
witness from the PNP, however, disputes the NBI’s
findings. In net effect, both experts from the NBI and the
PNP cancel each other out.
2. Palad signed the supposed deed of sale in Manila,
possibly at the LMB office at Plaza Cervantes, Binondo.
Even if he acted in an official capacity, Palad nonetheless
proceeded on the same day to Pasig City to appear
before the notarizing officer. The deed was then brought
to the Rizal Registry and there stamped “Received” by the
entry clerk. That same afternoon, or at 3:14 p.m. of
October 30, 1991to be precise, TCT No. 15084 was issued.
In other words, the whole conveyance and registration
process was done in less than a day. The very unusual
dispatch is quite surprising. Stranger still is why a bureau
head, while in the exercise of his functions as the bureau’s
authorized contracting officer, has to repair to another
city just to have a deed notarized.
3. There is absolutely no record of the requisite public land
application to purchase required under Section 89 of the
Public Land Act. There is also no record of the deed of sale
and of documents usually accompanying an application to
purchase, inclusive of the investigation report and the
property valuation. The Certification under the seal of the
LMB bearing date November 24, 1994 and issued/signed
by Alberto Recalde, OIC, Records Management Division of

the LMB pursuant to a subpoena issued by the trial court
attest to this fact of absence of records. Atty. Alice B.
Dayrit, then Chief, Land Utilization and Disposition
Division, LMB, testified having personally looked at the
bureau record book, but found no entry pertaining to
SHAI.
4. In its Answer as defendant a quo, respondent SHAI states
that the “deed of sale specifically meritorious Official
Receipt No. 6030203 as evidence of full payment of the
agreed purchase price” An official receipt (O.R.) is
doubtless the best evidence to prove payment. While it
kept referring to O.R. No. 6030203 as its evidence of the
required payment, it failed to present and offer the receipt
in evidence. We can thus validly presume that no such OR
exists or, if it does, that its presentation would be adverse
to SHAI.
A contract of sale is void where the price, which appears in the
document as paid has, in fact, never been paid.
5. The purchase price was, according to the witnesses for
SHAI, paid in full in cash to the cashier of the LMB the
corresponding amount apparently coming in a mix of P500
and P100 denominations. Albeit plausible, SHAI’s
witnesses’ account taxes credulity to the limit.
TCT No. 15084 of the Registry of Deeds of Rizal issued on the
basis of such Deed are declared void and cancelled
Republic vs Alagad
Facts: On Oct. 11, 1951, Melitona, Carmen (with spouse
Espiridion Kolimlim), Justo, Carlos, Librada (with spouse Emerson
Abano), Demetrio, and Antonio Alagad filed an application for
registration of their title over a parcel of land situated at Linga,
Pila, Laguna, with an area of 8.1263 hectares, which was
amended after the land was divided into two parcels, namely, Lot
1 withan area of 5.2476 hectares and Lot 2 with an area of
2.8421 hectares. The Republic opposed the application on the
stereo-typedground that applicants and their predecessors have
not been in possession of the land openly, continuously, publicly
and adversely under a bona fide claim of ownership since July 26,
1894 and the land has not ceased to be a part of the public
domain. It appears that barrio folk also opposed the application.
41 Tacder NatRes
On 16 January 1956, by virtue of a final judgment in said case,
supplemented byorders issued on March 21, 1956 and Aug. 13,
1956, the Alagads were declared owners of Lot 1 and the
remaining portion, or Lot2, was declared public land. In August
1966, the Alagads filed before the Municipal Court of Pila, Laguna
an action to evict the barrio folk occupying portions of Lot 1. On 8
August 1968, judgment was rendered in the eviction case
ordering the barrio folktherein to return possession of the
premises to the Alagads. The barrio folk did not appeal. The
Republic filed a petition for “annulment of title and reversion,
insofar as the 1.42 hectare northwestern portion on end of Lot1 is
concerned, contending that such is foreshore land, and that the
Alagads could not have had an imperfect title to it as it was the
barrio folk who filled up the land to elevate the land to its present
condition. The Court, issued a writ of preliminary injunction
enjoining the Provincial Sheriff of Laguna or his deputies from
enforcing a writ of execution, and the Alagads from selling,
mortgaging, disposing or otherwise entering into any transaction
affecting the area. The case was set for pre-trial on July6, 1971,
to which the attorney representing the Republic did not appear.
On July 16, 1971, the court dismissed the complaint. The
Republic filed a motion for reconsideration, was set for hearing,
and finally denied by the court. Appeal was made to the Court of
Appeals, which sustained the trial court for failure to show in the
record on appeal that the appeal was perfected on time. Hence,
the appeal. The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the
lower courts, and reinstated the Republic’s complaint and thus
remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings
State cannot be bound by or estopped from the mistakes
or negligent acts of its officials or agents
The State cannot be bound by, or estopped from, the mistakes or
negligent acts of its official or agents, much more, non-suited as
a result thereof. This is so because the state as a persona in law
is the judicial entity, which is the source of any asserted right to
ownership in land under the basic doctrine embodied in the 1935
Constitution as well as the present charter. It is charged
moreover with the conservation of such patrimony. There is need
therefore of the most rigorous scrutiny before private claims to
portions thereof are judicially accorded recognition. Such
primordial consideration, not the apparent carelessness, much
less the acquiescence of public officials, is the controlling norm.

Ramos v. Central Bank, and Nilo v. Romero not applicable
to the present case
The cases of Ramos v. Central Bank of the Philippines and Nilo v.
Romero, are not applicable. In Ramos, the Court applied estoppel
upon finding of bad faith on the part of the State (the Central
Bank) in deliberately reneging on its promises. In Nilo, the Court
denied efforts to impugn the jurisdiction of the court on the
ground that the defendant had been “erroneously” represented
in the complaint by the City Attorney when it should have been
the City Mayor, on a holding that the City Attorney, in any event,
could have ably defended the City (Davao City). In both cases, it
is seen that the acts that gave rise to estoppel were voluntary
and intentional in character, in which cases, it could not be said
that the Government had been prejudiced by some negligent act
or omission.
Res judicata is not an impediment to reversion of
property;
Republic v. CA, requisites for a prior judgment to become a bar
Res judicata is not an impediment to reversion of property. In
Republic v. Court of Appeals, the Court stated that a certificate of
title may be ordered cancelled (Republic v. Animus, et al.), and
the cancellation may be pursued through an ordinary action
therefor. This action cannot be barred by the prior judgment of
the land registration court, since the said court had no
jurisdiction over the subject matter. And if there was no such
jurisdiction, then the principle of res judicata does not apply. For
it is a well-settled rule that for a prior judgment to constitute a
bar to a subsequent case, the following requisites must concur;
1. it must be a final judgment;
2. it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction
over the subject matter and over the parties;
3. it must be a judgment on the merits; and
4. there must be, between the first and second actions,
identity of parties, identity of subject matter and identity
of cause of action (Municipality of Daet vs. C4 93 SCRA
503; Mendoza vs. Arrieta, et al., 91 SCRA 113)
Property of public dominion:
Property for public use or public service “Property”, according to
the Civil Code, “is either of public dominion or of private
ownership.” Property is of public dominion if it is
1. intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers,
torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the State,
42 Tacder NatRes
banks, shores, roadsteads and others of similar character;
or if it
2. belongs to the State, without being for public use, and are
intended for some public service or for the development
of the national wealth.
Patrimonial property and property of public dominion
“All other property of the State which is not of the character
mentioned in article [420], is patrimonial property,” meaning to
say, property “open to disposition” by the Government, or
otherwise, property pertaining to the national domain, or public
lands. Property of the public dominion, on the other hand, refers
to things held by the State by regalian right. They are things res
publicae in nature and hence, incapable of private appropriation.
Thus, under the present Constitution, “[w]ith the exception of
agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be
alienated.”
Public Dominion, as to waters Article 502 provides that
1. Rivers and their natural beds;
2. Continuous or intermittent waters of springs and brooks
running in their natural beds and the beds themselves;
3. Waters rising continuously or intermittently on lands of
public dominion;
4. Lakes and lagoons formed by Nature on public lands, and
their beds;
5. Rain waters running through ravines or sand beds, which
are also of public dominion;
6. Subterranean waters on public lands;
7. Waters found within the zone of operation of public
works, even if constructed by a contractor;
8. Waters rising continuously or intermittently on lands
belonging to private persons, to the State, to a province,
or to a city or municipality from the moment they leave
such lands; and
9. The waste waters of fountains, sewers and public
establishments” are of public dominion.
It is also ordained in Article 44 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 3
August 1866 that “natural ponds and lakes existing upon public
lands and fed by public waters, belong to the public domain.
Lakes, ponds, and pools existing upon the lands of private
individuals, or the State or provinces, belong to the respective
owners of such lands, and those situated upon lands of

