AMADO ALVARADO GARCIA, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

QUISUMBING, J.:

For review on certiorari is the Decision1 dated December 20,

2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.-CR No. 27544 affirming
the Decision2 dated July 2, 2003 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 9, Aparri, Cagayan, which found petitioner Amado
Garcia guilty beyond reasonable doubt of homicide. Contested
as well is the appellate court’s Resolution3 dated March 13, 2006
denying petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.4

On February 10, 2000, petitioner was charged with murder in an

Information that alleges as follows:

The undersigned, Provincial Prosecutor accuses AMADO

GARCIA @ Manding of the crime of Murder, defined and
penalized under Article [248] of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Republic Act No. 7659, committed as follows:

That on or about September 29, 1999, in the municipality of

Aparri, province of Cagayan, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with a
bottle, with intent to kill, with evident premeditation and with
treachery, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
assault, attack, box, club and maul one Manuel K. Chy, inflicting
upon the latter fatal injuries which caused his death.

CONTRARY TO LAW.5

Upon arraignment, petitioner entered a not guilty plea.

Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.

The factual antecedents are as follows:

At approximately 11:00 a.m. on September 26, 1999, petitioner,

Fidel Foz, Jr. and Armando Foz had a drinking spree at the
apartment unit of Bogie Tacuboy, which was adjacent to the
house of Manuel K. Chy. At around 7:00 p.m., Chy appealed for
the group to quiet down as the noise from the videoke machine
was blaring. It was not until Chy requested a second time that
the group acceded. Unknown to Chy, this left petitioner irate and
petitioner was heard to have said in the Ilocano vernacular,
"Dayta a Manny napangas makaala caniac dayta." (This Manny
is arrogant, I will lay a hand on him.)6

On September 28, 1999, the group met again to celebrate the

marriage of Ador Tacuboy not far from Chy’s apartment. Maya
Mabbun advised the group to stop singing lest they be told off
again. This further infuriated petitioner who remarked, "Talaga a
napangas ni Manny saan ko a pagbayagen daytoy," meaning,
"This Manny is really arrogant, I will not let him live long."7

Yet again, at around 12:00 p.m. on September 29, 1999, the

group convened at the house of Foz and Garcia. There,
petitioner, Foz, Jr. and Fred Rillon mused over the drinking
session on the 26th and 28th of September and the confrontation
with Chy. Enraged at the memory, petitioner blurted out "Talaga
a napangas dayta a day[t]oy a Manny ikabbut ko ita." (This
Manny is really arrogant, I will finish him off today.) 8 Later that
afternoon, the group headed to the store of Adela dela Cruz
where they drank until petitioner proposed that they move to
Punta. On their way to Punta, the group passed by the store of
Aurelia Esquibel, Chy’s sister, and there, decided to have some
drinks.

At this juncture, petitioner ordered Esquibel to call on Chy who,

incidentally, was coming out of his house at the time. Upon being
summoned, the latter approached petitioner who suddenly
punched him in the face. Chy cried out, "Bakit mo ako sinuntok
hindi ka naman [inaano]?" (Why did you box me[?] I’m not doing
anything to you.)9 But petitioner kept on assaulting him. Foz
attempted to pacify petitioner but was himself hit on the nose
while Chy continued to parry the blows. Petitioner reached for a
bottle of beer, and with it, struck the lower back portion of Chy’s
head. Then, Foz shoved Chy causing the latter to fall.

When Chy found an opportunity to escape, he ran towards his

house and phoned his wife Josefina to call the police. Chy told
Josefina about the mauling and complained of difficulty in
breathing. Upon reaching Chy’s house, the policemen knocked
five times but nobody answered. Josefina arrived minutes later,
unlocked the door and found Chy lying unconscious on the
kitchen floor, salivating. He was pronounced dead on arrival at
the hospital. The autopsy confirmed that Chy died of myocardial
infarction.

After trial in due course, the RTC of Aparri, Cagayan (Branch 9)

found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of homicide. The
dispositive portion of the RTC decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the Court renders judgment:

1) Finding AMADO GARCIA guilty beyond reasonable

doubt for the crime of HOMICIDE defined and penalized
by Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code and after
applying in his favor the provisions of the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, hereby sentences him to suffer an
indeterminate prison term of TEN (10) YEARS OF
PRISION MAYOR, as minimum, to FOURTEEN (14)
YEARS and EIGHT (8) MONTHS of RECLUSION
TEMPORAL as maximum;

2) Ordering him to pay the heirs of Manuel Chy the

amount of FIFTY THOUSAND (₱50,000.00) PESOS, as
death indemnity; TWO HUNDRED THOUSAND
(₱200,000.00) PESOS, representing expenses for the
wake and burial; THREE HUNDRED THOUSAND
(₱300,000.00) PESOS, as moral damages; and THREE
HUNDRED THIRTY[-]TWO THOUSAND (₱332,000.00]
PESOS, as loss of earning, plus the cost of this suit.

SO ORDERED.10

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction in a

Decision dated December 20, 2005, thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, appeal is hereby [DENIED]

and the July 2, 2003 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Aparri, Cagayan, Branch [9], in Criminal Case No. 08-1185, is
hereby AFFIRMED IN TOTO.
SO ORDERED.11

Petitioner moved for reconsideration but his motion was denied

in a Resolution dated March 13, 2006.

Hence, the instant appeal of petitioner on the following grounds:

I.

THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE

RULING OF THE TRIAL COURT THAT PETITIONER IS THE
ONE RESPONSIBLE FOR INFLICTING THE SLIGHT
PHYSICAL INJURIES SUSTAINED BY THE DECEASED
MANUEL CHY.

II.

THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE

RULING OF THE TRIAL COURT FINDING PETITIONER
LIABLE FOR THE DEATH OF MANUEL CHY DESPITE THE
FACT THAT THE CAUSE OF DEATH IS MYOCARDIAL
INFARCTION, A NON-VIOLENT RELATED CAUSE OF DEATH.

III.

THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE

RULING OF THE TRIAL COURT WHICH CONCLUDED THAT
THE HEART FAILURE OF MANUEL CHY WAS DUE TO
"FRIGHT OR SHOCK CAUSED BY THE MALTREATMENT."

IV.

BOTH THE APPELLATE TRIBUNAL AND THE TRIAL COURT

ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING THE PETITIONER ON THE
GROUND OF REASONABLE DOUBT.12

In essence, the issue is whether or not petitioner is liable for the

death of Manuel Chy.

In his undated Memorandum,13 petitioner insists on a review of

the factual findings of the trial court because the judge who
penned the decision was not the same judge who heard the
prosecution evidence. He adds that the Court of Appeals had
wrongly inferred from, misread and overlooked certain relevant
and undisputed facts, which, if properly considered, would justify
a different conclusion.14

At the onset, petitioner denies laying a hand on Manuel Chy.

Instead, he implicates Armando Foz as the author of the victim’s
injuries. Corollarily, he challenges the credibility of Armando’s
brother, Fidel, who testified concerning his sole culpability.
Basically, petitioner disowns responsibility for Chy’s demise
since the latter was found to have died of myocardial infarction.
In support, he amplifies the testimony of Dr. Cleofas C.
Antonio15 that Chy’s medical condition could have resulted in his
death anytime. Petitioner asserts that, at most, he could be held
liable for slight physical injuries because none of the blows he
inflicted on Chy was fatal.

The Office of the Solicitor General reiterates the trial court’s

assessment of the witnesses and its conclusion that the beating
of Chy was the proximate cause of his death.

Upon careful consideration of the evidence presented by the

prosecution as well as the defense in this case, we are unable to
consider the petitioner’s appeal with favor.

The present petition was brought under Rule 45 of the Rules of

Court, yet, petitioner raises questions of fact. Indeed, it is
opportune to reiterate that this Court is not the proper forum from
which to secure a re-evaluation of factual issues, save where the
factual findings of the trial court do not find support in the
evidence on record or where the judgment appealed from was
based on a misapprehension of facts.16 Neither exception
applies in the instant case as would justify a departure from the
established rule.

Further, petitioner invokes a recognized exception to the rule on

non-interference with the determination of the credibility of
witnesses. He points out that the judge who penned the decision
is not the judge who received the evidence and heard the
witnesses. But while the situation obtains in this case, the
exception does not. The records reveal that Judge Conrado F.
Manauis inhibited from the proceedings upon motion of no less
than the petitioner himself. Consequently, petitioner cannot seek
protection from the alleged adverse consequence his own doing
might have caused. For us to allow petitioner relief based on this
argument would be to sanction a travesty of the Rules which was
designed to further, rather than subdue, the ends of justice.

We reiterate, the efficacy of a decision is not necessarily

impaired by the fact that the ponente only took over from a
colleague who had earlier presided over the trial. It does not
follow that the judge who was not present during the trial, or a
fraction thereof, cannot render a valid and just decision.17 Here,
Judge Andres Q. Cipriano took over the case after Judge
Manauis recused himself from the proceedings. Even so, Judge
Cipriano not only heard the evidence for the defense, he also
had an opportunity to observe Dr. Cleofas Antonio who was
recalled to clarify certain points in his testimony. Worth
mentioning, too, is the fact that Judge Cipriano presided during
the taking of the testimonies of Fidel Foz, Jr. and Alvin Pascua
on rebuttal.

In any case, it is not unusual for a judge who did not try a case in
its entirety to decide it on the basis of the records on hand.18 He
can rely on the transcripts of stenographic notes and calibrate
the testimonies of witnesses in accordance with their conformity
to common experience, knowledge and observation of ordinary
men. Such reliance does not violate substantive and procedural
due process of law.19

The Autopsy Report on the body of Manuel Chy disclosed the

following injuries:

POSTMORTEM FINDINGS

Body embalmed, well preserved.

Cyanotic lips and nailbeds.

Contusions, dark bluish red: 4.5 x 3.0 cms., lower portion of

the left ear; 4.0 x 2.8 cms., left inferior mastoid region; 2.5 x 1.1
cms., upper lip; 2.7 x 1.0 cms., lower lip; 5.8 x 5.5 cms., dorsum
of left hand.
Lacerated wound, 0.8 cm., involving mucosal surface of
the upper lip on the right side.

No fractures noted.

Brain with tortuous vessels. Cut sections show congestion. No

hemorrhage noted.

Heart, with abundant fat adherent on its epicardial surface. Cut

sections show a reddish brown myocardium with an area of
hyperemia on the whole posterior wall, the lower portion of the
anterior wall and the inferior portion of the septum. Coronary
arteries, gritty, with the caliber of the lumen reduced by
approximately thirty (30%) percent. Histopathological findings
show mild fibrosis of the myocardium.

Lungs, pleural surfaces, shiny; with color ranging from dark red
to dark purple. Cut sections show a gray periphery with reddish
brown central portion with fluid oozing on pressure with some
reddish frothy materials noted. Histopathological examinations
show pulmonary edema and hemorrhages.

Kidneys, purplish with glistening capsule. Cut sections show

congestion. Histopathological examinations show mild
lymphocytic infiltration.1avvphi1

Stomach, one-half (1/2) full with brownish and whitish materials

and other partially digested food particles.

CAUSE OF DEATH: - Myocardial Infarction. (Emphasis

supplied.)20

At first, petitioner denied employing violence against Chy. In his

undated Memorandum, however, he admitted inflicting injuries
on the deceased, albeit, limited his liability to slight physical
injuries. He argues that the superficial wounds sustained by Chy
did not cause his death.21 Quite the opposite, however, a
conscientious analysis of the records would acquaint us with the
causal connection between the death of the victim and the
mauling that preceded it. In open court, Dr. Antonio identified the
immediate cause of Chy’s myocardial infarction:
ATTY. TUMARU:

Q: You diagnose[d] the cause of death to be myocardial

infarction that is because there was an occlusion in the artery
that prevented the flowing of blood into the heart?

A: That was not exactly seen at the autopsy table but it changes,
the hyperemic changes [in] the heart muscle were the one[s] that
made us [think] or gave strong conclusion that it was myocardial
infarction, and most likely the cause is occlusion of the blood
vessels itself. (Emphasis supplied.)22

By definition, coronary occlusion23 is the complete obstruction of

an artery of the heart, usually from progressive
arteriosclerosis24 or the thickening and loss of elasticity of the
arterial walls. This can result from sudden emotion in a person
with an existing arteriosclerosis; otherwise, a heart attack will not
occur.25 Dr. Jessica Romero testified on direct examination
relative to this point:

ATTY. CALASAN:

Q: Could an excitement trigger a myocardial infarction?

A: Excitement, I cannot say that if the patient is normal[;] that is[,]

considering that the patient [does] not have any previous [illness]
of hypertension, no previous history of myocardial [ischemia], no
previous [arteriosis] or hardening of the arteries, then
excitement [cannot] cause myocardial infarction. (Emphasis
supplied.)26

The Autopsy Report bears out that Chy has a mild fibrosis of the
myocardium27 caused by a previous heart attack. Said
fibrosis28 or formation of fibrous tissue or scar tissue rendered
the middle and thickest layer of the victim’s heart less elastic and
vulnerable to coronary occlusion from sudden emotion. This
causation is elucidated by the testimony of Dr. Antonio:

ATTY. CALASAN:
Q: You said that the physical injuries will cause no crisis on the
part of the victim, Doctor?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: And [these] physical injuries [were] caused by the [boxing] on

the mouth and[/]or hitting on the nape by a bottle?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: On the part of the deceased, that [was] caused definitely by

emotional crisis, Doctor?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: And because of this emotional crisis the heart palpitated so

fast, so much so, that there was less oxygen being pumped by
the heart?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: And definitely that caused his death, Doctor?

A: Yes, sir, it could be.29

In concurrence, Dr. Antonio A. Paguirigan also testified as

follows:

ATTY. CALASAN:

Q: I will repeat the question… Dr. Antonio testified that the

deceased died because of the blow that was inflicted, it triggered
the death of the deceased, do you agree with his findings,
Doctor?

A: Not probably the blow but the reaction sir.

Q: So you agree with him, Doctor?

A: It could be, sir.

Q: You agree with him on that point, Doctor?

A: Yes, sir.30

It can be reasonably inferred from the foregoing statements that

the emotional strain from the beating aggravated Chy’s delicate
constitution and led to his death. The inevitable conclusion then
surfaces that the myocardial infarction suffered by the victim was
the direct, natural and logical consequence of the felony that
petitioner had intended to commit.

Article 4(1) of the Revised Penal Code states that criminal

liability shall be incurred "by any person committing a
felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from
that which he intended." The essential requisites for the
application of this provision are: (a) the intended act is felonious;
(b) the resulting act is likewise a felony; and (c) the unintended
albeit graver wrong was primarily caused by the actor’s wrongful
acts.31lawph!l

In this case, petitioner was committing a felony when he boxed

the victim and hit him with a bottle. Hence, the fact that Chy was
previously afflicted with a heart ailment does not alter petitioner’s
liability for his death. Ingrained in our jurisprudence is the
doctrine laid down in the case of United States v. Brobst32 that:

x x x where death results as a direct consequence of the use of

illegal violence, the mere fact that the diseased or weakened
condition of the injured person contributed to his death, does not
relieve the illegal aggressor of criminal responsibility.33

In the same vein, United States v. Rodriguez34 enunciates that:

x x x although the assaulted party was previously affected by

some internal malady, if, because of a blow given with the hand
or the foot, his death was hastened, beyond peradventure he is
responsible therefor who produced the cause for such
acceleration as the result of a voluntary and unlawfully inflicted
injury. (Emphasis supplied.)35

In this jurisdiction, a person committing a felony is responsible

for all the natural and logical consequences resulting from it
although the unlawful act performed is different from the one he
intended;36 "el que es causa de la causa es causa del mal
causado" (he who is the cause of the cause is the cause of the
evil caused).37 Thus, the circumstance that petitioner did not
intend so grave an evil as the death of the victim does not
exempt him from criminal liability. Since he deliberately
committed an act prohibited by law, said condition simply
mitigates his guilt in accordance with Article 13(3) 38 of the
Revised Penal Code.39 Nevertheless, we must appreciate as
mitigating circumstance in favor of petitioner the fact that the
physical injuries he inflicted on the victim, could not have
resulted naturally and logically, in the actual death of the victim, if
the latter’s heart was in good condition.

Considering that the petitioner has in his favor the mitigating

circumstance of lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong as
that committed without any aggravating circumstance to offset it,
the imposable penalty should be in the minimum period, that
is, reclusion temporal in its minimum period,40or anywhere from
twelve (12) years and one (1) day to fourteen years (14) years
and eight (8) months. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence
Law,41 the trial court properly imposed upon petitioner an
indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years of prisión mayor, as
minimum, to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months
of reclusion temporal as maximum.

We shall, however, modify the award of damages to the heirs of

Manuel Chy for his loss of earning capacity in the amount of
₱332,000. In fixing the indemnity, the victim’s actual income at
the time of death and probable life expectancy are taken into
account. For this purpose, the Court adopts the formula used
in People v. Malinao:42

Net earning capacity = 2/3 x (80-age of x a reasonable portion of

the the victim at the annual net income which time of this death)
would have been received

by the heirs for support.43

Branch 9 of the Aparri, Cagayan RTC took judicial notice of the

salary which Manuel Chy was receiving as a sheriff of the court.
At the time of his death, Chy was 51 years old and was earning a
gross monthly income of ₱10,600 or a gross annual income of
₱127,200. But, in view of the victim’s delicate condition, the trial
court reduced his life expectancy to 10 years. It also deducted
₱7,000 from Chy’s salary as reasonable living expense.
However, the records are bereft of showing that the heirs of Chy
submitted evidence to substantiate actual living expenses. And
in the absence of proof of living expenses,
jurisprudence44 approximates net income to be 50% of the gross
income. Accordingly, by reason of his death, the heirs of Manuel
Chy should be awarded ₱1,229,600 as loss of earning capacity,
computed as follows:

Net earning 2/3 x (80-51) x [₱127,200 - 1/2

=
capacity (₱127,200)]

= 2/3 x (29) x ₱63,600

= 19 1/3 x ₱63,600

= ₱1,229,600

We sustain the trial court’s grant of funerary expense of

₱200,000 as stipulated by the parties45 and civil indemnity of
₱50,000.46 Anent moral damages, the same is mandatory in
cases of murder and homicide, without need of allegation and
proof other than the death of the victim.47 However, in obedience
to the controlling case law, the amount of moral damages should
be reduced to ₱50,000.

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated December 20, 2005 and the

Resolution dated March 13, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R.-CR No. 27544 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that
the award of moral damages is reduced to ₱50,000. Petitioner is
further ordered to indemnify the heirs of Manuel K. Chy ₱50,000
as civil indemnity; ₱200,000, representing expenses for the wake
and burial; and ₱1,229,600 as loss of earning capacity.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
vs.
NOEL T. SALES, Appellant.

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

A father ought to discipline his children for committing a

misdeed. However, he may not employ sadistic beatings and
inflict fatal injuries under the guise of disciplining them.

This appeal seeks the reversal of the December 4, 2006

Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No.
01627 that affirmed the August 3, 2005 Joint Decision 2 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 63 of Calabanga, Camarines
Sur in Criminal Case Nos. RTC’03-782 and RTC’03-789,
convicting appellant Noel T. Sales (appellant) of the crimes of
parricide and slight physical injuries, respectively. The
Information3 for parricide contained the following allegations:

That on or about the 20th day of September, 2002, at around or

past 8:00 o’clock in the evening at Brgy. San Vicente, Tinambac,
Camarines Sur, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused with evident
premeditation and [in] a fit of anger, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously hit [several] times, the different parts
of the body of his legitimate eldest son, Noemar Sales, a 9-year
old minor, with a [piece of] wood, measuring more or less one
meter in length and one [and] a half inches in diameter, [thereby]
inflicting upon the latter mortal wounds, which cause[d] the death
of the said victim, to the damage and prejudice of the latter’s
heirs in such amount as may be proven in court.

ACTS CONTRARY TO LAW.4

On the other hand, the Information5 in Criminal Case No.

RTC’03-789 alleges that appellant inflicted slight physical injuries
in the following manner:

That on or about the 20th day of September, 2002, at around or

past 8:00 o’clock in the evening, at Brgy. San Vicente,
Tinambac, Camarines Sur, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named [accused] assault[ed]
and hit with a piece of wood, one Noel Sales, Jr., an 8-year old
minor, his second legitimate son, thereby inflicting upon him
physical injuries which have required medical attendance for a
period of five (5) days to the damage and prejudice of the
victim’s heirs in such amount as may be proven in court.

ACTS CONTRARY TO LAW.6

When arraigned on April 11, 2003 and July 1, 2003, appellant

pleaded not guilty for the charges of parricide7 and slight
physical injuries8 respectively. The cases were then consolidated
upon manifestation of the prosecution which was not objected to
by the defense.9 During the pre-trial conference, the parties
agreed to stipulate that appellant is the father of the victims,
Noemar Sales (Noemar) and Noel Sales, Jr. (Junior); that at the
time of the incident, appellant’s family was living in the conjugal
home located in Barangay San Vicente, Tinambac, Camarines
Sur; and, that appellant voluntarily surrendered to the police.10

Thereafter, trial ensued.

The Version of the Prosecution

On September 19, 2002, brothers Noemar and Junior, then nine

and eight years old, respectively, left their home to attend the
fluvial procession of Our Lady of Peñafrancia without the
permission of their parents. They did not return home that night.
When their mother, Maria Litan Sales (Maria), looked for them
the next day, she found them in the nearby Barangay of
Magsaysay. Afraid of their father’s rage, Noemar and Junior
initially refused to return home but their mother prevailed upon
them. When the two kids reached home at around 8 o’clock in
the evening of September 20, 2002, a furious appellant
confronted them. Appellant then whipped them with a stick which
was later broken so that he brought his kids outside their house.
With Noemar’s and Junior’s hands and feet tied to a coconut
tree, appellant continued beating them with a thick piece of
wood. During the beating Maria stayed inside the house and did
not do anything as she feared for her life.
When the beating finally stopped, the three walked back to the
house with appellant assisting Noemar as the latter was
staggering, while Junior fearfully followed. Maria noticed a crack
in Noemar’s head and injuries in his legs. She also saw injuries
in the right portion of the head, the left cheek, and legs of Junior.
Shortly thereafter, Noemar collapsed and lost consciousness.
Maria tried to revive him and when Noemar remained motionless
despite her efforts, she told appellant that their son was already
dead. However, appellant refused to believe her. Maria then told
appellant to call a quack doctor. He left and returned with one,
who told them that they have to bring Noemar to a hospital.
Appellant thus proceeded to take the unconscious Noemar to the
junction and waited for a vehicle to take them to a hospital. As
there was no vehicle and because another quack doctor they
met at the junction told them that Noemar is already dead,
appellant brought his son back to their house.

Noemar’s wake lasted only for a night and he was immediately

buried the following day. His body was never examined by a
doctor.

The Version of the Defense

Prior to the incident, Noemar and Junior had already left their
residence on three separate occasions without the permission of
their parents. Each time, appellant merely scolded them and told
them not to repeat the misdeed since something untoward might
happen to them. During those times, Noemar and Junior were
never physically harmed by their father.

However, Noemar and Junior again left their home without their
parents’ permission on September 16, 2002 and failed to return
for several days. Worse, appellant received information that his
sons stole a pedicab. As they are broke, appellant had to borrow
money so that his wife could search for Noemar and Junior.
When his sons finally arrived home at 8 o’clock in the evening of
September 20, 2002, appellant scolded and hit them with a piece
of wood as thick as his index finger. He hit Noemar and Junior
simultaneously since they were side by side. After whipping his
sons in their buttocks three times, he noticed that Noemar was
chilling and frothing. When Noemar lost consciousness,
appellant decided to bring him to a hospital in Naga City by
waiting for a vehicle at the crossroad which was seven
kilometers away from their house.

Appellant held Noemar while on their way to the crossroad and

observed his difficulty in breathing. The pupils of Noemar’s eyes
were also moving up and down. Appellant heard him say that he
wanted to sleep and saw him pointing to his chest in pain.
However, they waited in vain since a vehicle never came. It was
then that Noemar died. Appellant thus decided to just bring
Noemar back to their house.

Appellant denied that his son died from his beating since no
parent could kill his or her child. He claimed that Noemar died as
a result of difficulty in breathing. In fact, he never complained of
the whipping done to him. Besides, appellant recalled that
Noemar was brought to a hospital more than a year before
September 2002 and diagnosed with having a weak heart.

On the other hand, Maria testified that Noemar suffered from

epilepsy. Whenever he suffers from epileptic seizures, Noemar
froths and passes out. But he would regain consciousness after
15 minutes. His seizures normally occur whenever he gets
hungry or when scolded.

The death of Noemar was reported to the police by the barangay

captain.11 Thereafter, appellant surrendered voluntarily.12

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

In a Joint Decision,13 the trial court held that the evidence

presented by the prosecution was sufficient to prove that
appellant was guilty of committing the crimes of parricide and
slight physical injuries in the manner described in the
Informations. In the crime of parricide, the trial court did not
consider the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation
against appellant since there is no proof that he planned to kill
Noemar. But the trial court appreciated in his favor the mitigating
circumstances of voluntary surrender and lack of intent to
commit so grave a wrong. The dispositive portion of said Joint
Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the prosecution having
proven the guilt of Noel Sales, beyond reasonable doubt, he is
found guilty of parricide in Crim. Case No. RTC’03-782 and
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. He is
likewise ordered to pay the heirs of Noemar Sales, the amount of
₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity; ₱50,000.00 as moral damages;
₱25,000,00 as exemplary damages and to pay the costs.

Furthermore, accused Noel Sales is also found guilty beyond

reasonable doubt of the crime of slight physical injuries in Crim.
Case No. RTC’03-789 and sentenced to suffer the penalty of
twenty (20) days of Arresto Menor in its medium period.

Accused Noel Sales is likewise meted the accessory penalties

as provided under the Revised Penal Code. Considering that
herein accused has undergone preventive imprisonment, he
shall be credited in the service of his sentence with the time he
has undergone preventive imprisonment in accordance with and
subject to the conditions provided for in Article 29 of the Revised
Penal Code.

SO ORDERED.14

Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal15 which was given due course

in an Order16 dated September 21, 2005.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

However, the appellate court denied the appeal and affirmed the
ruling of the trial court. The dispositive portion of its
Decision17 reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is DENIED.

The assailed decision dated August 3, 2005 in Criminal Case
Nos. RTC’03-782 and RTC’03-789 for Parricide and Slight
Physical Injuries, respectively, is AFFIRMED.

Pursuant to Section 13(c), Rule 124 of the Revised Rules of

Criminal Procedure, appellant may appeal this case to the
Supreme Court via a Notice of Appeal filed before this Court.
SO ORDERED.18

Issues

Hence, appellant is now before this Court with the following two-
fold issues:

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE

ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT OF THE CRIMES CHARGED.

II

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT GIVING

WEIGHT TO THE TESTIMONIES OF THE DEFENSE
WITNESSES.19

Our Ruling

The appeal is without merit.

The Charge of Parricide

Appellant admits beating his sons on September 20, 2002 as a

disciplinary measure, but denies battering Noemar to death. He
believes that no father could kill his own son. According to him,
Noemar had a weak heart that resulted in attacks consisting of
loss of consciousness and froth in his mouth. He claims that
Noemar was conscious as they traveled to the junction where
they would take a vehicle in going to a hospital. However,
Noemar had difficulty in breathing and complained of chest pain.
He contends that it was at this moment that Noemar died, not
during his whipping. To substantiate his claim, appellant
presented his wife, Maria, who testified that Noemar indeed
suffered seizures, but this was due to epilepsy.

The contentions of appellant fail to persuade. The imposition of

parental discipline on children of tender years must always be
with the view of correcting their erroneous behavior. A parent or
guardian must exercise restraint and caution in administering the
proper punishment. They must not exceed the parameters of
their parental duty to discipline their minor children. It is
incumbent upon them to remain rational and refrain from being
motivated by anger in enforcing the intended punishment. A
deviation will undoubtedly result in sadism.

Prior to whipping his sons, appellant was already furious with

them because they left the family dwelling without permission
and that was already preceded by three other similar incidents.
This was further aggravated by a report that his sons stole a
pedicab thereby putting him in disgrace. Moreover, they have no
money so much so that he still had to borrow so that his wife
could look for the children and bring them home. From these, it is
therefore clear that appellant was motivated not by an honest
desire to discipline the children for their misdeeds but by an evil
intent of venting his anger. This can reasonably be concluded
from the injuries of Noemar in his head, face and legs. It was
only when Noemar’s body slipped from the coconut tree to which
he was tied and lost consciousness that appellant stopped the
beating. Had not Noemar lost consciousness, appellant would
most likely not have ceased from his sadistic act. His subsequent
attempt to seek medical attention for Noemar as an act of
repentance was nevertheless too late to save the child’s life. It
bears stressing that a decent and responsible parent would
never subject a minor child to sadistic punishment in the guise of
discipline.

Appellant attempts to evade criminal culpability by arguing that

he merely intended to discipline Noemar and not to kill him.
However, the relevant portion of Article 4 of the Revised Penal
Code states:

Art. 4. Criminal liability. – Criminal liability shall be incurred:

1. By any person committing a felony (delito) although the

wrongful act done be different from that which he intended.

xxxx

In order that a person may be criminally liable for a felony

different from that which he intended to commit, it is
indispensible (a) that a felony was committed and (b) that the
wrong done to the aggrieved person be the direct consequence
of the crime committed by the perpetrator.20 Here, there is no
doubt appellant in beating his son Noemar and inflicting upon
him physical injuries, committed a felony. As a direct
consequence of the beating suffered by the child, he expired.
Appellant’s criminal liability for the death of his son, Noemar, is
thus clear.

Appellant’s claim that it was Noemar’s heart ailment that caused

his death deserves no merit. This declaration is self-serving and
uncorroborated since it is not substantiated by evidence. While
Dr. Salvador Betito, a Municipal Health Officer of Tinambac,
Camarines Sur issued a death certificate indicating that Noemar
died due to cardio-pulmonary arrest, the same is not sufficient to
prove that his death was due mainly to his poor health. It is worth
emphasizing that Noemar’s cadaver was never examined. Also,
even if appellant presented his wife, Maria, to lend credence to
his contention, the latter’s testimony did not help as same was
even in conflict with his testimony. Appellant testified that
Noemar suffered from a weak heart which resulted in his death
while Maria declared that Noemar was suffering from epilepsy.
Interestingly, Maria’s testimony was also unsubstantiated by
evidence.

Moreover, as will be discussed below, all the elements of the

crime of parricide are present in this case.

All the Elements of Parricide are present in the case at bench.

We find no error in the ruling of the trial court, as affirmed by the

appellate court, that appellant committed the crime of parricide.

Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code defines parricide as

follows:

Art. 246. Parricide. – Any person who shall kill his father, mother,
or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or any of his
ascendants, or descendants, or his spouse, shall be guilty of
parricide and shall be punished by the penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death.
"Parricide is committed when: (1) a person is killed; (2) the
deceased is killed by the accused; (3) the deceased is the father,
mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or a legitimate
other ascendant or other descendant, or the legitimate spouse of
accused."21

In the case at bench, there is overwhelming evidence to prove

the first element, that is, a person was killed. Maria testified that
her son Noemar did not regain consciousness after the severe
beating he suffered from the hands of his father. Thereafter, a
quack doctor declared Noemar dead. Afterwards, as testified to
by Maria, they held a wake for Noemar the next day and then
buried him the day after. Noemar’s Death Certificate22 was also
presented in evidence.

There is likewise no doubt as to the existence of the second

element that the appellant killed the deceased. Same is
sufficiently established by the positive testimonies of Maria and
Junior. Maria testified that on September 20, 2002, Noemar and
his younger brother, Junior, were whipped by appellant, their
father, inside their house. The whipping continued even outside
the house but this time, the brothers were tied side by side to a
coconut tree while appellant delivered the lashes
indiscriminately. For his part, Junior testified that Noemar, while
tied to a tree, was beaten by their father in the head. Because
the savagery of the attack was too much for Noemar’s frail body
to endure, he lost consciousness and died from his injuries
immediately after the incident.

As to the third element, appellant himself admitted that the

deceased is his child. While Noemar’s birth certificate was not
presented, oral evidence of filial relationship may be
considered.23 As earlier stated, appellant stipulated to the fact
that he is the father of Noemar during the pre-trial conference
and likewise made the same declaration while under
oath.24 Maria also testified that Noemar and Junior are her sons
with appellant, her husband. These testimonies are sufficient to
establish the relationship between appellant and Noemar.

Clearly, all the elements of the crime of parricide are obtaining in

this case.
There is Mitigating Circumstance of Voluntary Surrender but not
Lack of Intention to Commit so Grave a Wrong

The trial court correctly appreciated the mitigating circumstance

of voluntary surrender in favor of appellant since the evidence
shows that he went to the police station a day after the barangay
captain reported the death of Noemar. The presentation by
appellant of himself to the police officer on duty in a spontaneous
manner is a manifestation of his intent "to save the authorities
the trouble and expense that may be incurred for his search and
capture"25 which is the essence of voluntary surrender.

However, there was error in appreciating the mitigating

circumstance of lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong.
Appellant adopted means to ensure the success of the savage
battering of his sons. He tied their wrists to a coconut tree to
prevent their escape while they were battered with a stick to
inflict as much pain as possible. Noemar suffered injuries in his
face, head and legs that immediately caused his death. "The
mitigating circumstance of lack of intent to commit so grave a
wrong as that actually perpetrated cannot be appreciated where
the acts employed by the accused were reasonably sufficient to
produce and did actually produce the death of the victim."26

The Award of Damages and Penalty for Parricide

We find proper the trial court’s award to the heirs of Noemar of

the sums of ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity, and ₱50,000.00 as
moral damages. However, the award of exemplary damages of
₱25,000.00 should be increased to ₱30,000.00 in accordance
with prevailing jurisprudence.27 "In addition, and in conformity
with current policy, we also impose on all the monetary awards
for damages an interest at the legal rate of 6% from the date of
finality of this Decision until fully paid."28

As regards the penalty, parricide is punishable by reclusion

perpetua to death. The trial court imposed the penalty
of reclusion perpetua when it considered the presence of the
mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrender and lack of intent
to commit so grave a wrong. However, even if we earlier ruled
that the trial court erred in considering the mitigating
circumstance of lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong, we
maintain the penalty imposed. This is because the exclusion of
said mitigating circumstance does not result to a different penalty
since the presence of only one mitigating circumstance, which is,
voluntary surrender, with no aggravating circumstance, is
sufficient for the imposition of reclusion perpetua as the proper
prison term. Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code provides in
part as follows:

Art. 63. Rules for the application of indivisible penalties. - x x x

In all cases in which the law prescribes a penalty composed of

two indivisible penalties, the following rules shall be observed in
the application thereof:

xxxx

3. When the commission of the act is attended by some

mitigating circumstance and there is no aggravating
circumstance, the lesser penalty shall be applied.

xxxx

The crime of parricide is punishable by the indivisible penalties

of reclusion perpetua to death. With one mitigating circumstance,
which is voluntary surrender, and no aggravating circumstance,
the imposition of the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua and not
the penalty of death on appellant was thus proper.29

The Charge of Slight Physical Injuries

The victim himself, Junior testified that he, together with his
brother Noemar, were beaten by their father, herein appellant,
while they were tied to a coconut tree. He recalled to have been
hit on his right eye and right leg and to have been examined by a
physician thereafter.30 Maria corroborated her son’s testimony.31

Junior’s testimony was likewise supported by Dr. Ursolino

Primavera, Jr. (Dr. Primavera) of Tinambac Community Hospital
who examined him for physical injuries. He issued a Medical
Certificate for his findings and testified on the same. His findings
were (1) muscular contusions with hematoma on the right side of
Junior’s face just below the eye and on both legs, which could
have been caused by hitting said area with a hard object such as
a wooden stick and, (2) abrasions of brownish color circling both
wrist with crust formation which could have been sustained by
the patient due to struggling while his hands were tied. When
asked how long does he think the injuries would heal, Dr.
Primavera answered one to two weeks.32 But if applied with
medication, the injuries would heal in a week.33

We give full faith and credence to the categorical and positive

testimony of Junior that he was beaten by his father and that by
reason thereof he sustained injuries. His testimony deserves
credence especially since the same is corroborated by the
testimony of his mother, Maria, and supported by medical
examination. We thus find that the RTC correctly held appellant
guilty of the crime of slight physical injuries.1awphil

Penalty for Slight Physical Injuries

We likewise affirm the penalty imposed by the RTC. Dr.

Primavera testified that the injuries sustained by Junior should
heal in one week upon medication. Hence, the trial court
correctly meted upon appellant the penalty under paragraph 1,
Article 266 of the Revised Penal Code which provides:

ART. 266. Slight Physical Injuries and maltreatment. – The crime

of slight physical injuries shall be punished:

1. By arresto menor when the offender has inflicted physical

injuries which shall incapacitate the offended party for labor from
one to nine days or shall require medical attendance during the
same period.

xxxx

There being no mitigating or aggravating circumstance present in

the commission of the crime, the penalty shall be in its medium
period. The RTC was thus correct in imposing upon appellant the
penalty of twenty (20) days of arresto menor in its medium
period.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01627 that affirmed the Joint
Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 63 of Calabanga,
Camarines Sur in Criminal Case Nos. RTC’03-782 and RTC’03-
789, convicting Noel T. Sales of the crimes of parricide and slight
physical injuries is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS that the
award of exemplary damages is increased to ₱30,000.00. In
addition, an interest of 6% is imposed on all monetary awards
from date of finality of this Decision until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.
FILOMENO URBANO, petitioner,

vs.

HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT AND PEOPLE OF

THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

This is a petition to review the decision of the then Intermediate

Appellate Court which affirmed the decision of the then Circuit
Criminal Court of Dagupan City finding petitioner Filomeno
Urban guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide.

The records disclose the following facts of the case.

At about 8:00 o'clock in the morning of October 23, 1980,

petitioner Filomeno Urbano went to his ricefield at Barangay
Anonang, San Fabian, Pangasinan located at about 100 meters
from the tobacco seedbed of Marcelo Javier. He found the place
where he stored his palay flooded with water coming from the
irrigation canal nearby which had overflowed. Urbano went to the
elevated portion of the canal to see what happened and there he
saw Marcelo Javier and Emilio Erfe cutting grass. He asked
them who was responsible for the opening of the irrigation canal
and Javier admitted that he was the one. Urbano then got angry
and demanded that Javier pay for his soaked palay. A quarrel
between them ensued. Urbano unsheathed his bolo (about 2 feet
long, including the handle, by 2 inches wide) and hacked Javier
hitting him on the right palm of his hand, which was used in
parrying the bolo hack. Javier who was then unarmed ran away
from Urbano but was overtaken by Urbano who hacked him
again hitting Javier on the left leg with the back portion of said
bolo, causing a swelling on said leg. When Urbano tried to hack
and inflict further injury, his daughter embraced and prevented
him from hacking Javier.

Immediately thereafter, Antonio Erfe, Emilio Erfe, and Felipe Erfe

brought Javier to his house about 50 meters away from where
the incident happened. Emilio then went to the house of
Barangay Captain Menardo Soliven but not finding him there,
Emilio looked for barrio councilman Felipe Solis instead. Upon
the advice of Solis, the Erfes together with Javier went to the
police station of San Fabian to report the incident. As suggested
by Corporal Torio, Javier was brought to a physician. The group
went to Dr. Guillermo Padilla, rural health physician of San
Fabian, who did not attend to Javier but instead suggested that
they go to Dr. Mario Meneses because Padilla had no available
medicine.

After Javier was treated by Dr. Meneses, he and his companions

returned to Dr. Guillermo Padilla who conducted a medico-legal
examination. Dr. Padilla issued a medico-legal certificate (Exhibit
"C" dated September 28, 1981) which reads:

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

This is to certify that I have examined the wound of Marcelo

Javier, 20 years of age, married, residing at Barangay Anonang,
San Fabian, Pangasinan on October 23, 1980 and found the
following:
1 -Incised wound 2 inches in length at the upper portion of
the lesser palmar prominence, right.

As to my observation the incapacitation is from (7-9) days period.

This wound was presented to me only for medico-legal
examination, as it was already treated by the other doctor. (p. 88,
Original Records)

Upon the intercession of Councilman Solis, Urbano and Javier

agreed to settle their differences. Urbano promised to pay
P700.00 for the medical expenses of Javier. Hence, on October
27, 1980, the two accompanied by Solis appeared before the
San Fabian Police to formalize their amicable settlement.
Patrolman Torio recorded the event in the police blotter (Exhibit
A), to wit:

xxx xxx xxx

Entry Nr 599/27 Oct '80/103OH/ Re entry Nr 592 on page 257

both parties appeared before this Station accompanied by brgy.
councilman Felipe Solis and settled their case amicably, for they
are neighbors and close relatives to each other. Marcelo Javier
accepted and granted forgiveness to Filomeno Urbano who
shoulder (sic) all the expenses in his medical treatment, and
promising to him and to this Office that this will never be
repeated anymore and not to harbour any grudge against each
other. (p. 87, Original Records.)

Urbano advanced P400.00 to Javier at the police station. On

November 3, 1980, the additional P300.00 was given to Javier at
Urbano's house in the presence of barangay captain Soliven.
At about 1:30 a.m. on November 14, 1980, Javier was rushed to
the Nazareth General Hospital in a very serious condition. When
admitted to the hospital, Javier had lockjaw and was having
convulsions. Dr. Edmundo Exconde who personally attended to
Javier found that the latter's serious condition was caused by
tetanus toxin. He noticed the presence of a healing wound in
Javier's palm which could have been infected by tetanus.

On November 15, 1980 at exactly 4:18 p.m., Javier died in the

hospital. The medical findings of Dr. Exconde are as follows:

Date Diagnosis

11-14-80 ADMITTED due to trismus

adm. at DX TETANUS

1:30 AM Still having frequent muscle spasm. With diffi-

#35, 421 culty opening his mouth. Restless at times. Febrile

11-15-80 Referred. Novaldin 1 amp. inj. IM. Sudden cessa-

tion of respiration and HR after muscular spasm.

