Section 12.
(1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall  With this information, Carino and another policeman traced the whereabouts
have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and
independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the
services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived
except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiate
the free will shall be used against him. Secret detention places, solitary,
incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention are prohibited.
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall
be inadmissible in evidence against him.
(4) The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for violations of this section as
well as compensation to the rehabilitation of victims of torture or similar practices, and
their families.
People v Camat
G.R. No. 112262
Regalado, J.
Facts:
 Sinoy and Penalver, both members of the Philippine Marines, were walking
along Quirino Avenue. They came back from a birthday party and were
wearing civilian clothes. While walking, they noticed two persons trailing
them closely. Penalver was carrying a clutch bag containing a Sanwa electric
tester.
 Del Rosario rushed to Sinoy and kicked the latter. Camat followed Del
Rosario and pulled out a knife and stabbed Sinoy. Penalver kicked Camat
who in turn stabbed him.
 Realizing they were at the losing end, Sinoy and Penalver ran away. With the
aid of a policeman, they were brought to the hospital wherein Sinoy died
shortly. Penalver was transferred to the AFP Medical Center and was
discharged days after.
 Camat and Del Rosario interposed the defense of alibi and denied any
participation in the commission of the felony. Camat claimed that he was
already in his house and preparing to sleep.
 Del Rosario contended that he and his wife were at their stall selling
vegetables along a sidewalk of Quirino Avenue in Baclaran and went home
at 7PM.
 Camat and Del Rosario claim that they did not know each other prior to the
date of the commission of the crime and that they met each other only after
they were arrested and brought to the police precinct.
 Patrolman Odeo Cariño, to whom the case was assigned for investigation,
stated that Camat orally admitted to him his participation in the killing of the
soldier during interrogation.
 In addition, Camat also allegedly gave the names of Del Rosario and alluded
to him as the one who actually stabbed Sinoy.
of Del Rosario and when they found him, invited him for questioning.
 Del Rosario allegedly confessed to Carino his involvement in the crime and
informed the latter that the electric tester could be recovered from his
relatives.
 The investigation of the case centred upon Camat only after the latter was
pointed to by a vendor who allegedly saw what happened. Camat was
arrested by policemen for acts of lasciviousness, upon the complaint of his
sister-in-law.
 Since Camat fitted the description given by the eyewitness, Carino fetched
the vendor to verift Camat’s identity. Said witness recognized and identified
Camat as the one who killed Sinoy. Carino did not give the identity of the
vendor-witness who was afraid of the accused.
 The trial court convicted Camat and Del Rosario with the so-called special
complex crime of robbery with homicide and frustrated homicide.
 Camat and Del Rosario insist that the trial court cannot rely on the
extrajudicial confession of Camat as a basis for their conviction because such
confession was obtained during custodial investigation in violation of their
constitutional rights.
 Moreover, appellants aver that the lower court also erred in making an
inference of guilt from the extrajudicial confession of Del Rosario wherein
he supposedly gave to the investigating policeman the name of his relative
in possession of the electric tester.
Issue:
 W/N Camat and Del Rosario’s extrajudicial confession is admissible – NO
Ruling:
 The invoked by Camat and Del Rosario are premised upon Sec 20 Art IV of
the 1973 Constitution (now Art. 3, Sec. 12). The provision was interpreted in
the case of Morales v. Enrile wherein the Court laid down the procedure to
be followed in custodial investigations:
a) At the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting
officer to inform him of the reason for the arrest and he must be
shown the warrant of arrest, if any.He shall be informed of his
constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel, and that any
statement he might make could be used against him.
b) The person arrested shall have the right to communicate with his
lawyer, relative or anyone he chooses.
c) No custodial investigation shall be conducted unless it be in the
presence of counsel engaged by the person arrested or appointed by
the court.
d) The right to counsel may be waived but the waiver shall not be valid
unless made with the assistance of counsel.
 These rights begin to be available where the investigation is no longer a
general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has began to focus on a particular
 suspect, the suspect has been taken into police custody, and the police has
carried out a process of interrogation that lends itself to eliciting incriminating
statements.
 A reading of the challenged decision shows that the trial court relied upon
appellants’ confessions to disaffirm their credibility and to impugn their
denial of complicity in the commission of the felony.
 This, the lower court cannot do because absent any showing that Camat and
Del Rosario were duly advised of the mandatory guarantees under the Bill of
Rights, their confessions made before Carino are inadmissible against them
and cannot be used in support of their conviction.
 It is now incumbent upon the prosecution to prove during the trial that prior
to questioning, the confessant was warned of his constitutionally protected
rights because the presumption of regularity of official acts does not apply
during in-custody investigation.
 Even if the confession is the truth, if it was made without the assistance of
counsel, it is inadmissible as evidence regardless of the absence of coercion
or even if it had been voluntarily given.
 As to the implication of Del Rosario in the extrajudicial confession of Camat,
no reliance can be placed on the imputation because it violates the rule on res
inter alios acta and does not fall under its exceptions since it was made after
the supposed homicidal conspiracy.
 An extrajudicial confession is binding only upon the confessant and is not
admissible against his co-accused.
 Even disregarding the extrajudicial confessions of appellants, the judgment
of conviction stands. Although there is only one eyewitness presented by the
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Miranda v Arizona
384 US 436 June 13, 1966
Ponente: Warren, CJ.
Facts:
· The Supreme Court’s decision in Miranda v. Arizona addressed four different cases
involving custodial interrogations
· The constitutional issue here is: admissibility of statements obtained from a defendant
questioned while in custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any
significant way
· In each, the defendant was questioned by police officers, detectives, or a prosecuting
attorney in a room in which he was cut off from the outside world. In none of these
cases was the defendant given a full and effective warning of his rights at the outset of
the interrogation process
· In all the cases, the questioning elicited oral admissions and, in three of them, signed
statements that were admitted at trial
· They all thus share salient features of:
prosecution, the Court is of the opinion that the prosecution has satisfactorily
proved the guilt of both accused beyond reasonable doubt.