communal use belong to their respective ‘pueblos.’”
Laguna de Bay is a lake (Colegio de San Jose case);
Highest Ordinary Depth Laguna de Bay has long been recognized
as a lake. Laguna de Bay is a body of water formed in
depressions of the earth; it contains fresh water coming from
rivers and brooks or springs, and is connected with Manila Bay by
the Pasig River. Inasmuch as Laguna de Bay is a lake, the Court
must resort to the legal provisions governing the ownership and
use of lakes and their beds and shores, in order to determine the
character and ownership of the parcels of land in question. The
recourse to legal provisions is necessary, for under Article 74 of
the Law of Waters, “the natural bed or basin of lakes is the
ground covered by their waters when at their highest ordinary
depth” and in which case, it forms part of the national dominion.
When Laguna de Bay’s waters are at their highest ordinary depth
has been defined as the highest depth of the waters of Laguna
de Bay during the dry season, such depth being the “regular,
common, natural, which occurs always or most of the time during
the year. Otherwise, where the rise in water level is due to the
“extraordinary” action of nature, rainfall for instance, the
portions inundated thereby are not considered part of the bed or
basin of the body of water in question. It cannot therefore be said
to be foreshore land but land outside of the public dominion, and
land capable of registration as private property.
Foreshore land
A foreshore land has been defined as “that part of (the land)
which is between high and low water and left dry by the flux and
reflux of the tides,” or “The strip of land that lies between the
high and low water marks and that is alternatively wet and dry
according to the flow of the tide.” If the submergence, however,
of the land is due to precipitation, it does not become foreshore,
despite its proximity to the waters. 9. Court not a trier of facts;
not enough evidence to arrive a conclusive disposition; Remand
The case has to be decided alongside the above principles and
regretfully, the Court cannot make a ruling because it is not a
trier of facts, and it is in possession of no evidence to assist it in
arriving at a conclusive disposition. The Court thus remanded the
case to the court a quo to determine whether or not the property
subject of controversy is foreshore.
43 Tacder NatRes
SIAN Enterprise vs FF Cruz
That the foreshore area had been reclaimed does not remove it
from its classification of foreshore area subject to the
preferential right to lease of the littoral owner.
FACTS: Western Visayas Industrial Corporation (WESVICO) filed a
foreshore lease application over the foreshore land adjacent to
certain lots registered in its name. It eventually withdrew
the application and filed a petition for registration over the same
foreshore land with the then Court of First Instance of Iloilo. The
case was, however, archived as WESVICO‘s representative could
no longer be contacted, and later on, WESVICO has ceased
operations.
F.F. Cruz & Co. (F.F. Cruz) filed with the Bureau of Lands, Iloilo City
a foreshore lease application over a foreshore land, a portion of
which is adjacent to the lot previously occupied by WESVICO.
Sian Enterprises Inc. (SIAIN) purchased the properties previously
owned by WESVICO from the Development Bank of the
Philippines. It subsequently filed a foreshore
lease application over the foreshore land adjacent to the
properties it bought from DBP.
Upon learning that 130 linear meters of the foreshore land
subject of F.F. Cruz’s foreshore lease application overlapped that
covered by its foreshore lease application, SIAIN filed a protest 8
alleging that it being the owner of the property adjoining the
overlapping area, it should be given preference in its lease.
F.F. Cruz, argued that SIAIN must not be given preferential right
since the area in dispute is classified as ―reclaimed‖ and that
the ownership was not by means of accretion. This argument has
been sustained by the Land Management Bureau.
Upon appeal to the DENR Secretary, SIAIN was upheld, declaring
that there was no basis to declare the area as ―reclaimed‖. F.F.
Cruz however appealed to the Office of the President which
overturned the decision of the DENR Secretary and found that
the area is reclaimed. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed
the decision. Hence, the present petition. SIAIN contends that the
evidence overwhelmingly proves that the disputed area is
foreshore land and not reclaimed land which thus entitles it
preferential rights over the

ISSUES: Whether the disputed land is a ―foreshore‖ or
―reclaimed‖ area
HELD: That the foreshore area had been reclaimed does not
remove it from its classification of foreshore area subject to the
preferential right to lease of the littoral owner.
It bears noting that it was not the reclamation
that brought the disputed foreshore area into existence. Such
foreshore area existed even before F.F. Cruz undertook its
reclamation. It was ―formed by accretions or alluvial deposits
due to the action of the sea.‖ Following Santulan, the littoral
owner has preferential right to lease the same.
Contrary to the ruling of the Office of the President, as affirmed
by the appellatecourt, littoral owner WESVICO cannot be
considered to have waived or abandoned its preferential right to
lease the disputed area when it subsequently filed
an application for registration thereover. For being a part of the
public domain, ownership of the area could not be acquired by
WESVICO. Its preferential right remained, however. Its move to
have the contested land titled in its name, albeit a faux pas, in
fact more than proves its interest to utilize it.
As correctly argued by SIAIN, were WESVICO‘s petition for
registration which, as stated earlier, was archived by the trial
court, pursued but eventually denied, WESVICO would not have
been barred from filing anew a foreshore lease application.
Parenthetically, the petition for registration of WESVICO
was archived not on account of lack of interest but because it
ceased operations due to financial reasons.
44 Tacder NatRes
Administrative Legalization (Free-Patent)
- New RA 10023
Special Patents
Cadastral Registration Proceedings
a) Section 53 CA 141
b) Section 35-38 PD 1529
Director of Lands vs Roman Catholic
FACTS: In 1913, cadastral proceedings were conducted to settle
the title to a considerable tract of land in the Province of Rizal.
The Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila (church) and other
private parties were claimants of 13 cadastral lots that comprised
the contested property. The lower court ruled in favor of the
private claimants. Upon appeal, the church invoked that the
composition title of the church with the Spanish Government
included the subject property. The church then presented one
witness and rested. The private oppositors then called their
respective witnesses to prove title by possession, and rested. The
church thereafter made an offer to present additional testimony
intended to show that the possession of the private claimants
had been interrupted and that it was merely possession through
the tolerance of the church. However, the counsel for the
oppositors objected to the entry of additional testimonies which
was sustained.
ISSUE: Did the lower court err in refusing the entry the church’s
additional testimonies?
RULING:
The Court ruled in the affirmative.
The object of a cadastral petition is that the title to the various
lots embraced in the survey may be settled and adjudicated. It is
in the nature of a proceeding in rem, promoted by the Director of
Lands, somewhat akin to a judicial inquiry and investigation
leading to a judicial decree. In one sense, there is no plaintiff and
there is no defendant. In another sense, the Government is the
plaintiff and all the- claimants are defendants.