02 inhalation administered. Ambo bag resuscita-

tion and cardiac massage done but to no avail.

Pronounced dead by Dra. Cabugao at 4:18 P.M.

PMC done and cadaver brought home by rela-

tives. (p. 100, Original Records)

In an information dated April 10, 1981, Filomeno Urbano was

charged with the crime of homicide before the then Circuit
Criminal Court of Dagupan City, Third Judicial District.

Upon arraignment, Urbano pleaded "not guilty." After trial, the

trial court found Urbano guilty as charged. He was sentenced to
suffer an indeterminate prison term of from TWELVE (12)
YEARS of prision mayor, as minimum to SEVENTEEN (17)
years, FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of reclusion
temporal, as maximum, together with the accessories of the law,
to indemnify the heirs of the victim, Marcelo Javier, in the amount
of P12,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency, and to pay the costs. He was ordered confined at the
New Bilibid Prison, in Muntinlupa, Rizal upon finality of the
decision, in view of the nature of his penalty.

The then Intermediate Appellate Court affirmed the conviction of

Urbano on appeal but raised the award of indemnity to the heirs
of the deceased to P30,000.00 with costs against the appellant.

The appellant filed a motion for reconsideration and/or new trial.

The motion for new trial was based on an affidavit of Barangay
Captain Menardo Soliven (Annex "A") which states:

That in 1980, I was the barrio captain of Barrio Anonang, San

Fabian, Pangasinan, and up to the present having been re-
elected to such position in the last barangay elections on May
17, 1982;

That sometime in the first week of November, 1980, there was a

typhoon that swept Pangasinan and other places of Central
Luzon including San Fabian, a town of said province;

That during the typhoon, the sluice or control gates of the Bued
irrigation dam which irrigates the ricefields of San Fabian were
closed and/or controlled so much so that water and its flow to the
canals and ditches were regulated and reduced;

That due to the locking of the sluice or control gates of the dam
leading to the canals and ditches which will bring water to the
ricefields, the water in said canals and ditches became shallow
which was suitable for catching mudfishes;
That after the storm, I conducted a personal survey in the area
affected, with my secretary Perfecto Jaravata;

That on November 5, 1980, while I was conducting survey, I saw

the late Marcelo Javier catching fish in the shallow irrigation
canals with some companions;

That few days there after,or on November l5, l980, I came to

know that said Marcelo Javier died of tetanus. (p. 33, Rollo)

The motion was denied. Hence, this petition.

In a resolution dated July 16, 1986, we gave due course to the

petition.

The case involves the application of Article 4 of the Revised

Penal Code which provides that "Criminal liability shall be
incurred: (1) By any person committing a felony (delito) although
the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended
..." Pursuant to this provision "an accused is criminally
responsible for acts committed by him in violation of law and for
all the natural and logical consequences resulting therefrom."
(People v. Cardenas, 56 SCRA 631).

The record is clear that Marcelo Javier was hacked by the

petitioner who used a bolo as a result of which Javier suffered a
2-inch incised wound on his right palm; that on November 14,
1981 which was the 22nd day after the incident, Javier was
rushed to the hospital in a very serious condition and that on the
following day, November 15, 1981, he died from tetanus.

Under these circumstances, the lower courts ruled that Javier's

death was the natural and logical consequence of Urbano's
unlawful act. Hence, he was declared responsible for Javier's
death. Thus, the appellate court said:

The claim of appellant that there was an efficient cause which

supervened from the time the deceased was wounded to the
time of his death, which covers a period of 23 days does not
deserve serious consideration. True, that the deceased did not
die right away from his wound, but the cause of his death was
due to said wound which was inflicted by the appellant. Said
wound which was in the process of healing got infected with
tetanus which ultimately caused his death.

Dr. Edmundo Exconde of the Nazareth General Hospital testified

that the victim suffered lockjaw because of the infection of the
wound with tetanus. And there is no other way by which he could
be infected with tetanus except through the wound in his palm
(tsn., p. 78, Oct. 5, 1981). Consequently, the proximate cause of
the victim's death was the wound which got infected with
tetanus. And the settled rule in this jurisdiction is that an accused
is liable for all the consequences of his unlawful act. (Article 4,
par. 1, R.P.C. People v. Red, CA 43 O.G. 5072; People v. Cornel
78 Phil. 418).

Appellant's allegation that the proximate cause of the victim's

death was due to his own negligence in going back to work
without his wound being properly healed, and lately, that he went
to catch fish in dirty irrigation canals in the first week of
November, 1980, is an afterthought, and a desperate attempt by
appellant to wiggle out of the predicament he found himself in. If
the wound had not yet healed, it is impossible to conceive that
the deceased would be reckless enough to work with a disabled
hand. (pp. 20-21, Rollo)

The petitioner reiterates his position that the proximate cause of

the death of Marcelo Javier was due to his own negligence, that
Dr. Mario Meneses found no tetanus in the injury, and that Javier
got infected with tetanus when after two weeks he returned to his
farm and tended his tobacco plants with his bare hands exposing
the wound to harmful elements like tetanus germs.

The evidence on record does not clearly show that the wound
inflicted by Urbano was infected with tetanus at the time of the
infliction of the wound. The evidence merely confirms that the
wound, which was already healing at the time Javier suffered the
symptoms of the fatal ailment, somehow got infected with
tetanus However, as to when the wound was infected is not clear
from the record.

In Vda. de Bataclan, et al. v. Medina (102 Phil. 1181), we

adopted the following definition of proximate cause:

xxx xxx xxx

... A satisfactory definition of proximate cause is found in Volume

38, pages 695-696 of American Jurisprudence, cited by plaintiffs-
appellants in their brief. It is as follows:
... "that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence,
unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury,
and without which the result would not have occurred."And more
comprehensively, "the proximate legal cause is that acting first
and producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other
events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain
of events, each having a close causal connection with its
immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately
effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause
which first acted, under such circumstances that the person
responsible for the first event should, as an ordinarily prudent
and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the
moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might
probably result therefrom." (at pp. 185-186)

The issue, therefore, hinges on whether or not there was an

efficient intervening cause from the time Javier was wounded
until his death which would exculpate Urbano from any liability
for Javier's death.

We look into the nature of tetanus-

The incubation period of tetanus, i.e., the time between injury

and the appearance of unmistakable symptoms, ranges from 2
to 56 days. However, over 80 percent of patients become
symptomatic within 14 days. A short incubation period indicates
severe disease, and when symptoms occur within 2 or 3 days of
injury the mortality rate approaches 100 percent.

Non-specific premonitory symptoms such as restlessness,

irritability, and headache are encountered occasionally, but the
commonest presenting complaints are pain and stiffness in the
jaw, abdomen, or back and difficulty swallowing. As the
progresses, stiffness gives way to rigidity, and patients often
complain of difficulty opening their mouths. In fact, trismus in the
commonest manifestation of tetanus and is responsible for the
familiar descriptive name of lockjaw. As more muscles are
involved, rigidity becomes generalized, and sustained
contractions called risus sardonicus. The intensity and sequence
of muscle involvement is quite variable. In a small proportion of
patients, only local signs and symptoms develop in the region of
the injury. In the vast majority, however, most muscles are
involved to some degree, and the signs and symptoms
encountered depend upon the major muscle groups affected.

Reflex spasm usually occur within 24 to 72 hours of the first

symptom, an interval referred to as the onset time. As in the
case of the incubation period, a short onset time is associated
with a poor prognosis. Spasms are caused by sudden
intensification of afferent stimuli arising in the periphery, which
increases rigidity and causes simultaneous and excessive
contraction of muscles and their antagonists. Spasms may be
both painful and dangerous. As the disease progresses, minimal
or inapparent stimuli produce more intense and longer lasting
spasms with increasing frequency. Respiration may be impaired
by laryngospasm or tonic contraction of respiratory muscles
which prevent adequate ventilation. Hypoxia may then lead to
irreversible central nervous system damage and death.

Mild tetanus is characterized by an incubation period of at least

14 days and an onset time of more than 6 days. Trismus is
usually present, but dysphagia is absent and generalized
spasms are brief and mild. Moderately severe tetanus has a
somewhat shorter incubation period and onset time; trismus is
marked, dysphagia and generalized rigidity are present, but
ventilation remains adequate even during spasms. The criteria
for severe tetanus include a short incubation time, and an onset
time of 72 hrs., or less, severe trismus, dysphagia and rigidity
and frequent prolonged, generalized convulsive spasms.
(Harrison's Principle of Internal Medicine, 1983 Edition, pp.
1004-1005; Emphasis supplied)
Therefore, medically speaking, the reaction to tetanus found
inside a man's body depends on the incubation period of the
disease.

In the case at bar, Javier suffered a 2-inch incised wound on his

right palm when he parried the bolo which Urbano used in
hacking him. This incident took place on October 23, 1980. After
22 days, or on November 14, 1980, he suffered the symptoms of
tetanus, like lockjaw and muscle spasms. The following day,
November 15, 1980, he died.

If, therefore, the wound of Javier inflicted by the appellant was

already infected by tetanus germs at the time, it is more
medically probable that Javier should have been infected with
only a mild cause of tetanus because the symptoms of tetanus
appeared on the 22nd day after the hacking incident or more
than 14 days after the infliction of the wound. Therefore, the
onset time should have been more than six days. Javier,
however, died on the second day from the onset time. The more
credible conclusion is that at the time Javier's wound was
inflicted by the appellant, the severe form of tetanus that killed
him was not yet present. Consequently, Javier's wound could
have been infected with tetanus after the hacking incident.
Considering the circumstance surrounding Javier's death, his
wound could have been infected by tetanus 2 or 3 or a few but
not 20 to 22 days before he died.

The rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct, natural,
and logical consequence of the wounds inflicted upon him by the
accused. (People v. Cardenas, supra) And since we are dealing
with a criminal conviction, the proof that the accused caused the
victim's death must convince a rational mind beyond reasonable
doubt. The medical findings, however, lead us to a distinct
possibility that the infection of the wound by tetanus was an
efficient intervening cause later or between the time Javier was
wounded to the time of his death. The infection was, therefore,
distinct and foreign to the crime. (People v. Rellin, 77 Phil. 1038).

Doubts are present. There is a likelihood that the wound was but
the remote cause and its subsequent infection, for failure to take
necessary precautions, with tetanus may have been the
proximate cause of Javier's death with which the petitioner had
nothing to do. As we ruled in Manila Electric Co. v. Remoquillo,
et al. (99 Phil. 118).

"A prior and remote cause cannot be made the be of an action if

such remote cause did nothing more than furnish the condition or
give rise to the occasion by which the injury was made possible,
if there intervened between such prior or remote cause and the
injury a distinct, successive, unrelated, and efficient cause of the
injury, even though such injury would not have happened but for
such condition or occasion. If no danger existed in the condition
except because of the independent cause, such condition was
not the proximate cause. And if an independent negligent act or
defective condition sets into operation the instances which result
in injury because of the prior defective condition, such
subsequent act or condition is the proximate cause." (45 C.J. pp.
931-932). (at p. 125)

It strains the judicial mind to allow a clear aggressor to go scot

free of criminal liability. At the very least, the records show he is
guilty of inflicting slight physical injuries. However, the
petitioner's criminal liability in this respect was wiped out by the
victim's own act. After the hacking incident, Urbano and Javier
used the facilities of barangay mediators to effect a compromise
agreement where Javier forgave Urbano while Urbano defrayed
the medical expenses of Javier. This settlement of minor
offenses is allowed under the express provisions of Presidential
Decree G.R. No. 1508, Section 2(3). (See also People v.
Caruncho, 127 SCRA 16).
We must stress, however, that our discussion of proximate
cause and remote cause is limited to the criminal aspects of this
rather unusual case. It does not necessarily follow that the
petitioner is also free of civil liability. The well-settled doctrine is
that a person, while not criminally liable, may still be civilly liable.
Thus, in the recent case of People v. Rogelio Ligon y Tria, et al.
(G.R. No. 74041, July 29, 1987), we said:

xxx xxx xxx

... While the guilt of the accused in a criminal prosecution must

be established beyond reasonable doubt, only a preponderance
of evidence is required in a civil action for damages. (Article 29,
Civil Code). The judgment of acquittal extinguishes the civil
liability of the accused only when it includes a declaration that
the facts from which the civil liability might arise did not exist.
(Padilla v. Court of Appeals, 129 SCRA 559).

The reason for the provisions of article 29 of the Civil Code,

which provides that the acquittal of the accused on the ground
that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt does
not necessarily exempt him from civil liability for the same act or
omission, has been explained by the Code Commission as
follows:

The old rule that the acquittal of the accused in a criminal case
also releases him from civil liability is one of the most serious
flaws in the Philippine legal system. It has given use to
numberless instances of miscarriage of justice, where the
acquittal was due to a reasonable doubt in the mind of the court
as to the guilt of the accused. The reasoning followed is that
inasmuch as the civil responsibility is derived from the criminal
offense, when the latter is not proved, civil liability cannot be
demanded.

This is one of those causes where confused thinking leads to

unfortunate and deplorable consequences. Such reasoning fails
to draw a clear line of demarcation between criminal liability and
civil responsibility, and to determine the logical result of the
distinction. The two liabilities are separate and distinct from each
other. One affects the social order and the other, private rights.
One is for the punishment or correction of the offender while the
other is for reparation of damages suffered by the aggrieved
party. The two responsibilities are so different from each other
that article 1813 of the present (Spanish) Civil Code reads thus:
"There may be a compromise upon the civil action arising from a
crime; but the public action for the imposition of the legal penalty
shall not thereby be extinguished." It is just and proper that, for
the purposes of the imprisonment of or fine upon the accused,
the offense should be proved beyond reasonable doubt. But for
the purpose of indemnity the complaining party, why should the
offense also be proved beyond reasonable doubt? Is not the
invasion or violation of every private right to be proved only by a
preponderance of evidence? Is the right of the aggrieved person
any less private because the wrongful act is also punishable by
the criminal law?

"For these reasons, the Commission recommends the adoption

of the reform under discussion. It will correct a serious defect in
our law. It will close up an inexhaustible source of injustice-a
cause for disillusionment on the part of the innumerable persons
injured or wronged."

The respondent court increased the P12,000.00 indemnification

imposed by the trial court to P30,000.00. However, since the
indemnification was based solely on the finding of guilt beyond
reasonable doubt in the homicide case, the civil liability of the
petitioner was not thoroughly examined. This aspect of the case
calls for fuller development if the heirs of the victim are so
minded.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The

questioned decision of the then Intermediate Appellate Court,
now Court of Appeals, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
petitioner is ACQUITTED of the crime of homicide. Costs de
oficio.

SO ORDERED.
GEMMA T. JACINTO,

Petitioner,

G.R. No. 162540

Present:

- versus -

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,

Chairperson,

CHICO-NAZARIO,

VELASCO, JR.,

NACHURA, and

PERALTA, JJ.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Promulgated:

Respondent.

July 13, 2009

x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-----x

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioner

Gemma T. Jacinto seeking the reversal of the Decision[1] of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 23761 dated
December 16, 2003, affirming petitioner's conviction of the crime
of Qualified Theft, and its Resolution[2] dated March 5, 2004
denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
Petitioner, along with two other women, namely, Anita Busog de
Valencia y Rivera and Jacqueline Capitle, was charged before
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Caloocan City, Branch 131,
with the crime of Qualified Theft, allegedly committed as follows:

That on or about and sometime in the month of July 1997, in

Kalookan City, Metro Manila, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring together
and mutually helping one another, being then all employees of
MEGA FOAM INTERNATIONAL INC., herein represented by
JOSEPH DYHENGCO Y CO, and as such had free access
inside the aforesaid establishment, with grave abuse of trust and
confidence reposed upon them with intent to gain and without
the knowledge and consent of the owner thereof, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and
deposited in their own account, Banco De Oro Check No.
0132649 dated July 14, 1997 in the sum of P10,000.00,
representing payment made by customer Baby Aquino to the
Mega Foam Int'l. Inc. to the damage and prejudice of the latter in
the aforesaid stated amount of P10,000.00.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[3]

The prosecution's evidence, which both the RTC and the CA

found to be more credible, reveals the events that transpired to
be as follows.

In the month of June 1997, Isabelita Aquino Milabo, also known

as Baby Aquino, handed petitioner Banco De Oro (BDO) Check
Number 0132649 postdated July 14, 1997 in the amount of
P10,000.00. The check was payment for Baby Aquino's
purchases from Mega Foam Int'l., Inc., and petitioner was then
the collector of Mega Foam. Somehow, the check was deposited
in the Land Bank account of Generoso Capitle, the husband of
Jacqueline Capitle; the latter is the sister of petitioner and the
former pricing, merchandising and inventory clerk of Mega
Foam.

Meanwhile, Rowena Ricablanca, another employee of Mega

Foam, received a phone call sometime in the middle of July from
one of their customers, Jennifer Sanalila. The customer wanted
to know if she could issue checks payable to the account of
Mega Foam, instead of issuing the checks payable to CASH.
Said customer had apparently been instructed by Jacqueline
Capitle to make check payments to Mega Foam payable to
CASH. Around that time, Ricablanca also received a phone call
from an employee of Land Bank, Valenzuela Branch, who was
looking for Generoso Capitle. The reason for the call was to
inform Capitle that the subject BDO check deposited in his
account had been dishonored.

Ricablanca then phoned accused Anita Valencia, a former

employee/collector of Mega Foam, asking the latter to inform
Jacqueline Capitle about the phone call from Land Bank
regarding the bounced check. Ricablanca explained that she had
to call and relay the message through Valencia, because the
Capitles did not have a phone; but they could be reached
through Valencia, a neighbor and former co-employee of
Jacqueline Capitle at Mega Foam.

Valencia then told Ricablanca that the check came from Baby
Aquino, and instructed Ricablanca to ask Baby Aquino to replace
the check with cash. Valencia also told Ricablanca of a plan to
take the cash and divide it equally into four: for herself,
Ricablanca, petitioner Jacinto and Jacqueline Capitle.
Ricablanca, upon the advise of Mega Foam's accountant,
reported the matter to the owner of Mega Foam, Joseph
Dyhengco.

Thereafter, Joseph Dyhengco talked to Baby Aquino and was

able to confirm that the latter indeed handed petitioner a BDO
check for P10,000.00 sometime in June 1997 as payment for her
purchases from Mega Foam.[4] Baby Aquino further testified
that, sometime in July 1997, petitioner also called her on the
phone to tell her that the BDO check bounced.[5] Verification
from company records showed that petitioner never remitted the
subject check to Mega Foam. However, Baby Aquino said that
she had already paid Mega Foam P10,000.00 cash in August
1997 as replacement for the dishonored check.[6]

Generoso Capitle, presented as a hostile witness, admitted

depositing the subject BDO check in his bank account, but
explained that the check came into his possession when some
unknown woman arrived at his house around the first week of
July 1997 to have the check rediscounted. He parted with his
cash in exchange for the check without even bothering to inquire
into the identity of the woman or her address. When he was
informed by the bank that the check bounced, he merely
disregarded it as he didnt know where to find the woman who
rediscounted the check.

Meanwhile, Dyhengco filed a Complaint with the National Bureau

of Investigation (NBI) and worked out an entrapment operation
with its agents. Ten pieces of P1,000.00 bills provided by
Dyhengco were marked and dusted with fluorescent powder by
the NBI. Thereafter, the bills were given to Ricablanca, who was
tasked to pretend that she was going along with Valencia's plan.

On August 15, 2007, Ricablanca and petitioner met at the latter's

house. Petitioner, who was then holding the bounced BDO
check, handed over said check to Ricablanca. They originally
intended to proceed to Baby Aquino's place to have the check
replaced with cash, but the plan did not push through. However,
they agreed to meet again on August 21, 2007.

On the agreed date, Ricablanca again went to petitioners house,

where she met petitioner and Jacqueline Capitle. Petitioner, her
husband, and Ricablanca went to the house of Anita Valencia;
Jacqueline Capitle decided not to go with the group because she
decided to go shopping. It was only petitioner, her husband,
Ricablanca and Valencia who then boarded petitioner's jeep and
went on to Baby Aquino's factory. Only Ricablanca alighted from
the jeep and entered the premises of Baby Aquino, pretending
that she was getting cash from Baby Aquino. However, the cash
she actually brought out from the premises was the P10,000.00
marked money previously given to her by Dyhengco. Ricablanca
divided the money and upon returning to the jeep, gave
P5,000.00 each to Valencia and petitioner. Thereafter, petitioner
and Valencia were arrested by NBI agents, who had been
watching the whole time.

Petitioner and Valencia were brought to the NBI office where the
Forensic Chemist found fluorescent powder on the palmar and
dorsal aspects of both of their hands. This showed that petitioner
and Valencia handled the marked money. The NBI filed a
criminal case for qualified theft against the two and one Jane
Doe who was later identified as Jacqueline Capitle, the wife of
Generoso Capitle.

The defense, on the other hand, denied having taken the subject
check and presented the following scenario.

Petitioner admitted that she was a collector for Mega Foam until
she resigned on June 30, 1997, but claimed that she had
stopped collecting payments from Baby Aquino for quite some
time before her resignation from the company. She further
testified that, on the day of the arrest, Ricablanca came to her
mothers house, where she was staying at that time, and asked
that she accompany her (Ricablanca) to Baby Aquino's house.
Since petitioner was going for a pre-natal check-up at the
Chinese General Hospital, Ricablanca decided to hitch a ride
with the former and her husband in their jeep going to Baby
Aquino's place in Caloocan City. She allegedly had no idea why
Ricablanca asked them to wait in their jeep, which they parked
outside the house of Baby Aquino, and was very surprised when
Ricablanca placed the money on her lap and the NBI agents
arrested them.

Anita Valencia also admitted that she was the cashier of Mega
Foam until she resigned on June 30, 1997. It was never part of
her job to collect payments from customers. According to her, on
the morning of August 21, 1997, Ricablanca called her up on the
phone, asking if she (Valencia) could accompany her
(Ricablanca) to the house of Baby Aquino. Valencia claims that
she agreed to do so, despite her admission during cross-
examination that she did not know where Baby Aquino resided,
as she had never been to said house. They then met at the
house of petitioner's mother, rode the jeep of petitioner and her
husband, and proceeded to Baby Aquino's place. When they
arrived at said place, Ricablanca alighted, but requested them to
wait for her in the jeep. After ten minutes, Ricablanca came out
and, to her surprise, Ricablanca gave her money and so she
even asked, What is this? Then, the NBI agents arrested them.

The trial of the three accused went its usual course and, on
October 4, 1999, the RTC rendered its Decision, the dispositive
portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court finds accused

Gemma Tubale De Jacinto y Latosa, Anita Busog De Valencia y
Rivera and Jacqueline Capitle GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of QUALIFIED THEFT and each of them is hereby
sentenced to suffer imprisonment of FIVE (5) YEARS, FIVE (5)
MONTHS AND ELEVEN (11) DAYS, as minimum, to SIX (6)
YEARS, EIGHT (8) MONTHS AND TWENTY (20) DAYS, as
maximum.

SO ORDERED.[7]

The three appealed to the CA and, on December 16, 2003, a

Decision was promulgated, the dispositive portion of which
reads, thus:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision of the trial court is
MODIFIED, in that:

(a) the sentence against accused Gemma Jacinto stands;

(b) the sentence against accused Anita Valencia is reduced to 4

months arresto mayor medium.

(c) The accused Jacqueline Capitle is acquitted.

SO ORDERED.

A Partial Motion for Reconsideration of the foregoing CA

Decision was filed only for petitioner Gemma Tubale Jacinto, but
the same was denied per Resolution dated March 5, 2004.

Hence, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by

petitioner alone, assailing the Decision and Resolution of the CA.
The issues raised in the petition are as follows:

1. Whether or not petitioner can be convicted of a crime not

charged in the information;

2. Whether or not a worthless check can be the object of

theft; and
3. Whether or not the prosecution has proved petitioner's guilt
beyond

reasonable doubt.[8]

The petition deserves considerable thought.

The prosecution tried to establish the following pieces of

evidence to constitute the elements of the crime of qualified theft
defined under Article 308, in relation to Article 310, both of the
Revised Penal Code: (1) the taking of personal property - as
shown by the fact that petitioner, as collector for Mega Foam, did
not remit the customer's check payment to her employer and,
instead, appropriated it for herself; (2) said property belonged to
another − the check belonged to Baby Aquino, as it was her
payment for purchases she made; (3) the taking was done with
intent to gain this is presumed from the act of unlawful taking and
further shown by the fact that the check was deposited to the
bank account of petitioner's brother-in-law; (4) it was done
without the owners consent petitioner hid the fact that she had
received the check payment from her employer's customer by
not remitting the check to the company; (5) it was accomplished
without the use of violence or intimidation against persons, nor of
force upon things the check was voluntarily handed to petitioner
by the customer, as she was known to be a collector for the
company; and (6) it was done with grave abuse of confidence
petitioner is admittedly entrusted with the collection of payments
from customers.

However, as may be gleaned from the aforementioned Articles of

the Revised Penal Code, the personal property subject of the
theft must have some value, as the intention of the accused is to
gain from the thing stolen. This is further bolstered by Article
309, where the law provides that the penalty to be imposed on
the accused is dependent on the value of the thing stolen.

In this case, petitioner unlawfully took the postdated check

belonging to Mega Foam, but the same was apparently without
value, as it was subsequently dishonored. Thus, the question
arises on whether the crime of qualified theft was actually
produced.

The Court must resolve the issue in the negative.

Intod v. Court of Appeals[9] is highly instructive and applicable to

the present case. In Intod, the accused, intending to kill a
person, peppered the latters bedroom with bullets, but since the
intended victim was not home at the time, no harm came to him.
The trial court and the CA held Intod guilty of attempted murder.
But upon review by this Court, he was adjudged guilty only of an
impossible crime as defined and penalized in paragraph 2,
Article 4, in relation to Article 59, both of the Revised Penal
Code, because of the factual impossibility of producing the
crime. Pertinent portions of said provisions read as follows:

Article 4(2). Criminal Responsibility. - Criminal responsibility shall

be incurred:

xxxx

2. By any person performing an act which would be an

offense against persons or property, were it not for the inherent
impossibility of its accomplishment or on account of the
employment of inadequate to ineffectual means. (emphasis
supplied)

Article 59. Penalty to be imposed in case of failure to commit the

crime because the means employed or the aims sought are
impossible. - When the person intending to commit an offense
has already performed the acts for the execution of the same but
nevertheless the crime was not produced by reason of the fact
that the act intended was by its nature one of impossible
accomplishment or because the means employed by such
person are essentially inadequate to produce the result desired
by him, the court, having in mind the social danger and the
degree of criminality shown by the offender, shall impose upon
him the penalty of arresto mayor or a fine ranging from 200 to
500 pesos.

Thus, the requisites of an impossible crime are: (1) that the act
performed would be an offense against persons or property; (2)
that the act was done with evil intent; and (3) that its
accomplishment was inherently impossible, or the means
employed was either inadequate or ineffectual. The aspect of the
inherent impossibility of accomplishing the intended crime under
Article 4(2) of the Revised Penal Code was further explained by
the Court in Intod[10] in this wise:

Under this article, the act performed by the offender cannot

produce an offense against persons or property because: (1) the
commission of the offense is inherently impossible of
accomplishment; or (2) the means employed is either (a)
inadequate or (b) ineffectual.

That the offense cannot be produced because the commission of

the offense is inherently impossible of accomplishment is the
focus of this petition. To be impossible under this clause, the act
intended by the offender must be by its nature one impossible of
accomplishment. There must be either (1) legal impossibility, or
(2) physical impossibility of accomplishing the intended act in
order to qualify the act as an impossible crime.

Legal impossibility occurs where the intended acts, even if

completed, would not amount to a crime.

xxxx
The impossibility of killing a person already dead falls in this
category.

On the other hand, factual impossibility occurs when extraneous

circumstances unknown to the actor or beyond his control
prevent the consummation of the intended crime. x x x [11]

In Intod, the Court went on to give an example of an offense that

involved factual impossibility, i.e., a man puts his hand in the
coat pocket of another with the intention to steal the latter's
wallet, but gets nothing since the pocket is empty.

Herein petitioner's case is closely akin to the above example of

factual impossibility given in Intod. In this case, petitioner
performed all the acts to consummate the crime of qualified theft,
which is a crime against property. Petitioner's evil intent cannot
be denied, as the mere act of unlawfully taking the check meant
for Mega Foam showed her intent to gain or be unjustly
enriched. Were it not for the fact that the check bounced, she
would have received the face value thereof, which was not
rightfully hers. Therefore, it was only due to the extraneous
circumstance of the check being unfunded, a fact unknown to
petitioner at the time, that prevented the crime from being
produced. The thing unlawfully taken by petitioner turned out to
be absolutely worthless, because the check was eventually
dishonored, and Mega Foam had received the cash to replace
the value of said dishonored check.

The fact that petitioner was later entrapped receiving the

P5,000.00 marked money, which she thought was the cash
replacement for the dishonored check, is of no moment. The
Court held in Valenzuela v. People[12] that under the definition
of theft in Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code, there is only
one operative act of execution by the actor involved in theft ─ the
taking of personal property of another. Elucidating further, the
Court held, thus:
x x x Parsing through the statutory definition of theft under Article
308, there is one apparent answer provided in the language of
the law that theft is already produced upon the tak[ing of]
personal property of another without the latters consent.

xxxx

x x x when is the crime of theft produced? There would be all but

certain unanimity in the position that theft is produced when
there is deprivation of personal property due to its taking by one
with intent to gain. Viewed from that perspective, it is immaterial
to the product of the felony that the offender, once having
committed all the acts of execution for theft, is able or unable to
freely dispose of the property stolen since the deprivation from
the owner alone has already ensued from such acts of
execution. x x x

xxxx

x x x we have, after all, held that unlawful taking, or

apoderamiento, is deemed complete from the moment the
offender gains possession of the thing, even if he has no
opportunity to dispose of the same. x x x

x x x Unlawful taking, which is the deprivation of ones personal

property, is the element which produces the felony in its
consummated stage. x x x [13]
From the above discussion, there can be no question that as of
the time that petitioner took possession of the check meant for
Mega Foam, she had performed all the acts to consummate the
crime of theft, had it not been impossible of accomplishment in
this case. The circumstance of petitioner receiving the P5,000.00
cash as supposed replacement for the dishonored check was no
longer necessary for the consummation of the crime of qualified
theft. Obviously, the plan to convince Baby Aquino to give cash
as replacement for the check was hatched only after the check
had been dishonored by the drawee bank. Since the crime of
theft is not a continuing offense, petitioner's act of receiving the
cash replacement should not be considered as a continuation of
the theft. At most, the fact that petitioner was caught receiving
the marked money was merely corroborating evidence to
strengthen proof of her intent to gain.

Moreover, the fact that petitioner further planned to have the

dishonored check replaced with cash by its issuer is a different
and separate fraudulent scheme. Unfortunately, since said
scheme was not included or covered by the allegations in the
Information, the Court cannot pronounce judgment on the
accused; otherwise, it would violate the due process clause of
the Constitution. If at all, that fraudulent scheme could have been
another possible source of criminal liability.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The

Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated December 16, 2003, and
its Resolution dated March 5, 2004, are MODIFIED. Petitioner
Gemma T. Jacinto is found GUILTY of an IMPOSSIBLE CRIME
as defined and penalized in Articles 4, paragraph 2, and 59 of
the Revised Penal Code, respectively. Petitioner is sentenced to
suffer the penalty of six (6) months of arrresto mayor, and to pay
the costs.

SO ORDERED.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.

FERNANDO PUGAY y BALCITA, & BENJAMIN SAMSON y MAGDALENA,

accused-appellants.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Citizens Legal Assistance Office for accused-appellants.

MEDIALDEA, J.:

For the death of Bayani Miranda, a retardate, FERNANDO PUGAY y

BALCITA and BENJAMIN SAMSON y MAGDALENA were charged with
the crime of MURDER in Criminal Case No. L-175-82 of the Court of
First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Cavite, under an
information which reads as follows:

That on or about May 19, 1982 at the town plaza of the Municipality
of Rosario, Province of Cavite, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping and assisting one another, with
treachery and evident premeditation, taking advantage of their
superior strength, and with the decided purpose to kill, poured
gasoline, a combustible liquid to the body of Bayani Miranda and with
the use of fire did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously,
burn the whole body of said Bayani Miranda which caused his
subsequent death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the
aforenamed Bayani Miranda.

That the crime was committed with the qualifying circumstance of

treachery and the aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation
and superior strength, and the means employed was to weaken the
defense; that the wrong done in the commission of the crime was
deliberately augmented by causing another wrong, that is the burning
of the body of Bayani Miranda.

CONTRARY TO LAW (p. 1, Records).

Upon being arraigned, both accused pleaded not guilty to the offense
charged. After trial, the trial court rendered a decision finding both
accused guilty on the crime of murder but crediting in favor of the
accused Pugay the mitigating circumstance of lack of intention to
commit so grave a wrong, the dispositive portion of which reads as
follows:

WHEREFORE, the accused Fernando Pugay y Balcita and Benjamin

Samson y Magdalena are pronounced guilty beyond reasonable doubt
as principals by direct participation of the crime of murder for the
death of Bayani Miranda, and appreciating the aforestated mitigating
circumstance in favor of Pugay, he is sentenced to a prison term
ranging from twelve (12) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to
twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and Samson to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua together with the accessories
of the law for both of them. The accused are solidarily held liable to
indemnify the heirs of the victim in the amount of P13,940.00 plus
moral damages of P10,000.00 and exemplary damages of P5,000.00.

Let the preventive imprisonment of Pugay be deducted from the

principal penalty.

Cost against both accused.

SO ORDERED (p. 248, Records).

Not satisfied with the decision, both accused interposed the present
appeal and assigned the following errors committed by the court a
quo:

1. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN UTILIZING THE STATEMENTS OF

ACCUSED-APPELLANTS IN ITS APPRECIATION OF FACTS DESPITE ITS
ADMISSION THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS WERE NOT ASSISTED BY
A COUNSEL DURING THE CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION.

2. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE

SUPPRESSION BY THE PROSECUTION OF SOME EVIDENCE IS FATAL TO
ITS CASE.

3. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN LENDING CREDENCE TO THE

INCREDIBLE TESTIMONY OF EDUARDO GABION WHO WAS ONE OF
THE MANY SUSPECTS ARRESTED BY THE POLICE (Accused-appellants'
Brief, p. 48, Rollo).

The antecedent facts are as follows:

The deceased Miranda, a 25-year old retardate, and the accused

Pugay were friends. Miranda used to run errands for Pugay and at
times they slept together. On the evening of May 19, 1982, a town
fiesta fair was held in the public plaza of Rosario, Cavite. There were
different kinds of ride and one was a ferris wheel.

Sometime after midnight of the same date, Eduardo Gabion was

sitting in the ferris wheel and reading a comic book with his friend
Henry. Later, the accused Pugay and Samson with several companions
arrived. These persons appeared to be drunk as they were all happy
and noisy. As the group saw the deceased walking nearby, they
started making fun of him. They made the deceased dance by tickling
him with a piece of wood.

Not content with what they were doing with the deceased, the
accused Pugay suddenly took a can of gasoline from under the engine
of the ferns wheel and poured its contents on the body of the former.
Gabion told Pugay not to do so while the latter was already in the
process of pouring the gasoline. Then, the accused Samson set
Miranda on fire making a human torch out of him.

The ferris wheel operator later arrived and doused with water the
burning body of the deceased. Some people around also poured sand
on the burning body and others wrapped the same with rags to
extinguish the flame.

The body of the deceased was still aflame when police officer Rolando
Silangcruz and other police officers of the Rosario Police Force arrived
at the scene of the incident. Upon inquiring as to who were
responsible for the dastardly act, the persons around spontaneously
pointed to Pugay and Samson as the authors thereof.

The deceased was later rushed to the Grace Hospital for treatment. In
the meantime, the police officers brought Gabion, the two accused
and five other persons to the Rosario municipal building for
interrogation. Police officer Reynaldo Canlas took the written
statements of Gabion and the two accused, after which Gabion was
released. The two accused remained in custody.

After a careful review of the records, We find the grounds relied upon
by the accused-appellants for the reversal of the decision of the court
a quo to be without merit.

It bears emphasis that barely a few hours after the incident, accused-
appellants gave their written statements to the police. The accused
Pugay admitted in his statement, Exhibit F, that he poured a can of
gasoline on the deceased believing that the contents thereof was
water and then the accused Samson set the deceased on fire. The
accused Samson, on the other hand, alleged in his statement that he
saw Pugay pour gasoline on Miranda but did not see the person who
set him on fire. Worthy of note is the fact that both statements did not
impute any participation of eyewitness Gabion in the commission of
the offense.
While testifying on their defense, the accused-appellants repudiated
their written statements alleging that they were extracted by force.
They claimed that the police maltreated them into admitting
authorship of the crime. They also engaged in a concerted effort to lay
the blame on Gabion for the commission of the offense.

Thus, while it is true that the written statements of the accused-

appellants were mentioned and discussed in the decision of the court
a quo, the contents thereof were not utilized as the sole basis for the
findings of facts in the decision rendered. The said court categorically
stated that "even without Exhibits 'F' and 'G', there is still Gabion's
straightforward, positive and convincing testimony which remains
unaffected by the uncorroborated, self-serving and unrealiable
testimonies of Pugay and Samson" (p. 247, Records).

Accused-appellants next assert that the prosecution suppressed the

testimonies of other eyewitnesses to the incident. They claim that
despite the fact that there were other persons investigated by the
police, only Gabion was presented as an eyewitness during the trial of
the case. They argue that the deliberate non- presentation of these
persons raises the presumption that their testimonies would be
adverse to the prosecution.

There is no dispute that there were other persons who witnessed the
commission of the crime. In fact there appears on record (pp. 16-17,
Records) the written statements of one Abelardo Reyes and one
Monico Alimorong alleging the same facts and imputing the respective
acts of pouring of gasoline and setting the deceased on fire to the
accused-appellants as testified to by Gabion in open court. They were
listed as prosecution witnesses in the information filed. Considering
that their testimonies would be merely corroborative, their non-
presentation does not give rise to the presumption that evidence
wilfully suppressed would be adverse if produced. This presumption
does not apply to the suppression of merely corroborative evidence
(U.S. vs. Dinola, 37 Phil. 797).<äre||anº•1àw> Besides, the matter as
to whom to utilize as witness is for the prosecution to decide.

Accused-appellants also attack the credibility of the eyewitness

Gabion alleging that not only was the latter requested by the mother
of the deceased to testify for the prosecution in exchange for his
absolution from liability but also because his testimony that he was
reading a comic book during an unusual event is contrary to human
behavior and experience.

Gabion testified that it was his uncle and not the mother of the
deceased who asked him to testify and state the truth about the
incident. The mother of the deceased likewise testified that she never
talked to Gabion and that she saw the latter for the first time when
the instant case was tried. Besides, the accused Pugay admitted that
Gabion was his friend and both Pugay and the other accused Samson
testified that they had no previous misunderstanding with Gabion.
Clearly, Gabion had no reason to testify falsely against them.

In support of their claim that the testimony of Gabion to the effect

that he saw Pugay pour gasoline on the deceased and then Samson set
him on fire is incredible, the accused-appellants quote Gabion's
testimony on cross-examination that, after telling Pugay not to pour
gasoline on the deceased, he (Gabion) resumed reading comics; and
that it was only when the victim's body was on fire that he noticed a
commotion.
However, explaining this testimony on re-direct examination, Gabion
stated:

Q. Mr. Gabion, you told the Court on cross-examination that you

were reading comics when you saw Pugay poured gasoline unto
Bayani Miranda and lighted by Samson. How could you possibly see
that incident while you were reading comics?

A. I put down the comics which I am reading and I saw what

they were doing.

Q. According to you also before Bayani was poured with gasoline

and lighted and burned later you had a talk with Pugay, is that
correct?

A. When he was pouring gasoline on Bayani Miranda I was

trying to prevent him from doing so.

Q. We want to clarify. According to you a while ago you had a

talk with Pugay and as a matter of fact, you told him not to pour
gasoline. That is what I want to know from you, if that is true?

A. Yes, sir.
Q. Aside from Bayani being tickled with a stick on his ass, do you
mean to say you come to know that Pugay will pour gasoline unto
him?

A. I do not know that would be that incident.

Q. Why did you as(k) Pugay in the first place not to pour gasoline
before he did that actually?

A. Because I pity Bayani, sir.

Q. When you saw Pugay tickling Bayani with a stick on his ass
you tried according to you to ask him not to and then later you said
you asked not to pour gasoline. Did Pugay tell you he was going to
pour gasoline on Bayani?

A. I was not told, sir.

Q. Did you come to know..... how did you come to know he was
going to pour gasoline that is why you prevent him?

A. Because he was holding on a container of gasoline. I thought

it was water but it was gasoline.
Q. It is clear that while Pugay was tickling Bayani with a stick on
his ass, he later got hold of a can of gasoline, is that correct?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And when he pick up the can of gasoline, was that the time
you told him not to pour gasoline when he merely pick up the can of
gasoline.

A. I saw him pouring the gasoline on the body of Joe.

Q. So, it is clear when you told Pugay not to pour gasoline he

was already in the process of pouring gasoline on the body of Bayani?

A. Yes, sir (Tsn, July 30, 1983, pp. 32-33).

It is thus clear that prior to the incident in question, Gabion was

reading a comic book; that Gabion stopped reading when the group of
Pugay started to make fun of the deceased; that Gabion saw Pugay get
the can of gasoline from under the engine of the ferris wheel; that it
was while Pugay was in the process of pouring the gasoline on the
body of the deceased when Gabion warned him not to do so; and that
Gabion later saw Samson set the deceased on fire.