 It bears repeating that findings of the trial court pertaining to the credibility
of witnesses deserve great respect since it had the opportunity to hear and
observe their demeanor as they testified on the witness stand.
 Additionally, there was no ulterior motive on the part of Penalver that might
have led him to give fabricated testimony against appellants. His positive
testimony is sufficient for conviction.
 Camat and Del Rosario also contend that the failure of the prosecution to
present in court the police informer deprived them of their constitutional right
of confrontation. The Court reiterates that an accused’s constitutional right to
meet the witnesses face to face is limited to proceedings before the trial court.
 Camat and Del Rosario’s reliance on this constitutional right is misplaced as
the same is available to him at the trial and not during a custodial
investigation.
 As to their alibi, it must be noted that alibi becomes less plausible as a defense
when it is established by the accused himself and his immediate rlatives who,
as in tthis case, are appellants’ mother and mother-in-law because they would
naturally be expected to make statements in his favor.
 Appellants should have been indicted only for the special complex crime of
robbery with homicide under Art. 294 of the RPC. There is no crime of
robbery with homicide and frustrated homicide.
The judgment appealed from is AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION that
appellants are guilty of the crime of robbery with homicide.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
o incommunicado interrogation of individuals in a police-dominated
atmosphere, resulting in self-incriminating statements without full
warnings of constitutional rights
· Miranda v Arizona: Miranda was arrested at his home and taken in custody to a
Phoenix police station where he was identified by the complaining witness. Police then
took him to "Interrogation Room No. 2" where he was questioned by two police
officers. Miranda was not advised that he had a right to have an attorney present. After
two hours, officers came out with a written confession signed by Miranda stating that
it was done voluntarily and “with full knowledge of my legal rights, understanding
any statement I make may be used against me." Miranda was found guilty of
kidnapping and rape
o Held: Miranda was not in any way appraised of his right to consult
with an attorney and to have one present during the interrogation,
nor was his right not to be compelled to incriminate himself
effectively protected in any other manner. Without these warnings,
statements are inadmissible
o The written confession he signed saying that it is with "full
knowledge" of his "legal rights" does not approach the knowing and
intelligent waiver required to relinquish constitutional rights
· Vignera v New York: Vignera, was picked up by New York police in connection with
the robbery three days earlier of a Brooklyn dress shop. He was first taken to the 17th
Detective Squad headquarters. He was then taken to the 66th Detective Squad, where
he orally admitted the robbery and was placed under formal arrest. He was then taken
to the 70th Precinct for detention, where he was questioned by an assistant district
attorney in the presence of a hearing reporter who transcribed the questions and
answers. At trial, the oral confession and the transcript were presented to the jury.
Vignera was found guilty of first degree robbery.
o Held: Vignera was not warned of any of his rights before the
questioning by the detective and by the assistant district attorney.
Not effectively apprised of his Fifth Amendment privilege or of his
right to have counsel present. Statements are inadmissible
· Westover v US: Westover was arrested by local police in Kansas City as a suspect in
two Kansas City robberies. Also, he was wanted on a felony charge in California.
Local authorities took him to a police station and placed him in a line-up on the local
charges. Kansas City police interrogated Westover. Local police said that the FBI can
then proceed to interrogate him (since they are done). No records state that Westover
was given any warning of his rights by the local police. FBI continued the
interrogation. Westover was convicted of the California robberies
o Held: No showing that Westover knowingly and intelligently waived
his right to remain silent and his right to consult with counsel prior
to the time he made the statement. The interrogation of the local
police and that of the FBI (that followed), though these authorities
are legally distinct, made an impression to Westover that it was that
of a continuous period of questioning
o No evidence of any warning given prior to the FBI interrogation, nor
any evidence of a waiver of rights. Warnings came at the end of the
interrogation process. In these circumstances, an intelligent waiver
of constitutional rights cannot be assumed
o In this case, after local officers interrogated, the FBI interrogated next.
FBI benefited with the pressure from the local officers because
Westover felt that they were connected. So in these circumstances,
the giving of warnings alone was not sufficient to protect the
privilege
· California v Stewart: In the course of investigating a series of purse-snatch robberies
(where one victim died), Stewart was identified as the endorser of checks stolen in one
of the robberies. Police officers went to his house, asked for permission to search it
(which he agreed to), took robbed items and arrested Stewart (and his wife and 3
visitors). Stewart was interrogated for 9 times within 5 days, where on the 9 th day he
admitted to the robbery but said that he didn’t mean to hurt the victim (who died). He
was convicted of robbery and first-degree murder and sentenced to death. Supreme
Court of California reversed, holding that Stewart should have been advised of his
right to remain silent and his right to counsel
o Held: SC decision is affirmed. With custodial interrogation, it should
not be presumed that the defendant was apprised of his rights and
privilege against self-incrimination when it doesn’t show that any
warnings have been given or any effective alternative was
employed. Nor can a knowing and intelligent waiver of these rights
be assumed on a silent record
o The fact that Stewart only admitted on the 9th interrogation could
mean that he was compelled to forgo his 5th Amendment privilege
Issue:
WON statements by defendants questioned while in custody or otherwise deprived of
his freedom of action in any significant way is admissible in evidence? (NO)
Ruling:
· In each instance, we have concluded that statements were obtained from the defendant
under circumstances that did not meet constitutional standards for protection of the
privilege
· The prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory,
stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use
of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination
· By custodial interrogation, we mean questioning initiated by law enforcement officers
after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of
action in any significant way
· For procedural safeguards to be employed, the following measures are required
o Prior to any questioning, the person must be warned that he has:
§ Right to remain silent
§ That any statement he does make may be used as evidence
against him
§ That he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either
retained or appointed. (If he cannot afford an attorney, one
will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so
desires.)
o The defendant may waive effectuation of these rights, provided the
waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently
o If, however, he indicates in any manner and at any stage of the process
that he wishes to consult with an attorney before speaking, there can
be no questioning. Likewise, if the individual is alone and indicates
in any manner that he does not wish to be interrogated, the police
may not question him
o The mere fact that he may have answered some questions or
volunteered some statements on his own does not deprive him of the
right to refrain from answering any further inquiries until he has
consulted with an attorney and thereafter consents to be questioned
o Unless and until such warnings and waiver are demonstrated by the
prosecution at trial, no evidence obtained as a result of interrogation
can be used against him
· When an individual is taken to custody or deprived of freedom and subjected to
questioning, the privilege against self-incrimination is jeopardized. Procedural
 safeguards must then be employed to protect this privilege unless other fully effective
means are adopted to notify them of their rights.