As a general rule, courts should adhere to the usual rules of
practice, procedure, and evidence that governs registration
proceedings. However, in registration proceedings where so
many parties are involved and action is taken quickly and
abruptly, opportunity should be given to parties to submit
additional corroborative evidence in support of their claims of
title, if the ends of justice so require. This case was remanded
back to the lower court with the church being allowed to admit
additional testimonies in the interest of justice and
ascertainment of truth.
Abellera vs Farol
Whether in a cadastral case, the judge may upon motion of
adverse claimants order the cancellation of the claimant's
answer and keep the latter from introducing evidence to prove
his ownership because the case is barred by a prior judgment, is
the legal question at issue in this case. An order to that effect
issued by the Court of First Instance of La Union, is impugned by
Fabian B.S. Abellera in a petition for a writ of certiorari.
Abellera, in a previous case concerning the same real estate
involved herein, sued Hermegildo Balanag and others who are
either the same parties in this case or the latter's predecessors in
interest, alleging ownership of the land. But his complaint was
dismissed by the Court of First Instance on two grounds: (1)
prescription in favor of defendants; and (2) the deed of donation
of these lands to him had not been formally accepted according
to Article 633 of the Civil Code. Upon appeal to this Court, the
judgment of the trial court was affirmed on the second ground
aforementioned (Abellera vs. Balanag G.R. No. 11970,
promulgated March 22, 1918, and reported in 37 Phil. 865).
It appears in that decision of this Court that after the perfection
of the appeal, Abellera executed a public document formally
accepting the donation of the land, and presented and deed of
acceptance together with proofs of notification of acceptance to
the donor, as ground for new trial. This Court held that this was
not newly-discovered evidence, and that Abellera had not
acquired title to the hacienda until the execution of the deed of
acceptance and the notification thereof to donor. This Court
added:
So that whether rights he may have to institute and maintain a
new action of ejectment in reliance upon his claim that he has
acquired title to the hacienda, since the date of the dismissal of
this action, it is clear that the present action was properly
45 Tacder NatRes
dismissed on the ground of failure of proof of title in the plaintiff
at the time when the action was instituted and later when
judgment of dismissal was entered by the trial court.
In July of 1918, or four months after the above-mentioned
decision of this Court, petitioner herein brought another action
for recovery of the land against the same defendants in the
previous case. The second suit was later dismissed by the Court
of First Instance and transferred to cadastral case No. 5 which
included the hacienda in question that had in the meantime been
subdivided into lots. When the cadastral case came up before the
Hon. Meynardo M. Farol at Aringay, La Union, in July 1941, Fabian
B.S. Abellera appeared as claimant while Narciso de Guzman and
others appeared as adverse claimant. The latter through counsel
moved that Abellera's claim over the lots concerned be dismissed
on the grounds of res judicata and prescription.
A careful examination of the decision of this Court in the previous
case (37 Phil., 865) convinces us that there is no res judicata. We
merely held that Abellera had not acquired title to the hacienda
until the execution of the deed of acceptance and the notification
thereof, and we clearly refused to prevent Abellera from
instituting a new action based upon his assertion that he had
acquired title to the estate since the dismissal of his original
action.
The other ground for the motion for dismissal, prescription, is not
involved in the present proceedings.
The next question is: Did the cadastral court, on the ground of
res judicata, have any power to entertain the motion to dismiss
Abellera's claim and bar him from presenting evidence to prove
his ownership of these lots?
Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides:
These rules shall not apply to land registration, cadastral and
election cases, naturalization and insolvency proceedings, and
other cases not herein provided for, except by analogy or in a
suppletory character and whenever practicable and convenient.
The Rules of Court may be applied in cadastral cases when two
conditions are present: (1) analogy or need to supplement the
cadastral law, and (2) practicability and convenience.
If the nature and objective of the cadastral scheme are kept in
view, a motion to dismiss in a cadastral case on the ground of
prior judgment would seem to be out of place. The Government
initiates a cadastral case, compelling all claimants in a
municipality to litigate against one another regarding their
respective claims of ownership. By this plan, all the private lands
in a town are registered in one single collective proceeding. Thus,

the piece-meal and isolated registration of lands, so inadequate
in more ways than one, is avoided. The principal aim is to settle
as much as possible all disputes over land and to remove all
clouds over land titles, as far a practicable, in a community. To
attain this purpose, the cadastral court should allow all claimants
ample freedom to ventilate whatever right they may assert over
real estate, permitting them, in keeping with the law of evidence,
to offer proofs in support of their allegations. To countenance the
contrary opinion, by suppressing the presentation of evidence in
support of claims, would but serve to perpetuate conflicts over
land, for such stifled affirmations of ownership will fester like
wounds unskillfully treated. No sufficient leeway having been
give all claimants to demonstrate the strength and consistently
of their alleged rights, the stability of decrees of title is
jeopardized.
In Haw Pia vs. Roman A. Cruz (G.R. No. 48506), we declared that
the Court of First Instance in a cadastral proceeding cannot
appoint a receiver because its jurisdiction is special and limited.
We declined in that case to apply the new Rules of Court by
analogy.
We are, therefore, of the opinion that while in a cadastral
case res judicata is available to a claimant in order to defeat the
alleged rights of another claimant, nevertheless prior judgment
can not set up in a motion to dismiss.
The order appealed from is hereby reversed. Petitioner herein
shall in the cadastral proceedings be allowed to present evidence
to prove his claim over the lots in question. With costs against
the adverse claimants who are respondents herein. So ordered.
Yulo, C.J., Moran and Ozaeta, JJ. concur.
Prohibited Alienations and Transfer of Private Lands
a) Sections 118-124 of CA 141
b) Section 7 Art XII, 1987 Constitution
46 Tacder NatRes
Gayapanao vs IAC
FACTS: This is a petition for review on certiorari filed by Severino
Gayapanao and his siblings questioning the decision of the IAC in
upholding the validity of the sale of the land between their father
Constantino and their sister. The 2 hectare land, subject of this
case is part of 10 hectare homestead land registered in the name
of Constantino Gayapanao under OCT. The final order of the
Director of Lands for the issuance of patent was issued on
December 10, 1937. On November 15, 1938, Constantino
Gayapanao executed a private deed entitled kasulatan ng bilihan
in favor of Simeona Gayapanao and his husband.
RTC’s decision: The contract of sale between Simeona
Gayapanao and her father is null and void for having been
executed with the 5 year prohibitory period provided under
Section 118 of the Public Land Law
CA’s decision: It reversed the decision of the RTC and uphold the
validity of the sale.
ISSUE: WON CA was correct in upholding the validity of the sale?
RULING: No, the provision of law which prohibits the sale or
encumbrance of the homestead within 5 years after the grant is
mandatory.
From the date of the approval of the application and for a term of
five (5) years from and after the date of issuance of the patent or
grant, lands acquired under free patent or homestead provisions
cannot be subject to encumbrance or alienation, nor shall they
become liable to the satisfaction of any debt contracted prior to
the expiration of said period. The only exception mentioned by
the law is the sale or encumbrance in favor of the government or
any of its branches, units or institutions.
In a number of cases, we have consistently ruled that a sale of
homestead within the five (5) year prohibitive period is void ab
initio and the same cannot be ratified nor can it acquire validity
through the passage of time.
Republic vs Garcia
Sections 118-124
Sometime of CA
before the 141
last war appellant Isabelo Garcia and his
wife Tagumpay Dumaguindin acquired by purchase the

homestead rights of Lingasa Bapanialag to a parcel of homestead
land situated at Mabay, Kiamba, Cotabato, containing an area of
23.21 hectares (Homestead Application No. 182259 [E-90722]).
The transfer was approved by the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources upon recommendation of the Director of
Lands and Patent No. V-532 was issued in favor of the appellant
Isabelo Garcia and his wife. Three years and three months after
the issuance of the homestead patent, or on 14 April 1950, for
and in consideration of the sum of P11,000, by an instrument
executed and acknowledged before a notary public the
appellant Isabelo Garcia and his wife sold and conveyed to
Domingo Colorado, Raymundo de Guzman, Inocencio Padama,
Ignacio Ramos and Leon de Guzman 19 hectares of the
homestead land (Exhibit A). The vendees took possession of
the part sold to them. The deed of sale was not submitted to
the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources for
approval nor presented to the Registrar of Deeds in and for the
province of Cotabato for registration.
Section 118 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 partly provides:
Except in favor of the Government or any of its branches, units,
or institutions, lands acquired under free patent or homestead
provision shall not be subject to encumbrance or alienation from
the date of the approval of the application and for a term of five ,
years from and after the date of issuance of the patent or grant,
nor shall they become liable to the satisfaction of any debt
contracted prior to the expiration of said period, but the
improvements or crops on the land may be mortgaged or
pledged to qualified persons, associations, or corporations.
Section 124 of the same Act provides:
Any acquisition, conveyance, alienation, transfer, or other
contract made or executed in violation of any of the provisions
of sections one hundred and eighteen, one hundred and twenty,
one hundred and twenty-one, one hundred and twenty-two, and
one hundred and twenty-three of this Act shall be unlawful and
null and void from its execution and shall produce the effect of
annulling and cancelling the grant, title, patent, or permit
originally issued, recognized or confirmed, actually or
presumptively, and cause the reversion of the property and its
improvements to the State.
As the sale of the 19 hectares of the homestead land was made
within the prohibitive period of five years three years and three
months after the issuance of the homestead patent is null and
47 Tacder NatRes
[1]
void, and is a cause for reversion of the homestead to the
State.
Appellants' defense set up in the court below was that the
document Exhibit A was intended merely as a mortgage on the
improvements and crops existing on the 19 hectares of the
homestead land to secure the payment by instalment of a loan,
only that it was drawn up by mistake as an absolute sale upon
the insistence of the vendees. If it was drawn up as an absolute
sale upon the insistence of the vendees, then there was no
mistake committed. The document Exhibit A is so clearly
worded as to preclude an interpretation other than what the
parties had intended it to be a deed of absolute sale of the 19
hectares of the homestead land. Moreover, as found and held by
the trial court:
* * * as stated in Annex "A", the improvements on the land only
consist of 50 coco,nut trees, 5 mango trees, 1 nangka tree,
bananas and other friut trees. It is unbelievable that
defendants Domingo Colorado, Raymundo de Guzman,
Inocencio Padama, Ignacio Ramos and Leon de Guzman would
grant a loan of P11,000.00 for such a small security as those
improvements specified above. Then if it is true that the
transaction had between them is only a loan, to be paid by
instalment every year, the defendants failed to produce any
evidence that any instalment has ever been paid, taking into
consideration that already elapsed more than five (5) years from
that time up to the hearing of this case.
The fact that the appellant Isabelo Garcia moved to the
municipality of Bislig, province of Surigao, and abandoned his
homestead in Kiamba, Cotabato, is proof that he sold 19
hectares of his homestead.
Appellants contend that, under section 50, Act No. 496, the
operative act to convey and affect lands registered thereunder is
the act of registration, that inasmuch as the deed of sale Exhibit
A was never registered there was actually no conveyance made
of the 19 hectares of the homestead land, and that for that
reason there was no infringement of section 118 of
Commonwealth Act No. 141. To constitute a violation of the
section just referred to, it is enough that the homestead be
encumbered or alienated within the prohibitive period of five
years; it is not necessary that the encumbrance or alienation be
registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds. To uphold the