However, there is nothing in the records showing that there was

previous conspiracy or unity of criminal purpose and intention
between the two accused-appellants immediately before the
commission of the crime. There was no animosity between the
deceased and the accused Pugay or Samson. Their meeting at the
scene of the incident was accidental. It is also clear that the accused
Pugay and his group merely wanted to make fun of the deceased.
Hence, the respective criminal responsibility of Pugay and Samson
arising from different acts directed against the deceased is individual
and not collective, and each of them is liable only for the act
committed by him (U.S. vs. Magcomot, et. al. 13, Phil. 386; U.S. vs.
Abiog, et. al. 37 Phil. 1371).

The next question to be determined is the criminal responsibility of

the accused Pugay. Having taken the can from under the engine of the
ferris wheel and holding it before pouring its contents on the body of
the deceased, this accused knew that the can contained gasoline. The
stinging smell of this flammable liquid could not have escaped his
notice even before pouring the same. Clearly, he failed to exercise all
the diligence necessary to avoid every undesirable consequence
arising from any act that may be committed by his companions who at
the time were making fun of the deceased. We agree with the Solicitor
General that the accused is only guilty of homicide through reckless
imprudence defined in Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended. In U.S. vs. Maleza, et. al. 14 Phil. 468, 470, this Court ruled
as follows:

A man must use common sense and exercise due reflection in all his
acts; it is his duty to be cautious, careful, and prudent, if not from
instinct, then through fear of incurring punishment. He is responsible
for such results as anyone might foresee and for acts which no one
would have performed except through culpable abandon. Otherwise
his own person, rights and property, all those of his fellow-beings,
would ever be exposed to all manner of danger and injury.
The proper penalty that the accused Pugay must suffer is an
indeterminate one ranging from four (4) months of arresto mayor, as
minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional,
as maximum. With respect to the accused Samson, the Solicitor
General in his brief contends that "his conviction of murder, is proper
considering that his act in setting the deceased on fire knowing that
gasoline had just been poured on him is characterized by treachery as
the victim was left completely helpless to defend and protect himself
against such an outrage" (p. 57, Rollo). We do not agree.

There is entire absence of proof in the record that the accused Samson
had some reason to kill the deceased before the incident. On the
contrary, there is adequate evidence showing that his act was merely
a part of their fun-making that evening. For the circumstance of
treachery to exist, the attack must be deliberate and the culprit
employed means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which
tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to
himself arising from any defense which the offended party might
make.

There can be no doubt that the accused Samson knew very well that
the liquid poured on the body of the deceased was gasoline and a
flammable substance for he would not have committed the act of
setting the latter on fire if it were otherwise. Giving him the benefit of
doubt, it call be conceded that as part of their fun-making he merely
intended to set the deceased's clothes on fire. His act, however, does
not relieve him of criminal responsibility. Burning the clothes of the
victim would cause at the very least some kind of physical injuries on
his person, a felony defined in the Revised Penal Code. If his act
resulted into a graver offense, as what took place in the instant case,
he must be held responsible therefor. Article 4 of the aforesaid code
provides, inter alia, that criminal liability shall be incurred by any
person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be
different from that which he intended.

As no sufficient evidence appears in the record establishing any

qualifying circumstances, the accused Samson is only guilty of the
crime of homicide defined and penalized in Article 249 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended. We are disposed to credit in his favor the
ordinary mitigating circumstance of no intention to commit so grave a
wrong as that committed as there is evidence of a fact from which
such conclusion can be drawn. The eyewitness Gabion testified that
the accused Pugay and Samson were stunned when they noticed the
deceased burning (Tsn, June 1, 1983, pp. 16-17).<äre||anº•1àw>

The proper penalty that the accused Samson must suffer is an

indeterminate one ranging from eight (8) years of prision mayor, as
minimum, to fourteen (14) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum.

The lower court held the accused solidarily liable for P13,940.00, the
amount spent by Miranda's parents for his hospitalization, wake and
interment. The indemnity for death is P30,000.00. Hence, the
indemnity to the heirs of the deceased Miranda is increased to
P43,940.00.

Both accused shall be jointly and severally liable for the aforesaid
amount plus the P10,000.00 as moral damages and P5,000.00 as
exemplary damages as found by the court a quo.
Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed with the modifications above-
indicated. Costs against the accused-appellants.

SO ORDERED.
DEL CASTILLO, J.:

Petitioner Rogelio Roque (petitioner) was charged with the crime of

frustrated homicide in an Information that reads as follows:

That on or about the 22nd day of November, 2001, in the municipality

of Pandi, province of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused did then and there
willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously, with intent to kill[,] attack,
assault and shoot with a gun complain[an]t Reynaldo Marquez, hitting
the latter on his right ear and nape, and kick[ing] him on the face and
back, causing serious physical injuries which ordinarily would have
caused the death of the said Reynaldo Marquez, thus, performing all
the acts of execution which should have produced the crime of
homicide as a consequence, but nevertheless did not produce it by
reason of causes independent of his will, that is[,] by the timely and
able medical attendance rendered to said Reynaldo Marquez which
prevented his death.

CONTRARY TO LAW. [1]

When arraigned on March 23, 2003, petitioner pleaded "not guilty."

During the pre-trial conference, the defense admitted the identity of
petitioner; that he is a Kagawad of Barangay Masagana, Pandi,
Bulacan; and that the day of the incident, November 22, 2001 was the
Thanksgiving Day of the said barangay. Trial thereafter ensued where
the parties presented their respective versions of the incident.

The prosecution averred that on November 22, 2001, while brothers

Reynaldo Marquez (Reynaldo) and Rodolfo Marquez (Rodolfo) were in
the house of Bella Salvador-Santos (Bella) in Pandi, Bulacan, Rodolfo
spotted Rogelio dela Cruz (dela Cruz) and shouted to him to join them.
At that instant, petitioner and his wife were passing-by on board a
tricycle. Believing that Rodolfo's shout was directed at him, petitioner
stopped the vehicle and cursed the former. Reynaldo apologized for
the misunderstanding but petitioner was unyielding. Before leaving,
he warned the Marquez brothers that something bad would happen
to them if they continue to perturb him.

Bothered, Rodolfo went to the house of Barangay Chairman Pablo

Tayao (Tayao) to ask for assistance in settling the misunderstanding.
Because of this, Reynaldo, who had already gone home, was fetched
by dela Cruz and brought to the house of Tayao. But since Tayao was
then no longer around, Reynaldo just proceeded to petitioner's house
to follow Tayao and Rodolfo who had already gone ahead. Upon
arriving at petitioner's residence, Reynaldo again apologized to
petitioner but the latter did not reply. Instead, petitioner entered the
house and when he came out, he was already holding a gun which he
suddenly fired at Reynaldo who was hit in his right ear. Petitioner
then shot Reynaldo who fell to the ground after being hit in the nape.
Unsatisfied, petitioner kicked Reynaldo on the face and back.
Reynaldo pleaded Tayao for help but to no avail since petitioner
warned those around not to get involved. Fortunately, Reynaldo's
parents arrived and took him to a local hospital for emergency medical
treatment. He was later transferred to Jose Reyes Memorial Hospital
in Manila where he was operated on and confined for three weeks.
Dr. Renato Raymundo attended to him and issued a medical certificate
stating that a bullet entered the base of Reynaldo's skull and exited at
the back of his right ear.

Presenting a totally different version, the defense claimed that on

November 22, 2001, petitioner went to the house of Bella on board a
tricycle to fetch his child. While driving, he was cursed by brothers
Reynaldo and Rodolfo who were visibly intoxicated. Petitioner
ignored the two and just went home. Later, however, the brothers
appeared in front of his house still shouting invectives against him.
Petitioner's brother tried to pacify Rodolfo and Reynaldo who agreed
to leave but not without threatening that they would return to kill
him. Petitioner thus asked someone to call Tayao. Not long after, the
brothers came back, entered petitioner's yard, and challenged him to
a gun duel. Petitioner requested Tayao to stop and pacify them but
Reynaldo refused to calm down and instead fired his gun. Hence, as
an act of self-defense, petitioner fired back twice.

On March 12, 2007, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan,
Branch 84, rendered its Decision[2] finding petitioner guilty as
charged, viz:

WHEREFORE, finding the accused GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of

the crime charged in the information, he is hereby sentenced to suffer
the penalty of imprisonment of six (6) years [of] prision correccional,
as minimum[;] to ten (10) years of prision mayor in its medium
[period], as maximum.

SO ORDERED.[3]
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied in an
Order[4] dated August 16, 2007.

Undaunted, petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA). In its

Decision[5] dated February 27, 2009, the CA affirmed in full the RTC's
Decision, thus:

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing premises, the decision

appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED in its entirety.

SO ORDERED.[6]

Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration[7] thereto was likewise

denied in a Resolution[8] dated July 30, 2010.

Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari[9] under Rule 45 of the

Rules of Court where petitioner imputes upon the CA the following
errors:

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRONEOUSLY APPRECIATED

THE FACTS AND EVIDENCE ON RECORD WHEN IT RULED THAT THE
ELEMENT OF UNLAWFUL AGGRESSION WAS NOT SATISFACTORILY
PROVEN SINCE THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT HAS NOT SATISFACTORILY
SHOWN THAT THE VICTIM/PRIVATE COMPLAINANT WAS INDEED
ARMED WITH A GUN.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRONEOUSLY APPRECIATED
THE FACTS AND EVIDENCE ON RECORD WHEN IT RULED THAT
GRANTING FOR THE BENEFIT OF ARGUMENT THAT THERE WAS
INDEED UNLAWFUL AGGRESSION, PETITIONER WAS NO LONGER
JUSTIFIED IN FIRING AT THE VICTIM/PRIVATE COMPLAINANT FOR THE
SECOND TIME.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRONEOSULY APPRECIATED

THE FACTS AND EVIDENCE ON RECORD WHEN IT RULED THAT INTENT
TO KILL ON THE PART OF PETITIONER WAS PRESENT CONSIDERING: (A)
THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT ALLEGEDLY RECEIVED TWO GUNSHOT
WOUNDS, AND (B) THE PETITIONER PREVENTED BARANGAY OFFICIALS
FROM INTERVENING AND HELPING OUT THE WOUNDED PRIVATE
COMPLAINANT.[10]

Our Ruling

The Petition must be denied.

The errors petitioner imputes upon the CA all pertain to "appreciation

of evidence" or factual errors which are not within the province of a
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. The Court had already
explained in Batistis v. People[11] that:

Pursuant to Section 3, Rule 122, and Section 9, Rule 45, of the Rules of
Court, the review on appeal of a decision in a criminal case, wherein
the CA imposes a penalty other than death, reclusion perpetua, or life
imprisonment, is by petition for review on certiorari.
A petition for review on certiorari raises only questions of law. Sec. 1,
Rule 45, Rules of Court, explicitly so provides, viz:

Section 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court. A party desiring to

appeal by certiorari from a judgment, final order or resolution of the
Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Court of Tax Appeals, the
Regional Trial Court or other courts, whenever authorized by law, may
file with the Supreme Court a verified petition for review on certiorari.
The petition may include an application for a writ of preliminary
injunction or other provisional remedies and shall raise only questions
of law, which must be distinctly set forth. The petitioner may seek the
same provisional remedies by verified motion filed in the same action
or proceeding at any time during its pendency.

Petitioner's assigned errors, requiring as they do a re-appreciation and

re-examination of the evidence, are evidentiary and factual in
nature.[12] The Petition must therefore be denied on this basis
because "one, the petition for review thereby violates the limitation of
the issues to only legal questions, and, two, the Court, not being a trier
of facts, will not disturb the factual findings of the CA, unless they
were mistaken, absurd, speculative, conflicting, tainted with grave
abuse of discretion, or contrary to the findings reached by the court of
origin,"[13] which was not shown to be the case here.

Besides, findings of facts of the RTC, its calibration of the testimonial

evidence, its assessment of the probative weight thereof, as well as its
conclusions anchored on the said findings, are accorded high respect if
not conclusive effect when affirmed by the CA,[14] as in this case.
After all, the RTC "had the opportunity to observe the witnesses on
the stand and detect if they were telling the truth."[15] "To [thus]
accord with the established doctrine of finality and bindingness of the
trial court's findings of fact, [the Court shall] not disturb [the] findings
of fact of the RTC, particularly after their affirmance by the CA"[16] as
petitioner was not able to sufficiently establish any extraordinary
circumstance which merits a departure from the said doctrine.[17]

In any event, the Court observes that the CA correctly affirmed the
RTC's ruling that petitioner is guilty of frustrated homicide and not
merely of less serious physical injuries as the latter insists. As aptly
stated by the CA:

In attempted or frustrated homicide, the offender must have the

intent to kill the victim. If there is no intent to kill on the part of the
offender, he is liable for physical injuries only. Vice-versa, regardless
of whether the victim only suffered injuries that would have healed in
nine to thirty days, if intent to kill is sufficiently borne out, the crime
committed is frustrated homicide (Arts. 263-266).

Usually, the intent to kill is shown by the kind of weapon used by the
offender and the parts of the victim's body at which the weapon was
aimed, as shown by the wounds inflicted. Hence, when a deadly
weapon, like a bolo, is used to stab the victim in the latter's abdomen,
the intent to kill can be presumed (Reyes, The Revised Penal Code,
13TH ED., P. 431).

It is worth highlighting that the victim received two gunshot wounds in

the head. Indeed the location of the wounds plus the nature of the
weapon used are ready indications that the accused-appellant's
objective is not merely to warn or incapacitate a supposed aggressor.
Verily, had the accused-appellant been slightly better with his aim, any
of the two bullets surely would have killed him outright. Also, the
intent to kill is further exhibited by the fact that the accused-appellant
even prevented barangay officials from intervening and helping x x x
the bleeding victim. Indeed, the fact that Reynaldo Marquez was
miraculously able to live through the ordeal and sustain only modicum
injuries does not mean that the crime ought to be downgraded from
frustrated homicide to less serious physical injuries. After all, as was
mentioned above, what should be determinative of the crime is not
the gravity of the resulting injury but the criminal intent that animated
the hand that pulled the trigger.[18]

The Court, however, notes that while the penalty imposed upon
appellant is also proper, there is a need to modify the assailed CA
Decision in that awards of damages must be made in favor of the
victim Reynaldo.

The RTC and the CA correctly held that actual damages cannot be
awarded to Reynaldo due to the absence of receipts to prove the
medical expenses he incurred from the incident. "Nonetheless, absent
competent proof on the actual damages suffered, a party still has the
option of claiming temperate damages, which may be allowed in cases
where, from the nature of the case, definite proof of pecuniary loss
cannot be adduced although the court is convinced that the aggrieved
party suffered some pecuniary loss."[19] Since it was undisputed that
Reynaldo was hospitalized due to the gunshot wounds inflicted by
petitioner, albeit as observed by the RTC there was no evidence
offered as to the expenses he incurred by reason thereof, Reynaldo is
entitled to temperate damages in the amount of P25,000.00. Aside
from this, he is also entitled to moral damages of P25,000.00. These
awards of damages are in accordance with settled jurisprudence.[20]
An interest at the legal rate of 6% per annum must also be imposed on
the awarded damages to commence from the date of finality of this
Resolution until fully paid.[21]
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision dated February 27,
2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 31084 affirming in its
entirety the March 12, 2007 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 84 in Criminal Case No. 3486-M-2002
convicting petitioner Rogelio Roque of the crime of frustrated
homicide, is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the petitioner is
ordered to pay the victim Reynaldo Marquez moral damages and
temperate damages in the amount of P25,000,00 each, with interest
at the legal rate of 6% per annum from the date of finality of this
Resolution until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.
JASON IVLER y AGUILAR, Petitioner,

vs.

HON. MARIA ROWENA MODESTO-SAN PEDRO, Judge of the

Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 71, Pasig City, and EVANGELINE
PONCE, Respondents.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

The petition seeks the review1 of the Orders2 of the Regional Trial
Court of Pasig City affirming sub-silencio a lower court’s ruling finding
inapplicable the Double Jeopardy Clause to bar a second prosecution
for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to
Property. This, despite the accused’s previous conviction for Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries arising from the same
incident grounding the second prosecution.

The Facts

Following a vehicular collision in August 2004, petitioner Jason Ivler

(petitioner) was charged before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig
City, Branch 71 (MeTC), with two separate offenses: (1) Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries (Criminal Case No.
82367) for injuries sustained by respondent Evangeline L. Ponce
(respondent Ponce); and (2) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in
Homicide and Damage to Property (Criminal Case No. 82366) for the
death of respondent Ponce’s husband Nestor C. Ponce and damage to
the spouses Ponce’s vehicle. Petitioner posted bail for his temporary
release in both cases.

On 7 September 2004, petitioner pleaded guilty to the charge in

Criminal Case No. 82367 and was meted out the penalty of public
censure. Invoking this conviction, petitioner moved to quash the
Information in Criminal Case No. 82366 for placing him in jeopardy of
second punishment for the same offense of reckless imprudence.

The MeTC refused quashal, finding no identity of offenses in the two

cases.3

After unsuccessfully seeking reconsideration, petitioner elevated the

matter to the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 157 (RTC), in a
petition for certiorari (S.C.A. No. 2803). Meanwhile, petitioner sought
from the MeTC the suspension of proceedings in Criminal Case No.
82366, including the arraignment on 17 May 2005, invoking S.C.A. No.
2803 as a prejudicial question. Without acting on petitioner’s motion,
the MeTC proceeded with the arraignment and, because of
petitioner’s absence, cancelled his bail and ordered his arrest.4 Seven
days later, the MeTC issued a resolution denying petitioner’s motion
to suspend proceedings and postponing his arraignment until after his
arrest.5 Petitioner sought reconsideration but as of the filing of this
petition, the motion remained unresolved.
Relying on the arrest order against petitioner, respondent Ponce
sought in the RTC the dismissal of S.C.A. No. 2803 for petitioner’s loss
of standing to maintain the suit. Petitioner contested the motion.

The Ruling of the Trial Court

In an Order dated 2 February 2006, the RTC dismissed S.C.A. No. 2803,
narrowly grounding its ruling on petitioner’s forfeiture of standing to
maintain S.C.A. No. 2803 arising from the MeTC’s order to arrest
petitioner for his non-appearance at the arraignment in Criminal Case
No. 82366. Thus, without reaching the merits of S.C.A. No. 2803, the
RTC effectively affirmed the MeTC. Petitioner sought reconsideration
but this proved unavailing.6

Hence, this petition.

Petitioner denies absconding. He explains that his petition in S.C.A.

No. 2803 constrained him to forego participation in the proceedings in
Criminal Case No. 82366. Petitioner distinguishes his case from the
line of jurisprudence sanctioning dismissal of appeals for absconding
appellants because his appeal before the RTC was a special civil action
seeking a pre-trial relief, not a post-trial appeal of a judgment of
conviction.7

Petitioner laments the RTC’s failure to reach the merits of his petition
in S.C.A. 2803. Invoking jurisprudence, petitioner argues that his
constitutional right not to be placed twice in jeopardy of punishment
for the same offense bars his prosecution in Criminal Case No. 82366,
having been previously convicted in Criminal Case No. 82367 for the
same offense of reckless imprudence charged in Criminal Case No.
82366. Petitioner submits that the multiple consequences of such
crime are material only to determine his penalty.

Respondent Ponce finds no reason for the Court to disturb the RTC’s
decision forfeiting petitioner’s standing to maintain his petition in
S.C.A. 2803. On the merits, respondent Ponce calls the Court’s
attention to jurisprudence holding that light offenses (e.g. slight
physical injuries) cannot be complexed under Article 48 of the Revised
Penal Code with grave or less grave felonies (e.g. homicide). Hence,
the prosecution was obliged to separate the charge in Criminal Case
No. 82366 for the slight physical injuries from Criminal Case No. 82367
for the homicide and damage to property.

In the Resolution of 6 June 2007, we granted the Office of the Solicitor

General’s motion not to file a comment to the petition as the public
respondent judge is merely a nominal party and private respondent is
represented by counsel.

The Issues

Two questions are presented for resolution: (1) whether petitioner

forfeited his standing to seek relief in S.C.A. 2803 when the MeTC
ordered his arrest following his non-appearance at the arraignment in
Criminal Case No. 82366; and (2) if in the negative, whether
petitioner’s constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy Clause
bars further proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366.
The Ruling of the Court

We hold that (1) petitioner’s non-appearance at the arraignment in

Criminal Case No. 82366 did not divest him of personality to maintain
the petition in S.C.A. 2803; and (2) the protection afforded by the
Constitution shielding petitioner from prosecutions placing him in
jeopardy of second punishment for the same offense bars further
proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366.

Petitioner’s Non-appearance at the Arraignment in

Criminal Case No. 82366 did not Divest him of Standing

to Maintain the Petition in S.C.A. 2803

Dismissals of appeals grounded on the appellant’s escape from

custody or violation of the terms of his bail bond are governed by the
second paragraph of Section 8, Rule 124,8 in relation to Section 1, Rule
125, of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure authorizing this Court
or the Court of Appeals to "also, upon motion of the appellee or motu
proprio, dismiss the appeal if the appellant escapes from prison or
confinement, jumps bail or flees to a foreign country during the
pendency of the appeal." The "appeal" contemplated in Section 8 of
Rule 124 is a suit to review judgments of convictions.

The RTC’s dismissal of petitioner’s special civil action for certiorari to

review a pre-arraignment ancillary question on the applicability of the
Due Process Clause to bar proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366
finds no basis under procedural rules and jurisprudence. The RTC’s
reliance on People v. Esparas9 undercuts the cogency of its ruling
because Esparas stands for a proposition contrary to the RTC’s ruling.
There, the Court granted review to an appeal by an accused who was
sentenced to death for importing prohibited drugs even though she
jumped bail pending trial and was thus tried and convicted in absentia.
The Court in Esparas treated the mandatory review of death sentences
under Republic Act No. 7659 as an exception to Section 8 of Rule
124.10

The mischief in the RTC’s treatment of petitioner’s non-appearance at

his arraignment in Criminal Case No. 82366 as proof of his loss of
standing becomes more evident when one considers the Rules of
Court’s treatment of a defendant who absents himself from post-
arraignment hearings. Under Section 21, Rule 11411 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure, the defendant’s absence merely renders
his bondsman potentially liable on its bond (subject to cancellation
should the bondsman fail to produce the accused within 30 days); the
defendant retains his standing and, should he fail to surrender, will be
tried in absentia and could be convicted or acquitted. Indeed, the 30-
day period granted to the bondsman to produce the accused
underscores the fact that mere non-appearance does not ipso facto
convert the accused’s status to that of a fugitive without standing.

Further, the RTC’s observation that petitioner provided "no

explanation why he failed to attend the scheduled proceeding"12 at
the MeTC is belied by the records. Days before the arraignment,
petitioner sought the suspension of the MeTC’s proceedings in
Criminal Case No. 82366 in light of his petition with the RTC in S.C.A.
No. 2803. Following the MeTC’s refusal to defer arraignment (the
order for which was released days after the MeTC ordered petitioner’s
arrest), petitioner sought reconsideration. His motion remained
unresolved as of the filing of this petition.
Petitioner’s Conviction in Criminal Case No. 82367

Bars his Prosecution in Criminal Case No. 82366

The accused’s negative constitutional right not to be "twice put in

jeopardy of punishment for the same offense"13 protects him from,
among others, post-conviction prosecution for the same offense, with
the prior verdict rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction upon a
valid information.14 It is not disputed that petitioner’s conviction in
Criminal Case No. 82367 was rendered by a court of competent
jurisdiction upon a valid charge. Thus, the case turns on the question
whether Criminal Case No. 82366 and Criminal Case No. 82367 involve
the "same offense." Petitioner adopts the affirmative view, submitting
that the two cases concern the same offense of reckless imprudence.
The MeTC ruled otherwise, finding that Reckless Imprudence Resulting
in Slight Physical Injuries is an entirely separate offense from Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property "as the
[latter] requires proof of an additional fact which the other does
not."15

We find for petitioner.

Reckless Imprudence is a Single Crime,

its Consequences on Persons and

Property are Material Only to Determine

the Penalty
The two charges against petitioner, arising from the same facts, were
prosecuted under the same provision of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, namely, Article 365 defining and penalizing quasi-offenses.
The text of the provision reads:

Imprudence and negligence. — Any person who, by reckless

imprudence, shall commit any act which, had it been intentional,
would constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto
mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its medium
period; if it would have constituted a less grave felony, the penalty of
arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods shall be imposed; if
it would have constituted a light felony, the penalty of arresto menor
in its maximum period shall be imposed.

Any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall commit an

act which would otherwise constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the
penalty of arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods; if it
would have constituted a less serious felony, the penalty of arresto
mayor in its minimum period shall be imposed.

When the execution of the act covered by this article shall have only
resulted in damage to the property of another, the offender shall be
punished by a fine ranging from an amount equal to the value of said
damages to three times such value, but which shall in no case be less
than twenty-five pesos.

A fine not exceeding two hundred pesos and censure shall be imposed
upon any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall
cause some wrong which, if done maliciously, would have constituted
a light felony.
In the imposition of these penalties, the court shall exercise their
sound discretion, without regard to the rules prescribed in Article
sixty-four.

The provisions contained in this article shall not be applicable:

1. When the penalty provided for the offense is equal to or lower than
those provided in the first two paragraphs of this article, in which case
the court shall impose the penalty next lower in degree than that
which should be imposed in the period which they may deem proper
to apply.

2. When, by imprudence or negligence and with violation of the

Automobile Law, to death of a person shall be caused, in which case
the defendant shall be punished by prision correccional in its medium
and maximum periods.

Reckless imprudence consists in voluntary, but without malice, doing

or failing to do an act from which material damage results by reason of
inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person performing or
failing to perform such act, taking into consideration his employment
or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition and other
circumstances regarding persons, time and place.

Simple imprudence consists in the lack of precaution displayed in

those cases in which the damage impending to be caused is not
immediate nor the danger clearly manifest.
The penalty next higher in degree to those provided for in this article
shall be imposed upon the offender who fails to lend on the spot to
the injured parties such help as may be in this hand to give.

Structurally, these nine paragraphs are collapsible into four sub-

groupings relating to (1) the penalties attached to the quasi-offenses
of "imprudence" and "negligence" (paragraphs 1-2); (2) a modified
penalty scheme for either or both quasi-offenses (paragraphs 3-4, 6
and 9); (3) a generic rule for trial courts in imposing penalties
(paragraph 5); and (4) the definition of "reckless imprudence" and
"simple imprudence" (paragraphs 7-8). Conceptually, quasi-offenses
penalize "the mental attitude or condition behind the act, the
dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight, the imprudencia
punible,"16 unlike willful offenses which punish the intentional
criminal act. These structural and conceptual features of quasi-
offenses set them apart from the mass of intentional crimes under the
first 13 Titles of Book II of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.

Indeed, the notion that quasi-offenses, whether reckless or simple, are

distinct species of crime, separately defined and penalized under the
framework of our penal laws, is nothing new. As early as the middle of
the last century, we already sought to bring clarity to this field by
rejecting in Quizon v. Justice of the Peace of Pampanga the
proposition that "reckless imprudence is not a crime in itself but
simply a way of committing it x x x"17 on three points of analysis: (1)
the object of punishment in quasi-crimes (as opposed to intentional
crimes); (2) the legislative intent to treat quasi-crimes as distinct
offenses (as opposed to subsuming them under the mitigating
circumstance of minimal intent) and; (3) the different penalty
structures for quasi-crimes and intentional crimes:
The proposition (inferred from Art. 3 of the Revised Penal Code) that
"reckless imprudence" is not a crime in itself but simply a way of
committing it and merely determines a lower degree of criminal
liability is too broad to deserve unqualified assent. There are crimes
that by their structure cannot be committed through imprudence:
murder, treason, robbery, malicious mischief, etc. In truth, criminal
negligence in our Revised Penal Code is treated as a mere quasi
offense, and dealt with separately from willful offenses. It is not a
mere question of classification or terminology. In intentional crimes,
the act itself is punished; in negligence or imprudence, what is
principally penalized is the mental attitude or condition behind the
act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight, the
imprudencia punible. x x x x

Were criminal negligence but a modality in the commission of

felonies, operating only to reduce the penalty therefor, then it would
be absorbed in the mitigating circumstances of Art. 13, specially the
lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong as the one actually
committed. Furthermore, the theory would require that the
corresponding penalty should be fixed in proportion to the penalty
prescribed for each crime when committed willfully. For each penalty
for the willful offense, there would then be a corresponding penalty
for the negligent variety. But instead, our Revised Penal Code (Art.
365) fixes the penalty for reckless imprudence at arresto mayor
maximum, to prision correccional [medium], if the willful act would
constitute a grave felony, notwithstanding that the penalty for the
latter could range all the way from prision mayor to death, according
to the case. It can be seen that the actual penalty for criminal
negligence bears no relation to the individual willful crime, but is set in
relation to a whole class, or series, of crimes.18 (Emphasis supplied)
This explains why the technically correct way to allege quasi-crimes is
to state that their commission results in damage, either to person or
property.19

Accordingly, we found the Justice of the Peace in Quizon without

jurisdiction to hear a case for "Damage to Property through Reckless
Imprudence," its jurisdiction being limited to trying charges for
Malicious Mischief, an intentional crime conceptually incompatible
with the element of imprudence obtaining in quasi-crimes.

Quizon, rooted in Spanish law20 (the normative ancestry of our

present day penal code) and since repeatedly reiterated,21 stands on
solid conceptual foundation. The contrary doctrinal pronouncement in
People v. Faller22 that "[r]eckless impudence is not a crime in itself x x
x [but] simply a way of committing it x x x,"23 has long been
abandoned when the Court en banc promulgated Quizon in 1955
nearly two decades after the Court decided Faller in 1939. Quizon
rejected Faller’s conceptualization of quasi-crimes by holding that
quasi-crimes under Article 365 are distinct species of crimes and not
merely methods of committing crimes. Faller found expression in post-
Quizon jurisprudence24 only by dint of lingering doctrinal confusion
arising from an indiscriminate fusion of criminal law rules defining
Article 365 crimes and the complexing of intentional crimes under
Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code which, as will be shown shortly,
rests on erroneous conception of quasi-crimes. Indeed, the Quizonian
conception of quasi-crimes undergirded a related branch of
jurisprudence applying the Double Jeopardy Clause to quasi-offenses,
barring second prosecutions for a quasi-offense alleging one resulting
act after a prior conviction or acquittal of a quasi-offense alleging
another resulting act but arising from the same reckless act or
omission upon which the second prosecution was based.
Prior Conviction or Acquittal of

Reckless Imprudence Bars

Subsequent Prosecution for the Same

Quasi-Offense

The doctrine that reckless imprudence under Article 365 is a single

quasi-offense by itself and not merely a means to commit other crimes
such that conviction or acquittal of such quasi-offense bars
subsequent prosecution for the same quasi-offense, regardless of its
various resulting acts, undergirded this Court’s unbroken chain of
jurisprudence on double jeopardy as applied to Article 365 starting
with People v. Diaz,25 decided in 1954. There, a full Court, speaking
through Mr. Justice Montemayor, ordered the dismissal of a case for
"damage to property thru reckless imprudence" because a prior case
against the same accused for "reckless driving," arising from the same
act upon which the first prosecution was based, had been dismissed
earlier. Since then, whenever the same legal question was brought
before the Court, that is, whether prior conviction or acquittal of
reckless imprudence bars subsequent prosecution for the same quasi-
offense, regardless of the consequences alleged for both charges, the
Court unfailingly and consistently answered in the affirmative in
People v. Belga26 (promulgated in 1957 by the Court en banc, per
Reyes, J.), Yap v. Lutero27 (promulgated in 1959, unreported, per
Concepcion, J.), People v. Narvas28 (promulgated in 1960 by the Court
en banc, per Bengzon J.), People v. Silva29 (promulgated in 1962 by
the Court en banc, per Paredes, J.), People v. Macabuhay30
(promulgated in 1966 by the Court en banc, per Makalintal, J.), People
v. Buan31 (promulgated in 1968 by the Court en banc, per Reyes,
J.B.L., acting C. J.), Buerano v. Court of Appeals32 (promulgated in
1982 by the Court en banc, per Relova, J.), and People v. City Court of
Manila33 (promulgated in 1983 by the First Division, per Relova, J.).
These cases uniformly barred the second prosecutions as
constitutionally impermissible under the Double Jeopardy Clause.

The reason for this consistent stance of extending the constitutional

protection under the Double Jeopardy Clause to quasi-offenses was
best articulated by Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Buan, where, in barring a
subsequent prosecution for "serious physical injuries and damage to
property thru reckless imprudence" because of the accused’s prior
acquittal of "slight physical injuries thru reckless imprudence," with
both charges grounded on the same act, the Court explained:34

Reason and precedent both coincide in that once convicted or

acquitted of a specific act of reckless imprudence, the accused may
not be prosecuted again for that same act. For the essence of the
quasi offense of criminal negligence under article 365 of the Revised
Penal Code lies in the execution of an imprudent or negligent act that,
if intentionally done, would be punishable as a felony. The law
penalizes thus the negligent or careless act, not the result thereof. The
gravity of the consequence is only taken into account to determine the
penalty, it does not qualify the substance of the offense. And, as the
careless act is single, whether the injurious result should affect one
person or several persons, the offense (criminal negligence) remains
one and the same, and can not be split into different crimes and
prosecutions.35 x x x (Emphasis supplied)

Evidently, the Diaz line of jurisprudence on double jeopardy merely

extended to its logical conclusion the reasoning of Quizon.

There is in our jurisprudence only one ruling going against this

unbroken line of authority. Preceding Diaz by more than a decade, El
Pueblo de Filipinas v. Estipona,36 decided by the pre-war colonial
Court in November 1940, allowed the subsequent prosecution of an
accused for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property
despite his previous conviction for multiple physical injuries arising
from the same reckless operation of a motor vehicle upon which the
second prosecution was based. Estipona’s inconsistency with the post-
war Diaz chain of jurisprudence suffices to impliedly overrule it. At any
rate, all doubts on this matter were laid to rest in 1982 in Buerano.37
There, we reviewed the Court of Appeals’ conviction of an accused for
"damage to property for reckless imprudence" despite his prior
conviction for "slight and less serious physical injuries thru reckless
imprudence," arising from the same act upon which the second charge
was based. The Court of Appeals had relied on Estipona. We reversed
on the strength of Buan:38

Th[e] view of the Court of Appeals was inspired by the ruling of this
Court in the pre-war case of People vs. Estipona decided on November
14, 1940. However, in the case of People vs. Buan, 22 SCRA 1383
(March 29, 1968), this Court, speaking thru Justice J. B. L. Reyes, held
that –

Reason and precedent both coincide in that once convicted or

acquitted of a specific act of reckless imprudence, the accused may
not be prosecuted again for that same act. For the essence of the
quasi offense of criminal negligence under Article 365 of the Revised
Penal Code lies in the execution of an imprudent or negligent act that,
if intentionally done, would be punishable as a felony. The law
penalizes thus the negligent or careless act, not the result thereof. The
gravity of the consequence is only taken into account to determine the
penalty, it does not qualify the substance of the offense. And, as the
careless act is single, whether the injurious result should affect one
person or several persons, the offense (criminal negligence) remains
one and the same, and can not be split into different crimes and
prosecutions.

xxxx

. . . the exoneration of this appellant, Jose Buan, by the Justice of the

Peace (now Municipal) Court of Guiguinto, Bulacan, of the charge of
slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence, prevents his
being prosecuted for serious physical injuries through reckless
imprudence in the Court of First Instance of the province, where both
charges are derived from the consequences of one and the same
vehicular accident, because the second accusation places the
appellant in second jeopardy for the same offense.39 (Emphasis
supplied)

Thus, for all intents and purposes, Buerano had effectively overruled
Estipona.

It is noteworthy that the Solicitor General in Buerano, in a reversal of

his earlier stance in Silva, joined causes with the accused, a fact which
did not escape the Court’s attention:

Then Solicitor General, now Justice Felix V. Makasiar, in his

MANIFESTATION dated December 12, 1969 (page 82 of the Rollo)
admits that the Court of Appeals erred in not sustaining petitioner’s
plea of double jeopardy and submits that "its affirmatory decision
dated January 28, 1969, in Criminal Case No. 05123-CR finding
petitioner guilty of damage to property through reckless imprudence
should be set aside, without costs." He stressed that "if double
jeopardy exists where the reckless act resulted into homicide and
physical injuries. then the same consequence must perforce follow
where the same reckless act caused merely damage to property-not
death-and physical injuries. Verily, the value of a human life lost as a
result of a vehicular collision cannot be equated with any amount of
damages caused to a motors vehicle arising from the same mishap."40
(Emphasis supplied)

Hence, we find merit in petitioner’s submission that the lower courts

erred in refusing to extend in his favor the mantle of protection
afforded by the Double Jeopardy Clause. A more fitting jurisprudence
could not be tailored to petitioner’s case than People v. Silva, 41 a Diaz
progeny. There, the accused, who was also involved in a vehicular
collision, was charged in two separate Informations with "Slight
Physical Injuries thru Reckless Imprudence" and "Homicide with
Serious Physical Injuries thru Reckless Imprudence." Following his
acquittal of the former, the accused sought the quashal of the latter,
invoking the Double Jeopardy Clause. The trial court initially denied
relief, but, on reconsideration, found merit in the accused’s claim and
dismissed the second case. In affirming the trial court, we quoted with
approval its analysis of the issue following Diaz and its progeny People
v. Belga:42

On June 26, 1959, the lower court reconsidered its Order of May 2,
1959 and dismissed the case, holding: —

[T]he Court believes that the case falls squarely within the doctrine of
double jeopardy enunciated in People v. Belga, x x x In the case cited,
Ciriaco Belga and Jose Belga were charged in the Justice of the Peace
Court of Malilipot, Albay, with the crime of physical injuries through
reckless imprudence arising from a collision between the two
automobiles driven by them (Crim. Case No. 88). Without the
aforesaid complaint having been dismissed or otherwise disposed of,
two other criminal complaints were filed in the same justice of the
peace court, in connection with the same collision one for damage to
property through reckless imprudence (Crim. Case No. 95) signed by
the owner of one of the vehicles involved in the collision, and another
for multiple physical injuries through reckless imprudence (Crim. Case
No. 96) signed by the passengers injured in the accident. Both of these
two complaints were filed against Jose Belga only. After trial, both
defendants were acquitted of the charge against them in Crim. Case
No. 88. Following his acquittal, Jose Belga moved to quash the
complaint for multiple physical injuries through reckless imprudence
filed against him by the injured passengers, contending that the case
was just a duplication of the one filed by the Chief of Police wherein
he had just been acquitted. The motion to quash was denied and after
trial Jose Belga was convicted, whereupon he appealed to the Court of
First Instance of Albay. In the meantime, the case for damage to
property through reckless imprudence filed by one of the owners of
the vehicles involved in the collision had been remanded to the Court
of First Instance of Albay after Jose Belga had waived the second stage
of the preliminary investigation. After such remand, the Provincial
Fiscal filed in the Court of First Instance two informations against Jose
Belga, one for physical injuries through reckless imprudence, and
another for damage to property through reckless imprudence. Both
cases were dismissed by the Court of First Instance, upon motion of
the defendant Jose Belga who alleged double jeopardy in a motion to
quash. On appeal by the Prov. Fiscal, the order of dismissal was
affirmed by the Supreme Court in the following language: .

The question for determination is whether the acquittal of Jose Belga

in the case filed by the chief of police constitutes a bar to his
subsequent prosecution for multiple physical injuries and damage to
property through reckless imprudence.
In the case of Peo[ple] v. F. Diaz, G. R. No. L-6518, prom. March 30,
1954, the accused was charged in the municipal court of Pasay City
with reckless driving under sec. 52 of the Revised Motor Vehicle Law,
for having driven an automobile in a ῾fast and reckless manner ...
thereby causing an accident.’ After the accused had pleaded not guilty
the case was dismissed in that court ῾for failure of the Government to
prosecute’. But some time thereafter the city attorney filed an
information in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, charging the same
accused with damage to property thru reckless imprudence. The
amount of the damage was alleged to be ₱249.50. Pleading double
jeopardy, the accused filed a motion, and on appeal by the
Government we affirmed the ruling. Among other things we there said
through Mr. Justice Montemayor —

The next question to determine is the relation between the first

offense of violation of the Motor Vehicle Law prosecuted before the
Pasay City Municipal Court and the offense of damage to property
thru reckless imprudence charged in the Rizal Court of First Instance.
One of the tests of double jeopardy is whether or not the second
offense charged necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the
offense charged in the former complaint or information (Rule 113, Sec.
9). Another test is whether the evidence which proves one would
prove the other that is to say whether the facts alleged in the first
charge if proven, would have been sufficient to support the second
charge and vice versa; or whether one crime is an ingredient of the
other. x x x

xxxx
The foregoing language of the Supreme Court also disposes of the
contention of the prosecuting attorney that the charge for slight
physical injuries through reckless imprudence could not have been
joined with the charge for homicide with serious physical injuries
through reckless imprudence in this case, in view of the provisions of
Art. 48 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. The prosecution’s
contention might be true. But neither was the prosecution obliged to
first prosecute the accused for slight physical injuries through reckless
imprudence before pressing the more serious charge of homicide with
serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence. Having first
prosecuted the defendant for the lesser offense in the Justice of the
Peace Court of Meycauayan, Bulacan, which acquitted the defendant,
the prosecuting attorney is not now in a position to press in this case
the more serious charge of homicide with serious physical injuries
through reckless imprudence which arose out of the same alleged
reckless imprudence of which the defendant have been previously
cleared by the inferior court.43

Significantly, the Solicitor General had urged us in Silva to reexamine

Belga (and hence, Diaz) "for the purpose of delimiting or clarifying its
application."44 We declined the invitation, thus:

The State in its appeal claims that the lower court erred in dismissing
the case, on the ground of double jeopardy, upon the basis of the
acquittal of the accused in the JP court for Slight Physical Injuries, thru
Reckless Imprudence. In the same breath said State, thru the Solicitor
General, admits that the facts of the case at bar, fall squarely on the
ruling of the Belga case x x x, upon which the order of dismissal of the
lower court was anchored. The Solicitor General, however, urges a re-
examination of said ruling, upon certain considerations for the
purpose of delimiting or clarifying its application. We find,
nevertheless, that further elucidation or disquisition on the ruling in
the Belga case, the facts of which are analogous or similar to those in
the present case, will yield no practical advantage to the government.
On one hand, there is nothing which would warrant a delimitation or
clarification of the applicability of the Belga case. It was clear. On the
other, this Court has reiterated the views expressed in the Belga case,
in the identical case of Yap v. Hon. Lutero, etc., L-12669, April 30,
1959.45 (Emphasis supplied)

Article 48 Does not Apply to Acts Penalized

Under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code

The confusion bedeviling the question posed in this petition, to which

the MeTC succumbed, stems from persistent but awkward attempts to
harmonize conceptually incompatible substantive and procedural
rules in criminal law, namely, Article 365 defining and penalizing quasi-
offenses and Article 48 on complexing of crimes, both under the
Revised Penal Code. Article 48 is a procedural device allowing single
prosecution of multiple felonies falling under either of two categories:
(1) when a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave
felonies (thus excluding from its operation light felonies46); and (2)
when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other. The
legislature crafted this procedural tool to benefit the accused who, in
lieu of serving multiple penalties, will only serve the maximum of the
penalty for the most serious crime.