Tanenggee v People
G.R. No. 179448 June 26, 2013
FACTS:
March 27, 1998 - five Informations for estafa through falsification of commercial
documents were filed against petitioner.
According to the information, petitioner took advantage of his position as bank
manager and defrauded, thru falsification of commercial document, the
METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST CO. (METROBANK) by forging promissory
notes in the name of Romeo Tan.
The fraud was discovered when auditors conducted an audit of the branch. Thereafter,
appellant was asked to report to the Head Office by the Senior VP. When appellant
arrived, he was surprised to see that there were seven (7) other people present: two (2)
senior branch officers, two (2) bank lawyers, two (2) policemen (one in uniform and
the other in plain clothes), and a representative of the Internal Affairs unit of the bank,
Valentino Elevado.
Appellant claims that the bank officials asked him to sign a paper in connection with
the audit investigation; that he inquired what he was made to sign but was not offered
any explanation; that he was intimidated to sign and was threatened by the police that
he will be brought to the precinct if he will not sign; that he was not able to consult a
lawyer since he was not apprised of the purpose of the meeting; and that "just to get it
over with" he signed the paper which turned out to be a confession.
The RTC found appellant guilty of the crime charged. CA affirmed RTC ruling with
modification (added indemnification award to metrobank).
ISSUE:
W/N the written statement signed by petitioner is admissible as evidence in Court –
YES
RULING:
 Petitioner’s written statement is admissible in evidence.
 The constitutional proscription against the admissibility of admission or
confession of guilt obtained in violation of Section 12, Article III of the
Constitution, as correctly observed by the CA and the OSG, is applicable only
in custodial interrogation.
 Custodial interrogation means any questioning initiated by law enforcement
authorities after a person is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his
freedom of action in any significant manner.
 A person under custodial investigation is guaranteed certain rights which
attach upon the commencement thereof, viz:
1. to remain silent,
2. to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own
choice
3. be informed of the two other rights above.
 In the present case, while it is undisputed that petitioner gave an uncounselled
written statement regarding an anomaly discovered in the branch he managed,
the following are clear: (1) the questioning was not initiated by a law
enforcement authority but merely by an internal affairs manager of the bank;
and, (2) petitioner was neither arrested nor restrained of his liberty in any
significant manner during the questioning. Clearly, petitioner cannot be said
to be under custodial investigation and to have been deprived of the
constitutional prerogative during the taking of his written statement.
 Remolona v. Civil Service Commission
o we declared that the right to counsel "applies only to admissions
made in a criminal investigation but not to those made in an
administrative investigation."
 Carbonel v. Civil Service Commission
o The right to counsel under Section 12 of the Bill of Rights is meant
to protect a suspect during custodial investigation. Thus, the
exclusionary rule under paragraph (2), Section 12 of the Bill of
Rights applies only to admissions made in a criminal investigation
but not to those made in an administrative investigation.
 Here, petitioner’s written statement was given during an administrative
inquiry conducted by his employer in connection with an
anomaly/irregularity he allegedly committed in the course of his
employment. No error can therefore be attributed to the courts below in
admitting in evidence and in giving due consideration to petitioner’s written
statement as there is no constitutional impediment to its admissibility.
 Petitioner’s written statement was given voluntarily, knowingly and
intelligently.
 "It is settled that a confession or admission is presumed voluntary until the
contrary is proved and the confessant bears the burden of proving the
contrary."
 Petitioner failed to overcome this presumption. On the contrary, his written
statement was found to have been executed freely and consciously. The
pertinent details he narrated in his statement were of such nature and quality
that only a perpetrator of the crime could furnish. The details contained
therein attest to its voluntariness.
 People v. Sunga
GR 126029 March 27, 2003
Ponente: Carpio-Morales
Facts:
· On July 12, 1994, the mutilated body of Jocelyn Tan, a minor and a high school student
of Palawan Integrated National School, (PINS), was found at a coffee plantation in
Puerto Princesa City, Palawan.
· One of the accused Locil submitted a sworn statement which detailed how her co-
accused carried out the crime so that she can become a state witness.
· The rule is that the testimony of a self-confessed accomplice or co-conspirator
imputing the blame to or implicating his co-accused cannot, by itself and without
corroboration, be regarded as proof to a moral certainty that the latter committed or
participated in the commission of the crime.
o The testimony must be substantially corroborated in its material
points by unimpeachable testimony and strong circumstances and
must be to such an extent that its trustworthiness becomes manifest
· Another accused Sunga made 2 extrajudicial admissions which could have been used
to corroborate Locil’s testimony but SC finds Sunga’s admissions to be inadmissible
in evidence against him and his co-accused.
o Admissions: statements of fact that does not directly involve
acknowledgment of guilt
o Confession: with acknowledgment of guilt
· First extrajudicial admission
o Sunga was brought by SPO4 Pantollano and patrolman Bolos to the
Puerto Princesa City police precinct. They asked him questions
about Jocelyn’s death in a room for about 30 minutes. He was
presented to SPO2 Janoras for investigation. He initially asked
Sunga whether he knew anything about Jocelyns death and Sunga
replied affirmatively, prompting SPO2 to inform him of his rights
under custodial interrogation.
o After Sunga signified his desire to avail of the services of a lawyer,
Sunga chose Atty. Rocamora to be his counsel from the choices of
lawyers that SPO2 mentioned to him. Atty. Rocamora briefly
conferred with Sunga, asking him if he wanted to give a confession
and informing him of the consequences thereof.
o Thereafter, the investigation proceeded with Sunga voluntarily giving
his answers to questions SPO2 propounded at the end of which
investigation Sunga and Atty. Rocamora affixed their respective
signatures on the recorded statement.