appellants' contention would defeat the very prohibition
established by law, for no party to a prohibited sale or
conveyance would register such ah illegal transaction.
Besides, the vendees already, had taken possession of the part
sold to them.
Even if only 19 out of the 23.21 hectares of the homestead land
had been sold or alienated within the prohibitive period of five
years from date of issuance of the patent to the grantee, such
alienation is a sufficient cause for reversion to the State of the
whole grant. In granting a homestead to an applicant, the law
imposes as a condition that the land should not be encumbered,
sold or alienated within five years from the issuance of the
patent. The sale or alienation of part of the homestead violates
that condition.
The judgment appealed from is affirmed, with costs against
the appellants.
Lee Chuy Realty Corp vs CA
Facts: A valuable piece of land located at Meycauyan, Bulacan,
with an area of 24,576 sq. m. and covered by OCT No. 0-5290 is
disputed by Lee Chuy Realty Corporation and Marc Realty and
Development Corp.
On 5 May 1989 the Bascaras and Ernesto Jacinto also sold their
share to MARC REALTY which was registered on 16 October 1989.
Lee Chuy Realty claims that it was never informed of the
existence of the sale between Marc Realty and the
Bascaras/Jacinto. Marc Realty insists that Lee Chuy verbally
notified of the sale and was given a copy of the deed of sale.
On 13 November 1989 LEE CHUY REALTY filed a complaint for
legal redemption against MARC REALTY and consigned in court a
manager's check for 614,400. MARC REALTY insisted that the
complaint be dismissed for failure to state a cause of action there
being no allegation of prior valid tender of payment or a prior
valid notice of consignation.
ISSUE: WON a formal offer to redeem accompanied with tender
of payment a condition precedent to the filing of an action for the
valid exercise of the right of legal redemption; is the filing of the
action with consignation equivalent to a formal offer to redeem.
48 Tacder NatRes
HELD:
The Court of Appeals erroneously concluded that a prior tender
or offer of redemption is a prerequisite or precondition to the
filing of the action for legal redemption. To avail of the right of
redemption what is essential is to make an offer to redeem within
the prescribed period. There is no prescribed form for an offer to
redeem to be properly effected. It can either be the formal tender
with consignation or the filing of a complaint in court. What is
paramount is the availment of the fixed and definite period within
which to exercise the right of legal redemption.
The filing of the action itself is equivalent to a formal offer to
redeem. What constitutes a condition precedent is either a
formal offer to redeem or the filing of an action in court together
with the consignation of the redemption price within the
reglementary period.
The decision of respondent Court of Appeals is REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. The decision of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos,
Bulacan is REINSTATED.
Section 7 Art XII 1987 Constitution
Ong Ching Po vs CA
FACTS:
 Ong Joi Jong, sold a parcel of land located at Fundidor
Street, San Nicolas to private respondent Soledad Parian
on 23 July 1947. The sale was evidenced by a notarized
Deed of Sale, written in English, and was registered with
the Register of Deeds of Manila which in turn issued TCT
no. 9260 dated 2 September 1947 in the name of private
respondent. According to private respondent, she

entrusted the administration of the lot and building to Ong
Ching Po when she and her husband settled in Iloilo,
however when her husband died she demanded that the
lot be vacated since she was going to sell it, petitioners
refused to vacate said premises. On 19 March 1984,
Parian filed a case for unlawful detainer against Ong Ching
Po. The MTC dismissed her case and was reaffirmed by
both the RTC and CA.
 On the other hand, on 6 December 1983, Ong Ching Po
executed a Deed of Absolute Sale conveying the same
property to his children Jimmy and David Ong. On 12
December 1985, the Ong’s filed an action for
reconveyance and damages against Parian in RTC, Manila.
Upon the private respondent’s motion, this was
consolidated with her action for quieting of title against
the petitioners. The RTC rendered a decision in favor of
private respondent and was confirmed by the CA, hence
this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not Ong Ching Po could legally acquire the
property?
HELD: No. Petition is dismissed.
RATIO: Ong Ching Po cannot legally claim ownership of the
disputed property since the capacity to acquire private lands is
dependent on the capacity to acquire or hold lands of the public
domain. Private land may be transferred or conveyed only to
individuals or entities “qualified to acquire lands of the public
domain”. Petitioner Ong Ching Po was a Chinese citizen and
therefore is disqualified from acquiring and owning real property.
Further, despite the documentary evidence provided by
petitioners, they failed to provide evidence as to the genuineness
and due execution of the deed of sale. Likewise, the tax receipts,
tax declaration, rental receipts, deed of sale and TCT were in
Ong’s possession, these were not reflective of dominion or
ownership as even a mere administrator or manager may
lawfully perform payment duties relative to his appointment as
such. It was also noteworthy that the tax receipts and rental
receipts were in the name of Parian’s husband. Hence, petition
was dismissed.
49 Tacder NatRes
Frenzel vs Catito
DOCTRINE:
A contract that violates the Constitution and the law, is null and
void and vests no rights and creates no obligations. It produces
no legal effect at all. The petitioner, being a party to an illegal
contract, cannot come into a court of law and ask to have his
illegal objective carried out
FACTS: Petitioner Alfred Fritz Frenzel is an Australian citizen of
German descent. He was so enamored with Ederlina that he
bought her numerous properties such as house and lot in Quezon
City and in Davao City. He also put up a beauty parlor business in
the name of Ederlina. Alfred was unaware that Ederlina was
married until her spouse Klaus Muller wrote a letter to Alfred
begging the latter to leave her wife alone.
When Alfred and Ederlinas relationship started deteriorating.
Ederlina had not been able to secure a divorce from Klaus. The
latter could charge her for bigamy and could even involve Alfred,
who himself was still married. To avoid complications, Alfred
decided to live separately from Ederlina and cut off all contacts
with her.
On October 15, 1985, Alfred wrote to Ederlinas father,
complaining that Ederlina had taken all his life savings and
because of this, he was virtually penniless. He further accused
the Catito family of acquiring for themselves the properties he
had purchased with his own money. He demanded the return of
all the amounts that Ederlina and her family had stolen and turn
over all the properties acquired by him and Ederlina during their
coverture.
ISSUE: Whether the petitioner could recover the money used in
purchasing the several properties
HELD: No, even if, as claimed by the petitioner, the sales in
question were entered into by him as the real vendee, the said
transactions are in violation of the Constitution; hence, are null
and void ab initio. A contract that violates the Constitution and
the law, is null and void and vests no rights and creates no
obligations. It produces no legal effect at all. The petitioner,
being a party to an illegal contract, cannot come into a court of
law and ask to have his illegal objective carried out. One who