In contrast, Article 365 is a substantive rule penalizing not an act

defined as a felony but "the mental attitude x x x behind the act, the
dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight x x x,"47 a single
mental attitude regardless of the resulting consequences. Thus, Article
365 was crafted as one quasi-crime resulting in one or more
consequences.
Ordinarily, these two provisions will operate smoothly. Article 48
works to combine in a single prosecution multiple intentional crimes
falling under Titles 1-13, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, when
proper; Article 365 governs the prosecution of imprudent acts and
their consequences. However, the complexities of human interaction
can produce a hybrid quasi-offense not falling under either models –
that of a single criminal negligence resulting in multiple non-crime
damages to persons and property with varying penalties
corresponding to light, less grave or grave offenses. The ensuing
prosecutorial dilemma is obvious: how should such a quasi-crime be
prosecuted? Should Article 48’s framework apply to "complex" the
single quasi-offense with its multiple (non-criminal) consequences
(excluding those amounting to light offenses which will be tried
separately)? Or should the prosecution proceed under a single charge,
collectively alleging all the consequences of the single quasi-crime, to
be penalized separately following the scheme of penalties under
Article 365?

Jurisprudence adopts both approaches. Thus, one line of rulings (none

of which involved the issue of double jeopardy) applied Article 48 by
"complexing" one quasi-crime with its multiple consequences48
unless one consequence amounts to a light felony, in which case
charges were split by grouping, on the one hand, resulting acts
amounting to grave or less grave felonies and filing the charge with
the second level courts and, on the other hand, resulting acts
amounting to light felonies and filing the charge with the first level
courts.49 Expectedly, this is the approach the MeTC impliedly
sanctioned (and respondent Ponce invokes), even though under
Republic Act No. 7691,50 the MeTC has now exclusive original
jurisdiction to impose the most serious penalty under Article 365
which is prision correccional in its medium period.
Under this approach, the issue of double jeopardy will not arise if the
"complexing" of acts penalized under Article 365 involves only
resulting acts penalized as grave or less grave felonies because there
will be a single prosecution of all the resulting acts. The issue of
double jeopardy arises if one of the resulting acts is penalized as a
light offense and the other acts are penalized as grave or less grave
offenses, in which case Article 48 is not deemed to apply and the act
penalized as a light offense is tried separately from the resulting acts
penalized as grave or less grave offenses.

The second jurisprudential path nixes Article 48 and sanctions a single

prosecution of all the effects of the quasi-crime collectively alleged in
one charge, regardless of their number or severity,51 penalizing each
consequence separately. Thus, in Angeles v. Jose,52 we interpreted
paragraph three of Article 365, in relation to a charge alleging
"reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property and less serious
physical injuries," as follows:

[T]he third paragraph of said article, x x x reads as follows:

When the execution of the act covered by this article shall have only
resulted in damage to the property of another, the offender shall be
punished by a fine ranging from an amount equal to the value of said
damage to three times such value, but which shall in no case be less
than 25 pesos.

The above-quoted provision simply means that if there is only damage

to property the amount fixed therein shall be imposed, but if there are
also physical injuries there should be an additional penalty for the
latter. The information cannot be split into two; one for the physical
injuries, and another for the damage to property, x x x.53 (Emphasis
supplied)

By "additional penalty," the Court meant, logically, the penalty scheme

under Article 365.

Evidently, these approaches, while parallel, are irreconcilable.

Coherence in this field demands choosing one framework over the
other. Either (1) we allow the "complexing" of a single quasi-crime by
breaking its resulting acts into separate offenses (except for light
felonies), thus re-conceptualize a quasi-crime, abandon its present
framing under Article 365, discard its conception under the Quizon
and Diaz lines of cases, and treat the multiple consequences of a
quasi-crime as separate intentional felonies defined under Titles 1-13,
Book II under the penal code; or (2) we forbid the application of Article
48 in the prosecution and sentencing of quasi-crimes, require single
prosecution of all the resulting acts regardless of their number and
severity, separately penalize each as provided in Article 365, and thus
maintain the distinct concept of quasi-crimes as crafted under Article
365, articulated in Quizon and applied to double jeopardy adjudication
in the Diaz line of cases.1avvphi1

A becoming regard of this Court’s place in our scheme of government

denying it the power to make laws constrains us to keep inviolate the
conceptual distinction between quasi-crimes and intentional felonies
under our penal code. Article 48 is incongruent to the notion of quasi-
crimes under Article 365. It is conceptually impossible for a quasi-
offense to stand for (1) a single act constituting two or more grave or
less grave felonies; or (2) an offense which is a necessary means for
committing another. This is why, way back in 1968 in Buan, we
rejected the Solicitor General’s argument that double jeopardy does
not bar a second prosecution for slight physical injuries through
reckless imprudence allegedly because the charge for that offense
could not be joined with the other charge for serious physical injuries
through reckless imprudence following Article 48 of the Revised Penal
Code:

The Solicitor General stresses in his brief that the charge for slight
physical injuries through reckless imprudence could not be joined with
the accusation for serious physical injuries through reckless
imprudence, because Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code allows only
the complexing of grave or less grave felonies. This same argument
was considered and rejected by this Court in the case of People vs.
[Silva] x x x:

[T]he prosecution’s contention might be true. But neither was the

prosecution obliged to first prosecute the accused for slight physical
injuries through reckless imprudence before pressing the more serious
charge of homicide with serious physical injuries through reckless
imprudence. Having first prosecuted the defendant for the lesser
offense in the Justice of the Peace Court of Meycauayan, Bulacan,
which acquitted the defendant, the prosecuting attorney is not now in
a position to press in this case the more serious charge of homicide
with serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence which
arose out of the same alleged reckless imprudence of which the
defendant has been previously cleared by the inferior court.

[W]e must perforce rule that the exoneration of this appellant x x x by

the Justice of the Peace x x x of the charge of slight physical injuries
through reckless imprudence, prevents his being prosecuted for
serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence in the Court of
First Instance of the province, where both charges are derived from
the consequences of one and the same vehicular accident, because
the second accusation places the appellant in second jeopardy for the
same offense.54 (Emphasis supplied)

Indeed, this is a constitutionally compelled choice. By prohibiting the

splitting of charges under Article 365, irrespective of the number and
severity of the resulting acts, rampant occasions of constitutionally
impermissible second prosecutions are avoided, not to mention that
scarce state resources are conserved and diverted to proper use.

Hence, we hold that prosecutions under Article 365 should proceed

from a single charge regardless of the number or severity of the
consequences. In imposing penalties, the judge will do no more than
apply the penalties under Article 365 for each consequence alleged
and proven. In short, there shall be no splitting of charges under
Article 365, and only one information shall be filed in the same first
level court.55

Our ruling today secures for the accused facing an Article 365 charge a
stronger and simpler protection of their constitutional right under the
Double Jeopardy Clause. True, they are thereby denied the beneficent
effect of the favorable sentencing formula under Article 48, but any
disadvantage thus caused is more than compensated by the certainty
of non-prosecution for quasi-crime effects qualifying as "light
offenses" (or, as here, for the more serious consequence prosecuted
belatedly). If it is so minded, Congress can re-craft Article 365 by
extending to quasi-crimes the sentencing formula of Article 48 so that
only the most severe penalty shall be imposed under a single
prosecution of all resulting acts, whether penalized as grave, less grave
or light offenses. This will still keep intact the distinct concept of quasi-
offenses. Meanwhile, the lenient schedule of penalties under Article
365, befitting crimes occupying a lower rung of culpability, should
cushion the effect of this ruling.

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We REVERSE the Orders dated 2

February 2006 and 2 May 2006 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig
City, Branch 157. We DISMISS the Information in Criminal Case No.
82366 against petitioner Jason Ivler y Aguilar pending with the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 71 on the ground of
double jeopardy.

Let a copy of this ruling be served on the President of the Senate and
the Speaker of the House of Representatives.

SO ORDERED.
SULPICIO INTOD, petitioner,

vs.

HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

respondents.

CAMPOS, JR., J.:

Petitioner, Sulpicio Intod, filed this petition for review of the decision
of the Court of Appeals 1 affirming in toto the judgment of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch XIV, Oroquieta City, finding him guilty of
the crime of attempted murder.

From the records, we gathered the following facts.

In the morning of February 4, 1979, Sulpicio Intod, Jorge Pangasian,

Santos Tubio and Avelino Daligdig went to Salvador Mandaya's house
in Katugasan, Lopez Jaena, Misamis Occidental and asked him to go
with them to the house of Bernardina Palangpangan. Thereafter,
Mandaya and Intod, Pangasian, Tubio and Daligdig had a meeting with
Aniceto Dumalagan. He told Mandaya that he wanted Palangpangan
to be killed because of a land dispute between them and that
Mandaya should accompany the four (4) men, otherwise, he would
also be killed.
At about 10:00 o'clock in the evening of the same day, Petitioner,
Mandaya, Pangasian, Tubio and Daligdig, all armed with firearms,
arrived at Palangpangan's house in Katugasan, Lopez Jaena, Misamis
Occidental. At the instance of his companions, Mandaya pointed the
location of Palangpangan's bedroom. Thereafter, Petitioner,
Pangasian, Tubio and Daligdig fired at said room. It turned out,
however, that Palangpangan was in another City and her home was
then occupied by her son-in-law and his family. No one was in the
room when the accused fired the shots. No one was hit by the gun
fire.

Petitioner and his companions were positively identified by witnesses.

One witness testified that before the five men left the premises, they
shouted: "We will kill you (the witness) and especially Bernardina
Palangpangan and we will come back if (sic) you were not injured". 2

After trial, the Regional Trial Court convicted Intod of attempted

murder. The court (RTC), as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, holding
that Petitioner was guilty of attempted murder. Petitioner seeks from
this Court a modification of the judgment by holding him liable only
for an impossible crime, citing Article 4(2) of the Revised Penal Code
which provides:

Art. 4(2). CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY. — Criminal

Responsibility shall be incurred:

xxx xxx xxx

2. By any person performing an act which would be an offense
against persons or property, were it not for the inherent impossibility
of its accomplishment or on account of the employment of inadequate
or ineffectual means.

Petitioner contends that, Palangpangan's absence from her room on

the night he and his companions riddled it with bullets made the crime
inherently impossible.

On the other hand, Respondent People of the Philippines argues that

the crime was not impossible. Instead, the facts were sufficient to
constitute an attempt and to convict Intod for attempted murder.
Respondent alleged that there was intent. Further, in its Comment to
the Petition, respondent pointed out that:

. . . The crime of murder was not consummated, not because of the

inherent impossibility of its accomplishment (Art. 4(2), Revised Penal
Code), but due to a cause or accident other than petitioner's and his
accused's own spontaneous desistance (Art. 3., Ibid.) Palangpangan
did not sleep at her house at that time. Had it not been for this fact,
the crime is possible, not impossible. 3

Article 4, paragraph 2 is an innovation 4 of the Revised Penal Code.

This seeks to remedy the void in the Old Penal Code where:

. . . it was necessary that the execution of the act has been

commenced, that the person conceiving the idea should have set
about doing the deed, employing appropriate means in order that his
intent might become a reality, and finally, that the result or end
contemplated shall have been physically possible. So long as these
conditions were not present, the law and the courts did not hold him
criminally liable. 5

This legal doctrine left social interests entirely unprotected. 6 The

Revised Penal Code, inspired by the Positivist School, recognizes in the
offender his formidability, 7 and now penalizes an act which were it
not aimed at something quite impossible or carried out with means
which prove inadequate, would constitute a felony against person or
against property. 8 The rationale of Article 4(2) is to punish such
criminal tendencies. 9

Under this article, the act performed by the offender cannot produce
an offense against person or property because: (1) the commission of
the offense is inherently impossible of accomplishment: or (2) the
means employed is either (a) inadequate or (b) ineffectual. 10

That the offense cannot be produced because the commission of the

offense is inherently impossible of accomplishment is the focus of this
petition. To be impossible under this clause, the act intended by the
offender must be by its nature one impossible of accomplishment. 11
There must be either impossibility of accomplishing the intended act
12 in order to qualify the act an impossible crime.

Legal impossibility occurs where the intended acts, even if completed,

would not amount to a crime. 13 Thus:
Legal impossibility would apply to those circumstances where (1) the
motive, desire and expectation is to perform an act in violation of the
law; (2) there is intention to perform the physical act; (3) there is a
performance of the intended physical act; and (4) the consequence
resulting from the intended act does not amount to a crime. 14

The impossibility of killing a person already dead 15 falls in this

category.

On the other hand, factual impossibility occurs when extraneous

circumstances unknown to the actor or beyond his control prevent the
consummation of the intended crime. 16 One example is the man who
puts his hand in the coat pocket of another with the intention to steal
the latter's wallet and finds the pocket empty. 17

The case at bar belongs to this category. Petitioner shoots the place
where he thought his victim would be, although in reality, the victim
was not present in said place and thus, the petitioner failed to
accomplish his end.

One American case had facts almost exactly the same as this one. In
People vs. Lee Kong, 18 the accused, with intent to kill, aimed and
fired at the spot where he thought the police officer would be. It
turned out, however, that the latter was in a different place. The
accused failed to hit him and to achieve his intent. The Court
convicted the accused of an attempt to kill. It held that:
The fact that the officer was not at the spot where the attacking party
imagined where he was, and where the bullet pierced the roof,
renders it no less an attempt to kill. It is well settled principle of
criminal law in this country that where the criminal result of an
attempt is not accomplished simply because of an obstruction in the
way of the thing to be operated upon, and these facts are unknown to
the aggressor at the time, the criminal attempt is committed.

In the case of Strokes vs. State, 19 where the accused failed to

accomplish his intent to kill the victim because the latter did not pass
by the place where he was lying-in wait, the court held him liable for
attempted murder. The court explained that:

It was no fault of Strokes that the crime was not committed. . . . It only
became impossible by reason of the extraneous circumstance that
Lane did not go that way; and further, that he was arrested and
prevented from committing the murder. This rule of the law has
application only where it is inherently impossible to commit the crime.
It has no application to a case where it becomes impossible for the
crime to be committed, either by outside interference or because of
miscalculation as to a supposed opportunity to commit the crime
which fails to materialize; in short it has no application to the case
when the impossibility grows out of extraneous acts not within the
control of the party.

In the case of Clark vs. State, 20 the court held defendant liable for
attempted robbery even if there was nothing to rob. In disposing of
the case, the court quoted Mr. Justice Bishop, to wit:
It being an accepted truth that defendant deserves punishment by
reason of his criminal intent, no one can seriously doubt that the
protection of the public requires the punishment to be administered,
equally whether in the unseen depths of the pocket, etc., what was
supposed to exist was really present or not. The community suffers
from the mere alarm of crime. Again: Where the thing intended
(attempted) as a crime and what is done is a sort to create alarm, in
other words, excite apprehension that the evil; intention will be
carried out, the incipient act which the law of attempt takes
cognizance of is in reason committed.

In State vs. Mitchell, 21 defendant, with intent to kill, fired at the

window of victim's room thinking that the latter was inside. However,
at that moment, the victim was in another part of the house. The
court convicted the accused of attempted murder.

The aforecited cases are the same cases which have been relied upon
by Respondent to make this Court sustain the judgment of attempted
murder against Petitioner. However, we cannot rely upon these
decisions to resolve the issue at hand. There is a difference between
the Philippine and the American laws regarding the concept and
appreciation of impossible crimes.

In the Philippines, the Revised Penal Code, in Article 4(2), expressly

provided for impossible crimes and made the punishable. Whereas, in
the United States, the Code of Crimes and Criminal Procedure is silent
regarding this matter. What it provided for were attempts of the
crimes enumerated in the said Code. Furthermore, in said jurisdiction,
the impossibility of committing the offense is merely a defense to an
attempt charge. In this regard, commentators and the cases generally
divide the impossibility defense into two categories: legal versus
factual impossibility. 22 In U.S. vs. Wilson 23 the Court held that:

. . . factual impossibility of the commission of the crime is not a

defense. If the crime could have been committed had the
circumstances been as the defendant believed them to be, it is no
defense that in reality the crime was impossible of commission.

Legal impossibility, on the other hand, is a defense which can be

invoked to avoid criminal liability for an attempt. In U.S. vs. Berrigan,
24 the accused was indicated for attempting to smuggle letters into
and out of prison. The law governing the matter made the act criminal
if done without knowledge and consent of the warden. In this case,
the offender intended to send a letter without the latter's knowledge
and consent and the act was performed. However, unknown to him,
the transmittal was achieved with the warden's knowledge and
consent. The lower court held the accused liable for attempt but the
appellate court reversed. It held unacceptable the contention of the
state that "elimination of impossibility as a defense to a charge of
criminal attempt, as suggested by the Model Penal Code and the
proposed federal legislation, is consistent with the overwhelming
modern view". In disposing of this contention, the Court held that the
federal statutes did not contain such provision, and thus, following the
principle of legality, no person could be criminally liable for an act
which was not made criminal by law. Further, it said:

Congress has not yet enacted a law that provides that intent plus act
plus conduct constitutes the offense of attempt irrespective of legal
impossibility until such time as such legislative changes in the law take
place, this court will not fashion a new non-statutory law of criminal
attempt.
To restate, in the United States, where the offense sought to be
committed is factually impossible or accomplishment, the offender
cannot escape criminal liability. He can be convicted of an attempt to
commit the substantive crime where the elements of attempt are
satisfied. It appears, therefore, that the act is penalized, not as an
impossible crime, but as an attempt to commit a crime. On the other
hand, where the offense is legally impossible of accomplishment, the
actor cannot be held liable for any crime — neither for an attempt not
for an impossible crime. The only reason for this is that in American
law, there is no such thing as an impossible crime. Instead, it only
recognizes impossibility as a defense to a crime charge — that is,
attempt.

This is not true in the Philippines. In our jurisdiction, impossible crimes

are recognized. The impossibility of accomplishing the criminal intent
is not merely a defense, but an act penalized by itself. Furthermore,
the phrase "inherent impossibility" that is found in Article 4(2) of the
Revised Penal Code makes no distinction between factual or physical
impossibility and legal impossibility. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos
distinguere debemos.

The factual situation in the case at bar present a physical impossibility

which rendered the intended crime impossible of accomplishment.
And under Article 4, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code, such is
sufficient to make the act an impossible crime.

To uphold the contention of respondent that the offense was

Attempted Murder because the absence of Palangpangan was a
supervening cause independent of the actor's will, will render useless
the provision in Article 4, which makes a person criminally liable for an
act "which would be an offense against persons or property, were it
not for the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment . . ." In that
case all circumstances which prevented the consummation of the
offense will be treated as an accident independent of the actor's will
which is an element of attempted and frustrated felonies.

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED. the petition is hereby

GRANTED, the decision of respondent Court of Appeals holding
Petitioner guilty of Attempted Murder is hereby MODIFIED. We
hereby hold Petitioner guilty of an impossible crime as defined and
penalized in Articles 4, paragraph 2, and 59 of the Revised Penal Code,
respectively. Having in mind the social danger and degree of
criminality shown by Petitioner, this Court sentences him to suffer the
penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor, together with the
accessory penalties provided by the law, and to pay the costs.

SO ORDERED.
ESMERALDO RIVERA, ISMAEL RIVERA, EDGARDO RIVERA, Petitioners,

vs.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

This is a petition for review of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals

(CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 27215 affirming, with modification, the
Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cavite, Branch 90, in
Criminal Case No. 6962-99, entitled People of the Philippines. v.
Esmeraldo Rivera, et al.

On April 12, 1999, an Information was filed in the RTC of Imus, Cavite,
charging Esmeraldo, Ismael and Edgardo, all surnamed Rivera, of
attempted murder. The accusatory portion of the Information reads:

That on or about the 3rd day of May 1998, in the Municipality of

Dasmariñas, Province of Cavite, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping one another, with intent to kill,
with treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there, wilfully,
unlawfully, and feloniously attack, assault and hit with a piece of
hollow block, one RUBEN RODIL who thereby sustained a non-mortal
injury on his head and on the different parts of his body, the accused
thus commenced the commission of the felony directly by overt acts,
but failed to perform all the acts of execution which would produce
the crime of Murder by reason of some causes other than their own
spontaneous desistance, that is, the said Ruben Rodil was able to ran
(sic) away and the timely response of the policemen, to his damage
and prejudice.

CONTRARY TO LAW.3

Ruben Rodil testified that he used to work as a taxi driver. He stopped

driving in April 1998 after a would-be rapist threatened his life. He was
even given a citation as a Bayaning Pilipino by the television network
ABS-CBN for saving the would-be victim. His wife eked out a living as a
manicurist. They and their three children resided in Barangay San
Isidro Labrador II, Dasmariñas, Cavite, near the house of Esmeraldo
Rivera and his brothers Ismael and Edgardo.

At noon of May 2, 1998, Ruben went to a nearby store to buy food.

Edgardo mocked him for being jobless and dependent on his wife for
support. Ruben resented the rebuke and hurled invectives at Edgardo.
A heated exchange of words ensued.

At about 7:30 p.m. the next day, a Sunday, Ruben went to the store to
buy food and to look for his wife. His three-year-old daughter was with
him. Momentarily, Esmeraldo and his two brothers, Ismael and
Edgardo, emerged from their house and ganged up on Ruben.
Esmeraldo and Ismael mauled Ruben with fist blows and he fell to the
ground. In that helpless position, Edgardo hit Ruben three times with a
hollow block on the parietal area. Esmeraldo and Ismael continued
mauling Ruben. People who saw the incident shouted: "Awatin sila!
Awatin sila!" Ruben felt dizzy but managed to stand up. Ismael threw a
stone at him, hitting him at the back. When policemen on board a
mobile car arrived, Esmeraldo, Ismael and Edgardo fled to their house.

Ruben was brought to the hospital. His attending physician, Dr.

Lamberto Cagingin, Jr., signed a medical certificate in which he
declared that Ruben sustained lacerated wounds on the parietal area,
cerebral concussion or contusion, hematoma on the left upper
buttocks, multiple abrasions on the left shoulder and hematoma
periorbital left.4 The doctor declared that the lacerated wound in the
parietal area was slight and superficial and would heal from one to
seven days.5 The doctor prescribed medicine for Ruben’s back pain,
which he had to take for one month.6

Esmeraldo testified that at around 1:00 p.m. on May 3, 1998, Ruben

arrived at his house and banged the gate. Ruben challenged him and
his brothers to come out and fight. When he went out of the house
and talked to Ruben, the latter punched him. They wrestled with each
other. He fell to the ground. Edgardo arrived and pushed Ruben aside.
His wife arrived, and he was pulled away and brought to their house.

For his part, Ismael testified that he tried to pacify Ruben and his
brother Esmeraldo, but Ruben grabbed him by the hair. He managed
to free himself from Ruben and the latter fled. He went home
afterwards. He did not see his brother Edgardo at the scene.

Edgardo declared that at about 1:00 p.m. on May 3, 1998, he was

throwing garbage in front of their house. Ruben arrived and he went
inside the house to avoid a confrontation. Ruben banged the gate and
ordered him to get out of their house and even threatened to shoot
him. His brother Esmeraldo went out of their house and asked Ruben
what the problem was. A fist fight ensued. Edgardo rushed out of the
house and pushed Ruben aside. Ruben fell to the ground. When he
stood up, he pulled at Edgardo’s shirt and hair, and, in the process,
Ruben’s head hit the lamp post.7

On August 30, 2002, the trial court rendered judgment finding all the
accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of frustrated murder. The
dispositive portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, all the accused are found GUILTY

beyond reasonable doubt and are sentenced to an imprisonment of
six (6) years and one (1) day to eight (8) years of prision mayor as the
prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt the culpability of
the accused. Likewise, the accused are to pay, jointly and severally,
civil indemnity to the private complainant in the amount of
P30,000.00.

SO ORDERED.8

The trial court gave no credence to the collective testimonies of the

accused and their witnesses. The accused appealed to the CA, which
rendered judgment on June 8, 2004 affirming, with modification, the
appealed decision. The dispositive portion of the CA decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Imus, Cavite,

Branch 90, is MODIFIED in that the appellants are convicted of
ATTEMPTED MURDER and sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of 2
years of prision correccional as minimum to 6 years and 1 day of
prision mayor as maximum. In all other respects, the decision
appealed from is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.9

The accused, now petitioners, filed the instant petition for review on
certiorari, alleging that the CA erred in affirming the RTC decision.
They insist that the prosecution failed to prove that they had the
intention to kill Ruben when they mauled and hit him with a hollow
block. Petitioners aver that, based on the testimony of Dr. Cagingin,
Ruben sustained only a superficial wound in the parietal area; hence,
they should be held criminally liable for physical injuries only. Even if
petitioners had the intent to kill Ruben, the prosecution failed to
prove treachery; hence, they should be held guilty only of attempted
homicide.

On the other hand, the CA held that the prosecution was able to prove
petitioners’ intent to kill Ruben:

On the first assigned error, intent to kill may be deduced from the
nature of the wound inflicted and the kind of weapon used. Intent to
kill was established by victim Ruben Rodil in his testimony as follows:

Q: And while you were being boxed by Esmeraldo and Bong, what
happened next?
A: When I was already lying [down] xxx, Dagol Rivera showed up with
a piece of hollow block xxx and hit me thrice on the head, Sir.

Q: And what about the two (2), what were they doing when you were
hit with a hollow block by Dagol?

A: I was already lying on the ground and they kept on boxing me while
Dagol was hitting, Sir.

As earlier stated by Dr. Cagingin, appellants could have killed the

victim had the hollow block directly hit his head, and had the police
not promptly intervened so that the brothers scampered away. When
a wound is not sufficient to cause death, but intent to kill is evident,
the crime is attempted. Intent to kill was shown by the fact that the (3)
brothers helped each other maul the defenseless victim, and even
after he had already fallen to the ground; that one of them even
picked up a cement hollow block and proceeded to hit the victim on
the head with it three times; and that it was only the arrival of the
policemen that made the appellants desist from their concerted act of
trying to kill Ruben Rodil.10

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), for its part, asserts that the
decision of the CA is correct, thus:

The evidence and testimonies of the prosecution witnesses defeat the

presumption of innocence raised by petitioners. The crime has been
clearly established with petitioners as the perpetrators. Their intent to
kill is very evident and was established beyond reasonable doubt.
Eyewitnesses to the crime, Alicia Vera Cruz and Lucita Villejo clearly
and categorically declared that the victim Ruben Rodil was walking
along St. Peter Avenue when he was suddenly boxed by Esmeraldo
"Baby" Rivera. They further narrated that, soon thereafter, his two
brothers Ismael and Edgardo "Dagul" Rivera, coming from St. Peter II,
ganged up on the victim. Both Alicia Vera Cruz and Lucita Villejo
recounted that they saw Edgardo "Dagul" Rivera pick up a hollow
block and hit Ruben Rodil with it three (3) times. A careful review of
their testimonies revealed the suddenness and unexpectedness of the
attack of petitioners. In this case, the victim did not even have the
slightest warning of the danger that lay ahead as he was carrying his
three-year old daughter. He was caught off-guard by the assault of
Esmeraldo "Baby" Rivera and the simultaneous attack of the two other
petitioners. It was also established that the victim was hit by Edgardo
"Dagul" Rivera, while he was lying on the ground and being mauled by
the other petitioners. Petitioners could have killed the victim had he
not managed to escape and had the police not promptly intervened.

Petitioners also draw attention to the fact that the injury sustained by
the victim was superficial and, thus, not life threatening. The nature of
the injury does not negate the intent to kill. The Court of Appeals held:

As earlier stated by Dr. Cagingin, appellants could have killed the

victim had the hollow block directly hit his head, and had the police
not promptly intervened so that the brothers scampered away. When
a wound is not sufficient to cause death, but intent to kill is evident,
the crime is attempted. Intent to kill was shown by the fact that the
three (3) brothers helped each other maul the defenseless victim, and
even after he had already fallen to the ground; that one of them
picked up a cement hollow block and proceeded to hit the victim on
the head with it three times; and that it was only the arrival of the
policemen that made the appellants desist from their concerted act of
trying to kill Ruben Rodil.11

The petition is denied for lack of merit.

An essential element of murder and homicide, whether in their

consummated, frustrated or attempted stage, is intent of the
offenders to kill the victim immediately before or simultaneously with
the infliction of injuries. Intent to kill is a specific intent which the
prosecution must prove by direct or circumstantial evidence, while
general criminal intent is presumed from the commission of a felony
by dolo.

In People v. Delim,12 the Court declared that evidence to prove intent

to kill in crimes against persons may consist, inter alia, in the means
used by the malefactors, the nature, location and number of wounds
sustained by the victim, the conduct of the malefactors before, at the
time, or immediately after the killing of the victim, the circumstances
under which the crime was committed and the motives of the
accused. If the victim dies as a result of a deliberate act of the
malefactors, intent to kill is presumed.

In the present case, the prosecution mustered the requisite quantum

of evidence to prove the intent of petitioners to kill Ruben. Esmeraldo
and Ismael pummeled the victim with fist blows. Even as Ruben fell to
the ground, unable to defend himself against the sudden and
sustained assault of petitioners, Edgardo hit him three times with a
hollow block. Edgardo tried to hit Ruben on the head, missed, but still
managed to hit the victim only in the parietal area, resulting in a
lacerated wound and cerebral contusions.
That the head wounds sustained by the victim were merely superficial
and could not have produced his death does not negate petitioners’
criminal liability for attempted murder. Even if Edgardo did not hit the
victim squarely on the head, petitioners are still criminally liable for
attempted murder.

The last paragraph of Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code defines an

attempt to commit a felony, thus:

There is an attempt when the offender commences the commission of

a felony directly by overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of
execution which should produce the felony by reason of some cause
or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance.

The essential elements of an attempted felony are as follows:

1. The offender commences the commission of the felony directly by

overt acts;

2. He does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce
the felony;

3. The offender’s act be not stopped by his own spontaneous

desistance;
4. The non-performance of all acts of execution was due to cause or
accident other than his spontaneous desistance.13

The first requisite of an attempted felony consists of two elements,

namely:

(1) That there be external acts;

(2) Such external acts have direct connection with the crime intended
to be committed.14

The Court in People v. Lizada15 elaborated on the concept of an overt

or external act, thus:

An overt or external act is defined as some physical activity or deed,

indicating the intention to commit a particular crime, more than a
mere planning or preparation, which if carried out to its complete
termination following its natural course, without being frustrated by
external obstacles nor by the spontaneous desistance of the
perpetrator, will logically and necessarily ripen into a concrete
offense. The raison d’etre for the law requiring a direct overt act is
that, in a majority of cases, the conduct of the accused consisting
merely of acts of preparation has never ceased to be equivocal; and
this is necessarily so, irrespective of his declared intent. It is that
quality of being equivocal that must be lacking before the act becomes
one which may be said to be a commencement of the commission of
the crime, or an overt act or before any fragment of the crime itself
has been committed, and this is so for the reason that so long as the
equivocal quality remains, no one can say with certainty what the
intent of the accused is. It is necessary that the overt act should have
been the ultimate step towards the consummation of the design. It is
sufficient if it was the "first or some subsequent step in a direct
movement towards the commission of the offense after the
preparations are made." The act done need not constitute the last
proximate one for completion. It is necessary, however, that the
attempt must have a causal relation to the intended crime. In the
words of Viada, the overt acts must have an immediate and necessary
relation to the offense.16

In the case at bar, petitioners, who acted in concert, commenced the

felony of murder by mauling the victim and hitting him three times
with a hollow block; they narrowly missed hitting the middle portion
of his head. If Edgardo had done so, Ruben would surely have died.

We reject petitioners’ contention that the prosecution failed to prove

treachery in the commission of the felony. Petitioners attacked the
victim in a sudden and unexpected manner as Ruben was walking with
his three-year-old daughter, impervious of the imminent peril to his
life. He had no chance to defend himself and retaliate. He was
overwhelmed by the synchronized assault of the three siblings. The
essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack on the
victim.17 Even if the attack is frontal but is sudden and unexpected,
giving no opportunity for the victim to repel it or defend himself, there
would be treachery.18 Obviously, petitioners assaulted the victim
because of the altercation between him and petitioner Edgardo Rivera
a day before. There being conspiracy by and among petitioners,
treachery is considered against all of them.19
The appellate court sentenced petitioners to suffer an indeterminate
penalty of two (2) years of prision correccional in its minimum period,
as minimum, to six years and one day of prision mayor in its maximum
period, as maximum. This is erroneous. Under Article 248 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, the
penalty for murder is reclusion perpetua to death. Since petitioners
are guilty only of attempted murder, the penalty should be reduced by
two degrees, conformably to Article 51 of the Revised Penal Code.
Under paragraph 2 of Article 61, in relation to Article 71 of the Revised
Penal Code, such a penalty is prision mayor. In the absence of any
modifying circumstance in the commission of the felony (other than
the qualifying circumstance of treachery), the maximum of the
indeterminate penalty shall be taken from the medium period of
prision mayor which has a range of from eight (8) years and one (1)
day to ten (10) years. To determine the minimum of the indeterminate
penalty, the penalty of prision mayor should be reduced by one
degree, prision correccional, which has a range of six (6) months and
one (1) day to six (6) years.

Hence, petitioners should be sentenced to suffer an indeterminate

penalty of from two (2) years of prision correccional in its minimum
period, as minimum, to nine (9) years and four (4) months of prision
mayor in its medium period, as maximum.

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED for lack of

merit. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED WITH THE
MODIFICATION that petitioners are sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of from two (2) years of prision correccional in
its minimum period, as minimum, to nine (9) years and four (4)
months of prision mayor in its medium period, as maximum. No costs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, DIRECTOR
GENERAL OF THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE, CHIEF STATE
PROSECUTOR JOVENCITO ZUO, STATE PROSECUTORS PETER L. ONG
and RUBEN A. ZACARIAS; 2ND ASSISTANT CITY PROSECUTOR
CONRADO M. JAMOLIN and CITY PROSECUTOR OF QUEZON CITY
CLARO ARELLANO, petitioners, vs. PANFILO M. LACSON, respondent.

RESOLUTION

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

Before the Court is the petitioners Motion for Reconsideration[1] of

the Resolution[2] dated May 28, 2002, remanding this case to the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 81, for the
determination of several factual issues relative to the application of
Section 8 of Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure on
the dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 filed
against the respondent and his co-accused with the said court. In the
aforesaid criminal cases, the respondent and his co-accused were
charged with multiple murder for the shooting and killing of eleven
male persons identified as Manuel Montero, a former Corporal of the
Philippine Army, Rolando Siplon, Sherwin Abalora, who was 16 years
old, Ray Abalora, who was 19 years old, Joel Amora, Jevy Redillas,
Meleubren Sorronda, who was 14 years old,[3] Pacifico Montero, Jr.,
of the 44th Infantry Batallion of the Philippine Army, Welbor Elcamel,
SPO1 Carlito Alap-ap of the Zamboanga PNP, and Alex Neri, former
Corporal of the 44th Infantry Batallion of the Philippine Army, bandied
as members of the Kuratong Baleleng Gang. The respondent opposed
petitioners motion for reconsideration.[4]

The Court ruled in the Resolution sought to be reconsidered that the

provisional dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689
were with the express consent of the respondent as he himself moved
for said provisional dismissal when he filed his motion for judicial
determination of probable cause and for examination of witnesses.
The Court also held therein that although Section 8, Rule 117 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure could be given retroactive effect,
there is still a need to determine whether the requirements for its
application are attendant. The trial court was thus directed to resolve
the following:

... (1) whether the provisional dismissal of the cases had the express
consent of the accused; (2) whether it was ordered by the court after
notice to the offended party; (3) whether the 2-year period to revive it
has already lapsed; (4) whether there is any justification for the filing
of the cases beyond the 2-year period; (5) whether notices to the
offended parties were given before the cases of respondent Lacson
were dismissed by then Judge Agnir; (6) whether there were affidavits
of desistance executed by the relatives of the three (3) other victims;
(7) whether the multiple murder cases against respondent Lacson are
being revived within or beyond the 2-year bar.

The Court further held that the reckoning date of the two-year bar had
to be first determined whether it shall be from the date of the order of
then Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissing the cases, or from the dates of receipt
thereof by the various offended parties, or from the date of effectivity
of the new rule. According to the Court, if the cases were revived only
after the two-year bar, the State must be given the opportunity to
justify its failure to comply with the said time-bar. It emphasized that
the new rule fixes a time-bar to penalize the State for its inexcusable
delay in prosecuting cases already filed in court. However, the State is
not precluded from presenting compelling reasons to justify the
revival of cases beyond the two-year bar.
In support of their Motion for Reconsideration, the petitioners
contend that (a) Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure is not applicable to Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-
99-81689; and (b) the time-bar in said rule should not be applied
retroactively.

The Court shall resolve the issues seriatim.

I. SECTION 8, RULE 117 OF THE REVISED RULES OF CRIMINAL

PROCEDURE IS NOT APPLICABLE TO CRIMINAL CASES NOS. Q-99-81679
TO Q-99-81689.

The petitioners aver that Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure is not applicable to Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-
81679 to Q-99-81689 because the essential requirements for its
application were not present when Judge Agnir, Jr., issued his
resolution of March 29, 1999. Disagreeing with the ruling of the Court,
the petitioners maintain that the respondent did not give his express
consent to the dismissal by Judge Agnir, Jr., of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-
99-81679 to Q-99-81689. The respondent allegedly admitted in his
pleadings filed with the Court of Appeals and during the hearing
thereat that he did not file any motion to dismiss said cases, or even
agree to a provisional dismissal thereof. Moreover, the heirs of the
victims were allegedly not given prior notices of the dismissal of the
said cases by Judge Agnir, Jr. According to the petitioners, the
respondents express consent to the provisional dismissal of the cases
and the notice to all the heirs of the victims of the respondents motion
and the hearing thereon are conditions sine qua non to the application
of the time-bar in the second paragraph of the new rule.

The petitioners further submit that it is not necessary that the case be
remanded to the RTC to determine whether private complainants
were notified of the March 22, 1999 hearing on the respondents
motion for judicial determination of the existence of probable cause.
The records allegedly indicate clearly that only the handling city
prosecutor was furnished a copy of the notice of hearing on said
motion. There is allegedly no evidence that private prosecutor Atty.
Godwin Valdez was properly retained and authorized by all the private
complainants to represent them at said hearing. It is their contention
that Atty. Valdez merely identified the purported affidavits of
desistance and that he did not confirm the truth of the allegations
therein.

The respondent, on the other hand, insists that, as found by the Court
in its Resolution and Judge Agnir, Jr. in his resolution, the respondent
himself moved for the provisional dismissal of the criminal cases. He
cites the resolution of Judge Agnir, Jr. stating that the respondent and
the other accused filed separate but identical motions for the
dismissal of the criminal cases should the trial court find no probable
cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest against them.

The respondent further asserts that the heirs of the victims, through
the public and private prosecutors, were duly notified of said motion
and the hearing thereof. He contends that it was sufficient that the
public prosecutor was present during the March 22, 1999 hearing on
the motion for judicial determination of the existence of probable
cause because criminal actions are always prosecuted in the name of
the People, and the private complainants merely prosecute the civil
aspect thereof.

The Court has reviewed the records and has found the contention of
the petitioners meritorious.
Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure reads:

Sec. 8. Provisional dismissal. A case shall not be provisionally dismissed

except with the express consent of the accused and with notice to the
offended party.

The provisional dismissal of offenses punishable by imprisonment not

exceeding six (6) years or a fine of any amount, or both, shall become
permanent one (1) year after issuance of the order without the case
having been revived. With respect to offenses punishable by
imprisonment of more than six (6) years, their provisional dismissal
shall become permanent two (2) years after issuance of the order
without the case having been revived.

Having invoked said rule before the petitioners-panel of prosecutors

and before the Court of Appeals, the respondent is burdened to
establish the essential requisites of the first paragraph thereof,
namely:

1. the prosecution with the express conformity of the accused or the

accused moves for a provisional (sin perjuicio) dismissal of the case; or
both the prosecution and the accused move for a provisional dismissal
of the case;

2. the offended party is notified of the motion for a provisional

dismissal of the case;
3. the court issues an order granting the motion and dismissing the
case provisionally;

4. the public prosecutor is served with a copy of the order of

provisional dismissal of the case.

The foregoing requirements are conditions sine qua non to the

application of the time-bar in the second paragraph of the new rule.
The raison d etre for the requirement of the express consent of the
accused to a provisional dismissal of a criminal case is to bar him from
subsequently asserting that the revival of the criminal case will place
him in double jeopardy for the same offense or for an offense
necessarily included therein.[5]

Although the second paragraph of the new rule states that the order
of dismissal shall become permanent one year after the issuance
thereof without the case having been revived, the provision should be
construed to mean that the order of dismissal shall become
permanent one year after service of the order of dismissal on the
public prosecutor who has control of the prosecution[6] without the
criminal case having been revived. The public prosecutor cannot be
expected to comply with the timeline unless he is served with a copy
of the order of dismissal.