· Second extrajudicial admission (Exhibit I)
o This sworn statement was made by Sunga before Special Investigator
Reynaldo O. Abordo in the NBI Puerto Princesa office. Exhibit I
had some differences in admission from Exhibit A. Exhibit I also
embodied a waiver by Sunga of his right to counsel.
Issue:
WON Sunga’s admission can be admitted as evidence which would corroborate
Locil’s story (NO)
Ruling:
· A person under investigation for the commission of an offense is guaranteed the
following rights by the Constitution
o The right to remain silent
o The right to have competent and independent counsel of his own
choice, and to be provided with one if he cannot afford the services
of counsel
o The right to be informed of these rights
· Lack of competent counsel
o The right to counsel was denied Sunga during his execution of Exhibit
A – the counsel who assisted him, Atty. Agustin Rocamora, was the
City Legal Officer of Puerto Princesa.This Court made it sufficiently
clear that the independent counsel for the accused in custodial
investigations cannot be a special counsel, public or private
prosecutor, counsel of the police, or a municipal attorney whose
interest is admittedly adverse to the accused.
o A legal officer of the city, like Atty. Rocamora, provides legal aid and
support to the mayor and the city in carrying out the delivery of basic
services to the people. This includes maintenance of peace and order
and, as such, his office is akin to that of a prosecutor who
unquestionably cannot represent the accused during custodial
investigation due to conflict of interest
o Sunga chose him to be his counsel, even if true, did not render his
admission admissible. Being of a very low educational attainment,
Sunga could not have possibly known the ramifications of his choice
of a city legal officer to be his counsel.
§ The duty of law enforcers to inform him of his Constitutional
rights during custodial interrogations to their full, proper
and precise extent does not appear to have been
discharged
o Nothing in the records shows that Atty. Rocamora exerted efforts to
safeguard Sungas rights and interests, especially that of his right not
to be a witness against himself
o SPO2 Janoras which described how Atty. Rocamora assisted Sunga
§ Stated that Atty. Rocamora only conversed for a very short
while with Sunga prior to the investigation
§ The only thing Atty. Rocamora did during the questioning
was telling Sunga to just answer the questions
o Evidently, Atty. Rocamora only acted to facilitate the admission of
Sunga
· Lack of counsel per se
 o Before SPO2 offered Sunga’s options of lawyers, Sunga was already
questioned by SPO4 and Patrolman
§ At the time that the first two policemen started asking him
questions about Jocelyns death, Sunga could be considered
as already being custodial investigation without the
assistance of a counsel
o Custodial investigation is the stage where the police investigation is
no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to
focus on a particular suspect taken into custody by the police who
carry out a process of interrogation that lends itself to elicit
incriminating statements
o Even though Sunga declared in open court that he gave the admission
so that he can also become a state witness, it doesn’t make Exhibit I
admissible
§ Sunga was at the time still under detention at the NBI office
and had been languishing in jail since his arrest in mid-July
1994
§ His desire to regain his freedom is not difficult to understand,
he having lost it once due to his conviction for another
crime
§ His admission which was done without the benefit of counsel
consisted of answers to questions propounded by the
investigating agent of the NBI and not of a unilateral
declaration of his participation in the crime
o To this Court, these conditions are constitutive of an atmosphere
pervading that of a custodial investigation and necessitating the
assistance of a competent and independent counsel of Sunga’s
choice as a matter of right but which he had none
· Even if the confession contains a grain of truth or even if it had been voluntarily given,
if it was made without the assistance of counsel, it is inadmissible
o Exhibit I: the waiver by Sunga of his right to counsel as contained in
his sworn statement-Exhibit I was not a valid waiver for, on its face,
it was executed not in the presence of counsel, contrary to the
express requirement of the Constitution
o Exhibit A: the testimony of Sunga during the preliminary
investigation before the Municipal Trial Court whereby he expressly
acknowledged having executed Exhibit A and affirmed the contents
thereof did not render his extrajudicial admission into a judicial one
which could be used against him and his co-appellants.
§ The right to counsel involves more than just the presence of
a lawyer in the courtroom or the mere propounding of
standard questions and objections; rather it means an
efficient and decisive legal assistance and not a simple
perfunctory representation
· The right to counsel applies in certain pretrial proceedings that can be deemed critical
stages in the criminal process. The preliminary investigation can be no different from
the in-custody interrogations by the police, for a suspect who takes part in a
preliminary investigation will be subjected to no less than the States processes,
oftentimes intimidating and relentless
· This Court will not admit Sungas. This makes it unnecessary to discuss and emphasize
the conflict on material points of Sungas and Locils accounts of the incident. Only
Locil’s testimony can be used as evidence
o The aforementioned observations pertaining to both the weak,
incomprehensible voice with which Locil gave her testimony, the
improbability with which she was precisely made by appellants to
be a witness to their crime, and the failure of her description of
Pascuas eyes to match the latters actual physical feature cannot but
engender serious doubts as to the reliability of her testimony against
all appellants.
People v Ibañez
G.R. No. 191752 June 10, 2013
Facts:
 July 23, 2004 - Ibañez went to Weapons System Corporation (WSC) and told
Henessy Auron, WSC’s Secretary and Sales Representative, that he was the
one who bought a gun barrel at the company’s gun show in SM Megamall.
Ibañez inquired from Henessy about the schedule and the rates of WSC’s
firing range and the amount of the membership fee of its gun club. He also
asked the days when there are many people in the firing range, and whether
Henessy was WSC’s only female employee.