loses his money or property by knowingly engaging in a contract
or transaction which involves his own moral turpitude may not
maintain an action for his losses. To him who moves in
deliberation and premeditation, the law is unyielding. The law
will not aid either party to an illegal contract or agreement; it
leaves the parties where it finds them
Muller vs Muller
FACTS: Elena Buenaventura Muller and Helmut Muller are
husband and wife in this case. They wed and resided in Germany
until they decided to permanently reside in the Philippines in
1992. By this time, they bought a house in Antipolo, Rizal using
the proceeds that they got from selling the house the Helmut
Muller inherited from his parents in Germany.
The marriage, however, did not last. They were eventually
separated and Helmut Muller filed for separation of their
properties. The trial court then dissolved the absolute community
of property and ordered the equal partition of their personal
properties located within the country, excluding those acquired
by gratuitous title during marriage. As to the Antipolo property,
the court held that it was acquired using the paraphernal funds of
Helmut, however, he cannot recover said property, nor have a
right to recover the funds used to buy it since it was purchased in
violation of Section 7, Article XII of the Constitution. Upon appeal,
the Court of Appeals granted Helmut Muller’s prayer for
reimbursement for the Antipolo property.
ISSUE: WON Helmut Muller is entitled to reimbursement of the
funds used to acquire the Antipolo property.
HELD: NO. Respondent was aware of the constitutional
prohibition and expressly admitted his knowledge thereof to this
Court. He declared that he had the Antipolo property titled in the
name of petitioner because of the said prohibition. His attempt at
subsequently asserting or claiming a right on the said property
cannot be sustained. Thus, in the instant case, respondent
cannot seek reimbursement on the ground of equity where it is
clear that he willingly and knowingly bought the property despite
the constitutional prohibition. To allow reimbursement would in
effect permit respondent to enjoy the fruits of a property which
he is not allowed to own. Thus, it is likewise proscribed by law.
50 Tacder NatRes
Lee vs Director of Lands
FACTS:
 Sometime in March 1936, the Dinglasans sold to Lee Liong
(Chinese citizen) a parcel of land situated at the corner of
Roxas Avenue and Pavia Street, Roxas City.
 In 1993, Elizabeth Manuel-Lee and Pacita Yu Lee filed with
the RTC of Roxas City a petition for reconstitution of title
of the lot. (Alleging that the transfer certificate of title
issued to Lee Liong was lost or destroyed during World
War II.)
 Petitioners Elizabeth and Pacita alleged that they were the
widows of the deceased Lee Bing Hoo and Lee Bun
Ting, who were the heirs of Lee Liong, the owner of the
lot.
 The RTC approved reconstitution of the lost or destroyed
certificate of title in the name of Lee Liong on the basis of
an approved plan and technical description.
 Solicitor General filed with the Court of Appeals a
petition for annulment of the RTC decision alleging that
the RTC had no jurisdiction over the case.
 The Solicitor General contended that the petitioners were
not the proper parties in the reconstitution of title, since
their predecessor-in-interest Lee Liong did not acquire title
to the lot because he was a Chinese citizen and was
constitutionally not qualified to own the subject land.
 CA declared the reconstitution void. Hence this petition.
 Elizabeth and Pacita emphasized that the ownership of
the land had been settled in two previous cases of the
Supreme Court, where the Court ruled in favor of their
predecessor-in-interest, Lee Liong.
 They also pointed out that they acquired ownership of the
land through actual possession of the lot and their
consistent payment of taxes over the land for more than
sixty years.
 On the other hand, the Solicitor General submitted
that the decision in the reconstitution case was void;
otherwise, it would amount to circumventing the
constitutional proscription against aliens acquiring
ownership of private or public agricultural lands.
ISSUES:
1. WON Lee Liong has the qualification to own land in the
Philippines. NO

2. WON the reconstitution was valid. NO
HELD:
1. Lee Liong was not qualified but the ownership of the
lot was already acquired by Filipino citizens Lee Liong was
disqualified to acquire the land under the 1935
Constitution. The sale of the land in question was
consummated sometime in March 1936, during the
effectivity of the 1935 Constitution.
Under the 1935 Constitution aliens could not acquire private
agricultural lands, save in cases of hereditary succession. Thus,
Lee Liong, a Chinese citizen, was disqualified to acquire the land
in question.
The fact that the Court did not annul the sale of the land to an
alien did not validate the transaction. It was still contrary to the
constitutional proscription against aliens acquiring lands of the
public or private domain.
The proper party to assail the sale is the Solicitor General.
This was what was done in this case when the Solicitor
General initiated an action for annulment of judgment of
reconstitution of title. While it took the Republic more than
sixty years to assert itself, it is not barred from initiating such
action. Prescription never lies against the State.
The land is now in the hands of Filipinos.
The original vendee, Lee Liong, has since died and the land has
been inherited by his heirs and subsequently their heirs,
petitioners herein. Petitioners are Filipino citizens, a fact the
Solicitor General does not dispute.
The constitutional proscription on alien ownership of lands of the
public or private domain was intended to protect lands from
falling in the hands of non-Filipinos. In this case, however, there
would be no more public policy violated since the land is in the
hands of Filipinos qualified to acquire and own such land.
“If land is invalidly transferred to an alien who subsequently
becomes a citizen or transfers it to a citizen, the flaw in the
original transaction is considered cured and the title of the
51 Tacder NatRes
transferee is rendered valid.”
Thus, the subsequent transfer of the property to qualified
Filipinos may no longer be impugned on the basis of the invalidity
of the initial transfer. The objective of the constitutional provision
to keep our lands in Filipino hands has been achieved.
Incidentally, it must be mentioned that reconstitution of the
original certificate of title must be based on an owner’s duplicate,
secondary evidence thereof, or other valid sources of the title to
be reconstituted.
2. Reconstitution was void for lack of factual support
In this case, reconstitution was based on the plan and technical
description approved by the Land Registration Authority. This
renders the order of reconstitution void for lack of factual
support. A judgment with absolutely nothing to support it is void.
As earlier mentioned, a reconstitution of title is the re-
issuance of a new certificate of title lost or destroyed in its
original form and condition. It does not pass upon the ownership
of the land covered by the lost or destroyed title.
Any change in the ownership of the property must be the subject
of a separate suit. Thus, although petitioners are in possession of
the land, a separate proceeding is necessary to thresh out the
issue of ownership of the land.
1.CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; PROSCRIPTION ON SALE OF REAL
ESTATE TO ALIENS; DOCTRINE OF PARI DELICTO APPLICABLE TO
VENDOR AND VENDEE THEREIN; CASE AT BAR. — "In sales of real
estate to aliens incapable of holding title thereto by virtue of the
provisions of the Constitution both the vendor and the vendee
are deemed to have committed the constitutional violation and
being thus in pari delicto the courts will not afford protection to
either party." The proper party to assail the sale is the Solicitor
General. This was what was done in this case when the Solicitor
General initiated an action for annulment of judgment of
reconstitution of title. While it took the Republic more than sixty
years to assert itself, it is not barred from initiating such action.
Prescription never lies against the State. Although ownership of
the land cannot revert to the original sellers, because of the
doctrine of pari delicto, the Solicitor General may initiate an
action for reversion or escheat of the land to the State, subject to

other defenses, as hereafter set forth. In this case, subsequent
circumstances militate against escheat proceedings because the
land is now in the hands of Filipinos. The original vendee, Lee
Liong, has since died and the land has been inherited by his heirs
and subsequently their heirs, petitioners herein. Petitioners are
Filipino citizens, a fact the Solicitor General does not dispute.
2.ID.; ID.; ID.; EFFECT OF SUBSEQUENT ACQUISITION OF
PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP BY TRANSFEREE; CASE AT BAR. — The
constitutional proscription on alien ownership of lands of the
public or private domain was intended to protect lands from
falling in the hands of non-Filipinos. In this case, however, there
would be no more public policy violated since the land is in the
hands of Filipinos qualified to acquire and own such land. "If land
is invalidly transferred to an alien who subsequently becomes a
citizen or transfers it to a citizen, the flaw in the original
transaction is considered cured and the title of the transferee is
rendered valid." Thus, the subsequent transfer of the property to
qualified Filipinos may no longer be impugned on the basis of the
invalidity of the initial transfer. The objective of the constitutional
provision to keep our lands in Filipino hands has been achieved.
ASCTac
3.CIVIL LAW; LAND REGISTRATION; RECONSTITUTION OF TITLE;
VALID SOURCES OF THE TITLE TO BE RECONSTITUTED; CASE AT
BAR. — Incidentally, it must be mentioned that reconstitution of
the original certificate of title must be based on an owner's
duplicate, secondary evidence thereof, or other valid sources of
the title to be reconstituted. In this case, reconstitution was
based on the plan and technical description approved by the
Land Registration Authority. This renders the order of
reconstitution void for lack of factual support. A judgment with
absolutely nothing to support it is void.
Ramirez vs Vda de Ramirez
FACTS:
Jose Ramirez a Filipino, died in Spain leaving only his widow
Marcelle Ramirez, a French. In the project partition, the property
was divided into 2 parts: 1st part to the widow, and 2nd part to the
grandnephews the naked ownership. Furthermore, as to the
52 Tacder NatRes
nd
usufruct of the 2 part, 1/3 was given to the widow and 2/3 to
Wanda de Wrobleski, an Austrian. The grandnephews opposed on
the ground that usufruct to Wanda is void because it violates the
constitutional prohibition against the acquisition of lands by
aliens.
ISSUE:
WON the ground for the opposition is correct.
HELD:
No, it is not correct.
The SC held that the Constitutional provision which
enables aliens to acquire private lands does not extend to
testamentary succession for otherwise the prohibition will be
for naught and meaningless. The SC upheld the usufruct in favor
of Wanda because although it is a real right, it does not vest title
to the land in the usufructuary and it is the vesting of title to land
in favor of aliens which is proscribed by the Constitution.
Republic vs CA
On June 17, 1978, respondent spouses bought Lots, as their
residence with a total area of 91.77 sq. m. situated in San Pablo
City, from one Cristeta Dazo Belen. At the time of the purchase,
respondent spouses where then natural-born Filipino citizens.
On February 5, 1987, the spouses filed an application for
registration of title of the two (2) parcels of land before the RTC of
San Pablo City. This time, however, they were no longer Filipino
citizens and have opted to embrace Canadian citizenship through
naturalization.
RTC rendered a decision confirming the title of the Spouses.
Republic filed an opposition to the decision of RTC. On appeal, CA
affirmed the decision of RTC.
Republic submits that private respondents have not acquired
proprietary rights over the subject properties before they
acquired Canadian citizenship through naturalization to justify
the registration thereof in their favor. It maintains that even
privately owned unregistered lands are presumed to be public