Express consent to a provisional dismissal is given either viva voce or

in writing. It is a positive, direct, unequivocal consent requiring no
inference or implication to supply its meaning.[7] Where the accused
writes on the motion of a prosecutor for a provisional dismissal of the
case No objection or With my conformity, the writing amounts to
express consent of the accused to a provisional dismissal of the
case.[8] The mere inaction or silence of the accused to a motion for a
provisional dismissal of the case[9] or his failure to object to a
provisional dismissal[10] does not amount to express consent.

A motion of the accused for a provisional dismissal of a case is an

express consent to such provisional dismissal.[11] If a criminal case is
provisionally dismissed with the express consent of the accused, the
case may be revived only within the periods provided in the new rule.
On the other hand, if a criminal case is provisionally dismissed without
the express consent of the accused or over his objection, the new rule
would not apply. The case may be revived or refiled even beyond the
prescribed periods subject to the right of the accused to oppose the
same on the ground of double jeopardy[12] or that such revival or
refiling is barred by the statute of limitations.[13]

The case may be revived by the State within the time-bar either by the
refiling of the Information or by the filing of a new Information for the
same offense or an offense necessarily included therein. There would
be no need of a new preliminary investigation.[14] However, in a case
wherein after the provisional dismissal of a criminal case, the original
witnesses of the prosecution or some of them may have recanted
their testimonies or may have died or may no longer be available and
new witnesses for the State have emerged, a new preliminary
investigation[15] must be conducted before an Information is refiled
or a new Information is filed. A new preliminary investigation is also
required if aside from the original accused, other persons are charged
under a new criminal complaint for the same offense or necessarily
included therein; or if under a new criminal complaint, the original
charge has been upgraded; or if under a new criminal complaint, the
criminal liability of the accused is upgraded from that as an accessory
to that as a principal. The accused must be accorded the right to
submit counter-affidavits and evidence. After all, the fiscal is not called
by the Rules of Court to wait in ambush; the role of a fiscal is not
mainly to prosecute but essentially to do justice to every man and to
assist the court in dispensing that justice.[16]

In this case, the respondent has failed to prove that the first and
second requisites of the first paragraph of the new rule were present
when Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissed Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-
99-81689. Irrefragably, the prosecution did not file any motion for the
provisional dismissal of the said criminal cases. For his part, the
respondent merely filed a motion for judicial determination of
probable cause and for examination of prosecution witnesses alleging
that under Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution and the decision of
this Court in Allado v. Diokno,[17] among other cases, there was a
need for the trial court to conduct a personal determination of
probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest against
respondent and to have the prosecutions witnesses summoned before
the court for its examination. The respondent contended therein that
until after the trial court shall have personally determined the
presence of probable cause, no warrant of arrest should be issued
against the respondent and if one had already been issued, the
warrant should be recalled by the trial court. He then prayed therein
that:

1) a judicial determination of probable cause pursuant to Section 2,

Article III of the Constitution be conducted by this Honorable Court,
and for this purpose, an order be issued directing the prosecution to
present the private complainants and their witnesses at a hearing
scheduled therefor; and

2) warrants for the arrest of the accused-movants be withheld, or, if

issued, recalled in the meantime until the resolution of this incident.
Other equitable reliefs are also prayed for.[18]

The respondent did not pray for the dismissal, provisional or

otherwise, of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689. Neither
did he ever agree, impliedly or expressly, to a mere provisional
dismissal of the cases. In fact, in his reply filed with the Court of
Appeals, respondent emphasized that:

... An examination of the Motion for Judicial Determination of

Probable Cause and for Examination of Prosecution Witnesses filed by
the petitioner and his other co-accused in the said criminal cases
would show that the petitioner did not pray for the dismissal of the
case. On the contrary, the reliefs prayed for therein by the petitioner
are: (1) a judicial determination of probable cause pursuant to Section
2, Article III of the Constitution; and (2) that warrants for the arrest of
the accused be withheld, or if issued, recalled in the meantime until
the resolution of the motion. It cannot be said, therefore, that the
dismissal of the case was made with the consent of the petitioner. A
copy of the aforesaid motion is hereto attached and made integral
part hereof as Annex A.[19]

During the hearing in the Court of Appeals on July 31, 2001, the
respondent, through counsel, categorically, unequivocally, and
definitely declared that he did not file any motion to dismiss the
criminal cases nor did he agree to a provisional dismissal thereof, thus:

JUSTICE SALONGA:
And it is your stand that the dismissal made by the Court was
provisional in nature?

ATTY. FORTUN:

It was in (sic) that the accused did not ask for it. What they wanted at
the onset was simply a judicial determination of probable cause for
warrants of arrest issued. Then Judge Agnir, upon the presentation by
the parties of their witnesses, particularly those who had withdrawn
their affidavits, made one further conclusion that not only was this
case lacking in probable cause for purposes of the issuance of an
arrest warrant but also it did not justify proceeding to trial.

JUSTICE SALONGA:

And it is expressly provided under Section 8 that a case shall not be

provisionally dismissed except when it is with the express conformity
of the accused.

ATTY. FORTUN:

That is correct, Your Honor.

JUSTICE SALONGA:
And with notice to the offended party.

ATTY. FORTUN:

That is correct, Your Honor.

JUSTICE SALONGA:

Was there an express conformity on the part of the accused?

ATTY. FORTUN:

There was none, Your Honor. We were not asked to sign any order, or
any statement, which would normally be required by the Court on pre-
trial or on other matters, including other provisional dismissal. My
very limited practice in criminal courts, Your Honor, had taught me
that a judge must be very careful on this matter of provisional
dismissal. In fact they ask the accused to come forward, and the judge
himself or herself explains the implications of a provisional dismissal.
Pumapayag ka ba dito. Puwede bang pumirma ka?

JUSTICE ROSARIO:

You were present during the proceedings?

ATTY. FORTUN:

Yes, Your Honor.

JUSTICE ROSARIO:

You represented the petitioner in this case?

ATTY. FORTUN:

That is correct, Your Honor. And there was nothing of that sort which
the good Judge Agnir, who is most knowledgeable in criminal law, had
done in respect of provisional dismissal or the matter of Mr. Lacson
agreeing to the provisional dismissal of the case.

JUSTICE GUERRERO:

Now, you filed a motion, the other accused then filed a motion for a
judicial determination of probable cause?

ATTY. FORTUN:
Yes, Your Honor.

JUSTICE GUERRERO:

Did you make any alternative prayer in your motion that if there is no
probable cause what should the Court do?

ATTY. FORTUN:

That the arrest warrants only be withheld. That was the only prayer
that we asked. In fact, I have a copy of that particular motion, and if I
may read my prayer before the Court, it said: Wherefore, it is
respectfully prayed that (1) a judicial determination of probable cause
pursuant to Section 2, Article III of the Constitution be conducted, and
for this purpose, an order be issued directing the prosecution to
present the private complainants and their witnesses at the scheduled
hearing for that purpose; and (2) the warrants for the arrest of the
accused be withheld, or, if issued, recalled in the meantime until
resolution of this incident.

JUSTICE GUERRERO:

There is no general prayer for any further relief?

ATTY. FORTUN:
There is but it simply says other equitable reliefs are prayed for.

JUSTICE GUERRERO:

Dont you surmise Judge Agnir, now a member of this Court, precisely
addressed your prayer for just and equitable relief to dismiss the case
because what would be the net effect of a situation where there is no
warrant of arrest being issued without dismissing the case?

ATTY. FORTUN:

Yes, Your Honor. I will not second say (sic) yes the Good Justice, but
what is plain is we did not agree to the provisional dismissal, neither
were we asked to sign any assent to the provisional dismissal.

JUSTICE GUERRERO:

If you did not agree to the provisional dismissal did you not file any
motion for reconsideration of the order of Judge Agnir that the case
should be dismissed?

ATTY. FORTUN:
I did not, Your Honor, because I knew fully well at that time that my
client had already been arraigned, and the arraignment was valid as
far as I was concerned. So, the dismissal, Your Honor, by Judge Agnir
operated to benefit me, and therefore I did not take any further step
in addition to rocking the boat or clarifying the matter further because
it probably could prejudice the interest of my client.

JUSTICE GUERRERO:

Continue.[20]

In his memorandum in lieu of the oral argument filed with the Court of
Appeals, the respondent declared in no uncertain terms that:

Soon thereafter, the SC in early 1999 rendered a decision declaring the

Sandiganbayan without jurisdiction over the cases. The records were
remanded to the QC RTC: Upon raffle, the case was assigned to Branch
81. Petitioner and the others promptly filed a motion for judicial
determination of probable cause (Annex B). He asked that warrants
for his arrest not be issued. He did not move for the dismissal of the
Informations, contrary to respondent OSGs claim.[21]

The respondents admissions made in the course of the proceedings in

the Court of Appeals are binding and conclusive on him. The
respondent is barred from repudiating his admissions absent evidence
of palpable mistake in making such admissions.[22]
To apply the new rule in Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-
81689 would be to add to or make exceptions from the new rule
which are not expressly or impliedly included therein. This the Court
cannot and should not do.[23]

The Court also agrees with the petitioners contention that no notice of
any motion for the provisional dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-
81679 to Q-99-81689 or of the hearing thereon was served on the
heirs of the victims at least three days before said hearing as
mandated by Rule 15, Section 4 of the Rules of Court. It must be borne
in mind that in crimes involving private interests, the new rule
requires that the offended party or parties or the heirs of the victims
must be given adequate a priori notice of any motion for the
provisional dismissal of the criminal case. Such notice may be served
on the offended party or the heirs of the victim through the private
prosecutor, if there is one, or through the public prosecutor who in
turn must relay the notice to the offended party or the heirs of the
victim to enable them to confer with him before the hearing or appear
in court during the hearing. The proof of such service must be shown
during the hearing on the motion, otherwise, the requirement of the
new rule will become illusory. Such notice will enable the offended
party or the heirs of the victim the opportunity to seasonably and
effectively comment on or object to the motion on valid grounds,
including: (a) the collusion between the prosecution and the accused
for the provisional dismissal of a criminal case thereby depriving the
State of its right to due process; (b) attempts to make witnesses
unavailable; or (c) the provisional dismissal of the case with the
consequent release of the accused from detention would enable him
to threaten and kill the offended party or the other prosecution
witnesses or flee from Philippine jurisdiction, provide opportunity for
the destruction or loss of the prosecutions physical and other
evidence and prejudice the rights of the offended party to recover on
the civil liability of the accused by his concealment or furtive
disposition of his property or the consequent lifting of the writ of
preliminary attachment against his property.

In the case at bar, even if the respondents motion for a determination

of probable cause and examination of witnesses may be considered
for the nonce as his motion for a provisional dismissal of Criminal
Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689, however, the heirs of the
victims were not notified thereof prior to the hearing on said motion
on March 22, 1999. It must be stressed that the respondent filed his
motion only on March 17, 1999 and set it for hearing on March 22,
1999 or barely five days from the filing thereof. Although the public
prosecutor was served with a copy of the motion, the records do not
show that notices thereof were separately given to the heirs of the
victims or that subpoenae were issued to and received by them,
including those who executed their affidavits of desistance who were
residents of Dipolog City or Pian, Zamboanga del Norte or Palompon,
Leyte.[24] There is as well no proof in the records that the public
prosecutor notified the heirs of the victims of said motion or of the
hearing thereof on March 22, 1999. Although Atty. Valdez entered his
appearance as private prosecutor,[25] he did so only for some but not
all the close kins of the victims, namely, Nenita Alap-ap, Imelda
Montero, Margarita Redillas, Rufino Siplon, Carmelita Elcamel, Myrna
Abalora, and Leonora Amora who (except for Rufino Siplon)[26]
executed their respective affidavits of desistance.[27] There was no
appearance for the heirs of Alex Neri, Pacifico Montero, Jr., and
Meleubren Sorronda. There is no proof on record that all the heirs of
the victims were served with copies of the resolution of Judge Agnir,
Jr. dismissing the said cases. In fine, there never was any attempt on
the part of the trial court, the public prosecutor and/or the private
prosecutor to notify all the heirs of the victims of the respondents
motion and the hearing thereon and of the resolution of Judge Agnir,
Jr. dismissing said cases. The said heirs were thus deprived of their
right to be heard on the respondents motion and to protect their
interests either in the trial court or in the appellate court.
Since the conditions sine qua non for the application of the new rule
were not present when Judge Agnir, Jr. issued his resolution, the State
is not barred by the time limit set forth in the second paragraph of
Section 8 of Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. The
State can thus revive or refile Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-
81689 or file new Informations for multiple murder against the
respondent.

II. THE TIME-BAR IN SECTION 8, RULE 117 OF THE REVISED RULES OF

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE SHOULD NOT BE APPLIED RETROACTIVELY.

The petitioners contend that even on the assumption that the

respondent expressly consented to a provisional dismissal of Criminal
Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 and all the heirs of the victims
were notified of the respondents motion before the hearing thereon
and were served with copies of the resolution of Judge Agnir, Jr.
dismissing the eleven cases, the two-year bar in Section 8 of Rule 117
of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure should be applied
prospectively and not retroactively against the State. To apply the
time limit retroactively to the criminal cases against the respondent
and his co-accused would violate the right of the People to due
process, and unduly impair, reduce, and diminish the States
substantive right to prosecute the accused for multiple murder. They
posit that under Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code, the State had
twenty years within which to file the criminal complaints against the
accused. However, under the new rule, the State only had two years
from notice of the public prosecutor of the order of dismissal of
Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 within which to revive
the said cases. When the new rule took effect on December 1, 2000,
the State only had one year and three months within which to revive
the cases or refile the Informations. The period for the State to charge
respondent for multiple murder under Article 90 of the Revised Penal
Code was considerably and arbitrarily reduced. They submit that in
case of conflict between the Revised Penal Code and the new rule, the
former should prevail. They also insist that the State had consistently
relied on the prescriptive periods under Article 90 of the Revised Penal
Code. It was not accorded a fair warning that it would forever be
barred beyond the two-year period by a retroactive application of the
new rule.[28] Petitioners thus pray to the Court to set aside its
Resolution of May 28, 2002.

For his part, the respondent asserts that the new rule under Section 8
of Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure may be applied
retroactively since there is no substantive right of the State that may
be impaired by its application to the criminal cases in question since
[t]he States witnesses were ready, willing and able to provide their
testimony but the prosecution failed to act on these cases until it
became politically expedient in April 2001 for them to do so.[29]
According to the respondent, penal laws, either procedural or
substantive, may be retroactively applied so long as they favor the
accused.[30] He asserts that the two-year period commenced to run
on March 29, 1999 and lapsed two years thereafter was more than
reasonable opportunity for the State to fairly indict him.[31] In any
event, the State is given the right under the Courts assailed Resolution
to justify the filing of the Information in Criminal Cases Nos. 01-
101102 to 01-101112 beyond the time-bar under the new rule.

The respondent insists that Section 8 of Rule 117 of the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure does not broaden the substantive right of
double jeopardy to the prejudice of the State because the prohibition
against the revival of the cases within the one-year or two-year
periods provided therein is a legal concept distinct from the
prohibition against the revival of a provisionally dismissed case within
the periods stated in Section 8 of Rule 117. Moreover, he claims that
the effects of a provisional dismissal under said rule do not modify or
negate the operation of the prescriptive period under Article 90 of the
Revised Penal Code. Prescription under the Revised Penal Code simply
becomes irrelevant upon the application of Section 8, Rule 117
because a complaint or information has already been filed against the
accused, which filing tolls the running of the prescriptive period under
Article 90.[32]

The Court agrees with the respondent that the new rule is not a
statute of limitations. Statutes of limitations are construed as acts of
grace, and a surrender by the sovereign of its right to prosecute or of
its right to prosecute at its discretion. Such statutes are considered as
equivalent to acts of amnesty founded on the liberal theory that
prosecutions should not be allowed to ferment endlessly in the files of
the government to explode only after witnesses and proofs necessary
for the protection of the accused have by sheer lapse of time passed
beyond availability.[33] The periods fixed under such statutes are
jurisdictional and are essential elements of the offenses covered.[34]

On the other hand, the time-bar under Section 8 of Rule 117 is akin to
a special procedural limitation qualifying the right of the State to
prosecute making the time-bar an essence of the given right or as an
inherent part thereof, so that the lapse of the time-bar operates to
extinguish the right of the State to prosecute the accused.[35]

The time-bar under the new rule does not reduce the periods under
Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code, a substantive law.[36] It is but a
limitation of the right of the State to revive a criminal case against the
accused after the Information had been filed but subsequently
provisionally dismissed with the express consent of the accused. Upon
the lapse of the timeline under the new rule, the State is presumed,
albeit disputably, to have abandoned or waived its right to revive the
case and prosecute the accused. The dismissal becomes ipso facto
permanent. He can no longer be charged anew for the same crime or
another crime necessarily included therein.[37] He is spared from the
anguish and anxiety as well as the expenses in any new
indictments.[38] The State may revive a criminal case beyond the one-
year or two-year periods provided that there is a justifiable necessity
for the delay.[39] By the same token, if a criminal case is dismissed on
motion of the accused because the trial is not concluded within the
period therefor, the prescriptive periods under the Revised Penal Code
are not thereby diminished.[40] But whether or not the prosecution of
the accused is barred by the statute of limitations or by the lapse of
the time-line under the new rule, the effect is basically the same. As
the State Supreme Court of Illinois held:

This, in effect, enacts that when the specified period shall have
arrived, the right of the state to prosecute shall be gone, and the
liability of the offender to be punishedto be deprived of his libertyshall
cease. Its terms not only strike down the right of action which the
state had acquired by the offense, but also remove the flaw which the
crime had created in the offenders title to liberty. In this respect, its
language goes deeper than statutes barring civil remedies usually do.
They expressly take away only the remedy by suit, and that
inferentially is held to abate the right which such remedy would
enforce, and perfect the title which such remedy would invade; but
this statute is aimed directly at the very right which the state has
against the offenderthe right to punish, as the only liability which the
offender has incurred, and declares that this right and this liability are
at an end. [41]

The Court agrees with the respondent that procedural laws may be
applied retroactively. As applied to criminal law, procedural law
provides or regulates the steps by which one who has committed a
crime is to be punished. In Tan, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,[42] this Court
held that:
Statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed as
applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their
passage. Procedural laws are retroactive in that sense and to that
extent. The fact that procedural statutes may somehow affect the
litigants rights may not preclude their retroactive application to
pending actions. The retroactive application of procedural laws is not
violative of any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely
affected. Nor is the retroactive application of procedural statutes
constitutionally objectionable. The reason is that as a general rule no
vested right may attach to, nor arise from, procedural laws. It has
been held that a person has no vested right in any particular remedy,
and a litigant cannot insist on the application to the trial of his case,
whether civil or criminal, of any other than the existing rules of
procedure.

It further ruled therein that a procedural law may not be applied

retroactively if to do so would work injustice or would involve intricate
problems of due process or impair the independence of the Court. In a
per curiam decision in Cipriano v. City of Houma,[43] the United States
Supreme Court ruled that where a decision of the court would
produce substantial inequitable results if applied retroactively, there is
ample basis for avoiding the injustice of hardship by a holding of
nonretroactivity.[44] A construction of which a statute is fairly
susceptible is favored, which will avoid all objectionable, mischievous,
indefensible, wrongful, and injurious consequences.[45] This Court
should not adopt an interpretation of a statute which produces
absurd, unreasonable, unjust, or oppressive results if such
interpretation could be avoided.[46] Time and again, this Court has
decreed that statutes are to be construed in light of the purposes to
be achieved and the evils sought to be remedied. In construing a
statute, the reason for the enactment should be kept in mind and the
statute should be construed with reference to the intended scope and
purpose.[47]

Remedial legislation, or procedural rule, or doctrine of the Court

designed to enhance and implement the constitutional rights of
parties in criminal proceedings may be applied retroactively or
prospectively depending upon several factors, such as the history of
the new rule, its purpose and effect, and whether the retrospective
application will further its operation, the particular conduct sought to
be remedied and the effect thereon in the administration of justice
and of criminal laws in particular.[48] In a per curiam decision in
Stefano v. Woods,[49] the United States Supreme Court catalogued
the factors in determining whether a new rule or doctrine enunciated
by the High Court should be given retrospective or prospective effect:

(a) the purpose to be served by the new standards, (b) the extent of
the reliance by law enforcement authorities on the old standards, and
(c) the effect on the administration of justice of a retroactive
application of the new standards.

In this case, the Court agrees with the petitioners that the time-bar of
two years under the new rule should not be applied retroactively
against the State.

In the new rule in question, as now construed by the Court, it has fixed
a time-bar of one year or two years for the revival of criminal cases
provisionally dismissed with the express consent of the accused and
with a priori notice to the offended party. The time-bar may appear,
on first impression, unreasonable compared to the periods under
Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code. However, in fixing the time-bar,
the Court balanced the societal interests and those of the accused for
the orderly and speedy disposition of criminal cases with minimum
prejudice to the State and the accused. It took into account the
substantial rights of both the State and of the accused to due process.
The Court believed that the time limit is a reasonable period for the
State to revive provisionally dismissed cases with the consent of the
accused and notice to the offended parties. The time-bar fixed by the
Court must be respected unless it is shown that the period is
manifestly short or insufficient that the rule becomes a denial of
justice.[50] The petitioners failed to show a manifest shortness or
insufficiency of the time-bar.

The new rule was conceptualized by the Committee on the Revision of

the Rules and approved by the Court en banc primarily to enhance the
administration of the criminal justice system and the rights to due
process of the State and the accused by eliminating the deleterious
practice of trial courts of provisionally dismissing criminal cases on
motion of either the prosecution or the accused or jointly, either with
no time-bar for the revival thereof or with a specific or definite period
for such revival by the public prosecutor. There were times when such
criminal cases were no longer revived or refiled due to causes beyond
the control of the public prosecutor or because of the indolence,
apathy or the lackadaisical attitude of public prosecutors to the
prejudice of the State and the accused despite the mandate to public
prosecutors and trial judges to expedite criminal proceedings.[51]

It is almost a universal experience that the accused welcomes delay as

it usually operates in his favor,[52] especially if he greatly fears the
consequences of his trial and conviction. He is hesitant to disturb the
hushed inaction by which dominant cases have been known to
expire.[53]
The inordinate delay in the revival or refiling of criminal cases may
impair or reduce the capacity of the State to prove its case with the
disappearance or nonavailability of its witnesses. Physical evidence
may have been lost. Memories of witnesses may have grown dim or
have faded. Passage of time makes proof of any fact more difficult.[54]
The accused may become a fugitive from justice or commit another
crime. The longer the lapse of time from the dismissal of the case to
the revival thereof, the more difficult it is to prove the crime.

On the other side of the fulcrum, a mere provisional dismissal of a

criminal case does not terminate a criminal case. The possibility that
the case may be revived at any time may disrupt or reduce, if not
derail, the chances of the accused for employment, curtail his
association, subject him to public obloquy and create anxiety in him
and his family. He is unable to lead a normal life because of
community suspicion and his own anxiety. He continues to suffer
those penalties and disabilities incompatible with the presumption of
innocence.[55] He may also lose his witnesses or their memories may
fade with the passage of time. In the long run, it may diminish his
capacity to defend himself and thus eschew the fairness of the entire
criminal justice system.[56]

The time-bar under the new rule was fixed by the Court to excise the
malaise that plagued the administration of the criminal justice system
for the benefit of the State and the accused; not for the accused only.

The Court agrees with the petitioners that to apply the time-bar
retroactively so that the two-year period commenced to run on March
31, 1999 when the public prosecutor received his copy of the
resolution of Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissing the criminal cases is
inconsistent with the intendment of the new rule. Instead of giving the
State two years to revive provisionally dismissed cases, the State had
considerably less than two years to do so. Thus, Judge Agnir, Jr.
dismissed Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 on March
29, 1999. The new rule took effect on December 1, 2000. If the Court
applied the new time-bar retroactively, the State would have only one
year and three months or until March 31, 2001 within which to revive
these criminal cases. The period is short of the two-year period fixed
under the new rule. On the other hand, if the time limit is applied
prospectively, the State would have two years from December 1, 2000
or until December 1, 2002 within which to revive the cases. This is in
consonance with the intendment of the new rule in fixing the time-bar
and thus prevent injustice to the State and avoid absurd,
unreasonable, oppressive, injurious, and wrongful results in the
administration of justice.

The period from April 1, 1999 to November 30, 1999 should be

excluded in the computation of the two-year period because the rule
prescribing it was not yet in effect at the time and the State could not
be expected to comply with the time-bar. It cannot even be argued
that the State waived its right to revive the criminal cases against
respondent or that it was negligent for not reviving them within the
two-year period under the new rule. As the United States Supreme
Court said, per Justice Felix Frankfurter, in Griffin v. People:[57]

We should not indulge in the fiction that the law now announced has
always been the law and, therefore, that those who did not avail
themselves of it waived their rights .

The two-year period fixed in the new rule is for the benefit of both the
State and the accused. It should not be emasculated and reduced by
an inordinate retroactive application of the time-bar therein provided
merely to benefit the accused. For to do so would cause an injustice of
hardship to the State and adversely affect the administration of justice
in general and of criminal laws in particular.

To require the State to give a valid justification as a condition sine qua

non to the revival of a case provisionally dismissed with the express
consent of the accused before the effective date of the new rule is to
assume that the State is obliged to comply with the time-bar under
the new rule before it took effect. This would be a rank denial of
justice. The State must be given a period of one year or two years as
the case may be from December 1, 2000 to revive the criminal case
without requiring the State to make a valid justification for not
reviving the case before the effective date of the new rule. Although in
criminal cases, the accused is entitled to justice and fairness, so is the
State. As the United States Supreme Court said, per Mr. Justice
Benjamin Cardozo, in Snyder v. State of Massachussetts,[58] the
concept of fairness must not be strained till it is narrowed to a
filament. We are to keep the balance true. In Dimatulac v. Villon,[59]
this Court emphasized that the judges action must not impair the
substantial rights of the accused nor the right of the State and
offended party to due process of law. This Court further said:

Indeed, for justice to prevail, the scales must balance; justice is not to
be dispensed for the accused alone. The interests of society and the
offended parties which have been wronged must be equally
considered. Verily, a verdict of conviction is not necessarily a denial of
justice; and an acquittal is not necessarily a triumph of justice, for, to
the society offended and the party wronged, it could also mean
injustice. Justice then must be rendered even-handedly to both the
accused, on one hand, and the State and offended party, on the other.
In this case, the eleven Informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102
to 01-101112 were filed with the Regional Trial Court on June 6, 2001
well within the two-year period.

In sum, this Court finds the motion for reconsideration of petitioners

meritorious.

IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petitioners Motion for

Reconsideration is GRANTED. The Resolution of this Court, dated May
28, 2002, is SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated
August 24, 2001, in CA-G.R. SP No. 65034 is REVERSED. The Petition of
the Respondent with the Regional Trial Court in Civil Case No. 01-
100933 is DISMISSED for being moot and academic. The Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, Branch 81, is DIRECTED to forthwith proceed
with Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112 with deliberate
dispatch.

No pronouncements as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
SUSAN GO and the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioners, vs.
FERNANDO L. DIMAGIBA, respondent.

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J.:

Administrative Circular 12-2000, as clarified by Administrative Circular

13-2001, merely establishes a rule of preference in imposing penalties
for violations of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (BP 22), the Bouncing Checks
Law. When the circumstances of both the offense and the offender
indicate good faith or a clear mistake of fact without taint of
negligence, the imposition of a fine alone -- instead of imprisonment --
is the preferred penalty. As the Circular requires a review of the
factual circumstances of a given case, it applies only to pending or
future litigations. It is not a penal law; hence, it does not have
retroactive effect. Neither may it be used to modify final judgments of
conviction.

The Case

Before us is a Petition for Review[1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of

Court, assailing the October 10, 2001[2] and the October 11, 2001[3]
Orders of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) (Branch 5), Baguio City.[4] The
October 10, 2001 Order released Respondent Fernando L. Dimagiba
from confinement and required him to pay a fine of P100,000 in lieu of
imprisonment. The October 11, 2001 Order disposed as follows:

WHEREFORE, [in] applying the doctrine as held in the above-entitled

cases in this case, the instant petition for Habeas Corpus should be, as
it is hereby, GRANTED. The Baguio City Jail Warden is hereby ordered
to IMMEDIATELY RELEASE the petitioner from confinement unless he
is being held for some other lawful cause other than by virtue of the
Sentence Mittimus dated September 28, 2001 issued by CESAR S.
VIDUYA, Clerk of Court, MTC 4, Baguio City. Further, the petitioner is
required to pay a fine in the amount of P100,000.00 in lieu of his
imprisonment, in addition to the civil aspect of the Joint Judgment
rendered by MTC 4 dated July 16, 1999.[5]

The Facts

The pertinent facts are not disputed. Respondent Fernando L.

Dimagiba issued to Petitioner Susan Go thirteen (13) checks which,
when presented to the drawee bank for encashment or payment on
the due dates, were dishonored for the reason account closed.[6]
Dimagiba was subsequently prosecuted for 13 counts of violation of
BP 22[7] under separate Complaints filed with the Municipal Trial
Court in Cities (MTCC) in Baguio City.[8] After a joint trial, the MTCC
(Branch 4) rendered a Decision on July 16, 1999, convicting the
accused in the 13 cases. The dispositive portion reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing disquisition, this Court finds the

evidence of the prosecution to have established the guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt of the offenses charged and
imposes upon the accused the penalty of 3 months imprisonment for
each count (13 counts) and to indemnify the offended party the
amount of One Million Two Hundred Ninety Five Thousand Pesos
(P1,295,000.00) with legal interest per annum commencing from 1996
after the checks were dishonored by reason ACCOUNT CLOSED on
December 13, 1995, to pay attorneys fees of P15,000.00 and to pay
the costs.[9]
The appeal of Dimagiba was raffled to Branch 4 of the RTC in Baguio
City.[10] On May 23, 2000, the RTC denied the appeal and sustained
his conviction.[11] There being no further appeal to the Court of
Appeals (CA), the RTC issued on February 1, 2001, a Certificate of
Finality of the Decision.[12]

Thus, on February 14, 2001, the MTCC issued an Order directing the
arrest of Dimagiba for the service of his sentence as a result of his
conviction. The trial court also issued a Writ of Execution to enforce
his civil liability.[13]

On February 27, 2001, Dimagiba filed a Motion for Reconsideration of

the MTCC Order. He prayed for the recall of the Order of Arrest and
the modification of the final Decision, arguing that the penalty of fine
only, instead of imprisonment also, should have been imposed on
him.[14] The arguments raised in that Motion were reiterated in a
Motion for the Partial Quashal of the Writ of Execution filed on
February 28, 2001.[15]

In an Order dated August 22, 2001, the MTCC denied the Motion for
Reconsideration and directed the issuance of a Warrant of Arrest
against Dimagiba.[16] On September 28, 2001, he was arrested and
imprisoned for the service of his sentence.

On October 9, 2001, he filed with the RTC of Baguio City a Petition[17]

for a writ of habeas corpus. The case was raffled to Branch 5, which
scheduled the hearing for October 10, 2001. Copies of the Order were
served on respondents counsels and the city warden.[18]
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

Right after hearing the case on October 10, 2001, the RTC issued an
Order directing the immediate release of Dimagiba from confinement
and requiring him to pay a fine of P100,000 in lieu of imprisonment.
However, the civil aspect of the July 16, 1999 MTCC Decision was not
touched upon.[19] A subsequent Order, explaining in greater detail
the basis of the grant of the writ of habeas corpus, was issued on
October 11, 2001.[20]

In justifying its modification of the MTCC Decision, the RTC invoked

Vaca v. Court of Appeals[21] and Supreme Court Administrative
Circular (SC-AC) No. 12-2000,[22] which allegedly required the
imposition of a fine only instead of imprisonment also for BP 22
violations, if the accused was not a recidivist or a habitual delinquent.
The RTC held that this rule should be retroactively applied in favor of
Dimagiba.[23] It further noted that (1) he was a first-time offender and
an employer of at least 200 workers who would be displaced as a
result of his imprisonment; and (2) the civil liability had already been
satisfied through the levy of his properties.[24]

On October 22, 2001, Petitioner Go filed a Motion for Reconsideration

of the RTC Orders dated October 10 and 11, 2001.[25] That Motion
was denied on January 18, 2002.[26]

Hence, this Petition filed directly with this Court on pure questions of
law.[27]
The Issues

Petitioner raises the following issues for this Courts consideration:

1. [The RTC] Judge was utterly devoid of jurisdiction in amending a

final and conclusive decision of the Municipal Trial Court, Branch 4,
dated July 16, 1999, in nullifying the Sentence Mittimus, dated
September 28, 2001, issued by x x x [the] Municipal Trial Court, Branch
4, Baguio City, and in ordering the release of [Dimagiba] from
confinement in jail for the service of his sentence under the said final
and conclusive judgment;

2. Assuming only for the sake of argument that habeas corpus is the
proper remedy, the Petition for Habeas Corpus is utterly devoid of
merit as [Dimagiba was] not entitled to the beneficent policy
enunciated in the Eduardo Vaca and Rosa Lim cases and reiterated in
the Supreme Court Circular No. 12-2000; x x x

3. Granting for the sake of argument that [Dimagiba was] entitled to

the beneficent policy enunciated in the Eduardo Vaca and Rosa Lim
cases and reiterated in the Supreme Court Circular No. 12-2000, the
minimum fine that should be imposed on [Dimagiba] is one million
and two hundred ninety five thousand pesos (P1,295,000.00) up to
double the said amount or (P2,590,000), not just the measly amount
of P100,000; and
4. [The RTC] judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction in hearing and deciding [Dimagibas]
Petition for Habeas Corpus without notice and without affording
procedural due process to the People of the Philippines through the
Office of [the] City Prosecutor of Baguio City or the Office of the
Solicitor General.[28]

In the main, the case revolves around the question of whether the
Petition for habeas corpus was validly granted. Hence, the Court will
discuss the four issues as they intertwine with this main question.[29]

The Courts Ruling

The Petition is meritorious.

Main Issue:

Propriety of the

Writ of Habeas Corpus

The writ of habeas corpus applies to all cases of illegal confinement or

detention in which individuals are deprived of liberty.[30] It was
devised as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from
unlawful restraint; or, more specifically, to obtain immediate relief for
those who may have been illegally confined or imprisoned without
sufficient cause and thus deliver them from unlawful custody.[31] It is
therefore a writ of inquiry intended to test the circumstances under
which a person is detained.[32]
The writ may not be availed of when the person in custody is under a
judicial process or by virtue of a valid judgment.[33] However, as a
post-conviction remedy, it may be allowed when, as a consequence of
a judicial proceeding, any of the following exceptional circumstances is
attendant: (1) there has been a deprivation of a constitutional right
resulting in the restraint of a person; (2) the court had no jurisdiction
to impose the sentence; or (3) the imposed penalty has been
excessive, thus voiding the sentence as to such excess.[34]

In the present case, the Petition for a writ of habeas corpus was
anchored on the ruling in Vaca and on SC-AC No. 12-2000, which
allegedly prescribed the imposition of a fine, not imprisonment, for
convictions under BP 22. Respondent sought the retroactive effect of
those rulings, thereby effectively challenging the penalty imposed on
him for being excessive. From his allegations, the Petition appeared
sufficient in form to support the issuance of the writ.

However, it appears that respondent has previously sought the

modification of his sentence in a Motion for Reconsideration[35] of
the MTCCs Execution Order and in a Motion for the Partial Quashal of
the Writ of Execution.[36] Both were denied by the MTCC on the
ground that it had no power or authority to amend a judgment issued
by the RTC.

In his Petition for habeas corpus, respondent raised the same

arguments that he had invoked in the said Motions. We believe that
his resort to this extraordinary remedy was a procedural infirmity. The
remedy should have been an appeal of the MTCC Order denying his
Motions, in which he should have prayed that the execution of the
judgment be stayed. But he effectively misused the action he had
chosen, obviously with the intent of finding a favorable court. His
Petition for a writ of habeas corpus was clearly an attempt to reopen a
case that had already become final and executory. Such an action
deplorably amounted to forum shopping. Respondent should have
resorted to the proper, available remedy instead of instituting a
different action in another forum.

The Court also finds his arguments for his release insubstantial to
support the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus.

Preference in the

Application of Penalties

for Violation of BP 22

The following alternative penalties are imposable under BP 22: (1)

imprisonment of not less than 30 days, but not more than one year;
(2) a fine of not less or more than double the amount of the check, a
fine that shall in no case exceed P200,000; or (3) both such fine and
imprisonment, at the discretion of the court.[37]

SC-AC No. 12-2000, as clarified by SC-AC No. 13-2001,[38] established

a rule of preference in imposing the above penalties.[39] When the
circumstances of the case clearly indicate good faith or a clear mistake
of fact without taint of negligence, the imposition of a fine alone may
be considered as the preferred penalty.[40] The determination of the
circumstances that warrant the imposition of a fine rests upon the trial
judge only.[41] Should the judge deem that imprisonment is
appropriate, such penalty may be imposed.[42]
SC-AC No. 12-2000 did not delete the alternative penalty of
imprisonment. The competence to amend the law belongs to the
legislature, not to this Court.[43]

Inapplicability of

SC-AC No. 12-2000

Petitioners argue that respondent is not entitled to the benevolent

policy enunciated in SC-AC No. 12-2000, because he is not a first time
offender.[44] This circumstance is, however, not the sole factor in
determining whether he deserves the preferred penalty of fine alone.
The penalty to be imposed depends on the peculiar circumstances of
each case.[45] It is the trial courts discretion to impose any penalty
within the confines of the law. SC-AC No. 13-2001 explains thus:

x x x. Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 establishes a rule of

preference in the application of the penal provisions of BP 22 such
that where the circumstances of both the offense and the offender
clearly indicate good faith or a clear mistake of fact without taint of
negligence, the imposition of a fine alone should be considered as the
more appropriate penalty. Needless to say, the determination of
whether the circumstances warrant the imposition of a fine alone
rests solely upon the Judge. x x x.

It is, therefore, understood that:

xxxxxxxxx

2. The Judges concerned, may in the exercise of sound discretion, and

taking into consideration the peculiar circumstances of each case,
determine whether the imposition of a fine alone would best serve
the interests of justice, or whether forbearing to impose
imprisonment would depreciate the seriousness of the offense, work
violence on the social order, or otherwise be contrary to the
imperatives of justice;

The Court notes that the Petition for a writ of habeas corpus relied
mainly on the alleged retroactivity of SC-AC No. 12-2000, which
supposedly favored BP 22 offenders.[46] On this point, Dimagiba
contended that his imprisonment was violative of his right to equal
protection of the laws, since only a fine would be imposed on others
similarly situated.[47]

The rule on retroactivity states that criminal laws may be applied

retroactively if favorable to the accused. This principle, embodied in
the Revised Penal Code,[48] has been expanded in certain instances to
cover special laws.[49]

The issue of retroactivity of SC-AC No. 12-2000 was settled in De Joya

v. Jail Warden of Batangas City,[50] which we quote:

Petitioner's reliance of our ruling in Ordoez v. Vinarao that a convicted

person is entitled to benefit from the reduction of penalty introduced
by the new law, citing People v. Simon, is misplaced. Thus, her plea
that as provided for in Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code, SC Admin.
Circular No. 12-2000 as modified by SC Admin. Circular No. 13-2001
should benefit her has no basis.

First. SC Admin. Circular No. 12-2000 is not a penal law; hence, Article
22 of the Revised Penal Code is not applicable. The circular applies
only to those cases pending as of the date of its effectivity and not to
cases already terminated by final judgment.

Second. As explained by the Court in SC Admin. Circular No. 13-2001,

SC Admin. Circular No. 12-2000 merely lays down a rule of preference
in the application of the penalties for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. It does
not amend B.P. Blg. 22, nor defeat the legislative intent behind the
law. SC Admin. Circular No. 12-2000 merely urges the courts to take
into account not only the purpose of the law but also the
circumstances of the accused -- whether he acted in good faith or on a
clear mistake of fact without taint of negligence -- and such other
circumstance which the trial court or the appellate court believes
relevant to the penalty to be imposed.[51]

Because the Circular merely lays down a rule of preference, it serves

only as a guideline for the trial courts. Thus, it is addressed to the
judges, who are directed to consider the factual circumstances of each
case prior to imposing the appropriate penalty. In other words, the
Administrative Circular does not confer any new right in favor of the
accused, much less those convicted by final judgment.

The competence to determine the proper penalty belongs to the court

rendering the decision against the accused.[52] That decision is
subject only to appeal on grounds of errors of fact or law, or grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Another trial court may not encroach upon this authority. Indeed, SC-
AC No. 12-2000 necessarily requires a review of all factual
circumstances of each case. Such a review can no longer be done if the
judgment has become final and executory.

In the present case, the MTCC of Baguio City had full knowledge of all
relevant circumstances from which respondents conviction and
sentence were based. The penalty imposed was well within the
confines of the law. Upon appeal, the conviction was sustained by
RTC-Branch 4 of Baguio City. Eventually, the Decision attained finality.
Hence, RTC-Branch 5 did not have the jurisdiction to modify the lawful
judgment in the guise of granting a writ of habeas corpus.