 3 days later, Henessy arrived at WSC and rang the doorbell, but no one
opened the door. She went to the back of the office where the firing range
was located, and called Zaldy Gabao, another employee of WSC. Zaldy
answered from inside the store but Henessy did not understand what he said.
Henessy returned to the front door and called again. Zaldy replied that he
could not open the door because his hands were tied. Henessy called
Raymundo Sian, the company’s operations manager, and informed him that
Zaldy’s hands had been tied. After one hour, the police arrived; they opened
the gate at the back using acetylene. When Henessy and the police entered
the premises, they saw that Zaldy had been handcuffed to the vault. Zaldy
informed the police that the company’s gunsmith, Rex Dorimon, was inside
the firing range. The police entered the firing range, and saw the lifeless body
of Rex.
 The NBI received an information from an asset that the group of petitioner
Cachuela was involved in the robbery;
 The NBI, headed by Special Investigator Allan Lino, conducted an
entrapment operation against suspect Cachuela during which, Melvin
Nabilgas was arrested and subsequently gave the names of the other persons
involved in the crime.
  At the NBI Main Office, Zaldy pointed to the appellants, during a police line-
up, as the persons responsible for the robbery at WSC and for the killing of
Rex. Nabilgas also executed a handwritten confession implicating the
appellants and Zaldy in the crime.
 Upon filing of information and conclusion of the trial, the RTC found
appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the special complex crime of
robbery with homicide. (Zaldy died during trial)
Issue:
W/N the out-of-court identification of Zaldy and extrajudicial confession of Nabilgas
are admissible in court. - NO
Ruling:
Admissibility of the out-of-court identification and the extrajudicial confession
 Lino testified that Zaldy identified the appellants as the persons involved in
the robbery of WSC and in the killing of Rex in a police line-up held at the
NBI Main Office on Taft Avenue, Manila. We note that Zaldy did not testify
in court since he was brought to the National Center for Mental Health, and
subsequently died during the trial. For this reason, we examine with greater
scrutiny Lino’s testimony regarding Zaldy’s alleged out-of-court
identification.
 People v. Algarme
o the procedure for out-of-court identification and the test to
determine its admissibility:
 Out-of-court identification is conducted by the police thru:
 show-ups where the suspect alone is brought face-
to-face with the witness for identification
 mug shots where photographs are shown to the
witness to identify the suspect
 line-ups where a witness identifies the suspect
from a group of persons lined up for the purpose
o ff. factors are considered in resolving admissibility of and relying on
an out-of-court identification of suspects:
 (1) the witness' opportunity to view the criminal at the time
of the crime;
 (2) the witness' degree of attention at that time;
 (3) the accuracy of any prior description, given by the
witness;
 (4) the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the
identification;
 (5) the length of time between the crime and the
identification;
 (6) the suggestiveness of the identification procedure
 In the present case, Lino merely stated that Zaldy, during a police line-up,
identified the appellants as the persons involved in the robbery of WSC and
in the killing of Rex. Lino did not state when the line-up took place; how this
line-up had been conducted; who were the persons in the line-up with the
appellants and whether the line-up was confined to persons of the same height
and built as the appellants. Lino likewise did not indicate who accompanied
Zaldy before and during the line-up, and whether there had been the
possibility of prior or contemporaneous improper insinuations on Zaldy
regarding the appearance of the appellants.
 Lino’s failure to state relevant details surrounding the police line-up is a
glaring omission that renders unreliable Zaldy’s out-of-court identification.
No way exists for the courts to evaluate the factors used in determining the
admissibility and reliability of out-of-court identifications, such as the level
of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the identification; the length of
time between the crime and the identification; and the suggestiveness of the
identification procedure.
 The absence of an independent in-court identification by Zaldy additionally
justifies the Court’s strict treatment and assessment of Lino’s testimony.
 The records also bear out that Nabilgas executed an extrajudicial confession
at the NBI Main Office, where he implicated the appellants and Zaldy in the
crime charged.
 After a careful examination of the evidence on hand, Court held that
Nabilgas’ extrajudicial confession is inadmissible in evidence.
 An extrajudicial confession, to be admissible, must satisfy the following
requirements:
o (1) the confession must be voluntary
o (2) it must be made with the assistance of a competent and
independent counsel, preferably of the confessant's choice
o (3) it must be express
o (4) it must be in writing
 Nabilgas was already under custodial investigation by the authorities when
he executed the alleged written confession. "A custodial investigation is
understood as any questioning initiated by law enforcement authorities after
a person is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action
in any significant manner. It begins when there is no longer a general inquiry
into an unsolved crime and the investigation has started to focus on a
particular person as a suspect, i.e., when the police investigator starts
interrogating or exacting a confession from the suspect in connection with an
alleged offense.
 In People v. Rapeza
o the lawyer called to be present during custodial investigations
should, as far as reasonably possible, be the choice of the individual
undergoing questioning. If the lawyer is furnished by the police for
the accused, it is important that the lawyer should be competent,
independent and prepared to fully safeguard the constitutional rights
of the accused, as distinguished from one who would merely be
giving a routine, peremptory and meaningless recital of the
individual's constitutional rights.
 Cour rule that Nabilgas’ confession was not made with the assistance of a
competent and independent counsel. The services of Atty. Melita Go, the
lawyer who acted in Nabilgas’ behalf, were provided by the very same agency
investigating Nabilgas – the NBI itself; she was assigned the task despite
Nabilgas’ open declaration to the agency’s investigators that he already had
a lawyer in the person of Atty. Donardo Paglinawan. Atty. Paglinawan
confirmed this fact when he stated that he was already representing Nabilgas
at the time his client made the alleged confession. Nabilgas also testified that
Atty. Go did not disclose that she was a lawyer when she was called to assist
him; she merely represented herself to be a mere witness to the confession.