lands under the principle that lands of whatever classification
belong to the State under the Regalian doctrine. Thus, before the
issuance of the certificate of title, the occupant is not in the
juridical sense the true owner of the land since it still pertains to
the State. Petitioner further argued that it is only when the court
adjudicates the land to the applicant for confirmation of title
would the land become privately owned land, for in the same
proceeding, the court may declare it public land, depending on
the evidence.
ISSUE: WON a foreign national apply for registration of title over
a parcel of land which he acquired by purchase while still a
citizen of the Philippines, from a vendor who has complied with
the requirements for registration under the Public Land Act (CA
141)? YES
HELD:
Since the spouses’ predecessor in interest has been in
open, continuous and exclusive possession for at least 30 years
of alienable public land, such possession ipso jure converts the
same to private property (Recall ruling of Director of Lands
v. IAC). This means that occupation and cultivation for more than
30 years by an applicant and his predecessors-in-interest, vest
title on such applicant so as to segregate the land from the mass
of public.
What is important is that private respondents were formerly
natural-born citizens of the Philippines, and as transferees of a
private land, they could apply for registration in accordance with
the mandate of Section 8, Article XII of the Constitution.
In the case at bar, the spouses were undoubtedly natural-
born Filipino citizens at the time of the acquisition of the
properties and by virtue thereof, acquired vested rights thereon,
tacking in the process, the possession in the concept of owner
and the prescribed period of time held by their predecessors-in-
interest under the Public Land Act.
But what should not be missed in the disposition of this
case is the fact that the Constitution itself allows private
respondents to register the contested parcels of land in
their favor. Sections 7 and 8 of Article XII of the
Constitution contain the following pertinent provisions, to
wit:
53 Tacder NatRes
Sec. 8. Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 7 of this
Article, a natural-born citizen of the Philippines who has
lost his Philippine citizenship may be a transferee of
private lands, subject to limitations provided by law.
(Emphasis supplied)
Section 8, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution above quoted is
similar to Section 15, Article XIV of the then 1973 Constitution
which reads:
Sec. 15. Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 14 of this
Article, a natural-born citizen of the Philippines who has lost his
citizenship may be a transferee of private land, for use by him as
his residence, as the Batasang Pambansa may provide.
Pursuant thereto, Batas Pambansa Blg. 185 was passed into
law, the relevant provision of which provides:
Sec. 2. Any natural-born citizen of the Philippines who has lost his
Philippine citizenship and who has the legal capacity to enter into
a contract under Philippine laws may be a transferee of a private
land up to a maximum area of one thousand square meters, in
the case of urban land, or one hectare in the case of rural land,
to be used by him as his residence. In the case of married
couples, one of them may avail of the privilege herein granted;
Provided, That if both shall avail of the same, the total area
acquired shall not exceed the maximum herein fixed.
In case the transferee already owns urban or rural lands for
residential purposes, he shall still be entitled to be a transferee of
an additional urban or rural lands for residential purposes which,
when added to those already owned by him, shall not exceed the
maximum areas herein authorized.
From the adoption of the 1987 Constitution up to the present, no
other law has been passed by the legislature on the same
subject. Thus, what governs the disposition of private lands in
favor of a natural-born Filipino citizen who has lost his Philippine
citizenship remains to be BP 185.
Even if private respondents were already Canadian citizens at the
time they applied for registration of the properties in question,
said properties as discussed above were already private lands;
consequently, there could be no legal impediment for the

registration thereof by respondents in view of what the
Constitution ordains. The parcels of land sought to be registered
no longer form part of the public domain. They are already
private in character since private respondents' predecessors-in-
interest have been in open, continuous and exclusive possession
and occupation thereof under claim of ownership prior to June 12,
1945 or since 1937. The law provides that a natural-born citizen
of the Philippines who has lost his Philippine citizenship may be a
transferee of a private land up to a maximum area of 1,000
sq.m., if urban, or one (1) hectare in case of rural land, to be
used by him as his residence (BP 185).
It is undisputed that private respondents, as vendees of a private
land, were natural-born citizens of the Philippines. For the
purpose of transfer and/or acquisition of a parcel of
residential land, it is not significant whether private
respondents are no longer Filipino citizens at the time
they purchased or registered the parcels of land in
question. What is important is that private respondents
were formerly natural-born citizens of the Philippines,
and as transferees of a private land, they could apply for
registration in accordance with the mandate of Section 8,
Article XII of the Constitution. Considering that private
respondents were able to prove the requisite period and
character of possession of their predecessors-in-interest over the
subject lots, their application for registration of title must
perforce be approved.
Remedies to Recover Private Land from Disqualified Alien: Action for
reversion
a) Who can initiate
b) When proper. Improper
c) Reversion vs Action for Nullity of Land Titles
Who can initiate
Republic vs Animas
ORIGINAL CASE: Republic of the Philippines, Plaintiff, vs. Isagani
Du Timbol and the Register of Deeds of General Santos City,
54 Tacder NatRes
NOW Director of lands instituted to
1. declare null and void Free Patent issued in the name of
defendant Isagani Du Timbol;
2. to order the aforesaid defendant to surrender the owner's
duplicate of O.C.T. and the
3. defendant Register of Deeds to cancel the same;
4. to decree the reversion of the land in question to the
mass of public domain
The land was originally applied for by Precila Soriain 1966, who
transferred her rights to the land and its improvements to
defendant Isagani Du Timbol who filed his application on1969,
In 1969, free Patent No. was issued and City, (O.C.T.) No. P-2508
in the name of defendant Isagani Du Timbol.
In 1971, the Republic of the Philippines, at the instance of the
Bureau of Forestry, filed a complaint in to declare free patent and
Original Certificate of Title of Isagani Du Timbol null and void ab
initio and to order the reversion of the land in question to the
mass of public domain.
Grounds
 land covered thereby is a forest or timber land which is
not disposable under the Public Land Act;
 in a reclassification of the public lands in the vicinity of
the land in question made by the Bureau of Forestry on
March 7, 1958, was reverted to the category of public
forest,
 the application for free patent by Isagani Du Timbol more
than eleven years thereafter were obtained fraudulently
as private respondent Isagani Du Timbol never occupied
and cultivated the land applied for.
RTC -dismissed the complaint on the ground that Certificate of
Title based on the patent had became indefeasible in view of the
lapse of the one-year period prescribed under Section 38 of the
Land Registration Act for review of a decree of title on the ground
of fraud.
CA- grants the petition on the ground that the area covered by
the patent and title is not a disposable public land, it being a part
of the forest zone and, hence the patent and title thereto are null
and void.
Issue:WON LAND CAN BE REVERTED BACK TO THE STATE
Held: YES. A certificate of title fraudulently secured is null and