The doctrine of equal protection of laws[53] does not apply for the
same reasons as those on retroactivity. Foremost of these reasons is
that the Circular is not a law that deletes the penalty of imprisonment.
As explained earlier, it is merely a rule of preference as to which
penalty should be imposed under the peculiar circumstances of a case.
At any rate, this matter deserves scant consideration, because
respondent failed to raise any substantial argument to support his
contention.[54]

Modification of Final

Judgment Not Warranted

The Court is not unmindful of So v. Court of Appeals,[55] in which the

final judgment of conviction for violation of BP 22 was modified by the
deletion of the sentence of imprisonment and the imposition of a fine.
That case proceeded from an Urgent Manifestation of an
Extraordinary Supervening Event,[56] not from an unmeritorious
petition for a writ of habeas corpus, as in the present case. The Court
exercised in that case its authority to suspend or to modify the
execution of a final judgment when warranted or made imperative by
the higher interest of justice or by supervening events.[57] The
supervening event in that case was the petitioners urgent need for
coronary rehabilitation for at least one year under the direct
supervision of a coronary care therapist; imprisonment would have
been equivalent to a death sentence.[58]

The peculiar circumstances of So do not obtain in the present case.

Respondents supposed unhealthy physical condition due to a triple by-
pass operation, and aggravated by hypertension, cited by the RTC in
its October 10, 2001 Order,[59] is totally bereft of substantial proof.
The Court notes that respondent did not make any such allegation in
his Petition for habeas corpus. Neither did he mention his physical
state in his Memorandum and Comment submitted to this Court.

Respondent seeks the retroactive application of SC-AC No. 12-2000 in

his favor on the basis alone of the alleged settlement of his civil
liability.[60] Citing Griffith v. Court of Appeals,[61] he theorizes that
answering for a criminal offense is no longer justified after the
settlement of the debt.

Respondent, however, misreads Griffith. The Court held in that case

that convicting the accused who, two years prior to the filing of the BP
22 cases, had already paid his debt (from which the checks originated)
was contrary to the basic principles of fairness and justice.[62]
Obviously, that situation is not attendant here.
The civil liability in the present case was satisfied through the levy and
sale of the properties of respondent only after the criminal case had
been terminated with his conviction.[63] Apparently, he had sufficient
properties that could have been used to settle his liabilities prior to his
conviction. Indeed, such an early settlement would have been an
indication that he was in good faith, a circumstance that could have
been favorably considered in determining his appropriate penalty.

At any rate, civil liability differs from criminal liability.[64] What is

punished in the latter is not the failure to pay the obligation, but the
issuance of checks that subsequently bounced or were dishonored for
insufficiency or lack of funds.[65] The Court reiterates the reasons why
the issuance of worthless checks is criminalized:

The practice is prohibited by law because of its deleterious effects on

public interest. The effects of the increase of worthless checks
transcend the private interest of the parties directly involved in the
transaction and touches the interest of the community at large. The
mischief it creates is not only a wrong to the payee or holder, but also
an injury to the public. The harmful practice of putting valueless
commercial papers in circulation multiplied a thousand-fold can very
well pollute the channels of trade and commerce, injure the banking
system and eventually hurt the welfare of society and the public
interest. The law punishes the act not as an offense against property
but an offense against public order.[66]

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED and the assailed Orders

NULLIFIED. Respondents Petition for habeas corpus is hereby DENIED.
Let this case be REMANDED to MTCC of Baguio City for the re-arrest of
respondent and the completion of his sentence.
JOHN ERIC LONEY, G.R. No. 152644

STEVEN PAUL REID and

PEDRO B. HERNANDEZ,

Petitioners, Present:

QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson,

CARPIO,

- versus - CARPIO MORALES, and

TINGA, JJ.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Promulgated:

Respondent. February 10, 2006

x--------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case
This is a petition for review[1] of the Decision[2] dated 5 November
2001 and the Resolution dated 14 March 2002 of the Court of Appeals.
The 5 November 2001 Decision affirmed the ruling of the Regional
Trial Court, Boac, Marinduque, Branch 94, in a suit to quash
Informations filed against petitioners John Eric Loney, Steven Paul
Reid, and Pedro B. Hernandez (petitioners). The 14 March 2002
Resolution denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.

The Facts

Petitioners John Eric Loney, Steven Paul Reid, and Pedro B. Hernandez
are the President and Chief Executive Officer, Senior Manager, and
Resident Manager for Mining Operations, respectively, of Marcopper
Mining Corporation (Marcopper), a corporation engaged in mining in
the province of Marinduque.

Marcopper had been storing tailings[3] from its operations in a pit in

Mt. Tapian, Marinduque. At the base of the pit ran a drainage tunnel
leading to the Boac and Makalupnit rivers. It appears that Marcopper
had placed a concrete plug at the tunnels end. On 24 March 1994,
tailings gushed out of or near the tunnels end. In a few days, the Mt.
Tapian pit had discharged millions of tons of tailings into the Boac and
Makalupnit rivers.

In August 1996, the Department of Justice separately charged

petitioners in the Municipal Trial Court of Boac, Marinduque (MTC)
with violation of Article 91(B),[4] sub-paragraphs 5 and 6 of
Presidential Decree No. 1067 or the Water Code of the Philippines (PD
1067),[5] Section 8[6] of Presidential Decree No. 984 or the National
Pollution Control Decree of 1976 (PD 984),[7] Section 108[8] of
Republic Act No. 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 (RA
7942),[9] and Article 365[10] of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) for
Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property.[11]

Petitioners moved to quash the Informations on the following

grounds: (1) the Informations were duplicitous as the Department of
Justice charged more than one offense for a single act; (2) petitioners
John Eric Loney and Steven Paul Reid were not yet officers of
Marcopper when the incident subject of the Informations took place;
and (3) the Informations contain allegations which constitute legal
excuse or justification.

The Ruling of the MTC

In its Joint Order of 16 January 1997 (Joint Order), the MTC[12] initially
deferred ruling on petitioners motion for lack of indubitable ground
for the quashing of the [I]nformations x x x. The MTC scheduled
petitioners arraignment in February 1997. However, on petitioners
motion, the MTC issued a Consolidated Order on 28 April 1997
(Consolidated Order), granting partial reconsideration to its Joint
Order and quashing the Informations for violation of PD 1067 and PD
984. The MTC maintained the Informations for violation of RA 7942
and Article 365 of the RPC. The MTC held:

[T]he 12 Informations have common allegations of pollutants pointing

to mine tailings which were precipitately discharged into the
Makulapnit and Boac Rivers due to breach caused on the Tapian
drainage/tunnel due to negligence or failure to institute adequate
measures to prevent pollution and siltation of the Makulapnit and
Boac River systems, the very term and condition required to be
undertaken under the Environmental Compliance Certificate issued on
April 1, 1990.

The allegations in the informations point to same set [sic] of evidence

required to prove the single fact of pollution constituting violation of
the Water Code and the Pollution Law which are the same set of
evidence necessary to prove the same single fact of pollution, in
proving the elements constituting violation of the conditions of ECC,
issued pursuant to the Philippine Mining Act. In both instances, the
terms and conditions of the Environmental Compliance Certificate
were allegedly violated. In other words, the same set of evidence is
required in proving violations of the three (3) special laws.

After carefully analyzing and weighing the contending arguments of

the parties and after taking into consideration the applicable laws and
jurisprudence, the Court is convinced that as far as the three (3)
aforesaid laws are concerned, only the Information for [v]iolation of
Philippine Mining Act should be maintained. In other words, the
Informations for [v]iolation of Anti-Pollution Law (PD 984) and the
Water Code (PD 1067) should be dismissed/quashed because the
elements constituting the aforesaid violations are absorbed by the
same elements which constitute violation of the Philippine Mining Act
(RA 7942).
Therefore, x x x Criminal Case[] Nos. 96-44, 96-45 and 96-46 for
[v]iolation of the Water Code; and Criminal Case[] Nos. 96-47, 96-48
and 96-49 for [v]iolation of the Anti-Pollution Law x x x are hereby
DISMISSED or QUASHED and Criminal Case[] Nos. 96-50, 96-51 and 96-
52 for [v]iolation of the Philippine Mining Act are hereby retained to
be tried on the merits.

The Information for [v]iolation of Article 365 of the Revised Penal

Code should also be maintained and heard in a full blown trial because
the common accusation therein is reckless imprudence resulting to
[sic] damage to property. It is the damage to property which the law
punishes not the negligent act of polluting the water system. The
prosecution for the [v]iolation of Philippine Mining Act is not a bar to
the prosecution for reckless imprudence resulting to [sic] damage to
property.[13]

The MTC re-scheduled petitioners arraignment on the remaining

charges on 28 and 29 May 1997. In the hearing of 28 May 1997,
petitioners manifested that they were willing to be arraigned on the
charge for violation of Article 365 of the RPC but not on the charge for
violation of RA 7942 as they intended to appeal the Consolidated
Order in so far as it maintained the Informations for that offense. After
making of record petitioners manifestation, the MTC proceeded with
the arraignment and ordered the entry of not guilty pleas on the
charges for violation of RA 7942 and Article 365 of the RPC.

Petitioners subsequently filed a petition for certiorari with the

Regional Trial Court, Boac, Marinduque, assailing that portion of the
Consolidated Order maintaining the Informations for violation of RA
7942. Petitioners petition was raffled to Branch 94. For its part, public
respondent filed an ordinary appeal with the same court assailing that
portion of the Consolidated Order quashing the Informations for
violation of PD 1067 and PD 984. Public respondents appeal was
raffled to Branch 38. On public respondents motion, Branch 38
ordered public respondents appeal consolidated with petitioners
petition in Branch 94.

The Ruling of Branch 94

In its Resolution[14] of 20 March 1998, Branch 94 granted public

respondents appeal but denied petitioners petition. Branch 94 set
aside the Consolidated Order in so far as it quashed the Informations
for violation of PD 1067 and PD 984 and ordered those charges
reinstated. Branch 94 affirmed the Consolidated Order in all other
respects. Branch 94 held:

After a careful perusal of the laws concerned, this court is of the

opinion that there can be no absorption by one offense of the three
other offenses, as [the] acts penalized by these laws are separate and
distinct from each other. The elements of proving each violation are
not the same with each other. Concededly, the single act of dumping
mine tailings which resulted in the pollution of the Makulapnit and
Boac rivers was the basis for the information[s] filed against the
accused each charging a distinct offense. But it is also a well-
established rule in this jurisdiction that
A single act may offend against two or more entirely distinct and
unrelated provisions of law, and if one provision requires proof of an
additional fact or element which the other does not, an acquittal or
conviction or a dismissal of the information under one does not bar
prosecution under the other. x x x.

xxxx

[T]he different laws involve cannot absorb one another as the

elements of each crime are different from one another. Each of these
laws require [sic] proof of an additional fact or element which the
other does not although they stemmed from a single act.[15]

Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals

alleging that Branch 94 acted with grave abuse of discretion because
(1) the Informations for violation of PD 1067, PD 984, RA 7942 and the
Article 365 of the RPC proceed from and are based on a single act or
incident of polluting the Boac and Makalupnit rivers thru dumping of
mine tailings and (2) the duplicitous nature of the Informations
contravenes the ruling in People v. Relova.[16] Petitioners further
contended that since the acts complained of in the charges for
violation of PD 1067, PD 984, and RA 7942 are the very same acts
complained of in the charge for violation of Article 365 of the RPC, the
latter absorbs the former. Hence, petitioners should only be
prosecuted for violation of Article 365 of the RPC.[17]
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

In its Decision of 5 November 2001, the Court of Appeals affirmed

Branch 94s ruling. The appellate court held:

The records of the case disclose that petitioners filed a motion to

quash the aforementioned Informations for being duplicitous in
nature. Section 3 of Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Court specifically
provides the grounds upon which an information may be quashed. x x
x

xxxx

[D]uplicity of Informations is not among those included in x x x

[Section 3, Rule 117].

xxxx

We now go to petitioners claim that the resolution of the public

respondent contravened the doctrine laid down in People vs. Relova
for being violative of their right against multiple prosecutions.

In the said case, the Supreme Court found the Peoples argument with
respect to the variances in the mens rea of the two offenses being
charged to be correct. The Court, however, decided the case in the
context of the second sentence of Article IV (22) of the 1973
Constitution (now under Section 21 of Article III of the 1987
Constitution), rather than the first sentence of the same section. x x x

xxxx

[T]he doctrine laid down in the Relova case does not squarely apply to
the case at Bench since the Informations filed against the petitioners
are for violation of four separate and distinct laws which are national
in character.

xxxx

This Court firmly agrees in the public respondents understanding that

the laws by which the petitioners have been [charged] could not
possibly absorb one another as the elements of each crime are
different. Each of these laws require [sic] proof of an additional fact or
element which the other does not, although they stemmed from a
single act. x x x

xxxx

[T]his Court finds that there is not even the slightest indicia of
evidence that would give rise to any suspicion that public respondent
acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of
jurisdiction in reversing the Municipal Trial Courts quashal of the
Informations against the petitioners for violation of P.D. 1067 and P.D.
984. This Court equally finds no error in the trial courts denial of the
petitioners motion to quash R.A. 7942 and Article 365 of the Revised
Penal Code.[18]

Petitioners sought reconsideration but the Court of Appeals denied

their motion in its Resolution of 14 March 2002.

Petitioners raise the following alleged errors of the Court of Appeals:

I. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A R[E]VERSIBLE ERROR IN

MAINTAINING THE CHARGES FOR VIOLATION OF THE PHILIPPINE
MINING ACT (R.A. 7942) AND REINSTATING THE CHARGES FOR
VIOLATION OF THE WATER CODE (P.D. 1067) AND POLLUTION
CONTROL LAW (P.D. 984), CONSIDERING THAT:

A. THE INFORMATIONS FOR VIOLATION OF THE WATER CODE (P.D.

1067), THE POLLUTION CONTROL LAW (P.D. 984), THE PHILIPPINE
MINING ACT (R.A. 7942) AND ARTICLE 365 OF THE REVISED PENAL
CODE PROCEED FROM AND ARE BASED ON A SINGLE ACT OR INCIDENT
OF POLLUTING THE BOAC AND MAKULAPNIT RIVERS THRU DUMPING
OF MINE TAILINGS.

B. THE PROSECUTION OF PETITIONERS FOR DUPLICITOUS AND

MULTIPLE CHARGES CONTRAVENES THE DOCTRINE LAID DOWN IN
PEOPLE VS. RELOVA, 148 SCRA 292 [1986] THAT AN ACCUSED SHOULD
NOT BE HARASSED BY MULTIPLE PROSECUTIONS FOR OFFENSES
WHICH THOUGH DIFFERENT FROM ONE ANOTHER ARE NONETHELESS
EACH CONSTITUTED BY A COMMON SET OR OVERLAPPING SETS OF
TECHNICAL ELEMENTS.
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN
RULING THAT THE ELEMENT OF LACK OF NECESSARY OR ADEQUATE
PRECAUTION, NEGLIGENCE, RECKLESSNESS AND IMPRUDENCE UNDER
ARTICLE 356 [sic] OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE DOES NOT FALL
WITHIN THE AMBIT OF ANY OF THE ELEMENTS OF THE PERTINENT
PROVISIONS OF THE WATER CODE, POLLUTION CONTROL LAW AND
PHILIPPINE MINING ACT CHARGED AGAINST PETITIONERS[.][19]

The Issues

The petition raises these issues:

(1) Whether all the charges filed against petitioners except one
should be quashed for duplicity of charges and only the charge for
Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property should stand;
and

(2) Whether Branch 94s ruling, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals,

contravenes People v. Relova.

The Ruling of the Court

The petition has no merit.

No Duplicity of Charges in the Present Case

Duplicity of charges simply means a single complaint or information

charges more than one offense, as Section 13 of Rule 110[20] of the
1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure clearly states:

Duplicity of offense. A complaint or information must charge but one

offense, except only in those cases in which existing laws prescribe a
single punishment for various offenses.

In short, there is duplicity (or multiplicity) of charges when a single

Information charges more than one offense.[21]

Under Section 3(e), Rule 117[22] of the 1985 Rules of Criminal

Procedure, duplicity of offenses in a single information is a ground to
quash the Information. The Rules prohibit the filing of such
Information to avoid confusing the accused in preparing his
defense.[23] Here, however, the prosecution charged each petitioner
with four offenses, with each Information charging only one offense.
Thus, petitioners erroneously invoke duplicity of charges as a ground
to quash the Informations. On this score alone, the petition deserves
outright denial.

The Filing of Several Charges is Proper

Petitioners contend that they should be charged with one offense only
Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property because (1) all
the charges filed against them proceed from and are based on a single
act or incident of polluting the Boac and Makalupnit rivers thru
dumping of mine tailings and (2) the charge for violation of Article 365
of the RPC absorbs the other charges since the element of lack of
necessary or adequate protection, negligence, recklessness and
imprudence is common among them.

The contention has no merit.

As early as the start of the last century, this Court had ruled that a
single act or incident might offend against two or more entirely
distinct and unrelated provisions of law thus justifying the prosecution
of the accused for more than one offense.[24] The only limit to this
rule is the Constitutional prohibition that no person shall be twice put
in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense.[25] In People v.
Doriquez,[26] we held that two (or more) offenses arising from the
same act are not the same

x x x if one provision [of law] requires proof of an additional fact or

element which the other does not, x x x. Phrased elsewise, where two
different laws (or articles of the same code) define two crimes, prior
jeopardy as to one of them is no obstacle to a prosecution of the
other, although both offenses arise from the same facts, if each crime
involves some important act which is not an essential element of the
other.[27] (Emphasis supplied)

Here, double jeopardy is not at issue because not all of its elements
are present.[28] However, for the limited purpose of controverting
petitioners claim that they should be charged with one offense only,
we quote with approval Branch 94s comparative analysis of PD 1067,
PD 984, RA 7942, and Article 365 of the RPC showing that in each of
these laws on which petitioners were charged, there is one essential
element not required of the others, thus:
In P.D. 1067 (Philippines Water Code), the additional element to be
established is the dumping of mine tailings into the Makulapnit River
and the entire Boac River System without prior permit from the
authorities concerned. The gravamen of the offense here is the
absence of the proper permit to dump said mine tailings. This element
is not indispensable in the prosecution for violation of PD 984 (Anti-
Pollution Law), [RA] 7942 (Philippine Mining Act) and Art. 365 of the
Revised Penal Code. One can be validly prosecuted for violating the
Water Code even in the absence of actual pollution, or even [if] it has
complied with the terms of its Environmental Compliance Certificate,
or further, even [if] it did take the necessary precautions to prevent
damage to property.

In P.D. 984 (Anti-Pollution Law), the additional fact that must be

proved is the existence of actual pollution. The gravamen is the
pollution itself. In the absence of any pollution, the accused must be
exonerated under this law although there was unauthorized dumping
of mine tailings or lack of precaution on its part to prevent damage to
property.

In R.A. 7942 (Philippine Mining Act), the additional fact that must be
established is the willful violation and gross neglect on the part of the
accused to abide by the terms and conditions of the Environmental
Compliance Certificate, particularly that the Marcopper should ensure
the containment of run-off and silt materials from reaching the
Mogpog and Boac Rivers. If there was no violation or neglect, and that
the accused satisfactorily proved [sic] that Marcopper had done
everything to ensure containment of the run-off and silt materials,
they will not be liable. It does not follow, however, that they cannot
be prosecuted under the Water Code, Anti-Pollution Law and the
Revised Penal Code because violation of the Environmental
Compliance Certificate is not an essential element of these laws.
On the other hand, the additional element that must be established in
Art. 365 of the Revised Penal Code is the lack of necessary or adequate
precaution, negligence, recklessness and imprudence on the part of
the accused to prevent damage to property. This element is not
required under the previous laws. Unquestionably, it is different from
dumping of mine tailings without permit, or causing pollution to the
Boac river system, much more from violation or neglect to abide by
the terms of the Environmental Compliance Certificate. Moreover, the
offenses punished by special law are mal[a] prohibita in contrast with
those punished by the Revised Penal Code which are mala in se.[29]

Consequently, the filing of the multiple charges against petitioners,

although based on the same incident, is consistent with settled
doctrine.

On petitioners claim that the charge for violation of Article 365 of the
RPC absorbs the charges for violation of PD 1067, PD 984, and RA
7942, suffice it to say that a mala in se felony (such as Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property) cannot absorb mala
prohibita crimes (such as those violating PD 1067, PD 984, and RA
7942). What makes the former a felony is criminal intent (dolo) or
negligence (culpa); what makes the latter crimes are the special laws
enacting them.

People v. Relova not in Point

Petitioners reiterate their contention in the Court of Appeals that their
prosecution contravenes this Courts ruling in People v. Relova. In
particular, petitioners cite the Courts statement in Relova that the law
seeks to prevent harassment of the accused by multiple prosecutions
for offenses which though different from one another are nonetheless
each constituted by a common set or overlapping sets of technical
elements.

This contention is also without merit.

The issue in Relova is whether the act of the Batangas Acting City
Fiscal in charging one Manuel Opulencia (Opulencia) with theft of
electric power under the RPC, after the latter had been acquitted of
violating a City Ordinance penalizing the unauthorized installation of
electrical wiring, violated Opulencias right against double jeopardy.
We held that it did, not because the offenses punished by those two
laws were the same but because the act giving rise to the charges was
punished by an ordinance and a national statute, thus falling within
the proscription against multiple prosecutions for the same act under
the second sentence in Section 22, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution,
now Section 21, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. We held:

The petitioner concludes that:

The unauthorized installation punished by the ordinance [of Batangas

City] is not the same as theft of electricity [under the Revised Penal
Code]; that the second offense is not an attempt to commit the first or
a frustration thereof and that the second offense is not necessarily
included in the offense charged in the first information.

The above argument[ ] made by the petitioner [is] of course correct.

This is clear both from the express terms of the constitutional
provision involved which reads as follows:

No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same

offense. If an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or
acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for
the same act. x x x

and from our case law on this point. The basic difficulty with the
petitioners position is that it must be examined, not under the terms
of the first sentence of Article IV (22) of the 1973 Constitution, but
rather under the second sentence of the same section. The first
sentence of Article IV (22) sets forth the general rule: the
constitutional protection against double jeopardy is not available
where the second prosecution is for an offense that is different from
the offense charged in the first or prior prosecution, although both the
first and second offenses may be based upon the same act or set of
acts. The second sentence of Article IV (22) embodies an exception to
the general proposition: the constitutional protection, against double
jeopardy is available although the prior offense charged under an
ordinance be different from the offense charged subsequently under a
national statute such as the Revised Penal Code, provided that both
offenses spring from the same act or set of acts. x x x[30] (Italicization
in the original; boldfacing supplied)
Thus, Relova is no authority for petitioners claim against multiple
prosecutions based on a single act not only because the question of
double jeopardy is not at issue here, but also because, as the Court of
Appeals held, petitioners are being prosecuted for an act or incident
punished by four national statutes and not by an ordinance and a
national statute. In short, petitioners, if ever, fall under the first
sentence of Section 21, Article III which prohibits multiple prosecution
for the same offense, and not, as in Relova, for offenses arising from
the same incident.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision dated 5

November 2001 and the Resolution dated 14 March 2002 of the Court
of Appeals.

SO ORDERED.
ARSENIA B. GARCIA, Petitioner,

vs.

HON. COURT OF APPEALS and the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Respondents

DECISION

QUISUMBING, J.:

This petition seeks the review of the judgment of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CR No. 245471that affirmed the conviction of petitioner by
the Regional Trial Court2of Alaminos City, Pangasinan, Branch 54, for
violation of Section 27(b) of Republic Act No. 6646.3

Based on the complaint-affidavit of Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., who ran

in the 1995 senatorial elections, an information dated March 30, 1998,
was filed in the Regional Trial Court of Alaminos, charging Herminio R.
Romero, Renato R. Viray, Rachel Palisoc and Francisca de Vera, and
petitioner, with violation of Section 27(b). The information reads:

That on or about May 11, 1995, which was within the canvassing
period during the May 8, 1995 elections, in the Municipality of
Alaminos, Province of Pangasinan, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
Election Officer Arsenia B. Garcia, Municipal Treasurer Herminio R.
Romero, Public School District Supervisor Renato R. Viray, Chairman,
Vice-Chairman, and Member-Secretary, respectively, of the Municipal
Board of Canvassers of Alaminos, Pangasinan, tabulators Rachel
Palisoc and Francisca de Vera, conspiring with, confederating together
and mutually helping each other, did, then and there, willfully, and
unlawfully decrease[d] the votes received by senatorial candidate
Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. from six thousand nine hundred ninety-eight
(6,998) votes, as clearly disclosed in the total number of votes in the
one hundred fifty-nine (159) precincts of the Statement of Votes by
Precincts of said municipality, with Serial Nos. 008417, 008418,
008419, 008420, 008421, 008422 and 008423 to one thousand nine
hundred twenty-one (1,921) votes as reflected in the Statement of
Votes by Precincts with Serial No. 008423 and Certificate of Canvass
with Serial No. 436156 with a difference of five thousand seventy-
seven (5,077) votes.

CONTRARY TO LAW.4

In a Decision dated September 11, 2000, the RTC acquitted all the
accused for insufficiency of evidence, except petitioner who was
convicted as follows:

xxx

5. And finally, on the person of Arsenia B. Garcia, the Court

pronounces her GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt, of the crime
defined under Republic Act 6646, Section 27 (b) for decreasing the
votes of Senator Pimentel in the total of 5,034 and in relation to BP
Blg. 881, considering that this finding is a violation of Election Offense,
she is thus sentenced to suffer an imprisonment of SIX (6) YEARS as
maximum, but applying the INDETERMINATE SENTENCE LAW, the
minimum penalty is the next degree lower which is SIX (6) MONTHS;
however, accused Arsenia B. Garcia is not entitled to probation;
further, she is sentenced to suffer disqualification to hold public office
and she is also deprived of her right of suffrage.

The bailbond posted by her is hereby ordered cancelled, and the

Provincial Warden is ordered to commit her person to the Bureau of
Correctional Institution for Women, at Metro Manila, until further
orders from the court.

No pronouncement as to costs.

IT IS SO ORDERED.5

Petitioner appealed before the Court of Appeals which affirmed with

modification the RTC Decision, thus,

WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, the appealed decision is hereby

affirmed with modification, increasing the minimum penalty imposed
by the trial court from six (6) months to one (1) year.

SO ORDERED.6

The Court of Appeals likewise denied the motion for reconsideration.

Hence, this appeal assigning the following as errors of the appellate
court:
I

ON THE FIRST AND SECOND GROUNDS RELIED UPON BY THE

RESPONDENT COURT, NAMELY, THAT IT COULD NOT HAVE BEEN
SECRETARY VIRAY WHO DECREASED THE VOTES OF COMPLAINANT
PIMENTEL SINCE HE MERELY RELIED ON WHAT THE PETITIONER
DICTATED, AND THAT IT COULD NOT HAVE ALSO BEEN THE
TABULATORS BECAUSE PETITIONER WAS THE ONE WHO READ THE
ADDING [MACHINE] TAPE.

II

ON THE THIRD GROUND, NAMELY, THAT PETITIONER DID NOT

PRODUCE THE TAPES DURING THE TRIAL BECAUSE IF PRODUCED, IT IS
GOING TO BE ADVERSE TO HER.

III

ON THE FOURTH GROUND, NAMELY, THAT THE PETITIONER WAS THE

ONE WHO ENTERED THE REDUCED FIGURE OF 1,921 IN THE
CERTIFICATE OF CANVASS (COC), Exh. "7", WHEN THE DUTY WAS THAT
OF THE SECRETARY OF THE BOARD.

IV
THE REDUCTION OF THE VOTES OF CANDIDATE PIMENTEL WAS
CLEARLY NOT WILLFUL OR INTENTIONAL.7

Petitioner contends that (1) the Court of Appeals’ judgment is

erroneous, based on speculations, surmises and conjectures, instead
of substantial evidence; and (2) there was no motive on her part to
reduce the votes of private complainant.

Respondent on the other hand contends that good faith is not a

defense in the violation of an election law, which falls under the class
of mala prohibita.

The main issue is, Is a violation of Section 27(b) of Rep. Act No. 6646,
classified under mala in se or mala prohibita? Could good faith and
lack of criminal intent be valid defenses?

Generally, mala in se felonies are defined and penalized in the Revised

Penal Code. When the acts complained of are inherently immoral,
they are deemed mala in se, even if they are punished by a special
law.8Accordingly, criminal intent must be clearly established with the
other elements of the crime; otherwise, no crime is committed. On
the other hand, in crimes that are mala prohibita, the criminal acts are
not inherently immoral but become punishable only because the law
says they are forbidden. With these crimes, the sole issue is whether
the law has been violated.9Criminal intent is not necessary where the
acts are prohibited for reasons of public policy.10

Section 27(b) of Republic Act No. 664611provides:

SEC. 27. Election Offenses.- In addition to the prohibited acts and
election offenses enumerated in Sections 261 and 262 of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 881, as amended, the following shall be guilty of an
election offense:

xxx

(b) Any member of the board of election inspectors or board of

canvassers who tampers, increases, or decreases the votes received by
a candidate in any election or any member of the board who refuses,
after proper verification and hearing, to credit the correct votes or
deduct such tampered votes.

xxx

Clearly, the acts prohibited in Section 27(b) are mala in se.12For

otherwise, even errors and mistakes committed due to overwork and
fatigue would be punishable. Given the volume of votes to be counted
and canvassed within a limited amount of time, errors and
miscalculations are bound to happen. And it could not be the intent of
the law to punish unintentional election canvass errors. However,
intentionally increasing or decreasing the number of votes received by
a candidate is inherently immoral, since it is done with malice and
intent to injure another.

Criminal intent is presumed to exist on the part of the person who

executes an act which the law punishes, unless the contrary shall
appear.13Thus, whoever invokes good faith as a defense has the
burden of proving its existence.

Records show that the canvassing of votes on May 11, 1995 before the
Board of Canvassers of the Municipality of Alaminos, Pangasinan was
conducted as follows:

1. After the votes in the 159 precincts of the municipality of Alaminos

were tallied, the results thereof were sealed and forwarded to the
Municipal Board of Canvassers for canvassing;

2. The number of votes received by each candidate in each precinct

was then recorded in the Statement of Votes with appellant, in her
capacity as Chairman, reading the figures appearing in the results from
the precincts and accused Viray, in his capacity as secretary of the
Board, entering the number in the Statements of Votes as read by the
appellant. Six Statements of Votes were filled up to reflect the votes
received by each candidate in the 159 precincts of the Municipality of
Alaminos, Pangasinan.

3. After the number of votes received by each candidate for each

precincts were entered by accused Viray in the Statements of Votes,
these votes were added by the accused Palisoc and de Vera with the
use of electrical adding machines.

4. After the tabulation by accused Palisoc and de Vera, the

corresponding machine tapes were handed to appellant who reads the
subtotal of votes received by each candidate in the precincts listed in
each Statement of Votes. Accused Viray [then] records the subtotal in
the proper column in the Statement of Votes.

5. After the subtotals had been entered by accused Viray, tabulators

accused Palisoc and de Vera added all the subtotals appearing in all
Statement of Votes.

6. After the computation, the corresponding machine tape on which

the grand total was reflected was handed to appellant who reads the
same and accused Viray enters the figure read by appellant in the
column for grand total in the Statement of Votes.14

Neither the correctness of the number of votes entered in the

Statement of Votes (SOV) for each precinct, nor of the number of
votes entered as subtotals of votes received in the precincts listed in
SOV Nos. 008417 to 008422 was raised as an issue.

At first glance, however, there is a noticeable discrepancy in the

addition of the subtotals to arrive at the grand total of votes received
by each candidate for all 159 precincts in SOV No. 008423.15The grand
total of the votes for private complainant, Senator Aquilino Pimentel,
was only 1,921 instead of 6,921, or 5,000 votes less than the number
of votes private complainant actually received. This error is also
evident in the Certificate of Canvass (COC) No. 436156 signed by
petitioner, Viray and Romero.16

During trial of this case, petitioner admitted that she was indeed the
one who announced the figure of 1,921, which was subsequently
entered by then accused Viray in his capacity as secretary of the
board.17Petitioner likewise admitted that she was the one who
prepared the COC (Exhibit A-7), though it was not her duty. To our
mind, preparing the COC even if it was not her task, manifests an
intention to perpetuate the erroneous entry in the COC.18

Neither can this Court accept petitioner’s explanation that the Board
of Canvassers had no idea how the SOV (Exhibit "6") and the COC
reflected that private complainant had only 1,921 votes instead of
6,921 votes. As chairman of the Municipal Board of Canvassers,
petitioner’s concern was to assure accurate, correct and authentic
entry of the votes. Her failure to exercise maximum efficiency and
fidelity to her trust deserves not only censure but also the
concomitant sanctions as a matter of criminal responsibility pursuant
to the dictates of the law.19

The fact that the number of votes deducted from the actual votes
received by private complainant, Sen. Aquilino Pimentel, Jr. was not
added to any senatorial candidate does not relieve petitioner of
liability under Section 27(b) of Rep. Act No. 6646. The mere decreasing
of the votes received by a candidate in an election is already
punishable under the said provision.20

At this point, we see no valid reason to disturb the factual conclusions

of the appellate court. The Court has consistently held that factual
findings of the trial court, as well as of the Court of Appeals are final
and conclusive and may not be reviewed on appeal, particularly where
the findings of both the trial court and the appellate court on the
matter coincide.21
Public policy dictates that extraordinary diligence should be exercised
by the members of the board of canvassers in canvassing the results of
the elections. Any error on their part would result in the
disenfranchisement of the voters. The Certificate of Canvass for
senatorial candidates and its supporting statements of votes prepared
by the municipal board of canvassers are sensitive election documents
whose entries must be thoroughly scrutinized.22

In our review, the votes in the SOV should total 6,998.23

As between the grand total of votes alleged to have been received by

private complainant of 6,921 votes and statement of his actual votes
received of 6,998 is a difference of 77 votes. The discrepancy may be
validly attributed to mistake or error due to fatigue. However, a
decrease of 5,000 votes as reflected in the Statement of Votes and
Certificate of Canvass is substantial, it cannot be allowed to remain on
record unchallenged, especially when the error results from the mere
transfer of totals from one document to another.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision of

the Court of Appeals sustaining petitioner’s conviction but increasing
the minimum penalty in her sentence to one year instead of six
months is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
ALFREDO DE GUZMAN, JR., Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondent.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

Frustrated homicide requires intent to kill on the part of the offender.

Without proof of such intent, the felony may only be serious physical
injuries. Intent to kill may be established through the overt and
external acts and conduct of the offender before, during and after the
assault, or by the nature, location and number of the wounds inflicted
on the victim.

The Case

Under review at the instance of the petitioner is the decision

promulgated on September 27, 2006,1 whereby the Court of Appeals
(CA) affirmed his conviction for frustrated homicide committed against
Alexander Flojo under the judgment rendered on September 10, 2003
by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 213, in Mandaluyong City in
Criminal Case No. 191-MD.2

Antecedents
The CA summarized the versions of the parties as
follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

x x x [O]n December 24, 1997, at about ten o’clock in the evening,

Alexander Flojo (hereafter “Alexander”) was fetching water below his
rented house at 443 Aglipay Street, Old Zaniga St., Mandaluyong City
when suddenly Alfredo De Guzman (hereafter “Alfredo”), the brother
of his land lady, Lucila Bautista (hereafter “Lucila”), hit him on the
nape. Alexander informed Lucila about what Alfredo did to him. Lucila
apologized to Alexander by saying, “Pasensya ka na Mang Alex” and
told the latter to just go up. Alexander obliged and went upstairs. He
took a rest for about two hours. Thereafter, at around 12:00 to 12:15
A.M., Alexander went down and continued to fetch water. While
pouring water into a container, Alfredo suddenly appeared in front of
Alexander and stabbed him on his left face and chest.

Cirilino Bantaya, a son-in-law of Alexander, saw the latter bleeding on

the left portion of his body and begging for help. Alexander then told
Cirilino that Alfredo stabbed him. Cirilino immediately loaded
Alexander into his motorcycle (backride) and brought him to the
Mandaluyong City Medical Center. Upon arrival at the hospital, the
doctors immediately rendered medical assistance to Alexander.
Alexander stayed in the emergency room of said hospital for about 30
to 40 minutes. Then, he was brought to the second floor of the said
hospital where he was confined for two days. Thereafter, Alexander
was transferred to the Polymedic General Hospital where he was
subjected for (sic) further medical examination.

Alexander sustained two stabbed (sic) wounds. (sic) One of which was
on the zygoma, left side, and about one (1) cm. long. The other is on
his upper left chest which penetrated the fourth intercostal space at
the proximal clavicular line measuring about two (2) cm. The second
stabbed (sic) wound penetrated the thoracic wall and left lung of the
victim which resulted to blood air (sic) in the thoracic cavity thus
necessitating the insertion of a thoracostomy tube to remove the
blood. According to Dr. Francisco Obmerga, the physician who treated
the victim at the Mandaluyong City Medical Center, the second wound
was fatal and could have caused Alexander’s death without timely
medical intervention. (Tsn, July 8, 1998, p.8).

On the other hand, Alfredo denied having stabbed Alexander.

According to him, on December 25, 1997 at around midnight, he
passed by Alexander who was, then, fixing a motorcycle. At that point,
he accidentally hit Alexander’s back, causing the latter to throw
invective words against him. He felt insulted, thus, a fistfight ensued
between them. They even rolled on the ground. Alfredo hit Alexander
on the cheek causing blood to ooze from the latter’s face.3

The RTC convicted the petitioner, decreeing

thusly:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

PRESCINDING (sic) FROM THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the

court finds accused Alfredo De Guzman y Agkis a.k.a., “JUNIOR,” guilty
beyond reasonable doubt for (sic) the crime of FRUSTRATED
HOMICIDE defined and penalized in Article 250 of the Revised Penal
Code and in the absence of any modifying circumstance, he is hereby
sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of Six (6) Months and
One (1) day of PRISION CORR[R]ECCIONAL as MINIMUM to Six (6)
Years and One (1) day of PRISION MAYOR as MAXIMUM .

The accused is further ordered to pay the private complainant

compensatory damages in the amount of P14,170.35 representing the
actual pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly proven.

SO ORDERED.4
On appeal, the petitioner contended that his guilt had not been
proved beyond reasonable doubt; that intent to kill, the critical
element of the crime charged, was not established; that the injuries
sustained by Alexander were mere scuffmarks inflicted in the heat of
anger during the fistfight between them; that he did not inflict the
stab wounds, insisting that another person could have inflicted such
wounds; and that he had caused only slight physical injuries on
Alexander, for which he should be accordingly found guilty.

Nonetheless, the CA affirmed the petitioner’s conviction,

viz:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is DISMISSED.

The September 10, 2003 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Mandaluyong City, Branch 213, is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.5

The CA denied the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration on May 2,

2007.6

Issue

Was the petitioner properly found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of

frustrated homicide?

Ruling
The appeal lacks merit.

The elements of frustrated homicide are: (1) the accused intended to

kill his victim, as manifested by his use of a deadly weapon in his
assault; (2) the victim sustained fatal or mortal wound but did not die
because of timely medical assistance; and (3) none of the qualifying
circumstances for murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code
, as amended, is present.7 Inasmuch as the trial and appellate courts
found none of the qualifying circumstances in murder under Article
248 to be present, we immediately proceed to ascertain the presence
of the two other elements.

The petitioner adamantly denies that intent to kill was present during
the fistfight between him and Alexander. He claims that the
heightened emotions during the fistfight naturally emboldened both
of them, but he maintains that he only inflicted minor abrasions on
Alexander, not the stab wounds that he appeared to have sustained.
Hence, he should be held liable only for serious physical injuries
because the intent to kill, the necessary element to characterize the
crime as homicide, was not sufficiently established. He avers that such
intent to kill is the main element that distinguishes the crime of
physical injuries from the crime of homicide; and that the crime is
homicide only if the intent to kill is competently shown.

The essential element in frustrated or attempted homicide is the

intent of the offender to kill the victim immediately before or
simultaneously with the infliction of injuries. Intent to kill is a specific
intent that the State must allege in the information, and then prove by
either direct or circumstantial evidence, as differentiated from a
general criminal intent, which is presumed from the commission of a
felony by dolo.8 Intent to kill, being a state of mind, is discerned by
the courts only through external manifestations, i.e., the acts and
conduct of the accused at the time of the assault and immediately
thereafter. In Rivera v. People,9 we considered the following factors to
determine the presence of intent to kill, namely: (1) the means used
by the malefactors; (2) the nature, location, and number of wounds
sustained by the victim; (3) the conduct of the malefactors before,
during, or immediately after the killing of the victim; and (4) the
circumstances under which the crime was committed and the motives
of the accused. We have also considered as determinative factors the
motive of the offender and the words he uttered at the time of
inflicting the injuries on the victim.10

Here, both the trial and the appellate court agreed that intent to kill
was present. We concur with them. Contrary to the petitioner’s
submission, the wounds sustained by Alexander were not mere
scuffmarks inflicted in the heat of anger or as the result of a fistfight
between them. The petitioner wielded and used a knife in his assault
on Alexander. The medical records indicate, indeed, that Alexander
sustained two stab wounds, specifically, one on his upper left chest
and the other on the left side of his face. The petitioner’s attack was
unprovoked with the knife used therein causing such wounds, thereby
belying his submission, and firmly proving the presence of intent to
kill. There is also to be no doubt about the wound on Alexander’s
chest being sufficient to result into his death were it not for the timely
medical intervention.

With the State having thereby shown that the petitioner already
performed all the acts of execution that should produce the felony of
homicide as a consequence, but did not produce it by reason of causes
independent of his will, i.e., the timely medical attention accorded to
Alexander, he was properly found guilty of frustrated homicide.
We have no cogent reason to deviate from or to disregard the findings
of the trial and appellate courts on the credibility of Alexander’s
testimony. It is not disputed that the testimony of a single but credible
and trustworthy witness sufficed to support the conviction of the
petitioner. This guideline finds more compelling application when the
lone witness is the victim himself whose direct and positive
identification of his assailant is almost always regarded with
indubitable credibility, owing to the natural tendency of the victim to
seek justice for himself, and thus strive to remember the face of his
assailant and to recall the manner in which the latter committed the
crime.11 Moreover, it is significant that the petitioner’s mere denial of
the deadly manner of his attack was contradicted by the credible
physical evidence corroborating Alexander’s statements. Under the
circumstances, we can only affirm the petitioner’s conviction for
frustrated homicide.