There was also nothing in the records to show that Atty. Go ascertained
whether Nabilgas’ confession was made voluntarily, and whether he fully
understood the nature and the consequence of his extrajudicial confession and
its impact on his constitutional rights.
 This is not the kind of assistance required of lawyers in a custodial
investigation. "An ‘effective and vigilant counsel’ necessarily and
logically requires that the lawyer be present and be able to advise and
assist his client from the time the confessant answers the first question
asked by the investigating officer until the signing of the extrajudicial
confession."
 In addition, the extrajudicial confession of Nabilgas was not corroborated by
a witness who was present at the time the written confession was made.
 At any rate, Nabilgas’ extrajudicial confession is inadmissible in evidence
against the appellants in view of the res inter alios acta rule. This rule
provides that the rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act,
declaration, or omission of another. Consequently, an extrajudicial
confession is binding only on the confessant and is not admissible against his
or her co-accused because it is considered as hearsay against them.
 An exception to the res inter alios acta rule is an admission made by a
conspirator under Section 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. This provision
states that the act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the conspiracy,
and during its existence, may be given in evidence against the co-conspirator
after the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration.
Thus, in order that the admission of a conspirator may be received against his
or her co-conspirators, it is necessary that: (a) the conspiracy be first proved
by evidence other than the admission itself; (b) the admission relates to the
common object; and (c) it has been made while the declarant was engaged in
carrying out the conspiracy.
 This exception, however, does not apply in the present case since there was
no other piece of evidence presented, aside from the extrajudicial confession,
to prove that Nabilgas conspired with the appellants in committing the crime
charged. Conspiracy cannot be presumed and must be shown as distinctly and
conclusively as the crime itself. Nabilgas, in fact, was acquitted by the trial
court due to insufficiency of evidence to prove his participation in the crime.
People v. Chavez
GR 207950 September 22, 2014
Ponente: Leonen, J.
Facts:
· Peñamante arrived home at around 2:45 a.m from work as a janitor in Eastwood City.
He saw a person wearing ablack, long-sleeved shirt and black pants and holding
something while leaving the house/parlor of Elmer Duque (Barbie) just six meters
across Peñamante’s house.
· There was a light at the left side of the house/parlor of Barbie (Peñamante’s favorite
haircutter). He was able to see the face of Chavez and the clothes he was wearing
· Chavez could not close the door of Barbie’s house/parlor so he simply walked away.
However, he dropped something that he was holding and fell down when he stepped
on it.
· He walked away after, and Peñamante was not able to determine what Chavez was
holding. After 10:00 a.m., the Scene of the Crime Office (SOCO) team arrived. The
team noted that the lobby and the parlor were in disarray, and they found Barbie’s dead
body inside.
· At around 11:00 a.m., Peñamante’s landlady woke him up and told him that Barbie
was found dead at 9:00 a.m. He then informed his landlady that he saw Chavez leaving
Barbie’s house at 2:45 a.m.
· An autopsy on the body and found that the time of death was approximately 12 hours
prior to examination. There were 22 injuries on Barbie’s body — 21 were stab wounds
in various parts of the body caused by a sharp bladed instrument, and one incised
wound was caused by a sharp object. Four (4) of the stab wounds were considered
fatal.
· The next day, the police invited Peñamante to the Manila Police Station to give a
statement. Peñamante described to SPO3 Casimiro the physical appearance of the
person he saw leaving Barbie’s parlor.
· Accompanied by his mother, Chavez voluntarily surrendered on November 5, 2006 at
the police station. Chavez was then 22 years old. His mother told the police that she
wanted to help her son who might be involved in Barbie’s death. SPO3 Casimiro
informed them of the consequences in executing a written statement without the
assistance of a lawyer. However, Chavez’s mother still gave her statement, subscribed
by Administrative Officer Alex Francisco. She also surrendered two cellular phones
owned by Barbie and a baseball cap owned by Chavez.
Issue:
WON the Miranda Rights Doctrine applies to those who voluntarily surrendered
(YES)
Ruling:
· The right to counsel upon being questioned for the commission of a crime is part of
the Miranda rights, which require that:
o Any person under custodial investigation has the right to remain
silent;
 o Anything he says can and will be used against him in a court of law
o He has the right to talk to an attorney before being questioned and to
have his counsel present when being questioned
o If he cannot afford an attorney, one will be provided before any
questioning if he so desires
· The Miranda rights were incorporated in our Constitution but were modified to include
the statement that any waiver of the right to counsel must be made "in writing and in
the presence of counsel.”
· The invocation of these rights applies during custodial investigation, which begins
"when the police investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime
but has begun to focus on a particular suspect taken into custody by the police who
starts the interrogation and propounds questions to the person to elicit incriminating
statements.”
· Republic Act No. 7438 expanded the definition of custodial investigation to "include
the practice of issuing an ‘invitation’ to a person who is investigated in connection
with an offense he is suspected to have committed, without prejudice to the liability of
the ‘inviting’ officer for any violation of law.”
o This means that even those who voluntarily surrendered before a
police officer must be apprised of their Miranda rights. For one, the
same pressures of a custodial setting exist in this scenario.
· Chavez is also being questioned by an investigating officer in a police station. As an
additional pressure, he may have been compelled to surrender by his mother who
accompanied him to the police station.
Gamboa v. Judge Cruz
G.R. No. L-56291, June 27, 1988
FACTS:
 Petitioner alleges that:
 On 19 July 1979, he was arrested for vagrancy, without a warrant of arrest,
by Patrolman Arturo Palencia. Petitioner was then brought to a precinct
where he was detained with several others.
 The following day, during the lineup of 5 detainees, including petitioner,
complainant Erlinda B. Bernal pointed to petitioner and said, "that one is a
companion." After the Identification, the other detainees were brought back
to their cell but petitioner was ordered to stay. While the complainant was
being interrogated by the police investigator, petitioner was told to sit down
in front of her.
 An information for robbery was filed against the petitioner.