void ab initio when fraud consisted in misrepresenting that the
land covered by the application is part of the public domain when
it is not
As a general rule, timber or forest lands are not alienable or
disposable under either the Constitution of 1935 or the
Constitution of 1973.
When the defendant Isagani Du Timbol filed his application for
free patent over the land in question on June 3, 1969, the area in
question was not a disposable or alienable public land but a
public forest.
It is the Bureau of Forestry that has jurisdiction and authority
over the demarcation, protection, management, reproduction,
occupancy and use of all public forests and forest reservations
and over the granting of licenses for the taking of products
therefrom, including stone and earth. Given that the area in
question is a forest or timber land is clearly established, then, the
Bureau of Forest Development has jurisdiction.
Since it was Bureau of Lands who issued the patent and since it
had no jurisdiction to issue a patent because the land involved
was still inalienable forest land when granted, then it may be
plausibly contended that the patent title would be ab initio void,
subject to attack at any time by any party adversely affected.
A patent is void at law if the
 officer who issued the patent had no authority to do so
 If a person obtains a title by FAME under the Torrens
System
 Director of Lands did not have jurisdiction over the same
because it is a public forest, the grantee does not, by
virtue of said certificate of title alone, become the owner
of the land illegally included.
In the case at bar the party seeking the nullity of the title and
reversion of the land is the state itself which is specifically
authorized under Section 101 of the Public Land Act to
initiate such proceedings as an attribute of sovereignty.
The defense of indefeasibility of a certificate of title issued
pursuant to a free patent does not lie against the state in an
action for reversion of the land covered thereby when such land
is a part of a public forest or of a forest reservation.
The lapse of the one year period within which a decree of title
may be reopened for fraud would not prevent the cancellation
55 Tacder NatRes
thereof, for to hold that a title may become indefeasible by
registration, even if such title had been secured through fraud or
in violation of the law, would be the height of absurdity.
Registration should not be a shield of fraud in securing title.
It is the state is seeking the cancellation of the title,
therefore, it has not become indefeasible for prescription
cannot be invoked against the state. A title founded on
fraud may be cancelled, notwithstanding the lapse of one
year from the issuance thereof, through a petition filed in
court by the Solicitor General.
The land covered thereby may be reconveyed to the state
in an action for reconveyance under Section 101 of
Commonwealth Act 141 (Public Land Act).
Isagani Du Timbol was never in possession of the property prior
to his filing the application, contrary to the provisions of law that
 the applicant must have been in possession or cultivation
thereof for at least 30 years;
 no existing signs of improvements found in the area in
question as it is not under cultivation but covered with
grasses, bushes and small trees;
 that it is being used as ranch for grazing cows by the heirs
of Hermogenes Chilsot;
 that no monuments were placed on the area surveyed
which goes to show that there was no actual survey
thereof;
 inside the forest zone;
 the signature of then Acting District Land Officer Elias de
Castro of South Cotabato has been forged
The above alleged circumstances are indicative of fraud and the
misrepresentations of the applicant that he had been occupying
and cultivating the land and residing thereon are sufficient
grounds to ipso facto nullify the grant of the patent and title
under Section 91 of the Public Land Law which provides as
follows:
A certificate of title that is void may be ordered cancelled.
A title will be considered void if it is procured through fraud, as
when a person applies for registration of the land under his name
although the property belongs to another.

When proper/ improper
Republic vs Umali
FACTS
The land situated in Tanza, Cavite which consists of
78,865 square meters was originally purchased on installment
from the government on July 1, 1910 by Florentina Bobadilla, who
allegedly transferred her rights thereto in favor of Martina,
Tomasa, Gregorio and Julio, all surnamed Cenizal, in 1922. 2
Tomasa and Julio assigned their shares to Martina, Maria and
Gregorio. In 1971 these three assignees purportedly signed a
joint affidavit which was filed with the Bureau of Lands to support
their claim that they were entitled to the issuance of a certificate
of title over the said land on which they said they had already
made full payment. On the basis of this affidavit, the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources executed Deed No. V-10910
(Sale Certificate No. 1280) on September 10, 1971, in favor of
the said affiants.
A complaint for reversion was filed on October 10, 1985
when the registered owners of the land, following several
transfers, were Remedios Micla, Juan C. Pulido, and Rosalina, Luz
and Enrique Naval. They asked to return the property to the State
on the aforestated grounds of forgery and fraud. The plaintiff
claimed that Gregorio Cenizal having died on February 25, 1943,
and Maria Cenizal on January 8, 1959, they could not have signed
the joint affidavit dated August 9, 1971, on which Deed No. V-
10910 (Sale Certificate No. 1280) was based.
In their answer, Pulido and the Navals denied any
participation in the join affidavit and said they had all acquired
the property in good faith and for value. By way of affirmative
defenses, they invoked estoppel, laches, prescription and res
judicata. For her part, Miclat moved to dismiss the complaint,
contending that the government had no cause of action against
her because there was no allegation that she had violated the
plaintiff’s right, that the government was not the real party-in-
interest because the subject land was already covered by the
Torrens system, and that in any event the action was barred by
prescription or laches.
56 Tacder NatRes
ISSUE
Whether or not the land under the new owners are obtained thru
forgery and fraud and subject to return the property to the State
HELD
We agree with the contention that there is no allegation in
the complaint 13 filed by the petitioner that any one of the
defendants was privy to the forged joint affidavit or that they had
acquired the subject land in bad faith. Their status as innocent
transferees for value was never questioned in that pleading. Not
having been disproved, that status now accords to them the
protection of the Torrens System and renders the titles obtained
by them thereunder indefeasible and conclusive. The rule will not
change despite the flaw in TCT No. 55044.
Section 39 of the Land Registration Act clearly provided:
Every person receiving a certificate of title in pursuance of a
decree of registration, and every subsequent purchaser of
registered land who takes a certificate of title for value in good
faith shall hold the same free of all encumbrance except those
noted on said certificate.
The real purpose of the Torrens System of land
registration is to quiet title to land; to put a stop forever to any
question of the legality of the title, except claims which were
noted at the time of registration in the certificate, or which may
arise subsequent thereto. That being the purpose of the law, it
would seem that once the title was registered, the owner might
rest secure, without the necessity of waiting in the portals of the
court, or sitting in the "mirador de su casa," to avoid the
possibility of losing his land.
The difference between them and the private respondents
is that the latter acquired the land in question not by direct grant
but in fact after several transfers following the original sale
thereof to Bobadilla in 1910. The presumption is that they are
innocent transferees for value in the absence of evidence to the
contrary. The petitioner contends that it was Pedro Miclat who
caused the falsification of the joint affidavit, but that is a bare
and hardly persuasive allegation, and indeed, even if true, would
still not prove any collusion between him and the private
respondents. The mere fact that Remedios Miclat was the
daughter and heiress of Miclat, without more, would not

necessarily visit upon her the alleged sins of her father.
The land being now registered under the Torrens system
in the names of the private respondents, the government has no
more control or jurisdiction over it. It is no longer part of the
public domain or, as the Solicitor General contends — as if it
made any difference — of the Friar Lands. The subject property
ceased to be public land when OCT No. 180 was issued to
Florentina Bobadilla in 1910 or at the latest from the date it was
sold to the Cenizals in 1971 upon full payment of the purchase
price. As private registered land, it is governed by the provisions
of the Land Registration Act, now denominated the Property
Registration Decree, which applies even to the government.
1. LAND REGISTRATION; TORRENS SYSTEM; PROTECTS INNOCENT
TRANSFEREES FOR VALUE; TITLES OBTAINED RENDERED
INDEFEASIBLE AND CONCLUSIVE. — There is no allegation in the
complaint filed by the petitioner that any one of the defendants
was privy to the forged joint affidavit or that they had acquired
the subject land in bad faith. Their status as innocent transferees
for value was never questioned in that pleading. Not having been
disproved, that status now accords to them the protection of the
Torrens System and renders the titles obtained by them
thereunder indefeasible and conclusive. The rule will not change
despite the flaw in TCT No. 55044. Section 39 of the Land
Registration Act clearly provided: "Sec. 39. Every person
receiving a certificate of title in pursuance of a decree of
registration, and every subsequent purchaser of registered land
who takes a certificate of title for value in good faith shall hold
the same free of all encumbrance except those noted on said
certificate."
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; PIÑERO v. DIRECTOR OF LANDS, 57 SCRA 386,
NOT APPLICABLE IN CASE AT BAR. — The decision in Piñero v.
Director of Lands is not applicable to the present proceeding
because the lands involved in that case had not yet passed to
the hands of an innocent purchaser for value. They were still held
by the Piñeros. The action for reversion was filed by the
government against them as the original transferees of the
properties in question. They were the direct grantees of the free
patents issued by the government pursuant to which the
corresponding certificates of title were issued under the Torrens
system. The fraud alleged by the government as a ground for the
reversion sought was imputable directly to the Piñeros, who could
not plead the status of innocent purchasers for value.The
57 Tacder NatRes
difference between them and the private respondents is that the
latter acquired the land in question not by direct grant but in fact
after several transfers following the original sale thereof to
Bobadilla in 1910. The presumption is that they are innocent
transferees for value in the absence of evidence to the contrary.
3. ID.; ID.; SUBJECT LAND NO LONGER PART OF PUBLIC DOMAIN;
LAND REGISTRATION ACT, NOW CALLED "PRIVATE REGISTRATION
DECREE" GOVERNS. — The land being now registered under the
Torrens system in the names of the private respondents, the
government has no more control or jurisdiction over it. It is no
longer part of the public domain or, as the Solicitor General
contends — as if it made any difference — of the Friar Lands. The
subject property ceased to be public land when OCT No. 180 was
issued to Florentina Bobadilla in 1910 or at the latest from the
date it was sold to the Cenizals in 1971 upon full payment of the
purchase price. As private registered land, it is governed by the
provisions of the Land Registration Act, now denominated the
Property Registration Decree, which applies even to the
government. The pertinent provision of the Land Registration Act
was Section 122, which read as follows: Sec. 122. "Whenever
public lands in the Philippine Islands belonging to the
Government of the United States or to the Government of the
Philippine Islands are alienated, granted, or conveyed to persons
or to public or private corporations, the same shall be brought
forthwith under the operation of this Act and shall become
registered lands." This should be related to Section 12 of the Friar
Lands Act, providing thus: "Sec. 12. . . . upon the payment of the
final installment together with all accrued interest, the
Government will convey to such settler and occupant the said
land so held by him by proper instrument of conveyance, which
shall be issued and become effective in the manner provided in
section one hundred and twenty-two (Sec. 122) of the Land
Registration Act."
4. ID.; ID.; ORIGINAL TRANSFER OF LAND, MERELY AVOIDABLE,
NOT VOID AB-INITIO; LAND CEASES TO BE PUBLIC UPON
REGISTRATION AND ISSUANCE OF CERTIFICATE OF TITLE. — The
petitioner errs in arguing that the original transfer was null and
void ab initio, for the fact is that it is not so. It was only voidable.
The land remained private as long as the title thereto had not
been voided, but it is too late to do that now. As the Court has
held in Ramirez vs. Court of Appeals. (30 SCRA 301): "A
certificate of title fraudulently secured is not null and void ab