The affirmance of the conviction notwithstanding, we find the

indeterminate penalty of “Six (6) Months and One (1) day of PRISION
CORR[R]ECCIONAL as MINIMUM to Six (6) Years and One (1) day of
PRISION MAYOR as MAXIMUM ”12 fixed by the RTC erroneous despite
the CA concurring with the trial court thereon. Under Section 1 of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, an indeterminate sentence is imposed
on the offender consisting of a maximum term and a minimum
term.13 The maximum term is the penalty properly imposed under
the Revised Penal Code after considering any attending modifying
circumstances; while the minimum term is within the range of the
penalty next lower than that prescribed by the Revised Penal Code for
the offense committed. Conformably with Article 50 of the Revised
Penal Code,14 frustrated homicide is punished by prision mayor,
which is next lower to reclusion temporal, the penalty for homicide
under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code. There being no
aggravating or mitigating circumstances present, however, prision
mayor in its medium period – from eight years and one day to 10 years
– is proper. As can be seen, the maximum of six years and one day of
prision mayor as fixed by the RTC and affirmed by the CA was not
within the medium period of prision mayor. Accordingly, the correct
indeterminate sentence is four years of prision correccional, as the
minimum, to eight years and one day of prision mayor, as the
maximum.

The RTC and the CA also agreed on limiting the civil liability to the sum
of P14,170.35 as compensatory damages “representing the actual
pecuniary loss suffered by [Alexander] as he has duly proven.”15 We
need to revise such civil liability in order to conform to the law, the
Rules of Court and relevant jurisprudence. In Bacolod v. People,16 we
emphatically declared to be “imperative that the courts prescribe the
proper penalties when convicting the accused, and determine the civil
liability to be imposed on the accused, unless there has been a
reservation of the action to recover civil liability or a waiver of its
recovery.” We explained why in the following
manner:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

It is not amiss to stress that both the RTC and the CA disregarded their
express mandate under Section 2, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court to
have the judgment, if it was of conviction, state: “(1) the legal
qualification of the offense constituted by the acts committed by the
accused and the aggravating or mitigating circumstances which
attended its commission; (2) the participation of the accused in the
offense, whether as principal, accomplice, or accessory after the fact;
(3) the penalty imposed upon the accused; and (4) the civil liability or
damages caused by his wrongful act or omission to be recovered from
the accused by the offended party, if there is any, unless the
enforcement of the civil liability by a separate civil action has been
reserved or waived.” Their disregard compels us to act as we now do
lest the Court be unreasonably seen as tolerant of their omission. That
the Spouses Cogtas did not themselves seek the correction of the
omission by an appeal is no hindrance to this action because the
Court, as the final reviewing tribunal, has not only the authority but
also the duty to correct at any time a matter of law and justice.

We also pointedly remind all trial and appellate courts to avoid

omitting reliefs that the parties are properly entitled to by law or in
equity under the established facts. Their judgments will not be worthy
of the name unless they thereby fully determine the rights and
obligations of the litigants. It cannot be otherwise, for only by a full
determination of such rights and obligations would they be true to the
judicial office of administering justice and equity for all. Courts should
then be alert and cautious in their rendition of judgments of
conviction in criminal cases. They should prescribe the legal penalties,
which is what the Constitution and the law require and expect them to
do. Their prescription of the wrong penalties will be invalid and
ineffectual for being done without jurisdiction or in manifest grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. They should also
determine and set the civil liability ex delicto of the accused, in order
to do justice to the complaining victims who are always entitled to
them. The Rules of Court mandates them to do so unless the
enforcement of the civil liability by separate actions has been reserved
or waived.17

Alexander as the victim in frustrated homicide suffered moral injuries

because the offender committed violence that nearly took away the
victim’s life. “Moral damages include physical suffering, mental
anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded
feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury. Though
incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages may be
recovered if they are the proximate result of the defendant's wrongful
act for omission.”18 Indeed, Article 2219, (1), of the Civil Code
expressly recognizes the right of the victim in crimes resulting in
physical injuries.19 Towards that end, the Court, upon its appreciation
of the records, decrees that P30,000.00 is a reasonable award of moral
damages.20 In addition, AAA was entitled to recover civil indemnity of
P30,000.00.21 Both of these awards did not require allegation and
proof.

In addition, the amounts awarded as civil liability of the petitioner

shall earn interest of 6% per annum reckoned from the finality of this
decision until full payment by the accused.

WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on

September 27, 2006 finding petitioner Alfredo De Guzman, Jr. GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of FRUSTRATED HOMICIDE, and SENTENCES
him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of four years of prision
correccional, as the minimum, to eight years and one day of prision
mayor, as the maximum; ORDERS the petitioner to pay to Alexander
Flojo civil indemnity of P30,000.00; moral damages of P30,000.00; and
compensatory damages of P14,170.35, plus interest of 6% per annum
on all such awards from the finality of this decision until full payment;
and DIRECTS the petitioner to pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.
ALFREDO DE GUZMAN, JR., Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondent.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

Frustrated homicide requires intent to kill on the part of the offender.

Without proof of such intent, the felony may only be serious physical
injuries. Intent to kill may be established through the overt and
external acts and conduct of the offender before, during and after the
assault, or by the nature, location and number of the wounds inflicted
on the victim.

The Case

Under review at the instance of the petitioner is the decision

promulgated on September 27, 2006,1 whereby the Court of Appeals
(CA) affirmed his conviction for frustrated homicide committed against
Alexander Flojo under the judgment rendered on September 10, 2003
by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 213, in Mandaluyong City in
Criminal Case No. 191-MD.2

Antecedents
The CA summarized the versions of the parties as
follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

x x x [O]n December 24, 1997, at about ten o’clock in the evening,

Alexander Flojo (hereafter “Alexander”) was fetching water below his
rented house at 443 Aglipay Street, Old Zaniga St., Mandaluyong City
when suddenly Alfredo De Guzman (hereafter “Alfredo”), the brother
of his land lady, Lucila Bautista (hereafter “Lucila”), hit him on the
nape. Alexander informed Lucila about what Alfredo did to him. Lucila
apologized to Alexander by saying, “Pasensya ka na Mang Alex” and
told the latter to just go up. Alexander obliged and went upstairs. He
took a rest for about two hours. Thereafter, at around 12:00 to 12:15
A.M., Alexander went down and continued to fetch water. While
pouring water into a container, Alfredo suddenly appeared in front of
Alexander and stabbed him on his left face and chest.

Cirilino Bantaya, a son-in-law of Alexander, saw the latter bleeding on

the left portion of his body and begging for help. Alexander then told
Cirilino that Alfredo stabbed him. Cirilino immediately loaded
Alexander into his motorcycle (backride) and brought him to the
Mandaluyong City Medical Center. Upon arrival at the hospital, the
doctors immediately rendered medical assistance to Alexander.
Alexander stayed in the emergency room of said hospital for about 30
to 40 minutes. Then, he was brought to the second floor of the said
hospital where he was confined for two days. Thereafter, Alexander
was transferred to the Polymedic General Hospital where he was
subjected for (sic) further medical examination.

Alexander sustained two stabbed (sic) wounds. (sic) One of which was
on the zygoma, left side, and about one (1) cm. long. The other is on
his upper left chest which penetrated the fourth intercostal space at
the proximal clavicular line measuring about two (2) cm. The second
stabbed (sic) wound penetrated the thoracic wall and left lung of the
victim which resulted to blood air (sic) in the thoracic cavity thus
necessitating the insertion of a thoracostomy tube to remove the
blood. According to Dr. Francisco Obmerga, the physician who treated
the victim at the Mandaluyong City Medical Center, the second wound
was fatal and could have caused Alexander’s death without timely
medical intervention. (Tsn, July 8, 1998, p.8).

On the other hand, Alfredo denied having stabbed Alexander.

According to him, on December 25, 1997 at around midnight, he
passed by Alexander who was, then, fixing a motorcycle. At that point,
he accidentally hit Alexander’s back, causing the latter to throw
invective words against him. He felt insulted, thus, a fistfight ensued
between them. They even rolled on the ground. Alfredo hit Alexander
on the cheek causing blood to ooze from the latter’s face.3

The RTC convicted the petitioner, decreeing

thusly:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

PRESCINDING (sic) FROM THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the

court finds accused Alfredo De Guzman y Agkis a.k.a., “JUNIOR,” guilty
beyond reasonable doubt for (sic) the crime of FRUSTRATED
HOMICIDE defined and penalized in Article 250 of the Revised Penal
Code and in the absence of any modifying circumstance, he is hereby
sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of Six (6) Months and
One (1) day of PRISION CORR[R]ECCIONAL as MINIMUM to Six (6)
Years and One (1) day of PRISION MAYOR as MAXIMUM .

The accused is further ordered to pay the private complainant

compensatory damages in the amount of P14,170.35 representing the
actual pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly proven.

SO ORDERED.4
On appeal, the petitioner contended that his guilt had not been
proved beyond reasonable doubt; that intent to kill, the critical
element of the crime charged, was not established; that the injuries
sustained by Alexander were mere scuffmarks inflicted in the heat of
anger during the fistfight between them; that he did not inflict the
stab wounds, insisting that another person could have inflicted such
wounds; and that he had caused only slight physical injuries on
Alexander, for which he should be accordingly found guilty.

Nonetheless, the CA affirmed the petitioner’s conviction,

viz:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is DISMISSED.

The September 10, 2003 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Mandaluyong City, Branch 213, is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.5

The CA denied the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration on May 2,

2007.6

Issue

Was the petitioner properly found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of

frustrated homicide?

Ruling
The appeal lacks merit.

The elements of frustrated homicide are: (1) the accused intended to

kill his victim, as manifested by his use of a deadly weapon in his
assault; (2) the victim sustained fatal or mortal wound but did not die
because of timely medical assistance; and (3) none of the qualifying
circumstances for murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code
, as amended, is present.7 Inasmuch as the trial and appellate courts
found none of the qualifying circumstances in murder under Article
248 to be present, we immediately proceed to ascertain the presence
of the two other elements.

The petitioner adamantly denies that intent to kill was present during
the fistfight between him and Alexander. He claims that the
heightened emotions during the fistfight naturally emboldened both
of them, but he maintains that he only inflicted minor abrasions on
Alexander, not the stab wounds that he appeared to have sustained.
Hence, he should be held liable only for serious physical injuries
because the intent to kill, the necessary element to characterize the
crime as homicide, was not sufficiently established. He avers that such
intent to kill is the main element that distinguishes the crime of
physical injuries from the crime of homicide; and that the crime is
homicide only if the intent to kill is competently shown.

The essential element in frustrated or attempted homicide is the

intent of the offender to kill the victim immediately before or
simultaneously with the infliction of injuries. Intent to kill is a specific
intent that the State must allege in the information, and then prove by
either direct or circumstantial evidence, as differentiated from a
general criminal intent, which is presumed from the commission of a
felony by dolo.8 Intent to kill, being a state of mind, is discerned by
the courts only through external manifestations, i.e., the acts and
conduct of the accused at the time of the assault and immediately
thereafter. In Rivera v. People,9 we considered the following factors to
determine the presence of intent to kill, namely: (1) the means used
by the malefactors; (2) the nature, location, and number of wounds
sustained by the victim; (3) the conduct of the malefactors before,
during, or immediately after the killing of the victim; and (4) the
circumstances under which the crime was committed and the motives
of the accused. We have also considered as determinative factors the
motive of the offender and the words he uttered at the time of
inflicting the injuries on the victim.10

Here, both the trial and the appellate court agreed that intent to kill
was present. We concur with them. Contrary to the petitioner’s
submission, the wounds sustained by Alexander were not mere
scuffmarks inflicted in the heat of anger or as the result of a fistfight
between them. The petitioner wielded and used a knife in his assault
on Alexander. The medical records indicate, indeed, that Alexander
sustained two stab wounds, specifically, one on his upper left chest
and the other on the left side of his face. The petitioner’s attack was
unprovoked with the knife used therein causing such wounds, thereby
belying his submission, and firmly proving the presence of intent to
kill. There is also to be no doubt about the wound on Alexander’s
chest being sufficient to result into his death were it not for the timely
medical intervention.

With the State having thereby shown that the petitioner already
performed all the acts of execution that should produce the felony of
homicide as a consequence, but did not produce it by reason of causes
independent of his will, i.e., the timely medical attention accorded to
Alexander, he was properly found guilty of frustrated homicide.
We have no cogent reason to deviate from or to disregard the findings
of the trial and appellate courts on the credibility of Alexander’s
testimony. It is not disputed that the testimony of a single but credible
and trustworthy witness sufficed to support the conviction of the
petitioner. This guideline finds more compelling application when the
lone witness is the victim himself whose direct and positive
identification of his assailant is almost always regarded with
indubitable credibility, owing to the natural tendency of the victim to
seek justice for himself, and thus strive to remember the face of his
assailant and to recall the manner in which the latter committed the
crime.11 Moreover, it is significant that the petitioner’s mere denial of
the deadly manner of his attack was contradicted by the credible
physical evidence corroborating Alexander’s statements. Under the
circumstances, we can only affirm the petitioner’s conviction for
frustrated homicide.

The affirmance of the conviction notwithstanding, we find the

indeterminate penalty of “Six (6) Months and One (1) day of PRISION
CORR[R]ECCIONAL as MINIMUM to Six (6) Years and One (1) day of
PRISION MAYOR as MAXIMUM ”12 fixed by the RTC erroneous despite
the CA concurring with the trial court thereon. Under Section 1 of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, an indeterminate sentence is imposed
on the offender consisting of a maximum term and a minimum
term.13 The maximum term is the penalty properly imposed under
the Revised Penal Code after considering any attending modifying
circumstances; while the minimum term is within the range of the
penalty next lower than that prescribed by the Revised Penal Code for
the offense committed. Conformably with Article 50 of the Revised
Penal Code,14 frustrated homicide is punished by prision mayor,
which is next lower to reclusion temporal, the penalty for homicide
under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code. There being no
aggravating or mitigating circumstances present, however, prision
mayor in its medium period – from eight years and one day to 10 years
– is proper. As can be seen, the maximum of six years and one day of
prision mayor as fixed by the RTC and affirmed by the CA was not
within the medium period of prision mayor. Accordingly, the correct
indeterminate sentence is four years of prision correccional, as the
minimum, to eight years and one day of prision mayor, as the
maximum.

The RTC and the CA also agreed on limiting the civil liability to the sum
of P14,170.35 as compensatory damages “representing the actual
pecuniary loss suffered by [Alexander] as he has duly proven.”15 We
need to revise such civil liability in order to conform to the law, the
Rules of Court and relevant jurisprudence. In Bacolod v. People,16 we
emphatically declared to be “imperative that the courts prescribe the
proper penalties when convicting the accused, and determine the civil
liability to be imposed on the accused, unless there has been a
reservation of the action to recover civil liability or a waiver of its
recovery.” We explained why in the following
manner:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

It is not amiss to stress that both the RTC and the CA disregarded their
express mandate under Section 2, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court to
have the judgment, if it was of conviction, state: “(1) the legal
qualification of the offense constituted by the acts committed by the
accused and the aggravating or mitigating circumstances which
attended its commission; (2) the participation of the accused in the
offense, whether as principal, accomplice, or accessory after the fact;
(3) the penalty imposed upon the accused; and (4) the civil liability or
damages caused by his wrongful act or omission to be recovered from
the accused by the offended party, if there is any, unless the
enforcement of the civil liability by a separate civil action has been
reserved or waived.” Their disregard compels us to act as we now do
lest the Court be unreasonably seen as tolerant of their omission. That
the Spouses Cogtas did not themselves seek the correction of the
omission by an appeal is no hindrance to this action because the
Court, as the final reviewing tribunal, has not only the authority but
also the duty to correct at any time a matter of law and justice.

We also pointedly remind all trial and appellate courts to avoid

omitting reliefs that the parties are properly entitled to by law or in
equity under the established facts. Their judgments will not be worthy
of the name unless they thereby fully determine the rights and
obligations of the litigants. It cannot be otherwise, for only by a full
determination of such rights and obligations would they be true to the
judicial office of administering justice and equity for all. Courts should
then be alert and cautious in their rendition of judgments of
conviction in criminal cases. They should prescribe the legal penalties,
which is what the Constitution and the law require and expect them to
do. Their prescription of the wrong penalties will be invalid and
ineffectual for being done without jurisdiction or in manifest grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. They should also
determine and set the civil liability ex delicto of the accused, in order
to do justice to the complaining victims who are always entitled to
them. The Rules of Court mandates them to do so unless the
enforcement of the civil liability by separate actions has been reserved
or waived.17

Alexander as the victim in frustrated homicide suffered moral injuries

because the offender committed violence that nearly took away the
victim’s life. “Moral damages include physical suffering, mental
anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded
feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury. Though
incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages may be
recovered if they are the proximate result of the defendant's wrongful
act for omission.”18 Indeed, Article 2219, (1), of the Civil Code
expressly recognizes the right of the victim in crimes resulting in
physical injuries.19 Towards that end, the Court, upon its appreciation
of the records, decrees that P30,000.00 is a reasonable award of moral
damages.20 In addition, AAA was entitled to recover civil indemnity of
P30,000.00.21 Both of these awards did not require allegation and
proof.

In addition, the amounts awarded as civil liability of the petitioner

shall earn interest of 6% per annum reckoned from the finality of this
decision until full payment by the accused.

WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on

September 27, 2006 finding petitioner Alfredo De Guzman, Jr. GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of FRUSTRATED HOMICIDE, and SENTENCES
him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of four years of prision
correccional, as the minimum, to eight years and one day of prision
mayor, as the maximum; ORDERS the petitioner to pay to Alexander
Flojo civil indemnity of P30,000.00; moral damages of P30,000.00; and
compensatory damages of P14,170.35, plus interest of 6% per annum
on all such awards from the finality of this decision until full payment;
and DIRECTS the petitioner to pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.
LIANG VS PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

LIANG VS PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES GR no. 125865 January 28, 2000

Petitioner: Jeffrey Liang

Respondent: People of the Philippines

FACTS:

Petitioner is an economist working with the Asian Development Bank

(ADB). Sometime in 1994, for allegedly uttering defamatory words
against fellow ADB worker Joyce Cabal, he was charged before the
MeTC of Mandaluyong City with two counts of oral defamation.
Petitioner was arrested by virtue of a warrant issued by the MeTC.
After fixing petitioner’s bail, the MeTC released him to the custody of
the Security Officer of ADB. The next day, the MeTC judge received an
“office of protocol” from the DFA stating that petitioner is covered by
immunity from legal process under section 45 of the Agreement
between the ADB and the Philippine Government regarding the
Headquarters of the ADB in the country. Based on the said protocol
communication that petitioner is immune from suit, the MeTC judge
without notice to the prosecution dismissed the criminal cases. The
latter filed a motion for reconsideration which was opposed by the
DFA. When its motion was denied, the prosecution filed a petition for
certiorari and mandamus with the RTC of Pasig City which set aside
the MeTC rulings and ordered the latter court to enforce the warrant
of arrest it earlier issued. After the motion for reconsideration was
denied, the petitioner elevated the case to the SC via a petition for
review arguing that he is covered by immunity under the Agreement
and that no preliminary investigation was held before the criminal
case.

ISSUES:

(1) Whether or not the petitioner’s case is covered with immunity

from legal process with regard to Section 45 of the Agreement
between the ADB and the Philippine Gov’t.

(2) Whether or not the conduct of preliminary investigation was

imperative.

HELD:

(1) NO. The petitioner’s case is not covered by the immunity. Courts
cannot blindly adhere to the communication from the DFA that the
petitioner is covered by any immunity. It has no binding effect in
courts. The court needs to protect the right to due process not only of
the accused but also of the prosecution. Secondly, the immunity under
Section 45 of the Agreement is not absolute, but subject to the
exception that the acts must be done in “official capacity”. Hence,
slandering a person could not possibly be covered by the immunity
agreement because our laws do not allow the commission of a crime,
such as defamation, in the name of official duty.

(2) NO. Preliminary Investigation is not a matter of right in cases

cognizable by the MeTC such as this case. Being purely a statutory
right, preliminary investigation may be invoked only when specifically
granted by law. The rule on criminal procedure is clear that no
preliminary investigation is required in cases falling within the
jurisdiction of the MeTC.

Hence, SC denied the petition.

ORIEL MAGNO, petitioner,

vs.

HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

respondents.

PARAS, J.:

This is an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of

Court, from the decision* of the respondent Court of Appeals which
affirmed in toto the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City, Branch 104 finding the accused petitioner, guilty of violations of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, in Criminal Cases Q-35693 to 35696 before
they were elevated on appeal to the respondent appellate Court
under CA-G.R. CR No. 04889.

The antecedent facts and circumstances of the four (4) counts of the
offense charged, have been clearly illustrated, in the Comment of the
Office of the Solicitor General as official counsel for the public
respondent, thus:

Petitioner was in the process of putting up a car repair shop sometime

in April 1983, but a did not have complete equipment that could make
his venture workable. He also had another problem, and that while he
was going into this entrepreneurship, he lacked funds with which to
purchase the necessary equipment to make such business operational.
Thus, petitioner, representing Ultra Sources International Corporation,
approached Corazon Teng, (private complainant) Vice President of
Mancor Industries (hereinafter referred to as Mancor) for his needed
car repair service equipment of which Mancor was a distributor,
(Rollo, pp. 40-41)

Having been approached by petitioner on his predicament, who fully

bared that he had no sufficient funds to buy the equipment needed,
the former (Corazon Teng) referred Magno to LS Finance and
Management Corporation (LB Finance for brevity) advising its Vice-
President, Joey Gomez, that Mancor was willing and able to supply the
pieces of equipment needed if LS Finance could accommodate
petitioner and provide him credit facilities. (Ibid., P. 41)

The arrangement went through on condition that petitioner has to put

up a warranty deposit equivalent to thirty per centum (30%) of the
total value of the pieces of equipment to be purchased, amounting to
P29,790.00. Since petitioner could not come up with such amount, he
requested Joey Gomez on a personal level to look for a third party
who could lend him the equivalent amount of the warranty deposit,
however, unknown to petitioner, it was Corazon Teng who advanced
the deposit in question, on condition that the same would be paid as a
short term loan at 3% interest (Ibid., P. 41)

The specific provision in the Leasing Agreement, reads:

1.1. WARRANTY DEPOSIT — Before or upon delivery of each item of

Equipment, the Lessee shall deposit with the Lessor such sum or sums
specified in Schedule A to serve as security for the faithful
performance of its obligations.
This deposit shall be refunded to the Lessee upon the satisfactory
completion of the entire period of Lease, subject to the conditions of
clause 1.12 of this Article. (Ibid., p. 17)

As part of the arrangement, petitioner and LS Finance entered into a

leasing agreement whereby LS Finance would lease the garage
equipments and petitioner would pay the corresponding rent with the
option to buy the same. After the documentation was completed, the
equipment were delivered to petitioner who in turn issued a
postdated check and gave it to Joey Gomez who, unknown to the
petitioner, delivered the same to Corazon Teng. When the check
matured, Petitioner requested through Joey Gomez not to deposit the
check as he (Magno) was no longer banking with Pacific Bank.

To replace the first check issued, petitioner issued another set of six
(6) postdated checks. Two (2) checks dated July 29, 1983 were
deposited and cleared while the four (4) others, which were the
subject of the four counts of the aforestated charges subject of the
petition, were held momentarily by Corazon Teng, on the request of
Magno as they were not covered with sufficient funds. These checks
were a) Piso Bank Check Nos. 006858, dated August 15, 1983, 006859
dated August 28, 1983 and 006860 dated September 15, 1983, all in
the amount of P5,038.43 and No. 006861 dated September 28, 1983,
in the amount of P10,076.87. (Ibid., pp. 42 & 43).

Subsequently, petitioner could not pay LS Finance the monthly rentals,

thus it pulled out the garage equipments. It was then on this occasion
that petitioner became aware that Corazon Teng was the one who
advanced the warranty deposit. Petitioner with his wife went to see
Corazon Teng and promised to pay the latter but the payment never
came and when the four (4) checks were deposited they were
returned for the reason "account closed." (Ibid., p. 43)

After joint trial before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch
104, the accused-petitioner was convicted for violations of BP Blg. 22
on the four (4) cases, as follows:

. . . finding the accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of

the offense of violations of B.P. Blg. 22 and sentencing the accused to
imprisonment for one year in each Criminal Case Nos. Q-35693, Q-
35695 and Q-35696 and to pay to complainant the respective amounts
reflected in subject checks. (Ibid., pp. 25, 27)

Reviewing the above and the affirmation of the above-stated decision

of the court a quo, this Court is intrigued about the outcome of the
checks subject of the cases which were intended by the parties, the
petitioner on the one hand and the private complainant on the other,
to cover the "warranty deposit" equivalent to the 30% requirement of
the financing company. Corazon Teng is one of the officers of Mancor,
the supplier of the equipment subject of the Leasing Agreement
subject of the high financing scheme undertaken by the petitioner as
lessee of the repair service equipment, which was arranged at the
instance of Mrs. Teng from the very beginning of the transaction.

By the nature of the "warranty deposit" amounting to P29,790.00

corresponding to 30% of the "purchase/lease" value of the
equipments subject of the transaction, it is obvious that the "cash out"
made by Mrs. Teng was not used by petitioner who was just paying
rentals for the equipment. It would have been different if petitioner
opted to purchase the pieces of equipment on or about the
termination of the lease-purchase agreement in which case he had to
pay the additional amount of the warranty deposit which should have
formed part of the purchase price. As the transaction did not ripen
into a purchase, but remained a lease with rentals being paid for the
loaned equipment, which were pulled out by the Lessor (Mancor)
when the petitioner failed to continue paying possibly due to
economic constraints or business failure, then it is lawful and just that
the warranty deposit should not be charged against the petitioner.

To charge the petitioner for the refund of a "warranty deposit" which

he did not withdraw as it was not his own account, it having remained
with LS Finance, is to even make him pay an unjust "debt", to say the
least, since petitioner did not receive the amount in question. All the
while, said amount was in the safekeeping of the financing company,
which is managed, supervised and operated by the corporation
officials and employees of LS Finance. Petitioner did not even know
that the checks he issued were turned over by Joey Gomez to Mrs.
Teng, whose operation was kept from his knowledge on her
instruction. This fact alone evoke suspicion that the transaction is
irregular and immoral per se, hence, she specifically requested Gomez
not to divulge the source of the "warranty deposit".

It is intriguing to realize that Mrs. Teng did not want the petitioner to
know that it was she who "accommodated" petitioner's request for
Joey Gomez, to source out the needed funds for the "warranty
deposit". Thus it unfolds the kind of transaction that is shrouded with
mystery, gimmickry and doubtful legality. It is in simple language, a
scheme whereby Mrs. Teng as the supplier of the equipment in the
name of her corporation, Mancor, would be able to "sell or lease" its
goods as in this case, and at the same time, privately financing those
who desperately need petty accommodations as this one. This modus
operandi has in so many instances victimized unsuspecting
businessmen, who likewise need protection from the law, by availing
of the deceptively called "warranty deposit" not realizing that they
also fall prey to leasing equipment under the guise of a lease-purchase
agreement when it is a scheme designed to skim off business clients.

This maneuvering has serious implications especially with respect to

the threat of the penal sanction of the law in issue, as in this case.
And, with a willing court system to apply the full harshness of the
special law in question, using the "mala prohibitia" doctrine, the noble
objective of the law is tainted with materialism and opportunism in
the highest, degree.

This angle is bolstered by the fact that since the petitioner or lessee
referred to above in the lease agreement knew that the amount of
P29,790.00 subject of the cases, were mere accommodation-
arrangements with somebody thru Joey Gomez, petitioner did not
even attempt to secure the refund of said amount from LS Finance,
notwithstanding the agreement provision to the contrary. To argue
that after the termination of the lease agreement, the warranty
deposit should be refundable in full to Mrs. Teng by petitioner when
he did not cash out the "warranty deposit" for his official or personal
use, is to stretch the nicety of the alleged law (B.P. No, 22) violated.

For all intents and purposes, the law was devised to safeguard the
interest of the banking system and the legitimate public checking
account user. It did not intend to shelter or favor nor encourage users
of the system to enrich themselves through manipulations and
circumvention of the noble purpose and objective of the law. Least
should it be used also as a means of jeopardizing honest-to-goodness
transactions with some color of "get-rich" scheme to the prejudice of
well-meaning businessmen who are the pillars of society.
Under the utilitarian theory, the "protective theory" in criminal law,
"affirms that the primary function of punishment is the protective (sic)
of society against actual and potential wrongdoers." It is not clear
whether petitioner could be considered as having actually committed
the wrong sought to be punished in the offense charged, but on the
other hand, it can be safely said that the actuations of Mrs. Carolina
Teng amount to that of potential wrongdoers whose operations
should also be clipped at some point in time in order that the unwary
public will not be failing prey to such a vicious transaction (Aquino,
The Revised Penal Code, 1987 Edition, Vol. I, P. 11)

Corollary to the above view, is the application of the theory that

"criminal law is founded upon that moral disapprobation . . . of actions
which are immoral, i.e., which are detrimental (or dangerous) to those
conditions upon which depend the existence and progress of human
society. This disappropriation is inevitable to the extent that morality
is generally founded and built upon a certain concurrence in the moral
opinions of all. . . . That which we call punishment is only an external
means of emphasizing moral disapprobation the method of
punishment is in reality the amount of punishment," (Ibid., P. 11,
citing People v. Roldan Zaballero, CA 54 O.G. 6904, Note also Justice
Pablo's view in People v. Piosca and Peremne, 86 Phil. 31).

Thus, it behooves upon a court of law that in applying the punishment

imposed upon the accused, the objective of retribution of a wronged
society, should be directed against the "actual and potential
wrongdoers." In the instant case, there is no doubt that petitioner's
four (4) checks were used to collateralize an accommodation, and not
to cover the receipt of an actual "account or credit for value" as this
was absent, and therefore petitioner should not be punished for mere
issuance of the checks in question. Following the aforecited theory, in
petitioner's stead the "potential wrongdoer", whose operation could
be a menace to society, should not be glorified by convicting the
petitioner.

While in case of doubt, the case should have been resolved in favor of
the accused, however, by the open admission of the appellate court
below, oven when the ultimate beneficiary of the "warranty deposit"
is of doubtful certainty, the accused was convicted, as shown below:

Nor do We see any merit in appellant's claim that the obligation of the
accused to complainant had been extinguished by the termination of
the leasing agreement — by the terms of which the warranty deposit
advanced by complainant was refundable to the accused as lessee —
and that as the lessor L.S. Finance neither made any liquidation of said
amount nor returned the same to the accused, it may he assumed that
the amount was already returned to the complainant. For these
allegations, even if true, do not change the fact, admitted by appellant
and established by the evidence, that the four checks were originally
issued on account or for value. And as We have already observed, in
order that there may be a conviction under the from paragraph of
Section 2 of B.P. Blg 22 — with respect to the element of said offense
that the check should have been made and issued on account or for
value — it is sufficient, all the other elements of the offense being
present, that the check must have been drawn and issued in payment
of an obligation.

Moreover, even granting, arguendo, that the extinguishment, after the

issuance of the checks, of the obligation in consideration of which the
checks were issued, would have resulted in placing the case at bar
beyond the purview of the prohibition in Section 1 of BP Blg. 22, there
is no satisfactory proof that there was such an extinguishment in the
present case. Appellee aptly points out that appellant had not
adduced any direct evidence to prove that the amount advanced by
the complainant to cover the warranty deposit must already have
been returned to her. (Rollo, p. 30)

It is indubitable that the respondent Court of Appeals even

disregarded the cardinal rule that the accused is presumed innocent
until proven guilty beyond reasonable doubt. On the contrary, the
same court even expected the petitioner-appellant to adduce
evidence to show that he was not guilty of the crime charged. But how
can be produce documents showing that the warranty deposit has
already been taken back by Mrs. Teng when she is an officer of
Mancor which has interest in the transaction, besides being personally
interested in the profit of her side-line. Thus, even if she may have
gotten back the value of the accommodation, she would still pursue
collecting from the petitioner since she had in her possession the
checks that "bounced".

That the court a quo merely relied on the law, without looking into the
real nature of the warranty deposit is evident from the following
pronouncement:

And the trail court concluded that there is no question that the
accused violated BP Blg. 22, which is a special statutory law, violations
of which are mala prohibita. The court relied on the rule that in cases
of mala prohibita, the only inquiry is whether or not the law had been
violated, proof of criminal intent not being necessary for the
conviction of the accused, the acts being prohibited for reasons of
public policy and the defenses of good faith and absence of criminal
intent being unavailing in prosecutions for said offenses." (Ibid., p. 26)
The crux of the matter rests upon the reason for the drawing of the
postdated checks by the petitioner, i.e., whether they were drawn or
issued "to apply on account or for value", as required under Section 1
of B.P. Blg, 22. When viewed against the following definitions of the
catch-terms "warranty" and "deposit", for which the postdated checks
were issued or drawn, all the more, the alleged crime could not have
been committed by petitioner:

a) Warranty — A promise that a proposition of fact is true. A

promise that certain facts are truly as they are represented to be and
that they will remain so: . . . (Black's Law Dictionary, Fifth Edition,
(1979) p. 1423)

A cross-reference to the following term shows:

Fitness for Particular Purpose: —

Where the seller at the time of contracting has reason to know any
particular purpose for which the goods are required and that the
buyer is relying on the seller's skill or judgment to select or furnish
suitable goods, there is, unless excluded or modified, an implied
warranty that the goods shall be fit for such purpose, (Ibid., p. 573)

b) Deposit: — Money lodged with a person as an earnest or

security for the performance of some contract, to be forfeited if the
depositor fails in his undertaking. It may be deemed to be part
payment and to that extent may constitute the purchaser the actual
owner of the estate.
To commit to custody, or to lay down; to place; to put. To lodge for
safe- keeping or as a pledge to intrust to the care of another.

The act of placing money in the custody of a bank or banker, for safety
or convenience, to be withdrawn at the will of the depositor or under
rules and regulations agreed on. Also, the money so deposited, or the
credit which the depositor receives for it. Deposit, according to its
commonly accepted and generally understood among bankers and by
the public, includes not only deposits payable on demand and for
which certificates, whether interest-bearing or not, may be issued,
payable on demand, or on certain notice or at a fixed future time.
(Ibid., pp. 394-395)

Furthermore, the element of "knowing at the time of issue that he

does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for
the payment of such check in full upon its presentment, which check is
subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of
funds or credit or would have been dishonored for the same reason . .
. is inversely applied in this case. From the very beginning, petitioner
never hid the fact that he did not have the funds with which to put up
the warranty deposit and as a matter of fact, he openly intimated this
to the vital conduit of the transaction, Joey Gomez, to whom
petitioner was introduced by Mrs. Teng. It would have been different
if this predicament was not communicated to all the parties he dealt
with regarding the lease agreement the financing of which was
covered by L.S. Finance Management.

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is REVERSED and the accused-

petitioner is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime charged.
JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA, petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (Third
Division) and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

DECISION

BELLOSILLO, J.:

JOHN STUART MILL, in his essay On Liberty, unleashes the full fury of
his pen in defense of the rights of the individual from the vast powers
of the State and the inroads of societal pressure. But even as he draws
a sacrosanct line demarcating the limits on individuality beyond which
the State cannot tread - asserting that "individual spontaneity" must
be allowed to flourish with very little regard to social interference - he
veritably acknowledges that the exercise of rights and liberties is
imbued with a civic obligation, which society is justified in enforcing at
all cost, against those who would endeavor to withhold fulfillment.
Thus he says -

The sole end for which mankind is warranted, individually or

collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their
number, is self-protection. The only purpose for which power can be
rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against
his will, is to prevent harm to others.

Parallel to individual liberty is the natural and illimitable right of the

State to self-preservation. With the end of maintaining the integrity
and cohesiveness of the body politic, it behooves the State to
formulate a system of laws that would compel obeisance to its
collective wisdom and inflict punishment for non-observance.
The movement from Mill's individual liberalism to unsystematic
collectivism wrought changes in the social order, carrying with it a new
formulation of fundamental rights and duties more attuned to the
imperatives of contemporary socio-political ideologies. In the process,
the web of rights and State impositions became tangled and obscured,
enmeshed in threads of multiple shades and colors, the skein irregular
and broken. Antagonism, often outright collision, between the law as
the expression of the will of the State, and the zealous attempts by its
members to preserve their individuality and dignity, inevitably
followed. It is when individual rights are pitted against State authority
that judicial conscience is put to its severest test.

Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada, the highest-ranking official to be

prosecuted under RA 7080 (An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime
of Plunder),[1] as amended by RA 7659,[2] wishes to impress upon us
that the assailed law is so defectively fashioned that it crosses that
thin but distinct line which divides the valid from the constitutionally
infirm. He therefore makes a stringent call for this Court to subject the
Plunder Law to the crucible of constitutionality mainly because,
according to him, (a) it suffers from the vice of vagueness; (b) it
dispenses with the "reasonable doubt" standard in criminal
prosecutions; and, (c) it abolishes the element of mens rea in crimes
already punishable under The Revised Penal Code, all of which are
purportedly clear violations of the fundamental rights of the accused
to due process and to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him.

Specifically, the provisions of the Plunder Law claimed by petitioner to

have transgressed constitutional boundaries are Secs. 1, par. (d), 2 and
4 which are reproduced hereunder:
Section 1. x x x x (d) "Ill-gotten wealth" means any asset, property,
business, enterprise or material possession of any person within the
purview of Section Two (2) hereof, acquired by him directly or
indirectly through dummies, nominees, agents, subordinates and/or
business associates by any combination or series of the following
means or similar schemes:

(1) Through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of

public funds or raids on the public treasury;

(2) By receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift, share,

percentage, kickbacks or any other form of pecuniary benefit from any
person and/or entity in connection with any government contract or
project or by reason of the office or position of the public office
concerned;

(3) By the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets

belonging to the National Government or any of its subdivisions,
agencies or instrumentalities, or government owned or controlled
corporations and their subsidiaries;

(4) By obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any shares

of stock, equity or any other form of interest or participation including
the promise of future employment in any business enterprise or
undertaking;
(5) By establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or
other combinations and/or implementation of decrees and orders
intended to benefit particular persons or special interests; or

(6) By taking advantage of official position, authority, relationship,

connection or influence to unjustly enrich himself or themselves at the
expense and to the damage and prejudice of the Filipino people and
the Republic of the Philippines.

Section 2. Definition of the Crime of Plunder, Penalties. - Any public

officer who, by himself or in connivance with members of his family,
relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates,
subordinates or other persons, amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-
gotten wealth through a combination or series of overt or criminal
acts as described in Section 1 (d) hereof, in the aggregate amount or
total value of at least fifty million pesos (P50,000,000.00) shall be
guilty of the crime of plunder and shall be punished by reclusion
perpetua to death. Any person who participated with the said public
officer in the commission of an offense contributing to the crime of
plunder shall likewise be punished for such offense. In the imposition
of penalties, the degree of participation and the attendance of
mitigating and extenuating circumstances as provided by the Revised
Penal Code shall be considered by the court. The court shall declare
any and all ill-gotten wealth and their interests and other incomes and
assets including the properties and shares of stocks derived from the
deposit or investment thereof forfeited in favor of the State
(underscoring supplied).

Section 4. Rule of Evidence. - For purposes of establishing the crime of

plunder, it shall not be necessary to prove each and every criminal act
done by the accused in furtherance of the scheme or conspiracy to
amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth, it being sufficient to
establish beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or criminal acts
indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy (underscoring
supplied).

On 4 April 2001 the Office of the Ombudsman filed before the

Sandiganbayan eight (8) separate Informations, docketed as: (a) Crim.
Case No. 26558, for violation of RA 7080, as amended by RA 7659; (b)
Crim. Cases Nos. 26559 to 26562, inclusive, for violation of Secs. 3,
par. (a), 3, par. (a), 3, par. (e) and 3, par. (e), of RA 3019 (Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act), respectively; (c) Crim. Case No. 26563, for
violation of Sec. 7, par. (d), of RA 6713 (The Code of Conduct and
Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees); (d) Crim. Case
No. 26564, for Perjury (Art. 183 of The Revised Penal Code); and, (e)
Crim. Case No. 26565, for Illegal Use Of An Alias (CA No. 142, as
amended by RA 6085).

On 11 April 2001 petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion for the remand

of the case to the Ombudsman for preliminary investigation with
respect to specification "d" of the charges in the Information in Crim.
Case No. 26558; and, for reconsideration/reinvestigation of the
offenses under specifications "a," "b," and "c" to give the accused an
opportunity to file counter-affidavits and other documents necessary
to prove lack of probable cause. Noticeably, the grounds raised were
only lack of preliminary investigation, reconsideration/reinvestigation
of offenses, and opportunity to prove lack of probable cause. The
purported ambiguity of the charges and the vagueness of the law
under which they are charged were never raised in that Omnibus
Motion thus indicating the explicitness and comprehensibility of the
Plunder Law.
On 25 April 2001 the Sandiganbayan, Third Division, issued a
Resolution in Crim. Case No. 26558 finding that "a probable cause for
the offense of PLUNDER exists to justify the issuance of warrants for
the arrest of the accused." On 25 June 2001 petitioner's motion for
reconsideration was denied by the Sandiganbayan.

On 14 June 2001 petitioner moved to quash the Information in Crim.

Case No. 26558 on the ground that the facts alleged therein did not
constitute an indictable offense since the law on which it was based
was unconstitutional for vagueness, and that the Amended
Information for Plunder charged more than one (1) offense. On 21
June 2001 the Government filed its Opposition to the Motion to
Quash, and five (5) days later or on 26 June 2001 petitioner submitted
his Reply to the Opposition. On 9 July 2001 the Sandiganbayan denied
petitioner's Motion to Quash.