 On 14 July 1980, petitioner, by counsel, instead of presenting his defense,
manifested in open court that he was filing a Motion to Acquit or Demurrer
to Evidence. Petitioner filed said Motion predicated on the ground that the
conduct of the line-up, without notice to, and in the absence of, his counsel
violated his constitutional rights to counsel and to due process.
 Court denied the Motion to Acquit.
 Hence, the instant petition.
Issue: W/N petitioner’s right to a counsel and right to due process were violated – NO
Ruling:
 The rights to counsel and to due process of law are two of the fundamental
rights guaranteed by the Constitution, whether it be the 1973 or 1987
Constitution. In a democratic society, like ours, every person is entitled to the
full enjoyment of the rights guaranteed by the Constitution.
 The right to counsel attaches upon the start of an investigation, i.e. when the
investigating officer starts to ask questions to elicit information and/or
confessions or admissions from the respondent/accused. At such point or
stage, the person being interrogated must be assisted by counsel to avoid the
pernicious practice of extorting false or coerced admissions or confessions
from the lips of the person undergoing interrogation, for the commission of
an offense.
 Any person under investigation must, among other things, be assisted by
counsel. The above-cited provisions of the Constitution are clear. They leave
no room for equivocation. Accordingly, in several cases, this Court has
consistently held that no custodial investigation shall be conducted unless it
be in the presence of counsel, engaged by the person arrested, or by any
person in his behalf, or appointed by the court upon petition either of the
detainee himself, or by anyone in his behalf, and that, while the right may be
waived, the waiver shall not be valid unless made in writing and in the
presence of counsel.
 As aptly observed, however, by the Solicitor General, the police line-up (at
least, in this case) was not part of the custodial inquest, hence, petitioner was
not yet entitled, at such stage, to counsel. The Solicitor General states:
o When petitioner was Identified by the complainant at the police line-
up, he had not been held yet to answer for a criminal offense. The
police line-up is not a part of the custodial inquest, hence, he was
not yet entitled to counsel. Thus, it was held that when the process
had not yet shifted from the investigatory to the accusatory as when
police investigation does not elicit a confession the accused may not
yet avail of the services of his lawyer Since petitioner in the course
of his Identification in the police line-up had not yet been held to
answer for a criminal offense, he was, therefore, not deprived of his
right to be assisted by counsel because the accusatory process had
not yet set in. The police could not have violated petitioner's right to
counsel and due process as the confrontation between the State and
him had not begun. In fact, when he was Identified in the police line-
up by complainant he did not give any statement to the police. He
was, therefore, not interrogated at all as he was not facing a criminal
charge. Petitioner’s right to counsel had not accrued.
 Under the US Constitution, the right to counsel "attaches only at or after the
time that adversary judicial proceedings have been initiated against him (the
 accused)," under the 1973 and 1987 Philippine Constitutions, the right to
counsel attaches at the start of investigation against a respondent and,
therefore, even before adversary judicial proceedings against the accused
have begun.
 On the right to due process, the Court finds that petitioner was not, in any
way, deprived of this substantive and constitutional right, as he was duly
represented by a member of the Bar. He was accorded all the opportunities to
be heard and to present evidence to substantiate his defense; only that he
chose not to, and instead opted to file a Motion to Acquit after the prosecution
had rested its case. What due process abhors is the absolute lack of
opportunity to be heard. The case at bar is far from this situation.
People v. Linsangan
GR 88589 April 16, 1991
Ponente: Griño-Aquino, J.
Facts:
· Police were informed that there was a young boy, around 20 years old and average
build and height, who was selling/pushing marijuana. The police set up a buy-bust
operation so that they could catch him. Two P10 bills were marked and then given to
the informer and Pat. Corpuz. After, they all dressed up in civilian clothes and then
left for Dinalupihan, Tondo (the designated place for the buy-bust operation). When
they arrived, the informer called Linsangan (appellant) and Linsangan then approached
them. Patrolman Corpuz and the informer (both in disguise as a civilians) said that
they really, really wanted to buy marijuana. They handed the two marked P10 bills to
Linsangan who then went inside the wooden house nearby to get the marijuana. When
Linsangan came back, he handed over 10 sticks of marijuana to Corpuz and the
informer. With his right hand, Corpuz got the marijuana, and with his other hand, he
took hold of Linsangan, making sure that Linsangan couldn’t escape. Another
undercover officer frisked Linsangan and recovered the marked bills. Linsangan was
made to sign his name on the bills. Linsangan also put his initials “C.L.” on each stick
of marijuana.
· At the police station, Linsangan was being apprised of his constitutional rights when
his uncle, the barangay chairman, arrived. Allegedly, Linsangan's uncle offered P500
to Pat. Corpuz to let the accused go. Corpuz did not accept the money and so Linsangan
was brought to trial and convicted.
Issue:
· WON the accused’s rights under Art. 3 sec 12 were violated when the police made
Linsangan sign the P10 bills (NO)
Ruling:
· Although he was not assisted by counsel when he was made to sign his name on the
bills, his right against self-incrimination was not violated because possession of
marked bills is not a crime; the crime was selling the marijuana sticks.
· His conviction was based on the testimony of the police, not on the signed bills.
o The testimony of the police was that they caught the accused in the
act of selling marijuana.
· The Police are presumed to have performed their duties in a regular manner.
· The task of apprehending persons engaged in the drug trade is hard enough without
legal and procedural technicalities to make it doubly so.
· Linsangan was sentenced to life in prison.
People v. Ang Chun Kit
G.R. No. 109232, December 29, 1995
Facts:
 Ang Chun Kit, a Chinese national and reputed to be a member of a Hong
Kong-based drug syndicate operating in Metro Manila, was collared by
NARCOM operatives in a buy-bust operation after he sold to an undercover
agent for P400,000.00 a kilo of methamphetamine hydrochloride known as
shabu. His car also yielded more of the regulated drug neatly tucked in a
Kleenex box.
 RTC found appellant guilty of violating- Sec. 15, Art. III of RA 6425.