initio, unless the fraud consisted in misrepresenting that the land
is part of the public domain, although it is not. In such case the
nullity arises, not from the fraud or deceit, but from the fact that
the land is not under the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Lands.
Inasmuch as the land involved in the present case does not
belong to such category. OCT No. 282-A would be merely
voidable or reviewable. . . . Once a patent is registered and the
corresponding certificate of title is issued, the land ceases to be
part of public domain and becomes private property over which
the director of Lands has neither control nor jurisdiction. A public
land patent, when registered in the corresponding Register of
Deeds, is a veritable Torrens Title, and becomes as indefeasible
as Torrens Title upon the expiration of one (1) year from the date
of issuance thereof."
Pinero vs Director of Lands
The general rule is that possession and cultivation of a portion of
a tract of land under the claim of ownership of all is a
constructive possession of all, if the remainder is not in the
adverse possession of another.
FACTS:
Restituo Romero gained possession of a considerable tract of
land located in Nueva Ecija. He took advantage of the Royal
Decree to obtain a possessory information title to the land and
was registered as such.
Parcel No. 1 included within the limits of the possessory
information title of Romero was sold to Cornelio Ramos, herein
petitioner.
Ramos instituted appropriate proceedings to have his title
registered.
Director of Lands opposed on the ground that Ramos had not
acquired a good title from the Spanish government.
Director of Forestry also opposed on the ground that the first
parcel of land is forest land.
It has been seen however that the predecessor in interest to the
petitioner at least held this tract of land under color of title.
58 Tacder NatRes
ISSUE:
Whether or not the actual occupancy of a part of the land
described in the instrument giving color of title sufficient to give
title to the entire tract of land?
HELD:
The general rule is that possession and cultivation of a portion of
a tract of land under the claim of ownership of all is a
constructive possession of all, if the remainder is not in the
adverse possession of another.
The claimant has color of title; he acted in good faith and he has
open, peaceable, and notorious possession of a portion of the
property, sufficient to apprise the community and the world that
the land was for his enjoyment.
Possession in the eyes of the law does not mean that a man has
to have his feet on every square meter of ground before it can be
said that he is in possession. Ramos and his predecessor in
interest fulfilled the requirements of the law on supposition that
the premises consisted of agricultural public land.
On the issue of forest land, Forest reserves of public land can be
established as provided by law. When the claim of the citizen and
the claim of the government as to a particular piece of property
collide, if the Government desires to demonstrate that the land is
in reality a forest, the Director of Forestry should submit to the
court convincing proof that the land is not more valuable for
agricultural than for forest purposes.
In this case, the mere formal opposition on the part of the
Attorney-General for the Director of Forestry, unsupported by
satisfactory evidence will not stop the courts from giving title to
the claimant.
Petitioner and appellant has proved a title to the entire tract of
land for which he asked for registration.
Registration in the name of the petitioner is hereby granted.
1. Relevant Issue
- Whether or not the Director of Lands had authority to
order the investigation of the patents and title

2. Relevant Decision
- YES. The Director of Lands had authority to order the
investigation.
3. Doctrine
- It is not only the right but the DUTY of the Director of
Lands to conduct investigation of any alleged fraud in
securing a free patent, and the corresponding title to a
pubic land
- He may also file the corresponding court action for the
reversion of the public land to the State
- Sec. 91 of the Public Land Act states:
“It shall be the duty of the Director of Lands, from time to time
and whenever he may deem it advisable, to make the necessary
investigations for the purpose of ascertaining whether the
material facts set out in the application are true, or whether they
continue to exist and are maintained and preserved in good
faith..”
Reversion vs Action for Nullity of Land Titles
Kionisala vs Dacut
FACTS:
Private respondents filed a complaint for declaration of
nullity of titles, reconveyance and damages against petitioners
involving two parcels of land – Lot No. 1017 and Lot No. 1015.
Said lots were registered in their respective names. They claimed
absolute ownership of Lot 1015 and 1017 even prior to the
issuance of the corresponding free patents and certificates of
title.
ISSUE: Whether or not the complaint filed by private
respondents was sufficient.
HELD:
YES. A cause of action for declaration of nullity of free
patent and certificate of title would require allegations of the
plaintiff’s ownership of the contested lot prior to the issuance of
such free patent and certificate of title as well as the defendant’s
59 Tacder NatRes
fraud or mistake; as the case may be, in successfully obtaining
these documents of title over the parcel of land claimed by
plaintiff. Private respondents allege in their complaint all the
facts necessary to seek the nullification of the free patents as
well as the certificates of title covering Lot 1015 and Lot1017.
Clearly, they are the real parties in interest in light of their
allegations that they have always been the owners and
possessors of the two (2) parcels of land even prior to the
issuance of the documents of title in petitioners’ favor, hence the
latter could only have committed fraud in securing them.
In the more recent case of Heirs of Ambrocio Kionisala v. Heirs of
Honorio Dacut, 30 the difference between an action for
declaration of nullity of land titles from an action for reversion
was more thoroughly discussed as follows:
An ordinary civil action for declaration of nullity of free patents
and certificates of title is not the same as an action for reversion.
The difference between them lies in the allegations as to the
character of ownership of the realty whose title is sought to be
nullified. In an action for reversion, the pertinent allegations in
the complaint would admit State ownership of the disputed land.
Hence, in Gabila vs. Barriga [41 SCRA 131], where the plaintiff in
his complaint admits that he has no right to demand the
cancellation or amendment of the defendant's title because even
if the title were canceled or amended the ownership of the land
embraced therein or of the portion affected by the amendment
would revert to the public domain, we ruled that the action was
for reversion and that the only person or entity entitled to relief
would be the Director of Lands. On the other hand, a cause of
action for declaration of nullity of free patent and certificate of
title would require allegations of the plaintiff's ownership of the
contested lot prior to the issuance of such free patent and
certificate of title as well as the defendant's fraud or mistake, as
the case may be, in successfully obtaining these documents of
title over the parcel of land claimed by plaintiff. In such a case,
the nullity arises strictly not from the fraud or deceit but from the
fact that the land is beyond the jurisdiction of the Bureau of
Lands to bestow and whatever patent or certificate of title
obtained therefore is consequently void ab initio. The real party-
in-interest is not the State but the plaintiff who alleges a pre-
existing right of ownership over the parcel of land in question
even before the grant of title to the defendant. . . .
 60 Tacder NatRes

Evangelista vs Santiago

Roco vs Gineda

Republic vs Hachero

Republic vs Espinosa