As concisely delineated by this Court during the oral arguments on 18

September 2001, the issues for resolution in the instant petition for
certiorari are: (a) The Plunder Law is unconstitutional for being vague;
(b) The Plunder Law requires less evidence for proving the predicate
crimes of plunder and therefore violates the rights of the accused to
due process; and, (c) Whether Plunder as defined in RA 7080 is a
malum prohibitum, and if so, whether it is within the power of
Congress to so classify it.

Preliminarily, the whole gamut of legal concepts pertaining to the

validity of legislation is predicated on the basic principle that a
legislative measure is presumed to be in harmony with the
Constitution.[3] Courts invariably train their sights on this fundamental
rule whenever a legislative act is under a constitutional attack, for it is
the postulate of constitutional adjudication. This strong predilection
for constitutionality takes its bearings on the idea that it is forbidden
for one branch of the government to encroach upon the duties and
powers of another. Thus it has been said that the presumption is
based on the deference the judicial branch accords to its coordinate
branch - the legislature.

If there is any reasonable basis upon which the legislation may firmly
rest, the courts must assume that the legislature is ever conscious of
the borders and edges of its plenary powers, and has passed the law
with full knowledge of the facts and for the purpose of promoting
what is right and advancing the welfare of the majority. Hence in
determining whether the acts of the legislature are in tune with the
fundamental law, courts should proceed with judicial restraint and act
with caution and forbearance. Every intendment of the law must be
adjudged by the courts in favor of its constitutionality, invalidity being
a measure of last resort. In construing therefore the provisions of a
statute, courts must first ascertain whether an interpretation is fairly
possible to sidestep the question of constitutionality.

In La Union Credit Cooperative, Inc. v. Yaranon[4] we held that as long

as there is some basis for the decision of the court, the
constitutionality of the challenged law will not be touched and the
case will be decided on other available grounds. Yet the force of the
presumption is not sufficient to catapult a fundamentally deficient law
into the safe environs of constitutionality. Of course, where the law
clearly and palpably transgresses the hallowed domain of the organic
law, it must be struck down on sight lest the positive commands of the
fundamental law be unduly eroded.

Verily, the onerous task of rebutting the presumption weighs heavily

on the party challenging the validity of the statute. He must
demonstrate beyond any tinge of doubt that there is indeed an
infringement of the constitution, for absent such a showing, there can
be no finding of unconstitutionality. A doubt, even if well-founded, will
hardly suffice. As tersely put by Justice Malcolm, "To doubt is to
sustain."[5] And petitioner has miserably failed in the instant case to
discharge his burden and overcome the presumption of
constitutionality of the Plunder Law.

As it is written, the Plunder Law contains ascertainable standards and

well-defined parameters which would enable the accused to
determine the nature of his violation. Section 2 is sufficiently explicit
in its description of the acts, conduct and conditions required or
forbidden, and prescribes the elements of the crime with reasonable
certainty and particularity. Thus -

1. That the offender is a public officer who acts by himself or in

connivance with members of his family, relatives by affinity or
consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other persons;

2. That he amassed, accumulated or acquired ill-gotten wealth

through a combination or series of the following overt or criminal acts:
(a) through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of
public funds or raids on the public treasury; (b) by receiving, directly or
indirectly, any commission, gift, share, percentage, kickback or any
other form of pecuniary benefits from any person and/or entity in
connection with any government contract or project or by reason of
the office or position of the public officer; (c) by the illegal or
fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets belonging to the
National Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies or
instrumentalities of Government owned or controlled corporations or
their subsidiaries; (d) by obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or
indirectly any shares of stock, equity or any other form of interest or
participation including the promise of future employment in any
business enterprise or undertaking; (e) by establishing agricultural,
industrial or commercial monopolies or other combinations and/or
implementation of decrees and orders intended to benefit particular
persons or special interests; or (f) by taking advantage of official
position, authority, relationship, connection or influence to unjustly
enrich himself or themselves at the expense and to the damage and
prejudice of the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines;
and,

3. That the aggregate amount or total value of the ill-gotten wealth

amassed, accumulated or acquired is at least P50,000,000.00.

As long as the law affords some comprehensible guide or rule that

would inform those who are subject to it what conduct would render
them liable to its penalties, its validity will be sustained. It must
sufficiently guide the judge in its application; the counsel, in defending
one charged with its violation; and more importantly, the accused, in
identifying the realm of the proscribed conduct. Indeed, it can be
understood with little difficulty that what the assailed statute
punishes is the act of a public officer in amassing or accumulating ill-
gotten wealth of at least P50,000,000.00 through a series or
combination of acts enumerated in Sec. 1, par. (d), of the Plunder Law.

In fact, the amended Information itself closely tracks the language of

the law, indicating with reasonable certainty the various elements of
the offense which petitioner is alleged to have committed:
"The undersigned Ombudsman, Prosecutor and OIC-Director, EPIB,
Office of the Ombudsman, hereby accuses former PRESIDENT OF THE
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Joseph Ejercito Estrada, a.k.a. 'ASIONG
SALONGA' and a.k.a. 'JOSE VELARDE,' together with Jose 'Jinggoy'
Estrada, Charlie 'Atong' Ang, Edward Serapio, Yolanda T. Ricaforte,
Alma Alfaro, JOHN DOE a.k.a. Eleuterio Tan OR Eleuterio Ramos Tan or
Mr. Uy, Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia Rajas, and John DOES & Jane Does, of the
crime of Plunder, defined and penalized under R.A. No. 7080, as
amended by Sec. 12 of R.A. No. 7659, committed as follows:

That during the period from June, 1998 to January 2001, in the
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
accused Joseph Ejercito Estrada, THEN A PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC
OF THE PHILIPPINES, by himself AND/OR in CONNIVANCE/CONSPIRACY
with his co-accused, WHO ARE MEMBERS OF HIS FAMILY, RELATIVES
BY AFFINITY OR CONSANGUINITY, BUSINESS ASSOCIATES,
SUBORDINATES AND/OR OTHER PERSONS, BY TAKING UNDUE
ADVANTAGE OF HIS OFFICIAL POSITION, AUTHORITY, RELATIONSHIP,
CONNECTION, OR INFLUENCE, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and criminally amass, accumulate and acquire BY HIMSELF, DIRECTLY
OR INDIRECTLY, ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate amount or TOTAL
VALUE of FOUR BILLION NINETY SEVEN MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED
FOUR THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY THREE PESOS AND
SEVENTEEN CENTAVOS (P4,097,804,173.17), more or less, THEREBY
UNJUSTLY ENRICHING HIMSELF OR THEMSELVES AT THE EXPENSE AND
TO THE DAMAGE OF THE FILIPINO PEOPLE AND THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, through ANY OR A combination OR A series of overt OR
criminal acts, OR SIMILAR SCHEMES OR MEANS, described as follows:

(a) by receiving OR collecting, directly or indirectly, on SEVERAL

INSTANCES, MONEY IN THE AGGREGATE AMOUNT OF FIVE HUNDRED
FORTY-FIVE MILLION PESOS (P545,000,000.00), MORE OR LESS, FROM
ILLEGAL GAMBLING IN THE FORM OF GIFT, SHARE, PERCENTAGE,
KICKBACK OR ANY FORM OF PECUNIARY BENEFIT, BY HIMSELF
AND/OR in connection with co-accused CHARLIE 'ATONG' ANG, Jose
'Jinggoy' Estrada, Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Edward Serapio, AND JOHN
DOES AND JANE DOES, in consideration OF TOLERATION OR
PROTECTION OF ILLEGAL GAMBLING;

(b) by DIVERTING, RECEIVING, misappropriating, converting OR

misusing DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, for HIS OR THEIR PERSONAL gain
and benefit, public funds in the amount of ONE HUNDRED THIRTY
MILLION PESOS (P130,000,000.00), more or less, representing a
portion of the TWO HUNDRED MILLION PESOS (P200,000,000.00)
tobacco excise tax share allocated for the province of Ilocos Sur under
R.A. No. 7171, by himself and/or in connivance with co-accused
Charlie 'Atong' Ang, Alma Alfaro, JOHN DOE a.k.a. Eleuterio Ramos Tan
or Mr. Uy, Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia Rajas, AND OTHER JOHN DOES & JANE
DOES; (italic supplied).

(c) by directing, ordering and compelling, FOR HIS PERSONAL GAIN

AND BENEFIT, the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) TO
PURCHASE 351,878,000 SHARES OF STOCKS, MORE OR LESS, and the
Social Security System (SSS), 329,855,000 SHARES OF STOCK, MORE
OR LESS, OF THE BELLE CORPORATION IN THE AMOUNT OF MORE OR
LESS ONE BILLION ONE HUNDRED TWO MILLION NINE HUNDRED SIXTY
FIVE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED SEVEN PESOS AND FIFTY CENTAVOS
(P1,102,965,607.50) AND MORE OR LESS SEVEN HUNDRED FORTY
FOUR MILLION SIX HUNDRED TWELVE THOUSAND AND FOUR
HUNDRED FIFTY PESOS (P744,612,450.00), RESPECTIVELY, OR A TOTAL
OF MORE OR LESS ONE BILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FORTY SEVEN
MILLION FIVE HUNDRED SEVENTY EIGHT THOUSAND FIFTY SEVEN
PESOS AND FIFTY CENTAVOS (P1,847,578,057.50); AND BY
COLLECTING OR RECEIVING, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, BY HIMSELF
AND/OR IN CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES,
COMMISSIONS OR PERCENTAGES BY REASON OF SAID PURCHASES OF
SHARES OF STOCK IN THE AMOUNT OF ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY NINE
MILLION SEVEN HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P189,700,000.00)
MORE OR LESS, FROM THE BELLE CORPORATION WHICH BECAME
PART OF THE DEPOSIT IN THE EQUITABLE-PCI BANK UNDER THE
ACCOUNT NAME 'JOSE VELARDE;'

(d) by unjustly enriching himself FROM COMMISSIONS, GIFTS, SHARES,

PERCENTAGES, KICKBACKS, OR ANY FORM OF PECUNIARY BENEFITS,
IN CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES, in the amount of
MORE OR LESS THREE BILLION TWO HUNDRED THIRTY THREE MILLION
ONE HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY THREE
PESOS AND SEVENTEEN CENTAVOS (P3,233,104,173.17) AND
DEPOSITING THE SAME UNDER HIS ACCOUNT NAME 'JOSE VELARDE'
AT THE EQUITABLE-PCI BANK."

We discern nothing in the foregoing that is vague or ambiguous - as

there is obviously none - that will confuse petitioner in his defense.
Although subject to proof, these factual assertions clearly show that
the elements of the crime are easily understood and provide adequate
contrast between the innocent and the prohibited acts. Upon such
unequivocal assertions, petitioner is completely informed of the
accusations against him as to enable him to prepare for an intelligent
defense.

Petitioner, however, bewails the failure of the law to provide for the
statutory definition of the terms "combination" and "series" in the key
phrase "a combination or series of overt or criminal acts" found in Sec.
1, par. (d), and Sec. 2, and the word "pattern" in Sec. 4. These
omissions, according to petitioner, render the Plunder Law
unconstitutional for being impermissibly vague and overbroad and
deny him the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, hence, violative of his fundamental right to
due process.

The rationalization seems to us to be pure sophistry. A statute is not

rendered uncertain and void merely because general terms are used
therein, or because of the employment of terms without defining
them;[6] much less do we have to define every word we use. Besides,
there is no positive constitutional or statutory command requiring the
legislature to define each and every word in an enactment. Congress is
not restricted in the form of expression of its will, and its inability to so
define the words employed in a statute will not necessarily result in
the vagueness or ambiguity of the law so long as the legislative will is
clear, or at least, can be gathered from the whole act, which is
distinctly expressed in the Plunder Law.

Moreover, it is a well-settled principle of legal hermeneutics that

words of a statute will be interpreted in their natural, plain and
ordinary acceptation and signification,[7] unless it is evident that the
legislature intended a technical or special legal meaning to those
words.[8] The intention of the lawmakers - who are, ordinarily,
untrained philologists and lexicographers - to use statutory
phraseology in such a manner is always presumed. Thus, Webster's
New Collegiate Dictionary contains the following commonly accepted
definition of the words "combination" and "series:"

Combination - the result or product of combining; the act or process of

combining. To combine is to bring into such close relationship as to
obscure individual characters.
Series - a number of things or events of the same class coming one
after another in spatial and temporal succession.

That Congress intended the words "combination" and "series" to be

understood in their popular meanings is pristinely evident from the
legislative deliberations on the bill which eventually became RA 7080
or the Plunder Law:

DELIBERATIONS OF THE BICAMERAL COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE, 7 May

1991

REP. ISIDRO: I am just intrigued again by our definition of plunder. We

say THROUGH A COMBINATION OR SERIES OF OVERT OR CRIMINAL
ACTS AS MENTIONED IN SECTION ONE HEREOF. Now when we say
combination, we actually mean to say, if there are two or more
means, we mean to say that number one and two or number one and
something else are included, how about a series of the same act? For
example, through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, will these be
included also?

REP. GARCIA: Yeah, because we say a series.

REP. ISIDRO: Series.

REP. GARCIA: Yeah, we include series.

REP. ISIDRO: But we say we begin with a combination.

REP. GARCIA: Yes.

REP. ISIDRO: When we say combination, it seems that -

REP. GARCIA: Two.

REP. ISIDRO: Not only two but we seem to mean that two of the
enumerated means not twice of one enumeration.

REP. GARCIA: No, no, not twice.

REP. ISIDRO: Not twice?

REP. GARCIA: Yes. Combination is not twice - but combination, two

acts.

REP. ISIDRO: So in other words, thats it. When we say combination, we

mean, two different acts. It cannot be a repetition of the same act.

REP. GARCIA: That be referred to series, yeah.

REP. ISIDRO: No, no. Supposing one act is repeated, so there are two.

REP. GARCIA: A series.

REP. ISIDRO: Thats not series. Its a combination. Because when we say
combination or series, we seem to say that two or more, di ba?

REP. GARCIA: Yes, this distinguishes it really from ordinary crimes.

That is why, I said, that is a very good suggestion because if it is only
one act, it may fall under ordinary crime but we have here a
combination or series of overt or criminal acts. So x x x x

REP. GARCIA: Series. One after the other eh di....

SEN. TANADA: So that would fall under the term series?

REP. GARCIA: Series, oo.

REP. ISIDRO: Now, if it is a combination, ano, two misappropriations....

REP. GARCIA: Its not... Two misappropriations will not be combination.

Series.
REP. ISIDRO: So, it is not a combination?

REP. GARCIA: Yes.

REP. ISIDRO: When you say combination, two different?

REP. GARCIA: Yes.

SEN. TANADA: Two different.

REP. ISIDRO: Two different acts.

REP. GARCIA: For example, ha...

REP. ISIDRO: Now a series, meaning, repetition...

DELIBERATIONS ON SENATE BILL NO. 733, 6 June 1989

SENATOR MACEDA: In line with our interpellations that sometimes

one or maybe even two acts may already result in such a big amount,
on line 25, would the Sponsor consider deleting the words a series of
overt or, to read, therefore: or conspiracy COMMITTED by criminal
acts such as. Remove the idea of necessitating a series. Anyway, the
criminal acts are in the plural.

SENATOR TANADA: That would mean a combination of two or more of

the acts mentioned in this.

THE PRESIDENT: Probably two or more would be....

SENATOR MACEDA: Yes, because a series implies several or many; two

or more.

SENATOR TANADA: Accepted, Mr. President x x x x

THE PRESIDENT: If there is only one, then he has to be prosecuted

under the particular crime. But when we say acts of plunder there
should be, at least, two or more.

SENATOR ROMULO: In other words, that is already covered by existing

laws, Mr. President.

Thus when the Plunder Law speaks of "combination," it is referring to

at least two (2) acts falling under different categories of enumeration
provided in Sec. 1, par. (d), e.g., raids on the public treasury in Sec. 1,
par. (d), subpar. (1), and fraudulent conveyance of assets belonging to
the National Government under Sec. 1, par. (d), subpar. (3).
On the other hand, to constitute a series" there must be two (2) or
more overt or criminal acts falling under the same category of
enumeration found in Sec. 1, par. (d), say, misappropriation,
malversation and raids on the public treasury, all of which fall under
Sec. 1, par. (d), subpar. (1). Verily, had the legislature intended a
technical or distinctive meaning for "combination" and "series," it
would have taken greater pains in specifically providing for it in the
law.

As for "pattern," we agree with the observations of the

Sandiganbayan[9] that this term is sufficiently defined in Sec. 4, in
relation to Sec. 1, par. (d), and Sec. 2 -

x x x x under Sec. 1 (d) of the law, a 'pattern' consists of at least a

combination or series of overt or criminal acts enumerated in
subsections (1) to (6) of Sec. 1 (d). Secondly, pursuant to Sec. 2 of the
law, the pattern of overt or criminal acts is directed towards a
common purpose or goal which is to enable the public officer to
amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth. And thirdly, there
must either be an 'overall unlawful scheme' or 'conspiracy' to achieve
said common goal. As commonly understood, the term 'overall
unlawful scheme' indicates a 'general plan of action or method' which
the principal accused and public officer and others conniving with him
follow to achieve the aforesaid common goal. In the alternative, if
there is no such overall scheme or where the schemes or methods
used by multiple accused vary, the overt or criminal acts must form
part of a conspiracy to attain a common goal.

Hence, it cannot plausibly be contended that the law does not give a
fair warning and sufficient notice of what it seeks to penalize. Under
the circumstances, petitioner's reliance on the "void-for-vagueness"
doctrine is manifestly misplaced. The doctrine has been formulated in
various ways, but is most commonly stated to the effect that a statute
establishing a criminal offense must define the offense with sufficient
definiteness that persons of ordinary intelligence can understand what
conduct is prohibited by the statute. It can only be invoked against
that specie of legislation that is utterly vague on its face, i.e., that
which cannot be clarified either by a saving clause or by construction.

A statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible

standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at
its meaning and differ in its application. In such instance, the statute is
repugnant to the Constitution in two (2) respects - it violates due
process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by
it, fair notice of what conduct to avoid; and, it leaves law enforcers
unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an
arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.[10] But the doctrine does
not apply as against legislations that are merely couched in imprecise
language but which nonetheless specify a standard though defectively
phrased; or to those that are apparently ambiguous yet fairly
applicable to certain types of activities. The first may be "saved" by
proper construction, while no challenge may be mounted as against
the second whenever directed against such activities.[11] With more
reason, the doctrine cannot be invoked where the assailed statute is
clear and free from ambiguity, as in this case.

The test in determining whether a criminal statute is void for

uncertainty is whether the language conveys a sufficiently definite
warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common
understanding and practice.[12] It must be stressed, however, that the
"vagueness" doctrine merely requires a reasonable degree of certainty
for the statute to be upheld - not absolute precision or mathematical
exactitude, as petitioner seems to suggest. Flexibility, rather than
meticulous specificity, is permissible as long as the metes and bounds
of the statute are clearly delineated. An act will not be held invalid
merely because it might have been more explicit in its wordings or
detailed in its provisions, especially where, because of the nature of
the act, it would be impossible to provide all the details in advance as
in all other statutes.

Moreover, we agree with, hence we adopt, the observations of Mr.

Justice Vicente V. Mendoza during the deliberations of the Court that
the allegations that the Plunder Law is vague and overbroad do not
justify a facial review of its validity -

The void-for-vagueness doctrine states that "a statute which either

forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of
common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ
as to its application, violates the first essential of due process of
law."[13] The overbreadth doctrine, on the other hand, decrees that
"a governmental purpose may not be achieved by means which sweep
unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected
freedoms."[14]

A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to one

which is overbroad because of possible "chilling effect" upon
protected speech. The theory is that "[w]hen statutes regulate or
proscribe speech and no readily apparent construction suggests itself
as a vehicle for rehabilitating the statutes in a single prosecution, the
transcendent value to all society of constitutionally protected
expression is deemed to justify allowing attacks on overly broad
statutes with no requirement that the person making the attack
demonstrate that his own conduct could not be regulated by a statute
drawn with narrow specificity."[15] The possible harm to society in
permitting some unprotected speech to go unpunished is outweighed
by the possibility that the protected speech of others may be deterred
and perceived grievances left to fester because of possible inhibitory
effects of overly broad statutes.

This rationale does not apply to penal statutes. Criminal statutes have
general in terrorem effect resulting from their very existence, and, if
facial challenge is allowed for this reason alone, the State may well be
prevented from enacting laws against socially harmful conduct. In the
area of criminal law, the law cannot take chances as in the area of free
speech.

The overbreadth and vagueness doctrines then have special

application only to free speech cases. They are inapt for testing the
validity of penal statutes. As the U.S. Supreme Court put it, in an
opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, "we have not recognized an
'overbreadth' doctrine outside the limited context of the First
Amendment."[16] In Broadrick v. Oklahoma,[17] the Court ruled that
"claims of facial overbreadth have been entertained in cases involving
statutes which, by their terms, seek to regulate only spoken words"
and, again, that "overbreadth claims, if entertained at all, have been
curtailed when invoked against ordinary criminal laws that are sought
to be applied to protected conduct." For this reason, it has been held
that "a facial challenge to a legislative act is the most difficult
challenge to mount successfully, since the challenger must establish
that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be
valid."[18] As for the vagueness doctrine, it is said that a litigant may
challenge a statute on its face only if it is vague in all its possible
applications. "A plaintiff who engages in some conduct that is clearly
proscribed cannot complain of the vagueness of the law as applied to
the conduct of others."[19]
In sum, the doctrines of strict scrutiny, overbreadth, and vagueness
are analytical tools developed for testing "on their faces" statutes in
free speech cases or, as they are called in American law, First
Amendment cases. They cannot be made to do service when what is
involved is a criminal statute. With respect to such statute, the
established rule is that "one to whom application of a statute is
constitutional will not be heard to attack the statute on the ground
that impliedly it might also be taken as applying to other persons or
other situations in which its application might be
unconstitutional."[20] As has been pointed out, "vagueness challenges
in the First Amendment context, like overbreadth challenges typically
produce facial invalidation, while statutes found vague as a matter of
due process typically are invalidated [only] 'as applied' to a particular
defendant."[21] Consequently, there is no basis for petitioner's claim
that this Court review the Anti-Plunder Law on its face and in its
entirety.

Indeed, "on its face" invalidation of statutes results in striking them

down entirely on the ground that they might be applied to parties not
before the Court whose activities are constitutionally protected.[22] It
constitutes a departure from the case and controversy requirement of
the Constitution and permits decisions to be made without concrete
factual settings and in sterile abstract contexts.[23] But, as the U.S.
Supreme Court pointed out in Younger v. Harris[24]

[T]he task of analyzing a proposed statute, pinpointing its deficiencies,

and requiring correction of these deficiencies before the statute is put
into effect, is rarely if ever an appropriate task for the judiciary. The
combination of the relative remoteness of the controversy, the impact
on the legislative process of the relief sought, and above all the
speculative and amorphous nature of the required line-by-line analysis
of detailed statutes, . . . ordinarily results in a kind of case that is
wholly unsatisfactory for deciding constitutional questions, whichever
way they might be decided.

For these reasons, "on its face" invalidation of statutes has been
described as "manifestly strong medicine," to be employed "sparingly
and only as a last resort,"[25] and is generally disfavored.[26] In
determining the constitutionality of a statute, therefore, its provisions
which are alleged to have been violated in a case must be examined in
the light of the conduct with which the defendant is charged.[27]

In light of the foregoing disquisition, it is evident that the purported

ambiguity of the Plunder Law, so tenaciously claimed and argued at
length by petitioner, is more imagined than real. Ambiguity, where
none exists, cannot be created by dissecting parts and words in the
statute to furnish support to critics who cavil at the want of scientific
precision in the law. Every provision of the law should be construed in
relation and with reference to every other part. To be sure, it will take
more than nitpicking to overturn the well-entrenched presumption of
constitutionality and validity of the Plunder Law. A fortiori, petitioner
cannot feign ignorance of what the Plunder Law is all about. Being one
of the Senators who voted for its passage, petitioner must be aware
that the law was extensively deliberated upon by the Senate and its
appropriate committees by reason of which he even registered his
affirmative vote with full knowledge of its legal implications and sound
constitutional anchorage.

The parallel case of Gallego v. Sandiganbayan[28] must be mentioned

if only to illustrate and emphasize the point that courts are loathed to
declare a statute void for uncertainty unless the law itself is so
imperfect and deficient in its details, and is susceptible of no
reasonable construction that will support and give it effect. In that
case, petitioners Gallego and Agoncillo challenged the constitutionality
of Sec. 3, par. (e), of The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act for being
vague. Petitioners posited, among others, that the term
"unwarranted" is highly imprecise and elastic with no common law
meaning or settled definition by prior judicial or administrative
precedents; that, for its vagueness, Sec. 3, par. (e), violates due
process in that it does not give fair warning or sufficient notice of what
it seeks to penalize. Petitioners further argued that the Information
charged them with three (3) distinct offenses, to wit: (a) giving of
"unwarranted" benefits through manifest partiality; (b) giving of
"unwarranted" benefits through evident bad faith; and, (c) giving of
"unwarranted" benefits through gross inexcusable negligence while in
the discharge of their official function and that their right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against them was
violated because they were left to guess which of the three (3)
offenses, if not all, they were being charged and prosecuted.

In dismissing the petition, this Court held that Sec. 3, par. (e), of The
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act does not suffer from the
constitutional defect of vagueness. The phrases "manifest partiality,"
"evident bad faith," and "gross and inexcusable negligence" merely
describe the different modes by which the offense penalized in Sec. 3,
par. (e), of the statute may be committed, and the use of all these
phrases in the same Information does not mean that the indictment
charges three (3) distinct offenses.

The word 'unwarranted' is not uncertain. It seems lacking adequate or

official support; unjustified; unauthorized (Webster, Third
International Dictionary, p. 2514); or without justification or adequate
reason (Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. US Dept. of Justice, C.D. Pa.,
405 F. Supp. 8, 12, cited in Words and Phrases, Permanent Edition,
Vol. 43-A 1978, Cumulative Annual Pocket Part, p. 19).
The assailed provisions of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act
consider a corrupt practice and make unlawful the act of the public
officer in:

x x x or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage

or preference in the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial
functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence, x x x (Section 3 [e], Rep. Act 3019, as
amended).

It is not at all difficult to comprehend that what the aforequoted penal

provisions penalize is the act of a public officer, in the discharge of his
official, administrative or judicial functions, in giving any private party
benefits, advantage or preference which is unjustified, unauthorized
or without justification or adequate reason, through manifest
partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.

In other words, this Court found that there was nothing vague or
ambiguous in the use of the term "unwarranted" in Sec. 3, par. (e), of
The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, which was understood in its
primary and general acceptation. Consequently, in that case,
petitioners' objection thereto was held inadequate to declare the
section unconstitutional.

On the second issue, petitioner advances the highly stretched theory

that Sec. 4 of the Plunder Law circumvents the immutable obligation
of the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt the predicate
acts constituting the crime of plunder when it requires only proof of a
pattern of overt or criminal acts showing unlawful scheme or
conspiracy -

SEC. 4. Rule of Evidence. - For purposes of establishing the crime of

plunder, it shall not be necessary to prove each and every criminal act
done by the accused in furtherance of the scheme or conspiracy to
amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth, it being sufficient to
establish beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or criminal acts
indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy.

The running fault in this reasoning is obvious even to the simplistic

mind. In a criminal prosecution for plunder, as in all other crimes, the
accused always has in his favor the presumption of innocence which is
guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, and unless the State succeeds in
demonstrating by proof beyond reasonable doubt that culpability lies,
the accused is entitled to an acquittal.[29] The use of the "reasonable
doubt" standard is indispensable to command the respect and
confidence of the community in the application of criminal law. It is
critical that the moral force of criminal law be not diluted by a
standard of proof that leaves people in doubt whether innocent men
are being condemned. It is also important in our free society that
every individual going about his ordinary affairs has confidence that
his government cannot adjudge him guilty of a criminal offense
without convincing a proper factfinder of his guilt with utmost
certainty. This "reasonable doubt" standard has acquired such exalted
stature in the realm of constitutional law as it gives life to the Due
Process Clause which protects the accused against conviction except
upon proof beyond reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to
constitute the crime with which he is charged.[30] The following
exchanges between Rep. Rodolfo Albano and Rep. Pablo Garcia on this
score during the deliberations in the floor of the House of
Representatives are elucidating -
DELIBERATIONS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ON RA 7080, 9
October 1990

MR. ALBANO: Now, Mr. Speaker, it is also elementary in our criminal

law that what is alleged in the information must be proven beyond
reasonable doubt. If we will prove only one act and find him guilty of
the other acts enumerated in the information, does that not work
against the right of the accused especially so if the amount committed,
say, by falsification is less than P100 million, but the totality of the
crime committed is P100 million since there is malversation, bribery,
falsification of public document, coercion, theft?

MR. GARCIA: Mr. Speaker, not everything alleged in the information

needs to be proved beyond reasonable doubt. What is required to be
proved beyond reasonable doubt is every element of the crime
charged. For example, Mr. Speaker, there is an enumeration of the
things taken by the robber in the information three pairs of pants,
pieces of jewelry. These need not be proved beyond reasonable
doubt, but these will not prevent the conviction of a crime for which
he was charged just because, say, instead of 3 pairs of diamond
earrings the prosecution proved two. Now, what is required to be
proved beyond reasonable doubt is the element of the offense.

MR. ALBANO: I am aware of that, Mr. Speaker, but considering that in

the crime of plunder the totality of the amount is very important, I feel
that such a series of overt criminal acts has to be taken singly. For
instance, in the act of bribery, he was able to accumulate only P50,000
and in the crime of extortion, he was only able to accumulate P1
million. Now, when we add the totality of the other acts as required
under this bill through the interpretation on the rule of evidence, it is
just one single act, so how can we now convict him?

MR. GARCIA: With due respect, Mr. Speaker, for purposes of proving
an essential element of the crime, there is a need to prove that
element beyond reasonable doubt. For example, one essential
element of the crime is that the amount involved is P100 million. Now,
in a series of defalcations and other acts of corruption in the
enumeration the total amount would be P110 or P120 million, but
there are certain acts that could not be proved, so, we will sum up the
amounts involved in those transactions which were proved. Now, if
the amount involved in these transactions, proved beyond reasonable
doubt, is P100 million, then there is a crime of plunder (underscoring
supplied).

It is thus plain from the foregoing that the legislature did not in any
manner refashion the standard quantum of proof in the crime of
plunder. The burden still remains with the prosecution to prove
beyond any iota of doubt every fact or element necessary to
constitute the crime.

The thesis that Sec. 4 does away with proof of each and every
component of the crime suffers from a dismal misconception of the
import of that provision. What the prosecution needs to prove beyond
reasonable doubt is only a number of acts sufficient to form a
combination or series which would constitute a pattern and involving
an amount of at least P50,000,000.00. There is no need to prove each
and every other act alleged in the Information to have been
committed by the accused in furtherance of the overall unlawful
scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten
wealth. To illustrate, supposing that the accused is charged in an
Information for plunder with having committed fifty (50) raids on the
public treasury. The prosecution need not prove all these fifty (50)
raids, it being sufficient to prove by pattern at least two (2) of the
raids beyond reasonable doubt provided only that they amounted to
at least P50,000,000.00.[31]

A reading of Sec. 2 in conjunction with Sec. 4, brings us to the logical

conclusion that "pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the
overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy" inheres in the very acts of
accumulating, acquiring or amassing hidden wealth. Stated otherwise,
such pattern arises where the prosecution is able to prove beyond
reasonable doubt the predicate acts as defined in Sec. 1, par. (d).
Pattern is merely a by-product of the proof of the predicate acts. This
conclusion is consistent with reason and common sense. There would
be no other explanation for a combination or series of

overt or criminal acts to stash P50,000,000.00 or more, than "a

scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill gotten
wealth." The prosecution is therefore not required to make a
deliberate and conscious effort to prove pattern as it necessarily
follows with the establishment of a series or combination of the
predicate acts.

Relative to petitioner's contentions on the purported defect of Sec. 4

is his submission that "pattern" is "a very important element of the
crime of plunder;" and that Sec. 4 is "two pronged, (as) it contains a
rule of evidence and a substantive element of the crime," such that
without it the accused cannot be convicted of plunder -
JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: In other words, cannot an accused be convicted
under the Plunder Law without applying Section 4 on the Rule of
Evidence if there is proof beyond reasonable doubt of the commission
of the acts complained of?

ATTY. AGABIN: In that case he can be convicted of individual crimes

enumerated in the Revised Penal Code, but not plunder.

JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: In other words, if all the elements of the crime

are proved beyond reasonable doubt without applying Section 4, can
you not have a conviction under the Plunder Law?

ATTY. AGABIN: Not a conviction for plunder, your Honor.

JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: Can you not disregard the application of Sec. 4 in

convicting an accused charged for violation of the Plunder Law?

ATTY. AGABIN: Well, your Honor, in the first place Section 4 lays down
a substantive element of the law x x x x

JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: What I said is - do we have to avail of Section 4

when there is proof beyond reasonable doubt on the acts charged
constituting plunder?

ATTY. AGABIN: Yes, your Honor, because Section 4 is two pronged, it

contains a rule of evidence and it contains a substantive element of
the crime of plunder. So, there is no way by which we can avoid
Section 4.

JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: But there is proof beyond reasonable doubt

insofar as the predicate crimes charged are concerned that you do not
have to go that far by applying Section 4?

ATTY. AGABIN: Your Honor, our thinking is that Section 4 contains a

very important element of the crime of plunder and that cannot be
avoided by the prosecution.[32]

We do not subscribe to petitioner's stand. Primarily, all the essential

elements of plunder can be culled and understood from its definition
in Sec. 2, in relation to Sec. 1, par. (d), and "pattern" is not one of
them. Moreover, the epigraph and opening clause of Sec. 4 is clear
and unequivocal:

SEC. 4. Rule of Evidence. - For purposes of establishing the crime of

plunder x x x x

It purports to do no more than prescribe a rule of procedure for the

prosecution of a criminal case for plunder. Being a purely procedural
measure, Sec. 4 does not define or establish any substantive right in
favor of the accused but only operates in furtherance of a remedy. It is
only a means to an end, an aid to substantive law. Indubitably, even
without invoking Sec. 4, a conviction for plunder may be had, for what
is crucial for the prosecution is to present sufficient evidence to
engender that moral certitude exacted by the fundamental law to
prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, even
granting for the sake of argument that Sec. 4 is flawed and vitiated for
the reasons advanced by petitioner, it may simply be severed from the
rest of the provisions without necessarily resulting in the demise of
the law; after all, the existing rules on evidence can supplant Sec. 4
more than enough. Besides, Sec. 7 of RA 7080 provides for a
separability clause -

Sec. 7. Separability of Provisions. - If any provisions of this Act or the

application thereof to any person or circumstance is held invalid, the
remaining provisions of this Act and the application of such provisions
to other persons or circumstances shall not be affected thereby.

Implicit in the foregoing section is that to avoid the whole act from
being declared invalid as a result of the nullity of some of its
provisions, assuming that to be the case although it is not really so, all
the provisions thereof should accordingly be treated independently of
each other, especially if by doing so, the objectives of the statute can
best be achieved.

As regards the third issue, again we agree with Justice Mendoza that
plunder is a malum in se which requires proof of criminal intent. Thus,
he says, in his Concurring Opinion -

x x x Precisely because the constitutive crimes are mala in se the

element of mens rea must be proven in a prosecution for plunder. It is
noteworthy that the amended information alleges that the crime of
plunder was committed "willfully, unlawfully and criminally." It thus
alleges guilty knowledge on the part of petitioner.
In support of his contention that the statute eliminates the
requirement of mens rea and that is the reason he claims the statute
is void, petitioner cites the following remarks of Senator Taada made
during the deliberation on S.B. No. 733:

SENATOR TAADA . . . And the evidence that will be required to convict

him would not be evidence for each and every individual criminal act
but only evidence sufficient to establish the conspiracy or scheme to
commit this crime of plunder.[33]

However, Senator Taada was discussing 4 as shown by the succeeding

portion of the transcript quoted by petitioner:

SENATOR ROMULO: And, Mr. President, the Gentleman feels that it is

contained in Section 4, Rule of Evidence, which, in the Gentleman's
view, would provide for a speedier and faster process of attending to
this kind of cases?

SENATOR TAADA: Yes, Mr. President . . .[34]

Senator Taada was only saying that where the charge is conspiracy to
commit plunder, the prosecution need not prove each and every
criminal act done to further the scheme or conspiracy, it being enough
if it proves beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or ciminal acts
indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy. As far as the
acts constituting the pattern are concerned, however, the elements of
the crime must be proved and the requisite mens rea must be shown.
Indeed, 2 provides that -

Any person who participated with the said public officer in the
commission of an offense contributing to the crime of plunder shall
likewise be punished for such offense. In the imposition of penalties,
the degree of participation and the attendance of mitigating and
extenuating circumstances, as provided by the Revised Penal Code,
shall be considered by the court.

The application of mitigating and extenuating circumstances in the

Revised Penal Code to prosecutions under the Anti-Plunder Law
indicates quite clearly that mens rea is an element of plunder since the
degree of responsibility of the offender is determined by his criminal
intent. It is true that 2 refers to "any person who participates with the
said public officer in the commission of an offense contributing to the
crime of plunder." There is no reason to believe, however, that it does
not apply as well to the public officer as principal in the crime. As
Justice Holmes said: "We agree to all the generalities about not
supplying criminal laws with what they omit, but there is no canon
against using common sense in construing laws as saying what they
obviously mean."[35]

Finally, any doubt as to whether the crime of plunder is a malum in se

must be deemed to have been resolved in the affirmative by the
decision of Congress in 1993 to include it among the heinous crimes
punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. Other heinous crimes are
punished with death as a straight penalty in R.A. No. 7659. Referring
to these groups of heinous crimes, this Court held in People v.
Echegaray:[36]
The evil of a crime may take various forms. There are crimes that are,
by their very nature, despicable, either because life was callously
taken or the victim is treated like an animal and utterly dehumanized
as to completely disrupt the normal course of his or her growth as a
human being . . . . Seen in this light, the capital crimes of kidnapping
and serious illegal detention for ransom resulting in the death of the
victim or the victim is raped, tortured, or subjected to dehumanizing
acts; destructive arson resulting in death; and drug offenses involving
minors or resulting in the death of the victim in the case of other
crimes; as well as murder, rape, parricide, infanticide, kidnapping and
serious illegal detention, where the victim is detained for more than
three days or serious physical injuries were inflicted on the victim or
threats to kill him were made or the victim is a minor, robbery with
homicide, rape or intentional mutilation, destructive arson, and
carnapping where the owner, driver or occupant of the carnapped
vehicle is killed or raped, which are penalized by reclusion perpetua to
death, are clearly heinous by their very nature.

There are crimes, however, in which the abomination lies in the

significance and implications of the subject criminal acts in the scheme
of the larger socio-political and economic context in which the state
finds itself to be struggling to develop and provide for its poor and
underprivileged masses. Reeling from decades of corrupt tyrannical
rule that bankrupted the government and impoverished the
population, the Philippine Government must muster the political will
to dismantle the culture of corruption, dishonesty, greed and
syndicated criminality that so deeply entrenched itself in the
structures of society and the psyche of the populace. [With the
government] terribly lacking the money to provide even the most
basic services to its people, any form of misappropriation or
misapplication of government funds translates to an actual threat to
the very existence of government, and in turn, the very survival of the
people it governs over. Viewed in this context, no less heinous are the
effects and repercussions of crimes like qualified bribery, destructive
arson resulting in death, and drug offenses involving government
officials, employees or officers, that their perpetrators must not be
allowed to cause further destruction and damage to society.

The legislative declaration in R.A. No. 7659 that plunder is a heinous

offense implies that it is a malum in se. For when the acts punished
are inherently immoral or inherently wrong, they are mala in se[37]
and it does not matter that such acts are punished in a special law,
especially since in the case of plunder the predicate crimes are mainly
mala in se. Indeed, it would be absurd to treat prosecutions for
plunder as though they are mere prosecutions for violations of the
Bouncing Check Law (B.P. Blg. 22) or of an ordinance against
jaywalking, without regard to the inherent wrongness of the acts.

To clinch, petitioner likewise assails the validity of RA 7659, the

amendatory law of RA 7080, on constitutional grounds. Suffice it to
say however that it is now too late in the day for him to resurrect this
long dead issue, the same having been eternally consigned by People
v. Echegaray[38] to the archives of jurisprudential history. The
declaration of this Court therein that RA 7659 is constitutionally valid
stands as a declaration of the State, and becomes, by necessary effect,
assimilated in the Constitution now as an integral part of it.

Our nation has been racked by scandals of corruption and obscene

profligacy of officials in high places which have shaken its very
foundation. The anatomy of graft and corruption has become more
elaborate in the corridors of time as unscrupulous people relentlessly
contrive more and more ingenious ways to bilk the coffers of the
government. Drastic and radical measures are imperative to fight the
increasingly sophisticated, extraordinarily methodical and
economically catastrophic looting of the national treasury. Such is the
Plunder Law, especially designed to disentangle those ghastly tissues
of grand-scale corruption which, if left unchecked, will spread like a
malignant tumor and ultimately consume the moral and institutional
fiber of our nation. The Plunder Law, indeed, is a living testament to
the will of the legislature to ultimately eradicate this scourge and thus
secure society against the avarice and other venalities in public office.

These are times that try men's souls. In the checkered history of this
nation, few issues of national importance can equal the amount of
interest and passion generated by petitioner's ignominious fall from
the highest office, and his eventual prosecution and trial under a
virginal statute. This continuing saga has driven a wedge of dissension
among our people that may linger for a long time. Only by responding
to the clarion call for patriotism, to rise above factionalism and
prejudices, shall we emerge triumphant in the midst of ferment.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Court holds that RA 7080 otherwise

known as the Plunder Law, as amended by RA 7659, is
CONSTITUTIONAL. Consequently, the petition to declare the law
unconstitutional is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.