 The accused maintains his innocence and faults the trial court in not holding
that the crime could not have been committed under the circumstances
narrated by the arresting officers and that the alleged buy-bust operation was
a frame-up and the evidence merely planted. He argues that the prosecution
was not able to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt since every piece of
evidence presented against him is tainted with constitutional infirmities.
Issue:
 W/N signing the booking sheet means an admission to the commission of the
offense - No
Ruling:
 People v. Morico
o "when an arrested person signs a Booking Sheet and Arrest Report
at a police station he does not admit the commission of an offense
nor confess to any incriminating circumstance. The Booking Sheet
is merely a statement of the accused's being booked and of the date
which accompanies the fact of an arrest. It is a police report and may
be useful in charges of arbitrary detention against the police
themselves. It is not an extra-judicial statement and cannot be the
basis of a judgment of conviction."
 But as in the cases of Mauyao and Morico, accused Ang Chun Kit's
conformity to the questioned documents has not been a factor in his
conviction since his guilt has been adequately established by the detailed and
unshaken testimonies of the officers who apprehended him. Hence even
 disregarding the questioned documents the Court still finds the accused guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged.
Macasiray v. People
GR 94736 June 26, 1998
Ponente: Mendoza, J.
Facts:
· Petitioners Melecio Macasiray, Virgilio Gonzales, and Benedicto Gonzales were the
accused in a criminal case for the murder of Johnny Villanueva. It appeared that in the
course of the trial of the case, the prosecution introduced in evidence an extrajudicial
confession executed by petitioner Benedicto in which he admitted participation in the
crime and implicated petitioners Melecio and Virgilio. Also presented in evidence was
the transcript of stenographic notes taken during the preliminary investigation of the
case before the fiscal's office. This transcript contained statements allegedly given by
Benedicto in answer to questions of the fiscal, in which he affirmed the contents of his
extrajudicial confession.
· When the extrajudicial confession and transcript of the preliminary investigation
proceeding were offered, petitioners objected to its admissibility on the ground that it
was given without the assistance of counsel. The trial court sustained the objections
and declared the two documents to be inadmissible.
· When it was the turn of the defense to present evidence, Benedicto was asked about
his extrajudicial confession. On cross-examination, he was questioned not only about
his extrajudicial confession but also about answers allegedly given by him during the
preliminary investigation and recorded in the transcript of the proceeding. As he
denied the contents of both documents, the prosecution presented them as rebuttal
evidence, allegedly to impeach the credibility of Gonzales. Petitioners once more
objected and the trial court again denied admission to the documents.
· Private respondent then sought the nullification of the trial court's orders and
succeeded. The Court of Appeals declared the two documents admissible in evidence
and ordered the trial court to admit them.
Issue:
· Whether the petitioners waived objection to the admissibility of the documents, either
by failing to object to the introduction during the trial or by using them in evidence.
(NO)
Ruling:
· Objection to evidence must be made after the evidence is formally offered. In the case
of documentary evidence, offer is made after all the witnesses of the party making the
offer have testified, specifying the purpose for which the evidence is being offered. It
is only at this time, and not at any other, that objection to the documentary evidence
may be made.
· In this case, petitioners objected to the admissibility of the documents when they were
formally offered. Contrary to the ruling of the appellate court, petitioners did not waive
objection to admissibility of the said documents by their failure to object when these
were marked, identified, and then introduced during the trial. That was not the proper
time to make the objection. "Objection to the documentary evidence must be made at
the time it formally offered, not earlier." Thus, it has been held that the identification
of the document before it is marked as an exhibit does not constitute the formal offer
of the document as evidence for the party presenting it. Objection to the identification
and marking of the document is not equivalent to objection to the document when it is
formally offered in evidence. What really matters is the objection to the document at
the time it is formally offered as an exhibit.
· Objections to the admissibility of documents may be raised during trial and the court
may rule on them then, but, if this is not done, the party should make the objections
when the documentary evidence is formally offered at the conclusion of the
presentation of evidence for the other party. Indeed, before it was offered in evidence,
the confession in this case cannot even be considered as evidence to which the accused
should object.
· Nor is it correct to say that the confession was introduced in evidence by Benedicto
Gonzales himself when it was his turn to present evidence for the defense. What
happened is that despite the fact that in its order of April 14, 1988 the court sustained
the objection to the admissibility of the confession and the statements given by
Benedicto Gonzales at the preliminary investigation, the defense nonetheless asked
him question regarding his confession in reference to his denial of liability. It was thus
not for the purpose of using as evidence the confession and the alleged statements in
the preliminary investigation but precisely for the purpose of denying their contents
that Gonzales was asked questions. Gonzales denied he ever gave the answers
attributed to him in the TSN allegedly taken during the preliminary investigation.
· The defense did not really have to ask Gonzales questions regarding his confession
inasmuch as the court had already declared both the confession and the transcript of
stenographic notes to be inadmissible in evidence, but certainly the defense should not
be penalized for exercising an abundance of caution. In fact, the defense did not mark
the confession as one of its exhibits, which is proof of the fact that it did not adopt it
as evidence. There is, therefore, no basis for the appellate courts ruling that because
the defense adopted the confession by introducing it in evidence, the defense waived
any objection to the admission of the same in evidence.
· Private respondent justifies the use of the confession and TSN on the ground that they
are necessary for the purpose of impeaching the credibility of Benedicto Gonzales and
not for the purpose of presenting them as evidence in chief. But as already stated, there
was really no need for Gonzales to deny the contents both of the confession and the
TSN since they had already been excluded in evidence. There was therefore no use for
impeaching his credibility.
· Notes:
o Extrajudicial Confession and statements before the fiscal were
inadmissible
§ It was taken without the assistance of counsel.
§ Petitioner Benedicto was informed of his constitutional rights
in a perfunctory (hasty) manner.
§ He waived the assistance of counsel without a counsel’s
advice or assistance.